

## STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

INFORMATION DIVISION  
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No. 53/50 DON'T LET ASIA SPLIT THE WEST

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The greatest threat at the moment to the unity of purpose and policy of the Western grand alliance against Communist imperialism and aggression lies, I think, in the Far East. It arises out of differences of viewpoint over the scope and nature of the menace of communism in Asia and the measures which should be taken to meet it. If these differences persist and deepen, they may cause serious damage to the cooperation which has developed since the war and which has expressed itself not only in a close working relationship within the United Nations, but in such agencies for collective action as NATO and ANZUS (the Australian-New Zealand-US defense pact).

Furthermore, these differences often find the United States on one side and the governments of Western Europe and the British Commonwealth of Nations on the other - a result which causes special anxiety to a Canadian, but which should give no comfort to anyone except a potential aggressor.

There is no dispute between us over the attitude we should adopt when the international Communist conspiracy expresses itself in the form of military aggression - in Korea or elsewhere in Asia. We accept the obligation of collective resistance and assistance under the Charter of the United Nations, even though the manner in which that obligation is discharged may have to vary, both as between states and between areas.

In Korea, for instance, the United States took a bold and essential lead at the United Nations in having North Korea branded as the aggressor, and has borne by far the major non-Korean share of resistance to that aggression. The losses and the tragedies of the Korean War have made a strong impact on the American heart and mind. Other countries who have since 1914 experienced more than once and in full measure the bloodshed and misery of war should remember this.

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that if some countries have sent only small contingents to Korea, those countries are still weak from the losses and devastation of World War II, far greater than anything this continent suffered; and that some of them are also involved in their own military operations against Communist aggression and banditry. Mutual understanding is essential here if the alliance is not to be poisoned.

The Korean aggression has now been checked. The fighting has stopped. An armistice has been signed. But the situation is heavy with problems, especially for those members of the United Nations who have made the Korean operation the first international police action in history.

There is, first, the complex and explosive problem of converting the armistice into a peace. Already there have been divergent views between the United States and its friends on this issue, more particularly over the composition of the peace conference. This was an honest difference which, by adequate prior consultation, could have been minimized if not removed. Instead, it was allowed to develop into - and made to look like - a major crisis. Allied diplomacy failed here; or rather it was not given a fair trial. It is to be hoped that we have learned the lesson of this episode.

There may be even more serious problems for the alliance if the armistice breaks down or is indefinitely prolonged. The United States government, understandably doubtful of the Communists' good faith, has secured allied agreement for a declaration which, it is hoped, will prevent renewed aggression. It gives a solemn warning of speedy and firm resistance if such aggression occurs, and adds that should this happen, it might be impossible to limit action to Korea itself.

This "warning declaration" was agreed to by all the other governments with forces in Korea, but it is no secret that the agreement was given, in some cases, uneasily. This uneasiness arose over fears that the armistice might be broken either by the Communists or by the government of the Republic of Korea, which has violently opposed it. There was also concern lest a situation be created in which the origins of the new aggression might be concealed. Either contingency would impose a severe strain on the alliance, not contemplated by the "warning declaration." How can we guard against these untoward developments or ensure unity of action if they occur?

In the first place, the United States should be able to count on its friends if a clear-cut and new aggression from China and North Korea were committed. On the other hand, it should be understood that such support would only be forthcoming if the United Nations had decided that a new aggression had in fact taken place. Also, the government of South Korea must be convinced that it has nothing to gain and everything to lose by sabotaging either the armistice or the Korean peace conference, if and when it takes place. Finally, it should be made quite clear that our objective in Korea is to defeat aggression, and not to impose unity on that country by force. Any doubt on this latter point would certainly make cooperation in the Far East extremely difficult if not impossible.

It is true that the unification of a free and democratic Korea by political means remains a United Nations objective. There is, however, no greater obligation on any member of the United Nations to help bring this about by military means than exists in the issue of German unification.

There are dangers, then, to our coalition in Korea. Greater dangers, however, may arise from the policy we should adopt, not merely against Communist military aggression but against communism itself, and Communist governments, in the Far East.

This problem becomes immediate and compelling in the case of Red China. Should there be recognition or exclusion, trade or no trade, co-existence or implacable hostility? The problem is even deeper and wider than China. It is concerned with differing views about the nature and meaning of Asian communism in general. Here again, however, China provides the best illustration of the danger of disunity.

Certain governments, including the United Kingdom, have recognized the Communist government in Peking. This, they emphatically claim, does not indicate any approval of communism on their part. It is merely recognition of the fact that the Peking regime is now in effective control of continental China and that it is idle to pretend otherwise. To accuse governments, because of this recognition, of "appeasement" - a word which is now becoming charged with more and more emotion and less and less meaning - does no service to the cause of cooperation by the free world in Asian matters.

It may be unwise and inexpedient in the present circumstances to give formal recognition to Communist China, but to argue that such recognition is immoral would mean, if we are to be logical, that recognition of any Communist government is immoral and should not be given, or if already given, should be withdrawn. To carry the argument farther, we should isolate ourselves completely from every Communist government and accept the inevitability of permanent conflict as long as that government survives. We should not, for instance, discuss political questions with the Chinese Communists at a Korean or any other political conference - something, incidentally, we have already agreed to do.

The same "tough" viewpoint is expressed in statements to the effect that there should be no trade of any kind with Communist China, and that if the Peking government is ever admitted to the United Nations, the United States should walk out, and for good. If these views became US policy, cooperation in Asia with other countries would be hard to achieve.

#### Red China: target for the West?

Such a stand at once poses two questions: Is the Peking regime, in fact, a firm and fixed element in the international Communist conspiracy? Or is it a movement, directed and controlled by loyal Marxist-Leninist Communists, but deriving its greatest strength from national feeling and from the passionate desire of its people to escape from poverty and starvation, exploitation and hopelessness - conditions the Cominform has so successfully exploited, especially in Asia?

The emphasis in many quarters in the United States is on the first, the extreme "Cominform" concept of Chinese communism. Opinion in certain other countries of the

coalition tends to stress the second, the national and social basis of the regime. These different approaches to the problem result in different policies, which may jeopardize cooperation in Asia.

The first approach counsels militant counter-action; impatience with any course that seems to temporize or compromise; support for any anti-Communist leader or group, regardless of whether it has - or deserves - popular support.

Specifically, it implies that our policy should be to strengthen and assist the Chinese Nationalist government on Formosa in every possible way as the one which in due course will overthrow the Peking regime. The assumption is that once the Chinese people, persecuted, oppressed and disillusioned by Communist tyranny, realize that unrest inside the country can be supported by strength from outside, they will rise and join the armies which come to their rescue.

It will, however, be difficult to work out any united policy toward China on this basis. It means, frankly, a declaration of active and fixed hostility, with all action short of general war, and even at the risk of such war, not only against Communist aggression, but also against Chinese communism.

The other, the more qualified concept, can also split the alliance apart if it is interpreted to mean that all that has happened in China is an agrarian revolution, a surge of nationalism, joined with social and economic reform and allied to Moscow mainly because of the intransigent opposition of the United States. While the Chinese masses may well be far more interested in rice than in Marx, and may acquiesce in any government which promises them land and food and shelter, it is unrealistic to the point of dangerous self-deception to ignore the fact that these stirrings, these passions, have, for the time being at least, been harnessed to violence and revolution by the forces of international communism for purposes which are reactionary, aggressive and prejudicial to peace.

To understand the meaning of Asian communism, to place it, as we should, against the background of foreign exploitation and feudal oppression, is one thing. But it does not mean that at this time we should welcome into the international community, as a state willing to abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter, a regime which has committed aggression in Korea and has yet to show that it is willing to contribute to a peaceful and democratic solution of the Korean or other Asian problems.

Unite against aggressors, not Asians!

What, then, should be done to keep the alliance strong and united as it faces the coming test provided by our different approaches to Far Eastern problems?

In the first place, the Western European nations and the members of the Commonwealth must appreciate that the American people have made great sacrifices in resisting aggression in Korea against Chinese Communist armies, and are determined that this Communist aggression, if repeated, must be defeated once and for all by whatever measures are

adequate for the purpose. To this end, we must be willing to merge our own strength with that of the United States under the United Nations, thus ensuring that these measures are genuinely collective. Otherwise, the United States may be driven to isolated action in Asia. But isolation, like peace, is indivisible. There cannot be unity of action in Western Europe and disunity in Asia.

If, however, we are to work together in this way, and if isolation is to be avoided, the other members of the alliance must have confidence in the objectives of American policy in Asia and confidence also in the methods by which those objectives can be realized.

What should be the basis of a policy which will inspire this confidence and make this cooperation firm and effective?

We must not compromise with Communist aggression. This does not mean, however, that we should assume that every anti-colonial, nationalist or revolutionary movement is Russian Communist in origin and direction, any more than we should assume that with patience and sympathy every Asian Communist leader can be turned into a Tito.

We must avoid taking up rigid and inflexible positions based on emotion rather than intelligence, on short term rather than long term considerations.

We must convince the Asian peoples that democracy can do more for the individual than Communist tyranny can ever hope to. We can do this in many ways, by constructive policies in our own countries, by plans for mutual aid, and also by removing the impression that the Western allies are, in the East, associated only with regimes and societies that do not meet the desire for change of the awakening masses.

Our policy in Asia must be more than a policy of mere opposition to communism. It must be constructive; and anti-communism should not be the only claim to our assistance.

The new Asian countries have problems of a magnitude that would stagger a Western statesman. These countries may be old in the arts of civilization and steeped in ancient culture, but as political entities they are new and are faced with the problem of building in a few years cohesive and stable national societies which will provide a good life for hundreds of millions who have known little but distress and want.

We should remember this when we tend to get impatient at what we consider to be the "neutralism" of a country like India in what is to us a desperate conflict between the forces of Communist imperialism and free democracy. The conflict may not seem so simple to people who are preoccupied with the struggle for self-government and economic progress, millions of whom live under the recurring threat of starvation and who may be pardoned for thinking that hunger and servitude are worse enemies than Marxism.

We should recognize that new forces - economic, social and national - are at work in Asia, forces that would have erupted in disturbing ways even if there had

never been a Communist revolution in Moscow. We cannot reverse these forces. We in the West ignore them at our peril.

Where communism has been able to take over these new forces, as in China, we should neither blind ourselves to the dangers of the situation by wishful thinking nor increase those dangers by rash and provocative policies. Furthermore, by associating counter-revolution - which can develop indigenously, as it has so often done before in China - with foreign intervention and foreign assistance, we may strengthen rather than weaken Communist regimes.

Finally, it is not enough to agree on basic principles of policy. We must apply them collectively. This can be done effectively only if there is close and continuous consultation, which means more than ad hoc meetings to reach last minute decisions in an atmosphere of crisis. On the one hand there must be wise, steady and patient leadership, not swayed by every gust of popular passion, and, on the other, loyal and firm support.

If we adopt and carry out these principles of policy and collective action, our grand alliance of free peoples will be able to meet the test of the difficulties that face it in Asia. We shall be able to show in peace, as we have in war, that there is a strength in the co-operation of free men that slave societies can never achieve.

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