



STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

INFORMATION DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA - CANADA

No. 51/21 ASPECTS OF CANADIAN EXTERNAL POLICY

Statements made in the House of Commons on May 14, 1951, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, in the course of the debate on Canadian external affairs.

Formosa and the Recognition of Communist China.

The policy of the Government of Canada in regard to these matters has been made clear more than once in this House, outside this House and at the United Nations.I would repeat...because I think it describes in a nutshell our policies in regard to these matters--the last paragraph of the statement of principles adopted by fifty-two members of the United Nations, including the United States of America. It deals with the Far East problem in general, Formosa and recognition in particular. We are bound by this paragraph because we accepted this statement of principles. The last paragraph reads as follows:

As soon as agreement has been reached on a cease-fire, the General Assembly--

That is the General Assembly of the United Nations

--shall set up an appropriate body which shall include representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the People's Republic of China, with a view to the achievement of a settlement, in conformity with existing international obligations and the provisions of the United Nations Charter, of Far Eastern problems, including among others those of Formosa (Taiwan) and of representation of China in the United Nations.

Iran

...This would be one occasion, I think, when it would be inappropriate and inadvisable for one in my position to talk about this particular subject at this particular moment. It is one of the most difficult and dangerous problems, affecting not only Iran but many other countries as well. I think it would be unwise on my part to say anything about it at this time, except to express the hope that these problems can be settled in a way which would be consistent with the national aspirations of the Iranian people and the legitimate interests of other people who have ministered to the well being of Iran, in administering the oil industry of that country which they have been instrumental in developing.

CBC-IS

...I should like to refer to the policy guidance paper communicated by the Department of External Affairs to the International Service of the CBC, under which these broadcasts to the behind-the-iron-curtain countries are being operated. I should like to quote a few sentences from this hitherto confidential paper, in order to deal with this point, because I know of no other way of dealing effectively with it than to quote from the policy guidance paper which is supposed to guide the operations of the CBC International Service in this field. In this paper it is stated that one of the purposes of these broadcasts is:

Unmasking the hypocrisy of communist democracy in elections, trade unions, labour camps and religion and the hypocrisy of Soviet peace propaganda and its inconsistency in view of Soviet aggressive foreign policy, rearmament and concentration on heavy industry to the detriment of the Soviet standard of living.

That is a quotation from the policy paper. Another one is as follows:

Keeping alive and if possible increasing a knowledge of and appreciation of democracy, the code of ethics which we have derived from Christianity and western civilization and thought.

Those are the general lines along which the international services are proceeding or are attempting to proceed in regard to the broadcasts to the behind-the-iron-curtain countries.

The St. Lawrence Seaway

...We want to see this enterprise brought to completion as a power and navigational project by the co-operation of the two governments most concerned; but we want to see it completed. If it cannot be completed on an international basis, naturally we shall have to examine the situation and see what other way it might be done. In discussing this matter the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) asked whether there were any treaty obligations which would prevent our charging discriminatory tolls on non-Canadian vessels as a way to pay the cost of construction of the canal and the power installations, if they were a Canadian enterprise exclusively. There are...no treaty obligations binding on Canada which would be an obstacle to the imposition of tolls on Canadian canals in the Great Lakes - St. Lawrence system. There are treaty provisions, however, which affect Canada's ability to establish toll schedules discriminating between ships of Canada and those of another country, or between the ships of different foreign countries; so, as I understand, discriminatory tolls would not be possible.

The Colombo Plan and Technical Assistance

During our discussion, ...a good many members of the House made reference to international relief and rehabilitation problems, more particularly with reference to the Colombo Plan and to famine assistance for India. I announced in this House not so very long ago that the Government would ask Parliament to appropriate \$25 million as its contribution to the first year of the plan, provided

that it was clear that other contributing countries would make appropriate contributions so that the broad objectives of the plan might be realized. Since that time we have been taking steps to make arrangements with recipient countries for the purpose of ensuring that so far as Canada is concerned the momentum of the plan is sustained.

The Colombo report contains in its appendices lists of projects for financing under the plan; and without waiting for the working out of the details of the plan, indeed without waiting for the plan to come into operation, we have asked the Indian and Pakistan governments to send over technically qualified representatives to discuss with our officials on a bilateral basis the projects in which we might assist, having in mind those items which Canada is best fitted to undertake; and in this connection we are doing all the preparatory work that we can to keep this movement going.

In the broader field of technical assistance we have played, I think, a useful part. We have participated, either through the headship of, or membership in technical missions, in United Nations missions to Bolivia, Ethiopia, Burma, Colombia, Egypt and India, and the filling of requests for technicians received from Libya, the Philippines, Indonesia and Ceylon under the United Nations programme is now currently under consideration; but it is not of course under present circumstances very easy to find suitable Canadian technicians for this purpose.

No technicians have yet been supplied under the Colombo Plan, but approximately 50 requests have been received from India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and are now being examined by the Technical Assistance Service. More has been accomplished in making Canadian facilities available for trainees from abroad.

We have notified the Bureau on Technical Co-operation in Colombo that we are prepared to accept twelve trainees from India, ten from Pakistan and six from Ceylon at an early date for placement in the following fields: road building, electrical engineering, pulp and paper, rail transportation and agriculture. The bureau in Colombo is being notified that we will accept three technical missions for a six to eight week tour of Canada during the summer in the field of hydroelectric power, road building and agriculture respectively.

During the February meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee in Colombo the member countries were informed by our delegation that Canada was prepared to grant fellowships to interested recipient countries in such fields as agriculture, engineering, forestry, education and medical research. Subsequently we made a specific offer of sixty scholarships and fellowships to the countries of South and Southeast Asia.

Famine Conditions in India

Then there is the question...of assistance to India to deal with the very distressing and developing famine situation there. So that the facts on this matter might be clear, I should like to put into the record that the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, announced on May 10 that 50 thousand tons of wheat, purchased on a cash basis

from the Soviet Union, were on their way to India; 50 thousand tons only, purchased on a cash basis. He added that negotiations for the purchase of an additional 500 thousand tons of other wheat in exchange for certain Indian commodities were in progress. China has sent 50 thousand tons of rice as part of a barter deal, China receiving Indian jute in exchange; and India has also purchased from China 50 thousand tons of milo.

This afternoon reference was made to the United Kingdom contribution. It is true that the United Kingdom agreed to the diversion to India of some cargoes of Australian wheat out of its own purchases in Australia. Some 42 thousand tons of wheat have been so diverted to India and paid for by the Indian Government. It was suggested this afternoon that the Government were negligent in their appreciation of the terrible famine situation in India. It was suggested by an hon. member of the Opposition that we should make a contribution of \$100 million for famine relief to be spent in Canada, and that we could do it if we wanted to...It would be very difficult at this particular moment--and I am not sure that it would be the best way to proceed at this particular moment--to make any such contribution to India for famine relief. Hon. members will recall that the Government recognized as long ago as February of this year that a famine in India was likely to occur. At that time we offered wheat to India under the Colombo Plan, and the purpose and meaning of that offer has led to some misunderstanding. The only wheat of this year's crop that was not already fully contracted for by purchasers was grade 5. The Indian Government advised us last month that it wished to accept our offer of wheat under the Colombo Plan but that it preferred to wait until our next crop was harvested before obtaining the wheat in the hope that a better grade would be available.

I should like to assure the House of Commons at this time that the Government, as indicated by the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) the other day, (May 2 and May 14), is giving the closest attention to what Canada can do to ameliorate famine conditions which are rapidly developing in India. We are exploring every avenue, including some of the helpful suggestions which have been made during the course of this discussion, through which help might be given. I am very hopeful that we shall be successful in finding a number of ways in which we can contribute to the relief of starvation and suffering in India.

The Objectives in Korea

...I turn to consider once again what are our objectives in Korea and how those objectives can be reached...I realize that in such a confused situation as does exist in Korea it is difficult to have a clear objective or to see the objective that we have clearly. It is now more important than ever that we should have as exact an idea as possible of what we are trying to accomplish in Korea, along with other members of the United Nations. The Canadian brigade group will shortly be in action, so not only they but every other Canadian will want to know what is their purpose in Korea and what is the policy of the Canadian Government in regard to achieving that purpose.

Before I try to answer once again this crucial question, I should like to draw to your attention...the advantages which have already accrued to the cause of freedom from the United Nations action in Korea. In the first place,...the military danger to many other areas in Asia has been greatly reduced as a result of the courageous and skilful campaign which has been carried on in Korea. Many of the best formations of the Chinese communist army have been committed to battle in Korea and have suffered very heavy losses in the process. As a result, the number of trained troops facing Indo-China, Formosa, Hongkong, Burma and Malaya has been reduced, and the danger of successful attacks in those areas is now I think less than it was--although of course it has certainly not by any means been eliminated.

In meeting the onslaught of the Chinese communist forces then, the United Nations forces in Korea have suffered heavy losses but they have inflicted immensely heavier losses on the enemy. They can take pride in the fact that their heroic resistance has lessened the danger in other parts of Asia. I believe that is something that has already been accomplished by way of benefit to the cause of freedom.

Another way in which the cause of freedom has benefited through United Nations action in Korea is that the whole of the free world is now aroused and alerted to the danger so that more rapid progress is now being made in increasing the armed forces in being in the free world. We have now some reason to believe that before long these forces may be large enough to deter any would-be aggressor. This improvement in our position we owe, I think, largely to the sense of urgency which the war in Korea brought us, and also the energetic leadership of the United States of America.

This war in Korea has also been the occasion of another discovery which must be encouraging to free men everywhere. It is that collective military action against aggression is possible, and can be effective. It is certainly true even yet that three-quarters of the United Nations forces now fighting in Korea, apart from the South Koreans themselves, are being provided by the United States. But I think equally remarkable is the fact that no fewer than sixteen countries are now contributing contingents to the United Nations forces, and that all those contingents are being welded together in a strong and dependable United Nations army. It may be objected that all this is very well, but that if the United Nations army in Korea has not a clear mission which it can hope to fulfil, this whole grand exercise in international co-operation is futile. What, then, is the United Nations mission in Korea? Essentially, I think, ...to defeat aggression, and by the lesson of that defeat to help prevent the outbreak of World War III.

If the aggression in Korea had been allowed to succeed without any attempt being made to resist it, other acts of aggression would certainly have followed. The strength of the free world would have been nibbled away piecemeal in accordance with the master plans of the Politburo. Eventually, a stage would have been reached when the remaining countries which were still free and independent would have realized that they had either to

wage war with fewer resources and with much slighter hope of success, or else be engulfed under a wave of Soviet tyranny. Since they would certainly have chosen war rather than slavery, a third world war in those circumstances would have been inevitable.

To the infantryman slogging over the muddy fields of Korea, it may seem odd to hear someone say that his mission is to prevent a third world war. He may well be forgiven for not seeing very much difference between a world war and the bloody business in which he is now engaged. I certainly sympathize with that view. But it is necessary to remember that in the present circumstances a new world war will be very different from the campaign now being fought in Korea. It would be an atomic war which would result in the death of hundreds of thousands of people at one stroke, and which would leave the earth pockmarked and infected with radioactivity for years to come, even if it did not, as is conceivable, result in something far worse. That is the nightmare we are trying by every means in our power to avoid. When viewed in that light I believe that our soldiers in Korea, and the soldiers from other countries of the United Nations, will see that their task, however disagreeable and dangerous it may be, is supremely worthwhile.

A Definition of "Communism"

...Communism is a dogma, a type of society and a military danger--all three. The dogma has influenced the type of society which has been created in Russia, in other Cominform countries and in China. The totalitarian nature of Soviet society has facilitated, and perhaps even necessitated, acts of aggression. But communism as a dogma, I repeat once again, in my view, cannot be destroyed in Korea or elsewhere by military means. If we think it can, and if we think it should be attempted, we should have intervened in Czechoslovakia when the communists took over there. Such armed intervention at that time, however, or in Greece, or in connection with the Berlin blockade, could have and would have received no sanction of any kind from the United Nations. Communism as a dogma must be fought with other weapons and in other ways. But when its noxious doctrines, and when its perverted form of society takes arms and commits aggression against other peoples, then we must answer the communists with collective action including, when it can be made effective, collective military action; and that is what we are doing in Korea today.

What we are fighting in Korea and what we may have to fight in other parts of the world is what William Pitt the younger called "armed opinions", but armed opinions which have expressed themselves in armed aggression. I therefore hope that it will now be understood what I mean when I say that the United Nations' objective in Korea is not, by arms, to fight communism as an idea. Our objective there is to offer successful resistance to communist aggression and thereby to prevent, we hope, a third world war.

The Great Debate

...What can we do about the present situation in Korea?.. At the present time the advantages of two alternative methods are being urged. This is, indeed, the great debate. On the

one hand it is said that total military victory is indispensable and that it can be achieved by permitting the bombing of China, by imposing a naval blockade and by employing Nationalist Chinese forces outside Formosa. I do not want to repeat at this time why I believe that that policy would be a profound mistake--but I want to state my view that such a policy would not end the war in Korea at this time but might, on the contrary, lead from limited action to unlimited action, the result of which might bring in the U.S.S.R. If it did not, in my view it would almost certainly engulf us in a full continental war with 450 million Chinese people. I cannot myself think that that is the best way of ending the war in Korea. We would be playing for high stakes indeed if we took this kind of limited action in the hope that by such limited action we could end the war in Korea without going on, if it did not succeed, to unlimited action or without bringing in anyone else.

...It may be that, in spite of all our efforts, the catastrophe of a third world war may not be avoided. It may be that, in spite of all our efforts, this conflict will extend to (continental) China. We may not have the control of that extension. But if the conflict is so extended, let the responsibility for the terror, the anguish and the devastation that it will cause rest on other hands than ours.

...What is the alternative policy? It is for the United Nations forces to continue inflicting heavy losses on the aggressors, as they are doing at the present time, and at the same time to avoid any measures which are not absolutely necessary from a military point of view, and which might lead to the spreading of the conflict.

The Possibility of a Negotiated Settlement

As I said a few days ago in this place, there have been no recent indications that the Chinese communists are in any mood to negotiate. I cannot believe, however, that the Chinese Government in Peking can be so blind to Chinese national interests as to continue indefinitely suffering the very heavy losses which are now being inflicted on their forces. So we must hope that a day will come when they will realize that it is not China but Russia which is being served by the aggression in Korea in which they have participated.

If that time comes, they may then be ready to enter into negotiations leading to a settlement in Korea and also to a settlement of other Far Eastern issues. Then, as now, the United Nations will stand ready to negotiate, as has been made clear many times, and most notably by the General Assembly when it approved overwhelmingly the statement of principles drawn up by the United Nations' cease-fire committee...

But it is necessary to remember...that all the recent efforts of the United Nations...have been, to say the least, rudely rebuffed by the Chinese communist regime. The approaches made by the Good Offices Committee have been rebuffed, and unofficial feelers by individual countries have not been any more successful. The hon. member for Kootenay West (Mr. Herridge) suggested that we might propose to the Indian Government that they contact the Peking Government with a view to entering into negotiations. The

Canadian Government has kept in constant touch with the Indian Government on this question, and the Indian Government in its turn has been vigilant in watching for any sign that the Peking regime might be willing to discuss a settlement in Korea and in the Far East generally on any terms that we could even consider. Although it would certainly be improper for me to reveal what the Indian Ambassador in Peking has been reporting to his own government, I can say that his inquiries in Peking have not given any grounds for believing that the Chinese communists are yet ready to negotiate on any terms that could conceivably be acceptable to the United Nations. And that is what I meant when I said that for the time being, especially while the Chinese military offensive is going on, it would appear that there are no further steps that could be taken, either by the United Nations collectively, or by any other members individually, to bring the Chinese communists to the conference table on any conditions that we would consider.

...The possibility of securing an honourable settlement by negotiation is never being overlooked by any of the governments, any of the free governments, which are concerned with this matter; we will all continue to search for any indications that the Peking regime may be ready to discuss a settlement, and we will be energetic in taking advantage of any opportunity that we might be able to discover. Meanwhile, however, I can only repeat what I said the other day, namely, that until we get that indication in some form from Peking, and while the battle is going on, diplomacy must for the time being take a second place to arms. We can only hope that the use of those arms by the United Nations will be so effective and do so much damage to the forces of communist aggression that before long they will see reason. It may then be possible to negotiate with them on United Nations terms, and the danger of a third world war arising in that part of the world will, at least, have been avoided.

S/C