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
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REPORT TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
ON FOCUS GROUP RESEARCH

JANUARY 1985

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I. INTRODUCTION

Decima Research Limited is pleased to present this report to the Department of External Affairs. The report is based on a series of six focus group discussions.

All of the groups consisted of members of the general public, 18 years of age or older. Each group consisted of approximately half men and half women. Two groups were held in Toronto on December 20, 1984, two French language groups were held in Montreal, on January 3, 1985, and two in Vancouver on January 7, 1985.

Bruce Anderson was the Project Director for this study, assisting in various phases of the research was Martha Cronyn.

The agenda for the groups addressed perceptions regarding national attributes, perceptions of the domestic and international environments, attitudes toward the Canada-U.S. relationship, issues related to international competition, beliefs about personal sacrifices that Canadians are willing to make, assessments of Canada's economic influence in the world, Canadian and international security, Canada's relationship with the Third World, and a discussion of Canada's overall role in the world in terms of trade, military, aid, and security (see Appendix for detailed Agenda).

The report is organized into sections which loosely correspond to the agenda. Group differences (according to venue) are noted throughout the report, wherever appropriate. Conclusions drawn from this research are outlined at the end of the report.

II. PERCEPTIONS REGARDING NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES

At the beginning of each focus group, participants were asked to identify those things about Canada which distinguished it from other countries. In each group, a list of five to ten or more attributes was compiled.

The most frequently cited attributes had to do with Canada's physical resources. Its enormous geographic size, the diversity of landscape, and enormously abundant national resources were all mentioned on numerous occasions. The country's bilingual and multi-cultural nature also came to mind for a considerable number of participants. Canada was considered to be a compassionate country by most participants, the majority citing our aid programs to underdeveloped countries.

Our proximity to and friendly relations with the United States was another factor which many people volunteered made Canada somewhat unique. The discussion around this point tended to suggest that while it made Canada different from countries outside North America, in some ways, the strong American cultural influence made us somewhat similar to the United States.

Participants were somewhat divided on the question of whether Canada can be called an advanced industrial society. Many held the view that the country was not progressing adequately in this regard. The consensus about our current position appeared to be that while we are quite advanced in comparison with underdeveloped and developing countries, we do not compare that favourably with the Americans, Japanese, or some of the Western European countries.

Seldom mentioned in the volunteered listing of our national attributes were any of the distinguishing characteristics of our political system. When probed, participants agreed that the freedoms enjoyed by Canadians were a source of considerable pride when compared to many other countries, but acknowledged that they tended to take these things largely for granted.

Differences in political structures (i.e., Parliament, federal-provincial distribution of powers) were usually not mentioned as national traits, apparently because few were able to make comparisons between our structures and those of other countries.

III. CURRENT SITUATION AND RECENT CHANGES IN DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

Participants were asked to consider the state of national unity, relations with the United States, and domestic economic growth in this context.

A. National Unity

Most participants said they felt more confident than they used to about the state of national unity. The prevailing opinion was that for a variety of reasons, threats to unity had diminished. For most, even in the Vancouver groups, this subject immediately brought to mind the relationship between Quebec and the rest of the country, rather than the feelings of Western alienation which had been widely reported in recent years.

When discussing the easing of tensions within Quebec, the Vancouver participants were quick to point to the issue surrounding the resignation of several Parti Québécois Cabinet Ministers as evidence of an eroding separatist sentiment.

Among the reasons cited for improved national unity were the election of the new government, described as having a truly national mandate and a more conciliatory approach to relations with the provinces.

A number of participants also suggested that the economic recession forced many people to put aside regional differences and focus on solving economic problems.

Finally, a number of Vancouver participants argued that one of the main reasons behind the improvement in unity was a growing recognition and acceptance of the place of

Quebec and the French language in the country; a progression which they acknowledged had taken many years.

While most agreed that national unity had strengthened of late, participants were somewhat more guarded in discussing the future. Many appeared to hold the view that regional tensions had not vanished but were merely in suspension pending economic and political developments which, it was felt, could result in their resurfacing.

B. Relations with the United States

Most participants seemed relatively unaware or unconvinced that a significant deterioration in Canada-U.S. relations had occurred over the past few years. While many acknowledged that it seemed apparent that the Mulroney government was determined and likely to foster closer relations with the Reagan administration, there was little understanding or awareness of the irritants between the two countries. A few Toronto participants mentioned the disagreements on the acid rain issue, some in Vancouver mentioned fishing and lumber tariff disputes, but the predominant mood appeared to be that these problems were typical of those which regularly and unavoidably surfaced between two such close neighbours.

When asked to assess the costs and benefits of a closer relationship with the United States, there was no evidence that views had altered dramatically in recent times. Participants were generally aware that we are economically dependent on a good trading relationship with the United States, but that we must remain vigilant in protecting our economic interests where they are in conflict with those of the Americans.

Implicit and explicit in their assessments of the costs and benefits of a close relationship was a feeling that because of their strong entrepreneurial and free enterprise orientation, Americans would not give Canada any advantages or special treatment in their dealings with our country, but would be as "ruthless" as they would be with any other country.

Some of the Vancouver participants offered the view that while some of the economically nationalistic policies of the past had damaged our relationship and cost some economic opportunities, they had produced a beneficial signal to other countries that we were becoming more sophisticated in our economic planning. "The Americans used to just take us, now they take us seriously" said one participant.

C. Expectations of Continued Prosperity

There were some serious doubts expressed about whether Canada's prosperity will grow in the future unless our international competitiveness is improved. That said, however, most of the group participants seemed to believe that simple maintenance of the status quo would not require a major economic overhaul. Vancouver participants seemed more likely, based on their perceptions that their relative prosperity was waning, to say that sacrifices must be made simply to ensure the status quo.

Most participants seemed skeptical, however, about whether Canadians could be expected to comply with a general appeal to enhance productivity through personal sacrifices, something which will be discussed in greater length elsewhere in this report.

While participants generally stopped short of saying they expected continued prosperity, they implied a significant measure of optimism; something which has been substantiated by recent quantitative results.

IV. CURRENT SITUATION AND RECENT CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The first and overriding point emerging from the groups was the fact that the participants exhibited very little in the way of understanding or awareness of specific conditions in other parts of the world. Impressions of political and economic stability were little more than surface observations; real understanding of economic conditions in other countries was notably absent.

A. Growth in Incomes

While most group participants tended to feel that Canada may be losing ground economically because of a widening productivity gap between ourselves and other countries, this was not the dominant theme which emerged on this question. What did become clear was that many people seemed to expect the gap between rich and poor countries to widen. This feeling prevailed despite a general acknowledgement that countries such as Korea now had a competitive advantage because even their relatively low wage rates were enough to keep their workers happy and thus productive.

The bottom line in terms of expectations regarding general improvements in the world-wide economy is that most professed to have little knowledge, and no strong conviction that either improvements or deterioration would take place.

B. Socio-Political and Economic Stability

While admitting that they did not sufficiently understand the forces at play nor the possible outcomes, most people seemed concerned about the state of economic stability. Many

mentioned, and virtually all seemed aware of, the debt problems faced by certain South American countries. Others mentioned inflation rates in some countries which they believed were far higher and much more destabilizing than any known in North America.

Socio-political stability was also seen to be in jeopardy. Once again, however, it took some probing before participants recalled facts to support this perception. Interestingly, unrest in Central America was not an example which very many people cited. The Middle East generally, the Iran-Iraq war, and Lebanon's problems in particular seemed to be those most easily brought to mind.

Respondents seemed uncertain, however, whether or not the current level of socio-political stability was much lower than it had been in the past. A number of people volunteered the view that there have always been a number of trouble spots in the world and this had not changed too much.

This partial ambiguity about the deterioration of socio-political stability evaporated when people were asked to assess global security. Most seemed firmly convinced that the world was closer than it has been in a long time to real prospects of a major war. There were fairly substantial divisions of opinion on whether competing in the arms race with the goal of preserving mutual deterrence was a logical or necessary course. Quite apart from that question, a number of people voiced concerns about the fact that nuclear weaponry was now in the hands of countries which they felt might be more inclined to use them at some point than would the super powers.

In this context of general apprehension about the security and stability of the world, participants generally felt that the United Nations was a necessary if ineffectual

institution. While most held the view that the U.N. and other similar organizations could do little to resolve really large problems, that on those which they saw as secondary issues (i.e., resource management, environmental protection, and programming) significant results were being achieved.

V. IN-DEPTH PROBING ON CANADA/U.S. RELATIONSHIP

The concept of free trade with the United States found roughly half of all respondents unwilling to even venture a guess at how to describe it.

Those who did attempt to describe it generally had the fundamental principles correct, but virtually no one had any well thought out arguments as to the benefits or drawbacks associated with free trade. While the ensuing discussions found that most were able to understand the opportunities associated with having much larger markets available to Canadian products, they could also imagine the threat to our competitiveness when American "manufacturers" were able to sell their goods in Canada free of tariffs.

After most of the discussion had revealed the major pros and cons, the lingering thought in the minds of most participants seemed to be the sense that larger countries benefit more from free trade agreements than do smaller partners, and that the risks to Canada were significant. No one volunteered the idea that Canada would face more hazardous tariffs in the future if steps were not taken to reduce the amount of conflict occurring at present and few seemed worried that this would in fact occur.

Most participants seemed very convinced that entering into this type of agreement with the Americans would not necessarily guarantee favourable or even fair treatment at their hands. The commonly held view was that the Americans have become economically powerful because they are shrewd and at times ruthless and would try to exploit their relationship with Canada if it were possible to do so.

When the discussion topic shifted to foreign investment, participants again showed clear evidence of an underlying concern about protecting the country against exploitive behaviour by other countries.

While the dominant mood seemed to be one of accord with the federal government's view that new foreign investment was required to stimulate economic growth, most insisted that "some strings should always be attached." Among the desired conditions mentioned in Toronto were that foreign companies should be "good corporate citizens," "should comply with Canadian regulations," "should create employment," and "should increase our GNP." In Vancouver, these conditions were again considered important but another concern seemed almost equally critical. Throughout the discussion, Vancouver participants continually exhibited a great deal of concern about the fact that so much of the economic activity in their province revolved around the depletion of natural resources. This concern seemed to be at the root of the range of views on the economic interaction between Canada and the United States generally.

A. Security

Most participants tended to indicate that they take our security arrangement with the United States pretty much for granted.

One of the apparent beliefs underlying attitudes in this area has to do with a perception that the U.S. has little choice but to be concerned about defending our borders from aggression. In this sense, participants seemed to feel that our geographic location was fortunate in that it permitted Canada to spend less time and money worrying about our own defense. While the nature of our security commitment will be discussed in more

detail later in this report, it bears noting that participants seemed quite detached in discussing Canadian security, apparently because they could not imagine Canada being involved in anything but a global war, which in turn seemed to imply one quick nuclear battle, and hence a certain futility in conventional defensive preparedness.

VI. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

Virtually all participants indicated a growing awareness of Canada's competitive difficulties, tended to attribute them to low productivity and high wage scales, but were less than confident that much would be done in the short-term to improve the situation.

There was at times a startling lack of understanding of the importance of exports to the economic well-being of the country. A number of people, particularly in Montreal, believed that Canada imports more than it exports, although the majority felt otherwise. By the same token, while most felt that exports were vital to prosperity, a number felt that we could survive without exporting anything and supplying a purely domestic market.

A number of participants volunteered that the current value of the Canadian dollar (as against the U.S. \$) provided distinct advantages in terms of trade, and the majority seemed relatively unconvinced that there are serious threats to our existing trade strengths. In essence, participants seemed to feel that while we had to improve our international competitiveness, largely through greater productivity, enhanced entrepreneurial abilities, and a constant eye on the future and the need to modernize, we are not on the brink of disaster.

Participants tended to focus more on the problem of what we are currently exporting, voicing a strong feeling that the country must export fewer raw materials and more manufactured goods. In Vancouver, a number of people expressed concern about the export of logs to Japan, acknowledging that it was our wage rates that were preventing the sale instead of finished wood products, but arguing that the solution should be to stop selling raw logs rather than address the problem of our industry economies.

In general, the discussions on the whole question of Canadians' productivity were quite enlightening. Almost no one would argue that we are as productive as we should be. The causes of what people saw as a gradual decline in productivity were often seen to be related to the improvements in lifestyle which successive generations have enjoyed. Many volunteered that Canadians have become "a little too lazy," "don't give an honest day's work for an honest day's pay" and contrasted our situation with that of developing countries, where employees involved in the manufacture of goods which compete successfully against ours are content earning wages inferior by our standards but excellent by theirs.

A number of people, although a distinct minority, felt inclined to say that management inefficiency and nearsightedness was partly responsible for lagging productivity.

Vancouver participants, in a manner consistent with other recent research findings, were much more likely to point to union militancy as a major source of the productivity problem and hence the difficulties being experienced in the economy of British Columbia generally and in the trade sector in particular.

There was a broad but somewhat shallow consensus that a lot of money should be devoted to research and development. Most people seemed unaware of how much is currently spent, who spends it, on what types of research it is spent, or on what it should be spent in the future. This, while not surprising, is further evidence of what appears to be a underlying lack of concern about some of the very serious challenges which lie ahead.

In most instances, the group participants paid lip service to the need for "massive" changes in our economic structure or an "overhaul of our approach to the future" but stopped short of saying that major sacrifices on the part of Canadian workers could realistically be

sought. Most of the group members indicated a belief that serious wage restraint, cuts, or similar sacrifices work only when the alternative to the workers in question is unemployment. A number of participants in all three cities said they were aware of recent examples of this type of occurrence.

Otherwise, they argued, people would tend to be cynical about whether sacrifices were being equally shared by "everyone" (mentioned in particular were the public sector and politicians), a cynicism which they felt would frustrate efforts to generate a national will. That said, however, most seemed to feel that responsibility for drawing attention to the need for improvements in productivity and the lead role in organizing them resides with governments in general and the federal government in particular. One Montreal participant suggested that the finance minister should appear on television with charts outlining both our current situation and goals for the future, in order to build support for whatever steps are necessary.

While everybody nodded in unison when it was suggested (by the moderator) that the government could do little in terms of new programming because of a scarcity of funds, the size of the federal deficit was not something volunteered as a constraint facing the country. Where research and development funding was concerned most offered the (traditional) response that government had to provide incentives to industry without immediately considering the costs to the federal treasury of that type of assistance.

A. Canada's Economic Influence

Most people seemed to have considerable difficulty in assessing Canada's economic influence in the rest of the world. There was some consensus that our performance

rankings compared to other countries had deteriorated somewhat, but there remained a relatively complacent attitude about this deterioration. What seemed to be conditioning this complacency was the impression that while we would never be on an equal footing with the United States and Japan, neither would we ever be in a situation comparable to underdeveloped or developing nations. Participants seemed to find it difficult to make comparisons between Canada and EEC countries, apparently because they knew relatively little about how well those countries were faring.

Given this lack of ability to position Canada in the context of other industrialized countries, participants were unable to offer many impressions of what steps might be taken to address the deterioration and did not even display much fervor for addressing it at all.

VII. CANADIAN AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

There was a strong consensus among the groups that the Canadian Armed Forces are seriously underequipped and generally inadequate. This consensus, however, did not translate into a unanimous demand that this problem be solved through a major effort to re-equip and update. While most people seemed to feel that improvements should be made, a significant minority argued that spending money on arms and equipment was wasteful and only contributed to the increasing threat of war.

This latter response generally seemed more prevalent among women and in Vancouver. Some others who opposed major expenditures, particularly in Toronto, argued that since the Americans will find it in their interest to defend Canada, "why not let them spend their money," rather than spend our own. The majority view nevertheless was that mutual security arrangements such as NATO and NORAD were very much in Canada's interests and that our commitments must be honoured.

Surprisingly though, there was relatively little awareness of criticisms leveled at Canada (by NATO allies) over its perceived declining commitment of resources, and of course still less understanding of what type of specific commitments Canada has made other than participation in any war involving NATO countries.

Participants seemed convinced that Canada could never adequately defend herself without enormous help from the United States, and appeared to see no logic in trying to reach a point where such help was not needed. Most recognized immediately the prohibitive costs that would entail. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there was a clear perception in the minds of many that military procurement and expansion was an effective way to stimu-

late the economy and create jobs. Those who were dead set against this type of spending were quick to rebut those comments, arguing that stimulus and employment would result equally well from investment in consumer goods manufacturing or any other more peaceful endeavour.

The notion of the Canadian Armed Forces being a source of national pride did not strike a responsive chord for most participants. While people were quick to say that there was a sense of pride in our contribution to Allied efforts in the Second World War they seemed to feel that in a country like Canada a very strong and highly visible armed force was a symbol of pride that was perhaps too expensive and possibly not reflective of the generally peaceable nature of the country and its peoples.

Interestingly, many people spoke of Canada's image as being one of a "neutral" country, an idea they were quite comfortable with. When pressed, they recognized that Canada is not neutral in the sense of being non-aligned but felt that our general approach to international tensions, and outbreaks of hostilities was to distance ourselves from the heat of the conflict and avoid "taking sides" wherever feasible. The motivating attitude in alluding to this "neutrality" appeared to be the contrast which many saw with the more vocal positions taken by the United States.

In the area of arms control, most people were prepared to acknowledge that Canada could do little to directly influence events, but had a moral responsibility to continue efforts aimed at achieving arms control, even if the only action was in the form of a contribution to the ongoing debate.

In a similar vein, Canada's traditional peacekeeping efforts were generally applauded, although some doubted the long-term effectiveness of such activities, believing that tensions in some countries can and have endured for years, making it likely that the threat of war could never be eliminated simply by halting hostilities at any one point in time. A couple of people also cited the experience of American troops in Lebanon as evidence that peacekeeping efforts were, in some instances, futile, and could in fact backfire.

Participants seemed unconvinced that increased commitments of Canadian resources to the NATO effort would result in improved economic opportunities abroad. Part of this feeling no doubt stemmed from the lack of awareness of criticisms about our current level of commitment, but another element of this belief had to do with the view that trade decisions are made strictly on a "dollars and cents" basis and as a result people had difficulty imagining that any country could afford to turn away good trade opportunities because of this "unrelated" issue.

VIII. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE THIRD WORLD

Most of the group participants were convinced that Canada has a comparatively solid reputation as a contributor to Third World aid. In Toronto and Vancouver, a number of people expressed the view that perhaps too much aid was being provided and that "charity begins at home." The most striking point emerging from this discussion area was that aid seemed to be viewed more as a function of Canadians' compassion rather than as a function of a moral obligation on the part of better off countries to share their wealth.

Many people expressed the opinion that the assistance provided is misdirected or "band-aid" in nature, evidence of a belief that aid is predominately in the form of subsistence materials (i.e., food, medicine) rather than technology and training which would help the developing nation eventually reduce its dependence on other countries. The notion of tied aid, or aid involving the provision of goods which Canada has an interest in producing, provoked no strong reactions pro or con, the bottom line being that it should be rational either in terms of fulfilling an immediate need or as part of a overall development strategy.

Group participants were fairly pessimistic about the prospects of Third World economies ever becoming self-sufficient, a pessimism which appeared to some extent rooted in a view that the countries in question did not do enough to help themselves (i.e., practise birth control, plan land use more wisely).

This general tone to the discussion surrounding Third World aid appeared to contrast somewhat with the evidence that Canadians have been making substantial out-of-pocket contributions to relief funds in recent months.

IX. FUTURE TRADING RELATIONSHIPS

Participants exhibited virtually no resistance to the suggestion that Canada's trading relationships should be reoriented (i.e., towards Asia and the Pacific Rim and away from Europe) if the economics of the situation warranted such a shift. While the sense that this reorientation was in fact inevitable was most pronounced in Vancouver, it was almost equally evident in Montreal and Toronto. When asked which countries people felt Canada would do much more trade with in future, the U.S., Japan, China, the Soviet Union, and Korea were mentioned frequently, while EEC countries were cited only rarely. The predominant view was that we should look to wherever the opportunities lie and that as a multicultural country, we should have less difficulty in adapting to shifts of this sort, and less resistance to accepting them.

Finally, on the question of human rights and Canada's responsibility to speak up where injustices are seen, participants believe it is important for the country to observe and where necessary comment on external events. This in no way implied a sense of Canadian moral superiority, but more likely the notion that a court of world-wide public opinion is occasionally an effective agent of desired societal change.

X. SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS

- o For many participants the country's natural resources and geographic, linguistic and cultural features were those national attributes most readily brought to mind when asked what made Canada different from other nations. These tended to overshadow mention of political, governmental, or economic differences with which people were evidently much less familiar.
- o Most group members felt that threats to national unity had abated of late, tending to cite a new mood of national reconciliation emerging in part from the recessionary experience, and a weariness with past federal-provincial struggles and fostered by a popular new government with a national mandate. Many added the caution, however, that many of these tensions could quickly re-emerge given the proper circumstances.
- o While participants generally endorsed what they perceived to be a warming of relations with the United States, they did not appear to believe that those relations had reached a serious state of deterioration. Perhaps more striking was the fact that many people were at pains to stress their feeling that Canada must always exercise considerable caution in its dealings with the United States.
- o Most people who took part in the groups agreed that Canada had to become more productive, and more competitive internationally if the kind of economic growth seen in the last 15 or 20 years was to continue. However, they did not apparently believe that decline would result if these goals were not achieved, allowing a certain measure of complacency to exist. This complacency, bred of a belief that things are relatively pretty good in Canada, was occasionally obscured by the lip service which was paid to

the need and desire for "a major overhaul of the way things are done." In actual fact, most of those in the groups tended to doubt whether Canadians would be very willing to sacrifice much to improve productivity.

- o Group participants knew very little about conditions in other parts of the world, but did have surface impressions. Economic and socio-political stability was seen to be seriously lacking in many parts of the world, the gap between rich and poor nations widening and expected to continue to do so. Considerable concern was expressed about the perceived possibility of a global nuclear war and about the fact that some countries which were seen as unstable had or were trying to get nuclear weapons.
- o Participants were not knowledgeable on the subject of free trade, but tended to offer opinions nonetheless. In essence, it appeared that the words "free trade" sound promising and positive, but after discussions on the pros and cons, a considerable number of people were worried about the economic effect of a major surge of U.S. products into Canadian markets. No one seemed aware or concerned about the possibility of increasing countervailing measures being adopted by other countries if trade were not loosened.
- o Part of the difficulty encountered in trying to uncover a consensus in favour of major steps to change our approach to international trade seemed to stem from a lack of understanding of just how critical exports are to the Canadian economy. While quantitative research would obviously better assess the extent of this problem, it seemed apparent that this was yet another gap in economic literacy which would need to be dealt with before a broader national will to change might be achieved.

- o On a more positive note, the inward looking tendencies of participants allowed them to view future trading opportunities and relationships with considerable objectivity. Most felt no innate allegiances in terms of historical trading patterns or were more than willing to endorse government.

- o Participants tended to exhibit a narrow and relatively uniformed view of how Canada is positioned with respect to the rest of the world. Underlying this problem, as research from **The Decima Quarterly Report on Public Affairs Trends** has shown, may be the facts that an overwhelming majority (more than 80%) believe that Canada is the best country in which to live at the present time, and that there are very high rates of reported optimism about prospects of the future. This contentedness may be producing in the group participants a nonchalant about the country's challenges which would tend to frustrate efforts to stimulate desired responses.

- o Three obvious points emerge from the discussion where group participants indicated a fair amount of divergence with possible federal objectives:
 - . Only limited and skeptical support was found in response to suggestions that Canadians should be prepared to respond to a call for national sacrifices to improve productivity and competitiveness. People seemed aware of these goals and supportive of the principle of striving to achieve them, but a "you-first" or at least a "not-me-first" attitude tended to colour their comments. Carefully designed quantitative research should be capable of finding the attitudinal triggers capable of beginning the process of changing this attitude.
 - . Participants were lukewarm to the idea of major reinvestments in our Armed Forces. The mood was generally supportive but this support seemed more based on the view that economic stimulus and job creation would result, rather than the argument that we were not living up to our commitments to Allies or that we need the restoration of pride that a strong military would bring. Obviously, if this view were substantiated quantitatively, it would pose serious questions in terms of the current strategy of communicating this action.

Where foreign aid/development assistance is concerned, the groups tended to indicate that the crisis in Ethiopia and the response by Canadians did not necessarily signal a major shift in attitudes about the need for greater commitment of resources in the longer-term. Participants exhibited considerable doubts about how practical, rational, and useful our contributions really are, wondered about whether recipient countries did enough to help themselves, and seemed to find it surprisingly easy to suggest that Canada's poor were comparable in their need to the starving in Africa. What apparently enabled them to discuss aid in these terms was a clear belief that assistance was a privilege, not a right.

APPENDIX

DISCUSSION AGENDA

A. Perceptions Regarding National Attributes

1. Volunteered list
2. Moderator probes on following:
 - . federal state
 - . democratic
 - . compassionate
 - . multicultural, tolerant
 - . advanced industrial society
 - . close to U.S.

B. Perceptions of Current Situation and Recent (10-15 Year) Changes in Domestic Environment

1. State of national unity; improving/worsening
2. Nature of relationship with U.S.; improving/worsening
Have perceptions changed about the costs/benefits of close relationship?
3. Expectations of continued prosperity; individually, as a country
4. Perceptions about the need for risk-taking (i.e., just to maintain current standards)

C. Perceptions Regarding Current Situation and Recent (10-15 Years) Changes in International Environment

1. Growth in income (rapid, constant, mixed, uncertain)
2. Third World socio-political and economic stability
3. Role of U.N. and international organizations (changing?)
4. Global security (improving/worsening, changing?)

D. In-Depth Probing on Canada/U.S. Relationship

1. Understanding of free trade concept
2. Ability to identify costs, benefits, potential risks
 - . perceptions of American desires, interests
 - . concerns/apprehensions about dealing with Americans

3. Other issues:

- . foreign investment
- . security relationship

E. International Competition

1. Perceptions about how well Canada is doing vis-a-vis its competitors in terms of:

- . world trade
 - i.e., do we import more than export
 - do we really need to export more, much more
 - perception about relationship between prosperity and trade
- . productivity
 - are Canadians relatively productive
 - * why or why not
 - * probes: cost of labour, work ethic, management efficiency
- . research and development
 - are we spending enough
 - who should be spending

2. Are Canadians willing to sacrifice personally

- . how?
 - wage cuts or restraint
 - work harder, longer
- . are we capable of generating national will to sacrifice (if so, how)?
- . can government do much because of scarce resources?

3. How would you assess Canada's economic influence in the world

- . does it need improvement/why has it deteriorated
- . how might it be improved

F. Canadian and International Security

1. Participants would be asked to describe Canadian security qualitatively (probing on following: contribution, peacekeeping, arms control, overseas deployment of resources)
2. How do our Armed Forces affect our sense of national pride?
3. Are there economic benefits from stronger military commitment (i.e., better trade opportunities, through more goodwill, through military procurement/supply)

G. Relationship with Third World


1. Participants would be asked to describe Canada's relationship with Third World countries (probing on: human rights, trade, aid, etc.)
 - . relationship between aid and trade (current, potential)
 - . tied/versus untied aid
 - . scope for redesigning major trade relationships (i.e., Pacific); de-emphasizing European ties

H. Discussion of Canada's Overall Role in the World, Taking into Account Trade, Military, Aid, Security

1. Descriptive
2. Prescriptive

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