


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BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT

The member states of the Warsaw Treaty attach great importance of principle to the transition from individual confidence building measures, openness and glasnost in international affairs in general - and in the military sphere in particular - to a broad-scale policy that would become a component of a comprehensive system of international security, a vital factor in the real strengthening of confidence and the enhancing of predictability of activities of states and one of the components in the progress towards disarmament. Proceeding from this fundamental position, the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty are in agreement with the "Open Skies" concept put forward by US President George Bush on May 12, 1989, and are of the opinion that its implementation can become a real contribution to strengthening confidence between countries. They also hold that such openness cannot be selective or limited - it must be operative everywhere. For this reason, the establishment of an Open Skies regime could become part of a global system of strengthening confidence and of reducing the military threat and the risk of war - a system that would embrace not only the skies but also the land, the seas and oceans as well as space. An agreement of this kind will be the first step in the context of a broader solution to the problems of the transparency of military activities in other spheres.

II. Principles

The "Open Skies" regime should conform to the following principles:

- observation flights should be conducted on the basis of reciprocity and equality by combat unarmed aircraft;



- the regime parameters should ensure equal rights of the parties to the information;
- the regime should not be used to the detriment of the security of either party;
- the regime will be subject to certain agreed restrictions, but such restrictions should be minimal.

III. Aims

The main aims of the "Open Skies" regime could be:

- strengthening confidence between the participating states;
- reducing the military danger;
- ensuring the predictability of the military activities of the participating states;
- contributing to the process of arms limitation and disarmament and verifying compliance with the obligations undertaken in this area.

IV. Participants and Territorial Scope

1. Initially the "Open Skies" regime could involve the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member states. Other states may also adhere to it.



2. The "Open Skies" regime shall encompass the territory of all the participating states, including the island territories belonging to them. Given the occurrence of military activities beyond the national territories, those participating countries with military bases abroad would enter into negotiations, as far as possible while the agreement is being worked out, with the aim of deciding the issue of covering by the regime their military bases in third countries not participating in the regime, with the agreement of those countries.

V. Flight Quotas

1. Provision will be made for approximately the same number of flights between the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, the USSR and the USA. Flights will be allocated by agreement within an alliance. At the same time active and passive quotas would be established.

2. Observation of the territory of several member states of one alliance would be allowed in the course of one flight, with the agreement of these states.

3. No more than one observation flight will be carried out at a time over the territory of each participating state.

VI. Aircraft

The best solution from the point of view of the "Open Skies" regime would be to create an agreed composition fleet of observation aircraft, as will be indicated in an appropriate appendix to the

agreement. Observation aircraft could also use mixed flight crews and mixed teams of observers. The representatives of the observed country would be able to observe the activity of the members of the flight crews and of the observation teams. Where agreed, the aircraft forming part of the fleet of aircraft of an agreed composition could be based on the territory of any states party to the regime.

VII. Observation Equipment

1. The aircraft will be outfitted with observation equipment. The best solution would be to equip the aircraft with either uniform equipment or with observation equipment agreed upon on the basis of categories and technical characteristics, as set out in an appropriate appendix to the agreement. The observation equipment to be used will be available to all participants in the agreement.

2. The equipment installed on the aircraft would not include equipment for the transmission of observation data by radio channels.

3. The observation equipment would only be allowed to operate when the aircraft is in the observed area.

VII. Inspection of Aircraft

Before an observation flight, a joint inspection of the aircraft might be carried out with the aim of verifying its flight readiness and in order to ascertain that the only equipment present on board is that agreed for purposes of the regime.



IX. Flight Procedures

1. Observation flights will be carried out in strict accordance with a flight plan to be approved by the observed country and taking into account the safety requirements and flight systems in force in that country.
2. In the case of flights over areas not covered by radar systems the observation aircraft will be monitored by the air traffic control services via radio contact.
3. Provisions would be made to prohibit unsanctioned alterations in the flight plan of observation flights and to prohibit repeated flights over one and the same point in the observed area.
4. Notification of an observation flight would be furnished at least twenty-four hours before the aircraft departs for the country to be overflown.

X. Results from the Overflights

1. The results of the observations would be processed on the ground at a fixed facility by mixed groups of specialists using processing equipment, the composition of which would be agreed upon.
2. The information on the results of the overflights must be accessible to all participating states on an equal basis.



XI. Limitations to Be Set on the Regime


The question of the possible closure to overflights by observation aircraft of given areas, assuming timely notification regarding such areas including those in use for exercises hazardous to overflights, spacecraft launching sites, test flight corridors, etc., would be the subject of discussions. A special regime would be established with respect to such facilities as nuclear power stations, large chemical plants and certain other facilities. The special regime in such cases would mean alternation of the observation plan in order to ensure the safety of the aircraft and the facilities mentioned.

XII. Type of Agreement

The "Open Skies" regime would be established through a multilateral agreement concluded by the parties thereto.

XIII. The Consultative Body and Further Steps Following the Conference

To promote the objectives and the implementation of the "Open Skies" regime, the participating states will establish a body which will concern itself with questions related to observance of the provisions of the agreement, clarification of ambiguous situations, settlement of disputes and adoption of measures essential to the enhancement of the efficacy of the regime. The body will also deal with matters concerned with further steps to be taken towards the working out of measures dealing with openness of military activities following conclusion of the "Open Skies" agreement as well as with questions of the coordination of this agreement with other international agreements in the arms limitation and disarmament.



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OPEN SKIES: BASIC ELEMENTS

I. Introduction

1. On 12th May 1989, President Bush proposed the creation of a so-called "Open Skies" regime, in which the participants would voluntarily open their airspace on a reciprocal basis, permitting the overflight of their territory in order to strengthen confidence and transparency with respect to their military activities.

This proposal expanded on a concept that had already been proposed during the 1950s but had failed to reach fruition because of the unfavourable international political climate prevailing at the time.

Today, this new initiative has been made in a very different context as openness becomes a central theme of East-West relations and the past few years have been marked by important advances in the areas of confidence-building and arms control.

2. The provisions for notification and observation of military activities specified in the Helsinki Final Act were strengthened and made obligatory by the Stockholm Document concluded by the CDE in 1986.

With respect to arms control, in 1987, the INF Treaty, apart from its immediate goals, represented a very important precedent because of the extent of its verification provisions.

All this leads one to expect today that even more spectacular advances will be achieved in the near future. In particular, a two-pronged effort is under way in Vienna: on the one hand, to deepen the measures for confidence-building and transparency among the 35 countries of the CSCE, and on the other, to reach an unprecedented agreement between the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization on the elimination of large numbers of conventional arms.

Furthermore, one awaits important developments in other sectors of disarmament such as chemical weapons and the Soviet-American strategic arms negotiations.

3. All of these agreements will naturally require their own verification regimes, often of a highly intrusive nature. Moreover, the specific provisions of



each verification treaty will be supplemented by the habitual means by which countries verify compliance with agreements (national technical means).

It seems useful, however, particularly in the prevailing context of improved East-West relations, to reflect on other ways of creating a broadly favourable context for confidence-building and disarmament efforts.

In this context, the Open Skies concept has a very special value. The willingness of a country to be overflown is, in itself, a highly significant political act in that it demonstrates its availability to openness; aerial inspection also represents a particularly effective means of verification, along with the general transparency in military activities discussed above.

This double characteristic of an Open Skies regime would make it a valuable complement to current East-West endeavours, mainly in the context of the Vienna negotiations but also in relation to the other disarmament efforts (START, chemical weapons).

It would seem desirable to focus now on the European region, while also including the entire territories of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Canada. Accordingly, we will be ready to consider at an appropriate time the wish of any other European country to participate in the Open Skies regime. This element could be complementary to their efforts at confidence-building and conventional arms control and would conform to the objectives of those negotiations.

4. To this end, the Open Skies Regime should be based on the following guidelines:

- The commitment of the parties to greater transparency through aerial overflights of their entire national territory, in principle without other limitations than those imposed by flight safety or rules of international law.
- The possibility for the participants to carry out such observation flights on a national basis or jointly with their allies.
- The commitment of all parties to conduct and to receive such observation flights on the basis of national quotas.



- The establishment of agreed procedures designed to ensure both transparency and flight safety.
- The possibility for the parties to employ the result of such overflights to improve openness and transparency of military activities as well as ensuring compliance with current or future arms control measures.

II. Purpose

The basic purpose of Open Skies is to encourage reciprocal openness on the part of the participating states and to allow the observation of military activities and installations on their territories, thus enhancing confidence and security. Open Skies can serve these ends as a complement both to national technical means of data collection and to information exchange and verification arrangements established by current and future arms control agreements.

III. Participation and Scope

Participation in Open Skies is initially open to all members of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. All territories of the participants in North America and Asia, as well as in Europe, will be included.

IV. Quotas

1. Open Skies "accounting" will be based on quotas which limit the number of overflights. The quotas will be derived from the geographic size of the participating countries. The duration of flights can also be limited in relation to geographic size. For larger countries, the quota should permit several flights a month over their territory. All of the parties will be entitled to participate in such observation flights on a national basis, either individually or jointly in co-operation with their allies.

2. Effective implementation of a quota system requires agreement that a country will not undertake flights over the territory of any other country belonging to the same alliance.

3. Quota totals for participating states should be established in such a manner that there is a rough correspondence between totals for NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and, within that total, for the USSR and the North American members of NATO.



4. Every participant, regardless of size, would be obligated to accept a quota of at least one overflight per quarter.

5. Smaller nations, that is, those subject to the minimum quota, may group themselves into one unit for the purposes of hosting Open Skies overflights and jointly accept the quota that would apply to the total land mass of the larger unit.

V. Aircraft

The country or countries conducting an observation flight would use unarmed, fixed-wing civilian or military aircraft capable of carrying host country observers.

VI. Sensors

A wide variety of sensors would be allowed, with one significant limitation - devices used for the collection and recording of signals intelligence would be prohibited. A list of prohibited categories and types of sensors will be agreed among the participating states which will be updated every year.

VII. Technical Co-operation among Allies

Multilateral or bilateral arrangements concerning the sharing of aircraft or sensors, as well as the conduct of joint overflights, will be possible among members of the same alliance.

VIII. Mission Operation

1. Aircraft will begin observation flights from agreed, pre-designated points of entry and terminate at pre-designated points of exit; such entry and exit points for each participating state will be designated by that state and listed in an annex to the agreement.

2. The host country will make available the kind of support equipment, servicing and facilities normally provided to commercial air carriers. Provision will be made for refuelling stops during the overflight.

3. An observing state will provide 16 hours notification of arrival at a point of entry. However, if the point of entry is on a coast or at a border and no territory of the receiving state will be overflown prior to arrival at the point of entry, this pre-arrival period could be abbreviated.

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4. The crew of the observation aircraft shall file a flight plan within six hours of its arrival at the point of entry.

5. After arrival and the filing of a flight plan, a 24 hour pre-flight period will begin. This period is to allow time to determine that there are no flight safety problems associated with the planned flight route and to provide necessary servicing for the aircraft. During this pre-flight period the aircraft will also be subject to intrusive but non-destructive inspection for prohibited sensors and recorders.

6. Prior to the flight, host-country monitors will be able to board the observation aircraft. During the flight they would ensure that the aircraft is operated in accordance with the flight plan and would monitor operation of the sensors. There would be no restrictions on the movement of the monitors within the aircraft during flight.

7. The flight will be from the agreed point of entry to an agreed point of exit, where the host country observers would depart the aircraft. The points of entry and exit could be the same. Loitering over a single location will not be permitted. Aircraft will not be limited to commercial air corridors. Observation aircraft may in principle only be prohibited from flying through airspace that is publicly announced as closed to other aircraft for valid air safety reasons. Such reasons would include specific hazards posing extreme danger to the aircraft and its occupants. Each country will make arrangements to ensure that public announcements of such hazardous airspace are widely and promptly disseminated; each country will produce for an annex to the agreement a list of where these public announcements can be found. The minimum altitudes for such flights may vary depending upon air safety considerations. The extent of ground control over aircraft will be determined in advance by agreement among the parties on compatible rules such as those recognized by ICAO. In the application of these considerations and procedures, the presumption shall be on behalf of encouraging the greatest degree of openness consistent with air safety.

8. The operation of the Open Skies regime will be without prejudice to states not participating in it.

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IX. Mission Results

The members of the same alliance will determine among themselves how information acquired through Open Skies is to be shared. Each party may decide how it wishes to use this information.

X. Transits

A transit flight over a participating state on the way to the participating state over which an observation flight is to be conducted shall not be counted against the quota of the transitted state, provided the transit flight is conducted exclusively within civilian flight corridors.


XI. Type of Agreement

The Open Skies regime will be established through a multilateral treaty among the parties.

XII. Open Skies Consultative Body

To promote the objectives and implementation of the Open Skies regime, the participating states will establish a body to resolve questions of compliance with the terms of the treaty and to agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the effectiveness of the regime.





DOCUMENT: ICO-CS-029

(Revised)
February 26th, 1990

Open Skies Conference

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COMMUNIQUE ON CFE AND CFCE



THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOE CLARK,
MINISTER OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
(CHAIRMAN):

Colleagues, may I call to order the first session of the Open Skies negotiations.

It is with a great deal of pleasure that I invite the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, to give the welcoming address and to declare the meeting open.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE BRIAN MULRONEY, PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA:

Ladies and gentlemen, welcome and bienvenue au Canada. I am pleased to welcome you to Canada for this Conference of Open Skies.

We are living in remarkable years in world history. The Berlin Wall is down, Nelson Mandela is free, and a new age is born.

Throughout Eastern Europe governments are grappling with the unfamiliar challenges of democracy and economic change. They are trying to accomplish in months what it has taken others decades, and even centuries, to achieve.

It is not a small dream to carry out the dreams of a nation which are required by a democratic government and, at the same time, to answer the expectations of the citizens who wish, for themselves and for their children, to have access to new prosperity. You need time, patience, and a great resolve.

Nobody, as far as I know, has the necessary experience to prescribe a way to certain success for these governments which would make it possible for them to avoid either great national difficulties or considerable individual sacrifice. New national structures and economies are built slowly and with difficulties, but all nations have a stake in the success of the new governments and an interest in responding constructively to their needs.

Canada stands ready to do its part. Fully 15 per cent of Canadians have their origins in central and eastern Europe. These Canadians are schooled in the management of government in a bilingual nation and a multicultural society, and they are experienced in the conduct of international business in a free enterprise world. Canada is committed to co-operate in the rebuilding of Eastern Europe. Canada is also ready to play its part in building a new international order.

For almost half a century there has been half a peace, based on distrust and built on deterrents. Confidence was impossible while basic values were in conflict.

But the confrontation of ideologies has at last subsided. We

are no longer hostage to frozen political meteorology of suspicion and animosity. The Cold War is over. And today, in Ottawa, former adversaries work together to ensure that such a long and bitter winter never comes again.

The conditions exist now to make a new start on building a better world. The infernal nuclear legacy of the past remains. Unresolved issues and ancient conflicts, forgotten for a while, are exposed now by the sunlight of the perestroika thaw.

But, in recent months, much common ground has also reappeared. These developments raise, Canada believes, profound questions about the most effective means of reinforcing political and economic progress in Central and Eastern Europe; about the evolution of the European Community and the unification of Germany; about the risk to stability of dormant conflicts re-awakening; about the future of our alliances and about the nature of the relationship that will exist between North America and Europe; and about what sort of wider world we want to see.

What is needed now is a new concept of security rooted in universal, democratic values.

What is also necessary is the genius to give constructive expression to our rediscovered sense of shared purpose.

Newspaper headlines are filled, around the world, with a new lexicon of diplomatic architecture --expressions such as a common European home, concentric circles, confederation, and so on.

These ideas reflect the need to create new instruments of co-operation, to breathe new life into existing organizations and to bring greater definition to our common political vision of a new European future.

The new Bank for European Reconstruction and Development is one creative response to these very real needs.

The new Bank for European Reconstruction and Development will contribute to the business of economic reconstruction in Europe.

It will have a very important role for the spirit of enterprise which is beginning in Eastern Europe. It will also be important for the integration of the countries of Eastern Europe into the global economy.

We are participating actively in this constructive and beneficial initiative and are ready to contribute time, money and expertise to aid its success.

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is also a vital piece of that architecture. For almost two decades the

4CSCE has been an extremely important instrument for countries in both East and West. It has served as the bridge, often the only bridge, from sterile disagreement to fruitful co-operation. It has facilitated in many ways the quite extraordinary changes of the past year. And it is the only institution that comprises all of the countries directly engaged in European security.

A costly lesson of the history of this century is that European security and North American security are indivisible. None of us is secure when any of us feels threatened.

We support the call for a summit level meeting of the CSCE later this year and believe we should begin preparations immediately.

We believe that we should all strive to be in a position at that summit to sign an agreement on reducing conventional forces in Europe.

Further, we would like to see the CSCE transformed into an institution of ongoing economic, social and political co-operation between the countries of East and West.

In these days of torrential change and telescoped time frames, stability and predictability in security arrangements are at a premium.

For 40 years, NATO has embodied the commitment of North America to European security. NATO, with its trans-Atlantic membership, has a central role to play in facilitating the orderly transition from armed confrontation to more normal and productive political and human relationships.

NATO's arms control agenda is being pursued with the same seriousness of purpose as has been applied to maintaining an appropriate military balance between East and West.

And NATO provides a basis for going beyond arms issues to verification and confidence-building.

Openness is a pre-condition of confidence and, therefore, of stability.

An agreement on Open Skies is in concert with these times; it will help to consolidate the dramatic improvement in relations between East and West that has occurred over the past year.

By opening our territories to virtually unrestricted surveillance by air, we will be showing the world that we have nothing to hide and less to fear.

In concluding this Open Skies agreement we will make a



statement of enlightened political will, capitalizing on the current climate of achievement and building on a record of recent success.

When this idea was first proposed in the fifties, the times were not right. However, a spirit of leadership and catalytic change, which we are in now, have ensured that this concept -- a helpful, confidence-building measure -- will receive, for the first time, serious consideration today, probably in Ottawa in the course of our considerations.

I invite all present to pursue this agreement, this time with vision and vigour for the future well-being of mankind.

Quarrels and competition between east and west have had a profoundly negative influence on many areas of the world. Perhaps most significant, the Cold War distorted the functioning of the United Nations, stunted the development of multilateral co-operation, and inhibited genuine opportunities for dialogue and progress. The prospect of real peace in Europe at last provides us the opportunity to return to the unfinished business of building a modern and effective multilateral system.

The challenges we face as dynamic societies go well beyond orthodox definitions of national security. The global natural environment is threatened, and the international institutions to protect it are clearly inadequate. The scourge of drug abuse is felt around the world, north and south, and yet we have found no satisfactory collective means to curtail it. The burden of debt is a prejudice to the future of middle-income countries around the world. And hunger and disease are too often the fate of the world's poorest countries mired in economic hopelessness and social despair.

And so this meeting in Ottawa has, in my judgment, two main tasks: first, to concentrate diligently on the work at hand so that an agreement on Open Skies will be achieved when the delegations reassemble in Budapest; and, more generally, to seize this unprecedented moment in recent history to replace the Cold War and its incalculable costs in economic wealth, misspent human genius, and wasted social opportunity, with a new ethic of co-operation based on peace and prosperity and common purpose.

We who are gathered here in this room today bear a heavy responsibility to our nations and to history because the opportunity is given to few people to help shape a new era in world affairs. We carry the hopes and the prayers of people from Vladivostok to Vancouver, and from countries far removed from the old East-West axis of conflict.

So let us work together to multiply the gains that we have made in relations between the countries of East and West. And let

us dedicate ourselves to building a world that the Cold War made illusory and unreachable for all countries and all peoples. And let us broaden our horizons and open our skies to peace and prosperity for all.

Ladies and gentlemen, I believe that the world is watching all of you in high expectation. Grasp the opportunity that is open to you now. And on behalf of all Canadians, who are proud of your presence here and are grateful for your leadership, I wish you all good luck and Godspeed.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Prime Minister, on behalf of all of my colleagues, may I thank you for those remarks and that direction as we begin our deliberations in this first of two conferences which we are confident will lead to an agreement on Open Skies.

Thank you, sir.

MR. MULRONEY:

Thank you. Good luck.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Colleagues, there has been a list of speakers agreed to, and I would like to turn the floor now to the Honourable James A. Baker III, Secretary of State of the United States of America. Mr. Baker.

HONOURABLE JAMES A. BAKER III,
SECRETARY OF STATE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to our Canadian hosts: to the Prime Minister; to your Secretary for External Affairs, Joe Clark; and others in the Canadian delegation, all of whom have championed the Open Skies concept from the very beginning. This important initiative owes much to their long and hard work, and President Bush and I are very appreciative.

Two months ago I took a good look through a newly chipped hole in the Berlin Wall. I saw a great city striving to be reborn and, beyond that, whole nations seeking to reclaim their freedom and their independence. This past week I returned to central and eastern Europe to see the walls falling across the continent, from Prague in the west to Bucharest in the east.

Freedom is on the march, drawing strength from the resilience of the human spirit. Yet, the very hard task of moving from revolution to democracy still lies ahead of us, and we should

remain vigilant and we should remain active in our support.

The revolutions of 1989 are both exhilarating and sobering: exhilarating because the walls that have so long divided East from West have now been breached, and the prospect of a new era of peace and co-operation stretches before us; sobering because after the fall of totalitarianism's illegitimacies we face the great challenge of building an enduring peace in a Europe that is both whole and free. Our challenge is to construct a new and enduring European security system.

As I stressed in Prague last week, new security arrangements - the military aspect of the equation -- must proceed apace with and they must complement the political and economic revolutions in central and eastern Europe. It is imperative, I think, that we move quickly to finalize agreements that codify stabilizing military changes. In this way, we can lock in strategic changes and we can guarantee that our basic security principles are bound into practice through effectively verifiable arrangements.

We want to make this new day of freedom as difficult as we possibly can to reverse.

In our view, the new European security arrangements must promote two fundamental principles of strategy and arms control: first, stability and, second, predictability.

Stability, of course, requires military forces and policies that are such that no state can gain by striking first. A stable security system requires a balance in capability so as to prevent premeditated blitzkrieg-style attacks; its focus is military capability. Predictability requires sufficient openness, transparency, and even candour so as to prevent misperception, miscalculation, and what we refer to as military myopia. We need to open military activities to outside scrutiny thereby preventing a slide into inadvertent or accidental war during the fog that often enshrouds crisis situations.

Here the focus shifts to the point where military capabilities intersect with political intentions. Predictability and openness can also restrain the escalating spirals of distrust, fueled by secrecy, that are the invariable precursors of crisis itself. We need to promote both strategic stability and predictability in the new Europe. Neither of these standing alone is sufficient.

By focusing on both we can build a security system with mutually reinforcing components. In this new order confidence can replace fear; trust can overcome distrust; and knowledge can transform ignorance.

The western approach to the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, augmented recently by President Bush's proposals

on manpower and aircraft, is designed to promote stability. In combination with new NATO proposals on tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and helicopters, the President's manpower and aircraft initiatives move us closer to resolving many of the key remaining differences in the CFE negotiations.

Last week President Gorbachev moved toward our position on manpower, abandoning overall ceilings on all forces. But his response in equating United States' and Soviet forces in Europe does not acknowledge that United States' forces outside this limit would be an ocean away, whereas large numbers of Soviet troops would remain in the European part of the Soviet Union.

NATO also has made a new proposal on aircraft that accepts a number of points in the Warsaw Pact position. So far, however, the Soviet Union has not responded to our efforts to close this issue. Indeed, its position sets a ceiling that would require the West to add about 2,000 new NATO aircraft in order to reach equality. That is hardly a step towards arms reduction. So we have to redouble our efforts on this particular subject.

Disagreements over aircraft limits simply must not prevent us from signing a CFE agreement this year.

To promote predictability, President Bush last spring judged that the time was right to revive and extend the Open Skies idea - a concept that was first broached by President Eisenhower but at that time was rejected by the Soviet Union.

While the CFE negotiations are the primary means to codify strategic stability in the new Europe, Open Skies can, and should, become a key component of our efforts to increase predictability while also supporting stability. Complementing confidence-building measures that we are considering as a part of the CSCE process, Open Skies can make a decisive contribution in creating an open and transparent military and political environment in Europe.

Consider, just a moment, what Open Skies could accomplish. Under the Western approach, states will be able to see more clearly, literally, the actions and even the intent of others, whatever the time of day and whatever the conditions of the weather. A state will not be able to practise an exercise for offensive, aggressive attacks, with the help of a traditional ally, a closed society.

Neighbours will be able to fly over troop movements, lowering the possibility of a surprise attack; and by improving assessments of a potential adversary's capabilities and likely intentions, Open Skies can reduce miscalculations and reduce misconceptions or misperceptions. In so doing, it can alleviate those fears that are oftentimes the source of escalating tension.

Today, there is a general recognition of what we have long believed -- that security is indivisible. All of us must feel, and be, secure for all others to be secure.

President Gorbachev has also stressed the reciprocal nature of international security, rejecting the Stalinist concept that Soviet security depends somehow upon everyone else's insecurity.

I think it is fair to say that we all believe that increased openness and transparency in military matters provide the most direct path to greater predictability and to reduced risk of inadvertent war. Make no mistake, colleagues, about the implications of what we are considering here today. Open Skies is potentially the most ambitious measure to build confidence, that we have ever undertaken.

It has revolutionary ramifications. Soviet and East European surveillance aircraft would become a common sight in the skies over central and western Europe, and in the skies over North America. American and west European aircraft would be an equally common sight in the skies over eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. An Open Skies regime would, therefore, provide a tangible and a very powerful symbol of the emerging East-West co-operation that our publics could readily see and could readily understand.

Open Skies is also an integral part of the United States' vision of a new Europe: a Europe whole and free, a Europe belonging to a larger commonwealth of free nations. The new European security system that complements a new age of political and economic freedom will be based on the principles of national sovereignty and voluntary co-operation. It will operate within the framework of the 35-nation Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will also play an important new role in co-ordinating political initiatives like Open Skies, as we work with our allies to ensure a stable transition to new security arrangements.

The significance of this initiative is that it is an inherently co-operative measure that both demands trust and builds trust.

National technical means of monitoring are fine, but national technical means of monitoring are strictly unilateral. A state's decision to open its airspace to another state's surveillance aircraft is a highly significant, co-operative, political act in and of itself.

Last December, my NATO colleagues and I reached agreement on the basic elements of an Open Skies regime. Our paper sets out a number of guidelines underlying the NATO approach to Open Skies. Its essential tenet is the commitment of the parties to permit overflights of their entire national territory, with no limitations

other than those imposed by the inevitable need for flight safety and, of course, for the rules of respect for international law.

The NATO proposal has three essential features. First, it embodies openness; second, it is effective; and, third, it is workable. Open Skies is not a mere symbolic gesture. It can be a path, perhaps one among many, to a new era in East-West relations. Real openness means all territory being open to observation, consistent with safety.

Effectiveness -- effectiveness means openness even at night, or on cloudy days, and that means the right to use any technology that will do the job, understanding that these devices can be inspected by the country being overflown.

Workability -- that means working out practical arrangements for national overflights. No unwieldy new bureaucracies are needed. If countries want to share resources, that would, of course, be fine. If they want to fly their own unarmed aircraft, planes they have been trained to use, that is also fine.

Flexibility is the key here.

We have proposed a concept for the future. This is not just a bloc-to-bloc idea. Indeed, we are prepared to expand the regime to all 35 CSCE states once the regime has been established. In ten years, the regime may be finding uses that we cannot even imagine as we sit here today.

Open Skies is a test of our willingness to co-operate, to co-operate in building a new and better world for ourselves and for our children; a stable and predictable security environment that allows each nation to pursue its own destiny in peace, without fear of aggression or intimidation; an environment where dangerous capabilities are controlled and where fears are alleviated.

Together, we must seize this rare opportunity to remodel the political and the strategic architecture of the new Europe. As I said in Prague last week, if 1989 was the year of sweeping away, 1990 must become the year of building anew. As we enter the last decade of the twentieth century, we are already tearing down the walls that have so long divided us. As those walls go down, new and enduring security arrangements should go up in their place.

Open Skies and CFE can do this job. Now is the time that we should put them in place. Thank you very much.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Secretary Baker. I now call upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency Eduard Shevardnadze.



HIS EXCELLENCY EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, the theme of Open Skies implies an open-minded debate which may cover all its different aspects, from conceptual approaches to technical points.

My task, as I see it, is to set forth our vision of the problem, focusing on key issues and fundamental principles.

The Ottawa Conference is being held in winter, a winter which, for all the ups and downs in the temperature, has not been cold. Our meeting in the capital of Canada could be another clear sign that the Cold War is over, and Prime Minister Mulroney convinced us of that fact. It went on for over 40 years, leaving in people's minds the memories not only of a big political chill but, what is more, a fear, uncertainty about the future, and restrictions of what man values most, his freedom.

It is wrong to think that such restrictions affected societies only on one side of the Iron Curtain.

Passports stamped "Not Valid for Travel to Communist Countries" set a definite limit to freedom of movement in the West, too. And the prefix "anti" applied, in both its Soviet and American versions, to countless things common on both sides of the political watershed.

But why recall all of this now? Because we should not forget why the skies close or open.

As a poet once said, it is because someone needs it.

Walls, curtains and bans create fear, suspicion and intolerance. When the world had all of that in abundance, for long decades, everyone needed closed doors. As a result, the skies were closed and divided, as was the world.

Today, we need open skies, and not just the skies. The willingness of the participants in this conference to discuss this idea is evidence of tremendous changes in our perception of each other.

Last September in Wyoming, when my friend, Mr. Baker, suggested that we hold a round of talks on this problem outdoors, under the open skies, the weather was favourable to us. It was not windy, or raining, nor was the sun too hot.

This is the point I want to make: the idea of Open Skies is only good in conditions of good international weather, and prerequisites for it have now been created.

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We are abandoning the primitive concepts asserting that human and state entities are inherently aggressive.

We are taking a different view of the problem of force, becoming aware that it cannot help solve even the most trivial disputes, to say nothing of intricate conflicts. We understand that, to acquire the resources needed for development, it is cheaper and easier to buy them on the market than to seize them, that technology cannot be captured by force and made to work.

In the final analysis, anything open, whether skies or land, begins with open thinking. It alone is capable of recognizing and establishing as a norm the vital need to exchange information and openly seek to identify the truth and the universal, national and personal interests.

Over the past few years, progressive thought has made major advances in understanding openness as the principal factor of any progress -- intellectual, material and social. This process has also affected the area of security, in which for many years both sides played a game of hide-and-seek.

The historic threshold was crossed when, at the Stockholm Conference, all European states accepted the principle of on-site inspections.

Now this principle is being practically applied in verifying the destruction of nuclear missiles and as part of confidence-building measures. We have, thus far, not heard a single complaint that inspections and verification have impinged on anyone's security.

The success and usefulness of verification are so obvious and its sphere of application has expanded so much, covering not only military matters but also environmental, humanitarian, economic and other problems, that there is even a risk of complacency.

But it is too early to become complacent. Therefore, speaking of the Open Skies concept, one could logically ask: Do we need another type of verification when there are satellites and inspector teams working on the ground?

Here we must say, quite firmly: In verification, no excess is too much. And this is more than just a political statement. If we intend to continue moving as we have been doing until now, reducing troops and weapons, dismantling huge structures of military confrontation, adopting defensive doctrines and limiting military capabilities to levels of minimum sufficiency for defence, then we need an even more effective and multi-optional system of verification having a great margin of dependability.

I would even venture to propose this formula: sufficiency in

weapons and redundancy as regards verification capabilities. This formula is prompted not least by the trends and prospects of the current European situation.

Before our eyes a new Europe is emerging, which no longer consists of three or four groups of states but, rather, is a space with a vastly different, more complex political configuration. To our regret, few would vouch today that this new configuration would not create new problems, cause new complications in various places, or open old wounds or scars.

In this situation, the Open Skies regime could become an essential and effective way of maintaining and building confidence and removing the suspicions and apprehensions that might arise.

As you probably know, as soon as the President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, suggested the idea of Open Skies, we immediately called for more than that, that is, for extending the area of international glasnost and openness.

Of course, in monitoring the earth from above, we can get some idea of the movements of navy ships and submarines. But can this be sufficient today when nuclear weapons, long-range cruise missiles, aircraft and combat helicopters are moving from land to the seas and oceans?

And yet, again and again, at various negotiations, the issue of naval arms and confidence-building measures affecting the activities of states on the seas and oceans is being left out of consideration and without resolution.

And here I would agree with Mr. Baker that the problem relating to aviation is a very serious problem. It is very complex, but the naval issue is of equal importance, in fact.

No serious argument is cited to justify this. This, in fact, comes as a remnant of the Cold War, and I think that, in fact, we can remain quite confident knowing that an area which concentrates increasing numbers of the most sophisticated arms remains unaffected by glasnost, knowing that those arms are extremely mobile and intended, above all, for use in offensive actions.

Let us face the truth. Today the easiest way to launch a surprise attack, a military invasion, or an aggression, is from the seas. Of course, it is easier to look for things where there is light rather than total darkness. And instead of putting more searchlights where there is already a bright illumination, strong rays of light should focus on the darkest corners of military activity.

Take space, where they do not just grow chickens. It is oversaturated with more than just monitoring satellites. And can

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we really be sure that all this stuff is good for mankind and for peace? Closed space could make irrelevant the very idea of Open Skies.

I am convinced that we should urgently develop a system for verifying the activities of states in space. The advocates of continued existence of nuclear weapons like to talk about some crazy leader who might suddenly acquire a nuclear bomb, or missile, and threaten to destroy life on earth. This is a strong argument, but it belongs to the past.

Now that private companies are well able to launch space rockets and objects we can have absolutely no assurance that some company would not launch into space something that would make the world hostage to its ambitions.

It is extremely regrettable that, standing on the highest frontier of man's intellect, we do not have the gumption to observe elementary rules of safety.

Rigorous verification should be established, particularly on earth, to make sure that weapons do not find their way into space. Glasnost, in our view, must begin with research. We should seek to create an environment in which neither a state, nor a company, could launch into space anything unknown, any black boxes.

There is nothing unrealistic about the regimes of openness on land, on the seas, and in space. Many forms of verification and control have already been tested and are being successfully used in everyday practice. There are numerous promising concepts, methods, and proposals.

As regards the idea of Open Seas, we could agree to exchange information on fleet postures. We could send notifications of major naval exercises, movements of large naval formations, naval transfers of troops to areas that are close to the borders of other states, and invite observers to naval exercises and manoeuvres.

As for the regime of Open Space, we propose the establishment of an international space inspectorate as part of an international verification system to bar weapons from space, and the creation of an international space monitoring agency.

If we proceed from the principle of fairness and reciprocity which is as old as the world, we should have no insurmountable obstacles in developing measures and procedures that would truly open the skies, land, the seas and space.

During the recent talks with Secretary Baker in Moscow we reached agreement on mutual visits by experts to certain radars in our two countries. We regard this as an important step in building confidence.

And now, a few considerations on the subject of our dialogue here.

There is no doubt that the conference should begin movement toward agreement on an Open Skies regime. Even in its first phase, specific results could be achieved. For example, a declaration of principles, or any other form of document, could be adopted to serve as a basis for an agreement, and this would serve as a basis for developing an agreement.

The Warsaw Treaty Organizations, in fact, are going to make a proposal on this subject and it will be made by the Hungarian delegation.

We view the Open Skies agreement as a document in its own right which would not be formally linked with other arms control agreements. There must, however, be a substantive link to make sure that the agreement would serve to prevent possible violations of other international agreements and treaties and, in that sense, to a certain extent affect them.

So we have to retain the possibility of adjustments in it with due regard for its relationship with the obligations of the participating states under other arms control and disarmament agreements and with relevant verification arrangements.

As we understand it, the Open Skies regime would permit participating states, on a mutual and equitable basis, to fly unarmed planes over the territories of other participating states to monitor military activities. For the Soviet Union, the purpose of the regime is to build confidence, ensure the predictability of military activities, and promote the process of arms control and disarmament and verification of compliance with obligations assumed.

As we see it, participants in the regime could at the initial stage include those countries which are now actively involved in the dialogue on issues of disarmament. However, we do not rule out the participation of other countries, too, in this process. In other words, the Open Skies regime should, in our view, be the result of concluding a multilateral agreement, either spelling out the details of the future regime or briefly outlining its objectives and substance as specified in technical protocols appended to the agreement.

The Open Skies regime must rest on the principle of comprehensive and full equality -- equality in the acquisition of, and access to, information which must not be used to the detriment of any of the sides; equality as regards the area of application of the regime covering the states' military activities not only on their national territories but also outside; equality as regards

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flight quotas, the use of airplanes and monitoring and data processing equipment.

We would like to hope that other participants, too, proceed from the need for equality of rights and a balance of interest. Evidently, the Open Skies agreement should be open for subsequently incorporating into it provisions on Open Seas and Open Space. And, of course, it should provide for the establishment of a coordinating body to consider all matters concerning compliance with the agreement and the resolution of unclear situations and disputes.

Progress toward greater Glasnost, openness and global confidence-building would effectively contribute to constructing a comprehensive system of international security. It is precisely in this context that we support the measures being proposed.

I am confident that they will lay the groundwork for a really unique system of confidence which, in organic unity with the priceless experience amassed in this area before, will further enhance Europe's standing as the creative laboratory of openness, transparency, disarmament and joint search for ways toward a peaceful human community.

We would like to believe that this experience will be a lodestar for mankind, that it will be supported by the United Nations and by all continents and regions as an example and model for building a global confidence system.

Our warm thanks go to the Government, and people, of Canada, who are giving such a hospitable welcome in Ottawa to this important conference working in behalf of mankind.

Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Shevardnadze. Could I call now upon the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Right Honourable Douglas Hurd.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE DOUGLAS HURD, CBE, MP,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS,
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like, first, to pick up the last point made by our Soviet colleague and add our warm thanks to the Canadian government for their initiative in calling this conference, and for their hospitality. I know that talk of global warming can only be



relative in the middle of an Ottawa winter, even a mild Ottawa winter, but there is no doubt that this meeting represents a global warming of a different and a wholly welcome kind.

President Eisenhower launched the idea of Open Skies 35 years ago during the Cold War. Then it seemed bold, imaginative, unrealizable; today it is still imaginative, desirable and about to happen.

An Open skies agreement will mean saying to each other: You do not have to believe it when we say our military dispositions are entirely defensive. Come and look for yourself; we have nothing to hide.

Certainly there are still technical problems to be resolved. We shall, for example, need to ensure that the quota system gives each country the chance to play an active part; that the system is compatible with the one which we will apply in CFE; and that it can be extended to other European countries who also want to take part. But it is clear from what has already been said, from the work which has already been done, that the will to reach agreement is there.

Open Skies, Mr. Chairman, is just one aspect of a scene which has been transformed since the proposal was put forward by President Bush last May. And you have encouraged us during this conference to widen the scope of discussion to cover larger aspects of that same scene.

As has already been said by Jim Baker, 1989 was a year of revolutions, new faces in each country, new voices, new constitutions, but a common theme.

For years at Helsinki we worked to establish with great difficulty a charter of basic human rights for Europe. At the time it was an ambition which was worth stating but which seemed, like Open Skies, far from reality. Now reality has arrived.

The peoples of eastern Europe demanded of their governments only the implementation of the principles which those governments had already agreed at Helsinki.

It is perhaps significant that the one country of eastern Europe where change could, alas, only be brought about with bloodshed was the one country which had not signed the final document of the Helsinki process last year; the one government which was not prepared to concede even the principle of basic human rights to its citizens. We are delighted to see that country, Romania, represented here today in a completely different style.

Now, as was inevitable, we enter a period of change so rapid that it brings with it some fears of instability. But I believe

that there are several good reasons for optimism.

The first is that the east Europeans have seized their opportunity with courage and with moderation. As Vaclaw Havel said in his first speech as President of Czechoslovakia, he and others have made politics the art of achieving the impossible.

The second reason for optimism lies in the enormous and welcome changes under President Gorbachev's leadership in the Soviet Union. It is a tribute to him, a tribute to our colleague, Edward Shevardnadze, that they saw so clearly the need for radical economic and political change. They have led a revolution from the top and have encouraged, rather than blocked, reform within eastern Europe.

The third reason for optimism is the steady and positive response of the West. Of course there has been rejoicing, but no crude triumphalism. We want to help forward the process of reform, but we have no desire to exploit for our own advantage the tensions which go with rapid change.

Political change is taking place in a framework of far-reaching, but orderly and negotiated, disarmament. The first step to stability in Europe is to reduce the most threatening categories of military equipment in Europe, and any agreement, an agreement on conventional forces in Europe, will do this dramatically. It will do more; it will regulate where equipment may be deployed and, through the important 30 per cent sufficiency rule, who may deploy it.


The agreement will also establish the climate and the basis for further negotiation.

I see, Mr. Chairman, two main areas here on CFE where we should be able to make useful progress at Ottawa.

First, we are well on the way to agreement on the definition of ground force equipment and on the complex regime of zones and storage. We should confirm that we all accept the ideas which emerged last week in Vienna, and instruct our negotiators to finalize agreement as soon as possible.

Second, on that basis, we can set the framework for solving the still difficult issues of aircraft, helicopters and personnel. Political choices will have to be made. The West has accepted the Eastern proposal that aircraft should be covered in the agreement. I hope that our Eastern partners will be prepared to accept the logic of their own position, that all land-based combat aircraft should be included. These are the aircraft which could pose a threat to the other side.

If this point of principle is agreed, it should be possible



to meet Eastern concerns about basic trainers and the separate status of certain air defence forces.

Without pretending that agreement on CFE is yet in the bag - and I think it is enormously important that it should be reached this year -- we should start to think about the future of conventional arms control beyond that agreement this year.

Mr. Chairman, we hear much talk of a peace dividend, and that talk is not always very well defined. It seems to me that there are two types of peace dividend. There is the dividend which flows from successful disarmament -- and by "successful", I mean disarmament achieved by negotiation after orderly thought between neighbours and allies about the real needs of their security. No one wants to spend more on armaments than the minimum needed for that security.

As these changes establish themselves, as the military threat diminishes, there will be savings to be harvested, beginning with the CFE agreement later this year. But it seems to me that even more important than that type of peace dividend is the dividend which comes from greater security based on growing trust between states.

Suspensions can be reduced. Governments which have snapped and snarled at each other for decades can now work together against, for example, pollution, against drug trafficking, against terrorism. We need to concert our work so that we earn both kinds of peace dividend.

I believe that we should launch immediately after the CSCE Summit, which we hope will be held later this year, continuing consultations among all the countries concerned, with a view to new negotiations on an agreed basis as soon as possible. We should focus on both types of dividend -- on the political goal of security, as well as the military goal of arms control.

Those negotiations should be closely supervised at the political level and involve participation by ministers, where necessary.

I mention, as others have done, the CSCE framework because these negotiations may well not be bloc-to-bloc as so often in the past. The Warsaw Pact is changing beyond recognition. as is not directly a matter for us, because it will be for the individual member countries to decide on the future of the Warsaw Pact on troop strengths and dispositions on their territory.

NATO, too, is changing. The political side of its work will continue to build up, and we warmly welcome that. There are certain constants which we believe are vital to the stability of Europe as a whole. These include the presence of significant

stationed forces, including United States, Canadian and British, on the continent of Europe; an integrated NATO command; and a sensible mix of nuclear and conventional forces. They also include continued membership of NATO by a united Germany --if Germany becomes united -- and we strongly support what has been said about this recently by the Government of the Federal Republic.

The members of NATO are very conscious that in this process the security concerns of others are also affected, and we share the wish to respect those concerns.

While defence and disarmament arrangements are the core of stability and confidence in Europe, they are only a part of the broader economic and political picture. The CSCE has always been about strengthening openness and trust. Its political work will be more important in the new year, and that is why we favour a summit, carefully prepared, at which the CFE agreement would be signed and a number of confidence-building measures agreed.

It will be for the CSCE Summit to set work in hand which will help make freedom, democracy and the rule of law secure and permanent in Europe through the CSCE framework.

We should have more economic co-operation as markets open up. We have already made practical proposals, as have others. With the United States we launched last summer a proposal on free elections. We have put forward a proposal on respect for the rule of law. The forthcoming meeting in Copenhagen of the Conference on the Human Dimension, and the summit, are opportunities to secure further work toward agreement on these ideas.

Until now, the CSCE has been a mechanism for trying to build common ground and agreed standards between conflicting systems. I hope the CSCE process can become one means of entrenching democracy and free institutions throughout a Europe secure, stable and free of confrontation.

There is one further thought which I would like to put to the meeting. I believe that we might consider a role of conciliation for CSCE. And I would explain very briefly why.

As the confrontation between East and West recedes, we see from time to time an upsurge of nationalist feelings in its place. It is as if the Cold War had anaesthetized, had put to sleep with an anaesthetic, some of the ancient emotions of European states. Now the anaesthetic wears off and we see that the old nationalist emotions, in some places and at some times, are still strong.

Nationalism can be a great creative force for pride and achievement, and every country represented here knows the richness of that achievement. But nationalism can also create the kind of bitterness, the kind of jealousy, which virtually destroyed Europe



in the First World War and came near to doing the same in the Second World War. So that there is, I believe, a case for building into the CSCE process some procedure for conciliation.

The success of the European community has, I believe, solved that problem in part of Europe. No one in practice now argues about Alsace-Lorraine, no one argues about Schleswig-Holstein. We may perhaps need a means of conciliation, a means of trying to ensure that any future disputes and difficulties elsewhere can be identified and conciliated before they get out of hand. This might be one of the aims of the new CSCE process alongside, of course, the normal procedures of the United Nations.

The European Community offers an example of how countries can work together in a common legal framework, with convergent economic policies and a shared political dialogue. The Community does not offer itself on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to the countries of Eastern Europe. They are not ready, either politically or economically, at this stage, for full membership, though that day may come.

What the Community offers now does not foreclose the possibility of eventual membership. We offer enthusiastically the kind of help and association which the countries of Eastern Europe need now. The relationship between them and the Community will develop as their democracy becomes entrenched and as they establish free market economies.

So, Mr. Chairman, you, the Canadian Government, were prescient in calling this meeting. It could not possibly be more timely. It forms part of a fairly complex jigsaw of arrangements. Of course, fitting the pieces together may be hard, but I believe we can now see that the pieces for those arrangements are all there. This meeting in Ottawa under your chairmanship may be looked back on, not just for the progress which we have made on Open Skies, important though that certainly is, but as the first meeting of a new era in which confrontation is replaced by co-operation between us all, and in which together we manage successfully the problems of peace and of prosperity.

Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Hurd. And now I would like to give the floor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, His Excellency Roland Dumas.

HIS EXCELLENCY ROLAND DUMAS,
MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FRANCE:

Mr. Chairman, Ministers, allow me, first of all, on behalf of

the French delegation, to express my wholehearted thanks to Canada, to its people and its government.

Then I would express my satisfaction at being present at a meeting, the opening of which alone is strikingly symbolizing the new climate of confidence that reigns among our countries.

Through the force of circumstance, this meeting is a major rendezvous of European history. For the first time, indeed, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member countries of the two alliances together are going to broach questions of security.

Of course, this meeting was planned well before the events that have rapidly transformed the political map of the old continent, and I believe, indeed, that we now have the task of examining questions far broader than the simple question of Open Skies.

The confrontation which marked East-West relations is dissipating more and more every day. The arbitrary order and heritage from the Second World War is being swept away by the aspirations of people for freedom and democracy.

A new Europe is rising up under our eyes, before our very eyes. We need to consolidate this through new shows of solidarity. Even if there is considerable progress to be achieved and difficulties to overcome, confidence has replaced confrontation, co-operation has replaced mistrust. This is an example of that fact.

In this context, the Open Skies proposal launched, as has already been said, by the President of the United States of America, is highly welcome and innovating to us. Let us measure the considerable progress that it constitutes.

The right to control one's airspace is indeed an attribute of the sovereignty of states. To authorize in advance other states to overfly one's territory without restrictions, other than those linked to air safety, does indeed constitute a renunciation of considerable prerogatives, prerogatives considered up to now to be sacred.

I would note that our host of the Government of Canada, that I would once again thank for the quality of the welcome here, has placed this conference under the sign of an emblem, where we see side-by-side a red hemisphere and a blue hemisphere. A symbol, indeed.

France, indeed, considers that the Open Skies negotiations should not define a new state of equilibrium from alliance to alliance, but offers the opportunity of concluding national commitments that reflect the wish of each state to foster

transparency and reduce tension.

The Open Skies initiative, indeed, is part and parcel of a movement that my country has endorsed and contributed to. The Stockholm Agreement has allowed the eastern countries and the western countries, and indeed the non-allied and neutral countries, to conduct mutual inspections to guarantee the transparency of military activities.

The Vienna Mandate and the negotiations on the establishment of confidence-building measures and security has amplified this movement toward a greater openness between peoples. But now we need to go farther today.

The establishment of an Open Skies regime offers us three opportunities. First of all, it gives a new impetus to the search of new confidence-building measures and safety measures in Europe. I have already said this: allowing people to overfly one's territory without restriction by a surveillance plane from another country is "the" expression of the trust that we place in the latter, and will contribute to the reinforcement of the stability that we all desire.

Second, the establishment of an Open Skies regime will allow us to contribute to the verification of an agreement on the disarmament of conventional forces in a zone that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals. The negotiation of this agreement is progressing in Vienna, and I will come back to it in a minute.

Finally, Open Skies meets with our constant concern to avoid any evasion of the future agreement on conventional disarmaments through the uncontrolled accumulation of forces over and beyond the zone between the Atlantic and the Urals.

Open Skies undoubtedly will offer a direct contribution to the solution to this tricky question. All of us will be able to be sure that over and beyond this zone, military activities and the production of armaments is not in contradiction with the objectives of the agreement to reduce conventional forces.

Indeed, it is in Europe that we have accumulated the most incredible quantity of armaments in history. In the name of the maintenance of balance of terror, which has become intolerable, it is, indeed, on behalf of this that we have negotiated the most important agreement on disarmament after the war. Indeed, these measures of confidence will establish a new order, free of the vestiges of the last 45 years. All the European countries have the task of participating in this vast movement -- indeed, the neutral and non-aligned countries as well, of the CSCE. On what basis could one possibly deny them the right? I see no basis on which to do this.

There is not, in Europe, a single country that is remote from the concern of the security of this continent. When discussing measures of confidence-building, indeed this must apply to everyone. Just as security, confidence is indivisible.

I was happy to hear the opinion expressed by the Secretary of State of the United States of America on this question.

Indeed, Open Skies, right from the origin, should be based on a national basis, allowing new associations without this affecting its functioning, nor affecting the rights and obligations of the participants. Subsequently, of course, it is up to us all to cooperate with others on the basis of existing solidarities and indeed, why not on the basis of new affinities?

A single principle should guide this approach. The rights and obligations of the states should not stem from their membership or non-membership of an alliance.

Indeed, only a national regime could adapt to present and future developments. This is an essential consideration for the credibility of Open Skies. Indeed, what would be the value of a system that was based on realities which, tomorrow, could be placed in question?

Indeed, the need to adopt a national approach, to my mind, is not only justified through considerations of principle, but also through the concern of seeing that Open Skies develops hand-in-hand with other developments in Europe and the East-West relationships.

To anticipate the movement of European history, this indeed should guide us in the negotiations in Vienna on conventional forces and the confidence-building measures, negotiations, indeed, which would be linked with the Open Skies negotiations.

You know that I recently was in Vienna with my colleagues from the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to give a political impetus to these new negotiations and bring forth a rapid conclusion. The western countries have just tabled four new proposals. These concern ground vehicles, planes, helicopters, and the stationed troops.

In many respects, these proposals could give a new twist to the Vienna discussions. The progress is important. France has, without reservations, supported the principle and contributed actively to developing the contents.

The impulse that the 16 countries wish to give to these negotiations calls for a constructive answer to three major questions concerning planes, terrestrial equipment, helicopters. These indeed constitute the basis for an agreement. This exists already.

I would now like to allude to the proposal of President Bush, to limit to 195,000 the Soviet and American Forces in central Europe.

We, as you know, have endorsed this initiative. It aims at solving what we know to be, for many peoples in Europe, a major source of concern, to recuperate the entire sovereignty of their territory. This legitimate requirement is that of states who wish to be masters of their own destiny.

Mr. Gorbachev rapidly responded, and recently responded, to the proposal and suggested that we extend to the entirety of Europe the limitations that Mr. Bush suggested should apply to central Europe. This is worthy of our attention, if it can speed up the Vienna negotiations, facilitate the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the countries who have expressed this desire, and contribute to the striving for a new state of balance and security in Europe.

It is under this triple aspect that we should examine this proposal.

The asymmetrical withdrawal of American and Soviet forces stationed in Europe would bring us closer to the objective of establishing security and limiting the risks of a surprise attack that we have over central Europe. Then, of course, any state in respect of this constraint could express its own defence concerns. Should I remind you that there are particular alliances, for example, the Joint Franco-German Brigade, which could not possibly be affected by the Vienna negotiations.

As to the American forces, their presence on the territory of some of our allies is the reflection of the wish of those governments. There are political and strategic reasons for this which are at the very heart of trans-Atlantic security relations. This also should be preserved.

Ladies and gentlemen, questions of disarmament that I have just alluded to are but a few of the aspects of the construction of Europe of tomorrow. And to the origin of this extraordinary movement in central and eastern Europe there was the wish of the people to do away with an anachronistic political order. Many ministers here present realize this. They themselves were yesterday the persecuted people of dictators whose day was past, and I would like to welcome them here wholeheartedly today.

I think also there was the question of an attraction of democratic values, the flourishing of these democratic values, a feeling shared by the majority of the countries of the CSCE. There was also the courage and the will of statesmen who realized before others that certain developments were inevitable. I am thinking here in terms of Mr. Gorbachev.

Therefore, everything was ready for this fantastic acceleration in history. The magnitude, however, has surprised us all. Who would have said last summer that in the last few months of 1989 we would see the fall of the most shameful wall of history and that of the most abominable dictatorship in Europe after the war?

The movement will continue. Who can say whether we will still be 35 in the CSCE? The question is well worthwhile putting, and I believe that history very rapidly will supply the answer to this question.

So, in this period of hope and uncertainty, let us see to it that alliances remain the expression of free political association and not the reflection of bloc discipline which after all serves no longer any purpose.

Ministers, these questions concern the edification of a peaceful united Europe. These questions which affect our common future should be discussed at the highest, loftiest level. This is why France immediately endorsed the proposal for a summit meeting of the CSCE in 1990.

I am happy to see that this has been welcomed by a broad consensus. And I would like to remind you of what you all know, that we would be very happy to receive this summit in Paris.

So now we have to prepare for this major meeting and, in fact, our decision yesterday, which I am pleased with, goes along those lines.

First of all, I hope that this summit will be the crowning result of the Vienna Negotiation 23 on the reduction of conventional forces, and 35 on the implementation of confidence-building measures and security measures.

Indeed, we can say that the contents and the main thrust of the final document, of the Vienna document signed in 1989 and the results accomplished must be taken into account. We must give all this our attention because some countries with certain reticences are coming back to concepts that are only defended by the democratic countries. What appears to be acquired is well worthwhile of being solemnly ratified.

Over and beyond this, we must look in terms of a new security order based on the new political reality of Europe. The momentum in the field of disarmament should continue but in a coherent fashion, given the political developments in the old continent. In fact, things are so rapid now that a new framework and new objectives should be defined within the framework of a new mandate.



And we hope that on a national basis each country participating in the CSCE will wish to participate in the preparation of this.

So here you are, Mr. Chairman. Very rapidly, these are our initial ambitions for this meeting. It does not mean to say, however, that developments in Europe will not create other ambitions. Nevertheless, we should put forward now possibility for new values and the possibility of developing new relationships, new links of friendship. Some have not waited. The European Economic Community, for many a long day now, has been an example of vitality and the solidarity of its members, as the Secretary of State from Great Britain reminded us.

Also, indeed, we are striving toward a new political union, nevertheless open to the outside world and willing to look into all forms of agreement and co-operation.

But in a broader perspective, France, through the President of the French Republic, suggests that Europe move toward a confederation. After all, there are themes to bring us together over and beyond those that pull us apart. I am thinking in terms of human rights; the defence of the environment; of the new financial efforts; the creation of the future Bank of Reconstruction and Development in Europe. Only our imagination can limit us, indeed, so rich appear these new developments in potential.

The Open Skies initiative is one of these potentials. Indeed, previously there was no security without a surfeit of armaments; now we need to have reciprocal trust. Not only should we base ourselves on words but on concrete examples, the free verification of which can bear out this feeling. Indeed, Open Skies is going to become the key for new relations among the countries of the CSCE.

Allow me to conclude, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of France. Allow me to say that we are committed to contributing to the success on the basis of the principles that I have just alluded to.

Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you, Mr. Minister. Before I call upon our colleague, the Foreign Minister of Poland, may I just indicate to Ministers that last night you accepted my suggestion that we establish two informal working groups which are to meet at 11 o'clock to discuss their program of work, in the one case concerning Open Skies and, in the other case, concerning a discussion on conventional force reductions in Europe. Those meetings will begin as per our

agreement at 11 o'clock.

And now may I turn the floor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, His Excellency Krzysztof Skubiszewski.

HIS EXCELLENCY KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, POLAND:

Mr. Chairman, distinguished colleagues, may I be permitted to open my remarks by referring to the political context of our meeting.

The states of central and eastern Europe have rejected various forms of totalitarianism. The Europe of two ideologies and the confrontation based on them is becoming a thing of the past, though the two multilateral alliances still exist.

Poland has been the originator of the changes in central and eastern Europe. We should all remember the Solidarity movement and its impact on the various transformations that now take place in that region. In fact, the East-West dichotomy has lost its former sense. As a result of successful efforts to bring about a change in our part of the continent, Western Europe, the United States and Canada, and other states, including Japan, have reacted to our endeavours and gave us economic help and other support. We express our gratitude. The word "solidarity", which has a special importance in Poland, has now acquired an all-European and Atlantic meaning.

A single Europe is emerging. It is a Europe of democracy, pluralism and humanism. The construction of a new system of European security, the rejection of the East-West formula of relationships and the making of new arrangements of co-operation and cohesion should be subordinated to these values.

All this offers a serious challenge to our statesmanship. Old structures usually outlive the circumstances that created them. The inertia of old behaviours and habits is strong, and there is a justified fear of instability. Such anxieties should not be disregarded. But we do believe that they will soon be overcome and, in any case, we wish to act with prudence.

There is need to arrive at a long-term concept for the development of pan-European relations. Some most recent changes that are beginning to take place in the heart of Europe and that are fundamental require the creation of a new system of European security. It is with this in mind that we are considering the proposal to call a summit conference of the 35 states which participate in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. We feel that such a summit conference should consider various initiatives to modify the status of our continent.

While the European Community constitutes the hard core of the effort to build a united Europe, and the Council of Europe in Strassbourg plays a primary role, I wish to emphasize the importance of President Mikhail Gorbachev's concept of a "common European home" and of President Francois Mitterrand's idea of a European confederation.

In the Helsinki process, we also need some institutional improvements and, among other proposals to this effect, I wish to refer to the suggestion by the Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki to establish within that process a Council of European Co-operation. Let me add that this Council will not compete with any of the existing European organizations or institutions, nor will it be a substitute for them.

A well-prepared summit meeting of the 35 states before the end of this year will, we believe, give an essential impulse for setting up a novel framework of European security.

Distinguished delegates, the new security system which Poland is favouring should be guided by the mutual respect of rights and interests and should contain specific guarantees which would eliminate a possibility of a return to the rule of force, to political dictates and to satellitism. By following democratic policies and by respecting the rule of law, we shall be able to overcome the syndrome of the continent's division into zones of influence, which have had some negative a bearing on the international situation, particularly on the position of some smaller or medium-sized states.

Some instrumentalities which we can use to construct a new system are already at hand. There are the disarmament negotiations, especially those in Vienna, and the Helsinki process. The logic of their development must be subordinated to the political concept of a democratic restructuring of the European security system. Disarmament thinking may not be allowed to lag behind the requirements of the current situation and the course of events.

Hence, our call for a rapid and successful conclusion of the agreements which have already been outlined at the present negotiations and to advance to a new stage of accords which would lead to a comprehensive European rapprochement.

Mr. Chairman, this conference is devoted to a concept which was born a long time ago. This is not to say that it has lost any of its value. Far from it. The transformations I mentioned have created the conditions for its fruition; hence, our positive reaction to President George Bush's initiative on this matter.

Openness implies the absence of hidden and unfriendly intentions. Openness is a means of democratizing security

relationships, for it enables an equal access to information.

Poland advocated the lifting of the curtain on those spheres of national military activities which arouse distrust and suspicion as to the credibility of declared intentions. On our part, we are consistently declassifying information and making it available to our public and to other states in a spirit of good-neighbourly relations.

We have just published a White Book on Defence. This document was presented to the participants of the seminar on military doctrines staged last month in Vienna.

Poland advocates the extension and consolidation of the principle of openness as a standard practice in European relations. It is from such a viewpoint that the Government of the Republic of Poland approaches the proposals put forward during the disarmament negotiations. All ideas which serve the openness and the building of confidence can count on our support. We are ready to open our airspace under the forthcoming agreement.

Distinguished delegates, my country represents the view that the Open Skies regime be based on principles which would make it an indispensable component of a new concept of European security.

These principles are as follows:

First, it should be a regime that would not exclude other measures, would supplement them and amplify their functioning. Not only should the Open Skies regime lead to the transparency of military activities, but it should make the verification of disarmament agreements easier.

Second, it should be a democratic regime which means that its participants will be individual sovereign states. Those states should benefit in an equal degree from the Open Skies regime, regardless of their size and technical capabilities, while the agreement itself could be made accessible to some non-participants in the present Conference, though that matter still requires very careful consideration.

Third, the regime should be operationally effective. After all, it is not just a political symbol of the new times that we are seeking. The balance of cost and profit is the measure of effectiveness. This should be a cost-effective regime. Its effectiveness further means that collisions and complications should be eliminated, and there must be respect for the rules of air-traffic safety, and for the interests of transit states.

Above all, however, we should enhance the sense of security of all participating states.

Poland also evaluates the Open Skies concept from the viewpoint of its own geopolitical and geostrategic situation. We are located in a densely populated, sensitive area of the continent. Poland will strive to have that specific situation of the region reflected in the agreement.

Mr. Chairman, many technical issues will have to be resolved before the Open Skies concept becomes a reality. This will surely be a time and energy consuming task. Various solutions have their merits. However, I do believe, that the political and military values inherent in an Open Skies agreement will prevail over its details. It is in such a spirit that the Polish delegation will try to contribute to our endeavours.

Mr. Chairman, I have prepared my text using Shakespeare's language, but I would not like to reach the end of my comments without having expressed myself in French, the language of a country whose culture is so important to the entire world, to Europe, and for the heart of every Pole, and I cannot forget that is one of the official languages of our host country.

France, especially through its presence in the European community, made a major contribution to the support of democratic changes in central Europe, these changes allowing our meeting to take place today in a spirit of solidarity.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I would like to address my thanks to the Government of Canada for its initiative in calling this conference and for the creation of excellent conditions for the operation of the conference. We see Canadian hospitality, it makes us very pleased, and it is extraordinary. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Minister, I would like to thank you for having used the two official languages of Canada. It is an example of multilingualism, which I think can be appreciated by a large number of my fellow Canadians.

I take great pleasure now in calling on the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, his excellency, Hans Van Den Broek.

HIS EXCELLENCY, HANS VAN DEN BROEK,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen.

As was recalled earlier this morning, the idea of opening our skies to allow inspections by air over each other's territory is

not a new one. It was, indeed, President Eisenhower, who first made a proposal on the subject during his summit meeting with General Secretary Khrushchev in July 1955.

At that time, and in that conference room in Geneva, the presentation of the proposal, according to President Eisenhower's memoirs, was immediately followed by a loud, unexpected clap of thunder, an electricity breakdown, total darkness in the conference room, and stunned silence.

Seeing the large number of delegations present today both from East and West, I am happy to note that we have recovered from that shock eventually and that now we can discuss this bold and interesting idea.

I am grateful to President Bush for having launched the Open Skies proposal in May last year. The moment was well chosen. During the last few years dramatic changes have taken place and, although different in form as well as in thrust, they have in common that they mark the beginning of a new era that holds out bold promises.

In paraphrasing one of England's most famous poets, Milton, one could say "Europe lost, Europe regained", although we have hardly reached the state of paradise yet in Europe.

The unrelenting desire of the peoples to live in freedom and to build jointly, guided by a common heritage, a better Europe has uncovered new horizons. The Cold War is behind us; new tasks lie ahead.

One of these certainly is the management of change, our joint responsibility to ensure that the new Europe will develop along peaceful lines and remain embedded in a structure of stability.

As far as the Netherlands are concerned, two indispensable elements of such a structure of stability are the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance.

I am convinced that the process of European integration and the trans-Atlantic partnership will be two cornerstones of the new European architecture which we will have to design in the coming years. This architecture will have to be a robust one, strong enough to withstand any tendencies toward what I would call a re-nationalization of European policies, meaning a falling-back to the unstable and dangerous era of rampant nationalism and threatening power policies.

An important building-block in this new European architecture will also be a strengthened CSCE. The Helsinki process provides us with an excellent instrument for intensifying the co-operation between all European countries and enhancing security for all.

Its agenda is the right one, ranging from human rights to disarmament and economic co-operation. Its members are not only 33 countries in Europe itself, but also those two European powers who, geographically speaking, lie on a different continent but form, in the political and cultural sense, an integral part of the community of European nations, our host nation today, Canada, and the United States of America. Their continued participation in the affairs of Europe, also in the field of defence and security, is, we believe, crucial for the peace and well-being of our continent.

Each of the three institutions I mentioned -- the European Community, The Atlantic Alliance, and the CSCE -- has its own role to play in the new Europe.

And there is no need, as far as we can see, to look at them as a kind of alternative and to presume that a strengthened CSCE can or should replace, for instance, the Atlantic Alliance, or that the process of European integration in the framework of the European Community stands in the way of a greater economic co-operation between all European countries.

A CSCE summit later this year on the occasion of the signing of the CFE Treaty will lead, I hope, to a strengthening of the CSCE part of the new European architecture. And, in the view of my country, such a summit will not only provide a forum for a stock-taking and a general debate on the fundamental changes that have taken place in Europe in the recent years; but that summit will also be the appropriate moment to take decisions on the updating of the Helsinki process in accordance with the new circumstances.

These decisions could take the form of new CSCE commitments which would consolidate the positive developments in the European countries concerning, inter alia, human rights and free elections, and could harvest the results of CSCE meetings such as the ones later this year in Bonn and Copenhagen.

Furthermore, that summit will, in the opinion of my country, have to decide on new arms control objectives. The Netherlands is in favour, after the conclusion of a CFE agreement, to have an immediate start of a new cycle of negotiations to enhance stability and security in Europe even more.

Moreover, the summit could decide on strengthening the structure of the CSCE process by setting up a structure for consultations between the CSCE countries at the level of Foreign Ministers and their officials. And this structure should, in our opinion, be a flexible one, not based on a formal treaty and without a cumbersome bureaucracy.

Most important, however, at that summit the Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be given the mandate to elaborate proposals

regarding the founding principles of a new European peace order, and the role of the CSCE in that context.

Subsequently in 1992, at the Helsinki follow-up meeting, the steps taken in the framework of the CSCE process for the construction of what we call a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, of which the Harmel report already spoke in 1967, could then be in 1992 solemnly confirmed.

An important part of the new European architecture will be a unified Germany. Each day it becomes clearer that the German unification will figure prominently on the summit agenda this year. The Netherlands welcome the prospect of a unified Germany.

We have for decades supported the right of the German people to regain its unity through the exercise of its right to self-determination. And forty years of experience with the Federal Republic of Germany, as a partner in European integration and Atlantic co-operation, give us full confidence that also a unified Germany will play its full role in shaping a new European peace order, as a member of the European Community and as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Mr. Chairman, the negotiations on Open Skies form a part of a wider agenda which also encompasses the CFE and CSBM negotiations in Vienna. In my view, this conference offers a unique opportunity to all of us present here for giving a further impetus to these negotiations. I would not dare to go as far as to describe the ministerial part of our conference here in Ottawa as a Vienna plenary at ministerial level, but I am sure that all of us look forward to providing a political impulse to the Vienna negotiations. And, indeed, we should not fail to grasp the opportunity this conference offers us to help bring the CFE talks to a rapid, successful conclusion. Our publics expect nothing less because we ourselves have raised their expectations.

Recently the West has tabled five new proposals which, to my mind, can meet most of the concerns some countries may have had as to our previous proposals. By accepting the principle of conversion of helicopters, by excluding primary trainers, as well as accepting a separate category for interceptors in our aircraft definition, the West has made important and substantial concessions in our view -- concessions which, hopefully, will be reciprocated by the Warsaw Pact countries.

As to tanks and armoured combat vehicles, consensus over their definition and corresponding ceilings and sub-ceilings seem to be within reach now. And bridging our differences on zones and the concept of storage also seems to be feasible.

Concerning U.S. and Soviet stationed troops the positions seem to be getting nearer, although the Soviet Union has, as yet, not



been able to accept the latest western proposal.

As far as the presence of western European forces on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany is concerned, we would not accept a treatment of these forces which would imply that their presence there is basically an abnormality, which has no place in a new European security architecture and should be ended at a certain point of time.

On the contrary, as I said before, the process of European integration is destined to become one of the solid cornerstones of the new architecture. And the stationed troops of the members of the European Community, which have set themselves the goal of a European union, can in our view, therefore, not logically be included in a ceiling on stationed troops.

Our common commitment to an early conclusion of the CFE negotiations offers us no other option, I think, than to grasp every opportunity to give a further impetus to our negotiators in Vienna. I therefore propose that we agree here in Ottawa, as political representatives of our countries, to commit ourselves to the conclusion of the CFE negotiations in the course of this year.

Undoubtedly, it will prove to be a truly Herculean task to complete all the technical details of the treaty within the time limits we have set ourselves. All the more reason, I would say, for us to try to identify common elements during our meetings here on the basis of which our negotiators in Vienna can then proceed further. In this context I would like to draw your attention to the step the Netherlands took in Vienna in October last year. When the negotiators in Vienna agreed on a definition of artillery, the Netherlands decided to voluntarily provide the participants with informal information on the Netherlands' artillery holdings in the area of application. Our initiative was generally welcomed and I, therefore, propose that all participating countries agree to provide, during the negotiations, on a voluntary and informal basis, all the relevant information on national holdings of treaty limited equipment. To start with, this may apply to artillery.

After the pertaining definitions have been agreed upon, this could be extended to other categories of treaty limited items.

By a process in which an ever-widening group of countries would, on an informal basis, gradually release information on their holdings, we would not only make it possible to gain further insight into the structure and numbers of the armed forces present in Europe, but we would also gain valuable experience and pave the way for the formal exchange of data which will take place at the signing of the Treaty. And this, in my opinion, will be an important element in ensuring the immediate smooth implementation of the Treaty.

And, by the same token, Mr. Chairman, I would propose that the CFE Joint Consultative Group, as foreseen in the Western draft Treaty text, be operational immediately upon the signing of the Treaty.

It is foreseen that, in the transitional period between the signing and the entry into force of the Treaty, the parties will already begin to exchange substantial information, such as their maximum levels of holdings.

It will, therefore, be of the utmost importance that already in this interim period a forum will exist in which the parties can discuss the exchanged information and, if necessary, ask for clarification.

Mr. Chairman, let us not under-estimate the tasks which we will be taking upon ourselves in implementing this Treaty. The timely installation and activating of the Joint Consultative Group can only enhance the prospects of a smooth and effective implementation.

Mr. Chairman, let me now return to the subject of Open Skies.

In the Netherlands' view, the establishment of an Open Skies regime, consisting of regular, unarmed, surveillance flights, is the logical next step in the confidence-building process between East and West.

It will strongly enhance the transparency between our countries with respect to each other's military situation.

It contributes to stability in a period of great changes in Europe and can facilitate the management of those changes.

Moreover, Open Skies can usefully complement the verification arrangements under other arms control agreements.

We should try to create an Open Skies regime that is both flexible and effective. Heavy bureaucratic mechanisms and cumbersome procedures are to be avoided. The NATO countries have already reached some specific understandings in this connection. Subjects to which we attach particular importance concern the co-ordination of the observation flights to be conducted, the pooling of resources and the sharing of information gained from Open Skies flights.

There should also be the possibility for nations to group themselves into one unit for the purpose of hosting Open Skies flights and jointly accept the quota applying to the total land mass. I would like to inform the Conference that we have been discussing this possibility with Belgium and Luxembourg and that we are aiming at presenting ourselves as one Benelux group.

For the Open Skies flights to be effective and credible, the aircraft conducting the observation flights should, in the opinion of my country, be equipped with adequate sensors. Countries should be free in principle to decide on the sensors they wish to use; restrictions should be limited and specific.

Before closing, Mr. Chairman, I may point out that as we appreciate the participation of the neutral and non-aligned countries in the CSCE process, we should envisage the possibility to associate these countries also to Open Skies, once the system has proven that it serves its purposes.

Mr. Chairman, this time nature has not interfered with our discussions on Open Skies. I think this augurs well for the Conference, which I sincerely hope will be successful.

I would like to thank wholeheartedly with other colleagues the Canadian authorities for taking the initiative of bringing us all together for this unique exchange between countries of Warsaw Pact and NATO and for the very warm hospitality that the Canadian authorities have extended to all of us on this occasion.

Thank you very much.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you, Hans. Colleagues, as a demonstration not only of the new thinking but of the new behaviour, we are running ahead of schedule, which is a practice I hope we can continue because that may allow us more time while we are all in Ottawa to discuss informally some of the other urgent matters in addition to Open Skies which we want to discuss.

I have consequently been looking for volunteers from this afternoon's list and am pleased to say that we will be hearing in order after our colleague from Bulgaria, Greece and Denmark.

May I now call upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, His Excellency Boyko Dimitrov.

HIS EXCELLENCY BOYKO DIMITROV,
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BULGARIA:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Distinguished colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, I would like first of all to express our appreciation to the Government of Canada for hosting this first stage of the Open Skies Conference.

Our special thanks go to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Joe Clark, for his initiative which offered us all the chance to participate in the ministerial meeting of the group of

23.

This meeting, the first of its kind, may perhaps acquire unique significance because of the moment of history in which we are living.

For what we are now witnessing and experiencing in Europe is the rapid disintegration of the post-war international order based on bi-polarity and division, on ideological, political and military confrontation.

A decisive factor in this process has been the dramatic movement toward democracy which emerged in the East European countries, given impetus by the winds of Gorbachev's perestroika.

Since November 10 of last year, Bulgaria has proudly and resolutely joined in this movement. The goal is the peaceful and orderly transition from a bureaucratic, monopolistic and oppressive authoritarian regime, to a multi-party, democratic, parliamentary system, based on the rule of law and respect for human rights and entrenched in a pluralistic market-oriented economy.

Despite philosophical and political differences these objectives are shared both by the governing party and by the newly emerged parties and organizations of the opposition. In order to translate this broad consensus into new legislation and into practical policies which would enjoy the broadest possible popular support, a national round-table has been set up and is holding regular sessions, with a view to preparing genuinely free, open and competitive general elections.

These radical internal changes are naturally reflected in Bulgaria's foreign policy where priorities based on the national interest and universal values are redefined on a democratic basis.

Bulgaria is an integral part of Europe, of its historical heritage, of European moral, political, social and cultural values. At a time when existing alliance structures and capabilities are put in doubt, we are determined to find a proper place for our country in the newly emerging all-European solutions. That is why we welcome and support the establishment of a new, comprehensive effective system of security and co-operation in Europe, based, to an ever-growing extent on disarmament, confidence building, political guarantees, and the interdependence of economic interests.

It is precisely for this reason, and with these hopes in mind, that Bulgaria welcomes the idea of holding a summit conference of the 35 CSCE member countries preceded by a preparatory meeting of ministers. We believe that joint preparatory work should start in the nearest future for the convening of this summit as early as possible during the autumn of this year.



Bulgaria is also in favour of sparing no effort so that during the CSCE summit this fall a treaty on conventional armed forces and arms reductions among Warsaw Treaty and NATO member countries could be signed as well as new agreements to be reached on confidence and security-building measures among all 35 participating governments.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished colleagues, let me remind you of the fact that Bulgaria belongs to a part of Europe with a turbulent past and complex historical heritage. Moreover, it is one of the front-line states in the southern flank of Europe where pronounced military asymmetries exist.

In the context of on-going dynamic and radical democratic reforms in my country, which lead to a growing public awareness of and concern for security matters. There emerges a strong consensus on the need to comply with, and strictly observe, the principle of indivisibility of peace, stability and security in Europe as a whole, and against any solution which willingly or by sheer neglect would establish zones with unequal degree of security.

That is why, while wholeheartedly supporting mutually acceptable solutions for central Europe in CFE negotiations and in the possible agreement to be concluded among the 23 countries, we shall insist on similar equitable arrangements for the southern-flank area consonant with that provision of the mandate of the Vienna talks which stipulates: "...quite equal security...for every individual country at all stages of the reductions".

In terms of security and stability, each and every country in Europe should enjoy equal benefits whether it is in the center or on the periphery of the continent. This should be the guiding principle in discussing and settling such matters as regional divisions; regional subceilings; the possibilities for redeployment; or regional reasonable sufficiency rules.

Our specific position on this matter will be shortly presented by Bulgaria's delegation in Vienna.

One of these would be a provision that no single state should dominate the military in South-East Europe, namely, that no state should possess in this region troops and armaments above a certain percentage/ i.e. 30 per cent of all the forces/ which is enough for regional reasonable sufficiency.

Mr. Chairman, one of the facets of democracy is the genuine openness of society. It is obvious, therefore, why conditions for establishing an Open Skies regime nowadays are more favourable than ever. The Bulgarian government wholeheartedly supports and is willing to contribute to a constructive discussion and realization of the Open Skies initiative of the United States' President.

Our specific position is, however, motivated by the following considerations.

One, Bulgaria stands for full respect of the principle of equality in the observation process in order that all parties to the agreement be placed on the same footing regardless of their economic, scientific and technological potential. Given present realities and existing inequalities in these matters, it is only the use of the same sensors of a common-for-all international pool of aircraft and of joint data processing facilities that could ensure the achievement of that objective. This is especially true of the situation of smaller and less developed countries among which Bulgaria belongs.

Two, we attach great significance to the financial implications of the regime. In our view the purchase of aircraft for the joint international pool, and of joint equipment, should be funded through share contributions of participating states similar to those applied to the funding of the present conference.

Three, the agreement should be open for accession by all other CSCE participating states as well as other countries that might wish to join.

Four, openness and confidence are indivisible. The Open Skies negotiation should be followed up by talks for Open Land, Open Seas and Open Space talks.

In concluding my remarks, I would like to reiterate that we believe that the present negotiations should be conducted in a dynamic and constructive spirit, so as to achieve through the efforts and the political will of all of us positive initial results here in Ottawa with a view to finalizing the agreement in Budapest in the spring of this year.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Dimitrov. Could I now call upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, His Excellency Antonis Samaras.

HIS EXCELLENCY ANTONIS SAMARAS,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, GREECE:

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my government, I would like to extend our warmest thanks to the Canadian government for their initiative to host the Open Skies Conference in this beautiful city, and our congratulations for the excellent organization of the meeting.



We strongly support the Open Skies initiative and have welcomed it from the outset. This initiative comes at the moment when historic political evolutions in eastern and central Europe are giving a whole new meaning to the basic concept of international relations. These relations are increasingly being governed by the concepts of openness, confidence building, co-operation and the rule of international law.

The conclusion of an Open Skies treaty will contribute substantially to the attainment of these goals. It will serve as another formal fruitful co-operation in this new world architecture of peace and dialogue. By permitting the unrestricted area of surveillance of the territories of the participating states, it will greatly enhance the degree of confidence in the alliance's mutual relations.

Confidence will replace mistrust and co-operation supplant confrontation. The conference on Open Skies is thus placed in the direct line of a much broader process tending to transform the territories of North America, Europe and parts of Asia into a vast zone of co-operation and mutual trust.

This process has its roots in the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe which has played a major role in creating an advanced stage of co-operation among the participating states and which can provide the framework for an even higher form of collaboration between these countries.

For these reasons, my government would warmly welcome the participation of all the CSCE countries to the Open Skies initiative. So, we wish to express our satisfaction over the invitation extended to the neutral non-aligned countries to attend this conference as observers.

We trust that this development is a further positive contribution to reaching the aim shot by this meeting in connection with the expediency of an ever increasing need for building confidence amongst all European nations.

Mr. Chairman, the other very important aspect of the ongoing process for the transformation of our continent are the negotiations of the conventional forces in Europe. Greece is fully aware of the historical significance of these talks because they aim at the overcoming of the ideological and political confrontation between states and groups of states on our continent.

This goal, which a short time ago seemed at the most a far away dream, is now within our reach. My government shares the objective of all participating countries to reach, as was clearly stated last night, before the end of the current year, a concrete and substantial agreement on the reduction and the limitation of

conventional armed forces in Europe.

Such an agreement will open a new era in the history of arms control. It will achieve this goal by providing full and equal security to all participating states. Greece, as a small country, must also insist on the obvious fact that no country, however small, should see her security diminished as a result of this treaty.

In today's rapidly changing environment, the security of Europe does not depend only on the balance of forces between the two alliances. It increasingly depends on maintaining regional equilibrium.

The reduction of conventional forces in Europe, welcome as it is, should not be allowed to upset such regional balances because the result could be increased instability in the region concerned and ultimately in the whole of Europe.

Mr. Chairman, while reviewing the negotiations in the conventional forces in Europe, one is struck by the extent of the results achieved so far. It is remarkable that negotiations of so great importance and complexity conducted between 23 sovereign states have progressed so rapidly. However, there is still much to be done.

Therefore, Greece is fully convinced of the need to give a strong political impulse, as again was clearly stated last night, to these negotiations.

Our meeting here is designed to give them precisely such an impact. For the same reason, we support the idea of convening a ministerial meeting of the 23 participating countries during this spring in Vienna.

Finally, I would like to point out that the agreement to be signed this year will only be the link in a long process which will aim at the balance of forces at much lower levels. These new negotiations should begin immediately after the first accord is concluded.

Mr. President, before concluding, I would like to confirm to you the good will of Greece, who will provide all its efforts in order to put its input international development and to ensure that this next era is one of openness and will ensure rights and peace.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate, once again, on the part of the Hellenic delegation, and send to you our warmest thanks, our gratitude to the Government of Canada, as well as to you yourself, for your very generous hospitality and the excellent manner in which you have organized this meeting.
Thank you.



MR. CHAIRMAN:

May I now call upon the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. And, I should say, sir, that you know you are very welcome here, but we also regret that our colleague, Raphael Yevyensen, is not able to be with us. And, we hope that you will convey to him our very warm wishes. May I now call upon Mr. Otto Moller.

MR. OTTO MOLLER,
PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
DENMARK:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your very kind words to my Minister. I will certainly convey them to him.

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Danish government, I express our gratitude to the Government of Canada for the warm welcome and for the hospitality with which we have been received here in Ottawa. I also thank the Canadian government for its offer to host this conference on Open Skies. We, for our part, highly appreciate the hard work that your hosts have done in order to ensure that this conference goes forth to a good start.

Mr. Chairman, we are meeting certainly at a time of tremendous opportunities. Relations between East and West are now better and more productive than at any time since World War II. Developments in the Soviet Union and in central and eastern Europe have contributed greatly in this regard.

Denmark welcomes this new relationship of co-operation. We urge that all others seize the moment to lay the foundation of lasting peace.

Progress has been made within all fields of the CSCE process. The process has been given new life. Apart from progress in the security field, I would like to mention economic co-operation and the human dimension of the process, both of which will be the subject of important meetings this spring and summer in Bonn and Copenhagen respectively.

A number of proposals have been made in recent months for the strengthening of co-operation structures in Europe. It is a common feature in all of them that the CASE process is accorded a prominent role. There is a need for an urgent examination of all new proposals.

The political structures which we have built in Europe since the Second World War must be seen in a new light following the dramatic developments in Central and Eastern Europe.

The internal political structures in several states are under strain. The need for strengthening international co-operation is plain for all to see.

We are, therefore, very satisfied that the Soviet proposal for a CASE summit meeting have met with broad support from all sides. We now need to get on with the preparation. Thorough preparations are needed for such an ambitious conference to succeed with such short notice.

Not disregarding the complex technical problems, we must keep up the momentum at the CFE negotiations in Vienna in order that they may reach a first stage of agreement as soon as possible. The opportunities for lasting progress have never been brighter. Important political impulses to the negotiations should be given and are, in fact, being given.

We welcomed from the outset President Bush's proposal concerning stationed troops. Also in the necessary task of establishing agreed definitions on all categories of weapons and equipment covered by the negotiations new constructive proposals have been presented. This, inter alia, applies to combat aircraft.

We hope that these expressions of strong political will to bring CFE-1 to a speedy conclusion will be met with an equally constructive attitude.

Mr. Chairman, almost 35 ago President Eisenhower tabled a proposal to establish an Open Skies regime. At that time the Danish Government welcomed the proposal and declared itself ready to let such a regime encompass Danish territory, including Greenland.

Thirty-five years later, the positive view which was expressed then is still valid.

When President Bush, in May last year, took the initiative to relaunch the proposal on open skies and to expand its scope, the Danish Government immediately stated that it regarded the proposal as a very positive contribution to greater openness and confidence between East and West.

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, an open skies regime could not only help us achieve a larger degree of transparency as far as military activities are concerned, it could also as a tool in a verification context. Open skies will allow for virtually unrestricted aerial observation of the territories of North America, Europe and the Soviet Union. Thus, it will establish openness in a very concrete way, but on a very broad scale.

We must meet the challenges of the present and turn them into



results for the future.

And with these words, Mr. Chairman, I thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Moller. And may I now turn the floor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, His Excellency Mark Eyskens.

HIS EXCELLENCY MARK EYSKENS,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BELGIUM:

Mr. Chairman, distinguished colleagues, I, too, would like, first of all, to thank Canada for its hospitality on the occasion of the Open Skies Conference, the importance of which is even greater than was imagined only a few months ago.

It is true that in a few months the world has changed so that what was certainly immutable yesterday has now been uprooted by precipitous events.

This doesn't mean we have gone astray or that we lacked the necessary vision. Just the opposite. The declarations that were adopted during the Alliance Summit in March 1988 and May 1989 pointed out objectives in which some, especially in the field of conventional weapons, are being achieved. The reduction of armaments, as necessary as it is, is not an end in itself and can only be actual in the sense that it works towards a peaceful Europe -- a Europe that can overcome its divisions, a fairer, democratic and more human Europe.

Belgium, like its allies, always hoped to see the division of Europe disappear, a military division, but also a political and ideological division. The events of the last few months in East Germany and in Czechoslovakia, after the reforms undertaken in Poland and Hungary, the upheavals in Bulgaria and, finally, and in Romania show that a very painful chapter, a dramatic chapter, in European history is over.

And it was thanks to the reforms under way in the U.S.S.R., a reform in which President Gorbachev proudly took the initiative and in which we should stress the ambition. We support them because it is in everyone's interest and, first of all, for Europeans, that these reforms succeed if we want a peaceful order to be set up throughout all of Europe.

The fact that we are meeting here today in Ottawa reflects the contribution that our North American allies bring to the stability of Europe. This contribution is not only required, but also

desired by my country. The Atlantic Alliance for us is a guarantee of essential safety.

But, as with any human undertaking, the Alliance cannot remain unchanged. I am sure that it will find itself, as it has in the past, the resources to adapt to the need for a changing East-West relationship and for co-operation with the countries of central Europe and eastern Europe, especially when it comes to arms control.

We also hope that the Atlantic Alliance will continue to meet the requirements of a true partnership between North America especially when it comes to arms control. We also hope that the Atlantic Alliance will continue to meet the requirements of a true partnership between North Americans and Europeans.

It is, with this changing background, full of hope that I have come to the Open Skies project which is, properly speaking, the topic of our meeting. The very idea of transparency, considered by some as a type of unacceptable intrusion a while ago, is now part of the existing order.

It is not that the project was bad 35 years ago, when the idea was first launched by President Eisenhower, but, rather, that the mentalities have changed, as well as the policies. This gives us an idea of the road that we have taken.

For us, Open Skies is an instrument which will allow all of the countries who are interested in the security of Europe, to contribute directly to better mutual information on the military facilities of all countries.

Open Skies assumes that there will be active and passive co-operation on the part of all. This seems to be as important to me as the objective, itself, of greater transparency. Open Skies is no longer to be considered as a mechanism between blocs and to be negotiated between blocs because these concepts have been surpassed by the events. Now it will be up to the experts to set up the terms of this new regime.

I would like to stress two points that are very important from a political point of view. First of all, an Open Skies regime, according to us, should be extended at the right time to all of the European countries who would like to take part in it. Such an extension to neutral countries, I think, should eventually take place because they are nations, not alliances or pacts, which have rights and obligations which would stem from the accord.

Second, an Open Skies agreement, if it is to be judged on the basis of its actual merits, is also related to other verification systems which are being negotiated, starting with the CFE negotiations. There is a very close relationship between them,

and we have to take this into account.

As for the field of geographical application, it is not the same as for the CFE. The two regimes, one a verification regime and the other a transparency regime, will be called upon to support each other.

But Open Skies, regardless of how interesting it is, should not make us lose sight of the fact that the CFE agreement will be the true cornerstone of a new, safe environment which is taking place in Europe. This new order, which we all hope for, can only be established if we eliminate all of the military imbalances which have been accumulated over 40 years of hidden confrontation.

Therefore, we would like a CFE first agreement before the end of the year. This is a necessary point that we have to cross in East-West politics.

There are still a few obstacles to be eliminated. For example, the question of stationed forces, aviation and helicopters. On these three points, with our allies, we have made proposals which I think would make things advance more quickly.

On the question of stationed personnel, we would like to see significant lowering of the ceilings. This proposal goes in the direction of the steps that are taking place, toward greater reductions than were originally planned.

As for aviation, we are responding to a request of the U.S.S.R. to include air defence interceptors in a separate category which allows those, who wish so, to structure their forces with the necessary flexibility. This proposal does not call into question the very essence of our approach which would, like all ground-based combat planes, regardless of their location, to be covered. I would like to insist on this point, which is very crucial to us.

The new definitions for combat helicopters also meet some of the concerns of our Eastern European partners, which they have mentioned.

We have to organize ourselves to reach an agreement this summer in order to have the 35 countries sign it. The CSBMs must evolve at the same time as the CFE without it slowing down the CFE process, of course, which I mentioned was very important in the context of solving the major political issues that the 35-country summit will deal with.

I would now like to come to the summit itself, Mr. Chairman.

The CSCE is the natural framework in which 35 countries can look at the situation, can reflect on the future, and more concretely prepare the next meeting in view of what has been

already called Helsinki II.

The summit at the end of the year will be a very important step in the road toward a European order which is based on peace, security, and respect for rights and freedoms, as well as the achievements in Germany of the right to self-determination.

It is not a matter of rewriting the Helsinki principles, but rather to give them a new application which would lead to new co-operation. At this stage, our task is more political than legal. We will have to manage the change -- a very delicate operation which would require a greater level of trust and mutual guarantees.

The question is not one of institutionalizing the CSCE process but, rather, to fully use the potential that it offers in pointing out, if necessary, what it should be. For example, the principle of legitimacy which is based on free and open elections, or the inviolability of borders. But institutionalization will naturally flow from a new European order when it will be established, not the other way around.

The Europeans, by nature, all have a pan-European vocation, but this cannot eliminate the particularities or the integration process which should lead to a political union of Europe, an integrated Europe, as the 12 countries are aiming for today.

Belgium, a founding country of the European community sees the continuation of European integration towards a monetary political and economic union as an essential element of the new European structure.

A European Community, which is better structured, can only strengthen the consistency and the stability of a co-operation between all of the European states in Western Europe, Central Europe and Eastern Europe.

The European Community should and must contribute to the establishment of a large secure community in Europe, thanks to the development of its security responsibilities.

But there is no dilemma between our Eastern policy and Western policy. We feel that only a European Community which is politically coherent and economically effective can meet the major hopes that are raised around the world and around Europe by European unification.

The European Community, through the Treaty of Rome, is a community which is open. It is ready to open its doors to all of the countries who would accept the community principles. Its ideal of economic efficiency, of social justice, of political cohesion and democratic management.



The European Community is also ready to work as a federated union within a much larger community, which will include all of the European states in a confederation.

Mr. Chairman, your conference is a first step in the re-establishment of an agreement between our countries, the Eastern countries and Western countries, as well as the others, the fruit of detente which should lead to an agreement.

This is what is at stake in this debate beyond the discussions that our experts are going to have here in Ottawa and later in Budapest.

I would like to thank you very much.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. Our last speaker this morning is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency Kjell Magne Bondevik.

HIS EXCELLENCY KJELL MAGNE BONDEVIK,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NORWAY:

Mr. Chairman, the present meeting is the first gathering of the foreign ministers of the 23 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organizations since the peaceful revolution that swept Central and East Europe as the eighties drew to a close.

It is also the first east-west ministerial meeting of the nineties, a decade that at the outset would seem to hold more promise of political dialogue and east-west co-operation than at any point in the post-war period.

The old order which divided Europe and kept nations as well as individuals apart is increasingly being transformed. The overcoming of the division of Europe and of the ensuing ideological and political confrontation, which only a few months ago seemed a Utopian dream, now has become a political objective within the realm of reality.

We have, indeed, passed a watershed in European history. The continent is advancing from confrontation to co-operation. From this point of view, it is symbolically highly appropriate that we are gathered here today to launch negotiations on a proposal that was originally introduced some 35 years ago, in the heyday of the Cold War.

The original Open Skies proposal fell victim to the chilly political climate that prevailed in those days, to the lack of trust and to feelings of suspicion between nations.

But the Open Skies proposal has been launched once more. We have come together to negotiate a regime in which individual states of the two groups will be allowed to overfly the entire territory of states of the other group. This, in itself, bears abundant testimony to the dramatic change that has taken place in the East-West relationship and to the remarkable new commitment to transparency of the states represented here today.

Norway attaches great importance to the Open Skies Conference. We hope our negotiators will be successful in shaping over the next couple of weeks the outline of a mutually acceptable agreement which can be further elaborated and signed later this year.

But the present meeting is significant also because it provides an opportunity to give a political impetus to ongoing arms control processes, in particular the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament, and also to exchange views on the future direction of the East-West process.

Unprecedented achievements are within reach. The members of the Western Alliance have come here prepared to show flexibility and bringing along new ideas which we hope will contribute to eliminating some of the remaining obstacles to progress.

Mr. Chairman, Open Skies, to us, is primarily but not exclusively a confidence-building measure. The regime will strengthen the feeling of security of each of the participating states by placing at their disposal a mechanism for satisfying themselves of the peaceful intentions of the other participants. Particularly from the point of view of smaller nations with limited resources and without access to sophisticated national technical means, such as satellite surveillance, it is important to be able to monitor areas of particular interest and concern, either through overflights of their own or in co-operation with their allies.

In order to be meaningful, an Open Skies regime will have to provide for overflights of the entire national territory of participating states, without limitations other than those dictated by international flight safety rules.

Exclusion of areas deemed to be militarily sensitive would negate the very purpose of the regime. Unrestricted overflight may, in the eyes of some, seem a high price, but it is clearly a necessary one if we are to be able to harvest the benefits in terms of enhanced confidence and transparency.

Lack of openness clearly was a major cause of the suspicion and uncertainty that has previously characterized relations between the two parts of Europe.

An Open Skies regime will, therefore, contribute to



consolidating and codifying the new openness that we have seen recently.

Mr. Chairman, the Open Skies regime will be negotiated and implemented by the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Transparency about the military activities of these countries clearly is of key importance in terms of the military balance in Europe. But at the later stage we would favour the inclusion in it of the European neutral and non-aligned states. They, too, clearly have a stake in military transparency and confidence building and in the general stability and security of our continent.

It is essential that the Open Skies regime provide for equitable participation of all states concerned. To that end, great care must be taken to establish criteria for the allocation and quotas. As we see it, the most relevant criterion would be the size of each participant's national territory.

Let me add that the total quotas for each of the groups will have to be large enough to allow for meaningful monitoring of military activities and installations.

Similarly, the regime must provide for all-weather, night-and-day coverage if it is to be meaningful. These requirements will necessarily entail economic consequences.

The experience gained from the pioneering Canadian trial overflight of an Hungarian territory seems to indicate that the regime that we are about to create will be costly. The primary objective is establishing a functioning regime, capable of serving its purpose. We must, however, avoid creating a regime so costly that nations, particularly the smaller and less well to do, would not be able to make use of it.

In this context it should be recalled that Open Skies is only one of a series of existing or imminent arms control agreements that all entail comprehensive and costly verification schemes. The cumulative effects of all this, in terms of manpower, equipment and money, must not become prohibitive.

Mr. Chairman, the likelihood of drastic reductions in conventional forces means the prospects for the lasting improvement in stability in Europe are better than they have been for a long time.

The first CFE Agreement will be a cornerstone of the new security structure in Europe. Everybody in this room is committed to the objective of concluding an agreement this year. The basic challenge confronting us is to make sure that our arms control efforts go forward in parallel with political events. The CFE process must not be overtaken by developments in the political

arena. The present meeting offers an opportunity to accelerate the Vienna negotiations. We must make full use of that opportunity. For in spite of much progress, significant problems remain outstanding.

We hope, Mr. Chairman, our partners will respond favourably to the proposals recently tabled by the Western allies and that they will contribute to the establishment of further common ground through proposals and flexibility of their own. If so, there is every reason to hope that the present meeting will be the energizing injection that the Vienna talks so obviously require if momentum is to be maintained.

While the brunt of the remaining works has to be borne by our negotiators in Vienna, it is clear that early conclusion of a treaty requires constant political level attention.

For our part, we would in principle be open to the idea of a possible CFE foreign ministers' meeting later this year in order to facilitate progress in what we hope at that time will be a few remaining outstanding issues.

While concentrating on the final stages of the first phase of CFE, we also need to start looking beyond this. The agreement which seems now to be within reach is an important step towards a stable and lasting new security order of Europe. But it will not in itself solve all the continent's security problems. Hence, there must be no break in the conventional arms control process following a first agreement. The allies are on record as forcing further steps to enhance stability and security in Europe. These could include further reductions, inclusion of new equipment categories and stabilizing measures.

Developments in the various individual areas of arms control are obviously inter-related. CSBMs can make a vital contribution to the consolidation of the emerging new security structure in Europe. The chances that a start agreement to reduce strategic nuclear arms by fifty per cent can be concluded in the course of this year, and have obviously been increased as a result of the recent meeting Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze.

Significant progress appears to have been made also with regard to chemical weapons. Hopefully, this will pave the way for early agreement at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on a global ban on chemical weapons.

In the near future, it will also be time to launch negotiations on land-based nuclear missiles of shorter range.

Mr. Chairman, last year was one of unprecedented political change and upheaval. This year's challenge is to see to it that the old security order in Europe, characterized by mutual



antagonism and political and ideological competition is replaced by new security structures, based on co-operation and commonality of interest.

This CSCE process should, in our view, play a key role in this context as a framework for the management of East-West relations and as a basis for the establishment of the new order of peace in Europe called for in the May 1989 NATO summit declaration.

Norway is in favour of convening a CSCE summit later this year. Therefore, we have noted with satisfaction the expressions of growing support for this proposal in all three major CSCE groupings.

A CSCE summit would give the process and energizing political impulse by underlining the importance to the thirty-five attached to it as an instrument for peaceful co-operative change. It would also provide an opportunity for discussion of the political future of the continent of Europe, the future direction of arms control and the role that the CSCE process could play in the development of the new patterns and structures of co-operation in Europe.

Mr. Chairman, by way of conclusion, I also should like to express my thanks to the government and people of Canada for having arranged this important conference and for the generous hospitality they have extended to us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much. We have not only made progress in terms of what we have discussed. We have made progress in the speed with which we have discussed it. In a sense, we are not only at midday, but in terms of the agenda we are halfway through the afternoon. I want to thank particularly those of my colleagues who moved your allotted speaking time ahead to allow us to make as much progress as we can.

There have been consultations, and they will continue over the break, to ensure that we can try to continue this pace through the afternoon. We will have to be asking some of the countries who had been scheduled to speak tomorrow to agree to speak today. That, as I said earlier, will allow us more time tomorrow for the kind of informal and private discussion which I think we all agree would be helpful in addition to the public discussions of the Open Skies proposals.

For those of you for whom it has been a long time since breakfast, you will be delighted to know that there will be lunch available for Ministers in the ministerial lounge.

We will adjourn now to reconvene in this place precisely at
3:00 p.m.

Thank you.

--- LUNCHEON RECESS



--- UPON RESUMING AT 3:00 P.M.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Colleagues, while some of the media are leaving the floor, let me give you the speaking order that has been agreed for this afternoon. And I want to express in advance my appreciation to people who have agreed to move their interventions ahead to today.

Our order will be Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Spain, Romania, Portugal, Luxembourg, the German Democratic Republic and Italy.

I would like now to call upon the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, His Excellency Jiri Dienstbier.

HIS EXCELLENCY JIRI DIENSTBIER,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CZECHOSLOVAKIA:

Mr. Chairman, Ministers, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, for his welcome. And I would like to highly appreciate the care and hospitality extended to us by our Canadian hosts.

We are meeting at the time of dynamic changes in the eastern half of the divided Europe which lead to fundamental shifts in the East-West relations. In this context, all our institutions and often even thinking are lagging behind the political development. Nor can we in this respect evade the question of the present and the future of the blocs, the Warsaw Treaty and NATO.

I agree with the view that until now the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty has been a guarantor of European stability and security. How far is this valid for the future?

The new situation speaks against the existing concept of European security, resting on a bloc basis in the area of the Helsinki process.

The states of the eastern alliance are today developing toward political and economic plurality. This is reflected, inter alia, in democratization of their allied relations. The Warsaw Pact ceased to be a tool for keeping totalitarian bureaucracies in power.

We desire a dynamic development in Europe in conditions of stability. The Czechoslovak Government of National Understanding, however, is not convinced that stability can be maintained, or even strengthened, by conserving the status quo.

We proceed from the assumption that the prospect of European security should be based on a comprehensive, bloc-free, collective and democratic approach; that the bloc concept should be replaced



by a pluralistic model. This dissolution of the blocs, of course, is not yet on the agenda of the day, but it is necessary to demonstrate political resolve to overcome blocs.

Today, the blocs are helping the disarmament process. They should bring this task, beneficial for peace and security, to a successful end. That is why, at this stage, we agree with those representatives who want to preserve the alliances as an instrument facilitating the arms control process. With the continuing development toward democracy, it should be their last major task.

We are sometimes criticized that our gentle revolution is here and there changing into a naive revolution, but our experience shows that it is only with a certain measure of naivete, of untraditional thinking and courage, that it is possible to change obsolete institutions, structures and mechanisms. Only by striving for the impossible is it actually possible to push through something essentially new.

For the transition from the bloc concept of safeguarding European security to a democratic and pluralistic concept, there is a well-tested instrument, the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The adoption of the Helsinki documents in 1975 made possible the rise of the Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, of the Committee for the Defence of Workers in Poland, of the Helsinki groups in the Soviet Union, et cetera. Helsinki provided an international law basis for the independent groups striving for the establishment of democracy. It has also significantly contributed to the current changes in the eastern half of Europe.

For these and other reasons, Czechoslovakia will strive for the Helsinki process to acquire further new quality that would be in keeping with the developments in Europe at the turn of the millennium. The new political, economic, cultural, humanitarian and security institutions should be created which would be replacing gradually, step by step, the structures of the bipolar world.

In the unfolding of this process we see great possibilities for a full-fledged participation of all member states of both alliances.

In this context, we view as most timely the attainment of successful results at the Vienna talks of the 23 states on conventional armed forces in Europe. But this phase of the Vienna talks should be successfully completed as soon as possible in this year. This would allow us to give the negotiators a new, much more emphatic mandate for the second phase, to prepare agreements that would transform armed forces and their structures to purely defensive purposes, so that no country would possess enough soldiers and arms to be able to attack others with impunity.

My country has already embarked on the demolition of the rampant military machine. We shall continue along that path. We would welcome it if all the participating states proceeded in a similar manner.

We welcomed, with extraordinary satisfaction, the proposal by President Bush for a substantial reduction of the envisaged contingent of American and Soviet forces for Central Europe. The ceiling of one hundred and ninety-five thousand soldiers makes it possible to meet the wish of those states, among them also Czechoslovakia, which do not deem it necessary to have foreign troops stationed in their territories.

Mr. Chairman, we are today jointly launching working in a cause that took more than thirty four years to mature to this stage of its materialization in the form of a proposal put forward by President Bush on the 12th of May last year.

Czechoslovakia welcomes and unequivocally supports the proposal for the creation of an Open Skies regime. The reason we do so is after major political changes that have occurred in our society, we are determined to contribute towards the all-round strengthening of confidence and progress in the process of disarmament where precise and consistent verification represents the basic prerequisite, also because the proposal meets the call for maximum transparency of military activities and military organizations and, furthermore, because, in our view, this regime will significantly enhance collective security, which is our ultimate goal.

This precisely is the path to creating conditions in which military alliances will be gradually losing their justification.

It is, of course, typical that today we discuss Open Skies while the skies have been already open for tens of years and for decades we have been able from satellites to read the licence plates on cars.

The Open Skies is, therefore, a symbol of the changing times. We have to agree on something which in one way or another has been here for a long time. But the concurrence of views demonstrates our desire for transparency in military matters.

If an agreement is reached, it will be an indisputable contribution towards overcoming the division of Europe.

We would wish that the Open Skies project might gradually be open to all the states of Europe, that it might develop into a system of confidence-building measures which would have a truly European-wide and eventually also a global character.



We also appreciate its significant positive implications from the humanitarian point of view. We trust that this regime would definitively do away with such manifestations of the Cold War and its remnants as was the shooting down of civilian and other aircraft suspected of aerial espionage. After all, in the past the world found itself more than once in a crisis situation due to such conflicts.

The Open Skies project, the consideration of which we are today launching on political and expert levels, is in its potential so far without precedence. It represents a new quality in the field of confidence building and verification measures. Through this regime we would not only substantially raise the quality of the system of observation of military activities, but would also significantly strengthen the principle of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

The implementation of the Open Skies project, of course, creates also some technical problems. Czechoslovakia, at the present time, possesses neither the necessary aircraft park nor the appropriate equipment. The proposed options, whether it should be an allied or a group or a national aircraft park, have both their advantages as well as their drawbacks. Our experts should find the optimum variants, both from the point of view of national security, effectiveness, as well as financial costs.

It is very important, in our opinion, to ensure equal access by all the participating states to observation equipment of identical technological level. My delegation will, therefore, propose uniform, jointly approved observation equipment.

In this connection, however, I feel the need to say openly that at a time when we are embarking on the very complicated period of transition to a market based economy, we could only with difficulty assume excessive financial commitments. That, of course, does not in any way detract from our political resolve to do our utmost for an expeditious launching of the Open Skies regime, nor does it change our decision to fully open the territory of Czechoslovakia to this form of international verification without any restrictions.

Mr. Chairman, the Czechoslovak delegation, which I am so instructing, will do everything in its power to make this important conference as successful as possible.

Thank you for your attention.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much. May I now call upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, His Excellency Mesut Yilmaz.

HIS EXCELLENCY MESUT YILMAZ,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TURKEY:

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. At the outset I would like to express my appreciation for the efficient efforts deployed by Canada in promoting Open Skies. These efforts culminated in the successful organization of this conference and they rightly deserve our heartfelt congratulations. I would also like to thank our hosts for their warm welcome and hospitality.

The Open Skies Conference coincides with major transformations taking place in Europe and, henceforth, in the nature of East-West relations. The success of the reforms and democratization underway in the Soviet Union and other East European countries will, hopefully, bring about the end of the artificial division of Europe.

The prevailing circumstances also provide the necessary atmosphere for the acceleration of the ongoing arms reduction and disarmament efforts. There are promising signs that the first CFE agreements and a START Accord will be signed by the end of 1990. An agreement banning the use and production of chemical weapons also seems within sight. A CSCE summit will most probably be held during the last quarter of the year.

If all these are realized, 1990 might be quoted in the annals of history as the year of disarmament. The Open Skies Conference will no doubt contribute to this process.

We have come a long way since the idea of Open Skies was first formulated by President Eisenhower and formally proposed at the Geneva Summit in 1955. The very fact that when, thirty five years later, the same idea was re-launched by another American President, George Bush, it met a favourable reaction is a testimony to the far ranging progress achieved in East-West relations during the past few years.

If, as a result of our deliberations, we succeed in establishing an Open Skies regime, this will not only constitute a tangible proof of improved international relations, but will also contribute to the further advancement of the confidence building and arms control process already underway.

Indeed, by demonstrating the willingness of a country to open its entire territory to aerial overflights, to become transparent, the proposed regime will be a confidence-building measure par excellence. Moreover, it is likely to be very useful in assisting the verification of arms control agreements under negotiation. Therefore, as stated in NATO's Basic Elements paper, and I cite; "This double characteristic of an Open Skies regime would make it a valuable complement to current East-West endeavours."

With these considerations in mind, Turkey actively contributed to the consultations carried out in NATO. We are ready to display the same positive and constructive attitude during the work of this conference and contribute to a successful outcome.

Turkey's views find their expression in NATO's basic elements documents. So I will not repeat them here. But I want to emphasize a few points of particular significance for my country.

First of all, in establishing an Open Skies regime, an important principle should be to create equal security for all participating states. This ensues naturally from the objectives I have just mentioned. It follows that each participant, whatever its means, should have equal opportunity to benefit from the regime to be established.

As to the flight restrictions, they can be limited only for flight safety reasons or in accordance with obligations arising from rules of international law. But this should not weigh prohibitions established under ICAO procedures for flights outside the scope of the Open Skies regime.

Needless to say, flights over the Turkish Straits, within the framework of the regime, shall in no way constitute a precedent for flights outside the scope of that agreement.

My last point is related to the participation to the Open Skies regime of European countries other than NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization member states. In principle, Turkey does not object to such an enlargement provided that their participation is considered after the regime is well established and the decision to invite them is taken on a case by case basis and by consensus.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. I would like to give the floor now to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, his excellency Francisco Fernandez Ordonez.

HIS EXCELLENCY FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ ORDONEZ,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SPAIN:

Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to thank our Canadian host and especially our colleague Joe Clark for the wonderful hospitality and the outstanding job to create the necessary conditions for our meeting.

Mr. Chairman, I will continue in Spanish.

Mr. Chairman, in 1955 the proposal by President Eisenhower to

the Soviet Union to sign an Open Skies Treaty did not receive a positive response. Thirty five years later it is precisely, as has just been pointed out by our Turkish colleague, we find ourselves faced with this same project. I think the question we should ask ourselves is why is that those skies which could not be opened in 1955 can now be open in 1990.

I think that we all agree on the answer because we have wanted and known how to substitute confrontation for co-operation or, in other words, because we have ceased to consider ourselves incompatible and now want to compliment each other. This change, which is so encouraging and significant, a mode of power as old as the world and wiser than anyone, has triggered the rhythm of historic time. This power has been the unconstrainable pressure of nations whose own dynamism has allowed them to travel a much longer course in a few months, in terms of subsiding distress and decreasing threat between East and West than we negotiators and politicians have travelled in many, many years.

Europe no longer walks taking small steps, but long strides and is jumping over fences and overcoming obstacles practically every day. This is the here and now, Mr. President. This is our starting point and our challenge.

For years we have been negotiating a military balance which would make the world more hospitable and we have followed a double course, on the one hand, by articulating measures which would contribute to reduce the distrust level which started to prevail in Europe right after the second World War and, on the other hand, by restricting the qualitative and quantitative margins of armament that this distrust has lead us to accumulate.

All along we have always known that the confidence building measures and disarmament are not an end in themselves, but rather the means of achieving another goal which is much broader and much nobler, namely, to create a world which, as it feels more secure, may aspire to greater freedom and justice.

On this disarmament problem I would like to put forward three considerations. First of all, the need for disarmament negotiations to advance, at least, at the same rhythm as that of political events.

Until now, in Europe, our claim in the field of disarmament has been relatively modest. Europe is the continent with the biggest concentration of armament in the world. Until now we have not gone beyond a project of limitation of harm in a context of rivalry and distrust.

Disarmament must now come as a consequence of a new world situation and several of the statements which appeared before as the prime objectives are now minimal objectives and what appeared



to be points of arrival are merely now intermediate stages.

The end of our negotiations must end as soon as possible, not because they represent the conclusion of the disarmament process, but because they are an initial unnecessary step. The conclusion of this negotiation forcibly implies the beginning of another.

The second aspect of disarmament which I wish to refer to is that there is a European dimension of security which we must not forget and that is the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Sea is today the scene of an excessive concentration of armament.

Just as the process initiated in Helsinki has allowed for a transformation of the European reality, why cannot we come up with a grade of form of co-operation and security that would be in a position to take advantage of that experience in order to lay the foundation for confidence, democratic models and human rights in this part of the world, namely, the Mediterranean.

Third, let us not forget that how much more or as European disarmament process progresses the universal dimension of the problem becomes evermore evident. We are talking about problems which are not solely European, but are worldwide. This is clear in the case of chemical weapons.

In conclusion, the aspirations in the disarmament projects which have consistently failed because they were premature, today find a political context which gives them maturity. Thus, the Open Skies regime, which was evidently premature in the year 1955, is now mature in 1990 and we remain convinced that it is perfectly feasible to reach a double objective at which we aim with this regime.

On the one hand, the opening of the air spaces to observation flights, with a view to the strengthening of confidence and transparency and; on the other hand, co-operation in the peaceful use of air space by military aircraft.

As regards the conventional type of treaty, another old and frustrated aspiration today finds itself mature. The numerical magnitude of conventional armaments and its asymmetrical distribution in Europe are not only incongruous with a political evolution which is rapidly taking place, but what is even more serious is the fact that they may end up by constituting a dangerous restraint to the actual changing process in the expectations of co-operation which are being outlined.

Furthermore, reaching the conventional stability in Europe at lower levels of force is the lever which will allow to move decisively another parallel process and not less important, which is the drastic reduction of nuclear arms, the START negotiations and progress towards the conclusion of the Geneva convention on

irradiation of nuclear weapons.

We must along these lines direct our political will in order to reach prompt solutions to the problems we find in the Vienna negotiations. In the past we have often covered up political difficulties under the veil of technical difficulties.

Today we may rightly say that the difficulties which still subsist in Vienna are technical because we have the firm negotiation will to reach an agreement.

As regards the new proposals on combat aviation and personnel stationed in Europe, these must lead to a prompt agreement in both areas which are still open. We hope that flexibility will also continue to prevail in other pending matters, such as the delimitation of sub-areas and guarded armaments talks, combat helicopters, and definitions of armaments which are subject to limitations, so that we will be in a position to sign an agreement on conventional forces and also preferably the agreement referring to measures of confidence, and that this will take place before the end of the year.

Mr. President, we should not serve as prophets of history, but we are responsible for history. What is truly new about the times that we are living is the rhythm of change which may generate a true historical vertigo. We are taking a risk in that the intellectual process may stay behind the process of change and that we may not be able to foresee our thinking and doing and rightly interpret what is taking place.

It was Goethe who was present at Valmy and who knew how to recognize clearly that on that day in the battlefield a new era in the history of humanity had irrevocably begun. We who are witnessing a true transfiguration of Europe know that the changes which are occurring mean the recovery of a unitary conscience of our continent. This certainty compels us to adapt the ideas that we have entertained to a rival and divided Europe and that to use these to another Europe already coming to life as a collective hope. In this new Europe I would like to stress that the political role of the economic community and the dynamism of its unitary process are more important than ever. Spain does not conceive this architecture without a strong, economic and political European community.

Europe has always been a reality of weights and counterweights which have been arranged in a fragile equilibrium. In the past century this arrangement was called an agreement. We do not know, however, what it will be called in the next century, but what we do know with certainty is that we are heading now towards a new European balance.

The CSCE has been at once the witness and the instrument for



the transition from a European scheme of confrontation to a plan of co-operation. This flexible and open structure of the CSCE as a forum of European dialogue has been very successful and may also serve to make it a centre of convergence in which the synthesis we are aiming at for Europe will become a reality. Bearing this logic in mind, we support without any reservation the opportunity of holding at the end of this year a CSCE summit in order to carry out a collective thinking on the present of Europe and its future.

The summit would entail a loaded agenda for many common questions arising before us which require common answers. Our objective should be twofold: on the one hand the summing up and, second, the projection towards the future. We must make an overall evaluation of the process. We must review the jurisprudence which we have been accumulating and evaluate the needs for a new legislation. On the basis of the present situation in Europe, we must discuss the main outlines of its future architecture and set new disarmament objectives so that military logic will increasingly adjust itself to political logic and we must agree on the steps to be taken in the implementation of this process.

Finally, we must meditate on its regularization and consolidation and reflect on that which we have already called the institutionalization of the CSCE.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to quote an eminent Canadian statesman, Lester Pearson, who said: "We prepare for war like precocious giants and for peace like retarded dwarves." We have come here to this Canadian land willing to prepare ourselves for peace as precocious giants, for a newly made peace which opens before us, implacable and encouraging.

Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Ordonez. I will turn the floor now to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, His Excellency Sergiu Celac.

HIS EXCELLENCY SERGIU CELAC,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ROMANIA:

Mr. Chairman, this conference is indeed a symbol of the new spirit prevailing in the international relations, a spirit of openness now spreading way up into the sky. What seemed impossible 35 years ago becomes achievable today and we meet here in Ottawa in the name of our common willingness to lay down the foundation for the first agreement among states belonging to two opposite military alliances as a substantive step toward increased mutual confidence.

Our deep gratitude goes, first of all, to the Canadian government, to the Right Honourable Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, to you the Right Honourable Minister, Joe Clark, and to the friendly Canadian people for their constructive initiative and generous offer to host this conference.

It would have been difficult to find a more suitable venue. Symbolically, the sky above Ottawa today on the opening day of the conference was also cloudless.

We meet here in Ottawa after having witnessed, some of us after having participated, in history-making changes in Europe. Minds and hearts have come open to a new reality. Frontiers are no longer obstacles to contacts among people and nations. Walls which were built on prejudice, fear and suspicion, are falling down.

In order to regain its freedom and dignity my country had to pay with the blood of its sons and daughters. A totalitarian police state crumbled down. A total and irreversible break with the past is now doubled by an entire nation's firm commitment to the values of democracy, pluralism and human rights, to a market-oriented economy and to a foreign policy of openness to all horizons.

We have come to realize that freedom has to be won; but democracy has to be learned, not taught. We in Romania are learning it the hard way.

I am glad of this opportunity to express the deep gratitude of the Romanian people and government for the solidarity and support that all peoples and governments represented in this hall have extended to us at our time of need.

Free and democratic Romania now proudly rejoins the European and world concert of nations.

Just a few words on our view of the future structures of European security and co-operation. After listening to the speakers who preceded me today, I feel strengthened in my belief that the recent events in Europe have revealed, among many other things, a lack of proper permanent institutional framework for debate and possibly also for joint decision on European matters of general interest.

As a result, military-political alliances may tend to take upon themselves tasks that they are normally not supposed to handle. It becomes increasingly obvious that the CSCE process, which started as a bold initiative, then gradually became a frame of mind rather than a structured framework, will have to evolve, and quickly, into a real institutional structure. My government believes that an agreement, at least in principle, could be reached

at a summit level meeting of the CSCE participating countries later this year and we are also of the opinion that in view of the rapid and dramatic changes occurring on the continent, an active involvement of all the original signatories of the Helsinki Final Act is indeed essential.

Free Romania welcomes the progress achieved so far on arms limitation and reduction and hopefully expects the conclusion during the current year of the first negotiated agreement on conventional disarmament in Europe.

An impending Open Skies agreement, along with other existing agreements, will certainly strengthen confidence among the states participating in the two military alliances. It may hopefully encourage the elaboration and adoption of other confidence-building and disarmament agreements and measures by providing a broader view of an emerging system of verification and control.

We believe that in order to reach that objective the current negotiations should take into account at least four fundamental challenges:

First, the Open Skies system should be conceived to function as a confidence-building instrument. It should not cause more suspicion but, rather, alleviate the existing sources of mistrust.

Second, it should not become a burden for anyone. It should evolve in a natural way, on a basis of mutual goodwill, as a normal fact of life in the relations between states.

Third, it should offer equal chances for all participating states, irrespective of their size, military potential or level of technological development.

And, fourth, the legal instrument to be negotiated should be simple and flexible enough to make possible the adjustments that will be required in the future to suit the specific conditions of a changing world.

Meeting these challenges will turn the original concept of a confidence-building measure into an effective instrument for fostering a climate of understanding and co-operation in a new Europe.

One of the crucial issues our experts will have to solve is to ensure equality in the proper functioning of the proposed scheme, considering the different technological capacity of various countries.

It will also be necessary to ensure a sound co-operative relationship between the observing and the observed during the inspection of the aircraft to see that the observing mission is

performed without interfering with the normal function of the National Safety Flight Regulations.

In addition, the participating states should be protected against possible commercial use, without their consent, of the information and data acquired by the observing state.

And, conversely, the parties might have access to all data and information concerning their territory which have been obtained as a result of flight under the Open Skies program.

At the same time, since it may happen that the information collected by an observing flight may not dispel all suspicions, it would fit the logic of the Open Skies system, as a confidence-building measure, to include in the agreement a procedure whereby the observing state and the observed state would have valid incentives to sort out by dialogue all the aspects in question before making public statements or undertaking any unilateral measures.

As to the scope of the system, what is being called Open Skies should not be kept closed between military alliances. In fact, the system should be open for participation by all European countries, if and when they wish to join.

The Romanian delegation is confident that such a course of action would facilitate the negotiating process and foster a climate of co-operation that is required for a successful conclusion of our endeavours.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Celac. I am going to turn next to the Minister for Portugal, but I am sure that he would allow me to welcome to our meeting our colleague Gianni De Michelis, who has just flown in through open skies from Italy. Welcome.

May I now call upon the Foreign Minister of Portugal, Joao De Deus Pinheiro.

HIS EXCELLENCY JOAO DE DEUS PINHEIRO,
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PORTUGAL:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen. Allow me, first, to express my gratitude to the Canadian authorities for the warm hospitality bestowed upon us on this occasion.

The Canadian government's decision to host an Open Skies

conference is, in fact, a most timely and decisive contribution towards a successful result of an initiative which deserves our sincere praise.

Confidence building through the enhancement of openness and transparency has been among the main concerns of democratic societies. But, although confidence building is no doubt the primary objective of Open Skies, the regime we are about to structure will go beyond what has so far been achieved in the field of CSBMs; not only does it strive to promote trust and reduce the risks of misunderstandings, but it can be of great use to complement verification of ongoing of future arms control agreements.

It will also foster co-operation in areas other than security -- namely, for environmental purposes -- and it will be up to us to make the best use of the regime's potentially beneficial spin-off effects.

Our common endorsement of the Open Skies initiative is an additional guarantee of our commitment to accommodate peaceful change in Europe in a context of undiminished security for all.

In the military field, we have been pursuing these objectives in both Vienna CFE and CSBM negotiations and we are confident that recent proposals on the aviation, personnel and helicopter issues in CFE will gain wide consensus, thus paving the way to the completion of a CFE agreement in the course of this year. Both these negotiations have given us a chance to get to the heart of European security needs and have afforded an opportunity to eliminate factors which constitute a threat and replace them with confidence and co-operation.

This progress was possible because there is a new atmosphere in East-West relations which is linked to the fundamental and far-reaching changes which are taking place in Eastern European countries. These changes are radically altering the political architecture of Europe and we must ensure that the collateral reshaping of our security structures will not lag behind.

There is no real and lasting security without genuine confidence and trust. Yet, security is a global concept, encompassing not only disarmament and arms control issues, but also the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the promotion of greater understanding and interdependence.

Mr. Chairman, despite the division of Europe that prevailed for more than 40 years, there was always an awareness of a common destiny uniting the peoples of our continent. They were emphasized by the breathtaking changes that have swept through much of Central and Eastern Europe in the past year. But, to arrive at a whole and united Europe, much remains to be done in the political, economic

and cultural domains and, at the top priority, the absolute need to reach a defence and security arrangement which is capable of ensuring full security of each country at the lowest possible level of armament.

To build the new Europe we must be open minded and generous, but we must also be pragmatic. That is why we consider that all existing fora should be considered and its potentialities scrutinized before we embark on setting up new institutions which would duplicate existing ones.

It is not possible at this stage to foresee the future European institutions, yet two ideas should be kept:

The first is that CSCE is the most appropriate forum to create, at the present stage, a greater interdependence and greater confidence in the areas of security and defence for all those concerned with European future.

The second idea to be kept is that the development of the European Economic Community and its movement towards closer political and economic integration is not only an irreversible process, but also a must in the stabilization and prosperity of Europe.

We must realize that we are witnessing the end of cold war. And just like in any other war, its end requires the re-appraisal of relations among countries, the adjustment of the political perspectives, the setting up of co-operation and assistance programs and, eventually, the creation of new, or the revision of existing institutions for dialogue and co-operation.

It is in this perspective that Portugal supports the proposals for a CSCE summit in which the defence and security in Europe would be politically and effectively reinforced.

A CSCE summit should, therefore, be the proper occasion for the 35 states part of the CSCE to give a signal of their willingness to continue to work for a new, freer and more stable Europe on the basis on the ten principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

It could also begin to evaluate how far we could go in strengthening these principles with a view to the next CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki in 1992, where a decision to this effect could be taken.

Mr. Chairman, we are in the eve of a turning point in East-West relations where peace and interdependence, solidarity and co-operation are the key words. That requires a lot of work and a strong political will. Let us not defraud history.



Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. I would call now on the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Luxembourg, His Excellency Georges Wohlfart.

HIS EXCELLENCY GEORGES WOHLFART,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE, LUXEMBOURG:

Mr. Chairman, distinguished colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, first of all, I should like to join my voice to those of previous speakers in order to thank the Canadian authorities for having spontaneously accepted to host in Ottawa the first session of the Open Skies Conference. I would also like to express my appreciation to the government of Hungary who has offered to host the second stage of this conference.

My country is happy about the initiative taken last May by President Bush, and I should like to pay homage to him for that here. At the time we are constantly feeling encouraged in our objective to see draconian reductions in arms great importance should be accorded to a means of surveillance and information as well as verification of disarmament agreements.

The Open Skies regime is the proper measure of confidence-building and transparency. I am convinced that this system of verification of an entirely new type could also turn out to be an important factor in the context of new structures for security between East and West. In this spirit Luxembourg wholeheartedly supports this initiative.

When President Eisenhower first expressed the idea of Open Skies 35 years ago, it was at the time a revolutionary idea; too innovative, perhaps, for the period. And yet the installation of a system of verification of such a scope would have corresponded to a dire need at the time and would certainly have contributed to attenuating tensions and mutual distrust.

Since that time the situation has changed and the famous spirit of glasnost has now penetrated the military world as well. The principle of intrusive verification has now been largely accepted and we see concrete applications of it, particularly in the implementation of the agreement on the elimination of -- The hope has been taken up again by President Bush and we can hope that it surely will have a satisfactory agreement. I think the Open Skies regime can only acquire its true dimension when it has served as a complement to the verification measures which are now being negotiated elsewhere. How can we help but think of the CFE agreement, which we hope to be able to sign at the end of the year.

Members of the Atlantic Alliance in determining an ambitious objective to conclude the Vienna negotiations before the end of the year are aware of the enormous difficulties of such negotiations. It is, therefore, encouraging to see the Warsaw Pact countries as desirous as western countries to arrive at a substantial agreement very soon.

Some of these, and we note this with interest, are even prepared to make even more rapid progress as far as the retreat of troops are concerned, and anticipating in a way of the CFE to agreement. The proposals made a few days ago by President Bush move in the same direction and we are very happy about this agreement of different views of both sides. We now must deploy additional efforts in order to have a first agreement on arms control and have it ready for signing in a few months. We are confident that all sides will be flexible and imaginative. Now that the societies of these are adopting the ideas of democracy and liberty which are at the basis of the success of western societies our public opinion has the legitimate right to expect that the countries will renounce ideological renunciation and these will be followed by the elimination of excessive armaments. We feel that this is a precondition for building a new, free and united human perspective for a CSCE summit, which is expected to take place in the fall of this year, will be an additional impetus for each of us to continue and accelerate the work in Vienna so as to assure the signing of the CFE agreement at the time of that summit.

The CSCE summit will also be an opportunity to begin a thorough consideration of the way in which the East and the West will be able to tackle negotiations with a view to a second agreement on conventional arms reduction. In fact, we cannot stop halfway, quite the contrary, we must resolutely move forward to overcome the division of Europe which is, after all, our stated objective also means eliminating all superfluous military potential which represent a tangible symbol of such division.

NATO is prepared to consider new reductions and restrictions on conventional arms, as it was indicated in its overall concept for arms control and disarmament. The objective will imply a profound restructuring of armed forces so as to finally eliminate any capacity to have offensive action.

Mr. Chairman, if we wish to overcome the division of Europe, of course, we have to consider the future architecture of such a Europe. This has been mentioned on a number of occasions, that we are living not only in extraordinary changes of political reality of the eastern part of Europe, but also a teeming of ideas and proposals on the concept and structure of future Europe side by side with their hopes.

We have also seen emerging a stability and internal balance within that Europe. We can say that 1989 was the year where there

was a revolution in eastern Europe. We feel that the present year is the year of a challenge. How can we accomplish the transition from one regime to another, which was symbolized by a repression, but also was a symbol of stability? How can we move to liberty and justice while assuring the necessary stability? These are questions which we will have to deal with even though this may not be the primordial question for populations which aspire to well-being.

The dramatic events and the revolution of a certain regime in a part of Europe cannot pass unnoticed in another part of Europe. Even if it wanted to do that, the speed of changes which have taken place should not incite us to be precipitous in our actions when it comes to building a new European order. Quite to the contrary, if we want to have coherent, stable, endurable structures, we must proceed certainly with dispatch but also calmly.

The time is now ripe in order to build in Europe an order of a higher quality; higher than the one which has characterized earlier Europe. In political terms we can create a space which would be governed by the basic concept of human rights where there would be free movement of ideas and people. It is not a question of establishing a homogeneous political regime but to put an end to ideological antagonisms which often prevented the realization of mankind.

Economically we have to create an area for human wellbeing, and the objective should be to leave it up to each country and each nation to choose freely their political and economic structures.

When it comes to security, I think it is possible now to build a Europe which would have more security from minimum military potential and confidence, and also we should count on a synergistic effect among these different levels, and profit from a positive dynamic progress.

In the interests of stability and security for all of us, the definition of new structures in Europe should be within the framework of institutions and with due respect for existing treaties.

I should like to mention here, first of all, NATO and CEE. However, we must see to it that no new injustices or instabilities are established which would result in a new equilibrium containing the germs of discord.

Mr. Chairman, we are now living truly dramatic hours as has been properly mentioned earlier. And also our objective is to conclude our negotiations in a few weeks and have a proper Open Skies regime. I am convinced that all the delegations are of a desire to proceed with this pact so that we could live up to the task which we have assigned ourselves.

The Open Skies regime will put in the hands of participating countries, particularly small and medium-sized countries, means of information which have been unavailable so far.

A number of countries, including my own, can only take full advantage of the possibility of inspection if we closely co-operate with other countries, for quite obvious reasons. This is an aspect very dear to the heart of my delegation and which we intend to stress in the course of negotiations. Thus, preparatory works have already begun within the Benelux countries, and we intend to include our contribution in this framework and continue our contribution.

Luxembourg accepts to restrict originally this regime to the countries of the two alliances. Nevertheless, progressively, it should be expanded to other countries, particularly neutral and non-aligned countries in Europe.

Thus, we should take account of this throughout our work. Also, my delegation will adopt a flexible attitude, and may I express the hope that our work will continue in the spirit of conciliation and compromise.

I wish to thank the Canadian government for the most heartfelt and warm hospitality offered to all delegations, and which has made our work most enjoyable and productive.

I hope that during our next meeting in Budapest we will arrive at concrete results, fulfilling the reality of Open Skies, an important step toward peaceful and prosperous future.

Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Dr. Wohlfart. I would like to call now on the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, His Excellency Gianni De Michelis.

HIS EXCELLENCY GIANNI DE MICHELIS,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ITALY:
(No interpretation of beginning).

The staggering political developments that have occurred have leapfrogged even the arms negotiations. And this is despite the successful directions that these are taking, holding out the opportunity for our continent to shake off its melancholy destiny, to be the focus of the greatest concentration of destructive weapons.



The swift acceleration of history, which began last summer, is far from ending. 1990 will be the year in which to consolidate the positive changes which have taken place in Europe in the last months, and to lay the foundations of a new architecture of our continent.

We are perfectly aware of all this and we shall draw on it to ensure that this meeting provides us with an opportunity to give a further boost to the cause of peace and stability.

Our primary task here is to give substance to the Open Skies idea for what it signifies in terms of mutual confidence, transparency and awareness of the military capabilities and intentions of the other side.

We have covered so much ground since the time Khrushchev greeted a similar proposal by the President of the United States by retorting that the Soviet Union would never allow anyone to spy in its own bedroom. And we have never really been sure whether secrecy was a means of concealing strength or weakness.

With inadequate intelligence about the adversary, its capabilities are more likely to be over-estimated and the response excessive.

Today we are living in a wholly different climate, even in psychological terms, as demonstrated by the ready endorsement of the Open Skies idea.

Ever since it was first broached, the Italian government has wholeheartedly backed President Bush's initiative for a system of free, mutual air observation of the territories of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

Such measures are extremely useful for two main reasons: First, they will help to strengthen mutual trust and confidence, consolidate and enhance transparency, and make dialogue more concrete and constructive.

Second, there will be an important experiment for the verification and monitoring of military activities that could then be used in future disarmament agreements.

The originality and the vast scope of the Open Skies system, extending from San Francisco to Vladivostok, will act as an incentive to contemplate extending it after the initial running-in phase, to the participation of other countries.

This will also enable us to offer a substantial complement to the results that will emerge from the negotiating in Vienna on confidence-building and security measures.

With other member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, we have contributed to proposals for an Open Skies regime that could be acceptable by all of the 23 countries. We are perfectly receptive to any suggestions and ideas from any other party.

We have instructed our negotiators to engage in flexible and earnest dialogue when drafting the technical aspects that will be discussed after the ministerial meeting.

Italy is ready to open up her territory to the air observation aircraft of the Eastern European countries, reducing restrictions to the bare minimum, with the exclusive purpose of guaranteeing air safety.

We also confirm our readiness to take part in a second round of the negotiations, expected to take place in Budapest this spring.

But we have gathered here today with a further purpose: to give a decisive impetus to the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional forces.

Proposals for reductions have been gathering pace, recently. The disarmament race cannot be run unilaterally or in a state of uncertainty because our goal remains that of achieving a balance of forces, a recognizable and controlled force balance. But we have to make haste, as I recalled last month in Vienna together with our colleagues Dumas and Genscher.

Another reason for moving with dispatch is connected with the spring elections to be held throughout the Eastern European countries. Public opinion that has been kept silent for so long will want to express the people's expectations through their parliamentary representatives.

We must not create the impression that there can be an excessively long hiatus between the timing of the negotiations and the political decision making.

In Ottawa, we are therefore looking for a decisive step forward toward overcoming the constraints that still prevent an agreement for the reduction of conventional arms in Europe from being concluded by the summer. As to the definition of tanks, and to regional differentiation and storage, we would like the conversions that emerged in the Vienna negotiations to be now consolidated.

The Western countries have also recently advanced new proposals to overcome as rapidly as possible the differences that still exist regarding the two main outstanding negotiation issues, aircraft and military personnel. We appealed to our negotiating partners in the East not to let slip this invitation to compromise,



so as to be able to provide our respected negotiators with concrete guidelines for resolving the outstanding difficulties.

The first round of the Vienna talks must be brought to an end, so that we can then move on to the next stage: further reductions, restructuring of military forces and evolution of military doctrines in a defensive direction. A transition toward a form of security based on increased co-operation with others. The ultimate goal must be to establish one security system in which the alliances form the main focus of conversions for their respective stances. And the independence and integrity of every state is guaranteed, regardless of the military group to which they may belong.

That is why I believe that we have to send out a third signal from Ottawa, no less important than the other two, of which it is to a certain extent the natural consequence. I am thinking of the consensus to embark on a new round of negotiations of the 35, now that the CSCE has proved its metal, setting co-existence in Europe on a new footing and laying down the rules that will govern it from here to the third millennium, making our continent an area of peace and prosperity.

Starting with the summit of the 35 countries, to be held before the end of the year, we must immediately begin negotiations to build up co-existence in Europe on the basis of the changes I have mentioned, in a Europe that is no longer gripped by insecurity and anxiety because of the military balances and imbalances.

In Eastern Europe, political life is being enriched by a variety of movements and parties. The institutional implementation of the reforms still lies ahead, however. We know that they are still partly in the blue print stage, needing to be substantially fleshed out. Re-designing the CSCE also means creating the best possible international conditions so that 1990 does not harbour any surprises. Newly restored democracy is not obliged to take a roundabout route and its success becomes irreversible.

For many quarters, we have been urged to seek out new ideas and think of new institutions since the end of the Cold War. The extraordinary summit of the 35 must provide the global setting for a process that will restore fundamental freedoms and draw together all the countries of our continent around common values. Coming, as it will, after a first CFE agreement, and hopefully after the CSBM as well, Helsinki II will have to reaffirm the validity of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent commitments, complementing them with new provisions governing, for example, elections or the respect for the rights of minorities.

It is now our firm conviction that the respect for human rights is also a fundamental factor of our own security. And this is yet another reason why it is in the interests of all.

The necessity for the German people to be united is now being fuelled by sentiments that can no longer be bridled. It has become the only possible way to prevent a drift in the centre of Europe that might be even more destabilizing than the situation that presently exists.

The countries of the European community have expressed the hope in Strasbourg that this may come about in a framework of closer community integration and a strengthening of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. Integration with all the difficult compromises and negotiations that this entails will necessarily take longer than the phenomena that are now conspiring to forge the unity of a people divided by a long distant war. But, the parallel between German unity and the unity of Western Europe still holds good.

The CSCE, moreover, is the only context that can offer the political framework for German unity and the certainty that it can be achieved against the background of maximum international stability. And in this connection, too, we see the relevance of a Helsinki II. A new security is to be defined now that the threat we have lived with for 40 years is waning.

The great events of 1989, while not yet fulfilled, seem to be irreversible. We must take advantage of these new situations and boldly and imaginatively capitalize on the dividends of peace. Then we have to move onward towards eradicating the military confrontation, establishing balances that will do away with any possibility that either side might ever attack the other, enhancing the transparency and predictability of behaviour and of bringing strategic doctrines closer together.

In this context, the alliances are the structures that Europe needs to shake off the many uncertainties of the present. Economic co-operation is also one of the keynotes of the new Helsinki agreement. Redirecting our policy choices toward a very close association between the European community and the EFTA countries and the Eastern European countries. This will give rise to an increasingly more homogeneous economic area, albeit with different degrees of integration between the various parties.

It will be given a major boost from the drastic cuts in arms that we are presently negotiating and from the resources that this will release.

So, the Ottawa conference is of fundamental importance. And, I am sure that, in the awareness that 1990 promises to be a year of great hopes but also of great risks, we will find the way to make it an opportunity to confirm the former and contain the latter.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much. Our last participant this afternoon will be the Foreign Minister of the German Democratic Republic and I turn the floor now to His Excellency Oskar Fischer.

HIS EXCELLENCY OSKAR FISCHER,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC:

Mr. Chairman, dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, the world and, in particular, Europe is living, presently, through a time of historic and radical change. The peoples have risen up to fully assert their rights -- rights such as peace through disarmament, a departure from confrontation of blocs toward co-operation that will inter-link our systems. Democratic freedoms, as a condition of political and social self-determination, common efforts on an equal footing to ensure sustainable, healthy, political, economic and social development in which the stronger help the weaker, national and international challenges are now becoming intertwined. A new kind of security guarantee is required.

European states, and here I include the United States and Canada, are in the fortunate situation to have reliable sign posts on the road into the future thanks to the Helsinki Final Act and the follow-up process that has been going on now for almost 15 years. Every step on that road, though, must be well contemplated so as to maintain the necessary stability at all times.

At the present moment, it is the blocs and the military alliances that constitute the essential factor here. In the future, and this is what we aspire to, it would be to everybody's advantage to attain a new and productive stability based on co-operative structures that indeed transcend alliances. It should, after all, be possible to banish war and the risk of war from the lives of our peoples and our nations.

The CSCE nations can set an example to the world. As for the United States and the Soviet Union, whose mutual relationship is doubtless crucial to world peace, from them we expect that they continue boldly pursuing the change for the better.

A European community of security, stability and responsibility is in the fundamental interest of both German states. They are growing together through the exercise of the Germans' right to self-determination and, in collaboration with the four powers and with due regard to the interests of all European states, must constitute part of this process.

The proposal from Prime Minister Hans Modrow concerning a

future common path for the Germans is a sound offer. It places emphasis on a sensible accommodation of interest and the maintenance of a peace sustaining balance of forces, just as it relies on conferring on the still existing alliances a primarily political character until they are disbanded.

Even though there are, as yet, no final concepts on the future role of the Germans, nobody, undoubtedly, would take exception, for example, if, first of all, both German states consistently patterned their armed forces on purely defensive lines, which, as was suggested recently by Mr. Genscher, would be promoted by a joint renunciation for the production and possession of nuclear chemical and biological weapons and, perhaps, of the prohibition of stockpiling them on German soil.

Second, there could be virtually no exception if they continued to reduce their military arsenal as a result of negotiations and through unilateral moves.

Third, if foreign troops were withdrawn in stages from their respective territories.

Fourth, if both states, in their alliances made efforts to achieve further tangible cuts in their military capabilities.

And, fifth, if both states, mindful of the over-riding security interests of all peoples, detached themselves gradually from their alliance obligations and left the military structures of the Warsaw Pact and of NATO, because these ought to assume more and more of a political character anyway.

It would be most benefiting for the Germans to act as a kind of bridge between the two blocs. To stake out their role could be a task for the summit meeting envisaged by the CSCE states. Preparations for this meeting should be speeded up so that such CSCE framework could be created which could guarantee democracy and stability in the view of the growing weight which will potentially result in a unified German state.

Allow me, ladies and gentleman, in view of the continuing destabilization in my country which, of course, could not after all choose its politically and military sensitive location, and in the face of mounting nationalistic and even neo fascist manifestations, I wish to reaffirm that we intend to do everything in our power, everything that is reasonable, balanced and honourable, to prevent that instability spread to the European and disarmament processes.

Democratic renewal must, and can only, come from within ourselves. It cannot just be instilled in us from somewhere else.

In this period which abounds as much with opportunities as it is fraught with risks, the Government of the German Democratic



Republic is doing all in its power to preserve the anti-fascist traditions of our people. Now what is most imperative are major, rapid and serious disarmament moves. Disarmament and arms control must not lag behind the dynamics of the political process in Europe.

The initiative on the part of President Bush to agree on an Open Skies regime, and so commendably taken up by the Canadian government, has, therefore, come as a very timely move. I would like incidentally to thank the Canadian government for this invitation to the Conference. I would like to thank the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Clark, for the excellent working conditions provided.

Openness with regard to military potential and activities is, in our view, a hallmark, an important hallmark, of the emerging new type of international security. Exercised by both sides, it will replace mistrust and hostility by trust and co-operation. Consequently, consent to the Open Skies regime is a criterion of the seriousness of statements on openness and verification.

Situated at the boundary between the two alliances, and being a country of transit and tourism with air corridors of three of the allies and an international air route in its skies, and an allied military mission on its territory, the German Democratic Republic, whether it likes it not, is, and intends to remain, a transparent country.

Having agreed early on to the conference project of an Open Skies regime, the German Democratic Republic expects a number of things to be accomplished. It is of utmost importance that all states participate on the basis of sovereignty and equal rights. This makes it necessary to ensure, in the first place, that each of them will have equivalent possibilities and capabilities for data collection.

COCOM-like restrictions, in this context, would run counter to the envisaged goal of mutual confidence building. A co-operative approach should also be adopted with regard to the use of observation results.

An Open Skies regime, irrespective of its value, per se, should be based on the promotion of genuine disarmament measures and should facilitate verification of compliance with respective agreements.

Certainly no one can harbour illusions as to the multitude of problems as yet to be solved. Nevertheless, what we want is to have this instrument of mutual confidence building and verification at our disposal soon, all the more so since the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe is nearing its final stage, so duplication of verification efforts could be avoided.

What is now to be agreed upon between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty should be a starter for a future global system of confidence building and openness. The expectations of the world are great. And if we closed our eyes to that, we would indeed do a disservice to our own interests and surely block the road to the future.

Therefore, an agreement on more transparency and openness should, itself and above all, be open to other states and regions in the world. And, likewise, to new developments which today we can but surmise.

In conclusion, I would like to express my hope that here in Canada's capital city of Ottawa, the development will start-up which will be highly beneficial for global peace.

I would like to thank you for your attention.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Dr. Fischer, and thank you, colleagues, for your contributions and dispatch during the day.

We have four speakers to be heard from tomorrow. They are in order: The Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, and Hungary, who is Vice-Chairman of this meeting and will chair the concluding meeting in Canada. We propose to start tomorrow morning at nine o'clock sharp. When the formal presentations are finished, I would then propose that we move immediately to closed sessions to discuss the progress that has been made in the working groups on Open Skies and then to get on to other questions that are of interest to ministers with respect to the CFE negotiations and, if possible, into other matters as well.

There will be a working lunch tomorrow at midday and we will convene again in the afternoon for as long as we can command the active participation of Ministers here in Ottawa and as long as there are matters to discuss, although I think we will have matters to discuss longer than we can command the active participation of Ministers in Ottawa.

I remind you that there is a dinner tonight for Ministers given by Prime Minister Mulroney in the Lester B. Pearson Building at 7:30 in the evening. I look forward to seeing you at that time.

I would like to ask Mr. Bild, the General Secretary of the Conference, whether he has anything to add at this stage.

MR. BILD:

No, Mr. Chairman. Our plans are, as soon as the formal



statements are over tomorrow, as the Chairman has said, to move into closed session. At that time, Ministers will, of course, wish to spend some time in further discussions of the Open Skies regime with a view to giving their delegates who remain in Ottawa a proper work task.

Thereafter, of course, the discussions are open for any further subjects that you may wish to put on the agenda.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much. We will then adjourn now until tomorrow at 9:00 a.m. I look forward to seeing you at the Prime Minister's dinner.

Thank you.

--- WHEREUPON THE CONFERENCE ADJOURNED TO RESUME ON
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, AT 9:00 A.M.

--- UPON RESUMING AT 9 A.M., FEBRUARY 13, 1990

THE CHAIRMAN:

Colleagues, let me welcome you back to this session this morning. We are providing a little more typical Canadian February weather. For those of you who have spent much time outside, we are demonstrating some of the variety of Canada in the slightly colder temperatures today.

I believe some of our friends in the media banking the walls will be leaving in a moment. We can then turn to the agenda.

We have four speakers this morning. I propose to have a short coffee break and then to return as soon as we can after that to closed session in this room about ten minutes after the conclusion of the final speech.

I would invite to speak the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Federal Republic of Germany, His Excellency Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

HIS EXCELLENCY HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER,
VICE-CHANCELLOR AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, we are gathered here at a momentous and promising stage of European history.

The link between the North American democracies and Europe cannot be demonstrated more clearly than by the holding of this conference here in Ottawa, the capital of Canada. East and West are increasingly moving towards co-operation, Europe is growing together, the Berlin Wall has fallen. Hungary was the first country to take the bold decision to open the Iron Curtain.

The determination of the peoples of Europe and of the Germans to overcome divisions -- all this has proven stronger than all previously established artificial barriers. The people are demanding their inalienable right peacefully, circumspectly, and with a sense of responsibility.

At Davos, on February 1, 1987, I called upon the West to take General Secretary Gorbachev seriously, and not to allow a historic opportunity to slip by. Today we know that his policies played a decisive part in the fundamental changes in Europe.

The Germans in the East and West realize the significance for our people of General Secretary Gorbachev's remark made in Moscow, on February 11 during our visit, that the question of unity of the German nation can only be decided by the Germans themselves and that they must themselves choose in what political forums, in what



Recycle a can

periods, at what pace, and under what conditions they will realize their unity.

We thank all our friends and our allies who have stood by us during the past decades in our commitment to unity. Not forgotten are the declarations made by President Bush and President Mitterrand. As we Germans now follow the path to unity for which we have waited for decades, we are aware of the historical dimension of this process.

The historical dimension includes remembering all the suffering inflicted on other nations in the name of Germany. May the German post-war democracy and the resolute stance of the Germans in the GDR for freedom and human rights give all neighbours the reassurance that Germans united in freedom and democracy will contribute to a better Europe.

I reaffirm what Thomas Mann said as early as 1952: "We seek a European Germany, not a German Europe". That is our rejection of the power politics of the past; it is our recollection of the European mission of the Germans.

Vaclav Havel stated in Warsaw: "It is hard to conceive of a United Europe with a divided Germany. Likewise, hard to conceive of is a united Germany in a divided Europe".

The firm linkage of our destiny to that of Europe imposes great responsibility on us Germans. Our geographical position, our history, and the weight of our nation increase that responsibility. We seek our unification out of responsibility for European peace, and we seek it as a contribution to stability in Europe. We seek German unification in the context of integration in the European community. The CSCE process, East-West partnership for stability, the building of the common European house and the creation of a peace order throughout Europe.

We say to all our neighbours what we want to unite: the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, and the whole of Berlin. No less, but no more. We do not have territorial claims against any of our neighbours. I recall the words I addressed to our Polish colleague before the plenary of the United Nations on September 27, 1989.

We respect the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers with regard to the whole of Germany. The negotiations that the two German states will hold with each other on unification will not take place behind the backs of the Four Powers. We, the Federal Republic of Germany, want the two German states to seek their participation and agreement with them, with the Four Powers.

We want to incorporate the unification of Germany in the pan-European process. We, therefore, attach special importance to the

1990 CSCE summit. We wish to assure the states represented there that we Germans want nothing but to live in peace and freedom with our neighbours.

Mr. Chairman, the year 1990 will be one of disarmament, if we want it to be. This depends to a decisive extent on the governments gathered here. Let us provide the political impetus for this. Openness and confidence-building, these are a key to progress and security, arms control, and disarmament.

An Open Skies agreement will enable us to make a major step forward along the road to security through comprehensive transparency. Yesterday, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze indicated new dimensions of such a transparency.

I would like to thank my colleague Joe Clark for his country's efforts in translating the Open Skies initiative into practice. When the U.S. President Eisenhower first proposed an Open Skies regime on July 21, 1955, this was still a revolutionary proposal that many did not consider realizable.

Today the time is ripe for comprehensive transparency and confidence building. The Open Skies regime proposed by President Bush on May 12, 1989 reaffirms the determination to proceed from confrontation to co-operative security. The CSCE Final Act of Helsinki, the Stockholm Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and the INF Treaty are milestones on this road.

The Open Skies regime opens up a new dimension of confidence-building. Countries which only a few years ago viewed each other with distrust want to permit members of the other alliance to carry out observation flights over their own territory. For the first time the Soviet Union and the United States will make their entire territory accessible to such a multilateral regime. What progress this is in terms of transparency. And what progress it is in co-operation between the countries of the two alliances, which will have to work together closely in performing the observation flights. I am convinced that this openness and co-operation will increasingly become the natural form of relationship in Europe and North America.

Here in Ottawa the network of co-operative security is being further strengthened. The extent of change can only be appreciated when seen in the historical context. In the 20th century mankind has suffered terrible wars, millions have lost their lives, immeasurable destruction has been caused and untold misery endured. The possibility created by the invention of the atomic bomb of destroying all life on earth prompted the New York Times as early as 1945 to make the prophetic observation that civilization and humanity will only be able to survive if there is a revolution of political thinking.



Recycle a world

Now, in the final decade of this century, we are witnessing such a revolution. Is the British historian Arnold Toynbee not right to regard history as cycles of challenge and response? The danger of nuclear suicide gave rise to creative forces with which the future can be mastered and peace secured.

How political thinking has evolved from Heracleitus's view of war as the father of all things, and Augustine's concept of "bellum justum" to Clausewitz's theory of war as the "continuation of politics by other means" and on to the present-day recognition that war can neither be waged nor won.

The peoples, the nations, are compelling reflection on the values of freedom, human rights and democracy. They open, thus, the opportunity of fundamentally reshaping Europe's future in the last decade of this century. The basic conditions of stability required for this process include above all the elimination of military confrontation. In Malta the presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that now the Cold War is over its instruments must also be removed, including the arsenals of weapons that have been built up over a period of 40 years.

At the negotiations on conventional arms control we must create the preconditions for developing a new security system for the whole of Europe based on co-operative structures.

These preconditions are:

First, the elimination of the imbalances persisting in the conventional sector, and further substantial reductions of conventional forces and weapons. The forces of basing countries must also be included. We realize that this will have far-reaching effects on the strength of the Bundeswehr.

Second, the removal of the capability for launching surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive action. We are determined to make our contribution to disarmament.

Third, the restructuring of forces so as to strengthen their defensive nature and further reduce offensive capabilities.

Much of this already determines the ongoing Vienna negotiations on conventional forces. The more extensive goals must be negotiated in Vienna without interruption after the completion of the first set of negotiations, otherwise our efforts towards disarmament and arms control will fail to keep pace with the political changes. Vienna I must be followed without a break by Vienna II.

The nations of Europe and North America expect a first conventional disarmament agreement to be concluded by the end of the year. Time is pressing. The key problems must be resolved

before the summer. It should be possible for the heads of state or government to sign that agreement at a summit this autumn. The tracks must now be laid. The talks that we hold here in Ottawa - bilaterally among our allies and among all conference participants -- afford an excellent opportunity in this respect. All participants are called upon to use this opportunity.

However, conventional arms control cannot be pursued in isolation. We, therefore, attach particular importance to expanding the system of confidence- and security-building measures agreed in Stockholm. We must make every effort so that the negotiations on a new set of CSBMs, in which all CSCE participants are involved, also produce results by the end of this year.

The open exchange of views between East and West at the recent seminar on security concepts and military doctrines within the framework of the CSBM negotiations reinforces the transition from confrontation to co-operation in Europe. The political changes cannot fail to have an impact on military doctrines and strategies. Military doctrines and strategies must exclusively serve the political goal of preventing war.

As soon as the implementation of a CFE agreement has started, negotiations must be commenced on the reduction of short-range nuclear missiles. Nuclear artillery must not be excluded from disarmament either.

The objective pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union of concluding by the end of this year an agreement halving their strategic nuclear arsenals also serves the security interests of the Europeans. We welcome the substantive progress made at the recent meeting of the foreign ministers in Moscow.

This year, 1990, we also have the opportunity to achieve a global ban on chemical weapons. These dreadful weapons of mass destruction must no longer have a place in our world. The risk of chemical weapons spreading to Third World countries can now only be averted by a global ban.

On the road to co-operative stability in Europe, the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization have a special political steering function to perform. The two alliances are in the process of overcoming their antagonism and arriving at co-operation. Once their countries, once their members, achieve increasing co-operation, the alliances cannot and must not remain locked in confrontation. Our goal must be to attain security not through confrontation but through collaboration.

The alliances are acquiring new political functions with regard to confidence-building, dialogue and co-operation. They must help to form an East-West partnership for stability. They must become elements of new co-operative security structures by



which they will be increasingly overarched and into which they can ultimately be absorbed.

The change in Europe derives its strength from the substance of Europe, of the whole of Europe, its identity and its cultural unity. This is the yearning for an order that guarantees human dignity, human rights and social justice, as well as the right of nations to self-determination. This European identity rests on our common history and on the awareness of the common responsibility for our continent's future.

The United States of America and Canada, whose roots lie in this identity, share this common responsibility with the European nations. The aim of European politics must be to make this cultural unity also acquire political substance in the form of a peaceful European order reaching from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The basic conditions for this goal have never been more favourable than now. The dimensions of historic significance opened up for us by the Helsinki Final Act are becoming, indeed, increasingly evident. The fundamental decision taken at Helsinki in favour of human rights and self-determination was the prerequisite and stimulus for the reform forces that brought about radical changes in central and eastern Europe.

The CSCE process is now the most important instrument for controlling and consolidating this political momentum. It also continues to be the framework of the new partnership for stability that we seek for the whole of Europe.

The CSCE Summit at which the Vienna agreements can be signed will take place this year.

This recognition has gained acceptance everywhere. We must now make thorough preparations for the Summit. Indeed, we cannot afford to delay the preparations. This Summit should not replace the 1992 CSCE Summit meeting but it takes account of the recognition that it is already necessary to act. The CSCE Summit faces great tasks. It opens up great opportunities. The solemn reaffirmation of the principles embodied in the Helsinki Final Act can create new confidence. The Summit can provide orientation for common pan-European structures; not least in the field of security.

It must make visible the architecture of the peaceful European order of the common European house.

The CFE and the CSBM negotiations must be continued with a view to forging co-operative security structures in Europe. Pan-European institutions must be established to foster the coalescence of Europe within the CSCE framework.

Conceivable European institutions are institutions to co-

ordinate East-West economic co-operation, a pan-European institution for the protection of human rights, a European environmental agency and European centres for conflict management and verification.

The CSCE process must be perpetuated and deepened. The establishment of a council of foreign ministers of the CSCE countries, meeting at regular intervals, can contribute to stability and confidence building. We should also examine the opportunities that may be inherent in the proposal made by Prime Minister Mazowiecki of Poland for a European Council of Co-operation.

We Europeans bear responsibility for the world. The global challenges of protecting the common sources of life, developing the Third World and safeguarding peace world-wide are growing. A Europe that is whole and free, as President Bush put it, will possess greater strength for meeting these challenges. There is an increasing awareness, world-wide, that humanity's future can now only be safeguarded and shaped through common responsibility and common action.

1990 must be a year of co-operation, disarmament and European unification. The last decade of this century, which has caused so much war and suffering for the peoples of Europe, must bring about the transition to a just and lasting peaceful order on our continent.

East and West have the unique opportunity of reaching that goal. We have the historic duty to seize that opportunity with all our energies. History does not repeat its offers.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Genscher. I would like call now on the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland, His Excellency Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson.

HIS EXCELLENCY JON BALDVIN HANNIBALSSON,
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ICELAND:

Mr. Chairman, as the remarkable speech of Mr. Genscher which we have just heard, our meeting here in Ottawa is a part of a process which has been underway for a long time.

Looking back, it is difficult to conceive how this unique and, on a personal level, very memorable meeting might have taken place had it not been for the patient, laborious groundwork laid during the earlier stages of the CSCE process.

I am, of course, referring in particular to the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament and on the Vienna followup meeting last year.

Listening to the previous statements of our colleagues, yesterday, no one could be in doubt that we are on the threshold of a qualitatively new beginning. A new world order is gradually taking shape and we have a good glimpse of it in Mr. Genscher's speech just a few moments ago.

We who are gathered around this table may consider ourselves to be fortunate in many ways; fortunate in being called upon to administer our nations' international relations during this historical period of transition, when we are moving from an area of Cold War and confrontation into a new epoch of understanding conciliation and co-operation among nations. A new epoch that has already inspired hopes of a better world for future generations.

This welcome turn of events now offers humanity unprecedented opportunities for releasing resources long absorbed by military confrontation for more productive ends.

This is a message of hope, not only for the nations of Europe, East and West, but also for the developing nations and for the future relationship between North and South.

The task of apportioning credit for this auspicious turn of events is one that I shall happily leave to future historians. I would be amiss, however, if I did not take this opportunity to commend, in particular, the courage of the Soviet leadership in recognizing that the current flow of events is, after all, irreversible and for persisting in the face of Herculean difficulties in pushing through fundamental restructuring of their society from above.

All this testifies to the primacy of politics in initiating fundamental reform. There is no historical inevitability at work. Never shall we forget the resilience and the determination of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe who are now hopefully harvesting the fruits of their vigorous resistance to totalitarian rule over the last half century.

Overcoming the divisions of Europe has always been a part of the agenda of the Western Alliance. The attainment of that goal does not mean, however, that the Alliance has outlived its usefulness.

The Atlantic Alliance embodies, not least, the intertwining of the fates of Europe and North America in good times and bad, as this meeting testifies in a significant way.

This Alliance has served its double purpose well, that of

securing its member states peace and freedom for more than 40 years. In the coming years it will serve as a primary vehicle for managing the transition to a new peaceful order through, among other things, orderly and negotiated disarmament.

In seeking to establish that goal we must be careful not to precipitate sudden shifts in policy that might, in the end, undermine stability and peace in the Europe of tomorrow.

Assurances now given by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the foreign policy orientation of a united Germany are particularly encouraging in this respect.

The Basic Elements paper of the NATO ministerial meeting in December of last year sets out the unanimous view of the NATO allies as to how we envisage the workings of Open Skies regime in practice.

Our guiding principles are: Transparency and openness; active participation and co-operation; inspection based on national quotas; and the establishment of agreed procedures.

The task ahead for our negotiators is to identify and solve the problems associated with establishing that regime. A successful regime will contribute to progress and confidence-building and arms control through enhanced predictability, mutual understanding and the confidence resulting from this total openness.

This is politically desirable, primarily because, as was spoken in the words of Mr. Skubiszewski, "Openness is a means of democratizing security relationships".

Iceland fully supports the proposal to convene a CSCE Summit this year, and we wish to work actively for its success. A successful Summit, however, requires careful preparation and clarity as to its intended goals.

The objectives of the Summit should be to revitalize the CSCE process. This can be done by holding a focused discussion on the changes within Europe and by the affirming of the Helsinki principles; also by consolidating the Agreement of Vienna with the signing of a CFE Accord.

Furthermore, by incorporating the results of the CSBM negotiations and deciding on the next phase of the conventional arms control process.

In considering further steps in the field of conventional arms control, the Western Alliance is committed to maintaining the political cohesion of the Alliance. No more no less, the principle of the indivisibility of our security must be safeguarded.



We must avoid the creation of areas of unequal security. In particular, care must be taken that a reduction of any military threat to a European land mass does not result in relatively greater dangers to stability in the oceans and in the lands.

This is a vital, if often overlooked, element that must be borne in mind if the CSCE process is to serve as a framework for the promotion of peaceful evolution in Europe as a whole.

For this reason, not least, my government has stated time and again that the issue of naval CBMs and arms control must be dealt with without further delay in preparation for the next phase of the conventional arms control process in Europe. Here, indeed, is an iceberg, a remnant from the Cold War that needs to be melted. And that is a different and altogether more welcome sort of global warming.

I conclude by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, for your initiative in convening this conference. I feel confident that it will bring us success that may be formally finalized and concluded in Budapest. Your initiative, Mr. Chairman, concerning the new Open Skies regime is in the best tradition of Canadian foreign policy, and in keeping with the role of Canada as a generous host to the seekers of peace, prosperity and stability, in a troubled world.

Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much. May I call now on the vice-chairman of this conference, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, His Excellency Gyula Horn.

HIS EXCELLENCY GYULA HORN,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HUNGARY:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To begin with I would like to thank you for the hospitality and excellent organization we have seen here. And I must say it will be difficult for us to be as efficient as our Canadian friends are.

Mr. Chairman, it would be hard to find anything better than the Open Skies initiative to symbolize the favourable changes in the political situation in Europe and the world. When the idea was launched many did not conceal their scepticism as to its timeliness and feasibility. And now, nine months after President Bush's speech, we have come together in Ottawa in the hope that we can work out a treaty on an Open Skies regime and can begin implementing it soon.

Hungary gave tangible evidence of its confidence in the

success of the Open Skies initiative and its willingness to make an active contribution to this success through its commitment to hosting the second phase of the conference and through the execution, jointly with Canada, of a trial flight evaluated at the Budapest meeting of experts of the 23 states in January.

Sceptics were convinced of the usefulness and the timeliness of the Open Skies initiative by the rapid pace of events in recent months. The treaty, if signed in the near future, will ease concerns that arms control and security policies are increasingly lagging behind the accelerated pace of political changes.

If the participants of our current talks do not lose sight of the political significance of the treaty to be worked out, and they rely on the confidence created among the 23 states, the treaty could be signed as soon as May 12, the first anniversary of the initiative.

It is likely that the first treaty will not be able to satisfy every expectation and need of all participants, but we are convinced that these can be met later on the basis of experience accumulated and mutual confidence further strengthened through improvement and expansion of the operational system.

Signing a treaty as early as the first half of this year would give a boost to the Vienna CFE and CSBM talks and would undoubtedly have an impact on all other arms control fora, too.

Hungary as a Central-east European state is particularly aware of the importance of creating soon a stable security policy background to the rapid and deep political changes. Our conference can be an important step in a longer process putting changes occurring in our continent in a solid framework through interconnected confidence and security building as well as disarmament measures and leading to the emergence of a collective security system.

The Open Skies regime can serve as a building block of this collective security system, as the execution of flights requires a high degree of openness and co-operation among the parties. We deem it important that this treaty be an agreement of 23 sovereign states and thereby offer an opportunity for expansion through involvement of all interested European states.

We must strive to create a system that is not overly complicated and does not pursue maximalist goals. This will help us avoid unduly protracted negotiations as well as flights resulting in wariness rather than strengthened confidence. The composition and technical level of the instruments used, the quotas, the minimalization of areas closed to flights, will ensure that the flights result in an actual increase in military openness and transparency.



Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to raise a few ideas concerning the most important current disarmament forum, that is the CFE talks. Our opinion is that these talks, too, must adapt to the changing circumstances. Developments in the political and military situation in Europe make it indispensable that an agreement be reached in the year 1990; the outlines of this agreement having fully taken shape at the talks by now.

It is particularly important not to delay political decisions needed to reach an agreement. We are of the opinion that conditions necessary to making these decisions already exist regarding the most important issues at the talks.

Regarding the issue of air force, we see a basic consensus in that. The agreement must limit all combat aircraft. So the debate should focus on which of the disputed subcategories will be limited and how. Requirements of European stability, as well as those of an equal security of participants, must be considered when working out an agreement.

We believe that a common ceiling should apply to all units of combat-capable aircraft, permanently land-based naval aviation, and medium bombers. As for strategic bombers and for interceptors of Soviet Home Air Defence, special solutions will have to be worked out.

We appreciate and welcome President Bush's proposal of February 2 as a significant step forward on the personnel issue. The proposal is fully in compliance with the Hungarian concept presented in Vienna, January 18, calling for a reduction of troops stationed abroad to the lowest possible level. This proposal enables us to outline an agreement acceptable to all, based on a sufficiency rule establishing an upper limit on troops stationed abroad by any participant, while postponing a comprehensive limitation of personnel to be established by the next agreement.

I believe we need an open-minded approach to the post-CFE-I period. Our current perception is that the conceptual basis of the current talks -- namely, their alliance-based approach -- cannot be maintained. We should use the period between the signing and entering into force of the agreement to work out -- involving all member countries of the CSCE -- the mandate for the next phase of CFE talks. It would be important to see these talks start immediately upon the agreement's entering into force.

Mr. Chairman, it is symbolic for us that the location for the signing of the treaty creating an Open Skies regime will, hopefully, be Budapest. Hungary considers intensified European co-operation an important guarantee of its own future and democratic development. We are interested in seeing the favourable political processes currently experienced in our continent stretching out to

the fields of security policy and arms control.

This fact is itself a guarantee to our doing our best to ensure the success of the whole Conference, including the Budapest Phase. Pending an understanding of the States concerned, we would be ready to host -- following the conclusion of the closing session at the Ministerial level -- a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the 35 States participating in the CSCE process. That meeting would serve to lay the ground for the 1990 Summit of the Thirty-Five.

Getting back now to Ottawa, we are aware that the negotiating delegations will have to solve a number of complicated problems in the short time at their disposal. We are encouraged by our feeling that all the participating States have the political will needed to make this highly significant enterprise a success.

It serves the interest of all Europe that we proceed further on the road indicated by the historic disarmament and confidence building agreements signed or in the works. This can guarantee the durability of the current favourable trends in international politics and the opening of skies over every State and our globe in the not too distant future.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the document formulating the common position of the Warsaw Treaty member States, which I am tabling now, will serve as an appropriate basis to elaborating a treaty that meets the aforementioned requirements. The concepts outlined in this document give shape to a flexible regime containing sufficient common ground the NATO document "Basic Elements" so as to start working together.

Thank you very much.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Horn. That Warsaw Treaty document is circulated to Ministers.

Colleagues, let me now wear both my hats, as the Canadian Foreign Minister, and to some degree as Chairman. I think that this past day and a half have marked an important beginning in the construction of a new framework for political and security relations among our countries. This has obviously been a unique occasion.

It is the first time that Foreign Ministers of our countries have gathered together since the dawning of the new age of democracy and freedom in Eastern Europe.

We are meeting not as old adversaries, but as new partners in a new task, the task of building a durable peace in Europe.



We also have a new type of challenge before us. That challenge is not so much to initiate change, it is to channel it, to ensure that it remains permanent and stabilizing in its consequences. In effect, the challenge before us as ministers is to keep up with change.

In breaking new ground, I detect much common ground. That common ground goes beyond specifics. It relates also to a shared sense of purpose and mission.

Allow me, as Chairman, the luxury of summarizing what I see as the common elements of this shared purpose.

First, I think that all of us accept that we have entered a new era in relations between East and West. It is an era where the terms East and West are themselves beginning to lose meaning.

Second, I detect a consensus that we must act quickly. We must act quickly to consolidate the gains which have been made thus far and to ensure that future change proceeds in a way which enhances our common security rather than detracting from it.

Third, I believe there is agreement that there is an overriding requirement to be guided by the dual goals of stability and predictability. We must act in such a way as to smooth the bumps on the road ahead and to maximize the predictability of change.

Fourth, I also detect a shared belief that a guiding principle of our future security framework should be the reduction of military forces to the lowest possible level consistent with national security requirements.

Fifth, I believe that there is agreement that we must broaden the definition of security and act upon that broader definition. That broadened definition of security relates to confidence building, verification, and the legitimization of borders and frontiers.

Sixth, I think we all share the view that a new framework for relations in Europe requires the continued clear involvement of North America in the various councils of the continent.

Those are broad issues where I, as Chairman, see little, if any, difference between the 23 ministers sitting around this table. That in itself is grounds for optimism.

There also seems to be a measure of agreement on specific negotiations or institutions which have been the focus of our discussion so far. There is a strong consensus among us regarding the desirability of Open Skies. An Open Skies agreement will

solidify the gains in mutual confidence we have already achieved and allow us to move forward to a new are of confidence-building.

Open Skies will allow each country represented here to see that no one of us in carrying on military activities threatening to the security of the others. It will assist in the verification of future arms control agreements, and it will help to create the climate that encourages signature of those agreements.

Most important, we are agreed in our expressed readiness to come to an early agreement that we can sign in Budapest in May.

How do we put our political will into practice? What sort of aircraft will be used? How many flights will each country be allowed? What are the operational details of an Open Skies regime?

Questions such as these are sometimes called technical questions. We should not let that label mislead us into thinking that they are somehow simple questions with ready solutions or that political considerations do not intrude on them. Rather, we should regard them as the challenges that they are.

We should be prepared to work diligently to come up with solutions. And, should we reach a point where agreement seems difficult, I would urge us to look back on what we have said here, to bear in mind our shared purpose, and to reaffirm our determination to move forward.

I pledge the full support of the Canadian delegation in this endeavour. Canada's unflagging support for Open Skies is well-known to all of you. It stems form our strong interest in verification and from our commitment to East-West confidence-building.

I believe it is fair to say that the approach of all of us to Open Skies is based on four criteria:

- First, simplicity;
- second, cost-effectiveness;
- third, flexibility;
- fourth, equity.

The Open Skies concept is, by its very nature, a very simple one. In building a structure to embody this concept we should not look for complexity where none need exist. We should keep restrictions to a minimum. We should ensure that openness means openness. We should create a regime that, in principle, is subject to no limitations save those imposed by flight safety considerations and rules of international law.

Open Skies should be cost effective. Open Skies need not be expensive. The technology exists and is well within the reach of



all participants. Cost effectiveness also means we should avoid unnecessary bureaucracy.

We should construct a regime which is as flexible as possible in meeting the varying needs and requirements of the signatory states.

Equity allows all participants to benefit from the regime. No doubt there are differences as to what equity means and how it can be achieved.

NATO countries have put forward their conception of Open Skies in their Basic Elements paper. We have just had tabled a paper from Warsaw Treaty countries. We have heard, today and yesterday, from the various foreign ministers of both Alliances. Mr. Shevardnadze has introduced the notion of equality, which I take to mean equitable access to benefits. This is a concern that we need to take seriously. In general, there appears to be a fair amount of common ground in our approaches. It is our task now, as ministers, to identify that common ground in a communique, so that this negotiation will advance quickly, so that Open Skies can become a functioning element of East-West confidence building as soon as possible.

I am greatly encouraged by the pace with which events have progressed so far. It has been less than a year since President Bush re-launched Open Skies in his speech in Texas, yet here we are ready to commence detailed negotiations on a treaty text with the evident desire to sign an agreement a few months hence. Those of you familiar with the history of arms control negotiations will see this as a record.

I am encouraged also by the rapidity with which Canada's trial overflight of Hungary was put into play. I want to emphasize the outstanding co-operation we received from our Hungarian and our Czech colleagues in conducting the trial. The results of our joint experiment were discussed in detail at the Budapest preparatory meetings for this conference. I believe this has cleared away a lot of the technical questions that might otherwise hamper this negotiation. This test of the nuts and bolts of Open Skies demonstrated that if our will to co-operate remains strong, the concept can be made to work.

As we go into our closed session, I believe it is useful to outline the key issues with which we will be dealing:

-- whether aircraft will be nationally or collectively operated;

-- determining the types of sensors to be allowed onboard Open Skies aircraft;

-- determining the number, or quota, of overflights each participating state will be obliged to receive or permitted to carry out. I believe a compromise can readily be found on this issue using a formula that takes into account at its basis the realities of geography, geographic size and population;

-- determining the structure and language of an Open Skies treaty text.

In an effort to expedite the negotiation, Canada, in conjunction with its allies, has prepared a draft treaty text that we hope can serve as the basis of discussions over the next two weeks.

Let us move as far as we can towards agreement in Ottawa, so we can reconvene in the spring in Budapest to sign a final treaty text.

Let us make Open Skies our first step onto the uncharted ground of our future security in Europe. We face an enormous challenge, but we also face unprecedented opportunity. By putting our political will into practise we, together, can make the term "East-West" synonymous not with confrontation and rivalry, as it has been for the last 40 years, but synonymous, instead, with good will and co-operation.

We have also spoken today and yesterday about the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and about the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Some have spoken about the reunification of Germany, which we all acknowledge as a matter for the German people to pursue, and which we welcome, confident that those aspects that are of interest to others will be discussed in the appropriate forums.

The CFE negotiations are tremendously important. We are all greatly encouraged by what we have heard from President Bush and General Secretary Gorbachev in these past days about the reduction of troops in Europe. All speakers believe that we have the basis for proceeding rapidly to the conclusion of a CFE agreement. Let us do so in time for signature of a treaty at a CFCE summit meeting this year. Then let us move towards further measures to increase conventional stability.

We are all agreed that there should be a summit level meeting of the CSCE in 1990. The potential of the CSCE is enormous. Mr. Dienstbier spoke of the CSCE as a comprehensive framework for pluralism. It is the one body that has, in its composition and in its mandate, the ability to act as a framework for the construction of a new peace and prosperity in Europe.

How should we prepare for a summit? Some have suggested that we should do it at Copenhagen in June, or at the second Open Skies



meeting this spring in Budapest, or at a separate meeting of foreign ministers. Those are questions to be decided.

It is clear that a preparatory meeting will be needed involving not just the 23 nations represented here, but all 35 countries of the CSCE. But we need to discuss here what we believe should be the purpose of the summit itself beyond signing a CFE Agreement.

Is it to create the political setting for the 1992 follow-up meeting? Or will it also have a broader agenda, setting in motion a process of activities that range through economic, social, environmental and humanitarian co-operation, as well as security affairs?

Today we are all politicians, in the best sense of that word. We are responsible to our publics for our actions. We must, therefore, be sensitive to those responsibilities on the part of others. We must be mindful constantly of the need to keep our efforts co-ordinated so that change is not purchased at the price of stability.

Under normal circumstances this would be a recipe for slowness; but we cannot afford delay. We must be present, at the political level, during all phases of this process, to ensure success which is quick and sure.

As we pursue our discussions today in closed session, I am confident that we will continue to apply the same openness to each other and to new ideas as is embodied in the concept of Open Skies itself.

May I now propose, colleagues, since we have heard from the ministers of each of the 23 countries, that we rise for about 10 minutes for a coffee break.

I would have us, then, reconvene in closed session in this room. I would hope to begin discussion when we reconvene of the elements of an agreement on a communique with respect to Open Skies, and we can in that closed session discuss how we make best use of the rest of our time together this day in Ottawa, to discuss questions relating to CFE and other questions that ministers together will want to address.

So if I could suggest a 15-minute break, we will break for coffee and reconvene in this room, in closed session, at 10:30 a.m.

Thank you.

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PRESS CONFERENCE

**THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOE CLARK, P.C., M.P.,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (CHAIRMAN):**

Colleagues, let me begin very briefly by thanking you all for your co-operation during the last two days of meetings here on Open Skies. I think we have made important progress and I know that we look forward to accepting the invitation of the Government of Hungary to continue this process, with the hope that we can come to an agreement on the basis of our discussions begun here today on a Treaty on Open Skies in Budapest in May.

As your Chairman, I want to thank you for your co-operation and express the hope and the expectation that the very good spirit of co-operation we have seen here will continue.

As was well known, it was important for us to have the discussion that launched this Open Skies process, but this meeting also provided us with an unparalleled opportunity for Minister of the 23 nations to meet bilaterally and informally for discussions that were very productive.

Those of us from the NATO Alliance have just come from a discussion of some matters that had been on our agenda and I apologize for the delay to some of our colleagues. I want to make it clear that those discussions were not about matters discussed earlier today between Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Baker.

I am very gratified to announce today that the Foreign Ministers assembled in Ottawa have come to an agreement on the CFE manpower ceilings in Europe. The United States and the Soviet Union shall each station no more than 195,000 ground and air personnel on foreign territory in Europe in the Central Zone. This would also constitute the total ceiling on Soviet troops stationed on foreign territory in Europe.

In addition, the United States agrees that it will station no more than 30,000 troops on foreign territory in Europe outside of the Central Zone. The Central Zone referred to above is the zone proposed by the United States President in the specific context of his manpower initiative of January 31, 1990.

The agreement on manpower overcomes one of the most important obstacles to a CFE treaty and provides additional impetus to reach an agreement this year. It is news very much welcomed by all of us.

I thank you for your participation in the work of this



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Conference, for your very valuable contribution in the bilateral discussions. There is no question that we have contributed to historic processes in Europe, historic processes in terms of Open Skies, in terms of manpower levels, and we all look forward to continuing that work in time to come.

This meeting is now adjourned.

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Document : ICO-CS-038

Open Skies Conference

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Conference

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FEBRUARY 13TH, 1990



"OPEN SKIES" COMMUNIQUE

At the invitation of the Government of Canada, the Foreign Ministers and senior representatives of the Governments of Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America met in Ottawa February 12-14, 1990 to begin negotiation of "Open Skies". Also present at the Ministerial Session were observers of other CSCE states.¹

The Ministers welcomed the accelerating trend toward openness and the reduction of international tensions. In this context, they noted that although an "Open Skies" regime is neither an arms control nor a verification measure per se its successful implementation would encourage reciprocal openness on the part of participating states. It would strengthen confidence among them, reduce the risk of conflict, and enhance the predictability of military activities of the participating states. Finally it would contribute to the process of arms reduction and limitation along with verification measures under arms limitation and reduction agreements and existing observation capabilities. The Ministers noted further that the establishment of an "Open Skies" regime may promote greater openness in the future in other spheres.

Believing that an effective "Open Skies" regime would serve to consolidate improved relations among their countries, the Ministers therefore agreed on the following:

- The "Open Skies" regime will be implemented on a reciprocal and equitable basis which will protect the interests of each participating state, and in accordance with which the participating states will be open to aerial observation. The regime will ensure the maximum possible openness and minimum restrictions for observation flights;


¹ Those present as observers were Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Monaco, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia.

Turkey reserves her position on the status and representation of Cyprus.



- Each participating state will have the right to conduct, and the obligation to receive, observation flights on the basis of annual quotas which will be determined in negotiations so as to provide for equitable coverage;
- The agreement will have provisions concerning the right to conduct observation flights using unarmed aircraft and equipment capable in all circumstances of fulfilling the goals of the regime;
- The participating states will favourably consider the possible participation in the regime of other countries, primarily the European countries.

The Ministers expressed their gratitude to the Government of Canada for organizing this conference and welcomed the invitation of the Government of Hungary to a second part of the conference to conclude the negotiation in Budapest this spring.



Document : ICO-CS-040

Open Skies Conference

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FEBRUARY 13TH, 1990



The Foreign Ministers and senior representatives of the Governments of Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting in Ottawa at the invitation of the Government of Canada, gathered on the margins of the Open Skies Conference on February 13, 1990 to review progress in the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The Ministers welcomed this meeting as an opportunity to review and assess progress in the negotiations and provide impetus to their successful conclusion. They welcomed in particular an agreement reached in Ottawa between the USA and the USSR on the reduction of their stationed forces in Europe.



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Convinced that a CFE agreement would strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels, the Ministers agreed that the negotiation in Vienna should proceed as expeditiously as possible. For this purpose, the Ministers also agreed that negotiators in Vienna should be encouraged to develop solutions designed to overcome remaining obstacles, especially in those areas where new elements have been put forward recently:


- aircraft
- regional limitations, differentiation and storage
- helicopters
- tanks and armoured combat vehicles.

The Ministers recognized that the essential elements for a CFE treaty are now on the table in Vienna, though much remains to be done, in particular to develop an effective verification regime.

The Ministers expressed their willingness to give simultaneously impetus to the CSBM negotiations. They emphasized their shared commitment to achieving a CFE agreement as soon as possible in 1990, and agreed on the principle of holding a CSCE summit meeting this year. They stressed the need for timely and thorough preparation for such a meeting through appropriate consultation among the 35 participating states.

They affirmed their interest in continuing the conventional arms control process, taking into account future requirements for European stability and security in the light of political developments in Europe.

Document : ICO-CS-039



Open Skies Conference

PRESS CONFERENCE BY MR. DOUGLAS HURD
FOREIGN SECRETARY OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM

United Kingdom

FEBRUARY 13TH, 1990

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TRANSCRIPT A - FOREIGN SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

FROM REG FOR COT RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE

GIVEN BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR DOUGLAS HURD,

IN OTTAWA,

ON TUESDAY, 13 FEBRUARY 1990

TRANSCRIPT A

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

It has been a very busy 24 hours since I met some of you yesterday. I had a long meeting yesterday afternoon of more than an hour with Mr Shewardnadze. I have now met most of the East European Foreign Ministers, in fact I think all of them, and I seem to have been in continuous discussion through this time with Secretary Baker and M. Dumas and Herr Genscher. And there have been a number of developments which from our point of view are very positive.

On the question of manpower ceilings, you will have read what the President of the United States said yesterday, that he is holding to his proposal of 225,000 US troops in Europe as a whole, 105,000 in the central sector. That coincides with the view which I expressed to Secretary Baker.



TRANSCRIPT A - FOREIGN SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

On Germany, which has really taken up I think most of the work in the last 24 hours, after a lot of work we are quite close to an agreement on procedure, an agreement on meetings of the two Germanys and the four-powers to discuss those matters which fall naturally within the scope of such a meeting. This strikes me as an admirable and common sense procedure.

If agreed, and we are waiting for the final agreement of Moscow, it will provide what the British Government has long pressed for, namely a framework for such discussions. And I welcome the emphasis which West German leaders and Herr Genscher again in his speech today put on the rights of the four powers.

We will play a full and energetic part in that procedure, if it is set up, and using it not in any way as holding up self-determination, self-determination is a matter for the German people, for the peoples who live in the Federal Republic and the GDR. That principle has never been in question and the rights of the four-powers could not be exercised to hold it up, but simply to make sure, as best we can, that that process, if that is what the German people want, fits harmoniously and clearly into a pattern of European security which is acceptable to everybody.

That leads me into substance. I think there is a useful weight of opinion forming against the concept of a united, neutral Germany. That is very important. The Soviet attitude is still evolving and different comments are made by different Soviet spokesmen, one can make no complaint about that, but it is now clear that a number of East European states - notably Poland and



TRANSCRIPT A - FOREIGN SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

Hungary - are against the concept of a united, neutral Germany.

Our position, the British position, I made clear in Bonn exactly a week ago. We believe that if there is a united Germany it should be a member of NATO. We believe that arrangements need to be made to reconcile that with the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union and of Poland. And we believe that in the work which will be necessary on that, that work should include studying restrictions on the stationing of NATO troops within what is now the GDR, the territory of the GDR.

We also believe that it is very important that there should be a clear and binding commitment to respect the present borders of Poland. It was a point discussed by the Polish Prime Minister with Mrs Thatcher yesterday in London and by the Polish Foreign Minister this morning with me here in Ottawa.

So there is a lot of work to be done, Ladies and Gentlemen, on that, but at least we can now see a framework emerging within which that work can be achieved.

Finally I would like to say that Herr Genscher will be stopping in London tomorrow for talks with the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher. This follows the sequence of very close contacts we have had with the Federal German Government, including my visit to Bonn and my talks with the Federal Chancellor exactly a week ago, and as I have said, the almost continuous contacts that I have had here in Ottawa with Herr Genscher.

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(QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS)

QUESTION (Richard Widdle, Dallas Morning News):

Could you tell us, besides the Soviet Union, which nations at this gathering are still talking about a neutral Germany?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I have not heard anyone talk about a neutral Germany at this gathering. I have read various statements made by or attributed to Soviet spokesmen, although one particular statement attributed to a Soviet spokesman yesterday, which several of you picked up, has been repudiated by East European spokesmen today.

I have not heard anyone, except Herr Fischer, I think Herr Fischer's speech yesterday did commend the concept of a neutral Germany - the Foreign Minister of the GDR.

QUESTION:

Could you tell me a little bit more about the shape that a four-power conference might take, what sort of questions would be addressed, do you think it is important to get the legal questions out of the way first, the status of the four powers within Germany?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

We have not decided that. As I say, it is not in the bag yet, we are awaiting the final acceptance of Moscow and then there will need to be preparatory work which will need to cover obviously the agenda, the place, the timing of meetings and so on.

QUESTION:

The UK Government must have some idea as to what the role of the four powers will be?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

Of course we do, we have quite clear ideas, but I would like to expound them in the preparatory work, I am afraid, rather than publicly at this stage before the thing has even been set up.

QUESTION:

Any idea when it might happen, what sort of time frame we are looking at for a four power conference?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think that the preparatory work could start as soon as the announcement is made, as soon as agreement is reached. I think the actual meetings, the definitive work, definitive meetings would need to await the elections on 18 March.

QUESTION:

On the question of German reunification, could you elucidate on your earlier comments about the position of Poland and Hungary, what exactly that is, and could you say whether the British Government might support any sort of vote in a general referendum by the German people in a united country as a means of self-determination where they may vote on remaining in NATO, the Warsaw Pact or as a neutral nation?



FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think you must ask the Poles and the Hungarians, but my strong impression is that both of them are opposed to the concept of a neutral Germany. On the question of self-determination, in Britain and in most European countries the basic questions are decided through political elections. There are political elections in the GDR, it is very important that those elections on 18 March should happen in a free and orderly way so that no-one queries the results, and I think the crucial question will be what coming together there is of those who have been elected on 18 March and what attitude they take, what statements they pronounce, on the question of unification given that all the parties in the FRG, with the exception of the Greens as I understand it, are in favour of unification. So the elections on 18 March are the key and that is why it is so crucial that they should be held in a free and orderly way.

QUESTION (Charlotte Montgomery):

To go back to the four power meeting, you talked about issues which you felt were appropriate for them to be dealing with at these meetings. Surely you can give us some idea of what those issues are?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

We have fairly clear ideas about the agenda but I would rather not be drawn on that today.

QUESTION:

Would it be possible at any point for a united Germany within NATO to have any kind of Soviet or Warsaw Treaty troops in the Eastern portion?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

You do have at the moment a large number of Soviet troops in the GDR and clearly one of the questions to be addressed, one of the questions in which the Soviet Union has a clear interest, is what the future arrangements for those should be.

QUESTION (Olivia Ward, Toronto Star):

To follow up on that question, how would the future of a NATO united Germany affect current negotiations on troop withdrawals and troop strength in Europe?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I do not think they would. I mentioned manpower, we have now CFE discussions covering manpower levels. We believe that the relatively new American proposals are a correct Western move, as it were, in those negotiations and I do not think there is an intimate connection between that and the German question we are now considering.

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QUESTION (New York Times):

Now that the President has come out in favour of maintaining the 225,000 figure and you said this is a position which your country supports, how do you see this deadlock being resolved, do you think that the NATO position will be to simply leave things as they are and count on the Soviets to simply unilaterally have to reduce their troops, do you see NATO making another presentation to President Gorbachev on this issue, where does this issue go from here?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:


The position is that the United States has made a revised proposal. The Soviet Union has countered with a proposal of its own. The President of the United States has held to his original proposal. The Soviet proposal, as you know, offered a choice. I think the matter will no doubt be further discussed, but one stage at a time I think. We are pleased with the stance that the President has taken.

QUESTION:

Does that go for the entire Alliance?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

That I cannot say, that I cannot say. We were consulted, we were asked for our view by Mr. Baker and on his return from Moscow, very promptly, we were all asked for our view. We were asked for



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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

our view here and I gave him our view yesterday. I cannot speak for others.

QUESTION:

... the Warsaw Pact and the NATO Alliance on open skies is the question of uniformity in aircraft, could you give us an indication of how close you are to resolution of that issue and why the West is resistant to the uniformity of aircraft? Also, was there any discussion between you and other Foreign Ministers on Laos deployment, whether there is some alternative now being discussed for follow-on to Laos deployment?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

So, we have not discussed the second point, there has been no re-opening of the comprehensive concept which, as you know, set out the procedures for discussing that. On the first point, I left the Plenary Session just as it was discussing that very question of aircraft types and agreed equipment for open skies. We believe that the whole point about open skies is that you are not afraid of technology. Of course the aircraft should be unarmed and you could have a list of things which were prohibited, prohibited equipment and so on. But the whole principle of it is that you are not afraid, you have not anything to hide and if that is so, then there is not really a need to specify types of aircraft or equipment because you are not saying: "I have got something that I need to conceal from advanced technology". You are saying it is open.

FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

Therefore, I think there is a contradiction between the concept of open skies and saying: "Oh but it can only be done by agreed aeroplanes or agreed equipment". Provided it is unarmed, provided it is quite clear that it is an unarmed process, there is no threat of attack involved in it, I think it should be open and as technology develops, those who develop it should be enabled to use it.

QUESTION:

(Inaudible).

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

You are rushing ahead with things which we have not discussed and are not being discussed here at Ottawa. No, we are satisfied, the comprehensive concept sets out the sequence of ways in which this should be discussed. And as I say, no-one has reopened that, indeed Herr Genscher has reaffirmed it, not here but previously.

QUESTION (AFP):

You mentioned the problem of Polish borders, how do you address the concerns of the Poles with a 2 + 4 or 4 +2 framework?

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FOREIGN SECRETARY:

In one way or another the concerns have to be addressed, whether in that framework or directly, there clearly needs to be a permanent resolution of their problem. Herr Genscher again today made a very welcome statement that when German unification was discussed they were talking about the peoples of the GDR, of the FRG and of Berlin. And he added: "Nothing less, nothing more." That, I know, is welcomed by the Poles as a restatement of assurances which he and the Federal Chancellor have given already.

What they would like of course is something which is permanent and is binding and which respects their Western border and we believe that that is right and I am sure that at the right time that will be worked out. That is an important aspect of the external, international implications of German unification and we have to find a way of addressing it. It is not clear yet what that way will be but we believe that there has to be found such a way.

QUESTION:

What kind of answer are you waiting for from Moscow, is it just acceptance of the mechanism, of the formula of 2 + 4, or do they want some kind of guarantee on substantive issues?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I do not know, we have not had the answer yet. I do not know.

TRANSCRIPT A - FOREIGN SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

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QUESTION:

(Inaudible)

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think that is possible.

QUESTION:

Could you enlighten us on the arithmetics, is it 4 + 2 or 2 + 4?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

They each add up to 6.

QUESTION:

Yes, but the implication is that if it is 2 + 4, the two German states are best to sort out some of their internal matters first and then the four powers come in for the security arrangements whereas 4 + 2 would be the other way round?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think you will have to see the form in which it is announced, but the underlying point you are on is entirely correct. There are two aspects of this, there always have been. One is self-determination which is a decision of the German people, the German people in the areas I have described, and that is not to do with the four powers, that is not to do with the rest of us, that is their business and we have always supported their right to take

- 13 -

FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

that decision. But there are, alongside that, certain matters which then have to be considered and decided if German unity is to fit into an harmonious Europe and we have been discussing those, we have just discussed one of them, and some of those issues would fall naturally within the framework that I hope will come into being of the six.

QUESTION (Hella Pick Guardian):

Could I ask you about the declaration on the CFE agreement that is apparently being prepared, is there going to be any kind of political commitment to concluding it this year and if so what is the substance that is going to be put out later today?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think there will be a general endorsement of the idea that the CSCE process is going to carry a good deal more weight and is going to be very important because as the Warsaw Pact disintegrates, the countries of Eastern Europe feel the need for something which brings the countries of Europe together. We believe of course passionately in the continuation of NATO and the EC, but neither of those for the time being is suitable for the countries of Eastern Europe so they want to put more weight on the CSCE process and I think that that is right. I think there will then be agreement, as you know Hella there is agreement really on the principle of holding a CSCE Summit later this year and I dare say that will be in the communique as well.



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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

As you know, we believe that must be accompanied by the signature of a CFE agreement.

QUESTION (Hella Pick):

I think you have misunderstood me a little bit, I thought there was going to be something on the Conventional Forces Agreement, that there would be a statement put out about that today.

FOREIGN SECRETARY:


I am sorry I thought you were talking about the CSCE?

QUESTION (Hella Pick)

No. Also, given the fact that you do not seem to have overcome the two major hurdles - manpower and aircraft - what of substance can you actually say before this meeting breaks up?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think that we have not yet discussed aircraft, that will be a discussion which will be going on later today before we break up, I do not know what progress we can make on that. On manpower, it has not been really discussed here because of the exchanges in Moscow and analyze the sequence. I think that what will come out on CFE, and I am sorry I misunderstood your question, will be mainly an endorsement of the need to reach an agreement this year. Behind the scenes there has been a lot of activity and that may



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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

have had some ground clearing use on this. The impression I have had from the negotiators is that there has been a step backward on aircraft, that manpower does not seem to be a major, of course it is important but I doubt if there will be great conflict about that. Aircraft is more difficult, the other things seem to be yielding to treatment.

As I say, there will be a discussion later today on CFE among the Ministers and I do not know what the final shape of the communique will be but that is roughly what it looks like now. I do not think it will produce any sensations from your point of view.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT A, CONTINUED ON TRANSCRIPT B) EFTT

TRANSCRIPT B - FOREIGN SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

FROM EGEG FOR C01 RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE

GIVEN BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR DOUGLAS HUED,

IN OTTAWA,

ON TUESDAY, 13 FEBRUARY 1990

TRANSCRIPT B (CONTINUED FROM TRANSCRIPT A)

QUESTION:

If I may come back to the question of the 2 plus 4 for a moment, I would like you to expand a little on what seems to me to be a contradiction between your statement that the two Germanys must have it within their own powers of self-determination to make certain decisions about Germany and yet the assertion of four power veto rights, however you want to describe it, I would like to ask you why is it not a contradiction and a quick follow-up would be at what point in the process do you envisage the four power role would cease, would there be some document signed, some commitment made by the newly unified Germany and if so to whom would it be made or would the four power role continue essentially indefinitely until some further decisions are made by the four powers?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I do not think there is a contradiction, it was dealt with admirably in Herr Genscher's speech today, both points, that it is not for the four powers to decide whether or not the Germans have the right of self-determination. Perhaps it was originally, but



TRANSCRIPT B - FOREIGN SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

we decided that a long long time ago, that they did have that right and therefore it is they who trigger the whole process and that again is the importance of these elections on 18 March.

But alongside that are certain matters which are for joint discussion, which have external considerations, and what has been lacking until now is a framework, is a way in which those can actually be discussed. And now I hope that we are within sight of achieving that. We are not actually there, I have explained the tactical position, but I hope that that will be agreed. And then it will discuss a range of things and although we have our ideas I am not expounding them today because I would prefer to discuss them with others first.

But obviously the whole question of the four power status would clearly be one of those things which would need to be settled and dealt with in this new framework.

I think the key thing is not to continue indefinitely a four power relationship but to find ways of bringing it to an end which provide the Soviet Union with answers to its legitimate anxieties and that is why I have mentioned specifically in my opening statement the ideas of restricting the stationing, or not stationing, the prohibition of stationing of stationed NATO troops, non-German troops in the area now covered by the GDR.

That is an idea, it needs work on it before it becomes an agreement but it is an idea which has had a reasonable reception in several quarters and I think it is an idea which could be usefully explored.



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QUESTION:

Could I ask about the genesis of this 2 plus 4 formula, who thought it up, was it something that came out of meetings actually among NATO partners or is it, as Downing Street sources are suggesting this morning, Mrs Thatcher's idea?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

We certainly discussed it last week with Mr Medvedev when he was in London and the more we considered it among ourselves in London the better it seemed to be as a procedure. I came here therefore an enthusiastic proponent of it and I have found a relatively open door. Obviously it had also been discussed by others so it is a child, the moment of conception of which it is rather difficult to gauge, but it is none the worse for that.

QUESTION:

I am still not clear on how you perceived its conception, was it a mutual thing or was this an initiative of Mrs Thatcher?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

It was certainly an initiative of the British Government but other people were also thinking along the same lines and the best arrangements are those which are born in precisely that way, where different people, using a spot of common sense, come to find when they put their heads together they have come to the same conclusion, it is a very good basis.

TRANSCRIPT B - FOREIGN SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

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QUESTION:

When you use the word framework repeatedly, is that perhaps also replaceable by the word insurance policy as a method of trying to control the uncontrollable given that not much more than three months ago we would not have been talking about German reunification?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

No, no, it is not the same as an insurance policy at all, it is precisely that, it is a framework, it is avoiding a sort of free-fall where things are not thought through in relation to each other. It is precisely that, it is a framework.

Events have, you are perfectly right, moved faster than anyone was predicting because of the open border and the progressive collapse of the GDP and therefore events have moved very fast and there has not been a framework within which the external, international part of this could be properly considered. Now there is the prospect of such a framework, it is not an insurance policy, it is precisely that, it is a framework within which these things can be discussed.

QUESTION:

So what we are really saying then in this context is that the two Germans may work out arrangements between themselves but in terms of the relation of the new Germany outside of that, the four powers wish to have a say, at least in the beginning?

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TRANSCRIPT B - FOREIGN SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

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FOREIGN SECRETARY:

That is right, that is a fair summary, yes.

QUESTION:

I would like to go back to the question of arithmetics because you keep saying that 2 plus 4 makes 6.

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I said it once.

QUESTION:

I would have thought that it could make 5, in other terms the fact that you keep saying 2 plus 4 makes 6, does it mean that you will keep conceptually talking of 2 different territories, the former East Germany on which part there would be no NATO troops, and the former Western Germany where there would be no Warsaw Pact troops. Conceptually do you see two Germanys in one instead of 1, is that?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I do not know that I can really add to what I have said about that, I have illustrated what our own ideas are about that. We are at the moment talking about two Germanys. Have a look, if we reach agreement on this procedure, and as I say we have not quite yet, have a look at the formulation of what is put out and I think it may help you answer that question.

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TRANSCRIPT B - FOREIGN SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

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QUESTION:

Could you please answer my question?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I have answered it several times already. I do not think I can go any further on that today.

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
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NEWS RELEASE

February 16, 1990

PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON OPEN SKIES

OTTAWA -- Following the conclusion of a major East-West ministerial gathering in Ottawa last Tuesday, officials from NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) countries have begun the negotiation process to establish the outlines of an Open Skies regime.

Work began in earnest on Thursday with a plenary meeting and with the formation of four subsidiary working groups chaired respectively by Canada, The Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria (see ANNEX for more details). These groups will report to the plenary session twice a week, on Tuesday mornings and Thursday afternoons, after which there will be a media briefing by the Secretary-General of the Conference Mr. Fred Bild in room 103 of the Government Conference Centre (a separate notice will be sent to the press gallery prior to each briefing).

The Open Skies Conference in Ottawa is likely to conclude on February 28. The negotiations between NATO and WTO countries are expected to be concluded and an agreement signed at a second Open Skies Conference, to be held in April-May of this year in Budapest, Hungary.

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For more information, contact:

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OPEN SKIES CONFERENCE

SUBSIDIARY WORKING GROUPS

SUBSIDIARY WORKING GROUP A

Chairman: Mr. John Noble
Director General
International Security and Arms Control Division
External Affairs and International Trade
CANADA

Topics for discussion:

- Aircraft and sensors
- Inspection of aircraft and equipment
- Role and status of observers on-board aircraft

SUBSIDIARY WORKING GROUP B

Chairman: His Excellency Neicho Neicher
Minister
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
BUGARIA

Topics for discussion:

- Quotas
- Scope
- Limitations

SUBSIDIARY WORKING GROUP C

Chairman: His Excellency Jozef Sestak
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Topics for discussion:


- Mission operations, including air safety rules
- Transits

SUBSIDIARY WORKING GROUP D

Chairman: His Excellency F.P.R. van Nouhuys
Deputy Permanent Representative and Minister
Plenipotentiary to the Permanent Mission of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands to the North Atlantic
Council at Brussels
NETHERLANDS

Topics for discussion:

- Type of agreement
- Open Skies consultative body
- Liability
- Status of crews
- Future measures



Document : ICO-CS-072

Open Skies Conference

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Conference Secretariat

**CIELOS
ABIERTOS**

FEBRUARY 27TH, 1990



Document Number	Source	Title
003	Secretariat	Changes to the Official Media Programs
008	United Kingdom	Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, CBE MP
009	Soviet Union	Eduard Shevardnadze's Statement at the Open Skies Conference
010	France	Discours du ministre d'État à la Seance d'ouverture de la Conference Ciels ouverts
011	Warsaw Treaty Organization	Warsaw Treaty Organization Basic Elements Paper on Open Skies
012	Netherlands	Intervention by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Mr. H. van den Broek
013	Poland	Statement by H.E. Mr. Krzysztof Skubiszewski Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland to the Open Skies Conference
014	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO Basic Elements Paper on Open Skies

Document Number	Source	Title
015	Czechoslovakia	Statement by H.E. Mr. Jiri Dienstbier, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
016	Norway	Statement by Mr. Kjell Magne Bondevik, Minister of Foreign Affairs Norway
017	Belgique	Discours prononcé par M. Eyskens, ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Belgique, à l'ouverture de la Conférence Ciels ouverts
018	Spain	Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain
019	Romania	Opening Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, H.E. Mr. Sergiu Celac
020	United States	Open Skies and the New Era in Security
021	Hungary	Opening by His Excellency, Gyula Horn, Minister of Foreign Affairs
022	Turkey	Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, H.E. Mesut Yilmaz
023	Portugal	Opening Statement by His Excellency Joao de Deus Pinheiro Minister for Foreign Affairs



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024	Italy	Address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Gianni de Michelis
025	Bulgaria	Statement by His Excellency Boyko Dimitrov Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria
027	Federal Republic of Germany	Speech by Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany
028	Iceland	Statement by His Excellency Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland
029	Secretariat	Record of Proceedings
030	Denmark	Opening Statement
031	Canada	Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark Secretary of State for External Affairs
032	German Democratic Republic	Rede des Ministers fuer Auswaertige Angelegenheiten der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik auf de konferenz zur problematik "Offener Himmel" in Ottawa
033	Hellenic Republic	Opening Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Mr. Antonis Samaris

Document Number	Source	Title
034	Grand-Duché de Luxembourg	Discours du Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères et à la Force publique lors de la Conférence Ciels ouverts le Dr. Georges Wohlfart
038	Conference	Open Skies Communique
039	United Kingdom	Press Conference Mr. Douglas Hurd, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom
040	Conference	Communique on CFE and CSCE
045	Secretariat	Press Release
072	Secretariat	List of Public Documents

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