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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CHEMICAL WEAPONS — FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1986 SESSION



PV

COMPILED AND EDITED BY:

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA, CANADA

JUNE 1987



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
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This volume is a compilation of the final records (PVs) of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1986 session relating to Chemical Weapons. It has been compiled and edited to facilitate discussion and research on this issue.



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
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(The President)

It was also of very great significance that the President and the General Secretary declared, on 21 November 1985, that they favour a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They stated that "they agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter". In this context, they stated that they had agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on such a chemical weapons ban, including discussions on the question of verification.

The only place within the world community in which a full-scale and serious effort is being made towards the negotiation of a universal chemical weapons convention is in this Conference. There is perhaps no more lively and positive instance of the relationship between what must be done bilaterally and what must be done multilaterally than the subject of chemical weapons. Simply, a bilateral agreement or some other form of agreement limited to a number of States or a region of the world on the issue of chemical weapons would be of very little value. What is required with regard to those abhorrent weapons is a universal convention. For this purpose all must participate and no one should look for a partial or limited solution.

It is appropriate at this point to note that during the past seven years, although substantial and significant political negotiations have taken place within this Conference, there have been few concrete results in terms of practical progress towards disarmament agreements. We all have a vital interest in changing this situation and there is no area more likely to fulfil that vital interest, in the short term, than the area of chemical weapons. It is the Australian Government's earnest hope that in this eighth year of the Conference, real progress on a universal chemical weapons convention will be made. Every passing day makes more urgent the need to conclude this convention.

(Mr. Komatina, Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations)

The complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons has been, for a number of years, the most productive area of negotiation within the Conference on Disarmament. Given the work already done in elaborating a Convention and the summit commitment of the two major Powers to accelerate agreement on a comprehensive ban on these weapons, it seems reasonable to expect that the remaining obstacles can be overcome during 1986. Indeed, I would hope that the multilateral negotiating process may regain a momentum which will lead to progress on many outstanding issues.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

An important place in the statement of Mikhail S. Gorbachev was devoted to the problem of the prohibition and complete elimination of chemical weapons, including the elimination of the industrial base for their production. These provisions are directly relevant to the negotiations being conducted within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

Last year the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons advanced in a slow but steady fashion. The 40 pages of CD/636, making up the present draft for a Convention, are no small achievement and speak for themselves.

The process of defining and listing relevant chemicals is now well under way, after having been dead-locked for some time. This work is fundamental to the continued elaboration of several other parts of the Convention. It should therefore be actively pursued during the 1986 session. The question of identifying chemical weapons production facilities as well as measures for their elimination is another area usefully dealt with during the last months. A substantial amount of work remains, however. There are certain prospects for further progress this year.

Other issues which necessitate major efforts during 1986 are the elaboration of principles for the elimination of existing stocks of chemical weapons, as well as régimes to ensure that new chemical weapons do not emerge within the framework of the chemical industry. Last, but not least agreements must be reached on the principles, procedures and organization for ensuring all States parties that the forthcoming Convention is being complied with in all aspects.

A certain momentum has been created in the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention. This was confirmed when the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union met here in Geneva a few months ago. The role and the

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

responsibility of the major Powers in the Conference on Disarmament are crucial to the successful conclusion of a Convention. Their concerns and approaches to the issues involved cannot be overlooked. Direct talks between the United States and the Soviet Union have proved useful in the past. Such contacts could and should reinforce and speed up the negotiating process.

Chemical weapons are, however, at least theoretically, accessible to all States, should they choose to acquire them. Furthermore, all States are potential victims of the use of such weapons. Consequently, the future Convention must be elaborated in such a way that the concerns and interests of States from all parts of the world are met. This can only be done in a multilateral context. All members of the Conference on Disarmament should therefore make full use of this multilateral negotiating forum.

There are other initiatives, outside the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, which are intended as steps towards ridding the world of chemical weapons. Certain statements indicate that efforts are under way to prevent the spread of chemical weapons. The proposal to create a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe is another initiative, which is important from a political point of view.

Sweden is strongly in favour of all efforts that can diminish the threat of chemical weapons in Europe as well as in other parts of the world. At the same time we remain convinced that the most effective way of achieving this is through a comprehensive convention like that being negotiated in this forum. Geographically or otherwise limited initiatives should not become alternative solutions, but should be pursued in such a manner that they support and strengthen the multilateral negotiations of a comprehensive convention. Enough substantial and preparatory work has already been done for such a convention to be feasible within a reasonably near future. No additional measures would then be needed.

In order to further the negotiations, all countries producing or considering producing chemical weapons -- binary or others -- should refrain from such production during the negotiations on a convention. Disarmament can never be furthered through increased armaments.

(Mr. Lechuga, Cuba)

Another question that is sufficiently ripe for the negotiations to be concluded successfully is the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiled in the various arsenals. Again, there is no reason to extend the negotiations beyond what is necessary, as has been happening. It would be unforgivable to let slip the impetus that now seems to exist and fail to take advantage of this moment to meet yet another aspiration of mankind, which is the elimination of such horrifying weapons. In this connection, the recent Soviet initiative contains a positive factor which opens up the way for concluding the treaty, and it is the question of verification, namely, the proposal for strict control, including on-site inspections. There is no reason not to make rapid headway in the negotiations.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will continue its work without undue delay. It should build further on what was achieved last year and in January of this year under the chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland. We note with satisfaction that the atmosphere in the Committee recently improved substantially. This, together with the opening of the bilateral Soviet-American consultations last week, gives us a good negotiating pattern wherein multilateral and bilateral efforts could mutually complement each other. Thus, all constructive proposals could be made use of and lead towards the solution of the remaining problems outstanding.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is, in fact, the only working body of the Conference negotiating on a specific problem of disarmament. It has been working hard during the recent years on the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention and we may say that all delegations are paying special attention to its work. Let us hope that the activity of this Committee would serve us as an example of how we should organize our work also on other priority items. Otherwise, the Conference on Disarmament could soon be associated merely with the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. And we would like to believe that this organ of multilateral negotiations on disarmament would eventually be in a position, and why not this year already, to address other urgent problems too.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

As in recent years, the negotiation of a verifiable, comprehensive ban on chemical weapons is a priority item on our agenda. Modest but detectable progress was made on this item during the 1985 session but there is still cause for disappointment in spite of the strenuous efforts of our friend and colleague, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Known instances of recent chemical weapons use should add to our collective sense of urgency to attain the earliest possible conclusion of such a ban. We note with particular attention the affirmation by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in their Joint Statement of their intent to "accelerate their efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention" as well as their intention to "initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons."

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

As others have pointed out, and indeed my delegation has in the past, it will be of limited utility if we get an effective bilateral convention which is not a comprehensive convention in both senses in extending to all the main issues under negotiation and comprising a genuine non-proliferation convention. It is our understanding that this latter initiative is not intended in any way to divert efforts from the priority need to conclude a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, so too with respect to the statement contained in the proposals most recently made by General Secretary Gorbachev raising the possibility of "certain interim steps," possibly involving multilateral agreement on matters relating to the non-transfer of chemical weapons.

Despite the considerable progress which has been made, there remain several difficult issues to be resolved if a chemical weapons ban is to be concluded. Among these, the verification provisions of the treaty will require especially serious and dispassionate effort if agreement is to be achieved. It will be recalled that in April 1984, almost two years ago, the Vice-President of the United States of America tabled in this forum a draft treaty text which is the most comprehensive proposal yet before us, setting out in detail the kind of verification régime his Government prefers and would regard as adequate. Canada has indicated its readiness in principle to accept and apply the kinds of verification provisions contained in the United States text. However, while there has been much criticism of these proposals, no delegation has thus far come forward with concrete, substantive alternative proposals which would delineate with clarity the area of common ground and the areas of disagreement, thus providing a basis for serious negotiation with a view to arriving at verification provisions which would be acceptable to all.

The Canadian Government noted, and welcomed, the reaffirmation by the United States spokesman in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 31 October 1985 that "No imbalance in inspection obligations is either desired, intended or contained in any provisions of the United States draft convention banning chemical weapons." The Canadian Government has also noted with particular care and interest the recent statement by General Secretary Gorbachev that, with reference to declarations of the location of chemical weapons production facilities, the cessation of production, the destruction of production facilities and the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, "All these measures would be carried out under strict control including international on-site inspections." We are greatly encouraged by this statement. We hope that during the present session of this Conference the delegation of the USSR will be in a position to further elaborate on its particular meaning. The task of seriously negotiating effective, operable and politically acceptable verification provisions for a chemical weapons treaty will be difficult and time-consuming. However, it should not be postponed any longer.

During the session, the Canadian delegation intends to continue to make substantive inputs to the negotiation of a chemical weapons ban. We will be submitting a HANDBOOK FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. The Handbook identifies procedures, equipment and standard formats which could go a long way toward ensuring that the findings of an investigation of alleged chemical weapons use would be as conclusive, convincing and impartial as possible. It reflects Canadian experience and expertise and our longstanding interest in various aspects of verification.

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(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

It should be of particular value in relation to the provisions of a chemical weapons treaty dealing with a verifiable ban on chemical weapons use, as is being negotiated in this forum. We will also be submitting a technical working paper dealing with identification of chemical substances. We will also be making available to all delegations through the Secretariat a compendium of all chemical weapons documentation of this Conference during the period 1983-1985.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

Bulgaria has always held the view that all States, be they nuclear or non-nuclear, big or small, aligned or non-aligned, developed or developing, can and should make their contribution to the efforts to reduce the military threat and strengthen international peace and security. We attach great importance to the initiatives aimed at fostering a climate of mutual understanding and confidence in the Balkans, at consolidating good-neighbourly relations in our region. For some years now, Bulgaria, together with other Balkan countries, has been working to turn the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Most recently, on 23 December 1985, the Heads of State of Bulgaria and Romania -- Todor Zhivkov and Nicolae Ceauşescu -- came out, in a Joint Declaration, with a new initiative: to transform the Balkans into a zone free of chemical weapons. In this Declaration-Appeal to the leaders of the Balkan countries, circulated as document CD/648, they proposed to start without delay negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement among the Balkan countries to prohibit testing, production, acquisition and storage of any type of chemical weapons on their respective territories. We believe that the implementation of this proposal, as an interim measure, would provide an impetus to freeing the whole of Europe of a category of extremely dangerous weapons, and would contribute to the successful conclusion of a convention to prohibit and eliminate chemical weapons -- an important task of a global nature.

The same is valid also for the initiative of the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia aimed at the establishment of a CW-free zone in Central Europe, which the Bulgarian Government wholeheartedly supports.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

My delegation agrees with the Soviet assessment that negotiations for a convention banning chemical weapons have been unreasonably protracted and need to be intensified. My Government continues to adhere to the objective of a convention comprehensively prohibiting chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of their stockpiles, production facilities and delivery systems. We fear that bringing partial measures for discussion in the Conference on Disarmament will divert attention away from the main goal. Moreover, such measures may erode the political will to attain the agreed objective of total elimination of chemical weapons. An arrangement for non-transfer of chemical weapons and their non-deployment in other States or any other similar interim measure should best be negotiated and concluded among the chemical-weapon States themselves without involving the Conference on Disarmament or non-chemical-weapon States. This would allow the Conference to continue to concentrate its efforts on the objective of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland):

I have the pleasure to submit today to the Conference the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 13-31 January 1986, contained in document CD/651, which was adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee at its meeting on 31 January.

During this period, the Ad Hoc Committee, in accordance with its mandate and the decision on a resumed session taken by the Conference on Disarmament at its 333rd plenary meeting, held on 27 August 1985, continued to work on further elaboration of the Convention.

Without going into details and repeating the content of the report, I would like to characterize briefly its main features and to shed some light on the work preceding its preparation and adoption by the Committee.

As is known, in preparation for a resumed session I held informal consultations here in Geneva in October 1985 and prior to resuming the Committee's session in January. These consultations were carried out on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis; they had a somewhat structured form but retained a necessary degree of flexibility. It has to be said with all frankness that without these consultations it would have been hardly possible to present to the Conference the report in its present form.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Hard and devoted work by delegations taking part in all stages of consultations, but especially the extremely important contribution of technical experts, produced a solid backbone for our work in January.

I would like to take this opportunity to express before the Conference my deepest gratitude to all those who took part in the preparatory work of the resumed session.

At the beginning of the session, the Committee accepted the Chairman's proposal, based on the work done during the consultations, to consider the following three issues:

(a) Article II (Definitions and Criteria), point 4, in the context of Article VI (Permitted Activities);

(b) Article II (Definitions and Criteria), point 5, in the context of Article V (Measures on Chemical Weapons Production Facilities);

(c) Article IX (Consultation, Co-operation and Fact-Finding).

The report duly reflects the Committee's work, which resulted in further clarification or development of the issues involved..

With regard to the first issue, work was undertaken on further refining the three criteria characterizing key precursors, on defining especially dangerous key precursors or key components for chemical weapons systems and on identifying chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical-weapons purposes.

An endeavour was made to compile lists of these groups of chemicals. The progress achieved in this area is a result of lasting, patient efforts and a compromise approach by all the delegations involved. It is reflected in the annex to this report, entitled "Integrated Approach for Listing Relevant Chemicals", which is, of course, at its preliminary stage, and hence subject to development and revision.

The work on the issue of chemical weapons production facilities was more of an exploratory nature. Its purpose was a gradual identification of kinds of production facilities or parts of facilities, which should, for the purposes of the Convention, be included in the definition of a "chemical weapons production facility". Both the method which was applied and the level of clarification and identification achieved are extensively described in the report.

Still another method of work was used with regard to Article IX. A broad discussion took place, allowing delegations to explain their approaches and relevant aspects of their positions on fact-finding and a system of on-challenge verification.

In the course of discussions, a number of approaches, as well as a number of areas deserving more thorough consideration in the future, were identified, as reflected in the report.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

In the final paragraph of the report, the Committee emphasizes that the report should be considered together with the Committee's report on its 1985 session and should equally be utilized in further elaboration of the Convention. In other words, the Committee should make good use of the results achieved and continue its work toward setting up régimes with regard to the listed chemicals and defining chemical weapons production facilities -- thus enabling more concrete work to be done on their elimination -- and, finally, working out mutually acceptable and efficient fact-finding and on-challenge verification procedures.

These three areas are of basic importance for the overall possibilities of further progress in our work on the Convention.

The negotiations on the chemical-weapons ban have reached a very important stage, I would say -- a kind of turning point and, at the same time, a point of dilemma. Turning point because we will have to rely more and more on precise and thorough technical expertise. We are all striving to speed up the process of drafting the Convention but, at the same time, we do not always have the manpower resources, especially on the technical level, necessary to sustain, when needed, simultaneous work on different issues. We will have to resolve this dilemma.

At the outset of the 1986 session I cannot but make another remark. The Ad Hoc Committee worked in January in an atmosphere which was more conducive to progress than that during the session of 1985. I think everybody can identify the background of this improvement.

The first and most important one is the Soviet-American agreement on the need to activate efforts towards achieving an effective and verifiable convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Another factor undoubtedly favourable to our work was the statement made on 15 January by the General Secretary of the CPSU containing new ideas with regard to chemical weapons. Moreover, the intensification of the efforts of the USSR and the United States is being matched by a similar attitude on the part of other members of the CD. Such harmonized action by all members of the CD could soon bring even more tangible results. It is a specific characteristic of this important multilateral forum that to achieve common goals we have to work together.

There is also another factor, maybe not a quite new one, but certainly more visible. That is the continuity of the negotiating process in the intersessional period. We had a period of very intensive consultations and an intensive and productive January session. This should encourage us to use more fully and effectively the intersessional period for negotiating and drafting.

I do strongly believe that this year's session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will bring more good will, more understanding for each other's positions, and more readiness to compromise which all together will add to a new spirit around the chemical-weapons negotiating table, thus leading to considerable progress in the preparation of the Convention banning chemical weapons.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

As this is my last statement in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I would like once again to express my deepest thanks, as I did in August, to all the delegates and experts, as well as the employees of the Secretariat, with whom I have had the pleasure to work. Mr P. Poptchev of Bulgaria, Mrs. E. Bonnier of Sweden and Mr. F. Elbe of the Federal Republic of Germany, who assisted me also during the resumed session deserve my special gratitude. They were tireless, skilfull and efficient in their efforts while guiding the work in the areas assigned to them.

I wish to thank personally Mr. A. Bensmail, the Secretary of the Committee, as well as his collaborators from the Secretariat. I was always able to count on their advice, assistance and support. And finally, let me thank those who work invisibly, but efficiently, and without whom our work would have been much more difficult, not to say impossible, the interpreters and translators.

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

My delegation will soon present its position on the fundamental issues on our agenda. Today I would like to make a few observations with reference to the report (contained in document CD/651) describing the activities of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons between the 1985 summer session and the 1986 spring session.

First of all, I should like to express my special thanks to Ambassador Turbanski, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, for the excellent job he has done. His comments and the report show itself how much has been achieved under his guidance in the way of speeding up negotiations on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and on the liquidation of the stockpiles of these dangerous arms. To continue the examination of unresolved problems and to start drafting has proved the right thing to do. If we can speak of a businesslike and constructive atmosphere today, we must attribute it first and foremost to the tolerant and human style the Committee's Chairman has cultivated in the performance of his duties.

Also, I wish to congratulate Mrs. Bonnier from the Swedish delegation, Comrade Poptchev from the Bulgarian delegation, Mr. Elbe from the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Mr. Wisnomoerti from the Indonesian delegation on the circumspection they displayed in their offices as co-ordinators of the working groups. I would also like to express my appreciation to Mr. Bensmail and his assistant, Mr. Cassandra, who performed their functions with great devotion and outstanding ability. Last but not least, our grateful thanks are due to Mrs. Johnston.

Through the concerted effort of many delegations, it was possible to add new elements to the positive results obtained back in the summer. We have managed to make headway on the road to the wording of a future Convention. What is more, it is obvious now in what direction we should be heading if we are to achieve further progress in drafting the convention.

I understand all delegations consider the integrated approach as the basis on which to determine key precursors of toxic chemicals, key components of chemical-weapon systems and chemicals that are produced in large commercial quantities and can be used for CW purposes. The approach allows the simultaneous identification of criteria governing the selection of chemicals and the listing of relevant substances. It will be important, however, to discuss these two elements in a balanced way.

In the past few weeks, the chances of arriving at a definition of production facilities have increased. Most delegations recognize that, due to the great variety of chemicals of relevance to chemical weapons, a discriminative approach to the different stages of production is needed. The last manufacturing stage plays a particularly important role. If we continue working along these lines, I see no reason why progress should not be possible in respect to production facilities.

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

As far as measures of compliance are concerned, my delegation expects the Conference to carry on the discussion of problems. With regard to the crucial on-site inspection issue, we are witnessing an honest desire on the part of numerous delegations to find a practicable and generally acceptable solution. The present situation, Mr. President, is undoubtedly propitious for expeditious work on a CW ban. I am convinced that the proposals which the Soviet Union made on 15 January will have a positive impact on what we are doing here. The statement of Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, exemplifies how serious his country is about translating the joint declaration issued at the Geneva summit into concrete action.

(The President)

I now turn to the second group of agenda items, that is, those on which the Conference has taken decisions or made recommendations and which, according to our consultations, are now ready for decision. With regard to the establishment of subsidiary bodies, I would now propose that we turn first to the establishment of a subsidiary body under item 4 of our agenda, Chemical weapons.

In that context, the Conference has before it document CD/WP.207, which is a draft decision on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Do I hear any objections or any statements before the adoption of this draft decision? I hear none. So the Conference has adopted the draft decision provided in CD/WP.207. 1/

It was so decided.

1/ (Also issued as CD/654). "The Conference on Disarmament, keeping in mind that the negotiation of a Convention should proceed with a view to its final elaboration at the earliest possible date, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolutions 39/65 C and 40/92 B, and in discharging its responsibility to conduct as a priority task the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and to ensure the preparation of the convention, decides to re-establish, in accordance with its rules of procedure, for the duration of its 1986 session, the Ad Hoc Committee to continue the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting, taking into account all existing proposals and drafts as well as future initiatives with a view to giving the Conference a possibility to achieve an agreement as soon as possible. This agreement, if possible, or a Report on the progress of the negotiations, should be recorded in the report which this Ad Hoc Committee will submit to the Conference at the end of the second part of its 1986 session.

"The Conference also decides to appoint Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Chairman of this Ad-Hoc Committee."

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

As I noted, the joint statement of 21 November also addressed the issue that clearly is of most urgency for the Conference on Disarmament at this time: a comprehensive and verifiable global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January also addressed the chemical weapons negotiations, and we look forward to the elaboration of his remarks by the delegation of the Soviet Union in the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It is important at this stage that the possibilities suggested by Mr. Gorbachev be translated into a clearer picture of Soviet views. We also seek a clear response to the detailed proposals contained in the United States draft convention CD/500, which has been on the table in this Conference for almost two years. With such responses from the Soviet Union, we hope it will be possible to speed up our work. Thus far the situation has been one in which, on many issues, but in particular on verification, it has appeared that the United States was being invited to negotiate with itself. This is clearly not a productive path.

My delegation very much hopes that it will be possible to advance our work on the chemical weapons convention swiftly during this session. Ambassador Turbanski of Poland is to be commended for patiently guiding the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in its 1985 session. We pledge our full support to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom as he assumes his duties as Chairman of this Committee during 1986.

We look for progress on the numerous issues which await resolution in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We attach particular importance to the following issues: the important problem of ensuring that chemical weapons will not be produced in the civilian industry; the elimination of chemical weapons facilities; and the matter of resolving questions about compliance, including by challenge inspection. Progress in the Committee is needed on all these issues in parallel. It might seem easier to postpone resolution of the difficult issues, including verification, to a later time, and to make progress on the less difficult matters. But such an approach would be misleading. It would create a false impression that sufficient momentum had been generated to sweep all obstacles aside in the interests of concluding an agreement. The shortest path to our agreed objective lies rather in a candid recognition from the outset that verification issues, and in particular the matter of challenge inspection, need to be settled sooner rather than later. There should be no mistake about the views of the United States on challenge inspection. They remain as I described them in my statement of 22 August last: a fundamental need for an effective convention is mandatory, short-notice challenge inspection provisions to complement its routine verification provisions. The issue is the effectiveness of the provisions in satisfying security concerns, not specific language.

Within the structure of the common outline of a chemical weapons convention as contained in the 1985 report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, CD/636, it should be possible to narrow differences of view on many

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

of the areas in which blanks, or bracketed text, are present. Again, I believe that this should apply at least as much to the crucial issue of verification of compliance with the convention as to other issues.

I want to make one additional point about the chemical weapons agenda item. The United States maintains the view it has held from the outset, that the conclusion and implementation of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention is our primary objective in the field of chemical weapons. We see our bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union on all aspects of a chemical weapons ban as complementary to the multilateral negotiations and in no way intended to supplant them. It is our intention to use these discussions as a means of providing assistance to the task of reaching agreement on a multilateral convention. All of us in this Conference should join together to accelerate our work in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We should review the efforts we made last year, follow up on areas where progress was made, and do what we can to eliminate obstructions to further progress.

The problem of the use and dangerous spread of chemical weapons is an item of continuing concern to us and recently has been the subject of considerable press reporting, some of it confused and confusing as concerns the United States view. Achievement of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban is our first priority and the focus of my delegation's efforts in Geneva. Until that agreement becomes a reality, other measures, such as the control of the export of chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical weapons, may be useful. Indeed, a number of States have enacted such measures. However, the United States is opposed to a formal treaty -- as some have suggested -- such as one that would mirror the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We are also opposed to any attempts to hinder legitimate, peaceful, trade and development. Let me repeat: the focus of our efforts is and must remain a comprehensive agreement that eliminates forever the scourge of these terrible weapons.

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(The President)

As announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, we shall now proceed to adopt the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/651, which has been circulated to the members today. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The problem of a chemical-weapon ban and the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles has today become something which could be achieved relatively rapidly. This is all the more true in the light of the Soviet-United States agreement reached at the Geneva Summit Meeting and in the context of the new far-reaching proposals of the Soviet Union contained in the statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev.

In our view, the Conference on Disarmament should step up its efforts and make a practical contribution to saving mankind from this barbarous type of weapon of mass destruction by means of more intensive negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee, aimed at drawing up as rapidly as possible an international convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. In this connection the Mongolian delegation wishes to draw attention to the great contribution made by the Ambassador of Poland, Comrade Stanislaw Turbanski, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, in making headway in the negotiations on key parts of the Convention under preparation.

Together with the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, in our opinion, intermediate partial measures serving to achieve the general goals are of great significance. In this context Mongolia supports the proposal by the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia for ridding central Europe of chemical weapons and the joint proposal by Bulgaria and Romania for the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Balkans.

These, Mr. President, are some remarks that my delegation wish to make at this stage in the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. President, in my statement today I wish to touch upon some aspects of a future convention prohibiting chemical weapons. This is not only a subject to which we have devoted the greatest amount of time and effort over the last few years but one which continues to hold the maximum degree of promise among the various items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Let me state at the outset that Pakistan neither possesses chemical weapons nor desires to acquire them. Consequently we have a deep and abiding interest in the earliest possible conclusion of an international convention on a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons.

The present international consensus on the need to ban chemical weapons has its roots in efforts that began over a hundred years ago with the Brussels Declaration which prohibited the use of poisons and poisoned bullets in warfare. I do not intend to trace developments since then: suffice it to say that we have now reached a point where an international convention banning chemical weapons appears feasible. Given a sufficient degree of accommodation on the part of the leading chemical-weapon Powers, it can become a reality in

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

a matter of two to three years. There is, however, no room for complacency since according to a publication of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, there have been reports of the use of chemical and biological weapons in at least 16 different conflicts over the last 10 years. Further potentially dangerous structural changes are taking place in the chemical and allied manufacturing industries, especially in the field of biotechnology, which by facilitating the induction of new chemical and biological weapon concepts might open up the possibility of another destabilizing arms race. The existing international régime against the use of chemical weapons is thus under a mounting threat and it should, therefore, be in the best interest of everyone to strengthen that régime.

While expressing the hope that a chemical-weapons convention could be achieved in two to three years, I am fully aware that the present endeavour began almost 20 years ago. One reason for the slow rate at which the effort has moved forward is to be found in the implications that chemical weapons disarmament has for the industrial, scientific and military interests of States.

Pakistan supports a comprehensive, effective and equitable treaty which should prohibit the development, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of chemical weapons and provide for the total destruction of existing stockpiles, delivery systems and production facilities of chemical weapons. My delegation is particularly gratified that at its 1985 session the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was able to reach agreement on a simple and straightforward clause on prohibition of use. We have always held that such a clause would in no way erode the effectiveness or the legal status of the 1925 Geneva Protocol which the future Chemical Weapons Convention would indeed serve to complement and strengthen.

The issue of definitions and criteria in the context of a chemical weapons convention is an intricate subject which has been further complicated by the existence of competing national and commercial interests. Because of this we view with hopeful anticipation the possibility of an agreement that seems to be emerging as a result of the discussions held in the framework of Working Group A of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. An agreed set of criteria from which various definitions flow and on the basis of which lethal chemicals are categorized would constitute a foundation-stone for the convention. The integrated approach to the categorization of chemicals relevant to the chemical-weapons convention initiated last year and further developed during the January mini-session of the Ad Hoc Committee deserves to be earnestly pursued.

Ideally, declarations regarding chemical weapon stockpiles and their production facilities should be made before the convention is opened for signature. An agreement on these lines would, besides enhancing the value of the convention, also serve as a confidence-building measure. If this is not possible, a consensus on the time frame within which declarations are to be made should not be too difficult to reach. The declarations should not only be comprehensive but also verifiable. My delegation finds it difficult to sympathize with the position that detailed declarations would compromise the security interests of the possessor States. Such arguments appear to ignore the concerns of those who have not exercised the option to acquire chemical weapons.

Complete elimination of chemical weapon stockpiles, their production facilities and means of delivery should be a central feature of the convention. We hope the chemical-weapon States will eschew viewing the

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

destruction process exclusively from their own military perspective. The process should begin very soon after the convention enters into force, if not before it, and should be completed at the quickest possible pace under international supervision. It is absolutely essential, in this regard, to define chemical-weapon production facilities in a manner that does not impinge upon or interfere with the peaceful chemical industry in any country. As a non-aligned and non-chemical-weapon State, we find it difficult to appreciate the spending of valuable time over working out agreed destruction schedules whose central objective appears to be to ensure that the security of the two alliance systems is not put in jeopardy during the elimination process. When viewed in the light of the fact that the security of the two is not based on chemical weapons but on nuclear arsenals, this debate appears somewhat unnecessary. In our view the destruction process should provide for the elimination of chemical-weapon production facilities ahead of chemical weapon stockpiles. Similarly newer stocks should be destroyed before the older ones. Further, a 10-year period should not necessarily be required to complete the elimination process. It should be possible for States possessing chemical weapons to eliminate their stockpiles and production facilities in a period considerably less than 10 years.

The issue of establishing confidence in compliance with the future chemical weapons convention lies at the heart of our negotiations. Consequently provisions relating to verification and compliance, which would in any case constitute the backbone of the convention, would have to construct a régime which ensures that undertakings relating to destruction, non-production and non-acquisition were complied with. Given the limitations of the existing capabilities as well as the misgivings attached with too intrusive a verification régime, 100 per cent effective compliance machinery does not appear within the realm of possibility. This, however, does not mean that a verification régime containing a mix of national and international means of an intrusive nature cannot be arrived at. It is clear to us that the type and intrusiveness of verification to which an activity is subjected should be determined by the element of risk which that particular activity posed for the convention.

It would perhaps be too simplistic to base a vitally important international convention only on the premise that States would adhere to it in good faith and with the intention of abiding by its provisions. Trust blended with mutual self-interest, therefore, seems a better basis for an agreement. In our view it would be in the general interest to ensure compliance through an effective and equitable verification system and an efficacious and non-discriminatory complaints procedure duly supported by a viable organizational structure.

A general understanding appears to exist that the future chemical weapons convention should provide for the establishment of a consultative committee -- a body composed of all the States parties -- as the principal organ responsible for overseeing the implementation of the convention. A consensus also seems to prevail that the Consultative Committee should have as its main subsidiary organ an executive council, a body composed of a fixed number of States which remains permanently in session and exercises authority delegated to it by the Consultative Committee. My delegation believes that the organization and functioning of these bodies should be arranged in a manner that ensures their effectiveness without compromising the principle of sovereign equality, which is an essential basis on which States adhere to international agreements. We disagree in this regard with arguments calling

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

for the establishment of an organizational set-up which would give a privileged position to the developed nations at the expense of the developing countries. We realize the existing inequalities in the present-day world but cannot support their being institutionalized through international agreements.

In case the States with highly developed chemical industries find it difficult to accept the notion of an executive council in which some of them might not be represented, the solution could perhaps lie in starting with an executive council which is larger than the 15 member body that has often been mentioned. Simultaneously the convention could provide for an increase in the membership of the Executive Council once the total number of States parties goes beyond a certain figure. Another solution could be to fix the membership of the executive council at a certain percentage of the total number of States parties to the convention. A figure between 30 and 40 per cent should be considered as adequate. This would allow for automatic expansion in the executive council membership as the convention is acceded to by more and more States. Such solutions would be equitable and allow for a sufficient number of developed countries to be always represented in the executive council in order to protect their special interests.

The question of decision-taking is an important element in determining the effectiveness of the bodies set up under the convention. The consensus principle, by giving everyone virtually the right to veto, would be a prescription for paralysis, especially in situations where a decision or action is most required. On the other hand a significant number of States may be highly reluctant to accept decisions by a simple majority, especially in so far as substantive matters are concerned. There is also the additional question of determining as to what is substantive and what is procedural. The dilemma could be resolved by basing all decisions, procedural and substantive, on a qualified majority. Such a solution would not only be unambiguous but also have the merit of being simple and efficient. My delegation has explained this approach in a working paper submitted last year. We realize that the suggestion may be considered unconventional but we should not be afraid of breaking new ground if it signals improvement over past practice and contributes towards our goal of achieving an effective and efficient convention.

The future chemical weapons convention must also lay down procedures for resolving doubts, apprehensions and complaints about non-compliance. These would, however, have to be carefully balanced. While on the one hand they impinge on the sensitive issue of national sovereignty, they are essential, on the other hand, to ensure a healthy respect for the convention. The fact-finding procedures should thus be devised in a manner which operates as a safety net around the convention. The convention while acknowledging the value of clarifying suspicions and ambiguities through bilateral means should provide for a graduated, though not necessarily rigid, framework for resolving doubts through the machinery to be established under it.

While any breach would be a grave development, use of chemical weapons should be treated as the most serious violation of the convention. It is essential that a separate procedure is provided in the convention for expeditiously dealing with allegations of use of chemical weapons.

In the less than perfect world in which we live, inter-State relations often tend to be characterized by mistrust, mutual rivalries and competing interests. So long as the current situation obtains, efforts at having a

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

watertight convention do not come as a surprise to us. Comprehensive, unambiguous and stringent procedures would greatly help in promoting international confidence in any agreement. Provisions aimed at ensuring compliance with the convention should, therefore, not be seen as directed against this or that State or group of States, but rather at enhancing the credibility of the convention. The relationship between sovereign rights of States and international obligations freely entered into has been and will remain a sensitive issue as well as an interesting debating point. However, sovereignty voluntarily conceded for the greater good of all is altruism at its best.

The Conference on Disarmament must capitalize on the existing international consensus on the urgent need for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. We must not expend our energies and time in the pursuit of a less than comprehensive ban or on half-way measures. Also, inordinate delay or too laboured a rate of progress towards a comprehensive ban can lead to an erosion of world-wide interest in the subject. Equally, the danger that a momentum can also develop for the acquisition of these weapons of mass destruction which can be easily produced, disguised and employed can only be ignored at our peril. Such a disastrous development would irreparably destroy the international disarmament process itself.

I cannot allow this opportunity to pass without placing on record my delegation's gratitude to Ambassador Turbanski, the distinguished representative of Poland, for the very competent manner in which he fulfilled his responsibilities as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during our 1985 session. Our thanks also go to Mr. Petar Poptchev, Mrs. Elisabet Bonnier and Mr. Frank Elbe who chaired the three Working Groups established under the Ad Hoc Committee. We are also deeply appreciative of the efforts made by Mr. Wisnoemoerti in his consultations on the question of herbicides.

The Conference has taken a wise decision in appointing someone as eminently qualified as Ambassador Cromartie to the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for the 1986 session. My delegation looks forward to working under his guidance and pledges to him its fullest co-operation.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

We are appreciative of the fact that substantive and extensive negotiations for a convention prohibiting chemical weapons were conducted in the Ad Hoc Committee during 1985, through which the structure of the future convention and its major elements were developed in treaty language, with, however, many reservations. The deliberations were reinforced through inter-sessional meetings. I would like to congratulate the outgoing Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Turbanski, for his achievements as well as to welcome the incoming Chairman, Ambassador Cromartie.

At this point, I should like to recall that the objective of our negotiations is a "comprehensive ban on chemical weapons". Therefore, a partial or regional approach cannot be accepted as an alternative to our negotiations.

Additionally the "comprehensive ban" is of course not the same thing as a complete prohibition of all related substances and activities. Existing chemical weapons should be destroyed at an early stage, with due consideration being given to the need for undiminished security for all States. There should be no question about that, and similarly, particularly serious and careful attention should be paid to the questions concerning some other issues.

For example, if we look at the world, there are those countries which have a very extensively developed and comprehensive system of material chemical industries, there are those where only limited kinds and volume of chemicals are produced, those which engage extensive export-import of chemicals, and finally purely consumer nations. Since in talking about a chemical-weapon convention, we are in fact touching upon the extensive outer reaches of the modern, complex and ever-advancing chemical industries, it is useful and indeed very important to give due consideration to different concerns arising out of different conditions in different countries.

We should also keep in mind that the negotiations have become, in a certain respect, so complicated that it is rapidly becoming an issue surpassing the comprehension of the average bystander. In order for the future convention to receive the necessary wide support, we should always keep in mind that its basic logic should be straightforward and readily understandable. In our future negotiations, it is imperative that we should take the positions of various countries well into consideration so as to develop a convention which will be convincing and realistic.

This year's negotiations will be conducted on the basis of the results of last year's work, and we consider that the work conducted in January, where attention was concentrated on specific substances was useful in pointing the way towards a realistic approach to the issues of definition and permitted activities. At the same time, we feel it necessary to point out that future discussions should consider specific substances and the regulatory régimes concerned so as to keep an overall picture clearly in our mind.

In this connection, I should like to mention some of the obvious problems in the wish to find just solutions.

First, if we were to list those substances to be prohibited from among those now identified, we shall wind up leaving new technological developments unregulated.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Second, if we were to try to circumvent the above situation by laying down a comprehensive ban, we might rule out existing or future peaceful use which could be made possible through technological development.

Third, it would be just as inappropriate to provide for an unduly strict ban on those substances which have peaceful uses as it would be to provide for a loose regulatory régime on account of the peaceful uses.

Fourth, if the regulatory régime were to be extended to cover too wide an area of the chemical industry, its implementation could become impractical, thus creating disenchantment with such a régime.

Fifth, we should not forget that the problems related to the day-to-day management of the convention (namely, the composition of the secretariat, procedures for decision-making, etc.) are matters of delicate political balance.

These and other questions should be taken fully into account and considered together with the varied situations States find themselves in, so that a solution acceptable to all may be developed. I might add that the five points enumerated above are not necessarily unique to the case of chemical weapons. They are common to wide ranges of modern technology for which the distinction between military and peaceful uses is often found in the domain of subjective judgement.

With regard to our work for the present year, I submit for consideration the possibility of holding separate expert group meetings to draw up a list of chemicals and precursors in accordance with guidelines to be developed. I realize that for the past three years or so, the experts have not held that kind of a meeting but have basically participated in the general considerations directly, providing inputs from the expert's point of view. I would be the first to acknowledge that the utility of this approach has been well proven. At the same time, I feel that it may also be useful to reconvene an experts' meeting to deal with matters of a purely technical nature.

When discussing questions of verification in relation to chemical weapons, I believe that we are assuming an integrated system of routine verification as a basis for the structure of operations, which seems from time to time to have taken secondary place in the considerations due to very active discussions concerning challenge inspections. The working paper my country submitted last year dealt with a part of the problems regarding routine verification activities by showing how it could be possible to utilize various sensors and equipment, and we hope that this and other relevant proposals would be discussed further.

Though all States seem to be in agreement concerning the need for challenge inspection, differing views have been expressed as to the concrete formulation for such verification. We feel that the significance of challenge verification lies in ensuring compliance with the future convention and thus assuring security for all States, in other words, in its deterrence role. With such a perspective in mind, we should undertake a full examination of the question in search of a feasible solution.

In such work, much consideration should be given to the various reasons concerning which one among the possible different modes of challenge inspection might have to be invoked, together with the time frame and scenario

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

for an actual inspection. Further, full consideration should be given to the various procedures by which a request for on-site inspection may arise, whether they emerge from routine inspection or from some other procedure, taking into account such views as may be expressed by the experts.

At the recent meeting between the leaders of the United States and the USSR, the two sides "agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of experts on all aspects of such a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. They agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons". My country welcomes this agreement to intensify consultations on chemical weapons and to try to overcome their differences. However, we should like to state that the commencement of bilateral negotiations should not imply stagnation with the work of our Conference until such time as some progress has been made at these bilateral talks. We believe that these talks should be of a complementary nature to the work of this Conference.

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(Mr. Jessel, France)

Thus we are fervently hoping for a general convention, open to all, stipulating the banning and elimination of chemical weapons.

We welcome Ambassador Issraelyan's recent statement before the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, in which he described the measures taken by the Soviet authorities to regulate exports of toxic products.

I would like to point out that France, for its part, and in association with its European Community partners, has taken national control measures.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

Clearly, steps of this kind should open prospects for the establishment of a list of substances used in civil industry that should be under regular control in the framework of the future Convention. Of course, measures for control of exports of sensitive substances of this nature must necessarily be applied "across the board", and not only with respect to certain destinations, in order to avoid the risk of diversion.

But unilateral measures alone cannot solve the problem. Neither does it appear to us to be possible to conclude a chemical "non-proliferation treaty", for, besides the fact that such an agreement would leave stocks and production facilities intact, it might well increase the imbalances between the States which continued to possess such weapons and the others.

On the other hand, it would probably be wise to begin consultations among the concerned countries, and in particular those having a large chemical industry, with a view to adopting national measures that would make it possible to avoid compounding the difficulties involved in the negotiations on a total ban and on the destruction of stocks by problems concerning proliferation.

Among the many problems which should be examined by our Conference, France considers that priority attention should be given to the following:

- (i) The procedures for verification of civilian factories producing substances which might be diverted for the purpose of manufacturing chemical warfare agents.
- (ii) The elimination of stocks and of production facilities, concerning which last year the French delegation submitted a text that is contained in document CD/630. We have also observed that, in the area of verification, the language of the Soviet proposals of 15 January prompts us to ask for additional information which will, we hope help further the discussion in this area.
- (iii) The composition and modus operandi of the bodies to be set up under the Convention.

But our work is not confined to chemical disarmament, as is clearly indicated by our agenda. Without wishing to review all the items appearing on our agenda, I would like to refer to two other major areas, to which we will certainly devote a significant proportion of our meetings: space and nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Voicu, Romania)

In view of the progress made to date by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we consider it necessary during this session to stress the advance of negotiations on the draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of all chemical weapons. The convention should be an international legal instrument designed as a step in the direction of prohibiting and eliminating all weapons of mass destruction. We welcome the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and hope that it will work fruitfully throughout this session of the Conference.

The adoption of preventive measures for the non-proliferation of chemical weapons in chemical-weapon-free zones, in order to strengthen efforts to swiftly establish a universal convention on the prohibition and destruction of all chemical weapons, would be particularly useful in promoting confidence in the reduction and elimination of those weapons. The Declaration-Appeal of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, and of the President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Jivkov, concerning the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Balkans is particularly relevant here. It proposes that negotiations be undertaken without delay to establish an agreement among the Balkan States banning the testing, production, acquisition and stockpiling on their territory of all chemical weapons, as an effective contribution to confining the proliferation of chemical weapons on our planet. That Declaration-Appeal has been circulated for the Conference as document CD/648.

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(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

The prohibition of chemical weapons has long been considered as the most promising item on the agenda, and the reality fully bears this out. We have already entered the stage of developing and working out a draft convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, and we have been rid of the trouble of redrafting a mandate for the relevant subsidiary body every year. Like many other delegations, we are pleased to see that, thanks to the efforts of Ambassador Turbanski, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and all the co-ordinators, further progress was made during the January resumed session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We have also taken note that the two countries with the largest chemical-weapon arsenals have both expressed their willingness to speed up the negotiations to conclude a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Their representatives have made it clear that their bilateral talks are only aimed at facilitating the multilateral negotiations and they have no intention to supplant them. All this, we believe, is conducive to our work.

However, blind optimism will do us no good. We have to keep a sober mind on the fact that tremendous work has yet to be done, and divergences on some key issues still remain. The question of verification, especially challenge verification, is one of the thorny problems calling for greater

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

efforts. At the initiative of the Canadian delegation, the United Nations General Assembly last year adopted by consensus a resolution on the question of verification. Although this resolution only deals with the question of verification in general, we hope it will bear a positive impact on our negotiations. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has started its work. We wish it renewed success.

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(Mr. Alfarargy, Egypt)

The speakers who preceded me agreed that the opportunity we now have is more favourable than ever before for achieving real progress in formulating a treaty banning chemical weapons. This comes as an aftermath of the affirmation by President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev, in their Geneva Summit, of their determination to intensify their efforts to reach such an agreement. The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, during its resumed session last month, did show a new spirit in the negotiations. If the short time allotted to the resumed session prevented the Committee from considering all the existing problems and finding appropriate solutions, we still hope the spirit shown will continue to prevail so as to support the Committee in its work during its ordinary session. We are confident that Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, will continue the valuable efforts previously deployed by Ambassador Turbanski of Poland during his tenure as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee during the last session.

In this regard, it is of importance to me to indicate that while we share the concern at the increasing trend to possess and use chemical weapons, and while we support every effort to control such a trend, we still deem it necessary that this should not be considered as an alternative to or at the expense of our basic objective, which remains a convention for the comprehensive ban of chemical weapons.

MR. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, as is our pattern, many delegations have again devoted the opening period of the annual session of the Conference to a general assessment of the overall political situation in which we have resumed our work. This stocktaking has proved very useful. My delegation notes with satisfaction that it has generated a certain amount of common views. All delegations agree that the new year has started under favourable new circumstances for the arms control process and that progress towards a more stable and co-operative relationship between the two important military systems, but also, generally, progress towards a more peaceful world less dependent on the massive accumulation of armament appears now possible. Delegations have also agreed that these opportunities must be actively seized, and that a particular and considerable task awaits the Conference on Disarmament. We are called upon to do substantive work in appropriate organizational formats on as many of our agreed agenda items as is feasible.

As last year, many delegations have dwelt upon the role of the multilateral arms-control process at a time when much immediate attention is focused upon the on-going bilateral negotiation process. Indeed, my delegation agrees that our assignment in this initial phase of our annual work should be to define more clearly and more actively the relationship between bilateral arms control and multilateral disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. Foreign Minister Genscher, when he spoke at this Conference last year, called for a constructive parallelism of both, recognizing the necessary juxtaposition and mutual reinforcing role of both aspects of disarmament. It is not difficult to find rational objective criteria by which the multilateral domain can be defined and delineated from its bilateral complement. Global security issues need global solutions. There are domains where, by the very nature of the subject matter, it is clear that only global regulation can provide durable solutions. The negotiations on the global and effective elimination of chemical weapons are, as we all agree, very much a case in point.

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(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

My delegation is conscious that the area in which some progress has been registered is in the field of a chemical-weapons ban. We would like to congratulate Ambassador Turbanski of Poland of having chaired the

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

Ad Hoc Committee so successfully and for the useful inter-sessional work he conducted. We now have a basis for further progress in ridding the world of this repulsive form of weaponry effectively and finally. We were glad therefore that in the very first week of our 1986 session this Ad Hoc Committee has been re-established with Ambassador Cromartie, whom we wish well, as Chairman. We are negotiating an all-encompassing and comprehensive chemical-weapons ban to prohibit the development, manufacture and use of all forms of chemical weapons that could be employed in hostilities including those intended to strike at the sources of mankind's sustenance and the ecological system that nourishes the human environment. The speedy conclusion of this work will be a credit to the Conference on Disarmament but it cannot be the only area in which we must show results.

(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

The question of elaborating a multilateral convention for the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of

(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

chemical weapons is one to which my delegation attaches great importance. Next only to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons constitute the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction.

The General Assembly in its resolution on the issue last fall "Urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a view to achieving accord on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date and, for this purpose, to intensify the drafting process of such a Convention for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-first session". My delegation welcomes the early re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and is pleased to note that the body has already begun work, under the Chairmanship of one of our most competent colleagues in the field, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Ian Cromartie. We are impressed by the considerable progress so far made in the negotiations and would appeal to all members of this Conference to do their utmost to ensure the early conclusion of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. Such a breakthrough will certainly have a positive influence on negotiations in other areas, and to achieve that breakthrough, the draft convention must recognize the sovereign equality of all States, and the similarities in their security requirements. The convention must not seek to create categories of "have and have-not" States which characterized the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970.

(Mr. Afande, Kenya)

The effective prohibition of chemical weapons has been on the agenda of the Conference for a number of years now, and although considerable progress has already been achieved on the technical issues relating to a ban on chemical weapons, there are some areas that need to be resolved. My delegation shares the optimism that a comprehensive convention which would outlaw the development, production, stockpiling, storage and use of those weapons and provide for destruction of existing stocks can be effectively concluded. It is our earnest hope that the Conference will overcome the major political difficulties and resolve the divergent views that have emerged in the crucial area of verification. We thank Ambassador Turbanski, the distinguished representative of Poland, for his skill and ability in guiding the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during the Conference's 1985 session and welcome the decision to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee during the 1986 session under Ambassador Cromartie, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. Being aware that even developing countries can manufacture chemical weapons on a large scale, Kenya supports measures which can bring about the earliest conclusion of a convention to prohibit them and will, in this regard give Ambassador Cromartie our maximum co-operation in his challenging task. My delegation also notes, with satisfaction, the continuation of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament under Ambassador García Robles, the distinguished representative of Mexico. My delegation pledges to give him the necessary co-operation and urges others to do the same in order to enable the Ad Hoc Committee to complete its work this year, as scheduled, with a view to leading to a general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

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Mr. KAMYAB (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, as this is the first occasion that my delegation has taken the floor in the course of the present session of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference for the month of February. I wish you every success. I also take this opportunity to express my appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Argentina, and to offer my words of welcome to our new colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament.

It was not my intention to take the floor at our meeting today, but unfortunately some extremely sad developments concerning the use of chemical weapons prompted me to seek the floor in order to inform the Conference as a matter of urgency of these developments. According to information that I have received from my capital, the Iraqi Régime, once again, has engaged in a massive use of chemical weapons against the civilian and military sectors of the population of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The scale and frequency of this use of chemical weapons are both large and numerous. Most recently, on

(Mr. Kamyab, Islamic Republic of Iran)

12 and 15 February, during the course of the present military operation (which has been named VALFAJR-8) Iraq resorted to repeated massive employment of chemical weapons which resulted in many new victims. On one day alone, 12 February, the use of chemical weapons led to 1,700 persons being killed or wounded. On 13 February, chemical weapons were used by Iraq against the civilian population of Abadan City, which resulted in the death of 20 civilians and injury to more than 100 persons.

Of course, these recent incidents were not isolated. On 25 and 26 January 1986, Iraq several times used chemical weapons in Yibis area. On 27 January Iraq twice launched attacks using chemical weapons in the Aine Khosh area. On 30 January in two different places, Iraq more than eight times resorted to the use of chemical weapons. We are getting more information concerning the kinds of gas which have been used and other details with regard to recent incidents. As soon as this information is available we will make it known to interested delegations in the Conference on Disarmament. Of course I am referring here to the most recent occasions on which chemical weapons have been used by the Iraqi Régime. As the distinguished members of the Conference are well aware, during the course of the past two years, Iraq has employed chemical weapons on numerous occasions, some of which were brought to the attention of the Conference.

Some of the persons who have been wounded in the recent series of attacks employing chemical weapons have arrived in Europe for medical treatment and some others will arrive shortly. While sincerely thanking the countries which have received these wounded persons and have provided medical assistance for them I would like to request any other countries which find themselves in a position to provide medical care in such cases to let it be known.

I may bring to the attention of the Conference that on 12 February 1986, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran sent a note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in which, while raising the alarm with regard to the serious danger in the use of chemical weapons for the international community, it was requested that a mission be sent to Teheran immediately to carry out an on-the-site inspection and verification of the facts regarding this employment of chemical weapons. This request of the Islamic Republic of Iran still stands and it is a cause for regret that such a mission has not been despatched to the area to date.

We feel that these repeated violations of principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol by Iraq should meet with the strong condemnation of the international community. We also hope that these unfortunate developments will prompt the Conference on Disarmament to accelerate its negotiations on the convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

(Mr. Kornienko, USSR)

Now let me address chemical weapons -- that formidable instrument of mass destruction which actually exists. The Soviet Union has always been an ardent proponent of the idea that chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of people and never to their detriment. We believe that the most dependable way to achieve that goal is, as before, a total ban on chemical weapons as such and not merely on their use.

The USSR, both on its own and together with other socialist countries, has repeatedly made specific proposals on this subject. It is not through the fault of the Soviet Union that the solution of the problem has been unacceptably delayed.

As was pointed out in M.S. Gorbachev's Statement of 15 January, the Soviet Union regards as entirely feasible the task of completely eliminating chemical as well as nuclear weapons even in this century. He has proposed to intensify the talks within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament to work out and conclude an effective and verifiable convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of the existing stockpiles of those weapons.

It should be said that the Soviet Union favours the earliest possible elimination of the existing stockpiles of chemical weapons as well as of the industrial base for their production.

Accordingly, our position envisages the timely declaration of the locations of enterprises producing chemical weapons and the timely cessation of their production. We are in favour of starting to work out procedures for destroying the relevant industrial base and for proceeding to eliminate stockpiles of chemical weapons soon after the convention enters into force.

Again, it should be emphasized that all these measures would be carried out under strict control including international on-site inspections. Here, as in other cases, the Soviet Union is no less interested in such control than other States.

While proposing that weapons of mass destruction, both nuclear and chemical, should be removed from the arsenals of States and that the emergence of space arms should be prevented, the Soviet Union considers that measures to limit and reduce conventional armed forces and armaments should be carried out in parallel to this process.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): We listened with very great attention to the message addressed by General Secretary Gorbachev to the Conference on Disarmament and to the statement by His Excellency Mr. Kornienko, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. My delegation is thankful for General Secretary Gorbachev's message. We are also appreciative of the fact that Mr. Kornienko found time to address the Conference. We are confident that the Conference will give the close and careful consideration that the message and the statement merit. We see these as indicative of the importance that the Soviet Union attaches to the multilateral disarmament negotiating process.

I have sought the floor this morning to introduce a document that my delegation has submitted on the subject of "Fact-Finding under the future Chemical Weapons Convention". This document, which carries the number CD/664 has, I understand, been circulated in all working languages today.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

In my statement last Thursday I had in very broad terms described my delegation's views on the question of fact-finding. In doing so I had made the point that the fact-finding procedures should be devised in such a manner that they operate as a safety net around the Convention. I had also stated that the Convention should provide for a graduated, though not necessarily rigid, framework for resolving doubts through the machinery to be established under it. The Working Paper that we have submitted elaborates our views on this subject.

The overall approach spelt out in document CD/664 aims at handling the question of fact-finding at four different levels, which though separately identifiable, cannot be deemed to impose a strict discipline whereunder one level has necessarily to be traversed in order to reach the next one.

In our opinion most of the doubts and ambiguous situations emerging in the implementation or observance of the chemical weapons convention should be resolved through clarifications sought and obtained within the framework of bilateral consultations in a co-operative mood. This could be described as the first or the least acrimonious level at which suspicions could be allayed.

In case a State party having some doubts about the observance of the convention by some other State party does not wish to directly approach the latter it should have the right to seek clarification through the organization set up under the chemical weapons convention. This could be described as clarification through the multilateral process and referred to as the second tier for resolving doubts.

The third tier would come into operation when a State party failing to satisfy its concerns through either of the approaches already mentioned by me, or without resorting to them, submits a request for the dispatch of a fact-finding mission to another State party in order to clarify a situation that gives rise to doubts about compliance with the convention. Fact-finding at this level acquires a more serious nature and needs to be carefully elaborated since it implies, inter alia, direct interference in the affairs of another State.

The fourth level of the fact-finding procedure involves a complaint regarding the use of chemical weapons. Since such a complaint would denote a violation of the gravest nature it would need to be handled in the most expeditious manner. It should be obvious that delayed action could lead to the removal or diffusion of the evidence of the use of chemical weapons.

I have broadly outlined the thinking behind the Working Paper submitted by my delegation. In our document we have tried to foresee different contingencies that may arise in the implementation of the fact-finding procedure. The treatment may, however, still be far from exhaustive. We have also put various steps in different time-frames keeping in view their relative importance as well as the overriding necessity of allaying suspicions as expeditiously as possible. We are conscious of the fact that the issues addressed in our document may not be readily amenable to solutions acceptable to everyone. However, we have presented our ideas with the conviction that the objective of resolving contentious issues cannot be served by taking extreme positions, but by seeking reasonable and practical solutions which lie somewhere between the extremes.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

I also wish to clarify that the document has been submitted in a constructive spirit not only with a view to presenting our preferences on the various issues involved in fact-finding but also to stimulating discussion on this important question.

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(Mr. Renton, United Kingdom)

Our goal in the negotiations on chemical weapons -- a global and verifiable ban on their development, production or stockpiling -- is ambitious. It will be a new milestone in arms control agreements. We therefore regard our present task as immensely important. Many delegations -- among them, I am glad to say, that of the United Kingdom -- have put forward detailed ideas and concepts designed to contribute to a solution. All delegations are agreed on the goal of a complete ban on chemical weapons which is set out in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. As a result of the painstaking efforts of this Committee over the last four years, we may now be better placed to resolve the outstanding problems. In particular, there is general agreement on the basic framework of the Convention and on a considerable amount of substantive language for its content.

We welcome the joint commitment by President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev that they will accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter. We can all surely take heart from

(Mr. Renton, United Kingdom)

this common expression of determination. We also welcome the recent statement by Mr. Gorbachev, reinforced in his message to this Conference, in which he called for early and complete elimination of chemical weapons and of the industrial basis for their production. We look forward to hearing detailed ideas from the Soviet delegation on how to put this into practice.

There seems too to be general agreement that the main problem still to be solved is that of providing assurance to each party that other parties are complying fully with their obligations under the Convention. We must all work together to agree on provisions for the Convention that would give all countries the confidence they will require on this point. As chemical weapons are relatively easy to make and to conceal, stringent measures of verification will be needed to overcome suspicion that such weapons are being clandestinely retained or produced in violation of the convention; or that facilities for their production are being maintained under the guise of the civil chemical industry. To allay these suspicions, we shall need a combination of verification methods: first, during the transitional period covering the complete elimination of chemical weapons and their production facilities; and second, on a permanent basis, to ensure that material is not being diverted from civil purposes to make these weapons.

I think it is widely accepted that the measures of verification should include a system of fact-finding which could be initiated by a party suspicious about the compliance of another party. The convention would, however, be a fragile one if it depended for its verification mainly on a system of challenges. The British delegation has made detailed proposals for complementing ad hoc fact-finding with a system of international inspection on a random routine basis, combined with the international exchange of data. The purpose is to forestall suspicion that substances used for peaceful purposes might be diverted to the manufacture of chemical weapons. After detailed consultations with our own chemical industry, we are convinced that this purpose can be accomplished, without disrupting peaceful industrial operations or infringing their commercial confidentiality. In this context, we warmly welcome the invitation of the Government of the Netherlands to show members of the Conference just what this means on the ground in June. We hope that all delegations to this Conference will participate.

It is particularly incumbent on those countries which possess large stocks of chemical weapons to help devise means of convincing others that they will destroy them; and to agree to measures of verification that will give others the confidence, in both the short and long term, that they will not make them again. Many detailed proposals have been made to this end. If we are to accelerate work on this convention this year -- as the British Government is determined to do -- it will be necessary for all delegations either to accept what has been proposed or to offer detailed specific alternative suggestions for generating the confidence required. I have read with interest the remarks on this subject by Deputy Minister Kornienko of the Soviet Union. In the English saying, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. We look forward to tasting the new menu which we are promised.

Last year in this forum, my predecessor, Richard Luce, dwelt on the subject of chemical weapons at some length. He made no apologies for doing so, and I can only repeat his sentiment. The recent evidence of the use of such weapons should put us on our mettle. We cannot sit idly by, while another genie threatens to emerge from the bottle. We meet once again in the

(Mr. Renton, United Kingdom)

(Mr. Renton, United Kingdom)

dark shadow of the use of chemical weapons in the Iraq/Iran conflict. Each new report surely intensifies the need for a world-wide ban. I am reminded of Robert Burns's words: "Man's inhumanity to man makes countless thousands mourn". I believe that such a total ban can be achieved. I urge the Conference to spare no effort to this end. We shall do our part, as Chairman. We look to others to do theirs. Such a convention would redound to the everlasting credit of this Conference. It would go down in history. And it would make the world a safer place.

...together to agree on provisions for the Convention that would give all countries the confidence they will require on this point. As chemical weapons are relatively easy to make and to conceal, stringent measures of verification will be needed to ensure that such weapons are being clandestinely... of the Convention or that facilities for their production are being maintained under the guise of the civil chemical industry. ... verification... complete... second... from... I think... include a... subsequent... however... system of... comprising... a random... purpose... steps of... coordination... of industrial... or including... welcome the... the Conference... delegation to this Conference will participate.

It is particularly important that those countries which possess large stocks of chemical weapons to begin to take steps of confidence that they will destroy them... also the confidence... make their... are to... Government... either to... alternative... with... Soviet Union... ending. We look forward to seeing the new team which we are promised.

Last year in this forum, my predecessor, Richard Luce, dealt on the subject of chemical weapons at some length. He made an apology for doing so, and I can only repeat his sentiment. The recent evidence of the use of such weapons should put us on our wicket. We cannot afford to be lulled by another peace Christmas to emerge from the bottle. We must once again in the

(Mr. Tornudd, Finland)

Success in concluding a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons has too long eluded the Conference. In the meantime, interest in new forms of chemical weapons is growing. Reports appear of the proliferation of chemical-weapon manufacturing capacity. And most disturbing of all, chemical weapons have been actually used, as documented by the United Nations team in connection with the Iran-Iraq conflict. All these developments make the prohibition of this particularly insidious weapon more urgent a task than ever.

The necessary technical groundwork for a ban has been largely laid. Much of the legal language in terms of the outlines of a convention already exists. The political impetus to a chemical-weapon ban given by the two major Powers at their summit meeting should make a difference. In his message to the Conference on Disarmament, the Secretary-General of the United Nations concludes from this evidence that -- and I quote -- "it seems reasonable to expect that the remaining obstacles can be overcome during 1986". The Government of Finland shares this expectation.

The remaining obstacles are none the less difficult. One of them concerns the definition of high-risk chemical compounds and of the corresponding régimes such compounds must be submitted to in order to ensure their solely non-military use. It is important that the system finally arrived at is both effectively verifiable and sufficiently realistic. All parties must feel confident that the régime in question is credible, that it can be complied with. At the same time, it must avoid unduly hampering the operations of civilian chemical industry.

Another major issue is the verification provisions of the convention, particularly the régime to be applied to the various verification tasks, such as the provisions relating to challenge inspection. It is clear that effective verification requires both on-site inspections and the use of modern monitoring equipment.

Automatic monitoring equipment for chemical-weapon verification purposes has been studied and tested within the Finnish chemical-weapon verification project since 1972. The project seeks to develop verification methods that would cover all the verification requirements under the convention: non-production, destruction of existing stocks as well as detection of alleged use. The most recent findings will again be incorporated in a "Blue Book" and presented to the Conference at the summer part of its session this year.

Although verification by technical means only does not in itself suffice to provide the necessary assurance of compliance in all cases, it can be helpful as a complement to on-site inspection. One could also give consideration to a combination of different methods incorporating different degrees of intrusiveness.

(Mr. Gonsalves, India)

The work of the Conference on a chemical-weapons convention which has constituted the bulk of the substantive parts of its annual reports for the past several years has, unlike almost all our other endeavours, met with a reasonable degree of success. Ambassador Turbanski's contribution to the success that has so far been achieved has been rightly acknowledged in this chamber and we are confident that under the guidance of its new Chairman, Ambassador Cromartie, the Ad hoc Committee will make further progress. We must in passing reassert our commitment to achieving a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons and we are gratified to note that we in this Conference will not be diverted by the lesser aspect of non-proliferation of chemical weapons. We must also caution against the perceived tendency to suggest that chemical weapons are the only issue that the Conference on Disarmament can seriously handle. It is our hope that the important work on a chemical-weapons convention will overcome the long standing obstacles this year especially since the major chemical-weapon States have resolved to supplement and accelerate it through enhanced bilateral consultations.

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(Mr. Kerroum, Algeria)

First of all, a chemical-weapons convention is the only point on which the Conference on Disarmament, in the course of long years, has been able to carry out concrete negotiations and make significant progress. This is a perfect illustration of the complementary nature of multilateral and bilateral negotiations.

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(Mr. Kerroum, Algeria)

Secondly, the necessarily universal nature of such a convention and the involvement of all States which that implies mean that our forum is the most obvious venue for its preparation.

Thirdly, the encouragement given by Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev with a view to concluding a convention should logically result in a breakthrough and speed up its completion.

Lastly, it is self-evident that this convention can only mean the total elimination of chemical weapons if it prohibits their development, production and stockpiling. It cannot possibly have a non-proliferation function or constitute any sort of obstacle to the chemicals industry which is the very foundation of development, particularly in agriculture.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Unfortunately, arms delivery to Iraq was not only not halted after the inception of the aggression but was intensified, and went as far as the frequent deployment of chemical weapons in the past three years. The reports of the United Nations experts confirm the use of poisonous gas by the Iraqi régime against Iran (document S/16433). The presence of tens of Iranian victims of chemical weapons now being treated in European hospitals substantiates our claim.

The Iraqi régime, in addition to the use of chemical weapons in 33 operations in the past which have killed or injured more than 4,500 civilians and military personnel, has recently deployed more lethal doses in more than 10 instances leading to the injury of about 8,500 civilians. The detailed figures of these chemical attacks were presented to the Conference on Disarmament on 18 February 1986. On the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a United Nations team despatched by the Secretary-General to probe into the recent deployment of chemical weapons arrived in Tehran last night.

The United Nations Security Council's failure to take a clear position vis-à-vis the violation by Iraq of the 1925 Geneva Protocol has further encouraged this régime to continue such acts, and it was vividly clear that adopting resolutions such as those of 25 April 1985 and 24 February 1986 of the United Nations Security Council would not solve any problem. The violation of international laws and regulations was not limited to the use of chemical weapons, and other breaches by that régime can be summarized as follows: outright and fully-fledged military aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran instead of recourse to international organizations and arbitration to settle claimed differences through peaceful means; deliberate demolition of cities and population centres with bulldozers (Security Council Document S/15834); total violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1949 concerning the treatment of POWs and civilian citizens of the occupied territories (Security Council document S/16962); application of chemical weapons in contravention of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (Security Council document S/16433); attacking mercantile vessels in the Persian Gulf (Security Council document S/16877); violation of the 12 June 1984 undertaking with the United Nations Secretary-General as to the cessation of military attacks on civilian and population centres (Security Council document S/16897); attack on the atomic reactor in Bushehr, in the south of the country; attack on historical sites which have been registered as the cultural heritage of the world community in contravention of the Hague Convention 1954, especially the recent attacks against the monuments of historical value in Ispahan; and attacks on civil aircraft and threat to the safety of civil aviation.

The recent crime committed by the Iraqi régime in attacking a civilian aircraft in which 46 civilians were murdered is a new instance of violation of international laws and regulations.

If the deliberations on disarmament reach nowhere, and if verification of banning the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons is not carried out, is the trial of war criminals and those who deploy chemical weapons beyond the capability of international organizations?

(Mr. Froysnes, Norway)

challenge retains special significance. We believe that an effective and verifiable convention will necessitate a compulsory system of on-site inspections without making use of unnecessary intrusiveness. The elaboration of such a system is a momentous task, which will require an open mind and a flexible attitude from all the parties concerned.

So where do we go from here? I wish to recall that the United States, for its part, has tabled comprehensive proposals in the draft convention of April 1984. This was a welcome contribution. My Government attaches importance to the fact that the United States underlined that the draft was not presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. This is a necessary approach for all the parties at the present time. In his statement on 15 January General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would accept strict control, including international on-site inspection, for a number of major measures to be covered by the convention, inter alia destruction of the relevant industrial base for production of chemical weapons.

Let us now, then, have all the cards laid down. Think what a relief it would be if this Conference could finally announce that the horrors of chemical weapons will be eliminated! It is high time now.

In Norway's participation in these negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament we have presented the results of comprehensive field research on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. The Norwegian research programme will continue and later this year we will present additional proposals dealing with verification of alleged use of such weapons.

In this connection I also want to emphasize the grave concern of my Government in view of the new and recent reports on use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. The Norwegian Government condemns the use of such weapons. These reports, and not least the recent statement of the Foreign Minister of Iran, underscore once more the urgency of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical weapons ban.

We know that various proposals for regional zones free from chemical weapons and a treaty on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons have also been put forward. I think what we know of the use of chemical weapons dictates that we must eliminate this class of weapons altogether from existing arsenals. All other considerations are second to this fundamental objective.

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

In the opinion of Belgium, the complete elimination of chemical weapons, the existence of which is reported in the arsenals of several countries, and the use of which it has been necessary to deplore on several occasions, even recently, as His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran has just reminded us once again, is a matter of the highest priority. We believe that it is one of the main areas in which our negotiations can succeed, and succeed rapidly. It goes without saying, however, that a disarmament agreement will be valid only if it is scrupulously respected by its contracting parties.

If the agreement is violated, its credibility is likely to be affected. Suspicion may also spread to other agreements which have been or are about to be concluded. We are, I believe, fully alive to this danger: hence the attention we are giving to the questions of control and surveillance that arise of course in their own specific ways under any disarmament agreement.

In this regard, the future convention on chemical weapons should include adequate safeguards, since we cannot permit a situation to arise in which the renunciations to which some States would accede in good faith could one day be exploited to their detriment.

We would not wish to allow room for doubt among States parties concerning respect for the convention without provision being made for dispelling such doubt as quickly as possible through a binding investigating mechanism.

For the various chemicals likely to be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons, the systematic verification arrangements would be adapted in such a way as to encourage States parties to have confidence in the intentions of the other parties, while on the other hand preserving all opportunities for peaceful research and development and progress in the industry. In our opinion, these two concerns can be met if one is guided by what is called the "general purpose criterion", which has already proved to be an essential tool.

The objective sought by Belgium is a total and effectively verified ban on chemical weapons. It is clear that the object of the convention will not be to authorize the peaceful activities of the chemical industry but to prohibit and effectively prevent chemical production from being diverted to armaments. Chemical weapons are the result of the desire to have such weapons, coupled with the possession of chemicals or a combination of chemicals of which the characteristics and quantities are such that they can satisfy that desire.

It is the combination of these two elements, the intentional and the material which will be covered by the prohibition on development, manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and utilization.

The objective of total prohibition corresponds perfectly, in our opinion, to the criterion of equal security for all or of non-discrimination. It should be pursued for itself alone, particularly since it concerns a weapon the use of which has been renounced by all of us in acceding to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This weapon can be legitimately possessed by some countries only as a safeguard against a violation of the commitments entered into under the Protocol.

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

As soon as all member countries of this Conference, and therefore the main presumed possessors of this weapon, have demonstrated the will to achieve an agreement on the total prohibition of its manufacture, to accept the elimination of their weapon stockpiles and production facilities under international control, there is no possible justification for not considering that the active pursuit and rapid conclusion of our work are a matter of priority, at the very moment when all participants in the convention demonstrate an equal interest in the solution of verification problems which constitute, we are well aware, the main difficulty.

So long as this convention has not been concluded and ratified by a significant group of States, the outcome of our efforts will remain uncertain and the security risks connected with chemical weapons will continue to exist. It is the success of these negotiations, which are of course difficult but not insurmountably so, that will give expression to the desire so often proclaimed by so many to make a contribution to that end, and confirm beyond doubt the sincerity of our declarations.

We are, I think, all aware of the full significance that this crowning of our efforts would have. We shall have shown that it is possible to prohibit totally and effectively an entire category of weapons which is not merely foreseeable or hypothetical but which exists. We shall have shown in particular that it is possible to agree on procedures for effective verification and for all of us to submit to them, without any exception.

In our opinion, it would not be going too far to say that the future of disarmament hinges on such concrete demonstrations, since it is evident that the more a disarmament agreement is significant for the security of States the more it should be verified, for the insecurity created by any violations would be more serious.

The Belgium delegation has welcomed the pragmatic and more positive turn which the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has taken since last autumn. It hopes that the various working groups will continue their efforts along that promising path.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Mr. Reagan stressed that the United States is doing its part in the bilateral negotiations and in other negotiations. This includes, of course, the negotiations on chemical weapons at this Conference. The President concluded by saying that, "with an equal commitment by our Soviet negotiating partners, real progress is now within our reach."

The new proposal by the United States and those prior proposals that we have tabled represent a sound basis for that progress. Our new proposal is one that gives added substance to United States commitments to leave no stone unturned in its efforts to resolve the fundamental security issues posed by the threat of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the remarks of President Reagan succinctly place these efforts in the larger context of other efforts needed to further peace and stability. We all need to recognize that fundamental political differences are at the root of the security concerns that lead States to possess weapons. Thus, resolution of the threat to international security posed by nuclear weapons cannot, in the last analysis, be accomplished without also resolving other security concerns posed by imbalances in conventional and in chemical weapons.

CD/PV.343

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Mr. JESSEL (France) (translated from French): We have heard today a number of major statements. I should like briefly to take up an issue raised by one of the speakers, the problem of the use of chemical weapons referred to by His Excellency Mr. Velayati, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. May I first of all recall that on many occasions in the past my Government has emphasized and deplored the serious consequences of the prolongation of the disastrous conflict between Iraq and Iran not only for those two countries but also for the integrity of the neighbouring States and the security of the region, as well as peace and international stability.

Furthermore, on various occasions France has condemned quite categorically any use anywhere of the toxic warfare agents prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In doing so, my Government has merely been adhering to what has been France's unswerving policy since the signing of the Protocol more than 60 years ago. It has further reason for doing so in view of its responsibilities as a depositary State of the Convention. I recalled this in my statement before the Conference on 18 June 1985, and I recall it once again today.

As you know, the 1925 Convention does not include any verification procedure. That is why, pending the conclusion of the Convention currently being negotiated in our Conference, France and a number of other States submitted a resolution providing for interim verification procedures to the General Assembly of the United Nations, which adopted it. In this connection, France welcomes the decision just taken by the United Nations Secretary-General to send a fact-finding mission. We welcome the Secretary-General's action, which is in our opinion in keeping with the spirit of resolution 37/98 D, which serves the same purpose and has the same objective.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

It will be recalled that I presented the Canadian position on substantive aspects of each of these items in my plenary statement of 4 February 1986. Today I wish to address the kind of concrete action which the Conference on Disarmament could, and in our view should, take on each of these items, taking into account that on each subject the Conference is at a different stage of consideration, deliberation or negotiation.

On item 4, chemical weapons, it is quite clear that the Conference is more advanced in its work on the comprehensive convention on chemical weapons than on any other item on its agenda. Thus, it is encouraging, albeit not surprising, that we have been able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on which the Conference had agreed at the end of our last session. This should, nevertheless, not be grounds for special satisfaction on our part. When we began this session over a month ago there was a heightened sense of expectation about the prospects for progress in these negotiations. Recent reports of renewed chemical-weapons use, which have led the United Nations Secretary-General to initiate an investigation, should have reinforced our concern to make early and urgent progress.

In my statement of 4 February, we gave notice of our intention to submit documents intended to advance the negotiation of a comprehensive chemical-weapons treaty. I wish now to inform the Conference that the Canadian document entitled Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons has been submitted today to the secretariat for distribution to delegations. As I pointed out earlier, this working document identifies procedures, equipment and standard formats to help ensure that the findings of an investigation of alleged chemical weapons use would be as conclusive, convincing, objective and impartial as possible. It reflects Canadian experience and expertise, but also recognizes and benefits from important contributions by several other countries involved in extensive research in this area, particularly Sweden, Norway and Finland.

As stated in the introduction to the document, "such a handbook is both useful today in the context of the existing authority of the Secretary-General under resolution 37/98 D or under the Charter of the United Nations, and it should also be of use in the future in the context of a verification régime that would be part of a future chemical weapons convention as it is currently being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament." The Handbook, as some delegations are aware, has already been submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in New York.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

It should be noted that this handbook does not deal with the procedures and criteria leading up to the initiation of an investigation. This issue is still very much a subject for negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament. The focus of this study is on what investigators should know and do when called upon to implement a decision to conduct an investigation, including the procedures that might be followed and the equipment that might be needed.

A technical working paper dealing with the identification of chemical substances will soon also be tabled in the appropriate Working Group by the Canadian delegation. That paper proposes a method for identifying chemical substances based on Chemical Abstracts Service registry numbers, which could be of considerable utility in reducing ambiguity in the identification process and in helping to simplify and standardize eventual data flows relating to the implementation of the convention, taking full advantage of computerized methods now available to search chemical literature.

In addition, as mentioned in my earlier statement, we will also be distributing an indexed compendium of all chemical weapons documentation for the period 1983 to 1985 to assist delegations in their work.

In this context I would like to commend the delegation of Pakistan for the serious efforts it has made in addressing in a recent working paper, the first one tabled in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this year, some of the central issues in a future chemical weapons convention. We have noted in particular the statement in the paper that chemical weapons use should be treated as a most serious breach of a future convention. The Canadian Government shares this view.

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

In the negotiations held last year in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, some progress was made in defining and listing relevant chemicals, and in continuing the elaboration of some parts of the convention. Useful work was undertaken on identifying chemical-weapon production facilities as well as on measures for their elimination. However, on many

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

issues substantive efforts will be needed in order to arrive at acceptable solutions. These include elaboration of the principles for the elimination of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons, and the régime for precluding the possibility of the production of new types of chemical weapons by the chemical industry. A very important question which necessitates further examination concerns the elaboration of principles, procedures and organization in connection with strict compliance with the provisions of the Convention. We believe that the Ad Hoc Committee will make further progress in drafting the convention this year as well. We are encouraged by the decision of the United States and the Soviet Union to accelerate their bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons. However, we consider that the chemical-weapons negotiations pursued in the Conference should be completed at an early date, keeping in mind the road travelled so far and the results achieved in these negotiations. Yugoslavia, for its part, will continue to make its contribution towards that end.

In our opinion, the most effective way of averting the threat of chemical weapons is by their comprehensive ban within the framework of the convention which is currently being negotiated in the Conference. The initiatives which are geographically limited, like the creation of chemical-weapon-free zones in some regions, can be useful as confidence-building measures, but cannot replace a comprehensive ban. As a signatory of the 1925 Protocol, Yugoslavia has always been willing to consult with all interested parties on how best to contribute to a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

We are happy to see our colleague Ian Cromartie in the chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this year. We know his knowledge and expertise of the subject and have great confidence in his ability -- and that of his staff -- to carry matters forward. We pay tribute to his predecessor, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, to whom we are indebted for his dedication and perseverance in carrying matters a few steps forward. We wish him well in this period of recovery.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons begins its work at a time of new reports of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War. We listened with great attention to the statements made by our colleague of Iran on 18 February and subsequently by the Foreign Minister of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, on 27 February, that also dealt with this matter. These communications reminded us of the sad fact that chemical warfare is still a tragic reality of our days. The continued violation of the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons is, of course, of direct relevance to us in the Conference. Indeed, the violation of these and other rules of international law threaten to undermine our efforts on negotiating new rules.

It is against the background of violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 that the Netherlands Government, jointly with others, took measures to prevent the export of certain chemical compounds liable to lead to the production of chemical weapons. We are worried by reports on a continuing spread of chemical weapons in the world, both because of the inherent threat of actual use and because it complicates our efforts to ban chemical weapons altogether. We share with others in this room, the sense of urgency to cope effectively with the danger of a further spreading of chemical weapons in the world. We also recognize that non-transfer arrangements are required in the future Convention, which will apply as long as that Convention is not universally adhered to. We do not consider the conclusion of a formal treaty -- on the analogy of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty -- a desirable objective. Efforts towards a non-proliferation régime would only detract from our main objective, hopefully not too far away, of the conclusion of a comprehensive chemical-weapons ban. Such a ban, universally adhered to, is after all the most effective answer to the problem.

All delegations in this room agree on the objective of a timely conclusion of a convention completely banning chemical weapons. That common objective of ours is, in my view, slowly but steadily taking shape. In the last few years in particular, a general understanding has been reached on the structure of the future convention. Much agreed language on various parts of the convention has been drafted in a common effort. We have a fair amount of ideas in common now on what it is that the convention will have to prohibit. As a result we have a clearer picture of what will have to be monitored, so as to ensure that the convention is fully complied with and therefore consonant with member countries' security concerns.

But as we gained a clearer insight into the issues involved, our focus sharpened also on what still needs to be resolved. First, there are the modalities for carrying out the various undertakings under the convention, which in many cases still need to be discussed and negotiated upon. Mere details as they may appear to some, they are vital to the adequate functioning of the convention. And then, there are certain basic undertakings of the convention that have hardly been touched upon. We welcome the fact that

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

General Secretary Gorbachev has stressed the determination of the Soviet Union to achieve the early and complete elimination of chemical weapons and of what is called "the industrial base for their production". We are interested to hear how the Soviet delegation wishes to amplify this statement in detail in due course.

Enough has been said, I think, to illustrate that progress is possible but that we are not going to sign the convention next week. Key issues, in particular with regard to verification and compliance, remain to be resolved. We must make sure that all existing chemical-weapon stocks are declared and subsequently destroyed over a period of time; that declared chemical weapons plants stop production and are dismantled; that no new chemical weapons are produced clandestinely either in a chemical weapons production facility that never had been declared or under the perfectly innocent guise of the civil chemical industry. Chemical weapons are relatively easy to produce and it is perhaps still easier to hide them. Effectively verifying that the convention is not violated appears to be an immense task. Yet from an organizational point of view the task seems to be manageable as was also indicated in a working document introduced by my delegation in this Conference in 1984 (CD/445).

As already announced in my statement on 15 August 1985, the Netherlands Government intends this year to make a further contribution to clarifying the organizational and technical issues involved in verifying compliance with a future comprehensive chemical-weapons ban. In a workshop to be held this summer, we intend to focus on the question of non-production of chemical weapons in the civil chemical industry. In the past the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom have organized very useful visits to civil chemical plants for members of delegations of the Conference on Disarmament. This time, we aim at making one further step, by concentrating in more detail on the possible methods of verification of non-production. We therefore hope, in co-operation with participants, to do some pioneering work, as it were.

We certainly do not pretend to provide delegations once and for all with the solutions to the problems of verification of non-production, nor will the workshop give participants a full picture of what a routine inspection of a modern chemical plant will look like under a Chemical Weapons Convention. None the less we are confident that it will lead to a greater insight into the technical and organizational problems of verifying non-production and we trust that in this way it will give an impetus to ongoing negotiations on the subject.

I am pleased to announce that the Netherlands Workshop on Verification of Non-Production of Chemical Weapons in the Civil Chemical Industry will be held in our country on 4, 5 and 6 June next. Delegations will shortly receive an invitation to participate in the Workshop. A provisional programme as well as some practical information will be sent as an annex to the invitation. My delegation welcomes any comments or suggestions which may improve or complement the suggested programme. We remain at the disposal of delegations for any additional information they may wish to receive. For the moment, I shall limit myself to some preliminary observations.

It is our intention to enable the participants to acquaint themselves with some of the possibilities for and problems connected with inspecting

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

chemical industries in general. We all know, for instance, that the future chemical-weapons ban will have to strike a careful balance between the need of an effective verification régime, inspiring State parties with confidence in compliance with the Convention and, on the other hand, the need to safeguard the legitimate commercial interests of the chemical industry to be inspected. In other words, we have to balance the need for verification of non-production of chemical weapons with the need for not hampering legitimate civil production. Crucial to success in this balancing act is accurate knowledge of all factors involved. I feel confident that we have sufficient knowledge about the chemical weapons aspects of the problem, but I have the impression that we often lack precise knowledge about relevant aspects of the civil use of key precursors. We shall touch upon the latter issue on the first day of the Workshop. To that end, participants will receive an overview of existing national regulations in the Netherlands.

The task of developing methods of verification that take the required balance into account is a formidable one. But there certainly is no reason for despair. As undoubtedly in many other countries, we in the Netherlands have acquired a lot of experience with inspecting chemical industries for a variety of purposes, such as environmental protection, public health and safety. This system of inspection can, if necessary, be very intrusive, but at the same time it safeguards the intellectual property of the inspected plants.

We are, of course, very well aware of the difference between existing national inspection for civil purposes and the kind of international inspection needed under a chemical weapons convention. We believe, however, that a brief review of the experience the Netherlands has gained with existing national inspection will provide a proper background for a fruitful discussion -- at the Workshop, but also later on in the Conference -- on the international inspection we are heading for in the chemical weapons convention.

The centre-piece of our Workshop will be a report to be prepared for the Workshop on an experimental inspection of a production installation that is processing trimethyl phosphite. A few words may serve to clarify the relevance of verification of non-production in such a production installation.

There seems to be a consensus amongst delegations that the production of compounds with a P-methyl bond deserves special treatment in a chemical weapons convention because of the importance of those compounds as key precursors of certain nerve agents. Trimethyl phosphite is not a compound with a P-methyl bond but can relatively easily be transformed into such a compound. The main purpose of the experimental inspection is to study and test organizational and technical aspects involved in verification measures that are to ensure that the production installation processing trimethyl phosphite is not used for the production of compounds with a P-methyl bond.

The results of this experimental inspection will be discussed at the Workshop on the basis of documentation on the experiment to be made available to delegations. And, of course, the inspected chemical plant itself will be visited, in order to permit participants to get a better insight into the nature of the problem on the spot.

We hope that all delegations will be in a position and willing to participate in the Workshop. I would say: come and see for yourself this summer.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

In making a contribution to the solution of the issue of verification of non-production we hope to give a fresh impetus towards the solution of the verification issue in general. Problems at present under discussion in the negotiations are indeed complex, but technicalities can never be so complex that we cannot overcome them. This work of ours may sometimes appear less spectacular and will perhaps also be more tedious than the deliberations of a more general nature and on a more elevated level to which we are used in this chamber. But it should remind us of Werner Sombart's words: "Das richtige ist meistens langweiliger als das Falsche" -- "Right action is generally more tedious than falsehood".

CD/PV.347

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Mr. SHAFII (Islamic Republic of Iran): Thank you, Mr. President. We have here with us today two Iranian victims of the air-raid use of chemical weapons in Isfahan. If you will allow me, I will make a short statement in this respect. The two gentlemen behind me were kind enough to come to this meeting, in spite of some difficulties, to make their modest contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament: they are physicians, Dr. Bagherpoor Tehrani and Dr. Dehdashtian, who have been undergoing medical treatment in Switzerland and are now on their way to Iran. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express the sincere thanks of my Government and my delegation to the Swiss Government and to the Swiss hospitals for the humanitarian efforts they have made with regard to the treatment of these and many other Iranian victims of chemical-weapon use. It is very much hoped that other countries too will show influence and co-operation, as a matter of humanitarian principle, in receiving chemical-weapon victims in their territory, and in this way show their sincere commitment with regard to the ban on the use of chemical weapons. Now, if you will permit me, I will leave this seat so that Dr. Tehrani may say a few words concerning his experience of the use of chemical weapons.

Dr. TEHRANI (Islamic Republic of Iran) (translated from French): In the name of God, the Merciful. My name is Ahmad Bagherpoor Tehrani. I am a doctor and I work at Lormanadouli hospital in Teheran. I was sent to the front for a month, I worked in Fatene Ahra hospital, near Abadan, where I attended the wounded. It was towards the end of February, when I was on night duty until 2 o'clock in the morning. After falling asleep in the morning, I was woken up by the noise of rockets near the hospital. The hospital director came to my room and said that we all had to go to the emergency ward because there was a large number of wounded. Then we noticed that there was a strange smell in the room. The other doctors who were with me said that the rockets used had been chemical rockets. We used the special uniforms which had been distributed and went to the hospital. There was a very large number of wounded. They had been exposed to cyanide gas and emergency

(Dr. Tehrani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

measures had to be taken to treat them. I was told that two rockets had been fired at the hospital. The first contained mustard gas and the second cyanide gas. The persons exposed to the cyanide gas had to be treated as emergencies, and therefore all the doctors there, 65 of us, began to tend the wounded. As I have told you, there were many wounded, and we ourselves were exposed to the gas. We used special uniforms and masks and worked until 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon: we spent some six or seven hours caring for the wounded, we could not leave the hospital because we had to be there, it was a matter of professional conscience to stay there and tend to all the wounded. At about 3 o'clock in the afternoon the effects of the mustard gas started, and my colleagues were also able to note the effects of its use. We observed cases of conjunctivitis and vomiting among the wounded. When I found that I myself was suffering from these effects I could no longer stay there. The activities of the hospital came to a halt, the 65 or so doctors working there, as well as the rest of the medical personnel, especially those working in the surgical theatres, all had to stop work. All the doctors and all the medical personnel were sent to Ahwad, and from there to Tehran and from Tehran to Geneva. I was sent to the CHUV ¹/ in Lausanne and I must say that I was very well taken in and cared for there. Now I am here, and all my back has been burned, but I was allowed to leave the hospital anyway and I think that I can continue my treatment in Tehran. I should like to thank the authorities of the Lausanne hospital as well as the Swiss Government for having taken us in. The victims of chemical weapons sent to many countries can serve to prove the actual use of these weapons. They are cases which the Conference can use as examples of the violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or of a future convention. In conclusion, we should like to express the hope that the Conference, whose purpose is disarmament, may take this matter seriously and show its dedication to disarmament, which it can do by reacting in a suitable way to such a flagrant use of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Mariátegui, Peru)

Our delegation highly appreciates the progress made last year and in January of this year by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the efficient leadership of Ambassador Turbanski, in its work to conclude a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles. This progress may be seen in the process of defining and classifying the relevant chemicals and on the issue of the identification of chemical weapon production facilities and measures to eliminate them.

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Mr. KAMYAB (Islamic Republic of Iran): Objectivity with regard to the maintenance of respect for international obligations and undertakings related to international law has always been emphasized by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran as being of vital importance for the security of all nations and for the strengthening of the foundations on which the international community, composed of some large and many smaller nations, may continue its life with dignity and honour on the firm ground of prevalence of justice in international relations.

The adoption, however, of irresponsible attitudes on the part of certain countries in respect of many gross violations of international law, especially in the course of the Iran/Iraq war, has led to the continuation and further exacerbation of the violations in a much more blatant manner.

Nevertheless, Iran fights hard for the maintenance of respect for humanitarian principles and regulations concerning armed conflict to the almost unprecedented extent of not resorting to retaliation in kind even when confronted with instances of such gross violations as attacks against civil airlines and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. Certainly

(Mr. Kamyab, Islamic Republic of Iran)

there is also a role to be played by the international system and individual countries, or a group of them, in respect of such blatant violations of international law.

In the course of the past few years, Iraq has on many occasions resorted to the use of chemical weapons. The renewed use of chemical weapons during the course of the present year, however, became widespread during the month of February. The attacks were made against a number of Iranian cities and also against the new Iranian positions.

Therefore, a request was made to the United Nations Secretary-General for the despatch of a team of specialists to investigate the use of chemical weapons. On 24 February 1986, the Secretary-General gave instructions for the mission to assemble in Vienna and proceed without further delay to Iran and at the same time reiterated to the Government of Iraq his readiness to instruct the mission to visit Iraq also, to investigate Iraq's allegations with regard to this issue, should the Government so request. The request did not meet with a positive response from Iraq. The United Nations team of specialists visited Iran from 26 February to 3 March 1986, however, and with the support of the experience, knowledge and the results obtained during the two earlier investigations, conducted in 1984 and 1985, very important findings and conclusions were produced in the framework of their report to the United Nations Secretary-General.

The report S/17911 of 14 March 1986 will in the near future be presented to the Conference, but until then I consider it of importance to the Conference to draw attention to the most important parts of that report. It is recorded as an important point (paragraph 30) that there was a lapse of about two weeks between the dates of the first alleged attacks and the arrival of the mission in Iran, in addition, unusually heavy rain had occurred and many areas were flooded. The delay and the environmental degradation of chemical warfare agents that might have been used in attacks, particularly the nerve gas Tabun, made the chemical part of the work difficult, according to the report.

Paragraph 29 indicates that "it should be placed on record here that immense efforts have been made to attend to those exposed to chemical agents, that the medical treatment provided is perfectly in order, that the quality of the doctors responsible for such treatment is very high, that all the victims are treated with the utmost compassion and care, and the affected Iraqi prisoners are also treated with the utmost care and respect."

The chance that inaction on the part of the international system has given to Iraq for the improvement of its tactics is very well reflected in paragraph 42 of the report: "On this mission no unexploded bombs were found. This is not surprising as we were told by a captured Iraqi pilot during interview at the Shaheed Baghai Hospital in Ahvaz on 28 February 1986 that impact fuses were now being used in place of time fuses used previously and described in our earlier report. The pilot also stated that due to changes in tactics, chemical bombs are usually dropped from aircraft flying at high altitude instead of low altitude as used previously." And it continues on the next paragraph to say that "The Iraqi pilot also stated that the use of chemical bombs had to be specifically authorized and pilots were not permitted to examine critically those attached to their aircraft prior to undertaking a

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'special mission'. In spite of this restriction, the pilot was able accurately to describe the colour, shape, marking and mass of chemical bombs currently being used in attacks against Iranian forces and his description coincided with our description of the bombs examined by us in 1984."

The validity of the testimony given by the Iraqi pilot is emphasized immediately on the following paragraph (44). "The testimony of the Iraqi pilot given through an interpreter in the presence of all members of the United Nations team, was obtained without prompting or duress. The evidence is so vital that it cannot be ignored."

Very important points are also witnessed by other Iraqi casualties (paragraphs 51 and 52). "On Thursday 27 February 1986, we interviewed 9 Iraqi casualties, from a group of 15 being treated at the Labbati-Nejad Medical Centre for injuries suffered from chemical weapons in the Al Faw area about three days before. The interview was conducted by the mission in the presence of two doctors and through an interpreter. The information was provided by the Iraqis voluntarily without duress and with no prompting and in a free manner. The Iraqi personnel gave a consistent account of the attacks that caused their injuries, either after they had been captured by, or had surrendered to, Iranian forces or were in no man's land between the opposing forces. Almost all of the Iraqi personnel claimed that they had been injured by bombs dropped by Iraqi aircraft. When asked how they knew the identity of the aircraft they stated that the aircraft were bombing Iranian positions and were subject to Iranian anti-aircraft fire."

The specialists then point out that a hospital in Ahvaz they interviewed the Iraqi pilot whose aircraft had been shot down by an Iranian air-to-air missile several days before. The pilot responding freely and voluntarily and without any duress, stated that he had participated in two "special missions" against Iranian forces using chemical bombs.

Paragraph 56 under the heading "Summary and Conclusions" states the summary comments in relation to the present investigation in the following manner:

"(a) detailed examination of Iranian casualties showed ocular lesions, ranging from mild to severe conjunctivitis with intense palpebral oedema, skin lesions including large vesicles filled with amber fluid, cutaneous separations, dark pigmentations and lesions approximating to second degree burns. In some of the cases respiratory injuries and reduced leucocyte levels were found. The same features were found in other casualties which were cursorily examined as well as in corpses. All the lesions observed were caused, without any doubt, by mustard gas (yperite).

(b) using a special instrument designed to detect chemical warfare agents, low concentrations of mustard gas vapour were detected in numerous craters at three sites around Abadan. Contaminated soil collected from a bomb crater (resulting from an attack the previous day on a field hospital) when analysed in laboratories in Europe, was found to contain mustard gas. In addition a hair sample collected from a victim after he had been attacked with chemical weapons was shown to contain mustard gas.

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(c) examination of metal components of aerial bombs, collected from bomb craters around Abadan, showed that the items had come from bombs that were similar to those examined by the team in 1984. (During the present mission we did not find nor were we shown any other type of chemical weapons, such as artillery shells).

(d) significant new evidence was provided during the interviews in Tehran of Iraqi casualties. They stated that their injuries had been caused by chemical bombs dropped by Iraqi aircraft during attacks on Iranian positions.

(e) important new evidence was also provided by a captured Iraqi pilot. He confirmed that Iraqi aircraft had been used to attack Iranian positions with chemical bombs and that he had personally participated in two such 'special missions'.

The next paragraph (57), reads as follows: "From the present investigation the following are our unanimous conclusions:

(a) in areas around Abadan inspected by the mission, chemical weapons have been used against Iranian positions by Iraqi Forces,

(b) based on medical examinations and testimony of Iranian and Iraqi casualties evacuated from the Al Faw area, chemical weapons were also used in that war zone by Iraqi Forces,

(c) from the evidence examined by the specialists the type of weapon used was aerial bombs,

(d) the chemical used was mustard gas (yperite),

(e) the extent to which mustard gas was used could not be determined with the time and resources available to us. However, from the over 700 casualties actually seen in Tehran and Ahvaz it is our impression that the use of chemical weapons in 1986 appears to be more extensive than in 1984."

The concluding paragraph (58), however, indicated that: "after having conducted the examination of various sites, weapons components and numerous casualties in our investigations undertaken in 1984, 1985 and 1986, according to the guidelines given by the Secretary-General, together with circumstantial evidence, we unanimously conclude that:

(a) on many occasions, Iraqi Forces have used chemical weapons against Iranian Forces,

(b) the agent used mainly has been mustard gas although on some occasions nerve gas was also employed."

Finally in transmitting the report of the specialists to the Security Council, the Secretary-General notes with regret that "the specialists have confirmed use of chemical weapons by Iraqi forces against Iranian Forces".

(Mr. Kamyab, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The Islamic Republic of Iran expresses its sincere thanks to the United Nations Secretary-General and to the team of specialists (who also presented the first report on this subject in March 1984 (document S/16433)), composed of four eminent experts from Australia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, with Mr. Iqbal Riza as co-ordinator, for their devotion and courage in carrying out duties entrusted upon them.

Their courageous endeavour, though bringing to light only a minor part of the gross violations incurred by the régime in Iraq, calls indeed for sincere appreciation on the part of this Conference for the contribution this work has done towards the construction of a sure road to disarmament and security.

I am of the opinion that it would be highly beneficial to the activities of the Conference and particularly to the ongoing work in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in respect of the verification aspects of the future chemical weapons convention, to draw the attention on my colleagues to the invaluable knowledge and experience obtained during the three successful chemical-weapon investigations in 1984, 1985 and 1986 by the United Nations team of specialists, and I put forward for consideration by the Conference the suggestion that a request be addressed in the appropriate manner to the United Nations Secretary-General for the provision to the Conference of the experience, knowledge and results obtained in the course of the three investigations carried out to date by the team of specialists.

Experience we gain one way or another, and we may even be able to conclude, hopefully in a near future, the chemical weapons convention, but what I believe to be the most essential precondition for the real success of the Conference on Disarmament is an uninterrupted and objective effort by all of us here to preserve respect for and maintain credibility of the principles of the existing law, so that we may build upon what we have in a consistent and meaningful manner.

Therefore I am compelled to reiterate the need, as pointed out on previous occasions when I addressed the Disarmament Conference on the same issue, for suitable action on the part of the Conference in response to such gross violations of the existing international law, in particular the violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons in war. If we are serious in our work and have the sincere intention to make moves towards the sacred goal of disarmament in this Conference, we should not fail to condemn as the first step the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in the most clear terms. In this manner our progress towards peace and disarmament may certainly be guaranteed.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Before turning to the principal subject of my statement for today, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, I want to comment on a very troubling situation. The United States has noted the report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq conflict. We welcome the active role the Secretary-General has taken in ascertaining the facts in this grave matter.

The report's conclusion that Iraq has recently used chemical weapons against Iran is in accord with the United States findings. My country deplores Iraq's use of chemical weapons in this conflict. This use is a serious violation of international law and threatens the efforts of many decades to ban this form of warfare. The United States strongly condemns the prohibited use of chemical weapons wherever it occurs.

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(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

While condemning Iraq's use of chemical weapons, we should not lose sight of the fact that primary responsibility for the continuation of this senseless conflict lies with Iran. Iran continues to reject the many efforts of the international community to bring this war to an end. The United States repeats its call for the earliest possible termination of hostilities.

The United States has consistently opposed the flagrant violations of the Geneva Protocol which have occurred in recent years. Iraq's use of chemical weapons, confirmed by the report of the United Nations investigating team, underscores the need for us here in the Conference to achieve a comprehensive, verifiable ban on the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. It is our responsibility to achieve agreement on this global prohibition and the responsibility of each nation to respect and uphold existing arms control agreements.

Mr. ROWE (Australia): As this is the first occasion on which the Australian delegation has addressed the plenary during your tenure as President, I wish to assure you of our full co-operation and support in the exercise of your office.

I wish to inform the plenary this morning of a statement which the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bill Hayden, has issued in connection with the report of the United Nations Secretary-General, released in New York on 14 March, which again confirms that chemical weapons have been used in the Iran-Iraq war.

The report, by a team of experts including an Australian Defence Scientist, Dr. Peter Dunn, which visited Iran from 26 February to 3 March, this year concludes that aerial bombing with chemical agents had taken place in battle zones visited by the team during its investigation. Evidence collected by the team on this occasion pointed to the chemical agent being mustard gas.

The report also refers to earlier investigations undertaken by members of the team in 1984 and 1985. In its current report the team unanimously concludes on the basis of the investigations in 1984, 1985 and 1986, that on many occasions Iraqi forces have used chemical weapons against Iranian forces.

Mr. Hayden said, in his statement, that there could be no justification for Iraq's continuing use of these barbaric weapons which constituted a clear breach of international law and a threat to international security. Both Iraq and Iran, as well as Australia, are parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use of chemical weapons. He recalled that the Australian Government had made clear on many occasions that it would condemn unreservedly any use of chemical weapons wherever and whenever it should occur. It had no hesitation in doing so now.

Mr. Hayden paid special tribute to the members of the Secretary-General's team. He said their investigations in 1984, and again in 1986, which had required them to enter a combat zone and handle extremely hazardous and toxic substances, had placed the team members in real physical danger.

The team's conclusion, Mr. Hayden said, reinforced Australia's view that the negotiation of a comprehensive convention banning the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and requiring the destruction of existing chemical weapons must be pursued with the utmost vigour in this Conference. It also underlined the urgent need for appropriate interim measures pending the conclusion of that Convention.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

Prohibition of chemical weapons is one of the priority items on the agenda of this Conference. The fortieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted by consensus a resolution urging the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its negotiations with a view to accomplishing its task of elaborating a convention on prohibition of chemical weapons. This once again shows the strong desire of the international community to eliminate once and for all such abhorrent weapons on Earth. The urgency of the issue has further increased especially because of the harsh reality that today, more than 60 years after the signing of the Geneva Protocol, chemical weapons are still being used.

Compared with other items, the prohibition of chemical weapons is indeed the most promising. The work over the past few years has resulted in some progress in the negotiations on chemical weapons. A preliminary structure of the future convention is already before us. With regard to a number of long-standing controversial issues, differences have gradually been narrowed in some cases, while consensus is emerging on others. On the scope of prohibition, all sides have basically agreed that it should cover prohibition of use and that the principles, purposes and obligations assumed under the 1925 Geneva Protocol should be reaffirmed in the convention. With regard to destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles, the principle of continuous on-site inspections has been generally accepted. During the resumed session in January, an integrated approach was adopted for listing relevant chemicals, thus freeing us, on the elaboration of lists and criteria, from the three-year-old argument about "which should come first, the chicken or the egg?". All these demonstrate that, given the sincere will of all sides to iron out differences in a spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation, it is possible for our negotiations to move forward.

Since the beginning of the current session, we have seen some new developments that are conducive to our negotiations. It didn't take long before we re-established the Ad Hoc Committee and the three working groups and adopted their respective work programmes through consultations. A high degree of enthusiasm is manifested by many delegations in their statements on this item. Some delegations have submitted or will submit new working papers. The Canadian delegation has prepared specially for the Conference a Compendium of All Chemical Weapons Documentation for the Period 1983 to 1985 and a Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons. Besides, it has been noted that the two States with the largest chemical weapons arsenals have both expressed their willingness to accelerate the negotiations on the convention and to help solve problems in the multilateral negotiations through their bilateral talks. All these are undoubtedly encouraging developments. People have every reason to expect that, under the able guidance of Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and that of the Chairmen of the three working groups, as well as with the joint efforts of all the delegations, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will be crowned with further achievements this year.

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We cannot, of course, overlook the fact that the task before us is still very heavy. Divergences remain on a number of issues while some other issues have yet to be dealt with in depth. Great efforts still have to be made in order to resolve these issues. With a view to facilitating the progress of the on-going negotiations, the Chinese delegation wishes to offer its observations on the following issues.

First, lists of chemicals. Although an integrated approach for listing relevant chemicals was established during the resumed session in January, the lists are after all preliminary ones and have yet to be enriched through further discussions. In this connection, a new aspect that merits our attention is the régimes to which chemicals of various categories are subject. This is a matter of concern to many delegations and their concern is not without grounds, because without knowing the régimes for the listed chemicals, it would be difficult to judge whether the categorization of chemicals is rational, and this will probably lead to another round of "chicken or egg" arguments. We are very pleased to note that at present the relevant working group has already adopted the right approach of considering the lists, criteria and régimes together. The comprehensive approach for elaborating régimes for chemicals submitted by the Swedish delegation (CD/632) last year which contains three régimes for different chemicals merits our careful study and utilization.

Second, identification of chemical weapons production facilities. Useful discussions were held on this subject during the resumed session in January and the discussions should be pursued. The greater part of the discussions involved the question of criteria for the elaboration of the definition of chemical weapons production facilities, a question of whether it is better to make the scope of the criteria wider or narrower. It is our consistent view that only the facilities and technological units used solely for production of chemical warfare agents and their key precursors with no peaceful purposes be defined as chemical weapons production facilities, so that the scope of the criteria will not be made too wide; for too wide a scope will not be conducive to the effectiveness of the future convention. One idea suggests that it should also cover dual-purpose production facilities and that the identification may be based on the ratio between the products for peaceful purposes and the products for chemical weapons purposes. In our view, this will give rise to many difficulties that are not easy to overcome, one of which is that for various reasons, the demand for civilian products might change year by year. If the identification is based on the percentage designated to the products, then which year's data shall be taken as the standard? And how could future economic and scientific developments be taken into account? Therefore, we believe a more appropriate way to handle dual-purpose production facilities is to subject them to supervision and control under the system of CW non-production verification.

Third, the definition of chemical weapons and destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. In order to eliminate once and for all the threat of chemical warfare, destruction of the existing chemical weapons stockpiles should be the primary objective of the future convention; at the same time, effective régimes should be established for those chemicals that may be used for chemical weapons purposes according to their chemical and physical properties, so as to prevent the emergence of new types of chemical weapons. To this end, it is necessary to elaborate a scientific definition for chemical weapons. In this connection, it is our consistent proposition that the concept of "chemical warfare agents" should be used. Because, concise as it

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is, it can reflect clearly the most important criterion in the elaboration of the convention, namely, the general purpose criterion. Furthermore, the concept itself contains some objective technical criteria for judging whether a toxic chemical can be used for hostile purposes. Therefore, it covers all the toxic chemicals that can be used for hostile purposes, both the existing ones and the ones that may possibly emerge in future. As a matter of fact, this concept has been in general use internationally for many years. However, some delegations have all along held differing views on using the concept in the convention. Over the past two years, we have adopted a relatively flexible approach and agreed to use other expressions and retain our views in the footnote. However, in the course of discussions over the past year, we have felt that in the elaboration of the definition of chemical weapons the use of neutral terms that cannot reflect the general purpose criterion could easily lead to confusion and misunderstanding. We hope that with regard to the question of definition, explorations will be continued with a view to reaching a solution satisfactory to all.

With regard to destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, in our Working Paper CD/443, submitted in 1984, we proposed that in order to free mankind from the threat of chemical warfare as early as possible, the States that possess chemical weapons should in the first place destroy those chemical weapons stockpiles which are most toxic and dangerous. In 1985, we further submitted document CD/605 concerning the question of destruction. In that document, we proposed that States parties should destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles proportionally and by stages, and in addition, we also introduced the concept of "stockpile equivalent of chemical warfare agents" and the calculation formula that takes into account both the quantity of stockpiles and toxicity intensity in determining the quantity to be destroyed. We are very pleased that the paper has received positive appraisals. We will continue to work in co-operation with other delegations to further improve it. We are also prepared to study relevant suggestions from other delegations.

Fourth, verification. This is a key issue in the elaboration of the future convention, and it could even be said that it is an issue of decisive importance to the reaching of an agreement on the convention. It is gratifying to note that on verification of the process of destruction, views of various sides appear to be converging. Since 1984, it has been agreed in principle that the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles should be carried out under strict supervision by continuous international on-site inspections. We believe it is time now to start with the elaboration of specific verification procedures. A number of delegations have already submitted some papers on the subject, which can serve as the basis for our work.

Challenge verification, or fact-finding, has all along been the most difficult issue. If the countries concerned continue to stick to their respective positions and level charges against each other, progress in the negotiations will be out of the question. It is the consistent view of China that verification should be strict and effective, and at the same time, appropriate and rational. The resolution on the question of verification adopted by consensus at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly also emphatically points out: "Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures that are non-discriminatory and that do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development." As we see it, since all

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sides have accepted such a guideline, then, given the sincere will, it should not be difficult to find a solution acceptable to all. Working Paper CD/664, entitled "Fact-Finding Under the Future Chemical Weapons Convention", submitted not long ago by the delegation of Pakistan, represents a valuable effort to reconcile differing positions and deserves our serious study.

The Chinese Government has all along attached importance to the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Chinese delegation, pursuant to the proposal set forth in the speech by Premier Zhao Ziyang, will make its own efforts for the early conclusion of the convention on prohibition of chemical weapons.

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Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): Mr. President, today we start the two weeks in our programme of work allotted for the Plenary consideration of chemical weapons, which is the subject of my statement today. I should like first to comment on recent events outside this Conference which have been the object of a report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and of a statement by the Security Council. The United Kingdom Government issued a statement on this subject on 21 March, of which the text is as follows:

"Her Majesty's Government unreservedly support the Security Council statement on the report of the United Nations Secretary-General's mission to investigate the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq conflict.

The report showed that chemical weapons had been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian forces. We greatly regret that Iraq has been clearly shown to have been in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use of such weapons.

At the same time we fully share the concern expressed in the statement about the risk of extension of the conflict and fully endorse the call for the territorial integrity of neighbouring States. We also fully support the call for the immediate cessation of hostilities which would open the way to a regulated and comprehensive ending to this tragic conflict."

This is the national comment of the United Kingdom on these events and you will have heard other national comments both in this Conference and outside it. Whatever differences of view or emphasis there may be among the delegations represented here, I think that one message of these tragic events to the Conference is clear. The Geneva Protocol of 1925, which has been a strong bastion for the last 60 years against the horrors of chemical warfare, needs to be buttressed by a complete ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and by the destruction of those chemical weapons that already exist. There has long been consensus in this Conference that it is our joint task to elaborate a multilateral convention for this purpose. In detailed negotiations over the last four years the Conference has already made considerable progress towards the realization of this common aim and I should like to pay tribute to my predecessors as Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee for their major contributions to the identification of the common ground that now exists within the Conference on this subject. Under

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the Chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus in 1984 a framework of articles for a Convention was established and within it a considerable amount of common ground on the substantive issues identified, some of it in the form of Treaty text enjoying a provisional consensus. During the 1985 session further progress was made under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland. I should like to take the opportunity, both on behalf of my own delegation, and of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to express my regret that his illness prevents him from being here today and to wish him a speedy recovery. We are all indebted to him for the reports of the Ad Hoc Committee contained in documents CD/636 and CD/651, which form the foundation for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee this year. As its current Chairman I should like to report briefly on the present position.

As in the two previous years the Ad Hoc Committee has established three Working Groups, which reported yesterday to the Committee on their first month of work. For the first time responsibility has been divided between Working Groups on the basis of numbered Articles in the draft convention. Working Group A, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Rowe of Australia, is responsible for Articles II and VI of the draft convention. It has been concentrating its work on Article VI and in particular on the lists of substances of concern under a chemical-weapons convention and the régimes to be applied to them. Working Group B, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Poptchev of Bulgaria, is responsible for Articles III, IV and V of the convention and has been concentrating its work on the first two articles on régimes for the declaration and destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons. Working Group C, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia, is responsible for Articles I, VII, VIII and IX of the convention and for the question of herbicides. The Working Group is concentrating initially on Article VIII on the Consultative Committee and related organs, which will provide the institutional framework for overseeing the implementation of the convention. It seems to me important that there should be a credible international institutional basis to contribute to the international confidence that will be required to bring into force the convention which we are negotiating and to sustain it against the pressures to which it will be exposed. The institutionalization of the convention will be important to provide a multilateral basis for consultation, co-operation and fact-finding under Article IX of the convention. It will equally be important to provide the framework for international oversight during the transitional period of the elimination of existing chemical weapons and facilities for their production under Articles III, IV and V of the convention. Last, but not least an effective organization will be important on a continuing basis to provide assurance under Article VI of the convention that the civil chemical industry is not being misused for the clandestine manufacture of chemical weapons. I am sure that it is right to pursue these three elements of the convention independently in the three Working Groups but I should like to take this opportunity of emphasizing their interdependence. Confidence in the convention will need to be built on a combination of methods of verification, which will all require an effective organization for their implementation.

In the light of the reports of the Chairmen of the three Working Groups to the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee yesterday and in the light of conversations that my own delegation has had with others, I detect an improved spirit of co-operation in negotiation of the convention and an increased hope of realizing our goal in the foreseeable future. An important factor has been the joint statement at their Summit meeting last November by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, who reaffirmed that they were in favour of a

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general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons; and they agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international Convention on this matter. This statement of common purpose is of great importance to our Conference and I shall continue to remind my two neighbours at this table of it. I would, however, emphasize that what we are negotiating is a multilateral Convention to attract the adherence of all countries represented round this table and in the world outside. This negotiation is a crucial test of the efficacy in practice of the multilateral negotiation of international agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament. If we jointly meet this challenge and conclude a Convention it will be the first concrete achievement of the Conference in its present form. As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee I will spare no effort to this end.

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Mr. DESPRES (Canada): Mr. President, participants in this forum will be aware that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has reported to the Security Council, on the basis of the findings of an international investigative team which he sent to the area, that the renewed use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war has been confirmed. The President of the Security Council on 21 March issued a statement on behalf of the Council which includes a strong condemnation of this continued use of chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Security Council statement also includes a renewed demand that the provisions of that Protocol be strictly

(Mr. Despres, Canada)

observed. This is the third such confirmation of chemical weapons use in that war. In this instance, the use of chemical weapons by Iraqi forces against Iranian forces has been confirmed. This ought to be cause for dismay on the part of the entire international community.

It is well known that the investigation of allegations of chemical weapons use is a matter in which Canada has taken a particular interest and to which we have devoted considerable effort. During the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, presented to the Secretary-General a handbook on the investigation of allegations of the use of chemical weapons or biological weapons precisely for the purpose of assisting in investigations of the kind that has recently been completed. On 11 March that handbook was submitted in this forum as something that would be of use in the future in the context of a verification régime that would be part of a chemical-weapons convention as it is being negotiated. Canada lauds the Secretary-General for again taking the initiative to investigate the most recent allegations of chemical weapons use.

Canada, a signatory of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning chemical-weapons use, strongly opposes the use of chemical weapons. We call on all signatories to the 1925 Protocol, including both combatants in the Gulf war, to adhere to their legal obligations. We resolutely condemn any action that has been or might be taken in breach of that agreement.

In taking this position, the Government of Canada is in no way seeking to take sides between the combatants in that tragic war, which ought to be brought to a negotiated conclusion as soon as possible in accordance with Security Council resolution 582. Our concern is to maintain and strengthen the authority and integrity of international agreements.

We are also concerned at any actions which would have the effect of undermining the efforts in this forum to conclude a comprehensive, verifiable chemical-weapons ban and have it universally applied. The evidence of recent chemical-weapons use should reinforce our sense of urgency to complete this priority task. We hope the international community will be unanimous in condemning any future use of this kind of weapon, which we have by agreement defined as a weapon of mass destruction which ought not to be used.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic):

The first part of the 1986 session of the Conference is coming to a close, with no tangible progress in sight. Even the negotiations to ban chemical weapons are, in the opinion of my delegation, not moving at the anticipated pace. Glossing over the real situation will certainly be no help to us. Let me add, though, that justified disappointment must not lead to resignation. No, we are not going to oblige those who are eager to carry on their arms build-up with as little disturbance as possible. This Conference cannot afford to give up its endeavours to attain concrete results slowing down the arms race. What we need most of all at this stage is perseverance.

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(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

The complete and effective prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction are one of the most pressing of disarmament issues. The Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 already prohibits the use of asphyxiating, toxic or similar gases. Nevertheless, it has loopholes because it is primarily the use of the gases mentioned in the Protocol which is prohibited, and not their manufacture, possession or sale. Today that Protocol is being violated by the use of chemical weapons in wars which usually take place in third world countries. Sanctions cannot be taken with regard to those that violate the Protocol because the text is silent on this point. It is therefore imperative to conclude a convention in this field which would supplement the obligations undertaken under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925. The progress made in chemistry makes it possible to distinguish between lethal agents and non-lethal agents whose neutralizing effects have often been sought after and used in combat. Chemical agents have a great potential for rapidly changing

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their state as soon as they are used in one environment or another. Consequently, all possible reactions cannot be foreseen. The family of highly dangerous chemicals includes mustard gas and hemo-toxic gas which, in high doses, lead to a sudden loss of consciousness then rapid death by respiratory failure. It is well known that such weapons have been tested in the territories of developing countries, wreaking havoc among innocent populations as well as the flora and fauna of those countries.

Of all the items included in the Conference's agenda, the item on chemical weapons remains the only one on which in-depth work has been carried out and has reached an advanced stage. The discussions focused inter alia on various solutions concerning the manufacture of chemicals for permitted purposes, the manufacture on a laboratory scale of amounts of supertoxic lethal chemicals, the identification of production facilities which would be subjected to various measures under the convention to be concluded, the question of challenge verification, and others. It has been universally recognized that under the present circumstances, with the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq, chemical disarmament has become a matter of exceptional urgency and seriousness. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is progressing well, and my delegation hopes that members of the Conference will deploy their best efforts to speed up the negotiations on the drafting of a chemical weapon convention, which could be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-third session, as recommended in General Assembly resolution 40/92 A.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): One can look at our work on a convention banning chemical weapons in one of two ways. On the one hand, one can cast an admiring glance at the tremendous amount of relevant materials already accumulated, at the multitude of useful concepts that have been evolved and been continuously rendered more precise, at the agreed structure of the future convention and the considerable number of articles on which agreement in principle has been reached or is in progress, and even at some paragraphs that have been negotiated more or less in their definitive form, untarnished by brackets, as fully carved stones that are ready to go into, and to adorn, the final edifice. While nobody would wish to belittle all these achievements, this view would be one of self-complacency.

The other look would focus on the tasks yet unaccomplished. This glass is half full, but it is at the same time half empty. Concentrating on the outstanding issues, sizing them up in their political significance and collecting the negotiating strength and political determination to tackle them, is the more responsible approach of negotiators, who in any event are not going to be measured by the aesthetic beauty of the half-finished product, but only by their success in bringing about a complete and operational convention.

Speaking in the First Committee at the fortieth session of the General Assembly, on 6 November 1985, my delegation attempted to direct the attention of all delegations to the major problem areas on which this year's negotiating effort would thus have to concentrate: the verification of non-production, and on-challenge verification. No substantial progress has been achieved in these two major focal areas; worse, a true negotiating effort has not been deployed on either of them, and delegations -- even at the relatively successful and constructive rump session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in January of this year -- have continued to indulge in a mere exchange of philosophical views.

Is there hope that this will change, that 1986 will bring us a breakthrough on the really significant political issues of the convention? Two events have occurred since my delegation voiced its concerns in this respect during the General Assembly's session last year, and both have been commented upon frequently and positively during the present spring session. On 21 November 1985, President Reagan and General-Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed their commitment to a chemical weapons ban and agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter. There are 40 parties negotiating this international convention, but the significance of this firm undertaking by the two major military Powers can hardly be overestimated. General-Secretary Gorbachev's declaration of 15 January 1986, again, shows a welcome preoccupation with the elimination of chemical weapons. Both the joint statement of the November summit and General-Secretary Gorbachev's utterances on chemical weapons have largely contributed to the tangible spirit of optimism and the constructive atmosphere that have prevailed during this session of the Conference on the subject of chemical weapons. It is therefore particularly important to probe the extent and precise meaning of these two major documents under the auspices of the two overriding negotiating tasks of which I have spoken and on which the success of this annual session hinges.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

General-Secretary Gorbachev's statement in part IV of his declaration of 15 January is equally important for what it spells out, and because of the points he passes over in silence. The sense of urgency which the author conveys in speaking of banning chemical weapons and his appeal to all participants in the negotiations to take "a fresh look at things" are praiseworthy. It is equally gratifying that the Soviet statement -- here as in other areas -- seems to take a constructive and unencumbered view of the necessity for effective and appropriate international verification measures. In addition, the statement offers a number of new perspectives, both as regards the declaration of location of current production facilities and the preparedness to move forcefully on the future elimination of production facilities for, and stockpiles of, chemical weapons. In these areas the Soviet policy, as now announced, coincides with universally held views in the negotiations and can be put to good use in widening the existing consensus and intensifying the work on particular treaty language.

It appears that the "fresh look at things" has also been translated by the Soviet delegation, since the commencement of our annual session, into an open and constructive attitude on a number of issues, leading one to the hypothesis that in its search for means to accelerate the negotiations the Soviet delegation would now be willing to provide a greater amount of flexibility on controversial issues than has been the case in the past.

If that is what is meant by the Soviet call for a "fresh look", it would be all for the better. In a sense, the Soviet statement seems to have captured in its formulation the very essence of multilateral negotiating, for it is a necessary prerequisite for further progress in such negotiations that all participants, without exception, continuously reassess their previous positions, as evidenced in earlier Conference documents, and look anew to common objectives and the possibility of adjusting their previous stance to mutually acceptable positions, striking a balance between one's perceived national security needs and the security requirements of the international community at large.

Yet, behind this outwardly constructive attitude a number of serious questions emerge. Even though my delegation -- and, I am confident, all other delegations in this room -- are prepared to give the Soviet delegation the benefit of the doubt, it must be said that, so far, most of the principles enunciated in the Soviet statement of 15 January have not been translated into concrete negotiating positions, and that it has not become evident where possible flexible departures from earlier views could become a feature of the negotiating process. No doubt, a statement such as that of 15 January, with its enormous width and broad coverage of all disarmament problems, once agreed upon at high level, needs a certain time to be fleshed out and detailed at the working level. This is a natural ingredient of any bureaucratic process in a negotiating environment. However, more than two months have passed since the announcement of the Soviet proposals and, in all honesty, the Conference has not seen on any of the particular issues what the detailed manifestations of the new policy are going to be. In the view of my delegation, the time has therefore come to pose to the Soviet delegation a number of questions in order to satisfy the legitimate need of other delegations to know where the negotiations are heading.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The question is whether we will have the full benefit of a new constructive attitude or whether, conceivably, only a minimalist version will be offered to us and at the working level an attempt is made to nibble away at the more positive and constructive tone employed at the highest level of political authority.

It is in a spirit of earnest endeavour, seeking to explore the concrete negotiating mode of one of the major participants in our negotiations, that I have, on behalf of my delegation, the following questions to ask:

(1) The very problem areas that are of perhaps crucial significance for the ultimate success of our negotiations, control of future non-production, and the complex issues of fact-finding and verification in cases where a suspicion of a breach of treaty has been voiced, are not explicitly addressed by the Soviet Union in its statement. Can one nevertheless assume that its call for "a fresh look at things" and the preparedness to agree to measures of strict control, including international on-site inspections would also pertain to these important subjects?

(2) Is the Soviet Union prepared, in the spirit of its statement of 15 January to modify its present position, as expressed in document CD/636, that on-challenge on-site inspections should be carried out only with the consent of a State party in regard to which the request is made? What is the interpretation to be attached to the remarks of Ambassador Issraelyan of 22 January before the Ad Hoc Working Group on article IX of the Convention that the decision to accept an on-site inspection should not be of an "entirely discretionary nature"?

(3) In the light of this latter statement, what would be the interpretation the Soviet Union now attaches to "strict control, including international on-site inspection" in such on-challenge cases? Will the Soviet Union now be prepared to engage in negotiations on a meaningful fact-finding system designed to clarify and resolve any situation which gives rise to suspicions about actions in breach of obligations under the future Convention?

(4) Since the Soviet Union advocates, among possible interim steps, a prohibition to transfer chemical weapons or to deploy them elsewhere, and since the Soviet Union affirms that it already strictly abides by such principles, would this mean that there are at present no chemical weapons whatsoever on the territories of other States, specifically in the Warsaw Treaty area, that have been transferred to these States by the Soviet Union, or are produced or deployed under Soviet jurisdiction or control?

(5) Is it correct to assume from the readiness, as announced in the statement, to declare the location of enterprises producing chemical weapons, that presently existing military storage sites of such weapons are not going to be communicated? And if so, how can it be reliably ascertained that all existing stocks be fully declared at the inception of the validity of the Convention and be fully subjected to destruction procedures?

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

(6) In the spirit of its readiness to eliminate the industrial base for the production of chemical weapons, will the Soviet Union agree to subject the industrial manufacture of key precursors which are suitable for the production of chemical weapons to mandatory systematic international verification, designed to prevent effectively the circumvention of the future Convention on the one hand, but not hindering the economic and technological activities of the contracting parties in the field of peaceful chemical activities?

(7) Can one conclude from the statement of 15 January and its emphasis on eliminating the industrial base of weapons production, that the Soviet Union is now prepared to abandon an earlier approach by which the civilian production of super-toxic lethal substances for permitted purposes, as needed in any modern industrial society, would be limited to only one small-scale facility under international supervision?

I am certain that other delegations share the interest of mine in a reply to these important questions and may eventually have questions of their own. It would thus be useful for all participants in the negotiations to receive a reply to these queries, both in the plenary of this Conference and in the relevant negotiation committee. May I conclude by thanking the Soviet delegation in advance for giving attention to the various questions I have formulated.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. President, I have not had an opportunity until today to congratulate you formally on your Presidency for the month of March. I would like to express the appreciation of my delegation for your distinguished and valuable leadership; I take this opportunity to commend also, in his absence, the work of your predecessor, Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia.

I have asked for the floor today in my capacity as Co-ordinator of the Western Group on Chemical Weapons in order to make a statement on their behalf, concerning the report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to investigate allegations of use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq.

The delegations of the Western Group have noted with great concern the report dated 6 March 1986 of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq, where it is unanimously concluded that "on many occasions, Iraqi forces have used chemical weapons against Iranian forces".

As members of this single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum engaged in the conclusion of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, including that of use, we strongly condemn the said use of chemical weapons in contravention of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, and we strongly support the statement made in this connection by the President of the Security Council on 20 March 1986.

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(Mr. Imai, Japan)

On this occasion, we believe that the Conference on Disarmament should make further and increased efforts for the successful conclusion of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons at the earliest opportunity.

In the meantime, we as members of this forum, are deeply concerned about the extended conflict between Iran and Iraq, and also stress the urgent need for both countries to work strenuously for an early peaceful settlement of the conflict.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): I take the floor briefly to draw your attention to the fact that this morning invitations for participation in our Workshop on aspects of verification of non-production of chemical weapons, have been distributed to all delegations of the Conference on Disarmament, to observer-delegations taking part in the chemical weapons negotiations as well as to the secretariat. As I announced in my statement of 13 March, the Workshop will take place on 4, 5 and 6 June next. I do hope, Mr. President, that we can welcome all those invited at the official opening on 4 June. As you will see in the invitation, we would very much appreciate it if delegations could let us know by 18 April whether they intend to participate in the Workshop and, if so, who will attend.

We have just heard the statement by Ambassador Imai on behalf of the Western Group about the report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. My delegation associates itself with his statement. I already referred to this matter in my statement of 13 March.

In a press statement issued on 19 March by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, great concern was expressed at the findings of the experts' report. The use of chemical weapons is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Iraq is a party to this Protocol and thus acts in flagrant violation of this important part of international law. The Netherlands Government remains convinced that every effort should be made to work out a global treaty that will completely ban chemical weapons, as the only effective long-term solution to the problem.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

Secondly, the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai, has just given the view of the Western Group as a whole concerning the report of the fact-finding mission sent to Iran by the United Nations Secretary-General. I should merely like to add a few comments as the representative of a depositary State of the 1925 Convention. As you know, on 21 March, the Security Council, having studied the report of the mission of experts, adopted a unanimous declaration. Thus, according to that report, the international community has noted that the Iraqi forces have repeatedly and again quite recently used chemical weapons against the Iranian forces. The depositary country of the 1925 Geneva Protocol cannot but express its profound concern at these facts and condemn them quite categorically.

Since it was signed, more than 60 years ago, the Geneva Protocol has been one of the few instruments of international law that have been very widely respected in the alas numerous conflicts during the period, and it has enabled mankind to be spared particularly awful suffering. Any violation of this instrument is therefore a backward step whose consequences are as dangerous as they are unforeseeable. Everything must be done to prevent such a retreat. Respect for the Geneva Protocol must remain one of the foundations of relations among States when they have broken off all peaceful relations, and that is why the French Government has always stated that the Geneva Protocol must remain in force and must be strictly respected.

The statement of the President of the Security Council also condemned the continuation of a murderous conflict which might spread to other States in the region; my Government wishes to renew today, most pressingly, the appeal contained in that statement for the settlement of the conflict by negotiations to be rapidly begun between the belligerent States.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

Finally, the French Government draws one conclusion from this situation for our work: it strongly hopes that the negotiations under way in our Conference on a convention for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for organizing the destruction of stocks and the irreversible elimination of production facilities should be speeded up.

President:

Mr. C. Clerckx

(Belgium)

Throughout the month of March our Conference has been able to continue its work without major obstacles in three of the five areas it had set itself: chemical weapons, radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament. This must be a matter of satisfaction. In particular, the negotiations on the complete elimination of chemical weapons

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(The President)

are of capital importance and we wish to inform the Conference with satisfaction that work in this field is progressing in an encouraging manner and without obstacles and with, as it seems in the month of March, a general desire to reach a successful conclusion.

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Mr. Clerckx (Belgium)

During the French Government has one occasion for this effort in for our work. It strongly hopes that the negotiations near way in our Conference on a convention for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for organizing the destruction of stocks and the irreversible elimination of production facilities should be speeded up.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Ambassador de Souza e Silva, I would like to begin by expressing my delegation's sincere welcome back to this hall of the Conference on Disarmament to take up the important role of the Presidency. Your outstanding leadership, experience and fine sense of balance is much appreciated by us all, and I am quite sure that we will have a very useful and meaningful month of April. I would like to take this opportunity to commend the work of the outgoing President, Ambassador Clerckx of Belgium, and I would also like to welcome the presence among us today of Professor Petrosyants of the Soviet Union.

It has been more than five years that the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessor body the Committee on Disarmament have been working on a chemical-weapons convention. Many people, including the Chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee and of the Working Groups, as well as various delegations, have put in a great deal of work, serious considerations and a lot of good sense, so that we are much closer to a comprehensive multilateral treaty to ban chemical weapons. I need not enumerate here the various achievements on the positive side, for there are so many, and we are all well aware of them. For example we have a number of high-quality working papers, proposals, and draft conventions, and thanks to them, we seem to have the major framework of a treaty already in sight. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee last year, document CD/636, is an example which illustrates where we stand vis-à-vis our common and final objective.

What I would like to discuss today is how best we can proceed, based on the agreements that have already been achieved, and to find the shortest, and if I may say so, the most cost-effective path possible to come to an early conclusion of a chemical-weapons convention, to which all the delegations of the Conference on Disarmament have expressed strong support.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

At the same time, we cannot but express our grave concern with regard to the recent United Nations experts' report in conjunction with the Iran-Iraq conflict, which pointed out the use of chemical weapons in the conflict. This is an extremely deplorable situation. We should take this opportunity to emphasize again the importance of a speedy establishment of an effective and comprehensive international régime for a chemical weapons ban through a chemical-weapon convention, so that such violations may be effectively deterred.

Having said as much, I am afraid that I may not be the only one who, in reading through the pages of CD/636, is more than a little disturbed and alarmed by the frequent occurrence of the expressions to the effect "details to be elaborated later". If so many of the details, ranging from guidelines for the functioning of the national authority for implementation of the convention to plans for closure of chemical-weapon production facilities, have to await elaboration at a later stage but before conclusion of the convention, and when we think of the amount of time and effort which has already gone into defining and agreeing on some of the details, it may take more sessions and many years before all the necessary process of elaboration can be completed.

I would like to see if there may not be ways to divide the remaining problems into different categories so that somehow we can find a streamlined way of arranging and allocating our joint efforts regarding the chemical-weapon convention in an expeditious manner. In other words, if there are ways to let details take care of the details, while in many cases the Conference as such can work more on matters of principle, that would be a very effective work pattern. In saying this, of course, we express full appreciation of the manner in which these problems are now handled under the very capable Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom and the three chairmen of the Working Groups. The work has started in an admirable manner, and we have much to look forward to. It is in an attempt to further optimize our future efforts on details that I would like to refer to the following points.

In dealing with technical details in the chemical-weapon convention, or for that matter in any multilateral disarmament measure, one needs to first agree on the guiding principles which govern the details concerned. If the guiding principles are clearly established, the actual working out of technical details may often be more appropriately dealt with through deliberations and considerations by qualified experts. Otherwise we may find ourselves somewhat at a loss by trying to plunge directly into their fine structures. It will also be an extremely time-consuming process if we try to work out all the details by ourselves. What is important is to make sure that the processes of working out the provisions in detail, as well as the provisions themselves, are consistent with the principles which have been originally stipulated and laid out by common consent. Then it will bother people less if some of the technical work is entrusted separately to well-organized subsidiary arrangements. At the same time, one would need to have a mechanism through which further integration and revision of these details can be appropriately taken care of, as will be called for in order to properly reflect newly acquired knowledge and advancements in technology.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

This last item, namely an arrangement for integration and revision, may involve somewhat delicate considerations, and here one may take as an example the case of adding a new chemical to the list of substances to be controlled. There is a perennial question where, in agreeing on scientific and technical matters, the mechanism of majority decisions may not always be very appropriate. Adding an item on the control list is simultaneously a scientific and political act. There is a need to accommodate this aspect into our convention as best we can and to correlate the manner of decision-making with the nature of the problem.

An agreed method has to be established, for without agreement in principle on the type of mechanism for integration and revision to reflect our knowledge and experience, it will be difficult to keep the convention up-to-date by properly co-ordinating the findings of technical experts into the system for its implementation, no matter how qualified and capable these experts may be and no matter how clearly their mandate has been specified. It is always important, especially when we have to deal with technical details within the framework of a legal instrument like a multilateral disarmament convention, that extra care should be taken to distinguish (a) principles governing the relevant details, and their functions; and (b) the mechanism that integrate such details into a system, from (c) the actual provisions of the details themselves.

To illustrate, quantitative rules which govern verification of chemical weapons destruction correspond to (a), while methods of revising such rules, as well as triggering off actions including possible challenge inspection, would be (b), and the actual procedure for sample-taking, measurements as well as the schedule of inspection will all belong to (c). It may be argued that when the items (a) and (b) are clearly established, we may feel much more at ease in leaving item (c), the actual working out of details, to technical experts, who, on their part, would feel much more assured in knowing the nature and content of the tasks which have been entrusted to them.

One factor which I would like to take up for discussion today in this context is the matter of quantitative consistency throughout the chemical-weapon convention. I would like to first look at the subject of what one may call a quantitative comparison among different chemicals in terms of the risk involved to the objective of the chemical-weapon convention. This notion is important and useful for the purpose of actually classifying different chemicals, and controlling and assigning different priorities in their handling, such as would be the case in deciding a destruction schedule of declared chemical weapons.

Some people argue that destruction of chemical weapons should start from the least harmful and go up the ladder, whereas others argue that the most harmful should be destroyed first. Apart from a debate as to which has more merit, it is to be noted that in either case, there is a need to have a quantitative expression of the degree of harmfulness of different chemical weapons in order to develop equitable destruction schedules for countries with very different compositions of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

We are aware that there is an argument that says that the toxicity criteria of LD 50, namely the lethal dose for 50 per cent of the population exposed, is an appropriate parameter to be employed in this connection. With due respect, my delegation is nevertheless not fully convinced that LD 50 is an adequate parameter that can represent a chemical in a quantitative manner on all occasions. In other words, if there are two chemicals, A and B, with LD 50 for A being twice that for B, thus seemingly making A half as harmful as B, then is it correct to assume that twice the quantity of A has an equivalent harmfulness to that of B? We would want to reserve final judgement until the nature of toxicity of LD 50 is further clarified. Furthermore, we know of cases in which LD 50 cannot be determined uniquely but varies according to experimental conditions.

Another notion often referred to is the so-called "military significance", that is, to give quantitative classification to chemicals according to the assessment of their military usefulness and thus the harm they can inflict on the enemy. This is an extremely delicate subject in that a considerable level of military information and judgement has to enter into consideration. The military significance of a chemical weapon will depend on the mode of its deployment as weapons as well as the specific scenario of war-fighting, such as whether chemical shells or missiles are targeted on troop concentrations at the front or on supporting facilities in the rear.

The two examples mentioned here seem to indicate that there is no simple parameter to uniquely define the comparative harmfulness of chemicals, and some working hypothesis has to be worked out. As I said earlier, this notion is very important in working out an agreeable allocation of control efforts, both national and international. It would seem that a group of qualified international experts may very well be asked to consider the problem and come back with proper recommendations, that is, provided that sufficient care is taken to prevent their considerations from becoming an excessively scientific and abstract venture.

A further case requiring quantitative consistency is what is often referred to as the threshold amount for different chemicals. When we take up a group of chemicals which are primarily for civilian industrial use, which can be theoretically converted into military applications, there are two important approaches in determining threshold amounts.

One is the type of consideration similar to "military significance", and will represent a maximum quantity below which a chemical is of no interest for military purposes. This amount will be described in terms of tons of material for an entire State at any given time.

Another approach that is of practical importance in determining this threshold is to talk about an amount which is so small that it is not cost-effective to exercise control. In addition to the effectiveness aspect of the definition, it tries to determine the corresponding cost of control, or verification as the case may be. This will be very strongly influenced by the total efforts and resources available for control as well as the desire to find a method of their optimum distribution throughout the system of chemicals to be watched. For instance, when one thinks of the requirement for

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

verification of initial stocks of chemical weapons, their destruction, or the need to verify permitted use and non-diversion, the amount of control resources that can be allocated to civilian chemical industry may not be very large. Then it may not be very meaningful to set a threshold at too low a level.

An additional element of consideration which makes the subject very interesting is that for practical use in control activities, such a threshold will need to be expressed in terms of tons per year for each independent facility. I shall not go into the explanation of why this conversion from tons for an entire State at any given time to a different unit is necessary. As an illustration, within the international nuclear safeguards system, 25 kgs of highly enriched uranium or 8 kgs of plutonium are a "significant quantity" in that they roughly correspond to the quantity of special fissionable material required for a single nuclear explosive device. The threshold amount for control is often taken to be 25 kgs and 8 kgs respectively per annum regarding individual nuclear facilities. Somehow, for practical reasons, the threshold is defined as one bomb, per facility, per annum and accepted as a viable working hypothesis. On this and other items discussed today, my delegation intends to present further explanations to the Ad Hoc Committee or its Working Groups, so that these notions may continue to be looked into.

If the various steps of verification and control of chemical weapons follow the path of the material balance and its accountancy, we have an important lesson to learn from the work regarding the safeguard of nuclear materials under the IAEA. I would hasten to add that there is a considerable difference in approach between that for chemical weapons and the material balance for the very limited number of chemical elements under the IAEA, namely, uranium and plutonium, which have only limited use outside of the nuclear industry, and which have a clear and distinct signature of their existence even in minute quantities, namely radioactivity. However, when we look at the verification exercise as a matter of counting numbers, measuring weight, and doing chemical analysis, and realize that much of these activities have to be done on the basis of random sampling, because it is physically not possible to take measurements of thousands of tons of chemicals, there is an important requirement that the level of confidence and the level of accumulated error in measurement have to be the same throughout the process.

In other words, if the declaration of the initial stock is verified to 90 per cent confidence and with an allowable error of one ton, then the verification of the transfer of material from store to destruction facility should be consistent with this level. Similarly, when destruction is carried out either through incineration or another chemical decomposition process, and its verification is carried out through sampling of the waste stream, the confidence and accuracy of such verification should also be consistent.

What I have intended to do here today is merely to indicate the existence of the problem and not to present any sample calculations regarding the subject. One may add that it is only through such a quantitatively consistent system that it is possible to establish an objective criteria for triggering challenge inspection.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

There are of course two possible kinds of challenge inspection. One is the anomaly suspected through the process of routine inspections, and this is this one that I am referring to here. The case of challenge inspection in the case of suspected clandestine activities requires different considerations.

I hope that by inserting technical terminology into my speech I have not bored my colleagues too much. It may have unwittingly proved a case of rendering to Caesar what belongs to Caesar. I hope the point was clear that the quantitative consistency of chemical weapons control is a matter of principle. If there is agreement on the principle, then rather than having the Ad Hoc Committee itself devoting very much time in working out the details, it would be more effective and efficient to combine the Working Group meetings with occasional technical meetings or seminars to work out the fine details. When I made my intervention on 13 February, and referred to a possible reconvening of meetings to be attended mostly by technical experts, I had this in mind. In other words, there should be a clear and detailed mandate handed down to the experts so that there can be no question that the recommendations that come back from the experts are nothing but the elaboration of the principles which the Ad Hoc Committee has agreed upon.

It is of course very important to realize that many of the details serve rather intricate functions within the chemical-weapons convention. There are a number of subjects within the framework of our convention which require simultaneous solutions because of the interacting nature of the subject matter. Deciding on the different lists of chemical agents, and the control régimes to be applied to the different lists, is an example. One needs to know the name of chemicals to see what kind of control is necessary and adequate. On the other hand, countries with extensive chemical industries would want to know what kind of control régimes is being proposed in detail before agreeing to place on such a list various chemicals which are produced on a large scale and primarily for civilian uses. Together with the identification of interacting principles, as I mentioned at the outset, the mechanism for agreeing on, or revising, the list is a very important element.

I would like to add finally that in our view, the concept of quantitative consistency should be built into a comprehensive chemical-weapons convention as a system. To take up only a segment of the whole, on such an important aspect as non-proliferation, raises the risk of being out of context.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure to see you presiding over the work of our Conference. Our pleasure is even heightened by the knowledge that you are the first to have served twice as President of this Conference. You bring a wealth of experience and wisdom to this post. We pledge you our support in seeking to make April an especially productive period in our work. I also extend the thanks of our delegation to Ambassador Clerckx of Belgium for his skilful leadership during the month of March. His thoughtful and patient efforts served our work well.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

In my statement today I want to return again to agenda item 4 of our work -- the negotiation of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. In particular I want to address the central issue of challenge inspection, and in this regard to introduce a clarification of the United States proposal contained in CD/500. Before doing so, however, it is appropriate to consider the situation regarding our work thus far during this session, and our prospects for the future.

First, I think it is clear that the Chemical Weapons Committee has gotten off to a good start. Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom has been assiduously applying his long years of experience, both diplomatic and scientific, and the rhythm of the work is well paced to make progress. The United States delegation is encouraged by the willingness of other delegations to deal with specific matters of concern, and to address them in detail. I hope that the progress of our work will lead to additional drafting of provisions of the Convention.

Up to now, a number of Western and non-aligned delegations have been making their views known in practical ways. In particular, Australia, China, Canada and Pakistan have introduced useful suggestions in documentary form. My delegation hopes that the delegations of the Group of Socialist States will soon follow this practice by committing their ideas to writing so that we may more carefully address them.

Two years ago this month, Vice-President Bush addressed this Conference and presented the United States draft convention to ban chemical weapons, CD/500. At that time, the United States delegation had hopes that the Conference would be able to reach agreement on a comprehensive ban within a reasonably short time. As the months went by, however, it became apparent that not all delegations were able to work constructively to achieve that goal. Throughout the summer of 1984 and all of 1985, we saw the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons become entangled unnecessarily in procedural controversies.

One of the principal difficulties was the apparent unwillingness of some nations to commit themselves to the range of verification measures necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. Both in 1984 and in 1985, some delegations responded to verification proposals by indicating they believed that it was not yet time seriously to address the issue of verification. As the months went by, many delegations began to wonder if those States were seriously prepared to negotiate a chemical weapons convention.

This was the state of affairs when President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Geneva in November 1985. The Joint Statement issued after that meeting rekindled the optimism of my delegation, and, I think, was a source of renewed hope for all delegations. My delegation was further encouraged by General Secretary Gorbachev's statement of 15 January of this year, in which he stated that the Soviet Union was ready to reach agreement on verification measures, and in which he indicated specifically acceptance of the concept of on-site verification in the elimination of production facilities. Thus, it appeared that one of the major hurdles to a comprehensive chemical-weapons ban may have been eliminated.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

In the Conference we have heard much from delegations of the Group of Socialist States about the importance of verification. However, up to now these statements have largely been confined to generalities. In essence, what we have been hearing about verification over the past months is little more than the word itself. We have waited patiently for the delegation of the Soviet Union to introduce specific verification proposals. Such proposals could be a positive step that could move us closer to our goal. The Conference on Disarmament is still waiting for the detailed information necessary to transform Mr. Gorbachev's general statements on verification into concrete negotiating proposals.

In this regard, the excellent statement on 27 March of the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, was particularly appropriate and timely. The series of questions contained in this statement go to the heart of the verification issues. It is important that the members of this Conference soon receive the answers to the questions Ambassador Wegener raised.

We recognize recent increased participation on the part of members of the Group of Socialist States who have begun to provide somewhat more detailed explanation of their positions on some verification issues. If this foreshadows a change in approach, we welcome it. We can carry our negotiations forward only when we clearly understand one another's views on these critical issues.

Now, Mr. President, let me turn to the status of work in the Working Groups of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and to what my delegation believes has been accomplished there thus far this year.

In Working Group A, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Rowe of Australia, preliminary agreement has been reached on several commercial chemicals whose production will be subject to monitoring under a data-reporting régime. This is a positive step, not only in terms of the actual chemicals listed, but also as the beginning of an interactive process in which criteria for including chemicals on the lists are established, lists are elaborated, and régimes for monitoring non-production are specified -- each step taking into account the others -- so as to reinforce the overall effort. As we develop these provisions, however, we must also ensure that legitimate commercial activity is not hampered or restricted.

In addition to the provision involving commercial chemicals -- and of course by no means secondary in its importance -- is the work on the list of particularly dangerous chemicals to be prohibited. Unfortunately, work in this area has barely begun. This list will be the key to the convention, because it specifies the most dangerous chemicals that will actually be banned. Multilateral collaboration on this list should therefore now begin in earnest.

We must of course recognize that even after the convention is completed, the inevitable progression of technology means that no list can be considered final and definitive for all time. Therefore, it is also important that drafting should begin on procedures to modify and update the lists as necessary. The eventual convention should and must be a flexible document, evolving as necessary to meet as yet unanticipated contingencies.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Constructive work has also begun in Working Group B. In particular, useful discussions have been carried out addressing the sequence of stockpile elimination. Since this issue is in the early stages of negotiation, emphasis should be on refining principles, and all delegations should freely contribute their ideas. Delegations with concrete proposals should present them clearly and completely so that all delegations can accurately assess their feasibility and utility.

Working Group B has also begun a much needed and detailed discussion of the verification procedures applicable to the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles. This is a positive sign. We note the recent increased participation of the delegation of the Soviet Union in the Group B discussions on verification. We hope that the Soviet delegation, along with others, will lay out specific, detailed proposals in this forum as well.

Finally, Working Group C has made some progress in dealing with the form and function of the Consultative Committee. Chairman Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia presented a text for Article VIII that has received serious consideration. My delegation appreciates both the level of detail that it incorporates, and the time and effort that were devoted to its preparation.

We are concerned, however, that adequate consideration be devoted in Working Group C to the critical issue of compliance during this session. The paper introduced by the delegation of Pakistan, as well as other documents, provides a useful starting point for this consideration. This effort will be indispensable to the negotiation of verification provisions that will be appropriate and effective. My delegation encourages all delegations to participate in developing specific measures -- especially those related to challenge inspection -- which would eliminate the last sentence of Article IX in CD/636, which reads: "the further contents of Article IX remain to be elaborated". Our present state of progress is, unfortunately, precisely indicated by this sentence.

The United States has delineated its own views on challenge inspection very specifically in our draft convention, CD/500. Since that time my delegation has made every effort to explain our views on this matter and why the United States considers mandatory challenge inspection essential for an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. We have stated repeatedly that the United States would welcome suggestions for ways to improve the procedures and formulations so long as the same level of confidence is maintained.

Our 1984 proposal for challenge inspection was made with full awareness of the proposal of the Soviet Union, contained in its draft convention of 1982. Our proposal recognizes the critical need for a verification régime that would constitute a credible deterrent to a potential violator. Our proposal was made because we do not believe that making a challenge inspection voluntary, as the Soviet Union suggested, would provide either a credible deterrent or the necessary confidence of compliance with the provisions of the convention. A great majority of the delegations in this Conference recognizes, as have we, that deterrence of violations and confidence in compliance with a future convention are critical. This recognition has been

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

most recently reflected in the proposal made by the delegation of Pakistan, particularly in its provisions for investigating allegations of use. We respectfully suggest that the Soviet Union give further consideration to the inadequacies of its existing proposal, made at a very early stage of the negotiations. The Soviet Union should now make a new proposal which provides the deterrence and confidence necessary for an effective convention. Such a proposal would demonstrate that the Soviet Union is indeed seeking realistic solutions to the verification issues of a chemical-weapon convention, and would be in keeping with the recent statements of General Secretary Gorbachev and others.

In the period since we tabled our draft convention, we have continued to explain and elaborate various aspects of our substantive proposals. While our discussions in the Conference have served to clarify many issues, certain misunderstandings appear to remain. In particular it has been alleged that Article X of the United States draft convention, by its use of language referring to "government-controlled" facilities, would have the effect of discriminating against States whose economies are so structured that they have little or no large-scale involvement of private enterprise in their chemical industries. As my delegation has repeatedly sought to make clear, this is a mistaken impression. No imbalance -- I repeat no imbalance -- in inspection obligations is either intended or contained in Article X of the United States proposal in CD/500.

The United States is willing to do whatever it can to avoid any apparent misunderstanding. Therefore, in order to make our position absolutely clear, my delegation is today introducing an amendment to Article X of CD/500. This amendment will be submitted both as a Conference document and as a Chemical Weapons Committee Working Paper. The English-language text of the amendment is being circulated at this time.

I wish to emphasize that this amendment does not alter the United States position. Rather, it is intended to make even more clear that Article X obligations would apply equally to all States, regardless of their economic or governmental system. Specifically, the amendment deletes the term "government-controlled", and, in its place, substitutes new language descriptive of the types of privately-owned locations and facilities the United States intends to be covered by Article X.

Whatever the source of the apparent misunderstandings that we have heard expressed, my delegation trusts that this amendment will make it absolutely clear that Article X applies both to privately-owned and to public facilities. We trust as well that this amendment will make it absolutely clear that Article X is intended to cover any privately-owned location or facility that in the future might be suspected of being used for activities in violation of the convention. The key point is that no violation of the convention should escape the régime.

My delegation recognizes its responsibility to ensure that the United States position is understood by all. Effective negotiation cannot proceed without thorough understanding. I very much hope that this clarification will dispel any possibility of further misunderstanding on this

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

point. We are introducing this clarification now, before the issue has been taken up in Working Group C, in the hopes that it will contribute to progress on the essential matter of challenge inspection. I hope that other delegations will follow suit and introduce suggestions which will effectively clarify their own positions, not only on issues of verification and compliance, but on all other issues in the negotiation of the chemical-weapons convention.

(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

I now venture to turn to the topics which our delegation intended to discuss in its statement today.

For a long time, prohibition of chemical weapons has been regarded as a major question in our Conference, a question for which, at the same time, the prospects are most encouraging, and reality seems to confirm this view, especially after the clear and unanimous signs that emerged at the beginning of this session of the Conference.

Furthermore, at its fortieth session the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution urging the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its negotiations with a view to arriving at the earliest possible date at an accord on the subject of a convention on the prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Such a convention will radically and, once and for all, eliminate the potential danger of recourse to the use of a dangerous weapon of mass destruction already forbidden as a means of combat by the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

Last year, negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons moved ahead slowly, but steadily. We now have before us a 41-page document (CD/636) forming a draft convention on this subject. We note with satisfaction that, thanks to the endeavours of Ambassador Turbanski, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and all the co-ordinators of the working groups, further progress was made in January on the resumption of the session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Like many other delegations, we have taken note of the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States of America have expressed their willingness to accelerate the negotiations to conclude a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. We have appreciated the statements made by the representatives of those two countries to the effect that their bilateral talks aim chiefly at facilitating multilateral negotiations in this field.

The prompt re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at the beginning of this session has also been an encouraging sign. In his statement on 25 March last, Ambassador Cromartie, Head of the United Kingdom delegation and Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, depicted realistically the current stage in the negotiations. Ambassador Cromartie rightly said, among other things, "this negotiation is a crucial test of the efficacy in practice of the multilateral negotiation of international agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament".

The Romanian delegation welcomes the presence within the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of a remarkable spirit of co-operation. The three Working Groups have embarked on activities relating to the actual substance of various parts of the draft convention. Major priority questions are being considered, but it should none the less be said that on many aspects the discussions are confined to matters of principle, to generalities. Problems are not settled and no concrete, definitive and generally acceptable formulations are found. Generally speaking, we consider it very important

(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

and useful that the questions of the criteria and definitions, the lists and the régimes are being considered comprehensively and in terms of their interrelationship. The working papers submitted recently, more particularly by the delegations of Sweden, China and Pakistan, deserve all our attention.

Romania fully supports the conclusion of a general and universal international legal instrument, one that is both effective, equitable and generally acceptable, on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, on the complete destruction of existing stockpiles and delivery systems, and on the destruction or an irreversible change in the use of chemical-weapon substances. We also appreciate the fact that, at the 1985 session, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was able to reach agreement on a straightforward and direct clause concerning the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Such a clause will supplement and strengthen the legal obligation on non-use, an obligation introduced into international law by the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

With regard to the lists of significant chemicals and their régimes, we appreciate the fact that in the January meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, formulations were reached, and subsequently improved and consolidated during this session, they command all our attention in order to elaborate the text of the draft convention. At the same time, we consider it necessary for the future convention to provide for a review of the lists, in other words, an opportunity to insert new chemicals, in keeping with advances in modern chemistry and chemical technology, and to transfer a substance from one list to another or even to remove a substance from the lists, if appropriate. The lists of chemicals covered by all of Article IV of the draft convention should provide complete assurance that the civilian chemical industry will not be used for the clandestine production of chemical substances which can be used as weapons of war. Similarly, the establishment of lists and appropriate régimes should in no sense affect or limit development of the chemical industry, and the research and peaceful uses of this industry, which is essential to the economy of many countries. Again, it is important to arrive at a better definition of the concept of chemical weapons production facilities, so that it does not hinder the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes of many countries.

The question of confidence building in regard to implementation and observance of the future convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons is also one of the priority issues in our negotiations. Of course, we are relying on the good faith, the confidence and the interests of all and Romania, for its part, intends without any hesitation to act in such a way. At the same time, it would be in the general interest to ensure full observance of the convention by establishing a system of effective and appropriate verification without any discrimination, in accordance with generally acceptable procedures that are fully in accord with the purpose and the very nature of future conventions. At the same time, in the establishment and functioning of the Consultative Committee to monitor implementation of the convention, and other organs and procedures that may be envisaged, full respect for the principle of sovereign equality and the prevention of any possible discrimination must lie at the very core of any system of regulation.

(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

While every effort must be made to elaborate at the earliest possible date a comprehensive international treaty on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, every action aimed at limiting at the present time the danger involved in the actual existence of such weapons is, in our opinion, to be appreciated and encouraged.

In order to support the endeavours to bring about a universal convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, especially significant steps would include the adoption of preventive measures to secure the non-proliferation of chemical weapons in regions where this weapon does not exist at the present time, so as to build up confidence and achieve the reduction and elimination of chemical weapons. Our delegation has already pointed to the special significance in this regard of the Declaration-Appeal made by Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Todor Zhivkov, President of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, to establish a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Balkans. This document proposed the prompt initiation of negotiations to arrive, among the Balkan countries, at an agreement prohibiting the testing, production, acquisition and stockpiling of all chemical weapons on their territory, as an effective contribution to limiting the area of proliferation of chemical weapons throughout the planet. This document was issued for the information of the Conference under the symbol CD/648.

We also take the same view regarding the proposal by Zhao Ziyang, the Chinese Prime Minister, submitted by Ambassador Qian Jiadong at the Conference's plenary meeting on 25 March, concerning the undertaking by all countries in a position to produce chemical weapons never to resort to such a weapon and to put an end to the testing, production or transfer of this weapon.

As in any other field of disarmament, the priority question that really counts is the political will of all States. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the role and responsibility of the major Powers, of the countries with the technological capability to produce and develop chemical weapons, is of the utmost importance in elaborating and concluding at the earliest possible date a convention for the general prohibition of chemical weapons. We have noted with much appreciation the proposal made by the delegation of Sweden whereby, in order to facilitate the negotiations, all countries which manufacture or contemplate the manufacture of binary or other chemical weapons should refrain from producing them during the negotiations on the elaboration of an international legal instrument designed to prohibit them completely. As the Swedish delegation also emphasized, it would never be possible to advance the cause of disarmament by increasing the number of weapons.

In short, much remains to be done by the Conference, by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to arrive at the text of a convention, but we are duty bound to make more rapid headway in our work and concentrate on the priority substantive aspects, with real good faith and political will.

This convention should in our opinion constitute an international legal instrument conceived as a step towards the prohibition and elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

France attaches particular importance to the conclusion of a convention for the general prohibition of chemical weapons. We wish to help the negotiations to move forward, even if at present we find the progress somewhat disappointing.

In my previous statement, I recalled how severely my country condemns the use of chemical weapons in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Such occurrences illustrate the urgency of the problem. They confirm the fact that there is a danger of such weapons becoming commonplace. Many of us have stressed that it is the responsibility of our Conference to bring the negotiations for the complete prohibition of the production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons to a successful conclusion as rapidly as possible.

We therefore welcomed the resumption of bilateral Soviet-American talks on this subject, inasmuch as they may perhaps help to advance our work this year. But this is a matter which concerns us all. For our part, as I already stated in 1985, we are prepared to accelerate the pace of our work so that it may no longer be said that this is a subject of part-time concern to our Conference, one which takes up only part of the year. Simultaneously, the efforts which the main chemical producing countries can undertake nationally and in concert to make the proliferation of such weapons more difficult should be encouraged. Such measures should help to ensure that the situation does not grow any worse, and thus that the work of the Conference does not become any more difficult.

With regard to the draft convention on the prohibition of production and stockpiling, we note that while progress has been made on some issues for the time being there is no consensus on a fundamental matter on which the success of our work depends, namely, the question of respect for the convention and the resulting verification measures. Obviously, the principal difficulty lies in the verification of non-production. In this connection, we consider it essential to provide for the organization of international on-site inspections, or routine inspections, and also for a regular exchange of statistical information which in the very large majority of cases will make it possible to ensure that there is no diversion for chemical weapon production purposes of a number of substances produced in varying amounts by the civilian chemical industry. As a result of this set of verification measures, the use of challenge inspection should be confined to exceptional cases. All our delegations recognize that challenge inspection is necessary, but its modalities have yet to be established, and this remains an area of profound differences of view.

We consider it all the more important to have thorough exchanges of views on the question of routine inspection in that this is an issue which brings together various essential provisions of the convention concerning, firstly, the list of sensitive products; secondly, the balance to be struck between the various forms of verification; thirdly, the status of former production facilities which have been converted under supervision; and fourthly, permitted activities.

Let us take up these issues one by one. With regard to the list of sensitive chemicals, there are of course key precursors, but also a number of other chemicals which we must define jointly, which present a genuine danger in terms of respect for the provisions of the convention.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

Secondly, with regard to the balance to be struck between the different types of verification, the dangers are not all on a similar level. For some products, on-site international inspections must be organized in conditions which we must examine together: we believe that, for the system to remain effective, the inspections to be carried out within a given period should be decided by lot.

To ensure regular inspections on a fair basis, a formula combining the following elements could be considered, for example: countries would be divided into geographical groups, within which the country or countries to be inspected would be drawn by lot every year. For each of them, there would be a second drawing by lot to choose the facility or facilities to be inspected. Every country and every facility should be inspected at least once every five years. Of course, this is merely an example, and only an aspect of the problem: many other questions have to be resolved in this sphere.

For other very widely used chemicals, a regular exchange of statistical data will provide a basis for control: large variations from one year to another might, in the absence of satisfactory explanations, prompt on-site inspection measures to ensure that there has not been a violation of the convention through the production of chemical warfare agents.

Finally, in some cases, the on-site recording of data concerning production and stockpiling by automatic remote monitoring devices could be envisaged.

Thirdly, with respect to the status of former production facilities that have been converted, conversion is only acceptable if accompanied by especially strict verification measures. These must include international on-site inspection to ensure that there is no prohibited re-use of shops or parts of facilities which had previously served for the production of prohibited substances.

Fourthly, with regard to activities permitted under the Convention, the production of limited amounts of prohibited chemicals should be strictly supervised, including by on-site inspections.

I should like to remind you that in 1985 we submitted a working paper on another essential aspect of the convention, namely the destruction of stocks and of production facilities. We hope that that document will contribute to progress in our work this session. The thinking behind that paper may be summarized as follows: the destruction of stockpiles will take place over quite a long period - 10 years - during which it is essential to retain a small safety stockpile consisting of deterrent weapons (which is why we considered that the oldest toxic warfare stocks should be destroyed first). But it would be contrary to the spirit and purposes of the convention to retain production facilities intact until the end of the 10 year period. That would signify a desire to continue manufacturing new weapons, which the convention would prohibit upon its entry into force. We therefore proposed a time-table which would combine the destruction of stockpiles with the complete elimination of production facilities.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

It seems to us that rapid progress may be made on this question of the destruction of stocks and production facilities. In his statement of 15 January, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev, confirmed that his country accepted the principle of on-site verification of destruction. It remains to establish the ways and means, in other words, the essential points have yet to be discussed. Furthermore, in the event of conversion of some facilities, the question of how to organize on-site inspections to ensure that no prohibited use takes place also remains to be spelled out.

The principle of international on-site verification must be accepted for the verification of non-production. In this connection, it is not clear to us whether the Soviet Union's proposal, as recalled here in the Conference by Mr. Kornienko, could apply to the verification of non-production in facilities which produce permitted chemicals. This would hypothetically be a possible means of getting around the convention which obviously could not be overlooked.

I have just referred to the statement by the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union here on 20 February. I would also point out that on that occasion Mr. Kornienko described the work accomplished by the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament until 1977 as "impressive". As you all know, in 1978 that body was abolished by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and replaced by the Committee, subsequently the Conference on Disarmament. Everyone is well aware of the role played by my country in this transformation of the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body in order to introduce greater equality and make it more democratic.

Only the unadvised, however, of whom there are none, as far as I know, in this chamber, could attribute to that transformation the scantiness of the results obtained since then by our Conference. The truth of the matter is that roughly at that same time the relations between East and West began to deteriorate once again, and it is that deterioration, and the harm thus done to détente, which explain the lack of progress in multilateral disarmament negotiations. Besides, the same state of affairs has also been observed in the bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers.

Furthermore, we refuse at this point to consider the record of the Committee, now the Conference, on Disarmament as being negative. It has primarily tackled the difficult, urgent and complex task of producing a verifiable convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. This ambition by itself justifies the work of our Conference, and as I pointed out at the beginning of this statement, it is up to us to accelerate and intensify the pace of our work in this field.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

I wish to refer today to some of the issues connected with the negotiations which are under way on the convention which will prohibit once and for all the use and the very existence of chemical weapons.

The international community represented in this Conference has before it a unique opportunity for eliminating an entire category of weapons of mass destruction of real military significance. As a result, chemical warfare will cease to be an indiscriminate threat in the hands of those possessing this terrible destructive capability.

Over the last five years the great majority of States taking part in the work of the ad hoc Committee have put forward their views in detail, and an exhaustive analysis has been made of the technical, military, legal and other aspects of the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons. The objective pursued illustrates the need for a multilateral approach to an issue which affects the security of all countries, whether or not they possess chemical weapons. It also demonstrates that the bilateral talks should tend to facilitate multilateral negotiations, as may be seen, in our opinion, from the Joint Statement by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev of 21 November 1985. It is important to stress that in these negotiations the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of partial and regional approaches have been acknowledged, and thus all the questions connected with the issue have been tackled in a global manner. It is to be hoped that this experience will serve as an example in the treatment of other disarmament measures.

The time has come to take the necessary steps so that our Conference can rapidly submit the text of the convention to the United Nations General Assembly. We call on all delegations to redouble their efforts to complete this process which, in our opinion, is unjustifiably protracted.

There now exists a firm basis for drawing up the final text of the convention, and we think that those who possess the main chemical-weapon arsenals should take confidence-building measures to ensure that the negotiations on chemical weapons do not suffer the consequences of the confrontation between the Great Powers. It would serve this objective if all States refrained from producing chemical weapons during this final stage in the ongoing negotiations.

An effective and universal convention on chemical weapons should contain four essential elements. Firstly, it should include an absolute and unconditional prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Secondly, it should contain categorical provisions on the destruction of existing arsenals, production facilities and the prohibition of the development and future production of such weapons. Thirdly, it should include suitable verification machinery that must be in keeping with the scope and nature of the instrument

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

in accordance with the undertakings entered into under the Treaty. Fourthly, it must in no way be discriminatory or represent an obstacle to civil chemical industry and international co-operation in this field.

From this standpoint, the convention should apply to chemical weapons in the strict sense of the word, in other words, super-toxic, lethal and toxic chemicals, including key precursors, which are produced exclusively for military purposes. Thus, the object of the convention would be to prohibit the development, production, etc. of such chemicals if they are intended for use as weapons. In this context, it should be borne in mind that chemicals are not weapons in themselves. On the contrary, many chemicals of varying degrees of toxicity are widely used in various spheres of civil industry. Obviously, the use of such chemicals for civil purposes should not be covered by the scope of the prohibition.

We agree with those who have argued that the purpose of the convention is not to regulate civil chemical industry but solely to prohibit chemical weapons. Consequently, we share the view that the term of "permitted purposes" in the convention should be replaced by something else which suitably reflects this situation.

In the light of these considerations, particular attention should be paid to the formulation of the scope of the convention and to avoiding excessively wide concepts. Thus, the time has perhaps come to re-examine the definitions and criteria contained in the text which reflects the state of the negotiations. In this connection, it is worth recalling that the basic premise of the provisions concerning what must be declared and eliminated is the general-purpose criterion.

We also understand that at this point in our negotiations the working group on this issue should attach priority to the identification and listing of chemicals used exclusively for the production of chemical weapons.

At the same time we recognize the dangers which can stem from other chemicals if used for hostile purposes. Consequently, the convention must include balanced and reasonable provisions to ensure that these chemicals are exclusively confined to peaceful purposes. In the treatment of these chemicals which are used for industrial, agricultural, pharmaceutical, research and other activities, the fundamental principle to be respected should be that of not establishing regulations which hinder development, production, transfer and use of any kind for civil purposes.

This is of particular importance for a country such as mine, where the chemical industry plays an important role in the development, of both the agricultural and the industrial sectors; hence our repeated insistence on the need to ensure that the future convention does not hinder economic and technological activities or harm international co-operation in civil chemical activities. The convention should not hinder the transfer of toxic chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of such chemicals for peaceful purposes, nor hinder the wide and non-discriminatory use of scientific progress in chemistry for peaceful purposes in accordance with the needs and interests of each State and its economic and social priorities. In the light of these considerations, the Foreign Minister of Argentina recently

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

stated in this chamber our concern at references to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons, an objective which constitutes a discriminatory approach in that the priority objective of the Conference in this sphere must be to arrive at the universal, and permanent prohibition of such weapons.

Another fundamental aspect of the future convention is the provisions concerning the elimination of chemical weapon arsenals and production facilities. In this connection, States possessing such weapons must consider the destruction process from the standpoint of the confidence and collective security which the convention should generate, and not from the limited standpoint of their own military interests.

It should also be pointed out that if all chemical-weapon arsenals and production facilities are going to be destroyed, there will be no valid reasons for retaining specified quantities of super-toxic lethal weapons for so-called "protective purposes".

We have serious reservations about a provision of this kind, in that it is tantamount to perpetuating or de facto legalizing, through a convention aimed at eliminating chemical weapons, the inequality currently existing between States possessing and States not possessing such weapons.

The complete destruction of existing arsenals by the few countries which possess chemical weapons is the necessary counterpart and prerequisite for the restrictions which those that do not possess and do not intend to possess chemical weapons have to accept on their activities.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In connection with our Programme of nuclear disarmament the question arises of the relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons. The view is advanced that the process of the elimination of nuclear weapons should go hand in hand with necessary measures in the sphere of non-nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union agrees with this view. We, for our part, propose to free our planet by the year 2000 of chemical weapons and to ban all other weapons of mass destruction. As we understand it, the elimination of nuclear weapons must also be accompanied by appropriate stabilizing cuts in conventional armaments. While closing existing avenues of the arms race we do not want to open up others be it in space, chemical or conventional weapons. As in the area of nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union and the United States could also set a good example in curbing the non-nuclear-arms race.

CD/PV.355

Mr. MEIZSTER (Hungary):

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Today I intend to deal in my statement with the prohibition of chemical weapons. I wish, in fact, to raise two questions whose solution, in the opinion of the Hungarian delegation, is of primary importance for the chemical weapons convention as a whole, and in particular, for the promotion of meaningful negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

The first question could be summarized as follows: Is it necessary to eliminate the material basis of chemical weapons in order to ensure that the future chemical weapons disarmament régime could offer appropriate guarantees against the possible use of chemical weapons?

And the second question is, in a similarly condensed manner: Is it necessary, and is it admissible, to limit certain activities of the chemical industry in order to ensure the viability and efficacy of the future chemical weapons disarmament régime?

It is well known in this circle that the Geneva Protocol of 1925, with an inherent contradiction, tried to guarantee the prohibition of use of chemical weapons, while at the same time it left untouched their development, production, stockpiling and deployment. That is, it left untouched the most important links in the chain of acquiring a chemical weapons capability, and only tried to eliminate, in the form of a legal prohibition, the final link: the eventual use of those weapons.

From the very beginning, the endeavours, with only a couple of exceptions, were aimed at resolving that contradiction not by way of improving the arms limitation régime, but by seeking security through individual measures: that is, through chemical armament. Ever more destructive types of chemical weapons, ever greater stockpiles, ever more perfect means of delivery were lined up. As a consequence of their continuous improvement, what was to be avoided -- the use of chemical weapons -- has in fact become ever more probable.

(Mr. Meizster, Hungary)

The seemingly trivial justification for negotiations here at the Conference on Disarmament has been provided by the recognition that the distance between a chemical weapons capability and its eventual use is dangerously narrowing, and in a crisis situation this process may, in fact, become self-generating and reach the point of no return. However, the consequences drawn from this recognition not only promote the current negotiations but also stimulate new armament efforts, trying to find the solution to the dilemma in the binary chemical weapons programme. As reflected in the political debates of recent years in the United States, there are two main arguments for binary weapons: one, that they stimulate chemical weapons disarmament negotiations, two, that they strengthen deterrence.

Even a cursory examination of the first point would reveal that the situation really does prove the necessity of speeding up negotiations, but such a speeding up should not be achieved through a binary weapons programme. Let me explain why. In an earlier statement my delegation had the opportunity to enumerate the special characteristics binary weapons have: their components might be procured from the peaceful chemical industry in large quantities, at short notice, at low cost and without safety hazards, their storage and handling requirements permit their easy transportation between rear and forward areas, and their deployment in forward areas. As a consequence of these characteristics they would strengthen individual security by making the probability of the use of these weapons more credible than ever earlier. Individual "security", if I may call it that, would therefore be achieved on a level of mutual threat, higher than ever before, so that one could not even call it security any longer. The implementation of the binary weapons programme would thus once again prove, in an empirical manner, that the way out of mutual insecurity is to be found in negotiations.

But do we really need such a practical proof of a thesis which is so clear and has been so evidently supported by the nuclear arms race? Do we really have to discover yet another dead-end street in the endless labyrinth of the arms race? Do we really have to pay the economic, political and security price which it would necessarily entail? The Hungarian delegation would wish to believe that we do not have to.

The imperfection of the existing disarmament régime and of chemical weapons deterrence led States to the following conclusion: in order to bring about common security it is not enough to cut out the final link of the chain which connects the inherent potential of States to acquire a chemical weapons capability and the eventual chemical warfare. It is necessary to cut out also the other links, namely development, production, stockpiling, transfer and deployment, thus enlarging to the maximum possible the distance between the two terminal points -- inherent potential and chemical warfare. This recognition found a true reflection in the mandate of our Chemical Weapons Committee and provides the basis for our negotiations.

As a result of a complete prohibition of chemical weapons, that distance, the so-called lag-time would increase to the maximum possible, and that, in turn, would ensure each State party to the convention that no State party could possess such stocks or facilities as might be capable and sufficient, in the military sense, for chemical warfighting. That would also ensure that no State party would attempt to establish such stocks or facilities knowing full

(Mr. Meizster, Hungary)

well that due to the long lag-time it would unavoidably become exposed, thus depriving itself of the security advantages which stem from mutually regulated norms. Finally, the long lag-time would ensure that, in case any State party should nevertheless attempt to acquire a proscribed chemical weapons capability, it would then get caught in the safety net of verification.

Notwithstanding all the destruction measures, eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities, a future chemical weapons disarmament régime cannot be stable and long-lasting if certain alternative, militarily significant capabilities within chemical industry would remain untouched. Such alternative capabilities could, in particular cases, take over, partially or even fully, the functions of the links that were cut out, and thereby restore the full chain.

Such a "defective" régime would not create stability and common security, which are expected of a chemical weapons convention. On the contrary, it would recreate, in a different -- maybe camouflaged -- form, all the mistrust, the individual search of security, and even rivalry of the pre-convention period -- with the only difference of all that taking place within the scope of a chemical weapons convention.

Now I wish to turn to the second question, which concerns the necessity and the feasibility of limiting certain activities of the chemical industry.

It is a characteristic of chemical weapons that as far as development and production are concerned, military and peaceful purposes are intertwined. The reasons are well known.

Sometimes efforts were made to improve cost-effectiveness by way of trying to find peaceful uses for certain chemicals used as chemical weapons. At other times, it was in the course of peaceful development and production that the warfighting potentials of certain chemicals were discovered. Another basis for that interpenetration lies in the similarity of the chemical structures of chemicals for peaceful and chemical-weapon purposes, as well as in certain production capacities of the chemical industry that are built up in accordance with ever stricter safety regulations. All this leads to a situation where the differences between military and peaceful purposes actually vanish in respect of the development and production of a broad spectrum of chemicals. All those activities are grossly overlapping and interfusing in the so-called dual-purpose categories.

Unless the convention is designed to connive at leaving intact actual chemical weapons potentials, relying on purely formalistic definitions, the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons compounds, by virtue of the existence of dual-purpose chemicals, would require a certain impairment of the interests of peaceful chemical industry. If, on the contrary, the convention is to meet fully the interests of peaceful chemical industry, it would create a situation where, following the destruction of military capacities, there would remain such chemical industry capabilities as might constitute significant and militarily important chemical capabilities. Plotted against the degree of elimination of the facilities and stocks for military purposes, the importance of such unique, and immediately available, potential chemical weapons

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capacities would increase from military as well as security perspectives. It is especially true if the chemicals thus produced have great military importance, and if the quantities produced and the production capacities are of military significance. This problem would further deepen if the quantities produced and the production capacities could be enlarged theoretically without restraint, depending merely on the growth of "consumption" that could be justified for peaceful purposes.

From the foregoing, it is apparent, that the interests of the chemical weapons convention, if carried to extremes, would demand that, following the destruction of military stocks and production facilities, there should remain no parallel capacities of any military importance which might discredit the purposes of the whole disarmament measure. On the other hand, the interests of chemical industry and economic progress, again carried to extremes, would demand that the utilization of chemicals and production facilities for economic purposes should not be hampered by any obstacles, political, legal or otherwise, irrespective of the dangers which such chemicals and production facilities might pose in respect of the chemical weapons convention.

From all that, one could draw the conclusion that in the context of a chemical weapons disarmament régime, it is impossible to satisfy completely the interests of both the peaceful chemical industry and also the chemical weapons convention, without impairing one or the other. The task, therefore, is clear. The optimum solution must be found between those conflicting interests, by way of certain trade-offs and exceptions wherever and whenever feasible. As a concrete manifestation of such possible trade-offs or exceptions, some widely used dual-purpose chemicals, such as phosgene or hydrogen cyanide would not be affected by the limitation régimes being under discussion. Economic interests would thus prevail over security considerations in the case of these dual-purpose chemicals which have gradually lost their military significance since their emergence in World War I.

The conflicting interests of the chemical weapons convention and peaceful chemical industry are well represented by the diversity of views and negotiating positions on the question of so-called permitted activities. The relevant chapter of the draft convention is supposed to define how States parties to the Convention may develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for permitted purposes.

In spite of long years of negotiations, the regulation of the two most important categories -- supertoxic lethal chemicals and key components of binary systems -- continues to be unresolved, although this is a cardinal question in respect of not only permitted activities but also the whole of the convention. As for concrete negotiating positions, the differences continue to persist on the following question: in addition to the protective-purposes limitation, should there be any limitation on other permitted-purposes production and acquisition of supertoxic lethal chemicals and key components of binary systems.

The socialist countries have proposed that the aggregate quantity of supertoxic lethal chemicals and key components of binary systems for permitted purposes should be limited to an amount which is the lowest

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possible, and in any case does not exceed one metric tonne per year for each State party, and the production of such chemicals for permitted purposes should be concentrated at a single small-scale facility. They propose the monitoring of the small-scale production facility by annual data reporting with justification, on-site instruments, and systematic international on-site inspections. They contemplate as well a prohibition of the production of compounds with methyl-phosphorous bond.

Some other delegations do not accept the notion of limiting the permitted-purposes production and acquisition of those chemicals belonging to the categories mentioned earlier, which have justified civil uses. They provide merely for the monitoring of all facilities producing supertoxic lethal chemicals by regular reporting which would include description and justification of the civil uses for which the chemicals are produced, and systematic international on-site inspection.

Let us now compare the feasibility of these two approaches, and their consequences.

The cardinal issue is whether there should be any limitation on the production for permitted purposes of supertoxic-lethal chemicals and potential binary components. The opponents of limitation keep referring to imperative economic realities and the interest of the unhampered development of chemical industry. Oddly enough, apart from the putative plans to produce certain supertoxic-lethal compounds, they cannot quote precedents of significant ongoing production which would justify the creation of a general no-limitation rule. Notwithstanding that, they preclude in principle the possibility of imposing any limitations on chemical industry. Does such an approach stand the proof? Are there precedents of economically profitable activities being limited by any consideration whatsoever? Are there such precedents in the field of chemical industry?

Well, such precedents do exist. Both in relation to economic activities in a wider sense, and to chemical industry, in particular. The precedents, generally speaking, provide for limitations for the sake of protection of health and the environment.

The severe regulations of environmental protection, widely imposed on the automobile and heavy industries, offer a set of recent examples, demonstrating how far regulations and industries can go in order to meet global interests. In the chemical industry, too, there are constant endeavours to replace certain groups of chemicals, and to change the direction which certain branches of the chemical industry follow. For example, many chemical research groups are working on the development of low-mammalian-toxic insecticides, that is selective insecticides, to substitute for some of the insecticides of high toxicity currently in use.

Considering that for the moment there are no instances of supertoxic-lethal chemicals being widely produced for permitted purposes, the chemical industry is now at a crossroads. It is still in a position to choose, with minimal possible losses, the directions of its development, which are the most optimal, not only from an economic point of view. Ludwigshafen, Derbyshire, Seveso and lately Bhopal, are some of the mementoes of the

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consequences which chemical emergencies might cause to the workers and the surrounding population. The endeavours to limit to the lowest possible level the production of the most dangerous chemicals might seem even more justified in view of estimates that there are supertoxic-lethal chemicals 100 times more deadly than methyl isocyanate, the substance that caused the death of more than 2,500 people and injured nearly 100,000 overnight in Bhopal.

Turning to examples of regulations and restrictions affecting the chemical industry, special mention should be made of control actions, which numerous countries have taken, to ban or severely restrict the use or handling of pesticides in order to protect health or the environment. The best-known example is that of DDT. Concern over the effect of phosphates on eutrophication of water supplies led, for example, to the European Agreement on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Detergents in Washing and Cleaning Products, signed under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1968.

In 1971 the Council of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) established a Procedure for Notification and Consultation on Measures for Control of Substances Affecting Man and his Environment. Up to 1984 there were 36 notifications on such measures. Limitations, bans and regulations placed at the national level on hazardous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceutical products are, in fact, so common that in a 1983 report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the legislation and mechanisms existing at regional, national and international levels to obtain and exchange information on banned hazardous chemicals one can read the following: most of the 38 countries covered by the report have institutions for reviewing and dealing with scientific and technological information on banned hazardous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceutical products.

Legal and administrative limitations, bans and regulations placed on potentially toxic chemicals are now on such a large scale, that they have necessitated the co-ordination at the international level of activities for the exchange of information on banned hazardous chemicals. Recent developments of special interest in this connection include, the provisional notification scheme for banned and severely restricted chemicals proposed by an Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts of the United Nations Environment Programme, the draft guiding principles developed in the OECD on the exchange of information related to export of banned or severely restricted chemicals, the work of the Organization of American States (OAS) with regard to the preparation of a list of substances banned or significantly restricted in the United States of America.

In December 1983, a Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on Products Harmful to Health and the Environment was transmitted to Governments. A consolidated list attached to it, presents in a unified manner information on important restrictive regulatory decisions (bans, withdrawals, non-approvals, and severe restrictions) taken by 60 Governments on pharmaceuticals, agricultural and industrial chemicals, and consumer products. Although the list does not constitute a full inventory of decisions taken by those Governments, it contains nearly 500 chemicals.

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These facts prove quite unequivocally that it is not a novel or unique phenomenon to apply restrictions on the activities of the chemical industry. On the contrary, such restrictions do exist, limiting on a large scale the activities of the chemical industry. It is true, however, that for the time being, they only provide protection against health, occupational and environmental hazards. But if health and environmental hazards caused by chemicals might justify economic sacrifices to remedy them, is it not legitimate to ask whether the hazards posed by certain chemicals to the "health" of the future chemical disarmament régime, and to the "international security environment" would not justify certain sacrifices, if any, to be made.

A comparison of existing practices and negotiating positions reveals that some countries would not, for the sake of disarmament and international security, think of accepting, even in principle, what they widely apply in practice for the sake of protecting health and environment. At the same time, even a superficial glance at the relevant items in the budgets of the same States would show that security, if measured in terms of financial "sacrifices" for military purposes, would not lag far behind the protection of health and environment, to say the least, in certain cases.

Let us assume now that the proposed production restrictions would require certain sacrifices, though in the absence of any significant reported production of the chemicals concerned such an assumption remains a mere speculation. Is it justified to measure the costs of such restrictions exclusively in terms of economic losses for individual countries? Our answer is resolutely negative. The contemplated regulation has to be judged from the point of cost-effectiveness, measured not only in economic but also in security and political terms, and expressed not individually but on a collective level. Possible advantages may stem from a no-limitation production régime, that is true. But would they justify such production if measured against the extra financial and manpower burdens required by the ever increasing verification needs of such a production?

Would those possible advantages justify such a production if measured against the expenditures which unflagging chemical protection efforts might entail? Uncertainties about existing adversary capabilities might easily undermine confidence even under a chemical disarmament régime, and could prevent any decrease in protection efforts, or, what is worse, might generate further increases. Judging from available data, such protective efforts might consume several billion dollars.

Would those possible advantages justify such production if measured against the losses resulting from mutual suspicions caused by ever increasing chemical weapons capabilities of the adversaries?

And finally, would those possible advantages justify such production if measured against its possible political and security costs, costs which are not quantifiable? Those costs might result from a situation where, in the absence of mutual confidence, States embarked upon a hidden arms race in the guise of peaceful chemical activities within the framework of the chemical weapons convention, thus rendering senseless the whole chemical disarmament régime.

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No verification measure would provide guarantees against the latter eventuality, since verification can only ascertain whether the justified production and acquisition quotas are observed or not. But it cannot prevent the misuse of those readily available capabilities, or at least cannot defuse the chain reaction of mistrust resulting from anxiety about ever increasing adversary potentials to acquire chemical weapons capabilities, and about the ever decreasing lag-time to counter such capabilities.

As stated in a recently tabled Australian Working Paper on the non-diversion of supertoxic lethal chemicals, diversion of chemicals produced in thousands of tons per year could occur after leaving the plant. Such an eventuality raises further doubts about the advisability of a production régime with no limitation on supertoxic lethal chemicals and possible binary component compounds.

I would like to recall a statement made in 1969 during a series of United States Congressional hearings, in order to give at least a rough idea what the existence of readily available binary production capacities might mean, even if there is a legitimate justification for their existence:

"A move into binaries would mean that the limiting factor in the rate of nerve gas weapon production would cease to be the rate at which chemical agents could be manufactured, it would instead become the rate at which munitions could be fabricated, a much lesser obstacle."

If I may attempt to summarize the possible answers to the two questions that I posed at the outset of this statement, that could be done as follows:

First: the viability and efficacy of the future chemical weapons disarmament régime can only be guaranteed by extending to the maximum possible the distance, or lag-time, that separates chemical weapons capabilities from the eventual use of chemical weapons. The elimination of the links of development, production and stockpiling for military purposes from the chemical weapons chain might prove to be of limited value if alternative chemical weapons potentials of military significance survived in chemical industry, capable of restoring, partly or entirely, the missing links of that chain.

Second: it is imperative, on the one hand, and not at all unprecedented, on the other, to apply certain restrictions on some activities of chemical industry in order to bring about a viable chemical weapons disarmament régime. It is for the skill and inventive faculties of the negotiators here in Geneva to win acceptance of the interests of the future chemical weapons disarmament régime in such a manner as would minimize the possible individual economic losses, while assuring to the maximum the common overall advantages stemming from such a régime.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

The elimination of chemical weapons has traditionally been a question to which Poland has attached great importance, both at the United Nations and in this forum. I should, therefore, like to underline the concrete comments and postulates voiced by the Warsaw meeting of Foreign Ministers on this very question. There is, first, the conviction that the total elimination of chemical weapons and the dismantling of manufacturing facilities are fully feasible before the end of this century. Consequently, the necessity is stressed of intensifying the negotiations on an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles.

A multilateral accord under which States would commit themselves not to transfer chemical weapons to any recipient whatsoever or to deploy them on the territory of other States is also being advocated, evidently as a "collateral" measure, which States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty are prepared to take while calling on the NATO States to show similar restraint.

Obviously, the Conference on Disarmament is the principal addressee of the call for intensifying the work on the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons. In this connection, given in particular Poland's involvement in that work, notably during the past year, (which, I am gratified to note, has been so much appreciated in this hall) I regret to say that we

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are somewhat disappointed at the slow progress in the further elaboration of the convention so far in this spring session of the Conference. I wish to assure you, however, that the Polish delegation will continue to do its best in order to help advance the final goal of the Conference's endeavours in this field.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Let me turn now to the fourth factor in considering the issue of compliance. It can be described in the following way: there is now a sufficient number of arms-control agreements in force, and sufficient experience with the attitudes and behaviour of States with respect to those agreements, that the record of compliance and non-compliance of States with those agreements can be assessed and taken into account by other States concerned with these agreements. The effectiveness of verification provisions and compliance procedures established by those agreements can also be evaluated.

This experience factor is a valuable asset in the negotiation of treaties. If we know that negotiating parties have, in the past, failed to comply with other treaties to which they are a party, we must ensure that the verification provisions we draft are stringent enough to discourage such non-compliance.

Clearly these four factors show that compliance is not a simple matter. The requirements of compliance stem from the complexities of our world, with its system of States and values, and the interests of those States which are, unfortunately, often antagonistic. Coupled with what we know of the actions of others, we are led to the conclusion that the established degree of trust among nations is often very low.

This lack of trust is reinforced by our experience with instances of non-compliance. Such non-compliance is a serious matter. It negates security benefits that might otherwise be derived from arms control, creates new security risks, and decreases stability. It undermines the confidence necessary to an effective arms control process in the future. Despite our efforts to date to seek a solution to the problem, non-compliance continues, in particular the non-compliance of the Soviet Union with its obligations under both multilateral agreements such as the biological and toxin weapons Convention, and bilateral agreements such as the ABM Treaty.

(The President)

are happy that he is staying in Geneva and that he intends to maintain close contacts with us and I am sure that all members of the Conference will be very happy to keep these contacts with the Ambassador of China.

I give the floor to the Ambassador of Australia, His Excellency Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): This Conference operates on the basis of the rule of consensus. It must do so because consensus is the only way to produce disarmament agreements that will work and endure. There is consensus on chemical weapons. We are agreed that we must work together to elaborate a comprehensive convention which will completely ban the development, production, stockpiling and use of all types of chemical weapons and which will ensure that existing chemical weapons are destroyed. These objectives are urgent and their attainment has become even more urgent as a result of the findings by the Secretary-General's team of experts, which included an Australian expert, that chemical weapons have again been used in the Iran/Iraq war. The Australian Government has made clear repeatedly that it condemns unreservedly any use of chemical weapons wherever and whenever it should occur. There can be no justification for Iraq's continuing use of these barbaric weapons and such use constitutes a clear breach of international law and a threat to international security.

The use of these weapons is in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of chemical weapons and to which Iraq is a Party. This Protocol is a very significant arms-control agreement and we must ensure that it continues to be effective. There is, however, a clear need for it to be re-inforced by a comprehensive convention which incorporates, as one of its fundamental provisions, a categorical prohibition on the use of chemical weapons.

One of the most important developments in the negotiations last year was the agreement reached on the wording for a provision to be included in the convention whereby each State party would undertake not to use chemical weapons. Such a provision is a corner-stone of the convention and no one should doubt this. But, curiously the mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons does not include a specific reference to use as being within the scope of the convention.

Furthermore, the resolution on the chemical weapons negotiations which has been adopted by consensus by the General Assembly in recent years has not included a reference to use. This is a deficiency, in both cases. We will be proposing, at an appropriate time, that the mandate and the resolution clearly indicate the reality of the situation, that is, a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons is an essential part of the scope of the convention being negotiated.

We were encouraged by the work undertaken in the negotiations last year, particularly in the latter part of the session and in January this year. Under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland the Chemical Weapons Committee was able to reach a stage in its work from which significant strides could be made this year. It is clear that the 21 November reaffirmation by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev that they were in favour of a

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general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons and their agreement to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable convention on this matter, have had a very positive impact on our negotiations.

Our objective is a multilateral convention. Thus we are all involved in the negotiations. But, clearly it will not be an effective convention unless it has the full support and commitment of both of those major Powers. At this stage of the 1986 session our assessment is that the new and constructive approach, which has been evident in the negotiations over the past six months is being sustained and is leading to progress. We all know that the issues are extremely complex and that thorough consideration of them will take time if a convention, which has the confidence of all State Parties is to be achieved. But time is pressing on. Our goal is in sight but it is essential that we increase the momentum of the process even more.

Many important issues are under consideration in the three Working Groups of the Committee. One of them, on which I wish to advance some thoughts today, is the development of "régimes for non-diversion".

Article VI, at present entitled "permitted activities", of the draft convention text in CD/636 provides that each State party has the right, in accordance with the provisions of the convention, to develop produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for permitted purposes. This is a fundamental and essential right. A State party must be able to carry out activities, involving toxic chemicals and their precursors in the industrial and agricultural fields, among others, for purposes not prohibited by the convention. What is also important, however, is that these chemical substances are not diverted from these legitimate activities for purposes which are prohibited by the convention. The Chemical Weapons Committee has given much attention in recent years to the development of appropriate régimes to ensure that such diversion does not occur. A number of delegations, including our own, have presented working papers which have indicated the complexity of the issue. Those papers, including a significant contribution by the Netherlands delegation in Working Paper CD/CW/WP.133, tabled last Monday, have sought to find the most appropriate ways to ensure that diversion does not occur.

Working Group "A" of the Committee is currently engaged in continuing the valuable work undertaken last October and January, and through consideration of an interrelated approach encompassing definitions, criteria, and lists of chemicals, is endeavouring to develop régimes for designated chemicals.

Some progress has been achieved this session in listing chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical-weapons purposes, and in developing the elements of a régime for these chemicals.

A key element in an effective régime will, in our view, be the system of monitoring which is established for listed chemicals. It is axiomatic that the monitoring system we are developing must be effective. There must be no loopholes permitting unauthorized diversion. This is not to say, however, that we will need to account for the production and use of every kilogram of a

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designated chemical. The system must be cost-effective and designed to require the minimum allocation of resources consistent with its aims. It should not interfere with the normal functioning of the chemical industry. The data required from industry should be relevant and sufficient, and confidentiality should be maintained by appropriate procedures.

Thus the monitoring system must be effective, cost-effective, and it must preserve commercial confidentiality.

The monitoring system which is set up and becomes effective at the time of entry into force of the convention may fulfil these criteria adequately. However, circumstances in the chemical industry may change. The system may, therefore, require periodic review. Such a review might possibly reveal ways to simplify or tighten up the system.

On several occasions in the past the Australian delegation has noted that the monitoring of non-diversion will require a comprehensive system of data reporting. We envisage that information relating to relevant chemicals will flow through the appropriate national organs to the Consultative Committee. We have suggested that a process of materials accountancy should apply throughout the lifetime of designated chemicals.

The most cost-effective way to collect such data is, in the Australian view, to utilize data reporting systems which are already in place on a national basis. Enquiries that we have carried out in Australia lead us to believe that most, if not all, the information that will be needed is already available to governments. A national authority set up to collect, maintain and collate this information might need to supplement and/or check this data to fulfil the requirements of the convention. This will be for the State party to determine.

A second way to achieve a cost-effective régime would be to keep the lists of designated chemicals as short as is consistent with the purpose of listing them. This criterion will, however, necessarily involve us in considerable investigation, particularly in relation to precursors and key precursors. More attention needs to be given to the way these compounds are routinely used in industry. An understanding of the place of such chemicals in the flow-through of the manufacturing process might help to identify points where quantitative data reporting might be particularly meaningful.

The preservation of commercial confidentiality is likely to involve a number of factors. The most important (and obvious) will be the personal integrity of the technical inspectorate. Other factors will involve procedures to protect data held on computers, the coding of samples which may be taken as part of an inspection and the application of need-to-know rules whereby information is released in an agreed way.

We have noted that the number of chemicals that are listed for monitoring should be kept to a minimum which is consistent with the security of the convention. Another way to avoid the collection of irrelevant data would be to apply a quantity threshold below which reporting of a chemical is not required. Thus a facility or plant which produces less than a given threshold in a 12-month period would not be required to report it.

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The threshold value for chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical-weapons purposes might be higher than say, for some key precursor chemicals. A figure of one tonne seems appropriate to separate research quantities from production quantities. This figure might, however, be much higher for chemicals produced in large quantities where national production may be in the order of thousands of tonnes.

It is our view that the system of data reporting should be qualitatively similar for all listed chemicals. Different thresholds might be set, and more detailed production figures required for chemicals such as the methylphosphonates compared with phosgene. However, the format of reporting should be the same.

There is a minimum amount of information which would be required annually under the suggested approach of "materials accountancy". This might encompass:

Total production, consumption, end uses, import and export of listed chemicals; location of production; percentage used on-site at production facility; percentage sold to another facility; purposes of consumption; and type of end-product or products.

The régime for data reporting that we suggest would cover all situations for the transfer of chemicals except that between a State party and a State non-party. It is possible that the sale of a designated chemical to a State non-party to the convention could be considered to assist such a non-party to acquire a chemical warfare capability.

This possibility could be covered by a requirement for an end-use certificate. Such a document would have no legal standing under the convention but might be considered to give the State party some confidence that it was not inadvertently assisting a State to acquire chemical weapons. Similarly, re-transfer would need to be documented.

It will be necessary to verify the accuracy of the data reported to the technical secretariat so as to assure the Consultative Committee that all States parties are in compliance with the convention. An adequate system of data reporting should enable the technical secretariat to identify trading patterns. Any changes in such patterns or ambiguities in reported data could be settled by fact-finding consultations between the national authority and the technical secretariat, or by on-site inspections as appropriate.

The only restriction that will be placed on the civilian chemical industry of a State party by the convention will be the prohibition to produce, consume, export or import designated chemicals for purposes which are prohibited by the convention. The burden imposed by a system of data reporting supported by fact-finding consultations and, where appropriate, on-site inspections would be, in our view, minimal. It would ensure that relevant chemicals were not being diverted for prohibited purposes.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The régime to be established for verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the civil chemical industry is a vitally important aspect of the convention we are negotiating. We therefore welcome the initiative which the Netherlands Government has taken in organizing a Workshop on verification of non-production to be held in early June. We consider that the programme for the Workshop, as outlined by Ambassador Van Shaik to the plenary on 13 March, will provide us with a greater insight into the technical and organizational problems of verifying non-production and will be a valuable contribution to consideration of this subject in the negotiations during the summer session.

Another area of the convention which is of vital importance are the provisions to be elaborated for consultation, co-operation and fact-finding -- Article IX in the draft contained in CD/636.

We are pleased that Working Group "C" has embarked on consideration of Article IX using, as a basis the very thoughtful paper prepared by the delegation of Pakistan (CD/634).

One aspect of this article which has yet to be given thorough consideration, however, is the régime to be established for challenge inspection.

In this regard, Australia has supported Article X of the United States draft chemical-weapons convention as indicating the standard of verification required of the convention in relation to situations where, in exceptional circumstances, serious doubts exist or arise about a State party's compliance with its obligations under the convention.

Article X has been the focus of criticism by a number of delegations who have argued that it made a distinction in the verification régime from one country to another, depending on the degree of State ownership of the chemical industry.

Australia's view was -- and remains -- that the verification provisions of the future convention should apply with equal effectiveness to all countries, whatever their economic, social and political systems, and that comparable facilities, irrespective of ownership, should be subject to comparable controls.

In this respect, Australia took careful note of earlier United States statements that no such imbalance was intended and that the United States was also ready to work with others to ensure its verification proposals applied fairly to differing economic and political systems. We welcome the action which the United States has now unilaterally taken to amend its draft to take account of the perceived imbalance in Article X. But I want to emphasize that we will only be able to give in-depth consideration to the appropriate challenge inspection system to be incorporated in the convention if delegations which have alternative approaches to that embodied in the United States draft put forward their own detailed proposals. They should do so now.

It is only through discussion of specific texts that our consideration and efforts in relation to challenge verification can be focussed sharply.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

This consideration will be facilitated in Working Group "C" by the additional proposals put forward recently by Pakistan and, jointly, by the German Democratic Republic and Poland.

We should now make a concerted effort -- as others have suggested -- to reach agreement on Article IX, incorporating provisions on challenge verification which will provide a high standard of confidence of compliance with the convention.

My delegation is grateful for the determined efforts Ambassador Cromartie is making as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We have and will continue to support him in his efforts.

I stated earlier that time is pressing down upon us. We need to speed up our work. The horror of chemical weapons is known to all of us and has been known to we Australians since the beginning of this century when Australian troops were exposed to the first large-scale use of those weapons. Here in Europe others were also. Australians and New Zealanders were involved on that occasion, and that exposure to chemical weapons remains indelibly inscribed in our national consciousness. Indeed some of those who participated in the so-called Great War remain alive today and are still being treated in our veterans hospitals in Australia for the awful and debilitating effects of exposure to chemical weapons 70 years ago. And while we have been considering this convention chemical weapons have been used again.

Their use must be banned absolutely and that we have already agreed to such a ban, as part of our future convention, should itself be made known widely and clearly now. Above all we need to bring to conclusion our universal convention at the earliest possible time so that this class of weapons can be utterly and finally removed.

(U Tin Tun, Burma)

To conclude a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and the elimination of existing chemical weapon stocks and chemical weapon production facilities is one of the important objectives which we are pursuing with vigour. While seeking the comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, we should at the same time take care to ensure that the future convention on chemical weapons would not unduly hinder and interfere with legitimate activities of civilian chemical industries. My delegation is happy to note that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is proceeding with momentum under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom.

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(Mr. Issraelyan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

In his statement, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized the importance that our country attaches to the elimination of chemical weapons and announced that the Soviet Union plans to introduce a number of new proposals on that subject at the Conference on Disarmament.

Accordingly, our delegation will now outline these new proposals. May I, at the outset, recall the relevant provisions of the statement of M.S. Gorbachev of 15 January which defined the position of the USSR on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union is in favour of the earliest and complete elimination of chemical weapons and of the actual industrial base for their production. We are prepared to undertake the timely declaration of the location of enterprises for the production of chemical weapons and the cessation of their

(Mr. Issraelyan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

production, we are ready to start working out procedures for destroying that industrial base and to embark, soon after the convention enters into force, on the elimination of stockpiles of chemical weapons. All these measures would be carried out, of course, under strict control, including international on-site inspections.

Permit me now to state the essence of our proposals.

Firstly, the Soviet Union, proceeding from its readiness to start the destruction of the chemical weapons stocks soon after the convention enters into force, proposes that the elimination of chemical-weapon stocks should be initiated by each State party not later than 6 months, and should be completed not later than 10 years, after the convention enters into force.

Secondly, as to the timely declaration of the location of enterprises for the production of chemical weapons, including the components of binary weapons, the Soviet Union proposes that 30 days after the convention enters into force States parties should make official declarations concerning whether they have (or had) industrial facilities on their territories and the number of such facilities, irrespective of their ownership (State or private) and by whose order (agreement, contract) they were created and operate (operated) for the purposes of the production of chemical weapons, together with the indication of the precise location of each facility.

Thirdly, for the purposes of ensuring the earliest complete elimination of the industrial base for the production of chemical weapons the Soviet Union proposes to begin the destruction or dismantling of chemical-weapon production facilities not later than one year after the convention enters into force.

Fourthly, the Soviet Union, proceeding from its readiness to ensure the timely cessation of the production of chemical weapons, proposes the following: (a) Immediately after the convention enters into force each State party will cease all activities at chemical-weapon production facilities except those required for their closure. The official declaration to this effect shall be made not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force; (b) During the three months following the entry into force of the convention each State party will take national measures to ensure the non-operation (i.e. the closure) of the facilities, taking into account whether they are located separately from or together with other production facilities (prohibition of occupation of buildings, disconnection and dismantling of all communication services of the facility, and also of protective constructions for personnel safety, etc.).

Fifthly, in connection with the readiness of the USSR to start developing procedures for destroying the relevant industrial base, expressed in the statement of M.S. Gorbachev of 15 January, the Soviet Union proposes the following guidelines: (a) procedures for the destruction and dismantling of the relevant facilities should be developed, taking due account of the nature and special features of those facilities; (b) the destruction of chemical-weapon production facilities should be understood as the physical destruction of all the technological equipment of the final stage of the

(Mr. Issraelyan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

synthesis of super-toxic lethal chemicals and of the specialized equipment for the filling of chemical munitions. In the dismantling of such facilities, the removal (disassembling) of the basic units of technological equipment of the final stage of the synthesis of super-toxic lethal chemicals, and their mandatory subsequent destruction, would take place. The equipment (units, installations) not subject to unconditional destruction can be used for other chemical production with strict guarantees of its non-use for the purposes prohibited by the convention.

Sixthly, the Soviet Union proposes that the cessation of the operation of every chemical weapon production facility, including those of private enterprises and transnational corporations, should be ensured by means of strict verification, including systematic on-site inspections, such as the verification of the accuracy of declarations, the sealing by inspectors of the facility to be closed, the periodic checking of the preservation of seals up to the moment when the seals are removed and the destruction or the dismantling of the facility is initiated. In the process of joint examinations of facilities by the representatives of the national verification organization and the international inspectorate reports would be prepared to be transmitted to the Consultative Committee.

For the purpose of the effective verification of the destruction and the dismantling of chemical-weapon production facilities the Soviet Union proposes that provision should be made for the conducting of systematic international on-site inspections and that a procedure should be worked out for visits to a facility by international inspectors whereby inspectors would be present at all important operations for the destruction or dismantling of a chemical-weapon production facility. Final international verification would be carried out upon the full termination of the process of the elimination or dismantling of the entire facility.

The conversion of facilities for the purposes of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons, as well as their elimination upon the completion of their utilization for the destruction of stocks, should also be carried out under the supervision of the international verification personnel.

Seventh, the convention should envisage measures to ensure its strict observance and implementation by each State party, irrespective of whether State-owned or private enterprises or transnational corporations are involved, and above all the prevention of the use of the commercial chemical industry for the development and production of chemical weapons.

The Soviet delegation has set forth the new proposals of the Soviet Union on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We believe that these proposals will make it possible to achieve decisive progress in the elaboration of the convention on the subject in order that the complete destruction of chemical weapons everywhere on Earth by the end of this century may become a reality.

The Soviet Union attaches special significance to the idea of establishing a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe.

(Mr. Issraelyan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

The United States and NATO are pursuing a policy directed at undermining the initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist States aimed at ridding Europe of chemical weapons, and in particular at establishing zones free of such weapons. The reason for this position -- whatever artificial arguments are used to conceal it -- is that the United States and some of its allies regard the establishment of such zones as a real obstacle to the deployment of American binary chemical weapons. In this context their references to the effect that the establishment on the European continent of chemical-weapon-free zones would, allegedly, hamper the solution of the task of the prohibition of chemical weapons on the global scale is nothing more than a mere pretext. The deployment of binary chemical weapons in Western Europe would have a most negative influence on the negotiations under way at the Disarmament Conference on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons and would erect another serious obstacle to the elaboration of an international convention on that subject.

The implementation of the plans of the United States to produce binary chemical weapons and to deploy such weapons in West European countries threatens to turn the densely populated countries of Western Europe into a potential theatre of destructive chemical war, the main victim of which would be primarily the civilian population. The United States wants to turn Western Europe into its "double hostage", both nuclear and chemical. As in the case of the Pershing-2 and long-range cruise missiles, the United States is obviously playing a dishonest game, seeking to divert the retaliatory strike away from its own territory and onto the territory and the population of its allies.

The arguments in favour of the deployment of binary chemical weapons in Western Europe and assertions about their allegedly "defensive" purposes for strengthening the "deterrent" potential of NATO are groundless. They are deliberately intended to deceive the peoples of those countries since, in fact, the only purpose they serve is that of getting at any price the agreement of the Governments of the countries of Western Europe, and first of all that of the Federal Republic of Germany, to the deployment of binary weapons.

The Soviet Union resolutely condemns the plans for the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons and believes that the Government of the United States should recognize its responsibility for the consequences of such a step. The immediate duty of peoples is to prevent the realization of the dangerous plans for the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons in Western Europe.

As for the Soviet Union, it reaffirms -- while consistently advocating the radical solution of the issue of the prohibition and destruction of all types of chemical weapons -- its readiness to co-operate actively with all peace-loving States in the efforts to reach this humane goal. The new proposals of the Soviet Union prove that its words are not at variance with its deeds.

(Mr. Issraelyan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

These proposals fully expose the mendacious assertions that the Soviet Union is not interested in the elaboration of effective measures of verification of the implementation of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Our approach to these issues is basically different from the unrealistic and discriminatory nature of the United States proposals on the issues of verification, which were indeed conceived in the hope that they would inevitably lead the negotiations into a deadlock. Those proposals were, in fact, included in the draft convention of the United States of 1984. "It may mean that we can't get an agreement on that basis", publicly acknowledged R. Pearle, the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense, one of the authors of the American draft. As the two years of negotiations after the introduction of the American draft demonstrated, the unrealistic proposals of the United States on issues of verification proved to be unacceptable not only for the Soviet Union but also for a considerable majority of other participants of the negotiations.

We, however, have introduced our proposals not to produce deliberate deadlocks. On the contrary, the goal of our proposals is to ensure the effective and indeed realistic verification of the observance of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, with full respect for the sovereign rights of States Parties to the future Convention.

It is stated in the Message of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, addressed to the Conference on Disarmament that the Soviet Union proposes that the unduly protracted negotiations to conclude a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should be vigorously advanced. Seeking to accelerate the talks on that issue, the Soviet delegation has introduced today a number of new proposals that make it possible to remove the differences that have existed until now.

Mr. RYCHLAK (Poland): Let me begin by expressing my delegation's appreciation and satisfaction of the visit to the Conference on Disarmament of His Excellency Mr. Narayanan, Minister of State for External Affairs of India. We have listened with interest to his important statement.

Before turning to the subject of my statement today, I would like to welcome the very important proposals put forward today by the delegation of the USSR. The prohibition of chemical weapons has been on our agenda for many years, and international opinion expects an early agreement on the total

Mr. Rychlak, Poland)

prohibition of these weapons. The concrete proposals we have heard today will undoubtedly help in making tangible progress in working out the chemical weapon convention. The proposals are a visible proof of the Soviet Union's desire to see these terrible weapons of mass destruction banned. They demonstrate a readiness for compromise, they take into account many aspects of the negotiating position of other countries, thus creating a basis for mutually acceptable solutions. It is worth noting that today's proposals by the Soviet Union are the amplification and elaboration of the relevant part of the disarmament programme put forward on 15 January this year by the Secretary-General of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev. The new initiative of the Soviet Union belongs to the general efforts of the socialist countries, my country among them, directed at the achievement of the rapid prohibition of chemical weapons. The Polish delegation, as Co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries on the item of chemical weapons, wishes to express particular satisfaction with regard to the new perspectives opened by this Soviet initiative, for the acceleration of negotiations on a chemical-weapon convention.

However, we wish to stress that the hopes of achieving progress in the elimination of chemical weapons require that nothing be done which could endanger and undermine the process of negotiations. I would like to emphasize that we strongly object to the United States plans to begin the production of binary chemical weapons and to the prospects of their deployment in some NATO States. Being a European State, we cannot but qualify such plans as deliberate and purposeful action undermining the continent's security and peace. We are convinced that instead of deploying new binary chemical weapons in Europe, a zone free of all chemical weapons should be established, and that such a step would more accurately correspond to the expectations of all European nations.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, today, I would like to address item 4 of the agenda, "Prohibition of Chemical Weapons". This is one of the questions to which my delegation attaches great importance. Indeed, I should say that the serious and business-like attitude of the Warsaw Treaty Member States to the chemical-weapon negotiations is beyond any doubt. At their recent Ministerial Meeting, held in Warsaw on 19 and 20 March 1986, the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty declared that "they consider that the total elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production before the end of the century is wholly feasible".

The Warsaw Treaty Member States propose to impart a sense of urgency and a business-like approach to the Conference's negotiations on drafting a chemical weapons convention. As is known, the participants in the negotiations have already agreed that the chemical weapons and the facilities producing them should be eliminated within 10 years after the entry into force of the Convention. Having in mind the experience with previous international instruments, there may be a 2-3 year time-span between its signing and entry into force. Consequently, this means that if chemical weapons should be eliminated by the end of the century, the convention should be worked out in the next year or two.

For the realization of this important task there are, in the context of the negotiations, a number of positive developments, and on the other hand, some negative factors. Let me first address the favourable trends in our work.

Since the beginning of this year the negotiations on a chemical-weapon ban have acquired a new dimension - regular consultations between the USSR and the United States at the expert level, as agreed by M. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU, and R. Reagan, President of the United States, at their Summit Meeting in Geneva last November. It is noteworthy that for the second time in the last 15 years it has been considered useful to initiate bilateral Soviet-American talks on all issues relevant to the prohibition of chemical weapons. In their present form these talks are intended, as declared by the delegations of both States, to complement the multilateral negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Bulgarian delegation considers that the Soviet-American consultations and contacts could and should have a positive effect on the overall negotiating process, provided that they are held in the "Spirit of Geneva".

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

In this context the ideas contained in the Declaration of M. Gorbachev of 15 January this year and the subsequent contribution of the Soviet delegation on relevant issues considered in the respective working groups give an impetus for making progress in the negotiations during this session.

At the last plenary meeting, on 22 April, the USSR introduced new, concrete proposals which are an organic development of the ideas expressed by the Soviet leader in January. Thus, the Soviet Union has made yet another very important step in the direction of accelerating the elaboration of a chemical-weapon convention. The essence of these proposals testifies to the resolve of the Soviet Union to contribute to overcoming existing differences of view on the elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production. The procedures for ensuring the non-operation of chemical-weapon production facilities and the activities for the removal of the basic units of technological equipment have been addressed thoroughly. The same goes for the specific co-operation between the national authority and the international inspectorate. The activities for the destruction and dismantling of the relevant production base are intended to comprise all facilities regardless of their ownership at the time of entry into force of the convention.

The new Soviet proposals create a solid basis for the elaboration of an effective and realistic procedure for verification, and take into account the interests of the other participants in the negotiations. My delegation welcomes the constructive approach of the Soviet Union on all these key issues of the draft convention.

In the same vein of positive assessment we would like to commend the elaboration of the so-called Integrated Approach, contained in document CD/651, which represents the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for its extended session in January, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski. My delegation is happy to have been associated with the elaboration of the Integrated Approach. Undoubtedly, this Approach to listing relevant chemicals has certain deficiencies, in particular from the point of view of the structure of List A and List B. None the less, it must be emphasized that for the first time it was possible to incorporate in a jointly prepared paper practically all chemicals that could be considered -- in conformity with specific criteria -- to fall under régimes which would regulate the permitted activities with these chemicals. My delegation would like to commend this document as an example of serious and constructive co-operation of all delegations with a view to advancing the negotiations on some of the most complex matters of the convention. The Integrated Approach is a solution in transition: its full potential could be developed and used only at the stage of completing the analytical work on listing the relevant chemicals in the right-hand column of List "A" (key precursors), List "B" (key components of binary and multicomponent chemical weapons systems or especially dangerous key precursors), and List "C" (chemicals that are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes).

For this work to succeed, all delegations, in our opinion, should strictly abide by the understanding that guided the elaboration of the Integrated Approach in January, i.e. the lists of relevant chemicals should be

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

considered in interrelationship with the criteria and the definitions for the respective category of chemicals. From this point of view my delegation would like to recommend the completion of the process of perfecting the criteria for defining key precursors and on this basis to list these chemicals in the right-hand column of List "A", so that the elements of a régime in this area could be more usefully considered. The same goes for the need to co-ordinate the criteria for defining key components of binary and multicomponent chemical weapons systems. My delegation is convinced that only carefully elaborated and precise understandings in the context of all definitional problems related to the Integrated Approach could ensure a smooth functioning of a reliable system for controlling the chemicals and related data, with a view to excluding possibilities for diverting chemicals for chemical-weapons purposes.

Judging, inter alia, by the useful work in regard to assigning chemicals to List "C" and elements of a respective régime done in Working Group "A", my delegation has no doubts about the "vitality" of the Integrated Approach.

Another important aspect of the Integrated Approach is that the more it is being developed, the more it increases the level of specificity and purposefulness of the negotiations, including those on matters related to verification and compliance.

Many of the provisions of a régime in regard to supertoxic lethal chemicals have been agreed last year. On the other hand, important issues remain to be resolved. In this connection we bear witness to the fact that both at the national and the international level measures are being taken to restrict the production and use of the various chemical components, even of whole groups of products, which inflict irreparable damage to the environment and, in some cases, to man. According to Western estimates in the third world alone 10,000 people die annually through effects of pesticides and herbicides. Therefore, restrictions are being imposed which, in certain countries, amount to something like a total prohibition. A most general example in this regard is the restrictions placed upon the utilization of phosphate detergents, some medicines, etc. They are considerably less toxic than the supertoxic lethal chemicals, which lie at the basis of chemical arsenals.

In the course of our negotiations only single cases of supertoxic lethal chemicals with useful peaceful application have been cited. Such chemicals are, however, produced in very restricted quantities, and are available for practical utilization in a strongly diluted form. This peculiarity is one of the main considerations why the Warsaw Treaty Member States consider that the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals should be concentrated at a single small-scale production facility. Such an approach can hardly be prejudicial to the real commercial and scientific interests of any country whatsoever. Chemistry, like any other science, is in permanent motion, development and expansion. As a result of chance or systematic synthesis, new supertoxic lethal substances may appear. They have to be announced and placed under control promptly, following their identification with this category of chemicals, and this can be safely and effectively done at a single small-scale production facility.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

Another point relevant to the solidity of a régime on supertoxic lethal chemicals is the need to adhere strictly to the long-standing agreements on the toxicity levels which delimit the group of supertoxic lethal chemicals from the group of other lethal chemicals.

For practical purposes, deriving from purely commercial interests, some Western delegations tend to overlook toxicity levels as a definitional criterion. In the opinion of my delegation such an approach, even if it succeeds in satisfying some restricted interests, is likely to create grave problems with important security implications.

A number of delegations have addressed the chemical-weapon negotiations from the point of view of their country's commercial interests. My delegation shares this concern and is endeavouring to assist in the search for ideas which may open up the way for a common solution.

At this stage of the negotiations we are confronted, however, with a much more substantial problem: the implementation of the so-called binary programme of the United States which threatens to severely jeopardize the chemical-weapon negotiations.

The purpose of that programme is, by varying the components of binary mixes, to achieve greater toxicity and basically new mechanisms of action of end chemical-weapon agents with the aim of overcoming the system of detection and of troop and civilian treatment and protection.

In our submission the relative simplicity of the manufacture of binary components could lead to a world-wide proliferation of chemical weapons with unpredictable consequences for mankind. And last but not least, the binary programme is fraught with the danger of creating conditions for circumventing the verification of the provisions of a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The danger of the binary programme lies also in the unleashing of a new round of the development of offensive types of weapons of mass destruction on a qualitatively new, higher level.

A speedy solution of the binary problem in the context of the draft convention should be found. The setting up of List "B" in document CD/651 seems to be a concrete step in the right direction. A number of other related issues remain, however, unresolved.

My country, like other Warsaw Treaty Member States, is in favour of some interim solutions to the problem of prohibiting and eliminating the chemical weapons completely, including their particularly dangerous binary version. Such interim solutions are in no way intended to complicate the negotiations on chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament.

Four months ago, Todor Zhivkov, President of the State Council of Bulgaria and Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania, issued a Joint Declaration-Appeal to the other leaders of the Balkan States concerning the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Balkans. This new initiative is under active consideration. We find nothing extraordinary in the fact that the proposal to turn the Balkans into a zone free of chemical weapons would have its proponents and opponents. No one harbours the

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

illusion that it would be implemented immediately and without difficulties. We are convinced, however -- and the first official responses by our neighbours support the conviction -- that it has practical potential. In our view the implementation of regional measures is feasible, and in a way easier, because it concerns a limited number of States. The task of turning the Balkans into a zone free of chemical weapons could be facilitated by the de facto situation that there are no chemical weapons on their territory at the present stage.

Not only the Balkan States but the whole of Europe should be free from chemical weapons and my country is prepared to work in this direction alongside our active participation in the chemical weapons negotiations in this Conference.

A zone free of chemical weapons in Europe would correspond to the objectives of peace and would strengthen the European security and the international security. That is why we support the initiative of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia to create a zone free of chemical weapons in Central Europe which would comprise the territories of these two countries and the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Our aim at the Conference on Disarmament remains the speedy elaboration of a chemical-weapon convention. More than ever before the conditions have been laid down for making a considerable progress. I avail myself of this opportunity to assure the Conference of my delegation's readiness to contribute in developing further the positive perspectives in the chemical-weapon negotiations. We expect that the same spirit of constructiveness and business-like approach will be followed by all delegations during the second part of this year's session. Being aware of the diplomatic skills of Ambassador Cromartie, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we hope that he will make full use of the new prospects opened up before the Conference on the issue of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Yet another proof of our readiness to implement the agreements reached at Geneva are the new proposals on the prohibition of chemical weapons put forward by us on 22 April.

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(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

May I however note in this connection that replies on the part of the Soviet delegation to a number of questions I have put in the context of our negotiations on chemical weapons, in a statement of 27 March, have not yet been forthcoming. My delegation had nourished the hope that at least a partial reply might be contained in the proposals the Soviet delegation put

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(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

before us on 22 April. These proposals for the implementation and verification of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks and production facilities flesh out the positions which General Secretary Gorbachev had already announced on 15 January. The proposals mark, to a considerable extent, the agreement of the Soviet Union with positions which the Conference on Disarmament had already worked out for the solution of the issues inherent in the destruction phase. They thus constitute a positive Soviet contribution to the solution of two important aspects of the difficult task of verifying a chemical weapons ban. My delegation is engaged in a careful examination of the Soviet proposals and the useful clarifications and technical details they contain. On first sight, however, it appears that the proposals do not solve all relevant verification issues. In the field of destruction of stocks and facilities, there seem to be a number of restrictive elements. Beyond that, the proposals do not address the two vital areas in which negotiators are presently engaged, the issue of surveillance of chemical production to ensure future non-production of chemical weapons, and verification in on-challenge cases. These, however, were the very areas to which the questions of my delegation to the Soviet delegation related.

My Government expects that the Soviet Union -- by broadening the scope and contents of its past positions -- will soon also make a contribution to the solution of these crucial issues, thus paving the way for a breakthrough regarding the central problems of a chemical-weapon treaty. We feel encouraged in this anticipation by the partial proposals that are now before us. Many colleagues have commented on the status of the work of the Conference and the heavy task that is still before us. At the same time, they have expressed satisfaction on the dense work rhythm and the, at least partial, accomplishments of the current month. My delegation is acutely aware, Mr. President, of your determinant role in these achievements and would like to express its gratitude for the remarkable manner in which you have presided over the Conference.

Mr. CHIRILA (Romania)

The prompt re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at the beginning of the session was an encouraging sign, while establishing general agreement on the need and possibility, within a short period of time,

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(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

of elaborating an international legal instrument covering all aspects of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The Ad Hoc Committee and its three working groups have embarked on activities relating to the actual substance of various parts of the draft convention, while retaining and enlarging the points on which progress and agreement had been achieved before the session. We express the hope that, while drawing on the proposals and suggestions made to date, including the proposals made at the preceding meeting by the Soviet delegation, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will continue during the second part of the session in a still more dynamic manner, finding tangible, definitive and generally acceptable solutions and formulations. The Romanian delegation intended to intensify its contribution in that area of the Conference's work which offered the best chances of achieving an effective and generally acceptable legal instrument.

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

In my statement today I would like to limit myself to the work of the Conference under item 4. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is being conducted against the background of great progress in the chemical industry and of technological advances, which makes the production of chemical weapons accessible to many countries. That, in the long run, hampers the already complex work on a Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and destruction of chemical weapons. The fact that despite the ban embodied in the 1925 Protocol, chemical weapons are being used, makes it incumbent upon the international community to accelerate and intensify its efforts towards drafting and adopting the Convention and completing it as soon as possible.

We would like to reiterate this time again that Yugoslavia -- being one of the first signatory States to the 1925 Protocol on the prohibition of chemical weapons -- condemns the violation of its provisions and the use of chemical weapons by any State. In our view, the Conference on Disarmament has a duty and great responsibility before the international community to make maximum efforts to overcome existing political and other difficulties blocking the finalization of the Convention.

So far, the Ad Hoc Committee has made substantial progress in reaching consensus over matters of principle in the Convention. But we are now entering a stage when it is necessary and politically important to evolve a consensus on a number of technical matters as well. Negotiations are under way in the working groups on two very important problems of a future Convention: (a) the régime and measures of verification which will be applicable after the entry into force of the Convention, and (b) the unimpeded operation and development of the civil chemical industry.

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

Regarding verification measures, the Yugoslav delegation has always held the view that it is necessary to implement such measures of verification which will be internationally agreed, effective and verifiable. These measures should also be flexible enough to allow for the unhampered operation of the civil chemical industry, but very effective so as to leave no doubt about the possible abuse of such flexibility. In its working papers, the Yugoslav delegation has presented in more detail its views on implementation and measures to be taken within the framework of international and national verification bodies in compliance with the convention. We note with satisfaction that the results of the ongoing negotiations in the working groups prove that many of our conclusions are shared by other delegations. In the further work of the Committee, it will be necessary to elaborate the tasks and composition of the above-mentioned bodies. Nevertheless, the results achieved so far are encouraging.

We consider that the lists of chemicals established during the course of negotiations provide a good basis for further conduct of negotiations. These lists will have to be elaborated in great detail even after the convention comes into force, because of the development of the chemical industry and technology.

At the same time, however, the lists of chemicals contained in document CD/651 constitute at this stage a realistic basis for the elaboration of verification measures.

In elaborating the list of chemicals, a further effort should, in our opinion, be made to classify them as accurately as possible on the basis of general-purpose criteria and bearing in mind the current level of development of science and technology. All relevant chemicals today can be classified as single-purpose and dual-purpose chemicals, no matter whether they belong to super-toxic lethal chemicals or to other chemicals. In these considerations, special importance should be attributed to the military use of these chemicals, on the one hand, and on the other to the overall requirements of the civilian industry, agriculture, medicine, etc., regardless of the toxicity of these chemicals. Furthermore, sight should not be lost of the fact that the economic factor and the development of science and technology require such an approach. We believe that this will be the best way to deal with the activities that should be prohibited under the Convention without affecting further progress of mankind.

As far as single-purpose chemicals are concerned, it is understood that they should be subject to the most strict and elaborate régime in respect to their declaration and destruction, according to the timetable to be determined by the Convention. The dual-purpose chemicals, on the other hand, should be dealt with in two ways. The super-toxic lethal chemicals should be dealt with having in mind their peaceful uses, while their production and transfer should be allowed only under strict control. It goes without saying that their production facilities will play a large role in determining the régime of verification.

The other chemicals which are massively produced in the chemical industry either for industrial purposes or for pesticides, make up a special group of chemicals that deserve attention. Everyday life today is unimaginable without

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

them. These chemicals are found everywhere around us in different forms and are part of everyday contemporary living, and subsequently some of them are produced in large quantities. The great economic importance of these chemicals makes it necessary that the convention regulate their production in such a way as not to prevent further progress and not involve a vast international machinery for the verification of production, and that each State Party undertake not to breach the basic concepts of the convention. We welcome in this connection the initiative put forward by the Dutch Government to organize a workshop on verification of non-production, to be held in early June, as a contribution towards consideration of technical and organizational problems related to verification of non-production.

As we have underlined in our earlier working papers, the verification of super-toxic lethal chemicals, whether involving destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons or stockpiles of single-purpose chemicals for peaceful purposes, should be international in character. In connection with the super-toxic lethal chemicals, attention should be paid to the chemicals produced for medical, agricultural and other purposes, and on the basis of the production facilities, a régime of verification should be established with participation of international organs.

On the other hand, production of other chemicals, though in most cases involving large-scale facilities, should be subject to national means of verification. The responsibilities and obligations of such national organs are very important in view of the fact that these chemicals may be used for military purposes as well.

A ban on chemical weapons and the adoption of the chemical-weapon convention is an urgent task. The complexity of the problems faced cannot be an excuse for prolonging the drafting of the convention which has been under way for a number of years. We have listened with great interest to the proposals advanced by the distinguished representative of the USSR, His Excellency Victor Issraelyan, in his statement on 22 April 1986, which constitutes a new contribution to negotiations for the elaboration of the chemical weapons convention. Until the completion of the convention, interim and unilateral measures may be undertaken in line with the principled agreements reached. Thus, we would like to hear from time to time that a country possessing large stockpiles of chemical weapons has decided -- pending the destruction of all stockpiles of these weapons on the basis of the convention -- to unilaterally destroy at least a fraction of its stockpiles and invited other countries to observe it. However, such an example of one country should not remain isolated. We are confident that such a gesture would be widely welcomed, and that it could contribute to the climate of confidence which is essential to any agreement, in particular in the field of disarmament.

President: Mr. K. Tellalov (Bulgaria)

I should like to single out, in particular, the major importance that my country attaches to its relationships with the Balkan States. We are working actively to turn the Balkans into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons; we maintain our proposal to sign with all Balkan countries bilateral agreements which would include a Code of Good-neighbourly Relations; we have come out with the initiative for the Balkan States to work out and sign a Treaty on Ecological Protection of the Balkan Peninsula and to adopt an appeal on this matter to all countries and nations of the European continent.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

The problem of verification is of key importance for the negotiations concerning a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. These negotiations have already reached an advanced stage. There is no major issue of this

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

technically and legally complicated subject-matter that has not yet been dealt with in depth by the Conference on Disarmament. The still unresolved problems concern verification. It is encouraging to note the perseverance and objectiveness shown by the delegations at the Conference on Disarmament in developing adequate verification provisions both for systematic inspections and for on-challenge inspections. The Conference has, however, reached the stage where more is involved than elaboration of the legal and technical aspects of the subject. Now the aim must be to achieve, through action geared to early results, a consensus on an adequate international system of verification assisting the attainment of the purposes of the chemical weapons convention.

In paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Members of the United Nations declared that disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties.

In my Government's view the term "adequate" assumes special significance. It implies, on the one hand, that no contracting party should learn more through verification than it needs to know for the purpose of monitoring the observance of an arms control agreement, and, on the other, that the verification system should give no contracting party the chance to avoid the inspections necessary in order to determine whether the provisions of the agreement are being complied with. Only if such an agreement exists can all involved be confident that this is the case.

We welcome the Soviet Union's statement of 22 April 1986 agreeing to international controls, including on-site inspections, to ensure the destruction of remaining chemical weapons and the dismantling of manufacturing facilities. But two major problems of verification still have to be solved: the one concerning monitoring the non-production of chemical weapons, the other on-challenge inspections.

As regards the verification of non-production, we consider it necessary to establish a system of random, international on-site inspections to monitor substances that can serve as key precursors for the production of chemical weapons.

The Federal Republic of Germany has had practical experience with such controls. Under the 1954 WEU Treaty it undertook not to manufacture chemical weapons and agreed to appropriate controls. This monitoring takes the form of random inspections which cannot be used for anything but verification purposes.

The experience gained in this process has been incorporated in a number of the working papers we have submitted. Monitoring of the non-production of chemical warfare agents can be effected by agreeing on a list of relevant chemical substances and carrying out regular inspections at manufacturing facilities. In our view this procedure can be applied to the key precursors for all chemical weapons.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

The question of how to proceed if a contracting party is suspected of violating the chemical weapons convention raises particularly difficult problems which, basically, are of a political nature. Thus the extent to which nations are prepared to help solve the problem of on-challenge procedures will show how serious are their intentions with regard to a convention banning chemical weapons.

The purpose of on-challenge procedures is to create a safety-net for those cases that cannot be covered by regular inspections. Here, too, adequate and identical criteria must apply to all parties concerned so as not to create different conditions on account of different economic systems. Flexibility and a readiness for compromise are called for if the negotiations on this question are not to grind to a halt. The Federal Republic of Germany will do its utmost to help bring about a solution.

The recent use of chemical weapons in regional Third World conflicts has underlined the urgency of a global prohibition. It also shows that there is no reasonable alternative to such a universal ban. There must not be zones where chemical weapons are banned and others where they are allowed. Rather than provide more safety, that would create mistrust, instability and uncertainty. Moreover, it would further complicate the verification issue.

All nations have the same right to be free from the threat of chemical weapons. Together with our immediate neighbours we shall use every opportunity to achieve progress towards a solution of the outstanding problems in connection with a convention establishing a global ban. We have taken the initiative for talks between our delegation to the Conference on Disarmament and the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

My Government gives absolute priority to the early conclusion of a convention which ensures the global proscription of chemical weapons. This view is shared by all our allies. I urgently appeal to delegates to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to make full use of the time remaining in the 1986 session to complete their work on the convention. Mankind must at long last be freed from the scourge of chemical weapons. The total elimination of a whole category of destructive weapons would be a sign of hope to all mankind.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

In the multilateral field, the negotiating fora necessary to address all relevant matters are at our disposal. Comprehensive proposals are on the table: on a test ban, on chemical weapons, on radiological weapons, on force reductions and confidence- and security-building measures in Europe just to mention a few important examples.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The Conference on Disarmament has indeed a major opportunity today. It should be possible to start reaping the fruits of several years of technical and diplomatic work. The Conference should be able to conclude negotiations on a chemical weapons convention and a treaty on radiological weapons, it should be able to show how a verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty can be designed -- in the interest of all States, it should be able to elaborate measures helping to prevent an arms race in space, it should be able to start discussing some proposals in the naval field.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

During the first part of the session, the Conference made some slow but definite headway towards a convention on chemical weapons. My delegation would like to offer its congratulations to the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Cromartie, and the chairmen of the various working groups, who have all worked with dedication to reach substantive results in what must be considered as one of the most complicated and demanding negotiations ever embarked upon in the field of disarmament. My delegation is especially appreciative of progress made on the classification of chemicals, and concerning the machinery for the implementation of the convention and for the verification of compliance with it.

In this context, allow me to express the thanks of the Swedish delegation to the delegation of the Netherlands for the Workshop on the Verification of a Chemical Weapons Ban which took place in the Netherlands from 4 to 6 June. The Workshop is an important contribution to the negotiations of the Conference on the difficult problem of verification of non-production of chemical weapons.

A convention on chemical weapons is an important goal desired by the entire world community. The recent report by a United Nations expert mission that such weapons have been used by Iraqi forces in the war between Iraq and Iran clearly demonstrates the urgency of reaching that goal. It is also demonstrated by the fact that some of the major military Powers today possess

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

important arsenals of chemical weapons. Their quantity and quality may increase in the future, while the risk of geographical proliferation is ever more present.

All efforts should be made during the rest of this session to reach such progress that the major elements of a draft convention be completed. My delegation urges all Conference members to show both restraint in national armament policies on chemical weapons and inventiveness in finding solutions to outstanding matters in the ongoing negotiations.

This is particularly crucial as we now approach some of the most sensitive issues of a future convention. Matters such as the non-production and the effective verification of declaration of stocks and of compliance with the convention will now be the focus of attention of the negotiators.

In order to further the negotiations, all countries producing or considering production of chemical weapons should refrain from such production during the negotiations on a convention. Disarmament can never be furthered through increased armaments.

Against this background, the recent American decision on binary chemical weapons is regrettable, though I believe that it need not complicate our negotiations if they are conducted with appropriate speed. I trust that all States here present remain committed to the early conclusion of a chemical weapons treaty. My Government attaches the highest priority to this negotiation and will, for its part, do its utmost to see it successfully concluded.

However, what is good news to the supporters of chemical disarmament infuriates those who seek to slow that work down. The decisions adopted by the United States and USSR in favour of binary chemical weapons are in effect intended not only to maintain for years the chemical threat facing all mankind, but to increase it. They contradict the objective of the elimination of chemical weapons, run counter to the Soviet-American accord reached at the Geneva summit and are bound to damage seriously the negotiations for a convention banning such weapons now under way at the Conference on Disarmament. Such decisions raise considerable doubts as to the sincerity of statements made by their supporters who claim to be in favour of arms limitation, disarmament and building international confidence.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The world public justifiably sees a relation between the work of the Conference and mankind's many years of efforts to ban chemical weapons, which are among the most barbaric weapons of mass destruction.

The spring session was marked by a generally business-like discussion of matters related to chemical weapons. These negotiations, in both content and form, are increasingly geared to a final result -- the preparation of a complete text of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stock-piling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The Soviet Union certainly welcomes such a trend in the work of the Conference.

The Soviet Union advocates the early elimination, already in this century, of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production. I would like to stress in particular that the Soviet Union does not envision chemical disarmament without strict and effective verification, including international control. As a follow-up to the statement of 15 January, the USSR delegation on 22 April submitted a set of new proposals on a number of key issues under discussion. When preparing these proposals we were hoping above all for an intensification of work on the draft convention, which would be impossible without due regard for other participants' positions -- provided one is guided by a constructive approach to the negotiations and respect for the interests of those involved. As we see it, the Conference now has real

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

opportunities to reach agreement on a number of key provisions of the convention. I have in mind in the first place the time-frame for the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities, announcement by the participating States of the location and number of such facilities, discontinuance of their functioning and assurance of non-functioning, procedures for destroying the production base, etc. Agreement is now within reach on the necessary verification measures, including systematic international on-site inspections, to observe the cessation of operation of each facility, as well as its destruction and dismantling.

Work is to continue on drawing up a list of chemicals to be covered by the convention. We believe that the convention should envisage measures ensuring its strict observance and implementation by each State party, regardless of whether public or private enterprises or transnational corporations are involved, and above all preventing the use of the commercial chemical industry for the development and production of chemical weapons.

The question of challenge verification is also of importance. There is already understanding of the need to provide for such inspections in the convention so that ambiguous situations that may arise with regard to compliance with the provisions of the convention can be dispelled speedily and efficiently. The Soviet Union supports the many realistic and constructive proposals introduced to this effect by various delegations.

Even a very brief review of the state of the negotiations shows that the door is now open for an agreement on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The Workshop on the Verification of a Chemical Weapons Ban held a few days ago under the sponsorship of the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands, to whom we express our gratitude, is a useful contribution to our work.

However, what is good news to the supporters of chemical disarmament infuriates those who seek to slam that door shut. The decisions adopted by the United States and NATO in favour of binary chemical weapons are in effect intended not only to maintain for years the chemical threat facing all mankind, but indeed to increase it. They contradict the objective of the elimination of chemical weapons, run counter to the Soviet-American accords reached at the Geneva summit and are bound to damage seriously the negotiations for a convention banning such weapons now under way at the Conference on Disarmament. Those decisions raise considerable doubts as to the sincerity of statements made by their supporters who claim to be in favour of arms limitation, disarmament and building international confidence.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America):

Following the meeting a statement was issued by the White House reflecting President Reagan's view of the importance of effective multilateral arms control, and his mutual commitment with General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union to accelerate our efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable chemical weapons convention. I have asked the secretariat to distribute copies of this statement.

The President has asked me to convey to you, and I quote from the statement, "his sincere hope that a spirit of dedication and vigorous work would result in a successful agreement on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban and his conviction that the Conference is fully capable of achieving such an agreement, which the peace-loving nations of the world greatly desire." Further, and I quote again from the statement, "he stated that, for its part, the United States again stands ready to intensify even further these negotiations when the Conference reconvenes, and called upon the other members

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(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

of this unique body -- the sole arms control negotiating forum in which all regions of the world participate -- to do likewise."

The hope and conviction expressed by President Reagan are surely widely shared within this Conference. At our plenary meeting on 10 June, we listened to statements by the distinguished representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Minister Genscher, of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin, and of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan. Not all of these statements are completely congruent with our own views. But they all stress the importance of continuing our negotiations for a chemical weapons ban, and the importance of translating our work into a concrete agreement. My delegation has, in addition, carefully noted the plenary statement made on 22 April by Ambassador Issraelyan.

In light of the broad agreement on the importance of the negotiations we are conducting under agenda item 4, I expect serious work on a chemical weapons convention to take place during the summer. I wish the Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Committee, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, all success in guiding this work forward, and pledge him the full support of the United States delegation.

V
(Mr. Chnoupek, Czechoslovakia)

We also attach fundamental importance to the deliberations of this Conference on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons which, in their new modalities, are gradually becoming comparable to nuclear weapons. Thus, their proliferation and threat of use represent a dangerous component of strategic destabilization. The socialist countries have repeatedly demonstrated their sincere desire to achieve the definitive elimination of chemical arsenals. They have been and continue to be ready to take into consideration the security interests of all States. A graphic example in that respect was the proposals of the Soviet Union of 22 April of this year. They organically combine the Soviet concept of chemical disarmament with the demands of the Western States and they offer convincing proof that it is not questions of verification which frustrate the achievement of a chemical convention or of other disarmament agreements. We are of the opinion that these Soviet proposals provide a framework which should make possible a speedy solution of the question of the declaration of chemical weapons and facilities for their production as well as their gradual, complete destruction.

While giving priority to a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, we also stress the importance of partial practical measures that could facilitate the overall solution of this question. Together with the Government of the German Democratic Republic we therefore proposed, already on 12 September 1985, to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany that we should reach an agreement on the establishment of a chemical-weapons-free zone in Europe which would initially comprise the territories of our three States and, in a next stage, the entire area of Central Europe. On 21 May of this year, we furthermore submitted a draft of the principles and main directions for such negotiations.

v
(Mr. Chnoupek, Czechoslovakia)

We are convinced that an agreement on the establishment of a chemical-weapons-free zone in Central Europe would provide tangible guarantees of security, the significance of which would potentially reach beyond the boundaries of the zone. Moreover, it could serve in a way as an example for the solution of the problem of the global prohibition of chemical weapons, including the relevant aspects of verification. Why not take this path, why not choose this method when we use a similar one -- and even call for it -- in the solution of other problems? For instance ecological, trade, or economic ones, where, through the step-by-step method, by tackling partial issues, we are gradually heading towards a comprehensive solution of the problems.

These circumstances, in our view, warrant these parallel efforts for regional limitations of chemical weapons, as in the case of nuclear-free zones. They even make these efforts indispensable. They are not, in our opinion, at variance with the global prohibition of this type of weapons. They will not diminish confidence or stability, nor will they complicate verification. We are prepared to continue our contacts with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and with other interested States. We are ready to do so, inter alia, through consultations among delegations at this Conference, so that we would find common solutions, in a constructive and responsible spirit, in the shortest possible time. We furthermore support the proposal by Bulgaria and Romania for the creation of a chemical-weapons-free zone in the Balkans.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

Another item which figures prominently on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, and also attracted great attention at the Budapest meeting, is the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, and the liquidation of the industrial base for their production by the end of this century. In full harmony with the long-standing position of the socialist countries, and building upon their previous initiative and proposals to that end, the Political Consultative Committee reiterated the view that efforts must be persistently intensified to achieve the early conclusion of a corresponding convention. In the meantime, however, States should refrain from any action likely to impede the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, such as the further increase of arsenals of this type of weapons of mass destruction and their deployment in the territories of other countries, and the realization of plans for the production and deployment in Europe of binary weapons, a particularly dangerous type of chemical weapons.

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(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Third, Ambassador Rose's statement charges that the recent action within the Defence Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization noting the United States force goal for a chemical weapons deterrent was a response to a Soviet arms control offer. In fact, this action, the result of legislation passed by the United States Congress in 1985, was not in reply to any new arms control proposal of the Soviet Union. Rather, it was in response to the dangerous and steadily growing Soviet chemical weapon capability in Europe. As I have repeatedly stated in this Conference, the United States refrained for 17 years from producing chemical weapons. It continues to prefer to reach agreement on a global ban on chemical weapons, rather than to produce chemical weapons. But that goal can only be attained if the tough issues still outstanding -- particularly on verification -- are resolved here in Geneva. And that will require work, not generalized statements -- and certainly not polemics.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The creation of a secure world is inconceivable for us without chemical disarmament. We welcome the fact that the Conference has made the objective of ridding the world of chemical weapons one of its top priorities. To speed up the solution of this problem would be facilitated by interim steps such as the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones in central Europe and in the Balkans, which is the aim of the well-known initiatives of the Governments of the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Romania.

At the present stage, we need more than ever fresh efforts, bold steps, to overcome the longstanding differences in positions, the stereotypes which have now become so habitual at negotiations, and to work out a multilateral convention which would outlaw chemical weapons and provide for the destruction of their stockpiles and the elimination of the very industrial base for their production.

Here again the Soviet Union is setting a good example. New approaches to the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, contained in the statement

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(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

of 15 January 1986 and introduced in the Conference in the form of concrete detailed proposals on 22 April, have brought us to the brink of agreement in principle on a question considered one of the most complicated issues, that is, the elimination of the industrial base for the manufacture of chemical weapons.

With regard to verification, our proposals, together with the systematic international verification of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks and of the permitted production of all supertoxic lethal chemicals as proposed earlier by the Soviet Union, constitute an integrated system ensuring the highest degree of confidence in the implementation by States of their commitments.

I would like to express my appreciation to all delegations which have welcomed the new Soviet initiatives.

But we often hear reproaches to the effect that supposedly these initiatives do not cover all the issues. I would like to say that negotiations represent a process in which all participate in the search for solutions. Furthermore, we get the impression that those who are quick to reproach the Soviet position are now trying to hide behind general statements about the importance of banning chemical weapons and about their readiness to step up work in this area. But in fact it turns out that these fine sounding declarations either do not contain any specific new proposals or refer back to documents already two years old which long ago proved that they could not lead to any agreements. This cannot be considered other than direct contradiction between words and deeds, other than a double standard.

Against the background of this diplomatic foot-dragging by Washington at the negotiations, its efforts to push forward with its programme for chemical rearmament arouse particular alarm. The NATO decisions in favour of binary weapons taken at the end of May are actually programming for many years to come not only the preservation but also an increase of the chemical threat for the whole of mankind. They are in contradiction with the objective of eliminating chemical weapons and are contrary to the Soviet-American accords reached at the highest level and cannot but seriously damage the work of the Conference on concluding a Convention banning such weapons.

Mr. HUSLID (Norway):

In her capacity as an observer Norway has already participated in the work of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for several years. In two areas -- chemical weapons and a comprehensive nuclear-test ban -- my country has initiated research programmes which are relevant to the deliberations of the Conference. My statement today concerns the first of these areas, also dealt with by Mr. Petrovsky, whereas the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban will be addressed in another intervention from our side, scheduled for 22 July.

There is full agreement, I would think, that a global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons is urgently needed. For that reason the negotiations

(Mr. Huslid, Norway)

on this matter in the Conference on Disarmament should be intensified. To the extent it is possible the work should continue, we think, after the end of the 1986 session at the end of August, thus enabling the Conference to increase the momentum which has been developed over the last few years. In particular, further efforts should be made to elaborate convention texts in areas where agreement now seems to exist.

An important outstanding problem is, as we know, the question of verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry. Norway is of the opinion that a solution to this problem must primarily be based on routine random on-site inspections of the relevant chemical facilities. The Workshop which was organized in the Netherlands on 4-6 June has made a significant contribution to a solution of this question. I should like through you, Mr. President, to congratulate the Dutch delegation on a most successful workshop, which has highlighted possible procedures to be utilized to monitor the non-production of chemical weapons. In this connection, I welcome the progress which has been made during the present session of the Conference in developing and refining definitions, criteria and lists of relevant chemicals, as well as appropriate régimes to which the listed chemicals would be subject.

Whereas there seems to be an emerging consensus on the principle of on-site inspection of destruction of chemical weapons and the elimination of chemical weapons production facilities, there is still major disagreement as to how to deal with requests for on-site inspections on challenge. As a rule routine inspections would seem to be sufficient to ensure that the States Parties are complying with their obligations. Only in exceptional circumstances would it be necessary to make use of an inspection procedure on challenge. Such an exceptional procedure should, however, imply an obligation by the States Parties to accept a request. We believe that it ought to be possible to work out a procedure for this to which all the countries taking part in the negotiations can agree.

It is extremely regrettable that chemical weapons have repeatedly been used in the Gulf War in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which now more than 100 countries are parties. The Norwegian Government strongly condemns any use of chemical weapons. Such use underlines the necessity of incorporating a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in a global convention, which must also provide necessary verification provisions. It would in this connection be necessary to agree on specific provisions dealing with international verification of complaints on the use of such weapons. The Norwegian research programme on the sampling and identification of chemical warfare agents should be viewed against this background. In relation to the global convention this programme has two objectives, which are to contribute to the negotiations on such specific provisions and to provide material for the elaboration by the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary bodies of guidelines for on-site inspection concerning alleged use of chemical weapons.

In order to provide sound and realistic data the Norwegian experiments have been undertaken under field conditions. During the first five years the research programme was limited to winter conditions, but I am now able to present research results which concern investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons on an all-year basis. May I, in this regard, underline that

(Mr. Huslid, Norway)

the Norwegian papers which I have the honour to present today are complementary to the Canadian document CD/677 and the two Dutch Working Papers CD/306 and CD/307 which already contain concrete and valuable recommendations.

It is the ultimate objective of the Norwegian research programme to develop comprehensive procedures for identification, handling, transportation, and analysis of samples collected in the field, on which the investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons can be based. Today, I can present two new Working Papers and a research report. These papers are of necessity somewhat technical in nature and I cannot here go into any detail as to their contents. I should, however, by way of general explanation like to mention the following:

Working Paper CD/703 contains proposals for procedures for sample handling in the field on an all-year basis, to be followed by the fact-finding team in investigating alleged use. Two methods for sample handling have been developed by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. These methods are of general use in the field on an all-year basis. They supplement each other and are based on use of simple equipment. Already in 1984/85 the method of organic solvent extraction proved to be successful in such field experiments. This method gives a high recovery of all known chemical warfare agents and can easily be applied under field conditions. It requires, however, use of glassware and organic solvents in the field. An alternative method has, therefore, been explored. This method makes use of the adsorption of chemical warfare agents to columns containing porous polymers. The use of two different polymers has been tested in detail. This method of porous polymers is slightly less efficient than the extraction with organic solvent, but the columns are easy to use and are well suited for transportation and storage.

The second Working Paper, CD/704, evaluates methods for identification of arsenic containing chemical warfare agents. Little research has been undertaken on this important group of chemical weapons comprising inter alia adamsite, clark I and clark II. In brief, the Working Paper concludes that high-performance liquid chromatography with electrochemical detection is recommended as a method for identifying these strongly irritating compounds.

I hope that the two Working Papers which I have briefly introduced today and the research results on which they have been elaborated can contribute to the efficient implementation of a global and comprehensive convention on chemical weapons, which should be concluded without delay. Norway will for her part continue to take an active part in all phases of the negotiations on the convention.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): Mr. President, in my statement today I want to review the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As we have passed the mid-point in the 1986 session of the Conference, it is timely to assess the current status of our work and to consider suggestions for accelerating the negotiations. Several issues that are particularly important at this stage of the negotiations also deserve our attention.

It is sobering to realize that negotiations to ban chemical weapons have been under way in bilateral or multilateral form for 10 years without the conclusion of a convention. It is even more sobering to realize that during this same period the threat to international security posed by chemical weapons has gotten much worse. More countries possess chemical weapons today than in 1977. Since negotiations began 10 years ago, chemical weapons have been used repeatedly in combat in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

It is true that agreement has been reached on a number of substantial aspects of a comprehensive ban during the past decade. The general scope of the convention was settled rapidly. And work has gradually advanced on the nature of verification arrangements. The 1985 report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, contained in CD/636, records the progress we have made in this Conference. I should add that it reflects the tireless dedication of the successive chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee, which is exemplified by the efforts of our present Chairman Ambassador Cromartie, of the Chairmen of the Working Groups established under the Committee's aegis, and of the many delegates who have contributed to the Committee's work.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

But CD/636 also makes it painfully clear how much work remains to be accomplished. There continue to be significant gaps in the body of the draft convention, particularly in areas relating to verification of compliance. Moreover, the annexes that will contain the detailed arrangements for implementing the convention's provisions exist only in fragmentary form.

However, there are some encouraging developments. Several delegations have contributed to efforts to develop effective verification provisions. The Workshop sponsored by the Netherlands earlier this month, and the working papers introduced by the delegation of Norway on 24 June concerning investigation of use of chemical weapons, are the most recent examples. These represent precisely the types of careful and serious efforts that are needed to ensure that the future convention will be effective.

Over the last year there have also been some signs that the negotiations are beginning to intensify. The leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union have stressed their strong support for the negotiations. In the Conference on Disarmament, important areas of the negotiations have become more active.

But my delegation believes that the Conference can do even better. In light of the urgency of our task, it should be possible further to accelerate our negotiations. What we need is a clear, coherent strategy for doing so. Without one, even an abundance of political goodwill is unlikely to lead to a completed convention.

What strategy does the United States propose? In the view of my delegation, the following elements are essential:

First, States must work to restore and strengthen the foundations of the future agreement. Compliance with and respect for the 1925 Geneva Protocol must be maintained, or there will be no sound basis on which to erect a comprehensive and enduring prohibition. States must also co-operate in curtailing the spread of chemical weapons, which moves us further from our goal, and makes it even more difficult to reach multilateral agreement.

Second, States must moderate their rhetoric. States should not seek to question the sincerity of other members of the Conference and continually misrepresent the facts. Recent instances of this counterproductive approach may be found in statements of several delegations in the plenary, in the Committee, and in the press. Such instances waste valuable negotiating time, including time spent to set the record straight.

For example, it should not be necessary for my delegation to point out that the United States has no plans to store binary chemical weapons in Europe. This is a well-known and long-established fact. Yet there are those who knowingly misrepresent our intentions.

Nor should it be necessary to explain, again, that binary chemical weapons are designed to improve safety, not to increase the dangers or lethality of these already terrible enough weapons; and that unitary weapons will be destroyed as binary weapons are produced. Nor should it be necessary to remind others of which State maintains the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

We will set the record straight when United States policies are misrepresented, but we believe that the task of negotiating would be better served if such misrepresentations were never made.

In this regard, I note that charges continue to be made that certain proposals presented to the Conference were designed to be rejected. On 20 June such a charge was made in Working Group C by the head of one delegation, who said that the proposals in question were based on a demagogic philosophy -- in other words, that they were designed to stir people up by appeals to emotion and prejudice. Such language is not the language of negotiation. It does not advance the negotiations. It only sours the atmosphere. My delegation deplores it.

Third, States should not be diverted from the objective of a complete ban by short-term political considerations. Proposals are advanced from time to time for a variety of interim agreements, as if a complete prohibition were not attainable in the foreseeable future. In our view, negotiations on formal interim agreements would rapidly overshadow negotiations on a complete ban. They would deplete the political and technical resources required to finish the convention on which the Conference is working. Most importantly, interim arrangements would not solve the problem. It would continue to be necessary, on an urgent basis, to complete the very task under way in this Conference. Mr. President, we must keep our attention focused on our real objective.

Fourth, States must have a clear sense of the status of the negotiations. They need to recognize that a substantial amount has been achieved and that there are encouraging developments. At the same time, they must recognize both that considerable work remains ahead, and that the pace is too slow. A widely-shared appreciation of where the negotiations stand should be an impetus to increased efforts in this Conference.

Last, the negotiations should centre on resolving the major problems. As pointed out by the distinguished representative of Japan in his plenary statement of 3 April, negotiating issues differ greatly in importance. Some are fundamental to the general structure of the convention, others are matters of detail. This is not to denigrate the task of careful elaboration of the multitude of details essential to a comprehensive convention. But lesser questions cannot be answered if larger issues upon which they depend have not been addressed first. Putting off the hard, central issues will only delay both their resolution and the completion of the complete convention.

Let me take up this last point in my strategic outline, that concerning the resolution of major problems. What are the key negotiating issues before us? In my delegation's view there continue to be four issues of particular importance at this stage. These issues are nearly identical to those outlined in my statement of 28 March 1985. That these issues have remained the most important unresolved problems, despite some progress and an entire year of work, is another sober reminder of the slow pace of the negotiations.

These issues are as follows: (1) declaration and monitoring of chemical weapons stockpiles, (2) elimination of chemical weapons production facilities, (3) prevention of the misuse of the chemical industry for chemical weapons production, and (4) challenge inspection. I will comment on each in turn.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Unfortunately, there has been little progress in the last several years in resolving differences concerning the declaration and monitoring of chemical weapons stockpiles. Agreement was reached several years ago that the composition of stockpiles should be declared promptly and in detail. Useful work was accomplished last year in developing a format for such declarations. However, other important aspects of the verification régime for stockpiles remain unresolved. The United States has proposed that the locations of stockpiles also be declared promptly, so that the accuracy of the declaration can be confirmed and the stockpiles can be monitored by the inspectorate until they are destroyed.

The delegation of the Soviet Union frequently contends that declaration of locations of forward-deployed stockpiles would reveal military secrets. This had been universally interpreted to refer to stockpiles in other countries. Such an argument is difficult to understand, in view of General Secretary Gorbachev's 15 January statement that States should agree not to deploy chemical weapons in the territories of other States and that the Soviet Union has always strictly abided by this principle in its practical policies.

On the other hand, other statements by Soviet spokesmen convey the impression that the Soviet Union considers the simple fact that it has chemical weapons to be an important military secret. How else can one interpret the claims, made by Major General Anatoly Kuntsevich in a press conference in Moscow on 20 May, that the Soviet Union has no chemical weapons stockpile?

My delegation finds it very disturbing that the Soviet Union is unwilling to acknowledge, during negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, that it possesses chemical weapons. Why is this fact being denied? A simple acknowledgement of what everyone knows to be the real situation would help considerably to build the confidence that is so important to completing the Convention.

Let me reiterate the United States position on the issue of stockpiles. A chemical weapons convention, to be effective, must require prompt declaration of the locations of chemical weapons stockpiles, as well as on-site inspection to confirm the declaration and to ensure that the stockpiles remain inactive until they are destroyed. Such an approach has already been developed for chemical weapons production facilities. We welcome, and we will carefully consider, alternative proposals from other delegations that would provide the requisite level of assurance about stockpiles. But we cannot allow this issue to be set aside and ignored.

On the issue of chemical weapons production facilities, differences seem to have narrowed through the common approach that appears to have been reached on prompt declaration of such facilities, on-site international verification, and elimination over a 10-year period. However, agreement has not been reached on exactly what must be destroyed. The definition of the term "chemical weapons production facility" cannot be fully determined until the scope of the destruction process is agreed upon, and we have not yet finally resolved either matter. These important issues need to be settled.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

The comments on chemical weapons production facilities by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union in his plenary statement of 22 April appear to be an elaboration on the statement made on 15 January by General Secretary Gorbachev. It was disappointing, however, that it did not fulfil the expectations raised by Mr. Gorbachev's statement in East Berlin on 18 April, that the Soviet delegation in Geneva would offer proposals to resolve the remaining differences in the chemical weapons negotiations.

Nonetheless, we consider Ambassador Issraelyan's statement of the Soviet position on chemical weapons production facilities to be a constructive and positive development. While important aspects remain to be clarified and resolved, it is our hope that an article on chemical weapons production facilities can be put in draft form before the end of this session.

Work on ways to prevent misuse of the chemical industry for chemical weapons production has been given a major impetus by the Netherlands Workshop. Also during this Workshop, the Australian Government reported on an experimental inspection conducted by Australian experts. The United States is deeply grateful to the Netherlands for its sponsorship of the Workshop and to Australia for its research project. These efforts have given us and others important insights into the "non-production" issue. We support the conclusion of both the Netherlands and Australia that an effective verification system can be developed that will take into account the legitimate interests of the chemical industry.

The Netherlands Workshop and the report by Australia on its own studies represent the most recent in a long series of contributions by Western delegations to resolving the "non-production" issue. It is noteworthy that Western countries with advanced chemical industries have taken the lead in drawing attention to the need for effective monitoring of the chemical industry, and in presenting concrete proposals to accomplish such monitoring.

Since the Netherlands Workshop, discussions on the "non-production" issue in Working Group A have intensified. There are signs of a co-operative, problem-solving approach on the part of those involved. This is encouraging.

However, the position of the Soviet Union and other members of the Group of Socialist States has not yet been clearly defined, despite their many expressions of concern about the misuse of the chemical industry for chemical weapons production. The 10 June plenary statement of the Soviet delegation says only that "the Convention should envisage measures ensuring its strict observance and implementation by each State Party, irrespective of whether State-owned or private enterprises or transnational corporations are involved, first of all the prevention of the use of the commercial chemical industry for the development and production of chemical weapons". But this is no more than what the Soviet delegation was saying on 22 April, before the Netherlands Workshop. It would be difficult to dispute this broad, general principle. The Conference needs to know -- specifically -- how the Soviet delegation believes this principle should be implemented in practical terms. Does it accept the approach outlined by the Netherlands delegation in CD/CW/WP.133, by the United Kingdom delegation in CD/575, and by the United States delegation in CD/500? If not, what concrete alternative would the Soviet Union propose?

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

We are encouraged by the acceptance by General Secretary Gorbachev of the concept of on-site inspection in arms control agreements. And we have heard the assurances of various delegations that on-site inspection will be an integral part of the verification régime of the chemical weapons ban. But we have also heard the Soviet delegation question the idea of surprise inspection at commercial chemical plants. We would welcome hearing more about the Soviet Union's views about on-site inspection in the chemical industry. If their concept of on-site inspection entails nothing more than scheduled periodic visits announced well in advance, we would appreciate an explanation of how such inspections will provide confidence that the obligations of the chemical weapons convention are being honoured.

The last of the key issues is challenge inspection. Challenge inspection is the safety net providing the back-up to the other parts of the verification system. It is, in the last analysis, the best and only sufficient deterrent to actions inconsistent with the convention. All here in the Conference hope that the safety net will seldom, if ever, be used. But when it is used, it must be effective. A safety net that is poorly designed and constructed will fail to do its job. And an ineffective safety net is worthless, indeed dangerous.

The United States approach to challenge inspection is well-known, but it has been imperfectly understood. In April, we went so far as to revise Article X of the United States draft convention, contained in CD/500, to meet Soviet concerns that this article did not cover privately-owned facilities. Rather than trying to meet our concerns, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, in his remarks to Working Group C on 20 June, ridiculed the time-frames incorporated into Article X.

It is most regrettable when one delegation resorts to bad humour sharply to attack a major proposal of another member of the Conference, and then fails even to propose an alternative. Those who criticize have the responsibility to make a counterproposal. But no such counterproposal has been forthcoming. Indeed, the formally-stated Soviet position that challenge inspection should, in the final analysis, be voluntary has remained unchanged since 1982. However, during less formal working group discussions, the Soviet Union has appeared to move away from its 1982 position by voicing support for the approach contained in document CD/CW/WP.136, presented by the German Democratic Republic and Poland on 18 April. Yet, it remains vague and non-committal in its formal statements in plenary meetings. My delegation is left to wonder what the real Soviet position is.

There are other aspects of the Soviet position that remain unclear as well. On at least two occasions in Working Group C, Soviet representatives have associated themselves with the approach contained in the United Kingdom Working Paper of 10 February 1984, CD/431. This paper is based on the principle that "Every State Party should be under a stringent obligation to accept challenge on-site inspection.". Can one conclude from Soviet statements that the Soviet Union can accept this principle?

The United States delegation is not alone in lacking a clear picture of the Soviet position on challenge inspection. As one example, it should be recalled that on 27 March the distinguished representative of the

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, requested the Soviet delegation to clarify its views on several issues, including challenge inspection. I will look forward to responses to those questions as well as to the ones I have raised today.

In his statement to the press on 19 June, Ambassador Issraelyan called upon the United States to demonstrate its genuine interest in chemical disarmament by making new proposals. While it was not said so explicitly, there can be little doubt that the United States was supposed to change its position on challenge inspection. The United States delegation is not going to negotiate with itself. Rather than simply to criticize the United States position, we expect the Soviet Union to make clear what the Soviet position really is.

I have said it many times, and I will say it again: Article X was not presented as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. The United States is prepared to consider seriously any alternative proposals that will provide the same level of confidence. But we will not accept an ineffective approach to challenge inspection.

Unfortunately, much of the debate about challenge inspection has dealt with formulas and their political acceptability. Some States have lost sight of the concept of effectiveness. In order to make progress on challenge inspection there needs to be discussion of how to ensure effectiveness, while at the same time minimizing the risk of abuse of the challenge provision. The Chemical Weapons Committee needs to evaluate all of the various proposals in these terms.

Today I have described where the chemical weapons negotiations stand and what must be done in order to complete them. I have stressed the need for a strategy and have outlined its key points. I have commented on the four issues which we believe to be the key issues now in the negotiations.

In closing, I want to stress once again the importance that President Reagan and Vice-President Bush attached to the acceleration of the efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable agreement when I met with them on 5 June. The President has instructed the United States delegation to continue to seek mutually acceptable solutions to the outstanding issues in the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. We intend to do our best to fulfil these instructions.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, the statement of the United States this morning was principally devoted to a commentary on the position of the Soviet Union on the banning of chemical weapons. References were made to the statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mr. Gorbachev, to statements of the Soviet delegation at plenary meetings of the Conference, statements of Soviet representatives in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to statements by Soviet representatives to the press, and even to unofficial comments by Soviet representatives. I think that is a good thing that the United States delegation should follow so attentively the statements of representatives of the Soviet Union on such an important, priority item on our agenda. Certainly, we express our views on the prohibition of chemical weapons openly, freely, and honestly; we are interested in the positions of others, we study them very attentively, and we compare them with one purpose in view: to improve our own positions in the light of the positions of other countries. We understand that negotiations are not a one-way street. To confirm what we are really aiming at in being so active in our statements, talks and contacts, both officially and unofficially, there are the concrete proposals which the Soviet Union introduces, inter alia as a result of this kind of open and free exchange of views with other delegations. I would remind you that the basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons were tabled by the Soviet Union in 1982. Since that time we have worked on improving and developing our position. For example we proposed that there should be systematic and continuous monitoring of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons. We agreed with the view of many non-aligned countries that the convention should include provisions which confirm the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. We introduced detailed proposals on the work of the consultative committee which would be set up as a result of the signing of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Finally, reference has been made here to our statement of 22 April of this year, which contained a whole range of proposals concerning the declaration, destruction and monitoring of the industrial base for the production of chemical weapons.

This is the explanation of why we state our own views and listen to the views of other delegations. Unfortunately, if we were to ask the United States delegation what advances there have been in the United States position since 1984, if indeed there have been any, we would have to look through a very sophisticated microscope for them. I certainly cannot recall many such improvements. We are asked questions and we answer them. I hope

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

the Ambassador will not be offended if I say that the United States delegation has given us a list of 15 questions on the statement we made on 22 April and as soon as we meet, very soon, in a new round of Soviet-American consultations, we will give an answer to all of these 15 questions. We shall reply to precisely those questions which were put to us in today's statement by the United States delegation. But delegations should not make a show out of questions. They should not act as counsel for other delegations. I think that we will find opportunities to explain ourselves to the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to the questions which have arisen in their minds and which, in our view, should be dispelled by our statements both in plenary meetings of the Conference and in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. But if any doubts do remain, I do not think this is a proper subject for statements by a third party. We also have questions, but we will ask them in a business-like fashion, without making a show of it.

I am very pleased for Ambassador Lowitz that he has had the honour of being received by the President and Vice-President of his country and discussed the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. He told us today that the President gave instructions to the United States delegation to continue to seek mutually acceptable solutions in the negotiations on banning chemical weapons. I am not asking what instructions he gave, the answer will be clear by the end of the summer session. But I would like to hope that these are not just empty words and that the United States delegation, with its new instructions, will finally understand that negotiations are a two-way street.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

Taking into consideration the stage of negotiations and the desire expressed, I think, by all members of the Conference to have this convention on a general prohibition on chemical weapons drawn up and agreed on as soon as possible, we consider it very important that during the negotiations States should refrain from any measure to develop, produce, acquire or use these weapons -- actions that would in fact violate the spirit of the future convention. It is also appropriate to contemplate even now how best to ensure the desired continuity of efforts in this field, in which very painstaking work is required. Our delegation is prepared to make a constructive contribution to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and of its three Working Groups.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

If there is another area where the lack of specific results is alarming, it is that of chemical weapons. Despite the laudable and tireless efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ian Cromartie, and Mr. Richard Row, Peter Poptchev and Ambassador Wisnoemoerti, the Chairmen of the three Working Groups, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is still marking time. The end of the summer session is drawing near, and it seems unlikely that the negotiations underway on chemical weapons will come to a successful conclusion this year. This is particularly disappointing as the current negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is the sole glimmer of hope in the sky of the Conference on Disarmament. Our disappointment and our scepticism are particularly justified as the declaration stemming from the Geneva summit between the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a harbinger of hope, in that they stated that the two parties were in favour of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles, and agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this question.

We must unfortunately note that so far nothing has been done to accelerate the process of negotiation in conformity with the above-mentioned commitment. On the contrary, the way in which the negotiations are proceeding would lead us to believe that this commitment had never been undertaken, so similar is the atmosphere in the Ad Hoc Committee to that of last year.

It can never be said too often that chemical weapons, through their mass destruction capacity, are as redoubtable as nuclear weapons, but with two differences: the relatively easy technology of their manufacture, and their inhuman and dreadful character, in view of the suffering that they inflict. Although banned, chemical war still remains a possibility in the plans of the chiefs of staff of the States possessing chemical weapons. Indeed, at a time when biology is making great strides, and when negotiations are underway for their prohibition, the world is witnessing a renewal of interest in toxic agents. We are thus led to believe that perhaps the world is now witnessing a new chemical weapons arms race. The Powers which possess them are preparing for this eventuality, and are training to fight against chemical and bacteriological weapons. Concurrently with these preventive activities, which of course do not exclude stockpiling such weapons to discourage possible users, other countries do not hesitate to acquire these weapons. According to

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

the American Defence Department, more than 15 countries, principally in the Third World, have just discreetly joined the "chemical club". The Kingdom of Morocco does not possess chemical weapons and will never seek to acquire them, and hence we are concerned by this vertical and horizontal proliferation. This is the reason why we call urgently for the completion as rapidly as possible of the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In this connection, the Moroccan delegation has always defended the principle of the total prohibition, under any circumstances, of the use of chemical weapons. This prohibition should not be accompanied by any reservations. However, just as we were satisfied by the narrowing of the gap between the positions of delegations on this issue last year, now we do not understand why the process of seeking common ground on this question has not been given the same impetus as in the 1985 session. Our surprise is particularly great as the consideration of the other aspect of the scope of the prohibition, namely, the question of herbicides, has been left in abeyance. On this specific point the position of Morocco has always been clear. My country believes that firstly, the prohibition of the use of herbicides as a means of waging war is more than necessary, for we believe that the protection of the environment is no less important than the protection of man. Secondly, in order to have the same legal effect this prohibition should be included in the body of the convention. Any attempt to seek any framework for it other than that of the convention would just hinder and slow down the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The other aspect of the convention to which my delegation gives the greatest importance is that of the complete and effective elimination of existing chemical weapons arsenals. This process in our view should be initiated expeditiously, just after the entry into force of the convention.

The elimination of chemical weapons, through their destruction and not their diversion, is, we believe, the best procedure to avoid possible diversions of chemical substances to doubtful ends. Moreover, the period of elimination of chemical weapons, which some delegations wish to last 10 years, seems too long to us, particularly since military and security reasons have been advanced to justify the choice of chemical substances to be eliminated first. It seems none the less paradoxical that in the age of nuclear neutron weapons and military orbital stations, security concerns might be invoked during this period of elimination of chemical weapons. The concept seems all the more indefensible in that their possessors have at no time shown concern for the security of those who do not possess chemical weapons.

The balance of security during this crucial period can be guaranteed only by the establishment of mutual confidence. This cannot be born from a mere signature but from the essential condition of strict compliance with the commitments which the parties to the future convention would have fully subscribed to.

If the Geneva 1925 Protocol has often been flouted, that is because it did not include any verification system that could ensure strict compliance with its provisions. It is in order to prevent such a situation that the

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

convention on chemical weapons which is being negotiated will be given means of verification. The purpose of this machinery is to guarantee that this agreement enjoys maximum effectiveness and respect.

It is in this spirit that I should like to recall here that an international instrument without an appropriate and reliable verification machinery is a hollow instrument. Moreover, a convention which is not given a legal arsenal guaranteeing effective and non-prejudicial international control would be more dangerous than the lack of a convention, as it would give the illusion of respect and control and would lead to suspicions with unforeseeable consequences.

This is why the slowness and hesitation which have marked the negotiations on this important chapter of the convention for some time lead us to fear that an attempt may be made to side-step the issue by seeking an easy way out. Thus we believe that a modicum of political will must be requested, indeed demanded, from certain countries so as to overcome the present deadlock in the negotiations. Those countries cannot indefinitely hide behind the political and technical complexity of verification, and by their security and commercial considerations block the conclusion of agreements on this part of the convention which is justly considered as being crucial.

In this connection we believe that the very constructive proposals of the Pakistani delegation contained in document CD/664, could break the deadlock in which the Ad Hoc Committee finds itself. The favourable response that they have met with strengthens our belief.

Indeed, and without going too far, the Pakistani plan for fact-finding can satisfy our requirements for effective verification and as well as concerns relating to security and protection of information and of industrial property so as not to place the facilities inspected at a commercial disadvantage. Finally, the document of the Pakistani delegation has the merit of contemplating machinery capable of detecting any threat which might weigh on the future treaty régime and of resolving all problems that can arise during the duration of the convention.

Without undue illusions we, nevertheless, harbour the hope that political goodwill may be shown on this work of the Conference on Disarmament in order to enable it to complete it before it is too late.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The programme of 15 January 1986 for the total elimination of nuclear as well as chemical weapons by the year 2000, was further developed by the subsequent proposals concerning nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. All these proposals form a comprehensive concept of mutual security based on the peaceful co-operation of peoples in the world without the threat of weapons of mass destruction, both on Earth and in outer space, with substantially reduced conventional military potentials. The Polish position with regard to these initiatives is clear. To describe it, let me use the words of the Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski who, speaking at the 10th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party currently taking place in Warsaw, stated:

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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The very essence of their approach towards problems of peace and disarmament could best be described by pointing to the priority areas in which they feel urgent, common efforts should be undertaken. These areas are as follows: cessation of nuclear tests; the mutual and complete elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles deployed in the European region; specific agreements at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons; the destruction of types of mass-destruction weapons like chemical weapons and the liquidation of the industrial base for their production by the end of this century; significant reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons at the global and regional level; implementation of effective supervision in all areas and stages of the reduction of armaments and disarmament by both national technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspection.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

The self-sufficient approach to verification, as embodied in a primary reliance on national technical means in bilateral treaties, is not sufficient in all circumstances. In the multilateral context, co-operative institutions, procedures and techniques must be worked out which provide for equitable participation and sharing of responsibility by a multiplicity of parties with diverse interests and differing resources at their disposal.

I will give some illustrations of this in the fields of chemical weapons and nuclear test ban.

On the subject of chemical weapons verification, in our lengthy negotiations directed toward a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, it has become increasingly apparent, particularly during the spring portion of our 1986 session, that for the purpose of monitoring non-production, there is unlikely to be agreement on the precise substances to be controlled until there is also agreement on exactly what types of controls would be applied. Agreement on verification provisions cannot be put off to the final phase of our negotiation. On 22 April, the Soviet delegation put forward proposals relating primarily to the destruction of stocks and of production facilities. These proposals represent a substantive advance on previous Soviet positions and are thus most welcome. If there is to be eventual agreement on a treaty, however, these proposals will need to be supplemented by further proposals relating to the verification of declarations of stocks and of non-production, including at the sites of facilities which will have been destroyed. Agreement on some form of a "challenge inspection" provision will also be required as a necessary "safety net" to ensure that anomalous

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(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

situations are quickly clarified. Nevertheless, in light of the proposals which have been made, the Canadian delegation has increased hope that these critical issues can begin to be addressed more directly during our present session. The Canadian Government attaches high priority to further substantive advance on this important agenda item. If there is not significant, substantive progress during our present session, it may become necessary to explore new ways to overcome obstacles to progress in these negotiations.

I would like to take this opportunity to express the gratitude of my delegation, through Ambassador van Schaik, to the Government of the Netherlands for the very interesting and useful workshop conducted in The Hague and Rotterdam on aspects of the verification of chemical weapons non-production in the civil chemical industry. The workshop, and the working papers associated with it, constitute a significant contribution to progress on these outstanding issues.

I would also like to pay tribute to the Norwegian Government for the important research it has carried out over the past several years on the sampling and identification of chemical warfare agents. The two papers recently tabled by the Norwegian delegation (CD/703 and CD/704) constitute an important contribution in this area. This work ties in with similar research done by Canadian experts which resulted in the "Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons" tabled in this forum in April.

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

The way in which the Conference has tackled its objective of working for the complete elimination of chemical weapons is a perfect illustration of the approach we advocate. At first, the conditions for real negotiations did not exist, and so an ad hoc working group was set up in 1980 at the thirty-fifth session with a very simple mandate: "to define, through substantive examination, issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on such a Convention". This work was undertaken for two years and it was only at our thirty-seventh session, in 1982, that the Powers primarily concerned finally established amongst themselves the necessary conditions and the working group received a real mandate to draw up a convention. But in the meantime the subject had come to the forefront, which is only proper.

My delegation welcomes the existence of working groups on items 5, 6 and 7 of our agenda. However, we would advocate that the Conference should draw lessons from the past and resolve to review its working methods and take a favourable look at the possibility of resorting to simpler approaches that are more in keeping with its real calling as a multilateral negotiating body.

I mentioned earlier our task of organizing the mutual, complete and verifiable renunciation of chemical weapons. This is a task which was undertaken in this city over 15 years ago and should be completed as soon as possible, or at least as rapidly as the careful drafting of the articles of the future convention allows. That my country attaches paramount interest to this will surprise no one. In Belgium, as has been recalled more than once both in this chamber and elsewhere, we retain a horrified memory of the use of combat gas, a tragic privilege of our people and our statesmen. My country was one of the authors of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and we have never ceased to call for its respect. We consider this Protocol a starting point. At the second special session devoted to disarmament Belgium made proposals aimed at advancing even further, which led the international community to create at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly a procedure for considering complaints regarding the violation of the Protocol. The United Nations Secretary-General has always been able to count on the unconditional support of my country in the exercise of the duties entrusted to him in this connection.

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

However, the Protocol is threatened. The use of chemical weapons has been increasing in the past few years. The number of countries which are building up an arsenal of chemical weapons is rising, and the moral opposition to chemical weapons is decreasing. We need more complete, more lasting diplomatic instruments. Meanwhile, my country has associated itself with all partial measures aimed at the prevention of the use of chemical weapons, and in particular the international initiatives designed to prevent the acquisition of the weapon and thereby its use. In April 1984 the European Economic Community took measures to control the export of certain key precursors. These measures have since been successfully applied. But all this, in the view of Belgium, cannot validly replace the essential, decisive instrument -- a universal convention establishing the compulsory destruction of chemical weapons and the complete prohibition of its development, production and stockpiling. Nothing, neither non-proliferation arrangements nor chemical-weapon-free zones nor any other partial or interim measures can be a substitute for this. We need a final, global solution. This is all the more imperative in that it can now be envisaged, and we can no longer be satisfied at the slow pace of negotiations to which we have sometimes had to resign ourselves in the past.

Belgium has noted with satisfaction the relatively more pragmatic turn that chemical negotiations have taken since October 1985, during the consultations organized by the Ambassador of Poland, Mr. Turbanski, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee last year. We welcome the intention expressed in November last year by the President of the United States, Mr. Reagan, and the General Secretary of the USSR Communist Party, Mr. Gorbachev, to step up the negotiations.

The distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Lowitz, at our meeting on 26 June, told us that on 5 June last, President Reagan and Vice-President Bush reaffirmed the importance they attach to stepping up efforts to conclude an effective and properly verifiable agreement. On that occasion Ambassador Lowitz shared with us some very pertinent thoughts whose realistic, pragmatic and constructive nature prompts us to hope that a number of fundamental issues currently still in abeyance will be solved.

The Soviet Union for its part recently formulated, through Ambassador Issraelyan, a series of proposals which in our view indicate a desire to advance. But the intentions of the Soviet Union require further clarification, particularly with respect to verification, of which the USSR, unless there is an error of interpretation, seems indeed to recognize the importance now.

Verification should be international and is essential, not only in the area of the elimination of existing chemical-weapon stockpiles, in the area of declaration of production facilities and in the area of the destruction of these facilities, but also and above all as far as non-production is concerned. On this last score the Workshop organized by the Netherlands was very constructive indeed and my delegation wishes to thank here the Netherlands authorities for having so perfectly carried out the excellent initiative they had taken.

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

The negotiations of a Convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons is, in the view of Belgium, an absolute priority for the Conference. My country welcomes the fact that a new will seems to be developing to step up the work. The statements made recently by the distinguished representatives of the United States and the USSR, to which I have referred, are welcome and comforting confirmation of this.

My delegation would like to share some thoughts with you in order to help to clarify some of these ideas.

Firstly, let us agree that in negotiating the elimination of chemical weapons, it is essential to have a precise idea of what we want to eliminate. Drawing up an appropriate definition of such weapons has some influence on the nature of the prohibition measures and their verification, on the legitimate interests of the civilian chemical industry which, as a matter of principle, should not be unduly suspected, controlled or limited in its development, and on scientific research and technological progress in chemistry, where any trend towards the production of chemical weapons should be prohibited and prevented.

So far, our work has essentially focused on the identification of the constituent elements of chemical weapons, particularly the list of toxic chemicals and their key precursors. This work is being conducted in a clear-sighted and substantive manner, and now we already have very advanced lists. Our role, however, is not to negotiate the elimination of lethal, harmful and dangerous chemicals, but chemical weapons, that is, the manufacture of a weapon whose destructive effect is constituted by chemicals. I think that article II as now drafted or proposed, does not reflect, or at least does not sufficiently reflect, the purpose which is decisive for the very concept of a weapon.

We believe that it is time to tackle this question of definition anew, and Belgium intends to contribute in due course to the final drafting of article II. Our work is now happily progressing at a more rapid pace and we should concern ourselves with clearly establishing exactly what is to be the object of the fundamental obligations and prohibitions that the future Convention will set forth in its article I, in other words, we must have a body of definitions appropriate to the ends we are pursuing.

The task that the Conference on Disarmament should carry out with respect to chemical weapons is twofold in nature. Firstly, we should organize chemical disarmament stricto sensu, in other words, the elimination under international control of stockpiles of weapons and direct production facilities. Secondly, we must make sure that the renunciation of the acquisition of chemical weapons, to which the parties will commit themselves, is and remains credible, thanks to appropriate and effective verification measures. Verification is crucial to both of these aspects.

The problems arising in the two types of verification are doubtless very different and hardly comparable; the interests which have to be taken into account are essentially military security in the first case and economic in the second. In the first case, the presence of chemical weapons is certain

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

and recognized; in the second, it is simply a theoretical possibility which must be effectively prevented from becoming a reality. I will come back to this later.

I should like first to tackle the first aspect, that is, chemical disarmament stricto sensu, in other words the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles and their production facilities, which should take place as early as possible after entry into force. The total elimination period should be fixed in light of the time technically necessary to destroy the largest arsenals of chemical weapons held by a single country.

Belgium does not possess any chemical weapons, nor does it intend to possess them. We periodically find chemical weapons that were abandoned on part of its territory by the armed forces of other countries at the end of the first World War. These outdated chemical munitions are periodically eliminated and will continue to be eliminated as long as they are found. They present a danger only for my compatriots, as was again shown by a recent accident that led to the deaths of four persons. We hope that this problem will be dealt with separately by the Convention or an annex to the Convention, in view of its very specific aspects.

Working Group B is responsible for drawing up arrangements for the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles and production facilities. We are particularly pleased that the concern here is to get down to essentials, that is, to establish a complete set of rules. It would indeed be inconceivable for the credibility of the Convention and its chances of universal accession that after its entry into force it should turn out that the destruction of stockpiles is delayed pending the solution of problems relating to the declaration or location of stocks, etc.

An important problem which was the focus of our attention during the Spring session and to which we will have to return, is the order of the destruction of these stockpiles. My delegation hopes that it has contributed to showing, thanks to a proposal submitted by Belgium last April, that the difficulties, serious as they might be, could be surmounted.

We have included a method for the general comparison of stockpiles of weapons of varying composition in a proposed overall scheme for the order of destruction, as these two problems are closely linked. We have developed a proposal made by China, which constituted a conceptual breakthrough in the area of comparability of stockpiles.

As for the elimination of production facilities, we have noted with interest the specific proposals made by the Soviet Union, and we have known since the beginning of this year that it is ready to accept on-site international verification of the process. The distinguished representative of the United States, in his statement in plenary on 26 June last, stated however that it remained to be agreed "exactly what must be destroyed", thus illustrating the interest, it seems to us, of having an appropriate definition of what is to be considered a chemical-weapon production facility. We must be able to draw a distinction between the production facilities that have actually served for production of what could undeniably be called chemical weapons. Here again we come back to the problem of definition which I mentioned earlier.

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

The second essential aspect of the Convention is that of the prevention of the acquisition of chemical weapons. The aim here must be to draw up the most appropriate verification régimes so as to reassure de facto the parties that their commitments not to develop, manufacture, stockpile, or transfer chemical weapons are really respected.

The negotiations of Working Group A, since October 1985 have aimed towards the concrete identification of the physical elements which would be most likely to serve for the clandestine production of chemical weapons, which include, obviously, a number of chemicals which are universally recognized as combat chemical agents, as well as the precursors that necessarily make it possible to obtain them. In the choice of the prohibition and verification régimes to be applied to each of these chemicals, we will first and foremost have to ask whether the substance in question is or is not capable of serving purposes other than armaments. Only chemicals known only to serve, and to serve only for, arms purposes should be totally prohibited, except of course, if, as a result of a scientific discovery, a State party began to produce one of these chemicals for purely peaceful purposes which it would have been able to demonstrate to the international control organization that it will be necessary to set up. In drawing up our rules, we cannot lose sight of the development of science and technology which could lead us either to lift the prohibition on the production of certain chemicals, while keeping them under strict control, or to place them under a stricter régime in the case of chemicals hitherto manufactured for peaceful purposes but subsequently used otherwise, or else to include in the lists annexed to the Convention chemicals previously not recognized as chemical combat agents or new precursors.

It is important to keep in mind here the essential difference which exists between chemicals which present an inherent risk of being used for chemical weapons and those which are actually used for such a purpose. An appropriate definition of chemical weapons would here again have its full significance, and moreover it is verification and control which will enable us, for all dual-purpose chemicals, and I stress, dual-purpose chemicals, to determine whether or not they are on the prohibited side of the alternative.

While the national authorities will have the obligation to ensure that a country's industries co-operate with the international control body, in the provisions concerning non-production it is none the less essential to safeguard the legitimate interests of the chemical industry. The roles should not be reversed. Our philosophy in this connection should be that whatever is not explicitly prohibited is permitted, rather than the contrary. For otherwise we would place an unjustified and unbearable burden on civilian chemical industry and we would be opening the door to excessive, gratuitous or vexatious controls. Neither in the exchange of data nor in on-site verification should the régimes established under article VI have the effect of substituting the international organization for national authorities in respect of the responsibility for compliance with the Convention.

We may and we must expect from States parties that they will respect all the commitments that they will have subscribed to. We see systematic verification as a positive means to strengthen confidence among the parties which becomes necessary wherever the presumption of good faith in respective commitments cannot alone suffice to ensure such confidence.

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

This leads me to the question of the measures contemplated to cope with ambiguous factual situations which prompted doubts as to compliance with the fundamental provisions contained in article I of the treaty, namely, the obligation to destroy chemical-weapon stockpiles and their production facilities according to agreed time-tables and the prohibition on the development, production, stockpiling, transfer or use of chemical weapons. Measures whereby an international organization to be created would play an active role are envisaged: they range from the exchange of additional information to on-site challenge inspection which would cover undeclared sites not subject to the systematic inspection provided for in other articles of the Convention.

The difficulties encountered by the Conference on the latter question should not unduly surprise us in so far as we are seeking a new formula for a set of verifiable disarmament measures of unprecedented scope. Sizeable differences persist. It is essential, however, to arrive without delay at a credible and effective solution for challenge inspection so as to ensure that regular verification measures do not have the result of totally exempting from all control anything that is not explicitly contemplated as falling under them. To a great extent, challenge inspection would then contribute to the credibility of systematic inspection measures linked to declared sites and accepted as such by States.

The future Convention will, of course, have to include effective provisions which can be implemented as early as possible enabling on-site fact-finding in the event of credible allegations by a State party concerning the use of chemical weapons. Let us hope, however, that such an eventuality will never happen again and that the future convention will be sufficiently effective in all its provisions of verification to rule it out forever. It will thus have given a concrete example of a very ambitious disarmament measure that has been carried out and is verifiable, and will prompt to redouble our efforts along this path in order also to achieve, in the conventional and nuclear fields the very essential and urgent dismantlement of overarmament in the world.

(Mr. Hameed, Sri Lanka)

Neither space nor the oceans of the world can be insulated from the arms race if this Conference remains a mere bystander in world events. The establishment of this multilateral negotiating forum has a purpose for which all nations are in undeniable agreement. You are engaged in the important task of negotiating a chemical-weapons ban and I wish you all success in this. We must rid the world of the production and use of these awful weapons. That is not to set different priorities but to work pragmatically in areas where possibilities of success exist. We acknowledge a common debt to the Government of the Netherlands for the useful workshop held recently. Work on a ban on radiological weapons has acquired a greater urgency after the tragedy of the Chernobyl accident. While expressing our sympathy to the Government and people of the USSR, we cannot help drawing a lesson from this accident on the need to protect peaceful nuclear installations from not only accidental damage but also intentional attacks. The spontaneous international effort to ensure nuclear safety and the laudable role of IAEA which will hold an international conference in September to strengthen international

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

Mr. BARTHELEMY (United States of America): Mr. President, it is with great pleasure that my delegation sees you presiding over the Conference during the month of July. You bring an abundance of wisdom and experience to this post. My delegation will continue to co-operate with you to the best of our abilities so that our common labours are productive.

Two weeks ago today, Ambassador Lowitz, speaking for the United States, reviewed the status of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and outlined a strategy for accelerating the work of the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons toward a completed convention. Today the

... of the United States Government does not believe that national security demands secrecy regarding its possession of a chemical weapons capability. In any event, in a free and open society such as the United States, it would not be possible to conceal the fact.

The national security of all States will be affected by the success or failure of the Conference's efforts to achieve a chemical weapons ban. We believe the step we are taking today will contribute to such success. We are disclosing a document that goes far beyond confirmation that the United States possesses chemical weapons. It describes in considerable detail the specific chemical agents located in each United States site, the type of

In his statement on 26 June, Ambassador Lowitz pointed out that agreement on a chemical-weapons ban would be facilitated by confidence that the parties will comply with its provisions, and it would help build that confidence if the nation with the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union, would be open and candid about possessing chemical weapons.

(Mr. Barthelemy, United States)

United States delegation will take one step toward implementing that strategy by presenting to the Conference a document that provides detailed information concerning United States chemical weapons and current plans for their destruction. This data should prove helpful in furthering the work of the Chemical Weapons Committee in several areas.

The members of the Conference are aware, of course, that the United States Congress has directed the disposal of the present American stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions as an adjunct to the acquisition of a smaller, safer chemical weapon deterrent.

My Government has summarized preliminary planning for this destruction process in a document entitled "chemical stockpile disposal program" prepared by the United States Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency. My delegation has asked the secretariat to distribute copies of this document to all delegations, and we will ask that it be designated as a chemical weapons working paper. In keeping with our strong endorsement of the cost-cutting efforts undertaken by the secretariat, we are distributing this study at no cost to the Conference.

Two weeks ago, Ambassador Lowitz reiterated the United States position that a chemical weapons ban must require prompt declaration of the location of chemical weapons stockpiles. States must have confidence in the verifiability that all stockpiles have been declared and will be destroyed. To provide that verification, prompt declaration is required. The data you will receive today includes the location of every chemical weapons storage site in the United States. It is the hope of my delegation that this disclosure will encourage others, who have thus far manifested reluctance to accept prompt disclosure of stockpile locations, to show flexibility on this issue. If the United States can make this type of detailed disclosure now, surely others can do the same promptly once a chemical weapons convention has entered into effect.

In his statement on 26 June, Ambassador Lowitz pointed out that agreement on a chemical-weapons ban would be facilitated by confidence that the parties will comply with its provisions, and it would help build that confidence if the nation with the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union, would be open and candid about possessing chemical-weapons stockpiles.

The United States Government does not believe that national security demands secrecy regarding its possession of a chemical weapons retaliatory capability. In any event, in a free and open society such as the United States, it would not be possible to conceal the fact.

The national security of all States will be affected by the success or failure of the Conference's efforts to achieve a chemical-weapons ban. We believe the step we are taking today will contribute to such success. We are distributing a document that goes far beyond confirmation that the United States possesses chemical weapons. It describes in considerable detail the specific chemical agents located in each United States site, the type of

(Mr. Barthelemy, United States)

weapon or container used, and the percentage of the total United States-based chemical weapons tonnage that is located at each site. In demonstrating the kind of candour we seek from others, my delegation hopes to set the example for future negotiations. We recognize, of course, that at this stage of negotiations, parties cannot open their files completely. However, progress should not be impeded, nor confidence eroded, by secrecy, without reasonable purpose.

Since 1969, the United States has maintained -- unilaterally -- a moratorium on the production of chemical weapons. Some others have not followed this example. Now, 17 years later, even as it becomes necessary to modernize our deteriorating chemical weapons capability, the United States is taking another step directed toward the complete elimination of chemical weapons. It is greatly reducing the size of its chemical weapons arsenal. Once again, we do this without assurance of reciprocal action by the USSR or others, but we invite others to join us by making similar reductions.

In planning and implementing this disposal process, the United States will gain valuable experience and technical expertise in the destruction of chemical agents and weapons. We want to share this with other nations. In this regard, my delegation would ask each of you to give serious consideration to how this experience can best contribute to the elaboration and implementation of a chemical-weapons ban.

I said earlier that the disposal programme outlined in this document is part of the United States programme to move to a smaller, safer chemical weapons deterrent. We would prefer, of course, to use this plan as the basis for the complete elimination of all United States chemical weapons, in conformity with a comprehensive ban negotiated at this Conference. The United States is committed to that end, and my delegation hopes and believes that the information we present today will move us nearer to that goal.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Firstly, chemical weapons. An increased tempo in the chemical-weapons convention negotiations was generated during the spring session. It has been sustained during the summer. A clear commitment to constructive work is evident in the three working groups. There is a business-like approach to the consideration of issues. The prospects for securing real progress in the development of provisions for inclusion in the draft text of a chemical weapons convention are highly promising.

One area of the current negotiations, to which Australia has given particular attention, is that of so-called "permitted activities" -- article VI of the draft convention text in CD/636. Through our chairmanship of Working Group A we have been endeavouring to foster the development of lists of chemicals and the régimes which should apply to them, with the objective of ensuring that chemical substances which might pose a risk to the Convention are not produced for purposes which are prohibited by the Convention, or diverted from their legitimate activities in the civil chemical industry. During the summer the Working Group has been concentrating mainly on the list of and applicable régime for key precursor chemicals, carrying forward the valuable work undertaken in January this year, as reflected in document CD/651. Work has also been undertaken on further refining the listing and régime for chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical-weapons purposes.

We are confident that given the continuing co-operation of all delegations, it should be possible to arrive soon at common agreement on the lists and the basic elements which would constitute the régimes for these two categories of chemicals. We would also hope that, by the end of the session, consideration of the important category of super-toxic lethal chemicals will be advanced.

In devising these régimes it is important to keep in mind that the future convention will ban the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, States parties will, however, have the right to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors, for purposes not prohibited by the convention.

It is recognized, however, that it will be necessary to monitor the civilian chemical industry to ensure that chemical weapons are not produced, or their precursors diverted, for purposes in contravention of the convention. The burden imposed by a system of data reporting supported by fact-finding consultations and, where appropriate, on-site inspections would be, in our firm view, minimal. And it would ensure that relevant chemicals were not being diverted for prohibited purposes.

The work done during the summer in relation to all these chemicals and their régimes will assist the further consideration of the other part of the

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

mandate designated for Working Group A, namely, the definitions and criteria article of the draft convention text. We are deeply conscious of the complexity of the subject matter which has been assigned to Working Group A, but sufficient common ground has already been identified to enable the basic provisions and related annexes for article VI to be set down.

The approach of consolidating parts of the convention as they are drawn up is one which we strongly support. Thereafter, there will be the need to refine, perhaps in greater detail, some of the constituent elements. This is a necessary and integral part of the ongoing process of developing the convention text.

Our work on the subject of non-production of chemical weapons by the civil chemical industry has been greatly assisted, this session, by the workshop which was organized by the Netherlands Government in June.

We have already expressed our appreciation to the Netherlands delegation for their important initiative. We have all seen in the subsequent discussion in Working Group A, the benefits which we have derived from that Workshop.

The Workshop has provided us with an immense amount of material and information. It has enabled us to focus more sharply on particular aspects of verification of non-production and non-diversion in the civil industry. It is through workshops of this kind, where the practical considerations involved in verification can be examined thoroughly, that we will obtain a clearer understanding of what is required and what can be implemented as an effective régime for inclusion in the convention.

It was in this same spirit that Australia organized a trial inspection of a chemical facility earlier this year -- the report of which was tabled in the Chemical Weapons Committee in June. We believe that it would be useful if other countries were also to conduct trial inspections of their own chemical facilities and report the results to the Conference.

I have addressed most of my comments to the area of the convention under consideration by Working Group A, but this is not intended in any way to diminish the important work which is being carried out in the other two Working Groups, both of which are charged with consideration of important and complex subjects.

While the prospects for achieving progress this year are encouraging, we should not be complacent. There are a number of difficult issues, such as those referred to in the plenary statement of 26 June by the Ambassador of the United States, issues which will have to be negotiated before the convention can become a reality. We should all work now in a concerted effort to resolve these difficult issues.

Thus we strongly endorse the proposal which has been put forward by the Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Committee for inter-sessional work in the period between August and February next year. The momentum which has been generated in the negotiations in 1986 should not be allowed to falter because

Mr. RENTON (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I am grateful to have this opportunity to return to the Conference on Disarmament so soon after my last visit in February. When I spoke then, I tried to give some indication to the Conference of the British approach to arms control and disarmament. I emphasized in particular the importance of a climate of growing, even if only partial, confidence and trust if any arms control proposal is to flourish. And I underlined the importance of verification. Verification is the heart of any disarmament issue. It is not an optional extra, but is essential if any arms control agreement is genuinely to enhance stability and security.

I also indicated in my previous speech the United Kingdom position on a range of specific disarmament issues. But I dwelt in most detail on item 4 of your agenda, Chemical Weapons. I did so then because it is the most advanced of all your subjects and the conclusion of an agreement is an imperative for us all. With your permission, I would like to return now to this subject which is that laid down in the programme of work of the Conference for this week.

I would like to begin by noting that 1 July saw the start not only of your Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, on which I warmly congratulate you, but also of the United Kingdom's Presidency of the European Community. It is appropriate therefore that I recall the many contributions of the member States of the European Community to this Conference and the unanimous support the Community has expressed for the negotiations for a chemical-weapons treaty.

The United Kingdom views with the greatest seriousness recent instances of use of chemical weapons, including allegations concerning conflicts in not just one but many different parts of the world. We consider these deliberate breaches of the 1925 Protocol wholly unacceptable. We accordingly welcome the

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consensus arrived at in these negotiations that the chemical-weapons convention should buttress the Geneva Protocol by the conclusion of an explicit prohibition of use of chemical weapons.

The most persistent reports have been of use in the Gulf conflict. Three separate United Nations fact-finding missions -- in 1984, 1985 and 1986 -- have each concluded that chemical weapons had been used there. Following each report, such use was not only condemned by many individual States and groups of States but also collectively by the United Nations Security Council. This year, the United Nations report identified Iraqi forces as responsible, and further international condemnation followed.

Let me in particular quote from the declaration of the Twelve issued on 8 April 1986. This included the following passage:

"The Twelve have condemned without qualification any use of chemical weapons and they expressed the earnest hope that they would not be used again in this or any other conflict. However, the recent report of the mission of specialists dispatched by the Secretary-General concludes that chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian forces, most recently in the course of the present Iranian offensive into Iraqi territory. The Twelve have taken note of this report with great concern. Accordingly they emphasize the importance of the declaration of the Security Council of the United Nations of March 21, 1986, and they strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons mentioned therein. They reiterate that they attach the greatest importance to the strict compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925."

There have been all too many examples on both sides of disregard for international law, not least the many attacks on innocent shipping in the Gulf. But the sheer scale of the use of chemical weapons has to be a matter of the greatest concern. We have reason to believe that as many as 10,000 people may already have been casualties of this appalling form of warfare. Worse may be to come. We believe Iraq has full-scale production facilities capable of producing many hundreds of tons of Mustard gas and of nerve agents, and that new production complexes may be under construction. Iran may in turn be taking steps to acquire its own chemical weapons. To date we are not aware of retaliation in kind. But I would urge the Iraqi Government to reflect most seriously on what might happen if there were. This senseless conflict, already so tragically wasteful to human life and human resources would take a further downward spiral.

That said, one has to look at the wider context of the Gulf conflict. Iraq has repeatedly called for a cease-fire and stands ready to co-operate in mediation efforts to bring about a lasting peace. But it faces an implacable opponent which adamantly refuses such calls for a cease-fire and rejects all offers of mediation, including that of the United Nations Secretary-General himself. The United Kingdom has been and remains fervently committed to the earliest possible end to the Gulf conflict. We have fully supported United Nations and European Community initiatives. We have played a leading role in the adoption of Security Council resolution 582, calling for an

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immediate cease-fire. The end to all fighting and the need to restrict the threat faced by neighbouring States are prime objectives. But within those overall objectives, the international community -- still less this Conference -- cannot ignore the risks posed by continued chemical-weapons use.

There are also wider, and equally serious implications. In the Middle East alone, there is evidence that other countries apart from Iraq are developing an offensive chemical-weapon capability. More may be forced to consider the consequences of the potential chemical threat. And world-wide, other countries may reflect that Iraq has been able to use chemical weapons without serious international cost. They too may strive for advantage by covertly building their own chemical weapons stocks. World-wide, there may be more than 20 nations which now either possess chemical weapons or are looking at the option of acquiring them.

We, and many other governments, have imposed export controls to try to inhibit parties to the Gulf conflict from manufacturing lethal chemical agents. Recently a number of States have also provided their national chemical industries with a warning list of chemicals to reduce still further the possibility of inadvertent assistance in the manufacture of chemical weapons. But while such steps help to hold the line, they will not prevent any country which is determined to flout the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It is in this context that we welcome the consensus that the problem of proliferation of these weapons must be dealt with by the chemical-weapons convention and that a chemical-weapon non-proliferation régime is not the answer. The only sure way to prevent CW use, as all of you at this Conference appreciate, is to agree a comprehensive and verifiable convention, and to ensure that all countries adhere to it.

We stand at a critical moment in the deliberations on this issue. Either we all negotiate seriously, and quickly, and agree a treaty. Or we recognize the genie is beginning to make its escape from the bottle, and we accept the consequences of living forever under its shadow.

Two weeks ago we paid tribute to those who died at the opening of one of the fiercest battles of the First World War. We recalled the events on the Somme in 1916 with sadness, but with a stern determination that they should not be repeated. For many of us, the image of those battles some 70 years ago is overlain by the awful vision of chemical warfare, of thousands dying beneath the evil clouds of phosgene and cyanide. Seventy years later, even more horrible weapons can be deployed. Surely we should not allow history to repeat itself now, in the Gulf or anywhere else.

It is with these considerations in mind that we should address what still divides us in the crucial negotiations here at Geneva. My Government has considered with great care the statement made at this Conference by Ambassador Issraelyan on 22 April. We recognize that this has built upon the statement by Mr. Gorbachev on 15 January. We believe it represents a small but welcome step forward. We are greatly encouraged that the Soviet Union is at last setting out its position in detail, although it must be said that much of this detail does no more than reflect what already seemed to be the

(Mr. Renton, United Kingdom)

consensus view at the Conference. But a serious Soviet statement deserves a serious response. The United Kingdom delegation will work to respond fully to all these points.

What must not be forgotten, however, is that Ambassador Issraelyan's statement follows years of negotiation in which Western and non-aligned delegations put forward a range of constructive and practical suggestions for advancing the negotiations, to be met largely by indifference or silence from the Soviet Union. I point in particular to the series of United Kingdom papers on the verification of non-production in the civil chemical industry, CD/353, CD/514 and CD/575. Bearing in mind the lessons of the immensely useful workshop conducted by the Netherlands Government -- and I would like to express my Government's thanks to the Netherlands Government for all the effort that must have been put into this undertaking -- we hope that the time is now ripe to incorporate this thinking and these practical lessons into article VI of our convention.

I should now like to say some words on one of the core issues of our negotiations, challenge inspection. In doing so I wish at the same time to introduce a new United Kingdom paper. It is essential that we should all understand the objective of a challenge inspection régime. Without such an understanding, we risk making our work far more difficult, and delaying that moment of success to which we all profess ourselves to be committed.

First we must distinguish between the separate roles of challenge inspection and routine inspection. In the latter case there will need to be not only a system of data exchange, but also mandatory international on-site inspection to ensure confidence in initial declarations, in the destruction of stockpiles, in the destruction of production facilities, in the non-diversion of chemicals from the civil industry into weapons production, and in the operation of the single permitted facility for defence purposes. All of that, I believe, is common ground between us, even though the details still require extensive and complex negotiation. However, these routine verification measures should, taken together, provide confidence to all parties to the convention that others are complying with their obligations in respect of declared sites, facilities and stockpiles.

None the less we must recognize that concern may still be aroused about activities by States parties which cannot be resolved by routine inspection measures. We believe that States parties should therefore have the ability to resolve such matters by bilateral or multilateral co-operation, the convention, in other words, must have a fact-finding procedure which can invoke the authority of the Executive Council. We are encouraged by the degree of consensus which has already emerged within the Conference on this type of co-operation, and which has been reflected in article IX of the draft convention, CD/636. Nothing I shall subsequently say today is designed to cast doubt on that degree of consensus, or to suggest that it reflects anything but a valuable achievement. We ourselves will work hard to build upon it, and we look to others with confidence to join us in that effort.

However, the convention will not be a secure and complete achievement, a truly lasting monument to arms control in which all who have participated in

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its negotiation can take justifiable pride, unless it is supplemented by one vital, additional measure: a stringent régime providing for inspection on challenge in exceptional circumstances. Such a régime, as has been said before by British Ministers and others, must act as the safety net to the convention, providing the mechanism of last resort whereby all States to the convention can feel truly assured that their security has been lastingly enhanced.

Challenge inspection must perform two roles, and the provisions governing it must make allowance for both. In the first case, its function is to prevent any breaches of the convention occurring in the first place. In other words, it must act as a major deterrent to any contemplated violation of obligations under the convention. It must make the probability that such violations would be discovered so likely that any States parties which might be so tempted would be discouraged from considering such acts. Such States would also, under a challenge inspection régime, have to take account of the likely reaction of other States, were they to attempt to conceal breaches by refusing a challenge inspection. It therefore follows that such an inspection régime must be as stringent as possible, but that the right in the convention to request such an inspection on challenge might -- we would strongly hope -- never have to be invoked.

The second function of the régime is, of course, to provide the basis for an inspection should that be required. Here again, the most stringent provisions will be required, in order to fulfil the fundamental objective of challenge inspection. A weak and inadequate régime would be a recipe for a weak and inadequate convention, one which I trust no participant in the present negotiations would find acceptable.

Over the past two years a range of proposals have been made at this conference for implementing in treaty form the sort of ideas I have elaborated. The British Government first tabled its own proposals in February 1984 in the paper CD/431. Subsequently, we have seen other comprehensive proposals, notably those contained in the valuable United States draft treaty CD/500 and in the interesting paper from Pakistan CD/664. We have also taken account of the valuable discussions which have been going on in one of the working groups of the overall Committee which we have the privilege to chair this year, and I pay tribute at this point to the able work of Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia in this field. None the less we feel that there remains a clear and enduring difference of approach between many delegations here.

The purpose of the paper I am introducing today is to try to accommodate the concerns expressed by the various parties to the negotiations, and to establish a new basis for consensus which could then provide one of the several, solid pillars on which a successful convention must be based.

In summary our proposals envisage that each State party to the convention would have the right, in exceptional circumstances, directly to request a challenge inspection of another. The challenged State would then be under an obligation to demonstrate to others, and especially the challenging State, that it remained in compliance. It would be required to meet its obligation

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quickly and, it would be expected, by enabling a comprehensive investigation of the issue relating to compliance. However, in very limited circumstances there would be a right of refusal of direct inspection. In those circumstances a challenged State would propose alternative measures which would then enable the matter under consideration to be resolved.

I do not propose to go into further detail now on the specific provisions included in the new United Kingdom paper. These are spelled out at length in the paper itself and its accompanying annex. I trust that other delegations will find in them an acceptable response to their own preoccupations, and a sound foundation for consensus. I should however like to enlarge on three specific points.

First, our approach is based on the principle that in accepting any international agreement, a State voluntarily accepts certain obligations which implicitly affect its right to take sovereign action. A vital further principle follows from this. In order to provide confidence in any agreement it is in a nation's own interests to demonstrate to others that it is fulfilling the obligations it has assumed. I wish to underline that point. Were it not to do so, other States would be less ready to accept similar limitations on their own sovereign rights. On this basis, should any party request clarification or resolution of any matter causing doubts about compliance, each State party receiving such a request should be obliged to provide satisfaction to other States parties, and especially the requesting party, that it remains in full compliance with its obligations assumed under the chemical weapons convention.

Second, our proposal specifies a time-limit of 10 days for the provision of satisfaction. This is essential for two reasons. Confidence in the convention would rapidly be jeopardized if it was open to the requested State to draw out the time-scale by procedural delays. Once a suspicion of non-compliance had been aroused, it would have to be scotched urgently. The 10-day time-scale is also dictated by the risks that breaches could be subsequently concealed. For example, stocks of chemical weapons kept clandestinely could be rapidly moved to another site within a short time after a challenge. We therefore consider it wrong in all cases to demand prior multilateral consideration before initiation of an inspection, but of course the requesting State could exercise this option if it so wished.

Third, in our earlier United Kingdom paper of 1984 we recognized that in some very exceptional circumstances, which must be avoided if at all possible, a very limited right of refusal of direct inspection might form part of a challenge inspection régime. Such a right would have to be very restricted. Above all, it must not be allowed to detract from, or to weaken the fundamental obligation to demonstrate compliance. In such exceptional circumstances a State would have the right to propose alternative measures which would then enable the matter under consideration to be resolved. Were such alternative measures to fail in that endeavour, the State under challenge would still be obliged to find other ways to demonstrate its compliance. Otherwise, it would be failing in its fundamental obligations under the convention.

(Mr. Renton, United Kingdom)

Finally, I must address the response from other delegations. I am aware that there has been considerable debate, both in the Working Groups of the Committee and in private discussion, about ways in which a consensus on challenge inspection can be established. Recently I had the pleasure of discussing these issues in London with the distinguished Ambassador from the Soviet Union, Mr. Issraelyan. I should like to emphasize that this latest British initiative represents a genuine and serious attempt to establish a basis for acceptable compromise between the various views which have already been expressed.

Were it now not to meet with a genuine and serious response, particularly from those in the past who have been content to do little else but criticize the efforts of others, then my Government and no doubt those of other participants would have to draw some rather sombre conclusions not only about the future prospect of these negotiations but about the commitment of other countries to their success. We have heard a lot about words and deeds. We have heard perhaps more words than we have seen deeds. I believe that the British Government has demonstrated, with its new paper, that it intends to match its rhetoric with indisputable evidence of its intentions. We now look to others to do the same.

I turn now to the current moves by the United States to modernize its chemical weapons capability. I would like to take this opportunity to put the views of Her Majesty's Government firmly on the record.

Let me first remind the Conference of the facts. The United Kingdom unilaterally abandoned its chemical warfare capability in the 1950s. The United States has imposed a unilateral moratorium on production of chemical weapons since 1969. The Soviet Union has responded by building up a truly massive stockpile of chemical weapons, possibly approaching in total all chemical weapons produced by all other nations ever since chemical warfare first began. We, and all our NATO allies, want a ban. It is my hope that the new British ideas will unblock one of the major remaining obstacles. But it is, alas, a fact that we have not yet reached the end of our journey. So long as Europe is faced with the potential threat posed by the massive Soviet chemical superiority, it would be irresponsible of NATO not to consider ways of countering that threat.

That said, the United States move to restore its deterrent capability in this area, which NATO has adopted as part of its normal force goal procedures, does not mean that new United States weapons will be available in the near future. The United States Congress has decreed that final assembly of the new munitions shall not take place before 1 December 1987. Thus we look to the Soviet Union to ensure that such a step is no longer necessary. It is up to the leadership in Moscow to decide whether negotiations can succeed in removing all chemical weapons; or whether by their own actions they will call forth a legitimate and proportionate response from the West. Conversely, the prospect of United States modernization should underline to all the advantages of a total ban.

NATO has made it absolutely clear that a negotiated ban is preferable. We have no wish to see the United States resume production if the better

(Mr. Renton, United Kingdom)

option -- a negotiated ban -- can be achieved. It would only be with much regret that we would have to envisage such a prospect. However, were the Soviet Union to force this upon us, it must be emphasized that the new munitions would still be safer to store, the stockpiles smaller, the United States stocks currently held in Europe would be withdrawn over time, and the overall United States capability would remain considerably less than the massive threat now presented by the Soviet Union.

Let me end with one further point. We are very conscious of the pressures on many delegations to attend other important arms control discussions outside the Conference on Disarmament itself. Yet my Government is concerned that, because of these pressures, for some six months of each year the Conference is in recess. I have already set out the great importance we attach to the negotiations. I would therefore ask all delegations to consider what can be done between August and next February, when this Conference will be in recess. I assume there will, as in previous years, be some formal work in January. But I hope considerably more will be possible. I know that Ambassador Cromartie is consulting other delegations about two periods of further work this year. I very much hope others will be able to respond positively.

President Reagan, General Secretary Gorbachev and the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, have all underlined their commitment to making progress on a chemical weapons ban. There is an imperative on us all to succeed. Let us renew our efforts. Let us set ourselves the goal of completing our work within the next year. Let us aim to present a complete chemical weapons convention to the United Nations General Assembly in 1987.

CD/PV.370

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Mr. ISSRAEYLAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): May I first of all welcome the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Tim Renton, whom I have had the pleasure of meeting on several occasions, including recently in London. We shall, of course, carefully study his statement of today and reply to it in a suitable manner.

In its brief statement today the Soviet delegation wishes to address agenda item 4, prohibition of chemical weapons. I must say right away that we intend to deal with the substance of this major issue in due course in a separate statement. Today we intend to refer to the organization of our work on agenda item 4. There is clearly no need to refer to the importance of the prohibition of chemical weapons, which is the only issue on which substantive negotiations are taking place in the Conference. We are all aware of the hopes which have been aroused throughout the world for a successful conclusion to the negotiations and the elimination of this barbarous weapon of mass destruction.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Soviet Union has recently had the opportunity to conduct a useful dialogue with other States on the issue of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The main impression we have received is a declared readiness and interest for speeding up the negotiations with a view to their successful completion. If we approach the organization of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons guided by the criterion of efficiency, we cannot but draw the conclusion that there are many shortcomings in the organization of our work.

The Soviet delegation considers it its duty to voice its concern on the following points:

Firstly, with regard to the date for the completion of the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we are quite unable to understand why the substantive work of the working groups must end in three weeks' time, on 6 August, when there are a further 20 days until the end of the session of Conference. We cannot agree with this approach, and urge that the subsidiary bodies, or working groups, should pursue their active work at least until, for example, 20 August. It is sometimes argued that the secretariat will not have time to prepare the final documents and their translation into all the official languages of the Conference. However, this cannot be a justification for breaking off the negotiations. We request the secretariat to prepare the report of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly in such a way that the section on chemical weapons would be the last rather than the first section.

Secondly, with regard to work in the intersessional period, we are in favour of a more efficient and rational use of the intersessional period in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We should not allow the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons to be interrupted for virtually half a year, from August of this year to February of next year. That may suit some people, but those who are really striving for the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons cannot be convinced by such arguments against work in the intersessional period as the need for a respite, or to rest, or to attend the General Assembly in New York and so forth. We are altogether in favour of conducting negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, taking into account the progress achieved on substantive issues, on a permanent and uninterrupted basis until the conclusion of the convention. One proposal which was made by the Minister of State, I think, can be supported immediately, in any event by the Soviet delegation, which would be ready to make every effort to submit to the next, forty-second, session of the General Assembly in 1987 a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We therefore propose that agreement should be reached as rapidly as possible on dates for negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons in what remains of 1986 and January 1987.

Finally, there is a third question relating to participation in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The prohibition of chemical weapons is a universal problem. It affects the interests of all States, whether or not they possess chemical weapons. And all States members of the Conference should take an active part in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In fact, however, even in the regular

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

session of the Conference, by no means all 40 States participate in these negotiations. We regret this, as we cannot imagine a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons which would have been prepared without taking account of the positions and interests of all delegations. Of course, we understand the problems faced by our colleagues from a number of countries, and hope that their objective information on the present state of affairs, i.e. that now already very important decisions are being taken on key issues of the future convention, will encourage their capitals to do everything they can to ensure the direct and active participation of all States members of the Conference in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Soviet delegation is convinced that the task facing the Conference in the field of chemical weapons really requires joint and tireless work, without unjustified "time-outs".

CD/PV.371

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Mr. KHORAMIAN (Islamic Republic of Iran) (translated from French): I shall be extremely brief. I do not intend to take up the Conference's time, and furthermore this is not the place to talk about the war between Iran and Iraq, to which the representative of the United Kingdom has just alluded. I wish to recall that the Iraqi régime, in launching its troops against its Iranian neighbour on 22 September 1980, has undeniably committed crimes against my country by using chemical gases. Furthermore, it is somewhat strange that, as the representative of the United Kingdom said, the Iraqi régime is talking about peace. The conclusion must be drawn that punishment of the aggressor is a duty; the credibility of existing international law is at stake. Real peace can be envisaged only at this price.

(Mr. Hinteregger, Austria)

There is another type of weapons on which I wish to speak, the terror of which is not only a potential danger but an actual horror: I am speaking of chemical weapons. The activities of the Conference on Disarmament in this field have, therefore, acquired an aspect of acute urgency. Victims of such weapons used in an ongoing war have been treated in Austrian hospitals. That humanitarian aid has created an awareness of the danger of chemical weapons in the Austrian public. The former Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, once called chemical weapons the nuclear bomb of the smaller countries, and this warning of the extreme danger of the proliferation of those weapons should find a swift response.

Austria was among the first Parties that signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases and of Bacteriological Warfare. Furthermore, Austria renounced the possession of chemical and other special weapons in the State Treaty of 1955. It is also a Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, the second Review Conference of which will take place in September this year here in Geneva.

The abolition of chemical weapons seems to be the field where major progress may be possible in the near future. We noted with appreciation that during the last sessions of the Conference on Disarmament the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons moved forward in such important areas as the definition of chemical substances, permitted activities, destruction of existing stockpiles, and key precursors.

Agreed verification procedures will, of course, constitute an essential element of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. The issue is complex and it is obvious that no 100 per cent effective procedure can be found. There is, however, no reason why the Conference should not be able to establish adequate verification provisions that are generally acceptable.

Austrian experts have taken part in the technical discussions initiated by this Conference and would be available for participation in a safeguard system on request.

As in all negotiations, there will come a moment in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention when the search for further perfection may have to be halted in favour of a viable compromise between what is desirable and what is practicable. The prospect of new types of chemical weapons is on the horizon. Experience tells that new types of weapons are more difficult to prohibit once they have been introduced.

Mr. IMAI (Japan):

I am sure that there is no need for me to repeat here the importance of the Chemical Weapons negotiations for the work of the Conference on Disarmament, and also in terms of the current East-West disarmament dialogue. Along with the nuclear and space bilateral talks that are going on in Geneva, there is little doubt that chemical weapons can also be a very important and possibly very useful area for bilateral considerations. In addition to the work conducted in the Conference's Ad hoc Committee under the able guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador Ian Cromartie, we notice a number of signs that are rather encouraging in the context of arriving at possible compromises within the broader framework of more comprehensive arms control arrangements.

At the same time, if we look at the differences in views and discrepancies in positions regarding such important items as (a) the listing of chemicals and their respective control régimes, (b) the problem of non-production and the range of permitted activities, (c) provisions for initial declarations and their verification, and (d) the composition and functioning of the Executive Council, we realize that we still have a long way to travel before complete and satisfactory agreement may be worked out. There is no need of additional admonitions that we should not take the subject of the chemical weapons convention lightly. In order to realize the amount of remaining problems, one need only count the number of square brackets in texts such as CD/636, Appendix I, or other comparable documents. Undoubtedly, with the involvement of large-scale chemical industries and with a large number of chemicals which may be dually useful either in medicine or in industry, this is one of the areas of arms control and disarmament that represents and reflects the complexity of our twentieth century life.

However, I would like to emphasize that we are far from being confronted with an impossible task. As we can see from reading the various negotiating histories of arms control arrangements during the past 20 years or so, it has always been the case that while problems seemed unsurmountable, ways have been found to arrive at viable agreements somehow advancing the cause of

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

international arms control and disarmament. In the case of chemical weapons, which do not lag behind other disarmament subjects in the extent of complexity in handling, we nevertheless should be able to see our way through, so that the seeming confusion may be dispelled and the clear and logical structure of our convention emerge from the process of our negotiations.

It is in such a spirit that the delegation of Japan is today tabling Working Paper CD/713. This paper contains proposals and analysis which are primarily scientific, which I have had opportunities to discuss in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Also, back on 3 April, I had an opportunity to recall general principles which should run through the process of considerations of our chemical weapons agreement. Then, I called it a matter of quantitative consistency, so that various arrangements under the convention should be based on an accepted mathematical principle and thus be logically consistent. What this Working Paper proposes is the open recognition of such a need, and that the mathematical accountancy aspect of chemical weapons-convention verification be clearly established. The rest is, I hope, self-explanatory.

But in case it is not, I would like to give a short preview. We all know that in taking opinion polls on a national scale, one can somehow make telephone calls to several hundred persons and derive from such an exercise the entirety of the national trend with something like 90 per cent confidence. This is because the samples are carefully chosen on a "random and stratified basis" so that mathematical theory will ensure that there can be high confidence estimates on a population 100,000 times larger than the sample. Random sampling is a technique used in the quality control of industrial products, thus avoiding the need for testing and checking all the products, day in and day out. Random and systematic components together make up what is called statistical sampling. What is being discussed in our working paper is that by making use of the principles and theories of statistical sampling, we may establish a credible verification system regarding chemical weapon depots, destruction facilities and production facilities. In some cases, continued on-site inspection may be required, but then one may also employ tamper-proof remote sensing devices.

One additional comment I would like to make on this occasion is that we need not elaborate all the details of the chemical weapons convention at the Ad Hoc Committee meetings. It is the view of my delegation that the Committee may best serve its purposes by identifying governing principles for the different portions of the chemical weapons convention. Thus, we do not think that the Conference or its subsidiary body should be too much concerned with details regarding random sample verification and its statistics or the fine details concerning rights and obligations of international inspectors. We believe that once the governing principles have been worked out, it is better and more effective that the filling out of details be left to groups of competent experts.

This is all I wanted to say today in introducing our Working Paper CD/713. I hope tht I have made our intention clear. I also hope that if the seemingly gathering momentum toward an early completion of a chemical weapons agreement turns out to be real, our contribution may be properly

Mr. MORELLI PANDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish):

I should now like to refer to the item before us relating to the total prohibition of chemical weapons. Last year Peru adhered to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Means of Warfare. We also ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and toxin weapons and on their Destruction. By these two acts, my country has shown its rejection of those weapons of mass destruction and its willingness to contribute to the prompt conclusion of a treaty that will forever ban the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons and ensure the destruction of existing stocks.

For more than five years now, this negotiating forum has been working at a high-priority pace and yet despite the efforts made, today we have evidence

(Mr. Morelli Pando, Peru)

of the use in local wars of weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, it is disturbing for countries not engaged in the arms race, as is the case of Peru, to see the start of a new phase in the chemical-arms race with the advent of the production of so-called binary weapons, which are an even more sophisticated and frightful example of extermination.

There are those who, undoubtedly with the best intentions, advocate a "final and global solution" to the problem of the proliferation of chemical weapons. But this position, which is logical and worthy of consideration if confined to the short term, can also have the opposite effect if the quest for such a "final and global solution" becomes a convenient alternative aimed at legitimizing the present status quo that is characterized by a process of fait accompli in the development, production and possible deployment and use of chemical weapons. Similarly, when we talk about a short-term solution, it is very probable that all the States represented in this forum will agree that the negotiations should be concluded by 1987 at the latest. However, there are also those who speculate about the possible new deployment of chemical weapons from that moment on if that objective is not reached, thereby introducing a disturbing element which may serve as a bargaining "chip" but can also be the harbinger of foreseen failure.

There is no doubt that successful completion of our work in the short term implies firm political will, particularly from those who have the greatest responsibility because they are involved in the production of chemical weapons. As the Disarmament Conference is a forum for negotiating on disarmament in terms of its various priorities and not a forum to justify or explain the arms race, my country trusts that that political will be displayed as soon as possible.

In this connection, it is clear that the establishment of a mechanism designed to reduce mistrust or fear among States by means of transparency concerning inventories of existing chemical weapons in various countries would help the ongoing negotiations. In order to overcome the conceptual problem, the information could be confined to anything that unquestionably is considered a chemical weapon, although everyone knows that this as well as any other difficulty can be overcome given political will.

With regard to the various elements which are to become part of the future treaty, my delegation feels that it is worth making the following comments. First, the prohibition should be complete and without any distinction between States parties. Second, in the likely case that some States will remain outside that multilateral instrument, the prohibition should also include all forms of co-operation which may make it possible for a third party to manufacture such weapons of mass destruction. Third, the verification system should be designed to guarantee destruction of existing chemical weapons and also to avoid their development and production, in view of the risk of timely detection, whether covertly or using lawful means. Fourth, the treaty should establish an international body to carry out the verification measures as well as routine and challenge inspection activities. Fifth, there should also be established a mechanism for verification in cases where the use of these weapons of mass destruction is suspected.

(Mr. Morelli Pando, Peru)

Despite the significant progress made so far by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we are all aware that we still have a long way to go. That is why my delegation fully shares the interest expressed by the distinguished representative of Japan for focusing our attention without any loss of time upon basic principles, leaving the details to be dealt with later by an essentially technical body.

Obviously, if the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons does not manage to conclude its work shortly, there will remain no alternative in my delegation's view but to promote the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones in regions where suitable conditions exist. In this regard, Latin America has in the Treaty of Tlatelolco a valuable experience that can be of great utility in eradicating at the regional level the scourge of chemical weapons, whose common denominator with nuclear weapons is mass destruction.

Peru, as a contracting party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, not only views this regional approach to the prohibition of chemical weapons with interest, but for some months now, on the initiative of the President of Peru, has been undertaking at the South American regional level a major effort, initially at the bilateral level, to bring about understandings with a view to completing an agreement on limitation of spending on arms purchases.

(Mr. Van Schaik, Netherlands)

Permit me now to make a few remarks on chemical weapons. Recently various speakers have observed that negotiations on chemical weapons have received a fresh impulse, but that the tempo at which the negotiations are conducted is still too low. We believe that, in fact, there is every reason to step up our efforts in order to achieve tangible results.

It may partly be a question of how quickly Governments react to new positions adopted by other delegations at this Conference. It would be of great importance if Governments not only showed more flexibility, but also showed that flexibility at the appropriate time. I may take as an example the

(Mr. Van Schaik, Netherlands)

very interesting statement made on 15 July by the British Minister of State, Mr. Renton, who indicated a new approach for the procedures to be followed in face of a request for challenge inspections. My Government, after careful study of this proposal, has reached the conclusion that this new proposal offers an appropriate basis for dealing with this thorny issue. Whereas the proposed provisions ensure stringent rules that do not permit a country to get away with a simple negative reaction to a request for challenge inspection, it at the same time also prevents challenge inspections becoming the rule. An inappropriate use of the challenge inspection clause, should be avoided, so as to ensure a balanced implementation of the treaty.

But whatever the final outcome of negotiations on this crucial issue in the negotiations may be, it is important that delegations, in particular those who have been most critical of positions previously taken, will offer their comments, adopt their own position within a reasonably brief time-frame.

In general, we think that both governments and delegations here in Geneva should become more time-conscious. Time is in this case perhaps our greatest enemy, because if we wait too long this can only lead to more proliferation of CW to more countries, to the production of more weapons and to a more widespread use of CW, such as we have been witness of in the Iraq-Iran war.

Since time is becoming such a precious, even essential, factor in our negotiations, we also think that we should deal more effectively with the time available between the end of the summer session and the beginning of the spring session in 1987. Ambassador Cromartie's efforts to find a generally acceptable formula for the inter-sessional consultations have our full support.

We also think it worth while to reconsider the structure of the CW negotiations in the future. In the first place, we believe that, if we really wish to do business, our time schedule should no longer be dependent on timing of conferences and meetings taking place elsewhere. I recognize that for some delegations it is difficult to cover at the same time the sessions of the First Committee and those of the Conference on Disarmament. However, a solution must be found for this dilemma, by permitting negotiators on CW to work the whole year around on CW only.

In the second place, I think that it is worth while to consider whether it is not appropriate to follow another rhythm in the negotiations, so as to be able to alternate negotiating rounds with periods of homework, in order to prepare instructions for the next round.

Mr. Renton suggested that we aim to present a complete chemical weapons convention to the United Nations General Assembly in 1987. I think 1987 is indeed a crucial year. If in 1987 we do not break the back of the problems, we run the risk that negotiations will be slipping. We would therefore be interested in a discussion now on the way we wish to organize our work next year.

(Mr. Van Schaik, Netherlands)

Recent contributions to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee from various delegations are a promising signal of the interest delegations take in the work on chemical weapons. I mention the very useful document CD/713, presented by Ambassador Imai of Japan, about quantitative aspects of a chemical weapons convention. The basic conclusion in this Paper, namely that in various chemical facilities verification can be assured by taking a surprisingly small number of random samples, is encouraging. It would mean that, according to this method, intrusiveness can be kept at a modest level.

The Working Papers from Norway submitted to the plenary as CD/702, CD/703 and CD/704 on the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, are again proof of the long-standing high quality of the research conducted by Norway in this field.

The problem of chemical weapons production facilities was addressed in the statement of Ambassador Issraelyan on 22 April last. We consider this contribution as a modest but constructive step forward. We hope that other important aspects of this problem will receive also due attention.

We welcome the document presented by the United States on the chemical stockpile disposal problem (circulated under CD/711). This paper provides us with a great amount of interesting and hitherto unknown details about location and composition of chemical stockpiles in the United States. It would, indeed, be important if other countries will follow suit by providing us with information on the stocks located in their country.

Having said all this, allow me to take the opportunity to thank both the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and the three Chairmen of the Working Groups for their untiring efforts to produce more substantive results at this year's sessions, possibly in treaty language. We certainly owe it to them that work is well under way for a rolling text of the draft convention, which will reflect the progress so far achieved.

My final words today are for my colleagues here around this table and others who have expressed their appreciation for the Chemical Weapons Workshop held in the Netherlands in June. With the commitment and enthusiasm that dominated this two-day seminar, the CW convention could be realized in a week's time. The Netherlands Government is very grateful for the kind words addressed to it in the aftermath of the Workshop. Let us hope that the spirit of commitment and goodwill that inspired the participants of the Workshop will find its expression at this Conference by early agreement on the relevant issues.

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

In the Conference on Disarmament it should be noted that during the course of this 1986 session further positive steps have been made in negotiations conducted within the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the able leadership of the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Ian Cromartie. This points to the possibility of a successful outcome to negotiations on other outstanding issues in this field. Of particular relevance, we consider, are efforts to identify the procedures and measures of verification at specific stages of implementation of the CW convention.

In this respect we are still faced with a number of problems and difficulties which should not be underestimated, just as should not be underestimated the fundamental differences dividing the delegations, the bridging of which will require new efforts and new political will. We should not be discouraged by these difficulties. My delegation will continue to actively participate and contribute to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, just as we support the inter-sessional work of the Committee.

President:

U Tin Tun

(Burma)

Distinguished delegates, please allow me now to make a brief concluding statement as the President of the Conference, since this is the last formal plenary meeting I shall be presiding over.

The month of July is a busy month. It has seen an increase in the tempo of the work of the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committees, as we approach the conclusion of the 1986 summer session.

With regard to agenda items 4 (Chemical Weapons), 5 (Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space), 7 (Radiological Weapons) and 8 (Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament), the respective subsidiary bodies continued their activities with vigour under the able leadership of their respective Chairmen. Reflecting the sentiments of all the member delegations, I wish to express my deep appreciation of the considerable contribution made by their Chairmen, Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Luvsandorjiin Bayart of Mongolia, Ambassador Lechuga Hevia of Cuba and Ambassador García Robles of Mexico.

President: Mr. A. Beesley (Canada)

As for the Conference on Disarmament's priorities, the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction is a central task of the arms control and disarmament process. Your efforts to negotiate a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons therefore is rightly a priority item on your work agenda. Official confirmation by the United Nations Secretary-General of repeated chemical weapons use in the Gulf war, which Canada resolutely condemns, as well as reports of efforts by other countries to acquire a chemical weapons capability, must add to our collective sense of urgency to achieve progress on this item. Canada does not favour diverting efforts from the negotiation of a comprehensive ban in order to address the proliferation problem separately. Nevertheless, out of concern for the problem, Canada recently increased to 14 the number of chemicals subject to export controls and, in consultation with several other countries, we are implementing a warning list procedure for a longer list of chemicals.

In the effort to negotiate a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, there were several welcome developments during the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. The United States delegation made an important clarification of its thinking on how a treaty might apply to differing social systems. The USSR delegation made new and positive substantive proposals relating to certain aspects of verification of a treaty, which my Government hopes will soon be supplemented by further proposals dealing with other aspects of verification. The Canadian Government hopes also that the important recent United Kingdom initiative will facilitate a convergency of views on the sensitive and vital issue of challenge inspections. Under energetic and notably competent chairmanship, the Ad Hoc Committee has made further progress toward resolving some of the more difficult technical issues. The Canadian delegation submitted two working papers as a contribution to the collective effort. The holding by the Netherlands of a workshop relating to verification of non-production, as well as the broad attendance at that workshop, was gratifying and encouraging. It is important that the momentum thus generated be maintained, including through inter-sessional work to the extent practicable.

(Mr. Gucowatshov, Ambassador)

Item 4, Chemical weapons, is the one item in which most progress has been made, even though by common standards it has been slow. My delegation feels encouraged by the more truly businesslike exchanges which have characterized the discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee as well as in the Working Group this year, enabling real, substantive work to be done.

Ambassador Gucowatshov of the United Kingdom as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and the Chairman of the three Working Groups should be commended for their excellent work and exemplary dedication. The important and valuable results which have been achieved through painstaking work under their guidance should be given due recognition.

We are also grateful to the Netherlands Government for organizing the workshop on verification of non-production of chemical weapons in Holland last June, which has been very instructive and useful and, I might as well say, has helped to advance our work on this important question. I should like to make use of this opportunity to express my Government's appreciation to the Dutch Government for having taken the much-needed initiative.

Some major issues still need to be resolved in fairly concrete and this stage about the progress of an early conclusion of our work on chemical weapons. The questions which remain are of a nature which might seem

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

The threats to international security posed by nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons today are real and they are large. The future is no less challenging for us than the past was for our predecessors. And so we keep trying, we keep searching for the peaceful solutions, for the steps to more stable ground. The United States has made far-reaching proposals to reduce and eliminate nuclear arsenals, both strategic and intermediate range. It has initiated a search for defensive technologies that would protect rather than threaten. Together with the Soviet Union it agreed in January 1985 to the present nuclear and space talks. My delegation is encouraged by recent developments affecting these negotiations. For the first time, as President Reagan stated on 29 July, "We are not only pointed in the right direction -- toward reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons -- we have begun to move down that road".

In the Conference on Disarmament and bilaterally with the Soviet Union, United States efforts to conclude a chemical weapons ban have intensified. In Stockholm and Vienna, negotiations respecting conventional weapons continue.

The United States is not satisfied with the present, any more than any other concerned State. It recognizes the slow pace of progress, and it regrets negative developments such as non-compliance with existing agreements, and, most recently, the rejection by the Soviet Union of President Reagan's call for establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint pending conclusion of a verifiable agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms.

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(Mr. Sutowardoyo, Indonesia)

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Some major issues still need to be resolved to justify optimism at this stage about the prospect of an early conclusion of our work on chemical weapons. Indeed the questions which remain are of a nature which might daunt

(Mr. Sutowardoyo, Indonesia)

less hardened spirits. Take, for instance, the question of challenge on-site inspection in the context of Article IX which is being dealt with in Working Group C, of which we feel honoured to have a member of the Indonesian delegation acting as its Chairman. Further intensive work is still required for its final solution. But, on the other hand, let us consider who would have dared to predict even at the beginning of our session this year, that by this time we would have reached the stage in which we are finding ourselves now.

Important progress has certainly been made in the negotiation of the issue of on-site inspection by challenge, but it seems that further substantive work on the basis of the results achieved is needed in order that they can get the recognition they deserve in our view. Perhaps the remaining few weeks of this session could be usefully availed of for achieving this end.

My delegation believes that, given the necessary political will, on which we have been given plenty of assurances, with hard work and sufficient flexibility, a constructive approach and readiness to make mutual concessions all around, a solution of this and other still unresolved problems may yet prove to be within our reach at least during our next session.

The often-mentioned use of chemical weapons and their alleged further spread in the past few years, in addition to the great expectation that has been raised world-wide in the Conference's current work on the CW convention should make us all realize that we cannot afford to, and indeed must not, fail.

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

But there is another element which provides food for thought in the case of radiological weapons, and that is the possibility that an agreement may be reached to ban chemical weapons. Some students of military science argue that many of the functions for which chemical weapons were developed can be carried out by radiological weapons. This includes the fact that radiological weapons can contaminate the ground in a military manoeuvre aimed at carrying out a quick offensive, can protect the attacker's flanks and would be capable of disorganizing the enemy's logistics, in the same way as chemical weapons. One may well think, therefore, that once a treaty is in force on the prohibition of the latter, there would be a greater incentive to resolve the problems that radiological weapons currently seem to present.

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

Today my delegation addresses issues on our agenda on which we can and should find less difficulty in reaching a consensus but have not done so. It remains the view of my delegation that nuclear disarmament issues constitute the priority issues in disarmament and are fundamentally more important for the security of all. Nevertheless in terms of paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament we recognize the importance of chemical disarmament as an invaluable measure towards general and complete disarmament. Despite bilateral talks and recent pronouncements on the need to ban this kind of weapon completely the manifestation of these commitments has not yet been evident in sufficient degree to accelerate our work in the Conference. The prospect of a convention in 1987 has been held before us tantalisingly but the necessary readiness to agree on the issues confronting us is absent. Indeed what is most disturbing is that the chemical weapons race has been resumed. Our own resolve to work assiduously for a speedy solution of the problem in order to eliminate this abominable weapon once and for all remains strong and we are ready to assist in the final spurt towards our goal.

My delegation is happy to note the progress made this year in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in its efforts to draft a chemical weapons convention. The progress is admittedly slow but has to be welcomed in the present context of the Conference's performance record. We are confident that the Chairman, Ambassador Cromartie, will use his skills during the planned inter-sessional consultations to consolidate and extend the progress that has been achieved. My delegation wishes to address some issues relevant to the Convention so as to contribute to the orientation of the work and to highlight several other important aspects.

There are other important issues, albeit not as central as the verification issue, on which the attention of the CW Committee should be focused sooner rather than later. The question of herbicides has already had a reference in the negotiations of a chemical weapons ban, however this important question has not been addressed at all during this session. Since herbicides were used as chemical agents in practice, the ban on their use is not the remote possibility that we now discuss. A single prohibition clause prohibiting the use of herbicides as a method of warfare against an adversary within the convention on chemical weapons is an important part of the convention which will certainly act as a deterrent for its use in hostilities in future warfare. The legislative measures of countries which depend on vitally on agriculture, the use crop sector and rural economy

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

Although some key issues of a future convention such as scope, definition and criteria remain to be solved, it is apparent that the major area of controversy lies in the subject area of Article IX. The Working Papers presented by the delegation of Pakistan [CD/664] and the delegation of the United Kingdom [CD/715] in an obvious attempt to reconcile the divergent perceptions on this issue, are useful contributions which merit careful study. In this connection it is of paramount importance for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to act in unison to consolidate the achievements of Working Group C, which performed useful work under its able Chairman, Mr. Wisnomoerti of Indonesia. In Annex III of its report on Article IX especially formulations presented for a procedure for requesting a fact finding mission could be considered as a valuable point of departure for future work.

In this context may I draw the attention of the Conference to some relevant issues that may be important in the resolution of the complex issues of verification and compliance. It has been generally acknowledged that absolute transparency within a chemical weapons convention is neither necessary nor realistic. The military significance of chemical weapons to the nuclear-weapon States dependent on the strategy of nuclear deterrence is obviously not a core issue. And yet to insist on the most rigorous standards of verification for these weapons raises doubts on their relevance to actual security needs. An intrusive and elaborate system of challenge inspection is redundant in the light of the efficacy of certain national technical means available to the two major alliances, some of which have been used adequately to monitor existing treaties. A rigid strait-jacket system of challenge verification could become politically destabilizing in a context of a tense and sensitive political climate not only between major alliances but more so in regional situations where accusations and counter accusations can become the order of the day. Such a verification machinery will be difficult to operate in the best of times.

These reasons, inter alia, aptly demonstrate the need for compromise and realism. We are confident that a package which could include elements involved in the various verification methods propose, viz. "systematic continuous", "continuous random", "continuous regular", "fact finding", "on challenge" etc., could be reasonably put together if the political will exists to install an adequate system of verification to ensure compliance. After all it is clear that when there is no political will States could even withdraw or implicitly violate existing Conventions.

There are other important issues, albeit not as central as the verification issue, on which the attention of the CW Committee should be focused sooner rather than later. The question of herbicides has all along had a relevance in the negotiations of a chemical weapons ban. However this important question has not been addressed at all during this session. Ever since herbicides were used as chemical agents in hostilities, the danger of its use again is not the remote possibility that we can dismiss. A simple prohibition clause prohibiting the use of herbicides as a method of warfare against an adversary within the convention on chemical weapons or as an integral part of the convention will certainly act as a deterrent for its use in hostilities in future satisfying the legitimate concerns of countries which depend so vitally on agriculture, the tree crop sector and natural cover.

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

The chemical industry in many developing countries like Sri Lanka cannot be compared in extent or content with those in the developed or industrially advanced countries. Our chemical industry is largely concentrated on petro-chemicals, fertilizer, pesticides, synthetic fibres, dyes or paints. In some cases the industry is under multinational control. Therefore the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should also take cognizance of the activities of multinational and transnational corporations in particular in the deliberations over Article V [CW production facilities], Article VII [National Implementation Measures], Article IX [Consultation, Co-operation and Fact Finding] and in other relevant articles. Also, in this context, in developing countries, the verification machinery envisaged under the convention should not be a burden on the already hard pressed economies of developing countries. Multinational corporations could contribute towards sharing the burden with the expertise available to them.

Another area requiring work in the Ad hoc Committee is Article XI -- Economic and Technological Development, which has remained in abeyance for quite some time. In the view of my delegation the time is opportune for delegations to give preliminary consideration to the content and scope of this Article. For developing countries adequate notice may be necessary to formulate policies which will not prejudice their legitimate aspirations for the advancement of their indigenous chemical industry.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

The only item with respect to which, as I said before, we could harbour some optimism is chemical weapons. We wish to place on record our appreciation for the work done by Ambassador Cromartie, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with the item, and the work begun by the Co-ordinators of the Committee's three Working Groups. In this connection, we cannot however, fail to point out that the recent decision of one of the main Powers to carry forward its plans to resume the production of chemical weapons gives rise to doubt with respect to its genuine desire to make progress at negotiations currently under way, one of whose goals consists precisely in achieving the prohibition of the production of these weapons.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

This year's session marked a noticeable acceleration of the negotiations on a chemical-weapon ban. The Soviet proposals contained in the January Declaration of the General Secretary of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev, and subsequently developed in the speech of my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Issraelyan on 22 April, gave an impetus to the negotiations.

The work in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was organized in a manner that made use of all valuable texts in CD/636 and CD/651, reached during the chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, thus creating an atmosphere of continuity in the negotiations. The discussions in the three Working Groups not only gained momentum but also a new qualitative dimension.

The Working Groups' reports reveal that the area of agreement or mutual understanding have increased to a degree which allows almost a comprehensive assessment of the political, security, economic and legal implications of a future convention. A number of complex technical issues were solved or were brought to the point of near solution. In this regard the participation of chemical experts from many delegations was particularly useful.

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(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

The negotiations were conducted in a business-like manner and the atmosphere was generally positive.

My delegation also finds constructive the decision taken by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, to encourage additional efforts for developing the texts in the Working Groups up to 20 August.

The two rounds of Soviet-American consultations on all aspects of a chemical-weapons ban that took place during the session have had, in our opinion, a positive and stabilizing influence on the overall setting of the multilateral negotiations.

The good results in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons notwithstanding, my delegation believes the Conference should not allow itself any complacency. A number of important issues await decision in context of the draft convention. The readiness to complete this draft as soon as possible should be coupled with a specific agreement to utilize better the intersessional period this year. A different course of action, as suggested by some Western delegations, might have grave political consequences. Suspicions might arise particularly in the wake of the planned implementation of the United States binary programme. My delegation hopes that a decision to resume the work of the Ad hoc Committee as early as October could be taken.

(Mr. Gonsalves, India)

One group of States in the Conference has quite blatantly suggested that the Conference can legitimately hope to substantively tackle only the issue of a chemical weapons convention. The progress that is being made in this area alone is sought to be cited as satisfactory evidence that the Conference is in fact discharging its responsibilities. It is of course true that there have been several important contributions on this subject and I would particularly like to thank the Netherlands Government for the valuable workshop it arranged in June. There has been general agreement that the Ad hoc Committee on this subject under the able stewardship of Ambassador Cromartie has made reasonable progress during the current year and it is gratifying to note the expression of hope on either side of the ideological divide that an agreed CW convention can be presented to the forty-second session of the General Assembly. We are ourselves considerably less optimistic. While we hear reports of useful

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(Mr. Gonsalves, India)

bilateral super-Power exchanges on this subject we regret the persistent tendency not to share the results of these exchanges with the Conference on Disarmament. We have at the same time heard the complaint that participation in the work of the Ad hoc Committee is not adequately representative to ensure the conclusion of a convention acceptable to all. In our view this situation is in no way related to or responsible for the continuing sharp differences on verification and other issues between the parties possessing the largest stockpiles. These differences can be resolved only if they display a much higher degree of mutual confidence and accommodation than has been the case so far. There is thus much ground to be covered if we are to attain the goal of a CW convention. We cannot in any case satisfy the expectant international community with the assurance that the only issue on which we are registering some progress is chemical weapons more particularly since the role of these weapons in the global military strategies of the two alliances is essentially of a secondary if not marginal character.

(The President)

Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran):

The insane arms race poses a threat to the whole human community and it therefore deserves a lot of attention by any country. Apart from its universal dimensions, the subject is crucial to us for several reasons. Our country is located in a very sensitive and strategic region, under threat from direct military rivalries of the super-Powers. We have been witness to the increase of their spheres of influence and military presence in the countries of the region. The sophisticated arms delivery to the countries of the region in the past two decades is comparable with the total amount delivered to the Third World and developing countries. From the inception of the Iraqi aggression on 22 September 1980, we have been subjected to and victimized by the most sophisticated conventional and chemical weapons. We have directly experienced human loss and material damage and I am now addressing you with the deep feelings and complete comprehension of the effects of these weapons. Although we have countered and neutralized the weapons delivered by East and West, thanks to the self-sacrifice of our young, we are gradually increasing our awareness of the sensitivity attached to the international efforts for the reduction of the arms race. This awareness, particularly concerning the inhuman chemical weapons, is growing deeper and stronger. I am sorry that I have to start my statement from this very same subject, and more unfortunate still is the fact that the use of mass-killing chemical weapons has been repeated.

You are all aware of the latest report, issued in March 1986, document S/17911, filed by a United Nations team dispatched by the United Nations Secretary-General to probe into the use of chemical weapons. As you know, this is the third consecutive report. In 1984, the United Nations confirmed that chemical weapons were used in Iraqi aggression against Iran, and in 1985 the repeated use was reaffirmed after afflicted Iranians were sent for

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

treatment. In the last report, Iraq was introduced as the frequent deployer of chemical weapons on a large scale. All of these reports were followed by statements by the Security Council and a number of countries condemning the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, but none of these measures prevented the Iraqis from repeating such grave crimes.

Since the foundation of the United Nations Organization, this is the first time that a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Protocol has officially been denounced as the flagrant violator of this Protocol, repeatedly committing these crimes. This crime is not confined to one particular country, but rather others will be affected by its consequences. Deployment of chemical weapons from World War I became an international issue crucial to the peace and security of the countries. In this very Conference, the subject of the prevention of production, deployment, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons has been as equally important as the issue of nuclear weapons. But at the same time, a small country like Iraq is allowed to be equipped with sophisticated chemicals and to use them at various junctures.

Our studies, as reflected in the United Nations reports, show that Iraq has deployed cyanide and nerve gas in addition to mustard gas. The Iraqi régime does not possess the technical expertise to produce such weapons, particularly the nerve gas to which only a few countries have access because of its sophistication. We have information about the exportation of chemical weapons and the related technology to Iraq and these studies will be continued. However, this responsibility does not fall solely on us, as a victim of chemical weapons, but rather it is a common and international duty for all countries, particularly the members of the Conference on Disarmament as well as the relevant decision-making organ of the United Nations and other international organs which should carry out a thorough investigation into the matter.

With the continued deployment of chemical weapons by the régime of Iraq, the international duty to adopt practical and serious measures, vis-à-vis this régime, and to investigate the countries which have provided it with chemical weapons, becomes extremely serious. The Benelux countries have banned the exportation of 12 chemical substances to Iraq following the Security Council's statement of 21 March 1986 condemning the Iraqi régime. Other members of the European Community have also adopted special measures to impose controls on certain substances which can be turned into chemical weapons. It is, however, clear that such actions by a few countries concerning a limited number of substances and without thorough executive verification are in no way sufficient. Since the adoption of the Security Council's statement of 21 March, Iraq has deployed chemical weapons on five separate occasions in different places, the last of which was on 28 May 1986 in Gorgan and Amirabad in the south-west of the country -- resulting in the injury of over 50 persons. Mustard gas was used in all these instances and this has been reported to the Secretary-General with a request that teams be dispatched to investigate. Owing to Iraq's past record, no investigation was felt necessary in this regard and the cases were confirmed. In one case only, and following a long procrastination, we received a positive response for the dispatch of a probing team where the traces had, with the lapse of time, eroded away. Medical reports are sent to the Secretary-General on a regular basis.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The criminal action by Iraq has endangered the whole validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. If a country such as Iraq can violate this Protocol flagrantly and extensively and also keeps its insistence of its stance, then what kind of guarantee will exist for the implementation of the Protocol and even other international commitments by other countries? We are of the opinion that the Conference on Disarmament must heed and ask the co-operation of the United Nations on the implementation of the following points: first, re-condemnation of the use of chemical weapons as a "war crime"; second, investigation into the suppliers of chemical weapons and substances to Iraq; third, a total ban on the exportation to Iraq of chemical substances and related technology which can be used to manufacture chemical weapons; fourth, the dispatch of an investigation team by the Secretary-General whenever demanded by the Islamic Republic of Iran at the earliest possible date; fifth, a demand to all countries to once again announce their commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol which has been weakened by Iraq; and sixth, a direct call on Iraq to commit itself not to repeat the use of chemical weapons. Until the Iraqi régime announces this officially and publicly, we reserve the right to defend ourselves.

In the meantime, it seems that the continuation of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq has drawn the attention of all nations towards the dangers emanating from such weapons and, contrary to other working groups of the Conference on Disarmament, we have been witness to a certain progress. Particularly in the current session on discussions related to the Convention on banning the production, deployment, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons -- although achieving a final result seems remote. Regardless of agreement on those kinds of chemical substances which can be turned into weapons and their inclusion in the Convention, the modalities and nature of the implementation of the provisions of the Convention about other countries and the way of compliance and verification have still not gained any definite agreement. It is true that if any country is given the right of verification whenever its local information provides it, this matter provides certain ground for abuse, but allowing this process to depend on the consent of the other party can also create practical impediments to the implementation of the Treaty. Recent proposals in this area can lead us to a breakthrough although we believe that an international committee should make the final decision and judgement on the verification of each case. Such a committee should give top priority to the verification and destruction of stockpiles and means of producing chemical weapons in those countries identified as users of chemical weapons.

It is unfortunate to say that except in the chemical field, the Conference did not make noticeable progress and that the arms race showed an upward trend. This process, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons, poses a great threat for the future of humanity, capable of destroying the whole globe several times over. There is no winner for a nuclear holocaust while its loser will be the whole of humanity. The development of nuclear arsenals must be stopped immediately as the first step, but it seems that so long as the idea of "deterrence" prevails for achieving supremacy over the world, there will be no hope for the arrest of the arms race. Deterrence is in fact a justification to gain might and use it for expansion of the sphere of influence among the smaller countries. In this context, disarmament is a matter in tune with decolonization moves and the arms race a colonial policy.

Mr. LINEHAM (New Zealand): It gives my delegation considerable pleasure to see you, the representative of Canada, as President of the Conference for this concluding month of the summer session. New Zealand and Canada share much in common, we have traditions of justice and equality and a common desire for peace. We are both members of the Commonwealth, both strongly committed to Western values and both Pacific countries. Although we are from different hemispheres we have the common interest in seeing our Pacific region continue to develop in harmony with prosperity and free from discord.

We are also grateful to the Ambassador of Burma, for the skilful way in which he guided the work of the Conference in the month of July.

The purpose of my intervention today is to reiterate my Government's support for the work of this Conference on chemical weapons.

I do not wish to speak for long. But I do wish to stress that my Government is concerned that the Conference work towards concluding a chemical weapons convention as soon as possible.

New Zealand took the opportunity to address this Conference in the first part of the 1986 session. We expressed the hope that the Conference on Disarmament should be able to make a better rate of progress. We focused on that occasion particularly on its work on a nuclear-test ban treaty.

The New Zealand Government has demonstrated its commitment to disarmament. Its disarmament policies have been based on the primary principle that effective disarmament measures must increase the security of all, not diminish the security of anyone.

(Mr. Lineham, New Zealand)

New Zealand has excluded nuclear weapons from its territory, including its ports. There has never been a need for nuclear weapons in New Zealand. Their exclusion does not diminish security in any way. It enhances it. New Zealand has joined with the other countries of the South Pacific Forum in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty to limit the chances of nuclear rivalry in the South Pacific. As the Prime Minister, Mr. David Lange, pointed out when he addressed the Conference last year, that Treaty, by lowering the nuclear risk, increases the security of all.

New Zealand places the greatest importance on the work of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating disarmament measures based on that central principle. We seek to work with the Conference to help achieve that objective of increasing global security through effective controls on armaments.

We are encouraged that the Conference has worked in a positive atmosphere this year. We look to the future with hope for progress on a number of items on the agenda. It would be a serious commentary on the disarmament process if those hopes are again frustrated.

We join with those who express the hope that there will be results in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear arms and arms in space. If the political will is shown in those negotiations, this Conference will be better able to negotiate the agreements to give the multilateral framework for effective disarmament measures.

Chemical weapons is the area in which the Conference has moved closest to fulfilling its mandate of negotiating disarmament agreements to provide increased security for all. During the last two or three years the concern of the world about chemical weapons has heightened considerably. We have a common conviction that we urgently need a convention completely banning the development, production, stockpiling as well as the use of chemical weapons.

Earlier this year a group of specialists appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General confirmed that Iraqi forces had used chemical weapons against Iranian forces. And there have been assessments made in this Conference by other delegations that further countries are developing the capability to produce and deploy chemical weapons. These developments point out the necessity and the urgency of concluding as soon as possible a comprehensive chemical weapons convention.

New Zealand has always condemned the use of these barbaric weapons, whose employment in war has been outlawed for over 60 years. We have accepted and strongly support the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons. New Zealand was associated with the resolution 37/98D adopted by the United Nations General Assembly which elaborated the procedures which provide for investigation by the Secretary-General into allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

Pursuant to these procedures we nominated a chemistry laboratory of the New Zealand Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to undertake tests for the presence of prohibited chemical agents if called upon to do so.

(Mr. Lineham, New Zealand)

More recently the Government took further steps in order to limit the possibility that chemical manufacturers or suppliers in New Zealand could be used indirectly to contribute to the proliferation or use of chemical weapons. Since 1984 we have controlled the export of chemicals that could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons, and have warned our industry of other chemicals that could be used in that category.

Notwithstanding all the action that we and other countries have already taken, there is no substitute for the successful negotiation in this Conference, of a treaty imposing a comprehensive prohibition on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.

A comprehensive convention would reinforce the existing international legal prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. It would stop any further proliferation of chemical weapons. It would provide for the total elimination, over as short a time as possible, of chemical weapons and production facilities. And it would also build confidence and enhance mutual security through measures to ensure the observance of its prohibitions.

It is encouraging that the atmosphere in the chemical-weapons negotiations this year has been both reasonably positive and constructive. This has undoubtedly been helped by the agreement of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, in their Joint Statement on 21 November 1985, to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable convention. The bilateral talks which the United States and the Soviet Union have been holding as a complement to the multilateral negotiations may also have helped. This Conference may never have had as good an opportunity to make rapid progress on a chemical weapons treaty as it now has.

Progress has been made this year in a heightened spirit of commitment. We understand, full well, the enormous complexity of the negotiations on this subject. However it is important to match expressions of good intention with agreement on treaty language. That said, we do welcome points of agreement when they emerge, notably the language agreed last year on a provision which would unequivocally prohibit the use of chemical weapons.

As an observer, New Zealand has not been as close to the details of the negotiations as others involved in the work of the ad hoc committee. We would, however, offer some observations of a more general kind.

It is possible for negotiations to become bogged down in the discussion of detail. A comprehensive prohibition on chemical weapons requires, admittedly, the consideration of much detail and those negotiating must be vigilant to ensure that important details are not overlooked but also be awake to the possibility that some difficulties are not, in reality, central to the negotiations. Other speakers have referred to certain key issues in the negotiations and we would agree that it is on such issues that the negotiations should concentrate.

Much work has been done on lists of chemicals that pose a risk of diversion for the production of chemical weapons. Consideration is being

(Mr. Lineham, New Zealand)

given to listing chemicals that will be banned and chemicals that will be subject to monitoring régimes of varying degrees of stringency. This is necessary work since the toxic chemicals and their precursors that are subject to surveillance will need to be clearly listed so that the parties to the convention and the chemical industry are certain of the chemicals involved.

Consideration has also been given this year, however, to the régimes applied to those chemicals, and it does seem to us that this is a key area for future work. It is the devising of acceptable and effective régimes that will determine whether any chemical-weapons convention will be successful. We are encouraged by the progress that has been achieved in Working Group A this year, during intensive work under Australian chairmanship, on the whole question of criteria, lists and régimes and permitted activities.

In a disarmament treaty of this kind, where a whole category of weapons of mass destruction is to be banned forever, the formulation of provisions to verify compliance with the convention is central to the convention régime. Such provisions would include procedures for conducting international on-site inspections -- we do not see that such inspections could be left to national verification authorities -- and also for conducting inspections at short notice, so-called challenge inspections, in cases when breaches of the convention are suspected. It is expected that such cases would be exceptional.

Inspections will need to be provided for not only in the case of alleged breaches of obligations to declare and to destroy existing chemical weapons and production facilities, but also in the case of the obligation not to produce new chemical weapons. There are grounds for some encouragement at the progress that has been made in the negotiations in this area. We have appreciated the intensive efforts made by the Indonesian delegation on verification and compliance issues in Working Group C. We have also noted the very recent United Kingdom proposals on "challenge inspection" which seem to have given rise to a good deal of interest.

These and other proposals were put forward in this Conference in an effort to find consensus, and we would hope that procedures which are acceptable to all can be devised to resolve this long-standing issue. Agreement on the inspection provisions would constitute a major breakthrough in the negotiations. This should be a priority area for future work.

A comprehensive prohibition on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and in particular procedures in the Convention for verification of compliance, could be expected to be of some significance for the civilian chemical industry. We expect that New Zealand's industry, like others, would co-operate in the application of such measures and by doing so demonstrate that it does not want to contribute in any way to the manufacturing of chemical weapons.

In the elaboration of the procedures there will naturally be some concerns, such as the protection of commercial confidentiality and the

(Mr. Lineham, New Zealand)

unhindered commercial operations of the industry, which will have to be taken fully into account. But the devising of procedures which meet such concerns should be seen as a positive and constructive process which will contribute to the objectives of the convention and not as an obstacle in the negotiations.

I would like, before concluding, to touch on some other developments in the Conference this year on the subject of chemical weapons. The New Zealand delegation would like to express particular appreciation to the Government of the Netherlands for the Workshop on the verification of the chemical weapons ban held in June this year and for making it possible for countries like my own to participate. This was, in our view, a superbly organized affair and we would further thank the Dutch delegation for its follow-up reports and willingness to enter into discussions, in the Committee, on the results of the Workshop. Similarly, as another practical reference point for the negotiations, we would thank the Australian Government for its paper, tabled again in June, on the trial inspection of an Australian chemical facility conducted earlier in the year. We would also commend Canada for the material that it has made available to the Conference this year, including a handbook for the investigation of allegations of the use of chemical or biological weapons and the very useful compendia of Conference working papers and statements.

Finally, we would mention recent initiatives of both the United States and the Soviet Union relevant to the negotiations, that is, the provision by the Soviet Union in April of detailed proposals on certain issues in the negotiations, and the demonstration by the United States, in its paper on its chemical stockpile disposal programme, of the sort of openness that will help to build confidence that chemical-weapon stockpiles have, in fact, been destroyed. We welcome such developments.

In concluding, I would like to express the hope of the New Zealand delegation that the Ad Hoc Committee will be able to maintain momentum in the negotiations and in particular to continue work on specific subjects under consideration in the working groups after the current session of the Conference has ended for this year.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, it is a pleasure to see you, the experienced and skilful representative of Canada, in the Presidency of the Conference for the concluding month of its session. Under your efficient guidance we shall undoubtedly be able to appropriately evaluate what happened in the Conference during the last year and conclude the elaboration of our report to the General Assembly. My thanks go also to your predecessor, Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma, for his efficient Presidency in July.

We note with satisfaction that negotiations on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons have entered an intensive stage. The Ad Hoc Committee and its three Working Groups were working very actively throughout this session, and some important aspects of the chemical-weapon ban were also addressed at the bilateral United States-Soviet consultations. It is thus only natural that a certain optimism is emerging. Our delegation also welcomes the fact that the chemical-weapons ban seems closer now than it did a year or two ago. We recognize the positive impact which the new Soviet proposals exerted on the ongoing process of negotiations. A flexible approach, demonstrated once again by the Soviet proposals of 22 April, is the only attitude which can lead to final success. It is desirable that, as we try to finalize the convention, flexibility should mark the approach of all delegations.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

But there are unfortunately, not only positive developments concerning chemical weapons. While the Conference is doing its best to outlaw them, the NATO alliance is preoccupied with search for the rationale for the production of binary weapons and their eventual introduction in Europe. We deplore the Brussels decision of 22 May and we fail to understand how it fits in with widely proclaimed readiness to achieve a CW ban. This inconsistency makes us wonder what is wrong with the present process aimed at chemical disarmament if, in spite of its relatively advanced stage, it has not eliminated the drive towards a further chemical-arms build-up. Does this inconsistency result simply from the approach of individual military planners, or is it an indication of a wider, general policy line?

We can hardly find an exhaustive answer to that question. But some conclusions might offer themselves if one looks back at the development of CW and at the inner logic of the chemical-arms race. Within the span of about half a century several generations of CW were developed and it was mainly their toxicity which constantly increased. As a result, in terms of toxicity and area coverage, modern CW agents surpass the agents used in World War I by several orders of magnitude. A simple comparison of lethal effects of various CW agents illustrates this progression very clearly. If, in the case of phosgene, used in 1915, this represented 3,200 mg per cubic metre of air within a minute, for yperite (1917) it was only about half of that amount. For sarin, produced in 1939, the lethal effect threshold went down sharply to 100 mg/m³ of air, for nerve agent VX (1960/1) to 38 mg/m³ of air and the chemical designed as EA 5774 (1979) to just about 10 mg/m³ of air. Thus, today's CW agents are substantially, "qualitatively", different from the old ones. It might be further demonstrated by the simple fact that for percutaneous administration - which represents an important method of military use - about 200 drops of yperite are needed to constitute a lethal dose, while the same effect can be achieved by a simple drop of VX compound.

But even this extreme toxicity does not, unfortunately, represent a limit which could not be further lowered. Toxic compounds, which the United States is considering for military use and which are currently still in the development stage, are estimated to produce lethal effects even at a concentration of 0.1 to 0.001 mg per cubic metre of air. It might be safely presumed that these "prospects" are tempting to military planners and represent an important reason why they are not ready to abandon the chemical-arms race in their quest for superiority.

With the overall development of weapons and military equipment, the means for delivering chemical weapons are also becoming faster, more accurate and more penetrating. Today a whole spectrum of such means exists, from already obsolete chemical mines and hand grenades for use in combat to more sophisticated artillery and multiple-rocket-launcher shells, air force bombs and containers, chemical warheads for short-range and medium-range ground-based missiles. Here again, a new generation of delivery means appears on the horizon. For instance, it has been reported that specific systems for delivering organophosphorous compounds by means of cruise missiles are being developed and have already been tested. They will make it possible to carry out surprise attacks on pinpoint targets well behind the battle lines, using highly toxic and fast-acting chemical warfare agents.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

These, and possible future developments in the delivery means for CW, could lead to dangerous calculations about increased use of CW against the civilian population. It is obvious that, even without this "special concern", civilian populations will have to pay an extremely high price in the event of a conflict with the use of CW. It has been estimated that the ratio between killed soldiers and civilians could be as high as 1 to 20. In case of conflict in densely populated Europe, or other similar regions of the world, the civilian casualties would be immense.

These indiscriminate effects of CW, against both armed forces and the civilian population, render chemical weapons, by their nature, primarily offensive weapons. Since chemical weapons would demonstrably cause greater loss of life among civilians than among military personnel, it would make little sense to employ them as a means of defence against an invader. Instead of halting the enemy's advance, CW would, in the first place, provoke severe losses among one's own civilian population. Thus, the justification of the need for chemical weapons to serve defensive purposes simply does not hold water. Likewise, the necessity to possess CW in order to deter chemical aggression would simply disappear with the universal elimination of CW stockpiles. Weighing all the pros and cons, the most accurate conclusion seems to be that for supporters of the development and manufacture of ever new chemical weapons these play a far from insignificant role in scenarios for the offensive use of military power.

The NATO Airland Battle Doctrine is quite outspoken in this respect. The possible use of CW in offensive military operations might also be contemplated in conjunction with both nuclear and conventional weapons. Under certain scenario CW could be more readily used in place of another kind of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear weapons. This could apply to situations when long-term contamination of an attacked area is undesirable. Some chemical warfare agents may cause prolonged ground contamination, but this property is limited to only a few of these weapons. As a rule, chemical contamination would be much more shortlived than radioactive contamination due to nuclear weapons.

The increase in the toxicity of CW and the development of equipment for their use went through more or less clearly defined stages. It seems obvious that we are now somewhere between the two stages. The nerve agents of World War II are now firmly in the chemical arsenals of a number of countries and they have reached more than desirable perfection. But today, after long years of research and experiments, which in some instances took decades, a new generation of CW is already prepared for massive production.

It is thus only natural that the Conference on Disarmament has been considering the problem of a chemical-weapons ban in the course of the last six years. This fact alone confirms that the international community feels the need to prevent the introduction into arsenals of new, even more toxic and more sophisticated CW. To avert this new stage does not appear, however, to be an easy task. The problem is that it has in fact begun a long time ago. While existing CW were further improved, research on new weapons went on in parallel.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

In this connection, the announcement by the United States in 1969 that it would stop manufacturing lethal CW agents is of some interest. Many nice words have been said about that decision and we are not going to question its value. But one aspect is usually omitted -- the United States could afford to halt the production of the chemical agents known at that time because it had begun to develop binary weapons under a programme for the military use of new types of CW agents.

By 1969, extensive research on binary weapons had already been accomplished. It started in 1954, when the United States Army Chemical Corps embarked on a binary weapons programme, followed by the United States Navy six years later. Widely-financed research in the following years made it possible that in 1965 binary nerve gas bombs of the Big Eye type were patented by United States Navy and Air Force, as well as binary cluster bombs in 1968. In 1969 the XM 687 binary howitzer shell prototype was field tested at Dugway proving ground. The ensuing extensive work brought us to June 1980, when the United States House of Representatives appropriated the funds needed to set up a new production facility for binary chemical weapons at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. There followed the necessary political decisions from both the legislative and executive branches of the United States Government, and the stage was set for the actual production of this new generation of CW.

If binary and multi-component weapons production is launched, the verification of the desired CW ban will be substantially complicated. The problem is that components required for binary weapons can be made in the civilian chemical industry with no need to conceal huge stockpiles. They may also be used for peaceful purposes, e.g. to manufacture insecticides, pharmaceuticals or other chemicals. Furthermore, the binary technology makes it possible to contemplate the use of substances earlier thought to be unsuitable for military application because of their shortlived chemical stability. These are by no means all the potential dangers this new technology might bring about. If we fail to prevent binary-weapons production, we would set ourselves on a path full of unknown and often unpredictable dangers.

In our opinion, no country would start binary-weapons production out of purely security considerations. Rather, various aggressive designs will be kept in mind as well as the eternal quest for profits. And the mass production of binary and multi-component chemical weapons would ensure the arms contractors involved enormous extra profits. About \$US 10 billion is to be spent on the binary-weapons programme of the United States in the years up to 1990. Moreover, the eventual introduction of binary weapons into various regions of the world would substantially increase the chemical threat to many countries, which can only contribute to further proliferation of chemical weapons. We maintain that neither staunch aggressiveness of outdated military strategists nor financial interests of the military -- industrial complex represent a valid reason for States to launch a new round of the chemical-arms race. We are ready to believe that political realism will prevail and that finally the right choice -- the chemical-weapons ban -- will be made in time.

Let me stress one more aspect which renders a CW ban an urgent measure. With the development of the chemical industry one might note that commercial and military chemical substances are somewhat closer to each other than in the

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

past. Nobody can exclude that in the relatively near future some military use might be found for today's purely commercial chemicals and vice versa. For instance, single-purpose precursors, like QL or DF, have no commercial use today. But with the rapid development of science and technology no one can give us a guarantee that in the future some commercial use will not be found even for these substances. If that happens, these substances might spread quickly throughout civilian chemical industry. If the CW ban has not been achieved by that time, it would become then substantially more difficult to negotiate it and ensure compliance with it. Thus, a rather peculiar situation emerges -- in the absence of the CW ban, the natural development of chemical science and technology, which no one can stop, might objectively hamper prospects for the cessation of the chemical-arms race. On the contrary, early achievement of the ban and full compliance with it can give us a sufficient guarantee that future development in the field of chemistry will remain peaceful, with more favourable conditions for fruitful international co-operation.

We appreciate the fact that the Conference is paying due attention to the elaboration of the CW ban. Its relevant Ad Hoc Committee is by far the most active working body of the Conference with a unique negotiating mandate. Delegations are prepared to work actively not only during the Conference session itself but also in the intersessional period. Serious interest in chemical disarmament is also demonstrated by such actions as the recent Workshop on the verification of non-production of CW organized by the Netherlands, for which we would like to thank the Dutch delegation.

We maintain that each and every delegation should contribute towards the achievement of the CW ban. This is not a problem for only the handful of countries that possess the largest chemical capabilities. The need to provide for world-wide compliance with the ban, and its possible impacts on the civilian chemical industry and international trade in the field, require that countries take an active part in the formulation of the convention's basic provisions. It would not be a wise choice to wait until the convention is ready and then only try to fit it to a State's own interests.

Judging by some political decisions, like the one I mentioned in the beginning of my statement, it seems that for the time being in some NATO countries there are two opposite tendencies -- one supporting the prohibition of CW while the other favours the massive production and deployment of new CW. But these two tendencies cannot go on side by side for a long time. We are now at a point in time when extremely important decisions will have to be made. If the second option prevails and new CW production programmes are launched, negotiations on a CW ban will be seriously hampered and the tasks to be solved will become incomparably more difficult.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

If we can imagine ourselves in the process of writing a convention on a nuclear-weapons ban after the style of a CW convention, we may be able to see more clearly the place of a test ban within the comprehensive structure of nuclear disarmament. We would, of course, need to have definitions, and this would require clarification of the respective national positions regarding laboratory-scale examinations of the nuclear explosion phenomena. Then, one may have to deal with "permitted activities" or "protective purposes", which

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(Mr. Imai, Japan)

may be no more than a contradiction in terms. Initial declarations of weapons stocks will be followed by their verification and then elimination. One should also talk about non-production, in which the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear safeguards may be pertinent.

I mention these as matters we would be investigating if we were to be writing a convention to ban nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, it looks to be a rather remote possibility as a disarmament objective. Nothing, however, prohibits us from engaging in such an exercise as a means of setting up an ultimate goal as a criteria against which we may make assessment of various test ban possibilities. When Japan made a test-ban proposal, I do not think that we had any illusions about what could be meaningfully achieved in the short term. At the same time we did not feel constrained in insisting on the basic logic of the subject matter.

I have had a number of opportunities in the past to discuss our CW work and have no intention of repeating myself today. I would rather like to point out the following.

Because of the difficulties which the Conference is encountering in the negotiation of other agenda items, there is a distinct interest in CW as the only available subject for negotiations. This in itself may be a welcome sign, especially with the increasing interest in various capitals. At the same time, since the major part of the work is conducted at the working group level, which meets five or six times a week, it is not easy for anyone to have a good grasp of all the technical and legal details of the current work. It

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

is not inconceivable under the circumstances that both technical experts and non-experts might lose sight of the overall structural logic of the convention, obviously each into different directions. While we are all for the early realization of a CW convention, there is an additional consideration of importance. That is the fact that the convention, by necessity, will be an instrument which will place the world's chemical industry under some restrictions. Since extensive control of what is in effect a gigantic and mature industry is neither feasible nor desirable, it is important to draw a clear line at which an effective ban on chemical weapons can be carried out without undue interference in the day-to-day operation of the peaceful chemical industry. That is easier said than done, but obviously there is no alternative.

It seems to me that there are several key provisions in the convention that mark the dividing lines, and once these are identified and become parts of a shared common understanding, then ways can be found so that the respective details may be handled separately by appropriate experts in the most expeditious manner. If we were to fail to clarify these key provisions, then it is possible that the conceptual framework of the convention might be overwhelmed by the nuts and bolts aspects of the detailed provisions. Then we would indeed be wasting what seems to be a common political will to achieve this convention as soon as possible.

(Mr. Kerroum, Algeria)

True, considerable commendable effort has been made and progress has been achieved in the discussions on a chemical weapons convention. However, while it notes this positive development, the delegation of Algeria today is more inclined to express its concern at the trend which is emerging. It appears that little by little we are losing sight of the objective of a total ban on chemical weapons and that we are now envisaging a concept closer to a non-proliferation régime. If this trend was confirmed, it would mark a step backwards and one all the more negative in that it would carry within itself the seeds of the inevitable failure. Over and above the requirement of security, the signature of and compliance with an agreement of this nature are of necessity dependent on the production potential and development needs of States. I must therefore reaffirm what I said on 25 February 1986: that a chemical weapons convention "can only mean the total elimination of chemical weapons if it prohibits their development, production and stockpiling. It cannot possibly have a non-proliferation function or constitute any sort of obstacle to the chemicals industry, which is the very foundation of development, particularly in agriculture".

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Mr. President, before I come to the main subject of my statement today, which will be chemical weapons, I would like to welcome wholeheartedly the recent extremely important decision taken by the Soviet Union with respect to the extension until the end of this year of its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests, which was so fully presented by the representative of the Soviet Union, Comrade Kashirin.

As I have indicated, today I should like to make several comments and observations on some aspects of item 4 of the agenda, i.e. chemical weapons. Poland attaches great importance to negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation does its best to contribute to the Conference's work in this field, including as item co-ordinator for the group of socialist countries.

The Conference on Disarmament is getting closer to its goal of elaborating a draft treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Over the years a lot of work has been done, but the convention as a whole has not yet been born. Let us believe the delivery will be prompt and successful. I think there is a sound basis for this belief.

This being my fourth consecutive year of involvement in CW negotiations, I feel that we are entering a new stage, hopefully the final one.

It seems to us that the overall atmosphere of the negotiations has improved, positions of the delegations, although tough, are business-like and in general co-operative and compromise-oriented.

The negotiations are being carried on multifariously -- in the Ad hoc Committee, in the Working Groups, and at various multilateral and bilateral consultations. A valuable contribution to the Committee's work was the

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

bilateral Soviet-American consultations -- which we wholeheartedly welcome. It was broadly felt that their results were simultaneously incorporated into the work of the relevant Working Groups.

During this year's negotiations, new incentives were given to the Conference and many interesting, valuable ideas and proposals were put forward.

The proposal made by the General Secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev on 15 January 1986 to get rid, before the end of this century, of weapons of mass destruction, one of them being chemical weapons, paved the way for more fruitful and faster work in the Ad hoc Committee. The ideas stemming from this proposal were later developed and specified at the Conference. I have in mind the Soviet Union's proposals of 22 April 1986. They opened new possibilities for the solution of the crucial problem of elimination of the industrial basis for production of chemical weapons, thereby enabling faster work and progress in Group B.

My delegation considers as well that the Workshop held in the Netherlands in June this year also served its purpose. It brought out a better understanding of problems concerning verification of chemical industry with regard to the area of non-production, making it also more clear that actual possibilities of such verification are not unlimited, that they are bound to have certain limitations which need further study. At the same time it seems that this practical exercise indicated the important role which verification at the national level could and should play in this respect. Allow me, Mr. President, through you to thank the authorities and the delegation of the Netherlands for this useful initiative, hospitality, and excellent organization of the Workshop.

Many other interesting, thought-provoking working and conference room papers were put forward in the Committee, in the plenary and in the Working Groups, especially with regard to various aspects of verification of the future convention.

But the intensity of work on CW prohibition, impressive as it is, has not so far brought results which are equally impressive. I have to admit, however, there is always a certain degree of intermediary results which are still not mature enough to appear in a written, agreed form. What seems to be also important is that there is more creative thinking in seeking new, mutually acceptable approaches. Sometimes it is better to start from a general definition before getting into details, but in other cases it might be more productive to start from details before coming to more general notions.

That is why an attempt to assess or to measure progress made during this year's session would not only be a very difficult task but the result of such an assessment would most probably be rather inaccurate.

I think, however, that today, at the end of the 1986 session, everybody would probably agree that the achieved results, though not up to some expectations, are certainly not disappointing. We have moved forward in the elaboration of the CW convention. The body of the preliminary structure of the convention is getting thicker and more concrete, though I believe we should be careful not to overload it with too many details.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The question of non-production is one of the basic issues of the future convention, the one which from the very beginning would have direct bearing on chemical industry of all States parties to the future convention, though, due to various structures and level of development of chemical industry, this bearing may differ.

If we have a look at the issues considered in Group A, it becomes clear that the existing material worked out by the Group consolidated and developed last year's work, especially the so-called Integrated Approach for Listing Relevant Chemicals. A more clear picture of the problems we face in this area was created. It is obvious, however, that article VI, that is Activities not prohibited by the Convention, and relevant annexes, especially Annex I relative to Super-Toxic Lethal Chemicals and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems], still need a lot of work before they could reach a stage of mutual agreement and actual drafting. Some further consideration of this question is needed in the capitals. With regard to my delegation this will be done during the recess in the Committee's work. I do believe that consultations to be undertaken by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee in the intersessional period would be a very useful forum to further elaborate on these issues before they are formally put again for consideration by the Committee.

It is especially in this area of non-production that all delegations should bring the most active contribution to working out final solutions. Only by a common effort would we be able to agree on uniform procedures of transmitting statistical data and procedures of systematic international on-site inspections. We all know and agree that this system of control should not be detrimental to the normal activity of chemical industry, but we seem to understand it in different ways. Statements of some delegations in the Ad hoc Committee suggest their reluctance to submit the relevant chemical industry to adequate control.

If one takes a closer look at issues under consideration in Group A, it seems that at this stage of negotiations particular attention should be paid to the following questions:

Scope of data on production, distribution and use of relevant chemicals to be submitted to the Consultative Committee. In our view, it would be the simplest, the most basic and the cheapest form of verification of non-production of chemical weapons.

We are of the opinion that an important and urgent task should be to reach agreement on the list of key precursors in Annex II to Article VI. The problem is difficult as there seem to exist rather opposed approaches either to broaden or to narrow this list. Like always, a mutually satisfactory solution has to be found.

There is a need to work out an appropriate régime for key precursors. It is yet not entirely clear -- at least for my delegation -- whether such a régime should be uniform with regard to all chemicals in the list, or should be diversified. A preliminary scheme of this régime would make it easier to finally agree on the whole list. It would also be helpful to determine a militarily significant level for every key precursor.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

A still deeper analysis is needed with regard to the issue of super-toxic lethal chemicals (STLC), which at present are not used in CW production, but their future use for that purpose cannot be totally excluded today. As is known, some STLCs are being produced by the pharmaceutical industry, others in small quantities in research laboratories. I think that a clearer picture of this question is needed in order to solve comprehensively the STLC issue in the convention.

More attention should also be paid to multinational corporations, as they create some additional specific questions in the context of the verification of non-production of CW.

There has been a promising development of Group B in a very difficult and sensitive area of elimination both of chemical weapons and of the CW production facilities.

I think everybody would agree that further rapprochement of positions was achieved with regard to the content of relevant declarations as well as to the process of elimination and its control. It has to be noticed that formulations of Articles IV - Measures on Chemical Weapons and V - Measures on Chemical Weapons Production Facilities, together with relevant annexes, though still in some instances heavily bracketed and footnoted, show a clearer picture of this difficult part of the convention than was the case last year.

The results achieved in Group B, especially with regard to production facilities, would be very helpful in working out a still outstanding definition of production facility.

What seems to be more and more perceptible is a comprehensive blue-print of indispensable provisions concerning the whole process from declarations up to final elimination of CW stocks and CW production facilities. That is why we see in the present text of these articles obvious signs of progress. No doubt we have gained momentum in our work on these issues, and this momentum should not be lost.

One of the crucial outstanding issues is still the question of challenge inspection. There has been some conceptual rapprochement of positions which, however, does not suffice at present for working out a mutually acceptable solution. I think I would commit no mistake by saying that there seems to be general agreement that challenge inspection should not occur in everyday practice but rather in exceptional circumstances. There is, however, not enough clarity as to what is really meant by these exceptional circumstances. The need to resort to challenge inspection would depend very much on the efficiency of the whole system of verification including systematic on-site inspection. The better the routine verification system, the lesser, to our mind, the probability that challenge inspection would be needed. In short, we think that having a clear and precise picture of the whole system of so-called routine verification would help in final construction of the concept of challenge inspection.

Let me also, Mr. President, dwell briefly on some organizational aspects of our future work. The methods of work should always be in keeping with the stage of progress achieved. What is proper for today may not necessarily be

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

most useful tomorrow. I do not have any concrete ideas to offer at this juncture, but I merely would like to suggest that we should think over how to best organize our future work, which we would like to hope will be the final stage of the elaboration of the preliminary draft of the CW convention.

On the one hand there is an increasing need of a comprehensive review of the whole material with a view to make not only further preliminary drafting but also some rearrangement of the material if necessary.

On the other hand, there are still many detailed, sometimes minor, though important, problems which could be initially elaborated in smaller groups before being the subject of working groups or Committee's consideration.

One of the assets still not fully utilized by us is time. My delegation is of the opinion that there should be no place in our work for too long recesses. That is why we welcome the agreement achieved in the Committee to hold the traditional extended session in January as well as consultations by the Chairman in preparation for this resumed session. However, I would like to point out that the delegations of the socialist countries were prepared to use the recess in our work more fully. Unfortunately, this desire was not shared by some delegations which so often advocate the need for continuous negotiations on the convention.

In concluding I would like to congratulate and thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom, for his able guidance of the Committee's work. His chairmanship will continue for some time and I am confident it will be no less productive. Let me also express high appreciation of the contribution made by Ambassador Cromartie's collaborators -- the Chairmen of the three Working Groups, Mr. Rowe, Mr. Popczew and Mr. Wisnomoerti, whose efforts have brought us closer to our common goal -- a treaty on prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, People's Republic of China)

The prohibition of chemical weapons has all along been an item of greater promise for progress in the Conference. Trends more positive than before have emerged in the negotiations on the Convention this year. The positive and business-like discussions and consultations among delegations have brought about progress on certain issues. For instance, on List C intended for chemicals with wide civilian uses which can at the same time be used for chemical weapon purposes, there is basically a consensus on most of the chemicals to be included in the list and their régime. Preliminary discussions have been held on the contents of List A containing chemicals for key precursors of chemical warfare agents which can at the same time be used for peaceful purposes, and a considerable degree of agreement has been reached on the scope and extent of the data-reporting system. A common understanding has largely been achieved on the need for taking action without warning or unpredictability in routine inspections of the relevant production facilities. There has also been some progress on the issue of the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities. Useful attempts have been made to narrow the differences on challenge inspection, which has long been a subject of deep controversy. In this connection, the working papers put forward by Pakistan, the United Kingdom and Japan merit our attention.

These achievements are inseparable from the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Cromartie, and the Chairmen of the three working groups, whose devotion and diligence have contributed to the progress in negotiations. Here I wish to mention the useful role of the workshop on verification sponsored in early June by the Netherlands Government in promoting the negotiations in this field.

While giving due credit to these achievements, we should not overlook the fact that a large amount of work still needs to be done in negotiating a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, in view of the differences on verification, particularly challenge inspection, and on certain other issues that are yet to be solved. We welcome the willingness expressed by the

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, People's Republic of China)

two States with the largest chemical arsenals to expedite the negotiations on chemical weapons and hope that they will substantiate their intention with action.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

I hope to have another opportunity to take stock of the results and prospects of our present session and I would like to devote my statement today to our negotiations on chemical weapons. I should like to say at the outset that I do not share the opinion of those who consider that these negotiations are only a secondary matter. On the contrary, this is a problem and these are negotiations to which we attach great importance and it is our impression that many people around this table share that attitude. In addition, our role as a depositary of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 induces us to give this problem particular attention and vigilance. For this reason we continue to denounce all violations of that Protocol wherever they occur and by whomever they are perpetrated. For this reason we are anxious to help with everything that can further progress in the current negotiations.

For this reason too, we are happy to note that the Ad Hoc Committee and its working groups have done a serious job in a constructive spirit, as the report adopted yesterday by the Committee shows. The Workshop on verification organized by the Netherlands in June gave a first-hand view of the complexity of the problems which confront us and contributed to the serious atmosphere and realism of our work this summer. For that reason, I am happy to join those who have already expressed their deep gratitude to the Netherlands authorities for having organized that very useful meeting and organized it so well.

We welcome the decision taken, as last year, to continue consultations between sessions in order to make progress on the matters remaining pending. France had been making similar proposals for a long time, it even hoped that more would be done, but the agreement now reached is satisfactory.

It is true, after all, that a whole series of problems still require considerable work for the various viewpoints to be brought closer together. That is why, in particular, agreement has not yet been possible on the question which is at the heart of our negotiations, that of verification of compliance with the Convention. Within our Conference, and outside it too,

(Mr. Jessel, France)

everyone has noted the new things being said on this matter by the Soviet Union. However, the clarifications we have been given, including those given within the framework of the Conference, do not seem to us to have provided so far the truly decisive elements that we expected. We must therefore patiently continue the search for a satisfactory solution to this key problem.

Here in April I presented France's view of the general structure of a verification system based, in almost all cases, on international on-site inspections -- "routine" inspections -- and on the regular exchange of statistical data. Unfortunately, this has been a further year with no in-depth discussion of those matters.

To be complete, the system we have to set up must also provide for the exceptional cases where, doubt having arisen regarding the compliance with its obligations by a State party to the Convention, the regular "routine" inspection measures cannot be enough to dissipate it. In that case it becomes necessary to be able to resort to other measures, to other machinery. To be effective, such a "safety net" must, in our view, meet several criteria: first, the time interval between the request for an on-site inspection and the implementation of that request should be extremely brief so that there is no time to get rid of the evidence of a possible violation; for this reason, the procedure must be automatic, that is a State which wants to initiate an inspection should not have to go through an institutional obstacle course which, aside from wasting time, would also have the disadvantage of making it possible to block a request; finally, replying to a challenge should as a general rule be mandatory and not simply voluntary. Only if it meets these three criteria can an international on-site challenge-inspection régime serve as a genuine deterrent.

The United Kingdom delegation has submitted to the Conference, in working document CD/715, a draft which meets these criteria. It is based on two fundamental elements which seem to us both to guarantee the effectiveness of the system proposed and to respect the legitimate security requirements of each State.

To explain: on the one hand, the United Kingdom proposal calls for a public procedure of which the bodies of the Convention would be kept fully informed from beginning to end but the implementation of which would be the responsibility of the two States concerned, the State which requests the inspection and the State to which the request is addressed. The initiation of the procedure as well as the consequences to be drawn therefrom are up to them. Thus, whether the replies given by the "challenged" State are satisfactory or not can, all things considered, only be decided by the party whose suspicions have been aroused.

The second characteristic of this proposal is to provide that in very exceptional cases, where the security of a State is at stake, satisfaction could be given by measures other than unrestricted access to the installation with regard to which there are doubts. But those measures would have to be such as to enable the challenging State to come to the conviction that prohibited activities were not taking place at the installation in question. A State which requests an inspection being by definition the only judge of when

(Mr. Jessel, France)

it considers itself reassured regarding the activities being carried out at the installation, this procedure seems to us to meet the requirements that I have just stated. In addition, it would have a deterrent effect because no State concerned with its international reputation would be likely to take the risk of undertaking manufacture in violation of the Convention when it had, in advance, accepted as a general rule that an international inspection team could go to factories that came under suspicion.

The situation is different for the proposals that have been put forward elsewhere. Those which would only allow inspection at sites defined in advance would have the effect of defining, a contrario, the places where it would be permissible to circumvent the provisions of the Convention. Others, which would leave open the possibility of purely and simply refusing a request for access, would simply aggravate the crisis of confidence which has led to the call for challenge inspection; yet others, which would permit parties to hide behind delaying procedures within a committee that would in all likelihood be unable, because of the absence of agreement among its members, to make the necessary decisions, would ultimately lead to a result just as negative as the rest.

For all these reasons, and after very careful study of the problem, the French delegation gives its full support to the United Kingdom proposal. It earnestly hopes that that proposal will win the support of all sides and thus contribute to solving one of the key problems of these negotiations.

On this occasion I should also like to compliment the Ambassador of the United Kingdom, Mr. Cromartie, on his efforts as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and to thank him for the results that have been achieved due largely to his skilful tenacity, as well as to the work done by the chairmen of the various working groups. We are happy to see that he will, as usual, be continuing his work at the head of the Committee until next February, and we earnestly hope to see that he will be able to make further progress during that period. He will find that all the easier if we all help him in the firm determination to move ahead and to achieve results.

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

We also welcome developments which have recently taken place in this Conference's negotiations concerning a global ban on chemical weapons. The Federal Government greatly welcomes the proposal recently submitted by the United Kingdom relating to on-challenge inspections. In our opinion, the approach chosen by the United Kingdom -- while insisting on the obligatory nature of inspections -- could show a way of advancing the negotiations in a positive fashion.

Another problem to which this Conference must still devote extensive attention is that of effective means of verifying the non-production of chemical weapons. We remain convinced that it will be possible to resolve this problem, including verification of a ban on new developments. We note with satisfaction that here at the Conference a high degree of agreement is emerging on the concept of a triple matrix listing the chemical substances that are to be subjected to controls. On this basis, we consider routine inspections and an exchange of statistical data to be suitable measures for effectively verifying that no substances are being diverted from civilian chemicals production to the manufacture of warfare agents. Our delegation is preparing a working paper on methods for exchanging statistical data.

Foreign Minister Genscher stressed here that the Federal Republic of Germany accords the highest priority to a convention banning chemical weapons, and he urged that all resources be mobilized so that the negotiations can be completed in 1987. We therefore welcome the Conference's decision to hold three rounds of consultations on chemical weapons between this and the next session. It is now essential that this additional time be used for efforts aimed at achieving concrete results.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America):

The most noteworthy progress has been recorded in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, is to be congratulated for overseeing a year in which significant elaboration and restructuring of the draft text of the convention took place. As a result, five articles of the rolling text now appear in a more complete form: these are the articles on the elimination of chemical weapons production facilities, on chemical weapon stockpile destruction, on activities not to be prohibited by the Convention, on the consultative committee, and on consultation, co-operation and fact-finding. In addition, progress is reflected in the elaboration of four annexes addressing supertoxic lethal chemicals, key precursors, large volume commercial chemicals which could be used as weapons, and principles, methods and organization of the elimination of chemical weapons.

Last August, my delegation expressed cautious optimism for these negotiations. It seems to me that this optimism was justified, and that it can again be expressed for their future course.

This is not to say, of course, that complete agreement has been reached on any of the new texts. Bracketed sections, footnotes, and incomplete text reflect that many important issues have not yet been resolved. All areas require additional work. Key outstanding issues include the declaration of stockpiles, non-production in the civil industry, and challenge inspection. And work has barely begun on working out detailed verification procedures.

In particular, the United States delegation looks forward to a serious consideration of challenge inspection. My delegation would be particularly interested in hearing the detailed views of the Soviet Union on challenge inspection. While a number of States have provided constructive contributions in the area of verification during the session, and the Soviet Union has

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

repeatedly expressed its acceptance of the concept of challenge inspection, it has yet to set forth any comprehensive proposal. This is of concern to my delegation. We need to be mindful of what has transpired in other multilateral negotiating forums. In particular, in the Stockholm Conference, the highly publicized "agreement in principle" by the USSR to on-site inspection is now apparently so qualified as effectively to obstruct progress on this issue.

It is to be hoped that we are not witnessing a trend which could adversely affect the progress we see in other areas of the chemical weapons negotiations.

My delegation repeats yet again its view: that article X of the United States draft, document CD/500, was not presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and other approaches that provide the equivalent level of effectiveness to article X will find a ready reception for careful consideration. The crucial importance of the issue of compliance with agreements, and the experience of my Government with regard to non-compliance with existing agreements, remains a key factor in our work.

In other years, members of this Conference could have been greatly pleased with the progress made on chemical weapons. This year our expressions of satisfaction must be tempered by the fact that our task is clearly becoming more urgent, and that the road ahead is long. The United States is thus in complete agreement that extended consultations should be undertaken this Fall, especially in late November and early December. Together with the January meeting of the full Committee, these should provide another opportunity to advance the negotiations prior to the start of our 1987 session.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I have the honour to present the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which is before the Conference in document CD/727. The Committee has continued its work on the basis of the mandate indicated in paragraph 1 of it, which was given to the Committee in the present form in 1984. This mandate embodies the common will of all delegations to elaborate at the earliest possible date a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stock-piling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. All delegations are firmly united on the great importance of this goal which has been pursued with increasing urgency by the Ad Hoc Committee since its inception in 1982.

The main substantive result of the Committee's work in the 1986 session is contained in the rolling text of the draft Convention contained in its appendix. This continues the practice initiated in 1984 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus and developed last year under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski of establishing a single text which, without binding any delegation, represents the present stage of negotiations, with the recommendation that it be used for further negotiation and drafting of the Convention. Procedurally it represents an up-date of Appendix I of last year's report contained in document CD/636.

As you will see, remarkable progress has been made in many important areas of the draft Convention. The area of common ground represented by text unqualified by brackets and footnotes has been much enlarged. We have new and largely unbracketed texts for Articles IV, V, VI and VIII of the Convention. Considerable progress has been made on Article IX and on the detailed annexes to some of the Articles, notably Articles IV and VI. The credit for these important steps forward is due to the Chairmen of the three Working Groups set

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

up by the Ad Hoc Committee, in which the detailed substantive work was done. Working Group A, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Rowe of Australia, was responsible for Article II on definitions and Article VI, now entitled "Activities not Prohibited by the Convention". Working Group B, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Poptchev of Bulgaria, was responsible for Article III on declarations and Articles IV and V, now retitled "Chemical Weapons" and "Chemical Weapons Production Facilities". Working Group C, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia, was responsible for Article I on general provisions on scope, Article VII on national implementation measures, Article VIII on the Consultative Committee, and Article IX on consultations, co-operation and fact-finding. I should like to congratulate and thank all of them very warmly for the tireless work that they have done to contribute to the combined result which you see before you. Mr. Wisnoemoerti is leaving Geneva at the end of the session and I should like to thank him both personally and on behalf of the Committee for the work he has done and to offer him our very best wishes for success in his next assignment. I am glad to say that both Mr. Rowe and Mr. Poptchev are staying and will be continuing during the inter-sessional period the successful work which they have been carrying out. I should also like to express my gratitude and that of the Committee to its secretary, Mr. Bensmail, and to all other members of the Secretariat, and to the interpreters and translators who have contributed to our work and to the production on time in the present difficult financial circumstances of the report that you have before you today.

The progress recorded in this report has been made possible by the spirit of good will and co-operation demonstrated by all delegations represented in the Committee. This has been particularly noticeable in the summer part of the session after the common experience of visiting The Hague and Rotterdam for the workshop in June organized by the Netherlands Government. I should like to express again here the warm thanks of the Committee to the Government of the Netherlands and to the Netherlands delegation for organizing such a fruitful meeting and for their very generous hospitality. I think that there would be general agreement that this year the pace of progress in the negotiations has been further accelerated, and that it is essential to go on increasing this momentum with a view to the early conclusion of a Convention. Accordingly, the Committee agreed to recommend in paragraph 10 (c) of its report that it should resume its work on issues under specified Articles during the three-week period from 12 to 30 January 1987, in accordance with the practice of the last four years, and that this formal session of the Committee should be preceded by consultations under my authority as Chairman in the intervening period. These consultations would continue during the months of September, October and November and would culminate in a period of open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee to be held here in Geneva between 24 November and 17 December. The Secretariat would provide during this period a limited number of meetings with full services and all delegations are warmly invited to be present with such expert advisers as they think desirable. I would, however, emphasize that it will not be a formal session of the Committee: any common ground identified on a provisional basis during the inter-sessional period will be put formally for the consideration of the Committee when it meets again in January 1987.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

The Committee has agreed to recommend that the formal session of the Committee in January consider issues under Articles III, IV, V, VI and IX and under those parts of Article II relevant to Articles V and VI. Experience this year suggests that these Articles are interdependent, and that progress on one may depend on progress on others. This is particularly true of Articles III, IV and V, on which work has been continuing very actively since Working Group B submitted its report. The first fruit of this work was seen in the draft Article IV added only last week to the rolling text by agreement of the Committee at its last meeting on 20 August. We should be prepared to consider any or all of these topics at our open-ended consultations in late November and December and the promising areas will be identified by the consultations that Mr. Rowe, Mr. Poptchev and I will be holding in the meantime. We will prepare the ground with a view to making the open-ended consultations in November and December as fruitful as possible and to making a further decisive step forward in the report of our formal session in January to the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Finally, the Committee recommends in paragraph 10 (d) that it be re-established at the outset of the 1987 session with its 1986 mandate and that Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden be appointed as its Chairman. I would like to say how pleased I am that I shall be passing on the Chair of the Committee in February into his able and experienced hands for what may prove to be the decisive year of its work.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

New proposals on chemical weapons have also been introduced. As was recently stressed by Mikhail Gorbachev they should permit, in our view, before the end of this year or next year, the signing of a convention banning chemical weapons and eliminating stockpiles of such weapons as well as of the industrial base for their production.

We display flexibility, a readiness to search for compromise and mutually acceptable formulas. Suffice it to refer in this connection to our position on the verification of a nuclear-weapon-test ban, on the elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for the production of these weapons, and to a whole range of other questions. We have not made a fetish of organizational or procedural issues. For us, the crux of the matter is substance, movement towards the solution of the problem of disarmament. Another special feature of our proposals, and this is something that we have proven more than once, is that we do not consider them to be final. We do not

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(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

consider that discussion of them is impossible. Dialogue and contacts, discussions and negotiations are the way to overcome dead-ends and confrontation. We believe that only in this way can one melt the ice of mutual mistrust and achieve practical results.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden):

May I start with a short statement on behalf of the Group of 21 when we congratulate the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, on the impressive report of the work of the Committee during the 1986 session and also express our gratitude to him personally for the efforts, so characteristically skilful, patient and tactful, that decisively influenced the successful outcome of the negotiations on chemical weapons during the 1986 session. With this proven ability of the Chairman of the Committee, it is indeed with high expectations that we look forward to the intersessional work under the direction of Ambassador Cromartie, ably assisted by Mr. Rowe of Australia and Mr. Poptchev of Bulgaria. And with that I end the statement on behalf of the Group of 21.

One of the outstanding key issues is the question of the long inspection. Under work on this issue has been carried out within working Group 2 of the Committee under the guidance of the Vice-Chairman of India.

We note the statement, repeated in the Conference as late as earlier this week, by the United States, that the challenge inspection arrangements contained in the United States proposal, document CD/336, is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. We have in this context studied with great attention the recent proposal by the United Kingdom, document CD/313, which contains some impartial elements. Likewise, we consider the proposal, by the German Democratic Republic and Poland, document CD/CW/SP.134, and by Pakistan, document CD/343, as being helpful to the work.

My delegation shares the view that if, in exceptional circumstances, there were serious and well-founded suspicions of significant breaches of the provisions of the Convention, a State Party should be obliged to accept some form of on-site inspection without undue delay. At the same time, it is of the greatest importance that provisions for such inspections take into consideration legitimate security interests of State Parties and that they should not, in this context, be used for purposes not directly connected to the Convention on Chemical Weapons.

During recent years we have developed a well-balanced and rather robust organizational framework for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. This system has served us well. Also, the method applied by the Chairman of the Committee to concentrate the negotiations on the continuing development of a rolling text has worked well and ascertained that results achieved during earlier negotiations have not been lost. When the negotiations now are approaching more decisive stages, the subjects for negotiations appear to be more specific and more diverse than before. On the one hand, there are a number of problems of great political and technical significance and complexity; on the other hand, there is a need of issues still remaining after general agreements have been reached on some of the main issues. Further, there are several problems necessary for the future convention which so far have not been touched upon and have been subject only to a limited consideration.

The organization of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee next session should, in the opinion of my delegation, be designed with these new characteristics of the subject matter in mind. It should thus be possible to discuss the

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden):

This is not the time to make an in-depth analysis of the state of affairs with regard to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. We can, however, note with satisfaction that significant progress has been registered with regard to the issues of elimination of chemical weapons and their production facilities. Intensive work has been carried out on the difficult problems of lists and régimes for key precursors and chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes. The Chairman of the Committee has already highlighted the basic progress of the Committee, so I will limit myself on this point.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

During the intersessional work this autumn and in January 1987 we will be able to address a broad range of issues vital for a Chemical Weapons Convention. My delegation would look with special interest on the questions of régimes for super-toxic lethal chemicals and of order of destruction.

Although we hope that we shall be able to register real progress during the intersessional work, many difficult problems remain. I can only mention declaration and verification of stocks of chemical weapons and the related issue of order of destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities as well as régimes for different categories and items of chemical weapons production facilities and for activities not prohibited by the Convention.

One of the outstanding key issues is the question of challenge inspection. Useful work on this issue has been carried out within Working Group C of the Committee under the able guidance of Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia.

We note the statement, repeated in the Conference as late as earlier this week, by the United States, that the challenge inspection arrangements contained in the United States proposal, document CD/500, is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. We have in this context studied with great attention the recent proposal by the United Kingdom, document CD/715, which contains some important elements. Likewise, we consider the proposals by the German Democratic Republic and Poland, document CD/CW/WP.136, and by Pakistan, document CD/685, as being helpful to the work.

My delegation shares the view that if, in exceptional circumstances, there were serious and well-founded suspicions of significant breaches of the provisions of the Convention, a State Party should be obliged to accept some form of on-site inspection without undue delay. At the same time, it is of the greatest importance that provisions for such inspections take into consideration legitimate security interests of States Parties and that they should not, in this context, be used for purposes not directly connected to the Convention on Chemical Weapons.

During recent years we have developed a well-balanced and rather robust organizational framework for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. This system has served us well. Also, the method applied by the Chairman of the Committee to concentrate the negotiations on the continuing development of a rolling text has worked well and ascertained that results achieved during earlier negotiations have not been lost. When the negotiations now are approaching more decisive stages, the subjects for negotiations appear to be more specific and more diverse than before. On the one hand, there are a number of problems of great political and technical significance and complexity; on the other hand, there is a mass of loose ends remaining after general agreements have been reached on some of the main issues. Further, there are several provisions necessary for the future convention which so far have not been touched upon and have been subject only to a limited consideration.

The organization of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee next session should, in the opinion of my delegation, be designed with these new characteristics of the subject matter in mind. It should thus be possible to develop the

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

organizational framework to make it flexible and effective enough to cope with the shifting problems to be solved, without sacrificing the valuable features of the present organization, especially the politically balanced approach.

I listened with special attention to the recent interesting remarks on this problem made by Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, drawing upon his experience as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1985, and by Ambassador Imai of Japan.

Mr. MORELLI PANDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish):

One of the first goals that the Conference can attain in 1987 should be the elaboration of a comprehensive convention on all chemical weapons, and there is no need to recall in detail the advances already made by the Conference on technical aspects and in political negotiation.

(Mr. Meizster, Hungary)

The socialist States cannot conceive of a safe world without the elimination of one of the most barbaric types of weapon of mass destruction, namely chemical weapons. In general, the 1986 session of the Disarmament Conference was marked by businesslike negotiations on chemical-weapon-related disarmament issues. The content and form of these negotiations has been oriented increasingly towards the final result -- preparation of the complete text of a convention on banning the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. These developments were facilitated by the Soviet initiatives contained in the statement made by M.S. Gorbachev on 15 January of this year and spelled out in greater detail in the statement of the 22 April.

Our delegations are of the view that work must be continued on agreeing very important provisions of the Convention, first and foremost those related to ensuring the non-production of chemical weapons at commercial chemical facilities, procedures for eliminating the production base for the manufacture of chemical weapons, and the activities of various bodies to be set up under the Convention. The issue of challenge inspection is an important one. The socialist countries consider that the proposals made by the German Democratic Republic and Poland on this subject constitute a weighty contribution to achieving agreement on this problem.

The delegations on whose behalf I am speaking are of the view that the decisions taken by the United States and NATO regarding rearmament with binary chemical weapons, which in essence map out for the coming years not only the continuation but the intensification of the chemical threat hanging over all mankind, cannot but seriously impair the ongoing negotiations on banning such weapons. Those decisions run counter to efforts to eliminate chemical weapons, and are in conflict with the United States/Soviet agreements reached at the Geneva summit.

President:

Mr. J. Allan Beesley

(Canada)

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for his very kind comments to the President. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor before we proceed to the adoption of the reports of the Ad Hoc Committees? If no one does, then we shall proceed to that part of our work. As I mentioned this morning the Conference has before it the following documents: Document CD/722, entitled "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons", Document CD/726, entitled "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space", Document CD/727, entitled "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons", and Document CD/728, entitled "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament".

Mr. TORME (Hungary). As we approach the end of the 1968 session of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to make a few remarks in my capacity as Co-ordinator of the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States, the Group of 77.

Yesterday, the Conference on Disarmament adopted, thanks to your ingenious guidance and the co-operation of delegations, several important elements of its report for 1968. Today, we have just adopted the entire report for the year. We say rejoice at what we have achieved, we say lament what we have left undone. It has not been all negative. We have achieved practically nothing in the areas to which the Group of 77 had, it must be said, the United Nations General Assembly, through its various resolutions, attach the greatest priority. We have nevertheless made some progress, which is discernible, for example, towards a chemical weapons convention.

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(Canada)

Mr. J. Allan Beesley

President

Assessment of the results differ in my view, if they tell about our hopes, and even our expectations, some have been there as a widespread view that there were some positive and substantive developments which can be noted. There was also less antagonism, the atmosphere was healthier, and, as a consequence, there was more business-like work, more in-depth discussions, and greater clarification of words and control issues, even on such questions as outer space and a nuclear test ban. There are positive signs even on these last two issues, although not, I am sure, as much as we would all wish. On the unresolved nuclear disarmament issues, deep divergences remain, but we have at least begun to learn how to structure our work more successfully, which I hope can be further developed when next we meet. There is little, if any, disagreement that we have made significant progress in the negotiations on chemical weapons, and that we want not only to maintain but accelerate the intensity and pace of our work. We leave it in good hands, having left a part of the work with our present Chairman, Ambassador Gromyko, and he will have on the agenda, of course, for Ambassador Beesley.

(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

In all the work of the session, the specific topics on which marked headway could be made include, above all, the elaboration of a draft convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. We welcome the measures adopted by the Conference to ensure the requisite continuity and effective conditions of work in the intersessional period for the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

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Mr. TONWE (Nigeria): As we approach the end of the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to make a few remarks in my capacity as Co-ordinator of the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States, the Group of 21.

Yesterday, the Conference on Disarmament adopted, thanks to your ingenious guidance, and the co-operation of delegations, several important elements of its report for 1986. Today, we have just adopted the entire report for the year. We may rejoice at what we have achieved, we may lament what we have left undone. It has not been all negative. We have achieved practically nothing in the areas to which the Group of 21 and, it must be said, the United Nations General Assembly, through its various resolutions, attach the greatest priority. We have nevertheless made some progress, which is discernible, for example, towards a chemical weapons convention.

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President:

Mr. J. Allan Beesley

(Canada)

Assessments of the results differ in any event, if they fell short of our hopes, and even our expectations, none the less there is a widespread view that there were some positive and substantive developments which can be noted. There was also less antagonism, the atmosphere was healthier, and, as a consequence perhaps, there was more business-like work, more in-depth discussions, and greater clarification of basic arms control issues, even on such questions as outer space and a nuclear test ban. There are positive signs even on these last two issues, although not, I am sure, as much as we would all wish. On the unresolved nuclear disarmament issues, deep divergencies remain, but we have at least begun to learn how to structure our work more successfully, which I hope can be further developed when next we meet. There is little, if any, disagreement that we have made significant progress in the negotiations on chemical weapons, and that we must not only maintain but accelerate the intensity and pace of our work. We leave it in good hands, having left a part of the work with our present Chairman, Ambassador Cromartie, and he will pass on the torch, of course, to Ambassador Ekéus.

President:

Mr. J. Allan Beesley

(Canada)

This concludes our business for the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Before I adjourn this plenary meeting I should like to announce that the next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 3 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m. As agreed by the Conference at the time of the adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, document CD/727, paragraph 10(c), the Ad Hoc Committee will officially resume its work on Monday, 12 January 1987, at 3 p.m. in Conference Room III. I should also like to recall that open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee will be held between 24 November and 17 December 1986, including, when necessary, meetings with full services.



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