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**SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS:
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY,
UPDATE 1996-1998**




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



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PREFACE

The subject of small arms and light weapons continues to garner increased attention from policy makers and analysts. Speaking on 19 August 1998 at the International NGO Consultations on Small Arms Action held in Orillia, Ontario, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy said:

"Clearly, we must tackle the accumulation and proliferation of military small arms and light weapons if we want to help provide true security to civilians caught up in internal conflicts. That is why I have made military small arms and light weapons a priority for Canadian efforts in international arms control and disarmament, along with landmines and long-standing areas of concern, such as nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction."

In November 1996, Canada published a document entitled *Small Arms and Light Weapons: An Annotated Bibliography*. This present volume updates that earlier publication and, like it, has been prepared to assist government officials and researchers in their work in this field. It is made available as part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's policy to share the results of independent research undertaken by the Department's Verification Research Program. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or of the Canadian Government.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
September 1998

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For his part the author wishes to acknowledge the generous assistance of Mr. Alan Crawford, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The following individuals provided much appreciated help to the project in numerous ways: Philip Alpers, Michael Bechthold, William Benson, David Biggs, Jeff Boutwell, Bronwyn Brady, Michael Brzoska, David DeClerq, Susannah L. Dyer, Dominique Figa, Douglas A. Fraser, Owen Greene, Kate Joseph, Michael Klare, Keith Krause, Christine Kucia, Ed Laurance, Peter Lock, Lora Lumpe, Bob Mandel, Lucy Mathiak, Sarah Meek, Greg Mills, Stephanie G. Neuman, Liisa Peramaki, Alessandro Politi, Ernie Regehr, Joe Smaldone, Joanna Spear, Elizabeth Stanley, Rachel Stohl, Fasahat H. Syed, and Peter Van Kemseke.

INTRODUCTION

SCOPE

This publication — *Small Arms and Light Weapons: An Annotated Bibliography, Update 1996-1998* — is an update of an earlier bibliography on this subject produced in November 1996.¹ The decision to undertake an update of the previous work was prompted by the dramatic increase in documents dealing with small arms and light weapons. While the earlier bibliography covered the period from 1993 to August 1996, this bibliography covers the period September 1996 to early September 1998, providing annotations for additional 102 items. The criteria for inclusion of material in this update are similar to those used for the original *Annotated Bibliography*:

- 1) the item must be published in or after 1996 (publications already cited in the earlier bibliography are not reproduced here) and be publicly available by September 1998;
- 2) the item must offer some substantial analysis or assessment of small arms and light weapons proliferation or of possible responses to this issue (items that merely report on weapons transfers, proliferation control measures, or current events, are not included);
- 3) items dealing primarily with anti-personnel land mines are NOT included (separate bibliographies have been produced on that topic).²

This bibliography reflects the growing complexity of the literature on small arms and light weapons. No attempt has been made to try to include national statements made in international forums or elsewhere; these types of statements are simply too numerous to include. There are, however, a number of tracks or perspectives which can be identified in the literature, though there is much overlap among these themes. First, some of the literature tends to approach the subject from an arms control and disarmament perspective, and involves disarmament forums. For example, extensive commentary has been given in the wake of the report of the 1997 United Nations Small Arms Panel. A second focus has been on disarming, demobilizing and re-integrating ex-combatants in post-conflict situations, for example the work in the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This “development” focus also involves peacebuilding programs in specific regional contexts such as the proposal for a West African moratorium. Third, others,

¹ *Small Arms and Light Weapons: An Annotated Bibliography*, (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, November 1996). A copy of this earlier bibliography can be obtained while quantities last by writing to: Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division (IDA), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G2. An electronic version is available at the following WebSite:
<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignnp/disarm/smab12/menu.html>

² *Anti-personnel Land Mines: An Annotated Bibliography*, (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, October 1996), and *Update* (December 1997).

such as the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the Organization of American States (OAS), have approached small arms and light weapons from the perspective of firearms regulation with a view to reducing illicit firearms trafficking. An effort has been made to cover all three tracks in this bibliography.

ARRANGEMENT

This bibliography is divided into seven parts. **Part A** consists of annotations of documents from the United Nations, regional organizations and other international arrangements that are relevant to the subject of small arms and light weapons, organized in ascending chronological order. Each annotation summarizes the major arguments of the document and records any recommendations. For ease of reference, a serial number has been attached to each citation which begins with "I" (e.g., I-1) to distinguish it from other entries in the bibliography. For easy reference, the serial number is bolded and in larger font at the left margin before each annotation, and corresponds to the numbers included in the Author, Keyword and Title Indexes.

Part B contains annotations of governmental, academic and other publications offering substantive comment on the subject of small arms and light weapons. This section is further subdivided by year. Within each annual sub-division, entries are arranged in alphabetical order by author.

Each annotation in **Part B** describes the scope of the article or book being abstracted, lists the major arguments, and reports any conclusions or recommendations. As in **Part A**, entries in this section have been assigned a serial number. Publications dated 1996 have serial numbers starting with 601; publications from 1997 start at 701; and publications from 1998 start at 801.

Part C is a reference list of useful Internet sites on the subject of small arms and light weapons. Arranged alphabetically by WebSite title, each entry includes a World Wide Web address (URL), a street address, telephone and fax numbers, and, if available, an E-mail address. The annotation provides a summary of the scope and purpose of the WebSite. Serial numbers are attached to each annotation, preceded by the sign "WWW" (e.g., WWW-1), which permits researchers to identify World Wide Web sites quickly in the Keyword Index.

Part D is an Author Index which lists, alphabetically, the corporate and personal authors of documents contained in Parts A and B. Where an article was written on behalf of an institution (e.g., British American Security Information Council), the institution is listed as the author. Following each author's name is a list of the serial numbers corresponding to his/her articles. The numbering system makes possible quick reference from the Author, Keyword and Title Indexes. For instance, the following reference appears in the Author Index:

Laurance, Edward J.: 605, 717.

By virtue of the initial digit in the serial number, the reader can determine that the annotations associated with Laurance were published in 1996 and 1997 respectively, and these annotations can be found in Part B.

Part E is an alphabetically organized Keyword Index. Keywords listed in this section correspond to words or phrases that appear in the annotations or titles of items in Parts A, B and C, and fit into at least one of the following categories:

- 1) a country or region which is mentioned in the text of a study;
- 2) a group involved in the study of small arms and light weapons (e.g., the British American Security Information Council);
- 3) an agreement, arrangement or organization which addresses the problem of small arms proliferation (e.g., the Organization of American States);
- 4) an important term or concept used in the discussion of small arms and light weapons proliferation (e.g., a definition of 'small arms').

Following each keyword are listed all the serial numbers corresponding to the relevant annotations. As with the Author Index, each serial number allows the researcher to determine the type of document, and in the case of scholarly articles contained in Part B, the year of publication. For example, the following entry appears in the Keyword Index:

British American Security Information Council (BASIC): 701, 704, 706, 801, 804, 809.

From the numbers listed, it is possible to determine that this organization is mentioned in three articles published in 1997, and another three articles available in 1998. Acronyms for organizations are included with a cross-reference to the appropriate entry in the Keyword Index, allowing the Keyword Index to function as a glossary of acronyms.

Part F is an alphabetically organized Title Index. Titles are listed alphabetically. Following the title, is the corresponding serial number. For example, the following entry appears in the Keyword Index:

Armed Conflicts and Small Arms Proliferation: Refocusing the Research Agenda: 718.

From the number listed it is possible to determine that this title refers to a scholarly item published in 1997.

Part G is an Addendum which lists publications which were received too late to be considered for inclusion or annotation in this version of the *Bibliography*. Items are listed alphabetically by author.

PART A

UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

- I-1.** United Nations General Assembly. *General and Complete Disarmament: Measures to Curb the Illicit Transfer and Use of Conventional Arms*. United Nations Document A/51/181, June 27, 1996.

This document reproduces the responses by seven countries to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's note of 23 January 1996 requesting the views of Member States on effective ways and means of collecting weapons transferred illicitly, and on concrete proposals concerning measures at the national, regional and international levels to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms. The responses of the following countries are included: Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Germany, Namibia, Poland and Saudi Arabia.

- I-2.** Council of the European Union. *EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms*. December 10, 1996.

"Desirous to take concrete measures to curb the illicit traffic and use of conventional arms, as called for in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45F, to take practical disarmament measures, as called for in UNGA resolution 51/45N, and to provide assistance to states for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them, as called for in UNGA resolution 51/45L, of 10 December 1996" [Serial No. I-3] the Council of the European Union adopted this Programme.

EU Member States will strengthen collective efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of arms, particularly small arms, on and through their territories (i.e., by enhancing cooperation between intelligence, customs and other enforcement agencies to ensure adequate checks and prompt investigation of illicit arms trafficking). In addition, each Member State will undertake concerted action to assist other countries to combat illicit arms trafficking (e.g., create or strengthen an adequate body of laws to regulate and monitor arms transfers). Moreover, each Member State will assist affected countries in suppressing the illicit circulation and trafficking of arms, particularly of small arms (e.g., set up weapons collection programs). Furthermore, each Member State will ensure adequate cooperation by its national authorities to give concrete form to the objectives of this Programme. The European Council will make funds available to pursue these objectives. Finally, the Council will review annually the actions taken in the framework of this Programme.

I-3. United Nations General Assembly. *Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them.* Resolution 51/45L, December 10, 1996.

This resolution recognizes that the illicit circulation of massive quantities of small arms throughout the world impedes development and is a source of increased insecurity. It welcomes the initiative taken by Mali concerning the question of the illicit circulation of small arms and their collection in the affected states of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion. It also thanks the Governments concerned in the subregion for their support of United Nations advisory missions. The Secretary-General is encouraged to continue his efforts to curb the illicit circulation of small arms and to collect such arms in the affected States that so request. The resolution encourages the setting up in the countries of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion of national commissions against the proliferation of small arms and requests the Secretary-General to continue to examine the issue and to report to the General Assembly at its 52nd session.

I-4. United Nations General Assembly. *Consolidation of Peace Through Practical Disarmament Measures.* Resolution 51/45N, December 10, 1996.

This resolution states that a comprehensive and integrated approach towards certain practical disarmament measures, particularly with regard to small arms and light weapons, often is a prerequisite to maintaining and consolidating peace and security. The resolution makes several suggestions:

- 1) it underlines the important role of the United Nations in providing a political framework for such practical disarmament measures;
- 2) it requests the Secretary-General to make recommendations for an integrated approach to such practical measures, taking into account the work of the United Nations Expert Panel on Small Arms, and to seek the views of Member States on this subject and to include them in his report;
- 3) it calls upon Member States to assist the Secretary-General in this regard and to contribute actively to the implementation of practical disarmament measures;
- 4) it encourages United Nations organizations to join in this task within the framework of their responsibilities (e.g., the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on the basis of its Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project).

I-5. United Nations General Assembly. *Measures to Curb the Illicit Transfer and Use of Conventional Arms.* Resolution 51/45F, December 10, 1996.

Building upon United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/51/181 [Serial No. I-1], this resolution recognizes that the availability of massive quantities of conventional weapons and especially their illicit transfer are a disturbing and dangerous phenomenon, in particular for the internal situation of affected States and the violation of human rights. Member States are invited to do the following:

- 1) to enact adequate national legislation and/or regulations and appropriate administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the export and import of arms;

2) to provide the Secretary-General, by 15 April 1997, with relevant information on national control measures on arms transfers with a view to preventing illicit arms transfers. Member States are also asked to provide the Secretary-General with their views on effective ways and means of collecting weapons transferred illicitly, and on concrete proposals concerning measures at national, regional and international levels to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms.

I-6. Report of the Secretary-General. *Criminal Justice Reform and Strengthening of Legal Institutions Measures to Regulate Firearms.* United Nations General Assembly Document E/CN.15/1997/4, March 7, 1997.

After outlining the progress of the work of the Economic and Social Council on firearms regulation for the purpose of crime prevention and public safety, the report lists relevant initiatives (e.g., the Centre for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research kept the Economic and Social Council informed on the progress of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms).

The document also summarizes the results of the expert group meeting on gathering information on and analysis of firearms regulation, and lists the conclusions and proposals for consideration by the commission:

- 1) the project is of considerable relevance to the security and safety of civilian populations;
- 2) the project has already yielded results (e.g., it has provided constructive recommendations enabling other organizations to take necessary action);
- 3) the project has disseminated a questionnaire which allows substantive analysis and the development of databases, thereby enabling the Commission to make informed policy choices.

The Commission is invited to review the progress achieved in the light of the project's results. The following activities are planned for 1998:

- 1) organizing interregional and national training courses on the regulation of firearms;
- 2) convening an ad hoc expert group meeting to design a new questionnaire for the second round of the international study on firearm regulation;
- 3) continuing to develop and maintain databases on firearms regulation;
- 4) publishing an expanded global report on developments in firearms regulation (e.g., covering more countries);
- 5) convening an ad hoc expert group on the harmonization of the collection of information on firearms regulation;
- 6) developing model agreements on combating illicit trafficking in firearms;
- 7) developing awareness programs for criminal justice administrators concerning the prevention of violence involving firearms in urban, school and family settings;
- 8) extending the scope of the study to include explosives.

The report concludes with an appeal for additional resources (staff and expertise) to be made available to implement the above recommendations. Annex I lists the conclusions and recommendations of the expert group meeting on gathering information on and analysis of firearm

regulation held at Vienna from February 10-14, 1997. Annex II summarizes the international study on firearm regulation.

I-7. Council of the European Union. *EU Programme For Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms*. EU Resolution EU/9057/97 DG E/CPSP IV, June 26, 1997.

This Program calls on EU (European Union) Member States to strengthen collective efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of arms, particularly of small arms, on and through their territories. The Program states that consideration should be given to the following:

- 1) fostering enhanced cooperation and coordination of customs and other law enforcement agencies to ensure adequate customs checks;
- 2) improving information exchange on illicit trafficking of arms (e.g., through the use of international databases).

The European Council and its Member States will take concerted action to assist other countries in preventing and combating illicit trafficking of arms, particularly of small arms, through the following measures:

- 1) strengthening laws to regulate and monitor transfers of arms;
- 2) adopting strict measures to enforce national arms export control legislation;
- 3) establishing regional points of contact to report illicit trafficking of arms;
- 4) creating national commissions against illicit trafficking of arms;
- 5) preventing corruption and bribery in connection with illicit trafficking of arms;
- 6) promoting regional, subregional, and national cooperation amongst police, customs authorities and intelligence services working in this field;
- 7) promoting the use of existing international databases.

The European Council and its Member States will assist affected countries in suppressing the illicit circulation and trafficking of arms, particularly of small arms, by doing the following:

- 1) ensuring the incorporation of measures to suppress illicit circulation of arms in peacekeeping operations;
- 2) creating weapons collection, buy-back and destruction programs;
- 3) establishing educational programs to promote awareness among the local population of the negative consequences of illicit trafficking of arms;
- 4) promoting the integration of former combatants into civilian life.

I-8. Report of the Secretary-General. *General and Complete Disarmament: Consolidation of Peace Through Practical Disarmament Measures*. United Nations General Assembly Document A/52/289, August 19, 1997.

Building upon the foundation of United Nations General Assembly Document A/51/181 [Serial No. I-1], this document argues that consideration should be given to incremental steps leading to a more integrated approach to practical disarmament measures, particularly in post-conflict situations. The following steps are suggested:

- 1) "to include weapons-related issues as an integral part of peace accords where the United Nations is involved in bringing an end to armed conflicts and in consolidating the peace process to prevent their reemergence" (e.g., store weapons from de-mobilized soldiers);
- 2) "to promote an exchange of national and subregional experiences in the collection, control and disposal of arms, especially small arms and light weapons, and the reintegration of former combatants into civil society at the end of armed conflicts";
- 3) "to encourage harmonization of national legislation to monitor transboundary traffic on illicit arms and the pooling together of information about acts of criminality across national frontiers";
- 4) "to generate a better public understanding of practical disarmament measures intended to maintain and consolidate peace and security in areas that have suffered from armed conflicts through the collection and dissemination of information about the direct and indirect consequences of excessive accumulation, proliferation and use of weapons, including light weapons";
- 5) "to encourage greater transparency in military matters and seek wider adherence to tools of confidence-building" (e.g., periodical reporting of military expenditures).

Replies received in response to paragraph 4 of resolution 51/45 N, requesting the views of Member States on effective ways and means of collecting weapons transferred illicitly, and on concrete proposals concerning measures at the national, regional and international levels to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms, are also included. The responses of the following countries are included: Canada and the European Union.

I-9. Note by the Secretary-General. *General and Complete Disarmament: Small Arms.* United Nations General Assembly Document A/52/298, August 27, 1997.

The Small Arms Panel was established pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/70B of 12 December 1995 which requested that the Secretary-General prepare a report on small arms. The following document is the report of the Small Arms Panel, which identified the following categories:

- "a) The types of small arms and light weapons actually being used in conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations;
- b) The nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit production and trade;
- c) The ways and means to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, in particular as they cause or exacerbate conflict."

An overview describes some of the problems caused by small arms and light weapons (e.g., these weapons are increasingly used as the primary instruments of violence in the internal conflicts dealt with by the United Nations). While small arms and light weapons do not cause conflict, the availability of these weapons "contributes towards exacerbating conflicts by increasing the lethality and duration of violence, by encouraging a violent rather than a peaceful

resolution of differences, and by generating a vicious circle of a greater sense of insecurity, which in turn leads to a greater demand for, and use of, such weapons."

Tasked with a mandate to consider the types of small arms and light weapons actually being used, the Small Arms Panel report includes a listing of both types of weapons, focusing on "those which are manufactured to military specifications for use as lethal instruments of war." Offering a general definition, "small arms are those weapons designed for personal use, and light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew." In addition to lists of these weapons, the Panel drew attention to the integral role played by ammunition and explosives, since weapons can be rendered useless without appropriate ammunition.

The Panel also discussed the nature and causes of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of small arms and light weapons. This discussion is divided into several categories, each discussed in turn:

- a) nature (e.g., most of these weapons currently in use are not newly produced);
- b) causes (e.g., there is no single cause which renders accumulations of arms excessive and destabilizing; factors range from incomplete reintegration of former combatants, to links with insurgency and terrorism);
- c) modes of transfer (e.g., much of the transfer of these weapons is legitimate trade which occurs among Governments);
- d) illicit trade in weapons (e.g., resulting from inadequate national control systems on arms production and sale);
- e) regional realities (e.g., despite some commonalities, the African region experiences different problems with these weapons than do Central America, South Asia, and Europe).

The report proposes a series of recommendations, divided into two sections. The first discusses measures to reduce difficulties associated with already existing stockpiles:

- a) adopt a proportional and integrated approach to security and development (e.g., identify appropriate assistance for internal security forces);
- b) support all appropriate post-conflict initiatives related to disarmament and demobilization (e.g., destruction of weapons);
- c) once national conciliation is reached, convene an inter-Afghan program to destroy small arms and light weapons;
- d) develop plans to disarm combatants and provide assistance to peacekeeping missions;
- e) strengthen international and regional cooperation (e.g., between police, intelligence, and border control officials);
- f) establish mechanisms for information sharing for the above-mentioned purposes;
- g) collect and destroy all weapons not legally owned and not required for national defense and internal security.

The second section offers measures to prevent such accumulations and transfers from occurring in the future:

- a) all states should implement the recommendations contained in General Assembly Resolution 46/36H of December 1991 regarding international arms transfers;
- b) all states should determine which arms are permitted for civilian possession and under which conditions;

- c) all states should ensure the existence of adequate laws to control legal possession of small arms and light weapons, to prevent illicit trafficking;
- d) all states should, if emerging from conflict, impose licensing requirements for civilian possession of small arms and light weapons;
- e) all states should exercise restraint when transferring surplus small arms and light weapons;
- f) all states should safeguard such weapons against theft;
- g) the United Nations should urge relevant organizations (e.g., Interpol) and all states to help identify groups engaged in illicit trafficking activities;
- h) all states should intensify cooperative efforts against illicit trafficking of these weapons;
- i) the United Nations should encourage regional or subregional moratoriums on the transfer and manufacture of these weapons;
- j) other regional organizations should use the work of the Organization of American States (OAS) in preparing a draft inter-American convention against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in these weapons;
- k) the United Nations should convene an international conference on illicit arms trafficking;
- l) the United Nations should initiate studies on establishing a system for marking all such weapons from the time of their manufacture, and on restricting the manufacture and trade of such weapons to authorized dealers;
- m) the United Nations should initiate a study on all aspects of the problem of ammunition and explosives.

Appendix I reproduces a joint appeal on small arms, issued at the conclusion of the first regional workshop of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, held at Pretoria from 23 to 25 September 1996. Appendix II reproduces a statement on small arms, issued at the conclusion of the second regional workshop of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms held at San Salvador, on 16 and 17 January 1997. Appendix III reproduces a call upon Afghanistan, issued at the conclusion of the third regional workshop of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, held at Kathmandu on 22 and 23 May 1997. Appendix IV lists the persons invited to the regular sessions and regional workshops of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms.

I-10. Organization of American States. *Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition.* September 15, 1997.

These Model Regulations state that illicit international trade in firearms constitutes a specific risk to the security of member states. The purpose of these Model Regulations is to "set out for use on a multilateral basis, harmonized measures and a harmonized system of procedures for monitoring and controlling international movements of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, in order to prevent their illegal trafficking and diversion to illegal uses and purposes." Several key definitions are offered, including the following terms: ammunition, certified copy, export, import, export attachment, export certificate, final recipient, firearm,

import certificate, in-transit shipment authorization, in-transit country, parts and components, shipment transaction, shipping mode, and verifying agency.

Chapter 1 explores firearms and parts and components, and reproduces the procedures for the exportation of firearms or parts and components. Chapter 2 documents the procedures which must be followed to export ammunition. Chapter 3 outlines the general conditions applying to all certificates, attachments and authorizations (e.g., there will be no extension periods on any certificates, attachments and authorizations). Chapter 4 outlines the responsibilities of member states, which include the following:

- 1) record-keeping (i.e., each country shall maintain its own records of import/export/in-transit shipments of firearms, parts and components and ammunition for a period not less than 5 years);
- 2) computerization of records (i.e., countries shall make their best efforts to computerize their records);
- 3) information exchange (i.e., each country shall designate a Central Information Office to handle information requests from participating countries);
- 4) sharing of complementary information (e.g., information gathered shall be consolidated by the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) through the Inter-American Drug Information System (IADIS) for access by participating countries);
- 5) training and technical assistance (i.e., each country agrees to provide training and technical assistance for the implementation of these Model Regulations);
- 6) confirmation of import/export transactions (i.e., these shall be provided to any of the countries named on the certificates, upon request);
- 7) cancellation (i.e., doing so prior to expiration dates on certificates, attachments or authorizations, requires that the canceling country inform all other countries participating in the transactions);
- 8) identification of all agencies (i.e., each country shall identify to others, the names, addresses, telephone numbers, and other relevant information, of their authorizing information agencies);
- 9) shipment irregularities (i.e., when a verification agency detects an irregularity, it shall notify the central information office).

The Model Regulations conclude with a list of recommendations. The Group of Experts recommend that CICAD do the following:

- 1) consider periodically the effectiveness of the Model Regulations (e.g., to assess the extent to which recommended norms have been adopted);
- 2) provide technical assistance to member states which request it for the adoption of the Model Regulations;
- 3) convene periodic seminars to provide competent authorities and law enforcement agencies with a forum to exchange experiences on the control of international movements of firearms);
- 4) establish a close working relationship with the United Nations, and other international, regional and governmental bodies;
- 5) continue to develop a common definition of accessories to firearms that includes those which increase the danger of a firearm and its capacity to inflict harm;

6) convene a Group of Experts to examine explosives and explosives accessories to develop a set of model regulations for their control.

I-11. Permanent Council of the Organization of American States. *Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials*. General Assembly AG/RES.1 (XXIV-E/97), November 13, 1997.

The convention is divided into thirty Articles, listed under the following headings:

1) definitions (the following terms are defined: illicit manufacturing, illicit trafficking, firearms, ammunition, explosives, other related materials, and controlled delivery);

2) purpose:

i) "to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials";

ii) "to promote and facilitate cooperation and exchange of information and experience among States Parties to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials."

3) sovereignty ("States Parties shall carry out the obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other States.");

4) legislative measures (i.e., each State Party shall "establish as criminal offenses under their domestic law the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.");

5) jurisdiction (i.e., each State Party "shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has established in accordance with this Convention when the offense in question is committed in its territory.");

6) marking of firearms (i.e., it recognizes the desirability of marking firearms, whether manufactured, imported, or confiscated by the State);

7) confiscation or forfeiture (i.e., States Parties will undertake to "confiscate or forfeit firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials that have been illicitly manufactured or trafficked." Appropriate measures shall be taken to ensure that confiscated materials do not "fall into the hands of private individuals or businesses through auction, sale, or other disposal.");

8) security measures (i.e., "to eliminate loss or diversion of these materials while in transit through their respective territories.");

9) export, import, and transit licenses or authorizations (i.e., if not already in existence, States Parties shall maintain an effective system of controls);

10) strengthening of controls at export points (i.e., to detect and prevent illicit trafficking between territories);

11) recordkeeping (i.e., maintain information necessary to identify illicitly manufactured and illicitly trafficked firearms);

12) confidentiality (i.e., all information provided to States Parties shall be confidential);

- 13) exchange of information (i.e., States Parties shall share with each other relevant scientific and technological information useful to law-enforcement);
- 14) cooperation (i.e., at the bilateral, regional, and international levels to prevent illicit trafficking);
- 15) exchange of experience and training (e.g., identification and tracing of firearms, intelligence gathering, and improvement of efficiency in detecting illicit trafficking);
- 16) technical assistance (i.e., assist states to enhance their ability to prevent illicit trafficking);
- 17) mutual legal assistance (i.e., by promptly and accurately processing and responding to requests from authorities who have the power to investigate or prosecute illicit activities described in this Convention);
- 18) controlled delivery (i.e., done to identify persons and take legal action against them);
- 19) extradition ("Each of the offenses to which this article applies shall be deemed to be concluded as an extraditable offense in any extradition treaty in force between or among the States Parties.");
- 20) establishment and functions of the consultative committee (i.e., responsible for promoting and facilitating the exchange of information, encouraging cooperation to detect suspected illicit exports, promoting training, requesting information on illicit manufacturing, and promoting measures to facilitate the application of this convention);
- 21) structure and meetings of the consultative committee (i.e., one meeting per year, with one representative from each State Party);
- 22) signature (i.e., open for signature by member States of the Organization of American States);
- 23) ratification (i.e., the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States);
- 24) reservations (i.e., permissible provided they are not incompatible with the object and purposes of the Convention);
- 25) entry into force (i.e., on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification);
- 26) denunciation (i.e., any State Party may denounce it);
- 27) other agreements and practices (i.e., no provision in this Convention "shall prevent States Parties from engaging in mutual cooperation within the framework of other existing or future international, bilateral, or multilateral agreements.");
- 28) conference of States Parties (i.e., a conference shall be convened five years after the Convention enters into force to review its functioning and application);
- 29) dispute settlement (i.e., any disputes shall be resolved through diplomatic channels);
- 30) deposit (i.e., original copies of this Convention shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States).

I-12. United Nations General Assembly. *Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them*. Resolution 52/38C, December 9, 1997.

Building upon United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45L [Serial No. I-3], this resolution observes that the illicit circulation of massive quantities of small arms throughout the world impedes development and is a source of increased insecurity. The resolution welcomes the initiative taken by Mali concerning the question of the illicit circulation of small arms and their collection in the affected States of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion. The Governments concerned in the subregion are thanked for the support they have given to United Nations advisory missions. The Secretary-General is encouraged to continue his efforts to curb the illicit circulation of small arms and to collect such arms in the affected States that so request. The resolution further encourages that national commissions against the proliferation of small arms be set up in the countries of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion.

I-13. United Nations General Assembly. *Consolidation of Peace Through Practical Disarmament Measures*. Resolution 52/38G, December 9, 1997.

Building upon United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45/N [Serial No. I-4], this resolution notes that a comprehensive and integrated approach towards practical disarmament measures (e.g., small arms and light weapons) is often a prerequisite for maintaining and consolidating peace and security. The particular relevance of the deliberations at the 1997 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission in Working Group III is stressed. In addition, the report of the Secretary-General on the consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures is noted (51/45N), and Member States are encouraged to lend their support to the implementation of its relevant recommendations. The creation of a group to facilitate this process and to build on the momentum generated is suggested.

I-14. United Nations General Assembly. *Small Arms*. Resolution 52/38J, December 9, 1997.

This resolution endorses the Small Arms Report (A/52/298) [Serial No. I-9], calling upon all Member States to implement its relevant recommendations. It also requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the report, and to prepare a report, "with the assistance of the group of governmental experts to be nominated by him in 1998 on the basis of equitable geographical representation, (a) on the implementation of the recommendation of the report on small arms, and (b) on further actions recommended to be taken." The resolution further encourages Member States to carry out the report's recommendations for post-conflict situations, including demobilizing former soldiers and disposing of surplus weapons.

I-15. United Nations Economic and Social Council. *Criminal Justice Reform and Strengthening of Legal Institutions: Measures to Regulate Firearms*. United Nations Resolution E/CN.15/1998/L.6/Rev.1, April 28, 1998.

This document records the recommendation by the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to the Economic and Social Council to adopt its resolution regarding measures to regulate firearms. The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice made the following recommendations:

- 1) States should work towards the elaboration of an international instrument to combat the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms;
- 2) States should take into account the views of interested non-governmental organizations (NGOs) when discussing such an international instrument;
- 3) States should take into account the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, as well as other existing international instruments and ongoing initiatives;
- 4) the ad hoc committee on the elaboration of a comprehensive international convention against transnational organized crime, to be established by the General Assembly, should hold discussions on the elaboration of an international instrument to combat the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition;
- 5) the International Criminal Police Organization should provide the Secretary-General with proposals on how it could contribute towards a strengthening of the ability of law enforcement officials to combat illicit trafficking in and criminal misuse of firearms.

I-16. European Parliament. *Code of Conduct for Arms Exports*. May 14, 1998.

This Code of Conduct welcomes the initiative to establish a code of conduct for arms transfers. It calls on the European Council and the Member States to do several things:

- 1) to create consultation mechanisms to ensure that all Member States are informed of approvals and denials of export licenses, including a requirement that any Member State intending to undercut a decision by another is obliged to inform all other Member States about its intention;
- 2) to ensure that export guidelines state precise circumstances under which export licenses should be denied (e.g., not to be used for internal repression);
- 3) to agree to a comprehensive list of military and dual-use goods to which the code will apply;
- 4) to improve transparency and parliamentary scrutiny at the EU (European Union) level by presenting to Parliament an annual report;
- 5) to impress upon Member States the need to uphold their national policies with regard to strict arms export criteria;
- 6) to establish an EU system of monitoring end-use provisions to ensure that arms are not used in contravention of the code's export guidelines;
- 7) to adopt such a code as a Common Position leading to a series of Joint Actions;
- 8) to encourage third countries to sign the code of conduct;

- 9) to include in the code a clause on the subject of the export of arms to countries which do not abide by the United Nations Agreement on the Arms Register;
- 10) to give more attention to combating the illegal arms trade.

I-17. G-8 Birmingham Summit. Final Communique, May 15-17, 1998.

This Summit built upon the support offered by the G-8 states in April 1998 to the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). At that time, the G-8 asked member states to "work towards the elaboration of a binding international legal instrument to combat the illicit manufacture and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition within the context of a United Nations convention on transnational organized crime."

The communique endorsed the principles and action plan to combat illegal manufacturing and trafficking of firearms developed and agreed by the "Lyon Group" (i.e. a G-8 experts group). The Lyon Group principles include the following:

- 1) There must be no safe haven for those who participate in illegal manufacturing and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.
- 2) States should adopt effective methods of firearms identification and tracing.
- 3) Diversion into the illegal market of legally traded and held firearms must be prevented.
- 4) States must improve cooperation and exchange of information and data for law enforcement purposes on illegal manufacturing and trafficking in firearms.
- 5) States must pursue greater international cooperation through mutual assistance regimes in prosecutions relating to illegal manufacturing and trafficking in firearms.
- 6) States must develop and share technical expertise and training on preventing and combatting such illegal activities.
- 7) States must improve measures to prevent, detect and combat such illegal activities.
- 8) States must take the necessary steps to improve the international legal framework to prevent and suppress such illegal activities.

I-18. United Nations. Report of the Evaluation Mission to Albania. June 11-14, 1998.

This report is an in-depth assessment of the nature, scope and dimension of civilian possession of weapons in Albania. This report was requested by the United Nations Secretary-General before dispatching aid to help the Government of Albania disarm the civilian population.

The methodology used to evaluate the Albanian situation is described. The evaluation mission visited Albania between June 11-14, 1998. The mission's findings are listed below:

- 1) the Government of Albania emphasizes the need to retrieve the vast quantities of weapons in civilian possession;
- 2) opinions differ on the inducement necessary to encourage the return of weapons (e.g., local or national campaigns);
- 3) the Albanian Government views developments in Kosovo as further reason to retrieve weapons from civilians;

- 4) civilian possession of weapons is not a new phenomenon, nor is it unauthorized in Albania;
- 5) the Government's main concern is retrieving the weapons and ammunition taken from military depots in 1997 (over 650,000 weapons were taken);
- 6) the majority of the weapons are being held in rural areas where they are easier to hide.

The report argues that weapons collections programs are only possible within the context of continued democratisation, improved economic conditions, and greater public confidence in the country's institutions. In addition, weapons collections programs must address two other facets of concern: the safety of military depots, and the rising levels of criminal behavior. It is argued that any weapons collection program should be governed by the following goals:

- 1) to create a clearly defined, uniform and non-discriminatory legal framework for private possession of weapons;
- 2) to construct an advocacy campaign to heighten public awareness and support for a weapons collection program;
- 3) to pursue the goal of weapons collection by encouraging voluntary surrender;
- 4) to make use of extended family and traditional social structures in rural Albania to collect weapons from groups in addition to individuals;
- 5) to avoid using Buy-Back schemes which might have an inflationary impact and encourage criminal behavior (i.e., by formalizing domestic gun-running);
- 6) to offer poverty alleviating and job-creating development projects for the community in exchange for guns;
- 7) to promote development projects as a complement to, not a replacement of, existing resources;
- 8) to reinforce the commitment of the government of Albania to destroy recovered weapons.

The report recommends "the speedy development and urgent implementation of a pilot project for voluntary weapons surrendered in the district of Gramshi which, with its population of roughly 50,000, is estimated to account for roughly 8 to 10 percent of the weapons and ammunition possessed by the entire civilian population after the crisis of 1997." A five stage strategy for the pilot project is recommended, which should include the following elements:

- 1) symbolism (i.e., televise public destruction of weapons to mark the beginning of the project);
- 2) advocacy (i.e., distribute material promoting the campaign);
- 3) community involvement and reward (i.e., rely on local materials and expertise);
- 4) voluntary surrender;
- 5) public destruction of weapons, including ammunition.

I-19. United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. *Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA): The United Nations Policy*. June 19, 1998.

In pursuance of resolutions 50/70B and 52/38J, the United Nations is mandated to focus on small arms and light weapons which have actually been used in the armed conflicts dealt with

by the United Nations. Since research began in earnest in 1995, three levels of concern have been uncovered:

- 1) humanitarian concern (i.e., the suffering and displacement resulting from the use of these weapons);
- 2) developmental concern (i.e., any structural gains made over years are negated with each new incident of indiscriminate violence);
- 3) security concern (i.e., armed conflict can recur largely because of an incomplete process of disarmament).

The objectives of the United Nations on the issues related to small arms are five-fold and mutually supportive:

- 1) to retain the lead taken by the United Nations in putting the issue on the global agenda by projecting itself as a leader;
- 2) to channel the growing international concern into the realization of some realistic goals by assuming a coordinating role in determining priorities;
- 3) to encourage widespread involvement of civil society in building societal resistance to the illegitimate use of small arms and light weapons;
- 4) to strengthen the ability of the United Nations to respond effectively to requests for assistance made by areas severely affected by small arms proliferation;
- 5) to ensure that the above objectives are pursued within the framework of the overall objectives of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

The broad guiding principles for United Nations policy for Coordination of Action on Small Arms are listed below:

- 1) preventing armed conflicts (i.e., to facilitate this process, all relevant information on small arms should be forwarded to the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA));
- 2) reducing and preventing excessive accumulation and proliferation of small arms (i.e., the United Nations can act as a clearing house for new initiatives);
- 3) creating terms of reference for United Nations actions in response to specific requests for assistance (i.e., aid will be firmly based on clear terms of reference agreed to by the requesting State);
- 4) learning lessons from past experiences (i.e., this information will be supplemented by additional insights gained from promoting and exchanging national and subregional experiences through supporting workshops);
- 5) integrating approaches to disarmament and development (i.e., this entails closer cooperation between the economic and disarmament sectors of the Secretariat);
- 6) involving civil society (i.e., to help build resistance to the illegitimate use of small arms).

This paper proposes a system-wide commitment for coordinating measures on small arms, including the following:

- 1) identifying a focal point for all United Nations action on small arms within the United Nations system (i.e., the DDA);
- 2) setting priorities (i.e., the DDA will be responsible for ensuring a coherent and coordinated response to the challenge of small arms proliferation);

- 3) advocating measures to combat small arms proliferation (e.g., developing a small arms page within the United Nations Home Page on the INTERNET);
- 4) mobilizing resources (e.g., approaching the World Bank for support for poorer countries).

The CASA will serve as the DDA's mechanism for consultation. Subject to the approval of other partners, the DDA proposes the following composition of CASA:

- 1) Department of Political Affairs (DPA);
- 2) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA);
- 3) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO);
- 4) Department of Public Information (DPI);
- 5) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
- 6) Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA);
- 7) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CPCJ);
- 8) United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict;
- 9) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Various United Nations actors will conduct their own fund-raising activities to support United Nations policies in the area of small arms and light weapons. However, they will coordinate these activities with CASA to ensure that the policies are mutually reinforcing.

Annex I contains the list of recommendations made by the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms in pursuance of Resolution 50/70B, as contained in the Report of the Secretary-General, A/52/298. Annex II lists recent activities and initiatives in the field of small arms and light weapons.

I-20. Oslo Meeting on Small Arms. "An International Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Elements of a Common Understanding." July 13-14, 1998.

A number of states gathered in Norway to discuss small arms and light weapons proliferation. They concluded that immediate action should focus on the prevention of illicit transfers and should work towards tightening control in connection with legal transfers. Several prevention aspects are outlined, including the following:

- 1) enhance accountability, transparency and improved information exchange on small arms transfers;
- 2) develop coordination between police, intelligence units and customs officials within and between countries;
- 3) develop and strengthen laws and regulations to combat illicit manufacturing and trafficking;
- 4) ensure respect for international humanitarian law with regard to the use of small arms and light weapons;
- 5) develop national and regional mechanisms in connection with the legal manufacture, transit, and transfer of these weapons (e.g., codes of conduct).

They also outlined several initiatives to reduce the number of small arms and light weapons in circulation:

- 1) support the demobilization and reintegration of combatants (e.g., voluntary weapons collection programs);
- 2) seek to reverse cultures of violence (i.e., contribute to the process of reconciliation);
- 3) support efforts to establish trustworthy judicial systems and to train local police.

To address these problems effectively, it is argued that governments need to develop a common understanding of the problems associated with small arms proliferation. Participants at the Oslo Meeting "welcome and commend the various endeavors currently being undertaken in different areas and at different levels. Governments are encouraged to support the existing global and regional initiatives...and explore the feasibility of further initiatives, globally and in other regions and subregions." Annex 1 is a list of Global and Regional Initiatives on small arms. Annex 2 is a list of the states participating in this meeting.

I-21. United Nations. "International Study on Firearm Regulation." New York: United Nations, 1998. (Sales No. E.89.IV.2)

This study on firearm regulation covers the following topics:

- 1) criminal cases, accidents and suicides in which firearms are involved;
- 2) the situation with regard to transnational illicit trafficking in firearms;
- 3) national legislation and regulations relevant to firearm regulations;
- 4) relevant initiatives for firearm regulation at regional levels.

The mandate for the study is outlined along with the methodology used in conducting the survey. The methodology had three components, including the following:

- 1) to be descriptive and neutral in nature;
- 2) to address only firearms, excluding landmines and other armaments;
- 3) to focus only on civilian regulations and civilian-owned firearms, excluding the military.

A questionnaire was prepared on the basis of this methodology, and by 31 December 1997 a completed survey questionnaire had been received from 69 States. The survey responses are analyzed and the results presented in table form.

On the basis of this information the following conclusions were drawn:

- 1) the majority of the responding States indicated that they regulate firearms to some extent;
- 2) the majority of responding States restrict in some manner the import, export and manufacture of all long guns and handguns;
- 3) many States reported recent changes either in the legislation or the administration regarding the civilian ownership of firearms;
- 4) the authority for firearms legislation is most often located at the national level;
- 5) most States have adopted similar policies with regard to the levels of prohibition and restriction in relation to both the import and export of firearms;
- 6) few States reported the existence of formal agreements with other States on the regulation of firearms;
- 7) most responding States allow the ownership of hand guns for the purpose of hunting, target-shooting, collection and protection of person or property;

- 8) most responding States reported some type of licensing requirements for the purchase of all firearms;
- 9) many States reported the existence of an administrative record system for firearm owners;
- 10) levels of firearm ownership are highly varied among countries;
- 11) most States allow the possession of firearms for the purposes of hunting and target shooting, but somewhat fewer permit the possession of firearms for the purpose of collection and protection of person or property;
- 12) in the majority of countries, an individual is permitted to use the firearm of another, with the requirement in many cases that the borrower is legally permitted to own a firearm;
- 13) many States reported the existence of regulations for the storage and transport of firearms;
- 14) the majority of States require a special permit or license for the carrying of firearms for the purpose of self-protection;
- 15) many States have businesses that manufacture firearms;
- 16) most States reported problems with illicit sales and distribution;
- 17) there appears to be a problem of firearms illegally transiting one or more countries between the time of their manufacture and their ultimate recovery by law enforcement officers;
- 18) over 30 States provided detailed descriptions of smuggling methods used;
- 19) fewer States reported a problem with the illegal export of firearms;
- 20) most responding States did not have substantial evidence of the illegal manufacture of firearms;
- 21) twenty-nine States were able to provide data on stolen and missing firearms for one or more years;
- 22) it is generally accepted by the States surveyed that illegal firearms are sold to criminals or organized criminal groups;
- 23) almost all States provided information on the sources used to determine the origins of firearms that have been recovered by officials (e.g., national registries of firearms or firearms owners);
- 24) States generally reported serious maximum penalties for offenders who are apprehended for crimes of firearms smuggling and trafficking;
- 25) in many instances States could not provide statistics on firearms deaths and crimes for the previous five years;
- 26) there was considerable variability among countries on the firearm homicide rate (i.e., it ranged from 0 to 53.99 per 100,000 persons);
- 27) the report on the survey also contains some limited data on the number of law enforcement officers who were killed while on duty;
- 28) many States reported significant firearm policy initiatives that had occurred within the last five years;
- 29) twenty-nine States reported changes in legislation or administration regarding the civilian ownership of firearms (e.g., new licensing requirements);

- 30) seventeen States reported recent changes in the legislation or administration regarding the civilian possession of firearms;
- 31) thirty-two States reported significant initiatives to prevent firearms smuggling and other illegal dealings;
- 32) thirty-seven States reported particular initiatives by law enforcement agencies to improve coordination of firearm regulations (e.g., the development of computers for the maintenance of records);
- 33) twenty-eight States reported on initiatives to promote public awareness of firearm regulations and firearm safety;
- 34) thirty-two States responded that an incident involving firearms had occurred in recent years that has raised public concern on the issue of firearm regulation.

PART B

SCHOLARLY STUDIES

PART B.1 — ITEMS AVAILABLE IN 1996

601. Fung, Ivor Richard. "Control and Collection of Light Weapons in the Sahel-Sahara Subregion: A Mission Report." *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*. Vol. XIX, No. 2, 1996, pp. 44-50.

This article summarizes the activities of the Advisory Mission on the Control and Collection of Light Weapons in the Sahel-Sahara Subregion. The Advisory Mission responded to a request from the President of Mali for advice on how to collect and control the proliferation of illicit small arms in his country. Accordingly, it was decided to carry out a pilot project in Mali. The first phase was carried out in Mali in August 1994, and the second phase took place in February and March 1995 in the following countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. The mission examined the following factors relating to the proliferation of illicit small arms: the security situation in each country, the reasons for socio-economic unrest, the status of relevant legal documents, problems of refugees and internally displaced peoples, banditry, and self-defence.

The Mission concluded the following:

- 1) there was a problem with illicit small arms, but the lack of accurate information made it difficult to quantify;
- 2) there was a lack of human and material resources within the Governments involved to help control the security situation (with the exception of Mauritania);
- 3) the lack of security fueled the demand for weapons;
- 4) there will be little opportunity to collect small arms until number 3 is addressed.

A "security-first" approach must be followed (i.e., promoting personal security first, followed by structural development). Two sets of recommendations were put forward, the first to Governments in the affected region:

- 1) improve internal controls and procedures;
- 2) tighten national legislation;
- 3) offer better training for security forces.

The Mission also recommended that the United Nations do the following:

- 1) foster a subregional approach;
- 2) arrange for monitoring and supervision;
- 3) assist in training, develop confidence-building measures, and standardize legislation and customs procedures.

Fung concludes that these mechanisms are necessary to address the complex process of collecting and controlling illicit small arms.

602. Gamba, Virginia. "Controlling the Proliferation of Weapons." *African Security Review*. Vol. 5, No. 4, 1996, pp. 16-19.

Gamba argues that since the end of the Cold War increasing attention has been paid to controlling the actual "material elements of war and conflict, such as conventional arms production and trade, and the growing impact of the indiscriminate use of light weapons." Since most disarmament efforts focus on major conventional weapons systems, it is easy to understand why most violence suffered by individuals results from the existence of vast amounts of small arms and light weapons. Gamba maintains that the licit and illicit trade of light weapons must be seen as two parts of one problem.

In addition to examining issues surrounding conventional weapons transfers, Gamba examines the proliferation of light weapons, arguing that the topic can be subdivided into a variety of topics:

- 1) illegal transfers of small arms and political instability;
- 2) increases in crime and violence;
- 3) civilian casualties in conflict;
- 4) internal conflict and civil war;
- 5) failed states and weapons control during multilateral peace missions;
- 6) weapons pipelines and international organized crime;
- 7) ammunition control;
- 8) border control;
- 9) weapons caches;
- 10) the emergence of micro-economies based on supply and demand for light weapons (e.g., gun rental).

Gamba warns that although these subdivisions facilitate research, they produce a mind-set which isolates one topic from another. The solution is to undertake a holistic approach to analyzing the problem: "the linkages between issues related to conventional arms transfers and those that deal with the illegal trade in small arms must be explored and discussed."

There are many linkages between the legal trade in conventional arms and the illegal proliferation of light weapons. These linkages must be identified to allow researchers and policy makers to use a broader analytical spectrum when considering the problem of light weapons proliferation. Gamba warns that unless countries start concentrating on light weapons proliferation, "they will never manage to reach an agreement on the issue of reducing conventional weapons transfers, because of the linkage between these issues."

603. Goulding, Marrack. "Expanding the Disarmament Agenda." *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*. Vol. XIX, No. 2, 1996, pp. 33-37.

Goulding notes that the uncontrolled flow of small arms into States can be a major destabilizing factor. As a result, micro-disarmament is an important addition to the disarmament agenda. The consequences of the proliferation of small arms are discussed using examples from several states, including Nicaragua and the Horn of Africa. While weapons of mass destruction remain a threat, it is small arms that are killing people in large numbers. The end of the Cold War

has made the situation worse as conflicts held in place by Cold War politics are now being rekindled in Europe, the former Soviet Union and Africa.

There are several factors which explain why there are so many light weapons available: internal conflicts, deliberate de-stabilization by one Power to achieve political results in a neighboring country, crime, and the international drug trade. In addition to these answers, there are others which are more difficult to solve. For instance, in many states where security is not guaranteed by the state, many citizens have armed themselves in self-defence. Addressing small arms proliferation means confronting a central paradox: "There is no security without development; there is no development without security."

Goulding concludes that the questions surrounding small arms and light weapons proliferation are of critical importance to the international community. Unfortunately, solving these questions will be a difficult task.

604. Kartha, Tara "Light Weapon Proliferation and Regional Instability in Central Asia." *Strategic Analysis*. Vol. XIX, No. 9, December 1996, pp. 1277-1289.

Kartha argues that since 1990, the "new threat is an unprecedented availability of small arms and light weapons, accessed through different routes and sources, that appears to have changed the nature of conflict." Focusing on the Central Asia Region, Kartha examines the extent to which light weapons proliferation and narcotics movements have caused instability.

Virtually every conflict this decade has been fought with small arms. The main source of weapons in Central Asia is Afghanistan which is awash in armaments in the wake of massive arms shipments into the country in the 1980s. Even though covert operations were launched with the full support of policymakers, due to domestic pressure, operations had to be financed in a way not subject to strict accounting procedures. Thus, narcotics were used to fetch massive returns with very little effort. Kartha argues that in Afghanistan, "the cultivation of narcotics and the movements of weapons merged into one operation -- with often the one exchanged for the other." Throughout the process of shipping arms to the region, corruption ensured that many weapons never reached their intended targets, contributing to the rise of a flourishing black market trade in these weapons. In addition, countless numbers of men who had no previous military experience were trained as soldiers, resulting in a whole generation of men trained in nothing other than war.

The end of the fighting did not see an end to the diffusion of weapons and narcotics into surrounding regions, which continued to contribute to instability throughout the area. The result has been a spiraling rise in crime levels which in turn has prompted an increase in paramilitary forces. Kartha concludes that the proliferation of light weapons disturbs social development and impinges upon security.

605. Laurance, Edward J. "Surplus Weapons and the Micro-Disarmament Process." *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*. Vol. XIX, No. 2, 1996, pp. 59-67.

Laurance argues that the Cold War promoted the stockpiling of light weapons and small arms. Since 1989, disarmament agreements have generated large quantities of surplus weapons within a short period of time. This surplus must be eliminated to ensure a peaceful future.

The situation in El Salvador is outlined as an example of the scale of small arms and light weapons proliferation. The problem was so pervasive that the Government requested assistance from the United Nations. The result was a gun buy-back program beginning in 1995 which had citizens voluntarily turn in weapons based on amnesty. The development of a plan to implement such a program in El Salvador illustrates certain general criteria, Laurance argues, which should govern the involvement of the United Nations in micro-disarmament actions in general:

- 1) the surplus of weapons is a major factor in armed violence;
- 2) the weapons causing problems are military-style weapons not needed by citizens for personal security;
- 3) the internal security forces are unable to collect these weapons;
- 4) the internal security forces are developed enough so that the United Nations can provide the marginal assistance required to conduct a disarmament campaign;
- 5) the community has the potential to organize and play a major role in working with internal security forces to combat the weapons problem;
- 6) the initiative for United Nations involvement in micro-disarmament action lies with the Member States.

Laurance contends that as the number of countries needing micro-disarmament grows, the example of the gun buy-back program in El Salvador may provide a prototype that can be applied to other situations.

606. Rana, Swadesh. "Light Weapons and Current Conflicts." *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*. Vol. XIX, No. 2, 1996, pp. 38-43.

Rana outlines the characteristics of conflict since the end of the Cold War. Most current conflicts are characterized by mindless violence, poorly stated objectives, and unpredictable causes (e.g., a food riot). These conflicts are exacerbated by the large variety of small arms and light weapons readily available from ever-increasing sources of supply at ever-decreasing prices.

Rana argues that "traditional paradigms of arms control may not be adequate to deal with the phenomenon of small arms and light weapons. Unlike weapons of mass destruction, small arms cannot be eliminated as a category of weapons, because the very weapons causing so much death or destruction lately are also necessary for keeping internal security." International mechanisms to restrict the proliferation of these weapons may prove ineffective for two reasons:

- 1) proliferation has already occurred;
- 2) identification of sources and causes of production might be impossible.

Most arms agreements are negotiated with international entities. However, most of the small arms and light weapons which pose a threat to international security are being used by individuals

and groups not accountable to any State authority. In addition, the major military Powers do not show any inclination to get involved in areas of conflict.

Nevertheless, Rana is hopeful that something will be done. One area for concerted action is in the commonality of interest in breaking linkages between illicit arms transfers, drugs and criminality. The report concludes by stating that the "most reassuring aspect of the current situation in respect of small arms and light weapons proliferation is that Member States have not waited for an international agreement on how to go about curbing it."

607. Wulf, Herbert. "Disarming and Demobilizing Ex-Combatants: Implementing Micro-Disarmament." *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*. Vol. XIX, No. 2, 1996, pp. 51-58.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a reduction of armed forces throughout the world. Micro-disarmament is an important issue and deserves high priority on the disarmament agenda since most ex-combatants carry small arms or light weapons -- the types of weapons that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands. Thus, an essential part of successful post-conflict demobilization is the careful disarmament of ex-combatants. Once these weapons have been secured, they should be destroyed.

To successfully manage post-conflict demobilization, a number of suggestions are put forward, including the following:

- 1) cease hostilities;
- 2) promote regional security and stability;
- 3) ensure the existence of a credible central authority;
- 4) plan the campaign carefully (i.e., armies may disintegrate before formal demobilization is organized);
- 5) bring all combatants into a unified national force prior to demobilization;
- 6) use central assembly points to disarm ex-combatants;
- 7) ensure decent living conditions in encampments prior to demobilization (i.e., to avoid the desertion of soldiers still in possession of their weapons);
- 8) inform demobilized soldiers about their prospects (i.e., to avoid rebellions which can undermine the demobilization and disarmament process);
- 9) carry out demobilization and disarmament to its fullest extent (i.e., to avoid endangering peacekeeping operations);
- 10) provide transparency concerning arms collected;
- 11) move beyond disarming individual soldiers and units to include national or regional disarmament;
- 12) apply appropriate ways of dealing with surplus weapons to avoid their transfer into areas of conflict;
- 13) secure financial support;
- 14) reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life to avoid them returning to take up arms;
- 15) conduct post-conflict demobilization in a short period of time (the reintegration phase can be a longer term process).

Demobilization and disarmament of ex-combatants is a useful contribution to disarmament and peace as well as to human development.

PART B.2 — ITEMS AVAILABLE IN 1997

701. Batchelor, P. "Intra-State Conflict, Political Violence and Small Arms Proliferation in Africa." In *Society Under Siege: Crime, Violence, and Illegal Weapons*, ed. Virginia Gamba, Cape Town: Institute for Security Studies, 1997, pp. 103-128.

The increasing incidence of intra-state conflict has prompted an increase in the demand for small arms and light weapons. Batchelor examines the relationship between political violence, instability and small arms proliferation in Africa with reference to three case studies.

The first case study examines intra-state conflict and political violence in Africa. The conflicts that make use of small arms and light weapons take many different forms:

- 1) conflicts associated with termination of war and post-war reconciliation (e.g., Ethiopia);
- 2) conflicts over distribution of resources (e.g., Mozambique);
- 3) conflicts over political participation (e.g., Zimbabwe);
- 4) conflicts over political identity (e.g., Rwanda).

The second case study examines intra-state conflict, political violence and the proliferation of small arms, specifically in South Africa, Angola and Rwanda. Each case study examines the following issues:

- 1) the origins and causes of intra-state conflict and political violence;
- 2) the nature of the intra-state conflict and political violence;
- 3) the relationship between intra-state conflict, political violence and the demand for small arms;
- 4) the supply of small arms into the particular country under discussion from internal and external sources;
- 5) the relationship between the demand for small arms and small arms proliferation in neighboring countries.

The third case study examines intra-state conflict, political violence and the proliferation of small arms in Africa by analyzing three common issues:

- 1) the demand for small arms (i.e., the increasing incidence of intra-state conflict and political violence in Africa has created high levels of demand for small arms from state and non-state actors);
- 2) the supply of small arms (i.e., small arms have flooded into Africa as a result of increased demand);
- 3) small arms proliferation (i.e., the issue has become a major political and security factor at local, national, regional and international levels throughout Africa).

Batchelor concludes that there are a number of policy and practical measures which could be implemented to deal with small arms proliferation in Africa:

- 1) increase transparency in arms transfers (i.e., at the present time, there is a severe lack of transparency with regards to small arms transfers);
- 2) restrain suppliers (i.e., the United Nations could play a role in encouraging major suppliers of weapons to curb their shipments to countries experiencing intra-state conflict);

- 3) enhance import and export controls (i.e., legislative measures and enforcement agencies are required).

These measures must be implemented in conjunction with long-term planning, including political reform and socio-economic development. Efforts must also be made to disarm and demilitarize Africa. Batchelor concludes that the "use of non-violent mechanisms to deal with intra-state conflicts will not only help to reduce the demand for small arms, it will also assist in curtailing their proliferation and thereby help to promote sustainable peace, security and development in Africa."

702. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). *Light Weapons and Micro-Disarmament*. Ottawa: DFAIT, January 1997.

The emphasis on micro-disarmament, defined here to mean the collection and subsequent disposal of light weapons used in internal political conflict, began in earnest in the early 1990s. The report surveys early efforts at micro-disarmament, reviewing existing literature. Several facets of the literature are discussed:

- 1) arms control/non-proliferation and domestic lawlessness (i.e., determining where arms control or non-proliferation within the realm of international security ends, and where firearms regulation and enforcement within the realm of domestic law and order begins);
- 2) defining light weapons (i.e., there has been considerable debate about what constitutes a light weapon);
- 3) supply (i.e., factors which affect the amount of weapons available);
- 4) demand (i.e., political, economic, and social conditions can feed ethnic, religious, language and ideological hostilities).

The report also discusses UN peace operations and micro-disarmament, with a view to determining the issues, problems and potential solutions. The UN operations in Sahara-Sahel, Rwanda, Mozambique, El Salvador, and Nicaragua are evaluated. On the basis of these case studies, several conclusions are drawn:

- 1) micro-disarmament starts with negotiations between belligerents;
- 2) insufficient resources cause implementation problems;
- 3) peace agreements have many other components which are often seen as more important (e.g., free elections).

Several recommendations are put forward:

- 1) develop a set of guidelines on the merits of micro-disarmament for negotiators;
- 2) create a set of rewards and penalties for compliance or non-compliance within the micro-disarmament component of a peace agreement;
- 3) allocate resources carefully and allow sufficient time for forces to mobilize;
- 4) create a central coordinating staff within the Mission Headquarters and perhaps a disarmament staff at the Directorate of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York;
- 5) form disarmament teams with sole responsibility for micro-disarmament aspects of an agreement;
- 6) use a sliding scale for buy-back or reward systems, increasing rewards commensurate with the lethality of the weapon surrendered;

7) include an intelligence aspect with each mission.

Another section is devoted to outlining the Canadian perspective on light weapons regulation controls. While firearms regulations may appear at first glance to be a national concern, "it is indeed difficult to address the issue of destabilizing light weapons proliferation within the context of intrastate conflict without taking into account the effect or non-effect of national firearms regulations."

Areas for future study are also outlined, beginning with a survey of on-going studies:

- 1) British American Security Information Council (BASIC);
- 2) United Nations Institute For Disarmament Research (UNIDIR);
- 3) Towards Collaborative Peace (TCP);
- 4) Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion (PACD).

In addition, several other issues for further study are detailed:

- 1) defining the issue (i.e., the jurisdictional framework);
- 2) embargoes (i.e., the costs and benefits must be better understood);
- 3) registers of light weapons (i.e., either through the UN or through regional organizations);
- 4) free trade (i.e., the effect of a reduction in trade barriers on illicit arms trafficking);
- 5) arms control and domestic lawlessness (i.e., what is the nature of the link);
- 6) co-opting the suppliers (i.e., securing the cooperation of arms manufacturers).

The report concludes that light weapons proliferation is a complex issue. A long-term solution "clearly lies in the demand-side of the light weapons proliferation equation." However, in the short-term, more immediate steps can be taken on the supply-side (e.g., micro-disarmament and regulatory controls). In the future, all UN peace operations should include a micro-disarmament component.

Annex A presents, in table form, proposed solutions to light weapons proliferation. Annex B summarizes the issues and problems with a UN peace operations and micro-disarmament. Annex C reproduces pertinent Canadian regulations on controlling light weapons transfers.

703. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). *Practical Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Measures for Peacebuilding*. Ottawa: DFAIT, April 1997.

The purpose of this paper "is to survey selected relevant international experience and to outline a generic model for the effective planning and implementation of the practical disarmament, demobilization and reintegration aspects of the consolidation of peace process." Section I introduces the paper, taking as its starting point Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1995 publication *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (A/50/60)*, and his belief that the destructive nature of small arms and anti-personnel land mines must be addressed.

Section II outlines the background to the United Nations Disarmament Commission's consideration of guidelines for practical disarmament measures in the context of peacebuilding. The efforts of several groups and organizations are summarized: the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, the

United Nations International Study on Firearm Regulation, Anti-Personnel Land Mines and the Ottawa Process, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, and several complementary regional efforts including, the Organization of American States (OAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It is argued that developments at the regional level indicate a growing interest "in both the problem of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and in the development of regional mechanisms for cooperation in addressing security related matters."

Section III outlines specific disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts, by examining each of the following operations:

- 1) United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), 1989-1990;
- 2) United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1992-1993;
- 3) Second United Nations Operation in Somalia, (UNOSOM II), 1993-1995;
- 4) United Nations Operation in Mozambique, (ONUMOZ), 1992-1994;
- 5) Mali/Sahara-Sahel Experience, 1993-ongoing.

In each case the mission chronology is given, followed by observations on the main lessons to be learned.

Section IV examines disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the peace process continuum. The consolidation of peace requires short-term emergency stabilization measures and long-term plans to develop a sustainable peace. The collection, control and disposal of small arms and light weapons is vital to both phases. This section surveys the basic elements of an effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program (DDRP) in the context of peacebuilding operations. A technical assessment must determine the specific requirements of the DDRP, and requires expertise in the following areas:

- 1) the political/diplomatic dimension;
- 2) military peace operations;
- 3) humanitarian relief;
- 4) economic reconstruction (e.g., expertise in agriculture);
- 5) international financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank or International Monetary Fund).

A strong program of public information is essential from the outset. Assembling and demobilizing former combatants provides an excellent opportunity to collect and destroy weapons. Incentives will be required from the international community and national authorities to counter the culture of the gun, and enhance the disarmament process. Most cases of post-conflict disarmament and demobilization have emphasized emergency stabilization rather than the development phase. It is argued that DDRPs must be integrated within peacebuilding processes for the process to be effective. Any weapons collected should be destroyed. There are several elements essential to the success of the DDRP, including:

- 1) the commitment of the parties to disarmament and demobilization as an integral part of the peace implementation plan;
- 2) the commitment of neighboring countries to a responsible arms management policy;
- 3) a broad mandate for the implementing body with mechanisms to coordinate diverse players and to resolve difficulties;

- 4) adequate resources, both human and financial, to make the DDRP credible and sustainable;
- 5) sufficient planning to design and launch the peace operation and the DDRP as soon as a peace agreement has been achieved;
- 6) a recognition by the implementation body and international donors that successful completion of the DDRP is fundamental to the long-term stability of the country/region in question;
- 7) a long-term commitment by the international community to post-conflict economic reconstruction and development.

Standing in the way of successful implementation, however, are several obstacles:

- 1) lack of sufficient commitment by the parties to the peace process;
- 2) lack of sufficient priority given to weapons collection and destruction;
- 3) insufficient funding commitments to permit proper planning of the DDRP;
- 4) unwillingness of international development agencies to fund weapons destruction;
- 5) lack of sufficient funding to continue essential aspects of the DDRP (e.g., weapons destruction).

Section V reviews in point form the essential arguments detailed above, and Section VI lists recommendations for action in the following areas:

- 1) regional approaches, confidence building, and capacity building;
- 2) the need for an integrated approach to security and development;
- 3) responsible arms management policies;
- 4) the terms of peace agreement with regards to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration;
- 5) the need for a generic model for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs in the context of peacebuilding;
- 6) the terms of peace agreement with regards to co-ordinating mechanisms;
- 7) adequate resources for effective planning and mobilization;
- 8) planning and management capability;
- 9) areas for further research.

704. Chloros, Alexander, Joel Johnston, Katherine Joseph, and Rachel Stohl. "Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Light Weapons Destruction in Central America." British American Security Information Council Papers: Occasional Papers on International Security Issues, No. 24, December 1997.

This paper argues that the efforts of the United Nations at post-conflict peacebuilding in Central America have been largely unsuccessful in collecting the large numbers of small arms in circulation. To ensure the removal of weapons from circulation, surplus weaponry must be collected and destroyed wherever possible.

Destroying surplus weapons can have a variety of positive impacts, including limiting the instability created by a proliferation of surplus weaponry, and signaling an official end to the conflict. Despite these benefits, United Nations missions have seldom included destruction of surplus weapons as part of their initial peacekeeping mandates. This paper examines five Central

American countries (Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Haiti and Guatemala) where surplus weapons destruction was a part of the reconstruction process. On the basis of these case studies, several conclusions are drawn:

- 1) United Nations peacekeeping missions without a clear weapons destruction mandate prior to their arrival have difficulty enacting one later;
- 2) when mandates are not accepted by warring factions, weapons collections can be disrupted;
- 3) destruction programs should be tailored to address the particulars of each conflict situation;
- 4) when collected weapons were used to re-arm security forces, former combatants had a disincentive to hand in their weapons;
- 5) support from local people was more likely when indigenous groups were involved in destruction programs;
- 6) the Catholic Church lent the process validity and respectability, encouraging compliance;
- 7) even when targets are not reached, they can still have positive psychological and sociological effects.

Central America remains a heavily-armed region. To help address this problem, several recommendations are put forward:

- 1) encourage mandatory and public destruction as an element in all weapons collection efforts;
- 2) recommend destruction policies as a priority within the demobilization process and peacekeeping;
- 3) advocate the establishment of support funds within international and regional organizations (e.g., the Organization of American States (OAS));
- 4) review and improve domestic legislation in post-conflict countries to ensure that those weapons collected are destroyed.

705. DeClerq, David. "Light Weapons: A New Focus for Arms Control and Disarmament." In *Cyberspace and Outer Space: Transitional Challenges for Multilateral Verification in the 21st Century: Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Ottawa NACD Verification Symposium*, eds. J. Marshall Beier and Steven Mataija, Toronto: Center for International and Security Studies, York University, 1997, pp. 207-216.

The end of the Cold War has focused attention on micro-disarmament as it relates to light weapons. While it has been recognized that light weapons are responsible in generating human casualties, until recently arms control efforts have focused on weapons of mass destruction and large conventional weapons systems.

DeClerq maintains that the first significant international attempt to address light weapons proliferation was in January 1995 by Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali when he coined the term micro-disarmament. This article defines micro-disarmament as "the collection and subsequent disposal of light weapons, normally through destruction, used in internal political conflict."

The article outlines many of the issues confronting experts working in the field. One of the key issues to be resolved is where international "arms control" ends, and domestic "firearms regulation and enforcement" begins. Failure to clarify this distinction, DeClerq maintains, will undermine efforts to control light weapons proliferation. Another concern is the definition of light weapons, and whether it will include all firearms (e.g., hunting rifles) or only weapons designed for military purposes. In addition, micro-disarmament efforts must decide whether to focus on misuse from the supply-side, the demand-side, or both.

DeClerq also examines demand-side causes of light weapons proliferation. Intrastate conflict caused by political, economic, and social conditions often exacerbates existing ethnic, religious, language, and ideological tensions. Resulting conflicts initiate demands for light weapons, both by security forces and by citizens. DeClerq maintains that "while there are other issues regarding light weapons proliferation not yet discussed, most are subsets of supply and demand." Educating the public and stigmatizing violence is an area where advocacy groups, media outlets, government, and regional and international bodies can play a role. While involving these groups is easier to implement than supply- or demand-side controls, its effectiveness is slow and problematic.

Also outlined is the Report of the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms [Serial No. I-9], and some of the observations on micro-disarmament carried out under UN Peacekeeping operations. DeClerq concludes that micro-disarmament must be approached "in a holistic and systematic manner." To this end he makes several suggestions:

- 1) ensure that peace negotiations place micro-disarmament on the agenda;
- 2) develop a set of guiding principles for negotiators outlining the benefits of micro-disarmament (e.g., public safety);
- 3) initiate a reward and penalty factor for compliance and noncompliance (e.g., deny assistance if unreported arms caches are discovered);
- 4) provide a central coordinating staff within mission headquarters to develop and apply standard operating procedures and organize weapons collection points, verification, security, and destruction.

He concludes that while the area of light weapons proliferation is one where rapid progress is unlikely, incremental steps can be taken to lessen the destabilizing impact of light weapons surpluses.

706. Donawaki, Mitsuro. "Addressing Light Weapons and Small Arms Proliferation." In Malcolm Chalmers, Mitsuro Donawaki, and Owen Greene, eds. *Developing Arms Transparency: The Future of the United Nations Register*. Bradford Arms Register Studies No. 7. Bradford, England: University of Bradford, 1997, pp. 203-211.

Most weapons used in intrastate conflict since the end of the Cold War are either small arms or light weapons, items not covered by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Donawaki outlines the response of the United Nations to the proliferation of these weapons. For instance, in 1995 the Secretary-General published *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (A/50/60)*, followed by the report of the Small Arms Panel in 1997 [Serial No. I-9]. Donawaki served as

chair of the Small Arms Panel, and presents what he learned in connection with the panel's activities:

- 1) the problems related to small arms and light weapons call for immediate action;
- 2) the question of transparency with respect to these weapons must be tackled from various directions (e.g., harmonize national control laws and regulations pertaining to small arms and light weapons);
- 3) the level of transparency can be increased by lowering the threshold of some of the seven categories of conventional weapons already covered by the UN Register;
- 4) the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons must be countered by some transparency measures;
- 5) the initiative being undertaken by the Rio Group Nations of Latin America is encouraging (i.e., it has been working on a "draft convention against the illicit manufacturing, and trafficking of firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials");
- 6) the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice's report entitled "Measures to Regulate Firearms" contains much useful information (e.g., statistics on criminal cases involving firearms and on transnational illicit trafficking in firearms).

Donawaki concludes that all of these lessons and processes must be used together to help control small arms and light weapons.

707. Donawaki, Mitsuro. "Developing Associated Transparency Measures for Light Weapons and Small Arms and A Regional Arms Register in West Africa." *Disarmament: A Periodical by the United Nations*, Vol. XX, No. 2 & 3, 1997, pp. 103-123.

World leaders began to pay attention to the issue of light weapons and small arms proliferation in 1992 when the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was established. Intrastate conflict is the most common form of fighting in the world today, conducted using small arms and light weapons not covered by the Register. In an attempt to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, United Nations Resolution 50/70B called for the formation of a panel to study the issue. Donawaki outlines the formation of the Small Arms Panel and its 1996 and 1997 meetings.

Donawaki, the chair of the Small Arms Panel, comments on the outcome of its activities. He makes several observations, including the following:

- 1) the problems related to small arms and light weapons call for immediate action;
- 2) transparency can be promoted by lowering the caliber of several categories already covered by the Register (e.g., lowering artillery to include ammunition from 100 mm and above down to 75 mm and above);
- 3) illicit traffic of small arms and light weapons strongly needs to be countered by agreement on some transparency measures (e.g., put in place adequate national laws and regulations about weapons transfers).

Before a regional register can be created, he argues, consultations between military and police officials of each subregion must take place. At this point, national control laws and regulations would have to be enacted and intelligence information exchanged between authorities

in the subregion to curb the illicit trade in such arms. A computerized database to track and store this information would be essential. The net result, Donawaki contends, might be better called a "regional network of information sharing" than a "regional register."

In addition to outlining the reasons behind the creation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, Donawaki surveys its performance between 1992 and 1997. Participation by African States is significantly lower than that of other regions in the world. For most African nations, the real concern is not the types of weapons covered by the Register. Instead, it is small arms and light weapons that pose the greatest threat to security. To address the situation in Africa, the Small Arms Panel held a meeting in Pretoria in September 1996. The question of a regional register was discussed, and Donawaki includes some of the Panel's observations:

- 1) a regional register for West Africa must be different from the global Register (i.e., to account for the prevalence of small arms and light weapons in the region, and to address the fact that these weapons are produced in many more countries than are major conventional weapons systems);
- 2) a regional register must be established jointly by all States in the region or subregion concerned (i.e., to be as informative and as inclusive as possible).

Donawaki concludes that the "act of making public in a subregional reporting device the legal transfers of such weapons that take place would make it easier to track the illicit flow of small arms. If a regional register could be established that would keep track of the reduction of such weapons against the total number of such weapons in existence in the subregion, that would be a landmark achievement indeed!"

708. Gasparini Alves, Péricles and Daiana Belinda Cipollone. "Small Arms and Transparency: Curbing Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies: An Action-Oriented Agenda." *Disarmament: A Periodical by the United Nations*, Vol. XX, No. 2 & 3, 1997, pp. 61-78.

This article is drawn from the forthcoming United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) publication, *Curbing Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies: An Action-Oriented Agenda*, edited by Péricles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone, UNIDIR, United Nations Publication, Geneva, 1998.

The authors argue that the issues of illicit trafficking in small arms and sensitive technologies can be addressed as a single problem. They begin by outlining the nature of the problem. Arms manufacturers and dealers have been involved in illegal transactions, but little is known about the nature of their involvement. Gathering information is made more difficult, however, because illicit trafficking is generally carried out in secret. Looking ahead, the authors argue that new methods must be used to combat illicit trafficking. The level of cooperation between institutions and communities must be increased to take effective action to combat illicit trafficking. There are several areas available for improvement:

- 1) structuring the flow of information and action/reaction capabilities of legal authorities to be more fluent;
- 2) improving technical means at the disposal of law enforcement and information centers (e.g., better telecommunications);

- 3) addressing past problems and transfers (i.e., dealing with weapons and technologies already in circulation);
- 4) cooperating to promote transparency of transfers to provide a greater degree of predictability of illicit events.

Several recommendations to end the illicit trafficking of small arms and sensitive technologies are put forward at the end of the report. Short term actions at the national level should include the following:

- 1) raise the awareness of decision-makers about the growing importance of intelligence gathering to prevent illicit trafficking;
- 2) increase investigations at the center of arms concentrations to reduce their importance in fueling armed violence;
- 3) improve small arms related systems in the possession of civil society;
- 4) improve control mechanisms at border crossings;
- 5) install adequate mechanisms to coordinate the efforts of different agencies;
- 6) implement training courses for those enforcing national laws.

At the regional and global level, the following recommendations are put forward:

- 1) conduct a detailed survey of relevant industries;
- 2) increase cooperation in intelligence activities to enhance detection;
- 3) conduct joint investigations of the border areas and encourage the exchange of information;
- 4) enhance monitoring measures for legitimate international commerce to make it easier to detect unusual flows of goods;
- 5) foster permanent collaboration among countries to implement national control measures for the export of dual use materials;
- 6) encourage information flow among national agencies in the field to improve policies and legislation.

In the longer-term, it is argued, actions should be preemptive. To this end, several proposals are put forward under the following headings:

- 1) cooperative initiatives (e.g., integrate national and international ventures in combating illicit trafficking by conducting training courses to prepare professional staff on the identification, detection and development of illicit traffic);
- 2) legal aspects (e.g., the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC));
- 3) improving technical means (e.g., identifying the dealers, routes and methods used for illicit trafficking).

One clear conclusion is emphasized, namely that "no individual institution could cope with the problem of illicit trafficking in small arms or sensitive technologies on its own, and that no single approach to the issue would work." In addition, no long-term solution can fail to deal with all aspects of the issue. Four themes are stressed in the following recommendations:

- 1) institutions fighting illicit trafficking must know more about each other (i.e., who does what and how);
- 2) the international community must have a new vision of where efforts should be directed in the future;

- 3) the fight against illicit trafficking must be placed on a solid base which addresses both short- and long-term implementation;
- 4) experts and decision-makers must reflect on practical measures that contribute to building international security.

709. Goldring, Natalie J. "Bridging The Gap: Light and Major Conventional Weapons in Recent Conflicts." A Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association. Toronto, Canada: March 18-21, 1997.

Goldring examines the roles of light and major conventional weapons in recent conflicts, stressing the importance of addressing the entire range of weapons used in such conflicts when formulating policy proposals. Particular attention is placed on the need to examine both weapons types, not focusing exclusively on one or the other.

The first section reviews debates on light weapons issues. A relatively recent phenomenon, the literature on small arms and light weapons has been growing tremendously over the last several years. She cautions, however, against allowing a new debate to divide individuals and organizations seeking to control weapons transfers, arguing that light and major conventional weapons transfers pose similar problems.

The second section documents examples of light and major conventional weapon use in current or recent conflicts (i.e., post-1990). A table is produced which lists the countries involved, records the duration of the conflict, and describes the antagonists. Also included is an alphabetically organized list of countries involved in combat, and descriptions of their weapons.

The third section presents a diagram of light weapons transfers to illustrate the dynamics of conventional weapons transfers. The context within which weapons transfers take place is described (e.g., the causes of the conflict, such as disputes over resources). Also reviewed are the differences in production between major and light weapons. For instance, light weapons are supplied by governments, companies, insurgent groups, and individuals; in contrast, major conventional weapons are most often supplied by governments or companies. Goldring posits several policy options to address production controls:

- 1) increase the transparency of production (e.g., disclose production capacity);
- 2) require each manufactured weapon to have a unique mark;
- 3) apply international conventions to domestic production (e.g., the 1899 Hague Declaration banning dum-dum bullets in combat).

Also examined are domestic sources of demand (e.g., armed forces or legal private owners), and policies to address domestic demand (e.g., improve tracking of weapons owned by armed forces). Foreign demand met through legal or illegal means is also surveyed (e.g., insurgent groups or criminal organizations), along with a list of measures which would curb foreign demand:

- 1) increase information available through the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms;
- 2) deal more prominently with light weapons in the Wassenaar Arrangement;
- 3) use confidence- and security-building measures;
- 4) distinguish among "high-tech" and "low-tech" weapons and promote global agreements to ban transfers of "high-tech" weapons;

- 5) destroy surplus weapons;
- 6) limit flows of ammunition.

Goldring concludes by re-emphasizing that combined efforts to limit transfers of major and light conventional weapons are mutually reinforcing.

710. Goldring, Natalie J. "Developing Transparency and Associated Control Measures for Light Weapons." In Malcolm Chalmers, Mitsuro Donawaki, and Owen Greene, eds. *Developing Arms Transparency: The Future of the United Nations Register*. Bradford Arms Register Studies No. 7. Bradford, England: University of Bradford, 1997, pp. 213-231.

This article identifies international cooperative mechanisms that could improve the transparency of light weapons transfers, and outlines obstacles to such efforts. It also suggests adopting measures that move beyond transparency to aid efforts to limit light weapons proliferation. It begins with a working definition for light weapons which includes pistols and revolvers, rifles, machine guns, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, mortars up to 100 mm, associated ammunition and anti-personnel land mines.

Goldring also provides an overview of recent United Nations activities on light weapons (e.g., the UN Disarmament Commission, the Economic and Social Council's Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, and the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms) [Serial No. I-9]. Goldring argues that there are several ways to increase the transparency of light weapons transfers, both inside and outside the United Nations. She examines four options, assessing the advantages and disadvantages of each:

- 1) include detailed information on light weapons transfers in the global register (i.e., the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms);
- 2) develop subregional or regional registers with common forms that are then published as a global register under UN auspices;
- 3) create separate regional or subregional registers not under UN auspices;
- 4) suggest the voluntary provision of information within the global register.

In addition, Goldring posits several other methods available to increase transparency, including the following:

- 1) establish and/or strengthen national laws to oversee the light weapons trade;
- 2) develop reliable data on light weapons transfers (e.g., using detailed case studies of particular countries);
- 3) learn from previous successes and failures to improve efforts in the future.

Goldring maintains that despite its benefits, transparency is only an initial step towards limiting light weapons transfers. She offers several policy options that may help limit light weapons proliferation, including the following:

- 1) controlling individual types of weapons (e.g., anti-personnel land mines);
- 2) focusing on national and international control processes (e.g., improving oversight of existing national controls and enforcement mechanisms);
- 3) focusing on conflict (i.e., working to prevent it from occurring by promoting regional confidence and security-building measures).

Goldring concludes that the UN Register of Conventional Arms, as it is currently constructed, misses key dimensions of weapons procurement and transfers. She recommends expanding its scope to include light weapons or else the Register risks becoming less relevant as time passes.

711. Goldring, Natalie J. "Links Between Domestic Laws and International Light Weapons Control." A Paper Presented at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Controlling the Global Trade in Light Weapons, Washington, D.C.: December 11-12, 1997.

Goldring presents the "preliminary results of a project to develop strategies which would overcome domestic obstacles to the control of light weapons." After reviewing control efforts in the United Kingdom and Australia, Goldring draws examples primarily from the United States. The National Rifle Association (NRA) in the United States objects to most gun control legislation, arguing that it infringes upon citizens' right to bear firearms. Recent United States efforts at gun control are outlined, along with the difficulties associated in enforcing U.S. laws (e.g., lack of political will).

A survey of past and present activities by "pro-gun" organizations is also detailed. Goldring argues that these organizations have worked towards strengthening their own international links, and directly attack light weapons controls and the organizations sponsoring those proposals.

In conclusion, Goldring outlines various policy options to make the connections between domestic gun control and international control over small arms and light weapons:

- 1) increase transparency (i.e., openness favors restraint);
- 2) establish or improve oversight (i.e., ensure that countries have adequate administrative procedures to document imports and exports of these weapons);
- 3) control individual types of weapons (i.e., ban entire categories of weapons);
- 4) limit ammunition (i.e., gradually making existing weapons useless);
- 5) limit high-tech light weapons transfers (e.g., surface-to-air missiles);
- 6) focus on national and international control processes (e.g., enhance national policies);
- 7) increase domestic oversight (e.g., increase monitoring and controlling of domestic access to weapons);
- 8) destroy surplus weapons;
- 9) strengthen regional and international cooperation to combat the illicit weapons trade;
- 10) mark all small arms and light weapons at the time of manufacture;
- 11) focus on conflict (i.e., work to prevent it from occurring);
- 12) destroy weapons when conflicts end (i.e., destruction prevents reuse).

Many of these recommendations are mutually reinforcing. One key to future progress, Goldring argues, "will be joint action by non-governmental organizations working on a variety of issues, including humanitarian aid, disarmament, gun control, and development."

712. Goldring, Natalie J. "Overcoming Domestic Obstacles to Light Weapons Control." In *Arms Control Issues for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. James Brown, Albuquerque, New Mexico: Sandia National Laboratories, 1997, pp. 195-219.

This paper presents developing and evaluating strategies to overcome domestic obstacles to the control of light weapons. It argues that it will be difficult to control illicit light weapons transfers without monitoring and controlling domestic access to weapons. Goldring analyzes the light weapons problem, and outlines domestic measures to control light weapons. National laws governing light weapons vary widely from country to country, and Goldring analyzes United States gun laws because its weapons production is a major part of the world weapons market. Several aspects of United States gun laws are evaluated:

- 1) pending legislation (e.g., Anti-Gun Invasion Act of 1997);
- 2) difficulties in enforcing existing laws (e.g., Central and South American countries complain that the United States is not stopping the flow of guns from its borders).

In recent years, international efforts have been increasingly directed at solving the light weapons problem. Goldring reviews the activities of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Economic and Social Council's Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, and the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. It will be difficult, she argues, to control light weapons trade without controlling domestic access to weapons. Fearing pressure for domestic gun-control, gun organizations have strengthened their own international links and have attacked proposals for light weapons control as well as the organizations sponsoring those efforts.

Several options and strategies to connect domestic gun-control with international gun-control are reviewed:

- 1) control individual types of weapons (e.g., the campaign to ban anti-personnel land mines, or limit the amount of ammunition available);
- 2) focus on national and international control processes (e.g., greater oversight of existing national control and enforcement mechanisms);
- 3) focus on conflict (e.g., regional confidence and security building measures can be useful, as can measures to prevent destabilizing accumulations of arms).

713. Greene, Owen. *Tackling Light Weapons Proliferation: Issues and Priorities for the EU*. Saferworld Report. April 1997.

Greene argues that it is time for the "EU and its member states to take concerted action to tackle light weapons proliferation." The paper is structured around the development of three broad arguments on how the EU and its member countries can control light weapons proliferation.

First, strengthen EU states' controls on exports of light weapons. Several proposals are put forward to accomplish this end:

- 1) strengthen and coordinate national export controls on light weapons;
- 2) increase the "traceability" of arms supplies and destinations (e.g., tag all weapons and ammunition);
- 3) strengthen and harmonize EU end-use controls on light weapons transfers;

- 4) launch an EU program to tackle illicit arms transfers;
- 5) improve EU capacity to effectively implement arms embargoes.

Second, develop coherent EU assistance programs to regions of conflict. Several mechanisms are posited to help accomplish this goal:

- 1) improve the coherence of EU policy towards regions in conflict;
- 2) integrate security assistance with development aid (i.e., do not neglect security in favor of aid);
- 3) assist regions in conflict (or tension) to control light weapons (e.g., assist with demobilization or disarmament programs).

Third, develop wider international co-operation to tackle light weapons proliferation. To this end, Greene provides four mechanisms:

- 1) strengthen co-operation with other suppliers (e.g., assist East/Central European and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to strengthen national export control systems);
- 2) develop transparency arrangements for light weapons (e.g., expand the UN Register of Conventional Arms to include some light weapons);
- 3) promote the development of co-operative international controls (e.g., strengthen end-use controls);
- 4) promote the destruction of surplus light weapons.

Greene concludes by re-emphasizing that it is time for the EU and its member states to take concerted action to tackle light weapons proliferation. A key first step would be to clearly accept the issue as legitimate, and place it on the EU's agenda.

714. King, Jeremy. "Intrastate Conflict and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Expanding the Disarmament Agenda." *The Bulletin*. Vol. 10, No. 1, Winter 1996/97, pp. 5-7.

King attributes the increase in intrastate conflict and the demand for small arms to two factors: the demise of the Cold War concept of client states, and the emergence of fragmented states. Current peace processes are hampered by the lack of consistent strategies to manage small arms. To stop the costs associated with small arms proliferation, however, international organizations must address this issue. This paper has two goals:

- 1) to address small arms proliferation, especially within intrastate conflicts;
- 2) to identify obstacles which must be overcome in order to establish control over the transfer of small arms.

The Yugoslavian crisis is discussed briefly to illustrate that if there is a demand for arms, arms embargoes only succeed in driving the trade underground. Moreover, existing control regimes are not appropriate for small arms. New control regimes must be created, directed at the following:

- 1) curbing the illicit arms trade;
- 2) securing internal and regional stability;
- 3) disarming ex-combatants and civilians.

King concludes that for small arms controls to be effective, coordination between the United Nations, regional organizations, and individual states must be secured.

715. Klare, Michael T. "The New Arms Race: Light Weapons and International Security."
Current History. April 1997, pp. 173-178.

With the end of the Cold War and the rise of intrastate conflict, policymakers have paid more attention to the role of small arms and light weapons in sustaining low-level warfare. A variety of factors make these weapons suitable for intrastate warfare:

- 1) they are more affordable;
- 2) they do not require extensive logistical support networks;
- 3) they suit the character of ethnic and sectarian warfare (i.e., the intimidation of another group, forcing its members to abandon their homes and villages).

While small arms do not in and of themselves cause war, they can prolong the duration and intensity of conflict. They pose a significant hazard to United Nations forces enforcing peace agreements, and continue to threaten international security as former soldiers use their weapons for criminal purposes.

While there has been an increase in international awareness on the extent of the problem, Klare warns that solutions will be a long time in coming. One of the greatest obstacles is the lack of information on the international trade of these weapons. On the supply-side, weapons can be purchased legally from the government of a country. Non-state actors must rely on the illicit trade for their arms and ammunition. Weapons can be obtained in three ways:

- 1) stealing from government stockpiles;
- 2) purchasing on the international black market;
- 3) exploiting ties to government agencies in other countries.

Klare emphasizes that any attempt to restrict the proliferation of small arms and light weapons must address the reality that there are two distinct, if related, sources of supply (i.e., overt and covert). When dealing with government to government trade, control efforts are hampered by the attitude of most governments who believe these weapons are essential in preserving their sovereignty. Nevertheless, Klare outlines several proposals to restrict the small arms trade:

- 1) insist on some degree of international transparency (i.e., comparable to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms);
- 2) require arms suppliers to abide by certain specified human rights considerations before transferring small arms and light weapons (e.g., no transfer if the democratic process has been suspended);
- 3) adopt restrictions on the transfer of certain types of weapons that are especially cruel or barbaric (e.g., anti-personnel land mines).

In contrast, stopping black market traffic requires a totally different approach. Since suppliers and recipients are already, by definition, breaking international laws, asking them to abide by new agreements is futile. Instead, governments must enforce existing internal controls and cooperate with other states to suppress illegal gun traffickers (e.g., all nations in a particular region should agree to uniform export restrictions). The goal should not be to completely eliminate this source of supply, but to restrict it, thereby forcing belligerents to seek a negotiated settlement.

716. Latham, Andrew. "Taking the Lead? Light Weapons and International Security." *International Journal*. Vol. LII, Spring 1997, pp. 316-341.

Latham warns that "unless and until the ubiquity, ready availability, and continuing proliferation of light weapons is recognized as a serious impediment to democratization, development, good governance, and peacebuilding, it is unlikely that serious steps will be taken to develop a comprehensive strategy for dealing with them." The purpose of the article is threefold:

- 1) to provide an overview of the causes and consequences of light weapons proliferation;
- 2) to develop a framework for practical, realistic, and constructive measures to address the problem;
- 3) to identify ways in which Canada might take the lead in advancing this agenda.

Latham outlines several consequences of the ready availability and widespread diffusion of light weapons, including the following:

- 1) undermining traditional and modern institutional arrangements of public order, conflict mediation, good governance, and national defense;
- 2) promoting "cultures of violence" (i.e., transforming a culture to make violent responses to social problems normal);
- 3) thwarting progress toward democratic governance (i.e., arms can lead to an increased dependence on violence as an instrument of political control);
- 4) polarizing societies and intensifying intercommunal violence;
- 5) undercutting humanitarian development (i.e., all light weapons can be used in an inhumane fashion);
- 6) prolonging social conflict and undermining efforts at post-conflict peacebuilding.

Also outlined are several causal factors which contribute to the proliferation of light weapons:

- 1) the absence of durable political institutions capable of meeting basic human security needs (e.g., the inability of many states to secure persons against either organized or unorganized violence);
- 2) the existence of particularly authoritarian states, posing a threat to individuals or communal groups (i.e., causing people/groups to turn to light weapons for security);
- 3) the acceptance of "traditional gun cultures" and "militarizing cultures" (i.e., those in which it is not only acceptable but desirable to possess light weapons);
- 4) the increased availability of light weapons in recent years (i.e., resulting from increased production by traditional suppliers like the United States and France, as well as by "third-tier" producers like China and Brazil, along with the selling of surplus weapons since the end of the Cold War);
- 5) the existence of poorly suited or inadequately enforced import and export controls to monitor the flow of light weapons.

Latham argues that there are several options for addressing the light weapons problem, which he maintains fit into four general strategies:

- 1) norm-building (i.e., establish a common understanding of the legitimate limits on the trade in light weapons);

- 2) enhancing transparency measures (i.e., create a more accurate picture of the global trade in light weapons);
- 3) strengthening controls (i.e., establish regulatory measures which limit the quantity or quality of weapons in circulation);
- 4) developing the institutions of sustainable human security (i.e., reduce levels of insecurity among persons and communities both during and after conflict).

Noting the success that Canada enjoyed in promoting the anti-personnel land mines treaty, Latham concludes that middle powers such as Canada possess enough influence to play a role in promoting disarmament processes. Latham points to four leadership strategies that Canada might pursue in connection with light weapons:

- 1) it could contribute to norm-building by promoting discussion of the legitimate limits of the right to acquire light weapons;
- 2) it could provide leadership by promoting the development of regional transparency, thereby helping accelerate the development of shared non-proliferation norms that reflect local concerns;
- 3) it could actively promote supply-side controls (e.g., by providing assistance to "weak" states to improve their export and border controls);
- 4) it could exercise political leverage to encourage the evolution of sustainable security practices and institutions.

717. Laurance, Edward J. "Dealing With the Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Progress Report and the Way Forward." A Paper Presented at the Conference on Controlling the Global Trade in Light Weapons. Washington, D.C.: December 1997.

Laurance summarizes what has been done in the field of small arms and light weapons proliferation, and outlines future steps to combat the problem. Six "clusters of knowledge" are outlined:

- 1) intrastate conflict is the predominant form of violence, and is prosecuted by irregular groups (e.g., criminals and terrorists) using small arms and light weapons;
- 2) solutions to the above problems require a multilateral response;
- 3) supply and demand causes for small arms and light weapons proliferation must be examined;
- 4) consensus is emerging on the nature of the weapons used in intrastate conflict (i.e., small cost, smaller arms);
- 5) small arms and light weapons are acquired by both licit and illicit transfers;
- 6) societal consequences of the indiscriminate and unlawful use of small arms and light weapons are now painfully clear (e.g., 90 percent of casualties involve civilians).

He also outlines the activity which has taken place to address the problem. The United Nations has been an international focal point for action, culminating in several measures (e.g., UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced *An Agenda for Peace* which called for progress in controlling small arms and light weapons). The World Bank and regional organizations have also played a role (e.g., the EU agreed to an *EU Program for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms*). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

and independent researchers have also documented the link between the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and armed violence.

The next steps in combating the problem are also outlined. First, creating an early warning system to announce arms flows and accumulations. This information could be gathered in numerous ways:

- 1) monitor arms in post-conflict peace operations;
- 2) monitor post-Cold War arms surpluses and their export to other states;
- 3) evaluate attempts made by states to secure external support for action (i.e., historically a precursor to violence);
- 4) secure sources of small arms and light weapons more effectively to prevent theft;
- 5) determine levels of corruption in official circles;
- 6) survey illicit commodities networks to garner information;
- 7) monitor black market prices to determine stocks;
- 8) track the availability and shipment of ammunition;
- 9) patrol borders between states;
- 10) evaluate weapons used by gangs (i.e., higher sophistication in weaponry often means higher availability);
- 11) record legitimate arms acquisitions (i.e., often a sign of citizens losing faith in their system and seeking to protect themselves);
- 12) document sudden public displays of military-style weapons (i.e., often a precursor to widespread violence);
- 13) monitor government programs which distribute weapons to citizens to see if there is any indication of an increased potential for uncontrolled violence;
- 14) monitor the demobilization of former soldiers.

The second major step forward could be achieved through greater transparency, beginning with the legitimate trade of arms. Among the proposals put forward is one that maintains that if arms flows are too difficult to monitor, the production levels of manufacturers and legitimate arms traders could be made public.

The report ends with a series of recommended policy actions, shaped to promote the two measures outlined above: an early warning system and increased transparency. To that end, the UN could do several things:

- 1) implement early warning and transparency in peacekeeping operations;
- 2) include a mandate to collect and destroy all weapons related to the conflict;
- 3) change the focus of the UN bureaucracy to be less conservative;
- 4) create a specific department dedicated to arms issues at UN Peacekeeping Operations in New York.

Laurance also outlines several proposals put forward by the UN Panel on Small Arms (e.g., UN should support all post-conflict disarmament initiatives related to disarmament and demobilization). Laurance believes that regional organizations will play a key role in the struggle to limit small arms and light weapons proliferation (e.g., intelligence sharing). Embargoes enforced by the UN or regional organizations, urging a moratorium on the shipping of arms, or attempting to limit the transfer of ammunition, may also be effective ways to proceed. Security for existing sources of small arms and light weapons must be tightened, cooperation between

different organizations with the same demobilization goals must be enhanced, and rewards should be given to individuals or parties willing to promote disarmament.

At the national level, regulations could facilitate the process, including those already adopted by the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (e.g., improved firearm safety and storage, and increased penalties for misuse of firearms), as well as incorporating suggestions made by the UN Small Arms Panel (e.g., destroy unnecessary weapons). The NGO community must provide information necessary to create policy. The academic community must continue to document the link between arms and violence. An international effort is required to raise awareness on the importance of the issue. The "Ottawa Process Three" campaign is outlined and a plea is made for financial support.

718. Lock, Peter. "Armed Conflicts and Small Arms Proliferation: Refocusing the Research Agenda." *Policy Sciences*. Vol. 30, 1997, pp. 117-132.

Since the Secretary General of the United Nations wrote "An Agenda for Peace," increased attention has been devoted to small arms and light weapons proliferation. If small arms are to be better controlled, supply-side controls must follow the variable life cycles of small arms and ammunition to determine the nature of the small arms trade. During the Cold War, the two superpowers supplied vast quantities of arms to friendly forces. Since the end of the Cold War, states have been selling surplus weapons. Small arms also enter the black market after passing through the hands of the armed forces, police forces, private security services and individually licensed persons (e.g., through the theft or greed of the sellers). Any reduction in the sources of supply will have a beneficial "crowding out effect" at the demand-side.

The issue must also be approached from the demand-side. Unfortunately, knowledge of the world of intermediaries is limited because it is, by definition, criminal. Lock examines several sources of funds and arms supplies (e.g., covert support and collusion from within the government, and appropriation as a result of violent military action). He concludes that the "reproduction and re-supply of the war fighting at the sub-state actor's level hinges on external collaboration which might be both easier to target and more effective when controlled than internal sources of revenue."

Lock argues that it is the "changing nature of wars and their root causes which forces the international community to rethink its basically military approaches to peace enforcement lest a qualitative new cycle of militarizing international relations -- this time affecting and arming all layers of society -- will follow the Cold War."

719. Mathiak, Lucy. "The Light Weapons Trade at the End of the Century." In *Society Under Siege: Crime, Violence, and Illegal Weapons*, ed. Virginia Gamba, Cape Town: Institute for Security Studies, 1997, pp. 73-102.

Mathiak identifies key groups of suppliers and their changing motivations for participating in the light weapons trade. In addition, she examines such related issues as the changing roles of states, the diffusion of light weapons production, and the strengthened world roles of transnational factors. The arms trade has undergone a transformation in the wake of the Cold

War, and Mathiak outlines the nature of that process. Unfortunately, she argues, the international traffic in light weapons has accelerated since the end of the Cold War. The impetus behind the trade in light weapons is now largely economic rather than political or strategic, but the volume of arms remains high.

External security agendas have changed since the end of the Cold War, with militaries redefining their roles to include warring against drugs, peacekeeping, and protecting natural resources. As a result, states continue to arm other states and substate groups. States also have important domestic motivations to produce and transfer light weapons, the most important of which are the need to arm repressive apparatuses and to generate income from external sources.

The diffusion of small arms and light weapons has been compounded by the decentralization of small arms production. The commercialization of governmental trade in light weapons has become an important financial resource for cash-strapped economies, and helps to underwrite military research and development. For example, when the Soviet Union disintegrated it was in need of hard currency, and since small arms were readily available and valued in the external market, weapons "poured out" of its borders.

In addition to states supplying light weapons, the black and grey markets constitute a significant source of light weapons proliferation. Because participants in this sphere operate outside formal, legal channels, they are difficult to control. Moreover, the variety of agents engaged in this trade includes everything from police or security units to criminal organizations. The major source for black market trading is the large stock of weapons rendered surplus by the end of the Cold War. In many countries, monitoring and controlling these stockpiles has proven incredibly difficult.

Mathiak concludes that the "proliferation of producers, the spread of weapons within civil society and the fragile condition of many states has meant that states have lost significant measures of control over the means of violence." In the face of economic forces which promote light weapons proliferation, regimes that require small arms to equip repressive military structures, and the ability of transnational organized crime to threaten or intimidate governments, "it is hard to find reasons for optimism that the trade in light weapons will be diminished -- much less controlled -- in the near future."

720. Meek, Sarah. "United Nations Report on Firearms Regulation." Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Occasional Paper No. 23. APC Electronic Computer Conference, June 1997.

This report summarizes the report on firearms regulation of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in four sections: the first reviews the findings of the report, the second discusses information provided on the trafficking and smuggling of firearms, the third reviews the conclusions and recommendations of the commission, and the fourth suggests policy options for South Africa. Meek puts forward four regional initiatives which South Africa might consider:

- 1) review restrictions on hand gun imports;
- 2) review legislation on the storage of ammunition and circumstances under which a firearm is to be stored;

- 3) continue to use an amnesty period to collect unlicensed firearms;
- 4) develop bilateral and regional arrangements on the movement of firearms and information sharing with neighboring countries.

Meek praises South Africa for participating in the Crime Commission's report, but advises that it should not miss the opportunity to use this information to learn from its global partners.

721. Musah, Abdel Fatau, with Geraldine O'Callaghan and Khalid Majid. "Africa: The Challenge of Light Weapons Destruction During Peacekeeping Operations." British American Security Information Council Papers: Occasional Papers on International Security Issues, No. 23, December 1997.

The growing numbers of small arms in circulation in Africa diminishes the prospects of ending civil wars, and increases the probability of new conflicts breaking out. This study analyzes the reasons for which major weapons have been given priority in terms of collection, and the consequences of this phenomenon. In most cases, post-conflict demilitarization in Africa has not been carried to its conclusion. Several factors are cited to account for this shortfall:

- 1) inadequate mandates and/or insufficient resources for operations (e.g., Angola);
- 2) absence of an inclusive atmosphere, such as a multi-track approach, before deploying peacekeeping forces (e.g., Somalia);
- 3) lack of impartiality, fairness and firmness on the part of peace brokers;
- 4) failure to adopt a "Security First" approach (i.e., demilitarization is accompanied by a socio-economic package to assist societal reintegration).

This study examines case studies of demilitarization and destruction in Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Mali, and Liberia. The evidence supports the claim that the inability to pursue destruction thoroughly has significantly hampered the long-term reconstruction of civil society. The report also concludes that destruction can significantly reduce the levels of guns in circulation. Several recommendations are put forward to ensure effective disarmament:

- 1) address collection and destruction within the context of disarmament;
- 2) ensure adequate resources for operations necessary to fully execute the mandate;
- 3) carry out the mission in an inclusive atmosphere (i.e., one that addresses the needs and concerns of all parties);
- 4) create effective mechanisms to ensure impartiality.

In addition, the report advocates the creation of a comprehensive arms management mechanism which includes the following elements:

- 1) initiating comprehensive programs for the disarming of combatants;
- 2) assisting in the reintegration of de-mobilized soldiers back into civil society;
- 3) ensuring the collection and destruction of weapons and ammunition;
- 4) blocking access to easy riches (e.g., diamonds) to warring factions;
- 5) tackling underlying social and economic causes of conflict (e.g., taking a "Security First" approach to conflict resolution).

On the basis of these case studies, it is argued that regional and international support could be enhanced, especially in the following areas:

- 1) controlling arms transfers to the country and/or region of conflict (e.g., embargoes);

- 2) blocking illicit light weapons trade routes (e.g., border cooperation);
- 3) encouraging regional cooperation to uncover and destroy weapons caches;
- 4) controlling the production and transfer of ammunition;
- 5) developing inexpensive methods of weapons destruction (e.g., a hydraulic press);
- 6) re-training police, border guards and customs officials.

The report concludes that an integrated conflict resolution package that combines non-military security with a military component is crucial to the success of post-conflict peacebuilding.

722. Rahman, Reaz. "The Illicit Flow of Small Arms in South Asia." *Disarmament: A Periodical by the United Nations*, Vol. XX, No. 2 & 3, 1997, pp. 79-102.

Rahman argues that there is a vital need to identify the nature and dynamics of the illicit flow of small arms, and he does so by focusing on South Asia, particularly Bangladesh and Northeast India. A definition of small arms is offered that includes "all crew portable direct fire weapons of a caliber less than 50 mm and which will include a secondary capability to defeat light armor and helicopters." South Asia has a vast range of light weapons available, arriving in the region through a variety of routes:

- 1) Cold War pipelines (i.e., each superpower supplied allies with sophisticated small arms);
- 2) national production, import or transfer of technology;
- 3) surplus stockpiles (i.e., the end of the Cold War prompted many states to sell surplus weapons);
- 4) the black market;
- 5) escalating subnational arms races (i.e., as more illegal arms become available, qualitative improvements are more affordable).

Also reviewed is the political setting and the socio-economic backdrop in South Asia. Rahman outlines the impact of the geographic distribution of states in South Asia, the impact of adverse colonial legacies, as well as religious, linguistic and ethnic tensions. Since the end of the Cold War, ideology and military culture ceased to be the major causes of conflict. Intrastate conflict replaced interstate fighting, prompted by the release of long suppressed ethnic, religious and tribal tensions. In these conflicts, small arms are the weapons of choice. Several changes which have taken place in the small arms trade in recent years are outlined:

- 1) new weapons are surfacing in the hands of guerrillas/insurgents (e.g., rocket-propelled grenades);
- 2) spectacular bombing attacks have taken place on trains, highways and courtrooms in Northeast India;
- 3) large quantities of arms, ammunition, drugs and intoxicants are being supplied in border areas;
- 4) insurgent groups have been coordinating activities (e.g., to better acquire weapons);
- 5) the criminal underworld is well organized;
- 6) security forces have to deal with changing political leadership and directives as well as with criminals.

The security and political settings in Bangladesh and in Northeast India are analyzed as case studies. On the basis of this evidence, Rahman concludes that few credible options to address small arms proliferation exist, and that there is little inclination to take up the task. The first measure to be undertaken is the promotion of transparency to help understand the dynamics of small arms proliferation. Primary responsibility for action lies at the national level, and countries must strengthen and enforce existing legislation. At the regional level, states could cooperate to curb cross-border insurgency and terrorist activities. For the international level, Rahman puts forward a variety of suggestions:

- 1) make extradition treaties among states the rule rather than the exception;
- 2) strengthen Interpol cooperation;
- 3) increase media publicity at all levels;
- 4) strengthen monitoring by human rights agencies;
- 5) keep the small arms issue on the international agenda;
- 6) extend the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include small arms;
- 7) hold review conferences on specific small arms;
- 8) impose curbs on small arms production by major arms manufacturers and on the sale of ammunition;
- 9) strengthen all measures aimed at the prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes.

723. Regehr, Ernie. "Militarizing Despair: The Politics of Small Arms." *New Routes: A Journal of Peace Research and Action*. Vol. 2, No. 4, 1997, pp. 3-6.

Regehr defines small arms as any weapon between (and including) a revolver and a machine gun. The fundamental problem internationally, however, is with assault rifles (e.g., AK-47). These weapons provide those driven by political desperation or domestic despair with the tools to continue fighting. The result is growing insecurity and violence. While the campaign to ban anti-personnel land mines provides an attractive model to deal with small arms, Regehr argues the differences between land mines and small arms are too great for it to be practicable. The fundamental difference, he maintains, is that small arms do not kill indiscriminately. Moreover, many military and political leaders will not be convinced that small arms are unnecessary for security.

The pressure to do something about small arms proliferation, however, is mounting. There is a growing consensus that small arms are contributing to political instability, human insecurity, and humanitarian crises worldwide. Regehr outlines several policy options to address the issue of supply:

- 1) recognize that there must be a clear distinction between the kinds of weapons that are legitimately available to military and law enforcement officers and those available to civilians;
- 2) create adequate state-based licensing arrangements for all weapons;
- 3) mark all weapons at point of manufacture to track movement;
- 4) establish regulations governing safe and secure storage of weapons;
- 5) establish and maintain effective controls over the export of weapons;
- 6) promote transparency in small arms management and control.

Control efforts must also confront the reality that more than 100 million small arms are already in circulation. To deal with this situation, Regehr promotes the adoption of plans to collect and destroy surplus weapons. Law enforcement efforts to control illicit use of weapons must also be supported. New ground rules must be established through the formulation of a new peacebuilding paradigm which engages civil society in formulating policy options, mitigates conditions that promote demand for weapons, and understands control measures as part of the effort to establish conditions conducive to stability and the emergence of a longer term peace.

724. Renner, Michael. *Small Arms, Big Impact: The Next Challenge of Disarmament*.
Worldwatch Paper No. 137. Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, October 1997.

This annotation comments on each section of Renner's study. The labels in quotation marks correspond to his section titles.

"Introduction"

Renner begins by outlining the importance of studying the impact of small arms and light weapons. The largest supplier, by a large margin, remains governments. However, since such large numbers of small weapons are already in circulation, the first task is to reduce their quantities (e.g., using gun buy-backs). Initiatives must also be undertaken on the demand-side (e.g., programs to help re-integrate soldiers to civilian life). Citing the success of the anti-personnel land mine campaign, Renner argues that similar energy can be manufactured by dramatizing the "devastating impacts of assault rifles and other small weapons."

"Wars and Privatized Violence"

Renner outlines several reasons why small weapons are harder to track and control than major weapons systems:

- 1) their importance is too easily underestimated;
- 2) their low-cost makes them affordable to many sub-state groups;
- 3) they do not require complex logistical networks to maintain;
- 4) they are easy to assemble and can be used by a wide range of people, including children;
- 5) they are easy to conceal and smuggle;
- 6) they are not quickly rendered obsolete.

"As Easy As Buying Fish in the Market"

Unfortunately, many parts of the world are awash in small arms and light weapons which now number in excess of 500 million worldwide. A survey of several countries is conducted (e.g., the United States, Brazil, Russia, and the regions of Central America and southern Africa). There are both individual countries and whole regions inundated with arms, both military and civilian. Existing controls are insufficient to meet the emergency.

"Lethal Harvests"

This section deals with the prevalence and deadly nature of land mines. Recalling the success of the recent anti-land mine campaign, efforts must continue and build upon its success.

"Feeding the Habit"

This section details the supply-side of the small arms problem. Government-to-government transfers remain the most important source given that many states possess the technology to produce small arms. While little is publicly known about these transfers, even less

is known about the multitude of secret and illegal deals. The arms market is also fed by private arms merchants and criminal organizations, as well as by insurgent forces looting military supplies. Surplus weapons held by governments have been increasingly available on the open market since the end of the Cold War as states scale back their militaries. Weapons already in circulation are often recycled from one trouble zone to another.

"The Challenge of Shrinking Armies"

While the reduction of global armies during the past decade has been a welcome development, it has brought new challenges. Both ex-soldiers and their weapons are a source of concern. While some demobilization plans have been orderly (e.g., the United States and Germany), others have not been (e.g., states in the former Soviet Union). Renner examines these campaigns, along with efforts by numerous states to re-integrate soldiers into civilian life (e.g., Eritrea, Nicaragua, Mozambique and Angola). While the experience of each state has been different, they have one factor in common: "the positive trend of shrinking armies is clouded to some extent by the threat of large quantities of arms leaking and dispersing to new conflicts, and former soldiers becoming agents of discontent and instability."

"Taking Weapons Out of Circulation"

Renner argues the first challenge is to reduce the number of small arms already in circulation. This process involves stopping industrialized countries from selling surplus weapons cheaply, and collecting those weapons left over from civil wars before they are smuggled elsewhere. He emphasizes that the data available from the last few years suggest that "programs to collect arms will need considerable refinement and more substantial financial and political support if they are to succeed."

"Adopting the 'Orphans' of Arms Control"

By using this phrase, Renner refers to small arms and light weapons as the orphans of arms control efforts directed at major weapons systems. Renner offers several suggestions on how best to approach the problem of small arms and light weapons proliferation:

- 1) establish a register of small arms, either on a global or on a regional basis;
- 2) adopt an international "code of conduct" to govern small arms transfers;
- 3) clamp down on illegal transfers (i.e., even disrupting the biggest transfers would curtail international shipments);
- 4) enhance national customs controls to improve the monitoring of cross-border flows of goods;
- 5) address the issue of continued production (e.g., provide economic alternatives to work forces and communities dependent on arms production);
- 6) curtail domestic demand for guns (e.g., by restricting the number of guns considered legal).

Renner concludes by offering several lessons to be drawn from the anti-personnel land mines fight (e.g., persistent and dedicated work by NGOs can place any issue on any government's agenda). The final key to change is public awareness. Renner believes that a "strong constituency for alternative policies can be brought to life by making clear the horrendous effects of the virtually unlimited availability of small arms."

725. Smaldone, Joseph P. "Mali's Proposed Small Arms Moratorium: A West African Regional Arms Control Initiative." A Paper Presented at the Policy Workshop on Controlling Trade in Light Weapons: Policy Options for National Governments and the International Community, Convened by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and Hosted by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Washington, D.C.: December 11-12, 1997.

Smaldone outlines the factors which led the Mali government to ask the United Nations for assistance in dealing with the proliferation of small arms, and to lead "a West African subregional effort to inaugurate a five-year moratorium on the import, export, and manufacture of small arms." Most of the article presents the history leading up to the Mali initiative, including the process of implementing the request, diplomatic efforts, and the concept of the moratorium.

The substantive part of Smaldone's article examines the prospects and significance of the Mali initiative. Smaldone argues that the initiative's success will depend upon the regions' leaders and on international support. It is significant, however, for several reasons:

- 1) it provides a model for a low-key, low-cost, bottom-up approach to conflict resolution;
- 2) it could inspire similar efforts elsewhere;
- 3) it demonstrates that conflict resolution is cheaper than conflict;
- 4) it is a test case of the utility of the "security first approach" to security and development;
- 5) it promotes the necessity of considering some well-targeted programs to support conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding;
- 6) it suggests the need for a holistic approach to institution building with respect to the military;
- 7) it should be seen within the context of a groundswell of support for small arms control;
- 8) it is a modest but unprecedented arms control initiative.

726. Van Der Graaf, Henny J. "Proliferation of Light Weapons in Africa." *Policy Sciences*. Vol. 30, 1997, pp. 133-141.

The author argues that until recently, the attention of the international community has been focused on major conventional weapons systems. However, these weapons play a limited role in Africa's internal conflicts. It is argued that efforts to control the illicit flow of light weapons can only be effective through a regional or subregional approach. Despite the fact that international organizations like the United Nations and the European Union are paying "lip service" to the merits of devising guidelines for the transfer of conventional weapons, in "practice economic principles remain the decisive factor."

Several measures are outlined which could help alleviate the problem of light weapons proliferation in Africa:

- 1) establish National Commissions on the Proliferation of Small Arms (already done in many countries);
- 2) strengthen national legal instruments and judicial procedures regarding the circulation and transfer of illicit weapons;

- 3) provide external security assistance to uniformed forces in charge of maintaining law and order;
- 4) use national information programs (e.g., the United Nations could sponsor media programs which inform the population about problems with illicit arms);
- 5) encourage states to cooperate with other countries in the region (e.g., establish regional training centers for police and customs agents).

Van Der Graaf cautions, however, that the demand-side of light weapons proliferation at the regional level cannot ignore developments at the global level. Several proposals are put forward to help regulate the trade in light weapons:

- 1) control the production of light weapons;
- 2) improve national controls on the illegal shipment of light weapons;
- 3) strengthen legal instruments regarding the circulation of light weapons;
- 4) include light weapons in the new international regime for export controls of conventional weapons (i.e., the Wassenaar Arrangement);
- 5) include light weapons in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms or, preferably, in regional registers;
- 6) destroy surplus stocks of light weapons;
- 7) pay more attention to gun buy-back programs.

It is concluded that curbing the proliferation "of light weapons is certainly not a lost battle provided the political will exists in taking effective measures." Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are advised to pressure national governments by emphasizing how the accumulation and misuse of light weapons can lead to serious negative consequences.

PART B.3 — ITEMS AVAILABLE IN 1998

801. Austin, Kathi. "Security Issues, Arms Flows and Violence in Rwanda." A Paper Presented at the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, US Congress, May 5, 1998.

Austin outlines background information on how the flow of small arms and light weapons into Rwanda has contributed to over a million deaths in the past four years. She accords particular blame to the United States for failing to stop the flow of arms to all warring parties. Several security and human rights themes which emerged during the field mission are outlined:

- 1) violence in Rwanda has overwhelmed the political process and U.S. foreign policy has not been effective in addressing this fact;
- 2) foreign and domestic political changes in Rwanda are still overwhelmingly the result of the threat or use of violence;
- 3) weapons continue to be acquired by all manner of organizations and individuals for defence;
- 4) weapons proliferation negatively affects other non-governmental organizations' (NGOs) efforts (e.g., relief aid for refugees);
- 5) United States efforts have been insufficient (e.g., it has not made human rights a condition for aid packages);
- 6) leaders of warring parties have placed a priority on securing small arms and light weapons, thereby increasing the potential for violence.

The report ends with a series of recommendations for the United States to follow to create a more effective foreign policy. With regards to small arms and light weapons specifically, Austin recommends that all flows of these weapons from the United States to the affected region be stopped.

802. Author Unknown. *Proposals for an Effective EU Code of Conduct on the Arms Trade.* Amnesty International, British American Security Information Council, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Saferworld, World Development Movement, May 1998.

This document assesses the proposals of the European Union (EU) to develop an effective EU Code of Conduct on the arms trade. The British and French proposal for a European Code of Conduct on the arms trade is welcomed. However, the paper argues that there is a "worrying gap between the proposed text and the essential standards that are required for an effective Code." The paper puts forward a series of recommendations on how the Code could be strengthened.

It is argued that the aims of the Code, as articulated in the preamble, must acknowledge that EU security depends upon the protection of human rights, the rule of law, and economic and social development, and that a strong defense industry should serve these aims. The Code must also do more than recognize that the United Nations Charter grants states the right to self-defence. Other basic rights and duties of states must also be addressed.

In addition, The Code of Conduct's information exchange and consultation mechanisms are insufficient to ensure the consistent implementation of the Code by all member states. Several examples are provided which illustrate this point:

- 1) denial and approval notification (i.e., member states have to notify others when they refuse export licenses, but no details of the information or timeframe required are mentioned);

- 2) no undercutting (i.e., if one country has refused an export licence, multilateral consultations are necessary, and other countries should be notified of an intention to undercut 30 days in advance to allow in-depth multilateral consultations);

- 3) control lists (i.e., member states should adopt harmonized control lists which cover exports of, among other things, small arms).

The proposed export guidelines are criticized for being ambiguous and leaving too much room for subjective interpretation. For instance, the types of considerations to be considered when granting export licenses are outlined, but they fail to specify how these concerns will have a material impact on arms export decisions. The guidelines should state clearly where arms exports should be denied. Three recommendations are offered to strengthen export control guidelines:

- 1) human rights (i.e., greater consideration should be given to the potential use of the equipment);

- 2) regional security (i.e., arms exports should be denied if a sale might have a destabilizing effect on a region);

- 3) development (i.e., assume that arms exports will be denied to countries which spend more on the military than on health and education combined).

In conclusion, several essential additional measures are outlined to help ensure that member states promote transparency and harmonize export licensing procedures:

- 1) parliamentary scrutiny (i.e., member states should produce an annual report to Parliament of arms export licences granted and denied);

- 2) end-use controls (i.e., member states should agree to a common system of end-use controls);

- 3) implementation of embargoes (i.e., create a EU common embargo list which includes paramilitary and security equipment);

- 4) control of brokering (i.e., member states should establish a central database of arms brokers);

- 5) control of licensed production (i.e., these agreements must be subject to greater restrictions than are export agreements);

- 6) annual review (i.e., the Council of Ministers should annually review the implementation of the Code and make recommendations for its development).

803. Author Unknown. "Tackling the Problem of Light Weapons: The 'Micro-Disarmament' Policy Debate." *Light Weapons*. Vol. 4. No. 2, March 1998, pp. 1-2.

Noting that small arms and light weapons have caused the majority of civilians casualties in intrastate conflicts in the 1990s, this article outlines the extent of the problem (e.g., between 55 and 72 million assault rifles were produced between 1945-90). Also examined are various multilateral initiatives undertaken to address the problem (e.g., the Mali initiative). Problems associated with controlling small arms (e.g., small arms are physically small and easy to smuggle) are also analyzed. Solutions to small arms and light weapons proliferation fall into two

categories: export-oriented measures aimed at reducing trading or illegal trafficking; and development assistance policies to improve the coordination of aid. Export-oriented policy initiatives include:

- 1) developing the Wassenaar Arrangement to include some light weapons categories;
- 2) developing a regional or international code of conduct for the arms trade;
- 3) promoting supplier "traceability" by tagging weapons and ammunition;
- 4) strengthening end-user controls;
- 5) destroying surplus weapons.

Proposals related to development assistance policies are focused around four themes:

- 1) combating illicit arms flows through direct cooperation;
- 2) strengthening local customs and law-enforcement structures;
- 3) providing support for regional arrangements;
- 4) assisting with post-conflict demobilization programs (e.g., re-integrate former combatants).

Internationally, the United Nations has emphasized the need for more analysis of the problem. The report concludes that "while the issue of light weapons will benefit from increasing international attention, it could also suffer from competing policies. The test for those working to limit the spread of light weapons will be in creating consensus about the nature of the problem and how to address it."

804. Benson, William. *Undermining Development: The European Arms Trade with the Horn of Africa and Central Africa*. Saferworld, February 1998.

Despite efforts to control small arms and light weapons proliferation, most sub-Saharan states are plagued by political instability, shattered economies, and a surplus of weapons which continue to circulate within the region. This report urges "the introduction of a comprehensive and restrictive European Code of Conduct on the arms trade to ensure a coordinated policy of restraint over arms exports to regions of tension. It also calls for the implementation of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms that was agreed in June 1997" [Serial No. I-7].

The report is a series of case studies of Central Africa (Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) and the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya). Arms embargoes imposed on countries in these regions are analyzed as is the nature of arms exports. Benson argues that one of his most significant findings is that the vast majority of weapons exported to these regions have not been officially recorded or registered, but arrive illicitly. Many small arms and light weapons arrive despite United Nations arms embargoes, implicating France, Belgium and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom. Details on the involvement of these and other EU countries are recorded.

The report also analyzes the role that the EU and its Member States have played in "reducing the flows of weapons in conflict-prone regions, or in taking weapons out of circulation," by, for instance, supporting the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. Unfortunately, Member States are working at cross purposes. Often while one

Member State is supporting demobilization programs, another is exporting arms to the countries concerned.

The report concludes with a series of conclusions and policy proposals to help the Horn and Central Africa to sustain economic and social development after they have tackled the proliferation of arms:

- 1) introduce a comprehensive and restrictive EU Code of Conduct (i.e., to ensure that aid granted by one Member State is not undermined by another exporting arms to the country in question);
- 2) standardize end-use certification provisions and monitoring procedures;
- 3) adopt a rigorous system of parliamentary accountability in conjunction with the EU Code;
- 4) address the phenomenon which allows brokering of arms sales from third countries (i.e., all transactions involving brokering agents should be subject to the licensed approval of national governments);
- 5) implement the EU Program to combat illicit trafficking;
- 6) destroy surplus weapons stocks;
- 7) tackle the root causes of conflict (e.g., eradicating poverty and promoting responsive and accountable government);
- 8) support Demobilization and Reintegration Programs (DRPs);
- 9) assist states in the Horn and Central Africa in restricting the flow of arms between and within regions of tension;
- 10) sponsor other initiatives aimed at reducing the levels of light weapons in circulation within regions of conflict (e.g., Gun Buy-Back schemes).

805. British American Security Information Council (BASIC). "The G-8 Summit: A Leading Role in Small Arms Control?" May 1998.

This article reports on the May 1998 meeting of the G-8 to consider measures to combat the illicit trade in light weapons. The leading five arms producers together account for nearly 90 percent of the world's arms exports. Focusing specifically on illicit transfers of firearms to criminals, this report argues that the international community "cannot allow governments to use controls on illicit trafficking as a smoke screen to divert attention away from their commitments and responsibilities as producers, suppliers and recipients of firearms."

Given the long length of the chain extending from supplier to user, often including many links, piecemeal approaches are not adequate. While recent milestone agreements have been signed (e.g., the April 1998 UN ECOSOC Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice), more must be done. After outlining the history of G-8 discussions, the report makes several recommendations:

- 1) link domestic and international controls;
- 2) link legal and illegal firearms transfers;
- 3) link crime and conflict;
- 4) expand the definition of illicit transfers to include human rights and humanitarian law;
- 5) commit funds to small arms control.

The report concludes that a coherent and comprehensive approach to small arms proliferation is required. Efforts must be directed at controlling both licit and illicit transfers, and a commitment by the G-8 would have enormous influence towards that end.

806. Camacho, Daniel Ávila. "Interrelationship Between Drug Trafficking and the Illicit Arms Trade in Central America and Northern South America." In *Curbing Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies: An Action-Oriented Agenda*, ed. Péricles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone, UNIDIR/98/16, New York: United Nations, 1998, pp. 49-55.

Camacho argues that it is practically impossible to deal with problems of drug trafficking and the illicit trade of small arms separately. Using Colombia as an example, Camacho outlines the nature and chain of the drug trafficking trade, and details the interrelationship between drugs and arms trafficking in five stages:

- 1) the primary production stage (i.e., most coca-leaf farmers and growers possess small arms for self-defence in the fields);
- 2) the secondary production stage (i.e., more sophisticated weapons are used by the people who turn raw materials into usable drugs);
- 3) the transport stage (i.e., dominated by the drug cartels, bodyguards use small and sophisticated arms);
- 4) the distribution stage (i.e., the possession and use of weapons tends to diminish all the way down to street traders);
- 5) the consumption stage (i.e., consumers rarely possess weapons, but there is a high correlation between drug addiction, street crime and the use of firearms).

Camacho concludes that arms requirements vary depending upon the stage of the drug trafficking process. Arms are easily obtained on the black market in Colombia, and if they continue to be used by "drug traffickers, guerrillas and paramilitary groups, they will also be used by common criminals and civilians who will feel threatened by being surrounded by so many arms." The interrelationships between small arms and drugs are numerous and diversified, reflecting the complex nature of these issues.

807. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). *Consolidation of Peace Through Practical Disarmament Measures: The Context*. Ottawa: DFAIT, April 1998.

This paper examines how disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs (DDRPs) fit within the scope of the United Nations Disarmament Commission's (UNDC) terms of reference and within the arms control and disarmament agenda. It argues that an integrated and coordinated approach to DDRPs is essential for the success of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. This argument is developed by presenting and examining several factors:

- 1) the interrelated nature of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (i.e., experience demonstrates the futility of pursuing small arms and light weapons disarmament measures without also considering demobilization and reintegration);

- 2) the need for a balanced and practical approach to arms control and disarmament;
- 3) the need for an integrated and coordinated approach to overlapping issues (e.g., dealing exclusively with small arms without looking at issues of demobilization and reintegration is problematic);
- 4) the fact that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is a regional issue with global implications (e.g., effective controls in one state will be undermined if neighboring countries do not create similar mechanisms);
- 5) the role of the UNDC and other relevant bodies (e.g., general guidelines, principles and recommendations for DDRPs must be developed at an over-arching level).

The report concludes that the experience of the UN and its Member States demonstrates the need for "an integrated and coordinated approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the design and implementation of disarmament measures within a peacebuilding process." DDRPs are much more likely to succeed if properly planned and financially supported by the international community. Given the international repercussions of DDRPs, the experience of many international, regional and local actors must be brought together. It is recommended that the UNDC "turn its attention to developing general guidelines, principles and recommendations for DDRPs, in coordination and consultation with other relevant fora."

Annex A is a compilation of selected consensus guidelines, principles and recommendations produced by the UNDC relevant to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

808. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). *The Role of Ammunition Controls in Addressing Excessive and Destabilizing Accumulations of Small Arms*. Ottawa: DFAIT, April 1998.

This report was prompted by the July 1997 Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Small Arms (A/52/298) which recommended a study on the role of ammunition and explosives in contributing to excessive and destabilizing accumulations of small arms. This paper surveys some of the issues surrounding ammunition control to highlight the factors to consider when designing an effective control system.

The report begins with an overview of ammunition producers, illustrating that over 70 states produce small arms ammunition. Thus, from the perspective of controlling ammunition production insofar as the cartridge is concerned, diffusion of production both internationally and domestically would seem to present control problems greater than that for small arms. A few examples are provided to demonstrate the magnitude of ammunition production (e.g., Pakistan, the United States, and Canada).

Also reviewed are the components and prices of ammunition. The primary components for the manufacture of ammunition include the following:

- 1) the cartridge case;
- 2) the bullet;
- 3) propellants (i.e., powder);
- 4) primer.

Cartridges and bullets are relatively easy to procure; however, there are only a few major producers of propellants and primer, suggesting that control efforts might be better directed at the latter two components. The price of ammunition varies greatly according to market conditions. In addition, the larger the quantity purchased, the lower the cost per unit.

Also reviewed is the rationale that ammunition would be easier to control than small arms because smuggling of ammunition is less lucrative and more difficult. This report contends, however, that these assertions are based on "speculative analysis," arguing that more study is required in this area.

Various ammunition controls are reviewed, including the Canadian system, and the Organization of American States Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives and Other Related Materials. It is argued that ammunition and ammunition components should form part of Codes of Conduct. The possibility of marking cartridges at point of manufacture is also discussed, arguing that it would be difficult to add more information using a stamp process. However, other options may be effective (e.g., laser and bar code marking).

The report also surveys the implementation of law and enforcement mechanisms. Offering a "snapshot of some of the issues to be considered," several examples of ammunition control problems are presented (e.g., ammunition stores all over Albania were looted in February and March of 1997). In addition, ammunition does not time expire, leading to huge surpluses of ammunition worldwide.

The report concludes that "ammunition does not appear to be a significant choke point that can be easily addressed with improved controls." The ammunition production capacity is significantly larger than the small arms manufacturing industry with more countries producing ammunition than small arms. The difficulty is that ammunition is expendable and small arms (in general) are not. In short, "ammunition is much more difficult for enforcement personnel to deal with in comparison with firearms, particularly in small quantities." The proper role for ammunition controls in restricting the misuse of small arms requires much more study. Several preliminary studies that could be done to better capture the essence of any role that controls on ammunition might play are outlined:

- 1) survey regions or states where conflict and post-conflict problems exist (i.e., to determine which companies or states are the main suppliers of ammunition);
- 2) study the utility of marking cartridge bases with a stamp or bar code (i.e., to trace ammunition);
- 3) survey member states from the United Nations to determine which states produce small arms, ammunition and ammunition components (i.e., without this information effective controls will be difficult);
- 4) survey the few states and manufacturers that have a history of supplying ammunition to actors in areas of instability (i.e., to determine whether they were direct or indirect suppliers).

Annex A presents a list of countries which produce small arms ammunition. Annex B reproduces the information gained in a survey relating to small arms ammunition production. Annex C reproduces extracts from Canadian regulations for propellant explosives and sporting ammunition.

809. Cornwell, Richard. "The Organization of African Unity." In *Society Under Siege: Illicit Responses to Illicit Arms* [Serial No. 817]. Toward Collaborative Peace Series, Vol. II. ed. Virginia Gamba with the assistance of Sarah Meek, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, August 1998, pp. 57-74.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is the largest regional organization representing what used to be called the Third World. One of the major concerns it confronts is the proliferation of light weapons. This chapter attempts "to establish the extent to which the OAU's institutional and political history, and its recent identification of the economically and socially ruinous effects of conflict, allow it to incorporate in its own conflict-prevention strategies some means of monitoring the flow of small arms."

To accomplish this goal, Cornwell outlines the origins and structure of the OAU, along with its developmental history. Since 1990, the weakness of African states has resulted in increasing power being held by men with guns. War has destroyed the physical infrastructure of the region, and the preparation for war continues to divert scarce resources and energy. As an organization, the OAU has adopted several plans to help conflict prevention, management and resolution, and has been acting in concert with the United Nations. Each of these efforts is listed in chronological order.

On the basis of this survey of the history of the OAU, Cornwell argues that the demands "posed by multilateral action in this sphere [i.e., conflict prevention and resolution], both political, organizational and financial, are daunting, to say the least." One critical area to work towards in conflict prevention is in monitoring the flow of small arms. He suggests that the different security forces operating in Africa coordinate their efforts to help achieve this end.

810. Cucovaz, Sylvia. "Interrelationship Between Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorist Groups in South America." In *Curbing Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies: An Action-Oriented Agenda*, ed. Péricles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone, UNIDIR/98/16, New York: United Nations, 1998, pp. 33-47.

Cucovaz argues that the 1990s has seen new links between international criminal organizations and the need for terrorist organizations to fund their own activities. These factors have resulted in a strengthening of regional drug trafficking groups as they expand their areas of influence, and in a strengthening of their alliances with terrorist organizations. In this way, Cucovaz maintains, "the periodic supply of arms among illegal organizations speeded up the structuring of arms-trafficking networks, which are supplied by companies from all parts of the world."

Several factors which facilitate trafficking in small arms in the region of South America are outlined:

- 1) the extent and permeability of national borders (i.e., border lengths and low population density hinder effective control);
- 2) the low cost of small arms;

- 3) the difficulty of detection (i.e., both because small arms are small and easy to conceal and because the geography of Latin America makes patrolling difficult);
- 4) the increasing activity of suppliers in Eastern Europe and Asia;
- 5) the disarming of several Central American guerrilla organizations and the lack of control over the final destination of the equipment (i.e., weapons stores were raided and arms stolen);
- 6) the increase in arms imports through fictitious operators (based mainly in Paraguay) resulting in weapons purchases by drug trafficking and/or terrorist organizations;
- 7) the increased settlement of Arab communities in South America with close links to terrorist organizations in the Middle East;
- 8) the gradual growth in the activities of certain criminal groups and/or drug traffickers, mainly African and Chinese;
- 9) the corruption at certain levels of the security services and armed forces in the region which facilitates weapons trafficking;
- 10) the inadequacy of bilateral and multilateral instruments designed to prevent arms trafficking in the region.

Two case studies of Bolivia and Brazil are examined to illustrate the interrelation between arms trafficking groups and other international criminal organizations. Cucovaz concludes that small arms trafficking does not constitute an isolated process within the context of international organized crime. Should illegal trafficking of small arms fail to be curtailed, "a weapons escalation would give rise to unpredictable consequences due to the rearming of the security forces needed in order to counteract [their] activities."

811. DeClerq, David. "The UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms: A Canadian Perspective on Their Report." In *Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament: Enhancing Existing Regimes and Exploring New Dimensions*, ed. Peter Gizewski, Toronto: Center for International and Security Studies, York University, 1998, pp. 173-181.

Since the end of the Cold War, increasing attention has been paid to small arms and light weapons proliferation. As a result of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/70B, a panel of governmental experts on small arms was formed, and tasked to report on the following issues: "the type of small arms and light weapons actually being used in conflicts being dealt with by the UN; the nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of such weapons including illicit production and trade; and the ways and means to prevent and reduce excessive and destabilizing accumulations and transfers of such weapons." The Small Arms Panel's history is detailed, along with summaries of workshops in El Salvador and Kathmandu, and a listing of the Panel's major recommendations [Serial No. I-9].

DeClerq outlines two inadequacies of the Small Arms Panel report. First, the issue of the types of weapons actually being used was dealt with only superficially. Second, cursory treatment was accorded the subject of illicit trafficking.

Recommendations are made for Canada's next step. Canada should seek representation on any future panel, and could assist in some of the studies proposed by the 1997 Panel. In

formulating any initiative, Canada must keep in mind several realities. For instance, unlike anti-personnel mines, every state's security forces rely on small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, the difficulty lies not so much with new stocks of weapons, but with those stocks already in circulation. As a result, a "truly holistic approach is required." Within this context, a Canadian initiative must promote a UN post-conflict resolution system which includes disarmament, economic support, and social integration.

812. Dragani, Stefano. "Interrelationship Between Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorist Groups: African and European Issues." In *Curbing Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies: An Action-Oriented Agenda*, ed. Péricles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone, UNIDIR/98/16, New York: United Nations, 1998, pp. 77-83.

Illicit trafficking of small arms consists of a market running parallel to trade accepted and regulated by nearly all modern States, which has "developed clandestinely and which violates both international and national regulations on arms trading, and is thus difficult to quantify." Dragani surveys the link between transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking in small arms.

Organized crime needs small arms for several reasons:

- 1) controlling the territory wherein it operates;
- 2) opposing the Government;
- 3) deterring competitors or rival groups;
- 4) demonstrating for the same purpose its power through various types of military operative capacities.

Also explored are the links between the illicit trade in small arms and drug trafficking. Citing studies done in Italy, Dragani argues that "criminal organizations carry out both these illicit activities, using the same operational arrangements as well as the same operators, middlemen, carriers and routes." The arms-drug link fulfills two different requirements:

- 1) drug traffickers need large quantities of weapons to arm the forces which control and defend vast plantation areas and refining labs against armed intervention by regular forces;
- 2) arms traffickers trade arms for large quantities of drugs without other costly "go-between" charges.

Dragani also analyzes the interrelationship between illicit arms trafficking in small arms and terrorism. It is argued that they are linked in two respects:

- 1) the terrorist group is only a user or a client of the clandestine market;
- 2) the terrorist group is also a trafficker, either for money, or for political and ideological affinities.

Dragani concludes that the "interrelationship between illicit trafficking in arms, drugs and terrorist groups...constitutes a threat to the security of States and to their economies and to peace which cannot be underestimated." It is recommended that when investigating illicit trafficking in small arms, each State should:

- 1) establish effective operational coordination;
- 2) adopt modern methods to detect and analyze the evolution of illicit trafficking in small arms;

3) facilitate initiatives regarding amending laws that would be better suited for searching and investigating.

- 813.** Gamba, Virginia. "The International Agenda: Finding Leverage Points and Making Action Possible." In *Society Under Siege: Illicit Responses to Illicit Arms* [Serial No. 817]. Toward Collaborative Peace Series, Vol. II. ed. Virginia Gamba with the assistance of Sarah Meek, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, August 1998, pp. 19-32.

Gamba argues that light weapons proliferation and conventional weapons transfers are directly linked. If the international community could view the two items as two aspects of the same problem, "then the international community could concentrate on assisting with the control and reduction of light weapons flows across borders, which would encourage regional cooperation, allow for stability and permit development."

Gamba argues that an effective plan of action would include the following goals:

- 1) achieve international understanding that small arms proliferation has a set number of variables (i.e., more research must be undertaken to study small arms control);
- 2) focus on regional organizations (i.e., they should be enhanced to incorporate the theme of small arms control into their operational structures);
- 3) create a mechanism for national co-ordination (i.e., countries must prioritize inter-agency cooperation to permit focused discussion on the issue);
- 4) improve international capacity building (i.e., military and civil-military training);
- 5) allow an open exchange of information relating to firearms regulations and licensing practices (i.e., understanding each individual country's views on the issue);
- 6) develop statistics and central repositories of information on weapons captured (i.e., start the process nationally beginning with state-owned weapons in police custody);
- 7) develop improved technologies for customs inspections at major entry points (i.e., to better monitor the movement of goods);
- 8) promote non-governmental organization (NGO) involvement in research on the connection between weapons availability and the emergence of a culture of violence (i.e., since weapons themselves are only secondary tools of violence, information must be gathered concerning the primary causes of violence);
- 9) conduct international and national campaigns to raise public awareness of small arms as an international security issue (i.e., many states and organizations are still reluctant to recognize small arms as a separate issue);
- 10) encourage compliance with disarmament agreements, particularly those relating to conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction processes (i.e., ensure systematic collection and destruction of weapons during peace processes);
- 11) support NGO and governmental studies on the dynamics of transnational criminal organizations and black markets (i.e., to understand the networks utilized in the movement of illicit arms);
- 12) sponsor international studies on the activities of private security companies, transnational companies and other groupings that require arms for the pursuit of their

activities (i.e., to uncover where arms are used and to identify states where law and order mechanisms are deficient);

13) coordinate interaction between regional initiatives on arms control for the exchange of information on lessons learned and possible regional connections affecting the flow of weapons from region to region (i.e., to generate a forum for discussion similar to that which preceded talks on the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe);

14) destroy surplus stocks of light weapons in national armories and in post-conflict reconstruction situations (i.e., to prevent the next generation of light weapons proliferation);

15) assist states in reducing the manufacture of light weapons (e.g., by tightening regulations governing production quotas);

16) encourage non-state actors in the responsible management of existing weapons rather than outright disarmament and destruction (e.g., to control weapons used by insurgent groups);

17) encourage international relief agencies to undertake field studies on the impact of small arms on their operations (i.e., with a view to emulating the success of the anti-personnel land mines campaign);

18) focus international efforts on the control of ammunition (i.e., as another effort to control light weapons proliferation);

19) construct guidelines for funding practical disarmament and arms control projects by governments and NGOs (i.e., to help define the relationship between development and security, or between small arms and violence);

Gamba maintains that there are several elements included in the international process she advocates:

1) understanding the problem;

2) making solutions thinkable;

3) enhancing existing cooperation mechanisms;

4) raising international awareness on the issue of light weapons and their connection with violence;

5) choosing cooperative methodologies for training, action, structures and verification;

6) coordinating international and national initiatives for the control of small arms;

7) creating distance between intent and existence of arms.

Gamba maintains that each state must build a "formula for ownership," where each country manages its own agenda for action according to its own priorities, while still permitting input from other countries. Such a formula might consist of a three-tiered approach:

1) the prevention of small arms proliferation (e.g., create measures designed for long-term application to reduce the problem before it impacts on the South African region);

2) the management of existing small arms (e.g., ensure a reduction of flows in the future by creating combined police border controls to monitor arms trafficking);

3) the final resolution to the small arms proliferation problem (e.g., weapons collection programs and the destruction of surplus and captured stocks).

Gamba concludes that "in undertaking a revision of both the process and the ownership of the light weapons proliferation issue, international initiatives will be able to find a point of entry

that allows them to undertake ambitious projects over a long period, while at the same time respecting the point of view, interests and needs of each individual member of such an initiative, irrespective of whether it is a developed or a developing nation."

814. Gamba, Virginia. "Small Arms Proliferation in Southern Africa: The Potential for Regional Control." *African Security Review*. Vol. 7, No. 4, 1998, pp. 57-63.

Since the end of the Cold War, light weapons proliferation has reached alarming proportions, and its repercussions have placed the issue firmly on the agendas of African countries. National capacities to control and reduce these weapons depend on many variables:

- 1) the need for sufficient information on the extent of the problem in national territories;
- 2) the need for resources to cover the areas;
- 3) the need to increase the capacity of states to combat illicit firearms trafficking;
- 4) the need to develop the capacity to deal effectively with the issue;
- 5) the need to reduce corruption;
- 6) the need for coordinated regional approaches.

Gamba outlines the proposals put forward at a conference hosted by the Institute for Security Studies [Serial No. WWW-6] and Saferworld [Serial No. WWW-9] on the control of illicit small arms trafficking across borders in the Southern African region. The suggested steps put forward by the conference are described:

- 1) coordinating international and regional control initiatives (i.e., some organizations are positioned to place the issue on the agenda and some are positioned to implement recommendations, and these two strengths should be linked);
- 2) identifying a subregional organization to develop and implement policy on small arms (i.e., to lead to a regional initiative that addresses demand and cuts off the supply of new stocks of small arms);
- 3) using the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organization (SARPCCO) as a vehicle for action (i.e., to exploit the strong links between crime and illicit small arms trafficking);
- 4) strengthening subregional mechanisms to deal with small arms control (i.e., Southern African heads of state must adopt integrated security measures such as improved policing and information sharing);
- 5) assisting the Southern African region to create a realizable small arms initiative (i.e., create a practical guide for African organizations on how to prioritize and coordinate action to fight against small arms proliferation).

Gamba concludes by pointing to several facts which demonstrate that the potential for the Southern African community to control illicit small arms trafficking is strong:

- 1) most of the countries in the region genuinely desire peace;
- 2) a subregional structure already exists in the form of the Southern African Development Community (SADC);
- 3) there are reasonably efficient existing organizations through which small arms issues could be coordinated while member states finalize strategies for long-term control mechanisms;

4) some countries in the region have prioritized policies related to the control of weapons availability in their own national strategies (e.g., Mozambique).

815. Gamba, Virginia. "Small Arms Proliferation in Southern Africa: Towards Regional Action." In *Society Under Siege: Illicit Responses to Illicit Arms* [Serial No. 817]. Toward Collaborative Peace Series, Vol. II. ed. Virginia Gamba with the assistance of Sarah Meek, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, August 1998, pp. 105-114.

This article serves as the general conclusion for *Society Under Siege*. In Africa the national capacity to control and reduce small arms proliferation depends on many variables:

- 1) the lack of sufficient verifiable information on the extent of the problem;
- 2) the lack of resources to deal with the issue;
- 3) the lack of structures to combat the licit and illicit firearms trade (e.g., inter-agency structures);
- 4) the lack of technical and human capacity to grapple with the issue;
- 5) the presence of corruption;
- 6) the impossibility of isolated actions being of any value.

Gamba summarizes Sarah Meek's "International Initiatives on the Control of Weapons" [Serial No. 826], arguing that this volume's chief concern is "on identifying potential actors in international and regional initiatives, the structures with which they must operate, and the potential for joint and/or coordinate action." Creating an effective subregional mechanism for small arms control in Southern Africa must build upon existing structures that might carry out an integrated approach. To this end, this volume has reviewed the regional initiatives in Africa [Serial Nos. 809 and 835]. Gamba maintains that this look at the structures with potential to carry out small arms control initiatives in Southern Africa allows several observations to be made:

- 1) the Southern African heads of state must return to the concept of integrated security (i.e., "Security First");
- 2) the Southern African region must begin to think as a region;
- 3) the Southern African region must undertake a conscious effort to prioritize the control of small arms;
- 4) the Southern African region must enhance police co-operation across borders.

If these four considerations were met, examining ways to limit small arms proliferation could be examined. Gamba summarizes the specific goals that must be worked towards as described in "The International Agenda: Finding Leverage Points and Making Action Possible" [Serial No. 813].

Gamba also reviews the process of assisting the Southern African Region to arrive at a feasible small arms initiative. She maintains that a discussion of small arms control in Africa cannot be "undertaken until a prior identification of possible points of contact for international support has been made." Once this has been done, two distinct but related matters can be considered:

- 1) offering general recommendations on practical approaches that the international community should take when it considers furthering its small arms non-proliferation initiatives;

2) offering a similar practical guide to African organizations.

Gamba argues that despite "its infancy and the structural problems it has come up against, the Southern African community of countries has the potential for controlling illicit Small arms trafficking and bringing about the required reduction in existing stocks of weapons."

816. Gamba, Virginia. "What the EU Can Do To Help Strengthen Regional Initiatives Aimed at Tackling Light Weapons Proliferation." In *Report on the International Conference on European Arms Export Controls: Stockholm, Sweden: November 13-14, 1997* [Serial No. 833], compiled by Steve Shropshire, Sweden: TypoPrint, 1998, pp. 46-47.

Gamba contends that conventional arms sales and light weapons controls must be seen as part of the same intellectual package. She puts forward a plan of action which consists of the following components:

- 1) promote a regional organizational focus (i.e., to permit cooperation and exchange of information);
- 2) create a national coordination mechanism (i.e., to coordinate inter-agency cooperation to permit focused discussion of light weapons proliferation);
- 3) improve capacity building (i.e., to improve police, customs and information gathering efforts);
- 4) exchange information on licensing practices (i.e., to provide information about loopholes that allow illicit trafficking);
- 5) undertake more research which extends beyond the "supply/demand straight-jacket" and includes arms already in circulation (i.e., to cover source, transit, and end-user countries and regions);
- 6) develop central repositories of information on captured weapons;
- 7) develop improved technologies for customs inspections at major entry points;
- 8) research the connection between weapons availability and violence;
- 9) conduct an international campaign to raise public awareness of small arms as a threat to international security;
- 10) use international pressure to enforce compliance with disarmament agreements (particularly those related to post-conflict reconstruction);
- 11) study trans-national criminal organizations and black markets (i.e., to understand the networks used to transfer illicit arms);
- 12) study patterns of international groups that require arms for self-defense (e.g., private security companies);
- 13) create stronger mechanisms to coordinate regional initiatives on arms control to facilitate information exchanges;
- 14) destroy surplus stocks of light weapons;
- 15) provide assistance to reduce the production of light weapons in producer countries;
- 16) encourage responsible management of existing weapons;
- 17) encourage international relief agencies to study the impact of small arms on their operations (i.e., along lines used in the anti-personnel land mines campaign).

- 817.** Gamba, Virginia with the assistance of Sarah Meek, eds. *Society Under Siege: Illicit Responses to Illicit Arms*. Toward Collaborative Peace Series, Vol. II. South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, August 1998.

Gamba and Meek argue that within a few years the number of national, regional and international initiatives on light weapons has grown dramatically. They maintain that "the complexity of the small arms scourge is...so vast that it will be difficult to generate a single international initiative that will mobilize all others for the resolution of the problem." They contend that coordinating subregional initiatives might create a solution to the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms. With this in mind, this volume examines the problem of small arms proliferation in Africa, particularly Southern Africa. It does so by presenting a series of articles, each of which has been annotated separately in this bibliography:

- 1) Meek, Sarah. "International Initiatives on the Control of Weapons," pp. 7-18, [Serial No. 826];
- 2) Gamba, Virginia. "The International Agenda: Finding Leverage Points and Making Action Possible," pp. 19-32, [Serial No. 813];
- 3) Meek, Sarah. "The United Nations," pp. 33-44, [Serial No. 829];
- 4) Meek, Sarah. "The Organization of American States," pp. 45-56, [Serial No. 828];
- 5) Cornwell, Richard. "The Organization of African Unity," pp. 57-74, [Serial No. 809];
- 6) Solomon, Hussein and Jakkie Cilliers, "The Southern African Development Community and Small Arms Liberation," pp. 75-92, [Serial No. 835].
- 7) Gamba, Virginia. "Small Arms Proliferation in Southern Africa: Towards Regional Action." pp. 105-114 [Serial No. 815].

Annex 1 reproduces the Guidelines for International Arms Transfers in the Context of General Assembly Resolution 46/36H of 6 December 1991. Annex 2 reproduces the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials [Serial No. I-11]. Annex 3 reproduces conclusions from the Institute for Security Studies/Saferworld Conference on "Developing Controls on Arms and Illicit Trafficking in Southern Africa," Pretoria, South Africa, May 3-6, 1998.

- 818.** Godnick, William H. "The Patriotic Movement Against Crime in El Salvador: Update on the Seventeenth Round of the Voluntary Weapons Collection Program 'Goods for Guns.'" Report Prepared for the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion (PACDC) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. San Salvador, El Salvador: July 1998.

This report documents the visit of PACDC Project Consultant William Godnick to San Salvador, El Salvador to observe the Voluntary Weapons Collection Program (VWCP) in its 17th, and final round. The report surveys the reasons for the creation of the program in 1996 (e.g., the growing cycle of violence involving light weapons in El Salvador).

The Goods for Guns program which pays civilians for turning in guns for destruction is described. The eight steps of the program are outlined:

- 1) plan (i.e., make arrangements to allow civilians to hold weapons long enough to turn them in without being arrested);
- 2) bolster support (e.g., the Catholic Church endorsed the Program);
- 3) raise funds (more than one half was donated by the international community);
- 4) design paperwork, conduct a publicity campaign and standardize operational details (i.e., to ensure transparency and legitimacy);
- 5) contract an auditor (the Rotary Club served in this capacity);
- 6) design systems for arms storage, transfer and destruction;
- 7) implement the program (the 17th round was held July 11-12, 1998);
- 8) build a peace monument (to be completed in the coming months).

Godnick argues that the 17th round was very successful even though the date conflicted with the World Cup Final of soccer, which organizers feared would reduce turnout. The quality of the arms returned was higher than previous rounds, due to an increase in advertising. From a public health standpoint, the weapons turned in represent a small but significant reduction. The 17th round marks the beginning of a process of norm-building which has as its goal the rejection of the gun culture prevalent in El Salvador. The program was successful in the following respects:

- 1) it succeeded in disarming society more effectively than the United Nations;
- 2) it demonstrated the possibility of mobilizing the private sector in El Salvador to help;
- 3) it systematized the arms collection process;
- 4) it created relationships between private sector, civil society, media, government, police and military representatives;
- 5) it promoted good public relations on a national scale.

Godnick maintains that the program also had several weaknesses, including the following:

- 1) it failed to incorporate the youth of El Salvador;
- 2) it failed to integrate the program with a national plan;
- 3) it failed in the interior of country, owing to the largely centralized Salvadoran government and society.

The report ends with several recommendations designed to reduce disarmament problems:

- 1) continue to fund the program and work to re-integrate soldiers back into society;
- 2) adapt the El Salvador model for use in other Central American countries;
- 3) share the expertise with other states and organizations interested in implementing similar programs;
- 4) create new incentives to replace guns for cash (e.g., skills training);
- 5) consider VWCPs during initial discussions on mediated peace.

819. Greene, Owen. "Developing EU Programmes to Tackle Illicit Arms Trading and Light Weapons Proliferation." In *Report on the International Conference on European Arms Export Controls: Stockholm, Sweden: November 13-14, 1997* [Serial No. 833], compiled by Steve Shropshire, Sweden: TypoPrint, 1998, pp. 44-46.

Greene argues it is time for the European Union (EU), along with the rest of the international community, to tackle the problems associated with light weapons proliferation and

illicit arms trading. While the June 1997 "Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms" adopted by the EU provides a framework, the challenge remains to implement the program. Initiatives must be taken at all levels (global, regional, national and local), and address both "demand" and "supply" side measures. While targeting illicit trafficking is important, efforts must also strengthen measures to curb "legal" transfers. It is recommended that the EU adopt a "Security First" approach when assisting conflict-prone regions, tackling arms diffusion as well as initiating demobilization and development programs. Doing so requires enhanced coordination amongst EU states. EU cooperation with countries confronting problems with illicit weapons could include the following elements:

- 1) cooperating to combat illicit arms flows;
- 2) establishing systems for intelligence sharing;
- 3) providing training to help develop effective border controls and domestic laws;
- 4) establishing national and regional systems to promote justice and reconciliation after conflict.

Several recommendations are put forward for EU member states to follow to curb light weapons proliferation:

- 1) promote regional and subregional cooperation;
- 2) regard light weapons exports as potentially strategic and worthy of stringent control;
- 3) develop the United Kingdom proposed Code of Conduct on arms exports and implement it rigorously;
- 4) develop information exchange and consultation procedures (i.e., to ensure that one EU country does not undercut the export controls of another);
- 5) encourage the destruction of surplus stocks of weapons;
- 6) increase the "traceability" of weapons (i.e., develop tagging systems for all weapons and ammunition);
- 7) promote transparency by expanding the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include "heavier" light weapons (e.g., machine guns).

820. Grega, Pierre and Reginald Moreels. "The Problems of Light Weapons Proliferation and the EU Programme to Tackle the Illicit Arms Trade." In *Report on the International Conference on European Arms Export Controls: Stockholm, Sweden: November 13-14, 1997* [Serial No. 833], compiled by Steve Shropshire, Sweden: TypoPrint, 1998, pp. 42-43.

The authors argue that widespread access to small arms has made recourse to violence easier, thereby increasing the destructiveness and duration of conflict. Disarmament is an essential part of a conflict management strategy, and should be made a priority for European development cooperation. The paper puts forward several proposals to help achieve disarmament goals:

- 1) implement the "EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms";
- 2) strengthen controls on light weapons flows, both illicit and licit;

- 3) provide practical support for initiatives to strengthen national, regional and international cooperation;
- 4) support the reinforcement of United Nations monitoring in conflict areas (e.g., demobilization programs);
- 5) establish early warning systems to detect small arms and light weapons proliferation at an early stage;
- 6) strengthen the capacity of customs and border controls to monitor weapons transfers.

The authors emphasize that it is "imperative that EU member states ensure coherence between their aid and trade policies and synergy between their national approaches to the region in question so that the actions of one state should not undermine the policies of another."

821. Kartha, Tara. "Proliferation and Smuggling of Light Weapons in the Asia-Pacific Region." *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXI. No.10, January 1998, pp. 1487-1507.

Kartha argues that the present problem for militaries or anyone who seeks to implement the law regarding light weapons proliferation is complicated by three factors:

- 1) an immensely increased availability of weapons outside state control;
- 2) an increase in the lethality of light weapons;
- 3) a global trade in these weapons.

She maintains that there are several commonalities between domestic crime and conflict situations:

- 1) both owe their persistence to the massive and unprecedented availability of light weapons;
- 2) both militant and criminal groups access new technology on the black market;
- 3) weapons are intrinsic to all illicit activity in different degrees;
- 4) the movement of weapons leads to cooperation between criminals, terrorists, militants, and narcotics traffickers across entire regions;
- 5) the state is the main proliferator of weapons to both the grey and black markets (i.e., the proliferation chain has the state at one end and the criminal at the other).

This paper argues that "there are various levels of arms trafficking within this region, and this paper discusses this transnational traffic with the aim of evolving realistic controls on their movement, and evolving some cooperation between the countries identified."

It is argued that the Asia-Pacific Region has a weapons proliferation problem. The weapons flow into the region from a variety of sources:

- 1) from former conflict areas (i.e., the black market trade in weapons);
- 2) from ongoing conflict areas (e.g., moving into distant areas of rising discontent/militancy);
- 3) from international grey markets (i.e., mainly from excess stocks of weapons within countries);
- 4) from major producing countries due to poor controls (i.e., lax government control).

Kartha proposes several suggestions to help curb the proliferation of light weapons, including following:

- 1) adopting a "Security First" approach (e.g., the United Nations approach to the problem of weapons availability in Mali);
- 2) providing legal aid to states seeking to improve domestic laws to combat the problem;
- 3) tackling the "grey market" (i.e., convincing states that their interests could be better served through stability rather than armament);
- 4) encouraging legal conformity and basic knowledge (i.e., identifying a particular act as a culpable offence);
- 5) creating uniform gun-control laws;
- 6) raising awareness (i.e., informing bureaucrats and legislators about the extent of the problem);
- 7) targeting the ammunition (i.e., as a new way of controlling light weapons proliferation);
- 8) getting the men (i.e., arresting those people who are engaged in trafficking light weapons);
- 9) constructing a regional light arms Convention (i.e., addressing the problems of crime, terrorism and militancy in each country).

822. Lumpe, Lora. "Small Arms Trade Brief." *Foreign Policy In Focus*. Vol. 3, No. 10, May 1998.

Light weapons are responsible for 90% of deaths in conflicts around the world, and it is overwhelmingly civilians who suffer. Moreover, it is small arms and light weapons which are doing most of the killing. In the wake of the Cold War, states are downsizing their military budgets, and selling surplus weapons on the open and on the black market. Lumpe argues that United States foreign policy has failed to address the link between legal and illegal deals, refused to recognize lax domestic gun-sales laws as a threat to U.S. security, and failed to disarm combatants and destroy their arms. To help the United States develop a foreign policy to address the issue of small arms proliferation, Lumpe offers several recommendations:

- 1) recognize the interplay between the legal and illegal small-arms trade (comprehensive U.S. efforts must curb arms traffic on a national, regional, and global basis);
- 2) realize that greater transparency regarding exports of small arms is vital (the U.S. must protect aid workers in the field, and build trust among opposing forces);
- 3) understand that drug traffickers and criminals are obtaining lethal firepower in America (the U.S. must enhance domestic gun-control measures);
- 4) recognize that a critical element of any good-faith change in U.S. foreign policy needs bolstering (the U.S. government must ban covert supplies of weapons to insurgent forces).

823. Madrid, Wilfrido Robledo. "National and International Initiatives Against Illicit Arms Trafficking." In *Curbing Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies: An Action-Oriented Agenda*, ed. Péricles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone, UNIDIR/98/16, New York: United Nations, 1998, pp. 67-76.

Madrid argues that efforts to control the illicit trafficking of small arms must be directed at the following two levels: internal control, and international cooperation. At the internal level, controls should be based on the following premises:

- 1) establishing a central authority to coordinate national efforts;
- 2) creating a central authority responsible for licensing imports and exports;
- 3) initiating a central authority responsible for licensing the bearing and use of arms and for the functions of registration and control;
- 4) enacting national legislation to regulate registration, use and control;
- 5) creating a special body to coordinate investigative operations related to illicit trafficking in small arms;
- 6) establishing an intelligence section to study the black market and its links to criminal organizations;
- 7) using a central database to record all de-commissioned weapons or those lost by police forces.

Examining the case of Mexico, Madrid argues that the issue of illicit trafficking in small arms has become a problem of national and international security. He outlines Mexico's participation in several initiatives at the regional level to help combat the problem. Madrid argues that the issue of small arms trafficking is fundamentally important. It is for this reason "that all the work and initiatives which are currently developing at the local, regional and hemispheric level must be studied and utilized by the United Nations until a consensus of all mankind has been achieved."

824. Mason, Margaret (Peggy). "Practical Disarmament Measures to Consolidate Peace in Post-Conflict Environments." In *Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament: Enhancing Existing Regimes and Exploring New Dimensions*, ed. Peter Gizewski, Toronto: Center for International and Security Studies, York University, 1998, pp. 147-171.

Mason discusses the subject of practical disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration measures to consolidate peace in post-conflict environments in three ways:

- 1) drawing from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Background Paper, *Practical Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Measures for Peacebuilding: A Background Report* [Serial No. 703] April 1997, and updating where necessary;
- 2) reviewing recent developments in the subject area;
- 3) identifying future policy action, particularly research needs.

Mason outlines multilateral micro-disarmament initiatives, such as the following: the *Report of the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms and Light Weapons* Serial No. I-9]; the *United Nations International Study on Firearm Regulation*; and the *United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution*. Also included are summaries of the activities of several regional organizations, seen as complementary to United Nations efforts. Mason provides a brief overview of the activities of four regional forums: the Organization of American States (OAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum

(ARF), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Moving from the general to be specific, Mason outlines particular disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts: the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), 1989-90; the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1992-93; the Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), 1993-95; United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ); and the Mali/Sahara-Sahel Peace Process.

Also included is a list of the elements of a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DDRP) model:

- 1) general background, including short- and long-term stabilization measures;
- 2) technical assessments, ensuring that sufficient resources are dedicated to the operation, both material aid and technical expertise, to allow the process to be carried through to conclusion;
- 3) continued practices, including public information campaigns, assembling and demobilizing former combatants, providing incentives to sustain and enhance the disarmament process, ensuring that equal attention is paid to both disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and overseeing the destruction of surplus weapons.

Mason reviews recent developments in the field and the policy implications for Canada.

Outlining the areas for further research, several suggestions are made:

- 1) increase research in the area of donor support (i.e., international development assistance) to help consolidate peace, particularly in Africa;
- 2) conduct further regional case studies on the impact of small arms and light weapons proliferation;
- 3) support field research (e.g., Arms Project of Human Rights Watch);
- 4) develop a database of all Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) engaged in peacebuilding work.

In addition, several recommendations for action are made:

- 1) promote regional approaches, confidence building and capacity building (i.e., transparency, regional arms registers, and regional dialogs);
- 2) integrate approaches to security and development between international organizations (UNDP and the World Bank) and national mechanisms to promote dialogue and post-conflict peacebuilding strategies;
- 3) encourage a responsible arms management policy within the framework of the United Nations, regional organizations, and at national levels;
- 4) involve the United Nations as early as possible in the negotiating process, provide technical advisers, develop generic guidelines for the disarmament dimension of peace agreements, create standard operating procedures, and develop a generic DDRP model as a guide for negotiations.

Included in an Annex is an outline for a generic DDRP model. Mason argues that a generic model should include:

- 1) an integrated technical mission;
- 2) a strong program of public information;
- 3) an agreement on procedures for weapons collection and destruction;

- 4) an incentive program to promote the disarmament process;
- 5) a recognition of the confidence building effects of the public destruction of weapons;
- 6) a plan to integrate DDRP as part of a wider peacebuilding process.

Mason concludes that the time is right for more concerted efforts at global, regional, subregional, national and local levels. The challenges remain enormous, but for Canada's part, Foreign Minister Axworthy's Peacebuilding Fund offers the possibility of resources to pursue action in this area. Still needed, however, is "an institutional focal point with sufficient breadth of mandate to bridge the divide between developmental and security specialists and ensure there is concerted action at the bureaucratic level to back up what is undoubtedly the political will to move decisively forward."

825. Meek, Sarah. "The History and Prospects of Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes."
Published in ISS Monograph No. 22, *Buy or Barter*, March 1998.

Meek reports that one of the legacies of conflict in Southern Africa is a residual supply of small arms and light weapons which jeopardize peace, security, and democratisation programs. This paper outlines the history and prospects of Voluntary Weapons Collection Programs (VWCPs), commonly referred to as gun buy-backs. It presents "information collected on different types of VWCPs, a series of case studies of collection programs, and a discussion of some of the issues surrounding these programs."

Most VWCPs are conducted on a "no questions asked" basis. There are three main types:

- 1) amnesties (e.g., to allow unlicensed owners to register their guns);
- 2) gun buy-back programs (i.e., a collecting agency pays cash for returned weapons);
- 3) exchange programs (e.g., trade guns for farm tools).

Noting that little research has been done on VWCPs, Meek outlines the debate. On the one hand, organizers of VWCPs argue that every surrendered weapon makes a program a success, and several factors are outlined which ensure their continued popularity:

- 1) education campaigns (e.g., stressing the medical costs of treating gunshot wounds);
- 2) the chance of getting something in return for old weapons;
- 3) the opportunity for communities to work together to promote security;
- 4) the chance to develop norms against the use of firearms.

On the other hand, opponents argue there is no evidence that these programs reduce gun violence. Four potential problems with VWCPs are outlined:

- 1) they only collect guns currently in circulation, and do not address the supply-side issues which prompted the purchase of guns in the first instance;
- 2) they rarely attract the individual most likely to commit a crime;
- 3) they do not often attract younger, more powerful weapons;
- 4) they can be used as a stepping stone to purchase better weaponry (e.g., a cheaper weapon can be sold, and the money used as a downpayment on a better gun).

Also reviewed are several case studies from four regions who have experimented with VWCPs: Mozambique, South Africa, Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, Australia, and the United States. On the basis of these case studies, Meek argues there are several factors which affect the viability of a VWCP:

- 1) location (i.e., a neutral and trusted location works best);
- 2) organization (i.e., the earlier and greater the organization, the better the result);
- 3) incentives (e.g., range widely from cash and vouchers to housing materials and computer lessons);
- 4) publicity (all types of media, print, television, and radio should be used);
- 5) duration and timing (i.e., must take into account when people are available to participate).

VWCPs are just one way of collecting legal and illegal weapons. Without the necessary data to confirm or deny the utility of these programs, they are likely to continue. In the meantime, Meek concludes, other avenues must continue to be explored.

826. Meek, Sarah. "International Initiatives on the Control of Weapons." In *Society Under Siege: Illicit Responses to Illicit Arms* [Serial No. 817]. Toward Collaborative Peace Series, Vol. II. ed. Virginia Gamba with the assistance of Sarah Meek, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, August 1998, pp. 7-18.

Meek argues that the "challenges posed in addressing the issue of light weapons necessitate an approach internationally that combines the expertise of the arms control community, those engaged in practical disarmament (peacekeepers) and those involved in domestic firearms control." The purpose of this article is to describe current regional and international initiatives on small arms proliferation, and it is divided into three sections.

Section 1 outlines the role of international governmental and non-governmental organizations. She argues that the challenge to these organizations is to stop thinking of light weapons as a political issue and begin to address them as a technical one, thereby constructing practical solutions. The creation of the Preparatory Committee for a Global Campaign on Small Arms and Light weapons (Prep Com) [Serial No. WWW-7] is cited as a good step in the process of facilitating interaction between national and regional actors.

Section 2 comments on international initiatives on light weapons. Summaries of these initiatives are broken down into the following categories:

- 1) arms control initiatives (e.g., Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1995 publication *A Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (A/50/60)*, and the Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms [Serial No. I-9]);
- 2) crime and justice initiatives (e.g., the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, and the Group of 8 Industrialized States Communique regarding illicit arms trafficking [Serial No. I-17]);
- 3) development and humanitarian initiatives (e.g., the International Committee of the Red Cross);

Section 3 discusses international conventions, guidelines and model regulations such as the adoption by the Organization of American States (OAS) of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacture, Traffic, Sale and Transfer of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials [Serial No. I-11].

Meek argues that effective coordination of programs designed to curb light weapons proliferation will increase their effectiveness. As more and more groups and countries respond to

the problem, it will become increasingly important that information be shared. To be effective in reducing light weapons proliferation over the long-term, coordinated efforts at local, national, regional and international levels must be adopted.

827. Meek, Sarah. "Light Weapons and Early Warning: Initial Steps." In *Society Under Siege: Illicit Responses to Illicit Arms* [Serial No. 817]. Toward Collaborative Peace Series, Vol. II. ed. Virginia Gamba with the assistance of Sarah Meek, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, August 1998, pp. 93-104.

Meek argues that it is necessary to explore the nature of small arms proliferation to be able to predict the likelihood of conflict, rather than continuing to react to conflict already underway. Research must be conducted to identify the measures that can be taken prior to the outbreak of conflict in order to "distinguish patterns of weapons supply and potentially destabilizing accumulations and define means of using the accumulated information to prevent or forestall the outbreak of conflict." Historically, international and regional organizations have focused on the resolution of conflict, but more work must be devoted to conflict prevention in the coming years. Meek maintains that much of the recent work on small arms proliferation overlooks the early warning role that arms control could play. Thus, a new item must be added to the light weapons control agenda: "the monitoring of patterns of accumulations or transfers of arms that do not necessarily rely on the participation of the source or end-use country as a means of identifying possible areas of tension or potential conflict."

There are five identified elements of the early warning process: gathering information; sharing information; analyzing shared information; identifying potential risks; and taking the appropriate response. The starting point remains the development of the capacity to monitor international and domestic arms flows. This stage is a process of information gathering which should focus on the following tasks:

- 1) monitoring weapons in post-conflict peace operations;
- 2) monitoring the destruction of surplus weapons stocks;
- 3) monitoring internal controls over state-owned weapons (i.e., defence forces and the police);
- 4) monitoring corruption;
- 5) monitoring smuggling networks;
- 6) monitoring black market prices (i.e., to assess availability and demand);
- 7) monitoring borders for weapons transfers;
- 8) monitoring government policies regarding weapons in civilian possession;
- 9) monitoring demobilization and reintegration efforts.

On an individual basis, there are several measures countries can take to increase the availability of information, on which the rest of the early warning process depends:

- 1) increasing transparency;
- 2) sharing intelligence on known smuggling networks;
- 3) cooperating bilaterally and regionally to combat smuggling;
- 4) harmonizing national legislation among different countries;

5) establishing national coordination committees to bring together relevant officials for national action;

6) harmonizing regulations among countries pertaining to firearm ownership and use.

Meek concludes that while information gathering would help to develop the monitoring of weapons movements as a tool of conflict prevention, the "difficulty of undertaking the type of information gathering necessary to set up an early warning system is very real."

828. Meek, Sarah. "The Organization of American States." In *Society Under Siege: Illicit Responses to Illicit Arms* [Serial No. 817]. Toward Collaborative Peace Series, Vol. II. ed. Virginia Gamba with the assistance of Sarah Meek, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, August 1998, pp. 45-56.

The history of the Organization of American States (OAS) is outlined, dating back to the First International Conference of the American States in 1889. The structure of the organization is outlined briefly before attention is focused on two OAS initiatives relating to arms trafficking. The first is a set of model regulations which has been prepared by an expert group within the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). These regulations included firearms because of the growing power and influence drug smuggling syndicates derive from their illicit use of small arms. A group known as the Group of Experts on the Control of Arms and Explosives Connected to Drug Trafficking was appointed by the CICAD, and tabled a series of model regulations in September 1997. The regulations provide information on the following items:

- 1) detailed procedures on the export of firearms and ammunition;
- 2) detailed procedures on the import of firearms and ammunition;
- 3) steps to be followed for in-transit shipments;
- 4) general information on validity periods for certificates;
- 5) responsibilities of member states (e.g., record-keeping and information exchange).

The second OAS initiative is a convention on arms trafficking which was prepared by the Group of Rio and opened for signature at OAS headquarters in November 1997. The resulting Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacture, Traffic, Sale and Transfer of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials was signed at OAS headquarters in Washington, D.C. on November 13-14, 1997 [Serial No. I-11]. The main provisions of this Convention are discussed. Its importance lies in the fact that it is the first Convention in which specific recommendations are made for action against the smuggling of firearms.

In addition to the two OAS initiatives, the Central American Security Commission has produced a draft regional agreement among members on combating arms trafficking in the Americas. The draft agreement makes provision for the following:

- 1) exchange of information relating to investigations and prosecution of arms trafficking related crimes;
- 2) notification, transfer and receipt of statements by witnesses or experts for testimony;
- 3) preparation of expert reports and inspections.

Meek concludes that it remains to be seen whether the Convention on illicit arms trafficking will be effective in reducing the illegal manufacture and trafficking of firearms. Its relevance, however, will depend more on action taken by member states than on the Convention

itself. Meek argues that the work of the Expert Group on Model Regulations may prove to be the more important of the two initiatives, since it is through practical measures such as these that the aims of the OAS initiatives could be realized.

829. Meek, Sarah. "The United Nations." In *Society Under Siege: Illicit Responses to Illicit Arms* [Serial No. 817]. Toward Collaborative Peace Series, Vol. II. ed. Virginia Gamba with the assistance of Sarah Meek, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, August 1998, pp. 33-44.

This article begins with an outline of the history of the United Nations and a review of its structure. The control of arms and disarmament has been a priority for the United Nations since its inception, but the issue of small arms and light weapons has received increased attention since the end of the Cold War. The 1993 Mali Initiative is described as one of the early United Nations efforts to curb small arms proliferation. However, it was not until 1995, Meek argues, that the issue of small arms really moved into the political sphere of the United Nations with the publication of then Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* (A/50/60). Two years later the United Nations Panel of Experts on Small Arms submitted their report on small arms proliferation [Serial No. I-9]. Meek outlines the nature of the Small Arms Panel and its major recommendations. Also reviewed is the May 1996 United Nations Disarmament Commission report *Guidelines for International Arms Transfers*, and the activities of the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice [Serial No. I-15].

830. Musah, Abdel Fatau and Robert Castle. "Eastern Europe's Arsenal on the Loose: Managing Light Weapons Flows to Conflict Zones." British American Security Information Council Papers: Occasional Papers on International Security Issues, No. 26, May 1998.

For many years, licit and illicit light weapons transfers in Central and Eastern Europe were a key strategy in Cold War proxy battles. Despite the end of the Cold War, transfers to the developing world continue. Several factors have led to the continuing transfer of weapons:

- 1) lax controls (i.e., states cannot enforce border controls);
- 2) high demand (i.e., in the developing world);
- 3) cascading (i.e., new weapons purchased by Eastern European countries make older weapons surplus and available for re-sale);
- 4) high profits from the trade.

The authors call upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to devote more resources to solving the problem. These efforts should be coordinated with the work of the United Nations, the Group of Eight Industrialized States (G-8), and the European Union (EU). Several measures to curb the proliferation of light weapons are offered, including the following:

- 1) developing mutually reinforcing OSCE and NATO control programs;
- 2) encouraging other institutions to participate in controls (e.g., Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS));
- 3) controlling surplus weapons (e.g., destroy surplus stocks);

- 4) adopting restraint measures (e.g., restrict weapons flows to high-tension areas);
- 5) instituting effective management of the arms industry (e.g., support industry conversion);
- 6) reducing grey and black market weapons transfers (e.g., share intelligence to apprehend culprits);
- 7) promoting the idea of "Security First" (i.e., address the social and economic causes of proliferation).

Taken together, these measures can help reduce the flow of light weapons; however, "success will depend on the political will of the participating organizations and Member States."

831. O'Callaghan, Geraldine. "Statement to the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice," A Paper Presented at the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Seventh Session. Vienna, Austria: 21-30 April 1998.

In this statement made on behalf of the British American Security Information Council, O'Callaghan praises the work by the ECOSOC Crime Commission, but argues that momentum must not be lost. Several recommendations are put forward to continue the process begun by the ECOSOC Crime Commission:

- 1) explore the link between domestic and international control;
- 2) investigate the link between legal and illegal firearms transfers;
- 3) link crime and conflict;
- 4) broaden the definition of illicit transfers.

These improvements, however, will cost money. As a result, O'Callaghan outlines three crucial steps to help implement such landmark agreements as the Organization of American States (OAS) Convention:

- 1) countries with technical expertise and financial resources must commit substantial resources to support developing countries implementing international instruments;
- 2) richer nations must contribute funds to allow developing countries to participate in Interpol's IWETS database;
- 3) G-8 nations must endorse the work of ECOSOC and announce a commitment of funds to facilitate the fast and effective development of this work.

O'Callaghan emphasizes that a coherent and comprehensive approach to firearms proliferation is required. While praising ECOSOC's attempts to combat illicit trafficking, it is argued that similar attention must be given the licit side.

832. Revilla, Antonio García. "Interrelationship Between Small Arms Trafficking, Drug Trafficking and Terrorism." In *Curbing Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies: An Action-Oriented Agenda*, ed. Péricles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone, UNIDIR/98/16, New York: United Nations, 1998, pp. 85-92.

Since the end of the Cold War, the focus of arms control has shifted away from nuclear to conventional disarmament. One of the issues which has received increased attention has been the

proliferation of small arms. Revilla argues that the control of illicit arms trafficking requires "the will on the part of States to combat this traffic effectively, support on the part of producer countries, and cooperation on the part of the international community." Exchanging information between national authorities and creating complementary internal legislation are the two measures needed to combat the problem. However, implementing these measures will be difficult. Economic difficulties, insufficient resources, and structural changes are all obstacles which stand in the way of decisive action.

833. Shropshire, Steve (compiled by). *Report on the International Conference on European Arms Export Controls: Stockholm, Sweden: November 13-14, 1997*. Sweden: TypoPrint, 1998.

This report summarizes the "International Conference on European Arms Export Controls" held in Stockholm, Sweden, November 13-14, 1997. The report provides a biography of each speaker, a background survey of the issues, and a summary of each speech given at the conference. Summaries of papers given on an EU Code of Conduct on the arms trade, transparency and accountability, and light weapons proliferation are included. In addition, the report provides summaries of workshop discussions on each of the above topics. Researchers working on small arms and light weapons will be particularly interested in the following articles (annotated separately in this bibliography):

- 1) Grega, Pierre and Reginald Moreels, "The Problems of Light Weapons Proliferation and the EU Programme to Tackle the Illicit Arms Trade" [Serial No. 820];
- 2) Greene, Owen, "Developing EU Programmes to Tackle Illicit Arms Trading and Light Weapons Proliferation" [Serial No. 819];
- 3) Gamba, Virginia, "What the EU Can Do To Help Strengthen Regional Initiatives Aimed at Tackling Light Weapons Proliferation" [Serial No. 816].

Also included is a section which provides comments on the key recommendations offered during the workshops, along with a list of conference participants.

834. Singh, Jasjit. "Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms: Some Issues and Aspects." In *Curbing Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies: An Action-Oriented Agenda*, ed. Péricles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone, UNIDIR/98/16, New York: United Nations, 1998, pp. 9-17.

Singh argues that there are two central questions to address before identifying prominent issues concerning illicit transfers of small arms: "the first is a clear understanding of what would constitute 'illicit' transfers; and the second is what weapons are to be included in the classification of 'small arms.'" Singh maintains that the single greatest supply of small arms originates from states as they act in what they perceive to be their national interest.

Several aspects of illicit transfers and the spread of small arms are outlined, including the following:

- 1) the Cold War legacy (i.e., the superpowers spent years equipping their allies with small arms and light weapons to promote their national strategic interests, resulting in vast supplies of these weapons);
- 2) cascading (i.e., initial supplies are controlled, but further transfers are not always monitored, resulting in arms filtering down to various non-State actors and groups);
- 3) loose national controls (i.e., governments do not possess or enforce laws restricting access to arms);
- 4) retrenchment of political power (i.e., as the size of Cold War armies is reduced, surplus weapons are available for sale);
- 5) transnational ethnic and ideological factors (i.e., they raise the demand for small arms);
- 6) narcotics linkages (i.e., drug trafficking is linked with small arms proliferation);
- 7) commercial motives (i.e., profits are high).

Given the number of small arms already in circulation and the diversity of actors engaged in their trade, instituting controls will be a monumental task. However, failure to address the problem will have a negative effect on international security. Controlled efforts must take place at the international, national and local level. Singh argues that the key to control lies in enhancing transparency and accountability regarding transfers. In addition, a system of verification concerning end-use will be necessary, along with a system to control the more dangerous weapons first. National control measures must also be strengthened. Doing so could involve the following measures:

- 1) improving border surveillance and control;
- 2) imposing stricter gun control legislation and implementing it effectively;
- 3) creating strong and effective measures against illegal possession and trafficking in small arms.

Singh argues that all this activity should "lead to strong norms and inhibitions at the societal, national, and international levels against the spread of small arms and light weapons."

835. Solomon, Hussein and Jakkie Cilliers. "The Southern African Development Community and Small Arms Proliferation." In *Society Under Siege: Illicit Responses to Illicit Arms* [Serial No. 817]. Toward Collaborative Peace Series, Vol. II. ed. Virginia Gamba with the assistance of Sarah Meek, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, August 1998, pp. 75-92.

The authors argue that post-Cold War conflict has changed from interstate to intrastate in focus, and the conflicts themselves fuel mass migrations and small arms proliferation. They maintain that responses to these new trends have been taken on a theoretical and an institutional level. On the theoretical level, the new agenda has recognized that security is dependent on such factors as political democracy, human rights, and social and economic development, in addition to military stability. On the institutional level, the agenda has been expanded to include concerns about the security of women, demobilization and the social reintegration of former combatants. The purpose of this chapter "is to explore the historic development of SADC [Southern African Development Community], analyze its institutional arrangements and examine its effectiveness in dealing with the threat small arms proliferation presents to the region. In addition, the chapter

seeks to provide an analysis of another regional security institution -- the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organization [SADCC]."

The historical development of the SADC and the SADCC is outlined, along with the structure of each organization. At the present time, one of the legacies of war in Southern Africa is small arms proliferation. As the region enters a period of relative peace, the issue of small arms proliferation has become paramount. The ready availability of these weapons helps transform ethnic differences into ethnic conflict and political differences into political violence.

Solomon and Cilliers maintain that four things could be done to enhance regional mechanisms for curbing small arms proliferation:

- 1) develop a regional understanding of the legitimate limits of the export and trade in small arms (e.g., to determine that certain types of weapons can be transferred only to representative and legitimate governments);
- 2) enhance transparency (i.e., to lead to a more comprehensive picture of the global trade in small arms, and to enhance the capacity of regional organizations to monitor destabilizing accumulations of these weapons);
- 3) strengthen controls (i.e., tighten export controls, border controls and other regulatory measures);
- 4) build practical security-building measures (i.e., to reduce levels of insecurity among individuals and communities).

It is argued that the SADC cannot accomplish these tasks on its own, but requires the skills and resources of more developed states.

836. Stohl, Rachel J. *Deadly Rounds: Ammunition and Armed Conflict*. British American Security Information Council (BASIC) Project on Light Weapons, Research Report 98.4. May 1998.

Stohl argues that one avenue to control the killing done by small arms and light weapons is to regulate the ammunition they demand. She focuses on small arms ammunition, which she defines as ammunition with cartridges of caliber 15.5 mm or less or ammunition that can be used in hand guns, rifles, and machine guns.

The first section of the paper provides key definitions associated with ammunition (e.g., caliber, shelf-life). The four components of a cartridge are defined: case, propellant, primer, and bullet. Ammunition does not have as long a lifespan as weapons because it is expendable and often used up quickly.

The second section outlines the nature of the ammunition industry by examining the following items:

- 1) production trends (e.g., the greatest number of companies produce the bullets, a smaller number make the cases, fewer make the powder, and still fewer make the explosive primer);
- 2) identifying ammunition (e.g., headstamps help identify the country of origin and the manufacturer of the ammunition);
- 3) United States production (e.g., it has one of the largest ammunition production capabilities in the world);

4) production in the industrialized world and emerging economies (e.g., Western Europe is still competitive in the global market, and production in South Asia is rising substantially);

5) production in the developing world (e.g., it does not yet produce enough ammunition to fill its military needs).

The third section examines the trade routes that determine ammunition supply. Very little information is available on the trade and transport of ammunition. The end of the Cold War, and the need of former Soviet Union countries for hard currency, has resulted in a cascading of ammunition similar to that in light and major arms. Much of the ammunition used in today's conflicts follows the same trade routes as the weapons in which they are used, but field work must be conducted to discover the suppliers and routes of ammunition used to arm warring parties.

The fourth section identifies the negative effects of ammunition proliferation, surveying regions where the potential for a renewal of conflict is high (e.g., Mozambique, South Africa and Somalia). The fifth section outlines and analyzes existing and proposed control strategies to restrict the flow of ammunition at the national, regional, multilateral and international level.

The sixth section outlines recommendations for addressing and controlling the ammunition problem. Granting that stopping the proliferation of ammunition entirely is "unlikely," Stohl maintains that the situation can be improved. She offers the following recommendations to reduce the violence and killing:

1) destroy surplus ammunition;

2) develop new control strategies and initiatives (e.g., multilateral export and import controls);

3) promote transparency of ammunition transfers (e.g., make ammunition part of any proposed arms register of small arms and light weapons);

4) encourage powder and explosive companies to publicize the list of companies to whom they distribute their powder (e.g., thereby allowing for the creation of an international database to track dangerous stockpiling by countries or groups);

5) continue field work begun by organizations such as Human Rights Watch and the Institute for Security Studies to learn more of ammunition's negative effects (e.g., trade routes, modes of transfer, supply chains and prices);

6) accept the issue of ammunition as an effective means of conflict prevention and control.

The seventh section concludes the report. Stohl hopes that this paper serves as an introduction to the ammunition problem. While this paper has extensive information on ammunition in the United States, Stohl advises that similar research must be done in other regions (e.g., South Asia and Africa). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academics, law-enforcement agencies, and policymakers must join together to confront this issue. Stohl argues that the environment is ripe for ammunition control measures; until ammunition control gains priority as a mechanism to control conflict, ammunition will proceed to the killing fields.

Appendix A lists selected arms ammunition manufacturers by country and cartridge type. Included at the end of the document is a list of suggested readings.

837. Vines, Alex. "The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique." British American Security Information Council (BASIC) Papers: Occasional Papers on International and Security Issues, No. 25, April 1998.

Light weapons proliferation has traditionally been on the fringe of conventional weapons trade, but it has received growing attention since the end of the Cold War. In the Mozambique conflict, the most commonly used arms were light weapons. Russia and China were the two main providers to the ruling party, combining for a total supply of 1.5 million AK-47s. The opposition received arms from Rhodesia and South Africa.

The United Nations operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) began the disarmament process on 4 October 1992 when a cease-fire was signed in Rome, ending the 16 year war. The process was complicated by both sides who turned over only low-grade weapons, ordering their forces to hide any quality weaponry. Of those weapons recovered, only a few were destroyed. Reintegrating former soldiers into the civilian economy was complicated by their lack of skills, and the failure of the economy to produce many job prospects. The result was that many soldiers unearthed weapons hidden from ONUMOZ and turned to criminal activity to support their families. Police and military officials have been tasked with controlling the spread of crime, but since many of these officers are involved in weapons trafficking, action against them is problematic.

Despite local efforts at control, many of Mozambique's weapons are destined for South Africa. Local security forces and criminal gangs demand the weapons to control their spheres of influence, with pistols outselling AK-47s. Also outlined are some of the co-operative efforts being undertaken to stop trafficking (e.g., increased cooperation between the police forces of South Africa and Mozambique). This cooperation is still rudimentary, however, and could be expanded further (e.g., allow units to cross borders when in "hot pursuit" of arms traffickers).

The major obstacle is to determine the links between senior officials and crime syndicates. Failure to do so will "likely have significant implications for democracy and civil liberties."

PART C

WORLD WIDE WEB SITES

WWW-1. Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)

URL: <http://bicc.uni-bonn.de/>

An der Elisabethkirche 25
53113 Bonn, GERMANY
Phone: +49-228-911 96-0
Fax: +49-228-24 12 15
E-Mail: bicc@bicc.uni-bonn.de

Working as a worldwide clearinghouse on practical conversion experiences and projects, BICC provides documentation, research, information and consulting services for governmental and non-governmental organizations, research institutes, companies and individuals involved in conversion. The WebSite provides links to various aspects of BICC's activities in the following areas:

- 1) defense budgets;
- 2) research and development;
- 3) defense industry;
- 4) demobilization and reintegration;
- 5) base closures;
- 6) surplus weapons.

Each section contains abstracts and full text versions of relevant BICC documents, comments on BICC projects and related information sources.

WWW-2. British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

URL: <http://www.basicint.org/>

USA:
1900 L Street NW
Suite 401
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: +1 202 785 1266
Fax: +1 202 387 62 98
E-mail: basicus@basicint.org

UK:
Carrara House
20 Embankment Place
London WC2N 6NN
Phone: +44 (0)171 925 0862
Fax: +44 (0)171 925 0861
E-mail: basicuk@basicint.org

The WebSite presents BASIC as "an independent research organization that analyzes international security issues. BASIC works to promote public awareness of defense, disarmament, military strategy, and nuclear policies in order to foster informed debate on these issues. BASIC facilitates the exchange of information and analysis among researchers, journalists, and parliamentarians on both sides of the Atlantic."

The British American Security Information Council devotes particular time and resources to studying the problem of small arms and light weapons proliferation. As part of their commitment to fostering research, BASIC keeps an electronic record of researchers and organizations working on small arms proliferation. This list is an electronic update of two other versions of the list published in text form in 1997 and 1998:

- 1) Johnston, Joel and Alex Millar. *Current Projects on Light Weapons: Supplement, February 1997*. British American Security Information Council (BASIC) Supplement to Project on Light Weapons Working Paper #1. February 1997.
- 2) Kucia, Christine and Bryan Martin-Keating. *Campaigns & Projects on Light Weapons*. British American Security Information Council (BASIC) Project on Light Weapons, Report 98.3. April 1998.

Both of these reports are compilations of projects currently underway on issues related to the problem of light weapons proliferation. Organized alphabetically by name of institution doing the research, entries include the following information:

- 1) an address of the institution;
- 2) a name of a contact person, including phone number and E-mail address;
- 3) a brief description of the project(s) being conducted.

Also included in Kucia's update is a list of additional participants active in the Project in Light Weapons, as well as an index of institutes and individuals.

This resource is invaluable for researchers seeking to contact others working in the field. Under the heading "Project on Light Weapons," the names of organizations and individuals, complete with E-mail and WWW addresses, are listed. The WebSite also includes electronic versions of papers published by BASIC.

WWW-3. Center for Defense Information (CDI)

URL: <http://www.cdi.org>

1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 332-0600
E-Mail: Info@cdi.org

The Center for Defense Information was founded in 1972 to act as an independent monitor of the United States military. It is a private, non-governmental, research organization which seeks realistic military spending without excess expenditures for weapons that increase the danger of war. The WebSite is searchable, providing links to items relevant to the study of small arms and light weapons. For instance, searching for "small arms" results in links to the CDI

publication *Weekly Defense Monitor*. CDI maintains a section on small arms in its Arms Trade Database, searchable using keywords, which provides electronic versions of many articles relevant to the study of small arms proliferation.

WWW-4. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)

URL: <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/disarm/smab12/menu.html>

Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division
125 Sussex Drive
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada
K1A 0G2

This WebSite reproduces the November 1996 document, *Small Arms and Light Weapons: An Annotated Bibliography*, (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1996). This bibliography was the precursor to the present annotated bibliography, a comprehensive survey of the literature available on small arms and light weapons prior to August 1996.

WWW-5. Federation of American Scientists (FAS)

URL: http://www.fas.org/asmp/light_weapons/index.html

307 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC
20002, U.S.A.
Phone: (202) 546-3300
Fax: (202) 675-1010
E-mail: fas@fas.org

This WebSite notes that there are more than 30 wars raging around the world today, and they are being fought primarily with small arms and light weapons. Easily accessible, the availability of small arms and light weapons exacerbates already existing tensions, and increases the duration of civil conflicts. The Federation of American Scientists is conducting an awareness campaign on the dangers posed by these weapons. It hopes to help develop a database on black market gun-running and to publish a series of regional case studies on the subject.

The WebSite provides links to other organizations working in the field of small arms and light weapons proliferation (e.g., SIPRI), and links to various on-line resources to help in conducting their campaign: "The Global Threat of Small Arms and Light Weapons -- A Primer"; "Governmental and International Efforts to Combat the Illicit Traffic in Small and Light Arms"; "FAS Report: U.S. Policy on Small/Light Arms Exports"; "FAS Public Interest Report: A Call to Shutdown the Black Market"; "Case Studies and Black Market Data Base"; "Campaigning for Change"; "Preliminary Policy Options for Monitoring/Restricting Exports of Light Arms";

"Pending Legislation in the 105th Congress and U.S. Light Weapons Policy"; "Suggested Reading"; "Links and Other Sources of Information."

WWW-6. Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

URL: <http://www.iss.co.za>

Phone: +27-11-315-7096

Fax : +27-11-315-7099

E-mail: iss@iss.co.za

The mission of the Institute for Security Studies is to enhance human security in Africa through applied research that can inform decisions on critical areas of individual, national, regional and international security. This WebSite provides links to the following aspects of the Institute's work:

- 1) publications;
- 2) resources;
- 3) organized events;
- 4) research areas.

Under the heading research areas, there are six areas of expertise, including work on arms management where researchers will find an electronic version of the proceedings from the following conference: "Conclusions from the Institute for Security Studies/Saferworld Conference on Developing Controls on Arms and Illicit Trafficking in Southern Africa," Pretoria, South Africa, held May 3-6, 1998.

WWW-7. Preparatory Committee for a Global Campaign on the Spread and Unlawful Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons (Prep Com)

URL: <http://www.prepcom.org>

Monterey Institute of International Studies

425 Van Buren Street,

Monterey, California

93940 USA

Phone: 408-647-6676

Fax: 408-647-4199

E-Mail: email@prepcom.org

Prep Com is an Internet community of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and individuals dedicated to preparing a global campaign to alleviate the problems associated with small arms and light weapons proliferation. The WebSite is located at and staffed by the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

The site provides links to electronic versions of documents and resolutions related to the study of small arms and light weapons proliferation. The documents are divided into the following sections:

- 1) official documents generated by the United Nations, Organization of American States, and NGOs;
- 2) research documents written by scholars and NGOs;
- 3) news articles written by journalists;
- 4) ideas for campaign strategies and methods written by all of the above.

Also included are links to a virtual conference involving individuals and organizations working in the field, and a regularly updated Prep Com newsletter.

WWW-8. Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion (PACDC)

URL: <http://www.miis.edu/pacdc/homegraph.htm>

Program for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Conversion
Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS)
425 Van Buren Street, Monterey, CA
93940, U.S.A.
Phone: (408) 647-4142
Fax: (408) 647-4199;
E-mail: pacdc@miis.edu

This WebSite outlines the primary mission of PACDC to document and to serve as a facilitator for policy initiatives that reduce the impact of weapons and violence on human, political and economic development. Specifically, the PACDC focuses on two such initiatives: Voluntary Weapons Collection and Destruction Programs (VWCs), and the "Weed and Seed" model for community restoration and development. The site also provide links to other useful sites which provide information about the following: Voluntary Weapons Collection and Destruction Programs; small arms and light weapons events, resources and weapons descriptions, links to other related small arms and light weapons sites, and a link to the Spanish version of the PACDC site.

WWW-9. Saferworld

URL: <http://wn.apc.org/sworld/>

33-34 Alfred Place,
London SW1E 7DP,
Phone: +44 (0)171 580 8886
Fax: +44 (0) 171 631 1444
E-mail: Sworld@gn.apc.org

Saferworld is an independent foreign affairs research group, committed to alerting governments and educating the public about the need for more effective approaches to tackling and preventing armed conflict around the globe. The organization addresses two issues: the arms trade, and conflict prevention. Under the label of arms trade, Saferworld conducts research on the issue of the illicit trafficking of light weapons. Saferworld's Light Weapons Project aims to stem the flow of small arms and light weapons within regions of conflict by developing and implementing the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms. Saferworld will be hosting three seminars and publishing three reports linked to those issues and themes highlighted by the EU Programme. The first was held in South Africa in May 1998, and the remaining two will be held in the autumn and winter of 1998.

The site also provides links to the following locations:

- 1) recent Saferworld activities (e.g., Saferworld and the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa held a conference May 3-6, 1998 on "Developing Controls on Arms and Illicit Trafficking in Southern Africa");
- 2) Saferworld publications (e.g., *Demilitarisation, Reintegration and Conflict Prevention in the Horn of Africa*, July 1998);
- 3) how to join Saferworld;
- 4) how to contact Saferworld;
- 5) links to other useful sites.

WWW-10. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

URL: <http://www.sipri.se/>

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Frösunda
S-169 70 Solna
Sweden
Phone: +46-8-655 97 00
Fax: +46-8-655 97 33
E-Mail: sipri@sipri.se

This WebSite is the official home page of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. It provides links to sites which describe the organization's creation, its research areas, its publications, and its library and documentation. Also included are links to other related sites.

This WebSite also provides a search engine which allows researchers to search by keyword. For example, searching for "small arms" yields a number of links to sites, including a list of responses to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/70B which called for the views of Member States on the subject of the international trafficking of small arms and light weapons. An electronic version of the aforementioned Resolution is also available, as is a copy of the European Union Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms.

WWW-11. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

URL: <http://www.unog.ch/UNIDIR/>

UNIDIR

Palais des Nations

CH-1211 Geneva 10

Switzerland

Phone: (41.22) 917 31 86 or 917 42 63

Fax: (41.22) 917 01 76

UNIDIR is an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations, established for the purpose of undertaking independent research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security issues. The WebSite provides summaries of recent UNIDIR activities. For instance, UNIDIR hosted an international seminar on "The Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies," in Buenos Aires between April 23-25, 1997. A summary of the conference proceedings is available in electronic form. In addition, the site offers lists of recent UNIDIR publications and procedures to follow to order documents, and provides links to other related sites.

PART D

AUTHOR INDEX

This section is an alphabetical listing of the personal or corporate authors of the documents in Part A (United Nations, Regional Organizations, and Other International Arrangements), and Part B (Scholarly Studies). Serial numbers listed after each author's name refer the researcher to the articles annotated in Parts A and B. The serial numbers in which "I" appears (e.g., I-1) refer to the items from Part A. The numeric references correspond to the serial numbers in Part B. Numbers in the 600 series refer to items published in 1996. Similarly, numbers in the 700 series indicate items published in 1997, and so on through the 800 series which represents items available in 1998. This numbering system allows for quick reference. For instance, the following reference appears in the Author Index:

Laurance, Edward J.: 605, 717.

By virtue of the initial digit in the serial number, the researcher can determine that the annotations associated with Laurance were published in 1996 and 1997 respectively, and these annotations can be found in Part B.

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PART E

KEYWORD INDEX

This section is an alphabetically organized Keyword Index. Items listed in this section appear in the text of the annotations in Parts A (United Nations, Regional Organizations, and Other International Arrangements), B (Scholarly Studies), and C (World Wide Web sites), and they fit into at least one of the following categories:

- 1) a country or region which is mentioned in the text of a study;
- 2) a group involved in the study of small arms and light weapons (e.g., the British American Security Information Council);
- 3) an agreement, arrangement or organization which addresses the problem of small arms proliferation (e.g., the Organization of American States);
- 4) an important term or concept used in the discussion of small arms and light weapons proliferation (e.g., a definition of 'small arms').

Serial numbers corresponding to relevant annotations follow each keyword. United Nations Documents and other entries from Part A are indicated with "I" before the number (e.g., I-1). Scholarly items are indicated by the serial numbers between 601 and 809. Numbers in the 600 series refer to items published in 1996. Similarly, numbers in the 700 series indicate items published in 1997, and so on through the 800 series which represents items available in 1998. Serial numbers which began with "WWW" (e.g., WWW-1) refer the researcher to World Wide Web sites from Part C. Thus, as with the Author Index, the serial numbers allow the researcher to determine what type of item is listed, and in the case of scholarly articles, the year the item appeared. For example, the following reference appears in the Keyword Index:

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC): I-6, I-15, I-17, 710-712.

From the numbers listed it is possible to determine that this organization is mentioned in three items in Part A, and three articles (published in 1997). Acronyms or organizations are included with a cross-reference to the appropriate entry in the Keyword Index, allowing the Keyword Index to function as a glossary of acronyms.

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PART F

TITLE INDEX

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Armed Conflicts and Small Arms Proliferation: Refocusing the Research Agenda: 718.

From the number listed it is possible to determine that this title refers to a scholarly item published in 1997.

- | | |
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| Addressing Light Weapons and Small Arms Proliferation: 706. | Consolidation of Peace Through Practical Disarmament Measures (1997): I-13. |
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| Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them (1996): I-3. | Controlling the Proliferation of Weapons: 602. |
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| Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Light Weapons Destruction in Central America: 704. | Criminal Justice Reform and Strengthening of Legal Institutions: Measures to Regulate Firearms (April 1997): I-15. |
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- Dealing With the Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Progress Report and the Way Forward: 717.
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- EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms (1996): I-2.
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- Southern African Development Community and Small Arms Proliferation (The): 835.
- Statement to the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: 831.
- Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique (The): 837.

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- Tackling Light Weapons Proliferation: Issues and Priorities for the EU: 713.
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- Undermining Development: The European Arms Trade with the Horn of Africa and Central Africa: 804.
- United Nations Report on Firearms Regulation: 720.
- United Nations (The): 829.
- UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms: A Canadian Perspective on Their Report (The): 811.
- What the EU Can Do To Help Strengthen Regional Initiatives Aimed at Tackling Light Weapons Proliferation: 816.

PART G

ADDENDUM

LIST OF ADDITIONAL ITEMS

The following section lists publications received too late to be considered for inclusion. Items are listed alphabetically by author.

Author Unknown. "Conclusions from the Institute for Security Studies/Saferworld Conference on Developing Controls on Arms and Illicit Trafficking in Southern Africa." Pretoria, South Africa: May 3-6, 1998.

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
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
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