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### **WORLD POPULATION GROWTH AND POPULATION MOVEMENTS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA**

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**WORLD POPULATION GROWTH AND POPULATION MOVEMENTS:**  
**POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA**

**INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY**

Major decisions are facing Canada's policy-makers on the two great "people" phenomena of our time, rapid world population growth and mass movements of population. A huge UN Conference on Population and Development, almost on the scale of UNCED, is barely two years away, and because population issues are controversial as well as important, its preparation will require prolonged high-level attention. Migration issues have recently become a matter of widespread public concern in Canada, and are now high on the foreign policy agenda of many countries; they will also figure in the Conference. We urgently need a better understanding of these fundamental but complex problems, their links with other global issues, their impact on Canada, and what we can and should do about them. The paper is designed to help in this task.

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The statistics are frightening. World population has reached 5.4 billion and is increasing at 1.7% per year; it will reach 8.5 billion by 2025, and probably at least double by the end of the century. 95% of population growth is in developing countries, with the highest rates in Africa; in contrast all industrialised countries are now growing slowly if at all. Eventually world population will stabilise, but the experts cannot answer the key question on which so much depends: how soon, and at what level?

Rapid population growth combined with poverty cripples economic development; environmental sustainability is menaced; political and social structures are corroded, and authoritarian reaction against feared unrest blocks progress in human rights. In turn, migration pressures are fuelled, and world economic imbalances and Third World indebtedness are increased. Internationally, coming shifts in world population ratios will menace the UN system. How will the present three economic colossi, with their eventually declining populations, cope with the demographic colossi of tomorrow?

Economic progress and family planning complement each other in contributing to fertility decline, even though the process is gradual and uneven. Important factors include broader access to education, and particularly advancement of the status of women. Contraceptive use must increase rapidly if population is not to grow even faster than predicted; there is already much unmet demand. Surprisingly, neither AIDS, malnutrition nor religious factors will have decisive statistical effects. Most developing countries now have population policies, but in many the essential political will is still lacking.

Developed countries now recognise the link between population growth and development, but do not stress it; the link with the environment is more tentatively acknowledged; the link with migratory movements is only beginning to be seriously discussed. Population issues have not been taken up in summit gatherings. However there

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are extensive UN and IBRD programs, and large goal-setting UN Conferences in 1974 and 1984, to which the 1994 UN Conference on Population and Development mentioned above will be the successor. About 1.3% of world ODA goes to population; the USA leads the field, but does not give to the UN. We are near the mean.

Migration flows have become a major world concern; they include 17 million refugees, perhaps 20 million internally displaced, and millions more seeking to find a better life. Specific flows are idiosyncratic; migrants go to where co-nationals happen to have established a beach-head, and where the easiest entry and best benefits are. But it is only a question of time before most of the developing world becomes a source of migration pressure on the countries of the North. Among the latter, the distinction is breaking down between traditional countries of immigration, and others. Much migration is now irregular; stay rates of those rejected are high everywhere, and costs of maintenance and control are enormous. Racist reactions in Europe are increasing. Meetings on migration and refugees have mushroomed, so far with little result. Governments are beginning to recognise that control measures alone will not suffice, and that a broader approach is needed, but agreement is still lacking on its nature.

Population and migration trends gravely handicap many specific Canadian objectives, in the fields of international development, human rights, the environment, trade, and the UN. Some of our foreign policy emphases will have to change. Still more people will be pressing to come to Canada, using our refugee claim route if they can. The proportion of non-European applicants will rise, perpetuated by the extended family system. If tensions in our cities increase, and if much stronger control becomes necessary, our liberal self-image, itself a unifying factor, may be damaged.

One of the five priority objectives of Canadian policy, as stated late last year by the Government, is to encourage greater international involvement and cooperation on population growth and mass migration issues. A large number of specific recommendations made to this end include, in outline, that on the Canadian scene we should:

--do more to highlight the importance of these issues, for example through official statements dealing with global issues, clearer focus and improved liaison interdepartmentally and with posts, and closer NGO contacts;

--strengthen Canada's population assistance, through clarifying its priority and raising its proportion within our ODA, increasing Africa's share from the present 11.4%, adding population experts, restoring funding to WHO's reproductive health research, adjusting Canadian NGO funding, and preserving IDRC's modest population research;

--maintain our immigration policy's non-discriminatory and humanitarian aspects; but with the aim of being taken more seriously multilaterally, as well as of maintaining immigration's public credibility and keeping ample room for selection of independents, try to narrow the

gap between our and others' refugee claim acceptance rates, reduce our attractiveness to irregulars, and make sponsorship of relatives somewhat less generous.

On the international scene, it is suggested, among other things, that we should:

--generally, work to increase awareness of the issues and their links with other world problems, e.g. by encouraging suitable discussion at major UN fora, G-7, Commonwealth and Francophonie summits, NATO, OAS, Davos, interparliamentary meetings etc.;

--on population, put a strong effort into the 1994 Conference, rejoin the UN Population Commission, push for better UN coordination, urge the US to restore UN funding, stress the issue more at UNCED, raise population's priority at the DAC, IBRD, and IMF and with laggard G-7 and other donors, underline its importance with aid partners as an important indicator of their seriousness in development, and support the recently proposed Bruntland-type "Independent Commission on Population" designed to support the international population effort.

--on migration, strengthen resources for our international strategy, appoint a special representative to manage it, make more use of political-level contacts and our bilateral network, develop a considered Canadian view on the complex question of short and long-term effects of development on migration, support an OECD study and an early high-level DAC discussion, intensify efforts to secure agreements with the USA and Europe on refugee claims while recognising that early success may elude us, encourage trilateral talks including Mexico with an eye on possible future flows, be cautious about a larger UNHCR role, make vigorous use of the "Informal Consultations" for policy coordination even if Eurocentric trends make its future uncertain, stimulate joint action on root causes of migration through the "country assessment process" in the Consultations while avoiding exaggerated expectations, and in dialogue with source countries, counter the impression that Canada and other developed countries are retiring behind a fortress wall, oblivious to Third World problems. We must establish that migration needs to be tackled jointly in coming decades together with other great world issues such as development, environment and population.

The twin problems of rapid population growth and mass migration threaten the world's environment, economic future, and political stability. It is clearer what should be done about the first than the second, but resources are a key issue in both. While there are things we should do to put our own house in order, we are well placed to play an important role in a number of specific ways to promote common action by the world community. But solutions can only be long-term, needing much patience and consistent effort. Are we and others up to the challenge?

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# **CROISSANCE DÉMOGRAPHIQUE MONDIALE ET MOUVEMENTS DE POPULATION: CONSÉQUENCES POUR LES POLITIQUES CANADIENNES**

## **INTRODUCTION ET RÉSUMÉ**

Les deux grands problèmes "de population" de l'heure, l'explosion démographique et les migrations de masse, exigent des dirigeants politiques canadiens qu'ils prennent des décisions importantes. Nous sommes à deux ans seulement de la tenue d'une vaste conférence des Nations Unies sur la population et le développement, conférence d'une envergure presque aussi grande que la CNUED, et parce que les questions démographiques sont à la fois controversées et lourdes de conséquences, sa préparation nécessitera une attention soutenue. Depuis quelque temps, les questions ayant trait à la migration ne laissent personne indifférent au Canada et sont considérées comme prioritaires dans la politique étrangère de beaucoup de pays. Elles figureront aussi à l'ordre du jour de la conférence. Nous devons nous employer sans délai à mieux comprendre ces problèmes tant fondamentaux que complexes, leurs liens avec d'autres problèmes mondiaux, leurs répercussions sur le Canada et ce que nous pouvons et devrions faire à leur sujet. Le présent document vise précisément à faciliter cette tâche.

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Les statistiques sont alarmantes. La population mondiale a atteint 5,4 milliards et augmente à un rythme de 1,7 % par année. D'ici l'an 2025, elle aura atteint 8,5 milliards, et tout porte à croire qu'elle doublera, au moins, avant la fin du siècle prochain. Ce sont les pays en développement, avec en tête les pays d'Afrique, qui connaissent le plus haut taux de croissance démographique. Par contraste, tous les pays industrialisés connaissent actuellement une croissance lente, voire nulle. La population mondiale finira par se stabiliser, mais il reste une question clé à laquelle les spécialistes ne sont pas en mesure de répondre: quand et à quel niveau cette stabilisation aura lieu.

L'explosion démographique alliée à la pauvreté paralyse le développement économique; l'environnement est menacé; les structures politiques et sociales sont corrodées, et la réaction autoritaire contre l'agitation redoutée va à l'encontre des droits de l'homme. Par ailleurs, les pressions migratoires deviennent plus fortes et les déséquilibres économiques ainsi que la dette du tiers monde augmentent. Sur le plan international, les changements dans la répartition de la population mondiale menaceront le système des Nations Unies. Comment les trois géants économiques actuels, dont la population finira par diminuer, affronteront-ils les géants démographiques de demain?

Le progrès économique et le planning familial contribuent ensemble à la baisse de la fécondité, bien que le processus soit graduel et inégal. Parmi les facteurs importants, signalons un meilleur accès à l'éducation et, surtout, l'avancement de la situation de la femme. L'usage des contraceptifs doit se répandre rapidement si l'on veut éviter que la population ne s'accroisse encore plus vite que prévu. On n'arrive déjà pas à répondre à une grande partie de la demande. Chose étonnante, ni le sida, ni la malnutrition ni la religion

n'auront une influence décisive sur les statistiques. La majorité des pays en développement ont maintenant leur politique démographique, mais dans beaucoup d'entre eux, la volonté politique indispensable fait toujours défaut.

Les pays développés admettent à présent le lien entre croissance démographique et développement, mais ne le mettent pas en évidence. Ils admettent avec plus d'hésitation le lien avec l'environnement et commencent à peine à parler sérieusement du lien avec les mouvements migratoires. Les questions démographiques n'ont pas été abordées lors des rencontres au sommet. Les Nations Unies et la BIRD ont cependant développé des programmes importants sur la question. La conférence de 1994 sur la population et le développement, mentionnée plus haut, fait d'ailleurs suite à deux autres grandes conférences des N.-U. tenues en 1974 et 1984. Environ 1,3 % de l'aide publique au développement va aux populations : les États-Unis sont en tête dans ce domaine, mais ne font aucun don par l'entremise des Nations Unies. Le Canada est dans la moyenne.

Les courants migratoires sont devenus un immense problème dans le monde : 17 millions de réfugiés, peut-être 20 millions de personnes déplacées, et des millions d'autres à la recherche d'une vie meilleure. Ces courants relèvent le plus souvent de l'idiosyncrasie: les migrants vont là où leurs compatriotes ont établi une tête de pont, là où il est le plus facile d'entrer, et là où se trouvent les plus grands avantages. Toutefois, ce n'est plus qu'une question de temps avant que la plupart des pays en développement n'exercent de pressions migratoires sur les pays du Nord. Parmi ces derniers, la distinction s'atténue entre ceux qui sont traditionnellement des terres d'accueil, et les autres. Une grande partie de la migration est maintenant irrégulière; partout, le nombre de personnes qu'on tente de refouler mais qui restent en terre d'accueil est élevé, et les frais d'entretien et de contrôle sont énormes. Les comportements racistes en Europe ne cessent de prendre de l'ampleur. Les rencontres sur la migration et les réfugiés se multiplient, jusqu'à présent sans grands résultats. Les gouvernements commencent à reconnaître que les mesures de contrôle ne suffisent pas et qu'une approche globale est nécessaire. Toutefois, ils ne s'entendent toujours pas sur la nature de cette approche.

Les tendances démographiques et migratoires nuisent gravement à un grand nombre des objectifs spécifiques du Canada dans les domaines du développement international, des droits de la personne, de l'environnement, du commerce et des Nations Unies. Il nous faudra changer certaines de nos priorités en matière de politique étrangère. Néanmoins, plus d'étrangers chercheront à entrer au Canada et revendiqueront le statut de réfugié, s'ils le peuvent. La proportion de requérants non européens augmentera, phénomène que le système de famille étendue contribue à perpétuer. L'accroissement des tensions dans nos grandes villes et la nécessité d'un contrôle beaucoup plus serré risqueraient de ternir notre image libérale, qui est en elle-même un facteur unificateur.

Un des cinq objectifs prioritaires de la politique canadienne, énoncés à la fin de l'an dernier par le gouvernement, est de favoriser plus d'implication et de coopération sur le plan international dans le domaine de la croissance démographique et des migrations

massives. Bon nombre des recommandations faites précisément à cet égard indiquent que, sur la scène canadienne, nous devrions :

--faire ressortir davantage l'importance de ces questions, au moyen, par exemple, de déclarations officielles concernant des problèmes mondiaux, d'objectifs plus clairs, d'une meilleure liaison entre les ministères et avec les missions, et d'une communication plus étroite avec les ONG;

--renforcer l'aide canadienne à la population, c'est-à-dire clarifier sa place dans l'ordre des priorités et augmenter sa part dans notre aide publique au développement, accroître la part de l'Afrique, qui est actuellement de 11,4 %, augmenter le nombre de spécialistes en démographie, rétablir le financement de la recherche en santé reproductive menée par l'OMS, modifier la nature des subventions aux ONG canadiennes, et préserver le modeste programme de recherche démographique du CRDI;

--préserver le caractère non discriminatoire et humanitaire de notre politique d'immigration; toutefois, dans le but d'être pris plus au sérieux sur le plan multilatéral, de maintenir la crédibilité de l'immigration auprès du public, et de garder une marge de manoeuvre suffisante pour la sélection des immigrants indépendants, il faut essayer de réduire l'écart entre notre taux de reconnaissance du statut de réfugiés et celui d'autres pays, décourager l'immigration clandestine, et rendre le parrainage des parents un peu moins généreux.

Sur la scène internationale, il est suggéré que nous devrions:

--en général, accroître la sensibilisation à ces questions et à leurs liens avec d'autres problèmes mondiaux, par exemple en suscitant une discussion sérieuse aux grandes tribunes des Nations Unies, aux sommets du G-7, du Commonwealth et de la Francophonie, aux réunions de l'OTAN et de l'OEA, à la conférence de Davos, ainsi qu'aux rencontres interparlementaires, etc.;

--- sur le plan démographique, concentrer nos efforts sur la Conférence de 1994, adhérer de nouveau à la Commission démographique des Nations Unies, presser les Nations Unies d'exercer une meilleure coordination, exhorter les États-Unis à recommencer à verser des fonds aux Nations Unies, attirer davantage l'attention sur le problème à la CNUED, soulever la question cruciale de la croissance démographique aux réunions du CAD, de la BIRD et du FMI et auprès des pays du G-7 qui sont à la traîne et des autres donateurs, souligner auprès des partenaires dans le domaine de l'aide que l'importance qu'ils accordent au dossier démographique est un important indice de leur sérieux en ce qui concerne le développement, et appuyer la création, proposée récemment, de la Commission indépendante sur la population, modelée sur la Commission Bruntland;

--sur le plan des migrations, accroître les ressources consacrées à notre stratégie internationale, nommer un représentant spécial qui s'occupera de les gérer, avoir recours davantage à nos relations au niveau politique et à notre réseau bilatéral, établir une

position canadienne réfléchi sur la question complexe des effets à court et à long termes du développement sur les migrations, appuyer l'exécution d'une étude par l'OCDE et une première discussion de haut niveau par son CAD, s'efforcer davantage de conclure des ententes avec les États-Unis et l'Europe sur les revendications du statut de réfugié tout en reconnaissant qu'il ne faut peut-être pas compter sur des résultats rapides, favoriser la tenue de conférences trilatérales avec le Mexique en prévision des courants migratoires possibles, bien peser les conséquences de l'octroi d'un plus grand rôle au HCNUR, recourir systématiquement aux «Consultations informelles» pour la coordination des politiques, même si les tendances «eurocentriques» en rendent l'avenir incertain, promouvoir une action commune sur les causes premières des migrations au moyen de «l'évaluation des pays» menée dans le cadre des consultations, tout en évitant d'avoir de trop grandes attentes, et, dans le dialogue avec les pays d'émigration, montrer qu'il est faux de croire que le Canada et les autres pays développés s'enferment dans une forteresse et sont indifférents aux problèmes du tiers monde. Nous devons démontrer que, dans les décennies à venir, les questions relatives aux migrations, au développement, à l'environnement et à la démographie ne pourront être abordées séparément.

Les problèmes de l'explosion démographique et des migrations de masse menacent l'environnement, l'avenir économique et la stabilité politique du monde. Nous savons davantage ce que nous devrions faire pour ce qui est du premier problème, mais la question des ressources reste une question clé dans les deux cas. Il convient que nous mettions de l'ordre dans nos propres affaires, mais par ailleurs, nous sommes bien placés pour jouer, de diverses façons, un rôle important dans la promotion d'une action concertée de la part de la communauté internationale. Toutefois, il ne peut s'agir que de solutions à long terme, et il nous faudra nous armer de patience et fournir un effort soutenu. Le Canada et les autres pays sont-ils prêts à relever le défi?

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**WORLD POPULATION GROWTH AND POPULATION MOVEMENTS:  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA**

**CROISSANCE MONDIALE DÉMOGRAPHIQUE ET MOUVEMENTS DE POPULATION:  
CONSÉQUENCES POUR LES POLITIQUES CANADIENNES**

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## **PART ONE: BASIC ISSUES AND WORLD REACTIONS**

### **I -- World Population Growth: Facts and Projections**

#### **Global Trends**

The world's population, which was 2.5 billion in 1950, is now about 5.4 billion, and has been growing steadily since 1975 at a rate of 1.7% per year. This rate of increase will probably continue until 1995, after which it is likely to start a very gradual decline. The total world population increase will be near 94 million in 1991, and will rise to a maximum of 98 million per year by about 2000, after which annual increments will slowly start to drop.

These will only be declines in upward trends and do not mean any early halt to overall growth, for today's many children will be the many parents of the next generation. By 2025 the world population will probably have risen to about 8.5 billion, according to the UN "medium variant" projection. Beyond that, estimates understandably become much more tentative. It is generally assumed that some time during the middle of the next century the total fertility rate (the average number of children per woman), now about 3.4, will come down to the replacement level, about 2.1 per woman. If this assumption is not over-optimistic, world population may reach 10 or 11 billion by 2100, and level off at something like 11.5 billion by, say, 2150. But demographers point out the many uncertainties, and also admit that they have been wrong before (the "baby boom" of the 50's was not predicted). Still, at the least, a doubling of population over the next hundred years seems very likely.

#### **Regional Trends**

But growth is already highly uneven. 95% of world population growth is occurring in developing countries, which, on the average, are increasing at 2.1% per year, or 2.3% if China is excluded; the 42 least developed countries are growing at 2.8%. In contrast, the growth rate of developed regions (essentially Europe, North America, Japan and Oceania) has dropped to 0.5% and may fall further. The same stark contrast is naturally to be seen in fertility rates: these average 3.8 in developing countries, or 4.4 if China is excluded, with the least developed among them at more than 6.0; but fertility is now only 1.9, i.e. below the replacement level, in developed countries.

There are of course sharp differences between regions, and between individual countries within regions; moreover, the accuracy of detailed country statistics is often less than that for the world as a whole, since on the global level, as demographers engagingly confess, errors tend to cancel each other out.

Mid-1991 figures<sup>1</sup> show the remarkable extent of these differences.

**Africa** has much the highest annual growth rate (3%) and fertility rate (6.1). Such a growth rate for an entire continent is unprecedented in the history of humanity, and there is no clear indication that it has yet started to fall. But the range is wide, between, for example, Rwanda (growth 3.4%, fertility an astounding 8.1) and Mauritius (growth 1.4%, fertility 2.0). Significantly, by 2025 Nigeria's population, now between 108 and 122 million, may be 280 to 305 million -- more than all of Northern and Western Europe. The crucial factor for the future is how fast Africa's fertility rate will fall to the replacement level. A mere 25 years delay in achieving this -- from 2025 to 2050 -- will mean a difference of 1.5 billion in Africa's total population by the year 2100.

The **Middle East** is next, with a growth rate of 2.7% and fertility rate of 4.9. Its population, now 134 million, may reach 223 million by 2025. Jordan tops the list of countries with a growth rate of 4.1%, and a fertility rate of 7.1. The growth rate is even higher in Gaza (4.4%), and almost as high in the West Bank (3.9%). Syria, Oman, Yemen and Saudi Arabia follow close behind. Iraq is at 2.7% and 6.4. Israel, predictably, is near the bottom with 1.6% and 3.0.

**South Asia**, at 2.2% and 4.4, includes populous countries such as Pakistan (almost no recent change at 3.0% and 6.6), Iran (ditto, at 3.3% and 6.2), Bangladesh (2.4% and 4.9), where most of Canada's bilateral population assistance is concentrated, and above all India. The latter's growth rate, at 2.11%, is down from the 2.22% of a decade earlier, and its fertility is now "only" 3.9. But its total population, variously estimated at 843 to 859 million, may be 1,365 million by 2025, and may overtake that of China by 2045.

**Latin America and the Caribbean** has an overall growth rate of 2.1% and fertility of 3.5, but some large countries of South America, notably Argentina and Brazil, and most of the Caribbean except Haïti are well below this. Mexico, at 2.3% and 3.8 is a little above average for the area, but believed by U.S. government experts to be set for decline to replacement level before too long. Its population will nevertheless double before leveling off. The region as a whole will increase from 451 million now to perhaps 740 million in 2025.

**Southeast Asia**, at 1.9% and 3.4, includes population control success stories such as those of Indonesia and Thailand<sup>2</sup>, and large countries where less change has occurred, notably Philippines and Vietnam.

China, because of its immense population, weighs heavily in the world balance; its growth rate has come down to 1.4% and its fertility rate to 2.3, but there are indications that further decreases are stalling. Its population of 1.13 to 1.15 billion may approach 1.6 billion by 2025.

The ex-USSR<sup>3</sup> is not far above Western industrialised countries, at 0.8% and 2.3. These rates would be lower but for the Asiatic Republics; Tajikistan, for example, has one of the highest rates in the world.

North America follows close behind, at 0.8% and 2.0 (Canada at 0.78% and 1.86), as does Japan (0.3% and 1.5).<sup>4</sup>

And at the bottom is Europe, East and West, at 0.2% and 1.7, with Germany, Hungary and soon Denmark in actual population decline, and the continent as a whole likely to follow within about 20 years. Albanians, both in Albania and Kosovo, are an exception, with a fertility rate of 3.0. Another exception, even more important for Europe, but counted statistically in Asia, is Turkey (2.2% and 3.6). Its population may almost double by 2025.

### Trends within Populations

#### Urbanisation

Urban populations are relatively much larger in developed countries (73%) than developing countries (34%), but have been growing much faster in the latter (4.4-4.5% per year). By 2025 61% of the population of developing countries will be urban.

Urban growth is fed by rural migration as much or more as by natural increase. By 2015 rural populations in the majority of developing countries may begin to decline in absolute terms, as they have in Europe and in East Asia for a considerable period, and as is beginning to happen in South America. As in so much else, Africa will be an exception; it will add 260 million to its rural areas by 2025, while its cities will grow even faster.

A prominent feature is the rapid growth of "megacities", huge urban agglomerations. The world now has 34 cities of over 5 million people, 23 of them in developing countries. By 1990, Mexico City, with 20.2 million inhabitants, had become the largest city in the world, with Tokyo-Yokohama (18.1 m.), São Paulo (17.4 m.) and New York (16.2 m.) as runners up. The megacities in developing countries have higher growth rates; their appalling social problems are well known.

### Age Structure

Among the world's children, i.e. those under 15, 17 out of 20 live in developing countries. The proportion is highest in regions where fertility is highest, e.g. in Africa, where 45% are children. Of less humanitarian but greater political significance is the proportion of those aged 15-24 in developing countries (19-20%), because of the attention which many governments feel they must pay to this restless group, particularly in the cities, to prevent their own overthrow. In contrast, the developed countries all have an ageing population, with a decline in the proportion of those of working age.

### Basic Theory of Rapid Population Growth

While population growth has many causes, the basic phenomenon is commonly described in terms of the "demographic transition", i.e. the occurrence of a decisive shift from the high levels of both infant mortality and of fertility generally prevailing in pre-industrial societies. It was the decline in infant mortality in developing countries, particularly since 1950, unaccompanied by any significant decline in fertility, that began the explosive growth in world population since that time. The start of fertility decline, often quite rapid at first, slows the overall growth rate, except as offset by continuing decline in infant mortality. Eventually (an eloquently vague word), fertility rates should level off at or near replacement level, mortality will also cease to decline, and a stable population will be achieved. However fertility rates may fall further, as they have in most of the developed world, or even turn up again to a minor extent, as has happened in a few countries.<sup>5</sup> Total stability of population, either in the world or in individual countries, may never be achieved, but expansion cannot be infinite, and at some point, overall growth is bound to cease. As indicated by the example of Africa cited above, the fundamental question is when, and at what level.

### Population Growth and Migration

World population growth as such does not yet impinge directly on the consciousness of the public in developed countries such as Canada. There is, however, growing awareness of something closely, though indirectly and incompletely, linked with population growth -- namely, the massive and growing migration pressure from much of the developing world. These two major world phenomena must be kept in mind together in any attempt to understand and deal with either of them.

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Notes to Section I:

1. Apart from Canadian data, figures used in this paper are mainly from the Population Reference Bureau of Washington, D.C., and to a lesser extent from various publications of the UN Population Division, which are not as up-to-date but do not differ significantly. The percentage growth rates are those for natural increase; immigration (or emigration) is a separate issue, not statistically significant in most countries, Canada being among the exceptions.
2. Thailand's fertility rate fell an extraordinary 46% in ten years and, at 2.3, is now nearing the replacement level.
3. For convenience, the archaic terms "USSR" and "Soviet" will be used henceforth in this paper.
4. Canada's actual population growth rate in 1990 was 1.44%, the difference being accounted for by net immigration of 174,600, probably the highest for the last 30 years. Depending on future immigration levels, our population may peak at 32 million in 35-40 years, and then slowly decline. Japan's population will begin to fall by 2010 or 2020.
5. This includes Canada, in the last couple of years. However the recently announced increase in Canada's fertility rate to 1.86 (up from 1.76 in 1989) is not regarded by Statistics Canada as evidence of a long-term upward trend, but is probably a temporary phenomenon. Regionally, Quebec's fertility rate has lately risen much faster than that of other provinces, but at 1.72 is still well below the national average -- a fact not without political significance.

## II -- National Effects of Rapid Population Growth

The effects of rapid population growth on individual societies and countries are highly complex, with many interrelated factors, and the experts are not in full agreement on all of them. Yet the general lines are fairly clear.

### Economic Effects

It is the **combination of widespread poverty and rapid population growth**, rather than the latter in isolation, that handicaps the economies of developing countries so severely. Surging population growth very often negates all or most of the impact of growth in GNP; and the process of development itself may be slowed or stalled. Yet if an increase in population is an obstacle to economic development, slower population growth will not necessarily solve economic problems; it will however make it easier to take steps in other fields to deal with them.

**Absorption of labour** is obviously an enormous problem in most countries of rapidly growing population, even if no simple correlation is possible. It is increasingly an urban problem because it is there that population is growing fastest. The result is not so much actual unemployment (since this is simply unfeasible for most people in countries without a social safety net) but a great deal of desperately tenuous, low-productivity underemployment, with pathetic consequences which any visitor to a poor developing country can see. Much of the debt run up in the '70s and '80s by countries of the South was incurred for capital to somehow employ the fast-growing number of radicalised urban youth<sup>1</sup>, and massive make-work civil service expansion helped to fuel inflation.

**Mass world starvation is unlikely** at predicted rates of population growth. Despite local imbalances, world food production has so far been more than able to keep level with population, except in sub-Saharan Africa, where malnutrition has increased. More generally, further expansion is possible through higher investment and technological innovation, although obviously there are ultimate limits<sup>2</sup>. **But broader development goals are already severely affected** by the need for tractors, fertilisers and capital to raise food production. There is also more **pressure on increasingly scarce water resources** -- a huge problem for the future. The higher food imports required in countries such as Iran and Egypt to feed their growing populations have worsened their balance of payments problems.

### Environmental Effects

"Our age replaces the food limits envisaged by Malthus with limits of the environment as we place on it the burden of more billions of people, and more trillions of dollars worth of economic activity. . . .The limit (to population) set by the requirement of sustainability is undoubtedly much smaller, much more difficult to calculate."<sup>3</sup>

The problem is threefold:

- (i) **the poorest populations cannot afford or are ill-equipped to use technology and investment to compensate for their increasing numbers.** To survive, they resort to desperate measures which can lead to desertification, water shortages, crowding on to unsuitable land (as in Bangla Desh), urban squalor, or deforestation.
- (ii) **the process of economic development to keep ahead of population growth can itself be environmentally very costly:** pesticides and fertilisers are introduced everywhere; soft coal is used massively as the energy source for industrialisation, as in India and China; water is pumped unceasingly from non-renewing aquifers.
- (iii) **advanced technology and high resource and energy consumption in developed countries, despite their low population growth, can damage the environment at least as much, although largely in different ways.**

Clearly, the concepts of sustainable development and the finiteness of the biosphere are at the heart of the population-environment issue. There are no easy answers.

### Social and Political Effects

**Rapid population growth has a highly corrosive effect on political and social institutions.** Population pressures, combined with other factors, may strip away family roles, widen income inequalities or weaken traditional authority structures. One response may be to migrate, e.g. to cities, since individuals often believe that life will be marginally better for them in urban slums than in an impoverished over-populated countryside. From cities, some then try to move still further, to developed countries like Canada.

Another response, in the teeming mega-cities as well as in the countryside, is to express communal and class-based interests much more aggressively to the authorities. In addition, differential population growth of ethnic or cultural groups can fuel internal conflict; there are recent or current examples in Lebanon, Israel and the occupied

territories, the USSR, South Africa, and Yugoslavia. In the latter, the explosive growth of the Albanian population has helped to create what one analysis terms a "ticking time bomb" in Serbia.

The result almost everywhere is tougher government control to maintain security in face of actual or feared disorder, if not to defend menaced privilege. Thus population growth can be a major obstacle to democratic development and human rights.<sup>4</sup>

Rapid population growth also overextends and frequently overwhelms the administrative apparatus of governments. Enormous pressures are created on already inadequate health, education and social services. Expansion itself strains weak bureaucracies, which become even less able to cope with new challenges such as environmental degradation or shocks from international price changes.

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### Notes to Section II

1. Such efforts are not always successful in avoiding political problems for governments. In Algeria, for example, over half the electorate is under 30; it was they who were probably largely responsible for the recent electoral success of the radical Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), since banned by the authorities.
2. The best-known success story is India, which has become self-sufficient in food production through the "green revolution". Will it remain so when its 800+ million becomes 1.6 billion?
3. From article entitled From Malthus to Sustainable Growth, by Nathan Keyfitz of IIASA, Vienna, July 23 1991.
4. The Indian Prime Minister, for example, speaking at the October 1991 Commonwealth meeting, listed "population stabilisation" along with other factors as a "precondition to democracy".

### III -- International Effects of Rapid Population Growth

#### World Economy and Environment

With so many countries held back individually, to varying degrees, by population growth among other factors, imbalances in general world economic development are further accentuated, as are related phenomena such as Third World indebtedness. Potential ODA impacts are diminished as client populations increase; Third World investments in human capital weaken, as does educational quality; there are poorer markets for international trade; and migratory pressures are increased.<sup>1</sup> The economic downturn of recent years has put the underlying problems into sharper relief.

While much of the environmental damage linked to population growth is concentrated in the immediate country or region concerned, general world environmental problems such as climate change and global warming are also intensified. While the contribution of rich countries where population has almost ceased to grow is at least as great, the first sufferers may well be in the vulnerable countries of high population growth -- the coastal dwellers of Egypt or Bangladesh, the peasants trying to till the fringes of the encroaching Sahara.

#### Inter-State Relations

With large-scale shifts in world population ratios bound to continue far into the next century, there will be fresh strains on the international system of theoretically equal sovereign states.

The relationship is not a simple one between national power and overall population. Obvious other factors are the strength of a country's economy (to the extent it is not overwhelmed by population growth itself), its technological and educational base, and its degree of national unity and will.<sup>2</sup> But sheer numbers do count too. We are likely to hear the larger developing countries assert increasingly the need to realign international relations on the basis of population, particularly as they progress technologically and economically, and perhaps militarily.

It follows that there will eventually be strong pressure for changes in the list of those recognised as major powers. The Indians, for example, have recently started to talk officially about the need to add India and Brazil to the Security Council on the basis of their geography and population, as well as Japan and Germany on the basis of their economic strength. Others, allegedly even including the new Secretary-General, are making similar suggestions, adding Nigeria to the list as well. For the time being, these ideas will go nowhere, but they are a portent. The world of the early 21st century

may be dominated economically by the three economic colossi of North America, Europe and Japan; but how will these entities, with their low-growth and perhaps soon declining populations, cope with the new high-growth demographic colossi of China, South Asia and South America? Migration will be only one of the many subjects of controversy between them.

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### Note to Section III

1. The relationship between population growth and migratory pressures is discussed further in Section VI.
2. This is not always realised. Iraq until a few years ago thought that larger population would add to its military strength, and accordingly eschewed family planning; so did its rival Iran. A Syrian leader recently told a visiting minister that in the long term, time was on the side of the Arabs vis-à-vis Israel, and tried to prove his point by noting that every five years the population of Syria increases by more than the entire population of Israel.

#### IV -- Factors Affecting Reduction of Population Growth

##### General

The eventual decline and cessation of world population growth will be **gradual and uneven**, and there will be a **variety of contributing factors in different countries**. Thus:

- After the fall of a previously high fertility rate to replacement level, some 50 years elapse before a stable population is reached;
- Like the onset of rapid population growth, a decisive drop in this growth may happen rather faster in developing countries than it did earlier in Europe, as indicated by the example of certain economically vigorous East and Southeast Asian countries; but such a drop can unexpectedly slow down in its early stages; there have for example been disturbing recent indications of stalling decline in key areas such as India, China and Africa;
- General development and family planning measures complement one another in contributing to fertility decline, but in a complex and not fully measurable way; and different societies react differently to similar circumstances.

##### Economic, Social and Cultural Development

Economic development resulting in a real increase in per capita income can lead to broader access to education, a higher proportion of the population knowledgeable about modern contraception and able to afford it, and a lower proportion being married early. It can create greater awareness, through television etc., of Western family norms, together with willingness to imitate them, warts and all. These processes, which trickle down from élites like many other aspects of modernisation, occur first in cities and are thus linked with urbanisation. Development also gives governments more resources which they can, if they see fit, devote in part to dealing with population problems.

Sustained economic growth, if it reaches down to the poor, can reduce parents' belief that they need numerous children to assure their own old age security or provide labour for the family farm; but infant and child mortality must already have fallen well in advance in order for parents to be sure that enough will survive. Meanwhile, the population swells. Temporary economic setbacks, by adding to uncertainty, can slow down fertility decline.

### Status of Women

**Advancement of the economic and social status of women, and most particularly women's education, is highly important in fertility decline.** It gives them more ability and willingness to make choices about family size, more receptivity to innovation including family planning methods, and economic alternatives to early marriage. If their society no longer confines them exclusively to traditional childbearing roles and little else, they tend to marry later and opt for fewer children. Female education beyond the bare minimum as well as improved health services reduces infant mortality, and improves children's and mothers' conditions generally; this can eventually bring down birth rates by giving parents less reason to guard against the possibility of non-survival of their offspring.

### Contraception -- Knowledge and Access

The UN "medium variant" population projection is based on the perhaps bold assumption that contraceptive use in developing countries will increase from its present level of about 51 or 52% to 59% by 2000, and 73% by 2025. There has already been remarkable progress: the rate was well below 10% in 1960, and 45% in 1983. Knowledge of at least some modern contraceptive methods depends partly on age and education, but is now quite widespread in the Third World, except in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet access to such methods and willingness actually to use them varies greatly; in Pakistan, for example, contraceptive prevalence is still under 10%. But broadly speaking, there is now **great unmet demand in developing countries.** Properly designed family planning programs, accordingly, are well accepted and increasingly effective in lowering fertility rates in most areas; the problem is rather one of inadequate national and international resources.

### Uneven or Counterbalancing Factors

But generalisations are risky. **Fertility can differ between economically similar regions of the same country (including Canada).** It has dropped in some poorer countries or areas, e.g. Sri Lanka or the states of South India, with little economic progress (although with greatly improved status of women); in richer neighbours, e.g. Philippines or North India, rates remain much higher. Greece and Oman have roughly the same GNP per capita; fertility is 1.5 in the one, and 7.2 in the other. **In some places, political factors actually encourage population growth:** examples are Arabs in the occupied territories, reacting to Israeli numerical superiority and the arrival of settlers; certain smaller tribes in Kenya which see themselves as endangered if they do not maintain their relative strength; and some far-left groups in Latin America which depict birth control as a plot to keep down the numbers of the oppressed.

**AIDS, despite its devastating effects in a number of areas, will probably bring down population growth in sub-Saharan Africa by no more than about 0.5% annually**



over the coming decade, although precise estimates are not yet available. It will however hit some élites particularly hard.

Truly severe **malnutrition** is rare enough that it does not noticeably affect population growth statistics; mild malnutrition, while sadly common in a number of countries, has little effect on fertility.

Except in a few very small countries, **permanent emigration is not a major factor** in reducing population growth, as it was in 19th century Europe. As a percentage of population increase it is only 2-3% in Latin America and much less in Asia and Africa.

**Religious factors** have uneven effects. **Papal teachings** on contraception are heeded in some Catholic countries, e.g. the Philippines, less in others, e.g. much of Latin America, and very little in European countries such as Spain, Italy and Austria, which now have some of the world's lowest fertility rates. **Islamic theology** does not have tenets that prohibit modern contraceptive methods except those which are irreversible, and certain Koranic texts can be interpreted as actively encouraging child spacing. Resistance in some conservative Muslim societies mainly reflects their view of women's subordinate status and a feeling that family planning is a Western intrusion into traditional ways.

### National Government Population Policies

There are population policies now in the majority of developing countries, particularly in Asia, less in Latin America, and still less in Africa. The first such policies were mostly Western-inspired, and many in developing countries initially considered them as a Western scheme to curtail aid demands. This has gradually but almost completely changed over the past three decades. Governmental policies can help to reduce population growth by:

- altering the economic and social conditions, particularly those affecting women, that encourage high fertility;
- instituting or expanding family planning programs, through popular education about benefits and methods, and the provision of actual contraceptive and other family planning facilities; 123 countries now support such programs and only 4 are against them;
- providing direct incentives or disincentives, such as tax deductions, maternity benefits, housing, direct payments, and in some countries, openly coercive measures, as in China and, for a time, in India. In desperately poor countries and among local bureaucracies anxious to please overenthusiastic foreign donors, the distinction between incentive and coercion (a sari in return for sterilisation?) is not always clear -- whence the importance of voluntarism as a principle, rightly emphasized in Canada's own policy (see Annex III).

Developing countries at first relied almost entirely on foreign donors but are increasingly using their own funds, alongside foreign aid, for their population programs. Most are still well below China and India, which now fund respectively 98-99% and 93-94% of their programs, but the IBRD estimates that developing countries as a whole now spend some \$3 billion on population, with an additional \$675 million from other countries. It is the latter figure which must be substantially increased if the UN "medium variant" population estimate is to be achieved.

There remains however wide variation in the nature of population policies, and in the priority which individual developing countries genuinely accord to them in practice. Consistent "political will" at top levels is obviously essential. Often family planning activity is isolated in health ministries, is little heeded by planning or finance ministries, and is avoided by politicians except when Western aid missions come calling. There are cases where a program has existed without such will and without result -- e.g. in Pakistan, Zaïre, and until recently, Kenya and Egypt; certain others where fertility declined significantly with only NGO help -- e.g. Colombia, and Brazil in the '70s; and of course a number of success stories where a program with political will behind it produced similar or larger declines -- e.g. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Mexico, China (mainly in the cities, and much less now rurally), and Bangladesh; even more dramatic success was obtained in South Korea and Taiwan, now below replacement fertility; their fast economic development was doubtless a crucial factor. One bizarre case is Malaysia, which advocates family planning but at the same time wants to slow fertility decline so that its population, now about 18 million, will not level off until it reaches 70 million in 2100. This may reflect a desire to see a relative increase in the proportion of Malays in the total.

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## V -- Population Issues in the International Community

Over the past four decades the subject of rapid world population growth, originally confined mainly to academic circles since the days of Malthus, has gradually become a topic of some concern to international institutions and to national governments, firstly among developed countries, and more recently among most developing countries as well. However, because of its complexity and, for some, its controversiality, the attention devoted to it at top political levels has been sporadic and uneven, and is not yet nearly commensurate with its enormous importance for the economic and political future of the world. The links with other key world issues are beginning to be quite widely appreciated and understood in the international community beyond the immediate circle of specialist officials and academics, but here too the situation is uneven:

-- The two-way relationship between rapid population growth and economic underdevelopment in the Third World is now broadly recognised -- although not universally stressed -- in the international community.

-- The equally important and equally complex relationship between population and environmental issues, while intellectually recognised, is less emphasised internationally, as indicated by the hesitancy on the subject in the preparations for UNCED.

-- But the link between world population growth and migratory movements, of such potential importance for Canada, is only now beginning to be seriously discussed by governments and international institutions.

The activities of international institutions and governments in the field of population are discussed in some detail in Annex I of this paper. Briefly stated, there are two international bodies with major programs in population, the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), leading within the UN system, and the IBRD; a number of bodies in which population programs are a minor element, e.g. the WHO, UNICEF, ILO, and UNESCO; and a large and effective NGO with well-supported international activity, the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF).

Then there are other bodies which serve mainly as a forum for discussion, analysis and promotion of population issues, notably the UN Population Commission, the UN Secretariat's Population Division, and (intermittently) the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), as well as various NGOs, supported in whole or part by governments.

In addition there have been over the past two decades numerous conferences and international declarations which have served to focus attention on population issues and to establish guidelines for international and governmental action. Much the most important of these have been the UN's 1974 International Conference on Population in Bucharest, and the 1984 International Conference on the same subject in Mexico City; the successor International Conference on Population and Development in 1994 promises to be a major international event, almost on the scale of UNCED, although not at the summit level. Internal and international migration will be among its themes. It is discussed further in Section XIII of this paper.

Other recent meetings or documents bearing on the population problem to a greater or lesser degree have included the 1987 Brundtland Commission report, the 1989 Amsterdam Declaration of 79 countries on population, the 1990 and 1991 G-7 Summit communiqués (brief paper references, without actual discussion), the August 1990 South Commission report, the September 1990 World Summit for Children, the September 1990 Paris Declaration of the 2nd UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries, and various UN General Assembly resolutions. Canadians have participated in all except, of course, the South Commission.

Events still to come, in addition to the 1994 International Conference, are UNCED (June 1992), to which population has regrettably been admitted only as a peripherally related subject among many others despite the importance of the environment/population link, and the 1994 World Year of the Family, which, some believe, may be used as a vehicle for the expression of more traditional views on the subject.

The slow and uneven progress of population up the international agenda is further confirmed by the fact that it has not yet been seriously discussed by two fora important to Canada, both of which have a significant North-South dimension, i.e. the Commonwealth and la Francophonie.

Developed countries have been devoting about 1.3% of their total ODA to population assistance over the past decade -- a relatively stable proportion -- with the USA contributing nearly half of the total. It is however precluded from formal leadership of donor countries on this subject by the refusal of the Reagan and Bush Administrations to contribute to the UNFPA or the IPPF, and no other country has stepped forward to take its place. There is wide divergence among OECD countries in the relative amounts they dedicate to population in their aid programs, and in the geographic spread of their efforts. Canada is proportionately near the mean, but ahead of most Summit countries other than the USA; our bilateral activity is largely concentrated in Asia (Bangladesh), with only minimal involvement in the highest population growth area, Africa.

As for the future, warnings to the international community are becoming sharper and more explicit about the need to redouble efforts on population in this decade, as

every year of delay will only add to the underlying problems, including those of migration, and further handicap Third World economic development. But in the face of recession and political distractions, such as events in Eastern Europe and beyond, it is very uncertain whether Western leaders will respond vigorously to the challenge.

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## VI -- Migration -- Dimensions and Causes

Migration flows have become a major world phenomenon, with increasing impact on international relations as well as domestic policies. Massive in scale, particularly in their potential, they are:

- both internal and international;
- between developing countries, between developed countries, and, most contentiously, from developing to developed countries;
- closely linked in cause and effect with world population growth, even though not fully consistent in specifics with sheer population size or depth of poverty of individual countries of emigration.

### The Numbers

Some seventeen million people are classified as international refugees or "in refugee-like situations", and estimates of the internally displaced run as high as twenty million. In both categories, the great majority are in developing countries, and particularly in the poorest, although it is those who find their way to the gates of Western countries who receive most attention.<sup>1</sup> Some refugee populations have been in existence for many years, while others are new; some are genuine by any definition, and others much less so; and the totals fluctuate with political and economic circumstance.

Alongside these, there are many millions who make no claim to be refugees, but who leave their countries to seek temporary employment or permanent homes elsewhere, or would do so at once if they could. These population movements too are as much within the developing world as outside it, and like the real or claimed refugees, they lead to large floating populations of foreigners who can quickly become sources of domestic controversy and instability. Potential movements can also cause concern: a current example is the fear of an enormous mass movement of Slavs fleeing the collapsed Soviet Union -- a fear so far unjustified by developments.<sup>2</sup>

### Links with Population Growth

A sketch of the principal causes of migration pressure from the developing world confirms that rapid population growth is an indirect contributing factor in most of them:

- widespread poverty and stalled economic progress, accentuated by population growth, convinces many individuals, particularly among more

évolué elements who are aware of the striking disparity with rich countries and have contacts there, that they can and should try to move;

--**rural over-population** stimulates internal migration to already over-crowded cities, and thence, normally by others, abroad; if a billion make the move to cities in the next two decades, and 5% then try to go on to foreign countries, this means 50 million people;

--**political instability, social unrest, or ethnic tensions**, often encouraged by effects of general or uneven population growth, provokes authoritarian repression and human rights abuses, and perhaps civil conflict, causing temporary or permanent flight of refugees, singly or en masse;

--in turn, **bloody international conflict**, with still more tragic flows of refugees, can result from the above; as an IISS study has put it, "because the structure of conflict in the Third World has become increasingly international, with ...governments and opposing ...forces having external patrons and relatively easy access to weapons, ...internal wars in the Third World have become protracted, generating seemingly endless outpourings of people across borders";

--**drastic environmental degradation**, brought on in part by population pressure, may force mass departure from homes, usually to within the same country, since it is commonly the most disadvantaged who must flee. As many as 10 million Africans may have been forced off their lands in the 1980's as a result of drought and the advancing Sahara.

### Political or Economic Migration?

The picture above is complex, and with overlaps, but the international community, through the 1951 Geneva Convention and national asylum determination systems, has tried to simplify it for good humanitarian reasons by sorting people's motives for migration into two distinct categories -- solely or mainly economic or environmental, and solely or mainly political (fleeing from persecution etc.).

For many, the distinction is valid: Turkish and North African workers in Europe, Bangladeshis in the U.K., Asians and poorer Arabs in Gulf countries, West Indians and Mexicans in the USA and Canada, Sahelians in the Ivory Coast, Poles in Germany, Vietnamese and Cubans in Eastern Europe -- all have come only to seek a better life economically, even if some claim otherwise.

A number of other population movements can be seen to be almost entirely politically motivated, because the migrants believe they are personally or collectively at risk (their case being particularly convincing when they obviously stand to gain little or

nothing economically from their move): examples are Bulgarian Turks in Turkey, Kurds in Iran, Palestinians in various parts of the Middle East, Central Americans in Mexico, Afghans in Pakistan, Somalis in neighboring countries, and in theory all recognised Convention refugees.

But more and more, the distinction between economic and political migrants is tending to break down under pressure of numbers. The ultimate causes of migration pressure -- economic underdevelopment, rapid population growth, and political oppression -- are all interlocking and react on one another to produce desperate situations which millions seek to escape by moving.

Mixed motives are everywhere. Examples are Soviet Jews<sup>3</sup>, Cambodians, Vietnamese boat people, Iranians, Albanians, Sri Lankan Tamils, Sikhs, Russians, Chinese from the mainland or Hongkong. In most of these countries there is either political uncertainty about the future, or human rights abuses in the present; but political problems weigh unevenly on individuals, and migration is usually also of clear economic benefit. One Tamil may be in genuine danger, another merely an insignificant peasant whom the Sri Lankan authorities would never heed.

### More Complexities

Specific migration flows at any given time are idiosyncratic, both as to the countries of emigration and the countries of destination. Class and education, cultural background, proximity, previous flows, weakness of controls, extent of social benefits, and just plain chance all play their role:

-- Apart from mass refugee flows impelled by famine or war, such as the huge numbers that have moved internally or across borders in the Horn of Africa, and the recent flood of Yugoslavs into Western Europe, those at the bottom of society, the rural or urban Lumpenproletariat, rarely even think of moving abroad. It is mainly individuals who have more education, more awareness of the world through TV or otherwise, and more initiative, who are prepared to risk leaving -- even though family members who accompany or follow may not share these qualities. As minimal education and a little cash spread through the society, so the pool of potential migrants grows.

-- People from some countries, regions and ethnic groups have historically been more pre-disposed to migration than others in similar demographic and economic circumstances, although such differences may be narrowing. Migration pressure on the North from sub-Saharan Africa was small in the past, but is increasing sharply, and the World Bank predicts a further rise.

-- Migrants naturally often head for a familiar nearby country which it is relatively cheap to get to (Mexicans to the USA, North Africans to France, Spain or Italy),



but with cheap air fares, distance is now much less of a dissuasive factor than it was: Sri Lankans arrive in Europe and Canada, Filipinos (particularly women) are all over the world, Ghanaians come to the U.K.

-- Migrants, refugee or otherwise, tend to go where a bridgehead has already been established by relatives, friends or fellow-nationals, and to avoid destinations where they know noone. Somali asylum claimants are currently flooding into Canada to join Somalis already here; far fewer Ethiopians are coming, although their country has seven times the population, and its economic and political conditions are almost as miserable.<sup>4</sup>

-- Migrants scan their radar for the easiest entry and the best opportunities. Canada, for example, is a magnet not only because of our relatively prosperous economy and generous social system, but also because of our remarkable asylum claim procedures and our fast track for citizenship and admission of relatives. Germany and other Northern European countries pull in asylum claimants and others who arrive in Southern Europe but who are soon attracted by better social benefits as well as economic opportunities in the North. The largest single group of Yugoslavs seeking refugee status in Europe is said to be the Albanian element, rather than Croatians as one might expect; perhaps the Albanians have been quicker to sense the opportunity.

-- And then there is Lady Luck. Bizarrely, Zaïrois are suddenly high on the list of U.K. asylum claimants, despite the total absence of any previous historical connection; presumably a small group managed by chance to get a foothold, and others have seized the chance to join them. Such a phenomenon is bound to repeat itself elsewhere for other immigrant groups and receiving countries. At the same time Zaïre receives ten or more times as many refugees on its territory as the U.K. or Canada.

### Cessation of Flows?

A key point is that migration flows, once started, rarely cease unless the economic and demographic disparities which are at their root are removed. Italy and Spain, were formerly countries of net emigration, but have now, to their regret, become in practice countries of immigration, even though, like other European countries, they do not admit it officially. This happened as they became relatively prosperous and their birth rates fell to be among the lowest in Europe.

But such cases are exceptional. The large parts of the developing world which are progressing only slowly or hardly at all, and where population growth continues to press remorselessly on the system, are bound sooner or later to join the ranks of those countries which are producing significant migratory flows, if indeed they are not in those ranks already. We in the North may count ourselves lucky that serious migration

pressure on us is not more widespread. But we should not fool ourselves; it is only a question of time until the source of that pressure includes most of the developing world.

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### Notes to Section VI

1. There have been three million asylum claimants in Western countries since 1980; this contrasts with the 17 million figure for refugees worldwide mentioned above.
2. Experts speculate that some 6 to 7 million people may seek to leave the former Soviet Union, but this figure would include non-Slav elements such as ethnic Germans, Jews, and Armenians, whose movement is more or less organised. Of more current concern to governments and NGO's, however, are the large number of refugees between republics (variously estimated at 1.5 to 2 million or 3 to 4 million), and from country to city within Russia; in the latter the refugee and displaced person problem has been described as "massive and beyond the Government's current ability to cope."
3. Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel has fluctuated with perceptions both of anti-Semitism in the USSR and of economic prospects in Israel; the most recent trend has been downward on both counts.
4. For three years running, Somalis have been second in the list of Canadian refugee claimants after Sri Lankans (whose country has 2½ times the population), and far ahead of the next, i.e. Mainland Chinese. The 1991 figures were: Sri Lanka 4040; Somalia 3503; China 1564; Ethiopia 728. Canada's expatriate Somali community of 25,000 is now one of the largest outside the area.

## VII -- Migration Issues in the International Community

High-level governmental and public concern with migration issues has been rising in the last two or three years, most sharply in Western Europe under the pressure of a great surge in asylum claimants and other irregular migrants. Migration--and more particularly, how to stop it--is heading for the top of the political agenda in Europe, and is beginning to take attention away from other key problems.

There is also growing concern, but so far at a lower level, in North America and other developed regions such as Australia and East Asia. Not surprisingly, concern is much less in areas of emigration such as Eastern Europe, the USSR, and Third World countries, except where they face refugee influxes themselves.<sup>1</sup> Statements are increasingly heard that North and South are beginning to share a common concern about uncontrolled migration, but such statements are, as yet, more wishful Northern thinking than fact. The North itself worries much more about migration pressure aimed in its direction rather than the much larger flows which afflict poorer countries. There is also a good deal of ambiguity among governments on migration, as well as much regional diversity.

### Countries of emigration

Many countries of actual or potential emigration view at least a temporary outflow, other than that of élites, as helpful to ease population-pushed unemployment and gain foreign exchange, and regard efforts to stop or slow it as unfriendly. One estimate is that workers' remittances bring back some \$15 billion annually to the Third World, accounting in many countries for half their capital inflow; other estimates range even higher, up to \$32 billion. These remittances, however, do little or nothing to encourage local economic development of a kind which would reduce emigration from the places to which the remittances are sent.<sup>2</sup>

A few countries have upon occasion used emigration as a political tool, for example to get rid of dissidents or troublesome minorities, as in some parts of the Middle East, or to embarrass the receiving countries, as Cuba did by shipping its prison inmates to Florida.

There is some concern by labour-exporting countries regarding the treatment of migrant workers in receiving countries.<sup>3</sup> But as a general rule countries of emigration do not protest ill-treatment of their nationals as much as one might expect, perhaps because this draws attention to the fact that their citizens prefer to live elsewhere even in unsatisfactory conditions.

The "brain drain" component of emigration is naturally of special concern to many developing countries (and incipiently to Eastern Europe), since countries of immigration including our own are much more likely to find room for the best-educated and competent, and these are themselves more likely to want to move.<sup>4</sup> At one time the South even began to claim economic compensation for this drain, in the context of the "New Economic Order" of the '70's. But there is little that most countries of emigration can do about it, as they can rarely afford to create economic opportunities to keep their more qualified nationals at home. An unusual potential "brain drain", but one into developing countries, is now worrying the West--i.e. the possible emigration of unemployed Soviet nuclear scientists to lucrative posts in countries with nuclear weapons ambitions.

The "brain drain" is also an aspect of the little-noticed but increasing phenomenon of the world-wide circulation of top technological and managerial talent, often but by no means solely within multinationals, and much of it temporary, as part of the globalisation of the world economy. Canadians share in this movement, although we do not like it when it means Americans coming to run branch plants here. Some developing countries, notably India, are now producing an exportable surplus of low-cost, highly-educated people who are beginning to join this world pool of talent. In the context of the multinationals, the 1990 South Commission tartly mentioned the "growing movement of nationals of Northern countries to the South, for whom the North demands special treatment".

### Receiving Countries

Immigration policy normally reflects domestic economic and, to a much lesser extent, demographic factors (e.g. because of a declining or ageing population), as well as humanitarian concerns (refugees, and families of working immigrants). Some immigration is also occasionally encouraged for political, defence or other non-economic reasons in addition. Current or recent examples are Soviet Jews welcomed by Israel; Afghans who were initially encouraged to come into Pakistan to raise the latter's value to the USA; and former cold-war encouragement of Soviet, Eastern European, Nicaraguan and Cuban emigration to show up the bankruptcy of the system, as long as the actual numbers were small.

Only four developed countries--the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand--still admit to being countries of immigration as a matter of policy. But the distinction is breaking down. Many other countries, notably all those of Western Europe, but also elsewhere (e.g. Hong Kong, Singapore, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and, at least till recently, the Gulf countries) are in practice becoming countries of immigration, in some cases in addition to emigration.<sup>5</sup>

### Illegal vs. Legal Population Movement

A very large proportion of immigration is now in one way or another illegal, but this "illegal" immigration is a function of new restrictions on "legal" immigration. Earlier, many countries of Western Europe, for example, either actively promoted or turned a blind eye to the massive arrival of "guest workers", but by the '80's this was long over. Despite the change, illegal immigration in most developed countries is still not controlled with full rigour.

In part this is because of the benefits--to some national economies or to politically influential employers--of importing low-cost labour for jobs nationals will not do (still of residual importance in some European countries, although they rarely admit it, as well as in the Southern U.S.A. contiguous to Mexico). But increasingly it is because of the difficulty of fully preventing the flow of asylum claimants and other irregular migrants without resorting to politically unacceptable or financially impractical means. Tough national and collective statements of determination are now being heard daily, but in most democratic countries including Canada actual stern measures, necessarily of a kind which would result in unpleasant television scenes at airports or on borders, are still rare. Stay rates of those rejected consequently remain high everywhere, including European countries which, unlike Canada, reject the overwhelming majority of asylum claims. The costs -- for asylum determination systems, enforcement, and maintenance of claimants -- are immense: an estimated \$7 billion in OECD countries, with perhaps \$1 billion of the total in Canada.

Governments of receiving countries are just beginning to recognise what the experts have known for some time, namely that alongside economic underdevelopment, a major "push" factor in migratory flows is rapid population growth and high fertility in most sending countries (although not in Eastern Europe or the USSR).<sup>6</sup> The high-fertility factor is only temporarily transferred, since within a generation or less, most immigrants (including those who come to Canada) assimilate to the lower birth rate of their new home and cease to affect its demography. But they can bring about controversial changes in a Western population's ethnic and religious composition, particularly in poor urban areas where immigrants tend to cluster with fellow-nationals. The effects on public opinion are particularly strong when population movement occurs quickly, as at present.

### Reactions of Governments

As illustrated by recent events in France and Germany, governments are becoming very worried about the resultant political outbursts. Some of these have racist overtones; most are focussed ostensibly on the flood of fraudulent asylum claimants and

other irregular migrants, but with non-European foreigners as a whole an unspoken target. The recent Maastricht Summit of the European Community declared that it

"notes with concern that manifestations of racism and xenophobia are steadily growing in Europe, both in the Member States of the Community and elsewhere."

Such manifestations are less prevalent, but by no means absent, in North America; and Japan, with its Korean minority and growing numbers of other Asiatics, may eventually be caught up in similar problems, as its labour shortage grows and its policy of limiting official immigration to ethnic Japanese becomes harder to defend. According to unofficial estimates, there may be as many as 300,000 illegal workers in Japan; and by the year 2000 there may be 2.7 million more jobs than workers in that country.

In response, governments do a lot of talking about the need for tolerance and for humane treatment of genuine refugees and other legal migrants, as well as for more stringent control measures against illegal migrants. At every opportunity they also proclaim the need for more international cooperation, but are slow to agree on its nature.

### Multilateral Activity

This situation has led to an extraordinary growth in the number of organisations and meetings concerned with migration and refugee issues. A partial catalogue is given in Annex II of this paper. Ministers and particularly officials are starting to be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of the activity, much of which overlaps and involves the same people in different formats. There is confusion, duplication and insufficient time for thought.

With the important exception of the UNHCR, which is the main forum for North-South discussion of the interests (both protection and care) of refugees and other displaced persons, most current international activity is confined to developed countries, especially Europe and North America, and is in practice principally concerned with how to cope with refugee and other migratory flows from the point of view of receiving countries. Prominent among them are the governments of the European Community, who, with some difficulty, and with Britain as a reluctant partner in some fields, are trying to reach common arrangements for visas, border controls, and the handling of refugee claims; but there are also forums with wider participation deriving from the Council of Europe, as well as OECD, NATO and potential CSCE activity, and the beginnings of G-7 Summit attention.

A forum of special importance for Canada (and discussed further in Section XIV of this paper) consists of the so-called "Informal Consultations", grouping 8 EC and 8

non-EC countries, including Canada currently in the chair, and with an increasingly tenuous link with the UNHCR. This coordinating body tries to bridge some of the gaps which are developing between EC policies and those of others.

So far, apart from UN refugee maintenance and return activities, there have been few concrete results from this welter of multilateral analytical and policy coordination efforts, with the important exception of measures agreed on within the EC and its Schengen sub-set. These efforts are, however, helping to develop a growing if still incomplete consensus among developed countries:

--that migration pressures are bound to increase;

--that tighter and more cooperative control measures are necessary but cannot be totally successful over the longer term;

--and that some kind of multilateral approach to deal with the basic economic and demographic causes of migration will be needed.

But there is not yet much agreement, or indeed high-level policy focus, on what that broader approach should entail.

\* \* \* \* \*

### Notes to Section VII

1. Poland is a case in point: emigration of its nationals causes concern in Western Europe, and Poland itself is preparing apprehensively for a possible massive flow from the East
2. For example, up to 4% of Egypt's active population works abroad, mainly in the Middle East, and a special Ministry encourages the movement; it was formerly headed by the new UN Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali. The Philippines has a very high rate of permanent emigration (0.5% of the population in 1986), and a huge temporary labour export. Sri Lanka's flow of remittances from emigrants finances 15% of its merchandise exports. The proportion is even higher for Pakistan and Bangladesh. Others tacitly or openly encouraging emigration include Turkey, Indonesia, Jordan, and the three North African countries. Some countries, in contrast, claim that their emigration rate is too high and that they try to reduce it. Iran, Syria, Sudan, Jamaica, Poland and Argentina and (recently) Rumania are among these; certain of them may not be sincere, while others may be worried more about the composition than the rate of emigration.
3. Poland, for example, has raised a plea at the CSCE for better treatment of "emerging minorities now considered as foreigners". Turkey has occasionally complained about the

treatment of its "guest workers" in Western Europe. Governments have protested the unfeeling treatment of Palestinians and Yemenis in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf countries after the Gulf War. The Maghreb countries inserted in the communiqué of their Foreign Ministers' meeting with North Mediterranean states last October a pointed passage about treatment of non-nationals.

4. In a paper submitted to an IOM seminar in 1990, a Senegalese expert pointed out that by 1987, nearly 70,000 high-level workers, or 30% of sub-Saharan Africa's highly skilled manpower stock, had emigrated, mainly to countries in the European Community.

5. It is noteworthy that the proportion of foreign-born in France (8%) and in Germany (7.5%) is now larger than in the USA (6%): This proportion is however much less than in Canada (16%).

6. There is now, for example, increasing worry in Europe that there may soon be a massive influx from sub-Saharan Africa as the region of the world most disadvantaged economically and with the highest population growth rate; but see also Note 4 above. As for North Africa, the Italian Foreign Minister told a CSCE meeting in September 1990 that EC countries should devote at least 0.25% of their GNP to investment in the Maghreb, where demographic pressures were making them vulnerable to Islamic fundamentalism and encouraging mass migration to Europe.



## **PART TWO: CANADIAN POLICY**

### **VIII -- The Impact on Canadian Objectives**

As world population and migration pressures increase, so will the adverse impact grow on Canada's ability to pursue its policy objectives and promote its interests. In population, the effects will be not only those of a rapid growth rate but also those of an eventually doubled world total, in which Canada will count demographically for much less, and where many global problems of concern to Canada will have been immensely aggravated.

Our international development objectives are gravely affected by the negative economic and social consequences of rapid population growth for developing countries. The countries where such growth is highest tend also to be the poorest, so that our policy of priority for the least developed countries, e.g. in Africa, is hardest hit. The dilemma is classic: countries that are controlling their population growth and are growing economically are those that can use Canadian aid best and will most quickly be able to dispense with it, whereas those who need it most will be least able to profit by it. Another policy dilemma for Canada is that our aid, by furthering economic and educational development and by increasing contacts with us, may at the same time stimulate migration pressures on Canada.

Our efforts to promote human rights and democratic development are handicapped by the civil unrest and the authoritarian tendencies which rapid population growth often helps to foster.<sup>1</sup> Some tentative progress in democratic development is being made in parts of Africa; how much faster would this have been if the continent were free of the stresses of the world's highest population growth rate?

Canadian policies to foster a better world environment are hindered by population growth's contribution to environmental degradation in much of the developing world, and in consequence our attention and resources must be partly diverted from coping with environmental problems nearer home.

Population growth, by slowing or negating economic development, indirectly harms Canadian trade, since developing countries become less able to afford our products or repay debts to us. At the same time the need of some countries for our food exports becomes more urgent with every passing year, to feed the new mouths. Population growth, by depressing wages, can also add to competition pressures on us, although this is largely offset by low productivity in the countries in question. The near-

certainty that Mexico's population, unlike ours, will double before stabilising, might have long-term adverse implications for us within a future NAFTA. This needs study.

There will be little direct impact on Canadian security in the traditional sense, but population and/or migration will be among the many other factors fostering disorder and conflict in areas of particular Canadian political or economic interest, including the Middle East, Africa and the former Soviet Union, and may add to political tensions in Europe.

Canadian efforts to enhance the role and effectiveness of the UN will be handicapped. Population growth is adding to the pressure on the economic, social and humanitarian elements of the UN system, which is therefore becoming even less amenable to reform, as well as less capable of dealing with the root causes of the very problems that are undermining it. Moreover Canada, as a country of relatively small and eventually decreasing population, may find it particularly awkward to deal with reformist demands for greater influence in UN bodies by developing countries or by the most enormous among them, as their proportion of the world population grows still further.

The effects on Canadian immigration policies and the eventual composition of the Canadian population will be particularly important:

- there will be much **higher gross numbers** seeking admittance to Canada, with a large proportion trying to use the refugee claim route as long as our practices re claim determination and deportation give this route a reasonable chance of success;
- there will be a still **higher proportion of non-European applicants**, enhancing the trend of recent decades, which has included in particular South Asia, China plus Hong Kong, the Caribbean and parts of Latin America. Many among them are of very high quality. Sub-Saharan Africans, hitherto relatively few except for three or four nationalities, may follow in larger numbers once they establish more beachheads;
- immigration from individual Third-World countries will be a **self-perpetuating phenomenon** owing to the workings of our still liberal family class sponsorship system, strong loyalty to the extended family in the Third World and, often, easier availability of false documentation on relationships;
- but the **ageing of the Canadian population**, as well as the eventual leveling off or decline of its total, will be **only slowed** and not halted by Third World immigrants, since their higher fertility does not last in their new homeland;<sup>2</sup> and the **educational standard** of our population will be **little affected**, since new

immigrants tend to be of a somewhat higher standard than the Canadian mean, while the families which follow them are often somewhat lower;

-- more pressure on our refugee policy, as well as fresh complications in our relations with Europe, may be created by prospective stronger intra-European cooperation on asylum seekers and growth in their political-level concern with migration issues. Cooperation in this field with the USA may be somewhat easier but even more important to us because of higher numbers seeking admission via US border posts;

-- it is possible, although one hopes not inevitable, that we will see a serious further increase in tensions and racist incidents in our larger cities as the still modest proportion of visible minorities in our population gradually rises.<sup>3</sup> These minorities, like other newcomers, tend to congregate overwhelmingly in Toronto and Vancouver, and to a lesser extent 'ontreal. Such tensions if they arise, as well as still tougher admission and residence controls if found necessary, could do serious damage to Canada's liberal self-image as a strong proponent of human rights--an important unifying factor in the country at large.

As indicated by the points made above, it is not too difficult to discern how population and migration will create problems for us across a range of policies; but deciding how we should respond is a much more complex task. Some lines of approach are suggested in following sections.

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### Notes to Section VIII

1. See the discussion of "social and political effects" in Section II.
2. A Commons Committee has been told that the ageing of our population "could be delayed slightly by higher levels of immigration, giving us a longer period of time to adjust to the changes that ageing will bring. . . . Each additional 60,000 immigrants per year would delay that decline (in population) by 8 or 9 years" (Third Report of Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration--June 1990)
3. It was 5.6% (excluding aboriginals) by 1986, and may be just under or over 9% by 2001.
4. The Vietnamese refugees of the early 80's, for example, were warmly welcomed in the rural communities to which they were sent, but almost all have since moved to the larger centres.

## IX -- General Foreign Policy

### A. Introduction

The Government has recently made a clear statement of its intention to put more emphasis on policies to deal with international population and migration issues, by stipulating in its Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities "1991-92 Update" document that one of the five themes to be viewed as basic priority objectives in the forthcoming period should be:

**"encouraging the international community and key multilateral institutions to expand their involvement with the serious long-term problems of population growth and mass migration. Shared control arrangements should form part of this heightened multilateral cooperation."**

The issues at stake are numerous, and no easy or cost-free solutions are at hand. We will need to take sustained action on several fronts, both at home and internationally.

### B. Increasing Awareness and Understanding of the Issues in Canada

The first requirement is the **need to highlight to policy-makers throughout the government and to the informed public at large the crucial importance to Canada of current and future world population growth and mass migration**, stressing their interrelationship with one another and with other global issues of equal concern to us such as the environment and economic under-development. No new policies will succeed unless the issues are better and more widely understood. The message must be got across that these are fundamental problems that will be with us for many decades and that will continue to underlie many more day-to-day concerns.

Steps to this end could include:

- (a) giving much greater and more systematic prominence to these issues in ministerial statements, policy papers, and public documents describing current global issues;
- (b) including specific activities and programs relevant to the population/migration theme in the forthcoming "1992-93 Update" for the Themes and Priorities document. This was not done in the current edition, in contrast to a number of other topics;
- (c) providing for much closer and more continuous inter-departmental liaison linking development assistance, population, refugee and migration policy, environmental

concerns and general foreign policy in a more "global" approach to the issues; the inter-departmental committee recently set up to coordinate preparations for the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development will help to bring this about in the course of its work, but additional mechanisms may prove desirable;

(d) encouraging posts to give more sustained attention to population and migration in their general economic and political reporting and contacts, not confining this to specific developmental or immigration policy contexts. To this end, guidance to posts from area branches in EAITC on their strategic objectives should fully reflect the relevant policy theme. This year some branches made only passing mention of topics relevant to it; others omitted any reference;

(e) ensuring that the EAITC's International Organizations Bureau (which is tasked with the EAITC role in the 1994 Conference, among much else) is generally seen to have population issues as an important part of its mandate, and becomes the EAITC focus for dialogue with other departments and for Canada's international activity on the subject;

(f) systematically developing closer contacts and cooperation with Canadian academics, think-tanks and other non-governmental organisations concerned with demographic and migration issues, through seminars, lecture invitations, liaison visits and selective financial assistance. Better coordination is needed, to ensure that the useful efforts already being made by various departments (CIDA, CEIC, etc.) in some fields neither leave gaps nor create duplication;

(g) using the occasion of the huge August 1993 Montreal conference of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), for which several federal departments will be providing assistance, as a means of fostering Canadian public interest in population issues generally, and tapping Canadian demographic expertise for the 1994 Conference;

(h) examining whether some public relations use in Canada could be made of the annual July 11 UN World Population Day, widely publicized in a fairly large number of countries but not so far in Canada. The Planned Parenthood Association of Canada doubts that this would be a good use of scarce resources, but given UNFPA's strong backing for it, it should at least be looked at.

### C. Population and Migration Factors in General Foreign Policy

In addition to specific measures bearing directly on population and migration, as discussed in later sections of this paper, Canada must be prepared to adapt some of its general foreign policies to the consequences of what lies ahead in these fields. For instance:

-- we shall have to be more cautious about countries which have not yet brought population growth under control, since they may be less stable and thus less reliable political and trade partners for us than others at a similar stage of development;

-- we shall have to be particularly wary of countries of highly differential internal population growth or heavy internal migration, as likely candidates for civil conflict or worse;

-- rapid-growth countries, more prone to authoritarian methods, may have to be a particular focus of our human rights and democratic development efforts;

-- we shall have to pay more foreign policy attention to issues of particular concern to growing elements in our population (already Haïti, Central America and Sikhs; what about Hong Kong or the Horn of Africa tomorrow?)<sup>1</sup>. It can be argued that such developments will over the longer term lead to a lessening of the foreign-policy emphasis Canada has long placed on Europe, already diminished by our increasing economic interest in Japan and its neighbours;

-- our relations with some countries will be complicated (as they already have been) by the use made of our territory by certain new elements in our population as a base for terrorist activities against their former homeland;

-- we shall have to find a way of dealing with the coming issue of population weighting within international bodies such as the UN. A totally stand-pat position by Western countries could lead to a build-up of forces eventually destructive of these bodies.

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### Note to Section IX

1. For example, the growing Canadian Somali community has recently begun to ask why Canada is not paying more heed to the desperate political situation in Somalia.

## X -- Canada's Population Assistance

### A. Policy Statements

Population activities have been included in Canada's development assistance program for the past two decades. These activities have in general been well conceived and administered but are modest in level (at about US\$40 million, we are 7th out of 17 donors in the proportion of ODA devoted to population), and geographically unbalanced (the bilateral component is concentrated overwhelmingly in Asia, with little in Africa).

To take account of the future, **the priority accorded by CIDA to population issues needs to be both clarified and strengthened.** A basic "Policy Framework on Population" document approved by the ministers concerned in 1987 continues to be a valid guide to the general approach to be taken, but is silent on the relative priority to be accorded to population issues or the size of the total effort. Annex III describes this document together with other policy statements on the subject made or subscribed to by CIDA over the past decade; it will be seen that they differ markedly from one another in content and emphasis. **The ambiguities evident from these statements handicap the various parts of CIDA in pursuing a vigorous, consistent policy on population. They should be cleared up in a public document.**

### B. Population Funding: Scale and Allocation

The arguments in favour of an early proportionate increase in our population assistance are evident: the dimensions and urgency of the world population problem, its crucial importance for poverty alleviation and sustainable development, and the difficulty we will face in encouraging greater international involvement in the issue (as stipulated in the Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities document) unless we can give a better example ourselves. Accordingly, it is strongly suggested that **the proportion of our ODA dedicated to population assistance should be increased from its present level of about 1.45% to at least 2 or 2.5% over the next two or three years; further increases could be considered later in the light of trends among other donors.<sup>1</sup>** We would still be behind a number of countries, including the USA, but ahead of several other G-7 partners. Naturally any such proportionate increase should not be at the expense of other activities, such as health and women in development, which can also contribute significantly to checking population growth.

There is no particular argument in favour of accompanying the proposed overall increase in population assistance by an early change in the percentages allocated to the bilateral, multilateral and INGO sectors, now about 40%, 34% and 26% respectively. All three are deserving of support. Some proportional addition to the bilateral side may

eventually be desirable, but given the decentralised structure of CIDA (making precise "allocation" difficult) and the often complex and sensitive nature of bilateral population projects (requiring long and careful preparation), this should be approached cautiously.

Within the bilateral sector, it would be desirable over time to move towards a **much higher proportion for Africa** (now only 11.4%), since it is there that the population growth problem is by far the most acute, and since 45% of CIDA's overall bilateral aid is and will remain directed to Africa. This would not imply any phasing down of our extensive involvement in Bangladesh, but rather a phasing up of other areas so that they are more commensurate with what we are doing there. Central policy direction may be required to accomplish this transition.<sup>2</sup>

Even with better geographical balance, it would not necessarily be a good idea, however, to attempt significant population assistance in all countries of Canadian aid concentration, or to focus particularly on the largest countries, as USAID is doing; we should operate where we can make the most impact with our limited resources. This could sometimes mean a rather small country, or a purely regional institution.

**Decisions on the form of population assistance** in any given country or region (i.e. the balance between policy development, statistical information, education, family planning clinics, provision of contraceptives, etc.) should naturally be left to CIDA's experts, in consultation with the host country and other donors.

**Our multilateral assistance should continue to be concentrated on the UNFPA** if CIDA's institutional evaluation confirms its effectiveness, and it should partake largely of any increase in our population assistance as a whole; however the restoration of some Canadian funding to WHO's Reproductive Technologies research program should receive careful specialist study. If "multi-bi" projects with UNFPA continue to pose operational problems, they could be de-emphasized.

On the **international NGO side**, continuation of the same **high proportion of support to the IPPF** is well warranted, given its excellent reputation and the fact that like the UNFPA, it cannot receive US aid (although its Western Hemisphere branch and many of its component family planning associations do). On the **Canadian NGO side**, it might be desirable to **move away from being purely responsive** and encourage more funding requests from groups which are active and effective on population; this could include church groups, many of which have taken more interest in population than development-oriented groups. The desirability of building public interest in population issues through closer links with NGO groups, as suggested above in Section IX (B), is relevant here.

**It will be essential to strengthen CIDA's own population expertise** if population assistance is to be effective as a real CIDA priority, and if we are to play a useful international role on the subject, as desired by the Government. A total of only two



population specialists is grossly insufficient to handle one of the most complex, delicate and labour-intensive of all developmental subjects. Highly competent and dedicated though the present incumbents are, they simply cannot cope adequately with the full range of their responsibilities. Instead of concentrating on substance, they must spend much of their time on missionary and educative work in other parts of CIDA, particularly on the bilateral side. **Three or four additional population experts should be added right away;** whether they should be included in a central policy unit or deployed as advisers in individual geographic branches would be a matter for separate decision.

The departmental corporation which will succeed the present IDRC should be urged by CIDA, EAITC and other agencies involved in its affairs to maintain and expand its rather modest research activities on population. Its recently approved new strategy provides for "a sharper program focus (i.e. some limiting of the range of our activities)" while "devoting relatively more resources to a few, carefully selected global and "common" (i.e. inter-regional) problems". The IDRC's management has indicated informally that in the light of this strategy, it is unlikely to be involved in population in future, since so much research on the subject is being done elsewhere and there is no particular niche which the IDRC can fill with advantage. Others do not agree that there is no useful role for the IDRC in this most complicated and subtle of world developmental issues.

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#### Notes to Section X

1. Past trends in Canadian population assistance have been irregular, but generally upward; the proportion of ODA was, for example, 0.43% in 1970-71 and 0.96% in 1983-84.
2. The approved budgets for bilateral assistance in 1990-91 totalled \$20,776,000, including Asia 83%, Africa 11.4% and Latin America 5.6%.

## XI -- Canada's Immigration Policy

### A. Immigration, Population Growth and Development

It is clear to most that immigration to Canada is not economically or socially feasible on a scale which would have a significant statistical effect on other countries' population growth, except in a few minor cases (e.g. in Guyana, where a combination of emigration, largely to Canada, and precipitate economic decline has led to actual population decrease). Nor can it accommodate really large refugee flows, such as those of the Middle East or the Horn of Africa.<sup>1</sup>

There also can be no illusion that economic progress in the developing countries, despite its contribution to reducing population growth, will in the next few years be sufficient to reduce migratory pressures on us; indeed there is a good deal of evidence that the initial result of development in the poorest societies may be actually to increase such pressures.<sup>2</sup>

But we must look much further ahead. Many would argue that even if economic development may add to migration pressures in the shorter term, it is only if we push economic development vigorously now, whether through aid, trade or job-creating investment, that it will be possible to stem the much larger pressures inevitable in the future. This may well be so. Can we face the economic implications for our present policies in these areas?

### B. Managing Immigration

Canada's immigration policy must of course continue to be designed primarily to serve our domestic economic and social purposes. But it should also serve, or at least not harm, our international interests. These include, for example:

- being seen, internationally as well as domestically, to play a reasonable part in helping to deal with major humanitarian problems, which can mean (apart from relief assistance) a willingness to accept, on a burden-sharing basis with other countries, limited numbers of refugees, perhaps also including in certain cases people fleeing for mainly non-political reasons (e.g. those who might leave in desperation from an economically collapsing USSR where starvation threatened);<sup>3</sup>
- being seen not to discriminate against nationals of Third World countries as poor and/or racially different, despite the fact that it is they who by force of numbers and desperation will be battering most observably against our entry controls; Canadian policy clearly forbids such discrimination, but there can be a problem of perception abroad as well as in Canada, arising from the fact that any immigra-

tion restriction hits Third World applicants hardest simply because they are the majority;

- trying to avoid seeming to contribute significantly to the "brain drain" of developing countries (and running counter to our development efforts) by appearing to encourage the immigration of their most educated élites (one study says 20% of African immigrants have university degrees); this is a particularly delicate problem because of the potential conflicts with our humanitarian and non-discrimination policies and our domestic need for immigrants who can most quickly become self-supporting and contribute to our economy;
- minimising, to the extent possible, inconsistencies with our UN and CSCE role as champion of freer movement, and our objective of encouraging freer travel for legitimate purposes; this means, among other things, that restrictions on visitors (e.g. in the form of visa requirements) should be imposed and retained only when they are (and remain) demonstrably essential to halt large-scale irregular migration.

Despite the foregoing, international as well as domestic considerations favour somewhat firmer control arrangements by Canada, such as those which have been recently announced or are currently contemplated. Our efforts to secure the "heightened multilateral cooperation" which the Government seeks on irregular migration will be handicapped if we seem to other countries to be less determined than they to bring the problem under control in a reasonable way.<sup>4</sup> We need to be firmer, as other countries are beginning to become firmer, in removing those we find not to be genuine refugees as we choose to define them--a point already emphasised by responsible ministers.

Equally important, and equally difficult, the gap must somehow be further narrowed between the IRB's remarkably high rate of acceptance of asylum claims (despite the recent drop from 79% to 62%) and the much lower rates of countries with judicial standards comparable to our own. We cannot continue to argue, implicitly, that everybody is out of step but Canada. If we do, we will not be taken as seriously as we should be when we propose specific "shared control arrangements", as the Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities document puts it.

Domestic considerations weigh even more heavily on the question of the need to reexamine urgently our asylum claim system and the functioning of the IRB. The arguments are well known: the huge cost of the system (approaching a billion dollars annually, with heavy financial impacts on provinces and municipalities as well as the federal government); its cumbersome procedures; its time-consuming nature, creating huge backlogs; and the public perception that many claims are fraudulent or unjustified, and that the system works against those who patiently and lawfully wait their turn overseas.

Many Canadians do not agree with this view, and believe that it is Canada's duty to accept a high proportion of claimants even if they cannot be fully proven to meet the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee. But scepticism and criticism of the system increases month by month, even though the total of refugee claims seems to be levelling off. One cannot escape the conclusion that **if the credibility of the system in the eyes of the general public cannot be soon restored, the credibility of our whole immigration program may be severely undermined.** Much is at stake here for Canada.

**The specifics of tighter control arrangements and of an improved asylum claim system are not for non-experts to determine.** Most, unfortunately, are controversial in the human rights context, but all are either being implemented or under serious study by other countries.<sup>5</sup> In addition to more deportations and a simplified, faster refugee determination process giving somewhat less benefit of the doubt to claimants, measures could also involve less immediately available and generous social benefits, steps to curb duplicate applications in different jurisdictions, and, if as is possible these steps prove to be unfeasible or unsuccessful, perhaps ultimately a ceiling on the number of refugee claimants who can be "landed" in any one year. But nobody said it would be easy. . .

An aspect of our immigration policy which marks us off from other countries, even the USA, is our particularly **generous family-class and assisted-relative sponsorship system**, even though steps have recently been announced to limit it to some extent, and others are under study. As mentioned earlier (see Section VIII, p. 30), it has the practical effect of considerably increasing the proportion of Third World immigrants we receive, in what amounts to a kind of positive discrimination favouring those individual Third World nationalities which happen to be here already in strength, while doing nothing for other such nationalities.

Much more important, the extent of this kind of sponsorship, together with a large number of successful asylum claimants (who themselves soon sponsor relatives), will, if continued, **further narrow the margin available for the acceptance of independent immigrants from any part of the world selected to meet the needs of Canada and its provinces—including Quebec which seeks qualified francophone immigrants for demographic as well as economic reasons.**<sup>6</sup> This general point has already been publicly recognised by the Government. In addition to other measures which are already under study, a partial non-discriminatory remedy, which could also reduce the magnet effect of Canada on irregular migrants, might be to **delay eligibility to sponsor any category of relative except spouses and minor children for three years after landing, i.e. the time necessary to acquire Canadian citizenship, even though for Charter reasons actual citizenship could not be a requirement as it is in the USA.** But this is only a suggestion; other approaches may be preferable.

Such national measures by Canada, while desirable, will not be sufficient in themselves over the longer term, in the face of the profound demographic forces at work in the world. Much more intense and systematic international cooperation to tackle the

phenomenon of mass migration and its ultimate causes will be essential for us. This aspect is discussed below in Sections XIV and XV.

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### Notes to Section XI

1. Projected total immigration to Canada in 1990 was 200,000; actual net immigration (i.e. estimated inflow less outflow) was 174,600, probably the highest for the last thirty years. The projected annual total for 1992 and beyond is 250,000, from which must be deducted probable outflows of about 30,000 per year. In addition, there are about 150,000 "long-term temporary immigrants" in Canada at any one time, many of them either from the USA or Hong Kong.
2. This was the basic conclusion of the comprehensive and authoritative U.S. Report of the Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development of July 1990. It focussed largely on Latin America, but its views are of much broader relevance. As pointed out in Section XV on "Tackling Root Causes", its thesis needs urgent study by CIDA, CEIC, EAITC and perhaps other experts.
3. Canada's current record is good under these headings: \$111 million was provided to the UNHCR for international humanitarian assistance in '90-91 (the amount will probably be a little less this year because the special circumstances of the post-Gulf war situation no longer fully apply); and in 1991 6864 government-sponsored and 15,680 privately-sponsored refugees and members of refugee-like "designated classes" arrived in Canada, and 8,533 refugees were accepted through the inland refugee determination procedure.
4. The scepticism existing among some US officials about the desirability of agreements with us on this subject has been stated to be due in part to their view of the "pull of the Canadian system" on potential claimants in the USA.
5. For example the German Government, which has many more asylum claimants than any other country, is currently pressing forward with a bill to simplify and speed up claim procedures drastically, in the face of considerable domestic opposition.
6. According to the Government's 1991-1995 Immigration Plan, 69,500 of the 250,000 people to be admitted in 1992 will be independent (including business) immigrants and their accompanying dependents. This figure is projected to increase to 73,500 in 1993 and to 81,500 in 1994 and 1995, still within the overall 250,000 ceiling. It is very questionable whether these increased totals will be attained, given the probable number of refugees and various categories of relatives who will receive some degree of priority.

## XII -- Expanding International Involvement and Cooperation: Focussing Attention on the Issues

### A. General and UN

As within Canada, the first requirement of a more active international policy in this field is to **heighten general awareness**, among political leaders and their governments, of the crucial importance of current and future world population growth and mass migration, and their close links to basic developmental and environmental issues. We can and should help to do so in several ways.

We should make a practice of including thoughtful references to these issues in general tours d'horizon of world problems given in UN fora, such as the annual Canadian statements to the UNGA and to ECOSOC. This would be in addition to more specific policy discussions in UN organisations already involved in one or other of the issues (UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR, etc.). We could also raise the issues in prestigious international gatherings such as the annual Davos conference, which could be invited to have sessions on them because of their importance for future world economic development and stability. They could also be included in the discussion agendas of inter-parliamentary meetings in which Canadians participate.

### B. The G-7

We should ensure through our Sherpas that both issues are included with suitably firm emphasis in forthcoming G-7 Summit communiqués, growing more explicit as the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development comes nearer. More important, we should endeavour to **stimulate an actual discussion**, even if brief, among the participants. We should not be dissuaded by arguments that these summits should concentrate on a limited number of key issues of the day: population and migration are key issues, and will remain so. Part of the G-7's world leadership role is to focus attention not only on what governments are already concerned about, but also on what they should be concerned about in future.

Moreover, as pointed out by others, attempts by Europeans to exclude migration from discussion are contrary to the Canadian interest; G-7 summits can be a potent means of stimulating high-level trans-Atlantic dialogue on a subject on which the Europeans are closing ranks and tending to exclude us. Fortunately there are now some signs of interest by leading Europeans in including migration. Summits should also be used by Canada to encourage specific commitments, e.g. by G-7 laggards (Germany, Italy, France, Japan) to increase their population assistance and thus set an example to the world community.

### C. Commonwealth and Francophonie

We should bring up these issues (along with other global problems such as the environment) at Commonwealth and Francophone summits. They were scarcely mentioned in the 1991 meetings, although the Commonwealth's Harare Declaration included brief references to them; it said development helps in tackling "problems such as . . . migration and refugees" and listed "effective population policies and programmes" among eight measures to promote sustainable development and alleviate poverty among Commonwealth members. The closest the Francophone summit came to the question of population was through its expression of support for the Plan of Action of the 1990 World Summit for Children and its call for a conference of ministers responsible for children in member countries to adopt a strategy for implementation of the Plan. As indicated in Annex I, the Plan includes, among much else, references to responsible planning of family size, research in family planning, and the like.

Our message in these forums should be tailored to their predominantly developing-country membership and the fact that they both comprise a majority from high-population-growth Africa. This means stressing the importance of checking population growth for economic development, and also building on our initiatives on women's rights and welfare, such as those at the recent Francophone summit, to point out the relationship between improved status of women and the reduction of unwanted population growth. It is not suggested that we should in the near future advocate that the modest aid activities of these organisations should be spread still thinner by extending them to the population sector; however this aspect should be looked into by our experts for possible later action.

The next Francophone summit could advocate coordination of Francophone countries for the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, as last year's summit did for the 1992 UNCED. On the migration side, the stress should normally be on the humanitarian plight of refugees rather than on general migration pressures, again taking account of membership.

### D. Other Forums for Consciousness-Raising

We should also bring population and migration issues up in a very general way in major NATO meetings where questions of wider (as opposed to strictly military) security are discussed. However we should probably not do so in a manner implying we think the Alliance should become more involved now in detailed analytical or policy activities on them (with the possible exception of migration possibilities from the former USSR), since other broadly-based Western organisations such as the OECD are better equipped to deal with them in depth.

The OAS is another place where we could take opportunities to stress the general importance of population and migration, even though these issues are sensitive in some

member countries. Our message would have to be carefully adapted to the audience, and avoid creating the impression that Canada was encouraging migration from the area or moving towards agreement on a broader definition of refugees along the lines of the Cartagena Declaration of some OAS members.

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### **XIII -- Expanding International Involvement and Cooperation: Specific Steps in the Population Field**

#### **A. The 1994 International Conference**

The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development has the potential to be a key instrument in the Government's policy of promoting greater international involvement in population and migration. We should work towards ensuring that it is a high-profile success, and that Canada is seen to have contributed to that success. UNFPA's hope that it could lead to the acceptance of specific international objectives for the next decade in the population field (rather than generalised "Plans of Action" as in the past) is one we could share.

The inter-departmental committee recently set up under the chairmanship of the International Organisations Bureau of EAITC to coordinate our preparations will have to see to it that viable Canadian approaches are developed on each of the Conference's six policy themes, all of which have a potential for controversy.<sup>1</sup> An initial task will be to monitor the deliberations and results of the corresponding expert groups which meet over the coming year,<sup>2</sup> and to prepare for the regional preparatory conference for Europe and North America to be held in Geneva in March 1993. If possible we should also be observers at some of the other regional conferences. Another task is to decide how UNFPA's request for financial assistance with the preparatory process should be met.

We should soon start exchanging views on the Conference with other leading countries, in both the developing and developed worlds, not in the expectation of learning much at this early stage, but mainly in order to encourage attention to the Conference itself and what it could achieve. Our consultations with the USA will have to reckon with the fact that Washington officials think that the Conference, like that of 1984, may be a "disaster" for the USA, because of the possibility that, as in 1984, it will elicit extremist US political opinions hostile to population assistance which would have to be expressed. As with UNCED, the USA must be persuaded that positive results are obtainable. If a "Friends of the Secretary-General Group" is set up to pave the way for the Conference, as suggested by UNFPA, we should participate actively.

The UNFPA is apprehensive lest some developing countries, particularly in Latin America, try to use the Conference mainly as a political tool to obtain more money, as in the case of UNCED; perhaps we can help head this off. We can also use consultations in preparation for the Conference as a way to promote thinking in the international community about the controversial but important relationships between population, development and migration, since migration is one of the Conference's sub-themes; we must however guard against the possibility the some European countries may be so

domestically concerned by irregular migration that they could distort the deliberations of the Conference. Also, if (as in the present Agenda 21 draft) UNCED proposes that certain relevant aspects of its conclusion be relayed to the Population Conference for follow-up, we should see that this is done.

We should start working soon with **Canadian and international NGOs** to prepare the ground for them to contribute usefully to the Conference and build public support for it.

It would be useful for our mission in Vienna to follow carefully the UN's preparations for the **1994 Year of the Family**, to ensure that no awkward contradiction develops between this event and the Conference.

### **B. At the UN**

We should seek formal membership on the **UN Population Commission**<sup>3</sup>, and play an active role in its deliberations (not a burdensome task, as it next meets in August 1993; and not a controversial one, as it is largely a technical body); and we should follow more closely the work of the **UN Population Division** to see whether it could benefit from more encouragement and guidance from member states.

Steps should be taken to ensure **senior representation**, preferably from Ottawa and backed by experts, **at all significant UN or similar meetings dealing with population**, so that we can play, and be seen to play, an active role in their deliberations.<sup>4</sup>

Our representatives on the governing bodies of **UN bodies** with programs relevant to population (e.g. UNFPA, UNICEF, UNDP, WHO and others) should continue efforts to foster **closer coordination** among them, with UNFPA in the lead within the UN insofar as population is concerned. The recent improvement is attributed largely to previous such efforts by member states.

We should reexamine the question as to **whether UNFPA**, despite the absence of U.S. contributions to it and the "conflict-of-interest" argument (see Annex I (e)), be asked to play a larger **coordinating role on population assistance among donors as a whole**, covering questions such as the allocation of resources or the choice of forms of assistance in individual countries or regions. Careful consultations in Washington and other donor capitals, as well as with UNFPA itself, would be required if we came to the conclusion that the idea was feasible.

It is suggested that a **quiet top-level approach to President Bush** be made soon after the U.S. elections (on the assumption he is reelected) asking him to reconsider his opposition to even a carefully restricted **reinstatement of U.S. assistance to UNFPA and the IPPF**, as advocated by Congress.<sup>5</sup> It could be pointed out that Canada too does not support abortion as a family planning method, that UNFPA's family planning activities,

like those of USAID, in fact reduce illegal abortions (which are on an appalling scale in Eastern Europe and the USSR due to lack of contraceptive facilities), and that US leadership in the field is needed by us all.

### C. UNCED

We must ensure that population receives adequate attention at **UNCED**, despite the many other issues likely to preoccupy that conference. So far Canada has lagged behind others in this respect, even though Ottawa has rightly pointed out that "we can all agree that failure to address the linkages between poverty, population, and environmental degradation will have a serious impact on the global environment and ultimately on global security".<sup>6</sup> We should include references to the population aspect in our main statement at Rio; and it should figure in our last-minute consultations with leading participants. We should see that it is given an adequate place in the proposed "Agenda 21" follow-up document. Experts confirm that the recent Secretariat draft (entitled "Demographic Dynamics and Sustainability"), while hardly outstanding, is generally useful and welcome, and broadly consistent with Canadian policy; it should be carefully monitored to ensure it is not weakened. As a basic objective in this field, the link between population and environment must be clearly established in the international community.

### D. Outside the UN

We should encourage the proposed setting up this year of an **"Independent Commission on Population"** launched recently under Rockefeller Foundation auspices, and with a number of eminent persons in support. On the model of the Bruntland Commission, it would comprise a group of 12-20 persons from developing and developed countries, with about half the membership being women, and would have a small full-time staff. It would be intended to stimulate "a fresh vision of international population matters that engages, inspires, and commits, deeply and firmly, a large and broad constituency worldwide". It would produce a report in time for the 1994 Conference, but probably be extended beyond it. The USA, several European governments, and various major foundations have already conditionally promised financial backing; Canada and other countries will also be approached shortly.

We should work to ensure that population issues gain and retain a more consistently **high priority in the activities of the DAC**, by, for example:

- checking on the implementation of its 1990 promise to keep a watching brief on population initiatives through Aid Reviews etc.;
- bringing up the population issue in all major DAC meetings;
- ensuring that population is included as a functional criterion when and if the 1992 DAC high-level meeting tries to determine (as suggested by the Secretariat

and supported by Canada) "l'adéquation des apports d'aide eu égard aux priorités d'ordre géographique et fonctionnel";

--advocating that its proposed meeting to prepare for the 1994 International Conference be held at a sufficiently high level and early enough so that it can be genuinely useful in moulding developed-country approaches to the Conference;  
--and by seeing to it that OECD Ministerial Communiqués, such as that to be issued after the May 1992 meeting, continue to reflect the importance of the population issue, as in 1991.

A sub-unit of the DAC on population, to balance and work with the existing OECD unit on migration, might also be suggested.

Our Executive Director to the IBRD and our Washington Embassy could be asked to follow the IBRD's activities in the field of population more closely through interventions at meetings, enquiries of staff, etc. so as to indicate to top management Canada's keen interest in the Bank giving more priority to this field and displaying more leadership, with the useful by-product of stimulating more donor involvement. We could also express hope that the IBRD would prepare another World Development Report on Population in preparation for the 1994 International Conference, as it did for the 1984 conference. The numerous specific suggestions and implied criticisms in the final report of the Bank's respected former Population Adviser (who left in June, reportedly in frustration), all of which appear very cogent to an outside observer, could provide useful lines of enquiry for us. We may have to push hard to get beyond an official line that all is well in this field.

We should look into the question as to whether the regional development banks are devoting adequate attention to population, commensurate with their modest resources.

The IMF could be encouraged to take population problems and policies seriously into account in its analyses of longer-term financial and economic trends and in its discussions with prospective recipients of its assistance which are high-population-growth countries. An opening is provided by the statement of the IMF's Managing Director to UNCTAD VIII in February 1992 that "the continuing excessive growth of the world's population . . . is constantly undermining the best efforts of governments and international agencies to foster more rapid growth in per capita incomes. This problem is probably one of the most serious facing the human race."

On the assumption that our own population assistance is increased, we should use our bilateral consultations with other aid donors, particularly those which are proportionately less active in the field than Canada, to encourage them to give more attention to population issues in their aid programs, and to emphasize these questions more in dialogue with others. Japan, Germany and France would be cases in point.<sup>7</sup> We should also explore the possibility of increased support from OPEC donor countries.

In our consultations with developing countries regarding our own aid programs for them, we should make a point of including pointed enquiries on the extent to which they are taking population factors seriously into account in their economic planning, whether or not Canada envisages population assistance to the country in question. It would not be appropriate to make an adequate population policy an actual condition of general Canadian aid--still more conditionality would make our program still more unmanageable--but we could make it clear that we regard the adoption and implementation of such a policy as among the most important indicators of the seriousness and realism with which the country is tackling its development problems. Our review of population issues with recipient governments should be much more than an item on a check-list of a visiting mission.

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### Notes to Section XIII

1. These themes, as encapsulated by the Secretariat, are: (a) population, the environment and development; (b) population policies and programmes; (c) population and women; (d) family planning, health and family well-being; (e) population growth and demographic structure; (f) population distribution and migration. The Conference's overall theme is "population, sustained growth and sustainable development".
2. These will also be of much interest to the 1993 Montreal conference of the IUSSP (see Section IX B).
3. Preliminary steps to this end have already been taken via the Permanent Mission in New York.
4. Canada was represented--very competently, it is true--solely by one junior Ottawa official at the high-level meeting in 1989 where the important "Amsterdam Declaration" on population policy was adopted.
5. The new White House Chief of Staff, Samuel Skinner, is reported not to be opposed to the "pro-choice" position on the domestic scene, unlike his predecessor Sununu.
6. For instance, Canada's national paper submitted to the conference made no mention of population--a fact protested by at least one lobby group. Moreover, at the 3rd Prepcom in August 1991, Canadian objectives for the agenda item on "Poverty and Population" mentioned population size only in the context of "consumption patterns in middle income and rich nations". Many delegations at this session, including developing countries, said that population was an essential issue to address in combatting poverty. Our statement

expressed support for programmes to help developing countries implement their population policies but said that "the most effective way" to do so was "to improve the standards of health, education, food security and income of the poorest people and especially of women", without any mention of family planning as well. (Turning part of Canada's argument on its head, a WHO report presented at the same session noted that to achieve a sustainable basis for health for all a high priority should be given to reducing population growth rates, among other measures.) The European Community, Japan and Australia have recently proposed references to population growth in UNCED's draft Earth Charter; Canada did not do so.

7. Japan's ODA is slated to grow by 7.8% in 1992 over 1991; they can therefore afford a modest increase in the proportion accorded to population assistance. Germany is beginning to embark on a more active population policy. Intense French political concern with migration from the high-population-growth countries of the Maghreb may soon bring about more emphasis in Paris on population assistance.

**XIV -- Expanding International Involvement and Cooperation:  
Specific Steps in the Migration Field**

**A. Basic Objectives**

Elaborating on the migration theme quoted in Section IX above from the Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities document, the Government has set out its basic international objectives clearly and in a balanced way in the ministerial statement to the Executive Committee of UNHCR in October 1991 and in the November 1991 Annual Report to Parliament on the 1991-1995 immigration plan:

"Canada favours the development of international strategies to address migratory movements. These would include effective multilateral, bilateral and regional agreements on issues such as asylum protection and the removal of unsuccessful claimants. These agreements would require the adoption of broadly similar procedures and standards of application in the treatment of refugee claims. This harmonization would discourage asylum seekers from "asylum shopping". The goal of all countries must be to strengthen the international rule of law as expressed in instruments such as the 1951 United Nations Convention on the definition of a refugee. The goal of individual countries must be to ensure that domestic laws and policies reflect a clear-minded, pragmatic, humanitarian approach to the problem of large-scale population movements . . . "

**B. Scope of Effort Required**

This task is difficult and complex; it will require more sustained diplomatic effort and more people than are currently devoted to it. Otherwise, we shall not succeed. Several measures are needed:

(a) Migration issues must become a clearer priority in our political-level and ambassadorial contacts with other governments concerned and with relevant international organizations, backed of course by the continuing work of specialised officers. In turn this will require more detailed guidance from Ottawa (beyond the EAITC "strategic objectives" for posts, mentioned above in Section IX B (d)), as well as fuller and more regular accounts to the field of what Ottawa officials are saying to their foreign counterparts.

(b) Personnel resources in Ottawa devoted to international activity on the subject must be strengthened right away. Those working on the subject, while extremely able and dedicated, are far too few to be able to do much more than cope with

this week's problems; meanwhile, the scope of work spirals upward as the pace of international discussion quickens.

(c) The coming transfer of responsibility for this important aspect of Canada's foreign policy from EAITC to CEIC will require very close and continuing inter-departmental coordination on all levels on international migration policy, so that it is reinforced by and is consistent with other aspects of our foreign activities.

(d) Abroad, much more use should be made of Canada's extensive bilateral diplomatic network to prepare for and follow up important multilateral meetings through systematic before-and-after exchanges of view with other key countries in capitals, as is normally done on political and economic subjects; but this in turn will require enough people at headquarters to coordinate such operations and put the results to effective use multilaterally.

(e) Consideration should be given to the appointment of a special senior representative, with substantial experience in the migration field, and possibly also in development, to manage the implementation of the international strategy under the general direction of top officials in CEIC and EAITC. He or she could be given some kind of title for foreign consumption such as "Special Envoy", "Special Advisor to . . . (the responsible ministers)" or "Ambassador for . . . (the subject)". Analogies for such a representative are the senior officials who are now tasked interdepartmentally with the coordination of international environment policy, air negotiations, GATT negotiations, international fisheries conservation, etc. Such an idea might be appropriate from next fall, after Canada's term in the chair of the "Informal Consultations" ends.

### C. Shorter-term Strategy

Some principal elements of Canada's strategy for the near future are already fairly clear in outline, although not yet in specifics. (And as German-speakers are wont to say, the devil resides in the details.) The broad lines of approach in coming months should be, and largely are, as follows.

#### International and UN

We must seek to increase the international attention given to migration issues generally, and their relationship to other world problems such as population, environment and development, as well as human rights, as already stressed in Section XII A above. This on-going effort can and should be made in a broad variety of international fora, even though consultations and negotiations on specific solutions would be in more specialised settings, as suggested below.



We must continue to provide financial assistance to the UNHCR and UNRWA for the protection and relief of refugees under their care, with amounts to be determined in the light of specific humanitarian needs and the contributions of the international community, and remain willing to accept as immigrants the modest number of Convention refugees which the UNHCR currently recommends annually for permanent resettlement in Canada.<sup>1</sup> To enhance our humanitarian role, it would be opportune soon to review our legal and regulatory provisions for government and privately sponsored refugees, which date basically from 1978, and also to develop an instrument to facilitate the immigration of other groups on legitimate humanitarian or public policy grounds. The future policy role of the UNHCR is a separate, longer term issue, discussed below.

We must use our unexpected chairmanship of the Middle East Multilateral "Working Group on Refugees" not only to contribute to the peace process in that region, but also to enhance Canada's reputation as a country which well understands and sympathises with the humanitarian aspect of refugee issues in general, without implying that we envisage large-scale acceptance of Middle East refugees to Canada itself.<sup>2</sup> It will be desirable to multilateralise the issue as much as possible through promoting UN involvement to the maximum extent that the political traffic will allow. This chairmanship will require a good deal of effort by our refugee experts, official and otherwise, over a prolonged period; and success, if any, will bring its own costs.

### USA

Because of the high proportion of asylum claimants who reach Canada via the USA (currently about 35% of the total), we must persevere in our effort to reach an effective bilateral arrangement with the USA on asylum claims, i.e. in effect a "safe third country" provision, and if it becomes necessary, we should press our view at a high political level in the US Administration.

However neither the course of negotiations so far nor the texts currently under discussion are particularly reassuring. There is a distinct possibility that an agreement solid enough to curtail seriously the movement from the USA may not be attainable in the immediate future. The enthusiasm of most (though not all) US officials for such an arrangement appears tepid, partly because of their concentration on the immensely greater US problem of irregular migrants from Mexico (who are not asylum claimants), and probably also because they see the benefits as mainly accruing to Canada (viewed as largely the author of its own asylum claim problems) and therefore not worth the judicial or Congressional difficulties that might arise from a strong agreement. Asylum claimants in the USA from Canada, mostly Poles and Chinese, are not numerous. US officials have also seemed less worried than we are about spill-over from Europe, less confident about the effectiveness of a Dublin-style accord, and less convinced of the desirability of an agreement which could lay the groundwork for linkage with intra-

European arrangements. It is possible, although not certain, that their attitude may have started to change recently.

### Europe

We should pursue with similar vigour our current effort to associate ourselves, along with other non-EC countries, with the **Dublin Convention**, as soon as possible after its ratification by EC members; this latter process, still confined only to Denmark, may (or may not) be completed in the second half of 1992. The form which association might take (a new convention including non-EC and EC members, a parallel convention with a bridge to Dublin, a protocol to Dublin, or an informal arrangement sanctioned by EC ministers) will depend more on the views of EC members than of others, but any of these alternatives would probably meet our practical needs.

But the prospects for concluding an arrangement are uncertain. While the EC has formally "noted" Canadian interest in association with the Convention, and has undertaken to examine the legal aspects of this and similar requests by EFTA countries, little has been done, and comments by officials of EC governments have been sparse and non-committal at best. EFTA countries have been displaying growing impatience with EC delay, although those applying for admission to the EC (i.e. Austria, Sweden and Switzerland) are unlikely to continue their pressure once their EC membership (and thus their automatic accession to Dublin) becomes assured. They have also shown little interest in our initial feelers regarding a possible North America - EFTA Agreement if progress cannot be made with the EC. Moreover one important EC country has thrown doubt on the possibility of association with Dublin by any non-EC member, and particularly by non-European countries; and another has expressed uncertainty about the admissibility of non-EFTA members. It is no consolation to note that EC countries have recently been displaying even less interest in discussing common concerns with Australia than with ourselves.

In face of these Eurocentric tendencies, the key argument that we have been pressing, namely that the entry into force of Dublin will probably deflect large refugee flows to other countries, unfortunately points up the fact that, as with our projected arrangement with the USA, we are and will remain the *demandeurs*, despite our protestations to the contrary: substantial numbers of refugees move from Europe to Canada to make a claim, but few go in the reverse direction. Our position is not helped by the quiescence of the USA on association with Dublin, and it may be further weakened if we do not succeed in securing a significant parallel arrangement with the USA which draws on the Dublin precedent, so that we can approach Europe as a North American "bloc".

Time is not on our side, since EC enlargement is drawing nearer, and we risk losing allies. The second half of 1992 may be the time to make our maximum effort, including use of high-level political contacts.

#### D. Longer-term Strategy

Even if, as is to be hoped, our shorter-term efforts vis-à-vis the USA and the Europeans are successful, experience indicates that the solutions they may bring to the problem of containing the number of asylum claimants in Canada will be only palliative and temporary; with the pressure of numbers and poverty abroad, the ingenuity of claimants, and the likelihood of fresh legal challenges within Canada, new ways will eventually be found to circumvent, at least in part, whatever procedures are instituted. The probabilities are similar to those of death and taxes.

There is thus a priority need to find mechanisms to coordinate longer-term, flexible multilateral approaches to migration problems as they evolve. There are various possibilities.

#### UNHCR.

Canada is rightly cautious about an expanded role for the UNHCR beyond the humanitarian field. In the face of the growing number of people in distress and on the move worldwide, there are quiet moves within the UNHCR to expand its traditional refugee "protection" function through a broadening of the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee, and the inclusion of the internally displaced within its formal mandate (partly on the basis of the recent precedent in Northern Iraq).

It is not easy to oppose such ideas categorically without seeming indifferent to human suffering. However, as we have publicly argued, broadening of the Convention refugee definition would be undesirable because it would dilute already scarce resources for relief, as would the UNHCR's assumption of responsibility for internal refugees.

But another equally important reason is that the UNHCR is not well equipped to serve as a focal point for dealing with the wider questions of irregular migration, which would inevitably be posed--and made more acute--by a broader definition. Although there have been recent indications of a possible shift in a more pragmatic direction, its leadership has not been particularly sensitive to these questions or to the ever stronger political preoccupation of its chief donor countries with them; it remains, for instance, very hesitant about associating itself with efforts of Western countries to coordinate their own response to inflows of asylum claimants, as in the Informal Consultations, and wishes to have nothing to do with the important "safe third country" concept. Also, much of its personnel is of uneven quality and reportedly low in morale. Despite our urging, it has not been able or willing to verify the real numbers of refugees under its care; in some countries the estimated figures may be as much as 30% over the actual totals, although to be sure, the latter are themselves distressingly high in most cases.

The UNHCR is also moving to develop a prominent role in preventing refugee outflows, through involvement, along with other agencies, in human rights activities and the promotion of development assistance. For some little time it has been trying to encourage efforts to have assistance to refugees and returnees complemented by the development initiatives of other agencies, so far with little success according to its latest Annual Report. It is now promoting research, jointly funded with the ILO, into the root causes of migration pressure, arguing cogently that much migration is from mixed causes of population pressure, economic underdevelopment and political coercion. A large ILO-UNHCR seminar to follow up the results of the research, entitled "International Aid as a Means to Reduce the Need for Emigration", is being held in May to which many organisations and countries (including Canada) have been invited. The exercise may well be useful, and Canada should certainly attend (with development experts among others) and pay careful attention to it. Yet one may doubt whether these two UN bodies should be encouraged to go much further in this potentially crowded field, at any rate in a leadership role as their officials may envisage.

### North America

In relations with the USA, possible success in the near future in negotiating an adequate "Memorandum of Understanding", as indicated above, will not obviate the need for very close continuing consultation on trans-border problems, since these are bound to recur in some form. They should be kept under review by Foreign Ministers as well as Immigration counterparts so that the US authorities are constantly reminded of the seriousness of these issues for us.

The indirect implications of NAFTA for us in this field should also be noted; is there a possibility that more Mexicans would be led by the existence of the agreement to try their luck in cold Canada? Even a minute proportion of the Mexicans who manage to slip into the USA every year would overwhelm us. The recently instituted trilateral talks on refugee issues between Mexico, the USA and Canada, initiated at El Paso in September, should be encouraged not only as a consultative forum on asylum problems (in case refugee claimants from third countries start using Mexico as a way-station to Canada), but also as a place to meet in case an unregulated flow of Mexicans to us eventually begins.<sup>3</sup>

### Europe

With the European Community countries, association with the Dublin Convention would only be a partial solution, since it would do little more than facilitate where a given asylum claim would be heard. Also required, as Canada has said, is "the adoption of broadly similar procedures and standards of application in the treatment of Convention refugee claims" -- a much more complicated task, particularly since the European picture is itself changing. Although the Maastricht summit effected only a very limited transfer of jurisdiction over visa and asylum matters from member states to the Commis-

sion,<sup>4</sup> as the Germans now desire for domestic reasons, the trend is likely to strengthen over the next few years. In foreign policy matters outside the migration field, Canadian experience in trying to harmonize policies with EC countries collectively all too often means that it is we who have to do the harmonizing in their direction, rather than meeting in the middle. We may expect to encounter this problem more and more in the migration field as well, as the Community enlarges and solidifies.<sup>5</sup>

The "Vienna Process" flowing from the January 1991 Vienna Ministerial Meeting on East-West migration, which held a follow-up meeting of officials in Strasbourg in January, with a membership roughly parallel to that of the CSCE, has a future which is increasingly in question; while it lasts, it will be a moderately useful contact point for us on longer-term East-West issues,<sup>6</sup> but is viewed by our experts as unlikely to provide a means for policy coordination on issues of importance to Canada. Its recent decisions were limited to the need for more data-gathering and for reference of the results to national and international economic assistance agencies.

Could the OECD provide a base for operational coordination? Some US officials think so. Other people argue that if only because of its large membership (which also includes an important source country, Turkey), it could not be useful for the actual concertation and implementation of positions on specific migration issues, as opposed to its present role of exchanging information, providing analysis and focussing high-level attention. We should look into this carefully and fairly soon, although of course without giving any impression of undermining the role of the Consultations. In any case, we should highlight the issue in general terms at OECD ministerial meetings.

At the recent Prague ministerial meeting, Canada and the USA urged that the CSCE should become involved in questions of migration, including irregular migration, asylum seekers, and the right to citizenship. However because of UK and German opposition and lack of significant other support, the only decision reached was a minimal one, i.e. that a CSCE Seminar on Migration should be organised by the CSCE's newly established Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; no date was set and no priority was assigned to this proposed event. The USA returned to the charge on the seminar proposal in the preparations for the current Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, stressing among other things that duplication with the work of other forums should be avoided, and that the link between human rights should be among the issues to be examined; and the SSEA, in her opening address to the meeting, said that the CSCE must focus on potential sources of conflict, including migration, and that a date for the seminar, to be sooner rather than later, must be set at Helsinki, since we could not afford to put off any longer a serious CSCE discussion of this question. However, given the CSCE's very large membership (now 48 states) and rather cumbersome procedures, any more extensive CSCE involvement of a practical kind that might be useful to Canada is likely to develop only slowly and tentatively, despite hopes expressed in some Canadian quarters that the "Vienna process" might provide a bridge to it, and even that it could eventually take over the role of the Informal Consultations.<sup>7</sup>

### The "Informal Consultations"

For the time being at least, these Consultations are by far our most useful platform for promoting our specific objectives -- our "last best hope", so to speak. Our current chairmanship, combined with the somewhat more positive attitude the USA is beginning to take to this forum, should provide a good opportunity to make progress on the harmonisation of policies, even though leading members, particularly the EC participants, insist on its purely consultative and information-exchange role. Besides discussions in progress on getting at "root causes" (discussed below in Section XV), meetings are scheduled on removals and on national status determination procedures and their reform before the full ministerial-level annual meeting in Toronto in June. We must exploit our chairmanship to the full, and devote a good deal of diplomatic effort to it in the next few months and beyond. But given the scepticism of some of the leading Europeans, and increasing Eurocentric tendencies in general, we cannot be sure how long it will serve us as an effective tool in the advancement of our international strategy. Further Community integration may sharply reduce their interest in joint action with us. The priority is now.

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### Notes to Section XIV

1. See Note 2 to Section XI.
2. It may, however, become desirable to show our bona fides and general sympathy for the refugees' plight by accepting limited numbers of Palestinian expellees from Kuwait who are sponsored by close relatives in Canada and who are not admissible to any country in the area, particularly if other countries such as the USA take comparable action. The argument that has been advanced that such action could reflect adversely on Canada's role would not stand up as long as Canada showed no disposition whatever towards open-ended admission of Palestinians.
3. Academic institutions in the three countries are already beginning to study the implications of labour mobility within the NAFTA area, assuming rightly or wrongly that this may come in ten years or so.
4. The decision was described to non-members as "practical steps towards harmonization of policy and regulations"; the Community also mentioned the need, "in line with common humanitarian traditions, . . . to continue to offer refuge . . ." The Maastricht documents included a declaration that the European Council would have the "aim of adopting, by the beginning of 1993, common action to harmonize aspects of them (Member States' asylum

policies) and would by the end of 1993 consider bringing asylum and other border issues under European Community jurisdiction, acting unanimously (i.e. giving states such as Britain the ability to block it).

5. Significantly, this expansion will not include Turkey, largely because of its high population growth rate and its migration pressure on Western Europe.

6. The parallel "Berlin Process", in which Canada has not been invited to participate, deals with short-term measures in Europe to check illegal migration, including harmonization of visa practices and readmission agreements; the latter were also reviewed in Strasbourg.

7. There is no evidence as yet to support the argument made by some that the Government's recent decision to withdraw all forces from Europe will have an impact on our influence in the CSCE or other largely European fora on specific issues of interest to us.

**XV -- Expanding International Involvement and Cooperation in the Migration Field:  
Tackling "Root Causes"**

**A. General**

There is now general recognition of the need to press ahead with efforts to address the "root causes" of mass migration, including asylum claimants, in source countries. Besides Canada, a number of countries, such as Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, have emphasized the point in policy statements, and there have been collective declarations in the same sense.<sup>1</sup> The loosely agreed September 1991 "Strategy Platform" of the Informal Consultations has a useful section on "foreign and development cooperation policy" stressing the relevance of a long list of policy issues including "development cooperation with relevant countries which strengthens their economies, furthers employment, improved standards of living and reinforces human rights", increased trade, stabilisation of world population growth, measures to avert environmental degradation, cooperation with UNHCR, UNRWA and UN development agencies, and improvement of the capability of the multilateral system to deal with the causes and effects of mass displacements.

What is not at all clear to anyone is the "how to". To prepare for early international discussion and possible action, we need to develop as soon as possible a considered Canadian view, drawing extensively on CIDA's development experts as well as CEIC's and EAITC's migration specialists (and probably the academic community), on the extent to which economic development generally, and well-targeted development assistance in particular, can help to reduce migration pressures in individual countries or areas, as well as more broadly. The authoritative July 1990 report of the US Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, entitled Unauthorized Migration: An Economic Development Response, concluded, with particular reference to Latin America, that

"-- although there are other important factors, the search for economic opportunity is the primary motivation for most unauthorized migration to the United States; and  
-- while job-creating economic growth is the ultimate solution to reducing these migratory pressures, the economic development process itself tends in the short to medium term to stimulate migration by raising expectations and enhancing people's ability to migrate. Development and the availability of new and better jobs at home, however, is the only way to diminish migratory pressures over time. ...Thus, the development solution to unauthorized migration is measured in decades--even generations. Any serious cooperative effort to reduce migratory pressures at their source must stay the course in the face of short-term contradictory results".



In addition to this starkly realistic general proposition, the Report contained a large number of specific policy suggestions, e.g. assistance in checking population growth, targeting economic development on particularly poor areas, and, especially, facilitating trade access to the US market. A Canadian analysis of the issues and recommendations in the Report that are of general (rather than narrowly US-Latin American) relevance would be of great help in guiding our own thinking at the present formative stage in the "root causes" effort. The UNHCR-ILO seminar in May, mentioned above, may also be helpful for this purpose.

Beyond the economic sphere, we must also see whether it is feasible or desirable to emphasize migration source countries in our activities to promote human rights and democratic development; such selectivity may not be a practical possibility. Along the same lines, the Secretariat of the Informal Consultations has suggested that a "long-term in-depth analytical multilateral exercise" be conducted within the OECD to "examine the long-term effects of structural economic aid, and focus attention on the reinforcement of human rights, as they relate to specific migration propensities". This merits our support and advocacy.

#### B. The "Country Assessment Approach"

Meanwhile, in the last few years tentative efforts have begun through the Consultations to develop a concerted Western approach to migration problems originating in certain specific countries, initially Turkey, Sri Lanka and Rumania. At Canadian initiative, this idea was formalised last year within the Informal Consultations as the "country consortium" approach, on a World Bank analogy. Under pressure from members of the Consultations anxious to avoid any impression of actual operational coordination, the effort later had to be rebaptised as "the structured Country Assessment Approach". It "invites participating States to coordinate their efforts and adopt compatible responses to problems of common interest, while simultaneously striving to mitigate the factors leading to irregular migration and to facilitate return". It is to focus on a range of subjects concerning a given country or region, including "migration patterns, status determination, human rights evaluation, development projects and return efforts...with due regard to general foreign and economic policy objectives".<sup>2</sup> In addition to the three countries mentioned above, Somalia, Ghana, Albania and the CIS are to be considered this year, each under a different "lead delegation" of the Consultations, with a report to be made to the plenary session in Toronto in June; and the addition of further "target countries" or regions is to be considered.<sup>3</sup>

This exercise is well worth undertaking, if only for its transnational educative effect among policy-makers regarding the complexity and diversity of the causes of migration pressure in individual situations (population growth and poverty being dominant in some countries, economic collapse in others, oppression or civil conflict in still others); and any pooling of ideas and scarce resources in specific situations can only

be helpful. We must ensure that Canada itself shows the way by being willing to make concrete contributions. But we should be more cautious in our expectations than we have been so far in public statements and official documents about what the approach may achieve.

There are several reasons to keep our fingers crossed. The Informal Consultations themselves do not have an assured future, particularly as European integration intensifies; some of the individual measures which may be decided on in the context of the approach may be of only limited effectiveness in checking flows in the shorter term, and may therefore undermine the interest of participants; there will be little willingness to take costly major aid or trade initiatives commensurate with the scale of the migration problem;<sup>4</sup> success in one small area may be only temporary, or divert the source of flows to a neighbour; important source countries or areas (such as North Africa, Zaïre, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, Haïti, Yugoslavia) are not covered, and yet if they are added in future, or large new sources suddenly emerge, intellectual and financial resources of participants may be spread too thin to have any real effect. There is also the problem that concentration on sources of migrants to the "North" leaves out of account the plight of the much larger numbers which move within the developing world. For this reason, and the need to avoid the impression that a fortress of developed countries against the "South" is being constructed, it will be very important to try to retain UNHCR involvement, but as noted above, there is a good deal of hesitancy within the UNHCR about the Consultations.

### C. Other Measures

In parallel with such progress as may be made in the Informal Consultations on the development-migration-population link in specific countries, we should propose a major discussion of this matter in the next high-level DAC meeting, not only to sensitize other participants generally, but also to promote the long-term analytical study by the OECD proposed by the Consultations Secretariat. This year we are proposing a more sustained dialogue between the DAC and the OECD's Environment Committee, and the DAC and the OECD's Comité des échanges; of equal importance, but not yet suggested by Canada, would be DAC dialogue with the Working Party on Migration, to prepare the way for the general discussion proposed above. A springboard for this DAC discussion could be the stress at the last high-level meeting, in December, on "l'impératif de la cohérence des politiques principalement au chapitre de la dette, du commerce international, de la migration, et de l'environnement",<sup>5</sup> even if the OECD Secretariat is not yet well staffed to advance the "policy coherence" idea. But before such discussion--and before matters proceed much further on "root causes" within the Informal Consultations--we must have clarified our own thinking on the basics, as emphasized earlier.

We should perhaps try to involve officials of the IOM somewhat more in the international consideration of migration issues, even though it is basically an operational agency with limited resources for policy development. It is already represented at

sessions of the Informal Consultations and at various other meetings in Europe on migration, but perhaps its practical experience could be put to good use in some way.

Lastly, we must find ways of having our own **dialogue with countries from which flows of asylum claimants are coming to Canada**, alongside whatever group dialogue emerges from the collective "Country Assessment" exercise. In some cases this will mean still further emphasis on the need to correct human rights abuses (without necessarily connecting this with our narrow national concern about the flow of claimants); in other cases, where the flow seems mainly or solely economically motivated, we might want to display a basically sympathetic attitude towards the problems of emigration and "brain drain" which the country in question might be facing. Whether such dialogue takes place bilaterally or in international meetings, the key point is to counter the impression that Canada and other developed countries are retiring behind a fortress wall, oblivious to the problems of the developing world. We must present migration as a **truly international problem**, linked with other great world issues such as underdevelopment, environmental degradation, and overpopulation, and that dealing with them together will be the great challenge of coming decades -- as indeed it will.

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#### Notes to Section XV

1. This point was included, for example, in the conclusions of the September 1991 Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Migration Affairs in Luxembourg.
2. These quotes are from a working paper prepared by the Secretariat of the Consultations.
3. Canada is participating in four of these studies (those on Sri Lanka, Somalia, Ghana and the CIS) but because of our current chairmanship of the Consultations, for the time being we are tactfully not leading any of them.
4. The initial discussion of the CIS by the group which met for the purpose indicated that it did not intend to become involved in economic aid; the reason given was that other organisations were already dealing with this aspect.
5. Very wisely, Canada's own statement added "l'explosion démographique" to this list.

## XVI -- Conclusion

The twin problems of rapid population growth and mass migration are immense and complex; and if they are not tackled very seriously in the next few years, their scale is bound to increase drastically in the coming century; the environmental sustainability and political stability of the world system will be threatened, and Canada will suffer with the rest. On population, it has become fairly clear what should be done, but so far the will is lacking to deploy the necessary resources, which are large but not enormous. On migration, the answers are not yet so evident, but the resources eventually required may be even greater, if a reduction in North-South economic disparity proves ultimately to be the only long-term solution.

These issues, and particularly that of population, tend to get crowded out from the agenda of governments in favour of more pressing day-to-day concerns, economic and political; but like the environment, they are basic to our future, and must take their place among our priority concerns. They are, so to speak, the somber continuing drone of the bagpipes, against which the tune of events is played. This is why one of the main initial objectives of our policy should be to foster much greater awareness--both in Canada and internationally--of the nature and the importance of the various underlying trends, and their relationships to one another; preceding sections of this paper contain a number of suggestions about things that we could do to this end.

In parallel, we need to do somewhat more to put our own house in order, in part so as to put us in a better position to act internationally. As indicated in some detail earlier, the range of measures we could consider include: focusing more of our diplomatic and expert resources on these issues; clarifying and enhancing aspects of our population assistance activities; changing some emphases in the immigration field; and ensuring that our own thinking on the complex links between population, development, migration and the environment is as clear as this difficult, opaque subject will allow.

But the fundamental requirement, as the Government has rightly stressed, is for a large and sustained expansion in international involvement and cooperation. Canada is well placed to play an important role in this process, because of the many influential fora and bilateral contacts available to us. This paper has suggested a number of specific ways in which we could make use of them, although new approaches may, of course, become preferable as the situation evolves. The key point, however, is that we are faced with very long-term questions, and reaching solutions will be an equally long-term task, with a need for much patience and consistent effort over a generation and more. Are we up to it? Is the world community up to it? One must earnestly hope so.

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## ANNEX I

### Activities of

#### International Organisations and Governments in the Population Field

##### (a) UN Organisations

1. The leading UN institution in this field is the **United Nations Population Fund**, known as UNFPA from the abbreviation of its earlier official name. It had a voluntarily-funded budget of US \$225 m. in 1991, a figure which has been fairly constant in real terms over the past few years. However 1991 contributions were about \$3 m. below projections, and 1992 contributions are expected to increase by only about 2% in dollar terms, i.e. probably below the inflation level. It has activities in 141 developing countries, and is starting up in Eastern Europe; it also plans technical assistance to the ex-Soviet countries to help them prepare bilateral funding requests, but lacks funds for programs of its own there. Most of its activities are largely carried out for it by other UN bodies such as WHO, ILO, etc., as executing agencies; and there are also cooperative projects with individual donors and the IBRD. UNFPA receives contributions from all major developed countries except the USA (Canada 9th in 1991 at US \$13.2 m., with Japan in the lead at \$41.7 m., followed by Netherlands, Finland, Germany and Norway). It urges an increase in contributions to it to \$500 million by 1994 and to \$1.1 billion by 2000; this would represent some 24% of the \$4.5 billion which it estimates must be contributed to population programs through all channels by the international community if population growth is to be held to the UN's "medium variant" population projection. (At present it receives about 31% of the \$675 million contributed internationally). Its \$500 m. target seems very unlikely to be met. Besides its programs in developing countries, UNFPA carries out a world-wide advocacy role on population, as part of its mandate.

2. The 27-member UN Population Commission, a subsidiary body of ECOSOC, meets biennially, most recently in February-March 1991. Canada left the Commission in 1960, and has not sought membership since (although some initial moves in this direction have been made recently), but sends an observer. Functioning largely by consensus, it has an advisory rather than executive role on population issues. Reporting to it is the **Population Division of the UN Secretariat**, which gathers, collates and publishes comprehensive statistics and analysis on population, fertility, etc. in all countries, using national data and its own estimates. It is the most authoritative source of demographic information for the international community; there are others (e.g. the IBRD) but their results do not differ greatly.

3. The World Health Organisation (WHO) acts as an executing agency for UNFPA abroad and has at its HQ a research program into reproductive technologies and contraceptive safety of about \$50 m. per biennium, into which it puts some \$1.3 of seed money, the rest coming from UNFPA, the IBRD and individual donors. Canada (CIDA) ceased its contribution to this program a few years ago because of perceived managerial weaknesses at the time, although a small IDRC contribution continued for a period. WHO also provides some \$12 million for maternal and child health, contributing indirectly to family planning. Its programs have been criticised internally as insufficiently focused on the poorest countries and populations, and as not taking enough account of population shifts and urban growth trends. Cooperation with UNFPA has sometimes been uneven on the ground, although there are various UN committees which work to ensure coordination both at HQ and in the field between UN agencies involved in health, children and population.

4. UNICEF, another executing agency for UNFPA, for political reasons formerly tended to minimise involvement in family planning and even sought to avoid the term; but it has very recently shifted in its pronouncements and practical activities to a much more positive attitude, and cooperation with UNFPA, while still poor in the field, is now good at the executive level. This was partly under pressure from its Executive Board, and in response to the growing view, reiterated at the 1990 World Summit for Children among other places, that child welfare and safe motherhood can be gravely harmed by too many or too frequent children.

5. ILO and UNESCO, also with UNFPA funding, spread awareness of family planning activities and methods among important constituencies in developing countries, the ILO among labour leaders, workers and their families through education work on population issues, and UNESCO among teachers because of its work developing family planning curriculum material. The ILO's population programme is supposed to help member states incorporate demographic elements into development, with emphasis on human resources and employment. There is also educational and other activity, mainly for UNFPA, by FAO, UNIDO, and the Regional Commissions.

#### (b) Major UN and Other Conferences and Declarations

1. The most important of these are the huge 1974 and 1984 **International Conferences on Population** in Bucharest and Mexico City respectively, and their projected successor, the 1994 **International Conference on Population and Development**. The World Population Plan of Action agreed upon in 1974 set out the basic right of couples and individuals "to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so" taking into account "the needs of their living and future children and their responsibility towards the community", and indicated general principles for family planning and population growth reduction; it was strongly advocated by the USA and other Western countries, but accepted only

hesitantly by many developing countries. By 1984, when the Plan of Action was reaffirmed and supplemented, many more countries had come to see the urgent need for population programs, but the USA, under the new Reagan Administration, announced a policy of refusing aid to organisations which assisted countries which themselves were involved in abortion (e.g. China); this led to the termination, over Congressional objections, of US support to UNFPA and the largest NGO in the field, the International Planned Parenthood Federation. Preparations are already under way for the 1994 Conference, of which the Secretary General will be UNFPA's able Executive Director, Nafis Sadik. Financial contributions for the preparatory process have been promised by some developed countries including the USA, but not yet Canada. There will also be regional preparatory meetings, including one for Europe and North America. The Canadian approach to the Conference is discussed in Section XIII of this paper.

3. The prestigious World Commission on Environment and Development or "Brundtland Commission" of 1987 focused its attention on population, along with food security, the loss of species and genetic resources, energy, industry, and human settlements (including urbanisation); it said urgent steps were needed to limit extreme rates of population growth, and made a number of strong recommendations in this field. A respected Canadian, Jim MacNeill, was Secretary-General and a key member of the Commission.

4. The International Forum on Population in the Twenty-First Century, in which 79 countries including Canada (and the USA) participated, issued in November 1989 the important Amsterdam Declaration. This document expressed concern that rapid population growth, uncontrolled migration and urbanisation, and environmental degradation "threaten to darken our vision of the world we will leave for posterity in the 21st century"; it went on to set out a series of specific policy and financial goals necessary for the achievement of the UN "medium variant" projection by 2000, and notably that every effort would be made to provide the \$9 billion for core population activities necessary to reach that projection, i.e. a doubling of the \$4.5 billion level of 1987.

5. The July 1990 Houston Economic Declaration of the G-7 Summit countries contained among its numerous paragraphs one which states that sustainable development in a number of countries requires that population growth remains in some reasonable balance with expanding resources, that supporting developing countries' efforts to maintain this balance is a priority, and that action on behalf of women can help stabilise populations. Canada supported this paragraph, but there is no evidence that population was even mentioned by the Summit leaders during their discussions. The 13-page July 1991 London Economic Declaration of the Summit included one sentence saying, perhaps as wishful thinking, that the leaders "endorse the increasing attention being given to population issues in devising strategies for sustainable progress". This too was not discussed, except presumably among the Sherpas who drafted it.

6. The 300-page South Commission Report of August 1990, issued in the name of 28 eminent individuals from developing countries under the chairmanship of Nyerere of

Tanzania, contained two brief but firmly phrased sections stressing the importance of prompt adoption of policies designed to have an impact on population growth, including measures for women and rapid expansion of family planning, although nothing was said about resources for such policies relative to other aspects of development. This has been hailed as the first high-level statement on population emanating from developing countries alone.

7. The documents approved by the September 1990 **World Summit for Children**, co-sponsored by **Canada**, include, among much else, mention of "responsible planning of family size and ...child spacing" and the need for access to information on this, as well as research in family planning and the prevention of too early, too closely spaced, too late or too many pregnancies. A number of these themes, although not new, had not been approved at Head of Government level before.

8. The September 1990 **Paris Declaration of the Second United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries**, attended by **Canada**, mentioned that high rates of population growth were a fundamental problem for a number of these countries and stressed that population policies should be considered an integral part of national development strategies.

9. The November 1990 **Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference** noted that a projected increase in world population was a contributing factor in the projected increase in greenhouse gases.

10. The **International Development Strategy for the Fourth United Nations Development Decade**, adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1990, included in its recommendations on "priority aspects of development" a section saying that population assistance should be "substantially increased" in the 1990's and that developing countries should also "intensify their efforts to allocate adequate resources to population programmes".

11. The June 1992 **UN Conference on Environment and Development**, or **UNCED**, is unlikely to place the same emphasis on population as its near-namesake the **Brundtland Commission**. Some influential Latin American countries initially sought to keep population issues off the table, lest **UNCED** be distracted from its main task, as they see it, of securing financial and other concessions from the North; and for other reasons they were backed by the USA, and to some extent at first by **Maurice Strong**, although he has publicly stressed that "population is a critical element in the environment/development equation". This situation has gradually and partly shifted during the preparatory process, through the efforts of some developed and a few developing countries; **Canada** has participated only to a limited extent in these efforts. As a result, population, while still not to be a principal topic of debate, has now been accepted as an item in **UNCED's** voluminous follow-on "Agenda 21" in recognition of its status as a contributing factor to environmental problems.



12. In 1994 there will be a series of meetings and other events to mark the UN's **World Year of the Family**. There has been some concern that because of special meanings attached by some to the concept of "family", this might develop cross-currents at variance with ideas implicit in the work of that year's International Conference on Population and Development and its predecessors, particularly since it is being organised by a less than fully capable element of the UN Secretariat in Vienna. Cooperation has been established with UNFPA, and countries including Canada are endeavouring to ensure they take a consistent approach in both fora. The "Year" has poor funding prospects.

### (c) Non-UN Bodies

1. The **IBRD** has been extensively involved in lending for population purposes for some time; the figure will be about US \$180 m. in 1992 (an exceptional figure of \$351 for 1991 was fortuitous). It thus comes second only to **USAID** in the population field. While its efforts are more concentrated than those of the **UNFPA**, its loans have helped a substantial number of countries develop population policies, including family planning, and it has provided useful leadership for specific major projects (e.g. in Bangladesh where Canada's own largest population program has benefited from **IBRD** coordination of donor activity). However due to its decentralised structure its approach is perhaps not as geographically consistent as might be desirable; there is also, it is said, some current weakness of support at the top.

2. The **DAC** (the **OECD's** Development Assistance Committee) has devoted some attention to population issues, although its five subsidiary working parties and expert groups do not include one on population; in contrast, the **OECD's** Manpower and Social Affairs Committee has long had a Working Party on Migration. Some landmarks are:

- The **DAC** met on population to prepare for the 1984 International Conference on Population, and will do so again to prepare for the 1994 Conference.
- A Policy Statement issued by **DAC** "Aid Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies" in December 1989 referred to "an imperative need to slow population growth in those many countries where it is too high to permit sustainable development" and their readiness "to help developing countries to establish, fund and implement effective population strategies and programmes as a matter of priority".
- A special **DAC** meeting on population and development in April 1990 endorsed the conclusions of the 1989 Amsterdam Declaration, and its conclusions were adopted by the "Senior Aid Policy Officials" meeting of June 1990. As followup, the **DAC** was to "keep a watching brief on the progress of implementation of the above population initiatives through Aid Reviews, improved statistical reporting and other relevant activities". Will it?

-- The lengthy communiqué of the OECD Ministerial Meeting of June 1991 included among six objectives for cooperation with developing countries that of "ensuring environmental sustainability, and slowing population growth where it is too high for sustainable development"; a separate full paragraph on migration mentioned study of migration causes "for the sending countries, where the lack of development opportunities contributes to migratory pressures".

3. The widely respected **International Planned Parenthood Federation** or **IPPF**, founded in 1952, is the leading NGO with family planning programs in the field. It rivals the Red Cross in size. The IPPF works largely through family planning associations in individual countries; its budget of about US \$77 million (a figure which has not changed much in real terms since 1980) is funded mainly by 11 developed countries, including Canada in 6th place. The USA does not contribute, but does provide funds to its separately administered Western Hemisphere program.

(d) National Developed-Country and OPEC Donors

The total of developed country population assistance in constant dollars has not fluctuated much over the past decade, and is only a little higher than it was in the early '70's. It currently represents about 1.3% of their total ODA, divided, according to 1989 figures, into 36% of direct (bilateral) assistance, 35% to the UN (mainly the UNFPA) and 29% to NGO's. An increase to 3-4% or more in the proportion of ODA, together with a doubling of overall ODA, has been suggested as necessary to meet the UN medium variant projection.

There are however wide variations among donors. Norway has been giving well over 4% of its ODA to population, followed by the USA at 3.23% (in 1989); but France has been giving a mere 0.01%, and Austria 0.06%. In 1989 Canada came an undistinguished 7th out of 17, at 1.38%, just behind the Netherlands at 1.58% and ahead of the UK at 1.1% (although the latter's proportion has since been increased to 1.4%). Four of the G-7 Summit countries (Japan, Germany, Italy and of course France) are well behind us.

In gross amounts, USAID is by far the largest population donor; its \$250 million this year represents about 46% of all donor assistance. The total is slated to rise to \$300 m. next year and perhaps \$350 m. in the following year, assuming Congress continues its current enthusiasm for the subject in the face of Administration reluctance. USAID would like this ratio to decrease, through increases from other Western donors. However Presidential vetoes continue to prevent any of the US contribution from going to the UNFPA or the IPPF. While this leaves Japan as the largest donor to both, and Germany as the third to UNFPA, neither yet has more than a minimal bilateral population program (both, however, are considering increases, as noted earlier). Canada, with

total population assistance of about US \$40 m., is close to the mean in its proportional allocation (40% direct, 34% UN, 26% NGO).

There is also wide variation in the degree of spread of direct bilateral assistance. USAID provides population assistance in 101 countries, but only 5¢ per capita is spent on the ten most populous countries, while the 91 others receive an average of 19¢. It is planning to move soon to what it whimsically calls a "BIG Country Strategy", concentrating much more on 17 of the largest countries (from which, for political reasons, China and Vietnam have to be excluded), and phasing down in most of the others. The UK has recently raised the priority accorded to population in its overall foreign aid; it will focus bilateral assistance particularly on eight Commonwealth countries in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, mainly in the family planning field. Canada has a curiously skewed bilateral program: it puts most of its assistance into Bangladesh, with only minimal amounts in Africa and elsewhere.

OPEC donors reportedly devoted about 1.5% of their foreign assistance to population in 1983; more recent figures are lacking. Their contributions to UNFPA are minuscule (e.g. \$30,000 by Saudi Arabia in 1990). The UNFPA would like Western donors to urge them to do more.

#### (e) Donor Coordination

There is no recognised leader or coordination mechanism among donors in the population field, not even with respect to UNFPA (although Canada recently hosted a well-attended first meeting of UNFPA donors). The USA, despite the fact that it gives so much more than any other country, is not fully able to take on the leadership role that normally comes to it on other issues of common concern to developed countries, because of its policies precluding contributions to UNFPA and the leading NGO, the widely respected International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF); USAID officials would like to see another country take on this role but point out that European countries with relatively high proportionate donations to population, such as Netherlands and Norway, lack sufficient expert staff for the purpose (so does Canada, not suggested for leadership).

The DAC Chairman made the logical suggestion at the Amsterdam Forum that UNFPA itself could be the lead agency, but this idea was subsequently narrowed down by the Fund's Governing Council to a coordinating role in the contraceptive assessment and supply process. A wider leadership role was thought inappropriate since UNFPA would have been at the same time an interested party. The IBRD coordinates well in specific countries but does not seem equipped for (or interested in) a more general role.

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## **ANNEX II**

### **Partial Catalogue of the**

#### **Principal International Organisations in the Migration and Refugee Field**

##### **(a) UN Organisations**

1. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (**UNHCR**) has under its protection and care some 15 million refugees under the 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol (the number is disputed); and discussions in its 44-member Executive Committee or "Excom" (of which Canada is a member), various sub-groups and its Secretariat deal increasingly with other displaced persons who are not strictly within its mandate, and with migratory movements as a whole. Of particular importance for Canada is its Sub-Committee on International Protection, which deals with difficult issues such as refugee status determination and asylum; it has set standards for the treatment of refugees, and its findings (not all of which are necessarily to our liking) are often quoted domestically. It is now attempting to develop a more systematic dialogue and development of guidelines on contemporary protection concerns. In a sense the "Informal Consultations" act as its Western caucus. The UNHCR's budget is voluntarily financed. Its 1990 general expenditures were US \$332 m., and special programmes and trust funds totalled \$208 m. See Section XIV for discussion of current trends.
2. **UNRWA**, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, assists some 4 million Palestine refugees and is empowered to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to others affected by the 1967 war. Its projected 1991 budget, about half of which was for education, was \$254 m. Its activities and problems of the refugees are discussed in consultative bodies in Vienna and annually at the General Assembly.
3. The International Labour Organisation (**ILO**) has concerned itself with labour migration, including the status of migrant workers and their reintegration in home countries (e.g. Egyptians etc. displaced by the Gulf crisis) and the relationship between economic underdevelopment and emigration. This latter aspect is being increasingly emphasized (see Section XIV).
4. The **UN Population Division** (see Annex I) includes detailed analysis of migration trends in its demographic studies, and these are submitted formally to ECOSOC's **UN Population Commission**.
5. The 1994 UN **International Conference on Population and Development** (see Annex I) will have as one of its six themes an item on internal and international migration and urbanisation; an expert group on this aspect will meet in Peru in January 1993, and

migration is also sure to figure prominently in the preparatory regional meeting for Europe and North America, jointly organised by ECE, the Council of Europe and UNFPA, to be held in Geneva in early 1993.

6. The Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) has been trying to raise funds for migration research of its own.

**(b) Non-UN Bodies**

1. The 1991 London G-7 Summit included for the first time in its Declaration a short paragraph noting "growing concern about worldwide migratory pressures", and welcoming OECD attention to the issue, although only the Italian Prime Minister actually spoke about it at the meeting.

2. The last G-24 ministerial meeting referred in its Communiqué to the "potential destabilising effects of uncontrolled migration" and reportedly displayed an interest in aid to Central and Eastern Europe as a means of avoiding this.

3. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has had a Working Party on Migration since the '60's and has sponsored major conferences on the subject, most recently in Rome in May 1991, with the Italian Government. Its work has so far been largely analytical, dealing with integration as well as migratory flows. Its SOPEMI ("Système d'observation permanente des migrations") publishes statistical and analytical studies based on contributions from member states, with which Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are starting to cooperate, plus Bulgaria and Rumania next year.

4. NATO's Economic Committee has recently completed a study of the prospects for migratory processes in Europe.

5. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM), of which Canada recently became a full member, helps governments with transportation arrangements and return programmes for Convention refugees and other displaced persons, and its secretariat also has a growing role in encouraging consideration of broader migration and population questions.

6. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has from the start concerned itself with freedom to leave member countries, but has carefully avoided the touchier issue of freedom of entry. At the Berlin Ministerial meeting in June 1991 the USA proposed a wider CSCE discussion of migration issues within the CSCE region. However despite Canadian and US urging the January 1992 ministerial meeting was barely able to agree in January, in the face of opposition from some EC members, to

hold a CSCE Seminar on Migration at some unspecified time in the future, as mentioned in Section XIV above.

7. The Council of Europe has a steering committee on migration, the European Committee on Migration (CMDG), which prepares periodic conferences of European ministers responsible for migration (most recently in Luxembourg in September). Prominent among its various subgroups is CAHAR, its "Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on the Legal Aspects of Territorial Asylum, Refugees and Stateless Persons", which conducts information exchange but has not succeeded in becoming a centre of policy coordination efforts and is now in decline.

8. The Trevi Group, whose annual ministerial meetings are attended by Canada's Minister of Justice, exchanges information on criminal activities and irregular migratory movements. It is not involved in general policy coordination.

9. The Vienna Ministerial Conference on East-West Movements of People held in January 1991 under Council of Europe auspices and including Canada and most other CSCE members, is organising various follow-up meetings on legal and asylum matters; it has become known as the "Vienna process". A Ministerial Conference of most of the European participants was held in October in Berlin to recommend specific measures to curb illegal migration; now known as "the Berlin process", it has spawned a Working Party, to be chaired by the Austrian Interior Minister, to focus mainly on the criminal activities of clandestine immigration nationals.

10. The members of the European Community have been intensely active on migration matters since the 1986 Single Act; Ministers of Justice and Immigration meet twice a year, and there are frequent sessions of their Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration and of subsidiary bodies. Out of this system has come the 1990 Dublin Convention, so far ratified only by Denmark, to prevent "asylum shopping" among individual member countries, in which non-EC European countries and also Canada have expressed interest. Work is also being done on joint visa policies and related issues, and a Convention on External Borders is ready for signature as soon as a Spanish-UK dispute related to Gibraltar is settled.

11. France, Germany and the Benelux countries, later joined by Italy, with Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece probably soon to follow, form the Schengen Group within the Community, with a more far-reaching agreement, so far ratified only by France, on first asylum, and related work on the abolition of internal borders. German ratification is being delayed, perhaps indefinitely, by the insistence of a member party of the governing coalition, the CDU/CSU, that this should be accompanied by constitutional amendments which would limit the right of asylum in Germany. The UK is likely to remain as a hold-out, and some of the North European members are reportedly concerned at letting the Mediterranean EC members determine access to the territory of the group as a whole through the agreement. The group has concluded with Poland a

moderately successful agreement on readmission of rejected asylum applicants, and is considering others.

12. The "Informal Consultations" or "Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe", which came into existence in 1985, has expanded to include 8 of the principal EC countries, 5 EFTA members, and the USA, Canada and Australia as the principal traditional countries of immigration, with a small secretariat under an ex-Swedish official Jonas Widgren, and with a now loose link to the UNHCR. It tries to serve as a bridge between EC and non-EC states in considering solutions to asylum and migration issues among like-minded states, for implementation in other fora; Canada is its current chair. Its present role and prospects are discussed in Sections XIV and XV.

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### ANNEX III

#### Canadian Policy Statements on Population Assistance

1. Canada's statement at the 1984 UN Conference on Population spoke of the need for "greater efforts on the part of the international community, national governments and NGOs" on population issues.
2. A statement by the Prime Minister in 1985 for a UNFPA publication said that "monitoring population dynamics is an integral part of Canada's development assistance" and that it "supports population activities in its ODA programme" bilaterally, in the UN and by NGOs; but no mention was made of the relative priority to be accorded to population within Canada's ODA or of a greater Canadian effort in the field.
3. A useful "CIDA Policy Framework on Population" approved by ministers in 1987, but not so far published, recommended a "balanced, low-profile approach" with expansion of bilateral programs in family planning, but without neglect of other "activities in the areas of demographic and fertility research, census-taking, mother-and-child care, internal and international migration, refugees, population distribution, training, institutional development, etc." It reiterated that "greater efforts are needed from everyone" and that Canada would support population activities through multilateral (including UNFPA), NGO (including IPPF) and bilateral channels, and added, among other things, the useful statement that "while respecting individual freedoms and responsibilities, we have a collective responsibility to protect the global environment and resource base for future generations". It stressed that "Canada encourages voluntarism, that is to say, free and informed choice in family planning", but that "abortion is not an appropriate method of family planning" and CIDA funds should not be used for such a promotion; rather, they "should be used for family planning as a means to reduce the need for women to have recourse to abortion". The document said there was to be "more active participation in policy-making bodies of international organizations to encourage them to further action" (a theme not noticeably implemented, and not mentioned again until the Government's "Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities 1991-92 Update" quoted in Section IX of this paper). Again nothing was said about the relative priority of population assistance or of any increase in the total.
4. CIDA's basic Sharing Our Future document of 1987 did not list population among its "six development priorities", but did include family planning along with five other items under the first of them, "poverty alleviation"; and some key points from the Policy Framework on Population (#3 above) were reiterated in a short chapter on the subject.
5. Canada subscribed to the 1989 Amsterdam Declaration (see Annex I), with its call inter alia for a doubling of population assistance by 2001, subsequently endorsed by both the OECD/DAC and the UNFPA/UNDP Governing Council, at which Canada was also




represented; but these implied undertakings have not been referred to in published Canadian policy documents.

6. A policy decision at the 1990 Montebello forum of senior CIDA managers stated that "population and environment" was one of CIDA's three top priorities along with poverty alleviation and structural adjustment, but this has not yet been publicised.

7. CIDA's 1989-90 Annual Report, the latest available, mentioned enigmatically that world population increase "gave rise to the recommendation that CIDA redirect a large part of its resources toward controlling population growth", without indication as to whether, when or on what scale this recommendation might be implemented. The sections on bilateral assistance made no mention of a separate population assistance component, and even for Asia, where our major population project (in Bangladesh) is located, population was not listed among the five priorities of CIDA's government-to-government program.

8. The 1991 CIDA "President's Retreat" established five "pillars of sustainable development". Population was not listed as one of these but figured prominently under the "environmental sustainability" pillar. This document too has not yet been publicised.

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