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# **An Assessment of the Forum for Security Cooperation: Can It Address Europe's New Security Concerns? A Canadian View**

S. Neil MacFarlane and Jennifer Welsh

Prepared for the

International Security Research and Outreach Programme  
International Security Bureau

February 2001



Department of Foreign Affairs  
and International Trade

Ministère des Affaires étrangères  
et du Commerce international

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## PREFACE

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or of the Government of Canada.

The International Security Research and Outreach Programme commissioned a study to carry out the following tasks:

- (i). Provide a brief introduction to the FSC, outlining its existing mandate, role within the present OSCE structure and interaction with other OSCE bodies, and the issues it was designed to address.
- (ii). Examine the security issues which presently challenge the institutional/organizational abilities of the FSC in its capacity as a forum for security dialogue, making reference to the larger trends in the evolution of the OSCE as they impinge upon the FSC and offering substantive assessments of where these trends can be expected to lead the FSC and its member states.
- (iii). Provide an assessment of whether and how the FSC should evolve to maintain its relevance and ability to meet the challenge of these new security trends.

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February 2001

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper assesses the performance of OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), its role in cooperative security in Europe, and its prospects in future. It begins with a brief account of the significance of the end of the Cold War for European security and changes in the conceptualization of security in this context. It then examines the role of the OSCE in addressing the challenges of the period, noting the organisation's strengths as a venue in which to pursue cooperative security, not least the inclusive quality of its membership. It then turns to an account of the origins, purposes, and activities of the FSC within this OSCE framework. The FSC was established with a three-sided mandate, focussing on arms control and disarmament, security dialogue and conflict prevention. Its activities in its first six years of operation fell into four general categories: harmonization of obligations (as between the Vienna Document and the CFE Treaty); the development of a Code of Conduct on Security; disarmament negotiation; and the development of new regional (and sub-regional) confidence building measures. In contrast, the mandate concerning "goal-oriented" dialogue on security remained largely unfulfilled.

With the passage of time and substantial progress on several key aspects of the agenda (e.g. "goal-oriented negotiation" focusing on inter-state confidence building measures and the development of a Code of Conduct), the FSC has been seeking to develop a niche in efforts to deal with newer related issues such as subregional arms control and confidence building and small arms proliferation.

The paper then examines the evolving security landscape, noting the declining salience of interstate military issues in European security, and the rise of numerous new (and not so new) challenges, including internal war, post-conflict peace-building, conflict prevention, the security aspects of politic-economic transition in the former communist states, migration, terror, proliferation and transnational crime. The FSC has played some role in the areas of non-proliferation and conflict prevention, although its status as a focal point on these questions is contested by numerous other entities both within and outside the OSCE. There is, in short, a striking gap between the traditional inter-state and military focus of the FSC's activities and the emerging security agenda in Europe. When combined with the completion of many of the tasks with which it has been preoccupied, this raises doubts about the continued utility of the Forum. Such doubts are worsened by the proliferation of other institutions dealing with soft and hard security issues in Europe and the consequent potential for overlap and duplication.

The paper goes on to note the relevance of the FSC's second major purpose (goal-oriented dialogue) to many of the issues that characterize the post-Cold War European security agenda, such as internal war and sovereignty. However, this function has been conspicuously underdeveloped over the history of the Forum. It is also questionable whether member states would wish to activate this dimension of the FSC to address issues that historically have been considered matters of domestic jurisdiction and which are often highly sensitive.

The analysis concludes by identifying three options for the FSC: the status quo option (i.e.

continuing to focus on goal-oriented negotiation in the area of confidence building and arms control); closure; and revitalization of the FSC through an increasing emphasis on goal-oriented dialogue. Of the three, it suggests that the third is the preferred option, but notes that this may not be feasible in the face of state resistance. If this is so, then there is a strong case for shutting the Forum down and transferring its current responsibilities to other institutions within the OSCE.

## RÉSUMÉ

Le présent document est une évaluation de la performance du Forum pour la coopération en matière de sécurité (FSC) de l'OSCE, de son rôle dans la sécurité en Europe et de ses possibilités pour l'avenir. Il commence par un bref exposé sur la signification de la fin de la Guerre froide pour la sécurité en Europe et sur les changements de la notion de la sécurité survenus dans ce contexte. Il fait ensuite un examen du rôle de l'OSCE face aux défis de la période examinée, notant que les points forts de l'organisation qui pourraient mis au service de l'instauration d'une sécurité commune – entre autres points forts, et non des moindres, le caractère inclusif de sa composition. Il passe ensuite à un exposé sur les origines, l'objet et les activités du FSC au sein de l'OSCE. À son établissement, le FSC avait un mandat en trois volets : le contrôle des armements et le désarmement, le dialogue sur la sécurité et la prévention des conflits. Pendant ses six premières années d'existence, ses activités se sont inscrites dans quatre catégories générales : harmonisation des obligations (p. ex. entre le Document de Vienne et le traité FCE), élaboration d'un code de conduite sur la sécurité, négociations sur le désarmement et élaboration de nouvelles mesures de renforcement de la confiance dans la région (et les sous-régions). Par contre, la partie de son mandat concernant le dialogue sur la sécurité « orienté vers des buts » est resté de loin inachevée.

Le temps ayant passé et des progrès considérables ayant été accomplis dans certains aspects clés du programme (p. ex. les négociations « orientées vers des buts », portant essentiellement sur des mesures visant à créer la confiance entre les États, et la formulation d'un code d'éthique), le FSC a cherché à s'insérer dans les efforts déployés pour s'attaquer à de nouvelles questions connexes telles que le contrôle des armements dans les sous-régions, l'instauration de la confiance entre ces dernières et la prolifération des armes légères.

Le document examine aussi l'évolution du contexte de la sécurité. Il fait observer que les questions militaires occupent de moins en moins de place dans la sécurité en Europe et que les défis nouveaux et pas si nouveaux (guerres civiles, maintien de la paix à la fin des conflits, prévention des conflits, aspect sécurité de la transformation politico-économique des anciens États communistes, migration, terreur, prolifération des armements et crimes transnationaux) se multiplient. Le FSC a joué un certain rôle dans les domaines de la non-prolifération des armements et de la prévention des conflits, bien que son statut de centre de liaison pour ces questions soit contesté par de nombreuses autres entités à l'intérieur ou à l'extérieur de l'OSCE. Bref, il y a un écart flagrant entre les aspects interétatiques et militaires qui ont toujours été au coeur des activités du FSC et le nouveau programme de sécurité en Europe. Ce constat, auquel s'ajoute le fait que l'organisation a achevé bon nombre de tâches dont elle était chargée, soulève des doutes quant à l'utilité du Forum. Ces doutes se trouvent aggravés par la multiplication des institutions qui s'occupent de questions de sécurité mineures et majeures en Europe et par les possibilités de chevauchement et de dédoublement qui en résultent.

Le document relève ensuite la pertinence du deuxième objet du FSC (dialogue orienté vers des buts) en ce qui concerne de nombreuses questions particulières au programme de sécurité européen de l'après-guerre froide, comme les guerres civiles et la souveraineté. Or, cette fonction

est demeurée manifestement atrophiée depuis les débuts du Forum. Il y a lieu également de se demander si les États membres voudraient revitaliser cette fonction pour s'attaquer à des questions qui ont toujours été considérées comme des questions d'ordre interne et qui, souvent, sont très délicates.

L'analyse se termine par la présentation de trois options pour le FSC : le statu quo (le FSC continue de se concentrer sur les négociations orientées vers des buts dans le domaine de l'établissement de la confiance et du contrôle des armements), la disparition du FSC ou la revitalisation du FSC (mettre davantage l'accent sur le dialogue orienté vers des buts). Le document favorise la troisième option, mais note que la résistance des États pourrait la rendre irréalisable. Dans ce cas, il serait justifié de faire disparaître le Forum et de transférer ses responsabilités à d'autres institutions de l'OSCE.



# **AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FORUM FOR SECURITY COOPERATION: CAN IT ADDRESS EUROPE'S NEW SECURITY CONCERNS? A CANADIAN VIEW**

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

At least since World War II, Canada has considered transatlanticism to be a key aspect of its approach to national and international security. This reflects the unhappy experience of the first half of the century when crises in Europe twice drew Canada into major wars. In the years after World War II, Canada shared the concern of other Western democracies regarding potential threats from the USSR and consequently considered the maintenance of balance in Europe to be a vital national interest. Moreover, Canadian policy-makers, like many others, saw the construction and maintenance of institutionalized transatlantic security ties to be a promising way to reassure and to stabilize security relations amongst the Western European states, an essential underpinning to economic recovery and political consolidation in this region. Finally, through much of the Cold War era, multilateral transatlantic security ties also served to dilute somewhat the otherwise overwhelming asymmetry of power in North America favouring the United States.

For much of this period, the most significant institutional aspect of transatlanticism was membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1975, however, there emerged in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) a second institutional basis for Canada's transatlantic security relations. Canada has been an active and committed member of the CSCE/OSCE since 1975. With the passage of time, this institution has arguably become an increasingly important aspect of Canada's transatlantic strategy. This is so for several reasons, not least the changing nature of the security environment and the fact that security challenges in the post-Cold War era require new and different approaches that may be difficult to generate through traditional alliance mechanisms such as NATO (see section VII below).

The end of the Cold War removed one of the principal underpinnings of Canadian involvement in transatlantic security issues (the Soviet threat). None the less, Canada remains closely involved in transatlantic security institutions because of a fundamental interest in stability and cooperation in Europe, because of the emergence of new security issues of concern to Canadians (see below), because of significant residual uncertainties that may have important implications for Canadian security, and because the problem of North American asymmetry in the area of security remains significant, as is eloquently demonstrated in the current debate on National Missile Defence (NMD). The possible emergence of an independent European security identity presents new challenges for Canada's transatlantic security linkages.

The end of the Cold War meanwhile created possibilities for far broader and deeper security co-operation in the transatlantic space. One dimension of this was the potential to create a co-operative security regime, based on substantial reduction of conventional and theatre nuclear weapons, and the elaboration of shared norms and further confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). The CSCE and then Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) played a fundamental role in this construction.

One institution within the OSCE - the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) - took the lead in providing a consultative arena where this regime could be defined. Its accomplishments (e.g. updating the CSBM regime with the Vienna Documents of 1994 and 1999 and creating a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security) are impressive. By 1999, the basic normative and implementation frameworks for cooperative security in Europe were in place. Although there remain problems with the implementation of the CSBM regime, its completion raises the question of whether the FSC has outlived its usefulness, or whether it continues to have an important role in the evolution of the architecture for European security.

With these considerations in mind, this paper examines the role of the FSC in evolving transatlantic security relations. It begins with a brief conceptual discussion of the changing nature of European security. It proceeds to an account of the purposes and history of the Forum. It then turns to a more explicit consideration of current and prospective security challenges in Europe, and of the evolving institutional landscape of European security. It concludes with a discussion of options for Canada and other OSCE governments with regard to the FSC.

## II. European Security: A Conceptual Framework

The end of the Cold War sparked at least two kinds of conceptual debates about European security. The first involved an extension of the concept of security both *downward* - from nation-states to groups and individuals - and *horizontally* - from purely military concerns to economic, political, social and environmental threats.<sup>1</sup> The other more ambitious strategy attempted to rethink the very notion of "national security" and move toward more holistic ideas of "common security".

These two debates challenged scholars and policy-makers to approach the evolving security landscape in Europe with a new framework. The result is a multidimensional approach that emphasises:

- *co-operative security* rather than the search for unilateral advantage;
- the development of *international norms* rather than the pursuit of national interest; and
- the safety and well being of individuals (*human security*) as well as the security of nation-states.

In short, the subjective world of security studies has evolved to match the objective transformations in post Cold War Europe.

There has been a parallel evolution in Canadian discourse and policy on security issues, with the lead being taken by DFAIT and the current Minister, The Hon. Lloyd Axworthy.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, on

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<sup>1</sup> Emma Rothschild, "What is Security?", *Daedalus* (Summer, 1995), Vol. 124, No. 3, pp. 53-98.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, DFAIT, *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World* (Ottawa: DFAIT, April 1999).

many issues (e.g. soft power, land mines, child soldiers, small arms control), Canada and like-minded states such as Norway have taken the lead in pushing the human security agenda in the transatlantic context.

A key aspect of the new conceptual framework is the recognition that insecurity in Europe comes not only from a lack of "hard power", but also from political, economic and social weakness. As noted by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), today's European security problems "have become both more decentralised *and* more specific". Not everyone is affected equally by threats. No single security body can manage all of the challenges to European stability. And the steps required for enhancing security are gradual rather than dramatic – establishment of the rule of law, conversion of military hardware and technology, and (perhaps most critically) economic development.<sup>3</sup>

Nonetheless, the 1990s have seen significant changes even in the military dimension of security. The biggest shift has been the transition from bloc-to-bloc confrontation and the doctrine of mutually assured destruction to nuclear disarmament and co-operation between former adversaries. Second, there has been a decrease in the risk of interstate war, but a simultaneous increase in the risk of intra-state conflict. And finally, while conventional military forces have been streamlined, they have seen their missions expand from the defence of national/allied territory to peacekeeping and peacebuilding under international command.

### **III. The OSCE in the New Europe**

The OSCE has had two main advantages in adapting to these changes in military security. First, its membership encompasses Atlantic, European, and Asian axes; therefore, it has been a natural forum for co-operative security among former adversaries. More importantly, the activities of its predecessor - the CSCE - prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall already incorporated many aspects of the new security agenda, such as consensus building, norm development, transparency, and human rights. The original goal of the CSCE during the Cold War was a relatively limited one: to develop coexistence in a climate of competition and minimal trust, thereby reducing the possibility of a military confrontation. Yet, the mechanisms that it used to foster trust – confidence building measures (CBMs<sup>4</sup>), arms control, and dispute settlement – are the tools that dominate much current discussion about European security.

The CSCE/OSCE has gone through a considerable evolution during the 1990s. At Paris in 1990, the CSCE institutionalised its security-building mechanisms with the formation of the Council

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<sup>3</sup> *European Security in the 1990s: Challenges and Perspectives*, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (Geneva, 1995).

<sup>4</sup> The first generation of confidence-and-security-building measures were called "confidence-building measures" (CBMs). They evolved into CSBMs in the early 1990s.

of Foreign Ministers, the Permanent Secretariat in Vienna and Prague, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw, and the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) in Vienna. At Helsinki in 1992, the CSCE developed further competence in the field of conflict prevention and dispute settlement, established a High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM), and forged an explicit link to the United Nations (UN) as a regional security body under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In 1994, the CSCE solidified these institutional changes by transforming itself into the OSCE.

#### **IV. The Origins of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC)**

One of the more noteworthy outcomes of the 1992 Helsinki Conference was the establishment of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), a multilateral venue for dialogue and negotiation on issues of military security. For two years, the FSC existed side-by-side with the Consultative Committee of the CPC. In 1994, the OSCE addressed this duplication by merging the two bodies.

The FSC consists of representatives from OSCE participating States (at the ambassadorial level) and meets weekly in Vienna. It was originally designed to enhance the competence of the OSCE in arms control and disarmament, and to facilitate implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Vienna Document of 1992 on CSBMs. More generally, the FSC was seen as a mechanism for operationalising the CSCE's norms of openness and transparency. Therefore, in addition to its weekly meetings, the FSC was tasked with preparing seminars on military doctrine, hosting the Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings on CSBMs, and managing an annual exchange of military information among the (now) 55 participating states. Although the Permanent Council (PC) of the OSCE remains the primary body for political consultations in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, the FSC does serve as a forum in which to discuss the military aspects of potential conflicts.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the FSC's agenda has begun to tackle issues that are clearly political as well as military – such as the role of armed forces in a democratic society.

The triple mandate of the FSC is specified in Chapter V of the 1992 Helsinki Document:

**1) Arms control and disarmament:** The first role of the FSC was to negotiate concrete measures to reduce the conventional armed forces of OSCE states. The Forum's "Programme for Immediate Action" set out six specific areas for future negotiation:

- i) harmonisation of obligations contracted by OSCE states under the agreements covering conventional forces in Europe;
- ii) development of CSBMs (as described in the Vienna Document of 1992);

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<sup>5</sup> The quality of state representation is the same in both the PC and FSC, and there are joint meetings between the two bodies.

- iii) adoption of new stabilising and confidence-building measures;
- iv) development of a system for the exchange of military information (on an annual, world-wide basis);
- v) co-operation in the fields of non-proliferation and international arms transfers; and
- vi) adoption of regional arms reduction and arms limitation measures.

2) **Security dialogue:** The FSC's second role, which was much more innovative, was to facilitate "goal-oriented continuing dialogue" on security matters. This aspect of the Forum's mandate derived from the belief that security can no longer be the privilege of individual nation-states, but rather depends on the collective responsibility of all states – whether big or small.

It was hoped that co-operative security dialogue within the Forum would at some stage be transformed into more formal negotiations that would lead to concrete solutions. The initial list of issues to be dealt with in the FSC included: military force planning, co-operation in defence industry conversion, establishment of a code of conduct covering politico-military aspects of security, and regional security questions.

3) **Conflict prevention:** The final mission of the FSC – reducing the risk of conflict – was the most controversial part of its original mandate. What this role implied was a strengthening of the Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna. However, participating states were concerned that the CPC might become a replica of NATO (as it was evolving after 1991). As a result, this third aspect of the FSC's mandate was more vague in its provisions and has not been formally institutionalised.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the responsibility for the Forum's Secretariat was not entrusted to the CPC, but rather to the host country (in accordance with the OSCE's tradition).

## V. The Evolution of the FSC: 1992-1999

After its inauguration in September of 1992, the FSC created two working bodies to address the first and second aspects of its mandate. By the end of 1993, it had adopted four documents under its "Programme for Immediate Action": "Stabilising Measures for Localised Crisis Situations" (which discusses measures to facilitate decision-making in appropriate CSCE bodies); Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers; a Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation (which includes exchanges, visits and joint exercises); and Defence Planning (which requires States to provide information about their policies, doctrines, force planning, and budgets).<sup>7</sup>

In addition, the FSC launched a series of initiatives in the areas of arms control/disarmament, norm development and confidence-and-security-building. What follows is an overview of the FSC's main activities during the past seven years, including a brief assessment of its success.

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<sup>6</sup>For a further discussion of the FSC's "opening gambits", see Victor-Yves Ghebali, "The OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation", *NATO Review* (June 1993).

<sup>7</sup> In 1994, the FSC adopted two further documents: Global Exchange of Military Information; and Principles Governing Non-Proliferation (which covers nuclear, chemical and biological weapons).

### *1) Harmonising obligations*

The FSC's first priority was to harmonise the arrangements under the Vienna Document on CSBMs and the CFE Treaty in order to reduce the inefficiencies of overlap and to create a common set of rights and obligations to promote security across the continent. In practice, the process involved aligning the "exchange of information" system in the 1992 Vienna Document with the more rigorous standards set out in the CFE Treaty. Although harmonisation has proved more challenging than anticipated<sup>8</sup>, it can still be considered as an important focus for initial FSC activity.

### *2) Creating a Code of Conduct*

Another key task for the FSC was to develop a politico-military Code of Conduct for the participating States. France had proposed the idea of a code as a prelude to a legally binding security treaty among OSCE states. Although initially the United States and Turkey opposed the Code, it was included in the Forum's "Programme for Immediate Action" at Helsinki and was formally adopted at the Budapest Summit in 1994.

The Code of Conduct reaffirms the continuing validity of the comprehensive and co-operative concepts of security outlined at Helsinki, and commits participating States to defend the common values of the OSCE. But the Code also breaks new ground by formulating additional norms for the organization. Its specific goal, given the context of the transition from communism in Eastern Europe, is to guide the role of armed forces in a democratic society. The main principles of the Code include: non-recognition of territorial acquisition through violence; inviolability of borders; respect for the peaceful evolution in the constitution of states; prohibition of stationing foreign forces without the consent of the host state; recognition of the principle of military sufficiency; restraint and transparency in arms transfers; democratic control by civilian authorities of military and paramilitary armed forces; and the commitment of states to resort to OSCE machinery in the field of conflict prevention, crisis management and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

At Review Conferences in 1997 and 1999, participating states were extremely supportive of the Code's implementation, and several delegations credited it with helping them to achieve democratic control of their armed forces. In addition, the Code of Conduct has come to be viewed as an innovative instrument for conflict prevention, based on setting up norms for acceptable behaviour in the OSCE area. In the future, the Code could develop new salience with the expanded involvement of armed forces in international peacekeeping and crisis management.

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<sup>8</sup> The principal objections came from those countries not party to the CFE – particularly the neutral countries – who were concerned that the Treaty's arms limitation and verification measures disadvantaged those whose forces were primarily non-active and defensive. In addition, it was initially difficult for Soviet successor states to report on existing weapons systems or to determine defence budgets.

Despite this potential, the Code of Conduct - like other OSCE documents - remains a politically, as opposed to legally, binding document. Many participating states have yet to inform the FSC about a national programme for implementing its provisions, and the agendas of FSC meetings frequently include discussions of states' lack of compliance. More troubling is the failure of the Code to prevent or regulate the use of force by OSCE states in the latter half of this decade, particularly with regard to internal conflicts. Efforts to raise more "intrusive" approaches to such issues in the Code have been successfully resisted; as a result, the principle of territorial integrity retains a privileged status. Nonetheless, at the second follow-up conference on the Code of Conduct (June 1999), the key issues of contention surrounded the applicability of international humanitarian law and the use of armed forces in internal security situations.

In the future, the effectiveness of the Code will depend to an important degree on whether it can formulate appropriate responses to intra-state conflicts and help participating States to address the contradiction between the principle of territorial integrity and the principle of self-determination, a point underlined by the current conflict in Chechnya.

### 3) *Continuing Arms Control and Disarmament*

The FSC's role in arms control has been an important contribution to politico-military security in Europe during the 1990s. At the Lisbon Summit in 1996, the FSC presented a series of recommendations under its new "Framework for Arms Control" and set guidelines for future negotiations. In response to the growing concerns among some participating States about the emergence of different security zones in Europe, the document commits the FSC to creating a web of mutually reinforcing obligations that would express the principle of "indivisible security".

The foundation for the OSCE's armaments regime is the 1990 CFE Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and the 1999 adaptation of the CFE<sup>9</sup>. The FSC's role is to secure observance of these military arrangements and to facilitate discussion on future arms control programmes. In the words of Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, who served as OSCE Chairman-in-Office in 1998: "At the moment, the Forum is the only disarmament negotiator on behalf of the OSCE and also the only agency of its kind in Europe with representatives of almost all European states taking part in it."<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> The impetus for change came from the challenges posed by NATO enlargement, and the need to address the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. The agreement on adaptation, which was negotiated by the CFE's Joint Consultative Group and finalised at Istanbul, contains three main elements. First, the agreement adjusts the disarmament provisions of the CFE by replacing the *collective* ceilings for East and West with *national* and *territorial* ceilings for each individual State. Second, the new agreement decreases the overall level of conventional armaments in Europe by a further 10%. And third, it opens up the adapted CFE Treaty for accession by States that have not been members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact.

<sup>10</sup> Bronislaw Geremek, "The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe - Its Development and Prospects", OSCE Yearbook (1998), pp. 27-36 (p. 34).

Future items for the FSC arms control and disarmament agenda will likely include: regional arms control arrangements;<sup>11</sup> the creation of nuclear-free zones; the control of small and light weapons; and assistance to post-communist states in implementing Western transparency and control standards in arms trading.

#### 4) *Shaping a New Generation of CSBMs*

Building on one of the hallmarks of the OSCE, the FSC has continued to expand and modernise the set of confidence-and-security-building mechanisms for Europe. The evolution of these measures has affected both the *types* of information being exchanged, and the *means* of verification.

The Vienna Document of 1994 on CSBMs has been viewed as successful in building openness and transparency among participating states – even in a changing security environment. At the 1999 Review Conference on OSCE Principles and Commitments, the 1994 Document was credited with creating "a new pattern of relations in Europe" and engendering "a single European security space without dividing lines."<sup>12</sup> The FSC was particularly active in introducing additional thresholds for notification and observation, a more effective mechanism for communication between state capitals,<sup>13</sup> and more substantial provisions regarding defence planning and military contacts.

These adaptations were brought together in the Vienna Document 1999 (signed at Istanbul), which was the culmination of three years of negotiation. The key chapters of the Document include: the Annual Exchange of Military Information; Defence Planning; Risk Reduction; Contacts; Prior Notification of Military Activities; Annual Calendars; and Compliance and Verification. The major changes from the 1994 Document involve attempts to make CSBMs more applicable to a changing military and technological environment, an increase in evaluation quotas, a lengthening of the verification period, and a chapter on regional CSBMs which encourages OSCE states to "increase transparency in a bilateral, multilateral or regional context".<sup>14</sup>

In fact, the question of regional mechanisms for confidence-and-security-building has been a recent

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<sup>11</sup> See, for example, the Chairman's Summary to the FSC's Seminar on Regional Arms Control in the OSCE Area (18 July, 1995).

<sup>12</sup> See "Report of the Rapporteur on the Review of the Implementation of All OSCE principles and Commitments Relating to the Politico-Military Aspects of Security," in OSCE, Review Conference 1999, p.43.

<sup>13</sup> This includes the recent adoption of the "OSCE Communications Network Document," Agenda Item No. 2, FSC Journal 270 (6 October, 1999). In order to facilitate the implementation of the Vienna provisions, participating states have established a network of direct communication between their capitals. To judge from the January 2000 decision on communication account arrears, this has not been a smooth process.

<sup>14</sup> For a complete version of the Vienna Document 1999, see the OSCE's on-line handbook at [Http://www.osce.org/e/docs](http://www.osce.org/e/docs).



priority of the FSC. One example of this is the 1996 Dayton Agreement on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which provides for comprehensive measures to reduce the risk of conflict and a rigorous verification and inspection process.<sup>15</sup> During the first three years of implementation, there were no significant problems noted in over 130 inspections. The CSBM regime has been augmented by the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (concluded in June of 1996), which seeks to restrict and balance the force levels of Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). At first glance, military security appears to be significantly enhanced, particularly since the region has been in compliance with the arms control requirements of Dayton since October of 1997. Yet when examined in more detail, it is clear that the new entity's armed forces are still divided ethnically (with backing from Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), and that an unstable balance of power remains.<sup>16</sup>

While the CSBMs of the OSCE constitute an important tool of security, they do not always meet specific regional concerns. To address this gap, the FSC includes on its regular agenda a discussion of states' experience in bilateral and regional issues, and regularly updates a list of voluntary agreements. In this capacity, the FSC has encouraged regional CSBMs in the Baltic Sea area (which have been reasonably successful), between Greece and Turkey (which were very short-lived), and in Eastern Europe (Ukraine). The remaining challenge with regional CSBMs is ensuring a clear link to overall OSCE norms so as to avoid creating different degrees of security in the OSCE area in the context of the principle of "indivisibility of co-operative security" in the OSCE space.

However, two questions about regional CSBMs remain outstanding. First, it is debatable whether they can evolve into a real risk reduction measure, as opposed to what one OSCE delegation has called a "good weather instrument". Now that States have become "partners for peace", there is less need to enhance transparency in military matters or dispel mutual fears of aggression. What are needed instead are measures to deal with the risk of intra-state conflict, through early warning, fact-finding, and preventive diplomacy. Second, it is questionable whether the new Vienna Document can be more relevant in times of crisis management. The OSCE - as with all European security institutions - is still suffering from the continuing difficulty in managing the crises in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, and therefore may be less willing to invest resources in new and more intrusive CSBMs.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> The CSBMs covered in the agreement included: exchange of military information, notification and observation with respect to certain military activities, restrictions on deployments, and the withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons.

<sup>16</sup> There is a continuing relationship between the Bosnian Serb Army and the army of the FRY, and the Bosnian Croat section of the Federation Army still maintains its ties with Croatia. Also, the American 'train and equip' scheme, which was designed to help Federation forces to defend themselves against possible attack by forces from Serbia, has altered the military balance against the Serbs and in favour of the Federation.

<sup>17</sup> Some of the more controversial suggestions are the extension of CSBMs to naval activities, internal security forces, and defence conversion.

### **5) Promoting Security Dialogue**

The above areas of activity demonstrate the FSC's positive record in fulfilling the first aspect of its mandate: "goal-oriented negotiation" in the area of arms control and confidence-and-security-building measures. In so doing, it has provided the OSCE with an interesting array of tools for coping with new security challenges.

However, the second part of the mandate – "goal-oriented continuing dialogue and co-operation" – has been largely untapped. At the Lisbon Summit in 1996, there was a call for the FSC to further develop its security dialogue function, particularly in the areas of conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation. This was followed by similar calls noted in the report of the 1999 review conference. Despite the apparent interest in this course of action, the results thus far have not been encouraging. The FSC Journal records for 1999 and 2000 suggest that the Forum has yet to tackle these larger issues.

## **VI. The Evolution of Security within the FSC**

Over the course of the past decade, the OSCE has evolved from a *process* focused on overcoming Cold War rivalry, to an *institution* dedicated to building co-operative security. As stated in the 1998 SIPRI Yearbook: "While the tasks defined for the OSCE during the Cold War period have been largely fulfilled or have outlived their relevance, it has conducted significant activities in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management and resolution of disputes." Indeed, the new Charter for European Security agreed in Istanbul is designed to bolster the operational capabilities of the OSCE in these areas.<sup>18</sup>

On the surface, the mandate of the FSC fits well within the future vision of the OSCE. As the new Charter states: "Security and peace must be enhanced through an approach that combines two basic elements: we must build confidence among people within States and strengthen co-operation in pursuing comprehensive and indivisible security". The FSC's role in fulfilling this agenda is perceived in roughly the same terms as it was at Helsinki: on the one hand, to build greater confidence and military transparency, and on the other, to continue a "substantial security dialogue". With respect to the first task, the FSC is expected to launch a comprehensive discussion on the accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons, to continue implementation of CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to pursue further opportunities for regional arms control.

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<sup>18</sup> The key outputs of the Summit are as follows: 1) the creation of a Platform for Co-operative Security (which commits participating states to partnership with other international security organisations); 2) further development of the OSCE role in peacekeeping under the auspices of Chapter VII of the UN Charter; 3) creation of the Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (which will allow the OSCE to respond to requests from states for civilian/police expertise); 4) expansion of the OSCE's police-related activities; 5) establishment of an Operation Centre at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna to facilitate emergency planning; and 6) creation of a Preparatory Committee under direction of the Permanent Council to strengthen consultation within the OSCE.

Regarding the broader issue of dialogue, the agenda is less clear. Although the Istanbul Summit Declaration reiterates the need for the FSC to address "in greater depth" the security concerns of participating states, no specific issues have been targeted. Furthermore, while Istanbul strengthens the capacities of the Permanent Council – providing it with a Preparatory Committee and tasking it with responsibility for instituting the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe – there were no such improvements identified for FSC.<sup>19</sup>

Switzerland, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands are seeking to enhance security dialogue within the FSC, and make the venue flexible enough to respond to emerging challenges. Furthermore, these states would like to see the OSCE's roles in security co-operation, conflict prevention and crisis management more integrated. Under this formulation, possible agenda items for continuing dialogue in the FSC might include: the evolution of roles and structures of armed forces; the implications of a changed threat assessment; the development of joint defence doctrines; and co-operation in times of crisis.

On the operational side, some OSCE delegations have suggested refocusing and restructuring the FSC's work. One idea is for the FSC to enhance its ties with the OSCE's political bodies, such as the PC or the Chairman-in-Office, as well as with the organisation's official partners, such as the adjacent states in the Mediterranean. Another proposal involves reshaping the FSC's agenda around sub-regional issues. But in all such suggestions, one challenge persists: how to ensure that the FSC does not become a "subcommittee" of the Permanent Council. It is this latter body which has been the driving force behind the OSCE's most dramatic development in the 1990s, namely the establishment of over 20 field operations across Europe.<sup>20</sup> As long as this high-profile Permanent Council activity continues, it may be difficult to focus the reform agenda of the OSCE on the more intangible issue of security dialogue in the FSC.

## VII. The Changing Context of European Security

Consideration of the role of FSC presumes an understanding of the evolution of the context of European security since 1990. What are the most important challenges to European security at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century? Perhaps most striking in this context is the gradually diminishing significance of the inter-state dimension of security and the rising salience of substate and transnational issues. From the perspective of the FSC, this is a matter of some concern, since, as is clear from the above, it has focused largely on inter-state **military** questions in its efforts to stimulate a constructive security dialogue and to build confidence among OSCE members. At best, it might be suggested that the decreasing salience of "traditional" security issues is a measure of the success of the FSC and associated OSCE efforts to resolve them. At worst, it might suggest the growing irrelevance of the traditional mandate of the FSC in dealing with the security challenges of Europe

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<sup>19</sup> More recently, the adjustments to the framework of working groups supporting the FSC suggests that some progress is being made here.

<sup>20</sup> These field operations have been established in the following countries and regions: Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Estonia, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Latvia, Macedonia, Croatia, Tajikistan, and Chechnya (Russia).

and the Euro-Atlantic area.

### *Territorial Conflict*

One issue that animated much European discourse on security after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was the possible resurgence of territorial conflict. The number of potential *irredenta* was impressive in 1991 and included potential disputes between Latvia and Russia, Estonia and Russia, Poland and Lithuania, Germany and Poland, Poland and the then Czecho-Slovakia, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary (over rights in the Danube watercourse), Hungary and Rumania, Bulgaria and Macedonia, Bulgaria and Rumania, Ukraine and Slovakia, Ukraine and Poland, Ukraine and Hungary and Ukraine and Rumania, not to mention the numerous territorial issues enlivening relations among the CIS states.

It is striking after ten years of post-Cold War reality how little actual conflict has emerged out of the rather messy post-World War II (and post-Soviet collapse) territorial dispensations. Most of the outstanding territorial issues mentioned above have been resolved by treaty, or by unilateral renunciation even in instances when the historical basis of the claim was quite sound (as, for example, with Estonian claims on Russia). The challenge here was not merely one of deterring deliberate assaults by one European state on another and convincing potential revisionists of the illegitimacy of territorial change, but also of preventing the emergence of security dilemmas between states facing such potential disputes, and inadvertent (preventive or pre-emptive) war emerging from such dilemmas. The temptations for leaders facing rapid political and economic transition to sustain and build support through the manipulation of nationalism increased the danger.<sup>21</sup>

One factor explaining this positive outcome has been the OSCE norm concerning territorial integrity and the inviolability of internationally recognised frontiers, which was strongly reiterated in the 1999 Istanbul Security Charter. CSBMs and arms control measures worked out in part in the FSC also played an important role in stabilizing these potential disputes. The very existence of the FSC symbolises the community's commitment to the building of a cooperative security environment and is reassuring in this sense. The FSC also contributes as a transmitter of norms regarding the non-use of force in territorial disputes. The increasing transparency associated with CSBMs reduces states' sense of insecurity and enhances predictability, thereby mitigating the "security dilemmas" of states involved in such disputes. However, the key here was probably the desire of these states to enter European institutions, notably NATO and the EU. In order to make a credible case for doing so, they have had to get their houses in order. Both institutions have made it clear that they would not seriously consider a membership application by a state with unresolved territorial claims or disputes with their neighbours.

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<sup>21</sup> On this danger, see Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* XX, No. 1 (Summer 1995).

### *Internal War*

Perhaps the most significant issue in European security in the 1990s has been that of internal war, often, though not always, of an ethnic character. These conflicts emerged from an array of factors related to the collapse of the bipolar European system:

1. a legacy of historical animosities that had been suppressed by Soviet and communist rule;
2. instability, uncertainty and privation associated with political and economic transition;
3. insecurities for minority populations associated with the withdrawal of federal protections in the former Soviet Union (e.g. Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh);
4. the collapse of the prevailing communist ideology;
5. the efforts of elites threatened by processes of democratization to sustain their position through mobilization strategies centred on ethno-nationalism.

This was viewed as a generic threat to security throughout the former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet spaces in the early 1990s. Concern over the problem strongly informed much of the discussion of evolving roles of European and Euro-Atlantic institutions at the beginning of the decade, as these institutions attempted to redefine their missions in a post-bipolar security environment.<sup>22</sup>

Several aspects of the phenomenon of internal war were disturbing to these multilateral organizations:

1. an apparent pattern of ethnic cleansing, which constituted a clear violation of international and European humanitarian norms;
2. the danger of spillover of civil conflict into neighbouring states;
3. conflict-induced forced migration, which risked the destabilization of delicate ethnic balances in neighbouring states (spillover effects are considered below) as well as significant social costs to OSCE members farther removed from the zone of conflict.

With the passage of time, it has become clear that the phenomenon of civil conflict along ethnic or other regional lines is regionally concentrated in Southeastern Europe and the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union (from Moldova to Tajikistan), rather than afflicting the former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet spaces as a whole. Elsewhere, both internal (ethnic balances, the

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<sup>22</sup> NATO, "Strategic Concept" (November 7-8, 1991). <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107.a.htm>; OSCE, "Charter of Paris for a New Europe" (Paris: OSCE, 1990); "Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration" Bonn, WEU, June 1992); "European Security: A Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries" (Madrid: WEU, November 1995).

nature of inter-communal divides, historical factors limiting ethnic animosity) and external (the pull of European institutions and conditionalities on membership and assistance) have combined to remove the issue from the agenda.

None the less, it is an enduring feature of the politics of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. In the former instance, substantial NATO-based multilateral intervention has stabilized the situation, somewhat, although events in northern Kosovo suggest this may be a rather fragile outcome. In the latter, more or less robust cease-fires hold in most of the conflicts in question (Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan), but political settlements remain elusive. One conflict has been settled politically (Tajikistan), though that settlement is shaky.<sup>23</sup> Only the Chechen conflict remains as an active source of this form of instability in the OSCE space.

This should not necessarily be taken as reassuring. There is some prospect of the outbreak of civil conflict in Montenegro and Macedonia.<sup>24</sup> There is substantial potential for new inter-communal conflict in Georgia and in the northern Caucasus.<sup>25</sup> The Russian campaign in Chechnya carries a substantial potential for spillover into neighbouring jurisdictions within the Russian federation and into Georgia. Uzbekistan evinces increasing civil disorder in Uzbekistan owing to the government's efforts to control what it perceives to be a threat of Islamic fundamentalism in the Ferghana Valley. The incipient conflict in Uzbekistan implicates Kyrgyzstan which has been used and may be used again as a transit corridor for militants opposed to the Karimov government. The use of Tajikistan as a sanctuary risks the extension of conflict in Uzbekistan to Tajikistan as well. Recent (late 1999) arrests of separatist Russians in northern Kazakhstan suggest some potential for inter-ethnic and secessionist conflict in this OSCE member state as well.

### *Post-Conflict Stabilisation and Peace-Building*

The transition from war to peace in internal conflicts is a complex process. Short of victory by one side or another, a rare phenomenon, it involves:

1. the mediation of cease-fires;
2. efforts to address the humanitarian consequences of war;

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<sup>23</sup> On the settlement process in Tajikistan, see Lena Jonson, *The Tajik War: A Challenge to Russian Policy* (London: RIIA, 1998).

<sup>24</sup> The deep division of opinion within Montenegro over the nature of that jurisdiction's ties to Serbia, and the possibility of Serbian intervention in the event that Montenegro moves towards independence together constitute a serious danger of war. In Macedonia, much depends on the determination of the status of Kosovo. Should Kosovo become independent, unification of Kosovo with Albania is plausible. This would risk the destabilization of the internal politics of Macedonia as compactly settled Albanian minority populations in northern and western Macedonia might seek to join the larger Albanian state.

<sup>25</sup> S. Neil MacFarlane, *Reassessing Conflicts in the Caucasus Region*, CPN Briefing Paper (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik European Union Analysis and Evaluation Centre, January 2000).

3. deterrence, stabilization and the provision of security during the normalization of political life;
4. confidence-building between communities in conflict;
5. transitional economic assistance to wean societies away from relief dependency;
6. assistance in the rebuilding of state structures damaged by war;
7. assistance in the construction of political institutions that will enjoy the trust of the parties and will provide reassurance as they contemplate re-integration into politics and society;
8. electoral assistance as divided societies choose new representative governments.

In the extreme, it may involve the suspension of discredited institutions and the assumption of direct policy and administrative responsibility by international agencies in the transition from war to peace, as has occurred to varying degrees in both Bosnia and Kosovo.

The multi-dimensional character of peace-building raises difficult questions about the sustainability of the boundaries between the human dimension, the economic dimension and the security dimension of OSCE approaches to security. Clearly, in the area of conflict management and resolution (and, for that matter, conflict prevention), they overlap. The effort to sustain their separation in institutional terms (as with the FSC focus on politico-military aspects of security) seems somewhat artificial and is perhaps debilitating.

The multidimensionality of peace-building also poses a number of challenges related to the division of labour amongst states, inter-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations and the co-ordination of their activities in the field. There is as yet no generally agreed distribution of responsibilities for these activities in the OSCE space. It is not clear what institution should be responsible for delineating such responsibilities. It is clear that the roles and the aspirations of many of these institutions overlap.

Turning to institutional roles (within the OSCE) in the regulation of conflict, matters relating to the prevention of ethnic conflict in OSCE member states are generally handled through the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in the broader context of the Human Dimension. Matters relating to OSCE engagement in the management and resolution of civil conflict are generally addressed in the Permanent Council and the Secretariat. In contrast, there is little evidence of efforts to engage these issues in the FSC. This presumably reflects the sensitivity of the group to OSCE norms concerning non-interference in domestic jurisdiction, in particular on matters relating to regime change and territorial integrity, as well as the consensually based modes of decision in the organization.

One might ask whether the FSC **should** engage issues related to peace-building and conflict prevention, given the existence of alternative institutions with reasonably clearly defined practical responsibilities for dealing with them. This is a fair question, given legitimate concerns about overlap and duplication. But it bears stressing that the mandates of institutions such as ODIHR or HCNM (and for that matter the missions of long term duration), are operational rather than analytical

or communicative. The same is true, on the whole, of the CPC. In addition to the implementation dimension of these institutions, there may be a place for a community-wide dialogue on conflict prevention and regulation which would draw upon the practical experience of the functional institutions. The FSC may be an appropriate venue for such a dialogue, because its proceedings are less politicised than those of, for example, the PC. The experiences and expertise of the HCNM, ODIHR, the CPC and the permanent missions could provide invaluable input into a discussion of this type, which could proceed in an FSC working group and associated seminar activity with broad participation from the expert community and civil society stakeholders.

The OSCE - despite its lack of operational depth - has a significant comparative advantage in peace-building operations because (as mentioned earlier) it is the only truly inclusive **regional** organization operating in the area of security in Europe. OSCE organs - as well as other multilateral organizations - have been involved in many of these aspects of building peace, both in Southeastern Europe and in the Caucasus and in Central Asia (e.g. Tajikistan). With the passage of time, the OSCE implementation role in peacebuilding missions has grown considerably, as is evident in both Bosnia and Kosovo. However, this again has not been a significant element of the evolving discussion in the FSC.

### *Problems of Transition*

A fourth major cluster of security issues facing OSCE states are those related to political and economic transition. The propensity of member states to suffer from civil disorder is closely related to the legitimacy of structures of governance within them. Many of the newly independent states are not fully democratic, as is suggested by recent OSCE refusals to monitor (and hence legitimize) electoral processes in Central Asia.<sup>26</sup> Limitations on effective participation in politics risk fostering rising socio-political tension in these societies and consequent outbreaks of anti-government violence. Widespread politically motivated violation of human rights in Southeastern Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union risk strengthening extra-systemic (and violent) patterns of opposition.

Table 2 below provides ratings of performance for OSCE transitional states in the establishment of free and democratic polities. The data are drawn from Freedom House. Although the indices are complex and contested, there is little reason to contest the overall ranking of the states in question or the direction of trends within the group as a whole. According to these measures, over the period under consideration 13 made progress towards freedom, 11 regressed, and 2 remained unchanged. The 11 moving back are geographically concentrated in the Caucasus, the three Slavic republics of the former Soviet Union, and Central Asia (the exceptions being Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). The 12 moving forward are concentrated in the northern and middle tiers of Central Europe, as well as the Baltics. In short, the data indicate a deepening division in the OSCE

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<sup>26</sup> See, for example, OSCE/ODIHR, "OSCE/ODIHR Will Not Deploy Observer Mission to Turkmenistan Parliamentary Elections" (9 December, 1999). <http://www.osce.org/e/docs/presrel/1999-090-odihr.htm>.



space between Central and Eastern (former Soviet) Europe with regard to the process of political transition.

**Table 1. Democratization Ratings of States in Transition in Europe, 1991-2 and 1998-9**

<b>Country</b>	<b>1991-2</b>	<b>1998-9</b>
Armenia	5,5, PF	4,4,PF
Azerbaijan	5,5, PF	6,4,PF
Belarus	4,4, PF	6,6,NF
Bosnia-Herzegovina	6,6,NF (1993)	5,5,PF
Bulgaria	2,3,F	2,3,F
Croatia	3,4,PF	4,4,PF
Czech Republic	2,2,F (Czecho-Slovakia)	1,2,F
Estonia	2,3,F	1,2,F
Georgia	6,5,NF	3,4,PF
Hungary	2,3,F	1,2,F
Kazakhstan	5,4,PF	6,5,PF
Kyrgyz Republic	5,4,PF	5,5,PF
Latvia	2,3,F	1,2,F
Lithuania	2,3,F	1,2,F
Macedonia	3,4,PF	3,3,PF
Moldova	5,4,PF	2,4,PF
Poland	2,2,F	1,2,F
Romania	5,5,PF	2,2,F
Russia	3,3,PF	4,4,PF
Slovakia	2,2,F (Czecho-Slovakia)	2,2,F
Slovenia	2,3,F	1,2,F
Tajikistan	3,3,PF	6,6,NF
Turkmenistan	6,5,PF	7,7,NF
Ukraine	3,3,PF	3,4,PF
Uzbekistan	6,5,PF	7,6,NF
FRY	6,5,PF	6,6,NF

Note: In each cell, the first figure refers to performance on political rights, the second to performance on civil liberties. One is the highest rating, and seven the lowest. NF refers to not free, PF to partially free, and F to free. This rating is a composite of the first two.

Source: Freedom House, Country Ratings (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/>).

Meanwhile, although in the northern tier of Central Europe, significant progress has been made in improving the standards of living of large sections of the population, there is little evidence of such progress in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. In the latter case, most newly independent states were beginning to show evidence of bottoming out in 1995-7, but the Russian economic crisis of 1998 had significant further depressing effects on the regional economies. Table

2 provides human development data for 1991 and 1997 for a group of OSCE states in transition. Although the HDI suffers from a number of problems, it serves as a good surrogate for the assessment of the effects of transition on the populations of these states.

**Table 2. Human Development Indicators and HDI Global Rankings 1991 and 1997 for the Newly Independent States**

Country	HDI 1991	HDI 1997	Global Ranking 1991	Global Ranking 1997
Armenia	.908	.651	31	103
Azerbaijan	.908	.636	31	106
Belarus	.908	.806	31	62
Bulgaria	.899	.78	33	69
Croatia	NA	NA	NA	NA
Czech Republic	.92	.88	27	39
Estonia	.908	.776	31	71
Georgia	.908	.637	31	105
Hungary	NA	NA	NA	NA
Kazakhstan	.908	.709	31	93
Kyrgyz Republic	.908	.635	31	107
Latvia	.908	.711	31	92
Lithuania	NA	NA	NA	NA
Macedonia	NA	NA	NA	NA
Moldova	.908	.612	31	110
Poland	.863	.834	41	58
Romania	.762	.748	58	79
Russia	.908	.792	31	67
Tajikistan	.908	.58	31	115
Turkmenistan	.908	.723	31	85
Ukraine	.908	.689	31	95
Uzbekistan	.908	.662	31	100
FRY	NA	NA	NA	NA

Source: UNDP, Human Development under Transition: Summaries of the 1997 National Human Development Reports for Europe and the CIS (New York: UNDP, March 1998).

The HDI and economic data parallel to some extent the political ones discussed earlier and to some extent reinforce the impression of a Europe divided into two parts, one moving forward and the other falling behind. The combination of incomplete democracy, frequently illegitimate government, persistent human rights violations, and economic decline combine to raise significant prospects of continuing instability in the eastern parts of the OSCE space.

*Spillovers: Migration, Terrorism, Transnational Crime*

A fifth area of concern mentioned in both the 1991 and 1999 NATO strategic concepts and in much associated literature is the issue of spillover from conflict or state collapse in Central and Eastern Europe. The principal form that spillover has taken over the past decade is forced migration (viz. the massive flow of former Yugoslav citizens to Germany in 1991-3 or the flood of Albanians to Italy in 1997). As is evident in the link between migration flows and the growth of the extreme right in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, such flows can have deeply disturbing effects on recipient states.

Several qualifications are important here. First, the dangers of spillover are related to the incidence of conflict. The incidence of new conflict in the OSCE space has declined since the early 1990s. Although, as noted above, there is substantial potential for new conflict, this potential is present for the most part in regions far removed from Western and Central Europe. Conflict-related migration flows are likely to affect principally the newly independent states, as well as (possibly) non-OSCE member states along the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union (as occurred in both Iran and Afghanistan in the early 1990s).

Second, the experience of Germany in radically curtailing the flow of asylum-seekers in 1993-4 suggests that states have effective means of managing this problem. The evolution of the Schengen regime indicates further that Western European states are developing multilateral mechanisms to manage the process more effectively. The extension of Schengen arrangements as part of the EU accession process will push these mechanisms farther east. More generally, the international "community" is, willy-nilly and rightly or wrongly, revising the international refugee regime in order to prevent people from fleeing conflict, notably through increased efforts to deal with migrant populations inside their own country or in contiguous states.<sup>27</sup> Finally, the effects of specific episodes of mass migration are often concentrated in single states rather than constituting a regional problem, as was evident in the case of Albanians crossing the Adriatic. Not surprisingly, this asymmetry of interest complicates multilateral response. This explains the lack of a NATO response to the Albanian crisis and the decision of the Italians to lead a "coalition of the willing" instead.<sup>28</sup>

The problem of refugees from conflict is only one aspect of the issue of migration. The second is economic migration. Here, it is noteworthy that the dimensions of the problem of south-north and east-west economic migration have turned out to be smaller than most anticipated in the early years of the decade, while state and regional capacities (e.g. Schengen) have turned out to be more robust than initially anticipated in dealing with this problem.

Another major aspect of spillover is the spread of political violence from its point of origin

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<sup>27</sup> Adam Roberts, "More Refugees, Less Asylum: A Regime in Transformation," *Journal of Refugee Studies* XI (1998), No. 4, pp.375-395.

<sup>28</sup> Ettore Greco, *Delegating Peace Operations: Improvisation and Innovation in Georgia and Albania* (New York: UN Association of the United States, 1998), pp.19-21.

(either inside the OSCE space or in contiguous areas) to other OSCE member states. This may involve disputes among immigrant communities (e.g. those between Kurds and Turks in Germany, or between Greeks and Macedonians in Canada), or efforts to influence host government policy on the conflict in question, either through protest (e.g. against Kurds in Germany), or through terror (for example, the mid-1990s bombings in France attributed to Algerian Islamic militants or, for that matter, the bombing of New York's World Trade Centre). The effects of such activities - so far - are not so much direct and material as psychological. There is little indication that terror and wider conflict spillovers constitute fundamental threats to the socio-political fabric of the OSCE community.

One further factor associated with instability and migration is the spread of transnational crime in the Euro-Atlantic space. Criminal groups operating in southeastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have taken advantage of the instability in these regions - and the atrophied law enforcement capacities of local authorities in states in transition - to expand their activities more widely in the Euro-Atlantic space. This process is particularly serious in collapsed states. The post-1997 chaos in Albania, for example, and the migration to Italy, Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe that accompanied that state's collapse was accompanied by a very rapid expansion of Albanian criminal activity in Western Europe. The Kosovo conflict underlines the frequent interaction between the criminal and the political, as military-political movements such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (or, for that matter, many Chechen groups opposed to Russia's jurisdiction over the Chechen Republic) have engaged in criminal activity in part to raise funds in order to pursue their political agendas.

### *Non-Proliferation*

Weapons proliferation, particularly towards the Middle East, but also within the Euro-Atlantic space, is a matter of deep and persistent concern to security planners on both sides of the Atlantic. It is linked to terrorism, given the access that non-state actors may be gaining to these capabilities. The problem has three major dimensions:

1. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
2. The proliferation of delivery systems for such weapons;
3. The proliferation of conventional weapons technology and capability (including small arms and land mines)

The OSCE space is a potentially major source of such proliferation, given the interest of arms exporters in sustaining market share in an increasingly competitive arms market, the interests of major companies in exporting technologies that may have dual use, and the under-controlled nature of such capabilities in the former Soviet republics. The economic incentives to export may be particularly strong in those Central and Eastern European states in economic transition, with mounting external debt, limited opportunities for export, and with a post-communist legacy of substantial weapons production capability.

In addition, the illicit and licit movement of arms within the OSCE space has played a significant role in creating and sustaining security dilemmas for communities and states in conflict. It would be difficult to deny, for example, that the substantial transfers of surplus NATO weaponry to Greece and Turkey exacerbated the two country's relations in the early 1990s or that the massive Russian transfers of advanced weapons to Armenia in 1994-6 stiffened the resolve of Armenia (and Karabakh) in opposition to a settlement of the civil conflict in Azerbaijan.

The issue of non-proliferation is complex, not only as a result of the multiple technologies involved, but since the degree to which they are susceptible to control by states and their organizations is limited. States exercise considerable leverage over the transfer of nuclear and top-end conventional weapons. In contrast, the control over the proliferation of light weapons is highly problematic, given the existence of a substantial private market outside state control and the considerable supply of these weapons within such markets as a result of the end of the Cold War. In the chemical and biological spheres, state control is complicated by the dual-use problem noted above: technologies that have weapons applications are also essential aspects of civilian production in these areas.

In contrast to most of the issues treated above, the FSC has played a modest role in the discussion of non-proliferation issues since the forum's inception through the "Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers (1993), the provision of a mechanism for dialogue on these issues, and the effort to ensure the availability of reliable, up-to-date, and comprehensive information on weapons transfers. The issue is gaining profile in the post-Istanbul context with the discussion of small arms proliferation.

On the whole, despite the effort devoted to non-proliferation in the FSC, it is difficult to discern any substantial impact of the Forum in this area. This reflects several factors, not least the multiplicity of other multilateral and bilateral fora in which the issue is addressed (see below), the fact that the issue is closely related to key economic (e.g. weapons exports and the dilemmas of dual use technology), societal (e.g. gun control), and security (e.g. access to weapons perceived to be necessary to a state's defence posture) concerns of members, and the fact that the profile of the Forum is much less substantial than the profile of the issue in member state policy.

This said, there are advantages in discussing the issue of non-proliferation in an informal, reasonably low-key forum. This may be particularly true of the question of small arms proliferation. The issue is of central importance in the consideration of many of the challenges mentioned above (e.g. internal conflict, the consolidation of states in transition, terrorism). Yet it is one where, once one moves beyond generalities, the perspectives of member states on the feasibility and modalities of control vary widely. Success in the control of small arms depends importantly on the generation of common understanding of the issue and common perspectives on its regulation. This may require a **process** of extended discussion. The FSC is a potentially important mechanism in the effort to develop such a community of perspective. Although the concrete products from such a consensus-building effort are likely to emerge elsewhere, this does not mean that discussion of the question in the FSC would be irrelevant to the products that ultimately emerged.

*Russia and the Newly Independent States*

Perhaps the most significant **traditional** security problem in the Euro-Atlantic area is the issue of integrating the Russian Federation into a pan-European structure of co-operative security. Russia remains significantly alienated by the substance and course of NATO enlargement. The NATO-Russia Final Act has mitigated this alienation to some extent, but hardly completely. Further enlargement, particularly if it embraces former Soviet republics (e.g. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) will reinforce this alienating effect. NATO actions in Kosovo - and notably the Russian view that NATO may have circumvented UN Security Council and UN Charter provisions concerning the use of force by regional associations (Chapter VIII)<sup>29</sup> and the fact that such use was a response to the internal policies of a member state (bringing Article 2, para.7 into play) - have further complicated the relationship between Russia and its European and transatlantic partners.

Underlying these specific issues is a more general problem: NATO was founded as a collective defence mechanism directed at the Soviet Union. Although its counterpart (the Warsaw Treaty Organization - WTO) has disappeared, and although NATO has made significant efforts to redesign itself for the post-Cold War European security environment, the mission of collective defence remains at the core of the role that NATO defines for itself.<sup>30</sup> It is legitimate to ask: collective defence against what? In the OSCE space, there is one answer - Russia.

The Atlantic security community has not managed to discover a way to achieve the full integration of Russia into a broader architecture of co-operative security in Europe. Despite the effort to paper over the impact of NATO enlargement, Russian foreign policy and defence elites continue to display considerable consensus that this process is at odds with Russia's national interest. Elite opinion in Russia seems to range from the visceral hostility to NATO characteristic of the nationalist/communist right to the more nuanced criticisms of liberals.<sup>31</sup> The latter argue that, for NATO to play a positive role in European security, it needs to transform itself from an essentially collective defence organization to a co-operative security mode as part of an authoritative pan-European structure.

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<sup>29</sup> Article 53 of the Charter notes that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." Although NATO is not a "Chapter VIII" regional organization (as the OSCE is), NATO clearly is in common language a "regional arrangement." No such authorization was forthcoming. Two exceptions are mentioned in the Article, both pertaining to the response to actions taken by states that were World War II enemies of signatories of the Charter. Article 51 of the Charter (Chapter VII) notes that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations ..." No such armed attack occurred.

<sup>30</sup> See "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," NAC S(99)65, 24 April, 1999, paragraph 10.

<sup>31</sup> Polling data suggest the depth of Russia's alienation from NATO. A recent poll conducted by the Russian Public Opinion and Market Research Institute found that nobody in Russia trusted NATO completely, 5.7% trusted it to a certain degree, 15.7% did not trust it very much, and 59% did not trust it at all. "Most Russians Do Not Trust International Organizations, Including EU, UN, NATO," *BBC Monitoring*, 13 April, 2000. It is depressing, if unsurprising, that no data are reported on the OSCE.

One might argue that this does not really matter - that, when push comes to shove, Russia has to play ball, and, if it doesn't - so what? From a narrow and short term security perspective, such a position may be correct. However, it discounts the future heavily. Russia will probably recover. Recovery may already be beginning under Vladimir Putin. When it does so, it would be preferable for Russia to do so within a framework of European security whose legitimacy it accepts. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that the principal long term security challenge facing the Euro-Atlantic community in the longer term is what to do with Russia.

Closely associated is the question of what to do about the security problems of the non-Russian newly independent states. Here we run into a Catch-22. To the extent that international organizations (the UN, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE) attempt to address these issues through reaching out to the former Soviet republics, they risk enhancing Russian perceptions of insecurity and victimisation further. To the extent that they do not respond to the security needs of these republics, the latter remain dependent on Russia and vulnerable to Russian pressure.

Given recent events in Chechnya, this issue is of growing importance. In an immediate sense, there is considerable danger of spillover into Georgia along that country's border with Chechnya, as Russian forces attempt to prevent Chechen rebel use of Georgia's territory as a sanctuary. Georgia has been placed under pressure by the Russian Federation to allow military operations against Chechen forces from Russian bases in Georgia. Russian aircraft have repeatedly violated Georgian air space and have bombed targets inside Georgia's borders. And Russia has sought to deploy its own forces on Georgia's side of the border to seal it.

In a more general sense, the proactive Russian policy in Chechnya has important implications for the regional politics and security of the Caucasian region. It is unclear whether Chechnya is a "one-off" or whether it is the harbinger of a more concerted Russian campaign to restore influence south of the Caucasus range. The latter view is widely shared in the region itself. The former chief foreign policy adviser to Azerbaijan's President Aliiev declared recently that "the military campaign reflects Russia's imperial designs in the Caucasus and threatens the sovereignty of all the independent states in the region, particularly that of Azerbaijan and Georgia."<sup>32</sup>

If indeed this is Russian policy, it carries significant implications not only for Caucasian OSCE members, but also for Western European states and the United States, as well as for the OSCE itself. The OSCE is supposed to be uniform from a security perspective; the construction of special spheres of influence and responsibility contradicts the norms of equality and indivisibility that lie at the institution's core. Moreover, given the growth of substantial Western economic involvement in the region's energy sector, Russian policy could provoke specific tensions with Western OSCE members on this issue. Growing Canadian interest in this region is suggested the hearings of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade hearings on the region in 2000.

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<sup>32</sup> Beatrice Hogan, "Caucasus: Ex-Aliiev Aide Warns of Russian Ambitions," *Turkistan Newsletter* (23 February, 2000).

## VIII. The Evolving Institutional Context of European and Euro-Atlantic Security

### *Institutional Asymmetries*

At this point, it is appropriate to turn to several aspects of institutional "architecture" that bear upon the role of the OSCE and that of the FSC within it. First, and reflecting the point just made, if one looks at the OSCE space as a whole, it is striking how institutionally dense the West is and how institutionally deficient the East is. This is being addressed to some extent in Central Europe through processes of enlargement, and in south-eastern Europe through such instruments as the Stability Pact.

However, it is improbable that this process will proceed substantially into the former Soviet Union for the foreseeable future, with the possible exception of the Baltic states. The institutional deficit is both a product and producer of instability. This instability in turn may engender many of the more immediate challenges discussed above. The deficit may grow increasingly serious if and when Russia begins to recover in economic and security terms. One problem here is the lack of a widely accepted vision of institutional architecture, and the partly consequent problem of institutional rivalry. The result is an incrementalism that contributes to the alienation of Russia while doing little to address the security problems of the other newly independent states.

The OSCE is perhaps the only regional organization with direct security responsibilities that is well-placed to address this deficit, since it is the only universal organization in the Euro-Atlantic space and since, unlike the EAPC, the OSCE is not associated with Cold War Alliance structures viewed with suspicion by the Russians and some others. Its universality contributes to its perceived impartiality. However, for it to be able to fill this gap, two necessary conditions would have to be fulfilled:

1. the leading role of the organization in this area would have to be more explicitly recognized; and
2. the organization would have to be provided with resources sufficient to assume this role.

There is little indication that either of these conditions is likely to be fulfilled.

The issue of institutional empowerment brings us to a second broad question - the division of security responsibilities shared by regional and universal organizations in the OSCE space and how these are evolving. From the perspective of OSCE roles in the area of security broadly defined, three phenomena are significant. The first is the growing role of the United Nations in Europe. Prior to 1991, the UN security role in the European space was negligible. The 1990s witnessed a dramatic evolution, not least because of the unpreparedness of European institutions (and the UN) to cope with post-Cold War security problems. In the first place, the UN has taken on direct mediation responsibilities in a number of European conflicts (the former Yugoslavia, Georgia [Abkhazia], and Tajikistan). This has been combined with observation of cease-fires (e.g. UNOMIG in Georgia, UNMOT in Tajikistan), peace-keeping (e.g. UNPROFOR) and post-conflict administration



(UNMIK). The UN has also been heavily involved in humanitarian response in all recent European conflicts. It has taken on human rights responsibilities through the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), sometimes in conjunction with the OSCE (as in the case of the human rights issue in Abkhazia-Georgia). In addition, the UN brings to the table a wide array of capabilities in the area of electoral assistance and institutional capacity building, as well as transitional and development assistance. The broadening of its understanding of "security" closely parallels the evolution of OSCE perspectives. There is, consequently, some difficulty in determining where the line is or should be drawn between the UN itself and the OSCE as a Chapter VIII regional organization.

In general, the question of institutional leadership and institutional roles has been answered on an *ad hoc* basis in crises where it has arisen (e.g. Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Caucasian conflicts). This has sometimes been accompanied by a certain amount of jealousy over putative turf, as was evident in the protracted effort to negotiate a joint OSCE-UN initiative on human rights monitoring in Abkhazia (Georgia), and considerable tension between organizations in the field. Moreover, lack of clarity of the division of labour may be inefficient; in the case of Kosovo, for example, the OSCE expended considerable effort in the development of policing options as part of its mandate, only to be informed that this function was to go to the UN, which reportedly was considerably less far along in its planning.<sup>33</sup>

Second, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was left at the end of the Cold War without a major state-based threat against which to structure its activities. On the other hand, it was the most capable hard-end Euro-Atlantic institution for dealing with post-Cold War security problems. In 1991, NATO produced the Rome Strategic Concept as its first effort to deal with the new situation. A number of its provisions overlapped in potentially significant ways with the activities of the OSCE, including the FSC, which emerged at approximately the same time. The Strategic Concept emphasized the role of NATO in fostering dialogue on new security issues (paragraph 25), underlined the importance of its arms control and disarmament efforts as a contribution to European security (paragraph 26), emphasized the importance of crisis management and early involvement, and claimed a crisis management role for the Alliance.<sup>34</sup>

By the time of the Washington Summit in 1999, the Alliance had moved (at the declaratory level) to a more or less complete embrace of conflict prevention and crisis management, including crisis response in conformity with Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This included peace-keeping and related missions. Interestingly, the purposes of the Alliance also included reference to partnership directed at "increasing transparency and mutual confidence," functions usually associated with the OSCE. The provisions of the Concept dealing with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) approach FSC issues even more closely; the Concept emphasizes building "increased transparency and confidence among its members on security issues," contributing to "conflict

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<sup>33</sup> Interviews in Berlin, 1999.

<sup>34</sup> NATO, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," (Rome, November 1991). [Http://www.nato.int/docu/com/49-95/c911107a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/com/49-95/c911107a.htm)

prevention and crisis management," and the development of "practical co-operation activities."<sup>35</sup> The Concept also suggests that "arms control, disarmament, and proliferation" and the promotion of CSBMs in these spheres are key roles of the Alliance. This includes discussion of arms transfers and export controls.<sup>36</sup> Many of these (e.g. arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, confidence building and conflict prevention, and the issue of democratic control of the armed forces) are all also key elements of the FSC mandate. The potential for duplication is obvious. Indeed, one might argue that the creation of the EAPC itself is duplicative, since its mandate so closely parallels the mandated activities of the FSC. There is reason to believe that the FSC may be intrinsically more promising as a mechanism to engage these issues, since it has a broader membership and is not associated with Cold War Alliance structures. The expansion of EAPC to its current membership of 45 goes some distance towards reducing the universality advantage. However, NATO structures clearly differentiate between NATO member and non-member states. Moreover, with regard to the second point, although Russia has returned to active participation in NATO structures, it is nonetheless clear that Russia views NATO to lack legitimacy as a pan-European security structure. This is unlikely to change. For these reasons, it would seem appropriate to consider situating the discussion of pan-regional security issues as listed above in the OSCE/FSC context, rather than in NATO.

That said, the EAPC and NATO more generally have been careful about treading too heavily into issue areas where the OSCE/FSC have taken a leading role, although a number of EAPC members see it as the best, if not the only, way to engage certain countries in dialogue on security issues. This caution reflects several factors. In the first place, within the EAPC there are several countries (e.g. Norway, Sweden and Finland) who use no-duplication arguments to put the UN and the OSCE forward in discussion of and decision on broader security questions. This is perhaps most obvious with regard to non-proliferation. Despite the Concept, the EAPC appears to have clearly identified this as an activity where the OSCE is taking the lead. Whether the OSCE can do so effectively, however, is debatable for reasons considered above.

The third - and most ambiguous - organizational development has been the growing role taken by the EU in foreign policy (CFSP) and security (ESDI) questions. Early in the 1990s, the EU entered the ranks of institutions seeking to mediate conflicts in its ill-starred effort to resolve the Yugoslav crisis. Part of the effort involved the deployment of monitors. Undeterred by the abject failure of these efforts, from the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 forward, the EU has also come to embrace the maintenance of international peace and the strengthening of international security as key elements of its emerging foreign policy programme. This came to involve a direct organizational role in aspects of the Yugoslav crisis prior to Dayton (viz. EU administration of Mostar). The EU also

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<sup>35</sup> NATO, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," (Washington, April 1999), paragraphs 10, 31, 34, 40.  
[Http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm).

<sup>36</sup> One justification encountered for EAPC discussion of export controls is that it is the only way to engage partners who are not members of the Wassenaar group in dialogue on this important proliferation issue. This ignores the clear mandate of the FSC with regard to dialogue with member states on arms transfers and proliferation and probably reflects scepticism regarding the effectiveness of the OSCE as an institutional mechanism for dealing with this cluster of problems.

took advantage of its weight as a development actor to deploy conflict conditionalities in a number of potential regional crises (e.g. the dissolution of the Czecho-Slovakia).

The EU was galvanized by the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo - and the manifest weaknesses and lack of co-ordination of European response - to embark on an ambitious agenda of defence integration. The Treaty of Amsterdam (which came into force in 1999) codified a number of new instruments to improve the co-ordination of member state actions in the field of foreign and security policy. Building on Anglo-French-German consultations through 1998-9, and the deliberations of the Cologne EU Summit in June 1999, the Union decided at the 1999 Helsinki Summit to create a 40,000-60,000 force for rapid deployment in crises and to develop associated independent logistical and intelligence capabilities. If this works (and there are many reasons to presume that it may not), this will provide the Union with an operational capacity for the projection of force as a means of crisis management and military/humanitarian response. How this sits with NATO's broadened crisis mandate and what its implications are for Canada's transatlantic connection remain to be seen.

More broadly, the European Commission and the Council have become increasingly involved in broader security issues through the conclusion of partnership and co-operation and association agreements with most of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as embarking on an ambitious programme of eastward expansion. These agreements generally include provision for consultation and dialogue on security matters as well as on an array of democratization and rights issues that closely parallel the preoccupations of ODIHR. In the meantime, on the basis of an initiative of the European Parliament, the EU has established a network and centre for conflict prevention studies and early warning (the Conflict Prevention Network - CPN - based at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) that liaises closely with DG1-A on these issues.

In short, the organizational landscape of multilateral efforts to cope with security in the OSCE space is becoming increasingly crowded. In numerous instances, one or more of the above organizations have been involved in extensive co-operation with the OSCE in responses to conflict on the basis of more or less *ad hoc* agreements on division of labour. Just how complex the landscape has become is perhaps best illustrated by example.

#### *Multilateral and State Engagements in Non-Proliferation*

The core of multilateral efforts to control proliferation has centred on WMD. The major instruments in this field include:

1. the NPT framework for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons;
2. the Partial (1963) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaties;
3. the conventions on chemical and biological weapons.

In the conventional sphere, perhaps the most prominent achievement with implications for proliferation is the Convention against Land Mines. This success has been followed up by an increasingly active discussion of ways to control the trade in conventional weapons. Efforts to

control conventional weapons, and in particular the spread of light weapons, are a fundamental component of the human security agenda of the Government of Canada.

At the regional level, major activities/initiatives in Europe include:

1. the treatment of proliferation issues in the OSCE (FSC) described above;
2. the European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (June 1998).

In addition to these more formal mechanisms, there is an array of informal initiatives linking (more or less) like-minded states, including:

1. the Missile Technology Control regime (MTCR), formed by the G7 in 1987 and increasing in size to 28 states by 1997, restricting transfer of technologies associated with the development of missiles of greater than 500 kg in payload and 300 km in range;
2. the Wassenaar Arrangement, involving 32 major arms exporters in efforts to limit export to countries that (in their judgement) constitute a threat to international peace and security;

Responses to proliferation at the state level are also a critical aspect of ongoing discussion of security in the Euro-Atlantic framework and a major issue for the OSCE. National limitation on exports to particular states are a longstanding element of German, US (and increasingly British) foreign policy. The probable decision by the United States to deploy a limited anti-missile defence system - a response to growing American fears that nuclear and other WMD will end up in the hands of what are deemed to be rogue states - constitutes a major dilemma for security planners in Europe (and Canada). The Russian Federation opposes adjustment of the ABM regime, since it fears that the development of anti-missile capability in the United States will degrade the credibility of its (shrinking) nuclear deterrent. Allies of the United States remain skeptical of the effectiveness of the proposed system and nervous about its effect on nuclear arms control. Covering the United States with such a system while leaving Western Europe out may have a decoupling effect in any collective response to out-of-area threats involving states with incipient nuclear capability.<sup>37</sup>

## **IX. The Role of the FSC in European Security**

The above discussion begs the question of just what OSCE comparative advantages in the security arena are. Europe is now endowed with an array of much better endowed institutions taking a far more proactive role in the management of security. In some instances, their activities include a substantial normative component, traditionally an area of CSCE/OSCE advantage.

Given the preoccupations of many of these organizations with issues that are also of mandated concern to the FSC, the same question of comparative advantage might be asked about

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<sup>37</sup> See Ivo H. Daalder and Philip H. Gordon, "Watch for Missile Defence to Become a European Conundrum," *International Herald Tribune* (23 February, 2000), p.8.

the FSC itself. Much of the original agenda of the FSC (e.g. the Code of Conduct, revision of the Vienna Documents) has been completed, although there is room for sustained dialogue on implementation, as well as the inclusion of regional measures. Other issues continue to be troubling (e.g. proliferation). In addition, a number of the more pressing issues in European security (internal war, migration, terrorism and crime) fall largely outside the traditional state-based and military orientation of the FSC. It is striking, in this context, that few of the more substantial products of the Istanbul Summit were in any obvious sense "products" of the FSC.<sup>38</sup> This reflects the somewhat narrow focus of the Forum on technical aspects of the politico-military dimension, as well as its apparent marginalization in the OSCE as a whole. At a deeper level, it perhaps reflects the fact that as the CiO noted in 1996, "the Forum was, after all, only the sum total of the States represented in it and the vital political impulse was often missing."<sup>39</sup>

On the other hand, the FSC does possess a number of advantages in furthering security in Europe. One is its specific expertise in certain areas that remain of substantial concern (e.g. verification). A second is the relative informality of the forum which arguably permits more open and sincere consideration of security issues. A third - shared by the OSCE as a whole - is inclusiveness; of the European organizations discussed above, it is the only one with universal membership. A fourth is that its approach is essentially co-operative and persuasive, rather than conditionality-based and coercive. These two factors arguably enhance its legitimacy and its effectiveness as a vehicle for serious exchange in matters of security. Fifth, the FSC has an impressive track record as a vehicle for promoting agreements of general interest to European states.

One further point bears mention. One persistent implicit theme in this analysis has been the gradually diminishing salience of traditional military aspects of cooperative security in Europe and the rise of new security issues that do not fit neatly into the political/security, economic, and human rights "baskets" that have dominated the OSCE's institutional development up to this point. Instead, particular issues (e.g. conflict prevention, intra-state conflict, peace-building) involve elements of all three. In this context, an excessively rigid demarcation between these functional areas may be an impediment to the development of integrated institutional approaches to security-building. Some blurring of the boundaries has already occurred, as with the FSC's consideration of issues related to democratic control of armed forces.

This leads us to consideration of what (if anything) to do with the FSC. The member states of the OSCE have three options with regard to the OSCE. One is to leave it as is; a second is to wind it up; and a third is to reformulate its agenda so that it can more directly address currently more pressing issues related to European security.

### *The Status Quo Option*

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<sup>38</sup> This problem is hardly new. The report of the 1996 review meeting noted that "over a period of nearly two years, the Forum ... had not succeeded in producing a single agreed document." "Report of the Chairman-in-Office to the Lisbon Summit" (29 November, 1996), RM96EW09, p.8.

<sup>39</sup> *loc. cit.*

The conclusion of agreements providing mechanisms for arms control and confidence-building, in which the FSC has played a facilitating role, does not mean that the issues covered in the agreements are resolved. Much work remains in operationalizing the commitments that states have undertaken in the FSC, as is typified by the efforts to help states implement the provisions of the Code of Conduct and to improve communications between capitals in the "OSCE Communications Network Document" of late 1999. This work requires extended consultation and the FSC has proven to be an effective forum for such consultation. There is, consequently, an argument for sustaining the forum in its current form.

On the other hand, it is also worth asking whether the implementation of agreements on CSBMs, as well as consultation on CFE implementation, might not proceed more effectively in working groups devoted specifically to these tasks, without a need for a broader FSC umbrella. Moreover, for reasons discussed above, the issues upon which the FSC has focused are less salient in the overall European security equation than they once were. Sustaining the *status quo* option is a recipe for the marginalization of the FSC as a mechanism for coping with the actual problems that challenge European and transatlantic security planners. This creeping marginalization is arguably evident in the shortness of recent FSC meetings and the aridity of FSC journal descriptions of them, as well as the absence of reporting on the FSC's activities by the OSCE's newsletters and press releases, and the somewhat critical assessment of the FSC at review conferences.<sup>40</sup>

### *Closure*

A second possibility is to close up the shop and to transfer the residual responsibilities of the FSC to other bodies (e.g. the PC and the CPC). This has some potential advantages. The PC, for example, is a more authoritative body and its deliberations consequently may be perceived to have greater weight. There might also be efficiency gains.

On the other hand, the agendas of other bodies are frequently crowded already and it is not clear that they could devote the sustained attention necessary to embedding the OSCE's security regime in state practice that is possible within the FSC. Moreover, there is a certain value in sustained dialogue, independently of its concrete results. Keith Krause has rightly pointed out that arms control involves both process and outcome, and that "most contemporary attempts to catalyse arms control in different contexts ... have ... attempted to leap to the end products of this process (architectures, security-building, broad or formal agreements), without paying attention to the importance (or laborious and time-consuming nature) of the *process* itself."<sup>41</sup> The process of dialogue itself has utility in providing a mechanism for continual exchange of views on security. In

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<sup>40</sup> In the 1996 review document, it is reported that "a number of delegations presented a highly critical account of the Forum's modest achievements since the Budapest Summit." In the 1999 Review Conference Document, it is noted that "one delegation expressed doubts that anything had been achieved for the last two years."

<sup>41</sup> Keith Krause, "Structural and Cultural Challenges to Arms Control in Intra-state and Post-Conflict Environments" (Paper prepared for the 1999 Nobel Symposium), Stockholm, 2 October, 1999, p.4.

so doing, the very process builds or sustains confidence, while promoting learning and adaptation and the creation of communities of expertise.

### *Revitalization*

*"[T]he changing situation in the OSCE area highlighted the need for activating the other main function of the FSC as per its original mandate, namely consultation, goal-oriented continuing dialogue and co-operation in the field of security" ... As an inclusive forum, the FSC should be used by participating states for security dialogue in a flexible and innovative manner to respond to emerging challenges and to promote comprehensive security in the OSCE area"*<sup>42</sup>

One suspects that arguments emphasizing the intrinsic value of dialogue may encounter a degree of skepticism from diplomats whose time is limited and whose budgets are overstretched and who operate in a "results-oriented" environment. And it is quite likely that, in concrete terms, the utility of the FSC as currently configured will diminish as the focus of security shifts to problems that it has little role or background in addressing.

This raises the third option - the revitalization of the FSC's security dialogue. This would require a willingness to blur the boundary between the political/security, human, and economic dimensions of the OSCE, to increase the FSC's involvement in sub-regional issues, and to broaden the FSC's mandate to include such issues as internal conflict, transnational security issues, and the security implications of transition processes. It is abundantly clear that on many of these important issues, common perspectives are few and far between. This has been underlined recently in the clear differences of view between the Russian Federation and many other members of the OSCE on the applicability of international norms to internal conflict. A reasonably open dialogue around them might promote greater unity of perspective.

Likewise, despite the growing experience of inter-institutional co-operation in peace-building operations, there remain tensions among the organizations involved, disagreements over the distribution of roles and, underlying these, quite different institutional cultures. Moreover, as noted, the evolution of CFSP/ESDI suggests that the institutional landscape of European security is evolving in important ways, with important potential implications for other organizations in the region. There may consequently be some value in the mounting of sustained dialogue on such questions. The OSCE is a promising place for this to occur, given its inclusiveness and regional legitimacy. The FSC potentially has the advantage of greater informality than other organs within the organization. It is worth stressing that despite the breadth of the organization's membership, some critical players would have to be added. There is good reason for arguing that in such a dialogue, the UN, NATO, and the EU should have representation as collective entities with

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<sup>42</sup> "Report of the Rapporteur on the Review of the Implementation of All OSCE Principles and Commitments Relating to the Politico-Military Aspects of Security," OSCE Review Conference 1999 (20 September-1 October and 8-10 November, 1999), p.50. <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/rcs/istarev99e.htm>.

substantial (and in some instances growing) responsibilities in security in the OSCE space.<sup>43</sup> In addition, given the multi-dimensionality of the broadened agenda, it would make sense to include other OSCE institutions (e.g. ODIHR and the HCNM) more systematically in such a process. These could take the form of regular consultation on ongoing cooperation, but this could fruitfully be supplemented by less frequent and more general treatment of such issues as optimal distribution of labour in peace-building, and lessons learned from existing and past cooperative operations, perhaps in a seminar format.

In addition, there has been consideration that the FSC might be a useful forum for the elaboration of CSBMs operating at the sub-regional level. Several sub-regions (the southern Caucasus, the Black Sea,<sup>44</sup> the Caspian Basin and Central Asia) seem particularly appropriate in this regard. The advantage of a broader forum is that the tensions within the smaller subgroup of directly affected states would be diluted within the larger framework while the latter would be a potentially effective way of applying constructive leverage on reluctant parties.

It is **also** worth noting, with reference to Canada, that such a broadening of the activities of the FSC might make it a very useful platform for the promotion of certain prominent aspects of Canadian policy in the area of international security, among them the land mines treaty, small arms control, child soldiers, and, at a broader level, human security as an organizing concept for thinking about security issues.

The viability of this option depends to a considerable extent on finding modalities for discussing these issues constructively in a non-threatening environment. With regard to new security issues such as internal conflict, given the sensitivity of these questions and the intensity of the interests at stake, it is unlikely that they could be addressed immediately (if ever) in formal working groups or in the FSC itself. It may be possible, however, to situate them in less formal settings such as seminars involving not only member states and OSCE officials, but also academic experts and civil society stake-holders, and convened under the auspices of Working Group B (which is to address future challenges and risks to military security in the OSCE region and develop goals and methods for building, maintaining and improving security).<sup>45</sup> It is possible that these seminars could be contracted out to organizations with active research programmes focusing on the OSCE (e.g. the *Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik* at the University of Hamburg), on particular issues (e.g. the Conflict Prevention Network of the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*), or on particularly troubling sub-regions (e.g. the Former Soviet South Project at the Royal Institute for International Affairs). To the extent that discussion of new security issues were distanced from the

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<sup>43</sup> It should be noted that there is reasonably regular consultation between the UN and the OSCE and between NATO and the OSCE, but this tends to focus on specific implementation tasks in joint operations, rather than on broader conceptual and analytical issues. Interviews in Brussels, March 2000.

<sup>44</sup> *Viz.* the recent discussion of CSBMs relating to naval activities in the Black Sea region.

<sup>45</sup> In 2000, the FSC decided to maintain three subsidiary bodies: Working Group A (implementation), Working Group B (as above), and Working Group C (communications network). FSC JOUR/281).



formal diplomatic process, this might diminish the sensitivity of member states to their discussion. It deserves mention that the Canadian experience (i.e. the National Forum process) may have some utility in the design of such a broadened dialogue. The products of such meetings could then be fed back up to Working Group B and (potentially) to the FSC itself.

The obvious potential weaknesses of such an approach are:

1. the broadening of the agenda in this fashion risks loss of focus within the FSC and arguably the targeted focus of the Forum on a small range of specific issues has been one of its comparative advantages.
2. the broader agenda touches more directly on very sensitive and potentially controversial questions, which may prevent agreement among participants on expanding the agenda.
3. it may be that other major multilateral institutions with security roles may not desire that a unit of the OSCE become a forum for discussion of inter-institutional divisions of labour and broader questions of institutional architecture.

## **X. Conclusion**

The FSC has been a comparatively effective forum for the development of common OSCE perspectives on the inter-state and political/military dimensions of security. However, many of its original tasks have been essentially completed. Moreover, the security agenda has moved on, with non-traditional security issues gaining growing prominence.

This raises the question whether the forum can (or should) survive in its current form, and, by extension, whether its dialogue should be reoriented towards new tasks in areas more relevant to the central security concerns of OSCE states. It is worth recalling that the FSC was founded partly on the basis of the idea that dialogue in and of itself is a good thing, independently of its results. The FSC - as a universal, relatively uncontroversial and low profile unit within the Euro-Atlantic security - might be a good venue for a dialogue on these issues to develop. In this respect, the third option seems preferable, all other things being equal.

However, the obstacles to this development of the Forum are considerable. There seems to be little prospect that state members would embrace the notion of a wide-ranging dialogue on sensitive security issues in this venue. If this is so, then the case for closing the Forum down and transferring its core traditional functions elsewhere within the OSCE system appears compelling.

## Acronyms

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
CBM	Confidence Building Measure
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre
CPN	Conflict Prevention Network
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measure
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EU	European Union
FSC	Forum for Security Co-operation
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
HCNM	High Commissioner for National Minorities
HDI	Human Development Indicator
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMD	National Missile Defence
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PC	(OSCE) Permanent Council
PfP	Partnership for Peace
UN	United Nations
UNCHR	United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNPROFOR	(UN) Protection Force (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

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