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THE CANADA-UNITED STATES PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

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Since the end of the war, the Board, established originally for the primary purpose of co-ordinating the plans of the two governments for the wartime defence of North America, has gradually come to assume a somewhat different role, partly because of the changing nature of the task and partly because of the emergence of other bilateral consultative bodies in the defence field. Among these are the Military Co-operation Committee, established in 1946, the Senior Policy Committee on the Canada-United States Defence Production and Development Sharing Programme, and the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence, both formed in 1958. Thus the Board is no longer the only joint body concerned with defence problems.

The emergence of the Soviet threat to Western Europe in the late 1940s, and the consequent creation of NATO, brought Canada and the United States for the first time into formal alliance in peacetime. While actively supporting this multi-national defensive alliance, the two countries continued to provide for the defence of North America on a bilateral basis, paralleling the joint defence organization established collectively by the NATO countries

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The mixed military and civil membership of the Board, the prestige and experience it has acquired through the years and the flexibility of its procedures give it unique qualifications for dealing with the sensitive and complex problems which, under modern conditions, arise in connection with North American defence. The Board can be expected to continue to make an important and valuable contribution to the maintenance of mutually beneficial relations between Canada and the United States.

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
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