



STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

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CANADA'S DEFENCE POLICY

Partial text of a statement by Prime Minister
John G. Diefenbaker to the House of Commons
on January 25, 1963.

...One thing which we agree in all parts of the House is that everything possible should be done to maintain the strength of each of the nations within the free world, economically and strategically. We are in agreement that everything possible should be done to maintain our defences, while, at the same time, we should endeavour to attain that objective which, elusive as it has been for a thousand years, has represented the hope of all mankind.

I regret that the Secretary of State for External Affairs yesterday afternoon was unable to complete his summary of the contribution which has been made by Canada towards achieving disarmament and peace. However, even without elucidation on his part, I think Canadians everywhere realize that he has raised the standard of Canada in the United Nations to an extent that has brought honour to this country....

In 1961 the amount spent by the Canadian Government in Canada was \$502.9 million and \$26.1 million outside Canada, or 95.1 per cent of the expenditures within Canada.

Lessening Influence of Communism

Internationally we live from time to time in the hope of bettering days. We also live between the hope of an assured peace and fear. We must maintain our defences. Of that there can be no question. But I think it is of interest that in the spiritual things the Western world is gaining strength among those countries which in the past have had a large or considerable Communist population. In Western Europe today the Communists are down to 60 per cent of the strength they had in the years immediately following the Second World War. One reason for that is the division which has taken place between Russia and some of her satellites and now between Russia and Communist China. Another reason is that conditions among the people economically are far better than they are behind the Iron Curtain. There were about 4 million card-carrying members of the Communist party in Western Europe after the war. That number is estimated today to be 2.4 million. Even people living in the Communist world, as they become prosperous, are losing their fanatical adherence to Communism.

Then there are the events which have taken place in the last few weeks. Mention was made of the meeting between President de Gaulle and Dr. Adenauer. The agreement signed represents a forward step that could never have been contemplated 10 years ago. It shows that, in the international field today, the word "never" should not be in our vocabulary. Indeed, I feel that more and more we should endeavour through trade and cultural exchanges to bring about an understanding of each other.

Take the situation recently in East Berlin, when the delegates booed the Chinese spokesman. Then there is the exchange of letters between the President of the United States and Chairman Khrushchov regarding nuclear testing. This is encouraging. Of course, if an agreement were secured without the adherence of the French and particularly without the adherence of Communist China, it would not be too effective. All of these things point to better relations but we must in no way let our defences down. Admissions that things may be bettering should lead in no way to diminution in the need of our maintaining our defences.

Obligations Honoured

...We shall make our decisions, and have, on the basis of Canada's security and the maintenance of our responsibilities internationally. We have made them and will continue to make them on the basis of no other consideration. I start at once by saying that any suggestion that we have repudiated any undertaking by Canada internationally is false in substance and in fact. Canada does not, has not and will not renege on her responsibilities. Let there be no doubt about that. ...

...Defence is a complex problem, a difficult one not alone for Canada but for all the countries in the free world who are having difficulty in this connection. All of them have made expenditures for weapons and the like which, before they were produced, have had to be put in the scrap heap. Somebody said, and I think this is a slogan that appear on the walls of some of the defence establishments in the United States, if it works it is obsolete. There has been a tremendous expansion in plans for defence and the media for defence. How often it has been found that before the weapons are ready for distribution they have already ceased to have any effect.

I want to point out a few general rules that we in this Government have adopted. We say we shall take adequate steps at all times to protect this country. We have taken these steps. Indeed, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs said on December 17 on his return to the House of Commons from the NATO conference in Paris, the various nations there without exception paid tribute to the degree to which Canada had carried out her responsibilities. There was some suggestion today that in the interest of collective security we should co-operate in things that, for us, would not be effective. The stand we take is this: Canada has co-operated and will co-operate, but she will not be a pawn nor be pushed around by other nations to do those things which, in the opinion of the Canadian people, are not in keeping with her sovereignty and her sovereign position.

Our general purpose has been to do our part to assure Canada's security, to work with our allies in close relationship, and at the same time press forward for disarmament, which is the only hope for peace. This is our purpose, this is our aim and our objective. Regardless of the political consequences, we will act to do those things that will carry out our responsibilities. We will fully co-operate with the countries of the Western Alliance, but with policies in co-operation with them that are made in Canada and not elsewhere. We will maintain Canadian sovereignty, regardless of the pressures, of the views, of anyone visiting our country or otherwise. We will have a policy that remains flexible so as to meet changing conditions. We will do nothing to extend the nuclear family. We will do our part to assure the continuance of the contribution of Canada to all UN forces designed to preserve peace.

Fundamental to our policy as it relates to other nations is the desire to be a useful and ever-ready agent for peace and for productive solutions, while at the same time pulling our weight. Some say you should take the advice of generals if they are eminent. This was not the view of President Eisenhower, who had occupied the highest position in the Western world as a general. He did not say this until the last speech he delivered prior to giving up the Presidency. This is what he said at that time:

"In the councils of government, we must guard against acquisitions of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defence with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together".

This has been the view of Canadian leaders, too. Sir Robert Borden, in 1917, said, "They advise but the civil authority determines.".....

I am going to deal with the question of nuclear weapons. This is a question that arouses in all of us those feelings of fear. I am going to deal with that at some length.

Nuclear Arms

Nuclear weapons have a basis, for all peoples, of power and danger far beyond anything known before. Today, the United States has a preponderance of that power, and that caused Khrushchov to realize there would be no payoff in victory for the Communists if they moved forward. This was the essence of the Cuban question and of the stand taken by the President of the United States. ...

The United States has today taken over the Herculean responsibilities that Britain carried for a hundred years, and there is resting upon the President of the United States decisions the seriousness of which affect all parts of the world.

We have been confronted with serious difficulties and problems in the defence field since 1957. One of our first acts was to continue an arrangement which our predecessors had made, which permitted United States interceptor aircraft to fly over Canada. A few weeks later we entered into a NORAD agreement to establish a single separate effective control of North American defences. Forces of the United States and Canada were organized to defend our two nations against nuclear attack and, I point out, so far as the "Bomarc" is concerned, it was simply part of the plan, and was not to defend Canada. That is not its purpose. Its purpose is to preserve the Strategic Air Command from an attack which would prevent the Strategic Air Command from striking out with all its deterrent power. We organized to defend the bases of the deterrent nuclear force which has protected us, as well as the Western world, for the past half dozen years and more.

That agreement was worked out to the mutual advantage of both countries and Canadian officers have taken a full share of responsibility and have done outstanding work in carrying it out.

The question of defensive nuclear weapons is one that must receive the attention of all the countries. We believe strongly in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons at the independent disposal of national governments. ...

In December 1957, I was one of those who attended the meeting of the NATO powers in Paris. We agreed to the establishment of stockpiles of nuclear warheads in NATO nations, to be readily available for use by nuclear forces in Europe who were then confronted with the threat of Russian nuclear weapons against them.

During 1958 the Canadian Government studied intensively the arms required by Canadian forces in modern circumstances, and we reached the decision we would provide aircraft for the purposes of NATO. At that time I made it perfectly clear, as I shall point out in a moment, that those forces would have to be equipped, in order to be fully effective, with defensive nuclear weapons if and when the need arose. That was recognized in taking the decision that was announced in September 1958, to install "Bomarc" anti-aircraft missiles in Canada.

...In 1958, when the "Bomarc" was first laid down as a plan, the great challenge to North America was believed to be bombers carrying bombs. That is what we thought. Today that is changed. More and more there is a phasing out in connection with the bomber threat as more and more inter-continental ballistic missiles are increasing in number. Those are some of the stands we have taken and I set forth the views of the Government on February 20, 1959, as quoted by the Leader of the Opposition. In accordance with that statement, we proceeded to acquire equipment, aircraft, launchers and other items necessary to enable the Canadian forces to be ready to use defensive weapons if and when that became necessary.

Strike-Reconnaissance Role

In May 1959, the Supreme Commander of NATO forces visited Ottawa and proposed to the Government that the First Canadian Air Division in Europe should undertake a strike-reconnaissance role to protect the NATO forces from the first attack on them. That we placed before the House of Commons. The Government considered the proposal, and early in July announced its decision in the House to accept this role and to equip eight squadrons of the division to discharge it. Our Ambassador informed the NATO Council of this decision.

While nothing was specified about arming the aircraft with nuclear weapons, it was realized by all that this would be desirable and that nuclear weapons should be available as and when required, under joint control, in NATO stockpiles in accordance with the general NATO decision of December 1957, to which I have referred. Similarly, but less important, plans were made in connection with short-range defensive missiles. ...

We have spent billions of dollars on defence since World War II. Much of what has been spent might be considered by some to have been wasted, but if it had not been for the defences we built up, and those associated with us, our freedom might long since have disappeared. Since the time we entered into these commitments I have referred to things which have changed

greatly. It was not a mistake to take measures to ensure the necessary security, on the basis of the information we had then, even though in the light of subsequent events some of the things that were done had been proven, as with every country, to be unnecessary.

New Defence Concept

I referred a moment ago to the tremendous strength of the United States. In December it was publicly stated that the United States had now 200 nuclear-tipped, intercontinental ballistic missiles in place and that American missiles -- these were press reports -- now include 126 "Atlas" missiles, 54 "Titans" and 20 "Minutemen". In other words, they are moving in the direction of a new concept of defensive measures. Those new concepts were the result of the meeting in Nassau, to which I will later make reference.

No one can predict the future. We build today on the basis of information that we have. We provide the weapons today according to our best lights and following collaboration among those associated in this matter of defence. New forms of deterrent are being developed. Military mistakes and changes have been made by all the countries in the Western world. A short resume will give the committee some idea of how easy it is to say what should be done now on the basis of what was done earlier in the face of other circumstances.

Britain had the "Blue Streak", a long-range missile which cost her some \$267 million. She gave it up. Recently the United States decided that the "Skybolt" would not be used. ... What they decided was that in view of the uncertainty of this missile there was no real purpose in going on with it. But on the other hand, in Nassau the United States was willing to proceed, provided Britain would put up a corresponding amount of money in order to ascertain whether or not it could be made workable. By the spring of 1960 the United States had spent over \$3 billion on various forms of projects, military weapons and the like, that had to be cancelled or ended in their production.

We had to take the same course. Some people talk about courage. Well, we took a stand in reference to the "Arrow". No one wanted to take that stand. ... As I look back on it, I think it was one of the decisions that was right. Here was an instrument beautiful in appearance, powerful, a tribute to Canadian production. But people sometimes say to me, "How would it have defended Canada?" What is the total area in which it would operate at full speed? The answer is, 325 miles out and back, in a vast country like Canada. We could not get sales for it at all and the cost would have been \$7½ million per unit. What a tremendous cost to this nation. This instrument that was otherwise beautiful, magnificent in its concept, would have contributed little, in the changing order of things, to our national defence.

Every now and then some new white hope of rocketry goes into the scrap pile. We established the "Bomarc", the two units. They are effective over an area of only a few hundred miles. They are effective only against aircraft. People talk about change. Who would have thought three years ago that today the fear would be an attack with intercontinental missiles? This programme cost Canada some \$14 million. The United States put up the major portion of the total cost. I do not want to repeat, but it is necessary to do so, that with the advent more and more into intercontinental ballistic missiles the bomber carrier is less and less the threat that it was.

Conventional Arms

So what should we do? Should we carry on with what we have done in the past, merely for the purpose of saying, "Well, we started, and, having started and having proceeded, we will continue"? Should we do this in an area where mistakes are made? I am not dealing with those mistakes at the moment; but should we continue with such programmes, in the light of changing circumstances? These were not mistakes in judgment at the time, but the failure to be able to look ahead and read the mind of Khrushchov and those associated with him in the Presidium. More and more the nuclear deterrent is becoming of such a nature that more nuclear arms will add nothing materially to our defences. Greater and greater emphasis must be placed on conventional arms and conventional forces. We in Canada took a lead in that connection. In the month of September 1961 we increased the numbers of our conventional forces. There was criticism at the time.

I was in Nassau. I formed certain ideas. I read the communique that was issued there and I come to certain conclusions based on that communique. Those conclusions are as follows, and these are the views expressed also by the United States Under-Secretary of state, George W. Ball: that nuclear war is indivisible; that there should be no further development of new nuclear power anywhere in the world; that nuclear weapons as a universal deterrent is a dangerous solution. Today an attempt is being made by the United States to have the NATO nations increase their conventional arms. The Nassau agreement seemed to accept these three principles as basic, and to carry them out both countries agreed to assign to NATO part of their existing nuclear force as the nucleus of a multilateral force.

What was the plan? The "Skybolt", they said, had not been too successful -- although it is ironical that the day after the communique the first one was successfully launched into space. The day is rapidly passing when we will have missile sites that are set, firm, on land. The new concept is the "Polaris" missile, which is delivered from a submarine. When the "Polaris" missiles are delivered to the United Kingdom as part of the multilateral force, Britain will not have her independent nuclear-deterrent power any more to the same extent, excepting to use these in a case of supra-national emergency.

Nassau Communique

...I am going to read the paragraphs in question from the communique. They illustrate in a most striking way the state of flux of the defence of the free world. The communique shows that changes are taking place, and I will read the various paragraphs that set this out:

"The President informed the Prime Minister that for this reason --"
(That was, that it was very complex, and so on)

"...and because of the availability to the United States of alternative weapons systems, he had decided to cancel plans for the production of "Skybolt" for use by the United States. Nevertheless, recognizing the importance of the "Skybolt" programme for the United Kingdom and recalling that the purpose of the offer of "Skybolt" to the United Kingdom in 1960 had been to assist in improving and extending the effective life of the British V-bombers, the President expressed his readiness to continue the development of the missile as a joint enterprise between the United States and the United Kingdom, with each country bearing equal shares of the future cost of completing development".

Then the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, while recognizing the value of this offer, decided, after full consideration, not to avail himself of it because of doubts which had been expressed about the prospects of the success of the enterprise. As an alternative, the President offered the "Hound Dog" missile; but the "Hound Dog" missile cannot be used on British aircraft because it would put the bottom of the aircraft too close to the ground, causing danger to those operating the planes.

The statement continues:

"The Prime Minister then turned to the possibility of provision of the "Polaris" missile to the United Kingdom by the United States. After careful review, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that a decision on "Polaris" must be considered in the widest context both of the future defence of the Atlantic Alliance and of the safety of the whole free world. ... The Prime Minister suggested and the President agreed, that for the immediate future a start could be made by subscribing to NATO some part of the forces already in existence. This could include allocations from United States strategic forces, from United Kingdom Bomber Command, and from tactical nuclear forces now held in Europe. Such forces would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force and targeted in accordance with NATO plans."

Finally, they came out in favour of this multilateral NATO nuclear force. Returning to the "Polaris", the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the purpose of their two governments with respect to the provision of the "Polaris" missiles must be the development of a multilateral NATO nuclear force in the closest consultation with other NATO allies. Accordingly, they agreed that the United States would make available a contribution of "Polaris" missiles on a continuing basis for British submarines and that the nuclear warheads for "Polaris" missiles should also be provided. These forces, and at least equal United States forces, would be made available for inclusion in a NATO multilateral nuclear force. At the same time, while they set up this multilateral force in embryo, the last paragraph points out that the President and the Prime Minister agreed that, in addition to having a nuclear shield, it was important to have a non-nuclear sword. For this reason, the communique concludes, they agreed on the importance of increasing the effectiveness of their conventional forces on a world-wide basis.

That is a tremendous step -- a change in the philosophy of defence; a change in the views of NATO, if accepted by the NATO partners. Certainly it represents a change in the views of two nations which play such a large part in the NATO organization. They went further, as I understand it. They concluded that the day of the bomber is phasing out. Britain wanted a striking force of its own. Britain needed a delivery system produced at the lowest cost. Hence, the "Skybolt". With the advent of the "Polaris" missile, the United States believed there was no longer need for the "Skybolt", and this was agreed to by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Who made the mistake? Are they to be condemned? No less than \$600 million was spent on the development of the "Skybolt", which was believed to be the essence of defence measures for the United Kingdom itself. I point this out because everywhere in the world, as a result of Khrushchov's changing moods, and vast improvements in technology both with respect to defensive and offensive warfare, the decisions of today are often negated tomorrow.

Illustrations of Defence Change

When we say there has been a change, let me point out this fact. Only today, in a dispatch from Washington, it is reported that President Kennedy called Livingston Merchant, a veteran diplomat, out of retirement to lead a government team which will prepare United States proposals for a nuclear force in Europe. This was announced yesterday in a statement read to the press by the President's Press Secretary. The report says that although United States and British efforts to create a nuclear striking force under NATO have run into stiff resistance from the French, Mr. Salinger ... said: "Mr. Merchant and his group will talk with French officials as well as with officials from other NATO countries." All of us know the kind of man Mr. Merchant is -- one of those dedicated servants who, in his period of office, did so much to increase the good relations between our country and the United States.

Concepts are changing. I do not intend to go now into many particulars but I ask Hon. Members who say there is no new strategy to read the article in one of the December issues of the Saturday Evening Post. The heading is "Our New Strategy -- the Alternatives to Total War", and the viewpoint given is that of Mr. McNamara, the Secretary of Defence of the United States.

Only on Wednesday, the Turkish Government is reported to have announced that "Jupiter" missiles were being removed from Turkey and "Polaris" weapons substituted. A similar announcement was made yesterday, I think, by Premier Fanfani of Italy. As far as these missiles are concerned, the reported proposal to replace the present missiles in Italy and Turkey by submarines mounted with "Polaris" missiles is an example of the rapid changes of these times. Obsolete missiles in vulnerable positions are being replaced by a relatively invulnerable weapon. ... Since they are mobile, these "Polaris" missiles can be put in position or removed as the situation requires. They can be centrally controlled by NATO or another agency. By having the weapons stationed at sea, the provocation of having them mounted on the territory of close U.S.S.R. neighbours is removed. Because they are relatively invulnerable, their effectiveness as a deterrent is all the greater.

I propose to review some of the views expressed by this Government on the question of defence and to go back over some of the various statements which have been made.

I said (Hansard, February 20, 1959, Page 1223) that, in keeping with the determination that Canada should carry out its task in a balanced, collective defence:

"In keeping with that determination, careful thought is being given to the principles which in our opinion are applicable to the acquisition and control of nuclear weapons. The Government's decisions of last autumn to acquire "Bomarc" missiles for air defence and "Lacrosse" missiles for the Canadian Army".

(One doesn't hear anything more about "Lacrosse" missiles).

"...were based on the best expert advice available on the need to strengthen Canada's air defence against the threat to this continent and on its determination to continue an effective contribution to the NATO shield.

"The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads. The Government is, therefore, examining with the United States Government questions connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads for "Bomarc" and other defensive weapons for use by the Canadian forces in Canada, and the storage of warheads in Canada. Problems connected with the arming of the Canadian Brigade in Europe with short-range nuclear weapons for NATO's defence tasks are also being studied."

It set this out in great detail. There is no concealment. There is complete revelation of what we are doing. I could read from Hansard year by year. As found at page 1223 of Hansard for 1959, I said this:

"It is our intention to provide Canadian forces with modern and efficient weapons to enable them to fulfil their respective roles. ... It is the policy of the Canadian Government not to undertake the production of nuclear weapons in Canada. ... We must reluctantly admit the need in present circumstances for nuclear weapons of a defensive character."

Then again, ... on a number of occasions I stated that there was no expectation of an early conclusion of a formal agreement. On January 18, 1960, as found at page 73 of Hansard, I said this:

"Eventually Canadian forces may require certain nuclear weapons if Canadian forces are to be kept effective."

Then again:

"Negotiations are proceeding with the United States in order that the necessary weapons can be made available for Canadian defence units if and when they are required."

That was always of the essence throughout in the stand that we took; I cannot comment in detail on these negotiations but I wish to state that arrangements for the safeguarding and security of all such weapons in Canada will be subject to Canadian approval and consent. Then again on February 9, 1960:

"If and when Canada does acquire nuclear weapons, it will be in accordance with our own national policies and with our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty."

Again on July 4, 1960, I said a similar thing. As found at Page 5653 of Hansard, I said this:

"In so far as general policy is concerned, we are always in this position. On the one hand, we are desirous of attending disarmament; on the other hand, we have to discharge our responsibility of ensuring to the maximum degree the security of the Canadian people. So far as that is concerned..."

And so on. Again, in July, I mentioned the matter, and again in August:

"...We are, therefore, going ahead with the procurement of vehicles which can use these nuclear weapons, but the decision as to the acquisition of the nuclear warheads depends on circumstances which might develop some time in the future."

Throughout we have followed that course. I do not wish to fill the record, but again on November 23, 1960, I was asked to give a report and I said I would refer the Hon. Gentleman to what was said on January 19 and February 20, both in 1959; January 18, 1960; February 9, 1960; July 4, 1960, and July 14, 1960. On November 30 I said this:

"...The position of Canada is completely unchanged. We have made it perfectly clear that, when and if nuclear weapons are required, we shall not accept them unless we have joint control."

There has been no suggestion at any time of any watering down of that stand. Then again on September 20, 1961:

"However, and I emphasize this, in each of the instruments that we have, the "Bomarc" and the "Voodoos", nuclear weapons could be used. The defensive weapons requirements of Canada and the need for the preservation of security will be the overriding consideration in the mind of this Government."

And so on throughout the entire piece. Then as well, in various speeches made outside of the House of Commons, I underlined this fact, namely that we were in a position where nuclear weapons could be secured and would be secured in the event that the circumstances at the time made such a course reasonable and necessary. I went further in that connection when I said this:

"Would you, in 1961, faced by the overwhelming power of Soviet might in East Germany close to West Berlin, with large divisions fully armed, would you place in the hands of those who guard the portals of freedom nothing but bows and arrows? They would stand against overwhelming power -- it is as simple as that."

Throughout the election campaign I followed the same course. In the two speeches I made before the United Nations I asked, as had the Secretary of State for External Affairs ... for the abolition of nuclear weapons, the end of nuclear weapons, the systematic control of missiles designed to deliver nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the designation and inspection of launching sites for missiles, the abolition of biological and chemical weapons and the outlawing of outer space for military purposes. That has been our course throughout.

During the election campaign, however, with the change in circumstances that had been taking place from the point of view of defence, I outlined the position of this party in a speech which I made in Brockville. It was not too successful, judging by the results, but I spoke there during the campaign and I said this:

"We shall not, so long as we are pursuing the ways of disarmament, allow the extension of the nuclear family into Canada ... We do not intend to allow the spread of nuclear arms beyond the nations which now have them."

Those, in short, are the views expressed, with one exception. ... On June 12, 1961, I set out in detail the arrangements that had been arrived at between Canada and the United States (regarding the arming of 60 F-101B interceptors with nuclear weapons). I think I had better read from it:

"For some time representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments have been working on an agreement relating to the defence of Canada, more particularly to air defence and to the Canada-United States production-sharing programme. The objective of such an agreement was to reflect the desire of both Governments to ensure more effective use of the productive capacities, skills and resources of each country and at the same time to demonstrate our mutual determination to improve the defensive strength of NATO and particularly of NORAD under it ...

"In consideration of the financial and other benefits which will accrue to the United States as a result of Canada's assumption of additional responsibilities under the Pine Tree agreements, Canada will be furnished with 66 F-101B interceptor aircraft and appropriate support equipment. These aircraft, title to which will be vested in Canada, will be armed with conventional weapons."

...That is the background. That is the recital of some of the stands we have taken and which are consistent throughout and which, when read in conjunction one with the other reveal the situation as we saw it. ...

Summary

To summarize our viewpoint, there is a will to peace, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs said yesterday. There is progress being made. We must maintain our defence. We shall not allow Canada to be placed in a subservient or unsovereign position. We shall follow the course that we have been following -- one that has been consistent. It has been one of calm consideration of the matters as they arise.

We know ... that the way to prevent nuclear war is to prevent it. What course should we take at this time? I emphasize what I have already stated, that we shall at all times carry out whatever our responsibilities are. I have said that strategic changes are taking place in the thinking of the Western world, and there is general recognition that the nuclear deterrent will not be strengthened by the expansion of the nuclear family. With these improvements in the international situation, this is no time for hardened decisions that cannot be altered. We must be flexible and fluid, for no one can anticipate what Khrushchov will do.

A meeting is about to take place in Ottawa of the NATO nations. They will meet here on May 21 to 23 and the very fact that they are meeting here indicates the attitude towards Canada and the feeling of the NATO nations towards her. ...

What shall our attitude be? It will not be one of recklessness, not one of making final decisions in the face of a changing world. I mentioned Nassau a moment ago and, as one examines what took place there, he realizes that we are living in a new and changing world of defence realism. ...

I have said earlier that all the nations made mistakes, \$3 billion worth of mistakes and more, up to 1960, but the fact that a mistake may have been made, or may not have been made, should not be a basis for the continuation of a policy just because to admit it would be wrong. Delivery of the

F-104G has commenced, but the strike-reconnaissance role has been placed under doubt by the recent Nassau declaration concerning nuclear arms, as well as other developments both technical and political in the defence field. It will be necessary, therefore, at this meeting in May, for Canada to give consideration to this matter and we will, in co-operation with the nations of NATO, undertake a clarification of our role in NATO defence plans and disposition.

We are united in NATO. We have never and will never consent to Canada breaking any of her pledged words or undertakings. It is at that meeting, where there will be reviewed the entire collective defence policy, that we shall secure from the other member nations their views, and on the basis of that we will be in a position to make a decision, a consistent decision, first to maintain our undertakings and secondly to execute, if that be the view, the maintenance of our collective defence. In the meantime the training of Canadian forces in the use of these weapon systems can continue.

So far as NORAD is concerned I have said at the beginning of my remarks that Canada's sovereignty must be maintained. We shall continue our negotiations. They have been going on quite forcibly for two months or more. ...

There was never any concealment of the fact. We will negotiate with the United States so that, as I said earlier, in case of need nuclear warheads will be made readily available. In other words, we will be in a position to determine finally, in the interests of Canada and our allies, the course to be followed in the light of changing circumstances in the disarmament field, which have become encouraging recently through Khrushchov's acceptance of even a minimum observation of nuclear testing. We will discuss with the nations of NATO the new concept of a nuclear force for NATO. If that concept at Nassau is carried into effect, much of our planning in the past will pass out of existence.

...It is so easy to say what should be done. Conscientiously and honestly we have tried, in the face of changing conditions, to bring about peace. We do not want to do anything at this time to rock the boat. If in the progress of disarmament it is found that we are beginning to approach that new era that all of us look forward to, the NATO nations meeting together can make that determination in agreement that is best for each and all. If, on the other hand, there is going to be set up a multilateral nuclear force, then all our planning to date, or most of it, will be of little or no consequence. I know they say, "Make decisions. Be concrete; be direct"... Recklessness was never evidence of decisiveness. We will, as a result of the fullest discussion and consideration, determine a course which I believe now means a vast alteration in all the defensive techniques that we have accepted in the last few years, and we will come back to Parliament and place before it the considered view of this Government.

...All of us should be true Canadians when facing a problem that touches the heartstrings of each and every one of us. My prayer is that we will be directed in this matter. Some may ridicule that belief on my part. I believe that the Western world has been directed by God in the last few years, or there would have been no survival. I believe that will continue. My prayer is that we shall so live as to maintain not only the integrity of Canada and its high reputation by carrying out our responsibilities, but at the same time that we will be right, that the Canadian people will be able to say that, whatever decision is made, it was made with every consideration being given to all those moral and psychological things that form one's make-up.

I would rather be right ... so that those who come after may say, "He refused to be stampeded. He refused to act on the impulse of the moment. He and his colleagues together, with the support of the Canadian Parliament, brought about a policy, in co-operation with their allies and by influence over their allies, that led to the achievement of peace."

s/c