



STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

INFORMATION DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA - CANADA

No. 52/54

REPORT TO PARLIAMENT

Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, made in the House of Commons during the debate on the Speech from the throne, December 8, 1952.

...I have been attending the seventh assembly of the United Nations and though while doing so I have been engaged in international discussions, I have been conscious of the fact during those discussions that there is a very direct connection between what we have been talking about in New York at the United Nations and matters of more immediate domestic concern and, possibly, which have been under discussion in this House. We have been discussing international questions which bear on peace, welfare and good relations between states; mutual aid between states; and all those questions have a very direct effect on domestic policies and domestic interests in this country -even on such matters as trade and taxation. Indeed, ..., it has been said that foreign policy is merely domestic policy with its hat on.

This afternoon, therefore, I propose to keep that hat on and discuss for a short time, I hope, the work of the United Nations Assembly, and, possibly, the forthcoming NATO Council meeting in Paris....

The main question before the United Nations Assembly, the main challenge to the United Nations at this session, has been Korea. Almost at the beginning of our session it was agreed, and I think it was agreed unanimously if I recollect correctly, that that question should be given priority in our discussions. It was quite right that we should do that because fighting is going on in Korea and surely it is the first responsibility of the United Nations to bring that fighting to an end if that can be done on honourable and acceptable terms. In the discussion of this question of Korea much of the debate and much of our thoughts centered around the one remaining obstacle to the achievement of such an honourable armistice in Korea -the question of prisoners of war.

In the discussion of that particular question the Communist delegations have exploited to the full the situation which they claim, without adequate evidence to back it up, has existed in the prisoner-of-war camps and more particularly the Koje Island camp.

...This question of prisoners of war, we are told even by the Communists, is the only obstacle to the completion of armistice negotiations. It is the only question that remains unsettled. In respect of it and of Korea generally ... there were four resolutions submitted to

our Assembly which dealt with this question.

One was a resolution of those members of the United Nations who had forces in Korea, participating in operations there. That resolution became known as the 21-Power Resolution. Canada was one of the sponsoring members of that resolution, which endorsed the steps that had been taken and the effort that had been made by the Unified Command in Korea and the other side for an armistice, and called on the other side to accept those proposals and to bring about an armistice.

There were two other resolutions from delegations from Mexico and Peru, which dealt with more specialized aspects of the question; and there was at the same time introduced by the Soviet Delegation a resolution which would have set up an 11-power commission representing both sides of the conflict, and which would have had authority to deal not only with the prisoners-of-war question but with Korea generally and indeed with other Asiatic questions. On the face of it, that resolution by the Soviet delegation may have seemed to be not without some aspects of reason and possibility. The 11-power commission had four Communist members but, in order to make quite certain that this 11-power commission would not be able to act, the Soviet, within a day of the introduction of this resolution, introduced an amendment to make it quite clear that that commission could act only by a two-thirds majority. A two thirds majority of eleven is seven and a quarter; that would have meant that eight members of the commission would have been required to agree in order to reach a decision. The meaning of that provision, of course, is quite obvious. It would have given the Soviet and their satellites a veto on all the actions and all the activities of the commission.

After the introduction of these four resolutions the Indian delegation, after consultation with a good many Asian and Arab delegations -and indeed other delegations-introduced a resolution which narrowed the issue before the Assembly and before the Political Committee to the prisoners-of-war question alone and left out of the resolution all that had gone on before and other aspects of the questions than that of prisoners of war. They produced a proposal which attempted to reconcile the two ideas, the one to which our side clung as right and just and the other which the Communists said was a sine qua non of any agreement on their part to a prisoners-of-war solution. Those two ideas were, on the one hand, the right to repatriation guaranteed under the Geneva Convention of 1949, and on the other the refusal to use force to drive prisoners-of-war back to Communist territories if they did not wish to go.

As to the first, although we had a great deal of discussion on the subject, I think it is quite clear, from the legal point of view, that the right of repatriation is guaranteed under the Geneva Convention in question. The right is clear, I think, and the right is unambiguous. It seems that the delegations which made that prisoners-of-war Convention -that is the Red Cross Convention in Geneva in 1949 -were at that time, quite naturally, thinking more of a future war when the problem would be forced retention rather than forced repatriation. The question of forced repatriation did not enter into their calculations at that

time to any noticeable extent. So this right of repatriation, without that particular qualification in its terms, does exist.....

On the other hand the other issue -no force to be used in connection with prisoners-of-war -involves a principle which we on our side could not and would not give up; because if we had done so, we would have violated the understanding we had and the undertaking which we gave to some of these prisoners who came over from the other side.

The Indian resolution was an effort to reconcile these two points of view in a way which should be acceptable to all men of good will on either side. It did that in terms of the resolution; and to carry out those terms and make this reconciliation effective in practice as well as in principle, it set up a Repatriation Commission to which prisoners would be immediately released as the first stage of their repatriation. That Repatriation Commission, which would have taken over the prisoners from the detaining powers, would have consisted of Czechoslovakia and Poland, two Communist states; Sweden and Switzerland, two non-Communist states; and provision was made for the appointment of an umpire who will be an important member of that Commission if it is, ever set up. If that kind of Commission could not be established, an alternative procedure for setting one up is embodied in the resolution.

We considered this resolution to be, on the part of the Indian delegation, an important and constructive move to solve this question. It was not a perfect resolution; it was not clear in all of its terms, and there were reasons for some of those ambiguities. But we felt that it was a resolution which could work and which, if it did work, would bring the fighting in Korea to an end; so we in the Canadian delegation gave it our support from the beginning.

We were then confronted by two problems. One was whether we should give this resolution priority over our own 21-Power Resolution, and we agreed to do that as did all the other sponsoring powers of the 21-Power Resolution. The other problem was to achieve the maximum support possible for this Indian resolution. To do that certain clarifications -certain changes, if you like -were required. These in their turn required long and difficult discussions and negotiations between the authors of the resolution and certain other governments who wished to see it clarified in certain respects.

At this stage, ..., if I may, I should like to pay a tribute of the honesty of purpose, the industry and the refusal to give way to discouragement of the Indian authors of this resolution who, at this time, and at the United Nations, took a responsibility which I think we must all applaud. In the press, of course, there were reports of differences. In the process of negotiating clarification between the United States delegation and between other delegations there were such differences, but they were not as fundamental or as important as might appear from reading some of the reports. There were, however, sincere differences of approach and differences of opinion about what should be clarified in this resolution in order to make it acceptable to everybody.

Eventually, those differences were overcome. Some changes were made by the Indian delegation which made the text perfectly acceptable to practically all delegations at the assembly. That process of acceptance and that process of coming together was made less difficult, I think, by the Soviet attitude toward the resolution, which was one of complete, unalterable and violent opposition to a constructive initiative by the nation putting it forward; indeed it was referred to by the leader of the Soviet delegation himself as a "rotten compromise". Their opposition was based on the fact that we should first have an automatic cease-fire declared and then armistice negotiations later. The objection to that, of course, was that, if the cease-fire took place and it was without an armistice, the prisoners would still be prisoners, the issues which centred around the prisoners-of-war would not be solved, and there was no assurance that they would be solved.

Meanwhile, from the point of view of military security, the cease-fire would have meant that one side was under a military disadvantage in comparison with the other side which had its base close at hand.

However, as I said, the Indian text was clarified; it was put to the vote a few days ago, with a result which is not usual these days in the United Nations Assembly. Fifty-four nations of the Assembly voted for it, including every Asian, Latin-American and African state, and only five members of the Assembly voted against it: the Soviet delegation and its four Communist satellites. One delegation, China, abstained. Therefore that Indian resolution has now become a resolution of the United Nations; and in my capacity as President of the Assembly, under the terms of the resolution, I have submitted it to the Foreign Minister of the Communist Government at Peking, and the Foreign Minister of the North Korean regime, together with a covering letter in which I attempted to meet some of the objections which they had previously put forward over the radio, and in other ways, and to clarify some of the points which they claimed were still doubtful. At the same time I thought it was probably not inappropriate, as President of the Assembly, to make an appeal to them to accept these proposals as the basis of an armistice and eventual peace, if they really wish to bring the war there to an end.

I do not know, of course, what the result of this transmission and appeal will be. It may mean an armistice, or it may not. I would not like to give odds on one side of the question; but whether the Communists accept this United Nations resolution or not, it surely has very great value to the United Nations and to us all even if it is turned down, because that resolution now becomes the United Nations' basis from which negotiations must now begin, if they are to be resumed. And in the future that may turn out to be a very important and very useful development because of course, this resolution, having been accepted by the United States Government, now becomes operative in respect of the Unified Command in Korea. And I suggest, ... that whatever may happen to this resolution in Peking and Pyongyang, it has been a very worth-while initiative to have taken, and a very valuable result has been achieved, since this initiative was taken by a great Asian country and supported enthusiastically by every other Asian, Arab and African state.

If this resolution is rejected, what do we do then? Well, of course there are least three courses: The United Nations can preserve and hold on in Korea along the present line, bringing about as much military success as is possible within the limits of the present strategy. It may be possible within those limits -consideration by the military authorities in the Unified Command is being given to this -to add to the number of Koreans who are defending their own country. But in respect of that it should not be forgotten ...that at the present time a 155-mile line in Korea is being defended by 15 divisions, of which I think 9 are from the Republic of Korea, 5 from the United States and 1 division is from the Commonwealth. Of this line, 60 per cent is being held now by Korean troops; 25 per cent by United States troops, and 15 per cent by other United Nations' forces. This course, following our present strategy, will require of course a steadiness and patience not only in Korea, among the soldiers, but at home; it will require military steadiness, and it will certainly require political steadiness.

The second course would be to increase military pressure, to formulate new strategy in the hope that by doing so we will bring this struggle to an end by military means. There are obvious risks in following that course. There is the risk that we might extend the war to the continent of Asia without ending the war in Korea, and that is a risk which is in all our minds, and which indeed we have discussed in this house before.

But there is a third course, to withdraw and turn Korea over to the aggressor, and that is one that will not be supported I am sure by any government, any parliament or any people, which have accepted United Nations' intervention in Korea against the attacker.

It is interesting ... to recall that the President-Elect of the United States- has returned from Korea and has already stated that there is no easy, no trick solution, no panacea for this Korean campaign, and he is quoted in the press as having said in Seoul during his visit to Korea:

"How difficult it seems to be in a war of this kind to work out a plan that would bring a positive and definite victory without possibly running grave risks of enlarging the war."

But while we may be discouraged about our lack of immediate progress in ending this campaign, with its great drain on resources and men of the United Nations, and particularly on those of the United States, and those from the Korean forces, which are bearing the brunt of the struggle and bearing it steadily and courageously, apart from that difficulty, we must not forget that we have gained also by intervention in Korea, because we have stopped aggression there, and the lesson of that action is not lost on those who would begin aggression elsewhere. I suggest ... that it is not only the course of honour, it is the course of ultimate safety not to weaken in this United Nations' operation which we have taken in Korea, while always emphasizing, taking advantage of every opportunity to emphasize, that we are ready for an honourable political solution with the Chinese Communist government.

The Indian resolution -indeed my letter to the Foreign Minister of Communist China - emphasized that fact, that once an armistice can be achieved in Korea - and there is supposed to be only one obstacle to that achievement - then we should be ready to sit down with the Chinese at a political conference to deal with Korean political problems generally. It is not only implicit, it is actually written in the terms of this United Nations' resolution.

If the Chinese Communist Government will abandon the aggression that has been going on in Korea and refrain from participating in aggression elsewhere they have nothing to fear from us on the other side, and much indeed to gain by that course.

That ... is all that I think I need to say on Korea at this time. But in concentrating on Korea, I would not wish the House to be left with the impression - as I am sure it would not be, because of its knowledge of international developments - that Korea is the only danger spot in Asia. One has only to mention Indo-China, where the situation is not propitious; Malaya, where the banditry and the fighting still goes on, though the situation is improving; Iran, where there are elements of discontent which might deteriorate into chaos, and we know who exploits chaos; and indeed in the whole of the Middle East, where there is division, disruption, social unrest and political awakening.

There were of course other important questions before the United Nations Assembly, and some of them are still before the Assembly. I heard the other day, at a plenary session of the Assembly, the leader of one of the important Asian delegations speaking in connection with a resolution which has been supported by all the Arab and all the African, but opposed by a good many of the Western powers - I heard this delegate, who is not unfriendly to the West, in deploring this division on resolutions of that kind, say that Asia and Africa are on the march, and will not be denied.

We should realize, and the realization is not always a pleasant one, that they are not invariably marching with the West as they move. That philosopher and historian, Arnold Toynbee, in a very interesting article which appeared the other day under the significant title The World and The West gives three explanations for this discouraging development, why Asia and the Asians do not always seem to be with us on issues that we think are fundamental to the development of freedom and democracy in their own part of the world.

These three reasons lie, he said, in the appeal that Communist doctrine inevitably makes to the people in those countries of the world. It is a three-fold Russian Communist appeal, and it is not always easy to resist. Certainly it is not easy to resist at the United Nations, and the Russians there know how to exploit this appeal to a maximum value.

The first appeal they make to the Asian is: If you follow the Russian example, Communism will give you strength to stand up against the West, as Communist Russia does today. To some Asians the West does not mean what

we know it should mean - freedom and democracy - and that is an appeal which makes its impression on certain Asian minds.

The second appeal is to the Asian peasantry, and that is that Communism can and private enterprise neither can nor, if it could, would, get ride of the extreme inequality between the rich luxury-loving minority and the poverty-stricken majority.

Then the third appeal from the Communists, about which we hear so much in the United Nations and elsewhere - and it is offered most confidently and dogmatically - is an appeal for a unity in policy and in doctrine which is some form or another, is the only alternative to self-destruction in the atomic age. We know it is a spurious and fatal unity; but our knowledge is not shared by all the peoples of Asia to whom it is addressed.

Now, the danger of this kind of appeal is being shown today, and the effect that it is having today is being shown in the other great and difficult complex of problems which is before the United Nations Assembly. That complex of connected problems involves the relationship of colonial peoples to administering states, and expresses itself in charges of racial discrimination, in tensions between the haves and have-nots, and in the responsibility of the former for technical and other kinds of help for the latter; it also expresses itself in worries on the part of the haves that the have-not blocs are pushing extreme and premature resolutions through the United Nations by force of a mathematical majority.

These problems appear in various items of our United Nations agenda today, some of which have not yet come up for discussion. In considering them it is depressing to realize that Asian and Arab states are nearly always together and not always on our side. On our side sometimes we are restricted to some of the countries of the Western World.

The United Nations Assembly, with all its faults and with all its possibilities, has become the forum for the expression of these discontents, confusions and divisions, for the expression of these aspirations and, indeed, these fears. The problems which they involve and the solutions we find to these problems may in the long run have just as important a relationship to peace and, indeed, to the future of the United Nations as the question of Korea itself. We have to try to reconcile the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states, and the administrative responsibility of some of those sovereign states over dependent peoples in their progress toward independence - with the legitimate interest of the United Nations in human rights and racial discrimination, and freedom for all peoples.

The United Nations is not having an easy time in this Assembly in making this reconciliation. The United Nations is not there, I suggest - and its charter did not intend it - to make this progress, which we all agree is so essential either explosive or violent; but it is there to make this progress steady and sure.

In a delegation like the Canadian delegation, as it confronts these fundamental long-range issues, decisions on individual resolutions are never easy, especially in respect of the disputes between colonial powers and members who have only recently evolved from colonial status, and

others who have gone beyond the colonial status.

In those disputes many resolutions are put forward which do not provide an easy problem for a delegation such as the Canadian delegation.

I should like, if I may, for a moment or two, to try to explain some of these difficulties and the principles upon which in our delegation we have tried to act, principles which have been approved by our Government.

In the United Nations Charter, the administering powers accepted as a binding international obligation a concept of progress toward self-government for all dependent peoples, which they had long recognized as a moral imperative. Their acceptance was completely voluntary. At the time of San Francisco there was no external power which could have forced the victor states to surrender the smallest portion of this aspect of their sovereignty. Their response was not due to outside pressure, but to their own consciences; and if world opinion played a part in their decision - and this it did - it was able to do so only because it reinforced those irresistible currents that were already at work within the democratic states.

That is the inevitable consequence of the acceptance of colonial responsibilities by a democratic state. Yet, can anyone believe that these same consequences would ever have been accepted by a totalitarian state? Would they have been accepted by totalitarian states which at the United Nations Assembly attack, and very often viciously attack, what they call colonial powers?

Would India and Burma have won their freedom from a totalitarian system, with its slave-labour camps and its secret police? Would world opinion have been of the slightest help to Indonesia if it had been in the grip of such masters?

For that matter, has dialectical materialism any way of explaining how such advances to freedom could possibly take place, not merely with the assent but with the positive co-operation of the administering powers?

We have watched the exponents of this totalitarian philosophy in the United Nations and elsewhere in their assiduous efforts to capture such noble words as freedom and democracy and put them to slave labour. We have seen them reduced at this session of the United Nations Assembly to denying all evidence of colonial advancement in the face of the plain accomplished facts.

On their side, the administering powers have pledged themselves to work towards the progressive replacing of their own authority by that of the peoples hitherto subject to them. The Charter accepts and establishes them as the instruments for achieving this end. In doing so it recognizes what is called colonialism as an integral aspect of the effort to establish peace and stability. But it gives no comfort to the illusion that the immediate and unconditional abandonment of the dependent territories would be a good thing for the international community.

The whole tenor of the United Nations Charter assumes a balanced process of evolution. It lays commitments on the administering powers and it recognizes in every paragraph that the fulfilment of those commitments must be a gradual process whose rapidity will vary with each case. Colonialism, in short, is made the instrument of its own disappearance.

That is a responsibility whose formidable nature must surely be recognized and respected by those of us who do not share it. It is the task of fitting various societies, some of them primitive societies, to take place in this modern and highly integrated world. It is not enough to waken in these societies a desire to run their own affairs; they must also be trained to the necessary level of ability, and if this essential process is interfered with or frustrated, or if on the other hand it is rushed too recklessly and precipitately, it will be to the detriment of the prosperity and security and future advancement of these colonial territories themselves.

While accepting these principles, Canadian decisions on specific colonial questions at the United Nations are based on our judgment of their merits, conditioned only by our sincere desire to help reach the maximum common agreement that is consistent with the welfare of the dependent peoples themselves and the interests of the international community.

I think this problem has come most concretely to our attention in connection with the South African items which are now on the agenda of the United Nations and which were dealt with last week. They are not in themselves colonial problems, but they represent a problem of the relationship of dependent people to a sovereign state and a sovereign government. They are problems of discrimination.

These South African items illustrate the difficulties of that problem and they also illustrate the danger of friendly nations dividing in their approach to it. Probably the best single example of this difficulty is the item on the agenda itself called "race conflict in South Africa" and the introduction under that item of a resolution by certain Asian states challenging the South African legislation, challenging South African policy and setting up an agency of the United Nations to intervene in this matter.

At the same time there have been introduced other resolutions on the same subject. South Africa's defence against these charges - this defence has been carried on lengthily, vigorously and skilfully by the South African representative at the United Nations - has been the legal defence that the Assembly is simply not competent even to consider these matters under Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the Charter, which reserves domestic jurisdiction to the states themselves.

On the other hand, members on the other side of the argument pointed to articles of the Charter which pledged its members to co-operate for the achievement of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race. Members on the other side of this argument, that is the other side from the South African side, have attempted to

show that this kind of legislation, this kind of policy in South Africa is itself a threat to international peace by what it is stirring up in the minds of the coloured people on that continent.

As far as the decisions of the Canadian delegation were concerned - I gather that these decisions have caused some comment in this country - we joined the majority of the Assembly in voting against South Africa's contention that under the Charter the United Nations was not competent even to consider these matters. In voting in that way we drew a distinction between consideration in the form of discussion and consideration in the form of intervention.

We felt, and I think it is becoming the established jurisprudence and established doctrine of the United Nations, that the Assembly is now competent to discuss anything as the town meeting of the world, but that that does not mean that the Assembly is competent to interfere in the domestic affairs of member states by certain types of resolutions or by setting up committees and commissions to visit those countries and report and possibly take action at succeeding Assemblies. It was in the light of those considerations that we made our decision in respect to this particular resolution.

We voted for a resolution inspired by the Scandinavian states and supported by, I think, 18 delegations which, while not singling out South Africa in terms, while not setting up any machinery to go to South Africa, and while not calling on South Africa to rescind any item of domestic legislation, called upon South Africa and all other member states to bring their policies into conformity with their obligation under the Charter to co-operate for the achievement of and universal respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

It has been said that in voting for this and abstaining from voting on other resolutions we were avoiding our responsibilities. As the head of our delegation the Minister of National Health and Welfare, Mr. Martin, said:

"The Scandinavian resolution is not just a means of dodging the issue, but rather of dodging a reaction which will be harmful to the people who would like to help."

As far as the Asian resolution was concerned, we abstained on that because we thought it was of doubtful legality. For the same reason we also abstained on the South African resolution which said that this particular Asian resolution was ultra vires. In the committee considering this matter 21 other delegations joined us in abstention on this issue. In the plenary session, which was held last Friday, most of these delegations switched their vote from abstention to voting against the Asian contention and in favour of the South African contention that a particular clause of this resolution was ultra vires. We did not switch; we remained and abstained on that issue.

However, abstention on this particular issue, which was caused by doubt in our minds as to the legality of this action and as to the practical effect the action

would have, did not mean on our part any judgment one way or the other on the issue of the question. As the Minister of National Health and Welfare pointed out when he spoke on this measure:

"Our friendship for the South African people is deep and abiding. We in Canada recognize the immensity of the racial problem - which is not only a South African problem, but we are also very acutely conscious of the concern of the Canadian people and of people throughout the world on questions involving racial discrimination. Discriminatory policies of any kind anywhere are contrary to the spirit both of the Charter and of our times. We do not believe that in the long run history offers much hope that such policies can accomplish their purpose or can endure."

There are other questions of this kind which are before the Assembly but which have not yet come up for decision and I think it would be inappropriate for me to speak of them at this time. In concluding my observations on the United Nations and on the Assembly I should like to make one or two general remarks. The United Nations organization - and this Assembly certainly shows it - is in a very difficult stage of its development. It is having troubles and new obstacles to overcome. It is having its discouragements and its defeats, but those of us who are inclined to criticize it too prematurely, too rashly or too strongly should realize, I think, that the United Nations is not either a court or a superstate. If I may put it this way, it is only a mirror which reflects the picture of what is going on in the world today, and if the picture is unpleasant, and indeed at times terrifying, that is not the fault of the mirror if the reflection is an honest one. It is the fault of those who belong to the United Nations and who, by their policies, do not make it possible for that organization to work as it was intended it should work by those who drew up the charter at San Francisco.

Above all, it is the fault of this division of the world into two camps, which is reflected in the cold war. Practically every item that comes before any United Nations body now, including the General Assembly, is interpreted in terms of the cold war, even the most minute and technical item. That indeed is a tragic development and one which we could hardly have foreseen when the Charter was drawn up. When you are confronted at New York now with a resolution, a proposal or a statement, the first reaction of most people is not "what does it say" but "who said it" or "who wrote it"? That in itself gives a fairly discouraging picture of our chances of making constructive progress in these major political issues as long as this tragic division continues.

These difficulties are increased, I think, by the uneasiness and low morale in the secretariat of the United Nations which is the agent for conducting the day to day business of the organization. It is a fact that in some minds and because of certain developments the international character of the Secretariat, which we so rightly stressed at San Francisco, may be lost and that members of the Secretariat will merely become the nominees of their respective governments owing loyalty not primarily to the international organization, which should be the case, but to these governments.

Yet with all these difficulties, difficulties outside the United Nations and difficulties inside the United Nations, I suggest that this is no time to weaken in our support for, let alone abandon support for, this indispensable piece of international machinery merely because it has falsified some of the illusions that we may have had when the Charter was drafted. After all, we do not throw away a car because the wrong kind of gas stalls it.

Having painted a rather gloomy picture of some aspects of the work of the Assembly, I think it is only fair I should add that real achievements are being made in the Seventh Assembly, and that in one sense it is a tribute to the United Nations itself and to the importance of the Assembly that these controversial political issues are being discussed there and that the big powers take this agency so seriously as to discuss them in the terms that they do. It would indeed be the end of all hope for the United Nations if it became a body merely for the exchange of meaningless courtesies. Furthermore, headline controversies should not lead to ignoring the solid achievements made by the United Nations in the social, humanitarian and economic fields. Progress is being made along those lines in this seventh session but the progress is not such as to command very much attention.

I should like to say a few words now on another but not unrelated subject, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Ministerial Council of which meets in Paris a week from today. In NATO we have continued to make progress since the last report I made to the house on this matter. The accession to membership of Greece and Turkey, with their considerable national forces, has added to the strength of the Organization, particularly on the southeastern flank. A NATO command on the Atlantic has been established, with headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia. General Ridgway's forces in Europe have been increasing in numbers and improving in effectiveness from the point of view of defence installations, particularly airfields, and through training exercises. I had the privilege of attending one of the latter last September, and it showed how much experience in co-operation between national forces has been gained in the relatively short time that these operations have been conducted.

There have been comments in the press from time to time that the NATO program for 1952, agreed upon at Lisbon last February and so strongly criticized in certain quarters, will not be 100 per cent completed by the end of this year. This will, I suppose, turn out to be the case, though we do not yet know exactly what the total NATO forces available by the end of this year will be. Yet on the information that has been made available to me I am quite confident now that the so-called "Lisbon goals" for 1952 - this will surprise many who thought these goals were unattainable and that the very effort to reach them would result in economic chaos - will be in very large measure achieved. I do not think I should say anything more on this subject until after the Council meeting.

In any event, I do not think we should lay too great emphasis on mathematical targets for any given date for forces under arms, provided we are making steady progress towards our goals and are not at any time

dangerously short of what has been planned for a particular period.

In one important respect, which is sometimes overlooked, the NATO countries certainly are much stronger. Production lines for military equipment are now rolling in North America and in the United Kingdom, and very considerable progress has been made in this field in Western Europe. The equipment position of NATO forces is steadily and encouragingly improving.

If there are some signs of lessening international tension - and there are - this is because of the growing strength and continuing unity of the North Atlantic alliance. But there is certainly nothing to warrant resting on our oars because of that fact, though, as we settle down to the long pull - I believe this is good rowing technique - we may decide to strike a somewhat slower rate. There is certainly no evidence that the Russian military strength has been reduced. There is evidence that an increasing proportion of their military budget is being spent in developing and producing new equipment to strengthen their already huge forces. They are certainly preparing for the long pull, confident that they can outlast the West and, if necessary, wait for the "inherent and inevitable contradictions and conflicts of capitalist society" to divide, weaken and ultimately destroy us.

In this long pull we must not ignore of course - and we do not - the effects of rearmament on the economies of member nations. The national economy of nearly every European member of NATO has been a tender plant since the war, and in the case of European members particularly rearmament has meant continued sacrifices for their peoples. However urgent rearmament is, it has to proceed in accordance with the economic and political capabilities of the member states. Otherwise we would invite those economic and social conditions within member nations which would create a favourable climate for the growth of Communism in our society.

It was to avoid this sort of danger that the Council of NATO ... established at its Ottawa meeting over a year ago a temporary committee to review military requirements and national programs in the light of the economic, social and political capabilities of member nations. A similar review for the current year is now under way and will be shortly completed; but that review has been conducted in a different fashion. I think this is of some interest in the light of the fears that were expressed here at the time of the last meeting - that NATO might fall completely under the military. The Council of NATO, which has established its position, is the directing and controlling body of NATO and is now in permanent session. That Council, through its Secretariat, is conducting these annual studies and will control the decisions which will be made and passed on to various governments and parliaments arising out of the studies. When this review is concluded, and it should be concluded shortly, NATO members will no doubt have further guidance on NATO requirements and on their national programs. These, while agreed plans, must be flexible and constantly reviewed in the light of changing circumstances and requirements.

...with respect to military security and national security, it is certain that we have yet achieved it. Although we have made real progress there is still a long way to go in making NATO a defensive bulwark against aggression and as one element in that security. The risk of aggression remains and our recent gains in defensive strength must be consolidated and extended, and our co-operation strengthened and enlarged before we can feel safe. So, I suggest, we must press ahead in our own country, and in other countries of NATO, not merely with strengthening the military side of the alliance but also with building its political, economic and moral strength as well where progress is sometimes difficult and discouragingly slow.

We have no reason to assume on our part that there has been any change of policy or of heart on the part of the Kremlin and its satellites in recent months since Stalin has laid down the new party line - characteristically enough in an article in a magazine. It is possible, however, that there has been a switch in tactics in Moscow, as has frequently happened before in the history of Communist imperialism. During the immediate postwar period its aim in the West was to extend political control over whatever areas its armies occupied, and to exploit the postwar instability in other countries of Western Europe so as to bring into power governments which would be friendly and could ultimately be controlled by the Kremlin. But the governments and peoples of the democracies have awakened to the danger and, particularly through NATO, have begun to organize their defences against it. An immediate present aim of the Kremlin is clearly to stop this progress toward security and unification by dividing and wrecking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, by exploiting distrust of the United States within and without that organization.

With this object in view, Communist imperialists have mounted an offensive of propaganda and subversion designed to weaken, confuse, and discourage the democracies. The main vehicle of this offensive, that is up to the present although there have been some signs that it has been reduced, is the so-called peace campaign in which not only the formal peace organization but all Communist-front organizations are actively working. Meanwhile, much emphasis is being placed on, the possibility of peaceful co-existence between the Communist world and the democratic world which only the warmongering policies of the United States prevent - so goes the line, and some misunderstanding is being caused by it.

The ideal of "peaceful co-existence", in which indeed every man of good will must believe, presupposes an absence of aggressive intention. The Communist imperialists have not produced any evidence that their policies have in fact become compatible with their peaceful professions. They certainly have not produced any such evidence in the present Assembly of the United Nations. A genuine policy of peaceful co-existence implies a readiness to co-operate for the purposes of peace and for the promotion of human welfare. Instead of a readiness to co-operate for these purposes, the Communist imperialists resort to propaganda campaigns of hatred and falsehood. "Peaceful co-existence", in Soviet terminology, seems indeed to mean simply all mischief short of war, just as Soviet policy seems to mean military aggression if necessary but not necessarily military aggression.

...I hope to have another opportunity before this session has gone too far of making another statement on the final results of the United Nations assembly and, indeed, on the results of the NATO Council meeting which takes place this month. What I have said, however, about our policies at the United Nations, and about the policies which we continue to pursue in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, does, I hope, confirm what indeed probably does not need confirmation - that Canadian policy is directed solely toward bringing about in the United Nations and in NATO, and in any other organization devoted to peace, a peace which will be more than the kind of peace we have today. It is directed toward a peace which will mean more than merely the absence of fighting; and to the bringing about of a security that can ultimately be based upon something stronger and more permanent than force.

S/C

APPENDIX

TELEGRAMS DATED 5 DECEMBER 1952 ADDRESSED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO THE MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEKING GOVERNMENT AND OF NORTH KOREA; KOREAN RESOLUTIONS; RESOLUTIONS ON RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA

December 5, 1952

Sir,

The General Assembly of the United Nations, at its 399th plenary meeting on December 3, 1952, adopted a resolution under item 16 (a) of its agenda—Korea: Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Under the terms of that resolution, originally sponsored by the Government of India, the President of the General Assembly is requested "to communicate the following proposals to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the North Korean authorities as forming a just and reasonable basis for an agreement so that an immediate cease-fire would result and be effected; to invite their acceptance of these proposals and to make a report to the General Assembly during its present session and as soon as appropriate". In discharge of the duty placed upon me by the terms of that resolution, I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the resolution and to invite your acceptance of the proposals contained therein.

2. I send this message to you against the background of the casualties, the sufferings, and the destruction in Korea which are the inevitable consequence of war, and I add my personal appeal that you should give it your most thoughtful and sympathetic consideration. When the First Committee of the General Assembly, by an unanimous decision, agreed to treat the Korean question as a matter of urgency, its decision reflected the concern of all members of the United Nations, a concern which I am sure is shared by the peoples of the world, over the tragedy of war and devastation in Korea, and their deep desire to bring this war to an end on terms acceptable to both sides. To this end negotiations have been proceeding for some sixteen months at Panmunjom, in the course of which a wide measure of agreement on the terms of an armistice has been reached. The sole remaining issue which has not been settled in the course of these armistice negotiations concerns the principles and procedures by which the repatriation of prisoners-of-war can be effected.

3. In itself, the prisoners-of-war issue is a challenge to the fundamental humanitarian instincts which are shared by all mankind and urgently calls for solution. In camps on both sides, human beings have been kept for long months under military detention while the lengthy negotiations concerning their fate have been continuing. There is an inescapable moral obligation on both sides in the Korean conflict to make every possible effort to ensure that these prisoners-of-war shall be free to return to their homelands, and their speedy return facilitated.

4. The discussion of this matter in the first committee of this assembly has made clear the general agreement in the United Nations that this problem should be dealt with and the repatriation of prisoners-of-war should be effected under the terms of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners-of-war of August 12, 1949, under the well-established principles and practice of international law, and under the relevant provisions of the draft armistice agreement. It was also generally agreed that prisoners-of-war should be released from the custody of the detaining powers to a repatriation commission so that they can be free to exercise their undoubted right with respect to repatriation,

and that it was inconsistent with common humanitarian principles that a detaining power should offer any hindrance to the return to their homelands of any prisoners-of-war. Finally, there was general agreement that the Geneva convention cannot be construed as authorizing a detaining power to employ force to effect the return of individual prisoners-of-war to their homelands.

5. The General Assembly Resolution clearly states the above principles with respect to the solution of the prisoner-of-war issue, and, in addition, makes concrete proposals with regard to the machinery of repatriation. It represents ideas put forward by many governments represented in the General Assembly whose unanimous desire is to bring peace to Korea. The resolution can make this desire effective because its acceptance will make it possible to achieve an armistice and a complete and immediate cessation of hostilities.

6. The resolution, in addition, makes reference to the desire of the General Assembly to expedite and facilitate, once an armistice is effective, the convening of a political conference provided for in Article 60 of the draft armistice agreement already accepted by the military negotiators at Panmunjom.

7. It is my earnest hope that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China will accept these proposals of the General Assembly as a basis for the solution of the one remaining issue which has prevented the conclusion of an armistice during the negotiations at Panmunjom. Once this issue is solved, it will become possible to bring the fighting to an end and complete the programme for a peaceful settlement in Korea leading, we must hope, towards a more general settlement which would contribute to peace in Asia and in the world.

8. The United Nations is determined to do everything possible to bring the fighting to an end in Korea. This is also the declared aim of the Central People's Government. This common aim can be achieved if the proposals which are now submitted for your consideration are, as I earnestly hope will be the case, accepted in the spirit in which they are put forward. In this hope, as president of the seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations I appeal to you to accept these proposals of the United Nations as forming a just and reasonable basis for an agreement which will serve to bring about a constructive and durable peace in Korea.

9. I shall look forward to receiving as soon as possible your reply to this communication, which I shall report to the General Assembly when it is received.

10. In accordance with the decision of the General Assembly, the text of the resolution has also been communicated to the North Korean authorities, to whom I am sending a similar message.

11. Please accept, sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

LESTER B. PEARSON
President
General Assembly.

His Excellency,
Mr. Chou En-lai,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Central
People's Government of the People's
Republic of China,
PEKING, China

KOREA

21-POWER RESOLUTION

(This resolution did not come to the vote)

Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay: Draft resolution on Korea

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

1. HAVING RECEIVED the special report of the Unified Command of 18 October 1952 on the status of military action and the armistice negotiations in Korea,
2. NOTING with approval the efforts of the United Nations negotiators to achieve a just and honourable armistice to bring an end to the fighting in Korea in accordance with United Nations principles,
3. NOTING FURTHER that disagreement on one remaining issue has prevented the achievement of such an armistice,
4. REAFFIRMS the earnest intention of the United Nations to reach a just and honourable settlement of the Korean conflict;
5. NOTES WITH APPROVAL the tentative agreements which the United Nations Command has reached on behalf of the United Nations;
6. NOTES WITH APPROVAL the principle followed by the United Nations Command with regard to the question of repatriation of prisoners of war, and the numerous proposals which the United Nations Command has made to solve the questions in accordance with this humanitarian principle;
7. NOTES FURTHER that other suggestions consistent with the basic humanitarian position of the United Nations Command have been made by various Members of the United Nations;
8. CALLS UPON the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and upon the North Korean authorities to avert further bloodshed by having their negotiators agree to an armistice which recognizes the rights of all prisoners of war to an unrestricted opportunity to be repatriated and avoids the use of force in their repatriation;
9. REQUESTS the President of the General Assembly to transmit this resolution to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the North Korean authorities, and to make a report to the General Assembly as soon as he deems appropriate during the present session on the result of his action.

KOREA

(This resolution did not come to the vote)

Mexico: draft resolution

The General Assembly,

WHEREAS it is the purpose of the United Nations to restore peace and, therefore, to achieve the cessation of hostilities in Korea through the conclusion of a just and honourable armistice;

WHEREAS from official reports at the disposal of the General Assembly it follows that the only obstacle to the conclusion of the armistice lies in the fact that it has not been possible to reach an agreement in regard to the exchange of prisoners-of-war;

WHEREAS the United Nations must safeguard the application of the humanitarian principles that underlie the international instruments in force relating to prisoners-of-war;

A

REQUESTS the President of the General Assembly to invite, through the channels that he may deem appropriate, the Military Commanders of the North Korean and Chinese forces in Korea to consider the following general bases for the exchange of prisoners of war, with a view to facilitate the early conclusion of the armistice:

1. Prisoners-of-war held by either of the parties, who have voluntarily expressed their desire to return to the country of their origin, will be repatriated without delay upon the conclusion of the armistice.
2. Other prisoners-of-war held by either of the parties, desirous of establishing temporary residence in other States, would not return to the country of their origin until the coming into force of the decisions that, in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, might be adopted in the Political Conference that will take place after the armistice, in conformity with the agreement reached by the Military Commanders, on point 5 of the Armistice agenda.
3. Pending the entry into force of the above-mentioned decisions, the situation of the prisoners-of-war referred to in paragraph 2 shall be governed by the following rules:
 - (a) The General Assembly, acting in the manner and through the channel it may deem appropriate, will negotiate with each State agreeing to participate in the plan envisaged in this Resolution, on the number of prisoners which such a State may be prepared to receive in its territory, as well as on the conditions inherent to their admission.
 - (b) Once in the country of temporary residence, the authorities of that country shall grant them a migratory status which would enable them to work in order to provide for their needs.
4. When the situation foreseen for their repatriation arises as described in paragraph 2 above, the authorities of the countries of origin would grant facilities for the return of the ex-prisoners-of-war and would furnish guarantees for the subsequent protection of their freedom and their lives.
5. In the case of those ex-prisoners-of-war, who, by virtue of the present Resolution, would be provisionally residing in another country and would express their will to return to their country of origin before the situation foreseen for their repatriation in the terms of paragraph 2 has arisen, the United Nations would provide the means to carry their wishes into effect.

B

REQUESTS the President of the General Assembly to report to the Assembly in due course concerning the result of the steps which he is asked to take by this Resolution.

KOREA

(This resolution did not come to the vote)

Peru: draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Expressing the desire of mankind for an immediate, just and honourable peace, and considering that the only issue which has prevented the conclusion of the armistice is that relating to the repatriation of prisoners-of-war,

Decides

1. To set up a five-member Commission on which each of the parties to the conflict shall be represented by one delegate. The General Assembly, for its part, shall appoint two delegates and invite the collaboration of a neutral state, not a Member of the United Nations, to be a member of the Commission and to serve as its Chairman.
2. The Commission appointed as aforesaid shall immediately take steps to co-operate in the repatriation of prisoners in accordance with their freely expressed wishes.
3. Prisoners not wishing to be repatriated shall remain under the protection of the Commission in a neutralized zone so long as no provision has been made for their future.
4. The said Commission shall propose to the United Nations at the earliest possible moment the most suitable measures for the final decision as to the future of the prisoners remaining under its protection, one of the measures to be considered being their transfer to the territory of such Powers as may be prepared to receive them, or their settlement in Trust Territories in agreement with the Administering Power concerned. Prisoners shall, in any event, be free to make a decision later concerning their return to their place of origin.
5. In the performance of its functions, the Commission shall be guided by the principles of the United Nations Charter and by the Declaration of Human Rights.

KOREA

(This resolution was rejected by the
General Assembly)

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: revised draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea,

Considers it necessary:

To establish a Commission for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question with provision for the participation of the parties directly concerned and of other States, including States which have not taken part in the Korean war. The Commission shall consist of the following members: United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Republic of China, India, Burma, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia,

People's Democratic Republic of Korea and South Korea.

To instruct the said Commission to take immediate steps for the settlement of the Korean question on the basis of the unification of Korea—to be effected by the Koreans themselves under the supervision of the above-mentioned Commission such steps to include comprehensive action to promote the repatriation of all prisoners-of-war by both sides.

REVISION OF SOVIET RESOLUTION ON KOREA

The Soviet delegation on November 23 submitted the following addendum to be inserted as the first paragraph of the revised Soviet resolution:

"To recommend to the belligerents in Korea an immediate and complete cease-fire, i.e. the cessation of military operations by both sides on land, by sea and in the air, on the basis of the draft armistice agreement already approved by the belligerents, the question of the complete repatriation of prisoners-of-war to be referred for its solution to the commission for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question provided for in the U.S.S.R. draft resolution, in which commission questions shall be decided by two-thirds majority vote of its members."

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ON KOREA

ADOPTED BY UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON
DECEMBER 3, 1952.

(This resolution is based upon and consists principally of a resolution introduced by the Delegation of India)

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

HAVING RECEIVED the special Report of the United Nations Command of the 18 October 1952 on "the present status of military action and armistice negotiations in Korea" and other relevant reports relating to Korea;

NOTING WITH APPROVAL the considerable progress towards an armistice made by negotiation at Panmunjom and the tentative agreements to end the fighting in Korea and to reach a settlement of the Korean question;

NOTING FURTHER that disagreement between the parties on one remaining issue, alone, prevents the conclusion of an armistice and that a considerable measure of agreement already exists on the principles on which this remaining issue can be resolved;

MINDFUL of the continuing and vast loss of life, devastation and suffering resulting from and accompanying the continuance of the fighting;

DEEPLY CONSCIOUS of the need to bring hostilities to a speedy end and of the need for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question;

ANXIOUS TO EXPEDITE AND FACILITATE the convening of the political conference as provided in Article 60 of the Draft Armistice Agreement;

AFFIRMS that the release and repatriation of Prisoners-of-War shall be effected in accordance with the "Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War", dated 12 August 1949, the well-established principles and practice of International Law and the relevant provision of the Draft Armistice Agreement;

AFFIRMS that force shall not be used against Prisoners-of-War to prevent or effect their return to their homelands, and that they shall at all time be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention and with the general spirit of the Convention;

ACCORDINGLY REQUESTS the President of the General Assembly to communicate the following proposals to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the North Korean Authorities as forming a just and reasonable basis for agreement so that an immediate cease-fire would result and be effected; to invite their acceptance of these proposals and to make a report to the General Assembly during its present session and as soon as appropriate;

PROPOSALS

1. In order to facilitate the return to their homelands of all Prisoners-of-War, there shall be established a Repatriation Commission consisting of representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, that is the four States agreed to for the constitution of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and referred to in paragraph 37 of the Draft Armistice Agreement, or constituted, alternatively, of representatives of four States not participating in hostilities, two nominated by each side, but excluding representatives of States that are permanent members of the Security Council.
2. The release and repatriation of Prisoners-of-War shall be effected in accordance with the "Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners-of-War", dated 12 August 1949, the well-established principles and practice of International Law and the relevant provisions of the Draft Armistice Agreement.
3. Force shall not be used against the Prisoners-of-war to prevent or effect their return to their homelands and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner or for any purpose whatsoever. This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Repatriation Commission and each of its members. Prisoners-of-War shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention and with the general spirit of that Convention.
4. All Prisoners-of-War shall be released to the Repatriation Commission from military control and from the custody of the detaining side in agreed numbers and at agreed exchange points in agreed demilitarized zones.
5. Classification of Prisoners-of-War according to nationality and domicile as proposed in the letter of 16 October from General Kim IL Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and General Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, to General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall then be carried out immediately.
6. After classification, Prisoners-of-War shall be free to return to their homelands, forthwith, and their speedy return shall be facilitated by all parties concerned.
7. In accordance with arrangements prescribed for the purpose by the Repatriation Commission, each party to the conflict shall have freedom and facilities to explain to the Prisoners-of-War "depending upon them" their rights and to inform the Prisoners

of-War on any matter relating to their return to their homelands and particularly their full freedom to return.

8. Red Cross teams of both sides shall assist the Repatriation Commission in its work and shall have access, in accordance with the terms of the Draft Armistice Agreement, to Prisoners-of-War while they are under the temporary jurisdiction of the Repatriation Commission.

9. Prisoners-of-War shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the Repatriation Commission and to bodies and agencies working under the Repatriation Commission, and to inform any or all such bodies of their desires on any matter concerning themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Commission.

10. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3 above nothing in this Repatriation Agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the Repatriation Commission (or its authorized representatives) to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners under its temporary jurisdiction.

11. The terms of this Repatriation Agreement and the arrangements arising therefrom shall be made known to all Prisoners-of-War.

12. The Repatriation Commission is entitled to call upon parties to the conflict, its own member governments, or the Member States of the United Nations for such legitimate assistance as it may require in the carrying out of its duties and tasks and in accordance with the decisions of the Commission in this respect.

13. When the two sides have made an agreement for repatriation based on these proposals, the interpretation of that agreement shall rest with the Repatriation Commission. In the event of disagreement in the Commission, majority decision shall prevail. When no majority decision is possible, an umpire agreed upon in accordance with the succeeding paragraph and with Article 132 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 shall have the deciding vote.

14. The Repatriation Commission shall at its first meeting and prior to an armistice proceed to agree upon and appoint the umpire who shall at all times be available to the Commission and shall act as its Chairman unless otherwise agreed. If agreement on the appointment of the umpire cannot be reached by the Commission within the period of three weeks after the date of the first meeting this matter should be referred to the General Assembly.

15. The Repatriation Commission shall also arrange after the armistice for officials to function as umpires with inspecting teams or other bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by the Commission or under the provisions of the Draft Armistice Agreement, so that the completion of the return of Prisoners-of-War to their homelands shall be expedited.

16. When the Repatriation Agreement is acceded to by the parties concerned and when an umpire has been appointed under paragraph 14 above, the Draft Armistice Agreement, unless otherwise altered by agreement between the parties, shall be deemed to have been accepted by them. The provisions of the Draft Armistice Agreement shall apply except in so far as they are modified by the Repatriation Agreement. Arrangements for repatriation under this agreement will begin when the armistice agreement is thus concluded.

17. At the end of ninety days, after the Armistice Agreement has been signed, the disposition of any Prisoners-of-War whose return to their homelands may not have been effected in accordance with the procedure set out in these proposals or as otherwise agreed, shall be referred with recommendations for their disposal, including a target date for the termination of their detention to the political conference to be called as provided under Article 60 of the Draft Armistice Agreement. If at the end of a further thirty days there are any Prisoners-of-War whose return to their homelands has not been effected under the above procedures or whose future has not been provided for by the political conference, the responsibility for their care and maintenance and for their subsequent disposition shall be transferred to the United Nations which in all matters relating to them shall act strictly in accordance with international law."

TEXT OF 18-POWER RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE AD HOC POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON NOVEMBER 20, 1952.

The General Assembly,

Having taken note of the communication dated 12 September 1952, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Delegations of Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, regarding the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa,

Considering that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to achieve international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedom for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

Recalling that the General Assembly declared in its resolution 103 (I) that it is in the higher interests of humanity to put an end to religious and so-called racial persecution and called upon all Governments to conform both to the letter and to the spirit of the Charter and to take the most prompt and energetic steps to that end,

Considering that the General Assembly has held in its resolutions 395 (V) and 511 (VI) that a policy of "racial segregation" (apartheid) is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination,

1. Establishes a commission consisting of _____, to study the racial situation in the Union of South Africa in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, with due regard to the provision of Article 2, paragraph 7, as well as the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 2 and paragraph 3, Article 13, paragraph 1 (b), Article 55 (c) and Article 56 of the Charter, and the resolutions of the United Nations on racial persecution and discrimination and to report its conclusions to the General Assembly at its eighth session;
2. Invites the Government of the Union of South Africa to extend its full co-operation to the Commission;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with the necessary staff and facilities;
4. Decides to retain the question on the agenda of the eighth regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

TEXT OF SCANDIVAVIAN RESOLUTION

PASSED BY THE AD HOC POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON NOVEMBER 20, 1952

The General Assembly,

Having taken note of the communication dated 12 September 1952, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Delegations of Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, regarding the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa,

Considering that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to achieve international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedom for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

Recalling that the General Assembly declared in its resolution 103 (I) that it is in the higher interests of humanity to put an end to religious and so-called racial persecution and called upon all Governments to conform both to the letter and to the spirit of the Charter and to take the most prompt and energetic steps to that end.

1. Declares that in a multi-racial society harmony and respect for human rights and freedoms and the peaceful development of a unified community are best assured when patterns of legislation and practice are directed towards ensuring equality before the law of all persons regardless of race, creed or color, and when economic, social, cultural and political participation of all racial groups is on a basis of equality.
2. Affirms that governmental policies of Member States which are not directed towards these goals, but which are designed to perpetuate or increase discrimination, are inconsistent with the pledges of the Members under Article 56 of the Charter;
3. Solemnly calls upon all Member States to bring their policies into conformity with their obligation under the Charter to promote the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Text of South African Resolution Defeated in Ad Hoc Political Committee, November 20, 1952

Having regard to the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations,

The Ad Hoc Political Committee finds that it has no competence to consider the item entitled "The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa Resulting from the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa".

Text of South African Resolution Defeated in Plenary Session of the General Assembly, December 6, 1952

The General Assembly,

Having regard to the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter,

Finds that it is unable to adopt the proposals on the item entitled "The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa Resulting from the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa" contained in the Rapporteur's Report of the Ad Hoc Political Committee dated December 2, 1952.