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CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

WORKING PAPER #10

THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL
SESSION ON DISARMAMENT 1988:
PEACE PROPOSALS SINCE 1982

Hanna Newcombe

May 1988

INSTITUT CANADIEN POUR LA PAIX ET
LA SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALES



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PREFACE

CIIPS Working papers are the result of research work in progress, often intended for later publication by the Institute or another publication, and are regarded by CIIPS to be of immediate value for distribution in limited numbers-- mostly to specialists in the field. Unlike all other Institute publications, these papers are published in the original language only.

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
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Dr. Hanna Newcombe is a Director of the Institute--Dundas in Dundas, Ontario.

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Mme Hanna Newcombe est Directrice du Peace Research Institute, à Dundas (Ontario).

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Le présent document a été commandé par l'ICPSI qui voulait ainsi fournir aux lecteurs une analyse des propositions formulées entre la Deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'ONU sur le désarmement (UNSSOD II), qui a eu lieu en 1982, et la Troisième Session extraordinaire (UNSSOD III), qui se tiendra du 31 mai au 25 juin 1988. Le document montre que, même si les idées présentées sont nombreuses et qu'elles varient quant à leurs partisans, à leur portée et aux moyens de mise en oeuvre proposés, elles disent toutes d'une façon ou d'une autre que les gouvernements et les citoyens ont tous intérêt à rechercher des solutions novatrices pour régler les problèmes intéressant la sécurité internationale. Les participants à l'UNSSOD III auront pour mission de façonner ces solutions en un programme constructif susceptible de renforcer la sécurité mondiale.

Les opinions énoncées dans le présent document sont celles de l'auteure et elles ne représentent pas nécessairement les vues de l'Institut ni des membres de son conseil d'administration.

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UN Special Session on Disarmament, from May 31 to June 25, 1988. The international atmosphere has changed for the better, with an INF Treaty and a successful summit meeting between US and USSR. What can we expect from UNSSOD III?

In order to prepare for answering that question, this article reviews peace proposals that have been made in the interim period, 1982 - 1988. By "peace proposals" we mean, in this connection, proposals that have to do with disarmament and arms control, or with strengthening the United Nations, since these are the two main pillars of peace. We will take into account both governmental and non-governmental proposals; those implemented or merely proposed; unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral plans; long-range and short-range; and

Introduction

The First UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 produced an excellent Final Document, which gave the world hope. Unfortunately, the only part implemented was the new machinery for disarmament negotiations: adding more non-aligned nations to the Committee on Disarmament, directing the First Committee to deal exclusively with disarmament, etc.

The reason for non-implementation is obvious: the general worsening of East-West relations, which began in 1979 (Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). It was this same deterioration of relations (which has been called "The Second Cold War") which doomed the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1982. In spite of a spectacular peace walk of close to 1 million people in New York at its opening, UNSSOD II barely managed to reaffirm the Final Document of 1978 and launch the World Disarmament Campaign (a public education effort by the UN, governments, and NGOs). No progress was made on the Comprehensive Program for Disarmament (an attempt to pin down a timetable for definite sequential disarmament steps) or any other matter. Now we are anticipating a Third UN Special Session on Disarmament, from May 31 to June 25, 1988. The international atmosphere has changed for the better, with an INF Treaty and a successful summit meeting between US and USSR. What can we expect from UNSSOD III?

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actions to be taken by governments, NGOs, the UN, or municipalities.

A. Disarmament and Arms Control

1. Governmental plans

i) Implemented

Governmental peace plans that have been implemented in this period are actually fairly impressive, in contrast to the gloomy general evaluation of this period as a time of international tension and hostility. Of course, we are not recounting here the hostile acts (wars, threats, etc.) that also occurred in this period, nor do we consider the "normal" escalation of the arms race, arms trade, and arms expenditures.

(a) Unilateral moves that have been implemented by governments include the four mentioned below.

One, unfortunately, was only temporary; we refer to the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing, announced in late autumn 1985 and finally terminated 18 months later, in summer 1986, when no US reciprocation was obtained. In our interpretation, the USSR, under Gorbachev, tried a "GRIT move" (a unilateral initiative inviting reciprocation); but this can succeed only if the other side actually reciprocates. While the superpowers had carried out a successful series of mutual initiatives and reciprocations in the early 1960s under Kennedy and Khrushchev (Etzioni, 1967, 1969), this failed in the 1980s with the Reagan and Gorbachev.

There were some other minor Soviet GRIT initiatives in this period besides the nuclear test moratorium, but we shall not list them; they present a similar picture of US non-reciprocation.

(The second unilateral move implemented by a government (this time not requiring reciprocation, but complete in itself) was the New Zealand enforcement of its nuclear weapon-free status with regard to its harbours. Since US naval ships paying routine visits would not declare whether or not they carry nuclear weapons (this is their deliberate policy), they were refused entry to New Zealand harbours. This is the first, but hopefully not last, governmental attempt to make its nuclear weapon-free status real in fact, not just a symbolic declaration. The example has not yet been followed by others, but future developments bear watching.

The third case of a unilaterally implemented governmental peace plan is less clear, because it is difficult to sort out whether it is a real action or merely a declaration. We refer to the USSR's pledge, in a speech at the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament, never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Most observers welcome the pledge, but note that it has not been reflected in weapons deployed nor in strategic postures. Perhaps it would be difficult to do so, since the nuclear weapons deployed for deterrence (second strike or retaliation) are so similar to those needed for first strike or first use.

The fourth instance is in the form of a significant research report, a comprehensive plan for economic conversion from military to civilian production in Sweden. The UN Secretary-General has called for such national-scale studies by all members, but so far only Sweden has done so. Economic conversion studies are of great practical importance if disarmament is to be carried out without economic dislocation; but they are also psychologically important, by signalling that the nation doing the planning is truly serious about disarmament. This is why the Swedish report is listed here as

an implemented governmental plan, although it is in the form of research rather than action. (See Inga Thorsson, 1984.)

For the sake of comparison, we might note some pre-1982 examples of unilaterally implemented governmental peace moves:

(1) The famous Article 9 of Japan's constitution, which states that "the right of the state to wage war shall not be recognized." This is taken to mean that Japan will not wage war even in self-defence; this goes well beyond the UN Charter's prohibition of the use of force, which permits self-defence.

(2) Other national constitutions also have anti-war clauses, though not as strong as Japan's: e.g., Federal Republic of Germany, Italy (the former Axis powers seem to have become convinced of the futility of war), France, Belgium, and others.

(3) Also long before 1982, Costa Rica took the courageous step of abolishing its army, in spite of threats and one actual invasion by Somoza's Nicaragua, which is a neighbour. This Costa Rican posture persists to this day, in spite of Central America having become one of the world's dangerous crisis areas. Perhaps this posture of "unarmed neutrality" (in contrast with the "armed neutrality" of Sweden and Switzerland) contributed to the present role of Costa Rica as the peacemaker in Central America (Arias Plan). The recent award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Costa Rica's president Arias testifies to this.

(b) Among bilateral governmental plans that have been implemented in the 1982-88 period, we can cite two, but both are relatively recent (when US-Soviet tension has abated

somewhat).

One is the US-Soviet agreement, announced on May 4, 1987, and signed in September, to institute crisis control centres to avoid unintended (accidental) nuclear war. The centres, which will be in Washington and Moscow, will exchange information on matters such as an accidental missile launch or a commercial nuclear accident, like the Chernobyl reactor fire, that might be misinterpreted. The centres will act as "high-tech supplements" to the Washington-Moscow hotline. Such centres will obviously be of great benefit to both superpowers (as well as the rest of the world), and therefore no conflict of interest needed to be resolved in concluding the agreement. However, it still awaits ratification. Another reservation is that the crisis control centres will still be manned by US personnel in the US and Soviet personnel in the USSR (though in close communication with each other), instead of using the mixed teams in both countries that have been recommended by experts. (See Babst et al., 1984, 1986.)

The second example is even more recent: The Agreement on Intermediate and Shorter Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe, which are to be entirely removed (the "double zero" option) by both US and USSR. This agreement was announced at the superpower summit on December 8, 1987, though the details were negotiated beforehand.

The treaty, which covers nuclear missiles with a range of 500-5,500 kilometres, will require the USSR to destroy 1,836 such missiles and the US to destroy 867, within a period of 3 years. Verification will be by on-site inspection, inspection by challenge, and inspection by satellites. The inclusion of on-site and challenge inspection is a breakthrough in arms control negotiations.

Although it will remove only 3% of the world nuclear stockpile, this agreement is significant for 3 reasons:

(1) It will remove the hair-trigger of Pershing IIs' mere 6-minute flight time to Moscow, which is dangerous and accident-prone, encouraging a "launch-on-warning" response (possibly to a false alarm). It is thus a measure of "disengagement."

(2) It is the first-ever treaty in which nuclear weapons will actually be reduced. (Previous treaties specified "non-armament" rather than "disarmament," i.e., excluding weapons from areas where they had not previously existed, e.g., Antarctica, the seabed, outer space, Latin America, or the non-nuclear-weapons states, or "arms limitation," with limits higher than existing ones as in SALT I and II.) It is not the first treaty of actual disarmament (that honour is held by the Biological Weapons Treaty, under which some stockpiles were destroyed); but it is the first nuclear disarmament treaty.

(3) It may be the harbinger of further, even more significant steps to come, perhaps to be announced at the next summit meeting: a 50% cut in strategic nuclear weapons is being widely discussed. (Under the present conditions of gross "overkill," this would still leave nuclear stockpiles far in excess of "minimum deterrence" or even "overkill = 1", but it would certainly be significant.)

Some doubts can also be expressed about the INF agreement. For example, how will the warheads be disposed of? Will they merely be attached to other missiles? Or modified and "modernized"? Even if the warheads are dismantled, what will become of the fissionable material? Unlike chemical explosives, plutonium and uranium-235 cannot be destroyed,

once created. However, it could and should be denatured; i.e., mixed with a fast neutron absorber such as boron-10, which would make it unsuited (without a laborious separation) for use in weapons.

(c) There were also instances of multilateral peace plans implemented by governments. One was the well-known Stockholm agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, negotiated under the umbrella of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). This is a truly multilateral forum, composed of the 16 members of NATO, members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), and European neutrals, 35 nations altogether. [A forum such as the MBFR (Mutual Balanced Forced Reductions) talks in Vienna is not truly multilateral; it is "bipolar," being composed of the two alliances, NATO and WTO.]

The Stockholm agreement specifies particular military confidence-building measures, such as giving prior notification of military manoeuvres, troop withdrawals or other troop movements, allowing outside observers at military manoeuvres or exercises, and so on.

The second instance of a government-implemented multilateral peace plan in this period is the Rarotonga Treaty which declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Pacific. It entered into force on December 11, 1986. In a way it is a parallel to the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty which did the same for Latin America, and is considered one of the most successful arms control (or "non-armament") treaties so far. Possibly Rarotonga will be just as successful as Tlatelolco has been, though both have loopholes (e.g., some Latin American states never joined Tlatelolco; not all nuclear-weapon states have given guarantees - "negative assurances" - to Rarotonga.) Certainly, the Rarotonga Treaty is only the second treaty in

the world (after Tlatelolco) which excludes nuclear weapons from an inhabited area of the globe. (The Antarctic is not considered inhabited.)

The Rarotonga Treaty confers nuclear-weapon-free status only on land areas (up to the 12-mile sea limit) in the South Pacific (the numerous islands, as well as Australia and New Zealand), not on the vast stretches of ocean in between. However, unlike Tlatelolco and the Antarctic Treaty, it bans the dumping of radioactive nuclear wastes at sea, and thus touches on issues of civilian nuclear energy. One of its main concerns is banning nuclear tests, which France still carries on in the area (France has not recognized the treaty). Unlike Tlatelolco, it bans all nuclear explosions, even those for peaceful purposes. Another big concern is keeping nuclear-armed ships from harbours, a provision which New Zealand has carried out, as noted above. The treaty does not oblige members to prohibit such visits or other transit, but leaves it up to the discretion of member states.

The small new state of Palau has proclaimed itself nuclear-weapons-free in its 1979 constitution, and has had a long struggle about this with the US, the former administering power of this newly independent territory. In 4 separate elections and 6 different plebiscites since 1979, the people of Palau voted to uphold their constitution, but the last referendum in August 1987 decided for a change, and acceptance of the US conditions for forming a "Compact of Free Association." Fifty Palauan women elders filed suit to challenge the referendum results, but threats of violence and the murder of an anti-compact activist in September 1987 caused them to drop the case. (Bedford, 1988.)

The nations adhering to the Rarotonga Treaty are: Australia, New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua-New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa--all members of the South Pacific Forum. Among the nuclear-weapon states, the USSR and China have given assurances that they will respect the zone and never use nuclear weapons against any of their member states. However, the US, UK and France have not done so.

Verification of the treaty is to be carried out by the IAEA.

(ii) Governmental Plans Proposed, But Not Implemented.

In addition to the 8 implemented governmental plans outlined above, there has been an even greater number of plans that have been proposed or are under negotiation. In this section, we had problems separating the unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral plans. Unilateral unimplemented governmental proposals do not exist; if a government wants to do something unilaterally, it does so, rather than merely propose. It could, of course, propose that another state do something unilaterally, but this is unusual and we found no instances. The difficulty in attempting to separate the bilateral and multilateral proposals is that the nuclear freeze plans bridge both of these divisions; sometimes suggesting a US-USSR freeze, at other time a freeze by all 5 nuclear-weapon states. The same is true of the Comprehensive Test Ban. The most useful way to divide up these proposals turned out to be to discuss the clearly bilateral ones first; those related to the freeze, or involving nuclear-weapon states only, next; the clearly multilateral ones (other than zones) next; and a final section on nuclear-weapon-free or chemical-weapon-free zones and zones of peace.

(a) Prominent among the bilateral plans under negotiation between the superpowers is the "deep strategic cut" (usually a 50% cut is mentioned) in strategic land-based missiles (ICBMs). One of the first to broach this idea was George Kennan (1981). At that point it was a non-governmental proposal, since Kennan was already retired from the US State Department. He argued that the superpowers had so much "overkill" in land-based ICBMs that they would never miss the excess; and that, since land-based missiles are stationary and therefore more vulnerable to being destroyed in a first strike than submarine-based missiles are, they contribute to strategic instability and possible failure of deterrence, or even a temptation for first strike. One wonders why, then, he did not propose a 100% cut and complete reliance on the sea-based deterrent only; but perhaps that would have been viewed as too "radical."

The "deep cut" or "deep reduction" surfaced later as a governmental proposal, showing that there can be some "trickle-up" of plans from the non-governmental to the governmental level, at least if the proposer is influential enough (preferably a retired diplomat). The public was surprised by the emergence and near-success of this plan at the Reykjavik Summit in October 1986. At that point, the implementation of this plan was aborted because of the US-Soviet disagreement about SDI deployment; but now it is being suggested that it may be put in treaty form at the next superpower summit in Moscow in early 1988.

If this happens, the public would be impressed; but we should remember that the remaining 50% would still constitute substantial "overkill," and very far above the "minimum deterrence" level (defined arbitrarily as 100 missiles per side), even apart from the remaining two legs of the "triad,"

i.e., submarines and bombers (now assisted by air-launched cruise missiles). Yet the direction of movement would be important psychologically.

Also under negotiation is a treaty about ASAT (anti-satellite weapons). This is a topic quite apart from SDI. However, in UN discussions on curbing the arms race in space, some nations want to widen the concept to include all space weapons (space-to-space, space-to-earth, earth-to-space), not only anti-satellite weapons specifically. The more modest ASAT proposal has a better chance of becoming embodied in a treaty, and it would be helpful since surveillance satellites are important in verification and therefore enhance stability; though the more ambitious plan would be even better if it could be obtained.

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 banned only the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the Earth, or on celestial bodies such as the moon. This obviously does not go far enough, and needs supplementing. A comprehensive space ban should include anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) aimed from the earth to space and from space to space (killer satellites); not only mass destruction weapons but also specific-destruction weapons (e.g., directed-energy beams of light or particles, kinetic-energy weapons); not only in orbit or on the moon, but anywhere in space. Some experts distinguish "militarization of space" (which includes reconnaissance satellites) from "weaponization of space," and would ban only the latter.

Regarding process in bilateral negotiations, it has been suggested that talks about strategic, intermediate, and tactical nuclear weapons could be variously combined (either strategic plus intermediate, or intermediate plus tactical, or all three). This might make possible certain trade-offs and

thus facilitate agreement. It would also avoid arguments whether Intermediate Range Missiles which can hit Moscow should be considered strategic or not. The Soviet argument has been that it is the point of impact that matters, not the length of the flight path. However, now that the intermediate (INF) treaty has been achieved, the other negotiations will probably proceed separately, as before. (The term "shorter-range" missiles in the INF Treaty refers to missiles between intermediate and tactical, not the tactical themselves.)

The elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe has been proposed, e.g., at the United Nations by Sweden. The presence of these weapons is destabilizing, because it tends to erase the "firebreak" between nuclear and conventional weapons, and might make escalation of any European war to the nuclear level more likely.

Among the tactical nuclear weapons, the neutron bomb (or enhanced-radiation weapon) has met particular objections, and has not been deployed in Europe. It is being proposed that even its stockpiling in the US for possible use in Europe should be abandoned. Its use in anti-tank warfare is of doubtful value anyway; tank crews hit by its neutrons would probably remain capable of combat for several more hours, and knowing that they would die anyway, might fight more vigorously because they had nothing more to lose (and might be angry).

Negotiations between the superpowers continue on topics on which some agreements already exist, in order to improve them. Examples are measures to prevent nuclear war (various precautionary rules directed to their armed forces) and safeguards against accidents, which could be upgraded, as already stated, by having mixed-manning of the crisis control centres.

Besides specific treaty proposals, the superpower leaders also agreed on the general proposition that "nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." An expanded statement of such "common interest" propositions was stated by Trudeau in 1984 and is summarized below:

- (1) A nuclear war cannot be won.
- (2) A nuclear war must never be fought.
- (3) We should be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
- (4) The dangers of destabilizing weapons must be recognized.
- (5) Techniques of crisis management must be improved.
- (6) The consequences of first use of force must be recognized.
- (7) Security must be increased and cost reduced.
- (8) Horizontal proliferation must be prevented.
- (9) The US and USSR must recognize each other's legitimate security interests.
- (10) The security of either cannot be based on the political or economic collapse of the other. (Trudeau, 1984)

This "decatalogue" was put forward in the hope that it truly reflects the beliefs and codes of conduct of the superpowers, though they never confirmed some of the points. It does seem to represent their common interests, and the last point comes close to stating the principle of "common security" later enunciated by Olof Palme's Commission. (Independent Commission, 1982.)

(b) Prominent among proposals concerning the nuclear-weapon states is the nuclear freeze. There have been suggestions for parts of this earlier, and they were pulled together into a comprehensive proposal by Randall Forsberg just prior to UNSSOD II. (During the New York Peace Walk of 1982, the

signs proclaimed "Don't blow it, freeze it.") She proposed a bilateral (US-USSR) verifiable freeze ("stop where you are") on the development, production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons. A large peace movement in the US grew up on the basis of this idea. So the freeze was originally a non-governmental proposal. It reached the governmental level soon after, both in the US Congress (with the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution) and at the United Nations. In spite of favourable votes in Congress, the Reagan administration rejected the freeze, on the ground that the Soviets are ahead in the arms race and that the move would freeze the existing inequality. Reagan argued that reductions (START) were better than stoppages, and the opposition replied that "You have to stop before you reverse direction." Arguments arose as to whether a freeze of production could really be verified, and some freeze advocates were willing to leave this point out.

At the UN, various versions of the freeze became incorporated in General Assembly resolutions, and not all of these were bilateral. Sooner or later, the minor nuclear-weapon states (China, UK and France) would have to be included in a freeze, but there were differences of opinion about whether to start with 2 or with 5.

Trudeau's speech at UNSSOD I on "suffocating the arms race" should be considered to be a freeze proposal. It contained 4 points:

- (1) Cessation of nuclear weapons tests.
- (2) Cessation of flight-testing of missiles.
- (3) Cessation of production of weapons-grade fissionable fuel.
- (4) Freezing and then reducing arms expenditures. (Trudeau, 1978.)

In later UN sessions, the Swedish-Mexican resolution suggested starting with a bilateral freeze, launched with either simultaneous unilateral declarations by the superpowers or a joint declaration, with verification to be by satellites ("national technical means of verification") as under the SALT treaties. India proposed starting with all 5 nuclear-weapon states, as did the "Five-Continent Peace Initiative" (6 leaders of Mexico, Argentina, Sweden, Greece, India, and Tanzania). India stressed the ban on production, both of nuclear warheads and of weapons-grade fissionable material. Ireland proposed a 2-year moratorium on new strategic (US-USSR) weapons. These resolutions were generally adopted at the UN with large majorities, but received negative votes from the US and abstentions or negative votes from Canada.

In 1985 the USSR proposed a World Space Organization (WSO), in a letter to the UN Secretary-General. The purpose of WSO would be scientific cooperation in space. Called "Star Peace," this was the Soviet reply to "Star Wars," the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. Several nations at the UN think that the WSO plan should be put into effect even if the Soviet precondition (non-militarization of space) is not fulfilled.

Gorbachev surprised the world in 1986 by his plan to rid the world of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. His plan has 3 stages: In the first stage, there would be an end to development, testing and deployment of space weapons; the US and USSR would get rid of their intermediate missiles in Europe (already agreed on in the INF treaty); and the US and USSR would stop all nuclear tests. In the second stage, other nuclear powers would join the nuclear disarmament process; the US and USSR would continue nuclear weapons reductions; nuclear powers would eliminate tactical nuclear weapons; and all nuclear powers would stop nuclear tests. Finally, in stage 3,

all remaining nuclear weapons would be eliminated.

The nuclear freeze, insofar as it would stop nuclear testing, is related to the question of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB), which itself stems back to before 1963 when the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTB) was signed. The idea of a comprehensive test ban has received renewed attention during the 1982-1988 period.

Direct tripartite negotiations on CTB among the US, UK and USSR were interrupted in 1982 when Reagan indicated that the US was no longer interested in a CTB. The lack of interest was due not only to doubts about verification (probably unwarranted, because of technical advances in seismology), but more to the expressed need for periodic testing of the stockpiled weapons to guard against deterioration (though other means of spot-checking exist, according to some experts), and even more (it is suspected) to the desire to test a whole new generation of nuclear weapons, e.g., the x-ray laser which would form part of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Some experts characterize this as "the third generation of nuclear weapons," the first being fission bombs and the second hydrogen (fission-fusion-fission) bombs. These third generation bombs would be more highly specialized, e.g., to enhance x-ray production, or neutron production (Taylor, 1987). Since the whole point of wanting a CTB is to stop such "modernization," it seems simply that the Reagan administration does not subscribe to the main purpose that a CTB would serve.

In 1985-6, the USSR carried out its unilateral moratorium on underground nuclear tests, as already stated, and challenged the US to reciprocate. When no reciprocation was forthcoming, the USSR resumed its underground tests, explaining that it must not get behind in the arms race--which

could only mean that the USSR is mounting a "modernization" effort of its own. However, the fact that USSR now accepts on-site inspection to supplement seismic verification is a hopeful new sign. Unofficial groups of US and Soviet scientists have already monitored tests in each other's country.

To get around the CTB stalemate, it has been proposed that a CTB could be achieved by amendment of the PTB. This is both a governmental proposal (see UN resolution 834B, adopted 127 to 3, 1986) and a non-governmental proposal (by Parliamentarians Global Action, Center for Defense Information, and others), but will be described in the following section on multilateral governmental proposals, because it involves all the signatories of the PTB, not only the 3 nuclear-weapon states who signed it.

(c) Multilateral governmental plans

The Comprehensive Test Ban could be achieved by amendment of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

Article II of the PTB states that:

- (1) any one or more of the 113 States Party to the Treaty can formally propose an amendment to the Treaty;
- (2) any combination of 38 (i.e., 1/3 of 113) or more Parties can request an amendment conference and the Depository States (US, UK, and USSR) are then obliged to convene the conference;
- (3) all Parties attending the conference can vote to adopt the amendment;

(4) an amendment, forbidding underground tests (in addition to tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in space already banned under the PTB), would then be open to ratification by states.

It would enter into force for all Parties upon ratification of all of the original Parties to the Treaty. (Goldblat, 1982.)

Would the US and UK (being opposed to a CTB) refuse to carry out their legal obligations as Depository States of the PTB and not convene an amendment conference if requested to do so by 1/3 of the member states? Probably they would comply, because the amendment conference might otherwise be called by the USSR alone and they would lose face. However, no amendment can be adopted by the conference if a Depository State opposes it, and so either US or UK could veto the amendment and block transformation of the PTB into a CTB -- albeit against the publicly expressed desires of many states.

The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in favour of an amendment conference on November 30, 1987, by a vote of 128 in favour, with France, the UK and US opposed and 22 abstentions.

Regarding decrease in conventional forces, a follow-up meeting (FUM) of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has been meeting in Vienna since November 1986. Among other considerations, the FUM is attempting to agree on language which would outline the mandates for two new negotiations on conventional arms control. One set of negotiations would expand upon the confidence and security-building measures agreed upon at the Stockholm Conference. The other would consider measures by the members of NATO and the Warsaw

Pact to achieve greater stability and security in Europe at lower levels of conventional forces. These latter talks may replace the MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks).

The greater flexibility of the USSR under Gorbachev may break the deadlock and produce some results. This would be highly desirable, since talk is already heard about increasing conventional strength in Europe in view of the INF treaty. Balance must be kept between East and West, but it would be much preferable to do so at lower rather than higher levels; this would not only reduce tensions and thus dangers, but also save much-needed resources.

Regarding the conventional arms trade, which feeds the many local wars and troubled areas, bolsters local dictators and further impoverishes already poor countries, old proposals for an arms trade register have been repeated, in the UN and elsewhere. No progress has been made on acceptance. Even if accepted, such proposals would clearly be insufficient; real control of the arms trade would have to follow the disclosure of information. But it seems that, in the present world climate of tension, even the modest preliminaries are unacceptable. Perhaps efforts at conflict resolution in troubled areas will have to precede arms control efforts, as far as the willingness of the arms buyers is concerned. But the arms suppliers have responsibilities too--concerted action by suppliers (a "conventional arms suppliers club") might still be able to control the arms trade, before too many countries start manufacturing their own weapons ("conventional proliferation"). Many are already doing so, and becoming less dependent on outside suppliers. In any case, hopes for supplier cooperation are also unfulfilled, as the major powers prefer to compete for client-state allegiance, as well as for commercial gains.

Regional conventional arms control (proposed by Pakistan at the UN in 1982) is a proposal well worth considering. Conventional weapons reduction negotiations have so far concentrated on Europe, where potential East-West conflict presents great dangers, yet has never yet exploded into actual violence. Meanwhile, areas of chronic or periodic violence, so-called "protracted (or intractable) conflict", such as the Middle East, India-Pakistan, Cambodia, Lebanon, Iran-Iraq, Chad, Western Sahara, Angola, Mozambique, or Timor (to name only a few) have been ignored. Perhaps each of these separate conflicts needs and deserves "MBFR talks" of its own.

Another hopeful way to proceed, which has been much discussed at the UN, is through military budget reductions. These, too, would need to be "mutual and balanced." The advantage in proceeding through the financial management of the war economy is that this method would "liberate" the negotiators from having to decide how many machine guns equal one tank, or how tanks on different sides compare in quality and effectiveness. By allocating money limits to opposing armed forces, the burden of deciding which arms to scrap would be shifted from the negotiators to the military planners, who presumably (on both sides) would get rid of the least effective weapons first. The result may not be an exact balance between tanks or between numbers of soldiers, but an over-all balance determined by each nation's own considerations of using its allocated money to its best effect.

The sticking point in this plan has been the determination of how much each nation actually spends on its military needs. Accounting methods differ, and also there is much distrust, with accusations (especially by the West of the USSR) of trying to hide most of the military expenditure in parts of the civilian budget. The UN has commissioned a study

on comparative military budget reporting, and the study was completed in March 1982. The next step is to have nations report their data to the UN, using the recommended accounting procedures; however, only 21 nations so far have responded. The US has suggested a conference on accounting procedures, but there was not much enthusiasm for this at the UN. This path to arms reductions thus remains blocked, though it would seem to be one of the most reasonable ways to proceed.

If military budgets are to be reduced, then it would make sense to institute at the UN a Disarmament Fund for Development. Such a Fund was proposed by France at UNSSOD I in 1978, and a study of it was published by UNIDIR, (UN Institute for Disarmament Research). More recently, the idea was discussed at the UN conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, but no action was taken on it there. The UNIDIR study recognized 3 types of fund: a disarmament dividend (developing nations receive a part of the money saved by disarming); an armament levy (overarmed nations are taxed and the benefits go to developing nations); and a system of voluntary donations. The drawback of the disarmament dividend is having to wait till serious disarmament starts before giving development benefits; under the armament levy plan, benefits would begin immediately, and the payments would give overarmed nations an added incentive to disarm. The disadvantage of the armament levy is that it may be seen as selling licenses to nations to arm. The drawback of the voluntary system is that it might provide too little money and also be unfair--the willing would give more than the recalcitrant, even if both were equally able to give. The advantage of the voluntary system is that it would be easier to start, from the political viewpoint.

The idea of solving two big problems (the arms race and underdevelopment) in one plan is attractive. Marek Thee (1981) and Alan and Hanna Newcombe (1982) have both provided plans. Thee reminds us that Edgar Faure (France) proposed a disarmament-development link as far back as 1955; the USSR in 1958 called for 10-15% reductions of the great powers' military budgets, with the allocation of a part going toward development: and in 1973 the USSR advocated a one-time 10% reduction of the military budgets of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council and allocation of 10% of the funds saved to development. Thee calculates that about 2/3 of the contributions would come from the 5 nuclear powers; of this, US would pay 40%, USSR 40%, China 10%, UK 5%, and France 5%. The other states would pay the remaining 1/3. The Newcombes' plan is of the armaments levy type. There are 4 kinds of nations: A (rich and overarmed), B (rich and underarmed), C (poor and overarmed), and D (poor and underarmed). In general, under the plan, A pay into the fund and D receive from the fund, B neither pay nor receive, and C may pay or receive depending on the degrees of their poverty and overarmament.

Also in the process of negotiation is the treaty to ban chemical weapons. One of the new principles in it is "challenge inspection," a form of on-site inspection, in which inspectors would go immediately to inspect a site in country A if country B challenges that site to be under suspicion. Treaty compliance is to be managed by something similar to the Standing Consultative Commission which is operating under the SALT Treaties. The Markland Group, which has been meeting in Hamilton, Ontario, believes that this is insufficient, and are working on designing a full-fledged Treaty Administering Agency for this treaty (to become a model for other treaties), that would make use of third-party decisions about violations,

graduated measures of censure in case of non-compliance, and other such mechanisms.

The Six Nations of the Five-Continent Peace Initiative (Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, Tanzania) have agreed, at their summit meeting in Stockholm on January 21, 1988, to propose at UNSSOD III the formation of an Integrated Multilateral Verification System within the United Nations. Such a new agency would serve the verification needs of all arms control and disarmament treaties, old and new, in a comprehensive way.

(d) Zones of Peace and Nuclear (or Chemical) Weapons-Free Zones are not new in this time period. The idea is old, and has been implemented in pre-1982 times in such areas as Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the Antarctic, the Seabed and Outer Space. This refers only to state-level treaties, not mentioning the intense "non-governmental" activity all over the world at the municipal level. (Yet are these acts really "non-governmental?" They are "non-national," but municipalities are governments too. In any case, these will be described in a later section.)

At the national level, we have already described one implemented governmental plan regarding a nuclear-free zone, namely the Rarotonga Treaty proclaiming a Nuclear-Free South Pacific. In this section, we can only note repeated or continuing efforts (at the UN and elsewhere) to institute NWF Zones in various other regions: the Mediterranean, Middle East, South Asia, Africa, Southeast Asia, Caribbean, the Arctic, Scandinavia (the Nordic Zone), the Balkans, the Central European Corridor (Palme Commission, 1982), and of course the Zone of Peace (completely demilitarized) in the Indian Ocean.

Which of these plans have any chance of implementation? The Indian Ocean Zone of Peace has actually been declared by the littoral states in 1971, but the big powers who have bases and navies there show no signs of complying.

The European Corridor, conceived as 150 km on each side of the East-West border, is not at present being discussed at any negotiating forum. However, a meeting between the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has agreed on a zone free of chemical weapons in the corridor. The SED is the ruling party in the GDR, but the SDP is the opposition in the FRG, so the interparty agreement has no validity in international law; but it may indicate what might happen in the future if the SDP is elected to power. However, without US and USSR approval, the "corridor" may not be fully effective. It is worth noting also that the corridor is expected to be free of chemical weapons, battle tanks, and tactical nuclear weapons. Chemical Weapon-Free Zones in general have been reviewed by Trapp (1987).

Boudreau (1987) proposed a corridor of confidence in Europe. Nuclear weapons would be absent from it in peacetime, as the Palme Commission had stipulated; but with the understanding that in war-time the nuclear weapons could be reintroduced. This he calls "the Norwegian solution," because it is similar to Norway's agreement with NATO.

The Balkan Zone is interesting, because it might include not only Warsaw Pact states (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria), but also non-aligned Yugoslavia and Albania and NATO-member Greece. Local states are interested, but their superpower sponsors seem cool.

The Nordic Zone has seen some serious negotiations. The USSR wants it, and has offered some withdrawals of weapons from its own heavily armed base on the Kola Peninsula, in order to encourage it. Finland and Sweden (the non-aligned Scandinavian states) want it, especially Finland, whose former President Kekkonen had proposed it several times. NATO members Norway and Denmark hesitate, but seem to be warming up to it. US and NATO opposition may remain a problem: the West sees the Nordic Zone as favouring the East, because of the heavy concentration of armaments on USSR's Kola Peninsula; but if the Soviet withdrawal offer is genuine, the outlook may improve.

The Arctic Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) has never been proposed at the governmental level, therefore its discussion will be deferred to a later section. However, Gorbachev has recently proposed to Canada a zone of peace in the Arctic. The Arctic region also involves Scandinavia and the US. It is not clear what exact measures the Arctic zone of peace would entail. It might be more a zone of economic or scientific cooperation than a zone of disarmament.

Other Zones:

The Caribbean Zone was proposed by Jamaica;

The Southeast Asian Zone has been proposed by Malaysia.

The South Asian Zone has been proposed by Pakistan and opposed by India. Pakistan is suspected of attempting to develop nuclear weapons. India tested a device (they said it was "a peaceful nuclear explosion") in 1974, but is not known to be accumulating a stockpile of weapons.

NWFZ in Africa was declared in 1964 by local states, but they claim that it was violated by South Africa. At the time of its declaration, it induced France to stop its atmospheric tests in the Sahara; but France simply moved them to the Pacific.

The Middle East Zone has been proposed by Egypt. But it is believed that Israel has nuclear weapons of its own.

2. Non-governmental plans

An earlier collection of "Unofficial Peace Plans" (H. Newcombe, 1984) contains roughly 95 plans. Although there are some overlaps, some of the plans have reached official level, some stem from before 1982, and some concern strengthening the UN or settling regional conflicts rather than implementing measures of disarmament and arms control. The count of purely unofficial disarmament and arms control plans since 1982 in this collection come to about 23. Since even this is too many, a selection will be made for discussion in this article. However, there are also several plans to add since the earlier article was written.

Non-governmental plans can be divided into proposals that governments should carry out (with a possible subdivision of proposals for superpower or nuclear-weapon-state action and those meant for action by middle powers or small states) and plans of action for NGOs themselves. There is, of course, little that NGOs by themselves can do to effect disarmament, since the weapons to be discarded or dismantled are held and controlled by governments; and thus this category of plans blends into "peace actions." There is far too great a number and scope of peace actions to discuss here, but some of the bigger projects that occurred in 1982-88 will be mentioned.

In addition, there are proposals as well as actions at the municipal level.

(a) Non-governmental plans for action by governments.

One plan that keeps on being reinvented is the Hostage Plan. Its latest version, is by Kenneth Smail (1984). "Reciprocal hostage exchange," envisions about a million US citizens going to reside voluntarily, but temporarily, in Soviet cities, and a million Soviet citizens being similarly placed for a time (1 or 2 years) in US cities. (An earlier version of the plan proposed smaller numbers, but specified that the exchanged people should be relatives of political or military leaders.) The hope is that the presence of one's own nationals (or even family members) in target cities would help to restrain any impulse there might be to "press the button." The exchangees could at the same time act as "good-will ambassadors" in the host country, somewhat as in an extended cultural exchange. Provisions should be made that they not act as spies, against host country laws; but the exchange might become the occasion for more openness (glasnost) and less secrecy, in which case the reporting of observations would be quite legal. One might even come to a point where some exchangees could act as official inspectors, verifying compliance with arms control treaties. On the other hand, it might be better to keep these functions separate. Smail proposes that national service as an exchangee should be considered an alternative to service in the military forces. However, this does not mean that all exchangees should be young men; all ages, both sexes, and even whole families would be eligible if they volunteer, are found suitable, and receive appropriate (e.g., language) training.

An often-heard suggestion (e.g., Johansen, 1982) is for a general non-intervention treaty. In it, the superpowers (and possibly other states), would pledge not to engage in military intervention (carefully defined) in any other state, even if requested to intervene by the government of such a state. This last provision is put in to guard against interventions such as the USSR in Afghanistan or the US in Vietnam. Interventions on government request are common; the "request" usually comes from a puppet government, or comes as a result of threats or pressure by the eventual intervenor. It is therefore important to include a prohibition of interventions on request in the treaty, or the treaty would lose most of its value.

A non-intervention treaty would be self-verifying, since violations would be obvious to anyone. The benefit of a non-intervention regime in the world would be great reduction in superpower tension, as well as the reduction of direct violence in the countries invaded. If each power could be assured that its rival power would not intervene in some civil war situation, it would have little incentive to intervene on its own part. At least some interventions are probably pre-emptive or competitive in nature, aimed at preventing or thwarting intervention by the other side. If that is so, then keeping both intervenors away would achieve "balance at a lower level," which is the aim of all disarmament measures. Non-intervention is not really disarmament (it does not discard any weapons); it reduces the intent rather than the capability to wage war. As such, it would be a very valuable supplement to disarmament.

on the ratio of invulnerabilities (defensive strengths). It

In discussing the nuclear weapon-free zones, we postponed a discussion of the Arctic Zone, because it has not yet been proposed by any government. The original suggestion also pre-dates 1982, having been made in 1964 by two physicists, one Soviet and one American (Alexander Rich and Aleksandr P. Vinogradov, "the two Alexanders"); but it has re-emerged as a suggestion by this author (H. Newcombe, 1981), as well as (in various modifications) by Owen Wilkes (1984) and Rod Byers (1980). In some ways, a denuclearized Arctic would be analogous to the already demilitarized Antarctic; but being in a more strategic area much closer to big power centres, it would be both more difficult to do and more worth doing. According to one plan (H. Newcombe, 1981), the zone would extend North of 60 degrees North, and include Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Kola Peninsula and Northern Siberia in the USSR, most of Alaska in the US, Canada's Yukon and Northwest Territories, and Greenland. The weapons removed would not include the early-warning lines (though these may be internationalized); only nuclear weapons systems and their supporting installations would be removed. The submarines under Arctic ice would be a problem, since they are not easily detectable for verification purposes. Some alternative plans (e.g., Byers, 1980) therefore suggest "submarine sanctuaries" in these areas, where submarines would be allowed to roam, but be bottled up from exiting into the North Atlantic or the North Pacific. Some plans would leave out the superpowers and make it a joint Canadian-Scandinavian plan (really the Nordic Zone extended to Canada and the adjoining Arctic Ocean). However, this would seem to miss the opportunity for the middle powers to negotiate at least some roll-back of nuclear weapons by the superpowers, i.e., exercise their leverage.

Galton explains that national security (invulnerability of one's territory) depends not only on the ratio of offensive strengths (of ourselves and a potential adversary), but also

A related non-governmental plan is to declare all of Canada a NWFZ. Canada could do this unilaterally, but it would have repercussions on the relationship with the US, since it would ban not only the stationing of nuclear weapons (which is already a fact), but also all transit over land, by sea and in airspace. Nuclear weapons are still carried by US ships that visit Canadian harbours, and overflights of bombers carrying H-bombs also occur. The frequency of these events is unknown publicly, since the US does not declare what its vessels are carrying. However, if a Canada-wide NWFZ were to be seriously enforced, all these transits would have to stop. No one claims that being a NWFZ would save Canada from destruction in case of nuclear war; but it might contribute toward making the outbreak of nuclear war less likely. It would be a "New Zealand" option; but the two countries differ greatly, especially in their proximity to the US.

A reorientation of strategic thinking which has been variously called non-offensive defence (NOD), "defensive defence" and "non-provocative defence" has been studied rather widely, especially in Europe. (See Bibliography by Michael Johansen, 1985.) Two well-known books on the subject are There Are Alternatives by Johan Galtung (1984) and Preventing War in the Nuclear Age by Dietrich Fischer (1984). There is also a "NOD Newsletter" published in FRG, which brings news of further developments and suggestions. The Group of 78 in Canada is just completing a study of alternative defence, inquiring into possibilities of applying NOD concepts to Canadian defence planning.

NOD is not a single plan, but a new way of thinking. Galtung explains that national security (inviolability of one's territory) depends not only on the ratio of offensive strengths (of ourselves and a potential adversary), but also

on the ratio of invulnerabilities (defensive strengths). It makes more sense for the two adversaries to spend money on obtaining invulnerability than on increasing offensive capability, since the latter leads to an open-ended arms race and the former does not. It is also far less dangerous and more stable in crises. Galtung points out that "trans-arming" to non-violent defence (as advocated by Gene Sharp, Adam Roberts, and others) may be too drastic a step for military people, while trans-armament to purely defensive weapon systems might not be. The art of NOD is to install only such systems that would make invasion or attack very difficult, but which at the same time could not possibly be used to mount an attack of our own; that way, we would never be a danger to others, but would be difficult to swallow, like a hedgehog or a porcupine. It might be an interesting suggestion for arms-reduction negotiations in Europe to try not only to reduce the quantity of weapons on both sides, but also to change the quality (kind) of weapons to reflect non-offensive intent. Thus declarations of non-aggression could be supplemented and made credible by the kind of weapons one deploys.

Non-Violent defence is also still receiving attention. Richard W. Fogg, Director of the Center for the Study of Conflict in Baltimore, is working on "a proposal for non-military defense in case of nuclear crises," which recently received favourable attention from the UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar.

Bella (1984) suggested new alternatives for deployment of nuclear missiles designed to delay possible launching. One such scheme suggests storing the missiles and the warheads separately, with monitoring to verify that this has been done.

Another unofficial proposal has to do with verification, and has been called citizen reporting. It is conceived as a "soft-technology" supplement to such high-technology verification methods as satellites or seismology, and to such politically sensitive methods as on-site inspection.

Any significant violation of a disarmament treaty, by secret rearming or forbidden deployment or other deception, would be a large-scale project, and therefore many people would know about it (those working on the project, at least, and perhaps their families and close friends, or neighbours to the site). Among these people "in the know," at least one would almost certainly be willing to inform the international inspectors about his/her government's illegal activities. The motive might be respect for international law, desire for peace, or a sense of world citizenship and responsibility; countervailing motives would be nationalism and fear of punishment. To counteract the fear of punishment, procedures must be installed to protect the informer's anonymity, and in case of discovery give him or her asylum. There could be a procedure in which everyone periodically deposits a slip of paper in ballot boxes; most papers would be blank, but a few would contain information. The inspectors would sort the crank messages from the valuable tips and follow up the latter. In questionnaire surveys in several countries (Galtung, 1967), many of the people say that they would inform international inspectors about their government's illegal activities. The percentage would undoubtedly go up if, as part of the disarmament treaty proclamation, each national government were required to broadcast to their own citizens a plea to report to the inspectors any suspicions regarding violations that come to their attention. This would make informing seem legitimate rather than treasonous (Deutsch, 1963), and overcome any nationalist objection a person might

have against reporting. It would be valuable to have this supplement to technical means of verification, since some new weapons (e.g., cruise missiles) are difficult to detect by satellites. Chemical disarmament is also difficult to police technologically. Even counting the number of warheads on a MIRVed missile is difficult.

Harold Chestnut (1984) describes and further develops his concept of a Cooperative Security System. Such a system is to be created by providing additional information linkages between countries, having the resulting data examined by a Joint Review Board for possible trouble indications, and providing for conflict resolution teams to make recommendations to national decision makers on alleviating the perceived troubles. The system would include remote sensors in each country, satellite communications links, and interpretation logic. This seems to be a further technical elaboration of Palme's concept of "common security," and fits well with some other plans, e.g., Kurtz's "War Control Planning" and Polly Hill's "Mutually Assured Peace."

Competition as well as cooperation has its place in peace plans. L. Starobin (editor of World Peace Report) has proposed Competitive Measures as a plan for peace. This would be a system of non-military competition between the US and the USSR to establish superiority in such things as: health statistics, scientific skills, athletic contests, arts competitions, standard of living, crime abatement, and ecological control. Systematic data collection on these items by a UN agency or other impartial body would establish the winner at periodic intervals. The idea is that Competitive Measures would replace the arms race as a way of striving for superiority. In fact, arms expenditures would probably have

to be reduced in order to compete effectively in the other fields. Some international contests already exist, like the Olympic Games and the Nobel Prizes. A "battle of statistics," unlike a military battle, can have a beneficial fallout. While it is true that you cannot threaten another state with your low infant mortality rate, the latter can be used to show that the "free" countries perform better than the "unfree" in this respect. (Starobin works out a sample numerical comparison.)

The Nuclear Weapons Legal Action in Canada is preparing to test before the courts the legality of preparing for nuclear war. Co-plaintiffs include World Federalists of Canada, Lawyers for Social Responsibility, National Union of Provincial Government Employees, Veterans Against Nuclear Arms, the Assembly of First Nations, Voice of Women, and Operation Dismantle. Numerous other organizations and several municipalities have endorsed this action, without becoming co-plaintiffs.

The case will likely be based on six core principles which have been extracted from the body of international law and summarized as the so-called "Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict." They are:

Rule 1 - It is prohibited to use weapons or tactics that cause unnecessary or aggravated devastation and suffering;

Rule 2 - It is prohibited to use weapons or tactics that cause indiscriminate harm as between combatants and non-combatants, military and civilian personnel;

Rule 3 - It is prohibited to use weapons or tactics that cause wide-spread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment;

Rule 4 - It is prohibited to effect reprisals that are disproportionate to their antecedent provocation or to legitimate military objectives, or disrespectful of persons, institutions and resources otherwise protected by the laws of war;

Rule 5 - It is prohibited to use weapons or tactics that violate the neutral jurisdiction of non-participating states;

Rule 6 - It is prohibited to use asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and analogous liquids, materials or devices, including bacteriological methods of warfare. (Nuclear Weapons Legal Action, 1987.)

A global referendum on disarmament was proposed by Jim Stark in Canada, the founder of Operation Dismantle. The organization promoted this for many years, at the global level at the UN, where they tried to have Canada and then Costa Rica sponsor a resolution recommending to all UN members that a world vote be held. Many nations backed the plan, but it was never clearly proposed in a resolution. Operation Dismantle then turned to sponsoring municipal referenda on disarmament in Canada (discussed later), which were highly successful.

Cyrus R. Vance, a former US Secretary of State, and Elliot L. Richardson, a former US Secretary of Defense, proposed in 1987 that the UN should reflag ships in the Persian Gulf, instead of the US doing so. This would be a case of "diplomatic deterrence" (not military deterrence). It would not involve UN naval peacekeeping, as suggested by the USSR.

The UN Association of Australia (1987) proposed a system of bilateral peace treaties. As many pairs of nations as possible would sign and ratify treaties containing only two clauses:

- (1) That all disputes between them will be settled by negotiation or other peaceful means;
- (2) That neither will ever be the first to resort to force, violence or war.

Australia is urged to contribute to world peace by offering such a treaty to each country in the world.

(b) Non-governmental plans for NGO action.

When we turn to plans which NGOs have to carry out themselves, we find that often these still involve urging governments to turn toward peace; this is certainly true of the first two in our sampling. However, the plan of what governments should do is less precise and novel, and more attention is given to how the campaign is carried out.

One example is the Great Peace Journey, a project initiated by the Swedish section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom in 1984. Other groups joined the effort. In this campaign, groups of women visited the leaders of every nation, working in phases: Western Europe in 1986 (the International Year of Peace), then Eastern Europe, North America, South America, Asia, Africa, Australia.

The leaders were asked the "Five Great Questions":

1. Are you willing to initiate national legislation which guarantees that your country's defence forces, including "military advisers," do not leave your territory for military purposes (other than in United Nations peace-keeping forces)--if all other Members of the United Nations undertake to do the same?
2. Are you willing to take steps to ensure that the development, possession, storage and employment of mass-destruction weapons, including nuclear weapons, which threaten to destroy the very conditions necessary for life on this earth, are forbidden in your country--if all other Members of the United Nations undertake to do the same?
3. Are you willing to take steps to prevent your country from allowing the supply of military equipment and weapons technology to other countries - if all other Members of the United Nations undertake to do the same?
4. Are you willing to work for a distribution of the earth's resources so that the fundamental necessities of human life, such as clean water, food, elementary health care and schooling, are available to all people throughout the world?
5. Are you willing to work to ensure that any conflicts, in which your country may be involved in the future, will be settled by peaceful means of the kind specified in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, and not by the use or threat of force?

The questions are so worded that it is difficult to say "no," since agreement is conditional on other nations agreeing to do the same. Yet the women did receive some negative answers from overcautious leaders, no doubt afraid to commit themselves. Of 105 countries visited, 87 said "yes" to all questions (Ditzel, 1987). France, the US and Canada were not among the 87.

Another major project in the International Year of Peace (1986) was the Baha'i Statement on Peace, "To the Peoples of the World," composed by the Universal House of Justice, the highest ruling body of the Baha'i World Faith. This statement, too, was taken to most of the leaders of the world, by delegations if possible. The statement stresses the importance of world unity and the moral and spiritual improvement of individual human beings, not only the discarding of weapons. In fact, disarmament would follow such a spiritual improvement and may be impossible unless such improvement occurs first. The achievement of the Lesser Peace, which is expected in this century, and eventually the Most Great Peace, will accompany the maturing of humanity, which up to this point has been as a child.

The Peace Wave Action was first proposed jointly by US and Soviet delegates to the 1987 World Conference Against A- and H-bombs held in August in Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Calling for 1 billion signatures in support of the "Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki" to be collected worldwide, the Conference appealed to the world to launch a "Peace Wave" of local activities at noon on October 24, 1987, starting in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and circling the globe for the next 24 hours through the time zones, at noon local time in each place. The Peace Wave swept the world through 50 countries of the 5 continents and the Pacific islands. There were rallies,

human-chain actions, on-the-sea demonstrations, arts and sports programs, press advertisements, and TV and radio ads. The common theme was the abolition of nuclear weapons and signatures for the "Appeal." A second "Peace Wave" is being planned at this time.

David Martinez (1987) suggests some ideas for the thaw movement between US and USSR: make Moscow and Washington sister cities, build peace monuments or memorials, plant trees, cooperate on reforestation and protection of endangered species, make films, do TV programs, establish a Peace Day or a US/SU Friendship Day, have a joint symphony orchestra or Peace Corps, opera and ballet companies, boys and girls clubs, athletic and game clubs. Sometimes, cooperative citizen contacts can do much to support and supplement disarmament and to "pin down" US/SU relations by a ratchet effect in times of a thaw, so they would not revert to another Cold War.

(c) Municipal Level Peace Proposals

The most abundant activity for disarmament at the municipal level is the movement to declare nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ) in cities and towns. As of February 1988, 172 cities, 2 provinces (Manitoba and Ontario) and 1 territory (Northwest Territories) have declared NWFZs in Canada; 3850 cities have done it worldwide. The movement is well advanced in New Zealand, Britain, and elsewhere, and is also flourishing in the US. There are at least two levels of action: a declaration, which is purely symbolic; and a by-law, which is binding and should be enforced. Since industrial production of even parts of nuclear weapon systems is prohibited, enforcement is sometimes difficult, since in some cases it is not even known publicly which plant makes what. However, even a symbolic declaration has value, especially if it is widely advertised, by putting signs at city entrances or otherwise.

Canadian cities have also held referenda on disarmament, a project of Operation Dismantle in autumn 1983, when 116 cities voted "yes," with an overall yes vote of 76.5%. One year earlier (1982). 45 US cities voted on the freeze, with an average of 64.4% in favour. Only 4 fell below 50%. There are some explanations for the higher yes vote in Canada and the lower one in the US. It is easier for ordinary people to support disarmament (always presented as multilateral) than a specific measure like the freeze, which requires more explanation. Also, the US position as a nuclear superpower is very different from Canada's as a subordinate ally.

Cities have also passed various resolutions, such as opposing Cruise testing in Canada, opposing Star Wars, favouring a CTB, and so on.

B. Strengthening International Organizations.

1. Official Plans

The most prominent governmental plan to strengthen the UN is contained in the September 1986 speech of Gorbachev. This is all the more surprising since the USSR has traditionally been the most opposed to any changes in the Charter or UN reforms.

As summarized in the 1987 Arms Control Reporter, Gorbachev proposed the following:

1. "Set up under the United Nations organization a multi-lateral center for lessening the danger of war. Evidently, it would be feasible to consider the expediency of setting up a direct communication line between the United Nations headquarters and the capitals of the countries that are permanent members of the

Security Council and the location of the chairman of the non-aligned movement."

2. "A mechanism for extensive international verification of compliance with agreements to lessen international tension, limit armaments, and to monitor the military situation in conflict areas."
3. "Wider use should be made of the institution of United Nations military observers and United Nations peacekeeping forces."
4. "The Security Council's permanent members could become guarantors of regional security. On their part, they could assume the obligation not to use force or the threat of force, to renounce demonstrative military presence."
5. "The General Assembly and the Security Council should approach [the International Court] more often for consultative conclusions on international disputes."
6. "Hold meetings of the Security Council at the foreign ministers' level when opening a regular session of the General Assembly," [and rotate them to different Big Five capitals or crisis areas. Added by H.N.]
7. "It is impermissible to use financial levers for bringing pressure to bear on [the United Nations and its specialized agencies]."

Another proposal by Gorbachev might be mentioned in this category; the suggestion of naval peacekeeping by the UN in the Persian Gulf, where too many foreign ships are being sunk as a result of the Iran-Iraq war. This was (and remains) a

dangerous situation, and the UN certainly should have a role in it. Naval peacekeeping would indeed be a novel and much needed UN service to nations in trouble.

Gorbachev also proposed a UN brain trust of scientists, politicians and even church leaders to help solve global problems. In a rare article written for the Soviet newspapers Pravda and Izvestia, Gorbachev argues that "a world consultative council under UN auspices uniting the world's intellectual elite" is needed to help shape the future.

"Prominent scientists, political and public figures, representatives of international public organizations, cultural workers," should all be involved, he writes. So should "people in literature and the arts, including laureates of the Nobel Prize and other international prizes of worldwide significance (and) eminent representatives of the churches." Such a council "could seriously enrich the spiritual and ethical potential of contemporary world politics," Gorbachev tells his readers in what to many will sound like a visionary appeal. (Gordon Barthos, Toronto Star.)

The Bertrand Plan is not governmental, but is "official" in the sense of being written by a UN official. This is the report by Maurice Bertrand, the former head of the UN Joint Inspection Unit. He claimed that the world's complex political, economic and social problems can no longer be handled by a "second generation" world organization like the UN (the League of Nations being "first generation"), but need a completely reorganized "third generation" world organization. Remedies against such symptoms of the general malaise as North-South migrations, terrorism, civil wars, racism, debt of poor countries, etc., can be mitigated only by integrating and completely reorganizing the social and economic organs of the UN, creating a "world economic forum," coordinating the many UN programs, all to eliminate waste and greatly increase

efficiency. The aim should be to build an "Economic United Nations." The new structure would consist of regional and subregional integrated development agencies, the whole constituting a "community of communities." There would be an "Economic Security Council," with 23 members representing the major states and main regions of the world. Dualities in the present system, such as that between UNCTAD and ECOSOC would be ended.

The Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, originally adopted by UN resolution 2734 XXV of December 16, 1970, was reaffirmed in this period by further UN resolutions, e.g., 37/118 introduced on December 7, 1982, by Yugoslavia and co-sponsored by 21 non-aligned states and Romania; it was adopted on December 16 by a recorded vote of 116 to none. That resolution called for, among other things, non-aggression, non-intervention, promotion of collective security, peaceful settlement of disputes, implementation of the Final Document of UNSSOD I regarding disarmament, establishment of a New International Economic Order, and implementation of the Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Africa and the Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean.

While this Declaration is not new, its reaffirmation illustrates the fact that the UN majority keep trying for implementation, even if it is not likely to be forthcoming. However, in general we will not mention such older plans here, but concentrate on those that are truly new since 1982.

The proposal by France in 1978 to have an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA) at the UN can be considered as a measure to strengthen the UN in the field of peace-keeping, or as a measure to improve verification of disarmament and arms control; we choose to discuss it here. The UN studied the feasibility, legal implications, and cost

of the proposal, and the report (issued in 1981) was favourable. However, the superpowers were not willing to share their advanced remote sensing technology (interpretation of optical or infrared or "synthetic aperture radar" high-resolution photographs taken from space), and many other nations (e.g., Canada) balked at the cost. The highest estimated annual cost for optimum operation (3 billion dollars) is high for UN projects, because nations are in the habit of starving the UN financially, but it is, in fact, less than 1% of the world's annual arms expenditure. The technology could be developed independently from the superpowers; considerable expertise exists in many countries, including Canada. Canada has a research project called Paxsat, which is studying the feasibility of finding out the purpose and function (military or civilian) of foreign satellites under investigation, either by observation from space (fly-by satellites) or by observation from earth. These projects are called Paxsat A and Paxsat B, respectively. France is operating its SPOT (Système probatoire d'observation de la terre), and other nations are also experimenting in this direction. Many are now thinking in terms of a multi-national effort outside the UN, to overcome the bothersome question of who should have access to the data obtained--do we tell India about Pakistan? If information is to be available to all UN members, we would have to--and presumably to avoid being tied down by UN "bureaucracy." However, the increasing trend to act outside the UN should be resisted if we are to avoid further weakening of the world organization. If the problems connected with ISMA could be overcome, the world would gain a universally applicable method for the 4 functions mentioned by Dorn (1987): verification, conflict and crisis monitoring, peacekeeping, and management of natural catastrophes. At the same time, the ISMA would strengthen the UN. It is worth recalling (as Dorn does) that the official ISMA proposal grew originally out of the life-long "unofficial" work by Howard

and Harriet Kurtz, whose organization, War Control Planners, has always advocated control of warlike preparations by technical supervision from space. The Kurtzes' ideas were picked up by Robert Muller, Assistant Secretary-General of the UN, and transmitted to the then President of France, Giscard D'Estaing, who then proposed the ISMA plan at the UN in 1978.

2. Non-official plans

Non-governmental plans for UN strengthening are much more numerous than governmental plans, but most of them are much older than 1982. World Federalists especially have made many such proposals over the years. Since these have been summarized elsewhere (see e.g., H. Newcombe, 1974, 1980, 1984, 1986), only new ones will be mentioned here, unless the older ones have somehow received new impetus or new attention.

A Second UN Assembly ("We the People") has been proposed by J. Segall (1984) and the Medical Association for the Prevention of Nuclear War (UK). In this Assembly, the world's people (not governments) would be represented, in proportion to the square root of the population of each country. Selection of delegates could be by direct elections or through the NGOs (representing the politically more active parts of the population). Such a Second Assembly could be created without a change in the UN Charter, using Article 22, which permits the establishment of auxiliary bodies by the General Assembly.

This would make such a reform easy, and greatly heighten interest among ordinary citizens in UN affairs. A NGO Parliament, which this would be, would originally have only advisory functions with respect to the UN General Assembly (UNGA). But then, UNGA resolutions themselves have only the

status of recommendations, according to the Charter. In later developments, all delegates to the Second Assembly could be directly elected in their countries (using the model of the European Parliament and extending it worldwide), and decision-making in both UNGA and the Second Assembly could become binding. We would then have a bicameral World Parliament, with a House of Nations (present UNGA, one vote per nation like the US Senate) and a House of Peoples (the Second Assembly) voting by population, according to the square root formula.

In another sense, a UN Second Assembly would be a continuation and legitimation of two existing trends: (1) the parallel People's Forums already held in connection with many UN Conferences, but not yet in connection with regular sessions of the UN General Assembly; (2) the gradually increasing role of NGOs in UN operations, reflected, for example, in speaking directly to the General Assembly during UNSSOD I and II and the Conference on Disarmament and Development.

Mark Nerfin (1985), seeing the crisis of the organization as part of a wider crisis in the international system as well as the result of internal deficiencies, proposed a three-chamber UN, adding to the two already existing chambers, i.e., the "Prince Chamber" and the "Merchant Chamber", a third one, the "Citizen Chamber", which should serve as a forum to give voice to the 'grass roots' and as an instance of control, by having authority to hold the two other chambers accountable for their decisions.

A House of Parliamentarians could be an alternative idea to a People's Assembly (see previous point), but actually, both bodies could be added. In a House of Parliamentarians, as advocated by Parliamentarians for World Order (now

Parliamentarians Global Action) (Roche 1984), opposition parties as well as governments would be represented (at least from nations with a multi-party system), and voting might go more by ideology than by nation (e.g., all Social Democrats might vote together, or all Christian Democrats). Division along different cleavages (now by nation, then by religion, thirdly by ideology, etc.) is called "cross-cutting" and is known to moderate social conflict. It might thus benefit the UN to have such a body.

Parliamentarians Global Action (PGA) is essentially an organization for strengthening the UN. A supporting citizen organization, "The Federalist Caucus," led by Betsy Dana, has operated for some years from Portland, Oregon. It recently formed a group Citizens Global Action to be the constituency for PGA, by both giving grass-roots support and providing critical feedback when required.

Weighted voting as a proposal for UN reform has a long and venerable history. An evaluation of 25 plans for weighted voting in the UN General Assembly appeared in 1983 (H. Newcombe). The most highly recommended plans, using 8 criteria, are the ones using 2 factors: population and a wealth-reflecting factor (GNP or energy consumption or UN contributions or health/education expenditures), both taken proportionately and in a 1 : 1 ratio. The consequences of using any of the 25 plans on the votes and on East-West and North-South balances are fully worked out.

There is also the parallel proposal for using the Binding Triad (Richard Hudson), in which the voting on each resolution is counted in 3 ways: by number of nations, by populations, and by UN contributions. To be adopted, a resolution has to obtain a 2/3 majority on all 3 counts. Since this would restrict the number of resolution that pass, it is then

reasonable to require that the decisions reached in this way should be binding.

Regional peacekeeping was proposed by Simoni and Alcock (1988), especially for Central Europe and Central America, but also for the Balkans, Southern Africa, and Southeast Asia. Each region's boundaries would overlap the local conflict, so that the region would not be an alliance of like-minded countries (such as NATO or WTO). The peacekeeping force would manage local conflicts, not be directed to outside "enemies." The scheme would be supplemented, where appropriate, by economic integration arrangements, so that eventually regional federations ("oases of peace") would emerge.

At the municipal level, mundialization and town twinning (sister city programs) provide a forum for citizen initiatives to strengthen internationalism and world-mindedness. Mundialization (proclaiming a "world city" by official city council action) began in the early 1950s in France and Japan, from where it spread to several European countries. When introduced into Canada (Dundas 1967, Hamilton 1968, with about 30 others following), it was combined with town twinning, which also exists as an extensive movement independently of mundialization.

Mundialized cities in Canada also fly the UN flag at city hall every day of the year, and active mundialization committees carry out programs; not only visits back and forth to sister cities (Hamilton now has 6), but also interfaith programs, education on world issues, celebration of anniversaries, dedications of parks named after a sister city, etc. In 1987, an Ontario Council for Mundialization was formed to coordinate these efforts. There is an annual or biennial conference of mundialized communities hosted in a different place each time, and a newsletter called "Gemini" (for

"twins") 2 or 3 times a year. Twins of Canadian mundialized cities come from Japan, India, Italy, China, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Ghana, Poland, Netherlands, Colombia, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad, St. Vincent, Sri Lanka, and Cuba. There are 499 mundialized municipalities in France, 9 in Belgium, 2 in Italy, 3 in FRG, 1 in Denmark, 31 in Canada, 26 in the US (where 60 colleges, churches and organizations are also mundialized), and 306 in Japan. (Source: Marchand, undated.)

Regarding town twinings without mundialization, Sister Cities International (Washington) reports, for 1983, 708 US cities in its program and 986 cities in 79 other countries, with a total of 1094 links. For another organization in this field, United Towns Organization (Paris), the numbers are probably comparable (not available at this time).

Toronto teacher Anne McTaggart has started a simple but ambitious project: to put the picture of the Earth from space in every classroom in Canada, perhaps in the world. This project, called Our Planet in Every Classroom, could be very effective in promoting world-mindedness in children. The picture would be accompanied by an explanatory pamphlet and a study guide.

A new UN Agency for Mutual Assured Peace (UNAMAP) has been proposed by Polly Hill (1988). UNAMAP would use advanced technology to gather and disseminate information around the world, and to analyze and solve global problems on which nations, corporations and NGOs can cooperate. It would be located in Canada and have the physical appearance of a "war room," with up-to-date charts and maps on the walls showing the state of the world. Polly Hill would link this to ISMA as synergistically connected operations.

An older, but still current, idea is to convene a UN Security Conference, "security" being a wider concept than "disarmament" (also including UN peacekeeping, dispute settlement, etc). In one version, a Security Conference is seen as parallel to a UN Special Session on Disarmament, i.e., a session of about 4 weeks duration, preceded by Preparatory Committee meetings, and producing a Final Document. In another version, the parallel would be to the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea; i.e., a long conference lasting for many years, as many as necessary to produce a full-fledged, complex, consensual treaty. Of these two alternatives, the second would be preferable for producing lasting results, but if the process is too prolonged, it may lose momentum and produce discouragement.

Another suggestion has been to have an independent international commission on UN reform. The model here is the Brandt or Palme Commission. Its recommendations would be respected if commission members were former prime ministers or other such prominent persons. (These last two proposals originate from the ranks of World Federalists.)

An excellent program for stimulating public participation in government policy is the Swedish People's Parliament, later widened to include the other Scandinavian countries and renamed the Nordic People's Parliament. The topics can vary: the first (1982) was on disarmament in preparation for UNSSOD II; among the later topics was South African apartheid (1986). Participating organizations (all non-governmental) include a broad range: unions, churches, development education groups, environmental groups, women's groups, youth groups, human rights groups, peace groups. Preparations begin at least a year ahead of time. Each participating organization proposes resolutions, in the form of bills for parliament, on the theme topic. All these resolutions are collected and circulated to

all participating groups, who debate them in their own meetings and decide on their recommendations or guidelines to delegates. Finally the delegates from all the organizations meet in a collective formal session of the People's Parliament, debate all the resolutions and vote on them. Their recommendations are then forwarded to the appropriate official body: the national government, the Nordic Council or the UN. The Swedish (Nordic) People's Parliament is like a "Second UN Assembly" organized from the grass-roots, on a regional level. If it became global in scope and then received official UN status, it would link up with the proposal for a Second UN Assembly discussed earlier.

Conclusion

To have so many peace proposals in a period of only 6 years (and our list does not claim to be complete) is encouraging. But why then are international relations still in such a sorry state? Why does the nuclear sword of Damocles still hang over all our people?

The answer is this: If we were to compile all the war plans, plans for new or modernized weapons, plus all the implementations of such plans (deployments), plus actions to weaken or by-pass or oppose the United Nations or international law, the list would be much longer; especially if the weapons still on the secret list could also be included. It is a race, a competition between two opposing trends, and my guess is that the war side is still winning.

This is reflected by (or caused by) the wide discrepancy between spending on war and on peace. Anatol Rapoport recently estimated that the average person spends \$120 a year on war and 7 cents a year on peace. Ruth Sivard has implied: "Show me how people apportion their money, and I will tell you

what their values are."

Nevertheless, the relative spending on war and peace does not truly reflect the size of the effort. Military people are much better paid than peace people, are less efficient and more wasteful, do not use volunteers; and also the military need more high-technology hardware, which costs more. The serious peace movement, the part that makes implementable proposals, (including some governments), is a factor to be taken into account.

One last thought: In the age when the dinosaurs were dominant, the mammals were only tiny, hardly noticed creatures scrambling around the feet of the giants. Yet, in the end, it was the mammals who survived. As one bumpersticker comments, beside the picture of a dinosaur: "Extinct: too much armour, too few brains."

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