

CIVILIAN ASPECTS OF UNITED NATIONS'

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PEACEKEEPING

by Robin Hay

INTRODUCTION

The popular conception of peacekeeping has been of blue-helmeted soldiers keeping vigil over a fragile ceasefire in some far-flung, war-torn region of the world. While by no means false, this characterization ignores the rich history of civilian involvement in peacekeeping.

Civilians have been used only sparingly in peacekeeping operations in the past, but in 1989 they led the UN effort to oversee Namibia's transition to independence. A similar peacekeeping operation is getting underway in the Western Sahara, and Cambodia, and is being considered for Angola.

The increasing prominence of civilians, or non-military personnel in peacekeeping, is cause for examining the gamut of the often ignored civilian aspects of peacekeeping. These aspects include the administrative roles traditionally played by civilians in support of a peacekeeping operation, the non-military tasks¹ and responsibilities that have been carried out by peacekeeping troops as part of, or incidental to, their mandate, and the direct use of civilians in a "peacekeeping" capacity.

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND: ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Though peacekeeping began as an *ad hoc* response to a particular crisis, the UN has since developed an administrative model for handling such operations. Every UN peacekeeping force or mission has ultimately been responsible to a civilian, the UN Secretary-General. The Secretary-General,

reporting to the Security Council, is assisted in the day-to-day direction, management and execution of peacekeeping operations by two Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs², who, along with their staff, make up the Office for Special Political Affairs. This office is responsible for overseeing each operation.

The Office for Special Political Affairs turns to the Field Operations Division (FOD) at UN headquarters for executive and support personnel for the civilian administrative staff, or Force Secretariat, attached to each operation. These two departments, along with the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Finance, prepare the budget for each peacekeeping operation, presenting it to the appropriate General Assembly budget committees. The FOD is also responsible for troop transportation, communication with the force, conducting meetings and investigations in the field, the security of UN staff and mission, and the safe custody of archival material.

The Chief Administrative Officer and staff of the Force Secretariat, along with the Military Logistics Staff, are responsible for the logistics of the operation, including financial aspects, procurement of equipment and supplies, communication between the mission and UN headquarters, and direction and coordination of personnel and troop movements in the mandated area. They also act as liaison with the host government on logistics and administrative matters. If need be, the force may recruit local civilian personnel to work in administrative positions.

Command of a peacekeeping force in the field is usually vested in the Military Force Commander appointed by the Secretary-General. He is assisted

by a civilian staff that includes a political and legal advisor, and a press information officer.

In some cases, especially those where political problems are paramount or where peacekeeping entails a joint military/civilian initiative (e.g. Namibia), the Secretary-General may appoint a civilian Special Representative to lead the operation. In such instances the Special Representative usually outranks the Force Commander, though it may be that they share equal status, each reporting to the Secretary-General about their respective area of responsibility.

NON-MILITARY TASKS AND PEACEKEEPING

Armed peacekeeping troops were first deployed by the UN during the Suez Crisis in 1956 to *secure* and *supervise* the ceasefire between Egypt, on one side, and Britain, France, and Israel on the other. Peacekeeping has been identified with this kind of activity ever since. It is usually divided into four main categories: *internal pacification*, to prevent the renewal of fighting in an intra-state conflict; *buffer forces*, separating warring parties in an inter-state conflict; *border patrol*, involving ceasefire supervision, fact-finding, reporting, and patrolling; and *observation*, unarmed supervision of a truce, ceasefire, or armistice line.³

Peacekeepers are normally forbidden from using force except in self-defence; still, deterrence and reassurance, their overriding mission, gives their work a distinctly military cast. The *ad hoc* and unpredictable nature of each peacekeeping operation, however, has meant that troops have sometimes engaged in activities that are best described as non-military. This is not unusual. With every major conflict military forces have been used to bring stability to the theatre of operations, allowing the rebuilding of the civilian infrastructure until the proper legal authority could be re-established.⁴

This type of undertaking has been especially evident in two operations, one in the Congo (now Zaire) from 1960 to 1964, and the ongoing operation in Cyprus. Also characteristic of these operations has been the employment of non-military or civilian personnel and agencies, alongside the peacekeeping force, to deal with humanitarian or public service problems arising from the conflict. In contrast are missions such as the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in West New Guinea (1962-63), and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia (1989-90), where civilians played the predominant operational role.

THE CONGO OPERATION

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was precipitated by the mutiny of the Congolese Army following that country's independence from Belgium in June 1960. In reaction to the mutiny, Belgium deployed its

own armed forces, ostensibly to protect its citizens still living in the Congo. At the request of Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, a UN peacekeeping force was established in order to bring about the withdrawal of the Belgians and help restore law and order. ONUC's task was complicated by the secession of the southern province of Katanga and the collapse of the central government in the Congo.

The largest peacekeeping operation ever undertaken — involving upwards of 20,000 military personnel — ONUC is notable for having worked side-by-side with a large civilian operation. The military component of ONUC, however, was involved in supporting and sometimes carrying out tasks at the request of the Chief of Civilian Operations.

For example, the UN soldiers helped in the relocation of refugees and provided medical and humanitarian assistance to civilians. The headquarters hospital of the peacekeeping force and its field clinics were made available to the general population. The peacekeepers shipped food and medicine to the famine-stricken Kasai province and to other areas when the need arose.

Furthermore, ONUC helped to maintain law and order in the Congo. The force undertook joint patrols with the local police and, in areas where they no longer operated, carried out the full security duties of the Congolese authorities. Though one of the most controversial peacekeeping operations in UN history, the protection of countless civilians from the effects of political strife and tribal warfare was one of the significant successes of ONUC.⁵

ONUC: Civilian Operations

An important part of ONUC was *Civilian Operations*, which was directed and executed by civilians and was separate from the military component. It was charged with leading the relief and civil reconstruction operation in the Congo, and remained after the military peacekeeping forces had left.

A large civilian operation was necessary because of the widespread internal disorder caused by the intra-state conflict. The situation was exacerbated by the flight from the country of Belgian citizens, virtually emptying the Congo of its technical workers and professional class and causing an almost complete breakdown in public services.

In response, the Secretary-General convened a Consultative Group consisting of senior officials of the UN's specialized agencies to determine the requirements for public service restoration in the Congo. Reporting to the Chief of Civilian Operations, who had status equal to the ONUC Force Commander, the long-term task for this group was to advise the Congolese government on social and economic programmes and planning, and to help train Congolese replacements to fill those positions abandoned by the Belgians.

Civilian Operations became involved in every facet of public life in the Congo and drew on a wide variety of UN and other agencies for expertise. In the area of transportation, for instance, a team of engineers was recruited to reopen the country's most important port at Matadi. The Leopold docks and the railroads to the interior were also reopened by ONUC. The International Civil Aviation Organization sent a team of experts to restore civilian air traffic and maintain air safety. Meteorologists from the World Meteorological Organization helped train control tower personnel, and telecommunications were restored and maintained by technicians supplied by the International Telecommunications Union.

Relief operations were conducted by the Food and Agricultural Organization and UNICEF. The World Health Organization and the Red Cross sent teams of doctors and nurses to restore and run medical services. ONUC provided scholarships for local students to study abroad and provided six professors and a technician to the medical school in Leopoldville.

In agriculture, Congolese were trained to run farm machinery, and a Veterinary College in Kivu province was reopened. In education, ONUC improved and conducted training programmes for teachers. In 1961, UNESCO, through ONUC, provided the entire staff at a teachers college. To help rebuild the public service, ONUC assisted in setting up a new Ministry of Public Services and provided training courses for senior public servants. It also provided scholarship assistance to the national School of Law and Administration. In all, some 2,000 experts were employed by Civilian Operations.

THE CYPRUS EXPERIENCE

The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established in March 1964, following the outbreak in December 1963 of widespread intercommunal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As part of their mandate, the peacekeepers were expected to prevent further outbreaks of violence and assist in the restoration of normal conditions by helping to re-establish and maintain law and order.

Twenty-seven years later, UNFICYP continues to operate in Cyprus. It has been extensively involved in providing humanitarian relief to the local population and has assisted in repairing and maintaining the social fabric of Cyprus, largely through supporting the efforts of UN specialized agencies or organs such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and international humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

UNFICYP has also been dedicated to ensuring that the population in the peacekeeping zone can function day-to-day. Personnel from UNFICYP act as military escorts and

observers so that agricultural owners can work their land in territory occupied by the other side. They negotiate the restoration of public services and ensure that they operate efficiently, and establish clinics and stock them with medical supplies.

UNFICYP: Operation Economics and Civilian Police

The UNFICYP operation has both a civilian Special Representative and a Military Force Commander. The aforementioned social service activities of the military forces have been organized largely under the Operation Economics department of UNFICYP, which, after the outbreak of fighting in 1974, expanded to encompass relief activities.

In 1974, the Secretary-General appointed the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Coordinator of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus. Under his auspices organizations such as the ICRC, UNHCR and the United Nations Development Programme organized relief activities that UNFICYP assisted.

The intra-state nature of the Cyprus conflict suggested a police component (UNCIVPOL) for UNFICYP, to help maintain law and order, safeguard civil rights, and establish a balance between, and communicate with, both Greek and Turkish Cypriot police forces. UNCIVPOL became active in April 1964 with a broad range of internal security duties, including liaison with the Cypriot police, and investigating incidents involving Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Like the military force, UNCIVPOL is composed of multinational detachments. They do not carry weapons and have no powers of arrest. Still, they have been useful in negotiating the release of hostages, investigating criminal cases, and ensuring against the maltreatment of individuals.

NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN OTHER UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

United Nations Good Offices Missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)

As part of its mandate, the UN mission sent to Afghanistan in 1988 was to work with the UNHCR to monitor the return of refugees to that country. Because of continued fighting, this was done only to a limited extent.

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

Deployed to southern Lebanon in 1978, UNIFIL organized the delivery of non-military supplies — food, water, and medicine — to those in need. It has also been extensively involved in humanitarian relief and economic activities. This has included everything from repairing roads and buildings to the carrying out of a vaccination

campaign for Lebanese children. In this effort, UNIFIL worked with agencies such as UNICEF, ICRC, and the Coordinator of UN Assistance for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon.

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

Deployed as a buffer force between Israel and Syria following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, UNDOF has engaged in a plethora of humanitarian activities including the delivery of parcels and mail, and arranging periodic reunions of Druze families living on different sides of the buffer zone.

First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)

Stationed in the Gaza Strip from 1957 to 1967, UNEF I briefly took responsibility for civic affairs there while Israeli forces withdrew and until Egyptian civilian authority could be re-established. The Force worked closely with the United Nations Relief Works Agency.

Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)

Established following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the peacekeeping force stationed in the Suez Canal zone and the Sinai Peninsula engaged in humanitarian activities in collaboration with the ICRC and provided facilities for family reunions and student exchanges.

CIVILIAN PEACEKEEPERS

UNTEA/UNSF

The UN peacekeeping operation in West New Guinea took place from October 1962 to May 1963. UNTEA acted as the interim administration of that territory until authority was transferred from the Netherlands to Indonesia on 1 May 1963. The United Nations Security Force (UNSF) was the military complement to UNTEA, charged with maintaining peace and security in the region during the transfer period.

At the time, the operation in West New Guinea was unique in that, though it had a military complement, the thrust of UNTEA was civilian. It depended on an international team from a wide variety of professions — engineers, industrialists, technicians, forestry experts, and health advisers — who were recruited to take over from the Dutch the top administrative posts in government and public service during the transfer period.

The agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia on the transfer of West New Guinea provided the mandate for UNTEA. Along with full administrative authority, the agreement gave UNTEA the power to appoint government officials and members of representative councils, the right

to legislate for the territory (within certain parameters), and the duty to uphold civil liberties and property rights.

The biggest economic problem during the transfer period was unemployment. UNTEA concentrated on reactivating existing work projects and starting new ones. Some forty-five work projects were completed and thirty-two others were underway by the end of the UN temporary administration.

In the judicial sphere, departed Dutch personnel were replaced by qualified Indonesians following a UNTEA recruitment campaign. Civilian police were also used in this operation. Prior to the establishment of UNTEA, most of the rank and file of the territory's police establishment were Papuan but the officer corps was mostly Dutch. With the arrival of UNTEA, the officer corps left and was replaced by UN civilian police officers under a British Chief of Police. By May 1963, these officers had been replaced by Indonesians.

CIVILIAN PEACEKEEPING IN NAMIBIA

Another ground-breaking peacekeeping operation was the 1989 United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia. It has been said that UNTAG was not peacekeeping in the normal sense of the term.⁶ This may be true. But it is also true that the nature of peacekeeping, and how we think about it has begun to change, given the end of the Cold War and the opportunities this presents for the peaceful resolution of civil wars. An operation similar to UNTAG (and containing elements similar to UNTEA) has begun in the Western Sahara. On the horizon are analogous operations in Angola, Cambodia and El Salvador. It is timely, then, to examine the UNTAG operation in especial detail.

THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL AND UN RESOLUTION 435

The history of the Namibia problem dates back more than seventy years, to 1920, when the League of Nations conferred on South Africa the mandate for South-West Africa (Namibia). That mandate was revoked in 1966 by General Assembly resolution. South Africa refused to abide by this resolution, however, and resisted similar declarations and rulings by the Security Council in 1970 and the International Court of Justice in 1971. (In its ruling, the Court reaffirmed the direct responsibility of the UN to bring about Namibian independence.)

International pressure on South Africa continued thereafter. The UN and the Western Contact Group — Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain and the United States — explored separately with a reluctant South Africa, the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), and the frontline states (Angola, Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia) a means for ending South African

rule in the territory. These negotiations focussed on how to implement UN resolution 385 of 1976, which called for UN supervised elections in Namibia leading to complete independence.

The result was the Settlement Plan of 1978, which outlined a formula for the transition to independence of Namibia. The Settlement Plan, accompanied by a detailed report on how it would be implemented and an explanatory statement on the role of UNTAG, was adopted by the Security Council on 29 August 1978 as resolution 435.

Though both SWAPO and South Africa accepted the UN plan for Namibian independence, it took more than ten years, considerable modification, and a change in political circumstances before the plan was put into action.⁷ In broad outline, it allowed South Africa to administer the election process under supervision of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNTAG.

UNTAG'S ROLE

The purpose of UNTAG, which began operation on 1 April 1989, was to create the conditions for the free and fair election of a Constituent Assembly in Namibia. UNTAG had both a military and civilian component. The military was responsible for the surveillance of the Angola-Namibia and South Africa-Namibia border, and for monitoring: the confinement to bases in Angola of SWAPO, the phased withdrawal and confinement to bases of the South Africa Defence Forces (SADF), a ceasefire between SWAPO and SADF, and the conduct of the South African controlled South-West Africa Territorial Forces (SWATF).

The civilian component of UNTAG was charged with overseeing and supervising the voter registration and election process, supporting the UNHCR in the repatriation of refugees in time for them to vote, monitoring the conduct of the South-West Africa Police (SWAPOL), supervising the repeal of all discriminatory laws, ensuring the release of political prisoners and detainees held by South Africa or SWAPO, and, most importantly, certifying that the elections were free and fair.

Not including the administrative component, the civilian aspect of UNTAG consisted of five divisions: i) The Office of the Special Representative; ii) The Civilian Police; iii) The Electoral Division; iv) The Office of the UNHCR;⁸ and, v) The International Jurist.

THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

UN Special Representative (SR) Martii Ahtisaari was in charge of implementing the settlement plan and certifying that the elections in Namibia were "free and fair." Because South Africa, through Administrator-General (AG) Louis Pienaar, continued to administer the territory — and the election — during the transition period, the role of the SR

was limited to a supervisory and advisory capacity. He was, however, responsible for overseeing every step and aspect of the election process and for monitoring the conduct of the AG. The twofold power of the SR stemmed from his authority to suspend the entire process at any stage should he determine that it did not meet with UN standards, and his ultimate responsibility for certifying or nullifying the election result.

The AG was formally committed to cooperating with the SR, but in reality was responsible only to Pretoria for his actions. This arrangement demanded constant and skilful negotiating by the SR. One observer described the week-to-week bargaining this entailed as "mind-boggling." For example, working groups composed of AG and SR staff members met daily to haggle over the details of various proposed laws. When they reached agreement, the proposal was submitted to the AG and SR for their approval. Only after this process was the law promulgated.

Riding herd over the office of the AG was perhaps the most important of the SR's jobs. Nowhere was this more critical and significant than in the modifications made at Ahtisaari's insistence to the AG's original version of both the voter registration law and the electoral law.

When initially promulgated by the AG, these laws were severely criticized as unfair by both independent observers and the SR. Consequently, Ahtisaari negotiated important changes in them. Concerning voter registration, he wrung concessions from the AG that included the presence of UNTAG personnel at registration points, joint investigation of registration irregularities by UNTAG and the office of the AG, and a dual lock system — one controlled by UNTAG, one by the AG — on the vault holding the registration forms.

Changes to the electoral law suggested by the SR included simplifying the process for verifying registered voters, excluding voter registration numbers from ballot envelopes, and counting ballots locally not centrally.

Violence and voter intimidation were reduced following an SR-negotiated "Code of Conduct" agreed by all the political parties. Finally, the SR minimized the influence that the AG sought over the determination and functioning of the Constituent Assembly.

Other duties of the SR included coordination of, and liaison with, all UNTAG departments. His office dealt with all the political parties running for election, the local community and interest groups, and with the various governmental and non-governmental observer missions.

CIVILIAN POLICE

The role of UNTAG civilian police (CIVPOL) was probably the most important and prominent which police have

played in UN peacekeeping history. A disproportionate share of the responsibility for ensuring that the elections were free and fair rested on their shoulders. CIVPOL's job was to reduce to a minimum the level of violence and intimidation by partisan groups in Namibia.

To this end, CIVPOL monitored SWAPOL to see that it carried out its law and order responsibilities in a professional and non-partisan manner. This entailed observing SWAPOL in every aspect of their duties, from accompanying them on patrols to observing their investigations. It was especially important to monitor SWAPOL at political rallies and during the voter registration and election processes. To ensure a vote that was free from intimidation at election time, 1,023 UNTAG police monitors were assigned to electoral duties, meaning that a CIVPOL representative was present at every polling station.

CIVPOL was severely handicapped in its task, however. Originally, UNTAG made provision for only 500 police to monitor the activities of 6,000 AG-controlled SWAPOL. The level of intimidation and violence by SWAPOL being what it was, the number of civilian police assigned to UNTAG was doubled by the end of August 1989 and tripled in the run-up to the election.

CIVPOL was headed by a police commissioner who consulted with the SR's office on all police-related matters. He was responsible for the organization, deployment, and operations of CIVPOL.

Namibia was divided into two CIVPOL districts, each with their own regional coordinator. With the expansion of the force, the number of districts was likewise expanded to seven. Forty-nine CIVPOL stations were established throughout Namibia, but the north, where the level of tension and intimidation was highest, was the main area of concentration.

Like previous civilian police operations, CIVPOL was unarmed. Its personnel had no power of arrest, nor were they allowed to investigate crimes or complaints. All they could do was observe and report.

The most difficult problem for CIVPOL was the continued presence of Koevoet, the ruthless para-military unit set up by South Africa to root out SWAPO elements in Namibia. Though this organization was ostensibly disbanded prior to 1 April 1989, many of its members — 1,200 to 1,500 — were absorbed into SWAPOL. They continued to roam the country and intimidate SWAPO supporters, especially in the north. It was only in September and October, after the numbers of CIVPOL were increased, and, following countless entreaties from the SR and the UN Secretary-General, that Koevoet was purged from the ranks of SWAPOL, and CIVPOL was able to contain the situation.

Though CIVPOL was never entirely able to eradicate violence and intimidation during the transition period, a measure of its success is that 97% of registered voters felt confident enough to vote during the 7-11 November election period, and did so in a relatively violence-free atmosphere.

THE ELECTORAL DIVISION

The main task of the electoral division was to supervise both the voter registration and electoral process. It assisted the SR in his negotiations with the AG over the promulgation of the electoral laws and the manner in which they were implemented.

Those persons wishing to register to vote had to present photo identification or documents issued by UNHCR. Approximately 175 registration points were established, thirty-six permanent, thirty-five temporary, and more than 100 mobile. Ninety-nine per cent of those eligible, registered to vote.

An UNTAG election official was present at each registration point. The registration law stipulated that the UNTAG official would have final say on whether an application for registration should be rejected. A central voters register was compiled and supervised by an UNTAG computer expert, who made the list available to all parties on a weekly basis.

The election, though administered by the AG, was conducted under the constant scrutiny of UNTAG. Three hundred and fifty-eight polls were established, supervised by more than 1,700 mostly civilian UNTAG personnel and CIVPOL. For election purposes, the territory was divided into twenty-three electoral areas each with an UNTAG district supervisor. After the electoral law was promulgated, on 6 October, UNTAG helped to train election personnel and participated in a voter education campaign.

Following the vote on 13 November, ballots were counted at the twenty-three election centres and at Windhoek, all under the unwavering supervision of UNTAG.

OFFICE OF THE UNHCR

An integral, if functionally distinct part of the UNTAG operation was the UNHCR-run programme for the return to Namibia of exiles and refugees in time to vote. This undertaking was financed separately from UNTAG and administered entirely by UNHCR, but fell under the overall political structure of UNTAG.

UNHCR set up three land and three air entry points and five reception centres, mostly in north and central Namibia, to handle the refugees and exiles coming chiefly from Angola and Zambia. More than 40,000 people were

resettled by the end of August, some reporting that SWAPO still held political detainees in camps in Angola and Zambia. These reports prompted the SR to set up a UN Mission on Detainees consisting of officials from the UNHCR, the Office of the SR, UNTAG, and including the International Jurist.

A number of other UN agencies and programmes assisted in the repatriation programme, including the World Health Organization, UNICEF, UNESCO, the World Food Programme, and the Food and Agricultural Organization. Acting as implementing partner to the UNHCR was the Council of Churches of Namibia.

THE INTERNATIONAL JURIST

The Settlement Proposal of 1978 stipulated amnesty for Namibian exiles as a prerequisite of repatriation. The position of International Jurist (IJ) was set up specifically to advise on any disputes over amnesty of political prisoners or detainees.

In the case of the reported SWAPO detainees, the IJ acted as part of the mission that visited various camps in Zambia and Angola and found no evidence that SWAPO continued to hold detainees. By April 1990 the IJ mission managed to account for all but 211 of some 1,100 people who had allegedly been detained.

The IJ advised upon twenty-five cases of political prisoners held by South Africa, and determined that all were entitled to amnesty. His advice was accepted by the AG and the prisoners were duly released.

CONCLUSION

In the years to come, the United Nations will be mounting more peacekeeping operations that are analogous to the military/civilian mission undertaken in Namibia in 1989. One need only point to the plans being formulated for the settlements of conflicts in Cambodia, Angola, El Salvador, and the Western Sahara, to see evidence of this trend.

Peacekeeping, then, will no longer be identified as an exclusively military operation. In a very real sense this perception of peacekeeping has always been a misperception — or at least a misrepresentation. Civilians, from the Secretary-General on down, have traditionally played an important role in the political, legal, and administrative aspects of peacekeeping operations. In some cases, such as West Irian and Namibia, civilians have played an important, indeed, critical part in fulfilling the mandate of the peacekeeping operation.

But whereas in the past these types of operations were atypical, it is likely that in the future, peacekeeping will involve more often an active civilian component.

For this reason, Marrack Goulding, UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, has speculated that it is perhaps time to think about redefining the technical term “peacekeeping.” Goulding posits that peacekeeping is evolving from a species into a genus that embraces three different species. These are the following: classical military peacekeeping operations; large composite operations, such as in Namibia; and, *perhaps*, field operations without a military component.⁹

F.T. Liu has distinguished between traditional military peacekeeping operations and what he calls, “multi-dimensional” operations.¹⁰ In the latter category he includes UN operations in the Congo, West Irian, Cyprus, and Namibia — all of which involved civilians who performed essential political, technical, or humanitarian tasks.

Liu argues further that the innovative nature of the UNTAG operation in Namibia will serve as a precedent for the expanded use of civilians in peacekeeping. Moreover, the civilian functions of monitoring and supervising elections are likely to expand — specifically in the Western Sahara and Cambodia — to include responsibility for *organizing* elections.

While the use of civilian police, election organizing/monitoring, and territorial administration, or some combination of the above, seems to be the probable nature of multi-dimensional or composite peacekeeping operations in the immediate future, there are also other peacekeeping possibilities in which civilians or civilian agencies might play a larger role.

Thomas Weiss, Indarjit Rikhye, and Aage Eknes, among other commentators, have speculated upon the use of military peacekeeping troops in securing the delivery of humanitarian aid (again, the UN operation in the Congo comes to mind).¹¹ Rikhye reminds us that while several UN agencies are involved in refugee relief, none has a built-in security component. Yet, the need to provide security for humanitarian assistance in places such as the Horn of Africa is painfully obvious.

Weiss echoes the thoughts of Rikhye, saying that the use of peacekeeping troops could prove useful in the “contemporary world as part of a more comprehensive international response to humanitarian crises.” Eknes, flipping the coin, argues that the attachment of civilian humanitarian relief units to peacekeeping forces can help to strengthen the link between peacekeepers and the population.

The case for future civilian involvement in peacekeeping, then, is threefold. First, the complexity of the settlement arrangements that the UN will be asked to carry out in the future in order to resolve equally complex conflict situations, will make the use of civilians not only welcome but unavoidable.

Second, the need for the UN to be innovative in its use of peacekeepers will require the employment of civilians disposing of a wide variety of skills.

Third, for those countries hesitant to be involved in the military aspects of peacekeeping, the use of civilians can open the way for their participation in future operations. For example, in Namibia the then Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland were able to contribute, respectively, a civilian maintenance unit and a civilian medical element to UNTAG.

That the UN has already been seized with the issue of civilians in peacekeeping is evidenced by the "Report of the Secretary General" of 18 September 1990. In that report Mr. de Cuellar addressed the issue of the use of civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations such as UNTAG. But he also examined how far the functions that have traditionally been performed by military personnel — logistics, technical and supply-support — could instead be performed by civilians. He concluded that when it was cost-effective to do so, civilians could and should be used to fulfil these duties.

NOTES

- 1 Non-military tasks refers to those activities carried out by troops that are not normally considered intrinsic to the soldier's profession and that under normal circumstances would be undertaken by a civilian.
- 2 It is important to note that the administration, organization, and command and control of each peacekeeping operation may vary according to the mandate and nature of that operation. Therefore the comments in this section are general and may not apply to each specific operation.
- 3 International Peace Academy, *Peacekeeper's Handbook*, Pergamon Press, New York, 1984, p. 31.
- 4 I am grateful to Col. Michael Houghton, Director of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of National Defence, for this observation.
- 5 F.T. Liu, "The Significance of Past Peacekeeping Operations in Africa to Humanitarian Relief," in: Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help in Africa*, The MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1990, p. 25.
- 6 Chester A. Crocker, "Southern African Peace-making," *Survival*, May-June 1990, p. 222.
- 7 For background on the political/diplomatic maneuvering that led to the Settlement Plan implementation agreement see: Robert S. Jaster, "The 1988 Peace

Accords and the Future of South-western Africa," *Adelphi Paper* No. 253 (Autumn 1990); Fen Osler Hampson, "The Superpowers and Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa," in: Institute for International Studies, Brown University, *Superpowers and Regional Conflict in a Post-Cold War World: The Caribbean Basin and Southern Africa*, Occasional Paper No. 4., 1990; and, Chester A. Crocker, *op. cit.*

- 8 The UNHCR repatriation programme was not formally a part of UNTAG. It was conducted separately, though under UNTAG auspices, in fulfilment of the Settlement Plan for Namibia.
- 9 Murrack Goulding, "Statement Delivered to the DPI/IPS Symposium on The Changing Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peace-Keeping," (Edited transcript), Singapore, 13 March 1991, p. 3.
- 10 F.T. Liu, "The Role of Civilians in Various Types of UN Peacekeeping Operations," (Unpublished paper), 10 April 1991.
- 11 See: Thomas G. Weiss, *op. cit.*; Indarjit Rikhye, "The Future of Peacekeeping," *Occasional Papers on Peacekeeping* No. 2, International Peace Academy, New York, 1989; Aage Eknes, "Revitalizing Peacekeeping. Old Constraints, New Challenges," *NUPI Notat* No. 407, August 1989; and Robin Hay, "Humanitarian Ceasefires: An Examination of Their Potential Contribution to the Resolution of Conflict," *Working Paper* No. 28, CIIPS, Ottawa, July 1990.

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