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# HERBERT NORMAN

*Un Aperçu • A Documentary Perspective*



*Compilé par/Compiled by*  
**Greg Donaghy**

Section des affaires historiques,  
Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international  
Historical Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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
# HERBERT NORMAN

*Un Aperçu*

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*A Documentary Perspective*

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Photo de la couverture: Norman avec le général Douglas MacArthur, commandant suprême des forces alliées au Japon, 1947 (US Army Photo)

Cover Photo: Norman with General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, 1947 (US Army Photo)

design: Flex Media, Toronto

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## HERBERT NORMAN

### *A Documentary Perspective*

Egerton Herbert Norman was born on September 1, 1909 in Karuizawa, Japan, the youngest child of Canadian Methodist missionaries. After spending much of his youth in Japan, he studied classics at Victoria College, University of Toronto, before completing a second degree at Trinity College, Cambridge University, in 1935. In 1936, after winning a Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship, he left for Harvard University to study for a doctorate in Japanese history. His dissertation, which he defended in 1940, was published in the same year, as *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*, and quickly became an acknowledged landmark in modern Japanese scholarship.

Norman joined the Department of External Affairs in 1939 as a Japanese language officer, and was posted to Tokyo in May 1940. When Canada and Japan went to war following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Norman with the rest of the staff of the Canadian mission was placed under house arrest. Following his repatriation to Canada in mid-1942, he was chosen to head the departmental intelligence unit responsi-

### *Un Aperçu*

Egerton Herbert Norman est né le 1<sup>er</sup> septembre 1909 à Karuizawa, au Japon. Cadet d'une famille de missionnaires méthodistes canadiens, la majeure partie de sa jeunesse se déroule dans ce pays. Puis, il poursuit des études classiques au Victoria College, de l'Université de Toronto, avant d'obtenir un deuxième grade au Trinity College, de l'Université de Cambridge en 1935. En 1936, grâce à l'obtention d'une bourse d'études de la fondation Rockefeller, il choisit l'Université Harvard pour préparer un doctorat en histoire japonaise. Présentée en 1940, sa dissertation est publiée la même année sous le titre *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Sa thèse devint rapidement un ouvrage de référence reconnu en études japonaises modernes.

Norman est recruté au ministère des Affaires extérieures en 1939 en tant que linguiste japonais et est envoyé à Tokyo en mai 1940. Lorsque le Canada déclare la guerre au Japon à la suite de l'attaque japonaise du 7 décembre 1941 contre Pearl Harbor, Norman et le personnel de la mission du Canada sont placés en résidence surveillée. Après son rapatriement au

ble for analysing intercepted Japanese messages. Immediately after the war, he served on the intelligence staff of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in occupied Japan, and then as alternate to Lester B. Pearson on the Far Eastern Commission in Washington. He was appointed head of the Canadian Liaison Mission in Tokyo in August 1946, remaining in that position until his recall to Ottawa in October 1950.

In Ottawa, Norman served as Head of the American and Far Eastern Division (from the end of 1950 until the middle of 1951) and Head of the Information Division (July 1951 - May 1953). In 1953, he was sent to New Zealand as High Commissioner and three years later was transferred to Cairo as Ambassador, a position he held until his death in 1957.

The final years of Norman's career were darkened by questions arising from allegations in the United States that he was a communist. Canadian authorities questioned Norman in 1950 and 1951 but concluded that his loyalty was not in question and that his association with communism had ended before he joined the Department of External Affairs. This conclusion, however, did not prevent the accusations from

Canada au milieu de 1942, le ministère le sélectionne pour diriger son service de renseignements chargé de l'analyse des messages japonais interceptés. Au lendemain de la guerre, on le retrouve au service de renseignements du général Douglas MacArthur, commandant suprême des forces alliées d'occupation au Japon, puis il remplace Lester Pearson à la Commission de l'Extrême-Orient à Washington. Il est ensuite nommé chef de la Mission canadienne de liaison à Tokyo en août 1946, fonction qu'il occupera jusqu'à son rappel à Ottawa en octobre 1950.

À Ottawa, Norman est nommé chef de la direction de l'Amérique et de l'Extrême-Orient, de la fin de 1950 jusqu'au milieu de 1951, puis chef de la direction de l'information, de juillet 1951 à mai 1953. En 1953, il est dépêché en Nouvelle-Zélande à titre de haut-commissaire, pour ensuite être muté au Caire trois ans plus tard en tant qu'ambassadeur, poste qu'il occupera jusqu'à sa mort en 1957.

Les dernières années de la carrière de Norman seront assombries par la remise en question de sa loyauté, après qu'il eut été accusé aux États-Unis d'être communiste. Les autorités canadiennes interrogent Norman en 1950 et en 1951 mais concluent que sa loyauté n'était pas en doute, son association avec le commu-

being made public in committees of the US Congress, or their revival in 1957. Norman died tragically, by suicide, in Cairo in 1957.

The three documents published below touch on the most significant aspects of Norman's diplomatic career. The first is a report from his time as head of the Canadian Liaison Mission in Tokyo, where his knowledge of Japanese society made him a valuable observer of Japan's postwar struggle to create a democratic political system. The second was sent from Cairo in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis. As Ambassador to Egypt, Norman dealt with the many diplomatic challenges that followed the despatch of Canadian peacekeepers to the Middle East in November 1956. The final document, a memorandum by Lester B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, for Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent deals with Norman's death and describes the action taken in response to the allegations of disloyalty.

The three documents are reprinted in their language of origin. Editorial interventions are indicated with square brackets, while ellipses are used to indicate passages garbled in transmission.

nisme ayant pris fin bien avant qu'il ne joigne les rangs du ministère des Affaires extérieures. Toutefois, cette conclusion n'a pas empêché ces accusations d'être débattues au sein de comités du Congrès des États-Unis pas plus qu'elle n'a stoppé leur réapparition publique en 1957. Norman connut une fin tragique, se suicidant au Caire en 1957.

Les trois documents publiés ci-dessous abordent les aspects les plus importants de la carrière diplomatique de Norman. Le premier est un rapport datant de l'époque où Norman dirigeait la Mission canadienne de liaison à Tokyo. Dans cet écrit, la connaissance de Norman de la société japonaise fait de lui un précieux observateur des efforts d'après-guerre pour créer un système politique démocratique au Japon. Le deuxième document a été envoyé du Caire au lendemain de la crise du canal de Suez. En tant qu'ambassadeur en Égypte, Norman releva les nombreux défis diplomatiques qui suivirent l'envoi des casques bleus canadiens au Moyen-Orient en novembre 1956. Le troisième est un mémoire rédigé par Lester B. Pearson, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, pour le premier ministre Louis Saint-Laurent. On y traite de la

Further information on Norman and his times can be found in these publications of the Historical Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:

- *Documents on Canadian External Relations* (Canada Communication Group)
- *Canada's Department of External Affairs, vol. 1: The Early Years, 1909-1946*, by John Hilliker, and vol. 2: *Coming of Age, 1946-1968*, by John Hilliker and Donald Barry (McGill-Queen's University Press)
- *Canada and the Early Cold War, 1943-1957*, ed. Greg Donaghy

mort de Norman et on y décrit les actions entreprises en réaction aux allégations à propos de sa déloyauté. Chacun de ces documents a été réimprimé dans sa langue d'origine. Les interventions de la rédaction sont indiquées entre crochets et les points de suspension indiquent les passages brouillés de la transmission.

De plus amples renseignements sur Norman et son époque figurent dans ces publications disponibles à la Section des affaires historiques du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international :

- *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada* (Groupe Communication Canada)
- *Le ministère des Affaires extérieures du Canada, vol. 1 : Les Années de formation, 1909-1946*, par John Hilliker; vol. 2 : *L'essor, 1946-1968*, par John Hilliker et Donald Barry (Les presses de l'Université Laval)
- *Le Canada au début de la guerre froide, 1943-1957*, Greg Donaghy, éditeur

1.

**Chef de la mission de liaison au Japon au secrétaire d'État aux  
Affaires extérieures**

**Head, Liaison Mission in Japan to Secretary of State for  
External Affairs**

**Despatch No. 50**

**Secret**

Tokyo, November 1st, 1948

Sir,

I have the honour to report on the conversation I had on October 30th with Mr. Yoshida Shigeru, the Japanese Premier.

2. Mr. Yoshida who is concurrently Foreign Minister recently paid a courtesy call at the Mission during my absence and so I desired to reciprocate by returning his call. He was the first Japanese Foreign Minister since the end of the war who has, on taking office, paid such a call on this Mission. As I had not met Mr. Yoshida, I was glad to have this opportunity of talking to him since under occupation arrangements one does not meet Japanese Government officials as regularly as one would under normal circumstances.

3. Mr. Yoshida is a man of seventy who, in the years before the war, held high positions in the diplomatic service, notably as Ambassador at the Court of St. James and, for a brief time, Foreign Minister. Although in retirement during the war years, he followed the course of the war closely and is reported to have advised the Emperor to start peace negotiations right after the capture of Singapore by the Japanese early in 1942. It was his theory that Japan was then at its maximum strength and there would never be such an advantageous moment for peace negotiations again. As the tide of war turned slowly but steadily against Japan, Mr. Yoshida found among retired statesmen and senior courtiers consider-



able sympathy for his idea of negotiating a peace as soon as possible. At real risk to himself he formed a "peace faction" within the entourage of the palace and elder statesmen, but was unable to make serious headway against the army policy-makers until the spring of 1945 when Japan's defeat became plain for all to see.

4. In this period of court intrigue between peace and war factions, one of Mr. Yoshida's chief agents was a retired politician, Mr. Ueda Shunkichi. Although Mr. Yoshida himself was not arrested by the Kempei (gendarmarie) Mr. Ueda was imprisoned for some months during which time he lost his family and home in the great air raids over Tokyo. I mention Mr. Ueda in passing because in the fall of 1945 during my stay in Tokyo I made his acquaintance and profited greatly by a series of talks with him in which he gave me background history on personalities and affairs covering years both before and during the war. (These conversations are covered in memoranda which I left with the Department on my return to Ottawa).

5. Mr. Yoshida opened his conversation with me by saying that Mr. Ueda had spoken of me in a friendly fashion and wished to renew his acquaintance with me – an offer which I will gladly accept since it will give me an opportunity of becoming more directly acquainted with the policies and personalities of the present government. Mr. Ueda's position in the Yoshida Government is Minister of State without Portfolio, in charge of party discipline. What this means in effect is that he will hold much the same position as a party whip does in our parliament. He will probably act as the chief negotiator between the Yoshida Government and other parties in the Diet. Since the Liberals do not have a majority their position would be delicate, and a considerable amount of back-stage manipulation will be necessary to keep them in office even during the current session of the Diet.

6. Mr. Yoshida was affable and genial, so much so that he scarcely gave the appearance of a man who has just taken office at a rather trying time fol-

lowing the exposure of a financial scandal which drove the preceding Ashida Government out of office and which has even hit the opposition parties, of which Yoshida's was then one. Consequently Mr. Yoshida will have to tread a very careful path in view of the continued investigation into the scandal. But so far from giving the air of one who is cabinet-making in the midst of such circumstances, Mr. Yoshida was in a leisurely frame of mind, and to my remark that I did not wish to take up too much of his time he replied that he was not really a busy man but that he just "pretended" to be one. He left most of his political affairs to his lieutenants and spent as much time as he could at his country villa at Oiso, about one hundred miles from Tokyo, "in order to look after his health" – the last remark made with a good-natured but cynical smile.

7. The conversation was not so rewarding in terms of information derived from it as in the opportunity of observing Mr. Yoshida at close quarters. He gives the appearance of a genial, easy-going country squire and certainly not an energetic, ambitious politician – General MacArthur's characterization of him to me as a placid, old-fashioned type of Japanese, ignorant of politics and economics was borne out by my impressions of him yesterday. He told me that his main political responsibility was to conduct a thorough house-cleaning in Japanese politics. He said that a lot of unwholesome filth had been left behind by the military during the last stages of the war that still had to be cleaned up. In addition to this there was the post-war corruption which had caused the downfall of the Ashida Government, and he was left also with the task of cleaning it up.

8. He wanted me to know that the Boeki-Cho (Board of Trade) had earned a bad reputation under preceding administrations; he intended to reform it thoroughly by putting it directly under his own office and thus removing it from the control of the Department of Commerce and Industry. He wished to "internationalize the Boeki-Cho". Because of his emphatic repetition of this remark I gathered that he hoped to see Japanese trade diverted to various interested Allied nations.

9. His political goal was the creation of a two-party system such as in the United States and Great Britain. He deprecated the growth of small parties and said that Japan could not afford the luxury of many parties representing various shadings of political interest. He hoped to see emerge in Japan only one large party representing the conservative influence and another representing radical or socialist influence. In reply to a question of mine he expressed the hope that such a merger could be accomplished soon. Coalition governments he said were always a failure, except in time of war; when the Socialists had returned with a plurality during the elections of 1947 he had hoped that they would form a single-party government. However they had seen fit to make a coalition with the Democrats of Ashida and this had given rise to all kinds of manoeuvring and political horse-dealing which had lowered the tone of politics. Ashida had followed a similar policy when his government was created early this year by aligning himself with the Socialists, thus he also was unable to steer a clear course. Mr. Yoshida said that even though he did not command a majority in the House he preferred a single-party government which maintained unity and discipline to a heterogenous coalition cabinet. He emphasized that what Japan needed was a strong government; even though it was an unpleasant task which fell to him of house-cleaning, he was prepared to do it quite ruthlessly.

10. In regard to international affairs he seemed resigned to the fact that Japan could not expect to see a peace treaty in the near future. He even expressed some doubt as to whether such countries as Australia, the Philippines and China had outlived their resentment and suspicion of Japan. As for the United States he said he was amazed at the speed with which they had come to look upon Japan favourably and sympathetically. He hoped other countries would soon follow their example.

11. I came away from the interview with a feeling that Mr. Yoshida has no great love for the rough and tumble of politics, but prefers to direct affairs from the quiet retreat of his country home in Oiso, and only when necessity absolutely requires, from the Prime Minister's official residence. I

should imagine he has little taste for debates in the Diet and would leave most of that work to colleagues more gifted in public oratory. He is in every sense of the word a conservative with little understanding of the position of labour in modern politics, and has no great desire to make the effort to understand it. He is old-fashioned in the best sense of that word, both in his manner and personal tastes, but I fear that in the present age this will not be an asset as a political leader in post-war Japan. His cabinet is not outstanding for men of talent or experience, but Mr. Yoshida has one great source of political strength, namely his stubborn loyalty to his own followers. Anyone who has stuck by him can count on Mr. Yoshida's full support.

12. Following the scandals which caused the resignation of the Ashida Government, Mr. Yoshida will have to steer a careful course in the Diet, especially since he lacks a majority. Because of this situation he may decide to dissolve the Diet and go to the country. He has on numerous occasions expressed confidence that he could return with a definite majority. As the session of the current Diet will only last a few weeks we will soon know what Mr. Yoshida's strategy will be in this regard.

13. I am sending a copy of this despatch to our Embassy in Nanking.

I have the honour to be, Sir,  
Your obedient servant

E.H. Norman

2.

**Ambassadeur en Égypte au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires  
extérieures**

**Ambassador in Egypt to Secretary of State for External Affairs**

**Telegram 218**

**Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.**

**Most Immediate**

Reference: My Telegram 217 March 14

Cairo, March 15, 1957

Conversation with Nasser<sup>1</sup>

I saw Nasser last night as briefly reported in my Telegram 216 of March 14; I made it clear that I was not visiting him on your instructions but that I had very much on my mind recently the increasingly hostile tone of Egyptian press and what appeared to me serious misunderstanding even on government level of important statements made by the Prime Minister and yourself. I fear I went on at greater length than I had intended in setting forth Canadian policy and traditional outlook on foreign affairs especially towards countries who had recently gained their independence. I reviewed our UN role in the Mideast, pointing out how fantastic were press charges which attributed "imperialist" motives to Canada, and finally stressed the damage that can be done by unscrupulous press attacks on the Canadian contingent in United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). I only touched marginally on question of Canadian reinforcements as I did not wish to directly introduce the subject myself.

2. After listening intently to me and asking for clarification on one or two points, he frankly admitted that he had been adopting an increasingly critical attitude to Canada. He had great hopes from our position last

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1. *Le président d'Égypte Gamel Abdel Nasser. / President Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt.*

November and succeeding weeks, but said he had noticed an increasingly pro-Israel tone in your most recent interventions in UN. He had been deeply disturbed by remarks in the House by the PM on March 6 referring to the use of "force" in connection with [Suez] Canal clearance and the presence of UN in Gaza and Aqaba. Egypt, he said, had lived in an atmosphere of threats for the last few months and people here were becoming more and more sensitive to threats. They were still living under threats from England, France and Israel (whom he linked with these two powers); Australia had openly showed its hostile intentions, the USA was showing a cold attitude and its press was generally pro-Israel, and now Canada, he said, had appeared to join the chorus against Egypt. Naturally this would have repercussions in their view of the Canadian contingent in UNEF. Then working late at night in his office on the 10th he had heard that Canadian troops had fired on demonstrators in Gaza that afternoon. He asked for a thorough investigation from competent quarters, but he had no convincing account of events until Dr Ralph Bunche<sup>2</sup> informed him (March 12) that it was Danish troops who had been involved. All these events, however incorrect some of them might prove now, had contributed to his growing fear of Canadian intentions; that Canada in some vague and ill-defined but alarming fashion had now joined forces with those powers which were most hostile to Egypt.

3. Since I had gone over your intervention and four-point proposal in the UN in great detail with Aly Sabry<sup>3</sup>, I told the President that I did not wish to take up his time again on this subject unless he had specific points to raise. I summarized our position in trying to find a fair compromise between two embattled and embittered parties and, as is so often the role of the peacemaker, being criticized unfairly by both. I concentrated especially on his distorted interpretation of the PM's remarks of March 6. (We had sent copies to competent officers in the Foreign Ministry of the

2. *Le sous-secrétaire général des Nations Unies. / United Nations Under-secretary General.*

3. *Le chef de cabinet du président Nasser. / President Nasser's chief of staff.*

expanded form of the remarks to give their full context which would include their clarification. Apparently these had not filtered through to the President. I had also spoken to a few leading Egyptian journalists on the matter but without any effect as far as press comment was concerned.) I had with me text of exchanges in the House between the Prime Minister and members of Opposition on March 6 and 7 relating to Egypt, which I left with him, first reading out to him PM's relevant remarks on "use of force", clearance of Suez, etc. placing them in their proper perspective and showing how entirely distorted had been their interpretation. He admitted that there had been misunderstanding on his part, but then more in sorrow than in anger complained of hostile tone of press abroad including Canada. Everything he did was reported as "provocative", "abrupt", etc. When he sent an administrative governor back to Gaza ... the Western press accused him of "aggressive" designs. The same papers had not used such epithets in referring to Israel's attack of October 29. Ben-Gurion<sup>4</sup> had recently made an open threat of force [in] relation to Gaza. Yet, to his knowledge, no important Western paper had rebuked him for it. What would their comments have been if he had threatened force against Israel on the occasion of their making some arrangement behind their own borders? Could any fair-minded person be asked to believe that the press of the West was impartial in viewing the Israeli-Arab problem?

4. I interposed a question on his intentions in Gaza, expressing the hope that fedayeen raids would not be renewed as it hardly seemed in the long run to serve Egyptian defence interests. He went over some familiar ground insisting that authorized raids were purely retaliatory and only commenced in early 1955 when a new Ben-Gurion allegedly aggressive policy became apparent. He said he had no intention of organizing future fedayeen raids but the occasional marauder that broke through both lines would be always used by Israel as an excuse for attacks upon Arab neighbours. (It appears to be true that for at least three months before the

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4. *Le premier ministre d'Israël David Ben-Gourion. / Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion of Israel.*

attack of October 29 there had been no fedayeen raids from Egypt. The only incident was one in which an Israeli truck was blown up by a land mine in a demilitarized zone, therefore an area unauthorized to the Israeli military.)

5. He then brought up the question of reinforcements for Canadian troops and fully admitted that he had doubts even fears of Canadian intentions following PM's references to "use of force". I gather that Egyptian Embassy in Ottawa does not keep him too well informed by telegram of important debates. Replying to my query he said that all important reference in our debates he had studied through the various news agencies reports.

6. A propos of his complaints concerning the foreign press I spoke with some sympathy saying that we had likewise been the target of very malicious press campaign. I showed him copy I had with me of Egyptian press summary prepared in the office, giving recent (March 12) press comments on Canada and Canadian contingent. I pointed out the editorial in *Al Gomhouriya*, which made wild attacks on alleged Canadian "imperialist" designs, constructed on the hypothesis that our troops had taken over Gaza presumably as a first step towards "internationalizing" it, and had been responsible for the shooting. I said that while I was aware that he could not be held responsible for everything that appeared in the press, nevertheless he must agree that such wild and irresponsible remarks, which it was my duty to report to Ottawa, could not be expected to help in a sympathetic attitude on the part of Canadians towards Egypt. I said what was even more important, our troops here must be increasingly annoyed by this campaign and hence it could have an unfavourable effect on their morale. He agreed whole-heartedly with these last remarks.

7. I then thought it proper to ask whether he would not agree some time to giving a statement which would help to correct some of these impressions and whether he would confirm publicly the excellent performance of our troops here. I mentioned [Jack] Brayley, the Canadian Press repre-



sentative here, who has been vainly trying through the press office to get an interview with him, saying that such an interview might help in clearing away some of the obstacles in recent misunderstandings in Egyptian-Canadian relations. He agreed to such an interview within the next few days. He added that he had some knowledge of the Canadian record in foreign affairs and he had believed that our policy was devoted to peace and friendly relations with all who wished to reciprocate. He was glad that some false impressions had been removed and hoped that friendly relations would exist between us as between two free and equal states with no designs on each other.

8. He mentioned again the reinforcements from Canada saying that he assured Dr Bunche that the matter would be cleared up and told me to pass this on to you.

9. Before leaving he expressed the wish that I might perhaps see him more often if I so wished, particularly if it would help in clearing up possible [mis]understanding.

10. Finally I congratulated him on [his government's] recent announcement that there would be general elections (date and details to be announced later). While we would not interfere in the internal affairs of any country it could not but be a source of satisfaction since we were a democratic people, to see Egypt taking a step in this direction since it would certainly help in closer understanding between us both.

Norman

3.

**Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures pour le premier ministre**

**Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister**

[Ottawa],

April 15, 1957

If, at your press conference this evening, you are asked about the tragic case of Herbert Norman, perhaps you may wish merely to say that if a further statement is to be made it will come from me, but if you feel you should say something yourself, I would like to put forward the following suggestions.

Our purpose in this matter has been to protect one of our officials from slanderous implications against his loyalty as a Canadian, and also to do what we could, in the face of very great difficulties, to prevent public disclosures by a legislative committee of another government concerning Canadians. Even if the so-called evidence is fair and valid in any case, and it was not in this case, it is only elementary decency to send it to the Canadian Government for investigation and for any action which should be taken.

We have been accused of not clearing this matter up in 1951. At that time, we affirmed and re-affirmed our confidence in Mr. Norman as a loyal official of the Government and as a patriotic Canadian, and for years afterward, no reference was made to the matter in the United States. I do not agree that we should have made all the evidence available at that time. This is absolutely contrary to our way of dealing with security cases, a way which has been effective in protecting national interests and is just to individuals. In this case, disclosure would have focussed a great deal more attention on the incident than was actually given, and in the atmosphere of 1951, this would have been unjust and unfair to Mr. Norman, and might

well have driven him out of our service.

When the matter came up again years later, in March, 1957, we took quick and, as we thought, effective action.

In view of the disclosures which were being leaked out in Washington, however, it seemed to me that we should go a little further than merely to say that we had confidence in his loyalty, so last Friday, as you know, I said that the charges made as "evidence" were based only on Communist associations during his university days. We knew about them, looked into them exhaustively, and at the time decided that there was nothing in them that contradicted our view that he was a loyal and trustworthy official of the Government. We have no evidence to suggest that he had any Communist associations while he was with the Department. That seems to me to be the crux of the matter; that he should not be condemned and persecuted because of any Communist illusions as a student, which he may have once had, but which he had long since abandoned.

Mr. [John] Diefenbaker<sup>5</sup> demanded on Friday that we answer the question whether the statements made by the senatorial sub-committee were untrue. It was impossible to give the answer "yes" or "no", without going through all the testimony in which there were, of course, many statements that were untrue and some that were true, though implications drawn from them were false and malicious. If I had given a categorical answer – yes or no – without making public all the evidence, this would have created a wrong impression and would have been grossly unfair to a man who cannot now defend himself. If we now made all the evidence public, we would merely be raking up a lot of old insinuations and charges dealing with situations and activities which took place before Mr. Norman ever joined the Department and which did not affect his loyal service to the Department subsequently. Every bit of evidence derogatory to him, even by implication, dealt with his student activities and to drag all that up now

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5. *Le chef du parti de l'opposition loyale de sa Majesté. / Leader of Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition.*

and to make it all public would seem to me to be unfair and unjust.

I feel particularly strongly about the charge that I was in default of my duty to the Government and weak in my defence of Mr. Norman because I did not make public all the charges and reply to them in 1951. I may add (though we cannot, of course, use this publicly) that Mr. Norman himself was grateful that this was not done, and that the matter was at least given a chance to die. It is not our fault that it was resurrected.

L.B. Pearson



US ARMY PHOTO

Pearson, Norman, 1950

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