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# **An Overview of Multilateral SALW Programme Funding: Options and Opportunities for Canada**

**Dr. Andrew Latham**

in collaboration with Tyler Beckelman, Beth Neitzel and Anita Girdhari

Prepared for the  
International Security Research and Outreach Programme  
International Security Bureau

June 2002



Department of Foreign Affairs  
and International Trade

Ministère des Affaires étrangères  
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## PREFACE

The International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) commissioned a report to briefly take stock of existing multilateral and regional funds related to small arms and light weapons (SALW) and describing their mechanisms. This paper also address the scope and scale of SALW-related activities supported by the government of Canada.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade wishes to acknowledge the work performed under contract through the International Security Research and Outreach Programme in preparation of this report by the author and principal investigator: Dr. Andrew Latham, in collaboration with Tyler Beckelman, Beth Neitzel, and Anita Girdhari.

The views expressed in this report are those of the principal investigator and his collaborators, and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or the Government of Canada. All the data were collected before March 2002. Therefore, this report describes the situation at that time and does not represent the full account of the existing multilateral funds related to small arms and light weapons.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade  
June 2002

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## CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

### Scope and Purpose

The last five years or so have seen a rapid expansion of both SALW-related commitments and the programming and resources necessary to give practical effect to these commitments. But while these developments have unfolded, to date little systematic attention has been paid to the 'fit' between SALW-related commitments, programmes, and resources. No clear picture exists, for example, of the resource implications of many of the global, regional and sub-regional undertakings currently in effect (ie. what resources would be required to implement programmes that would fulfill widely subscribed commitments). Nor do we have a clear picture of aggregate SALW spending by the international donor community. Nor, finally, is there any clear picture of which areas – in terms of both geographic region (eg. east Africa) and functional programmes (eg. weapons collection) – are being adequately resourced and which would benefit substantially from even a modest infusion of financial or other support.

This gap in the research is significant for several reasons. In a general sense, not having a clear picture of the general pattern of the relationship between SALW-related commitments, programmes and resources allocation makes possible – perhaps even probable – needless and wasteful overlap, duplication, and inefficiency. It also creates a potential for gaps to emerge in resource 'coverage'. For individual donor governments (like Canada), not having a clear picture of what commitments/programmes are already adequately resourced has the added effect of seriously complicating the formulation of and implementation of sound public policy. Simply put, without such a picture it is difficult to develop an coherent/integrated 'action plan' to address the SALW problem in a comprehensive and efficient way.

In light of these considerations, the purpose of this report is threefold: to develop a broad-brush picture of existing SALW-related programming (types of activity, geographical foci, etc); to develop a better understanding of the resourcing of existing commitments and programmes; and, finally, to develop a set of policy options that will allow Canada to channel its available resources more effectively – that is, in ways that meet real and pressing operational needs, minimize duplication and overlap, enhance coordination, and that are highly visible and accessible. It proceeds in the following manner:

- Chapter 2 addresses the scope and scale of SALW-related activities being undertaken by major *global* international organizations and programmes;
- Chapter 3 addresses the scope and scale of SALW-related activities being undertaken by major *regional* international organizations and programmes; and,
- Chapter 4; addresses the scope and scale of the SALW-related activities being undertaken by the various departments, branches and agencies of the government of Canada.

The report concludes with a discussion of the important, if relatively modest, leadership role Canada can play in mobilizing the international community to deal with the light weapons problem. Specifically, it discusses three broad policy options regarding future SALW programming within the government of Canada: the status quo, focusing on a specific regional or geographic niche, and creating a multi-donor trust fund to support the UN *Program of Action*.

## Caveats and Qualifications

There are four caveats/qualifications that need to be registered at the beginning of this report. First, the focus of this report – and the research that underpins it – is on the SALW-related activities of *states* and *international organizations* (IO). This is not to suggest that NGOs have not played an important role in addressing the SALW problem. Clearly, this is not the case – global civil society actors and academics have made, and continue to make, a significant contribution to the overall campaign. Rather, the decision not to include NGOs in this study is due to the rather more mundane fact that these important actors are the focus of a companion study. This being the case, this report will not address the SALW-related activities of various global civil society actors, except to count state and IO contributions to NGOs as an important element of their SALW-related programming.

The second caveat also has to do with scope. Specifically, while this report does not list 'epistemic' activities such as workshops, conference and research projects as a discrete form of SALW-related activity it does include them in its measures of overall state/IO spending. The reason for this is simple: although the charge of the study was to focus on the practical and operational dimension of multilateral SALW programming, it proved to be exceedingly difficult to disaggregate the epistemic and operational spending lines within the budgets of national governments and international organizations. Moreover, some states have judged these epistemic activities to be intrinsically important and have consciously decided to devote considerable resources to nurturing a global SALW-related epistemic community. Thus, while listing each and every epistemic activity would likely be both difficult and pointless, this report does factor this type of resource allocation into its overall spending estimates.

The third qualification also has to do with scope: What counts as *operational* SALW programming? Some programming and resource allocation, of course, is directly and obviously related to addressing the SALW problem (egs., weapons collection and destruction). Other activities, however, are more difficult to define with precision. For example, as the links between development, security and small arms become better understood, greater attention is being paid to addressing the 'root causes' of the SALW problem through the alleviation of poverty and the promotion of development. Does this mean that all development spending should ultimately be counted as SALW-relevant? Probably not. But, for some at least, the question of where to draw the conceptual line remains. In this report, programming and resource allocation is considered SALW-related only if it deals directly with the instruments of violence. Thus, broad development and poverty alleviation programmes are not treated as SALW-relevant (even though they arguably address the root causes of the problem), while development programmes that are focused specifically on dealing with small arms (eg., demobilization, disarmament and re-integration programmes) are included.

The final qualification has to do with the nature of the available data and the limits this places on a project like this. Simply put, at this juncture at least, developing a detailed picture of SALW spending by donor countries is impossible because governments themselves do not have a firm grasp on how much they are spending on what. A moment's reflection suggests two basic reasons why this might be the case. The first of these has to do with the kind of accounting problems always encountered when attempting to cost out a government project. The second – more important – reason, however, is a function of the fact that SALW-related activities tend to take place across government departments and agencies, with no single institutional actor providing oversight and coordination. The result is that no one person within the organization has a clear picture of overall programming and resource allocation or expenditure. Moreover, because of the time pressures related to meeting operational demands, it is often the case that even within relatively small government units no one is responsible for maintaining an ongoing inventory of SALW-related spending. To be sure, this varies from government to government. But the fact remains that if a detailed picture of SALW-related donor spending is to be developed in the future, it will probably require a formal *démarche* from one government to others asking

them to undertake some sort of 'SALW audit' across the ministries/agencies responsible for foreign affairs, international development, defence, and law enforcement.

Given all this, what follows is a partial and somewhat imprecise 'snapshot' of SALW-related programming and resource allocation both within the government of Canada and across the major. While it may not be comprehensive, it nevertheless serves four purposes. First, it provides a 'first cut' at developing a framework for thinking about SALW-related programming and resource allocation. Second, and despite the qualifications above, it does provide at least a 'fuzzy' picture of SALW-related spending both within the government of Canada. Third, it identifies areas (geographic and functional) that are relatively under-resourced, thus providing policy practitioners with some idea of where financial and other resources might be most profitably (re)directed in the future. Finally, it provides the government of Canada with some specific options and recommendations regarding how to think about managing Canada's SALW-related resources.

## CHAPTER II GLOBAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMMES

**Objective:** To provide an overview of the resources that global organizations and programmes have allocated to support major global, regional and sub-regional SALW-related commitments and programmes.

### Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the SALW-related programmes currently being implemented by major global international organizations (IOs). It attempts to address the following questions: What sorts of programmes are being implemented by these IOs? What are the major geographic and functional foci of these programmes? And, how are these programmes being funded?

### United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

#### *Programming and Resource Allocation*

The main mission of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is development. However, given the growing recognition that SALW proliferation and accumulations in volatile and/or post-conflict situations undermines peace-building, reconstruction and development, the UNDP now delivers programmes that reduce demand for SALWs while promoting more sustainable forms of security and employment. Indeed, through its *Small Arms Programme*, UNDP is now a major contributor to, and facilitator of, the global campaign to combat and eradicate small arms and light weapons. Working with other UN agencies, national governments, and NGOs, the UNDP has sought to address the SALW problem in several ways. First, it has engaged in pragmatic "Weapons for Development" micro-disarmament efforts involving the voluntary surrender of illegal arms in exchange for development assistance and community development aid. Second, the UNDP has also sought to reduce demand for SALWs by promoting sustainable development and the alleviation of the root causes of conflict. Third, the UNDP also works with states to promote regional cooperation and self-restraint. Fourth, UNDP promotes and supports capacity building in the areas of border and customs controls. Finally, the UNDP supports public awareness and education activities at national and regional levels.

Examples of UNDP projects include:

- *Albania:* Perhaps the best example of a UNDP's "weapons for development" program, the Arms Collection Pilot Program in Albania helped organize the collection and destruction of weapons in the Gramsh district. Initially conceived as a traditional weapons buyback scheme, it subsequently evolved into a "weapons for development" program. The project encouraged the voluntary surrender of illegal arms in exchange for development assistance packages and community development aid. Though the initial program was limited to Tirana, it was later expanded to the Elbasan and Diber districts. Overall, some 14,000 weapons have been destroyed through this project.<sup>1</sup>
- *El Salvador.* In partnership with local government institutions, NGOs, and universities, the UNDP has pursued steps to strengthen legal restrictions on small arms and promote public awareness.

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<sup>1</sup>UNDP Website.



This program has been successful at mobilizing and strengthening the enforcement of national regulations, limiting the illicit trade in light weapons, and promoting peace education.

- *Republic of the Congo*: After the end of civil war in 1999, the UNDP embarked on a programme to reintegrate ex-combatants back into civil society by providing micro-credit, loans and job training in return for the surrender of weapons. The program has resulted in the collection of more than 9,500 weapons and provided assistance to 5,600 former fighters. Additional funding has been sought to cover approximately 15,000 additional ex-combatants.<sup>2</sup>
- *Niger*: The UNDP has launched a program in N'Guigmi in the Diffa District to collect weapons in exchange for development assistance. The population of N'Guigmi will decide on the form of assistance (roads, schools, health clinics, etc). In addition to weapons collection, the program also seeks to encourage peace education and public awareness, as well as to strengthen domestic legislation covering small arms.<sup>3</sup> It is estimated that this program will collect over 5,000 weapons. It is expected that the programme will cost US\$1 million, of which UNDP will provide US\$160,000.

UNDP is now embarking on a three year *Weapons Collection, Management and Destruction Programme* in partnership with the governments of Switzerland, Belgium, Norway, South Korea and the United Kingdom. This programme will involve post-conflict collection and destruction measures, development-based demand reduction initiatives, and good governance-based security sector reform measures.

### **Sources of Funding**

The UNDP *Trust Fund for Support to Prevention and Reduction of Small Arms* was established on 20 November 1998 to administer funds for UNDP SALW projects. The UNDP Trust Fund supports SALW activities within the broader context of the UNDP's mission – that is, within a development context. UNDP projects thus typically attempt to implement micro-disarmament activities in conjunction with programs designed to foster social, economic and political development. According to a fact sheet on the UNDP Trust Fund, "the Trust Fund will seek to support activities to reduce the demand for small arms, strengthen appropriate supply-side behaviour, and help partner countries tackle the illicit supply of small arms".<sup>4</sup> The main areas of Trust Fund support are:

- public information activities at all levels to inform and advocate against SALW;
- the development of national and regional mechanisms regarding legal moratoria, codes of conduct, and transparency in the SALW trade;
- strengthening cooperation and coordination of law enforcement bodies, national governments, and customs officials;
- weapons collection and destruction programs, demobilization, and reintegration processes of ex-combatants; micro-disarmament;

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<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>"New UNDP Project in Niger Seeks to Collect Small Arms through Development Incentives," <http://www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/18may2001.htm>, 18 May 2001.

<sup>4</sup>UNDP, *Small Arms Trust Fund Strategy*: Revised 3 March 2000.

- educational programs concerning SALW, as well as reconciliation and peace-building workshops; and
- assistance for national governments in appropriate budget making for defence, as well as arms procurement procedures.<sup>5</sup>

Norway was the first nation to contribute to the UNDP Trust Fund with a commitment of US\$2.1 million. Switzerland has contributed US\$600,000; Belgium has contributed US\$50,000; and South Korea has contributed an undisclosed amount. The United Kingdom has also allocated a minimum of STG£19.5 million (approximately US\$28 million) over the next three years to UN agencies, regional organizations, governments and NGOs seeking to develop and implement local, national, regional and international measures to combat small arms problems. A substantial portion of this will be provided to the UNDP to support the *Weapons Collection, Management and Destruction Programme*. This programme will deploy experts to assist, train and build the capacity of national authorities, regional organizations and international agencies in areas such as weapons collection, stockpile management, safe storage and the destruction of weaponry.

Other governments have contributed to the UNDP Trust Fund on an *ad hoc* basis, or for specific UNDP initiatives. The United States, for example, has donated US\$300,000 to the UNDP's program in West Africa. The US has also provided technical assistance to the UNDP for the *Gramsh Pilot Project* in Albania.

To date, UNDP has spent approximately US\$3 million from its trust fund. This spending has been combined with matching amounts from additional donors.

## **UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA)**

### ***Programming and Resource Allocation***

In 1998, the UN DDA was designated as the focal point for all SALW activity within the UN system. In order to facilitate action and coordination within the UN, DDA subsequently established the *Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA)* mechanism in 1998.<sup>6</sup> The goal of CASA was to integrate the development, law enforcement, humanitarian and security aspects of the SALW *problematique*. Since its inception, DDA has coordinated numerous SALW programmes and initiatives. It has also initiated specific programmes in response to member states' requests for assistance.

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<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Currently, fourteen departments and agencies, as well as the World Bank, participate in CASA. CASA participants: the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Public Information (DPI), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflict (SRSG/CAC), the NY Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the NY Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and the Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) of the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP/CICP). See David Biggs, "UN Contributions to the Process," *Small Arms: The Need for Coordination*, Disarmament Forum 2000, p. 36.

Examples include:

The Gramsh Pilot Project: Though implemented by the UNDP, the DDA played an integral role in the programme's conceptualization.

Bolivia: At a meeting of the Group of Interested States in May 1999, Bolivia put forward a program on conflict prevention, negotiation and resolution entitled *With Dignity*. Though not yet implemented, Bolivia has outlined a plan for weapons collection from paramilitary groups and drug cartels. The program also includes the implementation of an interdiction scheme, with small arms collection and destruction as a sub-initiative.

Yaoundé (Cameroon): Funded and organized by the DDA, a *Sub-Regional Seminar on the Training in Practical Disarmament Measures for the Consolidation of Peace for Senior Military and Civilian Officials* took place in Yaoundé from 27 to 31 July 1998. Except for Rwanda, all delegations of the eleven member states of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa participated in the seminar.<sup>7</sup>

Liberia: The DDA was instrumental in providing technical assistance for the destruction of weapons and ammunition handed over by ECOMOG (the monitoring organization for ECOWAS) to the UN Office in Liberia. On 26 July 1999, 15000 arms were burned publicly before representatives of the government, public, and media. By August 1999 18,420 small arms, 2.87 million rounds of ammunition and 606 heavy machine-guns had been destroyed.

The Guatemala Workshop: From 18 to 20 November 1999, participants from 20 countries, 10 UN agencies, regional organizations and NGOs met in Guatemala for a workshop to exchange information and practical techniques regarding weapons collection and integration of former combatants into civil society. The primary purpose of the workshop was to gather information, exchange practical experience and gain knowledge of the scope and magnitude of the small arms problem in the Central American region.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to these operational programs and workshops, the DDA has supported weapons collection initiatives in North Mali, Germany, Mozambique, South Africa, Cambodia and Niger. The DDA has also supported measures undertaken by regional organizations and programmes, including the ECOWAS *Moratorium* and the *Inter-American Convention*.

### **Sources of Funding**

Established at the behest of the Group of Interested States, the *Trust Fund for Consolidation of Peace Through Practical Disarmament Measures* was created to administer financial resources intended to support DDA programs. Contributions to the fund are made on primarily an *ad hoc* basis for specific programmes and initiatives.

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<sup>7</sup>Participants include Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe. See "Compendium of Organisation's Mandate and Activities Related to DD&R," <http://www.undp.org/erd/ddr/organisations/dda.htm>.

<sup>8</sup> "Compendium of Organisation's Mandate and Activities Related to DD&R," *op cit*.

Areas of Trust Fund support include:

- the retrieval, storage, and safeguarding of demobilized arms;
- destruction of ammunition; weapons buy-back programs and voluntary weapons collection projects;
- resource and experience exchange regarding the collection, control and disposal of arms;
- reintegration of former combatants into civil society;
- harmonization of cross-border legislation to effectively monitor trans-boundary weapons flows;
- public awareness and educational activities; and,
- transparency and confidence-building measures in military expenditures, as well as the establishment of regional arms registers.<sup>9</sup>

Precise levels of funding for the DDA Trust Fund are difficult to determine. Significant recent contributions, however, include Japan's donation of US\$1.87 million. This contribution was used to fund projects such as the UN *Fact-finding Mission to Cambodia* and the *Confidence-Building Seminar on Conventional Weapons Transfers* organized by the ASEAN Regional Forum. Japan has also undertaken to commit an additional US\$900,000 in support of SALW action, some as yet undetermined portion of which will go to the DDA Trust Fund.

## **World Bank**

### ***Programming and Resource Allocation***

Established in 1944 to support the reconstruction of post-War Europe, the Bank today works to promote conflict prevention and reconstruction. Being a development institution, it focuses on tasks such as infrastructure reconstruction, economic and development policy advice, aid coordination, institution and capacity building, revitalizing local communities, and restoring social capital. In recent years, it has also engaged in specific projects related to mine action, DDR, and the reintegration of displaced populations.

Responsibility for supporting the Bank's various conflict-related activities lies with the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Programme (CPRP) of the Social Development Department. In January 2001, the Bank adopted a new operational policy, *Development Cooperation and Reconstruction*, designed to enhance its ability to respond flexibly the needs of countries at various phases in the cycle of violence. The CPRP's programmes cover:

- Countries Threatened by Conflict: activities include promotion of economic growth and poverty alleviation through development assistance designed to address the economic causes of conflict.

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<sup>9</sup>Fact Sheet on Trust Fund For Consolidation of Peace Through Practical Disarmament Measures, <http://www.un.org/depts/CAB/dda.html>

- Countries Engaged in Conflict: activities include poverty reduction and maintenance of socioeconomic assets, assessment of the socioeconomic impact of conflict, and preparation for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.
- Countries Emerging from Conflict: activities include support for socioeconomic recovery and sustainable development.

To address post-conflict needs before regular development funding becomes possible (ie., to support priority transition needs), the bank maintains a number of mechanisms for mobilizing, coordinating and administering development and transition resources. These are:

### **Sources of Funding**

#### The Post-Conflict Fund (PCF)

The PCF is the Bank's principal mechanism for allocating resources to support countries in transition from conflict. Part of the Bank's umbrella mechanism for grant programmes (the Development Grant Facility), the PCF secretariat within the CPRP screens proposals and administers existing grants. Grants can be made to states, multilateral institutions, transitional authorities, universities and NGOs.

PCF themes include socioeconomic analysis (aimed at reducing conflict through development), watching briefs (damage and needs assessment in conflict situations where normal Bank operations are not possible), developing transitional support strategies (defining reconstruction risks and priorities), and small-scale pilot activities (focused on restarting production and creating employment).

Grants range from US\$25,000 to US\$1 million. These funds cannot be allocated to support large-scale reconstruction activities, emergency relief activities, or proposals duplicating work already being supported by the Bank or other donor institutions. Applications should be made to the World Bank country director of the country that is the subject of the proposal or the CPRP.

Four examples PCF-supported SALW programmes approved the fiscal years 1998-2000 are:

- three separate grants for East Timor, (US\$119,480; US\$486,060; and US\$394,460) for post-conflict reconstruction and reintegration programs; and
- a grant approved for Burundi worth US\$798,000 for an ex-combatants assistance programme.<sup>10</sup>

PCF had US\$7.4 million at its disposal in fiscal 2001.

#### The Japanese Post-Conflict Fund (JPCF)

This is a PCF-administered fund that channels resources provided by the government of Japan in ways consistent with the goals of the PCF. JPCF funds can be used to support Transitional Support Strategies or early reconstruction activities. Grants may be between US\$1 million and US\$2 million.

Proposals must be submitted by Bank country managers and endorsed by relevant governments. NGOs are not eligible for JPCF grants. JPCF had US\$15 million at its disposal in fiscal 1999.

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<sup>10</sup>See "Post Conflict Fund Approved Grants, FY98-FY02." World Bank.

### Country Trust Funds for Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The Bank also maintains country-specific funds to address post-conflict needs before normal development lending is possible. These include:

- US\$380 million for West Bank and Gaza (supplemented by the US\$269 million multi-donor Holst Fund);
- US\$60 million Kosovo community fund;
- US\$850,000 Georgia self-reliance fund for internally displaced peoples;
- US\$150 million multi-donor trust fund for emergency projects in Bosnia;
- US\$80 million multi-donor trust fund for East Timor;
- US\$12 million Sierra Leone multi-donor trust fund for DDR

### Greater Great Lakes Demobilization and Reintegration Programme and Multi-Donor Trust Fund

This programme is intended to support the consolidation of peace and stability in the Great Lakes region of Africa through a comprehensive framework for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The World Bank estimates that it needs US\$300 million dollars for the fund. The government of the Netherlands has recently contributed US\$100 million, making it the largest donor to date.

In addition to grants from the PCF, JPCF, Great Lakes and country trust funds, the World Bank also administers emergency credits. An example is the US\$170.6 million Ethiopia Emergency and Demobilization and Reintegration Programme.

## **World Health Organization (WHO)**

### ***Programming and Resource Allocation***

WHO is currently implementing three SALW-related projects:

A Multinational Study of Small Arms and Health: In view of both the growing threat to public health posed by SALWs and the lack of reliable data on this topic, WHO has initiated a multinational study that will (a) collect and analyze available data on SALW injuries and death, and (b) conduct surveys SALW injuries and death in at least 10 countries for which data are currently unavailable. Planning and fund-raising for this study were conducted in 2001. The study will begin in 2002 and run until 2005.

Implementation of the Injury Surveillance Guidelines for Less-Resourced Environments: In late 2001, WHO published its Injury Surveillance Guidelines for Less-Resourced Environments, a manual for the collection of SALW-relevant data by public health authorities and other institutions, particularly in under-resourced regions. WHO is now working with countries to begin operationalizing these guidelines.

Training Activities for Pre-hospital Care of SALW-related Injuries: Currently WHO is conducting training activities on pre-hospital care for victims of SALW-related violence in Maputo, Mozambique. This training of trainers approach will also be expanded to other regions.

***Sources of Funding***

Precise levels of SALW-related resources are not available.

**Table 1: Major Global Multilateral Operational Programs (Supply Side)**

Programs	Stockpile Security	Export Controls and Import Restrictions	Collection and Destruction	Illicit Trafficking and Arms Brokers	Tracing, Marking and Record-Keeping
UNDP			X		
UNDDA			X	X	
World Bank					

**Table 2: Major Global Multilateral Operational Programs (Demand-Side, Transparency and Other)**

Programs	SSR <sup>11</sup>	Development	DDR <sup>12</sup>	Transparency Consultation and Information Exchange	Strengthening National Legal/Export Controls and Enforcement Mechanisms	Regional Cooperation, Coordination, Harmonization of Measures/ Mechanisms	CC, PC& IS <sup>13</sup>
UNDP		X	X		X		
UNDDA				X	X		
World Bank		X	X				

<sup>11</sup>Security Sector Reform.

<sup>12</sup>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.

<sup>13</sup>Customs Coordination, Police Cooperation and Intelligence-Sharing.



## CHAPTER III REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMMES

**Objective:** To provide an overview of the resources that global organizations and programmes have allocated to support major global, regional and sub-regional SALW-related commitments and programmes.

### Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the SALW-related programmes currently being implemented by major regional international organizations. Following the same format as Chapter 2, it attempts to address the following questions: What sorts of programmes are being implemented by regional organizations? What are the major functional foci of these programmes? And, how are these programmes being funded? As with Chapter 2, the picture that emerges is partial and imprecise. Nevertheless, it does provide some idea of the scope and scale of SALW programming and resource allocation at the level of regional IOs.

### European Union (EU)

#### *Programming and Resource Allocation*

Since adopting the Joint Action on Small Arms and light Weapons in December of 1998, the EU has supported five multilateral SALW-related programmes. These are:

- **Cambodia:** The EU programme in Cambodia proceeded in two phases. Cambodia I ran from November 1999 to November 2000; Cambodia II ran from November 2000 to November 2001. Both phases involved the following SALW-related forms of assistance to the Cambodian government: assistance to the national government to establish relevant legislation; development of a framework for better record keeping and weapons security; and working with police and security forces to locate and destroy surplus small arms and supporting civil society programmes. The budget for Phase I was EUR 500,000 (approximately US\$440,000). The budget for Phase II was EUR1.3 million (approximately US\$1.15 million). Japan has also agreed to support this programme.
- **Operation Rachel:** Operation Rachel is an anti-crime initiative in which the police services of South Africa and Mozambique undertake joint operations aimed at locating and destroying arms caches within Mozambique. The programme was originally funded by South Africa, but is now supported by other donors as well. Twelve operations were carried out under this initiative between August 1995 and December 2000. This project does not have a deadline and will continue as long as Mozambique has excessive amounts of arms. Some have suggested expanding the programme into a regional plan of action. Between December 2000 and December 2001, the EU provided EUR200,000 (approximately US\$176,000) to Operation Rachel.
- **Georgia/South Ossetia:** In early 2000, the OSCE and the joint peacekeeping forces (JPKFs), initiated a program for the voluntary handover of small arms in South Ossetia, Georgia. This program works by establishing arms collection points where local authorities gather arms, register them and deliver receipts. These weapons are then destroyed by the JPKFs. All of this takes place in the context of an exchange programme in which local authorities are given communication, information and transportation equipment in return for collected weapons. Thus far, this program has been judged a success, both in terms of its local acceptance and the quantity of arms

surrendered. Between December 2000 and December 2001 the EU provided EUR90,000 (approximately US\$80,000) for the purchase of equipment to exchange for weapons.

- **UN-LiREC:** The EU also supports the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Specifically, the EU has provided financial support for two projects within the centre's regional clearing house on firearms, ammunition and explosives. The first project focuses on capacity building in the area of law-enforcement (training instructors from police forces, customs authorities, and related institutions). The second project aims to assist the centre (a) in computerizing firearms import/export and transit data and (b) in establishing a firearms legal documents database. The EU has allocated EUR343,000 (approximately US\$303,000) in support of these programmes.<sup>14</sup>
- **ECOWAS:** In 1998 the ECOWAS Member States declared a moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of small arms and light weapons. This was followed by the approval of a code of conduct in December 1999. The EU has indirectly contributed to the moratorium process with a EUR 1.9 million (approximately US\$1.7 million) contribution to the sub-region's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security. The Commission is currently considering further EU actions, which might eventually include direct financial support for the moratorium.

In addition to activities undertaken in connection with the Joint Action, the EU also supports SALW-related activities through development policy. Specifically, the EU Development Council Resolution on Small Arms calls for the Union and its member states to:

- include the small arms issue in the political dialogue with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States and other development cooperation partner countries of the EU;
- develop cooperation support for countries seeking assistance in the control or elimination of surplus small arms, as well as other incentives to encourage the voluntary surrender of small arms and their destruction;
- combat illicit trafficking of small arms through the promotion of appropriate measures, including regional and international cooperation and independent monitoring; and
- promote the effective disarmament and demobilisation of combatants and their subsequent rehabilitation and reintegration into civil life;

### ***Sources of Funding***

EU activities are funded through the regular contributions of the member states to the budgets of the Social Council and the EU Development Fund. Precise levels of funding support are not available.

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<sup>14</sup>"What is the UN Lima Regional Centre?" <http://www.unlirec.org/what.html> .

## Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe

### *Programming and Resource Allocation*

The Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact is well positioned to play an important role in curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the volatile South Eastern Europe region. According to the general document on small arms under the Stability Pact's Working Table III, the Stability Pact pursues the objective of establishing a cooperative regional approach in order to fight excessive small weapons circulation, building on the existing processes of the Wassenaar Agreement, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the European Commission, the OSCE and the United Nations. This document, drafted on 20 February, 2001, outlines five areas of concentration for the Stability Pact's SALW campaign: security sector reform, improving legislative standards, increasing the transparency of arms transfers, improving export controls, and assistance in the safe storing and destruction of small arms.<sup>15</sup>

The Stability Pact's commitment to addressing the SALW problem was first demonstrated by its *Joint Declaration on Responsible Arms Transfers*, adopted on 15 December 1999. Participating countries acknowledged the legitimate role of small arms and light weapons in international trade, but aspired to prevent these weapons from finding their way to irresponsible end-users. The states expressed readiness to develop a coordinated information system capable of tracking end-use and end-user certificates on weapons subject to export control.

The Stability Pact also organized several Working Group Meetings on small arms and light weapons throughout 2000. A workshop titled "Possible Contribution to the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe" was held in Ljubljana on 27 January 2000, and another identified as the "Stability Pact Seminar on Small Arms and Light Weapons Collection and Destruction" took place in Sofia on 17 to 19 October 2000 (co-sponsored by Bulgaria and Canada). A Roundtable Meeting on "Tackling Small Arms Diffusion in South Eastern Europe," held in Szeged, Hungary from 17 to 18 November 2000, was also organized under the auspices of the Stability Pact.<sup>16</sup> The conferences affirmed member states' interests in the small arms problem, and the Roundtable Meeting proposed the following concentrations: strengthening legal controls on the accumulation and transfer of small arms, enhancing the operational capacity of governments to prevent and combat illicit arms trafficking and promoting the removal of weapons from society and the destruction of surplus and confiscated weapons.<sup>17</sup>

The Stability Pact has, in limited capacity, participated in several regional small arms initiatives in Croatia, Kosovo and Bulgaria. Additionally, to support non-proliferation efforts, economic development and the strengthening of civil society, the Stability Pact's Norway/US Joint Working Group is presently conducting a small arms project in Albania. The programme aims to enhance regional

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<sup>15</sup>Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, *Working Table III, Small Arms and Light Weapons*: 20 February 2001.

<sup>16</sup>Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, *Working Table III, Small Arms and Light Weapons*: 20 February 2001.

<sup>17</sup>Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, *Roundtable Meeting on Tackling Small Arms Diffusion in South Eastern Europe*: 17-18 November 2000.

security *via* the collection and destruction of over 100,000 small arms and ammunition. One of the goals of the initiative is to build a national capacity for continued indigenous SALW action.<sup>18</sup>

## UN-LiREC

### *Programming and Resource Allocation*

UN-LiREC – the United Nations Regional Center for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean – was formally established in 1987 and now, functions as a regional extension of the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs. The work of UN-LiREC is aimed at, “providing decision makers of the region with in-depth analyses of situations where changes in policy could better human lives and stimulate development”.<sup>19</sup>

In 1999, UN-LiREC established a Regional Clearing-house on Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives. The clearing house was intended to work as a catalyst for action and as a platform for NGOs and other civil society groups to strive toward “the preclusion of firearms-related violence through different preventive actions, the eradication of illicit trafficking of firearms, ammunition and explosives; the collection and destruction of surplus firearms, ammunition and explosives and the creation of an environment which is more conducive to achieve sustainable development”. Clearing-House activities include:

- policy review conferences and workshops to engage governments;
- seminars and courses to build awareness;
- providing resources to children and NGOS to help prevent violence;
- technical courses and practical disarmament exercises; and,
- publishing educational material.

Recent examples of activities through the Regional Clearinghouse include creation of a database on institutions involved in curbing the illicit trafficking of firearms, ammunition and explosives.<sup>20</sup>

In January 2001, the UN DDA signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the OAS establishing the legal framework for cooperation between the two entities with respect to illicit SALW trafficking and designating UN-LiREC and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)

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<sup>18</sup>Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, *Quick Start Package*, Security and Destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons.

<sup>19</sup>“What is the UN Lima Regional Centre?” <http://www.unlirec.org/what.html> .

<sup>20</sup>“Regional Clearing-house on Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives.” <http://www.unlirec.org/regional.html> .

as the implementing institutions. In accordance with this MoU, UN-LiREC and CICAD have initiated a training and capacity building project for customs, police and other relevant officials as well as a programme on information sharing and databases.

### ***Sources of Funding***

The Lima Regional Centre receives its funding through two channels: direct contributions to its trust fund and partnerships in connection with specific activities. Between 1987 and 1998, the total contributions to the trust fund were US\$395,113, and the average yearly donation was between US\$15,000 and US\$40,000 (with the exception of 1993 when the Government of Canada donated US\$120,000 in support of a particular event).

Following the revival of the Centre's activities in 1997, donations sharply increased. By the end of 1999, the Centre had received US\$555,642 in *direct* contributions from nineteen countries, eleven of which were Latin American. In 1999 alone, *indirect* contributions to the Centre, totaled US\$367,000. Seven countries and institutions contributed by sharing or covering the costs of events. However, despite the strong growth in support since 1997, the situation of UN-LiREC's trust fund remains unstable. Aside from Peru's donations as the host country, there is no regular, continuing source of funding from traditional or potential donors. There is a widely shared view that the UN-LiREC is under-resourced.

## **MERCOSUR**

### ***Programming and Resource Allocation***

In 1998, Bolivia, Chile and MERCOSUR approved a Joint Mechanism to develop a registration system for both buyers and vendors of firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials. The effectiveness of this Joint Mechanism remains untested.

Under the Joint Mechanism agreement, states are responsible for reporting to the central authority any person or company that is involved in the selling, purchasing, importation, exportation, distribution or other stage of trade associated with firearms, explosives, ammunition and other related materials. This necessarily includes the person's/group's name, document number, reason for and location of activities and the name of export or import ports authorized for use. Signatory states that do not have a national arms database must, in accordance with their domestic legislation, create a register that documents owners of firearms, ammunition, explosives and any related parts.

### ***Sources of Funding***

N/A

## **Programme for Coordination on Security and Development (PCASED)**

### ***Programming and Resource Allocation***

The establishment of PCASED, under the auspices of the UNDP, was an important step in the effective implementation of the ECOWAS Moratorium. Through operational support and funding, PCASED is intended to augment the internal capacities of states to comply with the Moratorium.

Specific tasks of PCASED include:

- establishing a culture of peace through community education, advocacy campaigns, peace-building workshops, and seminars on civil-military relations;
- training programmes for military, security, and police forces in small arms collection, drug-trafficking interdiction, and the demobilisation of combatants;
- enhancing weapons controls at border posts, including augmenting systems of detection and apprehension as well as the creation of effective legal and regulatory regimes;
- establishment of database and regional arms register in order to bolster transparency and to identify excessive or destabilizing weapons accumulations;
- the collection and destruction of surplus weapons through the funding and implementation of voluntary weapons collection programmes (VWCP);
- facilitation of dialogue with producers/suppliers, particularly countries party to the Wassenaar agreement and the EU;
- review and harmonization of legislation of national legislation and procedures, with the goal of a legally binding convention in the future;
- mobilizing resources; and,
- enlarging membership of the Moratorium and working to harmonize policies with other African organizations, such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).<sup>21</sup>

### ***Sources of Funding***

Support for the Moratorium has been widespread. Only weeks after the establishment of the PCASED, a high-level consultation, funded by the UNDP, the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT), the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was held in Geneva to mobilize support for the Moratorium. Most Western governments and donor organizations have pledged or allocated funding for PCASED

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<sup>21</sup>"The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons," UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, 2000.

operations. However, support has not yet reached the US\$13 million target budget for full implementation of the PCASED's five-year programme.<sup>22</sup>

Notable donations to PCASED include US\$2.5 million from Norway, US\$500,000 from the UK, and US\$400,000 from Canada.<sup>23</sup> The US has also offered technical assistance, modest funding and diplomatic support.<sup>24</sup> Five other governments have expressed their intention to make contributions.<sup>25</sup>

## **Southern Africa/SARPCCO**

### ***Programming and Resource Allocation***

The SADC Committee on Small Arms and SARPCCO (Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organization) work in tandem to implement regional political commitments, while the SADC Special Projects Directorate has been assigned a role in co-ordinating regional policies and activities relating to SALW. The EU-SADC Working Group on Small Arms meets to discuss how co-operation on SALW initiatives between the two regions can best be enhanced.

The SADC-EU relationship has also proven to be fruitful in terms of practical SALW-related programming. Close political contact and frequent meetings/summits have produced a growing partnership. This is indicated by the EU's funding of Operation Rachel (see above), where the EU donated EUR 200,000 (approximately US\$1.8 million) to the weapons collection and destruction initiative in Mozambique. There is also an SADC-USA partnership on small arms.

Following a slow start, existing commitments are now being translated into operational activities. The consensus view is that significant progress is now being made in tackling the region's SALW problem.

### ***Sources of Funding***

SADC /SARPCCO programmes are funded by the EU *Joint Action* on small arms budget-line, the EU Development Fund and other budget lines accessible through in-country EU delegations.

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<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup>Joe Smaldone, "Mali and the West African Moratorium," *Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence*, J. Boutwell and M. Klare, eds., Rowman and Littlefield Press, 1999, p. 139.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 141, and Steven Edwards, "UN's African Gun Control Programme Firing Blanks," *National Post*, 14 April 2001.

<sup>25</sup>Tore Rose, "The Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development in West Africa, 'PCASED,'" Statement at the International Conference on Regional Small Arms Moratoria, Oslo, 1-2 April 1998.

Individual EU members states' development and foreign ministry funds have also been used to fund SALW activities and operational programming. In addition, Canada and other non-EU states have contributed substantial funds to regional SALW programmes.

Additional funding for EU-SADC summits and meetings has come from the NGO community, particularly Saferworld (UK) and the Institute for Security Studies (South Africa), both of which receive funds from the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the UK, as well as private donors, such as the Ford and MacArthur Foundations.<sup>26</sup>

Regional SALW programming is extensive creating substantial resource needs. While no one has suggested that funding is entirely adequate, the consensus view is that the EU partnership with SADC is now beginning to be translated into significant concrete funding for operational programmes. This view has been reinforced since the EU Development Council Resolution of May 1999 which identified SADC (and ECOWAS) as sub-regional institutions warranting EU investment in SALW activities. It is worth noting, however, that despite this resolution it is unlikely that any new funds will be allocated to SALW programmes. Rather, the resources will be drawn from existing ODA and MFA budget lines.

## **East Africa Police Chiefs Committee (EAPCCO)**

### ***Programming and Resource Allocation***

EAPCCO has become the principal institution involved in operationalizing the commitments articulated in the *Nairobi Declaration*, the *Coordinated Agenda for Action* and the *Implementation Programme*. In a meeting in Khartoum from 19-21 June 2000, the EAPCCO delegates agreed to a specific constitution regarding small arms enforcement. Included in this constitution were commitments to:

- strengthen national laws, regulations, and procedures related to the control and licensing of SALWs;
- establish a regional SALW database; and
- utilize the Interpol Weapons and Explosives Tracking System (IWETS) to better monitor regional SALW flows.<sup>27</sup>

Although off to a promising (if modest) start, these agreements have yet to be translated into effective operational action.

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<sup>26</sup> *Action on Small Arms in Southern Africa Newsletter No. 2*, May 2000.

<sup>27</sup> Andrew McLean, "Recent Initiatives in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa," in *Small Arms Survey 2000*, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, p. 264.



### **Sources of Funding**

Unlike SARPCCO, EAPCCO lacks the support of a powerful regional partner like the EU. Financial support is largely provided by NGOs and major donor countries on an *ad hoc* basis. This may change, however, as the new Great Lakes Multi-Donor Fund becomes more active. In general terms, this a substantial programming commitment that has not yet been adequately resourced.

## **ASEAN/Pacific Islands**

### **Programming and Resource Allocation**

Until very recently, ASEAN has avoided serious consideration of the SALW issue (except tangentially in the context of combating transnational organized crime). Among the few exceptions to this have been the May 2000 *Jakarta Regional Seminar on Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons* and the ASEAN Regional Forum seminar on transparency in conventional arms held in Phnom Penh in February 2001, co-sponsored by Cambodia, Japan and Canada.

Other regional initiatives include the Honiara Initiative of the Pacific Islands Forum (establishes commitments related to illicit SALW manufacturing and trafficking as well as licensing). The Pacific Islands Forum has also worked on model SALW legislation.

### **Sources of Funding**

N/A

## **OSCE**

### **Programming and Resource Allocation**

The implementation of the OSCE *Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, adopted by the Forum for Security Co-operation on 24 November 2000, is largely a national affair.

### **Sources of Funding**

States participating in the OSCE have contributed approximately US\$1 million for the removal and destruction of arms and ammunition in Moldova. This programme is known as the "Voluntary Fund on Moldova" and is related to Russia's commitment, under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, to remove its military bases and equipment from Moldova's territory.

## CHAPTER IV THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

**Objective:** To provide an overview of the resources that the various departments and agencies of the government of Canada have allocated to support major global, regional and sub-regional SALW-related commitments and programmes.

### Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to develop a more comprehensive picture of the scope and scale of the government of Canada's SALW-related programming and resource allocation. It will attempt to address the following questions: What are the various departments and agencies of the government of Canada doing to help address the global SALW problem? What sorts of contributions (financial and other) can these departments and agencies make to existing multilateral efforts to address the SALW problem? And, what sorts of resources to these departments and agencies possess that *might* be brought to bear to support these efforts in the future.

### Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

#### *Programming and General Types of Resources*

The principal institutional mechanism within CIDA for addressing the light weapons issue is the *Canadian Peacebuilding Fund*.<sup>28</sup> The mandate of the Fund is to finance emergency conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding activities in countries entering, experiencing or emerging from conflict. It is designed to complement CIDA's existing (geographic) peacebuilding programmes by providing a rapid response mechanism capable of addressing urgent needs that cannot be met through other Canadian programming mechanisms. The Fund typically supports more risky, urgent, and innovative peacebuilding projects, while other CIDA programmes support long-term activities that contribute to peacebuilding in war-torn societies. The goal of the fund is to promote and support activities that contribute to conflict resolution, intra-societal reconciliation and/or the capacitation of local institutions that can contribute to sustainable social peace. Peacebuilding Fund grants are intended to fund short-term activities and cannot be used to cover any of a partner organization's regular operating expenditures. Eligible partner organizations include NGOs, Non-governmental institutions, United Nations agencies or other national, regional or international organizations. The Fund has at its disposal CDN\$10 million (approximately US\$6.5 million) per year and is financed out of Canada's ODA budget.

The functional foci of the Fund include the following range of activities: small arms and light weapons control, gender initiatives in the context of peacebuilding, war affected children, emergency civilian response, support to multilateral and regional peacebuilding initiatives, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, support to free media and communications, civil society partnerships, and

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<sup>28</sup>The Peacebuilding Fund, established in 1997, is one of the key elements of the *Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative*, a joint initiative of DFAIT and CIDA created to "assist countries in conflict in their efforts towards peace and stability, and to promote Canadian peacebuilding capacity and Canadian participation in international peacebuilding initiatives".

educational initiatives as tools for peace. The geographical focus is on those countries eligible for Official Development Assistance (ODA). Project proposals are reviewed in consultation with CIDA as well as officials from DFAIT, other departments and Canadian posts abroad. The funds are then channeled through implementing partners.

### ***Allocations***

To date, two SALW-related projects have been supported by the Fund. The first is the World Bank's *Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Program*. The Fund provided a CDN\$1 million (approximately US\$650,000) contribution to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) established to support this programme

The second SALW-related Fund activity was to allocate CDN\$500,000 (approximately US\$325,000) to support a DDR programme in East Timor.

## **Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)**

### ***Programming and General Types of Resources***

Within DFAIT, there are several sites of SALW-related operational activity and programming. The most important of these is the Peacebuilding and Human Security Division (AGP) which was created in 1995 with a view to increasing Canada's capacity to contribute internationally to conflict prevention, peacebuilding and democratic development. AGP is both a policy development and a programming division. As such, it plays several important SALW-related roles. First, AGP works in close partnership with CIDA to develop a strategic, coordinated approach to Canadian peacebuilding through the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative. Second, AGP works closely with non-government organizations in Canada (primarily through the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee - CPCC) to promote policy dialogue on peacebuilding issues. Third, AGP manages the DFAIT's Peacebuilding Program, designed to support peacebuilding initiatives in areas which fall outside of CIDA's mandate or priorities. Finally, AGP also administers the Department's Human Security Fund.

Specific SALW-related programmes include:

The Peacebuilding Programme: The purpose of the Peacebuilding Program (PBP) is to support the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative in areas which fall outside the priorities of the CIDA-administered Peacebuilding Fund. The Canadian Peacebuilding Program has three strategic objectives: (a) To build Canadian peacebuilding capacity through research, policy development, public consultations and training; (b) to strengthen Canada's ability to participate in and influence multilateral mechanisms for peacebuilding; and (c) to support catalytic peacebuilding projects in regions or policy areas that are not eligible for Canadian ODA and therefore beyond the remit of the Peacebuilding Fund. The Canadian Peacebuilding Programme and the Peacebuilding Fund are used synergistically to advance the goals of the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative. SALW-related programmes and activities fall within the purview of both the Fund and the Programme.

The Human Security Programme: The Human Security Program supports initiatives that strengthen the capacity of the international community to prevent and manage violent conflict. Among the programme's SALW-related projects are (a) the *South Asia Small Arms Initiative* (which brought together civil society groups and governments from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan,

Sri Lanka, and Nepal to work towards a common approach to address the SALW problem; (b) support for the Small Arms Survey (a principal international source of impartial and public information and research on all aspects of the SALW problem); (c) commissioned research (including one study that focused on the impact and consequences of SALW proliferation on the safety and development of children); and (d) sponsored conferences and workshops to stimulate and broaden international dialogue regarding the SALW problem and possible solutions

In addition to AGP, two other divisions within DFAIT have SALW-relevant expertise or resources. These are the Regional Security and Peacekeeping division (IDC) – which has some responsibility for operational weapons collection and destruction activities in the context of peace operations; and the Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament division (IDA).

### ***Allocations***

AGP/Peacebuilding Programme: Overall programme funding is about CDN\$1 million (approximately US\$650,000). Precise levels of SALW-related resources are not available.

AGP/Human Security Programme: Precise levels of SALW-related resources are not available. The best estimate is that AGP spends about CDN\$500,000 (approximately US\$325,000) on SALW-related activities (not including CIDA/Peacebuilding Fund allocations).

IDD/IDA/Small Arms Fund: Overall programme funding is about CDN\$500 000.

The purpose of the IDD/IDA Small Arms Fund was to support the preparation of the 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms and hereafter the implementation of its Programme of Action. In addition, it supports destruction actions.

Examples of activities supported by the Small Arms funds are:

- Conference entitled “Countering Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in South Asia”, organized by the Governments of Canada and Sri Lanka and the Colombo-based Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, in collaboration with the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, Colombo, June 2000. The conference was the first such in South Asia at which the issue of small arms as well as others related to the 2001 Conference were discussed.
- In September 2000, the Governments of Poland and Canada organized a seminar in Warsaw to address the issue of small arms disarmament within the context of peacekeeping operations.
- In October 2000, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and the Governments of Bulgaria and Canada organized a seminar on collection and destruction techniques for small arms and light weapons at Sofia.
- In November 2000, the Canadian Joint Delegation to NATO and the Centre for European Security and Disarmament organized a roundtable on Small Arms and Europe-Atlantic Security at NATO headquarters.
- Canada, in conjunction with Cambodia and Japan, held an Asian Regional Forum seminar on transparency in conventional arms transfers, in Phnom Penh, in February 2001. This seminar concluded with a set of recommendations that are presently being considered by the Asian Regional Forum.

- In April 2001 the Governments of Canada and Hungary co-hosted and co-chaired a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council seminar on arms embargoes and sanctions. This seminar developed recommendations to improve the implementation of arms embargoes.
- In May 2001, Canada and the European Union, under the Swedish Presidency, organized a workshop in Canada on small arms and light weapons destruction in the context of peace support operations.
- Canada supported the organization by the OSCE of a series of training workshops in the five countries members of the OSCE in Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Kyrkystan and Kazakhstan) . These workshops were held in November-December 2001 and covered a number of topics including control and licensing of manufacture, export, import and transit of small arms; marking, record-keeping and tracing; secure storage of small arms stockpiles; destruction of surplus weapons.
- Canada co-sponsored with Costa Rica and Finland, with the cooperation of the Arias Foundation, a seminar on SALW in Central America: Implementing the UN Programme of Action's Aspects for Control and Regulation of Arms Transfers. This seminar was held in San Jose, 3-5 December 2001. It produced a series of "Recommended Actions for National and Regional Implementation". This was a very productive seminar that dovetailed quite well the Santiago Meeting held in November and to which all countries of the Americas were invited.
- Ten co-sponsors, including Canada, supported the organization of a Conference entitled "African Conference on the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms: Needs and Partnerships", held in Pretoria, South Africa, 18-21 March 2002. All African and countries members of the OECD were invited to participate as well as organizations (including the UN).
- In the context of NATO-EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), Canada commissioned a study by NAMSA (NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency) on the destruction of ammunition for SALW in Albania. Canada will take the lead in fundraising the sufficient financial support for implementing this project in the context of the EAPC-Partnership for Peace process in 2002.
- Canada contributed to the OSCE Trust Fund for destruction of ammunition and small arms in Moldova and also to the UNDP Trust Fund on small arms.

## **Department of National Defence (DND)**

### ***Programming and General Types of Resources***

The Department of National Defence (through the Small Arms Policy Unit) provides training and technical expertise regarding SALW collection/destruction, stockpile management, and use. It may also be able to help address the SALW problem by providing support to security sector reform programmes (professionalization and democratization of security forces). There are no other units within the Department work on SALW-related programming. DND provides operational support to governments and peace support operations on an *ad hoc* basis through DFAIT. There is no particular geographic focus to these programmes. According to DND officials, resource constraints are beginning to seriously undermine the ability of the CF to provide technical experts for these foreign missions.

### ***Allocations***

No dedicated financial resources are available within DND to support SALW-related activities.

## **Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC)**

### ***Programming and General Types of Resources***

The primary purpose of the Canadian Controlled Goods Registration Program (CCGRP) is to regulate access, possession and transfer, in Canada, of certain controlled goods (including SALWs and certain types of ammunition) under the terms of the Defence Production Act (DPA) and its Regulations. In practice, CCGRP registers firms that are involved in transfers of controlled goods. The Canadian and International Industrial Security Directorate (CIISD) is then responsible for conducting inspections aimed at preventing, detecting and deterring unauthorized access, transfer or possession of these goods. In addition to playing a direct role in preventing the unauthorized transfer of SALWs, both of these programmes could play a role in capacity building in countries/regions where government controls over SALW transfers may not be adequate.

### ***Allocations***

No dedicated financial resources are available within PWGSC to support multilateral SALW-related activities.

## **Natural Resources Canada (NRCAN)**

### ***Programming and General Types of Resources***

The Explosives Regulatory Division (ERD) of NRCAN is responsible for the administration of the *Canada Explosives Act*, which controls the authorization, manufacture, importation, sale, purchase, possession and storage of explosives in Canada. In this context, the term 'explosives' includes blasting explosives, detonators (blasting caps), propellant explosives, sporting and industrial ammunition, and all types of fireworks and pyrotechnic devices. In practice, this means that the Division is responsible for the licensing and inspection of all firearms ammunition manufactures in Canada. In addition to playing a direct role in preventing the unauthorized possession and transfer of explosives and ammunition, ERD might also play a role in capacity building in regions countries/regions where government controls over SALW transfers may not be adequate.

### ***Allocations***

No dedicated financial resources are available within NRCAN to support multilateral SALW-related activities.

## **Canadian Firearms Centre (CFC)**

### ***Programming and General Types of Resources***

One of the main policy objectives of Canada's new firearms legislation is to combat the illicit trafficking and smuggling of firearms. This has been pursued through amendments to the *Firearms Act* and the creation of new and separate offences for smuggling and trafficking in the *Criminal Code*. It has also been pursued through the creation of the Canadian Firearms Centre, which is responsible for

implementing Canada's domestic firearms legislation. Specifically, CFC runs a number of SALW related programmes, including:

- The Canadian Firearms Program – The first phase of the firearms program was the licensing of firearm owners. The second phase is the registration of all firearms in Canada by 2003.
- The Canadian Firearm Registration System – is a fully integrated, automated information system that provides administrative and enforcement support to all parties involved in licencing of firearm owners/users, registration of all firearms, and the issuance of authorizations related to restricted firearms.
- Firearms Research Unit – The objective of the Firearms Research Unit is to support the development and implementation of firearms policy, legislation and programs through systematic research, statistical analysis, monitoring and assessment.
- Canadian Firearms Safety Education and Awareness Program –The Canadian Firearms Safety Education and Awareness (CFSEA) Unit was established in March 1996 to help implement and administer the Firearms Safety Education and Awareness Programme.

In addition to playing a direct role in preventing the unauthorized possession and transfer of firearms, CFC might also play a role in capacity building and in promoting firearms safety and responsible firearms use in regions/countries where government controls and domestic firearms legislation may be inadequate.

#### ***Allocations***

No dedicated financial resources are available within the CFC to support multilateral SALW-related activities.

#### **Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)**

##### ***Programming and General Types of Resources***

The RCMP plays an important role in addressing the global SALW problem by participating in a range of UN, OSCE and ICTY peace support operations. In this connection, the types of activities most relevant to the SALW problem are:

- monitoring and advising local police forces;
- training, reforming, professionalizing and democratizing police organizations (ie. capacity building; aiding in the transition to community policing; and facilitating security sector reform); and
- monitoring the disarmament and demobilization of police and security forces.

Given resource limitations, RCMP assistance to peace support operations is supplemented through two arrangements. First, the RCMP draws on the resources of 28 provincial and municipal police forces across Canada to meet the growing demand for civilian police in peace support operations. As a result, the the RCMP now provides only about 45% of the civilian police deployed overseas on peace support operations; the partner police services provide the remaining 55%. The second mechanism for supplementing personnel resources is the participation of retired Canadian police

officers. In this connection, the RCMP can draw on a pool of trained and available retired police officers through the DFAIT-funded Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (CANADEM). Retired police officers have proven especially effective on short-term, specialized assignment such as the forensic missions to Kosovo and East Timor

In order to provide the special training needed on overseas peace support operations, the RCMP maintains an International Training and Peacekeeping Branch. This organization is responsible for selecting candidates and providing them with training and support. It is also responsible for overseeing Canadian civilian police participation in peace support operations and liaising with international and other Canadian agencies.

A partial list of Canadian police contributions to peace support operations with a substantial SALW element would include:

- UNIBH-UNTMIH – assistance in establishing and training the Haitian National Police;
- RCMP-CIDA – bilateral project involving the provision of technical advice and training;
- UNMIK – policing and advising in Kosovo; and
- UNAMET/UNTAET – policing, monitoring, advising and training in East Timor

### ***Allocations***

Since 1997, the policy framework and funding mechanism for RCMP participation in peace support missions has been the Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA). This is an interdepartmental administrative agreement used to authorize and organize the deployment of Canadian civilian police on peace support/peace building operations. The CPA is managed by a steering committee comprising Assistant Deputy minister-level representatives from CIDA, DFAIT, the Solicitor General, DND and the RCMP. These officials advise the responsible ministers (the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International Cooperation, and the Solicitor General of Canada) with respect to which international peace support operations should be supported by Canada. These decisions are made on the basis of the following criteria:

- achievable mandate;
- available resources;
- level of risk to the security of Canadian personnel.

CIDA, through the Canadian Peacebuilding Fund mechanism, funds the participation of Canadian civilian police deployed on peace support/peace building operations. Additional materiel and logistical support can be provided by requesting agencies (UN, OSCE, ICTY) and DND (which sometimes provides supplies, equipment and services).

## **International Development Research Centre (IDRC)**

### ***Programming and General Types of Resources***

The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is a public corporation created in 1970 to help developing countries find long-term solutions to the social, economic, and environmental



problems they face. IDRC's mandate is to 'initiate, encourage, support, and conduct research into the problems of the developing regions of the world and into the means for applying and adapting scientific, technical, and other knowledge to the economic and social advancement of those regions'. To this end, it supports research that is focused on alleviating poverty and promoting sustainable and equitable development. IDRC favours multidisciplinary, participatory research where researchers from different disciplines work with local people to devise solutions to local problems.

IDRC's programing is organized around Program Initiatives (PIs), each of which addresses a specific set of research issues. PIs are run as working networks that link Southern and Northern researchers to set research agendas and share research results. The Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Programme Initiative (or PBR PI) deals explicitly with SALW. The PBR PI supports interdisciplinary, collaborative, and policy-oriented research by established research institutions as well as by non- traditional research partners and peacebuilding practitioners. PBR PI supports research that addresses one or more of the following dimensions of peacebuilding:

- democratization: the key issues of governance that war-torn countries must confront as they transform their political systems;
- human security: the threats to the security of individuals and communities that result from war and the inability of the state to provide protection;
- political economy: the economic and political dimensions of war, violence, and peacebuilding.

PBR PI is especially active in Southern Africa, the Middle East, and Central America, but also supports a limited number of global projects. It is focused on creating North-South partnerships that involve significant capacity- building in the South.

Examples of IDRC research projects that deal directly with the SALW problem are:

- The Small Arms Control in Nicaragua project; and
- The Disarmament and Security in the Horn of Africa Project

### ***Allocations***

Total funding for IDRC in 2000-2001 was CDN\$135 million (approximately US\$85 million). Precise levels of funding for SALW related project are not available. As the lines between development, peacebuilding, human security, law enforcement and arms control become increasingly blurred, organizations like the IDRC will likely devote more resources to addressing the problem of small arms and light weapons.

## CHAPTER V CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

**Objective:** To identify practical options for Canadian policy practitioners seeking to maximize and rationalize the allocation of resources to support multilateral SALW commitments and programmes

### Summary and Conclusions

The current situation is characterized by sharply different levels of regional activity. Some regions/sub-regions (eg. Southern Africa) have adopted a comprehensive approach while others (eg. ASEAN) have only agreed a more limited or partial approach. Still others (such as South Asia and the Middle East) seem uninterested in the issue.

The UN *Programme of Action* did not introduce any significantly new types of SALW commitment. Moreover, the commitments articulated in the *Programme* are in many ways weaker than those expressed in regional agreements. The *Programme* remains important, however, in that it provides both a framework and an impetus for future SALW action. Given the lack of regional commitments in some parts of the globe, the *Programme* also provides a framework for action in those regions/sub-regions that lack formal legally or politically binding regional arrangements.

The most common and widely endorsed forms of SALW commitment have to do with post-conflict DDR, surplus weapons collection/destruction. This seems to have evolved out of the practical challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding. Law enforcement and export licensing are also widely endorsed, probably because they are consistent with norms of state sovereignty.

There is a growing sense that the kinds of commitments currently agreed are inadequate. Emerging priorities include tracing and marking, transparency, illicit brokering and stockpile management/security. There also seems to be an emerging interest in pressing for the negotiation of legally – rather than merely politically – binding SALW agreements. One example of this is the recent French-Swiss initiative that aimed to oblige states legally to implement marking and tracing measures.

A broad range of actors have been mobilized in support of these commitments, including states, multilateral institutions, and NGOs. Moreover, the SALW issue is now firmly embedded in both the global political agenda and the global consciousness.

It is obvious to all involved that, given the extent and depth of the problem, no region or functional category of SALW action is adequately resourced – although it is equally obvious that some are better resourced than others. It is also clear that the effective implementation of many commitments is undermined by lack of resources and inadequate institutional capacity in many parts of the world. Ultimately, then, all regions and programmes could benefit from the availability of additional financial support.

Implementation lags seriously behind commitments. There is no regional implementation mechanism for the Bamako Declaration; nor is there a global implementation mechanism for the UN *Programme of Action*. There is a general consensus that practical/financial support for the UN *Programme* is a high priority if forward momentum on the SALW issue is to be maintained.

The majority of those SALW implementation programmes that currently exist are under-resourced. Having said this, it is important to note that levels of resources differ sharply between regions/sub-regions. In this regard, programming in the Southern African and European regions is

increasingly well supported; those in East Africa and Latin/Central America less so (although, if it is fully subscribed, the new multi-donor trust fund for the Great Lakes of Africa may move this region into the 'adequately resourced' category). Support for institution and capacity building are particularly pressing needs in these two under-resourced regions.

Generally speaking, to date, weapons collection/destruction and DDR seem to have been among the better resourced types of SALW activity. Among those types of functional programming not particularly well supported are security sector reform and capacity building (although this may be changing). Simply put, in many parts of the world there is a largely unmet need for capacity-building measures to close the gap between formal multilateral commitments and the domestic capacity to implement these agreement. There is a similar need in many regions to provide security forces with appropriate training in both the techniques of community policing and the secure storage, safe handling and responsible use of SALWs. Expert opinion is that these types of programming (at the intersection of arms control, law enforcement, development, peacebuilding and human security) are precisely those with the greatest potential to reduce demand and mitigate the (mis)use of SALWs. Many experts argue that significant payoffs might result from even relatively modest increases in resource allocations to these types of programmes.

Regional partnerships and collaboration/cooperation within and between regions are emerging as important features of the SALW landscape. Partnerships between states, multilateral institutions and NGOs are also increasingly important.

Another trend that seems to be emerging is that the discursive and institutional distinctions between arms control, law enforcement, development, peacebuilding and human security seem to be becoming increasingly blurred when it comes to dealing with SALWs. More and more, the SALW problem has come to be seen as multidimensional in nature, with 'root causes' that are closely bound up with economic, political and institutional underdevelopment. As a result, the development community is increasingly interested in tackling the SALW problem and ODA resources are becoming an increasingly important element of the funding for SALW-related programming.

Certain states are willing and able to devote considerable resources to the SALW problem. In this connection the UK, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and Germany continue to exercise an important leadership role. Canada also plays a significant leadership role, although it devotes considerably less financial support to SALW programming than do the 'first-tier' donor states. It is worth noting that these are not the only states supporting SALW programmes. In fact, in recent years the donor field has grown increasingly crowded, with the perhaps inevitable result that resource allocation has become increasingly inchoate. This suggests that we may be approaching the point at which the greater coordination of state spending will become necessary.

State spending is typically diffuse and "across-the-board". There is also little effective coordination between states and the growing danger of wasteful duplication and overlap in SALW programme funding. This may be improving as networks of officials from states, multilateral institutions and NGO mature and deepen. Concerted action to enhance coordination could have significant payoffs in terms of rationalizing and maximizing the impact of SALW-related resource allocations.

### **Options for Canada**

Given all this, how can the government of Canada channel Canadian SALW assistance more "effectively" – that is, in ways that meet real and pressing operational needs, minimize duplication and overlap, enhance coordination, and are highly visible and accessible? In ideal-typical terms, three basic options can be identified:

### **Option 1: The Status Quo**

Currently, Canadian support for multilateral SALW programming is essentially handled on a pragmatic case-by-case basis. The result is a somewhat “diffuse” or “across-the-board” pattern of funding, characterized by considerable spending across a wide range of global, regional and sub-regional SALW programmes, organizations and initiatives. Consider the following snapshot of Canadian donor support:

- Canada has been a major source of funding for a significant number of conferences, workshops, seminars, and other “consciousness raising” and “information sharing” meetings dealing with topics as diverse as “marking and tracing”, “collection and destruction” and “regional transparency”;
- Canada has provided financial and other support to SALW actions in every region and sub-region (including Europe, the Americas, Africa, ASEAN/Pacific Islands);
- Canada has been an important and reliable contributor to a number of key SALW-relevant NGOs;
- Canada has assisted with capacity building in a variety of different regional and institutional settings; and
- Canada provided substantial support to the 2001 UN Conference on SALWs.

While this is an admirable record – and while there can be no doubt that to date Canada has exercised an effective leadership in the area of SALWs – the current approach may not be sustainable in the long run. The reason for this is simple: while Canada currently stands out as one of several countries playing a leadership role in addressing the SALW problem,<sup>29</sup> as the field of donor countries and multilateral institutions becomes increasingly crowded it may be difficult for Canada to maintain its current leadership profile. To the extent that maintaining such a profile is important to the government of Canada, this suggests the need for a somewhat more focused (or niche-based) approach that would allow more resources to be devoted to high value-added programming that would have a visibly and demonstrably *Canadian* identity or dimension.

Continuing with the *status quo* also appears to a somewhat less than optimal approach when judged against the other criteria of “effectiveness” defined above. While current Canadian support for SALW programming obviously meets pressing operational needs, there is a danger that in the future (as certain regional or global multilateral programmes become increasingly well resourced) Canadian funding will end up wastefully duplicating support from other donor countries or institutions. At the moment, despite the clear support within the donor community for SALW action, there has been very little co-ordination of effort. Moreover, few governments are fully aware of the programmes and activities being undertaken or supported by others. Diffuse or across-the-board patterns of funding by donor countries like Canada can only exacerbate this problem. Indeed, the result of continuing with the *status quo* approach seems entirely predictable: reduced visibility; increasingly poor coordination; and growing duplication and overlap. Increasing both focus and profile, on the other hand, would have the benefit of improving the visibility and co-ordination on SALW assistance within the donor community. It would also facilitate the targeting of assistance at priority (i.e., currently under-resourced) regions and programmes.

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<sup>29</sup>Other leaders include Switzerland, Norway, UK, Japan and Germany.

## **Option 2: Focused Support for Specific Regional and/or Sub-Regional Programmes**

If continuing with the current approach to SALW action is problematic, what alternatives are available to Canadian foreign and development policy officials? The first alternative approach would be to focus support on one or more key regions/implementation programmes, multilateral institutions/trust funds, or types of SALW action.

Adopting a regional focus: One way that Canada might begin to focus and rationalize its funding of SALW commitments and programmes would be to concentrate resources on one or more regional implementation initiatives. For example, Canada might opt to target technical and financial resources at EAPCCO and the Nairobi Secretariat (the two key institutional elements of the *Implementation Plan of the Coordinated Agenda for Action on the Problem of the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa*) which is far less well resourced than similar implementation programmes in Southern Africa. Specific needs in East Africa and the Greater Horn include:

- workshops, roundtables and ministerial meetings;
- regional and national training programmes;
- the establishment of national databases and communications systems;
- the development of research capacity in the region;
- regional, national and local public awareness programmes;
- assistance with weapons collection and destruction programmes;
- for capacity building to implementing agencies, National Focal Points and the Permanent Secretariat (the Nairobi Secretariat);
- for exchange programmes and expertise; and
- for programmes such as demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, rehabilitation of child soldiers, management of refugee communities to reduce demand and forestall the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

Other regional and sub-regional programmes that might warrant close attention in this regard include the OAS/Central America, where insufficient institutional capacity and lack of technical and financial resources are frustrating efforts to implement the *Model Regulations*, the *Inter-American Convention*, and related sub-regional agreements such as the *Framework Agreement for Democratic Security in Central America* and the *Antigua Declaration* and the *Antigua Declaration*.

There are two broad approaches to administering funding to under-resourced regional programmes. The first is to continue allocating funds on a pragmatic case-by-case basis, but targeting SALW resources at a specific region or sub-region. While certainly feasible, a potentially far more effective and attractive option would be to implement a regional partnership between Canada and a particularly under-resourced region such as East Africa or Latin/Central America. In the former case, the EU-SADC arrangement described above provides something of a generic model for this kind of partnership. Such a Canada-regional arrangement might be best financed through a dedicated Canadian SALW trust fund that could be established either within either the OAS or the Nairobi Secretariat (or possibly the OAU). Resources from such a trust fund would be dedicated to SALW action

in the partner region and could be disbursed in response to specific requests from regional, sub-regional or national actors, as well as NGOs engaged in operational SALW programmes.

The advantages of such a regional partnership (supported by a dedicated Canadian trust fund) are multiple. First, to the extent that the partnership focused on an under-resourced region, there would be an obvious value-added in terms of meeting real and pressing operational needs. Second, to the extent that the terms and objectives of the regional partnership could be made to reflect the regional-level commitments embodied in the *UN Programme of Action* (such as promoting regional cooperation, coordination and harmonization of SALW measures and enforcement mechanisms; establishing, regional stockpile management and security mechanisms; supporting national and regional DDR programmes; and developing voluntary transparency measures), this sort of arrangement would be broadly consistent with emerging international priorities. Finally, such an arrangement would be highly visible, thereby enhancing both accessibility and Canada's international leadership profile (both within the Hemisphere and in connection with the SALW issue).

Focusing donor support on multilateral institutions: Another approach to implementing Option 2 would be to channel a greater portion of Canadian SALW resources through existing multilateral institutions such as the UNDP, DDA or the World Bank. This would have obvious benefits in terms of rationalizing and focusing Canadian donor assistance, as a larger portion of Canadian assistance would be coordinated through a relatively small number of global multilateral institutions. Given that these institutions all address key elements of the *UN Programme of Action*, such an approach would also be consistent with emerging international priorities. Providing significant resources to the DDA might allow that department to exercise a greater leadership role with respect to implementing the *UN Programme of Action*.

On the negative side of the ledger, such an approach would both circumscribe Canada's capacity to direct SALW funds in accordance with its own interests and priorities and reduce Canada's leadership profile on this issue. These problems could be addressed, however, if Canada were to establish a Canadian SALW trust fund within the relevant multilateral institution. The Japanese Post-Conflict Fund within the World Bank suggests that there is ample precedent for such an arrangement. A sufficiently well endowed Canadian trust fund, over which Canada would retain some strategic control (by establishing guidelines for allocating grants), would certainly address concerns about Canada's leadership profile in the SALW field. It would also allow Canada to establish the terms and criteria under which funds would be allocated.

Another variation on this theme would be to contribute substantial financial resources to help establish a functional fund within a multilateral institution. That is what the UK, Switzerland, Belgium, Norway and South Korea did when they provided substantial funds to the United Nations Development Programme to allow it to establish its long term *Weapons Collection, Management and Destruction Programme*. The purpose of this programme is to deploy experts to assist, train and build the capacity of states, regional organizations and international agencies in areas such as weapons collection, stockpile management, safe storage and the destruction of weaponry. Canada could identify a similar functional category (say, capacity building for export controls or border/customs management or security sector reform/community policing) and contribute financial resources to establish a functional fund within a relevant multilateral institution.

Adopting a functional focus: A final approach to implementing Option 2 would be to adopt a strictly functional focus to funding and programme support. This would involve Canada focusing its SALW resources on, for example, DDR or weapons collection/destruction. Given Canada's broad base of SALW-relevant expertise it is difficult to conclude that Canada should focus largely on, say, DDR to the exclusion or detriment of security sector reform.

### **Option 3: Focused Support for the UN Programme of Action**

The final option available to Canada is to focus financial resources on implementing the UN *Programme of Action*.

In its purest form, this option would involve the creation of a trust fund through which a substantial portion of all Canadian SALW-relevant donor assistance would be channeled. Ideally, Canada would provide the initial investment in the fund. This initial contribution could range somewhere between the US\$2.1 million that Norway invested to initiate the UNDP Trust Fund up to the US\$100 million that the Netherlands committed to launch the Great Lakes multi-donor trust fund.

This trust fund could be a wholly Canadian mechanism (ie., a fund established by Canada to administer Canadian resources), a "bilateral" arrangement (for example, a Canada-EU trust fund), or a truly multilateral fund initially created through a Canadian initiative, but ultimately supported by other members of the international donor community. Structurally, it might be a "stand alone" multi-donor trust fund or it might be located within the UN DDA (or even associated in some manner with the DDA SALW trust fund). It might also take the form of a dedicated *multi-donor trust fund for the UN Programme of Action* (in much the same way as there is currently a multi-donor trust fund for the Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Program).

However configured, the remit of this trust fund would be to direct donor assistance to programmes and projects consistent with the UN *Programme of Action*. The objective of the Fund would be to fill urgent gaps in SALW programming resulting from the lack of regional or sub-regional commitments or projects – that is, to provide resources to support initiatives undertaken in connection with the *Programme of Action*. It could also be used to promote new and more innovative approaches to the SALW problem. Where appropriate, the Fund could be structured to call upon Canadian skills to better meet these objectives. The new Fund would not duplicate existing global or regional programmes but would aim complement these by being able to respond quickly to urgent SALW-related needs that cannot be met through other global or regional programming mechanisms. Use of the Fund could be restricted to countries eligible for Official Development Assistance (ODA). Eligible partner organizations could include NGOs, NGOs, United Nations agencies or other national, regional or international organisations could be called upon to implement activities financed by the Fund.

If such a fund were unilateral (ie. Canadian only), it would have the benefit of being a highly visible and accessible focal point for Canadian funding of global, regional and sub-regional SALW programmes. If this were the case, then the fund/programme could act as a kind of clearing house for requests for Canadian SALW assistance (and could perhaps be charged with keeping a rolling inventory of all Canadian SALW-relevant programmes, projects, expertise and development assistance. If such a fund were to be bilateral or multilateral in nature it would have the benefit of acting as a clearing house for *international* donor support, thus enhancing the coordination and efficient use of resources. As with other trust funds, it could be structured so as to be responsive to the real and pressing needs of states, regional/sub-regional institutions or NGOs in SALW-affected regions. It could also be charged with providing assistance with the implementation of all the categories of commitment embodied in the UN *Programme of Action*, thus providing a mechanism for supporting SALW action in regions/sub-regions not currently covered by a politically or legally binding regional agreement.

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