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THE SECURITY COUNCIL: REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS
AND SUPPLY OF FORCES

Text of an address by General A.G.L. McNaughton, to the Institute for Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, conducted by New York University in co-operation with the UN Department of Public Information, at Lake Success, on Wednesday July 20, 1949.

It is for me a great pleasure to have this opportunity of addressing the New York University Seminar on the subject of "The Security Council; Regulation of Armaments and Supply of Forces".

I welcome this topic, for it has been my good fortune, as Canada's permanent delegate to the United Nations, to participate in the work which has been and is being done in the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, in this field of endeavour.

In preparing this paper I have attempted to present in an objective manner an account of the work which has been accomplished in this field through the medium of the United Nations. Although I realize that much of what I am to say is common knowledge, I hope it may serve as a useful summary in your studies of this important and controversial subject.

HISTORICAL

Before entering upon an examination of the efforts which are presently being made toward the regulation and reduction of armaments (or as it is commonly called "disarmament"), it might be well to review briefly a few historical facts about disarmament. I say briefly, as time does not permit the marshalling of the mass of detail necessary to give any comprehensive account of the intensive efforts previously made in this field.

The first real efforts toward world disarmament were made in the latter part of the 19th century when, in 1898, the Czar of Russia taking the initiative, invited the leading world powers to join in a conference to discuss "the most effective means of assuring to all peoples the blessings of real and lasting peace, and above all to limit the progressive development of existing armaments".

The Czar's proposals, as later enlarged, led to the convoking at The Hague in 1899 of a conference to discuss disarmament. This first conference achieved little by way of concrete results, but it is interesting to note that it led to the creation of a Court of judges titled The Hague Court, to which questions could be submitted for mediation and arbitration.

A second conference was held at The Hague in 1907 to continue with the work of the first, but it too did not achieve a signal success.

Despite the limited success of The Hague Conferences, however, I think one has to credit them with the concept which led to the very great interest in disarmament which became evident immediately following World War I. The Hague Conferences brought the question of world disarmament to public notice and perhaps paved the way for future discussions which, unfortunately, were not resumed until the conclusion of World War II. I think, however, that it is worthwhile noting that the two Hague Conferences held at the instigation of Russia have an interesting parallel in that the discussions which were initiated in the United Nations in 1946 were sponsored by Soviet Russia. It is also germane to efforts being carried on today in the field of disarmament to note that at these Conferences one of the important issues on which the Russians were unable to agree with a number of other nations related to the technological disadvantages to which they considered they would be placed in the matter of new fire arms, new explosives, submarines or similar engines of destruction, warships armed with rams, strategic Railways all of which had become subjects for intense discussion.

I think it is well to remember that although The Hague conferences failed to place any limitations upon land armaments, the second conference in particular did succeed in extending the provisions of the Geneva Convention to naval warfare; it obtained some limitations on naval weapons; it declared against bombardment of undefended places, and most indicative of the future, in declaring against the use of poison gas in warfare, it laid the basis for the protocol on gas warfare of 1925.

Immediately following World War I two methods of approach to the problem of world disarmament were evolved. The first was through a system of articles in the League of Nations Covenant, and the second through a series of conferences held outside the framework of the League of Nations. Without going into the details of the efforts made to establish a system of disarmament following World War I, it can be said that the League of Nations in spite of the purposes for which it was established did not succeed because it lacked the support of certain major powers (principally the United States of America which had become isolationist). The fact that the Covenant itself lacked some of the machinery which is now contained in the Charter of the United Nations was, I think, only of secondary importance. Several of the conferences held outside the framework of the League scored limited successes and I will refer briefly to one or two of these efforts in order to draw attention to some of the points which remain of importance in the renewed efforts now underway.

Today when it is clear that the United Nations is the only international body which possibly can provide the framework for such discussions, it is difficult to understand a state of affairs which in the 1920's and 1930's gave better opportunities for reaching agreement on disarmament outside the League of Nations. The debates in the League resulted in a stalemate. The French, because of their very real fear of a resurgent Germany, demanded that security must precede disarmament. The United Kingdom and others took the opposite view, and early lost patience with French preoccupations and anxieties. In the late 1920's, however, a spirit of optimism spread throughout the world when Litvinov for Russia, Kellogg for the United States of America, and Briand for France promoted a treaty to outlaw war and it seemed for a time that as a consequence of this treaty important reductions in armaments might be effected. We must recall that the Washington, Geneva and London Conferences did achieve very substantial reductions in naval armaments, but these were later nullified when Germany and Japan denounced the treaties.

By the 1930's the optimism in which these efforts had begun had changed to pessimism. The last general disarmament effort began

in February 1932 when the Conference for reduction and limitation of armaments met at Geneva. This endeavor dragged on until 1936 when Germany's attitude and her repudiation of the League made further efforts senseless.

I should here like to mention one episode in these efforts following World War I which deserves attention. As I said earlier in this paper, a protocol outlawing the use of chemical and bacteriological warfare was signed by 29 nations including the United States in 1925. It was ratified by 41 nations including the U.S.S.R., France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The United States and Japan did not ratify. The protocol deserves attention because of its simplicity. It was merely an agreement to abstain from the use of asphyxiating poison or other gases and bacteriological weapons in war, providing no safeguards and no international system of control. In World War II gas was not used by one nation against another although the Germans used gas in gas chambers to exterminate large numbers of enemy civilians and prisoners. I think it is safe to say that fear of reprisals offered a strong deterrent against the use of gas in war. Certainly also there were very few occasions in which gas might have been used with decisive advantage and in each of these cases there were substantial tactical and technical reasons against its use. In drawing conclusions from the non use of gas in World War II we must not forget however that all the principal nations engaged had devoted very great attention to development and new gases of terrible potency were available.

In the discussions at Geneva a special jargon developed which made it very difficult for the general public to follow the debates with understanding. There was competition between the advocates of "qualitative" as contrasted with "quantitative" disarmament; others were advocates of indirect means of limitation such as "budgetary"; some asserted that armaments could be classified as "offensive" or "defensive" and that the former should be eliminated and the latter encouraged; in one phase of the discussions weapons of "peculiarly aggressive character" came in for much debate.

The lesson to be drawn from this experience is, I think, that care must be taken to keep discussions of disarmament to simple, well understood terms so that the public may know what is going on. It is important also that in discussing these matters the new terms with their special technical meanings should not be allowed to obscure the simple facts and political principles on which in the final analysis acceptance or rejection must rest.

Summarizing the lessons to be drawn from the great efforts in the study of disarmament made from World War I until the outbreak of World War II it would appear to have been proved conclusively, that any effective system of disarmament must be general and not unilateral or limited to regions or to a few nations; that it must be enforceable by an international system of collective security; that all nations must participate in good faith, and that any system must be accompanied by adequate and effective safeguards to protect all states against evasions and violations. These safeguards necessarily involve a system of international "security checks" with a corresponding surrender by all nations of some portion of their national sovereignty, or as I prefer to put it, the creation of an agency to exercise these powers effectively on behalf of all the nations.

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Charter of the United Nations, though not as detailed in some respects as the League of Nations Covenant on the subject of disarmament, contains several articles which bear examination, and

which set out the responsibilities of the various organs of the United Nations in that regard. It is well to note the Charter closely defines the respective responsibilities of the General Assembly and the Security Council in regard to regulation and reduction of armaments and other subjects -- the Assembly has the legislative function and the duty and the authority to recommend -- the Security Council is the executive with the responsibility to evolve the operative procedures and methods, and it is intended to have the power to enforce where enforcement is needed, which might be after the processes of persuasion and agreement had been shown to be insufficient.

The role of the General Assembly in regard to arms limitation is given specifically in Article 11 of the Charter which authorizes the General Assembly to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and to make recommendations in regard to such principles to the members of the United Nations or to the Security Council, or to both.

The Security Council on the other hand as an executive organ, is vested with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Article 24) and under Article 26 it is given specific responsibility for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

The authors of the United Nations Charter were acutely aware of the fact that moral authority alone was insufficient to enforce peace, and accordingly a whole chapter -- Chapter VII -- deals with the authority of the Security Council to enforce peace, and if necessary to achieve this by the use of military force. Under Article 43 members are obligated to make available to the Security Council armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Article 47 establishes a Military Staff Committee with the defined role of advising and assisting the Security Council both for the military requirements to maintain the peace, the employment of forces placed at its disposal, and the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament. I have mentioned these portions of the United Nations Charter because they form the framework on which are based the present efforts to regulate and to reduce arms and armaments.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 24, 1946, CREATING THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The impact of the discovery of the release of atomic energy and the manufacture of atomic weapons was felt by the world with the release of the first bombs at Nagasaki and Hiroshima. There are few people in the world today who are not aware of the terrible alternatives presented if agreement cannot be reached for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

The first step toward such an international agreement was made shortly after the termination of the war when the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada made a Declaration issued in Washington on November 15, 1945, which recognized the need for an international agreement and proposed, as a matter of great urgency, the setting up of a Commission under the United Nations which would study the problem and make recommendations for the international control of atomic energy.

This declaration was followed by a meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. in Moscow in December 1945, at which time the Washington proposals were endorsed. These three governments then invited Canada, China and France to join with them in sponsoring the proposal at the General Assembly. The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was established by unanimous resolution at the first meeting of the General Assembly on 24 January 1946, in London.

In this resolution the terms of reference of the Commission were laid down. The Commission was instructed to enquire into all phases of the problem of atomic energy and to make recommendations in particular in regard to the following points:

- (1) The elimination from national armaments of atomic energy and all other weapons of mass destruction.
- (2) Exchange of basic scientific information.
- (3) Control to the extent necessary to ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; and
- (4) Provide effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

Before discussing what has been accomplished by this Commission in its three years of work, I would like to mention the steps which were taken at the same time looking to the control and regulation of the more orthodox weapons of war or, as they came to be called, "conventional armaments."

FIRST GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS, DECEMBER 14, 1946.

Together with the control of atomic energy the General Assembly was faced with the problem of the control of other armaments. This latter became one of the main issues at the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly held in New York in October of 1946. The discussions were initiated when the Soviet Union in the tradition established by the Czars introduced a resolution couched in general terms, calling for a general reduction in all categories of armaments. The issue was further complicated by the introduction by the U.S.S.R. a resolution dealing with the presence in foreign countries (other than ex-enemy territories) of armed forces of member states of the United Nations. The debate on this matter in the Political Committee of the General Assembly immediately preceded the debate on disarmament and later the two issues became confused, and were only separated with difficulty. Finally two resolutions were passed by the General Assembly on 14 December 1946, one on the general regulation and reduction of armaments, and the other calling for the Security Council to determine the information which the member nations should furnish to their armed forces in order to implement the resolution on armaments. No one had expected that it would be possible for the General membership of the United Nations to agree so early in the life of the United Nations to take such an important first step towards general disarmament. The adoption of the resolution on the general regulation and reduction of armaments by unanimous vote therefore did much to restore confidence in the United Nations as an instrument of world peace and led to a feeling of optimism which later events have shown to be somewhat premature.

ANALYSIS OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER 14, 1946, INCLUDING REFERENCE TO PROBLEM OF ATOMIC ENERGY

The resolution on the regulation and reduction of armaments dealt with four related aspects of the disarmament problem:

- (1) the prohibition of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction;
- (2) the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes;
- (3) the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council;
- (4) the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

Insofar as the first two aspects are concerned, the resolution reaffirmed the Assembly resolution of January 24, 1946, which set up the Atomic Energy Commission. On the third aspect the General Assembly urged that Article 43 of the Charter be implemented.

With regard to the fourth aspect, concerning general regulation and reduction of armaments, the General Assembly resolution stated four principles for general disarmament:

- (1) the early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces in order to strengthen international peace and security;
- (2) practical measures to assure that the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces would be observed by all participants and not by some only;
- (3) practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions;
- (4) an international convention or conventions on disarmament to create, within the framework of the Security Council, an international system of control and inspection, operating through special organs deriving their powers and status from the convention or conventions.

The resolution set forth four stages which might take place in the process of general disarmament. The first stage was that taken by the General Assembly when it adopted a resolution on the principles which would govern the general regulation and reduction of armaments. The second stage was to be the formulation by the Security Council, under Article 26 of the Charter, of plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation and reduction of armaments. The third stage would be consideration by all members of the United Nations at a special session of the General Assembly of the plans formulated by the Security Council. The final stage was seen as ratification by the signatory states and the coming into force of disarmament treaties or conventions approved by the General Assembly. The question of general disarmament remains in the second stage; that is formulation by the Security Council of plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation and reduction of armaments.

REPLY OF FORCES

I will now comment briefly on the steps which have been taken to give effect to Article 43 of the Charter, by which all members of the United Nations are obligated to make available to the Security

Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreements, armed forces "necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." As you are aware, Article 47 of the Charter calls for the establishment of a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on this matter. The Military Staff Committee, under the terms of Article 47 (2) consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council or of their representatives.

The Military Staff Committee has been meeting now for some three years but as yet it has not been able to formulate general agreements for the implementation of Article 43 of the Charter. The position of my Government on this failure of the Military Staff Committee to make progress was stated by the then Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. St. Laurent, in his opening speech in the General Assembly on October 29, 1946, in the following words:

"We are particularly concerned that the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee have so far failed to make substantial progress towards a conclusion of the special agreements with individual members required to implement Article 43 and those following of the Charter, and thus make armed forces and other facilities available to the Security Council.... Canada therefore urges that the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee go ahead with all possible steps in the constructive work of negotiating the special agreements and of organizing the military and economic measures of enforcement."

This statement was made almost three years ago and the position has largely remained unchanged. Canada is not represented on the Military Staff Committee (as the latter consists only of the five permanent members of the Security Council) and so we do not have first hand information of the disagreements which have led to the present deadlock. However, it is generally known that these disagreements are mainly concerned with three important points. These are: the size and composition of the forces proposed to be made available by the five permanent members of the Security Council; the location of the United Nations forces, and their right of access to the military bases of member nations. It should be noted that all members of the Military Staff Committee except the Soviet Union have agreed that the initial overall contributions should be comparable but that in view of "the difference in size and composition of national forces of each Permanent Member and in order to further the ability of the Security Council to constitute balanced and effective combat forces for operations, these contributions may differ widely as to the strength of the separate component, land, sea and air." X

The position of the U.S.S.R. on this point is that these forces shall be made available "on the Principle of Equality regarding the overall strength and the composition of these forces." XX

The fallacy of the Soviet position on this question seems evident. The obvious result would be that a naval power, such as the United Kingdom, would contribute the same number of ships as, let us say, the Soviet Union; the Chinese would contribute aircraft on a parity with the United States, and so forth, or rather that the contributions in any service of any great power would be that of the weakest in that service.

X Report of the Military Staff Committee, Document S/336, 30 April 1947, Chapter IV, Article 11, p.p. 9-10.

XX Chapter IV, Article 11, page 9.

In connection with the location of United Nations forces, the Soviet Union proposes that such forces "shall be garrisoned within the frontiers of the contributing member nations own territories or territorial waters, except in cases envisaged in Article 106~~x~~ of the Charter."~~xx~~ The viewpoint of the United Kingdom, the United States and China, and the other hand, is that "Armed Forces made available to the Security Council by Member Nations when not employed by the Security Council will be based at the discretion of Member Nations in any territories or waters to which they have legal right of access."

I do not intend to go into further points of disagreement, as I do not have first hand knowledge of them. It is now evident, however, that four of the five members of the Military Staff Committee have for some time been in general agreement on the fundamental principles, and that the inability of the Committee to make progress in its work is due largely to the fact that the Soviet Union has consistently disagreed with the position taken by the other four members.

CREATION OF THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS.

FEBRUARY 13, 1947.

On February 13, 1947, the Security Council adopted a resolution creating the Commission for Conventional Armaments. This Commission was given the task of preparing plans for the general regulation and reduction of armaments, and was instructed to submit a plan of work to the Security Council. The Commission was established with the same membership as the Security Council.

The first issue debated by this Commission was whether or not the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons should be considered together with the general reduction of armaments and armed forces by the same body in drafting plans of disarmament. The Soviet Union desired to have the two matters considered together while the majority of the other members, on the other hand, pointed out that the problems involved in the working out of a plan for the international control of atomic energy involved technical questions which were different from those relating to the question of disarmament involving conventional arms and armaments.

DEFINITION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

In view of the differences which became apparent early in the Commission's work, it became important to establish a definition of "conventional armaments."

The Assembly resolution of December 14, 1946, stated that nothing contained in it should alter or limit the resolution of the General Assembly of January 24, 1946, creating the Atomic Energy Commission. Similarly the Security Council resolution of February 13, 1947, setting up the Commission for Conventional Armaments stated that those matters falling within the competence of the Atomic Energy Commission should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commission.

At the first meeting of the Working Committee of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, the United States representative proposed a definition of weapons of mass destruction. This definition was adopted in the Working Committee. The resolution of the Working Committee considered that all armaments and armed forces, except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction, should fall within its jurisdiction and that weapons of mass destruction should be

Article 106 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Chapter IX, Article 32, page 21.

defined to include atomic explosives, weapons involving radio-active materials, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to these weapons. The resolution containing this definition was approved by the Commission and later by the parent body, the Security Council.

FORMULATION OF POSITIONS OF THE POWERS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

The Commission for Conventional Armaments next undertook the consideration of general principles which should govern the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. The majority in the Commission were of the opinion that adequate conditions of security must first be established to enable disarmament to proceed safely and equitably. It is interesting to note the similarity in this position and the position of the French government in the discussions on disarmament in the League of Nations which I have previously mentioned. - Security should precede disarmament. -

Starting with this premise the majority of the Commission considered that the following prior conditions were necessary:

- (1) The completion of agreements under Article 43 of the Charter which called for the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council.
- (2) The establishment of a system of international control over atomic energy.
- (3) The conclusion of peace settlements with Germany and Japan.

The majority of the members of the Commission emphasized the need to establish an adequate system of international inspection and control, which would give assurance to all nations that disarmament would be on an equitable basis and that no state would be placed in a position which would give it an advantage over the others.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. took the position that an immediate across-the-board reduction of armaments and armed forces would in itself be "an essential condition for the creation of a sense of international confidence and security". He argued that the position of the majority was contrary to the resolution of the General Assembly of December 14, 1946. Concerning the question of international inspection and control, the Soviet representative contended that any control body must be established within the framework of the Security Council. This has been taken to mean by the majority of the Commission that the veto could be exercised in the Security Council by its permanent members; this raised the doubt that it might be used at some stage in their own interest by the U.S.S.R., who had advocated this condition, to prevent the effective inspection and control which is regarded as essential in any real disarmament system.

U.S.S.R. PROPOSAL FOR DISARMAMENT MADE IN PARIS

At the first part of the Third Session of the General Assembly in Paris in the fall of 1948, Mr. Vishinsky, the representative of the U.S.S.R., proposed that three steps be taken immediately towards general disarmament:

- (1) The reduction by one-third during one year of the present strength of the land, naval and air forces

of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

- (2) Prohibition of atomic weapons intended for "aims of aggression".
- (3) The establishment within the framework of the Security Council of an international control body for the purpose of supervision and control over the implementation of the above measures.

The main issue centered around the point as to whether or not the Soviet Union would permit effective international inspection to be carried out in its territory to determine both quantitatively and qualitatively the armed forces at its disposal. Without an undertaking by all states concerned to open their territories to international inspection, it was clearly impossible to arrive at any plan of disarmament which might be directly related to the needs of international peace and security. The arbitrary arithmetical formula for reduction by one-third suggested by the Soviet Union would leave that country in a position of advantage in relation to those countries which had already considerably reduced their armaments and armed forces since the conclusion of World War II. In short, in calling for a one-third reduction in the forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council, no regard was paid as to whether or not these forces have a proper relationship to one another numerically speaking. During the debate a counter-resolution was submitted by the United Kingdom delegation reasserting the principle already taken by the majority of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, that disarmament could only take place in an atmosphere of international confidence and security. During the debate the Canadian representative supported the United Kingdom resolution emphasizing in particular that the problem of inspection, verification and control was the root of the disarmament problem, and urged that the Soviet representative should declare whether the Soviet Union was prepared to open its territory to international inspection. The Soviet resolution was defeated in the First Committee in Paris, which subsequently adopted a resolution based upon the United Kingdom proposal. This resolution as adopted by the General Assembly on November 19, 1948, contained the following points:

- (1) It recommended that the Security Council pursue its studies of the regulation in reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces through the agency of the Commission for Conventional Armaments in order to obtain concrete results as soon as possible.
- (2) It requested the Commission for Conventional Armaments to devote its first attention to formulating proposals for the receipt, checking and publication by an international organ of control within the framework of the Security Council of full information to be supplied by member states with regard to their effectives and their conventional armaments; and
- (3) It laid emphasis on the fact that the Security Council should report on the effect given to its recommendations not later than the next regular session, which is to be held in September this year.

The resolution also noted that the aim of the reduction of conventional armaments could only be attained in an atmosphere of real and lasting improvement in international relations, and that such a renewal of confidence would be greatly encouraged if there

were an exchange of precise and verified information concerning armaments and armed forces.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY DISCUSSIONS FROM 1946 to 1948

As I mentioned previously in this paper, the Atomic Energy Commission was established by a unanimous resolution of the General Assembly on January 24, 1946, which set forth the terms of reference of the Commission. When the Commission first met in June of 1946, it was presented with two plans for the international control of atomic energy; one put forward by the United States delegate and the other by the U.S.S.R. The two plans differed fundamentally, and after attempting to find a basis for agreement the Atomic Energy Commission decided to defer consideration of the political aspects of the problem until it had first determined whether control of atomic energy was practicable from a technical and scientific point of view. In this regard a committee composed of scientific and technical advisers examined the problem, and in September 1946 reported unanimously that "we do not find any basis in the available scientific facts for supposing that effective control is not technologically feasible".

In its first report to the Security Council in December 1946, the Commission set out a general plan for the international control of atomic energy based upon proposals submitted by the United States government. These proposals were then developed in detail by the Atomic Energy Commission. The result of this work was the submission to the Security Council in September 1947 of the second report of the Atomic Energy Commission. This report elaborates specific proposals for the international control of atomic energy.

MAJORITY POSITION

The plan supported by the majority of members of the Atomic Energy Commission calls for the establishment of an international atomic energy authority, which would own all uranium and thorium in trust for the nations of the world from the time these substances are taken from the ground, and which would control the mining of all such ores. Production would be strictly related to consumption and there would be no accumulation of stocks to cause anxiety. The authority would own, operate and manage all facilities handling dangerous amounts of fissionable material and thus would control directly from the starting point all the atomic energy activities in all nations.

A licensing and inspection system is contemplated under the majority plan for activities of a character less dangerous to International Peace and it is provided that the control authority would foster beneficial uses and research in national or private establishments, or educational institutions, limited to non-dangerous quantities. It is proposed that the system of control should be set up by stages, and after it is fully in operation, the manufacture of atomic weapons would cease, existing stocks would be disposed of, and the nuclear fuel converted to peaceful uses.

SOVIET POSITION

The plan proposed by the U.S.S.R. for the international control of atomic energy was first presented in June 1946, and subsequently was elaborated in June 1947; it calls for the immediate outlawing of the atomic bomb and the destruction of all existing stocks of weapons "within a three-month period". The Soviet government has admitted that international inspection and investigation is a necessary condition of any plan for international control, but it has been unwilling to accept any proposals providing for continuous inspection, and has also

insisted that inspection be confined to such facilities and materials as governments may wish to declare. In addition, the Soviet government maintain that any international atomic energy authority must be subject to the jurisdiction of the Security Council. This would mean that the permanent members of the Security Council could exercise their veto power in the event that the Authority reported a violation of the treaty. The Soviet have suggested "special inspections" on grounds of suspicion but the control organ proposed by the Soviet government has not been provided with sources of information which would be capable of detecting evasions and violations and so there could be no suspicion on which to call for a special inspection.

The discussions in the Atomic Energy Commission in 1948 were confined to a detailed examination of the Soviet proposals of June 1947, and to a limited study of the organization of an international control agency.

The exhaustive study of the U.S.S.R. proposals led a majority of the members of the Commission to the conclusion that they were inadequate to provide a basis for effective international control of atomic energy. The opinion of the majority of the Commission is stated in the Commission's Third Report in the following words:

"In the field of atomic energy, the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure the agreement of the Soviet Union to even those elements of effective control considered essential from the technical point of view, let alone their acceptance of the nature and the extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field by the first and second reports of the Atomic Energy Commission."

The third report in consequence stated that the differences between the majority of the members of the Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S.S.R. had made it impossible for the Atomic Energy Commission to continue the preparation of a draft treaty for the international control of atomic energy. This report was adopted by the Atomic Energy Commission in May of 1948. In submitting its third report to the Security Council, the Atomic Energy Commission recommended approval and that this report and the two previous reports be transmitted to the General Assembly "as a matter of special concern".

In June 1948, when the third report was before the Security Council for approval, the U.S.S.R. exercising its 26th veto, voted against its adoption. The Security Council, however, approved a procedural motion proposed by Canada which transmitted the three reports of the Atomic Energy Commission, together with the record of the deliberations of the Security Council on the subject, to the Third Session of the General Assembly "as a matter of special concern". Thus there was created an opportunity to test the conclusions of the majority both as regards their technical correctness and also as to their acceptability to the member states of the United Nations.

In the opening meetings of the General Assembly in Paris, the Atomic Energy Commission proposals were given wide support by many nations, except by the countries of the Soviet bloc.

The Soviet Union presented two proposals. One to which I have previously referred concerned an immediate reduction by one-third in conventional armaments of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the prohibition of atomic weapons. The other proposal of the U.S.S.R. introduced the idea of "simultaneous" conventions, the one for the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the

other for what the Soviet termed as "effective international control of atomic energy". Both conventions were to be signed and "to enter into force and actual operation simultaneously".

Formerly the Soviet had insisted on prohibition and destruction of existing stocks as a prerequisite. They now presented this latest proposal as a great concession in the interests of reaching agreement.

It did not add in the least to the safety of the world to have "simultaneous" control when the elements of that control would lack the character deemed necessary to provide acceptable safeguards which would dispel suspicion and promote cooperation between nations. It was so recognized by a great majority of the General Assembly and decisively rejected. No nation outside the Soviet group voted for it.

The draft resolution submitted by Canada calling for the submission of the three reports of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Assembly formed the framework of the debate and these reports were duly considered in the First Committee.

The resolution as adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1948 approved the general findings of the First Report and the specific proposals of the Second Report "as constituting the necessary basis" of an effective system of international control of atomic energy. The resolution also noted with concern the impasse which had been reached in the work of the Atomic Energy Commission as shown in the Third Report. It requested the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission to consult together "in order to determine if there exists a basis for agreement on international control" and meanwhile called upon the Atomic Energy Commission "to resume its sessions, to survey its programme of work, and to proceed with the further study of such subjects as it considered to be practicable and useful". Such was the position at the conclusion of the Paris session of the General Assembly last winter.

Since the beginning of 1949, the Atomic Energy Commission, in compliance with the General Assembly's wishes, has continued to meet to review its plan of work. The Working Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission has given consideration to a proposal put forward by the Soviet Union substantially the same as the proposal they put forward in Paris, which called for the immediate preparation of draft conventions for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the control of atomic energy, the two conventions to be concluded and put into effect simultaneously. Further discussion revealed that the basic differences persisted and the representative of China proposed that the Committee conclude that no useful purpose could be served by further discussions. In a draft resolution presented by the Chinese delegation to give effect to this proposal, it was pointed out that the U.S.S.R. proposal had already been considered and rejected as not providing an adequate basis for effective international control. Moreover, the resolution pointed out that no new material had been presented in support of the Soviet proposals. In June, the Committee postponed taking a decision on the Chinese resolution and considered the General Assembly's resolution which had set the Atomic Energy Commission back to work. It shortly became clear, however, that the impasse which existed in the work of the Commission last year remained, and the representative of Cuba in conjunction with the representative of Argentina presented a draft resolution which found that nothing further useful or practicable could be done until the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission had met and reported the existence of a basis for agreement. The Working Committee approved the Chinese draft resolution as well as the joint Cuban-Argentine proposal, and as the Chairman of the Working Committee concluded that the agenda had been exhausted, it was agreed that there was no occasion for a further meeting.

I might point out, however, that although the Working Committee and the Commission have been unable to resolve the differences, the Commission, upon the suggestion of the representative of Canada, did initiate the preparation of some useful documentation which may prove invaluable in the consultations which are about to take place between the six sponsoring powers of the General Assembly's resolution of 1946.

PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

On February 8, of this year, the Security Council commenced discussion on the General Assembly's resolution of November 19, 1948, the main points of which I have already outlined in this paper. At this meeting the Soviet delegate reintroduced in almost identical terms the Soviet resolution rejected in Paris. That resolution, you will recall, sought a reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and called for the Atomic Energy Commission to proceed with the preparation of two draft conventions, one on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the other for the control of atomic energy, both conventions to come into effect simultaneously. On February 10, the United States submitted a resolution suggesting the transmittal of the General Assembly resolution of November 19, 1948 to the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The resolution of the U.S.S.R. did not receive acceptance in the Security Council. The United States resolution was adopted.

The Commission for Conventional Armaments next met on February 15, to consider the General Assembly resolution, and on February 25, the United States-sponsored resolution submitting the General Assembly resolution of November 19, 1948 to the Working Committee of the Commission for Conventional Armaments was adopted by nine votes to two.

More recently, in May, the delegation of France submitted a paper in the Working Committee of the Commission for Conventional Armaments outlining a method of carrying out the tasks allotted to the Commission by the General Assembly's resolution of November last.

In June the French representative presented a third section to this paper. This section deals with proposals for the organization of the control organ which would be set up to collect, check and publish information on the effectives and conventional armaments of member states. These proposals of the French delegation have received the support of a majority of the members of the Working Committee, which adopted them on July 18 by a vote of 8 to 3. Both papers were rejected in their entirety by the representatives of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and U.S.S.R. Egypt also voted against their adoption.

The French proposals, as I have indicated, are divided into three sections, the first section dealing with the general considerations on which the proposals have been based. This section defines the conditions which in the opinion of the French delegation must be met if an effective system for the receipt and verification of information on conventional armaments can be put into force. The second section deals with the scope of the census of armed forces and armaments which should be included in the plan and defines the nature of the forces and the equipment to be verified and the manner in which such verification would be carried out. It is made clear in the first two sections of the paper that "as between disclosure of information and adequate verification, the requirements of verification must be paramount". It is also made clear that the success of the plan would depend upon "the greatest possible freedom of movement and access to data fully depicting the level of conventional armaments and effectives of each state" being made available to the control organ.

CONCLUSIONS

It is not my thought in a paper of this kind to attempt to present you with definitive conclusions on matters so complex and so important. I think it must be clear, however, that both the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments in the field of disarmament has not led to the final results which all of us had hoped would be possible when the United Nations was first established. Nevertheless those of us who have participated in the work of these two commissions feel that such useful preparatory work has been done. In the Atomic Energy Commission I feel that the pattern which any effective agreement must take has been evolved and set forth in the majority reports. I think I can speak for my colleagues in this majority when I say that not only do our proposals represent the elements of a proper solution to this grave problem but that we believe that they represent the only solution. In the Commission for Conventional Armaments I believe we have taken a most important first step in providing a plan for a survey which, if accepted and carried out, would give the world the information requisite to a useful discussion of this complex subject.

The continuing disagreement between the Communist and non-Communist world which has affected the work of the United Nations as a whole has unquestionably been the principal reason why it has not been possible to reach agreement on disarmament and the Western Powers, in insisting upon the principle that disarmament must follow and not precede the establishment of an effective system of security, have had in mind the costly experience of unilateral disarmament by peace-loving states in the years preceding World War II.

I think it is safe to conclude that the Western Powers will not agree to accept any system for the prohibition of atomic weapons or the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces which does not give assurance of adequate security for all nations. It seems equally clear that the Soviet Union for their part are unwilling at this stage to accept the kind of international control and international inspection which is so obviously necessary for an effective system of control. In particular, the Soviet Union and those countries which think like her are unprepared to open up their frontiers to international inspection on a continuing basis - they insist on national management ownership and control over atomic energy and likewise in the matter of conventional armaments they will not agree to disclose their forces and armaments or to allow adequate verification thereof. It is difficult to see, therefore, how it will be possible to reach agreement on these matters until such time as there has been some agreement in the realm of policy which will permit all nations to join in the kind of international cooperative effort which is the only possible way to assure to all nations the kind of security on a universal basis which is envisaged under the United Nations Charter.
