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CANADA, EXPANDED SECURITY
AND THE "NEW" MULTILATERALISM
March 1998
W. Andy Knight





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Canada, Expanded Security and the "New" Multilateralism

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Summary:

In the post-Cold War era, security issues are related more to threats to the state and to society arising from within the state and to threats to core values and institutions rather than to military offensives. In this context, instruments of security are not necessarily of a military nature. Thus, Canada's security policy needs to be amended in order to reflect the new environment and the new security concepts. In one way, it can address the new understanding of security through a conceptual architecture of cooperative security, using 1. multilateral strategy, 2. assurance rather than deterrence, 3. an approach that complements, co-exists and even replaces bi-lateral security arrangements, 4. an approach that promotes both military and non-military tools of security, 5. multilateral arrangements and institutions that are flexible and adaptive, and 6. regimes of norms, principles, and practices of transparency to counter the erosive nature of the security dilemma. With respect to multilateralism in particular, the post-Cold War era has had an impact on it and has seen the transformation of multilateralism within a framework of global governance (a regulatory framework within which conditions for peaceful interaction could develop). This "new" multilateralism, which has moved away from state-centric forms) itself reflects the new items on the post-Cold War agenda such as democratisation, environmental protection, human rights and justice, among others, the base of which is a normative pre-occupation with strengthening the role of civil society or sovereignty-free actors at all levels of interaction to balance the influence of sovereignty-bound actors. In other words, current multilateral institutions need to be reformed in order to address issues in the new environment, or new multilateral institutions must otherwise be created.

Canada, Expanded Security and the "New" Multilateralism

by

W. Andy Knight¹
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Introduction

This paper is part of a larger project that advocates a re-construction of the understanding of what constitutes Canadian foreign policy.¹ Such a "re-construction" requires that one stand outside prevailing or received views on the nature of foreign policy and the foreign policy making process in order to critique those views. This is in line with a critical orientation to the subject — one that allows the observer to remain somewhat distant from the immediacy of contemporary issues affecting Canadian foreign policy so that those issues can be placed into a broader historical and sociological context.² In so doing, one is in a much better position to identify and investigate the impersonal historical forces that frame foreign policy action and at the same time to question the impact that global structural changes have on Canadian foreign policy orientations and vice versa.

The security elements of Canadian foreign policy is especially crucial in any attempt to re-construct our understanding of such policy. Dewitt and Leyton-Brown made the case recently that Canadians are unaccustomed to speak of security policy. This is so, according to the authors, because during the Cold War period the strategic assessment of the threat to Canada's security was done largely outside the Canadian State. As they put it: "The strategic assessment was, in effect, defined for us by our partnership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and our commitment to the United Nations."³ As a result, the Canadian government seemed content to deal with the more narrow issue of defining Canada's defence policy. As the late Rod Byers pointed out, defence policy is only one aspect of security policy. It constitutes "those military activities and capabilities which are utilized to promote national and international security from military-strategic perspectives." On the other hand, security policy "encompasses defence policy and includes those political instruments which are employed to enhance the security interest of the state. In theory, security policy serves as a bridge between foreign and defence policy."⁴

It is that bridge which Dewitt and Leyton-Brown tries to construct in their 1995 edited volume titled *Canada's International Security Policy*. That text had two main goals: 1) to address the gaps in understanding "between Canada's foreign policy interests in international peace and security, Canadian domestic well-being, and Canada's defence policy interests in

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dealing with both threat and risk to those sets of interests;" and, 2) "to provide students, the attentive public, and elected and appointed officials with a source of analysis and understanding about how Canada's foreign and defence policy is made and implemented in the areas vital to its role in international peace and security." However, that bridge was essentially being built to a large extent on an ostensibly Westphalian foundation, even though the authors recognized that "the concept of security and the notion of defence, both fundamental aspects of the way the interstate system has been formed since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648," had come under scrutiny at the end of the Cold War. I say that the bridge between foreign and defence policy being constructed by Dewitt and Leyton-Brown was to a large extent based on Westphalian pillars because to a lesser extent it was being built on something else as well.

In recognizing that certain threats to the state and to society within the state do not necessarily always come in the form of military offensives, Dewitt and Leyton-Brown suggest that a country's security policy should acknowledge

that, in addition to the potential effect of war and other forms of external violence, conflict, and instability, boundaries are not impermeable, that uncontrolled penetration by people, goods, services, ideas, culture, or even effluent might be considered an aspect of the security agenda if such activities are perceived as putting core values and institutions at risk.⁵

Herein lies a departure from the Westphalian position on security. By recognizing that threats or challenges to national security are not always military in nature, and that military forces are not the only instruments of security policy, Dewitt and Leyton-Brown open the door for a challenge to the realist and neo-realist conception of security which essentially maintains that the state is central to the subject of security.

The state, in such views, is usually presented as a rational, autonomous, actor operating in an environment which is filled with similar actors. Since there is no supranational actor to keep these players in check, the operating environment is therefore one of a Hobbesian "state of nature" or anarchy. As each state desire greater power (power maximisers) in order to protect itself from possible attacks on its sovereignty, territory and population, a security dilemma is created. That understanding of security privileges the state as the subject of security and concludes that anarchy is the eternal condition of international relations. But what if the state is not the only subject of security? What if one can conceive of the individuals within the state as the subjects of security, or of the globe as a whole as the subject of security? Those are the implicit questions raised by Dewitt and Leyton-Brown and they are addressed using the conceptual architecture of cooperative security.

According to the above authors, this new security architecture is designed using the following: 1) multilateral strategy; 2) assurance rather than deterrence; 3) an approach that complements, co-exists with and in some cases may replace bilateral security arrangements; 4) an approach which promotes both military and non-military tools of security; 5) multilateral arrangements and institutions that are flexible and adaptive; 6) regimes of norms, principles, and practices of transparency to counter the erosive nature of the security dilemma.⁶

The concept of cooperative security, while still falling within problem solving and statist

approaches to theoretical formulations on this subject, still makes some notable departures from the realist, and particularly structural realist, position on security. Clearly it is not based on the assumptions which neo-realist make about strategic global relations as operating in a zero-sum world. It does not hold the view that leadership of the international system necessarily requires a concert of dominant powers or a hegemon. It does not privilege the military as the sole actor that can address security issues. It does not assume that military conflicts and violence are the only challenges to security. However, the cooperative security concept still views the state as principal actors in addressing the issues of security, even though it acknowledges that non-state actors may from time to time play crucial roles in managing and enhancing certain aspects of security.

This paper builds on this notion of cooperative security while, at the same time, pushing the concept further by adopting a more critical orientation to the subject as it relates to Canadian foreign policy. It pushes the boundaries of the conception of security by taking into account: the conditions under which Canadian international security policy is being made during the post-Cold War period; the lens of a post-internationalist "turbulence" paradigm and that of critical reflectivists that offer a more realistic view of the nature of security dynamics in the contemporary world; a growing and intense debate about the need to expand the concept of security; and, the concept of "new" multilateralism which offers for Canada the prospects of developing the notion of subsidiarity security arrangements in its future foreign and international security policy.

Canada's International Security Policy: From the Cold War to an Era of Transition

Canadian foreign and defence policy has been influenced heavily by the international political and strategic environment within which Canada found itself as well as by the evolution of historical events which shaped the Canadian nation-state. When Canada became a dominion of the British Empire in 1867 it was granted a measure of internal sovereignty but very little in the way of external sovereignty. Full sovereignty was not conferred until 1931 with the passage of the Statute of Westminster by the British government. Even so, Canada did not repatriate its constitution from Britain until much later. Nevertheless, according to Middlemiss and Sokolsky, it was around the 1930s that Canada first exhibited signs of developing "a distinct international character and a nationally directed foreign policy."⁷

What was the nature of this foreign policy? It is clear that the Canadian government was occupied by at least two main issues. The first was the issue of trade. The new nation-state needed desperately to develop a solid economic base for its nation-building. Trade was seen as a major vehicle for accomplishing such. The second was the issue of security. A country the physical size of Canada needed to find ways to protect itself against external threats. The principal threat to Canada in the early days of confederation was its neighbour to the South, although by the 1920s this was really no longer the case. A traditional notion of security was adopted from the very beginning by the Canadian government. Security for Canada meant the defence of its small population and large geographical territory through a combination of "self-help" and alliances. Since the new nation-state did not have the means to secure the nation-state fully on its own, the government decided that it was best to embrace the idea of alliances. Canada therefore initially sought alliance with Great Britain -- a natural ally. Thus, the enemies of Great Britain became the enemies of Canada and vice versa. Threats to Canada would be viewed as threats to Great Britain and vice versa. When Britain went to war in the Sudan, in South Africa or in Germany, for

instance, Canada was thrust into those wars.

During World War I, English Canada's loyalty and allegiance to Great Britain coupled with its sentimental attachment to that country resulted in a major war effort on the part of the Canadian state. However, sentimentality, loyalty and allegiance were only part of the reason for the Canadian state to become so heavily involved in this war. There were other reasons as well. One of those reasons appears to be based on the need of the Canadian government of the day to demonstrate to the rest of the world that Canada had come into its own; that it was indeed an independent and sovereign state able to make foreign and defence policy decisions and willing to send military troops into those areas around the world from whence threats to the Canadian state originated. Indeed, Canada sent some 500,000 troops to Europe to fight alongside the British and sustained roughly 60,000 deaths. As Middlemiss and Sokolsky put it: this "was a contribution, and a price, out of all proportion to the country's size."⁸

This was the price that the Canadian government at the time was willing to pay in order for Canada to develop an international legal personality.⁹ It also sent out a signal to the rest of the world that Canada was capable of making "rational" calculations about its security interests.¹⁰ The calculation in this case was simply based on the premise that an upstart Germany would pose a serious threat not only to British interests but also to Canadian ones. If Germany was able to win the war, it would disrupt the balance of power in Europe, dominate the European continent, challenge the hegemonic leadership of Great Britain -- particularly its supremacy over the seas -- and eventually pose a direct threat to North America and therefore to Canada. It was from that point on that the Canadian government made the calculation that Europe would be part of its "strategic perimeter".¹¹

The heavy toll which the Canadian armed forces took at Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele, in its first major war effort, resulted in the country gaining some influence in international councils such as the Imperial War Cabinet, the Versailles Peace Conference and, later, the League of Nations. But those heavy losses, along with the backlash stemming from the conscription issue in 1917, which divided French and English Canada, caused the Canadian government to reflect on the nature of its alliance with Britain. While taking a relatively active role in the League, by 1922 Canada began to withhold support for British Imperial actions. For example, when Britain asked Canada to contribute forces in its interventionary action in Turkey, the Canadian government refused. Withdrawing into semi-isolation allowed Canada to reduce the level of its armed forces. Instead of embracing fully the most important principle of political realism, i.e. the essential nature of *self help* ("the ultimate dependence of the state on its own resources to promote its interests and protect itself"),¹² the Canadian state instead opted during the interwar years not to build up any significant armed forces and, instead, to put its faith in disarmament and peacemaking efforts, primarily through the use of multilateral instruments. Canada's commitment to the multilateralism can, in fact, be traced to its involvement in the the League of Nations, and League membership was "actively sought as an avenue for furthering Canadian autonomy in foreign affairs."¹³

However, with the failure of the League of Nations and the breakdown of the multipolar balance of power system in Europe in the mid to late 1930s, it became clear to the Canadian government that unless multilateral instruments were strengthened significantly, Canada would have to depend on strong alliances and/or the protection of the US to ensure its security. By the late 1930s it became evident that without the support of the US (and without its active

involvement in world affair) countries such as Great Britain and France were finding it difficult to respond decisively to the aggressive actions of the revisionist powers of the interwar period.¹⁴ Canada declared war on Nazi Germany on September 10, 1939 only seven days after Great Britain's declaration, and before the US decided to join in the Second World War effort. Some 42,000 Canadian were killed in that war and, like as in the previous war, Canada's contribution to the war effort was disproportionate to a country of its size and stature.

Once the US joined the Allied powers in entering the war, Europe no longer remained the only part of Canada's strategic perimeter. It would take one specific action to bring home this fact — i.e. the surprise attack on Pearl Harbour by the Japanese. That act demonstrated the extent to which the war was no longer distant from North American shores. By the end of World War II the strategic threat to Canada and to North America became increasingly evident as the US and the Soviet Union emerged from the war as two global superpowers and became locked in the comprehensive ideological, geopolitical, military, and international struggle which we call the Cold War. This Cold War environment defined international politics for Canada and for most of the rest of the world. Indeed, Canadian foreign and defence policy during this period cannot be fully explained without an understanding of how the Cold War environment affected and limited Canada's external actions.

The Cold War created an environment of insecurity, on the one hand, and of precarious stability, on the other. All peoples, from every country, lived under the fear of the possibility of a global nuclear war as the security dilemma produced an escalating nuclear arms race between the Americans and the Soviets. Luckily, the Cold War never became a hot war, although there is now evidence to suggest that the world came dangerously close to that scenario. Instead of using their military capabilities directly against each other, the US and the USSR engaged in proxy wars and maintained a precarious bipolar balance of power arrangement through threats and counter threats from the armed camps of NATO and the WARSAW pact, and through military doctrines such as mutual assured destruction (MAD) and nuclear deterrence, and by developing a number of security regimes. For Canada, the Cold War became the context or backdrop in developing its postwar security policy.

Canadian Security Policy and NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became the central forum within which Canada's defence and foreign policy was formulated during the Cold War era.¹⁵ Canada was one of the original signatories to the Washington Treaty that created NATO in 1949 and played a significant role in negotiating the text.¹⁶ Canada also actively supported the move to transform the NATO alliance "from its original juridical form of a guarantee pact, with limited institutional arrangements for allied consultations, into an integrated military and political structure." To demonstrate its commitment to the defence of Europe, Canada provided substantial land and air forces to the alliance in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. That strong commitment receded under the Trudeau administration, and even further by the Mulroney government in 1992 when financial exigencies forced Canada to withdraw its military units from Europe.¹⁷

Nonetheless, during the Cold War, the Canadian government demonstrated by its commitments to NATO that a forward defence in Europe was directly linked to Canada's own security interests at home. By buying into the NATO alliance's philosophy, the Canadian

government showed that it had accepted the threat perception held by Western Europe and the US, i.e. that the main threat in fact emanated from the Soviet Union and the USSR's dependent allies in Eastern Europe.

At the domestic level in Canada, there was little questioning of this country's relationship to NATO or of the wisdom of maintaining the alliances' view of the threat. As Paul Buteux points out, even today, "despite a growing consciousness of Canada as a hemispheric and Pacific power, Canadian have never defined for themselves security interests in the Pacific or in Latin America comparable to those that determined Canadian policy towards NATO for forty years."¹⁸ Even as the Cold War has drawn to an end, Canada continues to maintain support for a redefined NATO and sustains its ties with Europe through membership in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and in the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE). Thus, continued membership in NATO and these other European fora signals that Canadian foreign and defence policy continues to take into consideration a range of strategic European security issues that may or may not have much to do with Canada's own security interests. Indeed, in light of the changing nature of security one ought to question the rationality of Canada's position on this issue.

Canadian Security Policy within the US Bilateral Relationship

The Cold War can again be held responsible for Canada's strong bilateral relationship with the US. It must be remembered that the US was initially a threat to Canadian sovereignty and territory. However, as stated earlier, by the 1920s that threat had diminished significantly. By the end of World War II, Canada had hitched its security wagon on the US rather than on Great Britain.

While less important than the Canada/Western European relationship, Canada's commitment to "North American defence has always been a significant item on the Canadian foreign and defence policy agenda..."¹⁹ This stemmed from the fact that Canada found itself physically sandwiched between the world's two nuclear-armed superpowers, and that the US made it clear that it considered Canadian territory to be a strategic foreground for the protection of American territory, industry and resources. President Roosevelt, immediately after World War II, had promised to protect Canadian territory from any possible attack coming from the Soviet Union. Prime Minister King, for his part, promised the American President that Canada would cooperate with the US to ensure that enemy force would not attack the US via Canadian territory. What form did this bilateral cooperation take?

From the outset, it was clear that Canada would not be in a position to develop a large enough military establishment to protect itself from a communist threat to its territory, population and sovereignty. Thus for very pragmatic and practical reasons, Canada worked with the US to establish in 1940, through a simple exchange of notes at Ogdensburg (New York), a Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) designed to protect the North American continent during the war. In 1941, the Hyde Park declaration was signed by the two countries with the intent of meshing together the Canadian and US war economies. It was around this time that the US replaced Great Britain as Canada's main ally. This wartime collaboration was continued after the war with the formation of a Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) in 1946 which provided the mechanism for exchange of military information between the two countries on issues dealing with North American defence. In 1947, a joint statement on defence cooperation was signed by

President Truman and Prime Minister King which ensured that continental air defence issues would be dealt with jointly in order to counter the intercontinental delivery of weapons by Soviet bombers. This was accompanied by a number of arrangements for joint Canada/US naval monitoring exercises in the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans aimed at countering possible Soviet intercontinental and sea-launched ballistic missile threats, as well as by agreement to cooperate on intelligence matters. In addition, by 1958, the US cemented the bilateral security relationship by establishing the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD). This Command was established by a simple exchange of notes between Canada and the US. The establishment of NORAD combined with the mid-Canada radar line, the CADIN-PINETREE line, the Arctic Distance Early Warning (DEW) radar line, and the Defence Development/Production Sharing Arrangements, all signalled an increasingly integrated and cooperative approach to air defence on the North American continent -- what might be labelled as a "latent war community" or a "security community."²⁰ It should be noted, however, that while Canada is considered an equal partner in this relationship, the US pays 90% of the bill.

As Canada became increasingly roped into a North American defence/security community, it became clear that the country had also bought into the US perception of the threat to North America as well as supported the US's position on how best to deter that threat. Some have argued that this compliance posture on the part of the Canadians showed the extent to which Canada had become simply a "powder monkey".²¹ However, one can make the case that this bilateral security arrangement was made possible because Canadian liberalism was highly compatible with the broad internationalism that informed US foreign policy during the Cold War. In other words, the Canadian government chose to get itself entangled in this arrangement for largely ideological and practical reasons.

With the end of the Cold War, one has to question Canada's continued commitment to NORAD. A parliamentary review in the late 1980s concluded that Norad's missile/attack assessment, space surveillance and air sovereignty functions were still necessary for Canadian defence, because thousands of nuclear warheads from some of the states that were formerly part of the USSR are still pointed at North America. However, this defence against help argument is rapidly losing its salience as the air threat to North America is diminishing. The set of assumptions that prevailed during the Cold War tended to obscure for Canadian foreign and defence policymakers any possibilities for change. But unlike their American counterparts, Canadian policymakers placed much more hope in multilateral instruments as potential avenues for initiating changes in international relations and for securing the Canadian state.

Canada and the United Nations

Canada developed what may be called a diversified strategy for addressing his security concerns. As noted above, the Canadian government rationalized the strategic threat to Canada as coming from the global threat of communism and the threat of nuclear war. The government dealt with these perceived threats by becoming part of a regional/transregional alliance and by developing a secure bilateral relationship with the US. As part of its diversification strategy, Canada also chose to become involved in a number of multilateral arrangements, the most important of which was with the United Nations system.

Canada helped to form the United Nations in 1945. Indeed it was a major player in the

establishment of this organization. Further, Canada became heavily involved in the maintenance and reform of this institution.²² Canada's contribution to this organization over the years include: developing the functionalist principle which allows middle powers to play a significant role in the UN security system; inventing the notion of peacekeeping in 1956 for which Lester B. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize; contributing more military personnel and resources to UN peace operations than any other country to date; being a leader in the conceptualization and development of UN arms control verification and other forms of verification techniques used by the organization; contributions to humanitarian assistance, refugee protection, electoral supervision, and state rebuilding efforts; the development of a proposal for creating a rapid reaction capability for the UN; and, the assistance in constructing the groundwork for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court.

This multilateral activity is based on the outstanding adherence to the notion that the promotion and protection of Canadian interests and values can be advanced by having the UN take steps to ensure the speedy resolution of conflicts around the world, by having the UN act to prevent potential conflicts from brewing, and by supporting the UN's efforts to implement peace with justice in post conflict situations. However, one has to question the extent to which Canada's multilateral security commitments can be sustained in light of recent and planned cuts to the Canadian armed forces. Will Canada be in a position in the future to make the same kind and level of contribution to UN peacekeeping, for instance, as it had done in the past?

The Post-Internationalist "Turbulence" Paradigm and the Critical Reflectivist Turn
 Traditional multilateralists were more concerned with stability than change. Canadian foreign and defence policy makers had embraced the traditional multilateral position during the Cold War period and this made it difficult for them to adapt initially to the changes that accompanied the thawing of the Cold War.

By 1989, most observers of international affairs began to notice shifts in political, economic and social conditions globally which caused them to consider the possibility that across the globe discontinuities were as much in evidence as continuities. The fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, which happened to coincide with this period of disjuncture, was heralded with great fanfare and celebrated by more than 140 heads of State and other leaders in New York on 24 October 1995. This major milestone provided the opportunity for state leaders, practitioners and academics to reflect, specifically, on the organization's past half century and on the evolution of multilateralism more generally. It also provided a forum for re-defining the challenges facing humanity and for speculating about what changes would be necessary for the UN system to become a relevant, efficient and effective instrument of global governance in the coming millennium.

What became clear in the early part of the 1990s was that multilateralism as exhibited through the UN system and other established bodies was in deep trouble. Some scholars predicted that the UN might just go the way of the League of Nations unless major adjustments were made to its normative base and institutional statutes, its organizational structures and decision-making processes, and to the instruments and mechanisms that have been developed within the world body for the purpose of facilitating cooperation and managing common global problems. In other words, the future of this multilateral organization may very well depend on its

adaptive and transformative facility. Furthermore, the future of multilateralism itself appeared to be in doubt.²³

Analyses of adaptation or reform of the UN system was therefore considered timely, important and welcomed at this critical historical juncture when epiphenomenal and structural/ideological changes in international society appeared to be forcing a re-examination of the significance and relevance to contemporary world politics of specific multilateral entities. In addition, the advent of new security challenges, since the sea change at the end of the Cold War period posed a number of fundamental questions regarding the ability of multilateral institutions, particularly those created by states immediately after World War Two, to deal with increasing and new demands and needs of international society and the society of states. Yet, the inability of the UN system to reform itself or to grapple successfully with many of these challenges called into question the position of liberal institutionalism which held that as a result of increased interdependence states will be more prone towards accepting managed and institutional cooperative arrangements.²⁴ The problematic was decidedly more complex than that and required a different approach to the analysis of this period of transition and change in global order as well as to the understanding of the role (if any) that multilateral institutions would (ought to) play in the changed order.

The approach of some scholars who can be labelled "post-internationalists" and "critical reflectivists" was to link directly the concept of multilateralism with the notion of global governance by analyzing the nexus between the expansion of international society (with its exponentially growing demands and needs) and the striving of that society toward the creation of a regulatory framework within which conditions for peaceful interaction between people across the globe could blossom. Such an approach required a closer examination of the *longue durée* history of the evolution of multilateralism and its linkage to various conceptualizations of global governance, a more careful analysis of the reasons for the failed attempts at adjusting existing multilateral institutions to changing world conditions, and a prescriptive set of proposals for upgrading the practices of multilateralism to meet the challenges of what was perceived to be a "new era".

Both post-internationalists and critical reflectivists recognized the importance of having a broad historical view of the multilateral process. Among them, Simai reminds us that most ideas about multilateral organization and world order, presented as original to the 20th century, have actually appeared long before.²⁵ Clearly, modern multilateral practices have benefitted from concepts and routines tried in previous attempts at organizing and governing societies of states and other social groupings.²⁶ Therefore an understanding of the evolution of this historical and structural process was seen as essential for explaining and predicting the nature of change in the concrete entities that embody the traits of multilateralism and in the social institutions (defined by Young as those set of rules guiding the behaviour of those engaged in the identifiable social practices of multilateralism) that frame the context of their development and contribute to shifts in the design of world order.

Taking this historically-sensitive approach to understanding multilateralism allowed these scholars to remove the straight-jacket imposed on our thinking by neo-realist and liberal institutionalist theories. The impetus for developing the post-internationalist and critical paradigms came from the observations and assumptions that: world politics is undergoing

turbulent transformations; the transformations in world politics are so profound as to not be relegated merely to the status of epiphenomenal changes; the changes in world politics cry out for a new/different conceptual lens in order to get a handle on what is actually occurring; the emerging structures and processes of this changing world are still in the process of taking shape; the outlines of the new circumstances/paradigm are not yet clear-cut enough to be easily cast as a distinctive phase/theory.

As Rosenau and Durfee explain, the label "post-internationalist" reflects the decline of long-standing patterns without at the same time indicating where the changes may be leading. It is therefore suggestive of flux, uncertainty, and transition, while at the same time indicative of the continued existence of certain stable structures. In addition, the term is a reminder that "international" matters are sometimes indistinguishable these days from "regional", "national", and "local" ones. Thus, the way to address such matters may have to be different from methods used in the past.²⁷

Traditional multilateralism focused on government-to-government or state-to-state mechanisms or regulatory regimes. One of the first emancipatory moves of the post-internationalists was to recognize the changing elements of the Westphalian system.²⁸ Some of those elements are easily discernible: e.g. some states are having difficulty with the exercise of sovereignty (i.e., *inter alia* maintaining strict control over the flow of people, goods and money in and out of their borders); civil society has been revived in several parts of the globe posing a direct challenge to the sovereign state; the intergovernmental system, particularly the most universal one -- the UN system, is no longer the locus merely for state power plays; the principle of state sovereignty continues to be eroded as a result of economic and media globalization, the international divisions of labour, supranational arrangements, regional and free trade arrangements, advances in transportation, computer and telecommunication technologies, mass migration, external intervention, ethnic and other internecine violence, sub-national and anti-systemic forces, the phenomenon of state collapse, etc.. Furthermore, it was discerned that many existing multilateral bodies are finding it difficult to adjust their structures and processes in a way that would adequately address the emerging problems arising as a result of the turbulence in the international system.²⁹ Those that have tried to do so with some success (like NATO) still seem anachronistic.

The paradigmatic shift to the post-internationalist approach is linked to the above changes and what appears to be a movement towards establishing a post-Cold war global agenda that privileges items such as demilitarization, democratization, sustainable development, environmental protection, cultural pluralism and other civilizational issues, human rights and justice, and generally bottom-up multilateralisms (as a means of dealing with the "new world dis-order"). This refocusing of inquiry has given rise to what Richard Falk calls a potential "counter-project" to that of post-Cold War geo-politics.³⁰ At the base of this counter-project is a normative pre-occupation with strengthening the role of civil society or sovereignty-free actors in matters of world affairs at local, regional and global locales to balance the influence of sovereignty-bound actors. This is generally viewed as an essential counter-balance to state-centric views of world order, multilateralism and global governance that are so deeply entrenched in neo-realist and liberal institutionalist thinking and scholarship.

One of the most important contributions of post-internationalist scholarship is th

recognition and empirical observation of bifurcated structures operating at the global level. Rosenau & Durfee state that "alongside the traditional world of states, a complex multi-centric world of diverse actors has emerged, replete with structures, processes, and decision rules of its own." These authors go on to label these two worlds as "state-centric" and "multi-centric". As these two sets of structures intersect, one should expect that multilateralism at that specific historical juncture will be different in character from the multilateralism that emerged out of the immediate post-World War Two period. Certainly, the empirical evidence points to a changed socio-political environment within which multilateral institutions are forced to operate today. The international stage is now crowded with a proliferation of actors. The large number and vast range of collectivities that clamber onto the global stage exhibit both organized and disorganized complexity.³¹ Literally thousand of factions, associations, organizations, movements and interest groups, along with states, now form a network pattern of interactions which reminds one of Burton's "cobweb" metaphor.³²

The direct impact of the convergence of state-centric and multi-centric worlds on multilateralism has been observed and evaluated, at least at a cursory level, by a number of scholars that have either explicitly or implicitly adopted the post-internationalist and critical paradigms. In the foreword to a recently published edited volume by Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had this to say about formal and informal interactions between the UN system and non-governmental organizations (NGOs):

Until recently, the notion that the chief executive of the United Nations would have taken this issue seriously might have caused astonishment. The United Nations was considered to be a forum for sovereign states alone. Within the space of a few short years, however, this attitude has changed. Nongovernmental organizations are now considered full participants in international life.

He went on to note that in France 54,000 new associations have been established since 1987. Also, 40% of all the associations in Italy were created within the past 15 years. In recent years 10,000 NGOs were set up in Bangladesh, 21,000 in the Philippines, 27,000 in Chile and a very large number in Eastern Europe since the fall of communism.³³

It may have been a slight exaggeration on Boutros-Ghali's part to say that NGOs are "full participants" in international life. However, there is no denying that these entities now play an important role in global governance: e.g. in agenda setting for global conferences; as the engine for virtually every advance made in the field of human rights; in response to complex humanitarian emergencies; in preventive diplomacy missions; in planetary management and protection of the biosphere; as epistemic communities or knowledge-based networks particularly with regards to environmental and developmental issues as well as the AIDS epidemic; in advancing the rights of women, children, and the disabled; in promoting development in poverty stricken areas of the Third World, and; in the pluralization of global governance generally.³⁴

The second major contribution of the post-internationalist school has been the focus on the ways in which dynamic technologies have resulted in a decline of distances in the modern world (what Rosenau calls distant proximities). Technological advances in communications and transport have resulted in an increase in the level of complex interdependence.³⁵ Modern

communications (in the form of television, radio, newspapers, telephones, fax machines, the internet and electronic mail, etc.), appear to be uniting and fragmenting audiences, exacerbating social cleavages as well as bringing formerly disparate groups together, heightening existing antagonisms as well as providing a means through which such friction can be resolved, eroding national boundaries as well as propelling ultra-nationalist fervour, increasing political cynicism as well as raising the level of civil society's political consciousness. Individual citizens have been empowered as a result of the media's influence. At the same time, because of their adeptness with the utilization of communication systems, state leaders have also been empowered vis-à-vis civil society. Modern transportation has allowed people of formerly distant societies to interact more frequently. It acts as a conduit for bringing individuals from different countries with similar interests together.³⁶

The overall effect of the above "double movement" has been a shrinkage in social, political, economic, and cultural distances. As a consequence of this phenomenon, formerly dense and opaque frontiers are being dissolved, thus breaking down the Westphalian notion of inside versus outside. National boundaries are no longer able to divide friend from foe. Indeed, the technological revolution has the potential of creating in the minds of people around the world a sense of global citizenship which could result eventually in the transfer of individuals' loyalties from "sovereignty-bound" to "sovereignty-free" multilateral bodies. "The changing relationship between the public and private spheres and the virtual collapse of the dividing line separating the domestic from the external environment suggest a fluid but closely integrated global system substantially at odds with the notion of a fragmented system of nationally delineated sovereign states."³⁷ However it does not yet mean that a global civil society has been formed, although one could argue that such an entity is in the process of being established. Some critical scholars are beginning to observe and analyze the emergence of anti-systemic movements that are opposed to the globalization phenomenon.

The third substantial contribution of post-internationalist and critical reflectivist scholarship is the analysis of the impact of globalization on multilateralism. Aided by the technological revolution, globalization has also been a contributor to global space and time shrinkage. The globalization of trade, production and finance has resulted in a marked decline in governments' ability to control these sectors and has challenged the traditional concept of state sovereignty. It has also expanded the number of players that can be involved in multilateral processes. Robert Cox sees the globalization movement and the seemingly paradoxical adherence to territorialism as two concepts of world order that stand in conflict but are also interrelated. He points out that the globalization of economic processes "requires the backing of territorially-based state power to enforce its rules." But post-fordism, the new pattern of social organization of production that is congruent with the globalization phenomenon, implicitly contradicts the lingering territorial principle that was identified with fordism.

The results of post-fordist production have been, *inter alia*, the dismantling of the welfare state and the diminishing of the strength of organized labour. But it also has had the effect of increasingly fragmenting power in the world system, providing fodder for "the possibility of culturally diverse alternatives to global homogenization".³⁸ If Cox is right, we can see how this dialectical "double movement" of the globalization process can alter the relationship people have established with the political arena and how it can eventually cause a reaction leading to what

Rosenau terms "explosive sub-groupism".³⁹ It has already spurred the revival of what can be called civilizational studies that may be further unearthing anti-globalization movements and ideas.⁴⁰

The final substantial contribution of the post-internationalist and critical schools to the evolution of thinking on multilateralism has to do with the focus on the advent of transnational issues: e.g. environmental pollution, global warming, currency crises, the drug trade, human rights degradation, terrorism, AIDS epidemic, refugee flows, gender inequality. These issues, by their very nature, all impel cooperation on a transnational scale, since they cannot be resolved by individual states acting alone or bilaterally (in the majority of cases). Many of these issues have been pushed onto the global agenda by multi-centric actors. The impact of this on multilateralism is that the state-centric multilateral institutions have had to find ways of embracing the input of NGOs and other civil societal actors who formerly would not have been accepted as players on the international stage. The alternative of not embracing these entities could be the development of other multilateral arrangements that by-pass the existing multilateral bodies.

The Cold War structure has essentially crumbled. Not only is the WARSAW Pact history, all of its members are participating in NATO to one degree or another through the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Programme. The USSR was broken up into 15 states, most of them wary of Russia. As Donald Snow notes:

Because international relations generally, and national security policy, specifically, were dominated for over forty years by the Cold War, the end of that competition left a notable void that has affected both policymakers and analysts.⁴¹

The national security problem which was so clear in the minds of Canadian foreign and defence policymakers during the Cold War era became ostensibly blurred in the immediate post-Cold War period.

The end of the Cold War was also accompanied by a collapse in the intellectual framework that had long dominated thinking about national security policy in Canada. The consensus over the nature of the threat and the strategy for dealing with that threat, which were to a large degree developed in the United States, was also broken down. The main threat had disappeared and there was no real threat to replace it. The threat ended at a time of growing concerns in many of the Western industrial countries, including Canada, with domestic economic problems, e.g. the need for deficit reduction and the impact of this on welfare and social programmes. Nuclear weapons lost some of their salience and the nature of power was undergoing change. In addition, the very conception of what constituted security became contestable.

The Expanded Security Debate

Efforts to rethink security have often been met with resistance from those who hold a traditional understanding of security, or with an attempt to foreclose debate on the issue. Yet, it is clear that given the contemporary period of turbulence and transition we are in serious need of a new understanding of security; one that would be reflective of the ways in which this term is used today -- i.e. a more broadly constructed conception of the term.

In the absence of a consensus over what such a conception of security should be, and in an

attempt to address the issues of changing perceptions of the threats to security and the evolution in how the term itself is being used, Krause and Williams examine the intellectual debate that has emerged particularly since the end of the Cold War over the nature and meaning of security, as well as over the future of the security studies discipline itself.⁴² This debate has largely been between the adherents of neo-realism, on one side, and those advocating constructivist and expansionist approaches to security, on the other. Krause and Williams insert a welcomed critical orientation into this debate over the definition of security and the scope of security studies.⁴³

Some neo-realists suggest that calls to expand the field of security could make security studies "intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant."⁴⁴ In their attempt to demonstrate their adherence to canon of the scientific discipline, neo-realists claim that their approach to security is based on objectivity about what the nature of security is. For them, notions such as the centrality of the state, international anarchy, and the security dilemma are "facts" about the world. Such foundational claims are central to the debate about the broadening of the security studies agenda. Their problem solving approach to the issue has meant that neo-realists either accept the received views about security as givens or try to fit the evidence of new security threats into their existing conceptual frameworks.

Critical scholars are beginning to revise the very concept of security by asking the basic question of whose interest is being secured. Clearly if the object of security is the state, then security may be defined quite differently than is the object of security is the individual within the state or the globe. The expansion in the conception of security can be linked to new views on multilateralism.

From Traditional to "New" Multilateralism

A useful definition of traditional multilateralism is offered by John Ruggie who explained that multilateralism (as opposed to bilateralism or imperialism) is a *generic* institutional form (a type of institution⁴⁵ that one can find in all places and times) that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct.⁴⁶ Caporaso, drawing on Ruggie, argues that underlying the concept of multilateralism is the idea of an architectural form or a deep organizing principle of international life. For him, what distinguishes the institution of multilateralism from other forms are three distinct properties: indivisibility, generalized principles of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity.⁴⁷

Indivisibility implies that the costs and benefits of cooperation will be shared among the members of the group, i.e. there will be equal access to the institutions and the services provided through multilateralism. An ideal multilateral institution is therefore not one that would discriminate among its members. It should prescribe appropriate conduct without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or any special circumstances. *Generalized principles of conduct* refers to the norms created by multilateral institutions which govern the relationship of its members. The establishment of such general or universal standards ensures some degree of predictability of behaviour among members and should discourage, under ideal conditions, the differentiation of "relations case by case on the basis of individual preferences, situational exigencies, or a priori particularistic grounds."⁴⁸ Finally, *diffuse reciprocity* implies that members of the multilateral group should not expect strict and immediate reciprocity in their dealings with one another. They know that their collaboration will extend into the future and over many issues.

Thus, parties to a multilateral arrangement expect to get their share of benefits in the long run.⁴⁹

Multilateral institutions (MI) may comprise: 1) organizations with their resources, staffs and secretariats, structures and processes; 2) a set of persistent and connected rules. *Regimes* (used here as a type of institution), for example, may be defined as explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures agreed upon by actors and embodied in treaties or other documents.⁵⁰ Formal organisations, *per se*, regimes and even *international orders*⁵¹ may thus wear the label multilateral and belong to the category of multilateral institutions.

However, there is more to the institution of multilateralism (IM) than abstract notions like structures, processes, norms and rules. Indeed, multilateralism is also a normative conception of how the world ought to be organized. Multilateralism, in that sense, is a belief that international activities ought to be designed on a universal basis at least for a group of states and/or societies.⁵² Alternative conceptions of how the world should be organized would include bilateralism, unilateralism, imperial hierarchy and world government. More specifically, regime theory and multilateralism alike assume that between the state of anarchy and the notion of a World State there is a distinct prospect (space) for a type of international order where rights and obligations would not emanate exclusively from states but from voluntary agreements among state and non-state parties to play by a set of politically binding rules (in the sense that these rules would create expectations and influence policies).⁵³ This type of order, labelled *governance without government* by James Rosenau and Otto Czempel,⁵⁴ is characterized by the fact that the norms or the rules of a particular *regime* are not necessarily backed up by the threat or use of physical force. Instead, it is the legitimacy of norms and rules that ought to make international actors comply. Multilateralists and many regime theorists also assume that multilateral institutions are a highly desirable phenomenon, especially as the density of interactions among international actors have increased, resulting in a new quality of complex interdependence. In this sense, multilateralism is an ideology with normative designs of cooperative arrangements between many actors who agree to work out whatever problems that might arise in a peaceful manner.

Three factors have promoted multilateral cooperation in the current period. The first one is the globalization of the economy. The world has become increasingly globalized to the point where it is foolhardy to speak of total self-reliance and autarchy. Thus, collaboration and regulations are — in a sense — a matter of survival.

The second factor is also security related. Large-scale warfare between industrialized countries has become economically and politically less and less viable and thinkable.⁵⁵ Moreover, with the end of the Cold War many countries are considering the upkeep of armies as a net drain on their economy, and entire continents (Western/Central Europe, the Americas, etc.) are turning into vast *monitored security zones*.⁵⁶ This, in turn, requires the establishment and maintenance of interlocking security and arms control regimes such as *Partnership for Peace* and the CFE Treaty in Europe. On the global scene, the signing of the Chemical Weapon Convention and the indefinite extension of the NPT highlight this trend. In the area of peacekeeping and conflict resolution the picture is perhaps less impressive, but the continued activism of the UN and specifically of the Security Council in trying to dampen and moderate regional, low-intensity conflicts clearly shows that — on the eve of the 21st century — the international community no longer considers large scale violence as a legitimate instrument of policy. In all likelihood, efforts destined to stop and resolve "wars of conscience" — as opposed to "wars of interest" — will

continue to be an imperative of world politics.⁵⁷

The third factor relates to the growth in transnational problems and challenges. Such problems and challenges have created unavoidable pressures for regional and global cooperation. In the words of an observer in reference to the transnational issue of the environment: "The ecosystem is no longer to be thought of as an inert, passive limit to human activity. It has to be thought of as a non-human, active force capable of dramatic interventions affecting human conditions and survival."⁵⁸ In other words, the ecosystem, like the global economy, requires some form of multilateral regulatory regimes to ensure not just the protection of that system but also human survival itself.

All these trends — according to institutionalists — point to a very clear conclusion, viz., that both narrow and broadened security issues and more generally international issues will have to be addressed in a cooperative multilateral fashion, not necessarily because public opinion favors it, but because the pressure of events requires it.

The "New" Multilateralism

The early part of the decade of the 1980s witnessed what has been described as a "crisis in multilateralism" -- a period in which there was seemingly a drift away from multilateral activity towards the ascendancy of unilateralism in world affairs. Underlying this drift were the actions of the US and some of the other powerful states who largely ignored the UN system as a vehicle for international action because it was deemed an unfriendly forum and a potential obstacle to their liberal notions of free trade, free-market, deregulation, and privatization. To make their point, some of these countries took certain actions, such as withdrawing from UN bodies (e.g. the US and the UK pull-out from UNESCO), deliberately attempting to weaken such bodies as ECOSOC, UNDP, UNCTAD, SUNFED), withholding financial contributions to the main budget of the UN, quibbling over their contributions to the peacekeeping and voluntary budgets of the organization, and pressing for certain types of reforms to the organization -- using the clout of financial withholding to force these organizational changes.⁵⁹

The counter-hegemonic reaction to the above moves was galvanized by UN member states from the Third World who, weakened by the reduced support of a collapsing USSR, pressed demands for a new international economic order (NIEO) and a new international information and communications order (NIICO).⁶⁰ The failure of the Third World states to get these two important changes adopted by the UN system was an indication of the limits imposed on the existing multilateral system by the existing power structure of the international system.

What is interesting about this crisis in multilateralism is that it exposed one of the main weaknesses of the liberal institutionalist and internationalist school -- its tendency to limit its focus to current events and a problem-solving epistemology with respect to the subject of multilateralism. The crisis of multilateralism was quickly forgotten in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the ushering in of a brief euphoric interlude in which the UN system seemed to be operating as its founding fathers had intended; at least in the area of international peace and security. Canadian officials, like most liberal institutionalists, began to see the prospect of a new golden age for multilateralism as the scope for multilateral diplomacy broadened as a result of a number of events, notably the end of the East-West ideological conflict, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the tearing down of the Berlin wall, the revulsion against

dictatorships, the end of apartheid, and growing social pressures for democracy on a global scale.⁶¹ Those changes prompted a number of scholars to develop "post-internationalist" and critical positions that challenge the traditional approach to multilateralism.

What is clear from the above overview is that the intellectual approach to multilateralism is undergoing a shift from the traditional (and problem-solving) rationalist to a reflectivist (and critical) scholarship. The impetus for the post-internationalist position on multilateralism was begun with the work of James Rosenau and Martin Rochester, among others. The more critical approach to multilateralism owes its beginning to the work of Robert Cox and the MUNS network of scholars who drew heavily on Cox. This latter approach is critical in that it does not take the existing structures of the world as a given, but rather enquires into their origins and transformations. It exhibits "realism" in the sense that it recognizes the limitations of existing power structures and the ideas (such as neo-realism and liberal institutionalism) that continue to persist. The method of enquiry tends to be hermeneutic, dialectic and reflectivist, rather than positivist and problem-solving in nature as much of the liberal institutionalist and neo-realist scholarship have been. Its perspective privileges bottom-up approaches to multilateralism to counter the heavy influence of top-down approaches. In this sense it has a strong normative commitment. Finally, its overall approach can be considered holistic in that it is concerned with world order as a whole and with the link between multilateralism and changing world order.

One can discern from the MUNS studies different forms of alternative multilateralisms: 1) hybrid; 2) emergent; 3) new or potential. One is also made to recognize that there are forces opposed to multilateralism. Some of these forces are anti-systemic (such as the freeman, militia movements). Yet other transnational forces can be considered the underbelly of multilateralism (drug cartels, mafia, hell angels, terrorists). Overall we can label the MUNS approach a "new" multilateralism. The term "new multilateralism" was coined by Bjorn Hettne in reference to a "potential" multilateralism that is distinct from existing institutionalized forms. Its basic characteristics are its decidedly normative thrust and the fact that it focuses upon a bottom-up approach to multilateralism undergirded by a "broadly articulated global society."

Conclusion

A critical theory of foreign policy should stand apart from the prevailing wisdom about the how such policy is formulated and asks what are the underlying forces and pressures responsible for particular foreign policy positions and directions. Such a perspective would naturally challenge traditional approaches to Canadian foreign policy that have generally been state-centered (e.g. realist, neo-realist and liberal – pluralist-- institutionalist perspectives). This paper lays the foundation for such a challenge.

Most of the traditional analyses of Canadian foreign policy tend to revolve around the issue of whether or not the Canadian state projects an image to the international community of that of a *principal*, *satellite* or *middle power*. The first impression one is given from such analyses is that Canada is a rational unitary actor capable of channelling a multiplicity of domestic interest into a relatively coherent foreign policy that projects a particular image of Canada's capabilities to the rest of the states that form the international system. But is this really the case? It is also generally assumed that Canadian foreign policy has been remarkably consistent (reflecting laudable normative goals) and reasonably static (associated with privileging international peace,

stability and order over other concerns such as justice, change and transformation). However, in light of the post-internationalist argument that we are living in a turbulent and transitional period of history, can the old ways of examining a country's foreign policy remain adequate? Even fairly traditional foreign policy scholars have noted that "While the established concepts, and concerns, associated with the privileging of the older habits of Canadian foreign policy behaviour retain considerable value as signposts in navigating the driving dynamic of change, however, it is also conceded that this traditional mode of treatment is not enough."⁶²

This paper represents only the beginning of a much larger study of Canadian foreign policy that begins with the observation that globalization and sub-groupism envelop two sets of social forces that are squeezing in on the Canadian state. As a result, Canadian foreign policy making and behaviour will necessarily undergo significant variations from traditional patterns. It is also clear that debates about an expanded security concept will have a major impact on future Canadian security policy. The changing nature of threat/threat perception has so significantly blurred the international/domestic territorial and issues divide as to call into question the idea that states can formulate, and act on, independent foreign policy.

Endnotes

1. This research project is being undertaken by Claire Turenne Sjolander (University of Ottawa), David R. Black (Dalhousie University), and me. His working title is: *Turbulence and Transition: Towards a Critical Understanding of Canadian 'foreign policy' in a Changing World*. The final product will be published in 1999 by Broadview Press.
2. For an excellent explanation of the critical orientation see Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," in Robert Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p.208.
3. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (eds.), *Canada's International Security Policy* (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, Inc., 1995), p.1.
4. Rod B. Byers, *Canadian Security and Defence: the Legacy and the Challenges*, Adelphi Papers, no.214 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), p.4. In keeping with Byers' conception, Dewitt and Leyton-Brown argue that security policy "should be viewed as a lens or filter through which foreign policy informs defence policy" and that it "must place peace and security issues into the foreign policy context while devolving onto defence policy the obligations and commitments, including the development of doctrine and procedures and the ensuing allocation of scarce resources, appropriate to ensuring that Canada's military commitments are sustainable and credible." See Dewitt & Leyton-Brown, *op.cit.*, p.3.
5. Dewitt & Layton-Brown (eds.), pp.2-3.
6. *Ibid.*, p.14.
7. D. W. Middlemiss & J.J. Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence : Decisions and Determinants* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Canada, 1989), p.10.
8. *Ibid.*, p.11.
9. See Allen Sens & Peter Stoett, *Global Politics: Origins, Currents, Directions* (Toronto: ITP Nelson, 1998), p. 50.
10. The idea of a unitary, rational actor comes from the theory of political realism. For a full discussion of this concept see Charles W. Kegley, jr., & Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformation* 5th edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp.46-51.
11. *Ibid.*, pp.11-12.
12. Charles W. Kegley, jr. & Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p.22.
13. Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1993), p.4.

14. Namely Germany, Japan, and Italy. See Allen Sens & Peter Stoett, *Global Politics*, pp.55-57.
15. See Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977).
16. See Paul Buteux, "NATO and the Evolution of Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy," in David Dewitt & David Leyton-Brown, *Canada's International Security Policy*, pp.153-154.
17. *Ibid.*, p.153.
18. *Ibid.*, p.155.
19. Joel J. Sokolsky, "The Bilateral Defence Relationship with the United States," in Dewitt & Leyton-Brown (eds.), *Canada's International Security Policy*, p. 171.
20. For a much more detailed account of this collaboration see D. W. Middlemiss & J.J. Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants*, pp. 14-22.
21. See the provocative argument made by James M. Mimifé, *Peacemaker or Powdermonkey: Canada's Role in a Revolutionary World* (Winnipeg: McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1965).
22. Keith Krause, W. Andy Knight, and David Dewitt, "Canada, the United Nations, and the Reform of International Institutions," in Chadwick F. Alger, Gene M. Lyons, & John E. Trent (eds.), *The United Nations System: The Policies of Member States* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995), pp.132-185.
23. For a good discussion of this thinking see Rochester J. Martin, *Waiting for the Millennium: The United Nations and the Future of World Order* (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), Brian Urquhart & Erskine Childers, *Towards a More Effective United Nations* (Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1992), and Brian Urquhart & Erskine Childers, *A World in need of Leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations* (Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1990).
24. Marie-Claude Smouts, "United Nations Reform: A Strategy of Avoidance," in Michael G. Schechter (ed.), *Innovation in Multilateralism* (London: Macmillan Ltd., for the United Nations Press, 1997).
25. Mihaly Simai, *The Future of Global Governance: Managing Risk and Change in the International System* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), pp.25-31.
26. W. Andy Knight, "Multilatéralisme ascendant et descendant: deux voies dans la quête d'une gouverne globale," in Michel Fortmann, S. Neil MacFarlane & Stéphane Roussel (eds.), *Tous pour un ou chaque pour soi: promesses et limites de la coopération régionale en matière de sécurité* (Québec: Institut québécois des hautes études internationales, 1996), pp.49-56.

27. James Rosenau & Mary Durfee, *Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), especially chapter 3.
28. See Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno (eds.), *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) and Zacher, Mark, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance", in James Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Cziempel (eds.), *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
29. Some of these issues are discussed in Rochester, J. Martin, "The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study", *International Organization*, 40 (4) (Autumn 1986).
30. Richard A. Falk, "Democratizing, Internationalizing and Globalizing," in Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.), *Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994), p.477.
31. James N. Rosenau & Mary Durfee, *Op.cit.*, p.40.
32. John Burton, *World Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
33. Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker (eds.), *NGOs, the UN, & Global Governance* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp.7-8. Robert Cox makes an important distinction between articulated (interest groups, NGOs, etc.) and amorphous elements (the masses) in civil society. He suggests that the new multilateralism will depend on "a functioning relationship with an articulated global civil society" rather than on the amorphous element. See Robert Cox (ed.), *The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order*, p.8.
34. For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon see the following chapter in Thomas Weiss & Leon Gordenker edited volume *NGOs, the UN, & Global Governance, op.cit.*, Leon Gordenker & Thomas Weiss, "Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions," Felice D. Gaer, "Reality Check: Human Rights NGOs Confront Governments at the UN," Andrew S. Natsios, "NGOs and the UN System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict or Cooperation?" Antonio Donini, "The Bureaucracy and the Free Spirits: Stagnation and Innovation in the Relationship between the UN and NGOs," Ken Conca, "Greening the UN: Environmental Organisations and the UN system," Christer Jönsson & Peter Söderholm, "IGO-NGO Relations and HIV/AIDS: Innovation or Stalemate?" Martha Alter Chen, "Engendering World Conferences: The International Women's Movement and the UN," Peter Sollis, "Partners in Development? The State, NGOs, and the UN in Central America," and Leon Gordenker & Thomas Weiss, "NGO Participation in International Policy Process."
35. To use a term coined by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1977), see especially chapter 2.

36. Hélène Pellerin notes how large scale migration has given rise to a proliferation of diasporic networks. See her chapter, "New Global Migration Dynamics," in Stephen Gill (ed.), *Globalization and Democratization*.
37. Joseph A. Camilleri & Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, p.88.
38. Robert Cox, "Production and Security," in David Dewitt et. al (eds.), *Building a New Global Order*, pp.143-155.
39. James Rosenau, "Distant Proximities:..." pp.8-11.
40. See Robert Cox, "Civilizations in World Political Economy", *New Political Economy*, vol 1, no.2 (1996), pp.141-155 as well as Hassan Hanafi, "An Islamic Approach to Multilateralism," Kinhide Mushakoji, "Multilateralism in a Multicultural World: notes for a theory of occultation," Satish Chandra, "The Indian Perspective," and Hongying Wang, "Chinese Culture and Multilateralism," all in Robert Cox (ed.) *The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order*.
41. Donald Snow, *National Security: Defense policy in a changed international order*, 4th edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), p.vii.
42. Keith Krause & Michael Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," *Mershon International Studies Review*, 40 (1996), pp.229-254.
43. See Preface and Chapter Two of Keith Krause & Michael C. Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
44. See for instance, John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, 19 (1994/95), pp.5-49.
45. Robert Keohane has defined institutions as: "persistent and connected set of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectations". Quoted by John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), p.10.
46. John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters*, p.11.
47. James A. Caporaso, "International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: the search for foundations," *International Organization*, vol 46, no.3 (summer 1992), p.601.
48. *Ibid.*, p.602.
49. See Brian Job, "Multilateralism: The Relevance of the Concept to Regional Conflict Management", *Working Paper*, no. 5, Institute of International Relations, University of British

Columbia, October 1994, pp. 3-6.

50. See Andreas Hansenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, "Interest, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes", *Mershon International Studies Review*, vol. 40, Suppl. 2, October 1996, p. 182.
51. Hedley Bull's definition of international order is : "Patterns of activity that sustain the primary goal of the society of states or international society." See Hedley Bull, *Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 8. Oran Young's definition is the preferred one here. He defines international orders as "broad framework arrangements governing the activities of all (or almost all) the members of international society over a wide range of specific issues." International regimes, by comparison, are "more specialized arrangements that pertain to well-defined activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve only some subset of the members of the international society." Both are types of international institutions. See Oran Young, *International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 13.
52. James A. Caporaso, "International Relations Theory and Multilateralism; The Search for Foundations", in John Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters*, pp.54-55.
53. Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Michael Zürn, "Regime Theory. State of the Art and Perspectives", in Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer (eds.), *Regime Theory and International Relations* (New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993), p. 393.
54. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.), *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
55. See John Keegan, *History of Warfare* (New York: Knopf, 1993). Donald Snow makes a similar point noting that the international system is clearly divided into two distinct tiers of states: 1) the first tier -- members of the OECD/G7, the most prosperous countries in the world, and 2) the second tier -- consisting of the rest of humanity -- about 6/7 of the world's population that is materially and politically on the periphery. Snow argues that it is essentially impossible to think of war among any of the members of the first tier states, thus making military power basically irrelevant to their relations. On the other hand, the second tier states are to be found in what Snow calls the zone of turmoil (using an expression from Singer and Wildavsky). In this zone, conflict is the major, even sole, source of violence in the international system, according to Snow. Donald Snow, *National Security: Defense Policy in a Changing International Order*, pp. 11-15.
56. Jane Nolan, *Global Challenge* (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1994).
57. "Defence in the 21st Century (A Survey)", *The Economist*, September 5 1992, p. 4.
58. See Robert W. Cox, "Multilateralism and World Order", *Review of International Studies*, 18, 1992, pp.178.

59. For further details see W. Andy Knight, "United Nations Structural and Financial Reform", in Maureen Appel Molot & Harald von Riekhoff (eds.), *A Part of the Peace: Canada Among Nations 1994* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994); Donald Puchala & Roger Coate, *The State of the United Nations, 1988* (New Hampshire: Academic Council on the United Nations System, 1988); and, Maurice Bertrand, "Can the United Nations be Reformed?" in A. Roberts & B. Kingsbury (eds.), *United Nations, Divided World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

60. See Roger A. Coate, *Unilateralism, Ideology, and US Foreign Policy: The United States In and Out of UNESCO* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988), and Craig Murphy, "What the Third World Wants: An Interpretation of the Development and Meaning of the New International Economic Order Ideology", in Paul Dichl (ed.), *The Politics of International Organizations: Patterns and Insights* (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1989).

61. For a discussion of these changes see Rosemary Righter, *Utopia Lost: The United Nations and World Order* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995), pp. 1-10.

62. See Cooper, 1997, p.28.

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