CANADIANS

A N D

T H E

UNITED NATIONS

Cover design:

The cover design is an artistic representation of the panels on the seven nickel-silver doors presented by the Government of Canada to the United Nations for the public entrance of the General Assembly building. The presentation was made on 27 March 1953 by Ambassador Lester B. Pearson, who was at that time Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada and President of the Seventh Regular Session of the General Assembly.

The doors were executed by Ernest Cormier in nickel because of the particular significance of that metal to Canada, which is the world's primary nickel producer. Each door is faced with four bas-relief panels symbolizing the ideals which the United Nations is called upon to uphold: peace, justice, truth and fraternity. The inscriptions are in Latin.

(UN photos)

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

T H E

UNITED NATIONS

Edited by
Clyde Sanger

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Introduction

> Canada esteems the United Nations, its record and its potential. Our commitment to the principles of the Charter and to international co-operation is no fashionable pose. For four decades, it has been a motive force of our foreign policy.
>
> — Brian Mulroney to the United Nations General Assembly
> October 23, 1985

Canada has been a strong supporter of the United Nations (UN) since that body's founding more than 40 years ago. But there are signs that this commitment has become quite unfashionable with some major Western countries. In the last five years, the United States has, with Britain, refused to sign the Law of the Sea Convention and has withdrawn from UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). The United States has also stopped paying its annual contribution to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, and in 1986 it cut more than $100 million from its assessed contribution to the UN's regular (core) budget. It has refused to accept the ruling of the International Court of Justice that Washington's aid to the Nicaraguan rebels violates international law. Britain, for its part, has done its utmost to keep the United Nations away from any mediatory role in the Falkland Islands issue.

With these chill winds blowing, it is much to the credit of Canada that it remains open-minded and active in all the affairs of the United Nations. Indeed, this partial withdrawal by some Western countries places more responsibility on countries like Canada to take a lead, not only in long-running activities, but also in the necessary process of change and reform.

Canada is well placed to undertake this role. The work of Canadians at the United Nations and in its agencies has been far more extensive and influential than most people realize. This book focuses on the work of fewer than 60 Canadians, leaving the activities of hundreds of others unrecorded. Canadians have been influential because, for the most part, they have been strong-minded individuals who were not content to do set jobs unquestioningly, but (whether they were in top or middle-level positions) went about improving their bit of the system. The comments they make in this book bring out something of that character.

This is not a reference book about the United Nations; there are several good books of that kind already available. Nor does this book offer detailed case studies about significant events in UN history; Professor Franck describes the difficulties of such research, pointing out that United Nations archives—where they exist—are in appalling disorder. Rather, this book attempts to do something that has not been done before in Canada and seems not to have been tried in any other country. It might best be called a prose anthology, for it is a gathering of recollections, reflections, and critical comments from more than 50 Canadians who have either worked in some part of the United Nations system or whose job—whether as diplomat or journalist or non-governmental activist—has involved them with the organization. It is told, more or less

verbatim, in the words and idiom of these individuals, each contribution having been tape recorded, transcribed, edited, and then reviewed by them. The book is full of candid comments that assess shortcomings as well as recount tales of achievement.

The book's sections span the full 40 years and more of the United Nations. Starting with Escott Reid, who looks back at the tensions already apparent (and the mistakes Canada made) at the San Francisco Conference, the book carries through to Gunner Donald Stenger, who in 1986 prevented an ugly shoot-out between Greek Cypriot and Turkish troops across the Green Line in Nicosia.

But this book cannot be comprehensive in recording all who played a significant role. It does not, for example, include any of the memories of Maxwell Cohen, who has filled several roles, from assistant to John Humphrey in the early years of the Human Rights division to *ad hoc* judge in the International Court of Justice Chamber, which in 1985 ruled on the Gulf of Maine case.

Again, space constraints allow room to tell only certain anecdotes. I chose, for instance, to give King Gordon's account of the Congo operations and of how soldiers and civilian specialists from many countries saved that country from deep chaos after Belgium's abrupt departure. I might just as well have quoted him describing the large reconstruction effort under UN auspices in the mid-1950s that helped South Korea to its feet after a devastating war. But I have tried, in short introductions, to give a broader sketch of each person's work, while the anecdotes serve to highlight—and make more human—the work of agencies and other parts of the UN system.

These anecdotes and commentaries form, perhaps, a patchwork quilt—although I prefer to compare them to the Pointillist painters like Seurat and Pissarro who used bits of broken colour to achieve a picture of some luminosity. What struck me, during a year of seeking out Canadians of all ages for interviews, is the number of individuals that made up this canvas of Canada's involvement with the United Nations.

The trail led to several dynamic people of whom I had never heard before. There may be no single dominant Canadian figure, as Garcia Robles has been in Mexico or Hammarskjöld was in Sweden. But Lester Pearson must head the list, both for his own work for peace and for his inspiration of others. The list is a long one, of fine people who combine principle with passion for their area of work. Read, for instance, Adelaide Sinclair's account of how UNICEF, the United Nations Children's Fund, provided hurricane aid to Cuba over strong U.S. resistance; or Bill Epstein's story of how he tackled the task of writing the first draft of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in an overnight (and somewhat bibulous) session with a Mexican legal adviser; or Kalmen Kaplansky's description of the arguments between workers' representatives, employers, and government officials as they negotiated important International Labour Organization conventions in conference.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, trees—or the threat of their disappearance—seem to galvanize Canadians into energetic action at all levels. While that self-termed "rowdy rebel" Chuck Lankester was marshalling the highest

political support behind a vast program to save tropical forests, Mairuth Sarsfield charmed and cajoled famous artists into giving their talents for the United Nations Environment Programme's 1982 tree-planting campaign ("For Every Child a Tree"), and Yvonne Kupsch trekked the by-ways of Sahelian countries to make links with villagers that were starting to grow a woodlot or a windbreak.

There are also additions to political history. Paul Martin gives new details of his brusque encounters with John Foster Dulles and Henry Cabot Lodge in 1955 when he took the initiative to break the ideological logjam, which, for five years, had prevented any more countries from being accepted as UN members. His success in getting a package deal approved for 16 states was probably the most far-reaching move any Canadian has made at the United Nations, however one may assess the effect of "opening the floodgates." George Ignatieff tells of an episode in 1966, when Pierre Trudeau attended the General Assembly session as Pearson's parliamentary secretary, and which, he surmises, for 10 years effectively squelched enthusiasm in the future prime minister for using the United Nations as an instrument of his foreign policies.

To provide a string on which to hang these dozens of recollections and reflections, or a framework into which to fit them, I have compiled a chronology of events that have some relevance. It is one person's selection, with some personal commentary. This chronology, and the book itself, is divided into four decades. A brief summary heads each decade, mainly to bind together the contributions in that section but also to indicate some of the changes of focus, or shifting influences, that occurred about that time. It can only be approximate, because trends naturally did not alter course neatly in 1955 or 1965 or 1975; scholars must excuse such broadbrush treatment of history.

John Holmes with some modesty suggests that a myth has grown up about "a golden age of Canadian diplomacy" in the 1950s. There have been more than brief flashes of gold since: in particular, the Canadian performance throughout the Third Law of the Sea Conference (1973 to 1982). Stephen Lewis suggests here that the ethos of the United Nations is shifting from issues of arms control and regional conflicts, which cannot be resolved without superpower agreement, to social and economic questions.

Regardless of whether Lewis is correct, Canadians have for years taken a lead in the social and economic sectors. Outstanding examples are the work of Yvon Beaulne on the UN Human Rights Commission and work for the advancement of women as described by Norma Walmsley and Michele Landsberg. Recently, the United Nations has focused on the economic recovery of Africa, to which Canada has committed itself wholeheartedly.

After offering stern criticism of some ineffective parts of the UN system in his speech to the General Assembly in September 1986, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark concluded: "I remain confident that this institution can serve our common needs and serve them well. We have only to give it the means and the direction."

In a decade when some larger powers have withdrawn from many areas of multilateral diplomacy and global co-operation to a narrower approach with selected allies (and adversaries), Clark's words are important in their reaffirmation of Canada's 40-year-long attitude. I trust that this book also provides some reassurance about how well these common needs have been served by Canadians and about how a younger generation than those of "the golden age" are serving them now.

CLYDE SANGER

Acknowledgements

This book is a departure from a pattern set in 1965 and followed in 1975. In 1965 the Government of Canada published a volume entitled *Canada and the United Nations*, which was a factual book of reference that set out to cover those United Nations activities that were then of major concern to Canada. The second volume, in 1975, added some commentary. As the introduction to the second volume stated, "It is written from a more critical point of view; failures as well as successes are recorded, and disquietude is expressed as well as satisfaction."

When a third volume was being planned, to survey the four decades since the founding of the United Nations, the Department of External Affairs took a different—and, one might add, more adventurous—approach. Numerous reference books already exist about the United Nations, and Canada's role and connections have not altered dramatically enough from one decade to the next to warrant a whole new book. What have not been recorded (these lively minds in External Affairs argued) are the many-sided activities of Canadians, famous or not so famous, under the umbrella or in the chambers of the United Nations. So was born the idea of an anthology, to which the actors themselves would contribute—mainly through tape-recorded conversations. It was hoped that, together, the contributions would form a more vivid picture of the United Nations for Canadians because they would carry personal (and, quite often, critical) comments.

It was a privilege to be the person holding the tape-recorder and editing the transcripts. It was left to me to choose the contributors, and obviously there are gaps. I apologize to those with claims to be included, while thanking most sincerely all those who recorded their memories and then re-read the text for any necessary corrections. Special thanks are due to Jack Charnow of UNICEF, who made available for this book the transcript of an interview he had with Adelaide Sinclair on the day before she died, and to J. King Gordon who not only contributed his own memories of the Congo operation but also filled an important gap with some recollections of Lt.-Gen. "Tommy" Burns. I am also grateful to Capt. Craig Cotter, who as Adjutant of the 2nd Royal Canadian Horse Artillery provided three excellent illustrations of the problems of peacekeeping in Cyprus, and to the United Nations photographic library.

Among many in External Affairs who were helpful I would mention Julie Loranger, Eric Mikkelborg, Prisca Nicolas, A.W.J. Robertson and Hazel Strouts. A special word of thanks is due to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, who gave a useful push when the bureaucratic wagon (through no fault of anyone mentioned above) had slowed its pace.

Finally, my thanks to the following publishers for permission to reprint sections from these autobiographies and memoirs: Transnational Publishers Inc., *Human Rights and the United Nations* by John Humphrey; McClelland and Stewart, *On the Bridge of Time* by Hugh Keenleyside; University of Toronto Press, *Mike: Memoirs (Vol 2)* by Lester B. Pearson; and Macmillan Company of Canada, *The Siren Years* by Charles Ritchie. Also to *The Globe and Mail* and to Michele Landsberg, to reprint her article "Working Stubbornly for Women's Rights" from her column of April 26, 1986. My thanks also to Sidney Freifeld for his permission to reprint his humorous memoir of Andrew McNaughton, originally published in *The Globe and Mail.*

June 1988
Clyde Sanger

1945 to 1954

Summary

During its first decade, 1945 to 1954, the United Nations remained small by today's measure. By 1955, there were still only 60 member states seated in the General Assembly, and only 11 members of the Security Council. The United States was able to dominate both bodies—except when the Soviet Union interposed its veto in the Council. Although, as Escott Reid recalls, hopes of harmonious relations between the permanent members of the Council had begun to fade even before the United Nations Charter was signed, those members collaborated in actions that later stirred the deepest controversy. In particular, they agreed on the partition of Palestine and the creation of Israel.

Most of the major specialized agencies were launched during this decade, and Canadians were prominent in this work. The Food and Agriculture Organization was born at a conference in Quebec City, and the International Civil Aviation Organization was established in Montreal. Dr. Brock Chisholm, a central figure in setting up the World Health Organization, became that agency's first director-general. But, as George Davidson and Gordon Goundrey point out in later sections, the opportunity was lost during this time to organize, through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), an effective mechanism for co-ordinating the work of these agencies and for preventing either gaps or overlap. A good many of the problems of later years date back to this failure to give any strength to the "relationship agreements" between ECOSOC and the specialized agencies.

Canadians were leaders in other early activities. John Humphrey tells how the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came to be written and approved, and Hugh Keenleyside writes of the first projects in technical assistance, an area of work almost unforeseen when the UN Charter was drafted a few years before.

In security matters, Canadians also played a full part. General McNaughton is credited with prodding the Dutch Government and the Indonesian nationalists into the talks that ended that colonial war (although Sidney Freifeld, in his lighthearted reminiscence about Canada's great soldier-diplomat, focuses on other actions). Lester Pearson was influential in the intense discussions that ended in agreed action over Palestine in 1949 and later tried his utmost to negotiate an early end to the Korean War. And there were Canadian generals helping in the wake of conflicts, leading the military observers in Kashmir and heading the relief agency set up for Palestinian refugees.

The Panmunjon armistice was signed two years before the end of this decade, but the Korean War had marked a decisive and enduring split between the great powers, and Asia, more than Europe, was by the mid-1950s the arena for active rivalry.

Chronology of United Nations and Related Events of Special Interest to Canada

1945	June 26	United Nations Charter signed in San Francisco.
	October 16	Constitution of Food and Agriculture Organization signed by 36 states at first conference at Chateau Frontenac, Quebec City.
	October 24	United Nations officially created.
1946	January	General Assembly meets in London, elects non-permanent members of Security Council. Canada defeated by Australia on third ballot.
	February	Judge John Read elected to International Court of Justice (remains on Court until 1958).
	May	Soviet troops withdraw from Iran after Security Council pressure.
	June	International Health Conference with all 51 member states meets in New York, drafts constitution of World Health Organization and Dr. Brock Chisholm becomes executive secretary of Interim Commission.
	October	General Assembly (moved to New York despite Canadian preference for Europe) establishes United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF).
	November	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) comes into being.
	December	Security Council sends Commission of Investigation to northern Greece after Athens complains its northern neighbours are supporting guerrillas in civil war. Soviet obstructionism over this issue prompts United States to circumvent Security Council, turns to General Assembly, which sets up UN Special Committee on the Balkans in October 1947.
1947	April	International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) established in Montreal to facilitate safety, regularity and efficiency of civil aviation.
	October	General Assembly establishes International Law Commission to promote codification and development of international law. Comprises jurists from 25 countries.
	November	General Assembly approves plan for partition of Palestine, 33 to 13 with 10 abstaining. Of 11 countries on UN Special Committee on Palestine, 7, including Canada, had favoured partition with economic union, while 3 favoured a federal state.
1948	January	Canada on Security Council until December 1949. General McNaughton is ambassador.
		Kashmir issue comes before Security Council. After cease-fire line established in July 1949, UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) set

1948 (cont.)	January	up to patrol it. A Canadian, General Angle, is UNMOGIP chief until killed in air crash in 1950. Plebiscite promised by India never takes place.
		General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade comes into force.
	February	Communist coup in Czechoslovakia. Soviet Union vetoes Council resolution to set up investigating committee.
	April	Treaty signed establishing North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Canada presses for inclusion of non-military articles on social and economic collaboration.
	May 14	British pull out of Palestine mandate. State of Israel proclaimed. Fighting halted after several weeks through truce called for by Security Council. UN mediator Count Bernadotte assassinated in September in Jerusalem, but mediation by Dr. Ralph Bunche produces armistices between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria (February to July 1949). UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) took over supervision of cease-fire and investigation of alleged breaches of armistice.
	June	World Health Organization comes into being, and Dr. Chisholm is first director-general (until 1953).
	December	General Assembly adopts Universal Declaration of Human Rights, first drafted by John Humphrey.
1949	March 23	Canada helps toward breakthrough in hostilities between Indonesian nationalists and Dutch. Trouble had flared intermittently since 1946. McNaughton's resolution, adopted by Council, leads to Round Table Conference and independence for Indonesia in December.
	October	General Assembly creates the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine refugees in the near East. The first director-general of UNRWA is Maj.-Gen. Howard Kennedy of Canada.
1950	January	Soviet Union began boycott of Security Council in protest against exclusion of Peking (Beijing) regime from China seat, thereby absent when Korean War starts. Returns to Council in August.
	Summer	Technical Assistance Administration is organized as the operating arm of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA). Hugh Keenleyside becomes its director-general.
	June 25	North Korean troops invade South Korea. On June 27, a bare majority (seven) of Security Council members adopt resolution authorizing collective action, ask for

1950 (cont.)	June 25	military forces on July 7. Eventually troops from 15 countries fight under unified command. First Canadian troops arrive in December, a month after first clash between UN forces and Chinese.
	November	After experience over Korea in June and over Greek civil war in 1946 and 1947, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson pushes "Uniting for Peace" resolution through General Assembly. Under it, Assembly can be convened on 24 hours' notice after a veto in Security Council, and can step in to recommend collective action against an aggressor. It was adopted 40 to 5 with 12 abstentions.
1951	January	Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) comes into existence, originally for three-year period. It replaces International Refugee Organization, set up in 1948 to take over resettlement of displaced and homeless in Europe from Washington-based United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
		World Meteorological Organization (WMO) starts operations in Geneva.
	July	Cease-fire negotiations begin in Korea, but are soon deadlocked. General Douglas MacArthur, who had advocated an all-out offensive even at the risk of full-scale war with China, had been dismissed in April.
1952	September	Lester Pearson is elected president of General Assembly, uses Asian intermediaries in own search for end to Korean War.
		Question of racial conflict in South Africa arising from government's *apartheid* policies is first inscribed on agenda of General Assembly.
1953	April	Dag Hammarskjöld takes over as UN Secretary-General from Trygve Lie of Norway.
	July 27	Cease-fire agreement ends Korean War; 516 Canadians had been killed in hostilities.
1954	—	UNHCR wins Nobel Peace Prize.
	May	Geneva Conference on Indochina opens after French surrender at Dien Bien Phu. Canada, Poland and India appointed to International Control Commission to monitor armistice.
	—	Four hundred and fifty experts attend first World Population Conference in Rome.

Escott Reid
Hopes That Vanished at San Francisco

Escott Reid joined the Canadian foreign service in 1939 and retired from it in 1962, moving on to work with the World Bank and with the Canadian International Development Agency. He was a leading member of the Canadian delegation at the San Francisco Conference, where the United Nations Charter was drafted, and at the Preparatory Commission meetings that followed. Towards the end of his foreign service career, he was Canadian High Commissioner to India and later Ambassador to Germany. He has written three books about different periods in his career, including one book, *On Duty*, about the 1945 to 1946 period. The following is part of a conversation that took place in 1986, during which Reid looked back 40 years to San Francisco.

"I don't understand how anyone who was at San Francisco, and who knew what was going on there and in Europe, could have had high hopes. I am trying to recall whether I had high hopes before San Francisco, which is a different question. I think I had fairly high hopes until we knew of the difficulties which the Russians and the Americans and the British had at the Dumbarton Oaks conference in arriving at a sensible draft charter of the UN. But it was at the San Francisco conference that whatever hopes I had nearly vanished.

"The main reason for pessimism about what was happening at San Francisco was that what was happening at San Francisco was not as important as what was happening in Europe. The breakdown of co-operation in Europe between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, which was occurring before and during the San Francisco conference, was the basic reason for pessimism. The UN could only work if there was a high degree of co-operation between the three great powers, and the evidence from Europe was that this degree of co-operation was highly unlikely.

"I don't know whether people realize now the shock of the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe. I think we now tend to assume that this was inevitable, but we didn't at the time think [that] this was inevitable. The Polish issue was a divisive one for a long time before San Francisco, and the takeover of Poland was the alarm bell. Most people in the foreign offices in London and Washington, and in countries like Canada, assumed that the Soviet Union would be satisfied if, on its border, there were countries friendly to it; that it would not demand countries which would be subservient and would, in fact, be incorporated into its empire.

"A main reason for pessimism at the San Francisco conference itself was the determination of the Soviet Union to curtail as much as possible the powers and influence of the United Nations. This was very natural. The United States had a simple majority in the General Assembly in its pocket, and it put on, at the very beginning of the conference, an unwise demonstration of its power over the issue of the admission of Argentina to the San Francisco conference.

"Argentina was not entitled to attend, according to the criteria which the great powers had agreed on. Only countries that had participated in the war against Hitler were to attend, and Argentina had not. But the United States managed to get a majority and, as Molotov pointed out at a private meeting of

the steering committee, with 20 Latin American states plus Liberia and the Philippines—which he said were all controlled by one country—it needed only another one-and-a-half votes to constitute a majority in the UN. In those days the United States had an automatic simple majority.

"The Soviet Union desired to weaken the General Assembly because of its fear of this American automatic majority. But also, between the San Francisco conference and the meetings in London [of the Preparatory Commission], was the dropping of the atomic bomb, which must have made the Russians fearful of the increased power of the United States in the postwar world.

"Another reason for pessimism was the fact that, after the Dumbarton Oaks conference, the Americans began exaggerating the extent to which the United Nations would be an improvement over the League of Nations. Mike Pearson [who was then a high official in the department of External Affairs] pointed out in a memo at that time that, so far as taking action against a great power that was accused of aggression, the League's Covenant went further than the Dumbarton Oaks charter.

"The United States and Britain were insistent on having a power of veto in the Security Council, but they were prepared to have a more limited veto than the Soviet Union wanted. It was on the veto over the chapter on peaceful settlements that the lines were most clearly drawn between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union wanted to be able to veto mere discussion by the Security Council of a threat to the peace, and on this issue the San Francisco conference nearly broke up. But the Soviet Union gave in after an appeal was made in Moscow....

"It was depressing that the four principal powers at San Francisco (France had been added by then) agreed on an absurd proposal, which was fortunately defeated, that each of the great powers should have a veto on the appointment not only of the Secretary-General but of four Deputy Secretaries-General. By this they obviously meant that each of them would nominate a Deputy Secretary-General. The UN Secretariat is difficult enough to operate as it is, but if it had been established with a Committee of Five—a Secretary-General and four Deputy Secretaries-General, all from the Big Five and all appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council—it would have been even more difficult to make an efficient operation.

"Australia fought a losing battle about the veto. Perhaps if countries like Canada and Australia and the Dutch had worked out, in advance of the conference, agreed proposals on precise limitations of the veto, it might have had some effect at San Francisco. We disliked the idea of the great powers having a veto over the admission of new members; and finally [in 1955, under the initiative of Paul Martin], they agreed not to exercise their veto. They made a deal: We agree to admit your friends if you agree to admit ours.... But I don't think we realized at that time the importance of trying to develop, before an international meeting takes place, a substantial amount of agreement among influential countries likely to think the same way. I suppose that, if we had had before San Francisco the experience we have had in the years since, we

might have tried to work a common approach with, say, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway, Mexico, and Brazil.

"One of the ironic things about the San Francisco conference, as far as the Canadian delegation was concerned, is that the three proposals to which we attached great importance, and for which we fought hard and successfully, turned out to be of no importance.

"The first provision we insisted on was that, in the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council, the General Assembly should pay special attention to the capacity of the state to contribute to the purposes of the UN and 'equitable geographical distribution' should be a secondary consideration. It was an example of our belief in the 'functional theory.' The General Assembly paid no attention to this provision of the Charter, so the amendment we got was of no importance.

"We also insisted that, when the Security Council was discussing the use of a member state's armed forces to enforce its decisions, that state should have the right to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the use of its armed forces. This was on the assumption that the clauses in the Charter requiring member states to put armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council would be effective—but they weren't....

"The third was Mike Pearson's campaign for a revisionary conference in 10 years' time. Well, you can always have a revisionary conference, by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. But what is interesting is that Pearson obviously hoped that in 10 years' time—in 1955 or so—it might be possible to get a stronger UN; whereas in fact, after the Korean War, the Berlin blockade and all the tensions in Europe, it would not have been possible to get a United Nations as strong as the one established at San Francisco.

"Am I depressed by the shortcomings of the United Nations in these 40 years? I think I am depressed. Just take one international dispute that has never been resolved: Kashmir. I may be wrong, but it is my impression of our ideas at San Francisco that, on an issue such as Kashmir, the Security Council would go through all the motions of conciliation and mediation between India and Pakistan and, finally, if they could not reach an agreement, the Security Council would state what it considered should be the future of Kashmir. Then, if one or both of them did not agree, the Security Council would threaten the use of force to impose a settlement. This was not done in Kashmir, and has not been done in Palestine.

"Sometimes I have the feeling that, when the powers immediately concerned cannot—in a dispute such as Kashmir or Palestine—reach an agreement, they would welcome an imposed settlement. It would be like settlements imposed during the 19th century by the Concert of Europe: the leaders of the Concert of Europe could impose a settlement without actually using force, without armies marching....

"The United Nations has been more successful than we anticipated in speeding up the independence of colonial territories, and certainly it has done more than we contemplated at San Francisco in North–South relations. I don't think people then contemplated the importance of this issue."

Charles Ritchie
San Franciso Conference—And Circus

Charles Ritchie was another of the senior officials from the Department of External Affairs who toiled through the weeks of committee work that produced the United Nations Charter at San Francisco. In the style that has made him famous as a diarist since his retirement from the foreign service, he adds a light touch to an account of those tense days. These extracts from his diary of the San Francisco Conference are taken from his book, *The Siren Years*.

"26 April 1945.

"San Francisco is as lively as a circus—the setting and the audience are much more amusing than the Conference performance. No one can resist the attraction of the town and the cheerfulness of its inhabitants.... The Bay is a beautiful background, the sun shines perpetually, and streets are thronged, there are American sailors everywhere with their girls and this somehow adds to the musical comedy atmosphere. You expect them at any moment to break into song and dance....

"The people are full of curiosity about the Conference delegates. They crowd around them like the friendly, innocent Indians who crowded around the Spanish adventurers when they came to America and gaped at their armour and took their strings of coloured beads for real. The delegates are less picturesque than they should be to justify so much curiosity. There are the inevitable Arabs and some Indians in turbans who are worth the price of admission, and the Saudi Arabian prince who gleams like Valentino, but in general the delegates are just so many men in business suits with circular Conference pins in their buttonholes making them look as if they were here for the Elks' Convention.

"The exceptions are the Russians—they have stolen the show. People are impressed, excited, mystified and nervous about the Russians. Groups of wooden-looking peasant Soviet officers sit isolated (by their own choice) at restaurant tables and are stared at as if they were wild animals. They are painfully self-conscious, quiet, dignified—determined not to take a step which might make people laugh at the beautiful Soviet Union.... The town is full of stories about the Russians—that they have a warship laden with caviar in the harbour, etc., etc.

"Meanwhile the local Hearst press conducts an unceasing campaign of anti-Russian mischief-making—doing their damnedest to start a new world war before this one is finished.

"28 April 1945.

"Second meeting of the plenary session again in the Opera House with powerful klieg lights shining down from the balcony into the eyes of the delegates, dazzling and irritating them. The session is declared open by [Edward] Stettinius, American Secretary of State, who comes onto the dais chewing (whether gum or the remains of his lunch is a subject of speculation). His manner is one of misplaced assurance—unintentionally offensive.... He makes the worst impression on the delegates. He reads his speech in lay-preacher's voice husky with corny emotion....

"23 May 1945.

"The Conference atmosphere is thick with alarm and despondency about Russia. Wherever two or three are gathered together in the hotel bedrooms and sitting-rooms, where more unbuttoned conversation is permissible, there you can bet that the subject is the U.S.S.R.—speculation about their intentions, argument as to the best way of dealing with them—whether to be tough and, if so, when—gloomy realization that by unscrupulous conference tactics they may be courting and perhaps winning the favour of the 'working masses.' This fear of Russia casts its long shadow over the Conference....

"The Great Power representatives have no eloquent, authoritative or persuasive spokesman in the more important committees. They repeat, parrot fashion, 'Trust the Security Council. Do nothing to injure unanimity.' There are no outstanding speakers: Evatt of Australia has ability, Berendson of New Zealand has eloquence of a homespun sort....

"American policy or, perhaps I should say more narrowly, American tactics in this conference are similar to British. Like the British they hew closely to the party line of support for the Great Power veto while allowing the impression to be disseminated among the smaller countries that they do so reluctantly, that their hearts are in the right place but that they dare not say so for fear of the-Russians bolting the organization. One incidental result of this line which the British and Americans may not contemplate is to increase the prestige of Russia. The United States delegation as a whole is no more impressive than the British.

"There does not seem to be much attempt to understand the viewpoint of the smaller nations or to produce reasoned arguments to meet their objections.

".... In our own delegation Norman Robertson and Hume Wrong are the two most influential senior officials. There could hardly be a greater contrast than that between them. Hume [is] pale and fine featured, stroking the back of his head with a rapid gesture which suggests mounting impatience. He inspires alarm on first encounter, an alarm which could be justified as he is totally intolerant of muddle, inanity or sheer brute stupidity. He has style in everything from the way he wears his coat to the prose of his memoranda. He is a realist who understands political forces better, unfortunately, than he does politicians themselves.

"Norman understands them very well and has influence with the Prime Minister, but what does not Norman understand? His mind is as capacious as his great sloping frame. He has displacement, as they say of ocean liners, displacement physical and intellectual and he is wonderful company with his ironic asides, his shafts of wisdom and his sighs of resignation.

"6 June 1945.

"We had nearly seven hours on end in our Committee on Purposes and Principles. The Chairman, Manuilsky [a Ukrainian], gave us a touch of the knout when the Latin Americans were just spreading their wings for flights of oratory. He rapped on the table with his chairman's gavel and said, 'Gentlemen, we must speed up the work of the Committee. I propose that no one shall leave this hall until the preamble and the first chapter of the Charter are

voted.' The delegates gazed ruefully at their blotters—this meant cutting all dinner dates. Yet no one dared to falter in the 'sacred task.' Paul Gore-Booth, the British delegate, sprang to his feet and said in tones of emotion, 'Mr. Chairman, I cannot promise that I shall be physically able to remain so long in this hall without leaving it.' Manuilsky looked at him sternly, 'I say to the British representative that there are in this hall men older than you are and, if they can stay here, you must also.' So we settled down to hour after hour of debate.

"We were after all discussing the principles of the New World Order. The room was full of professional orators who were ravening to speak and speak again. Latin American foreign ministers hoped to slide in an oblique reference to some of their local vendettas disguised in terms of the Rights of Nations. The Egyptian representative was hoping to see his way clear to take a crack at the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty under some phrase about the necessity for 'flexibility in the interpretation of international obligations.' The Syrian delegate saw an opportunity to embarrass the French. The representatives of the Colonial Powers were junior delegates (their chiefs were dining) who were frightened that any reference to 'justice' or 'human rights' might conceal a veiled attack on the colonial system.

"All afternoon and all evening until twelve o'clock at night we argued about the principles that must guide the conduct of men and nations. By eleven o'clock there were many haggard faces around the table. The room had got very hot and smelly—dozens of stout politicians sweating profusely in a confined space—outside the streetcars (and San Francisco is a great place for streetcars) rattled noisily; and still the speeches went on.

"The Egyptian delegate was indefatigable in interpolations. He seemed to bounce to his feet on india-rubber buttocks, 'A point of order, Mr. Chairman' and he would fix his monocle and survey his helpless victims. The Peruvian was another inexhaustible plague; he was a professional lecturer who kept remarking, 'The Peruvian delegation regard this aspect of the question as very grave indeed, in fact fundamental.' Then he would remove his reading spectacles, put on his talking spectacles, brush the forelock back from his forehead and get into his stride. But it was the Norwegian who moved me to homicide by making lengthy interventions in an obstinate, bleating voice. However, thanks to the ruthless, surgical operations of the Chairman, we finished our task in time. The committee was littered with punctured egos, and snubbed statesmen glowered at each other across the tables. The eminent political figures and distinguished jurists of half the world had been rated by the chairman like schoolboys; but we had finished on time.

"18 June 1945.

"The Conference is on its last lap. The delegates—many of them—are quite punch-drunk with fatigue. Meetings start every day at 9 a.m. and go on until midnight. In addition, we are having a heat wave. The committee rooms are uncomfortably hot and the commission meetings in the Opera House are an inferno. The heat generated by the enormous klieg lights adds to this and the glare drives your eyes back into your head.

"We are in a feverish scramble to get through the work—an unhealthy atmosphere in which we are liable to push things through for the sake of getting them finished. The Russians are taking advantage of this state of affairs to reopen all sorts of questions in the hope that, out of mere weakness, we shall give in to them. Their tone and manner seem daily to become more openly truculent and antagonistic....

"However hot, tired and bad-tempered the other delegates may become, [Edward Wood, Lord] Halifax remains cool and Olympian and makes benevolent, cloudy speeches which soothe but do not satisfy. Senator [John] Connally of the U.S. delegation roars at his opponent, waving his arms and sweating. It is somehow reassuring to come out from the committee meetings into the streets and see the people in whose name we are arguing so fiercely and who do not give a damn how the Charter reads. Sailors hand in hand with their girls (this is a great town for walking hand in hand) on their way to a movie or a dance hall.

"19 June 1945.

"The Soviet delegates have got very little goodwill out of this Conference. They use aggressive tactics about every question, large or small.... Their system has some unfortunate results from their point of view. They have no elbow-room in committee tactics—they cannot vary their method to allow for a change in mood and tempo of the Conference. They are paralysed by the unexpected. They always have to stall and cable home for instructions. It is unfortunate from our point of view as well as theirs that they should have made such a bad showing, for I think they are proposing to make a serious effort to use the organization and are not out to wreck it.

"28 June 1945.

"Back in Ottawa. The Conference is over. It is going to be a little disconcerting at first living alone again, after our group existence in San Francisco. The hotel sitting-room which Norman Robertson and Hume Wrong shared was a meeting place for members of our delegation, and there was a perpetual flow of drinks on tap. There we foregathered to talk Conference gossip. The pace of the Conference got more and more hectic towards the end. Meetings would end at four or five a.m., when we would fall into bed and drag ourselves up three or four hours later.

"It also became increasingly difficult to relate the conference to other events going on in the world and form an estimate of the real importance in the scheme of things of what we were doing in San Francisco. While we were there, the war against Germany was won, the occupation of Germany took place, the Russians installed themselves in Prague and Vienna and made their first bid for a port on the Adriatic.... We were preoccupied with the Battle of the Veto and with the tussles over the powers of the General Assembly and the provisions for amending the Charter. How much were these mere paper battles? How much was the San Francisco Conference a smokescreen behind which the Great Powers took up their positions? These doubts were floating about in the backs of our minds, but we had not much time for doubts—the daily timetable was too gruelling."

Brock Chisholm
Dr. Chisholm's Prescription for Survival

George Brock Chisholm was the first Canadian to serve the United Nations in a major role—as the first director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO). As well as being a pioneer among medical administrators, he was a truly great internationalist and thinker. One biographer has noted, "He was one of the first to emphasize the danger of pollution, overpopulation and the nuclear arms race."

Born in 1896, he enlisted as a private in the First World War, was commissioned in the field, wounded and twice decorated. After graduating in medicine and spending some years in general practice, he became a psychiatrist in Toronto. During the Second World War he was Director General of Medical Services for the Canadian Army, and in 1945 was recruited as Deputy Minister of Health in the new federal department of Health and Welfare.

Very soon he moved onto the international stage, to help prepare the International Health Conference of June 1946, including the draft constitution of the World Health Organization. After two years as executive secretary of its Interim Commission, he became the first director-general of WHO in June 1948. He retired in 1953, even though he was offered a three-year prolongation, because (he said) "I believe that a permanent organization should not have the same head for too long, particularly at the beginning of its history. There is a real difficulty in too firm identification of a world organization with one person."

Dr. Chisholm achieved a good deal in those seven years with WHO. The agency began with six priority programs: campaigns against malaria, TB, and venereal diseases; and an emphasis on maternal and child health, nutrition, and environmental hygiene. WHO's fight against communicable diseases can be shown in two examples: it helped control an outbreak of cholera in Egypt in 1947, and it launched a campaign against yaws in Haiti.

But Dr. Chisholm was also concerned to decentralize WHO and to encourage health programs at the national level. At the same time, WHO came to be recognized as having responsibility for the co-ordination of all international health work.

In 1952 the total WHO budget came to $8.48 million (Canada contributed $268 854), a figure Dr. Chisholm described as "ridiculously small ... no more than the amount many a large city spends on its own municipal sanitary arrangements." Yet he also worried, in a speech in 1951, about "the tremendous influx of vast amounts of money" raised by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and thought that that money could disrupt the health services of governments, which would be under pressure to spend funds quickly on programs calculated to produce "spectacular or easily demonstrable results." He argued that in this context, WHO had a basic concern with the training of technical personnel who could oversee the orderly development of their national health services.

These were the concerns of 35 years ago. In this book, we have chosen to remember Dr. Chisholm by words that contain as much weight and poignant relevance now as when he spoke them on two occasions in the past: in his farewell address in May 1953, to the World Health Assembly, and in 1957 at Columbia University in a set of lectures which he collected into a book,

Prescription for Survival. These words illustrate the breadth of his internationalism—and his humanity. Dr. Chisholm died in February 1971.

".... As we go on with our specialized work in WHO and in the other agencies, we tend to become absorbed in our own particular assignments and to lose sight of the paramount aim for which each of our organizations was created: namely, to lay the economic and social foundations for a lasting peace. One immediate result of such an attitude could be that in a certain sense we might defeat the very purposes which our individual agencies are serving.

"What I am saying is simply that the word 'progress' has little meaning today unless it is applied in a total sense. It is obvious, for example, that, even if health campaigns are carried out successfully in a community, they do not promote social progress merely by restoring the health and the working capacity of a number of its members. There has been no social progress if the physically rehabilitated people merely swell the ranks of the unemployed, the dissatisfied or the hungry. The extra labour gained through such campaigns will mean progress only if the people freed from disease are assured of capital investment for production and stabilized markets for distribution, if they are thus guaranteed sufficient work and, in addition, are enabled to provide adequate educational and cultural facilities for themselves and their children....

"We must admit that we have so far failed to live up to the great hopes men and women throughout the world have placed in us. Despite occasional upsurges of international concern ... the nations of the world have, in their search for security, reverted to techniques and methods which the evolution of technology and science has made entirely obsolete.

"We are caught in a vicious circle which, if unbroken, cannot but result in the destruction of our civilization. On the one hand, we know and constantly proclaim that the more fortunate nations must be ready to invest an important part of their resources to banish the fear of war (which sooner or later may well lead to war), caused primarily by economic and social insecurity prevailing in the larger part of the world.

"On the other hand, it is precisely the fear of war which prevents many governments from embarking upon the economic rehabilitation of the underdeveloped areas; we are being told, indeed, that at this time overriding priority must go to rearmament and that no plans for large-scale economic development can be undertaken until the threat of war subsides.

"And so we witness the spectacle of governments spending billions of dollars for defence, while the same governments profess themselves unable to devote some 40 million dollars to financing one year's operation of the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, generally considered as a vital sector in our attempt to build for peace through positive means. The glaring contrast between the tremendous sacrifices we are forced to make for the piling up of instruments of war and destruction and the insignificant amount of energy and money we spend for constructive purposes is symbolic of the challenge modern man is facing.

".... Each one of us must learn that the welfare of his own nation is today dependent on the welfare of all nations, and that therefore we must

acquire, and above all help our children to acquire, an equal degree of concern for the welfare of all members of the world community, irrespective of differences in race, religion, colour or any other group characteristics. The struggle for prestige, which leads to attempts to force a group or individual will on others, is a primitive and outmoded behaviour pattern.

"While many millions of people have not yet realized that fact, other millions are learning to appreciate and admire the ability to compromise, to be helpful, to be concerned equally with the welfare of all people, to sacrifice something of individual, local or group interest for the common good. These abilities are gradually, but ever increasingly, recognized as the marks of developing maturity, whether in nations or in individuals.

"Viewed against this background—and it is the only valid measure we can apply today to whatever we do—the most important value of the World Health Organization or of any other part of the United Nations system does not lie in any measurable or reportable result it may have achieved. Its contribution to the solution of the problems of man learning to live peacefully with man can be found in the evidence it provides that men belonging to widely different political, social and religious systems can and usually do participate in genuine international co-operation, based on fraternal association and excluding domination by any country or group of countries.

"For this generation there is no sane alternative but to accept with courage and determination the realities of a new era. The time for courage and determination and action—even, it may be, for martyrdom—is now. The place is here, wherever we may be and whatever our responsibilities at the moment. Every action, every word, works for or against the great ideal of peace on earth. We, the peoples of the world, not only in the councils of the nations but, far more importantly, in our daily living, will decide whether we and our children will live and die in misery and fear far worse than anything we have known, or whether we and they can construct and enjoy a happy and peaceful world community. Again: the time for action is now!"

The above was from Dr. Chisholm's farewell address to the World Health Assembly. The following is from his book of lectures, entitled *Prescription for Survival*:

".... What is clear is that something must be done about the distribution of food on a world basis. I cannot see any prospect of real peace and security until that can be arranged.

"This does suggest the desirability, the inevitability, the necessity of very extensive changes in our economic system, because our economic systems were all designed for ruthless competition, not for the kind of necessities we have prescribed in the Charter of the United Nations as a minimum requirement for the survival of the human race....

"The United Nations Charter and the constitutions of all the specialized agencies may be seen as a minimum prescription, for this generation, for a sufficient degree of security to justify the hope that the peoples of the world may continue to exist and get on with their job of evolution. They do not represent any final prescription by any means, because by the next generation

human development will need to extend far beyond the limits prescribed in the present constitutions.

"In the World Health Organization's constitution there are statements that indicate some new points of view. One is in the constitution's opening statement, agreed to by some 88 nations: it is a definition of the word 'health.' Health is defined, by the nations of the world, as: 'A state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.'

"This is a big order. It suggests the responsibility of our generation to develop a degree of maturity that has never been expected before of any generation...."

About technical assistance and foreign experts, Dr. Chisholm had this to say:

"When anyone presumes to go into another country and mess about with other people's lives, he is assuming considerable responsibility. He needs to be quite sure that what he is doing is really for the good of those people and is not just something which he believes should be emulated by those people because we ourselves live that way.

"For instance, in the medical field, there has been a tendency on the part of people from Europe and America to go to the underdeveloped countries and teach the people there to get on with their medical development in the same way we have. This may be quite absurd. We are superimposing our highly developed methods of treatment on them without first showing them the long, slow methods of prevention, forgetting that we did nothing but treat diseases for hundreds of years with almost no techniques of prevention at all.

"Thus, the way the so-called underdeveloped countries should develop is by prevention first, with treatment when they can sustain it, or to the degree that they can sustain it. Prevention is wholesale; treatment is retail. We may have to sell our wares by undertaking treatment, by using penicillin, for instance, for the apparently magical cure of yaws or other diseases, but the primary necessity is prevention."

Finally, after saying that the United Nations and its specialized agencies "were admirably designed for a specific and limited purpose—to be instruments and to do exactly what they were told to do by the peoples of the world through their governments" and adding that "until the people at home do some growing up and begin to understand the necessities of this generation, we can't expect the United Nations and its specialized agencies to take very many steps forward in bringing about world co-operation for mutual benefit."

Dr. Chisholm went on: "In many countries I have visited in recent years, people have come to me and asked how to get a job in the United Nations. They want to do something significant, something important for the welfare of the world. The answer to that I have, I think, made very clear: 'Go home and do it, because it is at home that the job needs to be done. That is where the lag is, not in the United Nations. That is where the catching up has to be done.'"

John Humphrey
The Magna Carta of the World

John Humphrey was professor of law at McGill University when he was asked in 1946 to set up the Division of Human Rights in the United Nations Secretariat. It was a post he held for nearly 20 years. He was responsible for writing the first draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and guiding it through to adoption by the General Assembly in December 1948. The two human rights covenants, the first on civil and political rights and the second on economic, social and cultural rights, did not come into effect until 1976. In his book *Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure*, Humphrey tells the story of the genesis of the Declaration, explaining the importance of having it adopted as soon as possible.

"The Covenant of the League of Nations reflected the marginal interest of traditional law in human rights. By 1945, however, the historical context had changed, and references to human rights run through the United Nations Charter like a golden thread.

"The Charter says in its very first article that one of the purposes of the organization is to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion; and, by Article 56, member states pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the organization to promote that purpose.

"The reason for this sudden concern for human rights was, of course, the traumatic experience through which the world had just passed. One of the causes of the Second World War was the cynical, studied and wholesale violation of human rights in and by Nazi Germany. This, unlike any previous war, was a war to vindicate human rights....

"Yet when in the fall of 1944 the governments of China, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, these contained only a general reference to human rights....

"The Dumbarton Oaks proposals were the work of the great powers and reflected their current absorption with military security. There was no opportunity in the circumstances in which the proposals were drafted to hear the representations of the smaller countries or of private interests. The relatively strong human rights provisions of the Charter were largely, and appropriately, the result of determined lobbying by Non-Governmental Organizations and individuals at the San Francisco Conference.

"The United States government had invited some 42 private organizations representing various aspects of American life—the churches, trade unions, ethnic groups, peace movements, etc.—to send representatives to San Francisco, where they acted as consultants to its delegation. These people, aided by the delegations of some of the smaller countries, conducted a lobby in favour of human rights for which there is no parallel in the history of international relations, and which was largely responsible for the human rights provisions of the Charter.

"The United States delegation, remembering that the U.S. Senate had refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, wanted nothing in the Charter which might serve as a pretext for not ratifying it, and therefore resisted the pressure. But in a dramatic last-minute session, Mr. [Edward] Stettinius, the Secretary of State, agreed to support the minimum demands of the lobbyists. The U.S.

delegation then persuaded the other great powers to accept the amendments. How this was achieved has never been explained. Perhaps, in the rush of last-minute decisions, not much thought was given to the revolutionary character of what was happening.

"Some of the countries represented at San Francisco would have accepted stronger human rights provisions than the ones which were put into the Charter. Several Latin American countries even wanted it to contain an international bill of rights. But the great majority, including the great powers, were not ready for such a step. The result was that, although the Charter mentions human rights in a number of places, it does not define or even list them.

"But ... an article was inserted by which the Economic and Social Council was instructed to create a commission on human rights; and it was generally understood that this commission would draw up an international bill of rights.... One of the first acts of the Economic and Social Council was to create this commission and [to] instruct it to draft the bill.

"Mrs. [Eleanor] Roosevelt was one of the greatest personalities ever to be associated with the United Nations, and her prestige was one of the chief assets of the Human Rights Commission in the early years. There was a tendency in certain parts of the Secretariat to play down the human rights program as an exotic in an international organization. But when the time came for the first session of the Human Rights Commission, we had to meet in the largest hall available, so large was the audience that wanted to see Mrs. Roosevelt.

"Once the fourth session of ECOSOC [the Economic and Social Council] was out of the way, I turned my attention to preparing a draft of a declaration on human rights. The Secretariat was still housed in the Sperry Gyroscope plant at Lake Success and, while working conditions there were not bad, this was not the best place in which to do the kind of job I had to do.... It was therefore at the Lido Beach Hotel, where my wife, Jeanne, and I were living at the time, that I prepared the first draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

"I was no Thomas Jefferson and, although a lawyer, I had had practically no experience drafting documents. But since the Secretariat had collected a score of drafts, I had some models on which to work. One of them had inspired the draft declaration which Cuba had sponsored at the San Francisco Conference. There was also a text prepared by a committee chaired by [John] Viscount Sankey after a public debate conducted in Britain by the *Daily Herald*. One had been prepared by Professor Hersch Lauterpacht and another by H.G. Wells. Still others came from the American Law Institute, the American Jewish Congress and the editors of *Free World*. The American Bar Association had sent in an enumeration of subjects. With two exceptions, all these texts came from English-speaking sources and all of them from the democratic West.

"The best of the texts from which I worked was the one prepared by the American Law Institute, and I borrowed freely from it....

"My draft comprised 48 short articles. Although most of the articles related to civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights were

not neglected. I did not need to be told that the former can have little meaning without the latter. It is by no means certain that economic and social rights would have been included in the final text if I had not included them in mine. There was considerable opposition in the drafting committee to their inclusion.

"Two articles dealt with the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities. The Universal Declaration has a great deal to say about the prevention of discrimination, but it does not mention minorities. The refusal of the General Assembly to include rules to protect them was one of the first concrete signs that the United Nations would not continue in the role of the League of Nations as the international protector of minorities.

"After cataloguing and defining the various rights and freedoms, I went on to mention three principles, the recognition of which is essential in any effective system for the international protection of human rights.

"The first was that the right of individual petition included the right to petition the United Nations. The second was the duty of all member states to respect and protect the rights enunciated in the declaration. And the third was that its provisions were to be deemed fundamental principles of international law and of the national law of each member state.

"None of these principles was retained in the Universal Declaration, although some were put into the covenants. The Universal Declaration does not even recognize the right to petition national, let alone international, authorities.

"I had no plan for overcoming the difficulty that the General Assembly can make only recommendations. I knew very well that it had no power to impose binding obligations. But instinct told me that the declaration would later be recognized in some way as binding, perhaps by the force of custom; and that, I think, is what has now happened. By including the three principles in my text, I in any event raised most of the questions concerning the international implementation of human rights that needed to be discussed."

The drafting committee of eight members, with Mrs. Roosevelt in the chair, met in June 1947. They used Humphrey's text, but they also had a draft convention presented by Britain that provided for implementation at the national level and some enforcement procedures within the United Nations, including the ultimate power of expelling a member state that violated this bill of rights, on a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. But the British authors did not press it energetically, and the committee did not discuss it seriously. Humphrey comments: "It probably represented the highest point ever reached by the United Kingdom in its approach to the protection of human rights by the United Nations."

The Soviet member on the drafting committee was Professor Vladimir Koretsky (later a judge on the International Court of Justice). Humphrey describes how Koretsky criticized the political philosophy in both his and the British drafts for "their tendency to liberate man not from persecution but from his government, and that meant putting him in opposition to his own government and people." Humphrey adds:

"He had, of course, hit the nail right on the head. One purpose of both drafts was to protect individuals from their governments. If the protection of

human rights did not mean that, it did not mean much. Professor Koretsky wanted to fight the remnants of fascism and to prevent its rebirth, but that cannot be done without interfering in the internal affairs of governments. The struggle for human rights has always been and always will be a struggle against authority. There was perhaps something paradoxical about what the United Nations was trying to do, for the international bill of rights was being drafted by the representatives of governments. These were some of the things that I would have liked to say to Professor Koretsky, had I not been the servant of the committee; for I did not think that he was very effectively answered by the members.

"In 1947 it was an easy assumption in the West that the Soviet Union would never accept a binding convention on human rights, and Russian diplomats confirmed this by their off-the-record remarks. It was in the logic of the Cold War, however, that later, after the United States had turned against the covenants for reasons grounded in internal politics and countries like the United Kingdom were worried by the provisions put into them on the self-determination of peoples, the Soviet Union should attempt to fill the vacuum and become a champion of the covenants."

In the meantime, the drafting committee finished its work and the Universal Declaration went in September 1948 to the Third Committee of the General Assembly, which deals with social, cultural and humanitarian questions. All delegations are represented on this standing committee, and a first vote is taken here, to be followed by a final vote in the General Assembly. Charles Malik of the Lebanon, who was knowledgeable because he had been rapporteur of the Human Rights Commission, was in the chair. But there was lengthy debate before it was agreed to deal only with the Declaration, and leave until later the work on a covenant (which turned into two covenants: the first, on civil and political rights, and the second, on economic, social and cultural rights). Even so, the committee held 81 meetings to debate amendments to the draft Declaration. Humphrey comments:

"Several delegations regretted that the covenant would not be adopted at the same time as the Declaration. New Zealand in particular was against adopting any declaration until the convention was ready. Had their advice been followed, the adoption of the Declaration might have been postponed indefinitely. It should have been clear, even in 1948, that reaching agreement on a convention setting forth precise legal obligations would be infinitely more difficult than drafting a Declaration, and that it would take a long time to complete.

"In the meantime, it would be nothing short of a miracle if, in the rapidly changing atmosphere at the United Nations, the convention did not become a focus of political controversy, and that is what did happen. By 1950, the burning issue of the self-determination of peoples had, for example, become a principal theme in the human rights debates. The covenants ran into rough weather, and it was not until 1966 that they were completed and opened for signature, 19 years after the first session of the Human Rights Commission, and it was 10 more years before they came into force.

"It wasn't simply a question of choosing the easiest path. Although a lawyer and therefore naturally prejudiced in favour of a binding instrument, I had always thought that the Declaration would be the most important part of the international bill of rights.... The Declaration, even though it might not be technically binding, would apply to all states and would have the great authority of the United Nations behind it. It would also be the catalyst of national and international legislation. The best strategy, therefore, was for the General Assembly to adopt it as quickly as possible....

"Looking back after many years, I can find no reason for thinking that I was wrong in 1948. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is now part of the customary law of nations and therefore binding on all states."

Members of the Third Committee tangled on many points. Sometimes it was on the interpretation of words such as "democratic." South Africa objected to an article drafted by France: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." A discussion over religion ended by omitting any reference to God (or nature). Britain argued with the Soviet Union on the issue of forced labour, while the British and New Zealand delegations objected to the freedoms of assembly and association being without qualification, on the grounds that this would prohibit trade unions from forming a "closed shop." Humphrey goes on:

"An important omission is the failure of the Declaration to recognize any right of petition. My own draft had said that 'everyone has the right, either individually or in association with others, to petition the government of his state or the United Nations for redress of grievance'.... It was deleted at the drafting committee's second session on the initiative of the United Kingdom. The Third Committee discussed the question during three meetings; but, notwithstanding the efforts of the French to restore the article, the question was referred back to the commission for further study in connection with the covenant. As a result, neither the Declaration nor the covenants mention the fundamental right of petition, a right which exists even in some authoritarian countries....

"Every one of the 30 articles of the Declaration was discussed in great detail and most of the meetings were full of interest and even drama. There was a constant clash, not only of ideologies but of personalities.... Sitting next to the chairman, and both professionally and emotionally involved, I wished at times that I were a delegate. The silent role of an international official can sometimes be very frustrating....

"At one o'clock in the night of 6 December [1948], by roll-call vote, the Third Committee adopted its draft of the Declaration and sent it on to the Assembly. Although no delegation voted against, there were seven abstentions: Byelorussia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukraine, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Saudi Arabia and South Africa did not vote. The South Africans had made it abundantly clear that they would not accept the Declaration: it should, they had said, include only those fundamental rights the universal existence of which was recognized everywhere in the world....

"It was the Canadian abstention which shocked everyone, including me. The Canadians had given me no warning, and I was quite unprepared for what

happened. Although I knew that the international promotion of human rights had no priority in Canada's foreign policy, it had never occurred to me that the government would carry its indifference to the point of abstaining in such an important vote. I could hardly have prevented the scandal even if the delegation had taken me into their confidence, but I could at least have warned them of the company in which they would probably find themselves.

"The next day, Dana Wilgress, a senior career diplomat who was on the Canadian delegation, stopped me in the corridor. He had something to tell me, he said, that would take the iron out of my soul: it had just been decided that Canada would vote for the Declaration in the plenary Assembly. I had no doubt whatsoever that this quick change in position was dictated solely by the fact that the government did not relish the company in which it found itself.

"It was therefore with bad grace that Canada joined the majority when the General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the night of 10 December. Lester Pearson, explaining my country's vote, said that many of the articles of the Declaration were vague and lacking in precision. It would have been better, he said, if a body of jurists such as the International Law Commission had gone over the text before it was submitted to the General Assembly.

"This was probably *ex post facto* rationalization. The Canadians had certainly never made the suggestion before; nor had they made any effort, either in the Economic and Social Council or in the Third Committee, to make the Declaration more precise. Had the course Pearson preferred been followed, the Declaration could not have been adopted in 1948, with the consequences already suggested.

"A possible real reason for the Canadian abstention in the Third Committee may have been the government's fear that, if they voted for the Declaration, they might be accused of trespassing on the jurisdiction of the provinces under the constitution. But although this was mentioned in the explanation of vote, it is difficult to believe that it could have been a compelling reason. For in 1948 everyone agreed that the Declaration would not be binding in international law and would not, therefore, impose any legal obligations on member states....

"The countries which did abstain in the final vote [on] the night of 10 December were the six Communist countries then members of the United Nations, plus Saudi Arabia and South Africa."

Hugh Keenleyside
On the Fragile Bridge of Hope

When the United Nations began to organize its technical assistance activities systematically in the summer of 1950, it turned to a Canadian with an impressive amount of experience in administration. As a young foreign service officer, Hugh Keenleyside worked in Japan in the 1930s and was the Canadian ambassador to Mexico from late 1944 until 1947. During the war he had been head of the American and Far Eastern Division of External Affairs. When, in 1947, he returned from Mexico, it was to take up the most desirable post of Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources.

His first mission in technical assistance for the United Nations came in April 1950, when he led an economic survey of Bolivia. It proved to be an eventful five-month expedition, for he and his team were literally caught in the cross-fire of a general strike. An important part of the mission's proposals was the recruitment by the UN of "administrative assistants" from various countries who could give strength to the Bolivian public service which suffered from inexperience as well as frequent (and violent) changes of government. As Keenleyside records: "Our mission's scheme was subsequently tried elsewhere by the United Nations and, after active endorsement by Dag Hammarskjöld, was finally embodied in the OPEX (provision of operational and executive personnel) program of the United Nations."

When, later in 1950, the Technical Assistance Administration (TAA) was being organized at UN headquarters, Hugh Keenleyside was offered the post of director-general. TAA was the operating arm of the new Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) and was charged with providing assistance in economic development (except agriculture, the preserve of FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization]), social welfare (except health and education) and public administration. As events unfolded, he was TAA's only director-general, because TAA was abolished in 1959 during the amalgamation of the departments of Social Affairs and Economic Affairs and the setting up of the Special Projects Fund (which later merged with EPTA to become the United Nations Development Programme). He is proud of its productivity:

"Throughout the whole period of its existence, TAA was a very busy shop. During its nine-year life, nearly a third of all mail coming into the Secretariat came to TAA. In a typical year we handled over 800 requests for experts and 1 500 requests for fellowships. Our central staff of less than 200 persons serviced, on the average, over 600 experts recruited from some 55 different countries and working in over 65 recipient nations, over 600 fellows or scholars selected from 70 countries and being trained in more than 40 host areas, and some 20 to 25 seminars, training or demonstration centres or permanent institutes.

"In carrying out these duties, the administration normally handled funds totalling over $7 million, processed nearly 1 000 final and 4 000 interim reports from fellows, scholars or experts, and dealt with mail at a per capita rate eight times higher than the average for the Secretariat as a whole. This would have been quite impossible for our small numbers if we had not been able to attract and hold men and women of unusual ability.... Because of my own interest and experience and because I was the head of the only unit in the whole UN galaxy charged with the duty of advising governments that appealed

for help in public administration, my colleagues and I were determined that our own organization should be a model of efficiency."

Keenleyside has, however, been humorously caustic about some of the operational problems he faced, explaining how, "in the early stages of an international organization with a widely diversified staff, the protection of personal positions and the defence of familiar practices and procedures is almost certain to take on an exaggerated importance."

He goes on: "This was the case in TAA.... Instead of walking across the hall, or settling minor problems by a quick word on the office telephone, the more frequent practice in the early experience of TAA was the preparation of memoranda, each of which would take the better part of a day to move each way. Such punctilious communications, moreover, made compromise difficult, and emphasized individual rights and positions instead of facilitating the quiet and sensible meeting of minds that is the basis of good operational practice....

"The situation was further complicated by the avidity with which many members of the secretariat adopted the (largely American) system of committees and conferences. Few items of business seemed too small to justify the appointment of a committee or the calling of a meeting. On such occasions, moreover, because of national and other sensitivities, it was not safe to omit anyone with even a meagre claim to participation. It seemed to be equally important that unusually detailed minutes should be taken and that each participant's contribution should be recorded to his or her satisfaction.

"As a result, a wholly unreasonable amount of staff time was likely to be devoted to joint meditation and to the embalming of unimportant views. The proverbial definition of a committee as a group of men that keeps minutes but wastes hours was often applicable to the early days of the Secretariat of the United Nations, and of TAA."

Of the recipients of technical assistance, he has written the following in his volume of memoirs, *On the Bridge of Time*:

"In technical assistance matters we found the Yugoslavs consistently cooperative. They were among the most frequent applicants for aid and, within severe financial restrictions, were some of our most faithful supporters. They were also, during my time at least, among those who made the most sensible requests and the best use of what aid we were able to provide.

"I gradually came to the conclusion that, of all the countries we had to deal with in technical assistance, Israel and Yugoslavia were the two that were making the greatest efforts to help themselves and to use effectively everything we could offer.... While in Jerusalem I had a couple of talks with [David] Ben-Gurion. The prime minister, at 66, resembled an ancient prophet who had been washed and deodorized, and he talked like a keen, modern social democrat. He must have had a good deal of messianic fervour in him both to have survived and to have persisted as he did....

"The prime minister himself invited me to visit Elath, the only town in the narrow strip on the Gulf of Aqaba belonging to Israel. The invitation gave me a chance to see the progress that had been made in the southern Negev.... En route south we were impressed by the way in which irrigation had turned

desert into heavily productive farmland. Three feet from the last line of orchard trees there was nothing but rough and desiccated soil....

"In Israel we soon had TAA experts working with the operators of factories, mills and warehouses. Others were helping to improve the physical quality of hospitals and other social welfare institutions and even the operation of a model penitentiary. Near Jerusalem the extraordinary development of the new university was also under way with aid from UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] as well as the United Nations."

But in other parts of the Middle East he did not find such a bright picture of activity:

"We had been having a good deal of difficulty with the Iraqi authorities, particularly in connection with our fellowship programs. The local government had been sending in fellowship applications without proper screening of the candidates. Little that I saw or heard of the Iraqi officials or businessmen did much to encourage any hopes for improvement....

"Technical assistance relations between Iraq and the United Nations were eventually improved and for a time maintained by the appointment of the Hon. Milton Gregg, V.C. as our Resident Representative in Baghdad. His devoted and wise execution of the duties of that exceedingly difficult post was one of our more successful efforts to aid the countries of the Middle East. A man of experience, sound judgement and profound affection for his fellow human beings, above all, those in distress, he was among the small group for whom my admiration and respect were most profound. Because of his inimitable and infectious sense of humour he was also a constant joy."

For Canadian experts, whether in Egypt or Vietnam or elsewhere in the 1950s, Keenleyside has only compliments:

"I discovered in almost every case that the Canadians appointed by TAA or recruited by one of the specialized agencies were doing well and were highly regarded by the local authorities. One special category that seemed to enjoy a particularly high reputation was that of Canadian nurses. My friends in WHO [World Health Organization] said that they could never get enough Canadians to supply the demand.

"Among our TAA projects in Egypt was a Demonstration Centre for the Blind. This was run by Dr. Magill, a sightless Canadian who later headed the Canadian National Institute for the Blind, and who had set up in Cairo an institution in which persons from a number of the Middle Eastern countries who were anxious to obtain training as teachers of the blind were invited to enroll. Those who were accepted received UN fellowships, which took care of their expenses. The necessity for such an institution in the countries around the eastern edge of the Mediterranean was critically important; in fact, we were told that there was no equal need in any comparable area anywhere else in the world. It was one of the projects of the period from which I derived the most complete satisfaction....

"The many years of fighting between the Vietnamese and the French had left a vast residue of deformed and mutilated persons. As a result of the constant and insistent demand, one of our major activities in Vietnam was the

development, with the aid of WHO, of simple workshops for the production of prosthetic devices. In this we had the services of the Canadian orthopedic expert Dr. Gustave Gingras, a man as remarkable for the depth of his humane spirit as he was for his technical skills and his organizational genius. As a result of the establishment of these centres, many hundreds of Vietnamese were given a renewed capacity to live bearable and useful lives."

In summing up his time with TAA, Keenleyside said: "My departure after 10 years at the United Nations was not without elements of regret and sadness. I was disappointed that we had not been able to accomplish more in the tasks on which I had been engaged. It could not be denied that a large part of the international programs had ended in frustration and disappointment. About all that could be said with assurance was that a start had been made on identifying problems, and searching for effective ways to provide help to people and governments in need."

They had sought to provide five forms of service: (a) fellowships and scholarships; (b) conferences and demonstration projects in underdeveloped countries, to make available on the spot the results of foreign research and experience; (c) provision of technical literature and some supplies for officials; (d) research and other work in the field of public administration; (e) most important, recruitment of experts to work with local personnel in developing countries.

The record was mixed. While the provision of experts had been broadly successful, other sectors of assistance were less so. Fellowship students "developed a desire to remain in the countries in which they had studied because of the greater financial opportunities and glamour of life, although the awards stipulated that the recipients were to return home and use their new experience for the benefit of their own country and people. Moreover, when the student did go home, he was often blocked from utilizing his new knowledge by the jealousy of those who had not had similar opportunities and the failure of governments and other employers to accept his advice."

As for research into public administration, Keenleyside concluded (writing in 1982) that it was not "particularly productive because much of what was required for administrative success was not new. Well-defined organization and sensible distribution and co-ordination of responsibilities were obviously the most important factors. If, in addition, corruption could be eliminated and reasonable personnel policies developed, the basis for a competent governmental hierarchy could be improved. The difficulty, of course, was in persuading governments to accept these principles and harden their determination to practise and maintain them. Unhappily, in these matters little progress was made during my experience at the United Nations, nor has it been since."

Of the value of the work done in the field of technical assistance during the 1950s, he noted some improvement in the conditions of life of some people:

"In a few countries it could justifiably be said that a significant number of the people were living in less misery and with greater hope than had been the case when the UN programs had been started.... Yet not even the most

enthusiastic observer could believe that technical assistance, on the scale and in the forms in which it was being provided, was beginning to approach a solution to the problems of the underdeveloped countries.

"It was clear that something far more radical and fundamental would have to be done if the chasm between rich and poor was to be reduced. Only in the reduction of the percentage of people suffering from some of the more widespread diseases had really significant progress been made. Cholera was disappearing, smallpox and malaria were within sight of being stamped out.... On the other hand, the actual number of people in the world suffering from disease, ignorance and poverty in all their manifold forms was not decreasing but was rising each year by something in the neighbourhood of 35 million people.

"Thus, when I left the United Nations, I was under no illusion as to the measure of success that had been attained. Nor was I optimistic about the possibility of improvement resulting from the future impact of the programs with which I had been personally involved.

"Something much more radical in the way of new policies in trade, in monetary arrangements, and in refined methods for providing technological and administrative aid will have to be instituted before there can be truly significant betterment in the condition of the people of the world. That progress for the underprivileged majority of human beings will involve a reduction in the standards of material consumption in such countries as Canada will, I believe, be inevitable. And even if it were possible to raise consumption to our present standard for all the people now alive, it would result first in an enormous depletion of many of the world's resources, then in their rapid exhaustion."

Judge John Read
The "Minkies" and the Rule of Law

Canada has had only one judge elected to the 15-member International Court of Justice. This was Judge John Erskine Read, who was a member of the Court from February 1946 to February 1958. (Maxwell Cohen was an *ad hoc* judge appointed during the hearing of the Gulf of Maine case.)

Born in Halifax in 1888, Read pursued undergraduate studies at Dalhousie University's Law School and postgraduate studies at Columbia University and (as a Rhodes Scholar) at Oxford. After war service, Read returned to Dalhousie where he was dean of the Law School from 1924 to 1929. Then, for the next 17 years, he worked as legal adviser to the Department of External Affairs, acting as the government's agent in the two major arbitrations with the United States during that time: the *I'm Alone* case (in which a ship registered in Nova Scotia was sunk after a chase by the U.S. Coastguard during Prohibition days), and the Trail Smelter case (transboundary pollution).

Following the Versailles peace conference of 1919, the Permanent Court of International Justice was constituted in 1921. Canada played no part in drawing up the Court's statute, but in April 1945, when delegates of 40 nations met in Washington to draft the statute for a new World Court, Canada was very much to the fore. Read was made Chairman of the Drafting Committee. The draft statute of the Washington Committee of Jurists was adopted, with minor revisions, by the San Francisco Conference and annexed to (and made an integral part of) the Charter of the United Nations.

Read was elected a member of the World Court on the first ballot by the Security Council and General Assembly from among 76 candidates, but he drew by lot only a three-year term (a scheme by which five judges would subsequently be elected every three years). Following his first term, he was re-elected for a full nine-year term.

The 12 years during which Read sat on the World Court have been called "the most active period in the court's history," during which the Court gave 30 substantive decisions. Two of them, the Corfu Channel (1949) and the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (1951) cases, were important in developing the Law of the Sea. The Reparations (1949) case, following the assassination of the UN mediator in Palestine, established that the United Nations Organization had powers, beyond those expressly provided in the Charter, which were "essential to the performance of its duties," including the protection of its agents. There were also two early cases involving South-West Africa.

After his retirement from the Court, Read gave three lectures in Saskatchewan in 1960 in the W.M. Martin lecture series (named after a former Chief Justice and Premier of Saskatchewan). In these lectures, published in 1961 under the title *The Rule of Law on the International Plane*, Read looks at the slow growth of international law since the publication by Hugo Grotius of *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* in 1625, describes some of the work of the World Court—going into detail on the Minquiers and Ecrehos (1953) case—and puts forward four proposals of ways to advance to the rule of law, to the goal of what he calls "the new Jerusalem." This section contains excerpts from those lectures.

Read began the first lecture by contrasting the comprehensive body of rules and principles governing inter-State relations put forward by Grotius and

his immediate successors with the failure of lawyers at two Geneva conferences in 1958 and 1960 to agree on a single issue—the extent of territorial waters—and he asked: "Why is it that our world has strained at the Geneva gnat, while the seventeenth-century world swallowed, with gusto, the Grotian camel?"

He had several answers to his own question: the disintegration of the Church after the Reformation produced a vacuum, while the reaction to the horrors of the religious wars created "an urgent desire for something, no matter what, to mitigate the brutality and lessen the frequency of war." As well, Grotius wrote in the universal language of Latin and was held in the highest respect by jurists. In contrast, Read argued, while we may give grudging respect to a Banting or a Penfield for his research in applied science, we treat "with distrust and even with contempt" someone who does research in jurisprudence. "To us he is an egghead. On this continent, the egghead is without honour."

After this *cri du coeur*, Read takes on Canadian pessimists and asserts: "No country has been more deeply concerned in, or benefited so much from, international justice as Canada. For more than a century most Canadians have thought that Canadian interests were sacrificed on the altar of broader imperial diplomatic considerations in the negotiations and arbitrations which determined the Maine boundary, the Oregon dispute and the Alaskan Panhandle. But this almost universal opinion was unrealistic and without legal foundation. It was based on the assumption that Great Britain ought to have been willing to sacrifice British lives and treasure to maintain tenuous claims to what was then regarded as useless wilderness. It was based on the view that extreme Canadian claims were right...." He goes on to refer to the International Joint Commission (dealing with U.S.–Canada boundary waters) as "perhaps the oldest, and certainly the most effective, international tribunal in the world."

Read then moves to speak about the International Court of Justice and makes a strong statement about its objectivity:

"Many deride the suggestion that an international judge would deal objectively with a matter in which his own country was interested; but they ignore the facts to make room for their prejudices. In three cases, a French judge adopted a position directly contrary to that advanced by the French Government; in three cases, a British judge went directly against the British Government's contentions; in one case, a Soviet judge went directly against a position which had been taken by the Soviet Government at an earlier stage in the controversy; and in another case, a Canadian judge supported a conclusion which was directly opposite to the view submitted to the Court by the Canadian Government. In fact, there is neither east nor west on the Court; and, as regards objectivity, it would compare not unfavourably with the appellate courts of Canada, England or the United States."

To illustrate the ramifications of some cases with which the Court dealt in his time, Read tells the story of the ancient dispute between Britain and France over the Minquiers and Ecrehos, small islands that are really no more than large rocks off the Normandy coast and that have been known to generations of cross-Channel sailors as "the Minkies":

"It may be worthwhile to look at the case of the Minquiers and the Ecrehos. This will disclose the Court in action, dealing with a complicated dispute, primarily legal in its character, but with strong political and economic aspects. It shows the way in which the rule of law can be applied in the solution of a serious political dispute, with economic ramifications, between two countries whose relations are dominated by good will....

"The issue concerned sovereignty over two groups of little islets, the Minquiers and the Ecrehos, which lie between Jersey and the Normandy coast. Both countries claimed the islets. While, in one sense, the issues at stake were not great, they had aroused strong feelings in both countries over the centuries and could only be settled by good will and justice. The islets had comparatively little value as land; but sovereignty over them determined fishing rights, and some of the Minquiers were regarded by France as essential to hydroelectric development based on tidal power.

"Before submitting the dispute to the Court, the parties settled the disposition of the fishing rights by agreement; and, when the matter of possible hydroelectric development arose in the course of the oral proceedings, an agreement providing for such a contingency was made and placed on the record. The Court was, therefore, confined to the purely legal issues, undisturbed by political and economic overtones.

"The Court examined Anglo-French relations from 1066 to 1950. The ownership of the Minquiers and Ecrehos was in dispute from 1202. The islets were admittedly part of the Duchy of Normandy, and King John [of England] was Duke of Normandy. But in 1202 his Norman Duchy was forfeited by a French feudal court. The French king reduced the Norman mainland to possession, but failed to oust the English from the Channel Isles and the Minquiers and Ecrehos. In time, the French claim to the Channel Isles faded away, but the French king, and later the Republic, never abandoned the claim to the islets. The dispute remained political: the subject of wars, treaties and diplomacy for seven-and-a-half centuries.

"In December 1950, a special agreement was signed, asking the Court to decide whether the islets belonged to the United Kingdom or to France. It was sent to the Court a year later. After appointment of agents to represent the governments in the proceedings, the Pleadings were filed: the British Memorial in March 1952; the French Counter-Memorial in June 1952; the British Reply in November 1952; and the French Rejoinder in March 1953.

"The Pleadings were printed documents in which the parties, in turn, set forth in great detail the grounds on which they relied, together with the documentary evidence. They were voluminous. A great deal of time was needed for translation and distribution, for the examination of the documents by the judges, and for preparation of oral arguments by counsel.

"It is possible to form some idea of the bulk of the documentary evidence by looking at the main British contention. It was argued that the islets had been treated as part of Jersey throughout the centuries. In order to accept or reject this contention, the Court needed objective facts. The Court examined Treaty Rolls, Charter Rolls, Patent Rolls, Assize Rolls, Papal Bulls

and other ancient manuscripts. There were 177 documents in the British case alone.

"Public hearings were held from September 17 to October 8. The deliberations of the Court took seven weeks and judgment was delivered on November 17, 1953, 23 months after the commencement of the proceedings.

"This case has been examined in some detail to illustrate the Court's procedure and the way in which it deals with contentious and complicated disputes. Further, it shows the time that it takes to dispose of a difficult and complex case.

"There are other aspects of the case which are not without interest. The judgment awarded both groups of islets to the British, and decided against the French contention on all points. It rejected French claims which had been maintained for 751 years, and actively advanced by the Quai d'Orsay for nearly a century. Nevertheless, Judge Basdevant, a French citizen and a former legal adviser of the French Foreign Office, concurred with the rest of his colleagues in the actual decision—a striking instance of the fact that judges disregard their national prejudices and deal with disputes objectively."

Read devoted his final lecture to considering how progress can be made toward the rule of law. He began with a warning:

"Too many people are prone to believe that the new Jerusalem can be built by creating an institution, passing a resolution or referring the matter to a committee. The international world is at an early stage of an historical process which comes into focus if we look back at the course of development of the rule of law on the national plane in England.

"The notion that men and women, great and small, should be governed by independent tribunals, i.e. national justice, came into English history eight centuries ago. The reorganization of the King's Courts, and their equipment with new and efficient techniques, furnished the instrument that made the development of the rule of law inevitable. That instrument, the Royal Courts of Justice, survived reactionary setbacks: the Wars of the Roses, Tudor totalitarianism, and the Stuarts. Today, the rule of law is beyond question and that chapter of English history is closed. But it took 600 years to do it.

"The movement towards the new Jerusalem—a world in which relations between nations will be based on good will and the rule of law—has outgrown its swaddling clothes. Its position is comparable to that which was reached in England in Bracton's time, mid-thirteenth century.... On the international plane, the World Court is firmly established, procedures have taken shape, international law has come into being, and, in the political background, the United Nations Organization has emerged—foundations on which succeeding generations may be expected to establish the rule of law."

Read then set out four ideas for making progress towards the rule of law. Here, three of them are summarized, in order to highlight the fourth, "the problem of conformity: the adaptation of international law to the world as it is."

Firstly, he argues that "a reasonable and natural interpretation," rather than a restrictive interpretation, should be given to the agreement that all jurisdiction should be founded on consent and must respect national sovereignty.

Second, he looks at the growing and then declining popularity of the so-called Optional Clause, by which 42 states had declared by 1934 that they would accept obligatory jurisdiction (in those days of the Permanent Court). The decline was speeded by the U.S. invention in 1946 of the "push-button clause," under which a state involved in a pleading could suddenly deny the Court's jurisdiction at any time up to the actual delivery of judgment, even though it had made a declaration supporting the Optional Clause. Read urged the abandonment of this "push-button clause." Third, he suggested improvements to the World Court itself, including the creation of special or regional chambers with flexible rules, designed to sit anywhere in the world.

On his fourth idea, the problem of conformity, Read was eloquent. International law and justice, he argued, "are part of the institutional expression of the culture which we call Western civilization [formed] by the impact of Christianity on Greek culture, Roman legal and political structure, and barbarian invaders, in the course of the disintegration of the Roman Empire." Grotius had based his notion of a universal body of law on this moral foundation, which still seemed to prevail at the time of the San Francisco Conference in 1945. But by 1960, "a substantial majority of the membership of the United Nations consists of States beyond the shrunken confines of Christendom, nations that do not share the common moral foundation. The sanction that upheld international law for three centuries has been weakened."

What was to be done? Read is quite clear, if heretical to some. "The notion that standards, long acceptable to the West, should be lowered to levels acceptable to the new nations and the Communist powers may seem shocking; and the suggestion that there is possibility of movement towards acceptance of Western standards by the new nations and the East may seem unthinkable. But survival may depend on our readiness to accept shocks and to think the unthinkable. The problem of conformity is not a matter of weeks or months. It is an historic process—a matter of generations. It is not a matter of making up minds today about the content of the international law of the future. It is a matter of coping with international problems as they arise between nations of Christendom and nations of the new dispensations; and working out, through successive years, the inevitable adjustments between conflicting interests...."

Read pointed out, as grounds for hope, that Communist nations had not disavowed international law. "Indeed, in Russia far more support is given to study and research in international law than in Canada."

He ended thus: "There is need for a revolution in our thinking and in our policy, designed to end the cold war, to eliminate the causes of international friction, to re-establish good will and to promote the rule of law on the international plane. As regards thinking, there is a need to abandon clichés as substitutes for reason and to open the mind to facts.

"There is a need to approach the practical problems of adjustment, having in mind the actual interest of the country and of mankind.... There is need to abandon the new diplomacy, which now, in all too many countries, consists of vituperation, tantrums and impassioned speeches aimed at the voter at home and irrelevant to national and world interest. There is need to restore

manners to international discussion and negotiation, and to make the new Jerusalem the universal objective."

Judge John Read died in December 1973, in the words of a good friend, "full of mental vigour to the last."

Andrew McNaughton
Northern Spies for the Security Council

A book written about the Security Council by Andrew Boyd in 1971 was called *Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg*, which gives a vivid image of the pressures under which those ambassadors live who represent the 15 states on the Council at any time. But there are some humorous moments, even for these men. Sidney Freifeld, who served at the Canadian Mission to the UN for two periods (from 1947 to 1952 and from 1964 to 1969) and later became ambassador to Colombia and Ecuador, has recalled an early incident whose central figure is General Andrew "Andy" McNaughton, Canada's first ambassador to the UN. We reprint Freifeld's memoir from *The Globe and Mail* here:

"Nominations for a Canadian Man for All Seasons of the past half-century would surely have to include General Andrew McNaughton, not only for his lofty achievements as soldier, scientist, administrator and engineer, but also because there was a curious chink in his armour, providing an insight into a side of his personality unsuspected by the general public.

"I had the chance to observe this while serving at the Canadian Mission to the United Nations soon after World War II, when the General was appointed Canada's first ambassador and permanent representative to the UN.

"When he came down to New York he already bore an awesome list of credentials. He had organized and trained the First Canadian Army during the war, headed the National Research Council in Ottawa, represented Canada on the UN Atomic Energy Commission and, for a time, had been minister of National Defence in the Mackenzie King Cabinet. And much more.

"As those of us at the Canadian Mission were soon to find out, the General was a man of boundless energy, who tackled his new career of diplomacy with a high sense of dedication and enthusiasm.

"His capacity for work (and for homework) was prodigious and his resilience extraordinary. After Canada was elected to a two-year term on the Security Council—from 1948 to 1949—his pace became gruelling. He was deeply involved in the disputes between India and Pakistan, between the Netherlands and Indonesia, between the Arabs and Israel, and between East and West, with the Cold War enveloping all of them.

"However, nothing in the General's curriculum vitae had prepared us for a peculiar quality he began to display at the United Nations: a propensity for mispronunciations ... and plain slips of the tongue.

"As soon as the General began speaking at UN meetings, he revealed a gift for mispronouncing or garbling names which, perhaps in some obscure Freudian fashion, were associated in his mind with someone or something disagreeable.

"He had no trouble at all with the name of his British colleague, Sir Alexander Cadogan, or with that of Sir Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan, whom he greatly admired. But he found Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky politically antagonistic and personally disagreeable, and the name came out of the General's mouth as 'Viskinsky' or 'Visnisky.'

"He smoothly pronounced such tongue-twisters as the *New Orleans Times-Picayune* or the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, if they supported some

stand he had taken. But, when he wanted to object to a criticism advanced by the Moscow daily *Pravda*, it came out 'Pravada.'

"When the General wanted to refer to a previous speaker at the General Assembly's rostrum, it came out 'nostrum.' He would describe some delegate's machinations or confusions as 'higlady-piglady.' 'Façade' came out as 'fackaide.' He also had a slight lisp and, when he referred to 'the pithy remarks' of a previous speaker, the adjective that emerged would have a startling impact on his listeners and create just the opposite effect from what he had intended.

"All these oddities quickly became known among us as 'McNaughtonisms,' and they caused as much surprise among his ambassadorial colleagues at the United Nations as among his juniors in the Canadian Mission. We never knew what he might come up with next. George Ignatieff, who was then his principal adviser, in later years advanced the thesis that the General's propensity to mispronounce may have reflected an unconscious sense of humour.

"Whatever the explanation, we were quite unprepared for the choicest McNaughtonism of all, which fell from the General's lips on the night of March 31, 1948.

"At the beginning of that year, Canada had begun a two-year term as a member of the Security Council, the chairmanship of which rotated monthly among its member countries in alphabetical order. It was then the custom for each head of delegation to give a private dinner for his ambassadorial colleagues on the Council at the end of his month's term in the chair.

"The first time the General presided over the Council was in February, and it turned out to be a hectic month with more meetings than the Council had held in any month up to that time. When General McNaughton finished his term as chairman, he gave the customary dinner for his colleagues at the Canadian Club on the 18th floor of the Waldorf Astoria Hotel; and it went off uneventfully enough.

"In March, it was China's turn to preside. Cold War tensions had continued to mount, and they fuelled acrimonious debate, especially between such antagonists as Andrei Gromyko, the dour and hardnosed Soviet representative and the pugnacious Senator Warren Austin, a veteran of the wars on Capitol Hill.

"In addition, Canada's own relations with the Soviet Union were still sensitive, owing to the sensational defection to the Canadian authorities [in September 1945] of Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. His revelations about the extent of Soviet espionage and subversion in Canada and other Western nations had reverberated around the world.

"When General McNaughton went to the Chinese Ambassador's dinner on the last day of March, he found that Senator Austin had brought along Henry Wallace, who had been vice-president during one of Franklin Roosevelt's terms, and at that time was secretary of Commerce in Harry Truman's Cabinet.

"Chatting after dinner with Secretary Wallace and Mr. Gromyko, the General found the Russian even more gloomy than usual. Mr. Gromyko

complained about life in the United States and the problems of day-to-day living in New York City (his home was actually a sumptuous estate on Long Island's North Shore). He was finding life in New York unbearable. Everything he ate was canned or packaged. Even apples. He simply wasn't able to find a decent, fresh, edible apple.

"Mr. Wallace, himself a Mid-Western farmer and not inclined to take this aspersion lightly, replied: 'Well, you may not like our packaging of food, but people in the United States at least have a wider choice of food than in the Soviet Union.' He went on: 'Furthermore, we have an extensive trade in food products between the United States and Canada. Here, if you don't like an American apple, you can often buy some alternative sort from Canada.'

"Turning to General McNaughton, Mr. Wallace continued: 'General, can you suggest some Canadian apples which Mr. Gromyko might find more acceptable at this time of year? What are some of your favourite varieties up in Canada that Mr. Gromyko might try?'

"Without hesitation, the General replied crisply: 'MacIntosh Reds and Northern Spies.'

"The conversation, with the shadow of Igor Gouzenko hovering overhead, dropped like a lump of lead.

"When the General gave his account of the dinner the next morning at the Canadian Mission, he seemed preoccupied. He appeared concerned that, although his Reds and Spies blooper was quite spontaneous, he might have offended Gromyko. He wondered whether he should write a note of apology.

"George Ignatieff, himself of Russian origin, suggested to the General that he might have underestimated Gromyko's sense of humour. Mr. Gromyko might well have had a good laugh and regaled his own colleagues back at the Soviet Mission with the story.

"This satisfied the General, for the time being. Then, when he learned that Ignatieff had mentioned the episode to Under-Secretary 'Mike' Pearson on the telephone and that Mr. Pearson had in turn mentioned it at a press conference, the General sternly admonished his principal adviser with: 'Ignatieff, I don't like humour.'

"However future psycho-historians may seek to explain General McNaughton's vagaries with the English language, MacIntosh Reds and Northern Spies have become legendary fruits in the department of External Affairs."

1955 to 1964

Summary

During the decade from 1955 to 1964, the United Nations Organization quite changed its character. By 1965, there were 121 member states, or double the membership of 1955; the majority were African and Asian countries. Consequently, the United States lost its almost automatic majority in the General Assembly and assumed a more wary attitude towards the organization. Paul Martin tells how he helped to break the deadlock over admission of new members in 1956. At the time, 10 of the 16 states admitted in the package deal that he put together were from Europe; it was only later that the full effect of his move was seen, when many African countries gained independence.

Certainly the second half of this decade was crowded with African issues for the United Nations. The Sharpeville massacre in 1960 aroused world concern about South Africa, which the new group of independent African states naturally enlarged. At the same time, the United Nations became deeply embroiled in the problems of the Congo. J. King Gordon writes about the lesser-known side of the UN operation in the Congo: the job done in maintaining essential services after the Belgians had fled, and in training Congolese to take these services over.

In the early years of the decade, the United Nations was faced with the crisis over Suez. Three contributions in this section touch on this crisis. The extracts from Lester Pearson's memoirs point up his hope that a long-term peace settlement might be forged during the "red-hot" period of tense negotiations. General Burns' skill in securing the withdrawal of the combatants is described by King Gordon. And Stewart Sutton tells about an embarrassing incident the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) overcame when bringing relief supplies to Egypt. In another story about UNICEF, Adelaide Sinclair tells how the agency kept an evenhanded approach despite U.S. pressure in a politically charged situation.

The decade saw the start of the period of détente, despite (or to a degree prompted by) the 1962 missile crisis. The extracts from Howard Green's speeches in Geneva give a flavour of the urgent appeals for disarmament he was making on behalf of Canada. The United Nations also moved into the expensive business of providing peacekeeping contingents, first in the Middle East and later in the Congo and in Cyprus; it was expensive, that is, for member states that assumed the responsibility—because two permanent members of the Council, France and the Soviet Union, led the way in disclaiming responsibility during the Congo operation.

It was also the dawning of the space age: both outer space after the 1957 flight of Sputnik and "inner space" after the International Geophysical Year led to discoveries in the deep oceans. The United Nations promptly began to discuss the peaceful uses of outer space, but took another 10 years to focus on the seabed.

The advent of more member states that were at an early stage of economic development triggered the creation of two new UN bodies: the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the World Food Programme. Frank Shefrin writes about Canada's part in helping launch the World Food Programme in 1963 as a joint venture between the UN and the

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). And Kalmen Kaplansky describes how the workers' group in the International Labour Organization won acceptance for one of the most important ILO conventions.

Chronology of United Nations and Related Events of Special Interest to Canada

1955	May	Austria State Treaty signed, and occupation forces of four Powers withdraw.
		Plebiscite held in Togoland under British Administration; majority favours union with Ghana. Togoland under French Administration becomes independent state in April 1960.
		Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. President Truman had originally proposed to General Assembly the setting up of a world organization devoted exclusively to peaceful uses of atomic energy; this conference was a step on the road to creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957.
	December	Through initiative and perseverance of Paul Martin, deadlock over admitting new members to the General Assembly is broken. Security Council and Assembly approve package deal of 16 admissions after membership had stuck at 60 since 1950.
1956	October	General Assembly approves Statute of the IAEA.
	October 28	Security Council starts debate on Soviet troop repression in Hungary at request of Britain, France and United States.
	October 29	Israeli troops attack Egypt. The following day, Britain and France issue ultimatum to both sides, and by November 4 both countries have bombarded Port Said and dropped paratroops on Suez Canal.
	November 3	Pearson introduces resolution in General Assembly, which creates United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and leads to French and British troop withdrawal from Port Said by December 22.
	November 15	First UNEF troops (from Norway and Denmark) arrive in Egypt to be under command of Lt.-Gen. "Tommy" Burns, previously UNTSO chief of staff. Israeli troops finally withdraw from Gaza in March 1957, and UNEF maintains buffer between Israel and Egypt for 10 years.
1957	March	Ghana reaches independence and becomes pacesetter in decolonization drive in sub-Sahara Africa.
	—	Adelaide Sinclair appointed deputy executive director for programs of UNICEF (United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund). She serves until her retirement in 1967.
	July 29	IAEA comes into being with Vienna headquarters and mandate to promote co-operation in peaceful uses of atomic energy under international safeguards.

1957 (cont.)	October 4	Sputnik 1, an 84 kg capsule, is put into an earth orbit, remaining there until early 1958. General Assembly takes up issue of peaceful uses of outer space.
1958	January	Canada on Security Council until December 1959. Charles Ritchie is ambassador.
	February–April	First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva. Delegates approve four conventions drafted by International Law Commission, including Convention on the Continental Shelf, whose definitions are soon outdated.
	March	Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (now the International Maritime Organization) starts work as a UN specialized agency, with special responsibility for safety of life at sea and prevention of pollution.
	—	International Geophysical Year 1958–59. Leads to Antarctic Treaty and ushers in (see Epstein contribution) "the golden years of developing détente" of arms control agreements.
	May 12	Canada and U.S. sign North American Air Defence (NORAD) Agreement, at that time for defence against manned bombers.
	—	United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) sent to Lebanon after complaints of outside intervention. Canada contributes 78 military observers.
	June	International Labour Organization approves Convention No. 111—Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) at annual conference (see Kaplansky contribution).
		Canadian Commission for UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) launched.
1959	January	Canada on Security Council (Ritchie).
	—	Antarctic Treaty signed by 12 nations, including Soviet Union and United States, by which Antarctic continent is made a demilitarized zone to be preserved for scientific research. Treaty to last for 30 years; review is due in 1989.
	—	General Assembly establishes Special Projects Fund, for pre-investment assistance to develop large-scale projects, alongside Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. The two were merged into the United Nations Development Programme in 1966.
	—	General Assembly adopts the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, drafted by the UN Human Rights Commission. Work still continues on turning the

1959 (cont.)		declaration into a full convention, Poland and Canada taking the lead.
1960	March–April	Second Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva narrowly fails to agree on limits to territorial sea and fishing zones. In May, Iceland, engaged in "cod war" with Britain, declares 12-mile fishing zone.
	April	Sharpeville massacre of 67 black South Africans. Security Council calls on South African government to abandon *apartheid* policies.
	July 1	Independence of Belgian Congo. Within two weeks, a mutiny of the armed forces and secession of mineral-rich Katanga (now Shaba) province throws Congo into disorder. Security Council debate on July 13 launches UN operation in the Congo (ONUC from its French acronym). Canada contributes air transport and signals unit; King Gordon goes as a senior information officer for UN.
	October	Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, reaches independence. During 1960—"Africa Year"—16 African states become independent, including most former French colonies and Somalia (after a merger of two Trust Territories). General Assembly approves Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in December. World Bank opens "soft loan window" for aid to low-income countries with International Development Association (IDA).
1961	January	First Development Decade, inaugurated by General Assembly, begins. At midway point in 1966, it is decided that slow progress is partly due to lack of a world plan of action, so work starts on an International Development Strategy.
	February	Plebiscites in Northern and Southern Cameroons, both under British administration as Trust Territories. North votes to join Nigeria, South to join Republic of Cameroon.
	September 17	Dag Hammarskjöld killed in air crash near Ndola on flight to reason with Moise Tshombe, Katangan leader. On November 3, the Burmese ambassador U Thant takes over as Acting Secretary-General; he begins a full term in 1962.
		Financial problems over Congo operation (including Soviet and French refusal to contribute) prompt Assembly to authorize the Secretary-General to float a United Nations bond issue of $200 million.

1961 (cont.)	November	Canada takes lead at Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) conference in sponsoring resolution to establish World Food Programme (WFP), originally as experimental three-year program. WFP starts in 1963. Surplus grain and dairy products in exporting countries are used for emergency food needs, school feeding and food-for-work development projects (see Shefrin and Lankester contributions).
	December 9	Tanganyika under Julius Nyerere attains independence, the first country in East and Central Africa group.
1962	March	Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) meets for first time in Geneva. Previously a committee of 10 nations, 8 added from developing countries. ENDC given task of working out agreement on complete and general disarmament, after U.S. and Soviet Union had agreed on statement of principles. Canada's External Affairs Minister Howard Green active in disarmament talks in Geneva and New York.
	October	Cuban missile crisis. After deadlock in the Security Council, U Thant calls for standstill on high seas. Both superpowers accept, then make fuller agreement bilaterally. Thant's visit to Cuba for verification purposes a failure.
		To solve dispute between Netherlands and Indonesia over West Irian, mediator Ellsworth Bunker recommends UN takeover for limited period. UN Temporary Executive Authority administers territory from October 1962 to May 1963, before handover to Indonesia on promise to hold "act of free choice" in 1969 by which Papuans were to decide to stay with Indonesia or to sever ties.
1963	June	Hot-Line Agreement signed between superpowers to improve communications during times of tension. Soon followed by signing of Partial Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water or in outer space.
	August	Security Council calls for voluntary arms embargo against South Africa.
	December	Fighting between Greek and Turkish irregulars on Cyprus, which became independent in 1960, escalates when Turkish warships sail, regular troops join fighting and Turkish ministers leave Makarios government. British troops secure local cease-fires while Security Council holds brief, inconclusive meeting.

1964	February	After failing to raise NATO peacekeeping force for Cyprus, Britain turns to Security Council. Eventual resolution gives Secretary-General authority to decide size of force and appoint commander. Soviet Union and France abstain. Canada provides battalion on six-month rotating basis from outset.
	—	International Hydrological Decade starts under auspices of UNESCO.
	June	Last elements of ONUC withdrawn from the Congo. Tshombe takes over presidency in July, which prompts Lumumbist insurrection in eastern provinces, where about 1 000 foreigners of 18 nationalities held hostage. Belgian paratroops dropped to their rescue on November 24. Strong African reaction leads to 17 meetings of Security Council in December.
	March–June	First UN Conference on Trade and Development held in Geneva. Seventy-seven developing countries issue declaration, originating the "Group of 77."
	September	Dispute over Article 19 of Charter, barring countries that are two years in default of financial contributions from voting in Assembly (in this case, the Soviet Union and France), comes to a head. Assembly session is delayed and then decision made to conduct all business by consensus, without any votes. By August 1965, United States gives up pressing for implementation of Article 19, despite support of advisory opinion from International Court.

Paul Martin
Breaking the Deadlock on Membership

One of Canada's most significant acts at the United Nations, in more than 40 years of membership, was the initiative it took, and exhausting effort it made, during the General Assembly session of September to December 1955, to break the deadlock over new members. During the first decade only nine new members had been added to the 51 countries who had originally signed the Charter in 1945: Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden and Thailand in 1946; Pakistan and Yemen in 1947; Burma in 1948; Israel in 1949; and Indonesia in 1950. Then came the Korean War, and one or another of the permanent members of the Security Council stood ready to veto new applicants for ideological reasons. (Under Articles 4 and 18 of the Charter, an application has to receive a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly "upon the recommendation of the Security Council.")

Various attempts, first by an 11-member committee and then by a committee of good offices led by Peru, were made to break the deadlock over the next five years. Finally, in 1955, Canada found a way. Paul Martin, who was then the minister of Health and Welfare and who later served as External Affairs minister (from 1963 to 1968), was the principal actor; he often led the Canadian delegation at the UN in place of the then External Affairs minister, Lester B. Pearson. He hoped to win support for a package deal embracing 18 prospective members. The strongest opposition came from the United States, Britain, France and Taiwan, all possessing veto power at that time. The Soviet Union proved to be the most supportive permanent member. Agreement came only after the applications of the two states raising the most controversy—Outer Mongolia and Japan—were deferred. (They were separately approved in 1961 and 1956, respectively.)

In the agreement of December 14, 1955, the following 16 states were accepted as members: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania and Spain.

In the second volume of his memoirs, *A Very Public Life* (Deneau, 1985), Paul Martin sums up:

"Looking back, I am struck by the importance of our accomplishment, despite some of the most difficult and disagreeable negotiations ever undertaken between Canada and its major allies. The admission of new members in 1955 began a trend that has radically altered the composition and work of the United Nations. Because it signalled the beginning of the end of the great powers' stranglehold, some have argued that it also weakened the United Nations. The UN can only meet its long-range purpose, I still affirm, if it truly represents the world community. The growing number of members has certainly not made debate easier, but it has ensured that in the long run the United Nations has a chance to become a more effective institution."

In a conversation during 1986, Paul Martin told the story afresh, with new details:

"It was one of these perchance things. In June 1955, at the meeting to commemorate the San Francisco Conference 10 years earlier, Pearson had made a speech in which there was a general reference to his regret that so many sovereign powers of consequence were not members of the United

Nations. He was thinking of Austria, Japan, Ireland, Spain and so on. He was also thinking of the three Communist countries: Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Pearson said that the United Nations could not carry out its full function unless the qualified sovereign countries of the world were made members, and that the UN should not just be a club of the Western powers.

"The history was that the Soviet Union wanted the admission of the three Communist countries and, until it could achieve this, it vetoed every attempt to bring in the others. John Foster Dulles [the U.S. Secretary of State] was adamant in his opposition to the admission of the Communist countries. Moreover, Britain and France, like the United States, didn't want to disturb the balance of power in the United Nations. France was worried that the opening up of membership would spur on the African and other colonies to attain independence: she was particularly concerned about Algeria.

"I hadn't followed that issue very carefully although I had been at the United Nations just as many times as Pearson. Nor had I seen his speech at the San Francisco commemorative meeting. At San Francisco, Molotov had invited Pearson to visit Russia. His visit would be the first time a foreign minister from the West had gone to the Soviet Union since the war; so he was anxious to go. At the last minute he called me and said, 'I'm not going to go. They are now threatening that they won't allow me to fly in an RCAF plane, as they had promised: and I want to show the flag.' Then he said, 'I wish you would go down to the UN ahead of time—Molotov is there—and discuss this with him.'

"So I went to New York and saw Molotov. When I raised this issue of the plane, Molotov said, 'Well, I get impatient,' implying that this was too small a matter for him ('I am the foreign minister of the Soviet Union. I am not going to be worried about a plane!'). Arkady Sobolev, who was the Soviet ambassador to the United Nations, saw the situation and said, 'Mr. Molotov, would you mind letting me look after that?' Mr. Molotov was glad to get rid of that little irritation.

"Then I started to leave. Molotov said, 'Oh, Mr. Martin, sit down. Let's discuss the Assembly. What do you think are the main items?' And this was just a stab in the dark on my part, for the usual items were not very spectacular; and almost instinctively—it wasn't much more than that—I said, 'We ought to do something, you know, about the new members.' He said, 'I agree'—I almost dropped—'I agree. We ought to bring in all the countries that are undivided.' 'Well,' I said, 'We've been thinking about that,' which was not true. So he said, 'Well, you think about that and go ahead and do something.'

"I went back right away to our Mission, I was so enthused. I told Bert Mackay, our able ambassador to the UN. He said, 'Oh, you can't do that. We will get in wrong with everybody.' Then I got hold of John Holmes, who was there, and told him. And he said, 'Don't drop this. This is good.' He and Geoff Murray both gave full support. I went to Ottawa and talked to [Prime Minister Louis] St. Laurent—Pearson by this time was on his way to the Soviet Union. He said, 'Well, that would be a good thing, but I don't think you will succeed.' The people in the department all thought that it was a

thing that should be done, but that it would be too disturbing; it would be hurtful to the United States, to the British and the French; it would interfere with the balance of power position, and so on. And I said, 'Well, I think it should be done.' The only real merit I deserve was that I kept at it; I persisted in this.

"So, with St. Laurent's approval, we drafted a resolution at the end of September and started to circulate it. I sent a message to Pearson in the Soviet Union and, to keep him on side, I referred to his speech at San Francisco. If he had been inclined not to go ahead in this direction, it would have been very difficult for him in view of that speech only two or three months before. We went ahead and raised the matter in the Commonwealth group meeting at the UN [then comprising Australia, Britain, Canada, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and South Africa]; and, much to the dismay of the British, all the Commonwealth countries thought this was a necessary and good thing to do.

"We started to get co-sponsors, and eventually we had 27. The whole issue took almost two-and-a-half months of the Assembly session. Harold Macmillan, the British foreign secretary, came into the picture and he joined with the Americans and the French against the initiative. They pointed out what would happen: if all these countries came in, and others followed, there would be a gradual shift of balance. Well, we knew what would happen; but that was what the United Nations was all about.

"The Americans handled it very badly, Dulles particularly. They tried to get us to withdraw the resolution, and Dulles threatened our acting ambassador in Washington, George Glazebrook, over oil imports from Canada. Cabot Lodge in his discussions with me at the same time went much further. He said, 'Well, we could cut out our purchases of oil from you'; and then he went on and complained about Pearson being against President Eisenhower, sharing Nehru's view about the Republican Party—'Nehru in a homburg' was a phrase used. I took strong exception to what Lodge had said about Pearson. So I stood up and told him that it was an affront not only to Mr. Pearson, it was an affront to the Canadian government and to me. Then I walked away. Cabot Lodge was like that; and Dulles was not a wise man—he was knowledgeable, but not wise.

"The British said, 'You had better wait for a while. After all, it is the Security Council that must decide this.' And we said, 'Yes, but the Security Council has tried three times over the years, and nothing has been done.' In the General Assembly there had been resolutions calling merely for a study of the question—as a matter of fact, we had done so seven years before and it had been turned down. That is what the Americans wanted us to do again and to change our resolution, and we said, 'No, that has been tried before and it is just ridiculous to go on this way.' So this was the first time a full resolution on the issue had been drafted for a debate and voting in the General Assembly. [Canada was not then on the Security Council. Among the non-permanent members, Belgium and New Zealand occupied those reserved for Western European and Others.]

"We had trouble with the Irish. Our resolution called for the admission of all the undivided states. [It requested the Security Council 'to consider, in the light of the general opinion in favour of the widest possible membership of the United Nations, the pending applications for membership of all those 18 countries about which no problem of unification arises,' and it asked the Security Council to report back during the current Assembly session.] The Irish didn't want that characterization, and we had a terrible time persuading them to overlook this and get them in; after all, they were a divided state, just as much as Vietnam or any other country.

"The British carried on its opposition right to the end. Just before our resolution came up for debate [in the Ad Hoc Political Committee], there was a message from [Athony] Eden, the British prime minister, to St. Laurent asking us not to table the resolution, not to embarrass their main allies. And, just before the vote, the British ambassador, Sir Pierson Dixon, came to me and said, 'You can't go ahead. There's a message from our prime minister.' I said, 'I don't give a damn. The policy of our government is as I have stated it, and we are going ahead.' [In the vote, 52 nations voted in favour; Taiwan and pre-Castro Cuba voted against; 5 countries, including the United States, France and Belgium abstained. On the following day, December 8, precisely the same result came in the General Assembly itself.] When it came to the vote, Britain voted in favour. They didn't want to be isolated from the Commonwealth countries. It was just like [Prime Minister] Thatcher's action on the Rhodesian issue many years later."

The General Assembly vote put heavy pressure on the 11 members of the Security Council to approve all 18 applications. But this was not the end of the struggle. Indeed, the whole effort seemed to collapse in ruins when the Security Council began voting on individual applicants. Taiwan, attacking the notion of admitting Soviet "satellite states," cast its veto against the application of Outer Mongolia. Thereupon, the Soviet Union vetoed every subsequent non-Communist country.

Despondently, Paul Martin returned to Ottawa, after a conversation with the Soviet delegate showed a possibility of a new resolution omitting from the list Outer Mongolia and in addition Japan, with which the Soviet Union had not yet signed a peace treaty. The Soviet Union then took the initiative to request an emergency session of the Security Council. The Soviet resolution called for the admission of the remaining 16, and the deferral of these 2 countries' applications. Martin hurried back to New York, to join in the lobbying in support of this resolution.

"It was really Sir Leslie Munro, the New Zealand ambassador who was that month's president of the Security Council, who by some very clever footwork in the Council was able to get the resolution through. Cabot Lodge produced an amendment—supported by Britain, France and Taiwan—to restore Japan's name to the list. You usually take amendments ahead of the original resolution, but Munro took the position that this was a request from the General Assembly and it was a question that should be considered first. If it had been the other way 'round, the resolution might not have succeeded.

Dag Hammarskjöld, you know, played quite a part; he was very much in this...."

That evening the General Assembly voted to accept the 16 applications, and there was a standing ovation before Martin spoke. He sums up:

"The argument of the British and French was pretty strong. They had said, 'If this goes ahead, we are going to have a whole plethora of nations and we are going to have a real debating society here. It is going to be annoying.' And everything they said would happen did happen. They were right, but it would have happened anyhow. Oh, I am sure it was the right thing to do. It would have happened a few years later, anyhow. All these new countries were coming into being; you couldn't deny them admission to the United Nations. Article 4 of the Charter is so clear, you know."

Lester B. Pearson
Taking Hotspur's Advice for Suez

The most famous, and the most often praised, Canadian initiative at the United Nations was without doubt the lead Canada took in setting up the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in November 1956. UNEF helped to extricate the British and French troops from their ill-conceived invasion of the Suez Canal zone, and the peacekeeping troops provided a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces for 10 years. For his work in the General Assembly and his negotiating skills that brought all sides to support the peacekeeping operation, Lester B. "Mike" Pearson—then Canada's External Affairs Minister—was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

These events have been told in detail elsewhere many times. What has not been sufficiently underlined is the fact that Pearson (perhaps endorsing Henry Ford's axiom that "a problem is an opportunity in working clothes") hoped to use the Suez crisis to galvanize the major powers and the countries directly concerned into negotiating a long-term political settlement for the whole region. "Things can be done under the incentive of terror and fear that cannot be done when the fear disappears," he said. Pearson did not succeed, because others had less vision or had short-term objectives. But the extracts presented here, taken from the second volume of Pearson's memoirs, *Mike*, illustrate how he continually pressed this wider purpose throughout the critical days of November 1956.

Without trying to analyse the roots of the crisis (which go back further than the American refusal to provide assistance with the Aswan Dam and Egyptian President Nasser's subsequent nationalization of the Suez Canal), here is the sequence of events that immediately preceded these extracts from Pearson's account:

On October 29, Israeli troops moved against Egypt and toward the Suez Canal. The next day Britain and France jointly gave Israel and Egypt an ultimatum to stop the fighting and to withdraw 10 miles on either side of the Canal; they threatened, otherwise, to send in troops to occupy key points along the canal. Later that same day, Britain and France vetoed a U.S. draft resolution in the Security Council which called on Israel to withdraw its forces and on all members to refrain from the use of force or the threat of force. On October 31, the French and British air forces began bombing selected points in the Canal Zone. The same day in the Security Council, Yugoslavia presented a resolution calling for the Middle East question to be referred to the General Assembly, under the "Uniting for Peace Resolution." The resolution was adopted, despite resistance from Britain and France, whose negative votes in this instance did not constitute a veto. A special emergency session of the General Assembly was called for November 1.

At this all-night session of the Assembly, the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, introduced a resolution that addressed only the most immediate concerns. This resolution called on all parties to agree to an immediate cease-fire and to halt movement of forces into the area, and called on Israel and the Arab states to withdraw behind the 1949 armistice lines. It also urged measures to restore freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal. On the roll-call vote, 64 countries were in favour, 5 were opposed (Australia, Britain, France, Israel and New Zealand) and Canada was among 6

abstentions. Pearson explains that he had to make a quick decision to abstain, and that he did it for tactical reasons, to put Canada into a middle position from which it could negotiate with both sides:

"I was turning over in my mind the possibility of proposing a cease-fire, to be followed by a major diplomatic conference to deal with the whole context of Middle Eastern and North African questions. As part of this approach, it would be essential to set up an adequate UN military force to separate the Egyptians from the Israelis pending a stable and peaceful settlement of outstanding Middle Eastern questions....

"I decided not to participate in the debate on the U.S. resolution. I abstained in that early morning vote, but asked for the floor to explain my abstention. I wandered on about how we did not have enough time to consider everything, that a matter such as this could not be hurried. This was not my real reason at all, but it was impossible to explain that I was abstaining on tactical grounds. I did, however, have a chance to express these thoughts:

"'What is the use of passing a resolution which brings about a cease-fire and even a withdrawal? What are we withdrawing to—the same state of affairs? In six months we'll go through all this again if we do not take advantage of this crisis to pluck something out—how was it Hotspur put it: "out of this nettle, danger, we pluck this flower, safety"?—if we do not take advantage of this crisis to do something about a political settlement, we will regret it. The time has now come for the UN not only to bring about a cease-fire, but to move in and police the cease-fire and make arrangements for a political settlement.'"

On November 3, a further resolution on implementing a cease-fire and withdrawing forces was presented by 19 Asian and African members. Pearson followed it with the Canadian draft resolution, which, in effect, created the United Nations Emergency Force. The opening words of his introduction were:

"The immediate purpose of our meeting tonight is to bring about as soon as possible a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces.... Our longer-range purpose, which has already been referred to tonight and which may ultimately, in its implications, be even more important, is to find solutions for the problems which, because we have left them unsolved over the years, have finally exploded into this fighting and conflict...."

On November 5, French and British paratroops were dropped on Port Said after several days of bombardment, and Egypt accepted the Assembly resolution establishing a UNEF command (under General "Tommy" Burns). By the evening of November 6, all parties had accepted the cease-fire and, the next day, the Assembly debated the Secretary-General's report on the details of establishing UNEF, on which Pearson had worked closely with Dag Hammarskjöld. In the debate, Pearson spoke these supportive words:

"This is a moment for sober satisfaction, but certainly not for premature rejoicing. Yet it is hard not to rejoice at the thought that we may have been saved from the very edge of catastrophe—and saved, let us not forget, not by threats or blusters, but by the action of the UN. If we draw the necessary

conclusions from the manner of our escape and act on them, perhaps we will not in the future have to get so perilously close again....

"We must now press on with the greater and perhaps even more difficult task of a political settlement.... This is implicit in the resolution before us and that of November 3, which establish the conditions within which the UN force must operate. Until we have succeeded in this task of a political settlement, our work today and the cease-fire of yesterday—though they give us reason for hope and encouragement—remain uncompleted."

Immediately thereafter, Pearson became involved in the tiresome business of persuading President Nasser to accept a battalion of Canadian troops as part of UNEF. (The problem was that the two units that the Department of National Defence had in mind were the Queen's Own Rifles of Calgary and the Black Watch, both of which sounded far too British for the Egyptian leader. Pearson commented wryly, "What we needed was the First East Kootenay Anti-Imperialistic Rifles!") In the end, Canadian infantry units were not needed, but an air transport squadron and some 300 administrative personnel were sent. General Burns wrote to Pearson on Christmas Eve: "Canadians in the base units have made all the difference in the world in the efficient operation of the administrative side of the military effort. We just could not have done without them."

But meanwhile, the opportunity for talks on a political settlement was fading. In his memoirs, Pearson sums up:

"There was much discussion in the Assembly about getting all the British and the French out. The British and French did not want to withdraw until there was an assurance that the UN could do the job, and this took some weeks.... They did, however, retire completely before the end of the year. But the Israelis did not, and were not proposing to leave without conditions. While one could sympathize with them, their conditions were not likely to be acceptable to the UN Assembly, and there was no point in discussing a political settlement until the Israelis withdrew to the original armistice lines.

"There was no longer much hope of progress toward a political settlement in any event. Things can be done under the incentive of terror and fear that cannot be done when the fear disappears. There was a time for about a week or ten days, I think, when the Assembly could have passed a resolution providing the basis for a political settlement which could have been imposed by the United Nations. That moment soon passed, once the danger of world war passed. The Israelis knew this, and so fought very hard against withdrawal without conditions. I recall one or two sessions with Mrs. Golda Meir about this in the Plaza Hotel. Eventually they did go back, but they stayed in the Gaza strip as long as they could.

"I tried to get the Israelis out of the Gaza strip and succeeded by a UN administration. I had hoped that the strip could become a UN enclave for the refugees, but that was not possible. Egyptian civilian officials moved in immediately after the Israelis got out, although no Egyptian troops came with them. Gaza could have been the first territory to be directly administered by the UN. I do wish it had been possible."

E.L.M. Burns
Not So Far East of Suez

Lester Pearson gained worldwide fame and the Nobel Peace Prize for the negotiations that established the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in November 1956, and that defused a crisis that could have exploded far beyond the Middle East. It is fair, though, to say that Pearson's success might easily have turned sour within weeks if there had not been a remarkable soldier on hand to create the United Nations Emergency Force and lead it through some very sensitive situations. Lt.-Gen. E.L.M. "Tommy" Burns was both available and experienced in the politics and the logistical problems of the region; he had been chief of staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), based in Jerusalem, since August 1954. J. King Gordon, who was seconded from his post as director of the UN Information Centre in Cairo to be public relations officer on the UNEF staff, says today: "Pearson's reputation for peacekeeping could not have been gained without this partnership."

General Burns wrote his own detailed account of the UNEF operation along the Suez Canal and into the Sinai in his very readable book, *Between Arab and Israeli*. In that book, he describes a little of his military career and the reasoning that led him into service with the United Nations. A Montrealer, he was commissioned in 1915 from the Royal Military College into the Royal Canadian Engineers, fought on the Western Front and, between the wars, was for five years in charge of Canadian military mapping. In the Second World War he commanded the 1st Canadian Corps in Italy, leading it to its successful assault on the Gothic Line. He retired as a major-general in 1946 to join the civil service and become deputy minister of Veterans Affairs. In the preface to his book he wrote:

"I was happy in the service, and felt I was pursuing an honourable profession, and was sustained by the philosophy that war, however regrettable many of its features, was inevitable in the then state of development of the human race; and that peoples who refused to contemplate the possibility of war, and indeed to prepare for it, would be likely to be pushed off the world's stage by those who still thought of war as a means of settling differences not otherwise reconcilable.

"The atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki changed all that thinking. I had seen the destruction of countless years of human effort which had been wreaked by the airmen in their blitzes—in London, in many of the smaller cities in Italy, and above all in the Ruhr. This desolation was spread by the 'conventional' high explosive bomb. It did not need pages of laboured scientific and humanitarian explanation to convince me that there could be no quarrel between the so-called civilized nations whose settlement would be worth paying the price of the destruction that would be caused by an atom war.

"So, war being something to be avoided at almost any cost, the alternative way to settle international differences had to be some supranational machinery for the purpose.... Whatever the imperfections of the United Nations Organization, the ideal of the prevention of a war which would destroy countless million man-years of thought and labour was there, in the United Nations Charter. Everyone who believed in that ideal—that common-sense alternative

to mutual destruction—had a duty to do what he could to make this aspiration into a reality...."

General Burns died in September 1985. J. King Gordon, in a recent conversation, contributed these recollections of a colleague and a friend:

"My first contact with him was very indirect. Shortly after the war I was invited to take part in a United Nations Association seminar in Manitoba. I discovered that, in his position as deputy minister of Veterans Affairs, he had got all the branches of the Canadian Legion committed to backing the United Nations Association; so the Brandon seminar of high school students was financed by the Canadian Legion—and, I think, still is.

"I didn't meet him personally until 1956, when he flew into the bombed-out Cairo airport on November 8 on the first plane in after [the airport] had been bombed by the British. (I had been in Cairo during the attack, as head of the UN Information Centre.) His primary job that day was to speak to President Nasser and to establish a specific working agreement with the Egyptian Government which would, in a concrete way, implement the broad agreement to accept the UN peacekeeping force and enable it to carry out its task. Very soon the question of a Canadian contingent came up. The Queen's Own Rifles of Calgary were on standby and designated for UNEF service. Nasser expressed serious concern that, with the name of the regiment and their uniform quite similar to the British, Canadian soldiers might not be safe from popular attack. Burns worked out a compromise that suited him. UNEF had plenty of rifle regiments. But what they needed was administrative staff to look after communications, transport, supply and air reconnaissance. It was perfectly acceptable to Nasser to have Canadians in these roles.

"This was significant about Burns: when he took over, he acted in terms of the immediate needs for peacekeeping. For example, the Danes and Norwegians arrived in Egypt on November 15 and the same week they were put into the middle of Port Said because he thought this was a difficult, tense situation. The British and French troops are there, they have done a lot of damage with considerable loss of life, and the presence of an international force there with their blue helmets will have a quietening influence.

"The British and French stayed there until December 22. After General Burns, on the advice of the Secretary-General, discussed with the commanders a timetable for withdrawal, it was agreed it would take about a month to get out all their equipment and staff. I don't think there was any stalling. On the other hand, the Israelis certainly stalled over evacuating Gaza. Led by the Yugoslav contingent, UNEF had taken over El 'Arish from the evacuating Israelis on January 14. The Indians were in the desert close by; the Indonesians were at El Kuntilla close to the Egyptian–Israeli frontier. The Israelis continued to occupy Rafah, at the southern-most point of the Gaza Strip. They claimed they were awaiting assurance that UNEF would administer Gaza when it moved in. General Burns came up several times from his headquarters on the Canal to discuss the arrangements for entry, without success. Even after the Israelis had agreed to withdraw under the terms of the General Assembly resolution, following pressure from the United Nations and the United

States, General Burns had to wait several days. Eventually we moved into Gaza on the night of March 6 to 7.

"But that's the essence of peacekeeping. A peacekeeping force has no authority to exert military pressure. It is a supervisory force which sees to the implementation of an agreed upon political settlement. Until the Israelis decided to withdraw under the terms of the agreement, General Burns, commander of the United Nations Emergency Force, had to wait. I have never seen a man as frustrated and annoyed. That means he was just a little bit quieter than he was normally! He was always very quiet and very orderly. His meetings were a model of what staff meetings should be. He knew [the] issues [that] had to be decided. He had his own ideas of how they were to be settled. He was perfectly prepared to modify them, if someone else suggested a change. But these staff meetings, which I attended, started at 8:30 every morning and were always finished by 9 o'clock.

"You might think there would be a lot of difficulties because of working with troops of so many nationalities. You could not imagine a wider geographical, cultural or ideological range among the 6 000 UNEF troops. Well, he had perhaps to allow a bit more latitude than with a single national contingent. But the remarkable thing was that they worked together in a perfectly satisfactory way, with no kind of tension at all. They were all military people who had been trained in a specific approach to a situation. A number of the senior officers had attended the same staff colleges, whether Indonesians or Swedes or Pakistanis or Indians or Colombians. There was a common recognition of the way things are done. I was amazed to see how little the nationality of a particular unit or commander interfered with a sense of unity.

"For example, the Canadians—after we got to Gaza—shared with the Yugoslav armoured reconnaissance unit the patrolling of the Israeli–Egyptian line from Rafah on the Mediterranean right down to the Gulf of Aqaba; they worked perfectly well together. The Yugoslavs had their base camp among the palm trees of El 'Arîsh and the Canadians were not far away in Rafah; and they saw a lot of each other, and were very friendly.

"Above all this, Burns was a highly professional military man and he carried enormous respect. He happened to know the situation inside out; he had great intelligence and also great curiosity, and he made a point of discovering the political situation behind everything. He was not simply the military commander; he was also a political figure, representative of the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld.

"I remember, in the early days of the operation, when he got instructions from Hammarskjöld to move some troops across the Canal, because he had just heard that the Israelis had decided to pull back 50 km. He went (I was with him) to see the Yugoslav commander, because they were the only troops available. They were just making camp at El Ballah, having arrived by ship at Port Said the previous day. Burns knew that, unless you had a very important military reason, you left a unit to settle in before giving them a major task; but he had these instructions of top priority from the Secretary-General.

"So he met the Yugoslav commander, Colonel Radosevic, and they greeted each other; and we had a glass of slivovitz, and Burns explained the

situation. Radosevic said, 'Well, we will try to get some troops over in a few days, when we are settled.' Burns said, 'I perfectly understand your situation, and we will do everything we can to help. Brigadier Hilmy [the chief Egyptian liaison officer with UNEF] tells me that there is a camel ferry just above here at El Qantara, and it should not be too difficult for you to get some troops over quickly.' And Radosevic said, 'Well, I'll see about that tomorrow.' Burns said, 'What about today?' Nothing high-handed, but Radosevic suddenly realized that this was an order. That was how Burns worked.

"He said it with a bit of a twinkle in his eye—but not much. At the same time this was a man with an extraordinary sense of humour, rather sardonic and Lincolnesque. He was never effusive, and did not talk a great deal; but the more you got to know him, the easier it was to talk and this humour was just under the surface.

"Until we ran into the obstacle of getting into Gaza, there were no very difficult problems except the general problem of deployment on that desert terrain. It was a large area he had to cover with the comparatively small complement of six battalions, and they ran into various difficulties. UNEF was short of transport, but Burns smartly made a deal with the British commanders, Generals Keightley and Stockwell, and bought some vehicles and stores from them in Port Said. Then, when the Israelis retreated across the Sinai, they ploughed up all the roads, and he had to arrange for their rebuilding. Rations produced some complications: the Indians, for example, wanted different rations from the Danes and Norwegians. But these weren't real problems.

"The place where there might have been difficulties was in relations with the Egyptians. That didn't happen, however, thanks to a large extent to the appointment by the Egyptians of an excellent person, Brigadier Amin Hilmy, as their chief liaison officer with UNEF. Again, I think the old army training came in, and he and Burns got on extremely well. He is actually retired here in Ottawa.

"We had a newspaper which went 'round the force. It was called *The Sand Dune*—and that, in fact, was Burns' [choice of] title. We had a meeting with him of all the PR men of each contingent and agreed together to put a paper out, and encouraged them to send stuff in. There were local interest stories, and also references to what was happening at the UN in New York. It came out weekly, a four-page, mimeographed publication. At the top of the front page was the drawing of a UNEF soldier mounted on a camel and holding a United Nations flag. He is looking across a rolling desert into the face of a smiling sun. The original editor was an Indian officer, Major Victor Longer. I think it was an important link, getting across the general feeling that this is what you are all together in. There were humorous writers on my staff, a Mexican who was chief press officer and his Turkish colleague. There were good results.

"In judging the effectiveness of any peacekeeping operation, you have to say it depends on the general frame of reference within which it is carried out. It will not be effective unless you have a firm agreement among the parties to the dispute, backed by agreement among the large powers. If you have that

agreement, then the effectiveness depends really upon the administration and execution of the operation under an experienced person. That is where Burns comes in.

"In this case, with the exception of the Israeli delay over evacuating Gaza, all these factors were positive. You have the withdrawal agreement called for by the UN General Assembly being held to by the parties to the dispute—the Israelis, French, British and Egyptians—and they didn't depart from it. You didn't have any serious break in the overall position, although the Russians did challenge the validity of moving the authority from the Security Council to the General Assembly, because they always challenge that. Then you had this very efficient and considerate commander who could carry out the instructions of the Secretary-General and also get the sympathetic support of his sub-commanders. So it all worked very well."

Adelaide Sinclair
Adelaide and the Cuban Hurricane

Many Canadians have been associated with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), but no one for longer in a senior position than Adelaide Sinclair. Born and raised in Toronto, she lectured in economics and political science at the University of Toronto before the Second World War. During the war, she became director of the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service. Her involvement with UNICEF began in 1946 when she was executive assistant to the deputy minister of Health and Welfare, George Davidson. She was Canada's representative to the UNICEF Executive Board for 10 years, and its chairman from 1951 to 1952. In 1957, she joined the UNICEF staff as deputy executive director for programmes, retiring in 1967. She died in November 1982 at the age of 82. In the week before her death, she had been tape-recording memories of her days with UNICEF in a typically unpompous style. The following is drawn from the interviews she was then giving to Jack Charnow, and also from her farewell remarks to the UNICEF Executive Board in June 1967. Her introduction to UNICEF was fairly casual:

"The Canadian government in 1946 didn't care a hoot who represented it on the UNICEF Board. They were not in favour of this thing being started at all. The UN was very exciting and full of big opportunities, and to put in this extra little thing was, they felt, a kind of a waste of time. But when the UNICEF resolution was finally passed and Canada was elected to the Board, we had at least to make a show of appearing at the meetings. They considered that this was below the dignity of a serious foreign officer, and so they tossed it over to George Davidson and said: 'You will have to send somebody from your department.' When I came back from a weekend away, George came into my office and said, 'I'm afraid I've wished something on you while you were away. I hope you don't mind.... It might be interesting for you to see the UN and how it's developing and what it's like.' And so I said, 'All right, I'll be good. I'll go.' I think quite a lot of the people in External rued the day. They got a little tired of me at times.

"I had no instructions because nobody gave a hoot, you know, to give me any instructions. It was really more fun that they didn't, because I made up my own. At the beginning, I telephoned and asked for instructions. I presumed that was what I was supposed to do. I mean, George got instructions before he went to ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council], and a lot of other people I knew did. But I was told from External, 'Adelaide, you know more about feeding children and everything else than we do ... just use your head!' So for the first two or three years I had no instructions whatever, and it was perfectly lovely. I suddenly would find myself saying, 'The Canadian government could not agree to that,' or 'The Canadian government would support that,' and then thinking, 'I must remember to tell them sometime what we are doing.'

"I tried to write ... reports when I got home, since I thought that was my business, and they almost begged me to stop because they hadn't time to read them.... I don't blame them in one sense because they were all terribly busy, and this wasn't of paramount importance as far as they could see. And then the WHO [World Health Organization] delegates were chosen from our

department—Health and Welfare—and that was helpful because they were interested and would lend a little weight and support.

"To understand UNICEF properly I think you have to begin by recognizing that it is an anomaly. It was created in 1946 [as the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund] to provide a temporary palliative for a postwar emergency situation. No thought was given at that time to fitting it into the United Nations complex or to endowing it with any long-term objectives. It is quite impossible to classify. It is not a specialized agency; it is part of the UN proper, but has its own Board, its own staff and its own funds, which consist solely of voluntary contributions.

"One day at the end of its first emergency period it was suddenly recognized as having a potential for helping to meet the long-term needs of children in the developing countries. So, instead of the oblivion which had been planned for it at the opening of the 1950 session of the General Assembly, it was confronted with a reprieve and a challenge—but given only the most general mandate. It was still an anomaly. This created, and will continue to create, some confusion in the public mind. 'Why is there a children's fund working in the fields of various agencies; surely this is overlapping and lack of co-ordination, and so on....' In many ways I think this curious status of UNICEF has probably been a strength to it because, if your mandate is the welfare of children, you are bound to no single discipline. You can—and indeed you must—explore all problems affecting children for which external aid might be useful. You can pioneer, you can experiment, you can make mistakes....

"When you are confronted with needs—and particularly needs about which nobody else seems to be doing anything—[you are] tempted to rush in and not to wait until everything is well planned and propitious. UNICEF has more than once yielded to this temptation. Perhaps the fact that we are not a technical agency, and may be less aware than they of the problems to be confronted, makes this an easy thing for us to do. It is no secret that we have, at times, proceeded at a pace faster than the technical agencies thought prudent. But I, for one, am quite impenitent about having tried to meet these broad needs. I believe that many children are better off because of some of these efforts, even though they have not achieved a 100 per cent success. This does not mean, of course, that we should not learn in the light of experience...."

As Margaret Catley-Carlson points out later in this book, UNICEF has managed to avoid nearly all the political entanglements and ideological pitfalls that surround other parts of the United Nations. Here, Adelaide Sinclair tells of an exceptional incident involving her program. It was known by some in UNICEF as "the Cuba problem":

"In 1964, a month or so before the Executive Board was to meet in Bangkok, there was a hurricane—Hurricane Flora—that made a straight path through the Caribbean. It hit Trinidad and Tobago, then the Dominican Republic and then Cuba. It was a brute, and they all wanted help.

"I remember Dick Heyward [a senior UNICEF official] talking about this as he was passing somewhere and commenting that the United States might object to aid to Cuba. Well, I said, 'If Cuba has been hit by the

hurricane, just like anybody else, are you expecting us to refuse because the U.S. doesn't like it?' Dick said, 'No, but I'm just warning you.' I said, 'Thank you very much, but if that's going to be their attitude....'

"Word came in that the three countries had all suffered about the same kind of damage. It would have been simply preposterous, and a complete betrayal of UNICEF, if we had just said, 'No, we will only give to the other two.' I thought, just to make a slight compromise, we won't put in separate projects as we usually did for emergencies or for anything else; we'll put in for the three countries in a lump amount. Nobody could tell how bad the damage was, except that it was terrific in all cases; and there was not time to make a real study before the Board documents had to go out. And I said, 'To heck with the United States! If they are going to object, they can object. But with our mandate for emergencies and for children in need, we can't say we don't like Cuba so we won't give them anything.' Oh, I was ready to resign.

"So we put out the Hurricane Flora paper, so many thousand dollars. Then we got to Bangkok.

"The United States was simply livid. How could we dare give aid to Cuba? I said, 'We don't have the same attitude towards Cuba as you do. If we are to help children in need, we can't take into account prejudices of every single member country of the United Nations. And we are not going to, because I think we ought to go out of business if we start taking dictation of that kind from anybody. We don't deserve to be in business.' Of course, there were a lot of people completely on our side, but we didn't want to involve them in this mess.

"It was a good thing that we were in Bangkok. If the meeting had been in New York, we might have had all hell broken loose. But out there, as far as the press was concerned, what was Cuba? What they wanted to know was what we were doing for Thailand....

"Anyway, the United States was walking around like mad, and Zena Harman from Israel and Dr. Dogramaci, our nice Turkish delegate, and several others came to me just with tears in their eyes, telling me that the U.S. was saying that, if they voted for this program (which involved only a small amount for Cuba), all U.S. foreign aid to Israel and Turkey and what-have-you would stop....

"Dr. Dogramaci asked me when the Hurricane Flora project was going to come up before the Board, and I told him I thought Thursday of next week and the Board was due to end on Friday. He came back to me and said, 'The contribution of Turkey to this discussion will be that there will be nobody in the Turkish seat on Thursday, because I have to leave on Wednesday night.' And Zena said, 'I can't get in touch with my embassy.... It's very difficult and I don't know if I dare take the responsibility of risking all U.S. foreign aid to Israel on this principle.' But finally she got through by phone and, to the credit of the government of Israel, they voted for this aid to Cuba. It was just absolutely breathless, the whole thing. It was perfectly awful."

There was, as Adelaide recounts, a happy outcome for which Canadians were largely responsible:

"During the debate on the project, the Soviet delegate—a woman—said we might be interested in knowing that there was a representative of the Cuban Embassy in Tokyo sitting in the visitors' gallery. Other countries, you know, could come and listen to our Board's discussions but they couldn't take part. She said she thought it might be interesting to hear from him what his feelings were. Well, some of us held our breath. We didn't know what was being cooked up.

"And the suavest young man you ever saw, very well dressed, very well educated, perfect English and everything else, leaned forward. The chairman, Tabibi from Afghanistan, said, 'Yes, of course.' He did not know what to say, the poor man, he had to let him speak. And so the Cuban diplomat said he was grateful for the opportunity to speak, although it wasn't appropriate for a country that was not a member of the Board to take part in its decisions. However, as he had the floor, he would like to express the profound thanks of Cuba to UNICEF for the aid which they had already been given.

"Well, I swallowed hard and I thought, 'I should know if they've been given any aid or anything else.' But it turned out they had, and it was a lovely story.

"You see, everybody was in a state after Flora happened, but, when they pulled themselves together and began to look at the extent of the damage, the Cubans came to the conclusion that what they really needed was milk for children. They could afford to pay for it, but they didn't know where to get it or how to get it to Cuba. So they phoned UNICEF in New York and I suppose they got Ed Bridgwater [another Canadian] in the Supply Division, and said they were willing to pay for so many million gallons of milk, but did not know where to get it. The UNICEF staff person said, 'We'll find out. Give us a few hours.' Well, they knew where all the milk supplies were throughout the world and they were pretty sure there were some in Montreal. So they telephoned Montreal and it turned out that there were 100 million pounds of milk at a dockside warehouse which Canada would love to sell to somebody. It also turned out that there was a Russian ship unloading in Montreal with no outward cargo.

"So our supply people got hold of the Russians and asked if they would be willing, in a great rush, to take this milk on and get it down to Cuba. And the Russians said they would—I think they were paid in advance for their help and that was all right—and the Cubans were prepared to reimburse this payment. And the milk was there, I think, in 72 hours. For the Cubans this was the greatest kind of relief. So the Cuban representative stood up in the gallery in Bangkok and said, 'This milk got down, and it just saved the day for us ... we certainly have more needs, but this was the crucial thing and UNICEF has already done that for us.'

"This just simply floored all the opposition. It was very dramatic. He did it awfully well, and that put a little bit of an end to the argument."

Stewart Sutton
Unwelcome Labels on the Blankets

One of the first Canadians to take a field posting with a UN agency was a social worker, Stewart Sutton. He had been director of the Children's Aid Society in Toronto for about 10 years when he was phoned up by Maurice Pate of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and asked if he would go to Africa for UNICEF. "My reaction was, I'd go to Africa for anybody, provided that it is an interesting job and I can take my wife and children." That was in the autumn of 1954, and Sutton was posted to the agency's small office in Brazzaville, where a European colleague made him welcome with the words, "I didn't ask for you and I don't want you!" They sorted matters out by dividing the continent, Sutton concentrating on eastern Africa. It was several years before countries in sub-Sahara Africa began gaining independence, and he was dealing with colonial governors, as one anecdote that follows makes clear. He also tells about his years as director for the Eastern Mediterranean region, including emergency operations during the 1956 invasion of Suez:

"During my first months I learned most from the Africans 'round the office. They were curious about me and asked me questions, so I started asking questions back.... There was only one plane a week across Africa in those days, a Sabena flight from Leopoldville. The only type of flight you could get was a first-class flight, which meant the lowest form of third-class travel, and the rest of the aircraft was filled up with animal carcasses....

"Some French governors were quite suspicious of UNICEF, but I met some wonderful people in eastern Africa: Andrew Cohen in Uganda and Evelyn Baring in Kenya. They took the position that 'if there's anything you can do for the people, then do it.' One opportunity to test this out soon came up in Kenya.

"It was the height of the Mau Mau troubles in Kenya, and I got a letter from UNICEF in New York saying they had heard that the children of Mau Mau detainees were starving. So I went over and talked to my usual contacts, medical and education people, English big-shots; there were no senior African officials to talk to in those days. I was given quite a runaround. They showed me Mau Mau prisoners in prison, where their arms were tied to the walls with thongs, and their feet to the floor, and they were sitting on the concrete floor. Then, when I asked to see children, I was taken to a children's camp where they looked as if they were all right. I really didn't know what to do, because I was assured there was no problem. I thought there probably was a problem somewhere, but I just wasn't seeing it.

"The Governor was putting on a lunch for an American film crew who had just made the movie *King Solomon's Mines*. I was invited to come to this lunch, a modest affair, and here were all these Americans and I was seated at the bottom of the table with the lowest in the crew. I didn't belong at the lunch and wondered why I had been invited. Afterwards, we stood around having our coffee, and I felt completely out of place. Eventually, the Governor walked over and backed me into a bay window where nobody could hear us.

"He looked at me and said, 'Can I trust you? I understand you are Canadian and I hope I can trust you. I wouldn't say this to any old national.'

I said, 'It depends on what you want to trust me for.' He said, 'I know why you are here; I want to find out what they are telling you.' I said, 'They have assured me there is no problem.' And he said, 'They are lying to you.' I thought [that], from the Governor, these were pretty strong words, so I said, 'This is terrifying, because I am going back tomorrow morning.' He said, 'Stay another week. If you stay, I will see that things are made known to you, one way or other. We can't talk any more now. I won't see you again. Thanks.'

"So I arranged to stay another week, and I just walked 'round and didn't pay much attention to anybody until the odd person started to come and see me, and eventually I was taken to see children in another kind of camp in some other places, and they were in a hell of a mess. Then the dilemma that I faced was: if I report this to UNICEF as such and if UNICEF starts flying in food for these kids, it is going to be an embarrassment for the Governor who, after all, directed me into this. So what can I do to save everyone embarrassment and yet see they are properly fed? I spent about 24 hours pondering this, and suddenly it occurred to me that I should send a cable to the British Save the Children Fund. And I did and, by God, they reacted immediately and had food out there faster than anyone I ever heard of. And, of course, it was all done by the British; so nobody was embarrassed.

"I became particularly interested in the Maendeleo ya Wanawake (Women's Progress) movement in Kenya. It opened my eyes to the possibility that there was more to my job than health programs, and that we could help with education and nutrition. I met some wonderful people, both black and white, in the Maendeleo movement, and we were able to get them to enlarge their activities. Mainly we could provide transport for them and later, through the United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs, we helped them make international links. When I first knew the Maendeleo movement, it was quite paternalistic. White ladies would put on tea for the black ladies, and everyone would sit down and behave like little English ladies. I remember saying one day that you are not really teaching anything worthwhile if you do this. Anyway, within a year it was quite changed...."

Soon after, Stewart Sutton moved to Beirut as director of the Eastern Mediterranean, and UNICEF became involved in the aftermath of the fighting that occurred when British and French troops landed near the Suez Canal in November 1956:

"We were asked if we would supply blankets for some of the children who were evacuated from the Canal area to the Nile Delta. The people in charge of the children said they needed so many thousand blankets and I thought, 'How does one really assess the number they need?' I knew that General Burns was an honest man and knew what was going on. So I went to him and said I wanted to give a generous supply of blankets but not five times what they needed. He got out some aerial photographs and brought some experts in, and they made an estimate of the population that had moved, and we came to a figure that was very adequate.

"So I ordered these blankets through my headquarters. Now, I didn't think I had to say these blankets are for Arabs who have had their homes

destroyed by British, French and Israeli action, so be careful what you send them. But, dammit, when the blankets arrived—first of all, they were slow in coming— ... they were made in England. Every single blanket had a label on it, 'Made in England'! The Egyptian I was dealing with, Dr. Ali Fuad Ahmed, said that Gamal Abdel Nasser was furious when he heard about it. I said, 'Well, I don't blame him.' So I had all the labels removed and told them to keep them, but I also got a new supply of blankets in, from somewhere quite different.

"As a UNICEF official, you were always ready to respond to proposals put forward by governments but, on the other hand, we took every opportunity we had with, say, the Minister of Education or of Health to let them know what we could do. For example, one of the big and useful things UNICEF did in the Middle East was developing dairy processing plants—it wasn't just sending in powdered milk. The plant in Baghdad was quite a showpiece, and an English UNICEF specialist called Bob Cooper was in charge of developing such plants in many countries.

"We also worked intensively in parts of Iran on a campaign against malaria. There was close co-operation with WHO [World Health Organization], which gave technical advice, while we provided medication and vehicles. Dr. Otto Lehner, from Zermatt, was in charge of our office in Tehran, and he took me to see the Shah, who had become very interested in the campaign. The Shah gave us recollections of his childhood when he made journeys through places where people were dying of malaria.... With all that UNICEF or WHO speaks of 'our program,' it is always a government program. But WHO and UNICEF often sparked a government's interest in doing something. I think a lot of the initiative has to be taken by the United Nations.

"Some of the longer-term programs we supported were outside the health field. Eventually UNICEF became involved in education, by providing materials for books and schools, and the books had to be in the local language. The Canadian government was very helpful in providing paper for people to print their own books; I remember we did this in Madagascar.

"I was interested in getting UNICEF to be involved in areas other than health and nutrition programs. I was particularly concerned to get involved in social welfare, because there were a great many important social problems to be faced. One example was in Egypt, where after the Revolution, if a delinquent child had to be removed from his own home and sent to an institution, they were inclined to centralize everything and send the child to some institution in Cairo. Nasser eventually came to the conclusion [that] this was harmful—you can imagine a kid coming hundreds of miles down the Nile away from his own family—and he decided they should return to the old practices of keeping the child closer to home. The government asked us for someone who could advise how best to do this. We searched our brains and came up with the name of a man in Boston who was the director of the Home for Little Wanderers. He came out for a couple of years, financed by UNICEF, under the technical direction of the United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs and working for and with the Egyptian government. It worked beautifully, and was one of my big joys.

"In the health field I had another joy. In Egypt there was a real problem with schistosomiasis, or bilharzia. It is transmitted through snails in water, from infected people who urinate in the rivers. I have seen children very debilitated by the disease. I always remember that somebody, when they were fighting this disease by putting chemicals into the rivers, came up with the idea that it would be just as helpful to get the mullahs in their mosques, after praying for a while, to urge people not to urinate in the streams. And that was terribly effective. Just a simple person's idea, nothing scientific, but it came from the people themselves....

"In 1955, in Uganda, I met an English doctor called Cicely Williams, who had worked in WHO with [Dr.] Brock Chisholm. She became a dear friend of ours, and she told me a lot of things. She pointed out that there were many more resources in Africa than people knew of and you couldn't solve all the problems of Africa by flying supplies in to them. The important thing was to help them create their own structures, their own resources.... And I left Africa and the Middle East in 1963 with the profound feeling that the people of the region are potentially the best judges of the solutions for their problems."

J. King Gordon
ONUC—And What It Did for the Congo

J. King Gordon's years with the United Nations began in 1945, when he was managing editor of *The Nation*, which covered the San Francisco conference; for more than two years, he also covered United Nations affairs for the CBC. He joined the UN Secretariat in 1950 to work in the Human Rights Division, in which John Humphrey was director. He was an obvious choice in 1954 for chief of information for the United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency, a $140 million operation to help rehabilitate that war-devastated country. After nearly two years in Korea, he moved to Cairo to take over the United Nations Information Centre for the Middle East—and arrived just before the nationalization of the Suez Canal. He was in Cairo when British aircraft bombed the airport and, after the cease-fire and establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), he worked alongside General "Tommy" Burns in the Sinai as the link to the world's press.

He was therefore already a veteran of UN front-line operations long before the Belgian Congo became independent in July 1960, and, almost immediately, tumbled into disorder. The mutiny of the armed forces, the secession of mineral-rich Katanga province and the flight of most Belgian professionals and technicians all happened within a month. The UN peacekeeping force—mainly of African troops, but comprising also Scandinavians, Irish, Indians, Indonesians and Canadians—faced problems much more serious than those encountered by UNEF in the Middle East. The country, almost as big as Western Europe, was torn by political faction and tribal violence, and the interference of outside powers added to the strife. At the same time, all the civilian services—health and hospitals, communications, transport, education, banking and commerce—were threatened with collapse after the departure *en masse* of the Belgians.

J. King Gordon has written: "Faced with the responsibility of maintaining order and meeting civilian needs in a country without an effective government, the United Nations did remarkably well." His judgement was based on first-hand experience, for he was posted to the Congo as a senior UN information officer and travelled widely (and dangerously) to write reports on the work of ONUC (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo). The following are extracts from two of those reports, the first about Coquilhatville in the north-central part of the country and the second about Kasai province which bordered on Katanga to the south.

"Coquilhatville on the Congo River is a city of 40 000. Before the trouble in July, there were about 70 doctors in Equateur Province, an area as large as France. After the troubles, only 11 doctors remained; of these, 2 were left in Coquilhatville. The religious sisters stayed on—about 15 of them. And so, of course, did the Congolese male nurses and medical assistants.

"To this meagre staff was added the experience of two Canadian physicians, Dr. Jonathan Sinclair of Toronto and Dr. Phil Edwards of Montreal, and two nurses, Marguerite Tetrault of Ste. Anne de Bellevue and Johanna Korlu of Toronto. Somehow these Canadians, Belgian doctors, nursing sisters and Congolese medical staff have managed to keep the health services going.

"Yesterday, the day I arrived, I went with Phil Edwards to the 800-bed leprosarium at Iyonda, about 10 miles out of Coquilhatville. In his younger

days, Phil was an Olympic runner and competed in three separate meets—1928, 1932 and 1936. He still looks the athlete, but it has taken all his stamina to keep going the seven-day week, 'round-the-clock schedule he has set himself since he arrived with the Canadian team. Leprosy is very prevalent: four or five out of every 100 people have it. The patients live in small brick houses, many of them with their families; so that the population of this little village of the sick is about 1 500.

"I suppose I share the common repugnance to leprosy. I had never seen it before, but the biblical descriptions and taboos had done their work. It was only after I had spent an afternoon at Iyonda that I dropped the word 'leper' from my vocabulary. Leprosy is a disease like any disease, and not nearly as contagious as most contagious diseases; it is subject to treatment and (if caught soon enough) to cure. I saw quite a few cases at the dispensary where some patients requiring surgical treatment are sent. To a layman, some are very horrifying. But if, with Phil Edwards, you took the clinical approach, you could see the progress being made, the element of hope that was entering into the patient's thinking, that one day he would be able to lead a normal life in society...."

United Nations specialists came to Coquilhatville to maintain many basic services and train the Congolese people to take over these jobs. J. King Gordon met two sanitation engineers from the World Health Organization—one from Switzerland, the other from Haiti—who were running the city's water purification plant. He also met four cheerful technicians from the International Telecommunications Union [ITU]—three from Morocco and one from Switzerland—who had arrived to help one overworked Belgian maintain this link in the Congo's Public Telecommunications Transmission [PTT] network. He wrote:

"These ITU boys have pals in Coquilhatville. I noticed them this evening at the Canadian signals centre—known familiarly as the Cock and Bull—which has become a gathering place for the UN team, civilian as well as military. They were chewing the fat with the Canadian signallers who maintain teletype connections with Leopoldville. A Canadian sergeant was playing a guitar *à la* Segovia: he was good. A Swedish engineer came in and took over the guitar so that he could give a rendition of a song he [had] written—in Swedish. And at a low table a former crocodile hunter, now a UN interpreter, was beaten at chess by an Indonesian army doctor....

"I spent a good part of today with the Indonesians. Over at their battalion headquarters I watched them at their military training—hard combat training into which they threw themselves with great zeal. Then I went over to the hospital where one platoon was busy cleaning up the grounds and gardens. A few weeks ago, the colonel had asked the Red Cross team if there was anything his men could do to help. A Canadian nurse said, 'Sure, help us clean up the place.' When I was there, the soldiers were busy with sickles and hoes and wheelbarrows. Two religious sisters were watching them and joking with them: the sisters were talking Flemish and the Indonesian soldiers were talking Dutch!"

A few months later, at Christmastime in 1960, J. King Gordon was in one of the most destitute parts of the Congo. In August, some 250 000 Baluba tribespeople fled from a tribal massacre in northern Kasai province, into the southern part of the province, which then seceded. The extra numbers caused widespread starvation. The UN organized an airlift of food into Bakwanga, capital of southern Kasai province where Ghanaian troops were based. At Christmas, there was an uneasy mixture of traditional cheer and gaunt tribulation, as he recalls.

"In the Ghana camp, Christmas Eve was celebrated on December 23—at least for 'A' Company, who had to work on Christmas Day. As we sat, the guests of Major Wright, the commanding officer, sipping our drinks before supper, we heard the sound of the music and saw the lights through the palm trees. The Land Rover finally appeared with four lanterns on top, bright red leaves and flowers decorating the hood, and Father Christmas with his snowy beard in the driver's seat. The carol singers were a dozen soldiers, swathed in surplices made of mosquito netting. They sang the traditional English carols and then Ghanaian carols marvellously reconstructed from some of the old missionary hymns to resemble Gregorian chants.

"Next morning, the first of the big planes arrived at 0700, circling and putting down on the sandy strip, with its load of beans and rice. Captain Nick Raffle had his crew at the field, and within 20 minutes the aircraft was unloaded and its cargo was on the road to the ONUC warehouse in the Forminière compound. There were five more aircraft that day—the day before Christmas.

"The distribution convoy was ready about 1100, the three five-ton lorries loaded and waiting in the courtyard of the government buildings, a former technical school. The composition of the convoy gave some idea of the combined effort to get food to about 100 000 starving refugees. You get used to speaking rather technically when you are in Bakwanga: 'starving' means starving, not just hungry. If you were to add in the hungry, you would have to double or treble the figure.

"There was the Red Cross truck carrying milk and tinned fish and dried fish. Its crew was made up of twenty Congolese youngsters from the Junior Red Cross. Then came the Ghanaian five-tonner, loaded with rice, beans and maize flour, in charge of Lieutenant Naysmith with a crew of Ghana soldiers stripped to the waist, their blue helmets gleaming in the fierce sun. The third truck was loaded with 10 drums of palm oil and some fish, and was driven by the Rev. Archie Graber, a veteran Protestant missionary. And a 'staff car' carried the Deputy Commissaire of Refugees, the UN Refugee Co-ordinator and his assistant, an International Red Cross representative, and two WHO [World Health Organization] doctors.

"The convoy drove west and north towards Lake Makumba, into the heart of the famine area—Tschimbomba, Katenda, Kabeya Kawanga. There was a dispensary at the first stopping-point, and a couple of hundred refugees. One of the doctors was seeing kwashiorkor for the first time: the starvation disease, the faded hair and scaly head, the puffy cheeks, the swollen legs and feet, usually with sores. The rest of us had seen it before; but you never get

used to it. Starvation is such an individual experience and, somehow, as the flesh recedes and the body is reduced to a skeleton, the individuality of each child asserts itself, making a private appeal.

"We left rice and fish and oil there, and a couple of barrels of dried milk. The next stop was a distribution centre close by a Mission. Then to the headquarters of the commune. At each stop, a consultation with the man in charge of distributing the food, or with the medical assistant. And always the refugees and the thin-limbed children crowding around. And so back to Bakwanga, three or four stops, new distribution points established and existing centres stocked."

Most of Christmas day was spent escorting the representative of the UN Secretary-General (and 20 reporters) and taking food 'round a hospital in a town where the refugees said they had had scarcely any food for two days.

"On Christmas night, we had dinner at the Ghana camp. Nick Raffle stalked in muttering and angry. 'We were just up to the infirmary with the sweets we had had the pilots bring in for the kids. Just before we arrived, two babies had died. The sisters didn't think it was an appropriate time for the Father Christmas act.' We knew how he felt. We had felt the same way for two days as we looked at those kids with their big eyes and starved bodies. We had a drink together and a good Christmas dinner, although not very hilarious. We wished each other Merry Christmas as we parted—something, somehow, we had not had the heart to say to the refugees at Kabeya Kawanga."

Frank Shefrin
World Food Programme—
High Marks in the Class

When Frank Shefrin retired at the end of 1978 as chairperson of Canada's Interdepartmental Committee on the World Food Programme, he called the WFP (with some of the pride of authorship) "the greatest success story in the United Nations system." Certainly it had shown remarkable growth: from $100 million in the first three-year pledging period (from 1963 to 1965) to a target of $950 million for the two years 1979 and 1980. But the then executive director of the WFP (and another Canadian), Gerry Vogel, spoke more modestly about its quality: "We are far from perfect, but I think we do quite a good job, considering all the circumstances."

By the time of Shefrin's retirement, a total of 942 projects of food aid for economic and social development had been approved through the WFP in 108 countries. These included projects of land development and land settlement, forestry and fishery schemes, public utility and community development projects, education and training programs, improved hospital feeding, and food for nutritionally vulnerable groups, particularly mothers and children. Another 411 emergency operations—following droughts, cyclones, floods and disasters such as wars—had been undertaken in 93 countries. The cumulative cost to the WFP over 16 years of the development projects and emergency operations in cash and services came to about $3.75 billion.

Frank Shefrin says that "by sheer accident of the time of my birth I was in at the start of the Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO]. I sort of fell into the job." There was a little more to it than that. Born in Winnipeg in 1913, he graduated from the University of Manitoba in agriculture and economics in 1934, hardly the best time to find a good first job. But he was resourceful and worked as an ice cream maker, an egg-drying operator and a cheese maker before finding work for which he had been trained, analysing economic and agricultural data.

In 1941, after working for farmers' organizations, Shefrin joined the Canada Department of Agriculture, staying with it for the rest of his working career. Consequently, he was working in the conference secretariat in Quebec City in 1945 when the FAO was launched. He was a member of the Canadian delegation to every FAO biennial conference between 1955 and 1978, and he also served on a host of FAO intergovernmental committees as Canada's liaison with that agency. From 1951 to 1953, he worked for the FAO as an economist, on leave of absence from the Department of Agriculture.

Here, Shefrin's comments concentrate on the World Food Programme, which was established jointly by the United Nations and the FAO on an experimental basis for three years starting in January 1963:

"Very soon after FAO was established, the search began for a means to ensure that nobody in the world went to bed hungry and that food surpluses were handled intelligently. It had to be politically, economically and socially feasible. In 1946, the director-general proposed a World Food Board, but governments were not sufficiently motivated or politically ready for it. Then, in 1949, FAO proposed an International Commodity Clearing House, but that didn't get off the ground, either. Finally, in 1959, [FAO] began a third and

more successful attempt to set up a multilateral food aid program—the World Food Programme. It was the least ambitious of the three proposals.

"The Indian delegation raised the idea of a world food bank at the 1957 FAO Conference. It got scant consideration then, but by 1959 many countries, including Canada, began to show interest. Douglas Harkness, the Minister of Agriculture, referred to it in his speech to the FAO Conference that year, intending to test support for such an undertaking. After he left, various delegations came to me and asked me how serious Canada was about it, and some [delegations] from developing countries offered strong support. I had to say, 'Well, wait a little,' because I knew this proposal had not even been considered by Cabinet.

"Alvin Hamilton took over as Agriculture Minister in October 1960 and he began to push the proposal strongly. At the time both the United States and Canada had big surpluses of wheat and dairy products, but we saw a world food bank not as a means of solving the surplus problems or as a way to support high domestic prices, but rather as a means of using these stocks intelligently to bring about agricultural development in the poorer countries.

"The FAO had done some excellent studies. Mordecai Ezekiel, a senior FAO officer and a well-known economist, wrote a top-notch report on using food aid for development. These provided a really good basis for our discussions. It was timely, too, in the United States, with John Kennedy as President and George McGovern as administrator of its Food for Peace Program. Many supporters of a World Food Programme hoped it could bring some multilateral control over the movement of surplus foods for aid, which untll then was mainly a U.S. initiative. It was easier, of course, to set up a World Food Programme than a full scale Food Bank or to control completely the U.S. program of surplus disposal.

"Anyway, the Diefenbaker Government was sold on the idea of its being the right thing to do to help people who were short of food, and not inconsistent with moving surplus food stocks. At the FAO conference in November 1961, Alvin Hamilton co-sponsored a resolution approving a three-year experimental program; and a similar resolution was submitted to the UN General Assembly. The target agreed upon for the three years was $100 million, and the Americans were putting up $50 million in cash and in kind. This was just peanuts, compared with what they were giving away in their own bilateral surplus disposal program. Canada put up $5 million in cash. Even this small target figure produced opposition from some Canadian officials, who feared it amounted to over-commitment to a project [that] they thought would fail during the first three years. But Alvin Hamilton was a prominent minister and he won support from colleagues. It was a case when political figures were ahead of officials on an issue.

"When the experimental program was begun, Diefenbaker ordered that Canada give the $5 million cash in a lump sum and the food stocks be moved as they were called upon by WFP. But then the Canadian dollar dropped like lead and the Canadian commitment was paid in instalments over three years, which appeased the people in Finance who had to deal with deficits.

"During those first three years of the WFP's existence, we had a change of government in Canada and, when the executive director of FAO came to Ottawa in December 1964, seeking a supplementary contribution, Mitchell Sharp was Minister of Trade and Commerce and Harry Hays was at Agriculture. As soon as Addeke Boerma, the executive director, asked for an extra $2 million, Mitchell Sharp said, 'I have no problems with that,' and Harry Hays told me to draft a memo ready for the Cabinet in three days. I was delighted, because here the political figures were moving really fast.

"Then towards the end of 1965, Mitchell Sharp, who was also in charge of the Wheat Board, made [it] clear [that] he hoped the program would continue; so I put up a proposal for a three-year contribution from Canada of $15 million, which was quite a jump. But I got a call from Trade and Commerce, saying that Mr. Sharp would like to see a figure of $27 million. I said, 'Glory be!' From then on, Canada became a bigger and bigger contributor.

"What made the WFP an exciting enterprise was that the use of food aid on a continuous basis for economic and social development was ... new.... There were no established ground rules to guide the operations. Member governments, their delegates and the WFP secretariat had to make *ad hoc* decisions. As a result, we were involved all the time in experimentation, and in both rational and irrational debate at the sessions of the governing body of the WFP.

"Not all countries were equally enthusiastic over a multilateral food aid program. Some countries [that] did not have surpluses felt that they should not be expected to help dispose of the surpluses of other countries. However, there were five or six countries, including Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United States, [that] took the lead in making sure that the WFP functioned well. We worked out rules and regulations. One rule was that at least one-third of a country's contribution should be in cash, because there would be many expenses to cover and because it would help prevent countries just dumping surplus stocks. Countries didn't always adhere to this rule. Another was that contributions in kind had to be valued at world market prices, not at the higher domestic support levels. And food aid was to be used in conjunction with other forms of aid, both capital and technical.

"Other rules called for the food basket to consist of quality products with a nutritional balance. They had to fit various peoples' food habits and religious requirements. Food aid had to be provided on a grant, not loan, basis—and yet we had to avoid a conflict between food aid shipments and commercial sales. At the same time, the aim was to get the most food aid for the donor's buck. All these rules had to be acceptable to both donor and recipient countries. As you can imagine, the exercise called for a fine balancing act.

"The delegates and WFP staff had also to agree on the types of food aid project[s] to support, and this took a good deal of discussion. Some delegations supported only the idea of emergency food aid. Others favoured projects of economic and social development, and there was some disagreement about the priority to be given to either. I took [a] leave of absence from Agriculture Canada to prepare for the WFP an evaluation study on food aid and special

feeding projects, including the feeding of pre-school and school-age children and of hospital patients. My conclusion was that, if they were well managed, these social programs were definitely beneficial in a developmental sense. On the whole, delegates reached a useful compromise and food aid was provided for all these categories.

"It was not the intent of WFP, nor could it be, to solve the problem of agricultural surpluses. It did not aggravate the problem, either. And, from the very beginning it was recognized that food aid could not solve the problems of feeding large populations in developing countries. What it did do was make additional resources available.

"WFP, however, influenced changes in the whole structure of food aid. You see, for the first time on the governing body of WFP were brought together representatives from developed and developing countries—or donor and recipient countries—to help shape policies, approve projects and evaluate the results of food aid programs. At first, major donors were dominant in setting the ground rules and making decisions. But the balance shifted a good deal as developing countries became more articulate and assertive.

"WFP has always aroused strong emotions, for and against, in many circles: among governments, academics, NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] and the media. Even officials inside the same government have been divided in their views, and the critics and the doubters have had substance for their arguments.... [S]ome projects have been poorly planned; delivery has been slow; food distribution has been badly done; supervision and follow-up has been unsatisfactory. Other criticism has been based more on emotion than on substance, for example when they refer to WFP food aid as 'handouts' and say it encourages laziness and corruption. But it is fair to say that food aid does not always benefit the poor—others get the benefit.

"Delegates and the secretariat were aware of these weaknesses, and it is a pity that critical suggestions raised at WFP meetings were not always followed up by action. At the same time, delegates have to remember that the bottom line in all WFP operations [is] the neediest people. Unfortunately, there has to be a constant reminder of this 'bottom line.'

"When I retired in 1979, I felt qualified to judge the effectiveness of WFP. I had been involved with the program for 16 years, and had served as chairman of the WFP governing committee. I had been a member of many of its intergovernmental committees dealing with matters of finance, constitution and administration, and also with technical and operational questions. My experience with other international agencies gave me a broad perspective of United Nations activities. My general conclusion in 1979 was that I felt I could give the World Food Programme high marks in the United Nations class."

Kalmen Kaplansky
The Workers Lead the Way with No. 111

The International Labour Organization (ILO) is proud of being 26 years older than the United Nations itself, having been created in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles. The ILO is sometimes accused of using its senior status to undermine the co-ordinating authority of the infant Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and being primarily responsible for the loose and overlapping relationships among the specialized agencies. "It's not true," says Kalmen Kaplansky, whose connections with the ILO go back to 1957. "What happened was that, when ECOSOC was formed, the Soviet Union wanted to eliminate the ILO; they said there was no need for it any more.

"The ILO in 1919 was conceived by many as a challenge to the Russian Revolution. It was the challenge of the Western states, the Versailles Treaty powers. For they promised the working people during the First World War, 'We will satisfy all social needs through tripartism—through co-operation between government, management and workers—rather than through revolution.' The Soviet Union joined the ILO later, but they never forgot...."

This is living history to Kaplansky, who left Poland at the age of 17. He arrived alone in Montreal in December 1929, after the Depression had begun; "so I couldn't get a job and couldn't go to school. I went to night school for three weeks; this was the total of my education in Canada. When I arrived I knew about 10 words in English, because a friend had said, 'The basics are, you have to know "to do" and "to have," then you can add a string of other words and you can speak.' I stayed with a relative for six months, and he was mad when I left. But it was the best thing I did; I realized that, if I remained there, I would have been part of the ghetto mentality, the ghetto environment." By reading in libraries, he soon had self-confidence in English. "In 1932 I had the audacity to deliver a series of lectures in English on the French Revolution, based on Kropotkin's classic."

He got a break in 1932 when a friend offered him an apprenticeship as a typesetter. He is still a member of the International Typographical Union. He made his way in the union movement, as a delegate of the Montreal Trades and Labour Council to national conferences, and also in politics, as a CCF (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation) candidate and member of its provincial and national executives. After war service, he was asked by the Jewish Labour Committee to develop a program in human relations "and that's how I got into the human rights field, for it was anti-discrimination work. We developed the approach that there is no dichotomy between law and education, that the two are complementary and one without the other is not sufficient. If you add social action involving the public ... and campaigns against discrimination, you are fulfilling an educational purpose and, once the law is in place, you publicize incidents of discrimination. It was a North American invention, and I did this for 10 years."

When the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) was formed by merger in 1956, Kaplansky became its international affairs director.

"People said, 'How can he do it? He's never been to school in Canada.' (I had matriculated in Poland). Claude Jodoin said, 'Don't worry, I'll send you to the international school in Geneva for three months, and you'll learn all you need to know.' They never did, of course.

"Thus, the ILO became my responsibility. Its annual conference in Geneva was beginning in June, and Jodoin was a member of its Governing Body and the workers' delegate from Canada. I accompanied him as an adviser. The agenda included an item, which became Convention No. 111—Discrimination (Employment and Occupation). After a few days he told me that the workers' group had to have a chairman in committee to speak for them. But I said, 'Go on, I don't know anything about the ILO.' He said, 'You're the only one in the workers' group who knows anything about the subject matter, as a result of the 10 years' involvement in Canada.'"

This important but controversial convention had started off in 1953 in the United Nations Human Rights Commission, in its Subcommittee on Discrimination and Minorities.

"They had a proposal before them to develop an international convention on discrimination in employment but they said, 'The ILO is in this field and probably has a lot of material on this subject, while we don't know very much about it.' So they asked the ILO to prepare a *Law and Practice Report*, a world overview of where we stand on this issue. The ILO prepared that report and then said, 'We are also going to draft a convention, because it is within our jurisdiction.'

"There were some big arguments over it. The ILO had to deal with the Soviet Union, but the United States was also very touchy about this subject. After all, desegregation was just beginning for the blacks, and Gunnar Myrdal had just written *The American Dilemma*[, in which] he for the first time put in an organized form how discrimination not only affects the people who suffer from it but also the society in which they live. We took advantage of that argument, for the idea behind the convention was not to represent discrimination as an isolated thing, as only a problem of the people being discriminated against, but of society as a whole. I have a poster here which I brought back from the United States at that time, with a good slogan: 'Don't be a jerk. Race and religious hate hurts you!'

"A basic characteristic of the ILO [that] makes it different from all the other UN agencies is that it is tripartite. Each delegation to the annual conference consists of representatives of government, employers and workers. In plenary the governments have two votes, and employers and workers one each, while in committee it is one–one–one. If a delegation is not tripartite, the government representative cannot vote—you can challenge the government's voting right. At the start, all the workers' delegates get together and elect their officers (as do the other two groups). They were all there—from the Soviet Union, Spain, South Africa, Third World countries, everywhere—and I was elected unanimously in 1957 and 1958 to be the workers' chairman of the conference committee, which drafted Convention No. 111. And every year after, until 1967, I was elected workers' chairman, and thus a vice-chairman on the resolutions committee, which is the main political committee in the ILO annual conferences.

"The CLC never imposed any restrictions on me or asked me to consult them; on the spot I could make up my mind. It was a fantastic experience. Here was a kid like me, coming out of Jewish Montreal with that limited

experience, never having travelled abroad.... I will never forget when I came in June 1957, and the U.S. delegate was Joe Johnson, head of the Carnegie Foundation for Peace. He was very presentable, grey-haired and tall—all you associate with a typical Yankee. A day or two after I had been elected vice-chairman of the conference committee, he asked me to have lunch and said, 'We are very worried about this Convention. We don't know what to do. We can't oppose discussion of this item, but we don't want it to turn into a hate-America session.'

"Of course, I knew what was behind his words. It was the same conference [in which] the ILO was seized [by] the Hungarian invasion of November 1956. And the Soviets were getting ready to say, 'Never mind Hungary. Look what happens to the Negroes in the South!'

"So I said, 'If you act like the Soviets and say the problem doesn't exist here, then you will be in trouble, because the U.S. is an open society; Myrdal has published his book; the statistics are there.' He said, 'We won't deny any of this. But we are also going to say what we have done: how Roosevelt started it during the war, when we had to bring blacks in from the South to work in the munitions factories and there were presidential decrees from which developed a whole set of laws and regulations, including fair employment practices acts and human rights commissions in order to make it possible for blacks to enter the labour force. We are going to admit what is bad, but also say what we have done to bring about change.'

"I said, 'You will have no problem, then. There is no country in the world that can come to an international forum and say we have no racial or ethnic or religious discrimination.' And at the first meeting of the committee, I followed this up and said, 'We are all guilty. Let's start out with the idea that we are all guilty.'

"At first the Canadian government didn't want to touch this convention, because they burnt their fingers on this whole problem of federal–provincial relations regarding the question of ratification and implementation of international instruments. [To understand this reluctance] you have to know the story of the 'Labour Conventions Case' of 1937. R.B. Bennett, influenced by Roosevelt's New Deal, after he was elected in 1932 and things were terrible, decided to introduce a new deal in Canada. Rather than following the long and cumbersome process of legislation through Parliament, he thought the best way of introducing a new deal was by ratifying ILO conventions. He ratified three conventions—on hours of work, weekly rest and minimum wage-fixing machinery. The Province of Ontario challenged him in the courts and it reached the Privy Council in England.

"In a typical decision, the Privy Council's judicial committee said, 'You can ratify but, ah!, when it comes to implementation, you have to look at every convention [to see] whether it is strictly within federal, or strictly within provincial, or else in divided jurisdiction.' The decision may or may not have been correct from a constitutional point of view, but [for nearly 30 years] it made it impossible for Canada to ratify conventions that were not strictly in federal jurisdiction. Some dealing with marine matters were ratified.

"We make fun of countries [that] ratify conventions wholesale and then don't implement them. Canadian officials are usually very cautious. We spend years and years in internal debate.... Government lawyers are a peculiar breed, you know. They seem to worry about the remotest possibilities of what may happen one day.... [The result is that, out of 159 ILO conventions, Canada has ratified only 26, but these include most of the important human rights instruments.]

"In 1957, ILO delegates to the conference committee on discrimination were given two books. One contained replies from member states to the Governing Body's questionnaire on *Law and Practice*—the ILO always makes a distinction between what is on paper and how it is being implemented. The other contained a draft convention based partly on these replies. It lacked two important elements, in my view. It did not emphasize the duty of ratifying members to introduce legislation, and it did not provide machinery for receiving and investigating complaints. From my experience in Canada and the U.S.A., if you don't have these you might as well forget about it all.

"The first big fight in 1957 was over whether it should be a Recommendation or a Convention. The British had wanted the weakest form of international statement, a Resolution, but other Western governments were willing to have a Recommendation. Now there are good points about a Recommendation, and the ILO passed 169 of them up to 1984. If a government takes seriously a Recommendation it can draft internal laws based on it, and it is usually in more specific language than a Convention. On the other hand, it is a weaker form of instrument because you cannot ratify it and it doesn't bind a government to introduce laws. The Canadian Government and the employers' group were for a Recommendation, and I led the fight for a Convention. We won by a very narrow margin.

"The second fight was on the question of defining what is discrimination. There was no problem about political, racial or religious, but then came the question of discrimination of women. (In those days there was no thought of including the handicapped in a definition; that would have been totally innovative, and I'm sorry to say now our workers' group voted against it.) On the question of sex discrimination, the Canadian Government led the pack—Britain and New Zealand were there, too—for the exclusion of sex from the definition, on the grounds that it was a separate subject and dealt with under separate legislation.

"At one point they almost succeeded in getting deleted the reference to sex discrimination. But we had two readings of this draft, at the 1957 and 1958 conferences. The report of the 1957 ILO deliberations went to the United Nations Human Rights Commission, and several representatives there from different countries supported the position of the workers' group; women's organizations also came to our support. I will never forget the Irish government delegate pleading with us, 'What are you doing to us? We could never ratify this convention because of the clause on women.' But they did years later, and now they have a law on equal pay for work of equal value. Anyway, we won that point.

"The biggest fight exploded over Article 35 in the ILO constitution, called 'the colonial article.' Under it a colonial power has certain choices as to how it will implement a convention within a colony. The fight was over whether there should be a clause exempting colonial powers from automatically applying the provisions of the convention in their colonies. The French and the British became very touchy. A Canadian was committee chairman in 1958—Arthur Brown, Deputy Minister of Labour—and I got into a big fight with him on this.

"The final vote in June 1958 produced an overwhelming majority for us—we needed to win a two-thirds majority of those voting. The Canadian government finally voted for the draft instrument. So it came into force in 1958, and Canada ratified the Convention in 1964. Ratifying countries have to report every two years to the ILO on its implementation.

"Conventions have an effect, regardless of whether governments ratify them.... When Canada drafts labour legislation, officials look around for precedents, at British or American laws or at ILO or other international covenants. Moreover, delegates who attend international conferences become familiar with the issues and help bring about legislative changes in their own country. But if they are not ratified, nothing is obligatory.

"Conventions in themselves are not a cure-all; but the whole basis of international organizations is to develop what a former ILO director-general, Wilfred Jenks, called 'the common law of mankind.' There has been a continuous struggle, to carve out for the international jurisdiction something that can only be taken away from the narrow national jurisdiction. No country in the world will give up its ultimate right to proceed on the basis of its own interests, even though it will pay lip-service to all sorts of desirable objectives. What became fashionable among internationalists for a while was the functional approach: since we cannot agree on the big issues of war and peace and trade, let's start agreeing on smaller issues—safety in the workplace, obligatory school systems, abolition of torture and slave labour (national sovereignty wouldn't be affected if you do away with such abhorrent practices)—and the logic is that countries will get used to the idea that you can carve out certain things for 'the common law of mankind.'

"After a long life, I've come to believe in the incremental approach, in substance, no matter how small, and not just in the mere shifting of commas and semicolons around documents. I am a believer in reaching out for great objectives—the sky is the limit, because we must work for a world without poverty, injustice and war. But we should not be despondent if we achieve only a small measure of success."

Howard Green
Adding Ginger at Geneva

Howard Green had been Conservative MP for Vancouver–Quadra for 24 years, and was serving as both House Leader and Minister of Defence Production in the Diefenbaker government, when the Minister of External Affairs, Sidney Smith, died. Green was appointed External Affairs Minister in June 1959 and held the post until the Conservatives lost the election in April 1963. His years at External matched a period of intense and hopeful activity in disarmament negotiations and, as Mr. Green recalled in a lively interview in 1986 (when he was 90), "disarmament certainly was one of my main interests. We were also great believers in the United Nations."

Asked in that interview whether his service in France with the 54th Kootenays during the First World War was his first experience in international affairs, Green replied dryly: "Well, it was an experience—I don't know about the international affairs part!" However, it bred in him a deep concern for a secure peace and, in the 1950s, dismay at the accelerating arms race. As External Affairs Minister, Green was appalled by the resumption of nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, and in July 1962, he exclaimed at the Geneva disarmament conference: "Mr. Chairman, all this testing is sheer madness—polluting the air [that] human beings must breathe, endangering the lives of generations yet unborn, and possibly leading to the destruction of civilization." Trained as a lawyer, Green put a great deal of personal effort in to these disarmament negotiations, in Geneva and in New York.

In brief, Nikita Khrushchev had prompted this negotiating activity by laying a plan for "general and complete disarmament" before the General Assembly in September 1959. In December, Howard Green brought Lt.-Gen. "Tommy" Burns back from the Middle East, where he had commanded the United Nations Emergency Force, to be Canada's disarmament negotiator in Geneva. The 10-nation Disarmament Committee (5 NATO, 5 Warsaw Pact countries) met in March 1960 to discuss Soviet and U.S. plans for three-stage disarmament, but talks broke off in June. After John Kennedy became U.S. President, negotiations resumed between the superpowers, and Valerian Zorin and John McCloy produced a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles in March 1961.

During the next General Assembly session, the United States produced detailed plans for nuclear and conventional disarmament, and the U.S.S.R. tabled a draft treaty. Under pressure from the Soviet Union, the Geneva committee was enlarged with the addition of eight non-aligned countries (Brazil, Mexico, Sweden, India, Burma, United Arab Republic, Ethiopia and Nigeria). This Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) began meeting on March 14, 1962, and met 234 times in the next three-and-one-half years. Howard Green addressed the conference during its first week, and following are excerpts from that speech, which he typically entitled "Mankind's Greatest Problem—Disarmament":

"It is obvious that the main purpose of the United Nations is to keep the peace. Of course, under present conditions, that means that disarmament becomes the most important problem of the United Nations, and that forum will always have the main responsibility for bringing about disarmament.

There are several reasons why this conference has an unprecedented opportunity to make rapid progress toward agreement.

"First, there is now an agreement on the basic principles of disarmament unanimously endorsed by the UN General Assembly. For the first time, there is a common understanding about the objective to be reached, and the guidelines [that] should be followed in working toward it. As a result, we are in a position to move quickly from a general exchange of views to a detailed consideration of measures [that] will actually stop the competition in armaments and bring about substantial reductions from the present levels. In my personal opinion, the problem of stopping the development of more deadly weapons is perhaps more important than that of bringing about measures of disarmament, although of course both problems are of vital importance.

"Second, the new negotiating committee is representative of all major geographical areas of the world. This reflects the fact that disarmament is not the concern only of the great powers but of all countries.... The presence at this table of the representatives of eight additional countries is, in my opinion, a major advantage. They will, I am sure, play a valuable role in avoiding the stalemates [that] have so often developed in past disarmament conferences....

"Third, we had, just 10 days ago, the unanimous finding of the UN Committee on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament that general disarmament, far from producing adverse economic effects, would be an immense contribution to the advancement of human well-being. There can surely be no doubt that the reallocation of even part of the enormous resources now devoted to expenditure on armaments would open up unlimited possibilities for the improvement of living standards in all the nations, whatever their social system or whatever their stage of development.

"Fourth, past experience has made us fully aware of the grave consequences [that] will follow if we permit these negotiations to fail or even to lose momentum. It is now almost two years since the work of the Ten-Nation Committee was broken off. This period has been marked by renewed international tension and a nuclear arms race of increased intensity, of which the resumption of nuclear testing is the most serious aspect....

"Finally, the increasingly devastating power of modern weapons has placed a new responsibility on the representatives who are gathered here. The very fact that all of us around this table fully recognize the immeasurable catastrophe [that] would result from a conflict involving such weapons in itself provides new motives for meeting the challenge [that] faces us. We cannot allow another failure to establish an effective system of disarmament. If we do not succeed on this occasion, the world may not be given another chance.

"As far as my delegation is concerned, we have come to Geneva with the firm intention to continue working without interruption until a comprehensive system of general disarmament has been agreed.... [W]e should at once start to search for common ground. This is a case where, as we say in Canada, time is of the essence....

"Two principal documents are available to the Committee. There is the program of disarmament put forward by the United States on September 25, 1961. Canada participated in the drafting of this plan, and fully supports it.

The United States representative has emphasized that these proposals have been put forward in a spirit of flexibility and compromise. That is a point to which Canada attaches great importance. In other words, these proposals are not put forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

"There is also the draft treaty advanced by the representative of the Soviet Union, based on the Soviet plan of September 23, 1960.

"The United States proposals are presented in the form of a 'program,' and the Soviet proposals in the language of a 'draft treaty,' but this is largely a difference of presentation. The substantive provisions contained in the two documents parallel one another in several respects, and I suggest that we should take full advantage of this fact in trying to define and enlarge the area of agreement between the two sides.

"Starting from the Joint Statement of Principles, we should search out specific problems on which the two sides are close to agreement, and try to settle these as quickly as possible.... There are several examples which could be cited. The following list will help to illustrate the approach [that] my delegation has in mind.

"The first example: The [American] and Soviet proposals both provide for means of ensuring that rockets and satellites placed in orbit or launched into outer space will be used for peaceful purposes only. Both sides have an overriding interest in reaching an understanding [that] will ensure that scientific advances in this field serve only the cause of peace....

"The second example: The [American] proposals contain suggestions for observation posts and other procedures designed to reduce the risk of surprise attack or accidental war.... Similar ideas were advanced in the Soviet plan of September 23, 1960. The fear that war could break out through accident or miscalculation is a continuing source of international tension, which increases as more and more dangerous weapons are developed. Both sides have a vital interest in removing these fears as soon as possible....

"The third example: The [American] plan calls for technical studies of means to deal with chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Soviet Union has also put forward a suggestion for joint studies in this area in its plan of September 23, 1960. In the opinion of my delegation, such technical studies should begin immediately....

"The fourth example: Provision is made in both plans—although at different stages—to cease production of fissile material for weapons purposes and to transfer existing stocks to peaceful uses.... In our opinion, further negotiations could bring about full agreement....

"The fifth example: Both plans contain proposals designed to prohibit the wider spread of nuclear weapons. A resolution submitted by Ireland, calling for international agreement in this field, was endorsed by all the members of the United Nations ... just a few months ago. What is required now is early action to bring this recommendation into force.

"The sixth example: The [American] program and the Soviet draft treaty both call for reductions of conventional arms in the first stage. The Soviet plan provides for reductions proportionate to manpower cuts. At our second meeting, the U.S. representative put forward new proposals calling for

a reduction by 30 per cent. My delegation believes that this development brings the views of the two major military powers closer together. Detailed negotiations should begin at once to remove remaining differences.

"My seventh example is as follows: In the crucial field of nuclear disarmament the positions of the two sides have likewise been brought substantially closer by the significant new U.S. proposals for a 30 per cent reduction of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in the first stage. The Soviet draft treaty calls for the complete elimination of all such vehicles in the opening stage. Nevertheless, having in mind the magnitude of the initial cuts proposed by the United States, as well as the agreed principle of balance, my delegation believes that detailed negotiation should bring the two major military powers to agreement on phased reductions in this field.

"In these seven areas, and there are probably others, we believe that an appreciable measure of common ground already exists. There is a second category of problems in which there remain more pronounced and generally well-known differences between the two sides. I shall not dwell on them today, with the exception of the vital issue of stopping nuclear-weapons tests, which requires special mention.

"Canada deeply regretted that the Soviet Union last August broke a three-year moratorium on testing, for we are opposed to all nuclear-weapon tests. In this, we share the view of most other countries. Indeed, the major nuclear powers themselves have stated at this very conference that they would like to see all tests stopped. However, they now find themselves unable to reach final accord owing to disagreement on inspection. Is there no alternative to another series of tests with all the harmful consequences that such action could bring? Is it not possible, within the framework of this committee, to make the further effort [that] is required to break the deadlock? In my opinion, such an effort must be made, for otherwise the prospects of this conference itself could be seriously threatened.... Countries [that] do not possess nuclear weapons cannot put a stop to these tests; however, we can and do appeal to the nuclear states to do everything in their power to see that a solution is not further delayed."

EPILOGUE: Despite all the earnest energy of Green (who returned to Geneva several times) and the other negotiators, the achievements of the Disarmament Committee were meagre. There was, of course, no agreement on a plan for complete disarmament. As General Burns wrote in his book *Megamurder* (Clarke, Irwin and Co., 1966): "The results of all these meetings and the hundreds of thousands of words placed on the record are not very impressive." But he cited three specific agreements: the "hot-line" link between Moscow and Washington; the Partial Test Ban Treaty of August 1963; and the agreement not to place weapons of mass destruction in outer space or in orbiting satellites. Soon after Burns' book was published came the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

1965 to 1974

Summary

The years 1965 to 1974 were those of superpower détente, despite an increasing number of extremely serious regional conflicts. William Epstein, who directed the UN Disarmament Division for many years, talks of the bilateral (U.S.–Soviet) and multilateral treaties signed during this period, in particular, the one in which he played a major part: the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Some treaties, like the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-I), were negotiated outside the UN framework, but other important ones, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Seabed Treaty, were achievements within the system. Another aspect of big power détente was the arrival in 1971 of representatives of the People's Republic to take the "China seat" at the United Nations.

But regional conflicts seemed to multiply and intensify. The spotlights of the media were on Vietnam; on Rhodesia, where Ian Smith made his illegal declaration of independence in 1965; and on the Middle East, where two sharp wars were fought in 1967 and 1973. George Ignatieff, Canada's permanent representative at the UN during the Six-Day War, tells of the usefulness of the Security Council in easing the retreat of a superpower, in this case the Soviet Union under Khrushchev. On the other hand, the United States used the "silent veto" (six Security Council members not wishing it on their agenda) to prevent the Council's taking up the issue of Vietnam. But Britain did take the Rhodesian question to the Security Council, to have sanctions imposed. Gordon Goundrey talks of the preparations that were made to help the front-line states of southern Africa cope with their economic problems when borders were closed by, or against, Rhodesia.

Heading other regional conflicts were the battles between India and Pakistan in 1965 and again in 1971, when Bangladesh was born, and the growing campaigns of nationalists in the Portuguese African territories. All these conflicts added to the streams of refugees in Africa and Asia. George Gordon-Lennox tells of two episodes that ended more happily, in the Sudan and Burma.

This decade was a time when the world community took stock of global resources and started organizing its knowledge of these assets (and the threats to them) for policy-makers to act upon. Maurice Strong, who stepped in to run it, talks about the first of these great global gatherings, the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972. It was followed by the Population Conference in Bucharest and the World Food Conference in Rome, both in 1974. These conferences achieved more than stock-taking. They prompted countries and international agencies to take a much more integrated approach to development, and reinforced the International Development Strategy published in 1970 for the Second Development Decade. The integrated approach was followed in many quarters: at the national level, with, for example, Canada's "Strategy for International Development Co-operation 1975–80"; and at the international level, with the United Nations Development Programme's organizing a five-year planning cycle and with each recipient country's having an "indicative planning figure" of funds with which to flesh out its schemes for development. Despite these moves, as George

Davidson explains, the UN system was littered with obstacles that inhibited proper co-ordination of effort.

Negotiations for a comprehensive Law of the Sea began during this decade, and Canada's persevering chief negotiator Alan Beesley tells how this important conference managed, against many odds, to succeed. James Harrison, who served more than three years as an assistant director-general in UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) in charge of its science program, tells of his particular concern about ocean sciences.

Chronology of United Nations and Related Events of Special Interest to Canada

1965	—	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
	September	War breaks out between India and Pakistan, and fighting continues until January 1966. After Security Council calls for cease-fire, U Thant takes intiative in setting up UNIPOM (United Nations India—Pakistan Observer Mission) to monitor it and to patrol cease-fire lines from Kashmir to the sea. Maj.-Gen. Bruce MacDonald of Canada is its chief officer.
	November	Rhodesian government under Ian Smith makes unilateral declaration of independence. The Security Council immediately called on all states not to recognize the regime and to do their utmost to break economic relations. The General Assembly called on Britain to take all necessary steps to quell the rebellion. But initiative was left with British Government.
1966	January	Special Fund and Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) merged into United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
	April	Britain seeks Security Council support for naval blockade of oil tankers headed for Beira in Mozambique and thence to Rhodesia.
	September	Paul Martin enunciates a proposal to solve "China seat" issue at UN: both Peking and Taipei regimes to have Assembly seats and People's Republic to take over Security Council seat. He argues that this dual representation plan is not a "Two China" policy. Proposal lacks support.
	December	General Assembly votes overwhelmingly to terminate South Africa's mandate over South West Africa (renamed Namibia) and to take direct responsibility to bring territory to independence. World Court had refused to give substantial judgment on case brought by Liberia and Ethiopia to demolish South African argument that mandate lapsed with demise of League of Nations.
		Security Council imposes selected mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia. This marks UN's first entry into Chapter VII of the Charter to extent of laying obligations on all states under Article 41. Resolutions covered about 60 per cent of Rhodesian exports and imposed arms embargo.
		General Assembly adopts two Human Rights Covenants derived from 1948 Universal Declaration: one on Civil and Political Rights, the other on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. They finally come into force in 1976.

1967	January	Canada on Security Council until December 1968. Ambassador is George Ignatieff.
		United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) established as autonomous body within UN; it later becomes a specialized agency and has to raise own funds (see Foran contribution). Headquarters set up in Vienna.
	April	General Assembly sets up UN Council for Namibia to administer territory until independence. Although both Canada and U.S. voted in December 1966 to terminate South Africa's mandate, neither country volunteered to serve on Council, which lacks clout in consequence.
		World Health Organization launches campaign to eradicate smallpox within 10 years. In 1977 only one case is recorded (in Somalia).
		Treaty of Tlatelolco—full name: Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (for full story, see Epstein contribution).
	June	Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) completed.
		Six-Day War in Middle East won by Israel, after UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force) troops withdrawn from Sinai at Egypt's insistence (see Ignatieff contribution). In October, Security Council finally adopts the landmark Resolution 242, which sets out framework for future peace settlement.
	October	Outer Space Treaty comes into force, "governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies." Stipulates exclusively peaceful purposes.
	November	Arvid Pardo, Maltese ambassador, makes seminal speech on seabed issue and moves resolution that leads to Seabed Treaty and also to Third Law of the Sea Conference.
1968	January	Canada on Security Council (Ignatieff).
	May	Pierre Trudeau, on becoming prime minister, makes clear Canada's aim is to recognize People's Republic of China (mutual recognition is extended in October 1970) and to work for its seating on Security Council.
	May 29	Security Council adopts resolution imposing comprehensive mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia, but omitting African draft clauses calling for use of British force to end rebellion.

1968 (cont.)	July	Soviet Union, United States and Britain—and 50 non-nuclear-weapons states—sign Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. *Quid pro quo* was Article VI, obliging nuclear weapons states to pursue negotiations "for cessation of nuclear arms race at an early date." NPT entered into force in March 1970.
	August	Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, after the Dubcek efforts "to give socialism a human face." Security Council resolution calling for Soviet troop withdrawal and condemning invasion is supported by 10 of 15 members (India and Pakistan both abstained), but vetoed by Russia. Ignatieff co-ordinates effort.
1969	January	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination comes into force. All signatory states undertake to guarantee equality before the law in the enjoyment of human rights. A committee meets twice yearly to review reports from states on measures to implement Convention.
		International Labour Organization celebrates its 50th anniversary and is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. It launches its World Employment Programme, which falters from lack of funds.
		Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee is enlarged to 26 members and becomes Conference of Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Is given task of drafting a Seabed Treaty.
	September	Sir Robert Jackson (of Australia) produces his "Capacity Study"—a monumental analysis of the operational capacity of the UN system to carry out a larger role in development. He termed the United Nations Development Programme "a main gear wheel" and suggested ways in which all the other agencies could mesh together with it. His controversial study led to reforms in New York and to better co-ordination in the field.
1970	January	An International Development Strategy (IDS) is ready for the Second Development Decade. Taking an integrated view of development problems, it foreshadows the North–South dialogue and debate over a New International Economic Order.
	March	Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force, with first review conference set for 1975.
		In Venice, UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) stages intergovernmental conference of ministers on institutional, administrative and financial aspects of cultural policies.

1970 (cont.)	March	This pioneering effort leads to regional conferences, and Canada attends European one in Helsinki in 1972.
	December	General Assembly adopts Resolution GA/2749 (XXV) declaring the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction to be "the common heritage of mankind." It also decides to hold a Third Law of the Sea Conference.
1971	February	Seabed Treaty is open for signature. Drafted through the CCD in Geneva, its full name is "Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof." However, it allows emplacement within a country's 12-mile coastal zone (and nuclear-armed submarines to sit on the seabed).
	March	Deteriorating relations between West and East Pakistan culminate in tanks shelling Dhaka University. Civil war ends in December with invasion by Indian troops. U Thant sets up humanitarian programs of relief, but fails to mobilize Security Council into action; his offer of "good offices" to Pakistan and India is not taken up.
	October	General Assembly decides "to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China" and to expel the Taiwan government from all UN organizations (Resolution GA/2758 (XXVI)).
1972	January	Kurt Waldheim takes over as Secretary-General. UNDP starts a five-year cycle for development co-operation, through the IPF system: each developing country being given an Indicative Planning Figure of funds to be drawn upon.
	May	Soviet Union and United States sign SALT-I Accords. These consist of the ABM Treaty, limiting to two the number of anti-ballistic missile systems allowed—one around the capital and a second around a group of ICBM silos—; and an "interim agreement" halting construction of fixed land-based ICBM launchers and limiting numbers of ballistic missile submarines and their launchers. This is the last arms control treaty in nuclear field to be ratified by the U.S. Congress until 1988. George Davidson is appointed under-secretary-general in charge of the department of administration and management (remains until 1979).
	June	UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. Maurice Strong leaves CIDA presidency to

1972 (cont.)	June	become chief organizer of this conference. Its success prompts General Assembly to establish the UN Environment Programme in December, and Strong is appointed its first executive director. UNEP is first UN agency to be located in a developing country—Kenya.
	December	General Assembly decides to proclaim 1975 as International Women's Year (Resolution GA/3010 (XXVII)).
1973	—	Tokyo Round of tariff negotiations begins.
	October	Yom Kippur War in Middle East. Security Council met frequently but cease-fire achieved only after U.S.–Soviet plan negotiated separately. Non-aligned members of Council propose UNEF II Peacekeeping force of 7 000 troops for Sinai. Disengagement accomplished on Syrian and Egyptian fronts under U.S.–Soviet co-chair and UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) established in May 1974.
	December	General Assembly decides to locate headquarters of United Nations University in Tokyo.
1974	April	General Assembly, in Sixth Special Session, begins defining a new international economic order after energy and food crises and the threatened breakdown of the monetary system. It adopts a Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, and follows it in December with a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.
	June	Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS-3) holds first substantive meeting in Caracas after five years of preparation by UN Seabed Committee. Canada takes a leading role in all areas of negotiations (limits to national jurisdiction, fisheries management, pollution control, scientific research, seabed mining).
	August	World Population Conference held in Bucharest, and Western countries accept that economic development is a prerequisite to population planning success in developing countries.
	November	World Food Conference in Rome. It leads to establishment of World Food Council and to plans for an International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) to be financed equally by OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and industrialized countries.

George Ignatieff
What a Difference 20 Years Make!

When Canada was elected to the Security Council for two years starting in January 1967, its ambassador to the UN had the advantage of close acquaintance with that odd club. For George Ignatieff had been deputy to General Andrew McNaughton during Canada's first stint on the Council from 1948 to 1949. His family background also gave him unusual qualifications for this position. As he relates with humour in his memoirs, *The Making of a Peacemonger*, his father was the Tsar's last education minister; and his father's father, an adventurous soldier and diplomat, who settled a border dispute with China in 1860 and then rode on horseback from Peking to St. Petersburg—a two-month journey—to bring first word of it to the Tsar, and to stop the British and French from undermining the treaty!

Although communications have improved to an extent that would astonish the earlier Count Ignatieff, diplomacy has become increasingly more complicated. In the following excerpt from a conversation that took place in 1986, George Ignatieff describes how Security Council work changed in the 20 years separating the two periods during which he was involved with it and, particularly, how Canada's role changed. He also recounts episodes from the worst crisis during his time on "the hot seat"—the Six-Day War between the Arab states and Israel in June 1967—and he gives three reasons to explain why Pierre Trudeau "went sour" on the United Nations for a dozen years.

First, here is George Ignatieff on the changes he witnessed over those 20 years: "In 1948, the Americans had an assured majority in the Council and in the General Assembly. And therefore the game in each case was to isolate the Soviets and get through whatever vote it was. The Cold War had started from the beginning of the UN, and it had erupted particularly over the business of the U.S. proposal for an international agency to control the production and use of atomic energy. The dividing point was the fact that Bernard Baruch [the U.S. representative on the Atomic Energy Commission] insisted on the Council taking a position supporting, in principle, his plan for establishing a world monopoly for controlling all atomic activities. He insisted on a vote and insisted that the Western nations stand up and be counted, so that he could say, 'Well, the Soviets turned it down.' I said at the time that Canada should not break with the Americans on a matter of such importance. But I was wrong, as I admit in my book; for the opportunity was missed to explore the possibilities of arresting atomic proliferation and banning atomic weapons by some less far-reaching proposals which would have been acceptable to the U.S.S.R.

"Nevertheless, during McNaughton's time on the Council, Canada was seen [to have] importance as a mediator, independent of the Americans. In the Kashmir issue, the Indians looked to Canada [to play] a conciliatory role because of our Commonwealth connection. And in the case of Indonesia, the Dutch looked to us as mediators because of Canada's role in liberating Holland. The Indonesians didn't know us, but they felt that we were at least a non-colonial power and could be a mediator. They didn't trust the Americans, who were already showing signs of an imperialist policy in Asia; nor [did they trust] the British. So, right from the start, although we didn't look for business, we were forced by circumstances of being a non-colonial power with

Commonwealth ties into the Kashmir and Indonesian situations. In March 1949, after fighting had resumed in Java, General McNaughton introduced a resolution in the Security Council that helped open the way to a Round Table Conference at The Hague, and then to the independence of Indonesia in December.

"As well as being non-colonial, we had ended World War II as one of the chief providers. Another factor that's not generally known is that, through Pearson, we were the founders of the Food and Agriculture Organization, launched in Quebec City. And it was over UNRRA ([the] United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) that Mackenzie King enunciated the 'functional' principle, that Canada must have a decision-making role in matters where we make a contribution of supplies, food and so on. This was in contrast to his acceptance of being left out of the strategic direction of the war, for which he didn't want to take responsibility. The result was our deep involvement with the International Civil Aviation Organization, and through Brock Chisholm with WHO [first director-general of the World Health Organization]. Thus Canada, under Pearson's leadership laid the foundations for a Canadian policy of internationalism, especially through multilateral [forums].

"When the first UN regional economic commission was set up in 1947, it was for Asia; and, to our surprise, we were appointed there. I was named Canadian delegate, and indeed was made chairman of the founding meeting in New York. I remember asking some Indian and Australian friends there why Canada should be a member of the economic commission for Asia, and they said, 'You can't have a dairy without the cows!'

"The strange thing[, which] has never been really analysed the way it should be, was that we lost a certain innocence and independence from the United States in defence policy from the time of the Korean War onwards. It was then that a series of bilateral negotiations concerning the use of Canadian territory and airspace for deployment and continental defence began, leading to the North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD) in 1958.

"Setting aside personalities (of the Secretary-General and others), the whole nature of the United Nations went through a basic change in the 1960s after Paul Martin's famous initiative in breaking the stalemate over the admission of new members. I am not suggesting that Martin's initiative was undesirable. I certainly think it had to happen. Obviously a global organization had to have its new members. But the consequence, in terms of the Western nations finding themselves in a minority, had not been anticipated or understood. I think that some Americans had understood it, but we in the Canadian Government certainly hadn't. I don't remember any study being done, either before or immediately after Paul Martin made this initiative, about [the] effect [that] this would have on the UN.

"We had got along well with the Latin Americans, but it turned out that the Asians and Africans were not [such easy colleagues]. Our connections with the Commonwealth gave us illusions that, somehow or other, it would all be very congenial through use of the 'Commonwealth Club' and its tradition of consultations. But that wasn't so. We were simply faced with the fact that the Afro-Asian bloc could muster a majority in the Assembly and could stop a

majority in the Security Council. They had the same kind of veto in effect, if they acted together, that the permanent members had. That produced a totally different ball game. We had to work really hard and maneuver with the Third World representatives to get nine favourable votes, even to get something on the Council's agenda, let alone to get any resolution through.

"And how difficult it was to arrive at the magic figure of nine! I discovered this when Canada took the initiative with Denmark in May 1967 to have the Security Council cope with the threat of hostilities in the Middle East just before the outbreak of the Six-Day War. On May 16, Egypt had demanded the removal of the troops of the United Nations Emergency Force [UNEF] from buffer zone points east of Suez. It was a move intended to support Syria, which feared a full-scale attack from Israel, by taking over positions at Sharm al-Sheikh that commanded the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

"When UNEF was thrown out, on the face of it, logically and objectively, you would think the Security Council would meet promptly, as it was intended to do under the UN Charter, or else that the General Assembly would be brought into special session under the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution, and it would be recognized that certain consequences should be prevented, possibly including hostilities. I argued this with Secretary-General U Thant at a private meeting of states contributing to UNEF; I argued this in the Security Council on May 24, when Hans Tabor and I succeeded in getting a day's debate which ended without a vote on our resolution. But no! The Afro-Asians stood behind Egypt and were determined (as they said) 'to teach Israel and the Americans a lesson.'

"Not until after Israel had won this war in June with all the military aid the Americans gave them and had suddenly turned the tables on its opponents, did attitudes change. Then we were back in a situation where co-operation was suddenly restored. Syria and the Soviet Union called for an urgent meeting of the Council at a special night session, which promptly and unanimously accepted a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire.

"This really leads to the issues which I think caused Pierre Trudeau's disillusionment with the UN. The Soviets and the French were more obstructive of peacekeeping operations then than they are now; they had refused to pay any share of the UN Congo operations. What I was faced with when I took over as ambassador in 1966 was a resolution that had been cooked up by the Department of External Affairs, which would require a fraction of the contributions of member states to the UN's regular budget—about two or three per cent—to be assigned to peacekeeping. The Soviets were opposing this resolution, which would go through the General Assembly process, and the Indians were representing the Afro-Asians in opposition.

"This subject became one of the reasons why, I surmise, Trudeau went sour on the United Nations. He was sent down by Pearson (whose Parliamentary Secretary he was in 1966) to work with me, and I asked him to represent Canada on the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly; and this whole question and the Canadian resolution was referred to this committee [on which every member state has representation]. Through caucusing with the Latin American group, who nearly always worked with us, we managed to get

a majority on that committee. Then, when it came to the General Assembly itself, the Indians got up and said that this resolution had not received a two-thirds majority in the committee, that the Soviet Union and France were known to oppose it, and that it was a Canadian-Irish fad that not only was going to cost every member state more money but [that] would divide the whole United Nations. It was true that the Soviet Union was opposed, but the Indians took the lead in the Assembly debate, and our resolution failed to receive the required majority.

"Trudeau seemed to lose faith in the United Nations until nearly the end of his term of office as prime minister, when he suddenly came 'round to the idea of using the UN for launching his proposal for a strategy of suffocation at the First Special Session on Disarmament. Back in 1968 and 1969 I could hardly get him to the UN; he came only once when we were on the Security Council. This disillusioning experience in 1966, I believe, had a great deal to do with it. He had heard so much about Canada's influence, and then saw right before his eyes how we were totally outvoted and outmaneuvered by the Afro-Asians on what were for us important issues.

"Two other things annoyed him, when he was down at the UN in 1966. One was that he felt that Canada was shilly-shallying on the Chinese representation issue, that we should come out clearly [that] we recognized Communist China or we didn't, and that this 'Two China' thing was really for the birds. He felt strongly that this was nonsense, and he was absolutely right. He was very frank in saying he was recommending to Pearson that we shouldn't touch this China–Taiwan scheme, that you either recognize China or you recognize Taiwan, and that it was time to recognize China.

"The other issue was South Africa. This was strange, in the light of what he didn't do when he became prime minister; but he said that we were being inconsistent on South Africa, that if we opposed *apartheid* and had voted (as we did in December 1966) in the General Assembly that Namibia had to be separated from South Africa and that South Africa's mandate no longer applied, then we had to act on this vote and disconnect economically and do something about *apartheid*. But when he became prime minister, he did not win the day on this issue in Cabinet—or did not persist with these feelings. I wasn't told what happened.

"But to return to the Security Council, it is still a part of the United Nations where you can achieve really worthwhile results. Its worth is often underestimated. In a situation where there is obviously a state of tension between superpowers, their representatives are there and they constantly meet; and at least there is less chance of stumbling into a confrontation over some regional dispute, while gaining time for some compromise either at the UN or outside it.

"I personally saw this in 1967 in the Six-Day War, and it made a great impression on me. There was Khrushchev backing the Arab states and particularly Egypt, which the Soviet Union pushed into what it thought would be a diplomatic coup, including putting the screws on Sharm al-Sheikh and Israel's access to oil. But when they found they had miscalculated and Israel was about to occupy Damascus, they not only used the 'hot line' and accepted an

immediate cease-fire; the Soviet Prime Minister Aleksey Kosygin came and met President Johnson, and the senior deputy foreign minister Vassily Kuznetsov came and changed the top members of the Soviet delegation to the UN for having blundered and given them the wrong cue.

"The Soviets admitted in private more or less that they had made a mistake. 'Now where do we go from here?' they asked. And out of this *mea culpa* act there came, after some more maneuverings, the Soviet acceptance of Resolution 242 in the Security Council. [This resolution, adopted unanimously in November 1967, defined the framework for a peaceful settlement and based it on twin principles: withdrawal of Israeli troops from territory occupied in the recent conflict, coupled with an acknowledgement of the right of all states in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.]

"In a way, the momentum towards Resolution 242 started with our consultations with the Latin American bloc, who saw the strength of the argument which Mike Pearson had originally put forward at Suez in 1956. This was that it was no use demanding that Israel should withdraw to the armistice lines of 1949; what was required was that wherever they withdrew to would be recognized by its neighbours. We renewed that argument with the Latin Americans in 1967 and they said, 'In international law that is the right line.' Starting with the Latin Americans, that view began to spread in the Afro-Asian group. When the Soviets called (under the Uniting for Peace resolution) a special session of the General Assembly, they found to their great surprise that their delegation could not get a clear majority for a simple resolution demanding the withdrawal of Israel to the armistice lines.

"So then the issue bounced back to the Security Council. Lord Caradon was asked to co-ordinate the gathering of sponsors for what became Resolution 242, whose drafting was largely in the hands of the British. But Canada worked on bits and pieces of the resolution, and some of it had been tried out in the Assembly session.

"In the Security Council in 1948, it was a simple game of getting a majority to legitimize an American-led Western decision. Now it is a very sophisticated game of getting any kind of decision. Therefore, the easiest thing is to say, 'If we cannot get a clearcut decision, let's wind up the whole bloody works!' But that makes no sense. First of all, the Council is a constant point of contact between the great powers. Secondly, it gains time for some sensible action. Thirdly, if things get too dangerous between the two sides, you can conceive of a situation—as happened in 1967—when they suddenly reverse their positions and reach common ground, preferably by consensus rather than by vote."

William Epstein
Tlatelolco and the Golden Age of Détente

William "Bill" Epstein has been longer at the United Nations and working officially on disarmament than "anyone in history," he once said. Born and raised in Alberta, he had enlisted as a private and was a captain at Canadian military headquarters in London in 1945. Because he had a law degree, he was there dealing with claims made for the damage done by Canadian troops in Britain. One day at the end of 1945, he was telephoned from Vincent Massey's office at Canada House and asked if he was interested in a job in the UN Secretariat working for the Preparatory Commission meeting in London. "It was like asking a man in the desert, would he like a drink of water." He started immediately and was still in army uniform in Church House when photographers from *The Times* of London and *Life* magazine came by. He recalls those early days:

"There was a Russian in charge of the Political and Security Council Affairs section, and I went to work in that section. In those days everyone worked on everything. One night, when things were hectic during the Preparatory Commission, there was Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the executive secretary, in his shirtsleeves rolling off documents on a Gestetner machine. There was a tremendous feeling of working together and, although in the background there were real political problems between East and West, in the Secretariat we were working on technical things and there was really very good co-operation.

"Then, when they decided to move the UN headquarters to the United States, we went to New York in March 1946, where the UN's temporary office was in Hunter College. We had to start from scratch, and very soon we started meetings of the Security Council and some meetings were held in the Henry Hudson Hotel. Later we moved to the Sperry plant at Lake Success. It was a bit chaotic in terms of facilities, but it was marvellous in terms of morale. Everybody had a gleam in his eyes about this wonderful new body. Everyone thought we might get a so-called international police force under Article 43 of the Charter and that would give real teeth to the UN.... But by late 1946, the Baruch Plan for the control of atomic energy had been vetoed by the Russians, who said it was intended to preserve an American monopoly; the 1946 peace conference in Europe had broken down; and the Russians started more or less taking over Eastern Europe. Then there was no basis on which they could reach agreement on establishing an international police force."

Bill Epstein remained in the Political and Security Council Affairs department until his official retirement "on grounds of statutory senility" in 1973. His departmental head was always a Russian and he says, "I got on with the intelligent Russians marvellously, but there were only two really bright ones. One of them was Anatoly Dobrynin, who became the Soviet ambassador in Washington soon after leaving the UN. You could talk to them frankly...." He was acting chief of the Middle East section during the exciting years 1946 through 1950 and then became head of Disarmament Affairs for 23 years. Since his official retirement he has held an emeritus position as a senior special fellow at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. He increased his Canadian ties by becoming a visiting professor at four Canadian universities from 1974 to 1978 and also chairperson of the Canadian

Pugwash Group of scientists. He has written tirelessly and expertly on arms control and disarmament issues.

Here Epstein talks about the period from 1959 to 1972, which he calls "the golden years of developing détente," and in particular about the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco under which the Latin American states turned their region into the first and only nuclear-weapons-free zone in an inhabited part of the earth:

"All during the Cold War there was no progress on disarmament. Zilch! Then when Khrushchev came in, things changed a little bit. And we had the International Geophysical Year (1958 to 1959) and that led to the first treaty [that] had anything to do with security in it: the Antarctic Treaty, which banned all military activities there and provided for complete, free, total inspection, by each side of the other side.... In 1959, Khrushchev was invited to the United States, and things began to ease slightly. Then, after years of deadlock, they finally set up in 1962 the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee—five from the West, five from the East and eight non-aligned—and it started meeting in Geneva. I was appointed deputy representative of the Secretary-General.

"There had been some small bilateral moves during the Cold War, like setting up a group of experts on a nuclear test ban or on surprise attacks. But this was the first multilateral effort with so many countries involved. The first agreement they reached was the Hot-Line Agreement in June 1963. Then came Kennedy's June 10 speech in Washington and his unilateral suspension of nuclear testing, which led to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and that was the first slow beginning of détente. That was given a big move forward by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The superpowers had a strong interest in not letting others go nuclear, an interest which heated up after France exploded a bomb in 1961 and China in 1964. They began to worry about the 'Nth country' problem, and that's when they began to work on non-proliferation, and they finally came up with the treaty in 1968.

"When the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee started, U Thant said to me (because I was his representative): 'The big powers neither need nor want our help except for what they consider setting the table and doing the dishwashing. They don't want it in any substantial matter. But the eight smaller countries on the committee, they need our help. You help them.' So I began my friendly relations with these non-aligned countries: Sweden, Yugoslavia, Mexico, Brazil, Ethiopia and Nigeria, Egypt and India.

"I had better not go into details of how much I was consulted by them; the Secretariat is supposed to act when an organ or a body requests it, not an individual country. Well, all right, let me put it this way. They consulted me because they didn't want to appear to put forward proposals that others might think silly or impractical, and many of them showed me their draft speeches. I was carrying out U Thant's instructions. The eight non-aligned countries remained the same (until the committee was enlarged and was called the Conference on Disarmament [CD]) but of course the delegation leaders changed. I became an unofficial consultant to many of them, and ever since then I have had very close relations with the non-aligned countries.

"The two superpowers were at first co-chairmen of the Disarmament Committee, and we were working for them and the committee. The co-chairmen ran everything with an iron hand. The Final Document of the first Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 got rid of the institution of co-chairmanship and made it rotating. Because of that it was possible to get France and China to join the CD, because they weren't about to join it under the old system of two-power paramountcy or, as the Chinese called it, hegemony.

"We started having quite a few treaties in the period of détente, starting with the Antarctic Treaty. We had nine multilateral treaties that were mainly negotiated in the committee (or, later, the Conference on Disarmament). Two that we considered really important were the Partial Test Ban [Treaty] in 1963 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] in 1968; and following the NPT, the two superpowers started the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty] talks in 1969. Then we got multilaterally the Seabed Treaty in 1971 [forbidding the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed] and the Biological Weapons Convention. They were followed by the EnMod, the Environmental Modification Treaty. The Outer Space Treaty in 1967 we didn't negotiate—that was done by the Outer Space Committee—but it was all part of the détente period. And there was Tlatelolco, also, in 1967.

"If you want to hear a story, I'll tell you about Tlatelolco—that's a suburb of Mexico City where we met—and how I prepared the first draft of the main portions of the Tlatelolco Treaty for Garcia Robles overnight.

"Secretary-General U Thant appointed me as a technical consultant to the group, at the request of Garcia Robles, who was then the under-secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Mexican Government. We had worked together in the early days of the Security Council Department, when he was director of the Political Division and I was working under him as acting chief of the Middle East Section. I was sent down to Mexico City and, for the first day or two, everyone was correct but somewhat cool. Then, after they learned that I was a Canadian and not an American, they became palsy-walsy. I found that [to be] a very interesting experience, because the atmosphere in Mexico City was a little different from what it is in New York.

"Then, things went along well and I was called upon to make some statements to help promote the idea of the nuclear-free zone. Actually Garcia Robles needed me for the UN point-of-view to support the whole idea because, you know, the Latin American countries were giving up unilaterally the possibility of 'going nuclear' without any assurance of a *quid pro quo* from the nuclear powers. We were prepared with lots of papers and books on the whole problem of verification and everything else. Nobody ever read them; they called the big book 'the white elephant,' and it took them two years to translate it all into Spanish!

"Anyway, after we had been there five days, Garcia Robles called me in and he said, 'Bill, you know, this is going fine and I think we should aim at having another session of the committee [the preparatory committee on the Denuclearization of Latin America].' I said, 'Fine.' He said, 'I think that we

ought to give them a draft treaty or elements of a draft treaty.' And I said, 'Good, that's a wonderful idea.' And he said, 'But look, if they go home without a piece of paper and a draft treaty, we'll have to start the whole discussion over again.... We have got to have a draft treaty for them to take home now, so that they can start arguing about it in their governments and be ready for the next session.' And I said 'What does "now" mean?' He said, 'Like tomorrow morning.' And I said, 'I don't believe you!' He said, 'Yes, because we are going to end things tomorrow. (This was Thursday.) Oh, you know, you've drafted lots of treaties. Put down the best you can. You can have the legal adviser of my department to help you.'

"So his legal adviser, Sergio Gonzales Galves, and I sat down at five o'clock and they gave us a bottle of Scotch and plates full of lots of sandwiches and, by God, by five o'clock in the morning we had the draft of not a complete treaty with all the usual clauses but the guts of the treaty. And we sent it to him and he was delighted and said, 'Fine.'

"I never thought we could do it. We argued all night long, because we had to work out the provisions banning nuclear weapons and the verification measures. Tlatelolco has got the best verification provisions of any treaty ever entered into, except of course the Antarctic Treaty which says anyone can go anywhere with advance notice. We spent about an hour arguing about the principle of verification by the public, which we called psychological verification. Members of the public (or so we argued) should have the right to notify the agency of suspected violations by their own government. We argued about that for a long time and finally decided that, if we put that in, it would scare too many people off the whole treaty. So we dropped the idea—a pity.

"Still, we had lots of ideas about verification. Article 3 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was copied directly out of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and it is a standard now. On certain occasions in the treaty we permit on-site inspection but, if they don't find anything, the country that asks for the inspection has got to pay; and there are a few other things like that. The supervisory council in Mexico could ask for much more information than could the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Anyhow, we had a barrel of fun that night—in 12 hours, we drafted the elements of the treaty. Afterwards, we had two or three more sessions of the Committee before it was adopted. Yes, it was a wonderful treaty.

"Brazil signed and ratified it. Brazil said it would do this only if four conditions were met. The first was that all the nuclear weapon powers should sign Protocol 2 of the treaty, undertaking to abide by the treaty and not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a member of the zone. The second was that foreign powers administering territories in the area would accept their being part of the nuclear weapons-free zone. That is Protocol 1. The third was that all members had to accept IAEA safeguards. I forget the fourth.

"The United Kingdom and Netherlands were the first to meet these conditions. It took a long time for the United States to do it. Part of U.S. territory is now subject to the Treaty of Tlatelolco: the U.S. cannot station or send nuclear weapons to Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, which are within the area of the nuclear-free zone.

"Now here was Garcia Robles' genius. He said that any country that wishes can waive these conditions for the purpose of the entry into force of this treaty. And the treaty would enter into force when 11 countries made this waiver. So 11 countries, starting with Mexico, did that and the treaty entered into force for them almost immediately. Brazil is a party to the treaty, but the treaty has not entered into force for Brazil because their leaders didn't waive the conditions. However, a Brazilian delegate said to me one time, 'We are going to wake up one day and find that all our conditions have been met.' It took a long time to get the Americans and Russians on board: the Americans did it first, and then the Russians.

"Argentina signed but never ratified the treaty. They promised to do so at the first Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, but the colonels would not let them. I don't know whether President Alfonsin will. I think he has told people that, if there is a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty, he will ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco. And France hasn't yet ratified Protocol 1, to say that Martinique and Guadeloupe and French Guiana are covered by the treaty, but it has ratified Protocol 2 which commits it to honour the treaty.

"Then, on the question of transiting with ships and aircraft we had a hell of a problem and I stuck my neck out a mile. I didn't even check with U Thant. I said, 'There is no way you can see what is in an aircraft flying above you; there is no way you can see what is in a submarine going through your waters—and the treaty covers a huge area of the South Atlantic and South Pacific as well as the Caribbean. My guess is also that they will never tell you whether surface vessels have nuclear weapons on board; they won't let you go and look. If you insist that they cannot have the right of transit, the Americans will never sign because they have to have the right of transit through the Panama Canal.' Look, for example, what's going on [now] between the U.S. and New Zealand.

"So I was the one to tell them to drop insistence on banning the transit of nuclear weapons in the zone. I stuck my neck out a mile, but fortunately I was in tune with U Thant. And Garcia Robles in particular supported my view. And that became that. And then the Russians criticized the treaty from hell to breakfast because it didn't ban transit [of nuclear weapons] through the zone. They were the last to sign and ratify Protocol 2, and the fact that the Chinese did it before them put big pressure on them.

"So much for Tlatelolco. It has become a model now for treaties establishing a nuclear weapons-free zone. The recent South Pacific treaty followed it to a large extent. And it was essentially what got Garcia Robles the Nobel Peace Prize. He did a lot of other things and was also the most successful mover of ideas in UN resolutions, but the treaty was his main accomplishment.

"The official name of the treaty is the 'Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,' which hardly anybody remembers. Everybody refers to it as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which everybody remembers but few can pronounce or spell. It is called that because it was negotiated and signed in the Mexican Foreign Office, which is located in this suburb of Mexico City.

"I remember the awful difficulties U Thant had in pronouncing it. I spent several sessions trying to help him. I urged him to pronounce it by syllables, Tlat-el-ol-co, and we practised that for a few minutes until he had it right. But when he came to refer to it in a speech (which he often did, as he regarded the treaty as a 'beacon light' and as a great achievement by the smaller powers without any assistance from the nuclear powers), he invariably stumbled and got it all twisted up. But he was very proud that the Latin Americans had produced it by their own efforts and with only modest help from the UN Secretariat. No other populated region of the world has succeeded in creating a nuclear-free zone.

"My conclusion after all these years with the UN is that, during periods of détente and relaxation of tensions, the nations can make lots of agreements, and these have a kind of snowball and feedback effect to promote détente and more agreements. From my point of view, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, on which I worked very hard, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco were the high points, and I also helped get the Seabed Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention. At the same time in 1972—I was still there, and keeping U Thant informed—the superpowers made a good deal in the SALT-I Treaty. Another thing that I regard as a highlight (I was still in the Secretariat and working in the field with UNITAR [United Nations Institute for Training and Research] and also was a Special Adviser in the Canadian delegation) was the Final Document of the first Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. It was merely a declaration, but it was still a tremendous achievement. That was the highwater mark; after that things started to disintegrate.

"The last treaty that was ratified in the nuclear field was the 1972 SALT-I Treaty. There were 8 multilateral and 13 bilateral arms control treaties in those years. Three American-Soviet bilateral treaties in the nuclear field—the Threshold Test Ban in 1974, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty in 1976 and the SALT-II Treaty in 1979—were never ratified by the Americans. And the superpowers haven't signed any bilateral or multilateral nuclear treaty since SALT-II. Yes, I was lucky: I was in charge of disarmament in the UN Secretariat during the good years—the golden years.... I'm not alone in worrying about whether we'll ever see their like again...."

George Gordon-Lennox
Helping Refugees Return Home

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was set up in January 1951, as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, in the same way as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNHCR's mandate runs for five-year periods and comes up again for renewal in December 1988. There is little likelihood the Assembly will vote to abolish it: the UNHCR now cares for some 10 million refugees scattered around the world. It has a budget of more than $500 million, raised in voluntary contributions each year, to deal with both emergencies and long-term situations.

George Gordon-Lennox started his working life as a reporter on the *Winnipeg Free Press* and moved into work with refugees after years as an information officer with the League of Red Cross Societies. He was sent to India twice: during the Bihar famine of 1967, and at the time of the exodus of 10 million people from East Pakistan in 1971. He was recruited into UNHCR in 1972, and has spent years in Latin America—and in Geneva as executive assistant to the high commissioner. Here he tells mainly of two operations, in South Sudan and Burma, where he supervised the voluntary repatriation of refugees:

"In 1972 the Addis Ababa Agreement ended the civil war that had gone on in the Sudan for 17 years. It was agreed that refugees could be repatriated, and the high commissioner—then Sadruddin Aga Khan—was asked to co-ordinate the resettlement of refugees and [the] assistance to get the South Sudan going again. Various projects [that] were started were eventually picked up by the UNDP and other agencies, but for a year we were doing a really big rehabilitation job in the region—it was enormous. The headquarters of the operation was in Khartoum (and in Geneva), and I was in charge of the local sub-office in Juba. I was 37 at the time.

"The refugees had been in five nearby countries: Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zaire and the Central African Republic. There were between 250 000 and 300 000 who returned. They came back to practically nothing, to deserted villages that had often just gone back to nature or the bush. We helped them a lot with building materials, with putting up clinics and schools, so that they could start their village again. We were at the end of nowhere, at the end of the pipeline in all its senses.

"One of the things we did was bring in fuel. They had absolutely no fuel, and it took months to bring it up the Nile from Khartoum to Juba. We were bringing it in, overland, from Kenya through Uganda in trucks. But the city of Juba and the settled part is on the west bank of the Nile and the road to Uganda is on the other side, and there was no bridge—just a broken-down old ferry crossing the river, which is about 500 m wide at that point.

"We negotiated a contribution from the Netherlands for the building of a bridge, and said we would foot the bill for the approaches to the bridge. The approaches were earthworks, and were done mostly with manual labour and a few bulldozers. The Dutch brought in a ready-made Bailey type of bridge in pieces by sea to Mombasa and overland all the way up, and a whole team to build the bridge. A huge crew came in, and in about three weeks the bridge

was operational. That has ever since made an enormous difference to communications links with the South Sudan.

"As I say, we were at the end of the pipeline. Our only communications were by radio to Khartoum and also with the points where there were refugee camps in the neighbouring countries, so we knew what convoys were coming with trucks.

"We also had an airlift from Khartoum, which came in two or three times a week—a broken-down DC-4 which chugged back and forth. We had all kinds of adventures getting it going. We had to bring in a ground power unit to start the plane's engines, and once we had to take off one of the propellers because an engine had failed and they had to go back to Khartoum empty on three engines. I remember us rustling around, trying to find equipment to remove the propeller from the plane, building a tripod ... and then watching the plane take off, all of us with our fingers crossed.

"It was a lot of fun; that was adventure in those days. I relished that kind of work. I grew up in Canada partly on a prairie farm, and I think I have some equipment, physically and mentally, for dealing with that sort of situation. But now I have just been reading that everyone is pulling out of the South Sudan because the civil war is going on again and it is totally chaotic. It is very sad...."

Off the Road from Mandalay

"In Burma there is a minority population—basically Bengali and Muslim—in a country that is Buddhist. In 1978, the Burmese government had taken some authoritarian steps in the region that borders on Bangladesh in Arakan state when they were running a census. For the Burmese army had gone in, and the people got scared and they all rushed off, and 250 000 people crossed the border into Bangladesh, although they had lived for generations in Burma. They fled by swimming or on small boats across the Naf River, which is very wide.

"But the Bangladeshis said, 'We cannot have these people. We already have too many of our own. They are refugees, and they should be allowed to go back to Burma—and the UNHCR should come and help them.' Which we did. There were camps set up in the Chittagong area, and the situation got rather tense on the border for a while and there were even a couple of shots fired between Burma and Bangladesh over this exodus of people. But eventually good sense prevailed on both sides, and they agreed the refugees could go back, and Burma even backed down and said these people were residents and should be given national identity cards.

"But then the people themselves were a bit reluctant to go back. They had been scared when the soldiers came to take the census. It took a great deal of convincing to get these people to return voluntarily—because that is the principle of repatriation. We had people in the camps, ensuring that it was voluntary—and that meant that people had to sign statements.

"I went to Rangoon when the Burmese government said it needed help to resettle the people in these villages. I stayed there about a year. We had

projects in that northern region, providing simple things like building materials, medicines, school materials—but we also provided power-tillers because in their exodus the refugees had abandoned or lost their cattle and it would take several years for them to reconstitute a herd of draught animals. The return movement started about nine months after the exodus, and it was two years before all were back.

"The UNHCR, I should explain, works through an operational partner. In the South Sudan we had several voluntary agencies, while in Burma (although we had help from UNICEF and the World Food Programme) the partner was a branch of the Burmese government. They were doing the actual work of getting the materials out to the villages. We were there to see that the donors' contributions were correctly used, and to help with any advice we could give in setting up the programs. I went out alone to Burma, and eventually had a small staff of five people.

"We were not permitted to live permanently in this region, but we could go on as many visits as we liked and stay a few days. It was a two-day trip from Rangoon just to get there. I went up there quite frequently, and we had a house which was on stilts because the land was subject to flooding. The country was fascinating and beautiful: quite high mountains inland, and then this flatland near the river where the Bengali people lived. Up in the hills there are hill-tribes, some of whom are reputed to be dangerous. When we went there we always had military escorts. We were told we were the first white people that had been in the region since the Second World War, when there was a great deal of fighting between the Allies and the Japanese. Again it was romantic and quite adventurous.

"The Burma situation was a typical example of one you cannot budget for. It happened almost overnight. The Bangladesh government appealed for help, and we didn't have any budget for it. The UNHCR has ongoing programs—we call them general programs—which are planned and for which we have a pledging conference in New York every year, after the executive committee of 41 member states (including Canada) has approved the budget. But in addition, you make a special appeal for these specific new situations as they crop up. We may make half-a-dozen special appeals a year. It gives us headaches, but I don't think one could realistically operate in any other way. There has been talk of creating a revolving fund, but I don't think donor governments are prepared to tie up their money in a fund for possible future situations.

"Most situations start out as an emergency, and fairly soon become part of the general program, budgeted for annually but continuing for a number of years. Burma was an exception because it was over with after two years. Well, that was miraculous. It really was.

"Even after the pledging conference the UNHCR operation is still hand-to-mouth throughout the year. In 1985 we had to appeal for $112 million for refugees and drought victims in the Horn of Africa, and this ate into our general program. We had to revise our program downwards and cut out some of the projects of lower priority, like school building. The refugee children had to go on in makeshift schools made out of branches. We came in with a lower

budget for general programs, which is good. We realize that we have to do really tight budgeting, and it is a no-frills program.

"The statute setting up the UNHCR says that our work has to be 'of an entirely non-political character.' That involves tightrope walking all the time. I think you have to be fully aware of all the political implications of every action you take, and try to take those actions in a purely non-political way. That may not always be very easy, either to do or to understand.... The High Commissioner spends a good deal of time talking to everyone he can to show he is non-political. The best demonstration of all this is that, when a new high commissioner is elected by the General Assembly, it is all the countries in the world who elect him.

"I'm not sure whether it is an advantage being a Canadian as a UNHCR official, but it certainly isn't a disadvantage. When I was working in Burma, the governor of the province heard I was Canadian and he was very friendly. He asked me, 'Do you think you can get me a copy of Margaret Trudeau's book?' He had read about it in *Newsweek*! No, more seriously, we have about 95 different nationalities in UNHCR. When we select someone to represent the UNHCR in a country, nationality is one factor that is taken into account and I don't remember it ever being said that being a Canadian would not go down well in such-and-such a country. People around the world still remember the Pearson days and Canada's special role in the United Nations. And I think some of that is coming back...."

Maurice Strong
The Environment: From Stockholm to Nairobi

Maurice Strong first worked at the United Nations when he was 18. He had formed, he says, "a strong desire to come to the UN. I had no influence and no connections; I just had read about the Atlantic Charter and about the formation of the United Nations at San Francisco. I determined that, somehow or other, I wanted to go to the UN. By a lucky coincidence I met in Toronto a senior French official who had come up to speak at a women's meeting."

This French official helped him get a job in 1947 on what was to be the Palestine Commission under Count Bernadotte. While it was being formed, he had a temporary job in New York as special assistant to the head of security during the General Assembly session. This job, he says, was useful experience but after five months the Palestine Commission assignment was still uncertain, and he decided to accept an opportunity to take an officer training course in the RCAF. In his own words, "I wrote in my diary at the time that it was not feasible for a person like me with no particular qualifications to work his way up in the Secretariat, and therefore the only thing to do was to go back to Canada and try to establish [myself] at the national level, in the hope that eventually they could send [me] back. And, 27 years later, that happened."

In the meantime, Maurice Strong did well in the oil industry, established himself in the wider business community and was appointed by Prime Minister Pearson to head the External Aid Office (later the Canadian International Development Agency) in 1967. Immediately he interested himself in the World Bank and the developmental aspects of the United Nations. "So I really surfaced at the UN again as the representative of Canada, with responsibilities for the UNDP [United Nations Development Programme] and other agencies."

For some years he resisted the suggestion that, in the usual shuffle of deputy ministers, he should move to another department:

"After about five years it was quite evident that they didn't want me to stay in CIDA forever and I was going to have to decide to go into another portfolio if I was going to stay with the government. And, in as much as the other portfolios were not really related to my mainstream life-interest, which was in international development, I simply did not want to do that.

"As well, I had developed a strong conviction that the emergence of the environmental issue provided a new rationale for international co-operation. I argued that man's efforts to manage the environment required a new dimension of international co-operation and might provide a new set of reasons for support for the developing nations, because those countries have custodianship of much of the world's environment, and the way in which they exercise that role will have a tremendous effect on the rest of the world.

"So I felt that perhaps here was an opportunity of coming at this whole development issue in a slightly different way. It was not the popular view, and in fact developing countries themselves were rather negative about the whole environment issue and even about the Stockholm Conference. They were concerned—and understandably—really about two things. One, that this was

another new fad of the rich and it would divert attention and even divert resources from their particular interest which was overcoming their own poverty and underdevelopment. Secondly, that the issues were issues really peculiar to the rich, issues of pollution and the by-products of the same industrial processes and urbanization that gave rise to the wealth of the industrialized countries; and their first reflex action was 'So, what's so bad about that?'

"Brazil did the international community a favour by really taking the developing view at the extreme. In effect: 'What we want is more pollution if more pollution means more industrialization. If the industrialized countries want us to co-operate, they should pay the additional costs required for that.' In fact, Brazil and other developing countries helped us reshape the agenda for the Stockholm Conference and expand the very concept of environment to embrace the essential relationship between environment and development, environment and growth.

"The Stockholm Conference began to be seen by developing countries as an important forum for broadening the perspective of the industrialized countries towards the environmental issue to include very fully the concerns of the developing countries. Gradually that view became acceptable, and it was around that view that the consensus between the industrialized and developing countries which we were able to crystallize at Stockholm really emerged. It produced an agreement at Stockholm which, at the beginning of the process, looked to be impossible.

"There were other obstacles on the Stockholm road. A political one was the issue of the two Germanys, and this kept the Soviet Union from participating. We clearly understood why they were not at the conference, and we maintained communication. I briefed the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden every day, and we made sure they were fully informed about our work. They were deeply interested, and this communication made it feasible for them to participate in the follow-up and in the creation of UNEP [United Nations Environment Programme]."

The Stockholm Conference also pioneered a format of drawing in Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) through a parallel conference. Strong explains:

"We brought the NGOs and citizens' groups into direct interaction with the government community—and that had a tremendous impact on the outcome of the conference. Not only at the conference itself was that interaction very visible, but also before the conference and in its follow-up. After all, it was the non-governmental community that first created the high degree of awareness in the public mind about the environmental issue.

"It has sometimes been said that NGOs, in holding their parallel conference (as they did at Stockholm, and later at several other world conferences), come to be so absorbed in it that it takes them away from the main conference. There is something to that argument but, after all, the NGOs can have only a limited participation in the main conference and by holding their own conference they influence the main conference far more than they could do otherwise. They create visibility, the press and media and public notice what is being said down at the alternative conference—and that in turn influences

those participating in the main conference. Then again, there is a lot of interchange among people: people from the intergovernmental conference come down to speak at the non-governmental conference, and vice versa. This kind of interchange between the two is healthy. And without it the NGOs don't have much real participation.

"In other words, the NGOs don't have to reduce their participation in the governmental conference in order to have their own conference. There is not a trade-off. It is a net plus, because in fact by having their own conference they even increase the level of their participation in the main conference. I see the argument, but I don't think it constitutes an argument for not having their own conference."

The Stockholm Conference was followed, six months later, by the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme and its location in Nairobi. It is sometimes suggested that a new UN agency was part of the original plan for the conference. Maurice Strong corrects that impression:

"I guess it was always an underlying assumption that some institutional machinery would develop. It was clear that the issues did not have a logical place in the existing machinery because they cut across so many of the other areas of interest. So the idea of a new UN agency was implicit from the start; it became explicit as we moved along in the preparations for the conference. But I always insisted that form should follow substance. In other words, we should not move too quickly into crystallizing our views on what kind of institutional machinery was needed, but that [it] should flow out of a clear definition of what was needed in terms of international co-operation.

"Therefore, while we did have an institutional section in our agenda, the discussions on machinery came towards the latter part of our preparations. We succeeded in keeping them on the basis that they followed the substantive program as it emerged and that they did not develop a life of their own. In other words, the purpose of the conference was not to create an institution, but to decide what needed to be done and then to decide what international co-operation was required to make that happen. And out of that the institutional question arose."

The proposal to locate the agency in a developing country surfaced during the UN General Assembly in late 1972, when Kenya took a strong initiative, arguing that the headquarters of all other global UN organizations were in the industrialized world and that finally here was one that should be in the developing world.

"I personally had two reactions. One was that the principle was correct, that the developing world was entitled to a headquarters and that Nairobi would be an appropriate place. But, on the other hand, an environmental organization was not the best organization for such a location. This is because the environmental issue cannot be dealt with by itself, but needs to be dealt with by influencing other institutions whose policies and activities and constituencies in turn affect the environment. Therefore, its headquarters should probably be a place where it is closely accessible to other organizations—probably Geneva or Paris. The developing world's understandable desire to have a world headquarters should be satisfied by having one of the others that can be

more self-standing: for example, UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development].

"That reaction was all informal; I did not intrude into the formal discussions. In fact, the whole idea developed so much momentum that nothing would stop it, and I then took the view, 'Well, if it's going to happen, let's make sure it works.' Operationally, it was going to create problems, and it did. But politically, it could be turned into a positive matter. So, as soon as I realized it was going to happen, I felt my job was to try to make the best of it.

"My becoming executive director of UNEP had a strong relationship to that. I had only a two-year leave of absence from the Canadian government, and I had made it known that I would not accept any permanent appointment from any organization that resulted from the Stockholm Conference. I did that for two reasons: one, I felt it would make me more objective in handling the issues—I was personally a bit disgusted with the way that people normally try to turn these things into a career opportunity for themselves; and, secondly, I had undertaken to return to Canada.

"When it began to be clear that the location would be in Nairobi, the OECD countries including Canada came to me and said, 'We know you said you wouldn't be a candidate, but the work that all of us have done at Stockholm could well be lost if, in addition to having to accept a location in a developing country which many people have doubts about, we have to open up the whole question of executive head and have a real competition for that post.' Everyone, rightly or wrongly, had confidence in me at that stage. I was a known quantity, and they felt that opening up a race for the top job would get the new organization off to a bad start.

"So I was persuaded that perhaps I should head it up to start with, but I made it clear that I would do so for only the period needed to get it properly launched. I would take a full term, because I did not want to be a lame duck from the start, but it would be quietly understood with the sponsoring governments that I would probably leave somewhere before my first term finished.

"I would never have been the first head of UNEP, had it not been for the decision to locate the organization in Nairobi. Of course, I like Nairobi; I liked the idea, too. I felt it was very challenging to establish the world's first organization in a developing country.

"UNEP started off with operational disadvantages. It had to influence other organizations that have an impact on the environment, and being at a distance from these organizations—as well as Nairobi being at a distance from various world centres—produced difficulties. Also, Kenya is a good country, a beautiful country, but it lacked the basic infrastructure to run a world organization in five languages, and was short of translation and secretarial services. As for recruiting personnel from all over the world, there are lots of people who would like to live in Africa for a couple of years, but not that many who want to spend their whole life there. We had in our first crew as good a team as you could field in any organization, even the World Bank. But, the fact is, there has been a lot of turnover at the top. So there were special disadvantages, although they were largely overcome.

"The night of the General Assembly vote to create UNEP, I took off from New York to plant the flag of the new organization in Nairobi. That was my very first job. After that, a very important task was to establish the co-operation of other agencies, particularly those within the UN system. It was one thing getting co-operation for the conference and another thing getting them to move over and make room for us in the permanent family of UN organizations. That wasn't easy, but it was feasible because we had strong political support. Also the General Assembly had provided for an Environmental Co-ordination Board (of which I was chair) which was an instrument through which we could enlist co-operation. As well, the Environment Fund, with $100 million over five years, represented new money.

"UNEP has now established itself as a permanent part of the UN system, and has been accepted as such. That does not mean that everything is smooth and fine. In any family or any system of organizations, including very much governments, there is a certain degree of competition and rivalry from department to department, agency to agency. UNEP is subject to the same general institutional rivalries that characterize the rest of them. In the environment, because of the nature of the issue, it requires more collaboration and co-ordination. But the problem is not any longer that people don't think UNEP should be there. There is really a rather high degree of co-operation with UNEP.

"As for programs, one of the earliest initiatives was the Regional Seas Program, and it is clearly one of the most important. I was involved in that even before the Stockholm Conference. It is one of the things that wouldn't have happened without UNEP's initiative, or at least would have taken a long time to happen and wouldn't have happened as effectively or soon.

"And while I was still with UNEP we began the moves to try to combat desertification. Mustapha Tolba [Strong's successor as executive director], because of his professional competence and his knowledge of the area, as an Egyptian, was always in the lead in that, and the UN Conference on Desertification was held under his overall leadership after I left. But it was an initiative we had identified early on, and it was clearly an important one, particularly for the continent of Africa.

"One last point about relations with the private sector. There are many businessmen who have been resistant to efforts to get into their field with suggestions as to what they should do about the environment. We still have that, but the tension has (if anything) been ameliorated by UNEP's presence, not exacerbated. When I was there, and even more since, UNEP has become one of the organizations most closely consulting with the private sector. In 1985, they had a big 'World Industry Conference on Environmental Management' with some of the top industrialists. We created, when I was there, a liaison group of top world businessmen. The issue itself intrinsically requires tension with the private sector, but I think UNEP has been a very positive factor. It doesn't solve all the problems, but it certainly created a framework for doing so."

George Davidson
Trying to Co-ordinate—In a Jungle

The most senior post held by a Canadian at the United Nations was that of under-secretary-general in charge of the Department of Administration and Management. George Davidson was appointed to that position by Kurt Waldheim in 1972, and held it for seven years. He was in charge of the budget and the financial affairs of the United Nations itself and of its personnel matters (but not of subsidiary organs such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), nor of the specialized agencies).

Those years were difficult financially because of high rates of inflation and volatile exchange rates. The U.S. dollar, which is the currency in which member states make their assessed contributions, dropped during that time to half its value against the Swiss franc and, since 25 per cent of the budget is spent in Swiss francs in Geneva where 10 organizations of the UN system and some 7 000 staff are based, this created a major problem. He recalls today: "That 25 per cent component of the budget was very costly in terms of U.S. dollars. Dick Foran [the Canadian who became controller of Financial Services in 1982] knows what I am talking about. His extra costs in 1986, resulting from the sharp decline of the U.S. dollar since January will amount to more than $30 million. This is typical of the hazards of trying to manage the finances of a worldwide organization like the United Nations."

George Davidson is one of the more famous—and colourful—of Ottawa mandarins. He took a degree in classics at Harvard, and wrote his doctoral thesis in Latin, intending to become a teacher. But those were Depression years, and he ended up in his home province of British Columbia as superintendent of Welfare. He moved to Ottawa in 1942 to take over from Charlotte Whitton as head of the Canadian Welfare Council, where he became a prominent advocate of family allowances. In 1944, when the department of Health and Welfare was formed, Davidson was made deputy minister and, over the next 16 years, helped to pioneer a great deal of social welfare legislation. After another eight years in Immigration and at the Treasury Board, he was appointed president of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in 1968 by Prime Minister Lester Pearson and held that post "for four-and-a-half fascinating years"—enlivened by strikes, by arguments over separatist influences and by rumours of "kickback" scandals.

George Davidson had for years been a member of the Canadian delegation to sessions of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), starting in 1946 when it was decided to create UNICEF. Among other tasks which he undertook at the UN, he was enlisted by Dag Hammarskjöld to chair, in 1960 and 1961, a committee that revamped the whole pension system of the United Nations. So throughout the first 15 years he had a close view of the evolution of the UN system and, in particular, of the shortcomings of the Economic and Social Council, of which he was president in 1946. Under Articles 63 and 64 of the UN Charter, ECOSOC was given the role of co-ordinating the work of the specialized agencies in economic and social co-operation. Davidson tells what happened in that all-important matter of co-ordination:

"The role of ECOSOC simply withered. If you read the Charter, ECOSOC was supposed to be the co-ordinating mechanism, and one of the

delegations that was most insistent on its being given a strong co-ordinating role at San Francisco was the Canadian delegation, [which] played a major part in writing that section of the Charter that deals with co-ordination. I have always been unhappy about the way in which I think Canada abandoned that position and weakened its resolve to assure a strong role for ECOSOC in this matter.

"In 1946, when the United Nations began to implement these provisions, one of the first things it did through ECOSOC was to enter into negotiating a 'relationship agreement' with the International Labour Organization [ILO]. Now the ILO was the imperial dragon; it had been created by the Treaty of Versailles [in 1920] at the end of World War I. The ILO took the position that 'We were here long before the United Nations was ever thought of, and we will be here long after it has gone.' So very difficult negotiations took place, and they resulted in the ILO being given a much larger measure of autonomy and sovereignty than had been contemplated in the co-ordinating articles of the Charter.

"That cemented the position of the agencies *vis-à-vis* the United Nations: these were two sovereign states negotiating, equal in power and authority. There was no such thing as a recognition of the overriding position of the United Nations. And while I recognize that the specialized agencies' role should not be regarded as being subservient, I think that if co-ordination is to work at all there must be some degree of effective influence exercised by a co-ordinating authority. The role of ECOSOC, to my mind, was largely undermined by these negotiations.

"My first job in 1946, as a member of the Canadian delegation to the third session of ECOSOC, was to serve on a small group charged with negotiating a similar relationship agreement with other agencies. Invariably these specialized agencies, like FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization], UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization], ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] and all the others, took the position that they must have the same rights, privileges and autonomy as ILO. So you broke right there the effectiveness of the co-ordinating role of ECOSOC.

"A second thing happened to undermine ECOSOC. When it became clear that the Russians were not going to join the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, there arose a concern that, if ECOSOC were to exercise a strong co-ordinating role over this Bretton Woods group of organizations and also the specialized agencies such as FAO, the Russians might be able to exert influence over the policies involving these agencies without having to assume the responsibilities of membership. Therefore, the enthusiasm and zeal with which Canada, the U.S. and others had drafted the co-ordinating articles of the Charter diminished considerably when they saw this problem. The result was that the relationship agreements between ECOSOC and the Bank and Fund are even weaker than the agreements with the specialized agencies. There were, in fact, two streams of international negotiations that produced, on the one hand, the Bretton Woods group of institutions and, on the other, the United Nations system and they never came together to form a completely unified and harmonious whole.

"There have been ineffective efforts at co-ordination since, but the battle was lost. In 1948 I was chair of a small group set up by ECOSOC which tried to examine the programs of the specialized agencies and eliminate overlapping. It was a very unsuccessful exercise. There have been numerous attempts since then, the most recent being the work of the Committee on Restructuring of the United Nations System, and again during the period of the North–South dialogue, when the developing countries hoped to bring pressure on the Bank and Fund to change their policies and particularly their system of weighted voting. Nothing happened, except recognition of the fact that co-ordination takes place feebly with the agencies and not at all with the Bank and Fund. The developing world, which has the majority of votes in the General Assembly, cannot bring to bear its voting power to influence in any significant way the policies of the Bank or Fund.

"There are some other bodies. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) is a group of individuals who are supposed to be elected for their expertise to look each year at the United Nations budget and advise the General Assembly through the Fifth Committee whether to approve it or [to] make reductions; they are only incidentally involved in co-ordination. Over the years, they have tended less and less to act as independent experts and more and more to reflect the views of their governments.

"The Committee for Program Co-ordination [CPC] endeavours to examine the substance of programs in the same way as the ACABQ does for budgetary matters. And then there is ACC, the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, on which sit the heads of agencies, the chief executives, presided over by the Secretary-General. They are the imperial heads of the United Nations family; seldom is any one of them prepared to concede one iota of his theoretical, let alone his actual, jurisdiction.

"I'm sad to say that none of those co-ordinating bodies, with the exception of the ACABQ, is effective. They have a meeting in July between the ACC and CPC, which is a sort of ritual dance accompanied by meaningless speeches. So co-ordination has never really worked in the United Nations. It is a morass ... a jungle....

"I can remember, in the early years of ECOSOC, we were concerned about overlapping, and we asked each of the agencies to examine its programs and report to us, and we examined the budgets ourselves. And we said, 'Now, here is an area which is described as Arid Lands and we think there is a great deal of overlapping. For FAO is involved in it, ILO is involved, UNESCO is involved. There must be a lot of overlapping.'

"But then they answered. FAO said: 'The Charter of FAO clearly establishes that FAO has jurisdiction because of its work in agriculture. The desert bloomed in earlier centuries. It is FAO's task to restore that. So don't tell us to pull in our horns and get out of the way for others.' Then UNESCO followed: 'Science! Scientific research is needed to restore these lands and science is part of our mandate.' ILO: 'Workers, labour are required....' WHO: 'Health is an important factor....' Each of them claimed jurisdiction, based on the broad mandate set out in its Charter, and looked on ECOSOC's attempts to co-ordinate as intrusions upon its sovereign powers. As a result,

there was really no way to prevent overlapping ... because the role of ECOSOC was never really accepted by the agencies.

"So we moved away from co-ordination and into the era of what was called in the jargon 'concerted action.' Now, 'concerted action' is different from co-ordination because by definition it does not require a central co-ordinating body such as ECOSOC. Everyone had the same sovereignty, and nobody could tell anybody else what to do. So 'concerted action' was the buzzword for a while. Then we got into the 'lead agency' era, where there would be a joint activity, and it was recognized that there were a number of agencies in the picture, but one agency was acknowledged as predominant. That came up during the 1960s. When Jacko [Sir Robert Jackson] did his Capacity Study in the late 1960s, he again ran into the problem of finding a co-ordinating mechanism that could work and he began to speak about 'one voice.' These were all buzzwords that hovered around the theme of co-ordination."

George Davidson was somewhat less skeptical in a speech he made in September 1979, just after his retirement from the United Nations. He spoke about how a "common system" of personnel management (if not policy-making) embracing the central organization and the family of agencies did work in practice most of the time, about how the UN bureaucracy was not excessively large and about how the increase of employees hired on fixed-term (two to five years) appointments had not undermined the efficiency of this international civil service or loyalty to the United Nations. Here are a few excerpts from that speech:

"All [agencies] are joined together in what is known as the United Nations common system, which seeks to assure common salary standards, fringe benefits and allowances, conditions of work, personnel policies and a single joint pension fund for the entire system.

"It cannot be said that the common system functions with 100 per cent perfection. There is much friction and constant bickering as the agency representatives meet quarterly to resolve their differences.... By and large, however, all agencies being accountable for the most part, to the same governments, and realizing the dangers of being played off one against the other, accept the necessity of clinging together in order to survive and conform, however complaining and uncomfortably, to the common system.

"In terms of numbers, the United Nations bureaucracy ... is not overwhelmingly large. Despite the wailings and lamentations of the diplomats and delegates (most of whom belong to national bureaucracies far larger than the UN), despite their complaints that the Secretariats of the various agencies are bloated and overblown and growing at an alarming pace, the facts and figures tell quite a different story. The Secretariat of the United Nations proper, supported by the so-called regular budget, numbers between 11 000 and 14 000. For ready comparison, this is less than the police force or the sanitation department of New York City, and about the same size as the workforce of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation."

There has to be added to this core group, he went on, another 8 000 to 10 000 working for the subsidiary organs of the UN and responsible to the

General Assembly (UNICEF, UNDP, UNITAR [the United Nations Institute for Training and Research] and others); and the 13 independent specialized agencies making up the UN family (ILO, WHO, FAO and the rest) brought total numbers up to 44 000. If one wished to add the 16 000 Palestinians employed as teachers, health and relief workers ... in UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency] to look after the special needs of nearly 2 million Palestinians, and also the 12 000 military personnel serving in peacekeeping forces, "the number rises to an outside maximum of 72 000. This gives a greatly exaggerated picture of the real size of the international bureaucracy; but even so it is smaller by far than most of the national bureaucracies whose governments complain about its size.... And consider that ... United Nations personnel are serving, in one capacity or another, in something like 650 duty stations around the world."

On personnel policies, Davidson recalled that the United Nations inherited from the League of Nations (and from the British civil service) the concept of the career civil servant. "Some provision was made for the recruitment of staff on a fixed-term appointment basis—largely because the Russians and their satellites would not allow their nationals to dedicate themselves on a lifetime basis to a service which they could not control. But the fixed-term contract ... was seen as wasteful, not conducive to efficiency and likely to result in divided loyalties. Less than 25 per cent of the United Nations staff came to it in the early years on a fixed-term contract basis. The remaining 75 per cent or more—mostly British, French, Canadians, Americans, Egyptians and Indians—anchored themselves firmly in place on a lifetime basis as career international civil servants, thus perpetuating for decades to come a heavy imbalance of over-representation for these member states in the UN Secretariat."

When the "avalanche of decolonization" came and membership of the United Nations tripled between 1954 and 1979, there was a shift in recruitment policies. Article 101 of the UN Charter sets out two criteria: "the paramount consideration ... shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity," but also "due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible." Davidson commented in 1979 that the task of maintaining an effective workforce was being made considerably more difficult by policies and practices which downplayed the first criterion of efficiency, competence and integrity, "while stressing increasingly not just the broad principle but the mathematical formula[s] of equitable geographical distribution."

At the same time the overall proportion of fixed-term contracts rose from 25 per cent to almost 40 per cent. Davidson confessed that, when he joined the United Nations in 1972, he shared the concern of those who felt this trend would weaken the sense of commitment among staff members. He went on:

"After seven years of fairly close observation, however, I find myself less concerned about this alleged threat ... than I was originally. I have not been able to see a great deal of difference between the integrity, dedication or sense of commitment of fixed-term appointees and the majority of permanent staff members. If there is any discernible margin of advantage favouring the

permanent staff member in this regard, it is offset to a considerable degree by the fact that, after 30 to 35 years of the UN's existence, more and more cases seem to be showing up of 'deadwood'—persons who have been in the Secretariat too long and have outlived their usefulness, or are performing at only half-speed. As in all other public services, it is very difficult if not impossible to get rid of these people; even the relatively early age of retirement in the UN—age 60—does not provide sufficient relief. On the other hand, the fixed-term contract offers at least the possibility at the end of the term to review performance and to decide on further extension or termination of the contract."

Alan Beesley
UNCLOS-3 As a Model for Negotiations

The Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS-3 to the experts) either took 10 years, if you count only the negotiating period, or 15 years, if you include the important preliminary sessions of the UN Seabed Committee. There were results to show for this lengthiness: UNCLOS-3 produced, in the words of its president Tommy Koh, "a constitution for the oceans"—that is, for 71 per cent of the earth's surface. Those negotiators who stayed the entire course became particularly influential, even if they represented middle or even smaller powers.

Canada's representative, Alan Beesley, was one of the few who was in the forefront of these negotiations from the start in 1967 to the signing of the Convention by representatives of 119 nations at Montego Bay in December 1982. Born in Smithers, British Columbia, he worked for a private law firm in Victoria before joining the Department of External Affairs in 1956. In 1967, he had just been made head of its Legal Division. He played a leading role in the 91-nation Seabed Committee, which declared the principle that the oceans were "the common heritage of mankind" and which also agreed on the unusual, if not unprecedented, methods of conducting such a complex conference. When the Conference itself began, he was made chairman of the Drafting Committee and thus a member of the six-person "Collegium" that acted as the inner steering committee.

UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar said at the Montego Bay signing ceremony that the Convention was "like a breath of fresh air at a time of serious crisis in international co-operation and of decline in the use of international machinery for the solution of world problems." Others—and not just Canadians—have called this country's role in the remarkably successful negotiations "the greatest diplomatic achievement of Canada since Lester Pearson's diplomacy in the Middle East in 1956 and 1957."

It would take a separate book to describe the Conference and the Convention. Here Alan Beesley focuses on some of the mechanisms that were invented to bring results. For these may have more general application than the substance of UNCLOS-3 (important though that is) and may be a model for future negotiating conferences.

"There were two foundation stones for the negotiations. One was the 'package deal'; in other words, a comprehensive rather than a 'manageable' package of issues. The other was the consensus, the 'gentleman's agreement' on consensus. Both agreements were worked out in the Seabed Committee, the 'package deal' in 1970 and the consensus plan nearly three years later.

"In both cases, I chaired the negotiations, so I speak from personal knowledge when I say that the major maritime powers [the United States, Soviet Union, Britain and some other European countries] originally wanted just a 'manageable package' of issues involving navigational rights and limits of national jurisdiction, and Canada was one of the few developed countries who said, 'No, you would be making a partial solution that wouldn't stand up. You have got to look at all of the problems.' The developing countries went further and said that there was both a political and [a] legal relationship and that anything they agreed to was contingent on the final agreement on everything.

"The package deal concept always contained the seabed as well as the others. That was the whole point. There was no way the Group of 77 was going to give up existing claims, which were in some cases reflected in their constitutions, touching on navigational issues if they weren't going to get what they considered equitable treatment on the seabed. So that was the trade-off they sought from the beginning. And some Western representatives, including in particular Jens Evensen of Norway, spoke again and again about the trade-off being freedom of navigation in return for resources. I was the odd-man-out there, because I said, 'What about the environment? It's not that simple; there are other factors.' But the package deal was not just a myth. It was ground out as part of the negotiating process in the Seabed Committee.

"Occasionally during the later years of the Conference someone would say, 'Let's split off the seabed and just have an agreement leaving that issue aside.' And people would just snort and say, 'No way!' So when the United States did split off seabed issues at the end of the whole conference and forced a vote over them, it was considered simply a breach of good faith.

"If you go back to the resolution on the package deal which I introduced into the General Assembly in December 1970, it proposes very clearly 'a conference which is broad in scope' and adds that 'those questions to which significant numbers of delegations attach importance should be included in the agenda.... [A] more restrictive approach to the agenda could give rise to serious difficulties for many delegations.' I was speaking on behalf of the 25 co-sponsors, a fascinating group that included the United States."

The "gentleman's agreement" on a consensus rule was linked to the package deal concept, and was equally important. Decisions in the two previous Law of the Sea Conferences—in 1958 and 1960—had been made by majority vote in committee and then needed a two-thirds majority in the final plenary session. This rule bedevilled UNCLOS-2, where a U.S.-Canadian proposal on the breadth of the territorial sea and a fishing zone failed by a single vote.

In 1973, the Seabed Committee worked out what was for the United Nations a novel concept. It argued that so many issues—freedom of navigation, the management of fishing zones, maritime boundaries, pollution control, scientific research, as well as mineral resources—would be balanced against each other in a "package deal" that the conference should go to extreme lengths in search of a consensus and should avoid a vote, if at all possible.

The "gentleman's agreement" on a consensus was then annexed to the Rules of Procedure, and it bound the Conference until April 1982, when the United States called for a vote on the whole draft Convention. But back in November 1973, John R. Stevenson, the Special Representative of President Nixon for UNCLOS-3, wrote to External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp praising Beesley's role and saying "how very effective and constructive he was in negotiating a gentleman's agreement on the very difficult question of the decision-making process to be followed at the Conference. This agreement was essential to the very general support which the Conference resolution received."

UNCLOS-3 needed to be built on more than these two "foundation stones." Ambassador Beesley sketches the structure and some of the devices—informal working groups, informal plenary sessions, negotiating groups and the Collegium—that helped to hold it together:

"The Conference was not simply unstructured. In the Seabed Committee we had three committees, and we carried the same system into the Conference: Committee 1, the seabed beyond national jurisdiction; Committee 2, the classic jurisdictional issues plus all the new jurisdictional questions; Committee 3, the environment and scientific research, and transfer of technology (although much that was of substance on this question tended to be developed in Committee 1). But, of course, each of these committees was too unwieldy to do all of the negotiating—157 states all milling about—so we had to set up working groups in each one of them. There were, for example, up to nine working groups in Committee 2, which had to come up with a solution of their part of the problem, and they had to ensure that they reflected everyone's view because, don't forget, we were working by consensus.

"Some informal groups were set up without consulting the establishment, and many people (whose interests were not directly involved) didn't even know some existed. One example is the group on international straits, which Britain and Fiji co-chaired.

"And there were also informal drafting groups, the two most famous being led by outstanding men: Jens Evensen, now a judge of the International Court of Justice, and Jorge Castañeda who became Mexico's foreign minister. They agreed as individuals to call together a representative group to consider a specific subject, such as the environmental aspects of the 200-mile economic zone.

"It was always a nice question who would be invited to the Evensen Group, which usually numbered [between] 14 [and] 20. It depended on the issue, and Canada was always there, because every issue involved us. But it happened very informally. Very often the initiative for these informal negotiations would come from the 'Coastal Group' because a lot of the pressure and push in the Conference came from this group for understandable reasons: they were the ones who wanted to develop the law. But it was left to these two chairmen to pick up ideas, draft and redraft sections and finally give them to the Conference president as an anonymous document, for possible incorporation in the negotiating text. Nobody voted in the group. But it wasn't a hit-or-miss effort. Evensen and Castañeda consulted carefully and widely to ensure that the variety of views would be represented."

Another unusual part of the structure were the powers held by the Conference president (Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka until his death in 1980, and then Tommy Koh of Singapore), the chairmen of Committees 1, 2 and 3, and the Collegium over what went into the evolving text of the Convention. Beesley explains:

"The conference was unique in the degree of decision-making power delegated to the respective chairmen. [They produced sets of draft articles, intended to reflect a compromise position, for the president at the end of sessions; and they were then organized into a single negotiating text to which

no delegation was bound at that point. Gradually, with amendments, this text became a consensus document and finally a draft treaty.] It was found necessary to put this degree of responsibility into their hands, because without it we were going to get nowhere. The reason for this was that it was too easy for a group that might hold a 'blocking third' to prevent any progress. In other words, even if we were not voting, it was always in people's minds that, if you didn't bring everyone along on every single point, you didn't have a solution because ultimately you might have to vote. And it was to cut across the kind of delaying tactics that could be utilized—and sometimes was—that we gave this amount of power to the three chairmen.

"Then we coupled this power with a unique safeguard: the six-man Collegium. It comprised the president, the chairmen of Committees 1, 2 and 3, the rapporteur-general (Ken Rattray of Jamaica) and myself as chairman of the Drafting Committee. With us would be the two senior UN Secretariat people [Bernardo Zuleta of Colombia and David Hall of Australia]. We would try to determine whether a particular proposal advanced the process towards a consensus. Even if there might be some more difficulty, we would agree to put it into the new text as reflecting a greater measure of agreement than previously was the case. So that put a lot of power and responsibility on us."

This role emerged for the Collegium after about three years, when a few delegations had objected that some draft articles produced by individual chairmen did not properly reflect compromise views in their committee. Says Beesley: "That was partly why it was felt the Collegium approach would be better, so that there would be a safeguard, a cross-fertilization of ideas and a more systematic attempt to ensure that what would be put forward constituted a real step to consensus."

He adds: "We used to meet during the Conference when necessary as a kind of inner steering committee, when there was some really delicate problem raising its head. In theory, the steering committee was the 50-nation General Committee; but in practice it concerned itself only with procedural matters. The Collegium concerned itself with both procedure and the substance of the text."

Of his own 23-nation Drafting Committee, he says: "Initially it was conceived as the body in which much of the negotiations would occur, as is often the case in long-ranging conferences. Otherwise, we wouldn't have had this unedifying spectacle of two Commonwealth countries—Australia and Canada—running for the chairman's position. But at the first brief session of the Conference on procedure (which I didn't attend, as I had just been posted to Australia), I found that the Drafting Committee had had its mandate very carefully circumscribed. People were very nervous at that stage about giving any power to any committee or person. It was only later on, in desperation, that they turned power over.

"So the Drafting Committee had as its mandate purely the problem of harmonizing terms in six languages, where different terms were used to mean the same thing or the same terms were used to mean different things. It had to focus on whether the language had clear meaning: in brief, whether we

were producing an enforceable text or a series of political compromises that did not have much meaning legally.

"Then, because of the nervousness about the process itself, which goes back to the other fundamental principle of the package deal approach, it was felt and said on several occasions that the Drafting Committee must not meet until the whole package is in place; because for the Drafting Committee to meet after one subject was settled would break the whole contract, so to speak, on the package deal. So there was a period when the chairman of Committee 3, Alec Yankov, made an appeal to have the Drafting Committee seized of the work he had completed, and there was resistance to it. And I never volunteered, because I thought it would damage the Drafting Committee. While waiting for the real job, which was called the article-by-article review and involved getting down to the fundamental issues, we did the technical job of harmonization and co-ordination. In the process, we developed some of the working methods we later used.

"I used to make regular speeches warning everybody that suddenly everything would be thrown into the lap of the Drafting Committee at once, and we would have to do a job that required care, time and attention; and I warned about the dangers. But, in doing so, I knew it wasn't going to change anything and, sure enough, suddenly [in 1978] the floodgates were let loose and we were swamped with masses of documentation."

But of many parts of the Conference there is no official documentation. No records were made of the meetings of the Evensen and Castañeda groups, the informal working groups or even the informal plenary sessions, so that people might be encouraged to speak more freely and not feel they were fixing their position. Beesley says: "Although there were no summary records, we all sent reports back to our governments. I'm told that the reports of the Indian delegation on all the meetings they attended are about to be published. That could be fascinating!"

James Harrison
A Brighter Side of UNESCO—Science

James Harrison was director of Geological Survey during the time the reconnaissance mapping of Canada was completed. He says he thought "seven years in that job was long enough," so he accepted a post as assistant deputy minister in the department of Energy, Mines and Resources. This was, he says candidly, "the worst job I ever had in my life. You're neither flesh nor fowl nor good red herring. You float in the middle and never know what you are supposed to do. That's why I went to UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization]." He had become known around UNESCO when he was president of the International Council of Scientific Unions. Napoléon LeBlanc, then on the UNESCO Executive Board, nominated him as Assistant Director-General (Science) and he held that post for more than three years starting in 1973, half the time under René Maheu of France and the rest under Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow of Senegal.

The science program of UNESCO then received between 25 and 28 per cent of the total budget. It still does, and has suffered less than other parts of the organization from the U.S. and British withdrawal. Harrison says: "There are a whole lot of misconceptions about UNESCO's budget. It now amounts to $180 million a year, which is about the same as a good-sized Canadian university. Most programs of UNESCO depend heavily on national support for any particular project, beyond the country's general contribution made to the organization. So nearly every program is a co-operative venture. Man and the Biosphere (MAB) is a good example. Each state plans its own program, and there is a MAB secretariat in Paris that acts as clearing-house, and an International Co-ordinating Council."

Jim Harrison arrived at UNESCO with particular priorities and met with some disappointment. "I went there with the conviction that something needed to be done about oceanography, especially, and I probably devoted more time to ocean sciences than any of my predecessors. I tried to get the heads of the International Oceanographic Commission and the Ocean Sciences Division of UNESCO and their counterparts in the World Meteorological Organization and FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] to talk about a co-ordinating agency for all the UN units involved with ocean sciences. It turned out to be impossible. After three years of steady work we got the people who were the heads to show their hands before they had their programs locked into the General Conference [of their separate organizations].

"Why is it so difficult to get agreement on co-ordination? I came to the conclusion that the international bureaucrat has most of the bad features of a national bureaucrat, but he has them in a greater order of magnitude. The international bureaucrat has only one thing he can call his own: that is his program. If he admits that somebody in another agency can do some of the things he is doing, then part of his shield is broken. So he will just not agree to co-ordinate.

"I went to the Caracas session of the UN Law of the Sea Conference in 1973 and suggested, with Maheu's approval, that if the conference was successfully concluded they had a ready-made instrument in the International Oceanographic Commission [IOC] to monitor the Law of the Sea regulations. The IOC has its own General Conference and operates autonomously, but it

reports to the director-general of UNESCO. That apparently made it unacceptable to the other agencies as a co-ordinating agency, although it seemed to make a difference when I said at Caracas that the IOC could separate from UNESCO. However, the delegations decided to set up another organization, the International Seabed Authority.

"But during Maheu's last years, we helped establish better rapport with other scientific organizations in the UN system. That has pretty well gone by the boards now. UNESCO claimed too big a territory, I think. It is the only agency expected to deal in scientific projects of all kinds. Thanks largely to a French engineer, Michel Batisse, UNESCO has led in organizing special programs such as Man and the Biosphere. It was his original concept, and so was the International Hydrological Programme (IHP) and the International Geological Correlation Program (IGCP). Those major programs are really quite outstanding.

"The original International Hydrological Programme was completed in about 1971, but it was so successful and the newly independent countries wanted a part of the action, so it was extended into a second and third phase. The idea was to understand the regime that provided and replaced fresh water—starting with the simple measurement of stream-flow. When I was in Ethiopia with UNESCO, I found that the earliest records they had of any stream went back only 15 years, to the start of the IHP, in fact. How do you build dams on a river when you don't know the flow of the river, or the effects on groundwater or [the] effects [that] it will have on the water-table?

"Many countries responded to Ethiopia's need for assistance in hydrology: Canada, U.S.A., France, Germany, Soviet Union. But they wound up with a hodgepodge of schemes: they had a Russian team in one river basin, a French team in another and a Canadian team in a third—and all using different systems. It was a hell of a mess. The IHP eventually helped sort it out. Ethiopia, and other countries, began to realize they couldn't farm out to a multitude of other countries that wanted to spend some money: they had to take control.

"In Canada, through UNESCO's umbrella, the people in the 'feds' could speak to the people in the provinces and not be accused of 'imperialism.' The IHP has been kept on mainly for developing countries to try to understand their water resources. Canada still participates in it, but less actively; in its first decade we got what we wanted out of the program.

"Looking back on my years with UNESCO, I was particularly pleased with getting more engineering and technological education in the program. This meant trying to build up projects [that] would be of interest to developing countries. There are various schools and universities around the world that offer special courses for people from the Third World, and UNESCO supported and publicized these courses.

"[There were two] things UNESCO did in the educational field [that] I thought were very good indeed. One of these was the application of science to problems of the Third World; for example, applied microbiology—applying it to the manufacture of gas from organic rejects, and that sort of thing. It worked very well, and it happened that some countries would say, 'This is a

worthwhile program, and we want to be seen to be doing something good bilaterally for these countries.' So therefore they would plough in maybe three times as much as UNESCO, and you begin to get a program going. Japan did this in Southeast Asia.

"The other program, for which UNESCO deserves a lot of credit and hasn't received much, is of training technicians—not university graduates, but hands-on people who will keep the machinery going. There were some first-class projects. For example, Mexico set up a special unit for training people in chemical technology, and people from other parts of Latin America would be sent there for a one-year or two-year course because UNESCO would pay their transportation and living costs. Nearly all of UNESCO's enterprises depend heavily on national initiatives like this.

"One of the things I discovered, when I came back in 1976, was that, while UNESCO may not be important to the U.S.A. or even to Canada, it is enormously important to Third World countries. I fear this is not recognized well enough by the industrialized world, who see it too much from their own individual point of view. One minor example in the Canadian program of Man and the Biosphere: we organized a conference on 'The Child in the City.' The Sick Children's Hospital in Toronto had a project going on this and had put in a big chunk of money, but they couldn't get the people they wanted from developing countries because they had no link. However, once the Canadian Commission for UNESCO got UNESCO itself to sponsor the meeting, several people from the Philippines and Indonesia were able to come simply because it was MAB and UNESCO. The powers-that-be in industrialized countries don't seem to realize this...."

Gordon Goundrey
Professor of Border Closures

Over a period of 22 years, Gordon Goundrey worked in many capacities for the United Nations. He started in 1960 as adviser to the national planning council in (what was then) Ceylon and ended by serving for five years as an Assistant Secretary-General in the Office for Special Political Questions, dealing with emergencies that often had political complications. But, because of alternating between posts as an economic professor at the University of Alberta and at Newfoundland's Memorial University, and UN postings connected with Southern Africa and Rhodesia's UDI (unilateral declaration of independence), he was sometimes referred to as "the professor of border closures."

Goundrey's early life was unconsciously good preparation for work in the Third World. He grew up on a farm in southern Alberta badly hit during the Depression years—in 1933 their gross income from 8 900 ha (22 000 acres) was $96—and when teaching in Newfoundland he was recruited by the provincial government to work on questions of resource taxation. But, he says, "I was never a development economist. I was an economist who worked on development problems and I saw them as very similar to the kinds of problems I'd known in Canada—lagging regions and subsistence production." When he was doing graduate work at the University of Toronto in economic theory and international trade in 1948 and 1950, he knew practically nothing about the United Nations, "which is a reflection on the Canadian academic community at that time. But I am just as happy I didn't as a student spend my time reading volumes of such material."

In 1963 he was recruited from the University of Alberta to go to Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) to help in the programming of the capital budget, "very similar work to what I had done in Ontario, Newfoundland and Sri Lanka." But almost at once he found himself playing a much wider role:

"Nobody now realizes how fast things happened in the old Central African Federation. Between the time I agreed to go and when I arrived, the decision had been made to break up the Federation. So I arrived in Lusaka at the weekend and in no time at all I was on my way to Victoria Falls as economic adviser to the Northern Rhodesian government at a conference to negotiate the dismantling arrangements. I was there at the instigation of the Governor, Sir Evelyn Hone, but I was thrown in closely with Kenneth Kaunda who played a strong role there [and went on to become president at Zambia's independence in October 1964]. So while my terms of reference from the United Nations were very narrow, it soon became clear that this was not the role the government wanted me to play: I became more and more involved with the president's office. Fortunately, I was working with some very good UN people in New York who gave me full support in this expanded role.

"I stayed on in Lusaka for more than two years. It was a very exciting period, covering the transition to independence. It also coincided with the setting up of the Commonwealth Secretariat. As a senior Zambian government official, I was at the 1965 meeting of Commonwealth heads of government that agreed to the setting up of the Secretariat and appointed the first secretary-general—Arnold Smith [of Canada].

"I left Zambia in the summer of 1965 to return to Alberta. It was a very difficult decision to make, but I had come to the conclusion that I had run my course. I was an outside adviser who had been working very closely with the top people in government and had been heavily engaged in contingency planning for UDI (unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia). Both Kaunda and Julius Nyerere were convinced that Ian Smith would declare independence in Southern Rhodesia as soon as Zambia became independent, and they asked me to prepare a background paper on what could happen to Zambia. They took my paper to London at the time of Winston Churchill's funeral in February 1965, for discussions with the British prime minister. As you can understand, the British Government was reluctant to precipitate action by Ian Smith; so, at its request, all this was done with a great deal of secrecy. In Zambia, knowledge of the work was restricted to a few Cabinet ministers and practically no civil servants.

"So you rapidly reach the point at which you are beginning to move over that line, difficult to define, from being an international civil servant advising a government, to getting right into policy-making and having an executive function. And, of course, you are not accountable because, under these circumstances, you do not inform the UN about the kind of advice you are giving governments as it is much too confidential to be put into circulation throughout the United Nations. Nor are you accountable to the Zambian people. You begin to get so entwined in the government that you run the risk of jeopardizing your own position, and you can cause problems for the government and for the United Nations.

"Therefore, in spite of the fact that Kaunda was anxious that I remain, and that I thought I was abandoning the ship at a critical stage, I went back to Alberta in the middle of 1965."

Ian Smith declared UDI in November 1965 but did not close the border with Zambia until 1973. Goundrey says:

"This was a very difficult period with massive problems involved. We had to do our planning on a worst-case scenario as well as a best-case. The worst case in 1964 and 1965 was pretty critical: it assumed that the British tried to put pressure on the Southern Rhodesian government, and its reaction would be to hold Zambia hostage, close the border and shut off Kariba hydroelectric power. There was no power station then on the north shore of the Zambezi. As well, all the petroleum came up through Southern Rhodesia, and there was no rail-link through Tanzania. There was the question of what to do in the short run. You could only bring down 25 per cent of power needs from Zaire, because of the capacity of dams there, and the Lobito railway through Angola could handle only 12 000 tonnes [per] year—and there was trouble with dissidents in Shaba province.

"It was a very complex problem and, of course, it involved the necessity of mounting an airlift. You could not just do the planning on paper; you had to have some discussions with governments about what aircraft would be available. President Kaunda asked me to see about the possibility of organizing an emergency airlift, and so I visited Washington, London and Ottawa. Indeed, an airlift did take place in 1973, with aircraft flying in fuel from Leopoldville,

Nairobi and Dar. Then, because of the time needed to provide any alternative arrangements, the conditions in 1973 hadn't changed much from what we had foreseen in 1965."

In the meantime, Goundrey had worked on economic planning in another section of the UN Secretariat, had helped set up the technical assistance arm of the Commonwealth Secretariat and had gone back to teaching in Newfoundland. When the border was closed in 1973, the Security Council decided to send out a mission to assess Zambia's needs.

"I was asked if I would head the technical team. The Security Council mission included the ambassadors from Austria, Indonesia and the Sudan—and Pérez de Cuéllar, who was then Peru's Permanent Representative at the UN. This was the future Secretary-General's first real exposure to Africa. Anyway, we wrote the report in about two months; it involved redoing the whole contingency plan. In one sense the Security Council had passed a nonsense resolution, asking for an assessment of Zambia's needs 'to maintain normal development.' Zambia had become used to quite high levels of imports, and would have to go down to essentials. We tried in our report to phase the planning in such a way that, if you could only carry this much traffic, this is the number of trucks you'll need; if you go up to this level of tonnage, you'll have to start using airlifts. As for the normal traffic of 1.2 million tonnes, there was no way you could get it into Zambia, but you still had to draw up a hypothetical plan.

"The report was reasonably well received. But there then followed six difficult years for Zambia because the international community did not provide the support that was required to implement even that minimal level. Of course, member states weren't legally committed to doing this. The United Nations Charter merely said that, in the event of sanctions being applied, any state adversely affected had the right to come to the Security Council and request assistance. Again, the mandatory sanctions resolutions from the Council called only for voluntary assistance. African leaders, and particularly President Kaunda, took these resolutions as much more of a commitment than those who subscribed to them. For Zambia this period was disastrous."

After Mozambique became independent in 1975, plans were being made to close its border with Southern Rhodesia in order to cut off oil and other supplies. Goundrey, back at the Commonwealth Secretariat after an ILO (International Labour Organization) mission to the Sudan, went to Mozambique to advise its leaders—in particular, its interim prime minister and now president, Joachim Chissano—on what it would involve and what assistance they would need. Mozambique decided to close the border, and the Security Council then wanted to send a mission to assess the aid needed. "I was loaned by the Commonwealth Secretariat to do this report, and later to go back and prepare a report for Kurt Waldheim to the Economic and Social Council on what had been the international response. Meanwhile, South Africa had closed the borders of Lesotho, which it surrounds; and I was sent there too. By then African friends said I had become a sort of professor of border closures in southern Africa."

He had also become so useful to Secretary-General Waldheim that he was asked to join the Office of Special Political Questions in January 1978. This office works directly under the UN Secretary-General. A major role of his unit there was to pull together the efforts of UN agencies to deal with emergencies and, in the process, to maintain the humanitarian nature of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) by shielding it from political involvements. His previous contacts with many of these agencies helped greatly, but he had to contend with many shortcomings in the UN apparatus.

"The United Nations really has only *ad hoc* arrangements to deal with emergencies and disasters, whether they are man-made or natural. We had a Disaster Relief Co-ordinator in Geneva, but his office had been given no resources and its mandate was so restricted that all it could do was to become an information centre. Then there is no organization in the United Nations that deals with transport. The World Food Programme hauls food but not medicine, and only pays the full cost up to the border of the recipient state.

"These weaknesses became clearest during the Karamoja famine in Uganda. Idi Amin's government had fallen, and there were outbreaks of lawlessness across the country and the public service was paralysed. Melissa Wells, the UNDP [United Nations Development Programme] Resident Representative, was herself beaten up. It was a very difficult time to operate. And the Secretary-General has absolutely no resources to deal with such emergencies, not a nickel! Well, he has $50 000 for emergencies, which is ludicrous. Melissa Wells had no authority to direct operations; so in the end you got another *ad hoc* set of relationships, largely based on individuals. They brought in resources from the World Food Programme and UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] was able to play a big part because it is both a funding and an implementing agency. And we got a special Swedish group to pay for the trucks and drivers....

"But in each case you have to go through it all again on an *ad hoc* basis; in each case you have to try to find the resources. And these kinds of problems are growing. We now have the Southern Sudan, and the situations in Mozambique and Angola, where you can't get relief supplies to the people. The conflict in Chad caused serious difficulties for UN operations over the years. It's awfully hard to see how you can deal with all the problems that are emerging, especially because of the mixture of political concerns. Public expectations of what the UN can do have, over the years, become quite unrealistic."

There is a different concern about co-ordination which Goundrey encountered. "There are overlaps. Who is responsible for women and children in refugee camps—UNICEF or UNHCR? Or for refugees in the event of a natural disaster? Or for internally displaced peoples? You don't have the reconciliation mechanisms in the United Nations that you have in a national government. This caused lots of problems, and the fault should be placed squarely on member states. All the agreements with specialized agencies recognize the General Assembly as the body competent to co-ordinate, and, in this regard, exercise authority over the agencies. But the General Assembly

has never carried out this function, and has dumped it into the administrative structure. So there are constant quarrels over territory and mandates, and the Secretary-General is powerless. The longer it goes on, the less likely is it that this problem will be addressed...."

But there were success stories. An example, in which Goundrey was involved, was the mobilizing of aid for Botswana during Rhodesia's UDI. "The international community did respond to the special needs of Botswana, particularly after the raids began across the border from Rhodesia. The United Nations program included work on what to do about taking over the railroad from Rhodesian Railways, organizing grain storage and oil tanks and the development of reserve supplies of petroleum products. One result of the war in Rhodesia was the breakdown in veterinary health there, and cattle were moving back and forth from Matabeleland, because of rustling. Eventually the international community—particularly the European Community—came out with funds and technical assistance to set up a vaccine plant; and they produced a very high quality foot-and-mouth vaccine, better than those coming from South Africa. Botswana began to export this vaccine to neighbouring countries.

"The very fact that the United Nations worked with the Botswana government to put together the country's priority needs and brought them to the attention of the international community gave a degree of co-ordination to the program which donors hadn't been able to provide. So this was reasonably helpful and effective work."

(Photo: WHO/2019)

Dr. Brock Chisholm
(p. 14)

Charles Ritchie in 1986
(p. 10)

(Photo: Capital Press/National Archives of Canada/PA-165050)

Lester B. Pearson and Hugh Keenleyside with Dag Hammarskjöld *(centre)*
(p. 53, 24)



Gen. Andrew McNaughton
(p. 35)

Escott Reid in 1986
(p. 7)

John Humphrey with Eleanor Roosevelt in 1947
(p. 18)



Judge John Read
(p. 29)

Kalmen Kaplansky in 1983
(p. 77)



(UN photo)



J. King Gordon with Bernard Wood of the North-South Institute in 1985
(p. 69)



(NFB photo)

Howard Green
(p. 82)

Lt.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns reviewing UNEF troops
(p. 56)

(UN photo)

(Canapress Photo Service)

Paul Martin addressing the United Nations General Assembly in 1966
(p. 48)



(Photo: Stuart-Rodgers Studio)

Stewart Sutton
(p. 65)

Frank Shefrin *(right)* **with Executive Director of World Food Programme F. Aquino (p. 73)**

Adelaide Sinclair
(p. 61)

(UN photo: Saw Lwin)

Gordon Goundrey
(p. 130)

George Gordon-Lennox
(p. 107)



(UN photo: M. Grant)

George Davidson
(p. 116)



George Ignatieff
(p. 96)

William Epstein in 1986
(p. 101)



(UN photo)

Alan Beesley signing UN Law of the Sea Convention, December 1982
(p. 122)

James Harrison
(p. 127)

(Photo: Thomas Studio)

Maurice Strong with Barbara Ward at Habitat Conference, Vancouver, 1976
(p. 111)

(UN photo: Y. Nagata)

Dominick Sarsfield
(p. 232)

Hilary and Katharine Pearson
(p. 164)

Norma Walmsley in 1986
(p. 147)

(UN photo: Y. Nagata)

William Barton
(p. 185)

(UN photo: Y. Nagata)

Brian Mulroney, Stephen Lewis and Douglas Roche at General Assembly, October 1985
(p. 199, 214, 195)

(Guy Dubois)

Betty Zimmerman
(p. 180)

Murray Thomson
(p. 202)



(UN photo)

Yvon Beaulne *(right)* **with UN Secretary-General U Thant**
(p. 167)

Margaret Catley-Carlson
(p. 157)

Thomas M. Franck
(p. 235)



(UN photo: M. Tzovaras)

Angus Archer
(p. 252)

John Holmes
(p. 256)

Richard Foran
(p. 244)

Mairuth Sarsfield
(p. 228)

(UN photo: 151, 237/M. Grant)

Ginette Ast
(p. 248)

(Photo: Ruth Massey)

Charles Lankester
(p. 219)

Nancy Yates
(p. 240)

Maury Miloff with Ugandan colleagues
(p. 207)

Michele Landsberg
(p. 161)

Dr. Jane Faily in Nigeria
(p. 153)

Gordon Fairweather
(p. 172)



Napoléon LeBlanc
(p. 175)

Yvonne Kupsch
(p. 225)

1975 to 1986

(Photo: Helen Cassidy)

Summary

The decade from 1975 to 1986 was, indisputably, the Decade of Women, beginning with the Mexico City conference in mid-1975. Norma Walmsley describes the three landmark conferences of the women's decade: Mexico, followed by Copenhagen (1980) and Nairobi (1985). In contrast, Jane Faily tells how the Mexico City conference inspired her to make an 18-month teaching tour through west African villages. Margaret Catley-Carlson, talking of her time as deputy executive director of UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), explains how the agency developed its "child survival strategy" by approaching problems of disease and malnutrition from a woman's perspective, and how she found it a myth that village women were difficult to reach with development ideas. Michele Landsberg reports on how a team of Canadian diplomats have done outstanding work at the United Nations to bring substance to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. To round off this section, two women of a younger generation—grandchildren of Lester B. Pearson—give their views on the United Nations and talk about their own involvement with the organization.

This decade focused on human rights generally. The two UN covenants came into force in 1976, giving new strength to the work of the Human Rights Commission. Yvon Beaulne, who was Canada's ambassador to the Commission for eight years, speaks of some of its achievements; Gordon Fairweather, who led the Canadian delegation to the Commission's 1986 session, sees hope in pursuing human rights' themes that do not divide East from West. In the particular area of human rights that involves freedom of expression and the responsibility of the media, Napoléon LeBlanc describes how the long ideological argument within UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) was resolved and Betty Zimmerman recalls her time on the MacBride Commission, whose work helped to take some steam out of this dispute.

It was, nevertheless, a decade of conflict: in the Middle East after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, in Afghanistan, in South Africa after the Soweto uprising in 1976, in the Falklands in 1982, and in Namibia. William Barton, permanent representative during Canada's time on the Security Council in 1977 and 1978, talks about the still uncompleted efforts of five Western countries to bring peaceful independence to Namibia.

If there was little progress in peacemaking, peacekeeping was a quiet achievement of the decade. As one example of this work, three soldiers, then recently returned from a six-month tour of duty in Cyprus with the 2nd Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, give a sharp flavour of peacekeeping on the "Green Line" through Nicosia. Douglas Roche, Canada's ambassador for disarmament, extends the usual connotation of peacekeeping to include Canada's pioneering work on verifying arms control agreements. Brian Mulroney, in his much acclaimed speech to the UN General Assembly in October 1985, also touches on verification initiatives. Murray Thomson talks about the efforts to make the World Disarmament Campaign an effective partnership between governments and peoples, and how it fell short of this aim.

Africa, once again, was in the foreground of concerns at the United Nations. Maury Miloff gives a picture of the difficulties faced in trying to help

Uganda recover from the devastation of the years under Idi Amin. Maurice Strong paints the broader picture of destruction wrought by famine over a wide swath of Africa, and describes the vast relief operation the UN helped to co-ordinate. Stephen Lewis, from the vantage point of being Canada's ambassador to the UN, reasons that the work involved in Africa's rehabilitation has given the world organization a new lease on life at a time when it had hardly any grip upon issues of peace and security.

Forests claim a priority for rehabilitation. Chuck Lankester, from the UN Development Programme, describes the high-level campaign to involve politicians as well as technical experts in the saving of tropical forests. Yvonne Kupsch brings this drive on forestry projects down to community level after her tour of African countries on behalf of the Vancouver branch of the UN Association of Canada. And Mairuth Sarsfield describes how she enlisted famous artists and many others in the 1982 tree-planting campaign that the UN Environmental Programme sponsored under the title, "For Every Child a Tree."

Three contributors touch on the other areas of UN efforts to promote economic and social development. Dominick Sarsfield describes moves, under the auspices of the UN Centre for Human Settlements (which was created after the 1976 conference in Vancouver), to help governments organize investment in low-cost housing. Thomas Franck, who was director of research at UNITAR (United Nations Institute for Training and Research), reports on the studies that that institute did to evaluate the efficacy of various units in the UN system; including the Economic and Social Council itself. More cheerfully, Nancy Yates, with nearly 20 years' experience in the UN Development Programme, explains how it has adapted both to the varying needs of different regions and to a diminished flow of funds.

The United States' withholding of funds precipitated a crisis during 1986 and Richard Foran, in the hot seat as controller of finances in the UN Secretariat, goes into some detail on this question. Public opinion in the United States has given backing to—or, at least no opposition to—the chilling verdict that the Congress and the Reagan administration are passing on the usefulness (to American interests) of the United Nations. Ginette Ast, the CBC producer in charge of United Nations programming, traces the growing hostility shown in the Western media; Angus Archer describes steps taken by the Non-Governmental Liaison Service to bring businesspeople and the public in American cities together to discuss world issues in more depth and with less emotion. John Holmes, acting as an observer during the 40th anniversary session, after years as an active diplomat around the UN, acknowledges these problems of a bad media image (and coverage) but goes on to give his own upbeat assessment of the United Nations at 40.

Chronology of United Nations and Related Events of Special Interest to Canada

1975 — Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow of Senegal replaces René Maheu of France as director-general of UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization).

March — Convention comes into force calling for the destruction of biological weapons. It prohibits "the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons" and provides for their destruction. It also confirms the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use in war of asphyxiating and poisonous gases. Canada has recently (November 1985) produced a handbook for investigating allegations of their use.

The second general conference of UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) adopts the Lima Plan of Action on Industrial Development, with a target of increasing the developing countries' share of industrial production from 7 to 25 per cent by the year 2000. It also recommends that UNIDO be converted into a specialized agency (see Foran contribution).

May — First Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference agrees on consensus document, although nuclear weapons states cannot show much progress in negotiations for early cessation of nuclear arms race (Article VI).

June–July — Major event of International Women's Year is World Conference in Mexico City. Conference issues Declaration on the Equality of Men and Women and their Contribution to Development and Peace, and agrees on a World Plan of Action with targets for 1980. General Assembly in December proclaims 1976 to 1985 the UN Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace (see Walmsley contribution).

September — Canadian Government publishes its "Strategy for International Development Co-operation 1975–1980" with 21 policy points. Among them are a greater focus on helping food production and rural development in developing countries, priority in helping the poorest countries, relief of Third World debt and untying of procurement for developing countries. It is Canada's substantial response to the call for a new economic order.

December — Conference on International Economic Co-operation (CIEC) opens in Paris under co-chair of Canada (Allan MacEachen) and Venezuela. Numbers are limited to 27 countries, and issues reduced to four: energy, raw materials, finance, and trade and development. Paris

1975 (cont.)	December	talks continue intermittently until June 1977, but most developing countries took view that CIEC had not made advances towards goals of new economic order.
1976	January	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights comes into force, while its twin, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, follows in March. Yvon Beaulne is elected Canada's representative on the UN Human Rights Commission and serves for nine years.
		Soweto uprising in South Africa.
	April	At UNCTAD-4 (fourth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) held in Nairobi, a main issue is a plan for a Common Fund to support buffer stocks in an Integrated Commodities Programme covering 18 basic commodities. Canada ends by supporting Common Fund in principle.
	June	UN Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat) in Vancouver. Every participating country is asked to provide a film illustrating some solution to a settlement problem it had encountered. UN Centre for Human Settlements eventually located in Nairobi, near UN Environment Programme which had fathered the Vancouver conference.
1977	January	Canada on Security Council to December 1978. Ambassador is William Barton. United States withdraws from the International Labour Organization; returns in 1980.
	November	Security Council imposes mandatory arms embargo on South Africa.
	December	International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), first proposed at 1975 World Food Conference, holds first session in Rome. Initial resources amount to $1.022 billion, of which industrialized states contributed 56 per cent and OPEC countries 43 per cent. IFAD's first president (chief executive) is Abdelmuhsin Al-Sudeary of Saudi Arabia.
1978	January	Canada on Security Council (Barton).
	March	Israeli forces invade southern Lebanon. Canada is asked to contribute troops to "interim" peacekeeping force UNIFIL (United Nations International Force in Lebanon); feeling overstretched and doubtful of the venture, it provides signals group for first six months.
	June–July	General Assembly holds its first Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD-1). Pierre Trudeau makes powerful speech urging a "suffocation strategy" to stop the

1978 (cont.)	June–July	arms race at laboratory stage. Session ends with consensus on a forthright Final Document ("... the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. The time has therefore come ... to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament"). The accompanying Plan of Action lays out a blueprint for doing so.
	July	Culmination of 16 months' quiet diplomacy by five Western powers then on Security Council (U.S., Britain, France, Canada and West Germany) to get agreement between South African government and SWAPO (South West African People's Organization) on precise moves to bring Namibia to independence: Security Council adopts the plan of "contact group" as Resolution 435. But momentum slows, and South Africa walks out of the "pre-implementation meeting" in Geneva in January 1981, and with arrival of Reagan administration the independence of Namibia becomes linked to the issue of Cuban withdrawal from neighbouring Angola.
	November–December	Napoléon LeBlanc is president of UNESCO General Conference, which deals with issue of contribution of mass media in matters of peace, disarmament and human rights. Steam is released from debate upon 1977 appointment of MacBride Commission on communications problems and with deft redrafting, in 1978 conference, of declaration of "fundamental principles." First two Canadian sites included on UNESCO world heritage list: Nahanni national park in N.W.T. and L'Anse aux Meadows in Newfoundland.
1979	—	Yvon Beaulne is chairman of UN Human Rights Commission.
	March	Egypt and Israel sign peace treaty after President Jimmy Carter's mediation at Camp David. UN is not directly involved and, when mandate of UNEF II expires in July 1979, there is no agreement on UN successor to monitor Camp David accords. So Egypt, Israel and U.S. create Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) outside UN framework.
	August	UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development is held in Vienna with 130 participating countries. Ottawa-based International Development Research Centre closely involved. Later pledges for development fund of minimum $250 million under

1979 (cont.)	August	auspices of UN Development Programme disappointingly small.
	October	General Assembly adopts Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, covering political, civil, social, economic and cultural rights.
	November	MacBride Commission (comprising "16 Wise Men" until Betty Zimmerman replaced Marshall McLuhan!) publish report *Many Voices, One World*. The UNESCO media debate results in the International Programme for the Development of Communications.
	December	Soviet troops enter Afghanistan.
1980	March	World Conservation Strategy drafted by scientific commissions of International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) and jointly sponsored by World Wildlife Fund and UN Environment Programme (UNEP). FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) and UNESCO commit themselves to adjust their programs to promote strategy.. Review conference is held in Ottawa in June 1986.
	April	Independence of Zimbabwe ends 14-year sanctions campaign against Rhodesian regime. But British Prime Minister Thatcher resists any UN observer involvement in February elections; Gordon Fairweather is member of Commonwealth Observer Group.
	June	United States returns to International Labour Organization.
	July	Decade of Women holds mid-term conference in Copenhagen for reports by governments on progress made. Canada among those abstaining on Program of Action vote at end, because of objectionable phrases about "Zionism" (see Walmsley contribution).
1981	January	Reagan administration takes over, alters policy on South Africa to one of "constructive engagement" and consultations by chief official Chester Crocker with diminishing links to Contact Group.
	March	Final negotiations (on seabed mining) at Law of the Sea Conference slow to a crawl after U.S. delegation virtually withdraws while Reagan administration reviews its whole oceans policy.
	August	Margaret Catley-Carlson is appointed deputy director-general, operations, of UNICEF, at time when that agency, under James Grant, is focusing efforts on Child Survival Strategy.
	November	General Assembly adopts Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination

1981 (cont.)	November	based on Religion or Belief. Canada (see Beaulne contribution) had worked on issue in UN Human Rights Commission since 1976.
1982	January	Javier Pérez de Cuéllar takes over from Kurt Waldheim as UN Secretary-General.
	April	Argentine forces invade Falkland Islands. Britain, after winning an 11 to 1 vote in the Security Council for Resolution 502 calling for cease-fire and Argentine withdrawal, did utmost thereafter to keep issue out of UN. When Peruvian proposal collapsed after sinking of *General Belgrano*, Pérez de Cuéllar tried mediation for plan that would replace British governor with UN administrator; eventually rejected by both sides.
	June	Tenth anniversary of Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment is marked by tree-planting campaign—"For Every Child a Tree"—initiated by UNEP team of Mairuth Sarsfield.
		Failure of General Assembly's second Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD-2). No progress noted since UNSSOD-1 in arms control negotiations. Only with difficulty is Final Document of UNSSOD-1 reaffirmed. Report of UN Group of Experts on the Relationship of Disarmament and Development (the Thorsson Report) is tabled. World Disarmament Campaign has very modest start (see Thomson contribution).
	December	Ambassador Alan Beesley signs for Canada the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea at Montego Bay ceremony. One hundred and nineteen countries sign Convention that day and, when two-year period for signing expires in December 1984, the U.S., Britain and West Germany are only major holdouts.
1983	March	First session of the Preparatory Commission of the International Seabed Authority in Kingston, Jamaica, the headquarters of future ISA. Britain and West Germany, in observer role, play active part, but U.S. does not attend.
	March 23	U.S. President Reagan makes "Star Wars" speech, announcing Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and calling on scientists for research to "render nuclear weapons obsolete."
	October	Pierre Trudeau, alarmed by crisis over shooting down of Korean airliner in September and by general deterioration of East–West relations, begins peace missions with speech at University of Guelph about "third rail

1983 (cont.)	October	[of] political energy." During four months of shuttle diplomacy, he tries to win leaders of five nuclear weapons states to the idea of five-power summit, but makes no converts.
	October 24	U.S. Marines and airborne Rangers invade Grenada one week after Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and others killed by revolutionaries. Security Council draft resolution condemning invasion and calling for troop withdrawal supported by 11 members; Britain abstains and U.S. uses veto.
1984	January	Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe opens with 35 states that have been participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).
	August	International Conference on Population in Mexico City, organized by the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and the Mexican Government, to review situation 10 years after Bucharest conference. Conference Secretary-General (and UNFPA chief) Rafael Salas estimates that by year 2000 world's population will be 6.1 billion and annual increase 90 million, compared with 80 million today.
	November	General Assembly adopts Convention against Torture.
	December	United States withdraws from UNESCO, thus cutting that agency's $180 million annual budget by 25 per cent.
1985	January	Maurice Strong appointed executive co-ordinator of UN's Office of Emergency Operations in Africa. News of African famine had finally penetrated to West in October and November with TV footage, and Canadian government set up $50 million fund for famine relief, appointing David MacDonald as co-ordinator of emergency aid. In early 1986, Strong is able to say operation ensured survival of 35 million people who were not expected to live: "This is like averting a major war."
	July	Nairobi conference at conclusion of Decade of Women adopts Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women.
	August	Eighty-six states take part in third review conference of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. While no consensus had been achieved at 1980 review conference, this time a compromise allowed agreement on a Final Declaration which (*inter alia*) stated that "except for certain states, (they) deeply regretted that a comprehensive multilateral Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ... had not been

1985 (cont.)	August	concluded so far, and therefore [they] called on the nuclear weapons states party to the treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985." It also noted that certain states considered deep and verifiable reductions in existing arsenals of nuclear weapons as having the highest priority. The "certain states" in both instances are the U.S. and Britain.
	October	Campaign to save the world's tropical forests, which are being reduced each year by 10.9 million ha (an area the size of Austria), is launched by the World Resources Institute, World Bank and UNDP (see Lankester contribution).
	December	Britain and Singapore withdraw from UNESCO after General Conference in Sofia, which External Relations Minister Monique Vézina tells MPs was conducted with "goodwill and moderation." She reiterates Canada's support for UNESCO and its "compressed and improved program."
1986	January	International Year of Peace begins.
	May	General Assembly holds Special Session on the critical economic situation in Africa. Canada's ambassador to the UN, Stephen Lewis, is made chair of committee that drafts the UN Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986–90, calling for outside assistance of $46 billion to match African states' own investment of $82 billion. Lewis is subsequently invited to act as special political adviser to UN Secretary-General over this program.
	September	Gulf War between Iran and Iraq enters its seventh year. By Ruth Leger Sivard's estimate in her annual *World Military and Social Expenditures*, another 14 protracted wars with annual deaths of more than 1 000 people are continuing.
	October	U.S. cuts made unilaterally in its assessed contribution to the regular (core) budget of the United Nations begin to take effect on the 1986 calendar year budget. Together, the Kassebaum Amendment and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act lead to the U.S. reducing its contribution from the assessed $210 million to $100 million. The U.S. separately ceased funding the UN Fund for Population Activities. Prime Minister Mulroney pledged Canada's continued support, regrets situation that compels UN to brandish "tin cup."
		Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow announces he will not run for

1986 October (cont.)

third term as director-general of UNESCO when present term expires in November 1987. On other hand, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar is persuaded to accept a second five-year term from January 1987.

Norma Walmsley
A Decade for Women—At Last

She would never call herself a radical feminist. She says: "I am really a human rights activist. I am a person, and it's crazy to think women can get along alone, or men can get along alone; each has to support the other." But a good deal of Norma Walmsley's life has been devoted to improving the status of women, in Canada and in developing countries. This work culminated in the founding in 1976 of MATCH, which describes itself as "an international centre designed to match the resources and needs of Canadian women with those of women in developing countries." The MATCH International Centre, of which Walmsley was president until October 1980, grew out of the action plan of the 1975 International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City. Walmsley, who was active in all three important conferences during the decade for women, here describes some of the achievements and the disappointments of those years.

Born in Manitoba, Walmsley learned much about the world from her paternal grandfather, who had spent 21 years in the Indian Army. He instilled in her a love of reading and of stamp collecting ("it [stamp-collecting] teaches you geography, history, aspects of currency and finance, to say nothing of exotic flora and fauna"). She grew up during the Depression of the 1930s and, when the Second World War came, "having read a lot about events in Europe and being particularly interested in international affairs, I figured there was no alternative except to support the Allied cause in fighting Hitler, so I joined the Air Force." When the war ended she was, at the age of 25, an acting squadron officer based at Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ) in Ottawa, in charge of all supplies and equipment for the women's division of the RCAF in Canada and overseas.

Of women in wartime she says: "Women were recognized as being able to play a very useful role and contribute to the war effort, no question about that. That ranged all the way from munitions workers to office workers and those who replaced men in many capacities: in the services we always said we did what 10 men had been doing, and that was literally the case in my first job. But we were not recognized to the point of being recompensed the same way, nor for promotion....

"The real thing about lack of recognition was what happened after the war. Immediately after the war, instead of going ahead with the progress that had been made up to that point, it was out of the offices, out of the boardrooms, out of all these things and back into the traditional occupations—teaching and nursing—and back into the kitchens for women."

Walmsley became too engrossed in political science studies at McGill to join any debates on this issue. But she dates from that time her concern that women should play a full part in public affairs and development. "The feeling became increasingly strong over the years, it didn't matter where I was. [In all] my years as a professor at the University of Brandon, it was certainly true that we were underpaid, underpromoted, under-recognized and usually given all the extra jobs."

This kindled rather than quenched her international interests. "I was concerned about the narrow scope of students' minds, and therefore brought in the international perspective." She started a committee of World University

Service of Canada, another for Canadian University Students Overseas (CUSO) and in 1961 formed the Brandon branch of the United Nations Association. In 1960 she spent six weeks in Paris as a member of the Canadian delegation representing the social sciences at the 11th General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Of that meeting she says:

"There were very few women, just a handful; one of them, by the way, was Indira Gandhi. She was leading the Indian delegation. We had several meetings on our own, just the women of different delegations caucusing together in a room no larger than my study here. We weren't at the Paris conference as representing women, but we talked about the problems for women over a wide range of subjects and in all countries, and about the specific program[s] of UNESCO. Remember, that year was the beginning of independence for many African countries."

In 1972, the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, then a small unit working under the Economic and Social Council, began focusing its recommendations on the idea of holding an International Women's Year. To get the General Assembly to declare such a year for 1975 was, Walmsley thinks, "a considerable achievement" because, at the UN, most of the men that thought about women's role in development believed they had done what needed to be done by supporting UNICEF. They saw women's role as "subsumed in the care of children." Even in Canada there was "general ridicule, mostly from men but also from a lot of women [that] thought it wasn't necessary. All sorts of jokes were made about an International Year of Women, and people couldn't figure out why money should be spent on it. You remember the slogan on the button [that] Marc Lalonde's department [when he was minister of state responsible for the Status of Women] put out to counter this view: it simply said, 'Why not?' which was a harder question to answer.

"The thing to do was not only to consider women, but to reverse the coin and look at development. If someone is a good development officer, that person is looking at people and at all the human resources available. So then why close your mind and exclude women, who make up more than half your resources when you come to food production? Similarly, with health and education, what you have to do is to listen to and train the women who are bringing up the next generation. If you are looking where the action is, the action is with women."

Walmsley went independently to the Mexico City conference which was the big event of International Women's Year in 1975. She had a germ of an idea from what had happened the previous year at Abidjan, in the Ivory Coast, where she was at a conference of the Society for International Development. "We talked about women's role, but only incidentally. The juxtaposition of a number of things bothered me. We were sitting there in a wealthy, fabulous hotel, where ordinary Ivorians couldn't come. We were discussing all the problems of developing countries in their many facets; and I thought this incongruous, for several reasons. It was a very costly conference, champagne was flowing like water in the banquets; and yet less than two blocks from this luxurious hotel you could come on scenes of utter deprivation and grinding

poverty: the mothers bringing their children to a hopelessly inadequate clinic because they were dying of malnourishment. We were sitting in that hotel day after day in workshops listening to so-called erudite individuals giving of their opinions [on] how we should improve the situation in Africa and Asia, when all around us was the reality to which nobody was paying attention at all. It bothered me considerably.

"For a long time I had been trying to figure out why it was that, given the technology of the 1970s and despite the amount of development aid transferred to these countries, the condition of the ordinary [person] had not changed in two thousand years. What had gone wrong? Obviously, if you want change you must have agents of change. The more I thought about how I would identify change-agents, particularly when I focused on basic needs—food, water, health, education and shelter—the more it came out starkly clear that it was women who were involved. If you want to change things, you have to change things for them. So in 1975 I determined to go to the Mexico conference and ask as many women as possible there in leading positions in developing countries the same questions.

"The Mexico City conference lasted for only two weeks in July 1975, but it generated great excitement in the non-governmental world, because there was running in conjunction with the official conference a parallel conference called the 'Tribune' where women had an opportunity to meet and discuss all sorts of things, the whole range of women's issues. Such an opportunity had never existed before internationally.

"I attended a lot of the sessions at the Tribune. I tried also to talk with as many of the official delegates as I could, but I knew that, because they had been chosen by governments, they could only say what they were allowed to say, whereas in the Tribune it was a free exchange of information. At the Tribune there were some 8 000 women—that's a lot of women! Of course, most were from Mexico, North America and Europe as it was a long way to come from Asia and Africa. Most of the women from Asia and Africa were academics, lawyers, doctors; but nevertheless many of them were working in church groups or professional organizations with women's issues. They were representative of a broad spectrum of women in society.

"With wall-to-wall women at the Tribune, it was easy to get a group of six to ten together to talk. I spoke with groups of women from Indonesia, Ghana, Jamaica, Pakistan, Tanzania and many other places, asking them all the same three questions: what was wrong in their country, what needed to be done, and why weren't they doing it?

"They could answer the first two questions simply enough. The difficulty came over the third. The reasons why they weren't able to do what they knew was needed boiled down to the fact that they hadn't the power, they weren't the decision-makers, they could not call the tune in the countries concerned, or they were trying to do things and people were not listening to them. So what came loud and clear was the message, 'Let's forget about the big attempts to get prime ministers or dictators in a given country to do things, and go down to the area where you can pick off something you can do without disturbing too much in a community sense but which would still make an

improvement in the status of women.' There was, they agreed, a real chance to initiate things at a community level, if they could have access to the necessary human resources, information and some money.

"It appealed to me, because I am fundamentally an activist at [the] grass roots level, and I don't believe in handouts. With a friend, Suzanne Johnson, I came back to Canada believing there were women here who needed to know about these international issues and the aspirations of women in other countries, and who might become interested in working co-operatively and provide resources to groups in developing countries. That was the start of MATCH International Centre.

"Mexico was an enormous conference—both the governmental and Tribune parts—and a great watershed as far as the women's movement was concerned ... and, without being grandiose about it, as far as human history was concerned. It was the first occasion when an international meeting of so many women had taken place. Of course, university women or other particular organizations have met together, but each with just a small focus of interest. Here you had women from every walk of life and with every interest imaginable and from practically every country. You had issues that had never been on the world stage, even though the press didn't cover it well.... Women were really enthusiastic, going back to Delhi or Peru. There was a great thrust of action that has never died down.

"Out of the governmental conference came the *Declaration and Plan of Action*, which was really a long list of what governments should and should not do and which documented discrimination against women. And the main thing was that governments were faced with a formal decision that; five years thence in 1980, they would be called to account at a mid-decade conference and asked what progress they had made and how serious they had been in signing the Plan of Action.

"The mid-decade conference in Copenhagen drew more than 8 000 women to the unofficial forum. This time I was a member of the official Canadian delegation.... Months in advance each member state prepared massive reports on every issue that had been raised in Mexico, and the UN Secretariat boiled them down into background documents for the Decade's three themes—equality, development and peace—and then the sub-themes of health, education and employment. Whereas Mexico was more or less a consciousness-raising exercise, the Copenhagen conference involved a number of governments accounting for progress made between 1975 and 1980. Unfortunately, Canada was unable to vote for the final conference document or 'Program of Action' because of phrases it found objectionable in the section on assistance to Palestinian women. There were lots of problems and interminable arguments about some words such as 'Zionism' and 'racism.' We couldn't sign, which was very frustrating, because we agreed to everything else in the 280-odd paragraphs of the document.

"By 1980, MATCH International Centre had been in action for four years, supporting projects in many countries, and its directors agreed that MATCH was a good example, a model of what could be done. I decided that, instead of one of us just talking about it at Copenhagen, we should draw

representative women from MATCH projects to make a joint presentation to the Forum there, together with women from their sponsoring groups in Canada. So, for example, the Ruli Women Farmers' Association in Rwanda sent Marina Dusabirema and Godeleine Mukaremera to Copenhagen where they met for the first time one of their sponsors, Marguerite Bergeron-Tremblay from Alma, Quebec. Other women came from Ecuador and Sri Lanka. Our presentation was well received by everybody.

"In 1979 I had visited the Suhada Seva Women's Training Centre in Sri Lanka, which physically was nothing more than a slab of concrete, some uprights and a roof, to protect some tables where the women had lessons. They learned about sewing and nutrition and vegetable gardening, about health and family planning—as much information as you could pump into them without alienating too many people, and using the focus of income generating [through the] production of clothing to be the overt symbol of the centre. The chief came up to me and said the men of the village had helped put up the structure, and he added that he needed at least 15 such centres in his district. That was a definite change from before, when there was no interest in these subjects. So it was good to carry this story to Copenhagen, with Jessica Alles telling it for her own people in Sri Lanka.

"At the end-of-decade conference in Nariobi in July 1985, I was supposed to chair the non-governmental plenary session on development but, the morning I arrived, I came down with a raging fever and had to be invalided back to Canada a few days later. But, judging from a letter Dame Nita Barrow wrote me and from all the documents that followed, both conferences in Nairobi were clearly a huge success. They found compromises to solve the early political controversies and reached consensus on the main document, the *Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women*; and that was a major achievement. The aim was to identify obstacles in the main theme areas—equality, development and peace—and [to] set out strategies for overcoming them and reaching long-term targets.

"Another really good thing about Nairobi was that, for the first time, African women made up the majority and had the largest voice in all the workshops. Margaret Kenyatta was president of the conference, and the organization of the NGO parallel conference was tremendous, fitting in a thousand workshops, panels and seminars in less than two weeks.

"What has been most disappointing to me about the Decade for Women? I, as an individual tend to be impatient, and hence to deplore the slowness of action over the years. I cannot forgive the inaction of intelligent people and of many governments who have had the facts put on the table, and obstacles identified for them, by the three women's conferences of the Decade. Having said that, however, I must point out that 10 years is only a blip on the face of history; when we look at the strides that have been made for women during the last decade we must be optimistic.

"Improving the status of women and women's rights is part of the larger struggle for human rights, and that is the perspective which preoccupies me personally. Every gain for women should improve conditions for humanity in general.

"The problem now is what remains undone. Women have to work with men to ensure that inequality and injustice, wherever manifested, are opposed and eliminated. This includes putting an end to the degrading poverty and deprivation of basic needs for countless millions. It also means concern for environmental damage of every kind, including that threat of potential ultimate destruction posed by the nuclear arms race.

"Obviously, the right to life for this planet is a precondition of every other right, and women have to participate in this fundamental struggle. The Decade for Women has shown that governments can be made to act. And, now that women realize they themselves can do a great deal to improve their own status, and thus that of the community as a whole, I would say that the 'decade of humanity' has really just begun!"

Jane Faily
Slowly Through African Villages

At the UN conference in Mexico City in 1975, which marked the beginning of International Women's Year (and, as it turned out, the Decade of Women), Dr. Jane Faily met several African women who impressed her with their commitment to progress and development. She was then working as a psychologist in North Carolina, and she began to think about how she could use her experience for the benefit of developing countries. Soon afterwards, she moved to Canada and started to correspond with the World Baha'i Community office at the United Nations—she is of the Baha'i faith—about a proposal for training adults. Her scheme was to go to Africa and make use of the network of people of the Baha'i faith, which has spread rapidly through rural as well as urban parts of west Africa since the 1950s, to train literate Baha'is to start children's classes in remote villages. She planned to do this during the International Year of the Child in 1979. Her proposal was discussed with UNICEF people and others at the United Nations, "who found it sound." That was the start of an extraordinary 14 months that Jane Faily spent in the less travelled parts of seven states of west Africa:

"There is an administrative office of the Baha'i Community in Lomé in Togo, and the chief person there knew very well all the village areas in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Benin and the other places where I hoped to travel. After visiting Lomé, I started in Ghana with a loaned car and a driver, and, with another woman who had been working in parent education in North Carolina, we drove up to Kumasi and all the way up north to the border. We found [that] there was tremendous difficulty with the fuel shortage. If we hadn't had our own transport, we would have been stranded for days and we certainly could not have got out of a town to remote villages. As it was, we 'wrote the blues' in Bolgatanga: We were sitting in a petrol line there for about two hours and, in order to encourage ourselves, we got out the guitar.... So, after that experience, I realized that, unless I had a vehicle of my own, I would not achieve the purpose of my trip.

"So I went off to Germany, bought a Volkswagen camping bus and persuaded a Canadian Baha'i whom I met there to drive this van from Germany down through the Sahara desert and meet me in Liberia. His name is Gert Bindseil, [and he was] a teacher from Ontario. He was visiting relatives in Germany. I persuaded him by talking about how much good this was going to do all those children—that was the key! Anyway, we met up in Liberia and we went together for 7 000 miles [11 000 km] over the next nine months, from January to September 1979.

"When we got to Abidjan in the Ivory Coast, I discovered the way my project could collaborate closely with UNICEF, which had its regional office for west Africa there. They had worked out some brilliant visual materials for mothers, because many of the children in west Africa suffer from kwashiorkor—protein deficiency—and, in a single area where people were growing the same crops, some children will have the disease and others won't, depending on how the mothers combine the foods—whether they combine them to give a whole protein.

"So, UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] had worked out large posters with pictures of the food that had to be combined. Instead of being

technical and talking about proteins and carbohydrates, they talked about growth foods, strength foods and protection foods; and they also showed pictures of babies who develop normally and those who have kwashiorkor, who don't grow so rapidly and then get rust-coloured hair and so on. Many of the village women are ignorant about the first signs of the disease and think that their baby is fine.

"Well, there were stacks of these large posters and other educational material in the office in Abidjan, but UNICEF did not have the staff to get out to the remote areas where the mothers who needed it were located. But that is what we were doing. And because we were going as members of a Baha'i community, when we came to a remote village area, there would be within it Baha'is who immediately had a feeling of trust and receptivity. It is that bridge of trust that is so essential to the educational process. So the UNICEF personnel were absolutely delighted that we could distribute their posters and booklets, and we were delighted that we had such well done materials to give to the people. Otherwise, our message would have been very short-lived.

"The Baha'i faith has spread rapidly in west Africa because it is deeply religious, but it is also modern in that it recognizes the equality of men and women, and the equality of cultures in the world.... [P]eople who have been hurt by colonialism appreciate the social values that they find in the Baha'i Community. Another strength is that in west Africa it is a grass roots community; there are many illiterate, very poor village Baha'is as well as more educated ones. So ... my project was a catalyst, to enable the better educated ones to use some of the United Nations material and deliver it to the mothers in need.

"The visit I remember as my favourite was in the area of Kumasi, in Ghana. I was the guest of the dean of the school of agriculture at the university, and of his wife Beatrice Asare. She is a marvellous woman, an elementary school teacher. She made plans for us to go to 12 villages around Kumasi. She said, 'We go on one day to tell them that we want to meet with their administrative units and we will come back in two days to do that.' It is a very important mark of courtesy to an African not to just appear with an important message. So then we came back two days later and told them our interest was to assist them with children's education, if they felt that was a need. We said they should deliberate together and decide if that was important. If they thought so, they should choose two adults whom they could trust to come for a training session in Kumasi, so that they could begin to hold children's classes. So they went off and consulted among themselves, and decided it would be a great advantage to have these classes.

"This was the right way to go. Immediately we had community support, we had respected their customs, we had not imposed a decision; and the people chosen to come and be instructed had a commitment to their own community, for we hadn't selected them.

"They came in from all 12 villages to Kumasi, where we had rented space at the university, and for five days they went through a series of training programs in which they taught each other as though they were the children. This is very effective learning, going through the motions of teaching children's

classes through songs, plays and games. Some of the teaching was in their own language, Ashanti, and some in English.

"At the end of the course we gave them a certificate of graduation, and I went back for the first classes with each of the village teachers, which gave them a feeling of status and commitment. They were self-motivated after that. I went on, to the north of Ghana, and came back four weeks later and visited these same places, and they were teaching regularly. The children were able to sing, and perhaps say a prayer, in English; so that they were breaking through the cultural barrier that would permit them to advance.

"When I came back to Accra, I met with some college-educated Ghanaian Baha'is, and they planned a series of lessons that they would send out to the village teachers, so that [the teachers] would not run out of resources. So that worked beautifully. As for the UNICEF material, since 90 per cent of the student teachers were men, when I went to a village I would gather a group of mothers and go over that material and leave one of the booklets and posters with them. I would also make sure that someone from a nearby town, such as Mrs. Asare, would come out and keep reinforcing the material.

"Sometimes in other places I wasn't able to go twice to the village, or the course was only three days long. But you cannot do village work if you are in a hurry or are trying to maintain a time schedule that comes with city life. The two don't mesh. If you are serious about leaving something behind in a village, you first have to adapt to their way of life, being there to speak with them after they have finished in the fields or before they go. It is these small things that make the difference between a successful project and one that doesn't work.

"One thing that was surprising to me was the difference in temperament between the peoples I met. The terrain and climate and flora and fauna were basically the same, but tribes were as different as the French from the Germans. For instance, the Yoruba in Nigeria are artistic and sensitive and melodramatic; and, next door to them, the Ibo are industrious and methodical. The Yoruba had lived in Ibadan in hundreds of thousands before white people came, whereas the Ibo have small villages and, if they grow beyond a few families, some move away. So the temperaments are incredibly diverse, and that was delightful for me.

"My transportation expenses were paid for by the Baha'i community in Iran, which was quite touching. The Baha'i faith began there, and it had stressed education. Many of the Baha'is who were now engineers and physicians and accomplished professional people had come from villages and been educated. So they had contributed to a fund to help with the education of all the children in Africa. That motivation was a beautiful part of the project.

"[In Togo] I lived in this camper van and had my own source of water.... I also often stayed in village homes. It all went very well. Once in a while I might retreat in reading a book, just to shut out everything and recover from culture shock. Malaria is not a joke. I was taking malaria medication all the time, but Togo is heavily infested and you just get so many bites that it is likely you will get it anyway. I had it for about 24 hours and really I didn't

want to get better—I wanted to die! But that was brief, compared with what many people had.

"The roads were very poor, but we always got where we were going. We sometimes travelled 8 to 10 hours, because in Ghana, for instance, petrol was very short, so we would load up jerrycans and have [enough] to reach our destination. And from Ghana through Nigeria to Cameroon we had as [a] companion Dorothy Hanson, a poet from California who was doing research on a west African woman poet. She would give poetry readings in the larger cities, and young African poets would come, and she would invite them to share their poetry. They were very pleased to be respected as fellow artists.

"In 1985, I went back to Africa to attend the Nairobi conference marking the end of the Decade of Women. I travelled by air to Zimbabwe and to main centres in west Africa, and I heard some news of what had happened in the places I had been six years earlier. In several countries, it seemed, the interest my project had created among the village people and the conviction they had that, with this brief training and some sustaining help from outside, they could do something significant for the children of the village had heartened them and become the start of some social and economic projects.

"In Nigeria, some villages were trying out new varieties of seeds to improve their agricultural yield. In Cameroon and Benin the women were meeting to talk about health projects for their children. The greatest worry I had in 1979 when I was travelling along was that, when I go, this will vanish like the vapour on the desert. To find there were enduring projects was a great satisfaction."

Margaret Catley-Carlson
Four Ways to Reach Women, Four to Save Children

Immediately before she became president of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in August 1983, Margaret "Maggie" Catley-Carlson spent two years with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) as deputy executive director of operations. She arrived in New York at a time of dramatic change. James "Jim" Grant, the new executive director of UNICEF, had decided on a four-point program which could (in Catley-Carlson's words) "have an absolutely startling effect on the health of the world's children." It was Catley-Carlson's job to reorganize the 3 000-member staff of UNICEF so that they became "the best possible delivery mechanism for this new thrust." At the same time, the agency was shifting its focus away from Asia, where the results of positive development were apparent, towards Africa. It was a major managerial task to carry out this reorganization.

Born in Nelson, B.C., Maggie Catley-Carlson had done pre-med courses at university before taking a year out to travel in Europe and up the Nile. She finished university studying economics. During her days in External Affairs, she helped to frame Canadian policies for UNCTAD-3 (the Third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) in Santiago and for the 27-nation Conference on International Economic Co-operation, which Canada co-chaired for two years in Paris. Then, as senior vice-president in CIDA after 1977, she was immersed in management. She says: "I once told someone, without a trace of shame, that I could not give any thought to development in that job because 'running the box,' which is what a senior vice-president does in CIDA, is so absorbing."

UNICEF contributed to Catley-Carlson's education in development. Catley-Carlson was chief Canadian delegate to the UNICEF Board in 1979 and 1980, before joining its staff the next year:

"The main contribution I thought I could make to UNICEF in 1981 was better management. Let me amplify that. UNICEF had been very well managed, and was a sort of star in the UN crown. A lot of that was due to Dick Heyward, whom I replaced and who had done that job ever since the time when I was seven years old. So to say there had been continuity is putting it mildly! He strong-mindedly persisted with ideas like decentralization of policy[-making] and program-making to the field, creation of national offices [and] all sorts of pioneering work within the UN system itself. I was aware of the contribution he had made and, without any modesty whatsoever, I thought I was one of the few people around who could sustain and protect and build on that kind of legacy.

"Jim Grant had just had a year as executive director, and he obviously wanted to change UNICEF. At that time, UNICEF could be described as a supply organization with brains. Which is to say, its principal role was ordering equipment and supplies in support of government programs in health, social development and a wide variety of activities affecting children. It could be immunization equipment, wheelbarrows and shovels, medical stuff, [midwifery] kits, even play-school equipment.

"At the end of his first year, Jim became more and more convinced that, out of all the things UNICEF was doing, there were priorities that really would demonstrably affect the health of the world's children. These became crystallized in the famous GOBI which, working backwards, was Immunization, Breast-feeding, Oral rehydration and Growth measurement. Taken together, those four would make an absolutely startling effect on the health of the world's children.

"In numbers, UNICEF is two and one-half times the size of CIDA. It has 3 000 staff, including project staff, who are usually long-term, and normal staff, for a budget of $300 million—so they have one-sixth the budget of CIDA for nearly three times the people. Which is very right and proper for the delivery of social programs. It takes a lot to deliver a social assistance dollar. That is still small, but it is large in terms of person-years, compared with CIDA.

"Anyway, it was my task to take those 3 000 people in these several tens of offices, at a time when the whole UN system was looking at a zero-growth budget, and re-configure the raw material into the best possible delivery mechanism for the new thrust. At the same time, with the tragedy of Africa already looming on the horizon, it was very obvious to people working in development that Asia was starting to move and move quickly and that the real challenges in the last half of the 1980s and the 1990s was going to be in Africa. So that was my task, using all sorts of organizational tools like job descriptions and levels of classification, and budgets and board approvals and all those tedious things that make a bureaucracy work, to re-configure them in such a way that UNICEF would be the best possible delivery mechanism for this program.

"It took me all of my two years, and it still continues. The UN goes forward by biennial budgets—a budget every two years—and they set how many people you are going to have in each of the offices, what level they are going to be, and how much you can spend. Once you have set these, you at least have a document to which you are accountable for reporting back that this is what you did. So, when our budget was approved, the die was cast in terms of the future organizational structure of UNICEF. Yes, I was very proud of that. It was reasonably unique in charting for an organization of this size: a change that profound in that quick a time, with the understanding of the staff and with the minimum uproar and disapproval.

"With the adoption of the GOBI approach and the child survival resolution, a real attempt was made to turn UNICEF from a supply organization with brains into an advocacy organization that therefore encouraged programming, particularly in these four areas and [then] did the supplying.... What we were trying to do was to turn the organization on its head. That is, you don't start off asking, 'What can we supply you with?' We started off with, 'What are we going to do about children in Benin, in Kenya, in Costa Rica, in Nicaragua? What are the needs? How can we accelerate these four thrusts, as necessary and as adapted for the country? And what are the needs for that process, and whom can we pull into the process?' UNICEF had been an early and active proponent of both primary health care and appropriate village levels of

intervention; so that wasn't new. What was new was concentrating on these four interventions.

"This involved our field representatives having an awful lot of discussion with governments. It also involved liaison with NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations]. This developed very well during that period, despite national committees being jealous of headquarters having direct contact with NGOs in developing countries. These NGOs and UNICEF now have a very effective partnership.

"I myself went to South Korea and tried to make them look at themselves on breast-feeding. It certainly made for some amusing moments. I am sure it was the first time anyone had mentioned breast-feeding to the head of Economic Planning. He jumped perceptibly. Using my economic background, I started talking about the economic effects of breast-feeding in terms of disease prevention and the acquired immunities it passes on; about illness prevention and time away from work. By the time I had finished, he at least paid me the compliment of appearing to be quite interested. I then talked to the minister of Health and the minister of Education about the fact that, as is the case in most countries, there is absolutely nothing about breast-feeding in the curriculum of doctors. So therefore doctors don't encourage breast-feeding because they don't know a damn thing about it. In that sense, I was doing a little bit of advocacy.

"My second trip with UNICEF was to west Africa—Senegal, Mauritania, Mali and Ivory Coast—and the whole focus of that trip was on the woman's work-load and what could be done to alleviate it. I looked at mills and at water supplies and pump maintenance, and that was when I began to appreciate what the value of these very small-scale interventions at the village level were for the life of women.

"It made an indelible impression on me: women are not hard to reach at all. You look at pumps, at mills, at transportation and at firewood or energy sources, and that way you have affected the four basic components of a woman's life—and you haven't even talked about health or education. But there is nothing at all mysterious about reaching women in villages [with development ideas].

"This wasn't my notion. I was educated by UNICEF. It was the lesson I learned from my first field trip, and verified later. I went out to west Africa garumphing about over-consumption of person-years; I was the chief pooh-bah on management, and my main concern was really how the offices were being managed. But obviously you don't go on field trips without looking at 'the field,' and that was when I started to be educated. It was the first time I had ever seen a project. I had gone right through my first time in CIDA, as vice-president (Multilateral) and then senior vice-president, without ever seeing a project. In those jobs you don't go on field trips....

"On social mobilization, or project support communication, what is required is a profound transformation in the thinking of the people running the organization. Most of us, for reasons that are quite obscure to me, think that, if we do a good job and get on with developing a good idea, somebody else will come along and become an advocate and exponent of the whole thing. There

is very little in human history that would indicate any support for this kind of blind faith. The people who work in the dark usually stay in the dark. What was different about the child health survival revolution was that Jim Grant defined as his top priority the dissemination of this business. He said that he would leave to technicians the working out of details of vaccines, what scales to use, the procedure for growth monitoring, but he would work on the public awareness part of it.

"UNICEF has certainly tried harder than every other organization to promote primary health care as an empowering vehicle, [and] to promote literacy as an empowering vehicle. It is very much part of what officers are trained to do. It doesn't do any good just to deliver things to people. You need to convince people that they have the means in their own hands of changing their own destiny; that, either by mobilizing in their own community, or by changing slightly the way they feed their children, or by agreeing to plant and nurture some trees, they are taking steps that really can make a demonstrable difference to their own lives. That is what development is.

"It is much harder and takes more work and more time, and it is much messier than delivering things. UNICEF is not immune from the syndrome of delivering things. It's neater. You can report to the board better: we planned to dig 75 wells, and we dug 75 wells. That's much more demonstrable, you can get better television pictures out of it than from 75 village health and water committees learning about animal excrement near water and the relationship of guinea worm to clean water. That doesn't really make very dramatic footage at all. But that's what we are all involved in now.

"UNICEF is really blissfully free from the East–West macro-political issues. The international community has simply tacitly decided that there will be at least one organization where these things are not discussed and fought out. It takes a little bit of management, but somehow we managed to get a program approved in Vietnam and a little program in Afghanistan and one in Chile. There is a willingness on the part of all parties to put the purposes of organization first, whereas in other UN organizations countries feel that the principles being espoused—whether fighting *apartheid* or containing the aggressive ambitions of others—are more important. The UNDP [United Nations Development Programme] is certainly one of the places where these issues are hammered out. UNICEF is the only one I know of where these battles just simply don't happen. We held our breath there every single time. We did a lot of canvassing beforehand, and, as a secretariat, tried to produce things in as non-confrontational [a] way as possible. We bent over backwards to make it easy for the board to approve the program, and it was...."

Michele Landsberg
Working Stubbornly for Women's Rights

The United Nations Decade for Women, 1976 to 1985, was built around three themes: Equality, Development and Peace. Elsewhere in this book Dr. Norma Walmsley describes how it was launched and sustained through three conferences in Mexico City, Copenhagen and Nairobi, and Dr. Jane Faily tells about some effects it had in parts of west Africa. But there was a continuing job to be done at the United Nations to influence governments. Many states signed the UN Convention on Elimination of Discrimination against Women after it came into force in 1979. But how serious and meaningful was their action, especially if their governments entered a "reservation" to some parts of the Convention?

Canada was determined that it should mean something substantial. Michele Landsberg describes here how a team of Canadian women officials (and some men) have taken every opportunity to bring this issue into the centre of discussion and action at the United Nations. Michele Landsberg was a reporter on *The Globe and Mail* before becoming an editor for *Chatelaine* and then a columnist with the *Toronto Star*. Since 1984, she has lived in New York, where her husband Stephen Lewis is Canadian ambassador to the United Nations. She has been writing a weekly column about events in New York and at the United Nations for *The Globe and Mail*, and the following is reprinted with permission from her column of April 26, 1986:

"'The United Nations,' sneered the tourist, standing under the row of snapping flags, 'it's nothing but a debating society.'

"Yes, it is, and admirably so. It deals in words, not bombs. And, though bombs assuredly do have the power to rearrange the map, words can alter the shape of history.

"Canada, tenaciously adding its words about women's equality to the millions of UN speeches, files, documents and papers, is helping to shape the world's future in a more egalitarian mould.

"Our domestic record on women's rights is certainly not glorious. From my vantage point in New York, however, I'm struck by how much more Canada does for women's equality on the international scene than almost any other country.

"It's not as though Canada has to surge onto the platform, beating drums and preaching the gospel of social change. The UN has unanimously agreed, in principle, to all the changes we would urge. It's just that these massively male-dominated assemblies, conferences and agencies need constant nagging to keep them awake at the wheel. Nothing sinks out of their consciousness faster and more completely than women's claim to be included in the world's plans.

"Canada's commitment began way back in 1970 with the Royal Commission on the Status of Women, was kept alive since then through the perseverance of parliamentary women, and is continued now by External Affairs Minister Joe Clark, his personal staff, and a vigilant group of officials (mostly women) in his department. Both times Mr. Clark has spoken at the United Nations, for example, he has emphasized Canada's support for the goals of the Nairobi Women's Conference.

"In fact, when male diplomats were hopelessly at loggerheads on setting the agenda for that Nairobi women's conference last summer, it was a Canadian—Maureen O'Neil, now with the Human Rights Commission—who was brought in to hammer out a compromise. She won international recognition for her skill both in enabling the Nairobi conference to take place, and in helping bring it to a successful conclusion with the unanimously signed *Forward-Looking Strategy for Women*.

"Behind the scenes at External Affairs, Lindsay Niemann holds an almost unique position as Canada's special adviser on international women's programs. Wherever experts are gathering to debate policy, she turns up (or briefs the Canadian emissary) with tough and trenchant reminders of the priority Canada puts on women's issues.

"The Canadian International Development Agency has a special unit to keep women's concerns alive and sparking in international aid plans; over at Canada's International Organizations Bureau [in External Affairs] director Julie Loranger uses her clout the same way.

"Gradually, the message gets through. Canadian officials are still chortling at the memory of the Commonwealth Ministers of Education meeting in Nicosia in 1984. The ministers sat in baffled silence as Dorothy Armstrong, director of Canada's Commonwealth Division, insisted that 200 new Commonwealth scholarships must be offered equally to men and women. They shrugged, finally, and agreed. Today, some African countries have more female scholarship winners than male.

"Canadian women (Ms. O'Neil, Ms. Niemann and Ms. Loranger again) laboured through seven years of weary haggling at the United Nations for the adoption of a Declaration on Women and Peace, intended to encourage the integration of women into the peace process. Ms. Niemann, in fact, was hired by the Canadian government to solve the UN deadlock. She succeeded; the declaration was passed.

"None of this patient, plodding, bureaucratic work sounds spectacular. But without Canada's persistence—often to the irritation of some European members who would just as soon ignore the whole pesky problem—women's equality might lie entombed in dusty resolutions.

"Several weeks ago, for example, a United Nations committee met to elect new officers. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women is charged with monitoring the compliance of 85 countries [that] have signed and ratified a far-reaching international bill of women's rights. Preoccupied with the perennial jostle for power and status, some of the members there were avidly focused on getting their representatives elected to the committee. Only Mexico, Sweden, Australia and West Germany seemed worried by the fact that many of the countries [that] had signed the convention had done so with 'reservations.' That is, they reserved the right to discriminate against women in significant ways (family law, property rights, etc.) that undercut the whole intent of the convention.

"Canada, however, was alert. In a series of elegant, political and persuasive maneuvers, as intricate and swiftly calculated as the dance of a matador, Canadian officials led the members to a position undreamed of at the

beginning of the day. Now, instead of being shuffled off to some vague future occasion, these troubling 'reservations' will be the subject of a major General Assembly debate next fall.

"Consciousness, as the women's movement has taught us, is the essential step that leads people from a passive, centuries-long acceptance of rooted injustice to the point where they demand change.

"Nobody claims we don't have a long way to go. But on the international level, Canada is one of the world's consciousness raisers. 'It may be a surprise to Canadians to know that we're the pioneers and the innovators in this field,' Dorothy Armstrong told me. It was certainly a surprise to me. Quietly but stubbornly, Canada is doing us proud."

Hilary and Katharine Pearson
Two Generations On from San Francisco

Two generations have grown up since 1945 and the days of the San Francisco Conference. The ideas and the ideals that were expressed then have had plenty of time to tarnish—or to be forgotten. What changes of viewpoint have come in two generations? We thought it would be interesting to talk about this to two grandchildren of a delegate at San Francisco, Lester B. Pearson, then a senior External Affairs officer, who went on to become prime minister of Canada in 1963.

Obviously, the experience of Hilary and Katharine Pearson is not typical of their generation. For Canadians, they had a very international upbringing. Born in 1954 and 1955, respectively, in France, where their father Geoffrey Pearson was on diplomatic posting, they spent three years in Mexico and went to high school in India. Hilary completed high school and university in Ottawa, and now works in the department of Finance organizing pre-budget consultations. Katharine studied French and some Spanish at the University of British Columbia, married and lived in B.C. for a total of 10 years. She returned to Ottawa, and now works for Oxfam Canada on its Latin American programs. The sisters also visited the Soviet Union while their father was ambassador in Moscow.

The following is part of a conversation they had, during a busy lunch hour, about what the United Nations means to them two generations on from San Francisco:

Katharine: "Have we ever felt cynical about the United Nations? Let me answer the question this way. Both Hilary and I have been on United Nations Association [UNA] executives, in Ottawa and Vancouver. My experience was different from hers because the UNA in Vancouver has always been a bit of an anomaly in Canada, with a reputation for being quite radical in its perspective and its activities—very activist. I had quite a good experience there. It tied in with my perspective on the world.

"So I have not been cynical, but sometimes uncomfortable with some of the perspectives within which the United Nations operates. I think there is a bit of tension between the old guard who want to look at things from a very lofty viewpoint and those who are more activist. In Vancouver there was a lot of emphasis on disarmament issues, and people came out for activities every October during Disarmament Week. The UNA also played a pro-active role in Vancouver in arranging meetings and activities on Central America and on *apartheid*. We would invite controversial people to speak, and have debates, and we would pass fairly strong resolutions every year that went forward to Ottawa and were invariably watered down or defeated."

Hilary: "The local UNA chapter in Ottawa was not seen as being in the forefront among the activists. As a group it was quite conservative with a small 'c.' Its focus was on education about the UN, the more traditional line of 'let's get out to the schools and tell the kids what the United Nations means.' It has sponsored a model UN Assembly now for four or five years. I think this type of activity is quite worthwhile.

"I participated in a model UN Assembly when I was in Grade 11 in high school. I'm glad I did it. I played South Africa, which was really instructive. I had to go to the South African embassy and get their material and figure out

what their position was and then try to defend it. And then I had to go up to the podium—and have everyone walk out on me!

"This was in 1969, long before Soweto. South Africa was already a pariah, but at the time there wasn't much public debate on it. The model assembly was actually debating the Middle East. I didn't mind being allotted South Africa; I enjoyed it in a way. It forced me to try to understand a point of view I would never otherwise have had to. I remember thinking that South Africa did have a point of view and that it did have the right to express it, even if everyone disagrees with it. I didn't feel any sympathy personally with the South African arguments, but I guess I felt angry that people were so willing to get up and make a show of walking out, a parade I didn't agree with. The boy playing the Soviet delegate did a Khrushchev act and took his shoe off and banged it on the podium. That's what sticks in kids' minds...."

Katharine: "My first job in Vancouver was to run, not model assemblies, but school programs on behalf of the UNA. It was some of the most gratifying work I have ever done. We held weekend workshops, to which high school students came because they were interested. We discussed international issues, not focusing so much on the United Nations *per se* but certainly identifying the role the UN might play. The students mostly responded to aspects of the United Nations' work, rather than to it as an institution; and that's what I have always responded to, especially now in my work on Central America. Agencies like UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization], the Human Rights Commission and of course the UNHCR [United Nations High Commission for Refugees] are the ones with which I am most familiar. But when I think of the United Nations as a whole, I am more pessimistic about what it can do."

Hilary: "I find I make a distinction between the UN agencies and the United Nations General Assembly. A lot of people criticize the Assembly for this shoe-banging on the podium and the walking out. I know it only happened once, but I guess it is the attitudes behind it that are resented: the theatricality about public debate, not having serious discussions but making set speeches. People who don't have the exposure to know what happens behind the scenes, and to know that corridor talk is important, have this sense of the Assembly. But they are affected by agencies like UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] and identify them as United Nations and think it is worthwhile. UNESCO has had a lot of problems lately, but I remember reading the *National Geographic* and all those stories about UNESCO saving the world's monuments...."

Katharine: "Yes, when I think of UNESCO, I think of some of the work being carried out on a cultural and historical level, the recovery of languages that are dying or histories disappearing, bodies of learning, and the protection of monuments, etc. UNESCO plays an important role, quite essential because no one else is doing that in a systematic way with an international commitment.

"Its communications work is an entirely different area but, as the world becomes smaller and smaller, the question of communications and the political control of it becomes much more important...."

Hilary: "In many UN agencies you can see the difficulties of taking on any project that requires more than non-controversial co-operation. Even with UNICEF in a country like Kampuchea, I have friends there who tell me of the difficulties of taking on work that involves any political overtones at all.

"It seems that, in a lot of work the UN does, what is clear is not that nations are coming together but how far apart nations still are and how difficult it is for the United Nations to work around that. All the ideals [that] people had after the Second World War, which we've read about although we weren't born till the 1950s, I just don't see people having those kinds of ideals now. I don't think younger people are necessarily more pessimistic than they used to be, but they don't see the United Nations as the solution in finding a co-operative approach. I think people see the United Nations as one of the ways of doing that, and I don't think people want the United Nations and its agencies to disappear. As for the talk of kicking the Assembly out of New York, I think younger people don't like to hear that; they react against that."

Asked about the UN Human Rights Commission, Katharine said: "Its objectives are very good. It is important to maintain the Commission's work, although often political priorities take precedence. I know from my contacts with people in Central America that they see it as absolutely essential to have a body to go to year after year with well-documented research, as they continue to seek justice. The process is slow, but nevertheless the Commission is there specifically to address these questions. It may not accept our perspective. But the petitioners, many of them in exile, make use of the deliberations of the Commission—I find that again and again in my work. I often cite these UN documents, and the Commission has a lot of credibility, and weight in the world."

Finally, faced with the question of what she would have done if she had been at San Francisco in 1945 (instead of her grandfather) or what she might do if she could singlehandedly revise the UN Charter today, Hilary said:

"I think it is a pretty good statement of hopes and ideals of what a world government could be. It doesn't really matter that the UN, or nations, haven't lived up to it. You've got it out there like a beacon."

Yvon Beaulne
A Lifelong Passion for Human Rights

For Yvon Beaulne, a passion for human rights was born long before he began to represent Canada as ambassador to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in 1976. It was, as he explains, a very personal matter:

"It started when I was a little boy in Ottawa and I couldn't go to school, because in those days the Ontario Government had abolished French in school. So I had to learn to read and write with my grandfather at home because there were no schools for French Canadians. I did not go to school at all until the age of nine, in 1928, when this Regulation 17 which had abolished instruction in French was allowed to become obsolete. It is still on the statute books, by the way. I think I was deeply marked by that sort of injustice.

"Really what crystallized this calling, this passion for human rights, was my coming to the United Nations in January 1969. I was ambassador to Brazil, and I thought life there was wonderful. I had the most beautiful house that the Canadian government ever bought for any of its envoys. My children were happy; I had recently picked up Portuguese; we had just had a mission of six Cabinet ministers visiting.... Brazil was really full of new hope at that time. So when Mr. [Mitchell] Sharp asked me to go to the United Nations, at first I refused. But he insisted, so I went to New York. The children were crying, it was wintertime and I came to that thing—the United Nations—very reluctantly. And it was there that I got religion!

"I became convinced, after a few weeks, that in order to be a real member of the United Nations you had to become a missionary of peace, justice and progress. And that's what I decided to do. The Human Rights Commission was meeting in New York, but Canada was not then a member of the Commission. Also, in those days the Commission was armed only with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, because the two covenants did not come into force until 1976 when enough countries had ratified them. Mr. Sharp agreed to the idea that we should send an observer delegation to the Human Rights Commission, and it should include five representatives of provincial governments each year.

"It was an extraordinary experience for these provincial representatives. The first group decided it was such an exhilarating experience that they should establish a sort of clearing house to keep in touch; it was the Alberta representative, I think, who suggested the idea of CASHRA, [the] Canadian Association of Statutory Human Rights Agencies. This mechanism was very useful in persuading the provincial governments to acquiesce in Canada's ratification of the covenants and to set about bringing provincial laws into harmony with the covenants.

"I spent some time going to various provincial premiers, explaining to them the matter of the covenants. It became apparent that the provincial governments would not acquiesce in the ratification, unless a mechanism was set up to consult and to concert actions among the 11 governments. This machinery was established in December 1975, at a meeting in Ottawa of all provincial and federal ministers concerned with human rights. A committee was set up under Alice Desjardins, in the ministry of Justice, to review all the laws in Canada, federal and provincial, to bring them into harmony with the covenants. Also at that meeting the ministers decided [that] Canada should

take part in the Human Rights Commission, and they agreed I should be the Canadian representative. I was then in the secretary of state's department, which was the focal point of human rights in the federal government.

"There are three elements of the UN human rights machinery. The Human Rights Commission consists of 43 representatives of member states. Then there is the sub-commission composed of private individuals—Mr. Justice Deschênes is now on it—and one of its major tasks has been to examine more than 40 000 individual petitions a year and discern whether there is a pattern indicating flagrant and systematic violations of human rights in certain countries. Finally, there is the Human Rights Committee, comprising 18 experts—Canada has provided Walter Tarnopolsky and Madame Gisèle Côté-Harper.

"Governments which have ratified the covenants have to present reports on how they have been implementing them, and these are analysed and criticized by the Human Rights Committee. Well, in 1980 the Canadian government presented a remarkable report, which is 572 pages long and is the most comprehensive report ever produced on the subject [of human rights]. I think the Canadian drafters were very pleased with themselves. But, when it was scrutinized by the Human Rights Committee, suddenly there appeared many flaws in the way Canadians were implementing the covenants. And these criticisms had repercussions in Canada. Many amendments to Canadian laws and practices were brought forward and adopted, and in 1985 there was a second report to show how the 11 governments in Canada had tried to correct the errors that had been pointed out by the Committee. So that's very important for the progress of human rights on both the national and the international plane.

"In the other work of receiving petitions about individual cases, a great number come from Canada—in fact, the largest proportion of cases from any single country. This is because people in Canada, particularly the indigenous people, have been made aware that, if they cannot find a remedy in Canada, they can bring their case here. The case of Sandra Lovelace, who was excluded from her tribe when she married a white Canadian, is the most famous, I suppose. Bringing her case to the Human Rights Committee had tremendous effect: it led to the amendment of the Indian Act, removing from it the discriminatory section under which about 16 000 women had lost their Indian status.

"I was a member of the Human Rights Commission for nine years. The year I was elected—1976—the role of the Commission changed. Before then, it had been enunciating principles. But in 1976, when the two covenants came into force, it had to implement these principles; and that was quite a difficult thing to do. The Commission had to be creative and innovative, and find new means to solve situations. All sorts of devices were tried, and those that seemed to be the most effective were continued. Among them was the establishment of 'special rapporteurs,' who examine the human rights situation in certain countries and report to the Commission, and of 'special representatives,' who are emissaries of the Secretary-General and try to reach some accommodation with a government.

"The first country for which the Commission chose a special rapporteur was Chile in 1975. He was not allowed in, but he made his report from outside and this has kept the pressure on Chile ever since. The second was for South Africa, and the third was in the Middle East.

"But I don't think we should be too legalistic about the implementation of human rights. That is one of the great difficulties I encounter everywhere. People think the situation will improve if the machinery can be improved. Most of the time, that's not the way it goes. It's not a question of mechanism and machinery; it's a question of political will on the part of states which are independent and sovereign, and which cannot be coerced into doing anything they don't want to do. In Canada we are not legalistic; we want to get things done in a practical way. The point of the Human Rights Commission is not to denounce and to give hell to governments; the point is to protect and to save lives. So the main action, during the sittings of the Commission, takes place not in the general session, where delegates pose and posture and speak for the gallery, but in the corridors.

"For instance, I was the Chairman of the Commission in 1979. This was a crucial year, especially for the Africans. You had Idi Amin in Uganda, Macias Ngnema in Equatorial Guinea and Emperor Bokassa in the Central African Republic. And the Africans had a sort of epidermic solidarity which prevented them from realizing that they were weakening their own case on South Africa by closing their eyes to the misdeeds of black dictators. But a great man intervened at that time: Keba Mbaye, head of Senegal's delegation at the Commission and now a judge of the International Court of Justice. He persuaded the Organization of African Unity to adopt an African Declaration on the rights of persons and peoples, to create a Human Rights Commission for Africa—and to do something about these misdeeds.

"You know what happened: Idi Amin was toppled by his neighbours, Macias Ngnema after 11 years of misrule was driven out by the military, and Bokassa was dethroned. And, very important, the new government in Equatorial Guinea sent envoys to the Human Rights Commission to ask help in rebuilding their country. I was fortunate enough to find an excellent rapporteur, Volio Jimenez of Costa Rica, who went there and wrote an extraordinary report suggesting reforms and practical ways of assistance in various fields. He suggested the Commission provide experts to help the new government establish a new constitution, which we did. He also reported that the authorities wanted the return of the Claretian missionaries, who they said had been doing a wonderful job running schools. Since I had just been appointed ambassador to the Holy See, I took it on myself to ask the superior-general of the Claretian missionaries to go back to Equatorial Guinea, and he accepted.

"The same pattern was used to revamp the Central African Republic, after the terrible squall of Bokassa. The advisory services of the Human Rights Commission were used in various ways. This is an aspect of the Commission's work that is often neglected.

"An initiative of the Canadian delegation in the Commission was to deal with subjects, rather than with particular countries. This started in the case of Argentina. It was impossible to go on tolerating the evil phenomenon of

'disappeared persons' that was developing in Argentina. I brought in a resolution on this question in 1978, but it was defeated by the United States delegation perhaps—I surmise, I don't know—because of political links with Argentina. The next year it was also defeated, this time by the Soviets who were then buying wheat from Argentina.

"I came back a third time—it takes a long time to build up momentum—and I went to see the Argentines. I know them well. I have a son born in Buenos Aires, during my posting there. I know they are a very proud people, and I told my Argentine colleagues, 'Your country has been an architect of international law for 150 years. It has a reputation for respect for justice that has been applied over generations. Do you want to lose your good name because of the bad things done by your generals at this time? There is a way in which you can erase all this: Jump on the bandwagon! The resolution that I wish to propose will not single out Argentina, but will apply to all the countries where involuntary disappearances are practised.'

"Finally, both they and the Philippines joined in and became co-sponsors of the resolution; it was introduced by the French delegation, which had been inquiring into the disappearance of two French nuns in Argentina, and we established a working group on disappearances. And this is why the Argentine military government stopped disappearances, and started giving names to the relatives, and how the practice was almost eliminated in the Philippines. Not only that, but the Mexican government volunteered to produce lists of disappeared persons in its country before the group began any work there....

"One of the most important subjects on which the Canadian delegation worked was the question of the elimination of religious discrimination. When I arrived in 1976, I was asked to be chairman of the group working on this issue, because the Frenchman who had been in charge, Pierre Juvigny, had just died. For almost two decades the Soviet Union, because of its atheistic policies, had been opposing discussion; and, because of the consensus rule, very little progress had been made—only three articles of the preamble had been adopted in 18 years! It was impossible to go forward, because we spent our time discussing theology with the Russians and the Ukrainians, and sometimes the Syrians would come in and throw their weight.

"These were public meetings, but not well attended. As chairman, I managed to convince the Muslims and the Jews to come in. But it was practically impossible to make progress. So finally the Canadian delegation took the bull by the horns and proposed that about half of the articles that had been drafted should be put to the vote, instead of waiting for a consensus. And they were adopted, with the Socialist countries abstaining and not daring to vote against, because an article in the Soviet constitution provides for freedom of religion. After that, I persuaded Justice Abdullaye Dieye of Senegal to be the chair, in order to get the votes from the Muslims and Africans. He did a tremendous job and managed to get the rest of the declaration adopted without a dissenting vote in 1981. It went to the General Assembly and was adopted with Poland and Czechoslovakia voting for it, and the Soviet Union abstaining.

"I did my best to persuade everybody now to adopt a convention based on this declaration, but the usual trickery has set in, and the dilly-dallying and the dilatory tactics have been used to have special examinations and special reports on its implementation. So, unless there is some gumption and some leadership, it probably would stagnate there for a couple of decades. But it is a major achievement to have the declaration on the books.

"Again, there is the question of the Rights of the Child. I think the 1959 declaration is excellent and should have been translated into a treaty. But no government took an initiative until the Polish government was elected to the Commission in 1979 and, I surmise, thought they would garner some kudos by pressing for a convention on what is an attractive subject. For the first two or three years, the main objections came from the American delegation—because, again I surmise, the project came from a member of the Warsaw Pact. From the beginning, the Canadian delegation worked positively with the Poles and others to get this convention moving. Finally the Americans seemed to have a change of heart and relented; now the convention has a chance of being adopted in 1987.

"One of the most contentious issues in the discussion about the Rights of the Child was the question of abortion. But the whole first year was shadow-boxing, wasted on a definition of childhood: does it begin at the moment of conception, or of birth, or of weaning? In African tradition, a child is sometimes only recognized at, maybe, four years old after he is weaned. Then, when does childhood end: at 21 or 18 or even 13? That depends on various civilizations, various national laws. In the end, it was decided to leave it to each country to define these points. What really matters is the protection of the child.

"In Canada, the whole subject was taken very seriously. The inter-provincial and federal committee on human rights met, and various provincial groups made recommendations; and finally the whole thing was brought together by External Affairs. So the Canadian delegates to the Commission were really speaking on behalf of all the Canadian people. This was a very good exercise. And I should not fail to say how important in all these matters has been the work of Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations [NGOs]. I don't think any Canadian delegation would be half as useful or effective if it did not have the backing of the NGOs and particularly the information they provide."

Gordon Fairweather
A World Movement—And Colour-Coded

Gordon Fairweather was attorney-general in the New Brunswick government before becoming a Conservative MP in 1962. In 1977, he was appointed the first chief commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, and then, in the first part of 1986, he led the Canadian delegation to the six-week session of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Canada had not been on the 43-member UN Human Rights Commission since 1984 (Canada has since been elected to the Commission in 1988), so he was leading an observer delegation:

"Unhappily, as an observer, the only part of the Commission's work that we are not privy to are the procedures under Resolution 1053. These allow analysis and discussion of human rights abuses in certain countries to be made in camera to the Commission members by the special rapporteurs and special representatives. This is a pity, because such reports are of growing importance. But the [Resolution] 1053 procedures are seen as a pragmatic solution to endless debate as to whether such examinations are intrusions in domestic affairs. There are other procedures for public examinations, according to the rules: for instance, those of Chile and Guatemala and Iran are public.

"One of the agenda items of the Commission—Item 12—is a *tour de table* of the world—each delegation giving its opinion about violations of human rights. Canada did not mark examples with different coloured stars, but we did pick out the most egregious cases. Sri Lanka—how could one go to Geneva in 1986 and not say anything about the conflict in Sri Lanka? The Sri Lankans didn't like our reference to their air force bombing a densely populated area and our plea to them to find a peaceful political settlement. We were not the only country to make such a comment, but we were the first Western country to do so. In our statement we tried to say where there had been progress in the world; it is the balance that makes the criticism more believable, surely. For example, I said about Guatemala that 'I personally witnessed the open and democratic election [that] gave that nation its first civilian government in 30 years,' and suggested that it deserved the Commission's support and encouragement.

"Certain states still complain that international interest in human rights represents an undue interference in their internal affairs. That attitude is, to say the least, outdated. It is especially so, given modern technology. Cries of anguish are no longer muffled by distance. The technology of the silicon chip and satellite communications telescope sounds and scenes across vast distances, and the boundaries that were arbitrarily drawn on maps are no longer able to resist the transmission of truth. I am greatly excited by the fact that the greatest growth of Amnesty [International]—what has made Amnesty relevant is that the movement is now well entrenched in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Unheard of, 10 years ago.

"But I would rather talk about themes than about particular countries. Take the Rights of the Child: it is very interesting to me, because the lengthy negotiations are going to work, we are going to have a covenant in the next few years resulting from the declaration in 1959. Even taking our own country's legislation relating to children, we had on the books a Young Offenders Act—a Juvenile Delinquents Act—from 1908 to 1985 with very trivial amendments.

Well, if it takes domestic law 77 years to go through fundamental change and review, how long might it have taken the world?

"The good news about the Declaration of the Rights of the Child being turned into a covenant is that it is East–West. It is one of those themes that doesn't involve nationalism; it isn't part of the arms race, or anything like that. I hate to equate children with torture, but torture is another thematic subject. [In 1984 the General Assembly adopted a Convention against Torture, after seven years' work in the Human Rights Commission.] Wiser heads than I have suggested that, as the United Nations moves from national concerns to thematic concerns, there is hope.

"But to go on with the Rights of the Child. Poland and Canada are just hand-in-hand in turning this declaration into a covenant. The Polish delegate at Geneva, who happens to be a minister in the present government, of all things embraced me in the Commission, because he knew that a young officer in the department of External Affairs (Colleen Swords) had really taken him a long way along the road. It was exciting. The embraces I was indifferent to, but I suddenly realized that here are people—it doesn't matter what the regime is—working together for children. Couldn't this also apply—I think it does—to a concern about torture?

"When I talk to groups in our own country I try to breathe life into these subjects. I don't mean to be chauvinistic, but I want to relate in Canadian terms what our membership of such UN bodies means and what responsibilities flow from them. I went recently to a chief executive officers' meeting organized in Toronto and they came away, I think, with the idea that [international covenants on human rights weren't the fabrication of] some horny-headed Gestapo-like person but that it was part of a world movement with domestic implications. I'm going tomorrow to Montreal to talk about employment equity—a fancy new phrase—but the equality concept has its foundation in the Universal Declaration, and I will make these links. I like that linkage: it gets people off the day-by-day instant solution, to think that there is an inexorable process, a world movement.

"A wise social scientist at the University of Toronto, professor Christian May, once elaborated for me the idea of colour-coding of rights. It goes like this. Civil and political rights—rights of voting, of free speech, of assembly and so on—are blue rights (nothing to do with Canadian political party colours, by the way!). Then economic rights—the right to work and equality of services—and social supports (health, food, shelter) are red rights. And the newly emerging rights, not yet in any declaration or covenant, are green rights—the ecological rights that have been given such terrible impetus from Chernobyl.

"Canadian domestic law is mostly concerned with blue rights; the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is blue. The same is true in most Western countries. In contrast, as John Humphrey acknowledged in the 1950s, Eastern Europe had a special interest in economic and social rights—the red rights—and their collectivities were seen (and still are) to subsume any rights of individuals. And so the solution was the two covenants [one concerned with political and civil rights, the other with economic and social rights]. I am always interested that Canada can understand collectivities better than some

other countries. Groups and collectivities have had rights here for 225 years, for language and religion, well before Britain and France. I like to think that, when we hear a socialist speak of collectivities, at least we don't close our ears to it. Now, the irony is that their collectivity is usually larger than ours: ours is a group and theirs is a nation."

Napoléon LeBlanc
A Lesson from UNESCO: Talk but Don't Push

The involvement of Napoléon LeBlanc with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) goes back almost to its formation in 1945. His links actually began in 1949, when he was asked to supervise the work of French-speaking educators from many countries who came on UNESCO scholarships to study what Canada was doing in the field of adult education. He was a founding member of the Canadian Commission for UNESCO in 1958, was nominated its vice-president in 1964 and its president in 1967. In 1970, he became a member of the UNESCO Executive Board, and, in 1978, he was in the very centre of controversy as president of the General Conference, during the heated debate on communications and the role of the media in issues of peace, disarmament and human rights. He looks back over that long vista, and also turns to the future of the troubled organization.

"I start with the 15th session of the General Conference in 1968, when I was asked to lead the Canadian delegation. This was the first General Conference I attended. I must confess I was quite lost, because UNESCO appeared then to me in a different way than I had thought about it before. For the first time, I was able to observe the impact of the ideological conflict.

"I am ready to say that ideology has always been with UNESCO. In 1951, it published a report of the first World Conference on Adult Education, held at Elsinore in Denmark. Only 26 countries, mainly from Europe but some from Latin America, were participating. The impression I got from reading the report was that UNESCO was a kind of agency to export to other countries the experience of Western countries in the field of adult education, and to develop democratic attitudes among their citizens. For example, Sir John Maud of the British delegation made it clear that he thought the purpose of adult education, according to UNESCO, was to build a peaceful world.

"But in 1960, I was in the Canadian delegation at the Second World Conference on Adult Education, held in Montreal, and the discussion was different. There were 56 countries taking part, and for the first time we heard people from India and other Asian countries and from some African countries. So we had to ask ourselves if we had not missed something, and whether what we had done was convenient to the newcomers within the organization. From that moment, I started to ask: 'What is going on? What did they mean when they pledged in the UNESCO Constitution to develop a genuine co-operation among member states?'

"I came to the conclusion that UNESCO was still in search of defining itself as an international organization. Not that the wording was wrong; the real problem was how to implement that co-operation. Personally I have always had the conviction that the General Conference itself is the place not only to build up a consensus but to be the route to reach agreement about specific activities.

"Two particular criticisms have been made about UNESCO more than about other specialized agencies. One is that a great deal of time is taken up

with meetings of the Executive Board, up to three months in some years. The other criticism is that the whole system is too centralized in Paris.

"First, about the time spent by the Executive Board, which has grown to 51 members from the 34 members when I was nominated in 1970. We have to put this on the complete biennial cycle. The Executive Board has to give guidance to the director-general and to study his proposals for the two-year program, and then make recommendations to the General Conference. So, I do not think the different committees of the Board waste their time. Anyway, I was elected president of a special committee of the Executive Board to make recommendations for better management of the use of the Board's time. It was a British idea, the special committee. I would say that the director-general, René Maheu, was rather reluctant about this. However, we suggested that the bureau of the Board should point out all the items on the agenda which will not necessitate a debate and recommend that the Board adopt them. And they did decide on a system of putting aside two days—and no more—for comments on these items. When I was president of the General Conference, I observed that this system worked well.

"Secondly, about decentralization. I think that, with the passing of time, it will come. Some programs are already decentralized. For example, take the Man and the Biosphere [MAB] Program. A very small unit in the UNESCO secretariat looks after it. Many of the countries have their own MAB committee, and they decide how much money they will put into that program. The same is true of general programs of information and statistics, and of the International Program for the Development of Communications [IPDC].

"It was even true for Julian Huxley's project of writing the history of the scientific and cultural development of mankind, a project which horrified many of the member states when it was first proposed. It was decentralized in that there was a small, general committee that was responsible for the management of the whole program which worked with a series of national groups. It was published in nine books, properly done and the project was certainly justified. This history turned out to be a useful reference document for scholars and for many teachers."

Most of these UNESCO projects, and other programs such as the drafting of a general history of Africa, are overshadowed by the controversy that boiled up in the agency over a New World Information and Communications Order in the 1970s. Napoléon LeBlanc sketches the outlines of that controversy:

"All the work of UNESCO in the field of communications started after a meeting of experts held in Montreal in 1969, which was chaired by Alphonse Ouimet, who was at that time president of Radio-Canada. There was a debate on communications, and on the flow of information, at every session of the General Conference from 1970. On a divided vote, the General Conference in 1972 added to the program the project of 'a draft declaration on fundamental principles governing the use of the mass information media with a view to strengthening peace and international understanding and combatting war propaganda, racialism and *apartheid*.'

"At its 1974 session the General Conference examined a draft declaration prepared by a committee of experts, but decided to have it reviewed by an intergovernmental meeting [that] would re-draft it for the 1976 conference. Some 80 countries sent representatives to that meeting in Paris, which began on December 15, 1975. They agreed to adopt a new draft, paragraph by paragraph, by consensus, but by the third day they had failed to get consensus, and most of the Western countries withdrew the following day.

"So the General Conference in Nairobi in 1976 was faced with a draft declaration that set out in strong terms the responsibilities of journalists to the state. This led to lengthy debate in commission and finally the conference invited the director-general 'to proceed with a new and broad consultation of experts with a view to preparing a final draft declaration which can meet the largest possible measure of agreement.'

"That was the background to the new draft declaration at the 20th session of the General Conference in 1978, when I presided. We have to have in mind that the U.S.S.R. and the Socialist countries were in agreement with the draft, and that the non-aligned countries were having their own committee, under Mustapha Masmoudi of Tunisia, working on the development of communications. The MacBride Commission [International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems; see the Zimmerman contribution] was established in December 1977, and put in only an interim report to the General Conference in 1978.

"But at the same time, all the gossip possible about the MacBride Commission was leaping around the delegates to the 20th General Conference, and you also had the declaration on the use of mass media. So this was my problem as president. I talked with the chairman of the commission discussing communications, Alberto Wagner from Peru, a man of experience who had been on the Executive Board. He told me he was planning to get a small working group to draft a formula, but at the same time amendments were coming from the Western countries.

"So I convened all those people: the Tunisian chairman of the non-aligned countries, the Italian chairman of the working group, the heads of delegation of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, and the adviser to the director-general. I was informed by the commission's working group chairman how hard its job was. So we all worked together to readjust and add to the draft and finally produce an acceptable text. We spent five full sessions—two-and-a-half days. The result was that the director-general was able to produce a revised text which was adopted by consensus. This was the Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War.

"I remember being at the UNESCO secretariat at midnight on that Friday night, when we had agreement on what could be the final version, and being told by a lady from the Bulgarian delegation that the Socialist countries were critical about the change in the calendar. She pointed out that most of them were only small delegations and their experts who were in Paris for the

Saturday would have left by the following Wednesday. She was rather skeptical when I told her that we had worked out a text that would not divide the conference.

"It was an exciting experience, rather than a difficult job. It was exciting because I was able to move around and talk to the people. The 34 persons on the bureau of the General Conference used to meet three times a week, to help me steer the conference properly. On the other mornings I was free, and I was in the meeting room early, moving around, shaking hands with delegates and talking. So I was able to get the feeling they were ready to accept any guidance I could suggest. And I made a lot of use of that, like a politician would.

"The exciting moment came on the Tuesday evening, November 21. On the previous Saturday a man from the U.S.S.R. delegation, who was a member of the Bureau, had come to my office and said they were against the text of the declaration, and I had replied there was a large consensus for it and it would be adopted. Now on the Tuesday evening I was the host of a reception, as president of the General Conference. But I [received] an invitation from the U.S.S.R. ambassador for the opening of an art exhibition. So I got there a little late, and the member of the U.S.S.R. delegation who had talked to me the previous Saturday [came] up and said 'We will join the consensus.' And, then finally, the one who accepted to lead the consensus on the Wednesday was Masmoudi, the Tunisian chairman of the non-aligned countries' committee on communications.

"I would not say I am particularly persuasive. I talk to many people, but I never push. I wait. At the very end of everything, one member of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] delegation came to me and said, 'I attended the small working group. I must congratulate you; you are among the few men I have met who works with his mind and his heart.'

"A real problem with UNESCO is that the member states have not succeeded with their medium-term planning, looking six years ahead. The purpose of having a medium-term plan was to concentrate the program better, and have a more explicit strategy. In the special committee I chaired before the 1974 General Conference all the proposals were elaborated and they got unanimous support in the conference. But it wasn't yet a coherent plan. The failure came in the method used in making the plan. For they then asked the director-general to consult all the member states in writing ... and everybody sent in a different plan! So it became an occasion to enlarge the program, instead of reducing it.

"I think the member states have to leave to the Secretariat the job of working out the program. The men and women I have met there are highly qualified and competent and understand the needs, so that they can put everything in perspective. But misunderstandings about the process have been there a long time. When the Executive Board met in Madrid in 1972, we decided to discuss the written introduction of the director-general to the biennial program and also to the medium-term program. It was a kind of synthesis and did not go into detail; that would come later. The Soviet member began a critical speech, saying the two documents 'smelt of Bonapartism.' The

director-general, who was René Maheu of France, was quick-witted and said (to my amusement, at least), 'Mr. President, I would like to assure members of the Executive Board that there is no Napoleon among us.'

"I still think that UNESCO has not yet succeeded in defining itself. From its inception it has been called to perform emergency jobs. First, it was called to manage part of the reconstruction of Europe. Then, in 1950, the first crisis happened, when a majority of states rejected the budget. An American took over as director-general and the program became better structured and more concrete. But, since 1960, UNESCO has been involved in trying to provide the poorer countries with resources to solve their problems, and these subjects are not discussed in a good atmosphere. If you take science, the developing countries are very conscious that they are far behind the Western countries, so they come and urge a transfer of science and technology for development. Two conferences, in Geneva in 1963 and in Vienna in 1979, addressed that issue. In 1979, the developing countries asked for a fund of $2 billion, and by 1980 only $32 million was contributed. So this makes them worried and anxious.

"There have been major achievements. UNESCO has helped the democratization of access to education, and it has also made important connections between in-school and out-of-school education, to help the human being continue in his personal development. In science it has drawn on the co-operation of Non-Governmental Organizations [NGOs] like ICSU [International Council of Scientific Unions]. It has been highly instrumental in the training of scientists from developing countries and organizing exchange programs. In the late 1960s, it did an analysis of the scientific policies of about 20 member states. In culture, the Venice conference of 1970 was a landmark because for the first time governments were invited to look at what they were doing and to share their experiences. This led to a series of regional conferences, and Canada was invited to the 1972 conference of European countries in Helsinki. So I think a major contribution of UNESCO has been to maintain a network of people in various fields meeting and suggesting patterns of action.

"As for the future, my conviction is that UNESCO has several times demonstrated its ability to react to crisis. I think the Executive Board can build a consensus—but this is why I was more concerned about the British decision to leave the agency than about the earlier American decision. For, in December 1985, the British got not only what it had requested, but more. So my preoccupation is whether this consensus is a 'consensus of circumstance,' removing everything that is displeasing to some member state, or whether it is really the beginning of a new era, a new departure. The acid test will come, I should say, when proposals come forward for the next medium-term plan."

Betty Zimmerman MacBride: Many Voices but No Music

Until Marshall McLuhan withdrew, the MacBride Commission (International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems) was known as "The 16 Wise Men." McLuhan's replacement, Betty Zimmerman, found that, as well as being the only woman, she was the only member of the commission with a background in the electronic media. The MacBride Commission was established by the director-general of UNESCO after the quarrelsome 1976 General Conference in Nairobi to take some of the steam out of the debate about the flow of information—or, at least, to direct the steam to some purpose. Its origins were therefore political, and during the eight sessions held between December 1977 and November 1979, there was much discussion about "cultural domination" of developing countries and about what might be done about it.

As a Canadian, Betty Zimmerman had similar concerns. But she also wanted to get Sean MacBride (the former foreign minister of Ireland and UN commissioner for Namibia) and his colleagues to focus on some other subjects: in particular, the profound issues surrounding communications and women, stemming from the fact that girls' education usually ends before that of boys and that two-thirds of the illiterates in the world are women. She also stressed the importance of professional training and of entertainment.

For some of these points Zimmerman drew from her own career. When she graduated from the University of Manitoba in May 1945, she was hired by John Grierson of the National Film Board who said, "If you get to Ottawa, you can have a job in the negative room as a cutter." She says: "I remember well that the salary was a magnificent $90 a month.... I was very interested in film. But it was extremely difficult after the war for women to get into production, so after six or seven years I went from the Film Board into Crawley Films where that particular restriction about women was not in force." At Crawley she learned to be a director and producer. In her spare time she wrote children's plays.

Zimmerman moved to CBC Public Affairs, first as radio producer and then TV producer. A bursary in Britain helped widen horizons further and, after two years co-ordinating the CBC planning for Canada's centennial year, she helped start its International Relations group—"that was, in fact, my greatest interest"—and was its director for 14 years. When Zimmerman was nominated to the MacBride Commission, she was director of Radio Canada International.

"Almost everyone on the MacBride [Commission] had been involved with journalism in some form or other, but nobody else had been in the electronic media or film. I found [that] strange.... And there was no one from Britain—and that historical perspective would have been extremely important with some of the subjects we were discussing. I was never able to find out how the mix of members came about. Mustapha Masmoudi of Tunisia and Bogdan Osolnik of Yugoslavia came to be seen as co-godfathers of the New World Information Order; they were writing a good deal on the subject and looking for international support. Mochtar Lubis of Indonesia and George Verghese of India were journalists who had both been imprisoned by their governments; their point of view was not the same as that of Masmoudi on a number of

matters. On some of the basic things, though, they did agree. One of the big concerns was about outside cultural domination. Most of us—not all of us—shared that problem. We just had different experiences and, mainly, we had different solutions.

"At our meeting in Mexico several groups of academics and social scientists came eagerly to see us, because Gabriel García Márquez was their hero and he was on the Commission. In Mexico, the groups that own the stations are in the high-income bracket, and the programming is involved with American programming and there is a great tie-in with the American commercial grouping. A number of the Mexicans said that their public broadcasting was not strong, that the educational component was not there and that they were very much afraid of losing their cultural identity. So we were talking about ways of getting access to the media and about the fact that there should be much less national programming and much more local and smaller regional programming. And the discussion was about cultural domination but also always about 'cultural aggression.'

"Canadians will talk about cultural domination, but 'cultural aggression' is not really something we sense. Most of us feel that the selection has been made by ourselves. We may be disturbed about it, but it hasn't been forced upon us from outside. Every Canadian has the God-given right, apparently, to American programming. In looking for solutions to this perception of cultural domination—and this was true of the discussions that led to the recommendations in the Caplan–Sauvageau Report—our discussions will be very much based on what we can do, while still sticking to the principle of as much free flow of information as possible. We feel that there should be very little interference with choice, but that there should be what would be considered more real choice—that is, not just the choice of what we have now but a choice that will include more Canadian material. We also feel that we have to build up and spend money on providing that alternative. If we treat this issue seriously enough, it is up to us to do something about it as a country and to make our points politically.

"The difference between the Canadian approach and that in some other countries—I am not talking necessarily about Mexico now—[that] feel there is cultural domination by the United States is that they don't have a strong feeling about the concept of a free flow of information. They look at the television programming and conclude that it builds up consumerism, as an audience sees the materials that are in the background of American programming (and maybe commercials as well), and they say, 'We don't want these things to happen in our society. We don't want Western solutions to it, because we haven't the kind of money that could be put into improving our own programming. It would be easier to set some regulations to keep these programs out.'

"They were forgetting, however, the real love for entertainment—and for American entertainment—that is practically everywhere in the world. I felt quite often that the Commission and the people who came to it forgot how important the media is as an entertainment. I began to feel terribly trivial and frivolous from time to time when I would say, 'But why are we not talking about music? Why are we not talking about stars of entertainment and that

quality of programs that so many people want? Why are we not talking about escapism that most people want?'

"Most of this part of the discussion was about television. They hoped it would eventually be available for mass audiences, instead of being, as now in most developing countries, strictly for the elite or perhaps for community viewing. There was thought that things could be done before television became such a general form of entertainment or education. I was amazed that there was not more talk of radio—but then radio is not the same problem. What can you have in radio from another country other than music? Music alone will go worldwide. A great deal of informational programs and public affairs and important cultural material are just not available in the language of the country.

"(We did not go into shortwave broadcasting, because the research had not been done. Sean MacBride and I thought it important, and I outlined the research that would need to be done before we could do a proper analysis and make any kind of recommendations. I'm not worried about that, because we would probably have had to get into a lot of discussion with the International Telecommunications Union [ITU] about frequency allocations. This comes under ITU jurisdiction, not under UNESCO. Our discussion would have been meaningless without their input.)

"A lot of the discussion was about democratization of the media and about access to it, all of which I really do agree with very strongly. I feel there should be a great deal more done in this field—but not to the extent that it should be substituted for professional excellence, which the audience likes. That would make no sense. You are building nothing to make possible a future where people would prefer indigenous material. For one's own programs to be used and appreciated, the material has to be well produced; and I made a fuss about production and training.

"The report doesn't show enough of the positive thinking or good examples we came across. In Mexico, they have these wonderful soap operas, like the *feuilletons* on the CBC French service, half-hour formats of family life that are adored by their audiences. Most of the discussion was about what is wrong, and almost nothing about some of the most exciting things that are happening around the world. Why don't we learn from what works?

"The most fundamental discussions were on the multinational press agencies and the whole field of journalism. Most of the sources of information for consumption in developing countries are foreign, and the information from these agencies has been pretty ethnocentred and was difficult for the governing bodies in developing countries to accept. They felt strongly about the ways in which foreign journalists looked at their customs, at their mores and at the political situation from a Western viewpoint, and discounted many of the things that were important to them.

"Out of these discussions came the questions: Should there be a universal code of ethics? Should there be an international right of rectification? Should there be special protection for journalists? Now, for very important reasons, I think all three would be unsuitable. Sean MacBride thought we were callous in opposing special protection for journalists, but Verghese and

Lubis were also strongly opposed. Our reason was that, although protection of journalists sounds good, in the analysis of how you would achieve it the fear comes up that it would lead to the licensing of journalists. We all know the grave problem there, that licences which are given can be taken away and therefore people's livelihoods are at stake, plus their right to report honestly. It could bring a great deal of self-censorship.

"There is licensing of journalists in many places, I know, but I don't know enough facts to say how serious the drawbacks are. I do know what it would mean in our terms and with our principles. I am not prepared to endorse an international concept that journalists should get special protection everywhere and therefore should be licensed. And always in this discussion comes the comment: 'You cannot really protect journalists who have shown no objectivity.' Objectivity in whose terms? From what I heard in a small group of 16 people, everybody had a different idea of what objectivity was. I would find, even in a group of journalists here in Canada, that it would be very difficult to agree on a precise definition which also brought in the question of responsibility. The MacBride Report stated that freedom was inseparable from responsibility, and responsibility was inseparable from freedom. But the second part was not always said and, if the concept of freedom is not there, you have immediately wrecked the whole discussion. We went 'round and around and around with this kind of discussion, and it did take a very large proportion of the Commission's time."

Before the MacBride Commission had drafted its final report, the General Conference of UNESCO had in 1978 reached a compromise form of phrasing in the Declaration on the Media, replacing "fundamental principles governing the use of the mass media" with "fundamental principles concerning the contribution of the mass media" (see the LeBlanc contribution). Betty Zimmerman says: "That did not stop the Commission from arguing the whole thing from the beginning again.... It became a discussion between where is power, and where should it be, in presenting information. As you read through *Many Voices, One World*, on one page we have one way of putting the whole discussion and on the next page the other side; but there would never be an agreement. The title of our report was a very proper one."

Some omissions worried her. "We weren't looking into the future. We were talking 1980s, at best. There was not much talk about new technology or its applications, and not much about some of the really basic problems. We were all concerned about literacy and, suppose the programs work, there will be an immense new group of literates. There are problems of newsprint and of making sure these new literates can get the books they need. That needs some planning. Is there some kind of electronic step that can take us to the next generations without going through exactly what we have gone through? Should we be planning to jump some steps, because the chances are all there? UNESCO [United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization] should have been addressing these issues; if it has, we didn't pay attention to what has been done.

"I am disappointed that a much stronger section on the concerns of women wasn't in the report. But some of the strongest wording is there: '...

of all the violations of human rights, the most systematic, widespread and entrenched is the denial of equality to women....' [page 189 of the report]. The wording is fine; it's just the space which the section on Equal Rights for Women takes up—two pages. References should have been in nearly every chapter, and indeed they were written for every chapter by me. The section almost ended up in the wrong place entirely, such as 'We must be more concerned about the generally handicapped'! It needed women at all levels of the Commission to get these points across, and UNESCO itself at that time was totally male-dominated, so there was nowhere to appeal.

"I am not disappointed with the book or its recommendations. It will serve a certain purpose, which is that it is a very good study, it gives a lot of information in different areas and each country can then look at it in its own terms. A lot of the problems people were talking about were put down, but not solved. No commission is going to solve them. It put ideas in people's minds in many fields. I'm always disappointed that my own idea of priorities is not met, but in fact in many cases I was convinced that the group as a group was wiser than its individuals."

William Barton
Getting Tough, Briefly, on Namibia

Canada has so far served four two-year terms on the Security Council, at roughly 10-year intervals. The latest was from January 1977 to December 1978. The Canadian ambassador during that period was William "Bill" Barton, whose whole diplomatic career seems to have been linked to the United Nations. He served in Vienna during the first days of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in New York in the early 1960s during the UN Congo operations, then back in Ottawa in charge of the UN Division from 1964 to 1970.

In 1972, Barton received his first ambassadorial posting—to Geneva, where he kept an eye on a wide range of agencies: the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). WIPO gives protection to trademarks, industrial designs and authors' copyrights, and its head resented the fact that Canada had opposed its becoming a UN specialized agency. But he never managed to attend any of the conferences of the International Postal Union, "which were tremendously popular because the tradition is that all the delegates receive sets of first issue stamps from each of the countries there."

Major claims on Barton's time came from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during the preparations for the Tokyo round of tariff negotiations and also during the entry of Britain into the European Community; and from UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development], whose meetings went on all night, "which was awful. In UNCTAD, you negotiate very much in blocs and the Western bloc, which is usually the case wherever you go, was completely disorganized. They were unwilling to compromise with each other or give in on anything, and are more Bolshevik than you can believe, Bolshevik in the true sense of nihilistic."

The final area of heavy work at Geneva for Bill Barton—"not to great profit"—was on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). He talks here about this work on the CCD and about how it was linked to disarmament discussions in the General Assembly, particularly the first Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD-1) in June and July 1978 when he had been transferred to New York and where he became the convenor of the "Barton Group":

"There were 25 states [that] were members of the CCD at the time, and an empty chair was left for the French, who were not participating; and of course the Chinese were not there at that time. The Western countries on it then were Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and Netherlands, in addition to the U.S.A. and Britain. We would work at negotiations during the spring and summer, and then go off to New York in September to be our countries' representatives on the First Committee—the disarmament committee—of the General Assembly. So there was continuity there. And the Western group that came from Geneva had the practice of consulting together in New York, trying to co-ordinate strategy.

"Just before I moved to my new posting in New York in mid-1976, I detected that the French were coming around [in their views]. The Special Session was to come up in 1978 and, almost two years in advance, you could see things were beginning to change. Anyway, the French came to me and

said they would like to 'nibble at the edges' of disarmament discussions and was there some way they could get involved in the Western group discussions in New York. I said, 'Sure, we may have to bring in some of the other countries as well.' So I called an informal meeting at the Canadian Mission—it has the advantage of being on the northern end of the UN grounds and has a good conference room.

"We agreed that it would be useful to consult, without any binding obligation; but, since our general concerns and views were similar, we agreed we should at least discuss the implications of whatever was coming up and, to the extent that we could reach any agreement, we would do that. Since we had agreed that we should keep on meeting, somebody said, 'What will we call ourselves?' and somebody else said, 'Well, we were convened by Bill Barton. It's the Barton Group.' That group still holds meetings; I suspect that most of the people who participate now don't know who Bill Barton was....

"UNSSOD-1 took on a number of things. I am not deprecating the *Plan of Action* it produced, because it is a useful blueprint to have. But we have had plans before; they are great if you do anything with them. I really think that in practical terms the most useful contribution of UNSSOD-1 was to devise a formulation on the restructuring of the CCD in Geneva that got the French and the Chinese participating. At least now we have got all the five nuclear weapons powers sitting around the table together. I feel that was a real accomplishment.

"When I was going to Geneva in 1972, Tommy Burns [who had represented Canada on the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee from 1952] gave me a copy of his book, *A Seat at the Table* and inscribed it 'To you I pass the torch,' which made me feel good. But I quickly found that it wasn't much of a torch. It was interesting to watch the way the Russians and the Americans worked it. You would have thought that they were in conspiracy against the rest of us! What they were using the organization for was simply a mechanism for multilateralizing the agreements that they had reached, and the British were a sort of third party to the operation with little apparent influence. I don't know what it is like now that the French and the Chinese are there....

"At the time I was in Geneva, there were two or three things we were really supposed to be working on. The biggest one was the Comprehensive Test Ban, and they [the Russians and the Americans] kept telling us that it was coming along and it would be available shortly. And each year we would go back to the General Assembly and make excuses.

"I was doubtful whether the United States really wanted a Comprehensive Test Ban. They always claimed that they did in those days, from 1974 to 1975, and they alleged they were negotiating in good faith. But I had had experience of working with the U.S. military back in 1956, when I was on the Canada–U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence. We went to the H-bomb tests in Eniwetok. We were there for a week, and I talked to them all and watched the way they did things, and I could not believe that at least the military was cheerfully going to give up testing. In Geneva in the 1970s, they kept telling us they were getting closer and closer to a test ban agreement, but they would never tell us what exactly they were doing.... The work was

discouraging, but it was a superb luncheon club. The CCD representatives had a practice of going out together once a month, and we visited every restaurant within 30 km of Geneva.

"You simply cannot make the big boys do something they don't want to do. To the extent that you can generate pressure on them, maybe they will respond; but the closer you get to what they regard as really vital, the less you seem to gain. All the agreements that have been negotiated are ones they decided were desirable. Middle powers don't have much leverage in the whole field of arms control, but that doesn't mean we should not keep on pressing. Yet our ability to influence them is not great."

Being one of the 10 non-permanent members of the Security Council has its advantages and its drawbacks. One advantage, says Barton, is that "it conveys a status on the delegation and involves them in activities and consultations you don't otherwise get into." A drawback of being non-permanent is that "the experience comes so rarely that you don't get a chance to build up much of a background for working effectively. By the time you have really learned to play the organ, you are off! I have written up what I did in 1977 and 1978 but, by the time we get on again (if we do) in 1989, it is going to be old history and won't be very relevant."

One fact not often recognized, Barton points out, is that developing countries have heavy influence, amounting in some circumstances to a form of veto, in the Security Council. "Of the 10 non-permanent members, 2 come from Western Europe and Others, 1 from Eastern Europe, 2 each from Latin America, Africa and Asia, and 1 is a sort of floater but usually comes from the Middle East. So the mathematics are that developing countries control seven seats, and that gives them a veto of a kind—what has been called 'a silent veto.' They can stop a resolution because you need 9 positive votes out of [a possible] 15; they can even stop an issue coming on the agenda. So they have a very profound influence on what goes on in the Council, and you cannot get something through if you don't have them on-side."

Barton had expected that the main activity of the Security Council in 1977 and 1978 would be related to the Middle East—and indeed he made a familiarization trip to that region. The UN International Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established but (says Barton) "I thought it wasn't well conceived and would be an invitation to trouble. Its mandate was clear but impracticable; but everybody thought we should do it. This involved the question of Canadian participation, and the UN was keen [that] we should take on the signals commitment. But the Canadian forces were just too stretched in that area, and we only did it for six months to help them get started."

Instead, the focus was on southern Africa. The Soweto uprising and its suppression had occurred in 1976, and South Africa had defied for 10 years the overwhelming vote in the General Assembly terminating its mandate over South-West Africa, now to be called Namibia. "My coming on the Council coincided with the arrival of [U.S. Ambassador Andrew] Young, and he was very keen to try to solve some of these African problems and take the heat off because, as a black American, he was dissatisfied with the position that had been taken in the past. He proposed first to our little Western group, which

subsequently became known as the Gang of Five—the Americans, British, French, Germans and Canadians—that we should attempt to hold off what we knew was coming up: a series of resolutions on South Africa, which would demand sanctions over both the issue of *apartheid* and also over Namibia.

"Andy's idea was that, instead of coming up with a resolution that would get vetoed and would emphasize the differences, we should try to find a high degree of common ground and get a declaration that everyone would agree to. Well, the Africans were pretty skeptical about that operation, but he talked them into trying it. The other prong of the fork was that we were to use all the forces at our disposal to lead to a solution of the Namibian problem. The Americans and the British really talked tough about what they were prepared to do. That led to a long series of negotiations over Namibia which took up all the period Canada was on the Council.

"Coming back to the first prong of the fork, the business of the declaration: it petered out over time, because the maximum distance that the Western countries were prepared to go was so far short of what the Africans felt they had to have that, in the end, I think it was unwise for us to have engaged in it. They were just mad at us. But these discussions resulted in the Western draft resolution (rewritten by India) proposing a compulsory arms embargo against South Africa. It was adopted in November 1977. Of course, the West played this up as a great thing, the first time except for the case of Rhodesia and the first time against a member state of the United Nations that the Council had adopted a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter, dealing with threats to the peace. In fact, it was a mere placebo, an attempt to excuse what the Western countries were unwilling to do in terms of sanctions that would really hurt."

Over Namibia, the five Western countries on the Council produced a plan for a cease-fire in the cross-border warfare with Angola-based guerrillas, for elections that would be internationally supervised and for a handover of the administration and withdrawal of South African forces. A contact group, consisting of the deputy representatives of the five missions in New York, travelled to Africa several times; the five foreign ministers were also actively involved. In April 1978, the South African government said it accepted the plan, but efforts to gain the South-West African People's Organization's (SWAPO) acceptance were almost destroyed by a South African raid on Kassinga in Angola where 400 refugees were killed. Nevertheless, SWAPO did accept the plan in July 1978, and at the end of the month the Security Council, with Bill Barton presiding, triumphantly adopted Resolution 435. But the triumph did not last long. By September, the South African government was saying the "time was not yet ripe" to implement the UN plan. Barton continues the sad tale:

"By the end of 1978 it was very evident that the South Africans were stalling, and the time came for the Western countries to live up to their undertakings about how tough they were going to get with South Africa. At that point the British panicked. Quite contrary to the rules by which we had been operating, the British foreign secretary, David Owen, sent his representative on the contact group off on a separate mission to South Africa. They really were

squirming on the end of a hook; there was just no way the British were in any position to agree to any sanctions. I strongly suspect that, although [then U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus] Vance and Andy Young talked tough, if the issue of sanctions had got to the U.S. Congress it would have foundered there, too. In any event, it became past history because of the 1980 elections and the coming of the Reagan administration with its new policy.

"Why did Canada go along with the contact group rather than with a more 'like-minded' set of countries [such as] the Scandinavians? Well, the circumstances were particular in this case. We were the five on the Security Council and it was worth a try. Certainly, if you took the words at face value, it was worth a try; and I think we may yet have put something on the record with Resolution 435 that ultimately may be useful. The machinery is all there now. If the situation changes to the point that the South Africans decide that they want to go, then it is there and you press button 'A.' Another thing you have to evaluate is where you can exercise most influence. The question came up repeatedly after Chester Crocker took charge of negotiations: Should we get out of the contact group since we were off the Council? African countries didn't want us to get out; they told us behind the scenes that they wanted us to stay on.

"Looking back on our two years on the Security Council in 1977 and 1978, I found it an exciting and rewarding experience, and I think we did justice to Canada during our time there. It was an important and proper thing for Canada to claim its turn on the Council which, in spite of frustrations, continues to be a useful body."

Darrin Langen • Carl Day • Donald Stenger
22 Years On—And Still in Cyprus

It was in March 1964 that the first Canadian peacekeeping troops were airlifted to the island of Cyprus, to help prevent a recurrence of fighting between the Turkish and Greek communities. Over the next 10 years the situation improved, and the size of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was reduced from an original 6 200 troops to 2 800—yet always with a Canadian contingent. But in June 1974, the situation deteriorated, when an unsuccessful coup attempt by right-wing Greek Cypriots against Archbishop Makarios led to an invasion of Turkish troops from the mainland. These troops swiftly occupied 40 per cent of the island, and remaining minorities fled across the new line, which has come to be called the Green Line.

One of the most difficult sectors to patrol is the stretch through the city of Nicosia, where, in places, Turks and Greeks face each other across the once busy shopping streets that are now empty and dilapidated. Canadian battalions serve a six-month spell of duty in Cyprus, covering this sector. In March 1986, the Second Royal Canadian Horse Artillery completed their period of rotation and returned to Camp Petawawa in Ontario. Several members of the regiment had striking tales to tell and the adjutant, Captain Cotter, arranged that three of them would talk to the editor of this book. Lieutenant Darrin Langen describes the sensitive atmosphere on that part of the Green Line; Master Warrant Officer Carl Day recounts an awkward incident in which he was arrested by Turkish secret police; and Gunner Donald Stenger tells perhaps the most dramatic story, modestly explaining how he prevented a wild shoot-out between the two sides.

Lt. Darrin Langen: Keeping the Peace—By Not Giving an Inch

Lieutenant Darrin Langen, from Saskatchewan, joined the armed forces when he was 19. He was 24 and had been with the Second Royal Canadian Horse Artillery for two years when the regiment was posted to Cyprus:

"We had about four weeks of training in peacekeeping here at Petawawa. The way we normally train is very aggressive; it is set with an enemy. But this way we made sure we got through the minds of our people that there is no enemy and we have to negotiate equally with both sides, the Greeks and the Turks. In one exercise we set up on the parade square here a demilitarized zone, a fake Green Line, with the Greeks on one side and the Turks on the other, only we called them different things. And we set incidents so that our people got practice reporting and doing checkpoints, setting up roadblocks and observing. We used old case studies written up by other battalions on their return. We also had lectures on what the UN was; and we learned a little bit of Greek and Turk—just a few phrases, enough to say 'Where is your officer?' and 'Halt!' or 'Thank you' and 'Please'....

"In Cyprus, I was a troop commander covering about one-third of the Canadian part of the line with 30 men. In the suburban section, we had three Observation Posts [OPs] and one patrol, and in the main city we just had one OP manned all the time, one checkpoint and two patrols. The line in the suburban sector was 3 km long and the buffer zone anything from 50 to 100 m wide. In the old walled city of Nicosia, the zone ranged from the furthest of

50 m apart to 5 m apart between the Greeks and Turks, with portholes for guns in the walls opposite each other. But by showing a force in the buffer zone, we made sure they did not enter it, or break agreements they had made. And with that we had a few exciting moments.

"The first one happened when I was in the suburb, just south of OP Mojave. I was taking our sketchbook one day, and reviewing it and writing down notes of the discrepancies of what had changed in the Greek line since the last time sketches were done. We have sketches of every position in the buffer zone, because we are not allowed to take photographs there. We had relied on the sketches done by the Vandoos [Royal 22nd Regiment], and, going through them to update them, I noticed a number of portholes they had missed. So I tried to update the whole line in a period of about two weeks.

"I told the Greeks on the first day I was going to be observing their line, but obviously they didn't tell everyone on the line. The people there were always asking us, 'Any problem? Any problem?' Some wanted to look at the sketches, but I didn't let them. The next day I asked for an artist, someone from the militia in Transport, and when he came I told him to go through one sketch at a time, over a period of a week, and update as many as he could. One of my troop escorted him, and he sat down in the buffer zone and started sketching.

"About half an hour later the Greeks started making a big hoopla about it. They brought on down their sergeant and their lieutenant, and my sergeant went on over to see what was happening. When I had told them we were going to have people sketching, they had said, 'fine, that's good'; but when it happened, they started sending in protests and they also had reporters there, and the next morning's newspaper called us 'UN Spies in Greek Cypriot Sector.' When an incident gets into a newspaper, it goes straight up to the UN force commander, a general; for it is part of the political net. They labelled us spies, even though we have only sketches, and the Greeks and Turks have photographs of each other's positions.

"Anyway, the result was we just stopped it and, about a month later, we resumed and we did one sketch one week and another the next. We still never got the whole line done. That was the frustration: because someone misconstrues an action and blows it out of proportion, you have to sit back and let it all calm down and let the higher-ups sort it out and then come down and start again. You try to carry on without too much apathy setting in among your troops, sort of thinking, 'Oh, jeez, here we go again, setting up another sketch, they're going to do us, tell us to stop again.' But some of my soldiers really liked the controversy of it, because it meant they were actually doing something and getting one up on either side. It wasn't adversarial; it was one of the tools of negotiation.

"I tried not to give an inch to either side, and I made sure my sergeants did not give an inch. I almost treated the area of buffer zone I was responsible for as sovereign territory. There was a lot of talking between their lieutenant and me, and between their sergeants and mine. The Greeks didn't give us too much of a problem in most cases. It was the Turks who were trying to push forward....

"The elections [in December 1985] were a point of tension on the Greek side. The Turks were a little bit upset about it, but they contained it and they actually showed less presence on the line at the time. We were prepared for a problem with the Greeks after their rallies. Whenever they came to our checkpoint and tried to hand in a petition, we would state we were not accepting it for the United Nations but we would give it to the appropriate person. The petitions would be asking the UN to leave the island, and the Turkish forces to leave as well, as they were not needed here. The only people doing this were the left-wing parties. We expected up to 2 000 people to come from some of the rallies, but usually only 60 to 75 people showed up. They came with cameras and reporters. They were probably expecting us to do something wrong that they could blow up to the press; but we never did.

"It wasn't difficult for my troop to keep a balance between the two sides. I had some really good sergeants. They didn't mind being aggressive in negotiations with both sides, so in that way they were fair. We gained a lot of respect, especially from the Turks who were hard negotiators as well. It is like the old carpet dealer. The next time they see you, they say, 'Hello, my friend, how are you?' and they would offer you a cigarette. But if you didn't argue with them or negotiate with them hard and gave in too easily, they wouldn't even talk to you next time. Once they realized we were not going to give an inch in the first two or three weeks ... my troop had the least amount of incidents, whenever we moved to a different part of the line."

MWO Carl Day: An Eye-Opener from the Secret Police

Master Warrant Officer Carl Day, of Kingston, joined the army in 1963, a year before the first Canadian troops went to Cyprus. He remembers them returning to Petawawa and telling of having to live in bunkers for three months. He says: "They didn't have all the niceties we had." When he went to Cyprus himself with the Second Royal Canadian Horse Artillery in 1985, he was in charge of the "recce" platoon of 23 men, with four jeeps, two wheel-based armoured vehicles and two Lynx tracked vehicles. The platoon's job was to patrol through both the north and south parts of the island:

"It was more interesting than doing 12 hours in an OP. You never knew what would happen.

"We used to go over most parts of the south [Greek] side, and we were given a route to travel in the north that took us up to Kyrenia port and back. Each side had agreed on the route we would take. There were 10 or 11 camps up this way in the north, and we would travel this route to see, over the period of six months from September, what changes in equipment there were and what different boats were in the harbour. Just gathering information. We weren't allowed to stop by the camps, but we used to stop in Kyrenia to have lunch, and at Helena castle to talk to people there. We went Tuesdays and Fridays to the north, and around the south the other days. Each route took about four hours to drive 'round.

"One day last October, I went out just to check the crew, the young driver and sergeant. We had gone down to Kyrenia port to check the ships,

and we went by where the Turkish invasion took place in 1974. Then, beyond Lapdos, there is quite a big Turkish training camp, and the driver, seeing all the activity, slowed right down.... I don't know how far 'round the route we had been followed by the secret police, to see what we were doing, but as soon as the driver slowed down we were stopped and ordered to follow the secret police, who took us back into Nicosia to the jail there.

"They questioned us about what we were doing. We had a map, but you weren't allowed to have marks on the map. They confiscated and checked the map, to see if we had marked it. It took two hours before the liaison officer [LO]—an Austrian captain—came and got them talked into releasing us. As far as the secret police were concerned we had been spying.

"I wasn't really worried. As soon as I saw it wasn't going to be an open and shut thing where they would allow us to leave, I phoned our military police—the Turks let me phone—and they phoned the UN military police. After that, it was only a matter of half-an-hour before the LO came and they let us go.

"But it was an eye-opener, definitely, to know how closely we were being watched. In the jail at that time, we had as many as five secret police all in the room. I knew they were secret police, because of the technical identification they pulled out, so you could see what level they were. It was something to see. Each policeman didn't just look at all three of us. These two would watch me, these two watch the sergeant, to see if any of us would make motions to the other.

"They were trying to say the route we came back up was incorrect, but it was the one the Turkish authorities had agreed on. It shows you how careful you had to be. If a young driver or a sergeant ever made a wrong statement in these circumstances, they would automatically be accused of spying. But they couldn't prove anything. We never made notes; we memorized what we saw. The more you try to use your memory, the better your memory gets.

"You don't think anything will ever happen to you, but in this case it did."

Gunner Donald Stenger: The Impromptu Firing Range

Gunner Donald Stenger from Winnipeg celebrated his 19th birthday on the Green Line in Cyprus. His father had been there with the Black Watch, during one of the early peacekeeping stints in 1967. His son tells of the most dangerous episode that happened during his battalion's six months on the island in 1985 and 1986:

"I was a rifleman in F Battery, and we were doing Line West in that suburb of Nicosia. I was either in the OPs or doing escort duty when the Greeks or the Turks needed to repair—but never build up—their defensive positions. When they wanted, like, to repair old sandbags after bad weather, they would get a United Nations escort; and we would go out and watch and make sure, from drawings of what it had looked like, that they didn't build it up more. If a sketch wasn't available, we would draw it first on the back of a piece of paper before they started work.

"I had just one difficult situation while on escort. I was standing there, watching a party of eight Greeks working to clean out a trench that wasn't used too much and had grass growing over it. I was the only UN guy there. I heard two sharp cracks and then I heard the bullets go over. If you have ever worked in the butts, you know what it sounds like when the rounds go directly overhead. So immediately I said, 'What's going on?' After the third bullet came, immediately I hit the ground. I told the Greeks to get down.

"It was a stretch of open ground, with the Greeks and Turks about one-eighth of a mile [200 m] apart, and some buildings in the background on the Greek side. I phoned in to my Line NCO and told him to get over to my position ASAP. By the time he got there, the firing had stopped. Thirteen shots had come in a matter of 10 minutes, kind of off and on. I counted them as they came. After I told him what was going on and he had left to find out the reason for it, 14 more were fired and then they stopped. They would fire, and then I would say, 'OK, you can stand up.' So I would get up and go back to my position. After the 14 were fired, my NCO came back again—and that was the last of it.

"But, in the meantime, after 17 shots had come, a young Greek second lieutenant went and got an automatic weapon from their section house. He came back and put it down. Then two more shots were fired and he picked it up and he said to me, 'I fire back to save my people.' I said, 'No.' I've got to persuade him not to, because I didn't want to get involved in a fight. He looked at me kind of stupid[ly]. I said: 'My line NCO has taken care of it. It will be OK.' Meanwhile shots were still coming over, and he was getting a little anxious. He didn't end up firing, and my NCO came and said the Turks were trying out a new range, a kind of impromptu firing range, and they were directing their fire another way now. They had just started that day and didn't seem to have told anyone.

"But I'm not scared to say I was scared silly. I was on the ground half the time. It just doesn't happen to me every day.

"When you are out there in Cyprus, you respect their rank. But, when an incident like that happens, it is man to man. You say, 'Come on, buddy, straighten up! You can't do that!' I had 20 days left on the island. I kept bringing that up to myself, 'Come on, you've got 20 days left on the island and then you'll be home in Canada!' "

The adjutant, Capt. Craig Cotter, commented: "If that second lieutenant had returned fire, that would have been prime reason—Greek forces firing on Turkish forces—for it to have escalated right up, I am sure, to the General Assembly."

Douglas Roche
Verifying Arms Control—
The Modern Peacekeeping

In 1983, the Canadian Government set up a Verification Research Unit in the department of External Affairs. The Unit's annual budget has been $1 million. This is solid proof of the importance that Canada has placed on building effective verification measures into every arms control agreement. Douglas "Doug" Roche, ambassador for disarmament since October 1984, has written: "The highly sophisticated nature of today's weapons means that, in order to be meaningful and durable, arms control and disarmament agreements must have provisions which ensure compliance and build confidence in the validity and integrity of a treaty."

Doug Roche moved into politics after more than a dozen years as a journalist and after founding the *Western Catholic Reporter*. During 12 years as Conservative MP for Edmonton South, he poured much of his energy into international affairs. He served as president of the United Nations Association in Canada; and when he was international president of Parliamentarians for World Order (now renamed Parliamentarians for Global Action), he played a large part in launching the Five-Continent Peace Initiative. As Canada's ambassador for disarmament, he was much involved during 1985 in the third review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and then in November piloted through the UN General-Assembly a resolution on "Verification in All Its Aspects" (GA Resolution 40/120) which broke new ground on this subject.

John Holmes, who was attending the Assembly session as an observer in the Canadian delegation, wrote: "Douglas Roche and his extraordinarily able team did as professional a job of arm-twisting, cajoling, bargaining and friendly persuasion as I ever saw in the so-called 'golden age' of Canadian diplomacy at the United Nations." Here, Roche speaks of this initiative, and of the issue of verification in general:

"Verification is a reflection of Canada's concern for its six basic policies on arms control and disarmament.[1] Verification is, in a certain manner of speaking, the proof of the pudding for those skeptics in Canada who think that all we are doing is just giving lip service to these policies. It is a form of practical outreach, like peacekeeping. In fact, verification is the modern peacekeeping.

"Canada has worked on verification measures in three areas. They are seismic verification of underground nuclear tests; verification of the use of chemical or biological weapons; and—I suppose the newest area—satellite monitoring, both air-to-air and air-to-ground.

"I don't need to go into much detail about these programs here. The work done by means of the Yellowknife seismograph array since the 1960s is

[1] The six arms control measures that Canada has advocated for a number of years are a comprehensive test ban treaty; a radical reduction of nuclear forces and associated measures to enhance strategic stability, including reaffirmation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; a global ban on chemical weapons; the prevention of an arms race in outer space; the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; and agreement on confidence-building measures, sufficient to allow the reduction of conventional military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

described in the booklet, *Seismic Verification*, published in 1986 by the department of External Affairs. When 70 stations around the world joined in an experiment in 1984 called the International Seismic Data Exchange, Canada contributed nearly 15 per cent of the total data. So that shows how important Canadian monitoring is in this area, of differentiating between earthquakes and nuclear tests. Now we are upgrading the Yellowknife array, to make it more effective.

"Canada's work on chemical weapons verification arose from the allegations made in 1980 by the United States that such weapons had been responsible for many deaths in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. The General Assembly invited the UN Secretary-General to send a team of experts to investigate, and he picked experts from Egypt, Kenya, Peru and the Philippines. Although they were not allowed into Afghanistan and Kampuchea, the team reported it had found 'circumstantial evidence of the possible use of some sort of toxic chemical substance.' The Assembly by a majority vote adopted the conclusions of this report, and in the same resolution (GA Resolution 37/98) in December 1982, asked the Secretary-General to devise procedures for the 'timely and efficient investigation' of new charges. And the report of a UN Group of Consultant Experts in October 1984, brought out the need for a handbook for the use of teams sent to investigate allegations.

"So Canada took that job on. Two professors from the University of Saskatchewan compiled this 174-page handbook, taking the most difficult situation—an investigation in a remote area—and providing checklists for teams in such a situation who are trying to sift evidence of the use of either chemical or biological weapons. The handbook is a very thorough job. After we gave copies to the Secretary-General in November 1985, he sent them out to his teams. So this is quite a story. Canada has directly contributed to the monitoring that is now going on in the field—South east Asia and Iran–Iraq are cases in point which the Secretary-General is looking at. And the handbook also earned a four-page review in the *American Journal of International Law*[2] in which Miriam E. Sapiro says it 'promises to be an invaluable aid to the international community.'

"The satellite work is at an early stage; but Spar Aerospace did a feasibility study on remote sensing to determine the function of an unknown satellite in space, and there is a contract with McGill University for computer work on space-to-ground monitoring. That's PaxSat A and PaxSat B.

"This thumbnail sketch sets the ground for the statement that Canada has truly entered into verification in a meaningful way as a contribution to arms control, and isn't just playing with rhetorical expressions.

"The recognition of the substantive work going on in Canada has been a factor in establishing our *bona fides* when we came to present our resolution to the General Assembly in 1985 and got it through by consensus. Resolutions that are voted on in the Assembly are of much less value that those [that] you get by consensus. You have the world community expressing itself in the consensus resolutions. So that, when Canada got the verification resolution by

[2] Vol. 80 (July 1986), pp 678–682.

consensus, it was indeed a victory. No resolution on this subject had even reached the General Assembly before.

"A factor in the victory was the political moving and maneuvering on the floor of the Assembly. Of course, that would have been to little avail if there had not been a substantial body of Canadian expertise and work and track record to carry the subject along. But it takes more than good ideas and good intentions and hard work by scientists to 'save the world.' It takes political maneuvering to get points across at the United Nations.

"This is what happened. We were concerned to legitimize the concept of verification as a basic element of arms control agreements generally, in addition to specific verification measures being worked out for particular agreements. This involved a lot of argument with those who still see verification as one more obstacle in the path to arms control. One such country was India, whose representative on the Assembly's First Committee, Mr. Gonsalves, cited the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament (UNSSOD-1) to argue that verification had to be related to individual disarmament agreements and went on: 'We are accordingly unable to appreciate the need to restate the obvious in a general way without relation to any such specific agreements. We are also acutely aware that the verification aspect is being overstressed and exploited by certain States to frustrate progress on disarmament negotiations.'

"In drafting our resolution we also resorted to the Final Document of UNSSOD-1, drawing all that was said in it in various places about verification and bringing these phrases into one paragraph. This helped to give a legal basis for the concept. And Garcia Robles, for example, [who was formerly] the ... Mexican foreign minister [and] who won the Nobel Peace Prize for his work in this area, quoted this paragraph as a fundamental reason why Mexico could join the consensus. For, he said, it made clear that no provision should be adopted that covers verification in the abstract.

"We had 10 co-sponsors, including Britain and West Germany and 2 Third World countries (Cameroon and Costa Rica). But we still had to finesse the resolution. There is a whole story to be told about how we got it through the Western nations and the Soviet Union. But quite different tactics were successful with the neutral and non-aligned group. During the 1985 Assembly session, about 18 of them were sponsoring a resolution that dealt with the imminent Gorbachev–Reagan summit in Geneva. [The resolution's] essence was an expression of hope that the summit would 'give a decisive impetus' to bilateral U.S.–Soviet negotiations. Most Western countries wanted to abstain, because they said the resolution was not evenhanded. I maintained [that] the resolution—known as L.60—was evenhanded, and I carried the Canadian government on this point.

"It was a split second decision we made at the very end, when we saw the Americans rebelling against L.60. I made the decision that we were going to support it and, when I did, Canada stood out as supporting the non-aligned countries' projection that the two superpowers are holding the world as hostage in the arms race. I did this, not just for the sake of L.60 because our support of it was causing me problems with the separation from the Western

countries, but also with an eye to our own verification resolution, because I needed their support of it.

"Later I went to the leading members of the non-aligned group—India, Mexico, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia—and reminded them of Canada's support on L.60. I said we lent them support at some cost to ourselves, and asked them to accept my *bona fides* on the verification resolution. And I won their support, and so we got our resolution through by consensus."

A year later, in November 1986, a new Canadian-initiated resolution on "Verification in All Its Aspects" came before the Assembly with twice the number of co-sponsors, including representatives from Eastern Europe as well as the Western and non-aligned states. It was also approved by consensus. The resolution took the initiative a large step further by referring the subject of verification to the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC). The UNDC is expected to draw up principles and techniques to encourage the inclusion of adequate verification provisions in arms control agreements, and to consider ways in which member states of the United Nations may play a larger role in the field of verification. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said that the verification resolution also reflected "the strong support of the international community for Canada's continuing efforts in this critical area."

In December 1986, Roche spoke on the subject of "Why Canada Stresses Verification" in a speech made in Kiev during a tour of the Soviet Union. Canada believes, he said, that "verification is the single most important element in international arms control and disarmament negotiations.... We must recognize that it is unfortunately true that arms control agreements cannot be negotiated on the basis of trust alone." He went on to quote from a recent speech by Clark in the House of Commons:

"Many of the persisting obstacles to negotiating progress arise directly from a lack of trust. The priority attention Canada has given to verification issues ... attacks this question directly. Arms control agreements alone do not produce security; confidence in compliance produces security. Verification justifies that confidence."

Brian Mulroney "We Must Celebrate UN's Existence Every Day"

During the celebrations of the United Nations' 40th anniversary, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's address to the General Assembly in New York earned him a remarkable ovation from many delegations. This, with some minor cuts, is what he said:

"Mr. President, I would like to speak with you today about people and nations working together.

"History shows that the solitary pursuit of self-interest outside the framework of broader international co-operation is never enough to increase our freedom, safeguard our security, or improve our standard of living.

"Since 1945 we have not had a world war. But we have lived for decades under the threat of an ultimate catastrophe, one which would unleash immeasurable forces of destruction. The same human genius which conquered outer space has also wrenched from nature the secret of devastation.

"In our search to create, we discovered the ability to annihilate. Anxiety has become a fact of daily life. It can be seen in the arts; it permeates political activity; it alters social structures; it shapes mentalities....

"Can we blame the UN for having been unable to put an end to the vicious cycle of force and fear, of injustice and violence? In my view, we cannot blame the UN for problems that have been caused essentially by self-centred nationalism and our own failures. We must not make the UN the scapegoat for our inability to recognize and accept diversity in the world....

"While the UN may seem powerless in the face of the circumstances that confront it, it is nevertheless all we have. The men and women who created this organization in 1945 hungered for peace and justice and were guided by high principle.... In this organization nations have the opportunity to bring reason to their relations, to break the chain of violence, to defuse the lust for revenge, to voice their needs, and to affirm their dignity....

"The UN was created by man, and is therefore fragile. For this reason, I do not believe that it is completely appropriate to talk about celebrating one particular anniversary of the UN; rather, we must celebrate its existence every day, for it is threatened every day and it must be protected every day.

"Since 1945, we have all recognized the threat presented by catastrophic weapons of war. That threat goes beyond our individual concerns as peoples and nations. It commands the attention of all; it calls for urgent action by the entire international community.

"All of us, through international forums and treaties, have a role to play in arms reduction. We must reinforce negotiations for verifiable disarmament accords on testing and weaponry, both conventional and nuclear. Individually and collectively, we must all do our part. Progress is possible. The recent successful review of the non-proliferation treaty gives credence to that.

"Canadians recognize that there is no greater goal, no more compelling duty than the quest for peace. We shall not rest until our security can be assured without tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. Above all, we shall not rest until we have secured the future for our children.

"Mr. President, 40 years ago, the peoples of the world were united in the hope that human rights could become subject to universal standards. Forty years later, some countries apply these standards only in part, and a few—sadly—hardly at all. In this respect, South Africa stands alone.

"Only one country has established colour as the hallmark of systematic inequality and represssion. Only South Africa determines the fundamental human rights of individuals and groups within its society by this heinous method of classification. This institutionalized contempt for justice and dignity desecrates international standards of morality and arouses universal revulsion. That is why, at our meeting in Nassau just concluded, Commonwealth leaders agreed on a course of common action against South Africa.

"And the crescendo of pressure is having an impact. Already, the opposition of the business community to *apartheid* is unprecedented. The combination of internal dissent and external condemnation is obviously taking its toll on the government. The Mandelas, the Tutus, the Boesaks will one day prevail....

"My Government has said to Canadians that, if there are not fundamental changes in South Africa, we are prepared to invoke total sanctions against that country and its represssive regime. If there is no progress in the dismantling of *apartheid*, our relations with South Africa may have to be severed absolutely.

"Our purpose is not to punish or penalize, but to hasten peaceful change. We do not aim at conflict but at reconciliation—within South Africa and between South Africa and its neighbours.

"The way of dialogue starts with the repudiation of *apartheid*. It ends with the full and equal participation of all South Africans in the governing of their country. It leads toward peace.

"Mr. President, 40 years ago, emerging from the ruins of global conflict, the world was in economic upheaval. Today, though we have made enormous gains, hundreds of millions are caught in desperate economic circumstances.

"Over the last several weeks from this dais, heads of state, heads of government and foreign ministers have eloquently described their circumstances, ranging from the crippling burdens of debt and blighted prospects on the one hand, to the menace of protectionism on the other.

"Canada is pressing, urgently, for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. We are seeking to liberalize further our own trading relationships with our largest partner, the United States of America. We are working actively to strengthen the capacity of international financial institutions to ease the paralysing burden of Third World debt and permit resumed growth. We are increasing our aid.

"The international mobilization and delivery of aid show dramatically what immense good can be done when governments and citizens together recognize crises and act with concerted determination, aided by organizations such as the UN and its agencies. If collectively we have managed to save whole populations from starvation—and we have—then surely in the same spirit we can improve our performance in easing the international economic predicament.

"Mr. President, 40 years ago, there was another blight upon this earth that took an incalculable toll of human life: remorseless epidemics of disease. Over the intervening decades, we have made huge strides in discovering cures and in combatting those diseases. Today we stand on the threshold of another dramatic breakthrough.

"UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] and the World Health Organization have set 1990 as the target for worldwide, universal immunization. If the target is reached, the lives of as many as five million infants and children will be saved every year. We have eradicated smallpox; through universal immunization, we must now do the same with diptheria, measles, polio, tetanus and whooping cough.

"Universal immunization is an astonishingly efficient health investment. On the eve of the Commonwealth Conference last week in Nassau, I confirmed Canada's commitment to this goal and announced a significant increase to Canada's international health care efforts. Canada will continue to collaborate with UNICEF and the World Health Organization as they co-ordinate this inspiring campaign. For us the goal of mass immunization exemplifies, in large measure, what the United Nations is all about....

"Mr. President, Canada esteems the United Nations, its record and its potential. Our commitment to the principles of the Charter and to international co-operation is no fashionable pose. For four decades, it has been a motive force of our foreign policy. Time and again, on critical occasions Canada has offered its troops for UN-sponsored peacekeeping roles around the globe.

"Canadians are united in one simple conviction: to better the human condition and to achieve international peace and security, nations acting together can always do much more than nations acting apart.

"To be sure, we recognize the imperfections, deficiencies and limitations of the United Nations. That is why we work so hard to improve its functioning; that is why we so strongly support the Secretary-General as he strives to reform it from within. But, all said and done, Mr. President, we must surely agree with the Secretary-General that, where the United Nations is weak, it is almost always due to a failure of political will.

"That kind of failure is not easily reformed. It will change only when sovereign states realize that the principles of the Charter are the signposts that can lead us all towards mutual respect, collective security and lasting peace. Living by these principles offers the best hope for us all. To the fulfillment of these noble and timeless principles, Canada today renews its pledge of loyalty and support."

Murray Thomson
Mobilizing the World—For Peace

Murray Thomson, adult educator and peace worker, was born in China. He is a "mish kid," one of several remarkable Canadians whose internationalism started at birth in a missionary family. He says his first involvement with the United Nations came in the early 1950s, when he was an adult educator based during summers at Fort Qu'Appelle, Saskatchewan, where programs included model UN Assemblies for high school students. Later, working in Asia first for the American and Canadian Friends Service Committees, and then for Canadian University Students Overseas (CUSO), he "pushed support of the United Nations as the only set of international institutions we have." Here he talks about the work done to establish the World Disarmament Campaign under the mandate given by the UN General Assembly at the end of the first Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD-1) in June 1978:

"The idea of a World Disarmament Campaign grew out of the Final Document of UNSSOD-1. There were four or five paragraphs in that Final Document where diplomats recognized that, if they were going to develop the political will for disarmament, then the public had to be informed and educated about the arms race. And so mobilizing public opinion was stressed in the Final Document, and the involvement of Non-Governmental Organizations [NGOs]; and having a Disarmament Week every year was put forward at that time.

"The actual holding of the World Disarmament Campaign, the specifics of the proposal, came from Garcia Robles the Mexican Nobel Peace Prize winner, who wrote quite a bit of the Final Document. He was a member of a UN advisory group on disarmament, and he grabbed hold of this idea and got the group to support it and introduced it into the preparatory committee of UNSSOD-2. It was looked at, and the Secretary-General agreed to set up a small group to work out proposals in 1980.

"It was called a Group of Experts, and on it were diplomats from Romania, Mexico and Ghana; and Prvoslav Davinic from the department of Disarmament Affairs at the UN, and Ingrid Lehman from the department of Public Information was secretary. And I was on it as the only NGO representative. I had spent quite a lot of time down at the UN representing Project Ploughshares and I was—and still am—vice-chair of the NGO Committee on Disarmament at UN Headquarters.

"The purposes we had in mind—and which the United Nations still has in mind—are the objectives and the program[s] of the UN itself, and that is represented by the Final Document of 1978. There are some very specific objectives in its Principles and Plan of Action: a comprehensive test ban, nuclear weapon-free zones, zones of peace, reduction of military budgets, finding alternatives to weapons of mass destruction—the whole gamut. Nobody could say this was a subversive plan of action unless they reneged on the Final Document. And the only country that didn't support the Final Document was Albania.

"It was a consensus document. There wasn't a vote taken, and nobody had to sign anything. But there was an agreement at the end, two days after the formal ending of UNSSOD-1. At two o'clock in the morning, after an awful lot of back-and-forth between backrooms, they agreed on the final

wording and removed the last square brackets from the text. Of course, there have been changes of government since 1978. But, by and large, it is a product of the thinking of all the countries of the world who are represented there.

"I wrote the first draft of the World Disarmament Campaign proposal in Finland in 1981, when I was attending a meeting of peace educators that have set up the Peace Network. I had been involved in compiling a questionnaire which the Department of Disarmament Affairs sent out to 300 or 400 groups around the world. We got replies from about 75. There were some very good replies, and I am just sorry they didn't get greater publicity. We got replies from the Young Farmers of Tanzania, the UN Association of Bangladesh and the Christian Association of Singapore. Not a lot from the Third World, but many European groups, both West and East, and Japanese, American and Canadian. There were a lot of really good ideas.

"Then the Quakers organized a weekend seminar at Mohonk, up in the hills in the north of New York state. They invited top diplomats and we spent a whole weekend talking about the World Disarmament Campaign. There were some very serious UN people there. And there were several other inputs, including the NGO Committee on Disarmament itself—Homer Jack and others—who represent about 50 different organizations. So there was a fair amount of discussion about what the World Disarmament Campaign would look like; and many of us wanted to see a real partnership of NGOs, governments and the United Nations.

"Therefore, when I wrote the first draft of the proposal, I wrote it with a heavier emphasis on NGO participation, on the involvement of NGOs not only in the carrying out of activities but in the taking of decisions and being part of the planning process, than turned out in the final product at the second Special Session—UNSSOD-2—in 1982. The UN was up against the problem of not being able to allocate to NGOs decision-making responsibility. They felt that that was not possible, because the Russians, for example have been opposed to human rights NGOs, the Americans to disarmament NGOs, and so on. So the best they could do was to provide an advisory and support position for NGOs. That's how the actual campaign came out in 1982. That has been a major flaw, and continues to be.

"The overall purpose of the campaign, as we saw it, was to educate, inform and mobilize public opinion. They didn't end up with that word 'mobilize'; they ended up with the more passive phrase 'generate understanding,' but it could work out to the same thing. Anyway, it was to mobilize public opinion all over the world, at all levels—Indian farmers, Chinese trade unionists and so on—in such a way that national politics would be reduced; that is, they would not just be exposed to certain facts, but would be exposed to the same facts, the same problems, the same trends and tendencies with which the United Nations has to deal.

"A good example of this is the information which the doctors of the world have used, so that they have been able to neutralize the problems of ideology by talking about the medical effects of nuclear war, which doesn't have an ideology. And the best example is the study of the relationship of disarmament and development, done by a UN group of experts under Inga

Thorsson. We said it would make a good ingredient for the World Disarmament Campaign, because the report was approved by East and West and South. And we thought that, if one could develop a multimillion dollar campaign—for we thought in terms of hundreds of millions of dollars, not in terms of the paltry sums that have been provided—maybe there would indeed be a mobilizing of public opinion.

"There was a vision about it—a limited vision, but still a vision—that, with a huge effort on the part of the governments of the world, the UN and NGOs, maybe this would in fact provide the political will that would begin to produce changes. It had to be a co-operative effort, because all these three parts—the UN, national governments and NGOs—have to be involved if we are going to attain a lasting peace.

"An important part of the World Disarmament Campaign was the setting up of a fund; and the expectation was that countries would contribute to the fund in the same magnitude as they put money into some of the other funds, like UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund], which receive hundreds of millions of dollars. That, of course, has not turned out to be the case. They have had three pledging conferences now for the World Disarmament Campaign, and what has happened is that several countries—particularly in the West—have not put in anything, on the grounds that it would not be a fair campaign but would be biased towards the East. At the same time, many countries in the East have supported it by providing only their own currency, which is understandable but doesn't help very much in terms of the international campaign.

"One cynic, an ambassador from an African country, said recently: 'The trouble is, those countries that support it don't permit it'—he meant by that, serious criticism of their own policies—'while those who permit it don't support it.'

"The fund has about $3 million of convertible, hard currency available, and all the rest is in national currencies. Canada has provided $300 000, one of the largest contributions, but more than half of that is earmarked: $150 000 is earmarked for the UN Yearbook on Disarmament, but the UN Department people say they can always fund that, so it is not a lot of help to the World Disarmament Campaign. And they have earmarked another $50 000 for UNIDIR, the research centre in Geneva. So only about $100 000 is un-earmarked, and for the Campaign to work the UN has to have funds that are not earmarked. But it is certainly better than nothing.

"I had hoped for $1 million a year from Canada, and $10 million or more from the United States. But the United States has not contributed a cent; neither has France, neither has Britain, neither has West Germany. This is one of the worst failures. Of course, it reflects the lack of enthusiasm for disarmament since 1978. A major factor has been the change of government in Washington and London and Bonn, the Russian response to Reagan, the heating up of the cold war. The accentuation of the cold war came at that crucial time in late 1979, Afghanistan and the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] two-track decision coming in the same month. They were the main factors.

"The money has so far been spent on some 10 regional seminars, on special projects for some people from the media and universities, on more translations of material and on more UN staff to cope with this work. There are five constituencies that the campaign is particularly aimed at: educators, the media, parliamentary groups, NGOs and universities. The opportunities are still there; there is no reason why more NGOs could not get involved.

"Of course, there are limitations about the way the UN is set up. The fact is that UN staff have large salaries, that they are afraid to alienate governments—with some reason, for governments are always looking over their shoulder—and that disarmament is a controversial area. As well, the staff of the UN tend to be good administrators but not good educators. They don't know much about how people learn in conferences; so they set up conferences with a lot of speeches but not a lot of learning.

"The regional seminar in June 1986, at Tbilisi in the Soviet Union—for people from Europe and North America, and paid for by the Soviet contribution in rubles—was like this. It was formal in the UN pattern, with many speeches and only one day of working groups, and these not well done. The regional seminar in Caracas in 1983 was better. They invited an NGO ally, Betty Reardon, to plan the conference; and there were two days of small working groups, separating the educators and adult educators and then subdividing them again. One very specific result was that one participant, Bob Barker, who is director of international relations for the Canadian Teachers' Federation [CTF], was quite influenced by that seminar; and it is largely through his efforts that the CTF has adopted a very good statement of policy and program on peace education.

"Cutting the NGOs out of the decision-making part of the World Disarmament Campaign has limited its scope. Some governments wanted them cut out entirely, so it might not have gone as far as it has gone. But if, as we suggested, it had been allowed to develop a Board—or some kind of body, whether advisory or whatever—at which the objectives of the campaign could be discussed, plans could be established and the NGOs had a regular input—with this huge network of NGOs all over the world—I think the campaign might have gone a lot further. But it does reflect the very uneasy relationship between NGOs and governments and the UN, in any part of the world.

"One of the reasons I have had in starting the Peace Fund in Canada is to try to do in a very small way what the World Disarmament Campaign is failing to do in a big way: to mobilize NGOs for the same purposes as the campaign. Some of the Peace Fund money has gone to a group in Cape Breton which is trying to get people to become aware of the threat of military industries coming into the area, and to educate themselves about alternative ways of organizing industry in Cape Breton. Then in Nelson, British Columbia, the people were very unhappy when the provincial government closed down the David Thompson Community College for lack of students. They did not want to lose their only college, because they thought it could be used to educate people in the whole valley about national and international affairs. So, with the mayor's support, they are organizing a summer course with some

20 workshops on the environment, peace, development and so on, with a particular concern for the Pacific Rim countries.

"The Peace Fund is supporting the people in Nelson, and a Jesuit initiative in studying militarism in Central America. And we do this because we think there are better ways to organize society, healthier ways in which fewer people get hurt and there are more opportunities for life, if you organize on a civilian, democratic basis than on a military, authoritarian basis. I'm hoping that the Peace Fund in a small way would be a kind of goad to the World Disarmament Campaign.

"Many of the problems remain to be worked on. I suppose the central problem is that disarmament touches the nerve-centre of nationalism, the notion of a nation state and national security. It also triggers off memories of national holidays, patriotism, flags and statues of heroes and strong men who have played these roles. And people were killed in these wars. Look at the Soviet Union: 20 million dead, practically every family affected; they are still living in the Second World War. And yet you would think they are one of the most secure nations on earth, in terms of population and resources. It is very hard for them to accept disarmament, or to define security in any other way than military readiness. So these are many of the realities of the World Disarmament Campaign, and it just reflects the insecurities and the hostilities of member states.

"There has been an impressive spread of public education on disarmament in the last dozen years, but very few victories for disarmament. The awareness is much higher in many parts of the world, and increasingly if slowly the linkages are being made between the major problem areas: disarmament, development, the environment and human rights. For those of us who have worked in international development—I was with CUSO during the 1970s—the connection was clear. Bradford Morse, administrator of the UNDP [United Nations Development Programme], put it succinctly: 'To live, the world must disarm; to live decently, it must develop.'

"But obviously we have not got hold of the time factor. The process of understanding and resolving to take action is very, very, very slow while the process of the problems is very, very fast: the escalation of the arms race, population, poverty—they are all moving at a much faster rate than the effort to resolve them. And nobody has got hold of them, in terms of population or poverty or the environment. The race is being lost, as of now. That's the sober part of it. It doesn't mean it will be lost. That's the whole point about mobilizing public opinion."

Maury Miloff
Pulling Together in Uganda

Maury Miloff was born in Edmonton in 1954, but grew up in Montreal and Winnipeg where his father worked for Air Canada. Travel is in his blood: he spent a year in Israel during Grade 10, went to Central America for seven months after CEGEP (Collège d'enseignement général et professionel), and shifted between four universities before finishing a BA in sociology. He did an MA at Carleton University in Ottawa, and wrote his thesis on the role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Canada, while working part-time at the North–South Institute. From some friends in the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), he learned of the Junior Professional Officers (JPO) Program. Under this program CIDA paid each year for four young people to work abroad in the United Nations development system. Miloff was accepted and posted to Uganda.

"I was excited for personal reasons, because of the development challenges, the strong Baha'i community in Uganda and also because everyone said how beautiful it was. But my wife and I were nervous about the reported insecurity." Also, UN staff were not being allowed to bring their families with them into Uganda.

Miloff thought of taking an alternative posting in Swaziland but, together with his wife Helen, eventually decided on Uganda. He arrived in March 1981, four months after Milton Obote had been returned to power in an election whose disputed results sent Yoweri Museveni off to organize an ultimately successful guerrilla campaign. Helen joined him in August 1981.

Miloff says: "When I arrived in Kampala the economic and security situation was in a terrible mess. There were huge line-ups for gas. There was hardly anything in the market. There was lots of shooting every night. It would start just when night was falling, and would go all night, until just before sunrise.

"Eventually, UNDP [United Nations Development Programme] had more than 100 technical experts around Uganda, but there were a lot less in 1981. Foreign agencies had a surreptitious policy of going slow on recruiting, which was understandable. The Kampala office had about 60 national staff, and I was one of eight expatriates doing administration. As program officer, I covered at various times the sectors of housing, industry, education and water as well as energy, health and telecommunications. I dealt with projects involving about $10 million a year.

"Every kind of development in Uganda was very slow, principally because of the security situation but also because people could not afford economically to stay at a job. You could go into a government ministry, past office after office, and nobody would be in there because people would come to work for only a few hours or for one day a week. They were looking for ways to make money, hustling. Everyone did two or three jobs. The salary of a permanent secretary—equal to our deputy minister—was 7 000 shillings a month, which up to the IMF [International Monetary Fund] devaluation in 1981 was worth $1 000 [(Cdn.)], a fairly decent salary, but by mid-1983, [this salary] was worth $20 [(Cdn.)]—and it had even less buying power, because things cost more than in Canada. A permanent secretary might keep on

working, but the ordinary person could not afford to stay in an office on one salary alone.

"The UNDP housing program I looked after was Habitat's largest program in Africa. Its main aim was to set up and assist a new corporation which cut across existing ministries and was responsible for the reconstruction of three war-destroyed cities: Mbarara and Masaka in the west and Arua in the north. Consultants came to advise on the powers of this corporation, to train the national staff, and also to supervise the formulation of studies and plans in those cities. The government put an official ban to prevent individuals starting new buildings in designated target areas and to allow for development of rezoning and a master-plan. Ideally it was a good idea, but the bureaucracy ground so slowly they eventually lifted the ban in 1984.

"I visited most areas of the country. I once flew up to Arua to look at the earth satellite station Idi Amin had built in his fairly deserted home area near the Sudan. Being so remote, it was a really worthless site [at which] to put it.... I also drove to a disturbed area in the west once, to rescue a house-servant after he had been taken off the train by soldiers who shot his three companions on the spot, saying they must be Museveni guerrillas from the kind of sticks they were chewing and the clothes they were wearing—jean jackets! He wriggled his way out by asking to make a phone call and getting to a police station where a friendly policeman saved him by putting him in a cell. Life was very cheap. In one year, everyone on my office floor had either had a house completely looted, been robbed in the streets or lost a close relative to murder. Every week you would see a group of people standing around crying, and you would know something had happened.

"On the industry side, there were two projects for which there had been a scramble to get ready for the UNDP administrator, Bradford Morse, to sign when he came on a visit. These projects were to rehabilitate a biscuit factory near Kampala and a paper factory in Jinja. There was some criticism later of these projects, because they seemed not really to reflect the priorities of the country.

"The paper factory was the only one in the country and they were using 100-year-old machines. It had a lot of difficulties. There were strong tensions between the technical adviser and the factory director which created problems. And there were continuous breakdowns, because of the old machines. The UNDP also did a pre-feasibility study on substituting *bagasse*—sugar waste—for paper. It needed millions of dollars to implement, and people were not very interested in investing in Uganda at the time; they were watching the situation.

"In any case, the government's strategy until 1983 was purely rehabilitation: Uganda had had a fairly well developed economy, and they thought it best to repair what was there. In this, they were following the approach of the Commonwealth team [led by Dudley Seers], whose recommendations formed the background for the government's three-year recovery program. The civil service was quite dedicated in implementing what was really a non-political, pragmatic economic program of recovery. The political abuses took place in other areas.

There was no skewing of economic development in favour of one region or another. A number of people worked very hard to try to get the program off the ground. Obote was a developmentalist economically, in the sense that he aspired to have a pragmatic economy that worked well. He was proud of having followed the IMF program point by point, and in some ways it definitely worked: within two years there were increased exports, increased foreign reserves and reduced inflation. At the macroeconomic level it was hitting targets, but the plight of the ordinary person was extremely difficult....

"The UNDP provided about $400 000 for the biscuit factory, for equipment and the services of a French expert for 18 months. It was soon nearly making a profit, as it had a contract with the army. My job was to see that the objectives of repair work and training were implemented, and to find some other donor agency for those additional needs [that] we identified. With the entire country having fallen apart, there was never enough money to see any one project through to a successful completion. We were constantly juggling resources and priority programs. But the UNDP didn't make unilateral decisions: everything was done in co-operation and consultation with the Ministry of Planning.

"In the energy sector, we did not use the allocation we had for consultancies, because the World Bank sent out a large team which drew up a comprehensive plan for the government. Likewise, the health sector was slow in developing; it was served mainly by a good UNICEF program. The telecommunications program of installing infrastructure was eventually completed, and allows for linkages outside as well as inside the country.

"When I came in 1981, the principal concern of the UNDP resident representative, Melissa Wells, was the famine in Karamoja. She was a[n] ... exuberant woman, a former appointee of Jimmy Carter to the UN. She can be credited with saving a lot of lives among these pastoral people, because there wasn't much media attention and quite possibly the world would not have cared about them if she had not taken such a strong interest and drummed up international commitment to a major relief program. The UNDP co-ordinated the feeding program among the Karamajong, which involved a good number of international NGOs as well.

"The UNDP was stretched so thin in Uganda because of the incredible needs in the country, plus having to work in an unstable environment. There were tremendous internal administrative problems within the office alone, problems of morale and efficiency, including the ability to keep photocopiers going and cars repaired.

"It was a much more difficult existence for Helen than for me, as with any spouse. We moved from house to house for 18 months, as the housing stock was small. There had been no new housing built under Amin. Eventually we got our own house, but it was in quite a shambles. She worked at getting it in order right up to the day she delivered our first child. And there was an additional challenge, to make a safe little nest, when there was shooting outside your door every night and your friends and neighbours were living in fear. So it was more emotionally draining on her; and she did not have the structure I had to work within, which gave me not only a perspective on what

was happening but also some involvement and outlet for my concern. But she also made some close friends, taught social work at Makerere University for one term and in general loved the country too. She was just more isolated.

"Was 27 the right age to do this job? It was perfect timing for me. I had just left university, and I am really grateful to Canada and the UN for the JPO program, which allowed me to work 'in the field' without very much experience behind me and assume the kind of responsibility I was able to assume there. To do that kind of job through another avenue would have required me to have a lot more experience. It was extremely exciting and had an absolutely formative effect on my career from the point of giving me some credibility and good experience and of putting me in the middle of a very challenging work situation.

"What was frustrating about the UNDP was that it is still largely oriented towards bureaucratic decision-making with high-level government bodies and other UN agencies. We had a good perspective on the overall development situation in Uganda, but by and large lacked close contact with the people. Other agencies like UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] are closer to the grass roots. I wanted to have a more people-oriented experience, and to take part in the building of local self-help organizations. So I decided to try to work with NGOs on my return to Canada in August 1983. I see myself as a field person. I know we will be going back to the field after a few years in Canada.

"But an organization like UNDP is needed. It is an expression of commitment by the world to develop[ment] and to co-operation among nations. It is a major channel for the provision of consultants and technical experts and trainers—and that has been identified as a prime need of the developing countries. A body of global experience and institutional memory is being generated, which is important to international development. Mistakes are made and, as in other institutions, inertia and bureaucracy takes its toll.

"But that is the cost to pay. What is important is that the countries of the world have agreed that the developing countries deserve and can make use of international assistance. The UNDP can be changed, if people want to change it. There is no problem in this. There is an openness within the system to adapting, to doing things better."

Maurice Strong
African Operation on the Scale of the Invasion of Normandy

Maurice Strong was asked in January 1985, to take on the job of executive co-ordinator of the United Nation's Office of Emergency Operations in Africa, which had just been established under Bradford Morse, the administrator of the UN Development Programme.

As Strong recalled in a speech months later, "the famine evolved slowly and quietly as drought conditions deepened.... Unfortunately, the international community was slow to respond on the scale required when in 1983 and again in 1984 UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar called attention to the gathering crisis in Africa. The United Nations itself was already stepping up its efforts significantly.... Many private voluntary organizations did the same. But the resources needed to provide assistance on the massive scale required were not forthcoming until dramatic media reports shocked the world into awareness of the crisis in October 1984. This was followed by an unprecedented outpouring of public concern and generosity which enabled the United Nations, together with governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies, to mount a large-scale emergency relief operation going beyond anything ever done before."

A year after taking on the co-ordinating role, Maurice Strong talked about the range of the operation:

"It was very difficult for me not to heed the request that I come in to help in January 1985, given my interest in the environment and also given my long-standing interest in Africa: I had lived in Africa in 1952 and 1953, travelling all over East Africa, and again when we created UNEP [United Nations Environment Programme]. So it was pretty hard to say 'No' even though, frankly, it hadn't been on my agenda and I was just relishing the return to private life and the opportunity for a little more freedom.

"The Office for Emergency Operations in Africa was set up by the Secretary-General in December 1984, when it was quite clear that the African emergency was beyond the normal capacities of the organizations of the UN system to respond, and that it was continent-wide in its scale, embracing 20 countries with a population of about 200 million and actually affecting—to the point that their lives were at risk—some 35 million people. In many respects the African emergency can properly be characterized as the largest known example of ecological breakdown.

"It was really a question of putting the United Nations on the peacetime equivalent of a wartime footing. The reason for this was not that these organizations were not able to do their bit, but it was because they all had to be called upon to do a great deal more than they were accustomed to doing. This required far closer co-operation among the UN organizations, and between them and the African governments and donor countries and the non-governmental community.

"So we required a special instrument for this. We also needed a special instrument for facilitating the mobilizing of the vastly greater resources that were going to be needed, and then the deployment of those resources. Separate organizations, both governments and NGOs [Non-Governmental

Organizations], did the mobilizing in different countries. The UN did not do all this. But for these organizations to do their job, they needed the assurance that what they were doing was going to be addressing real needs and not overlapping with the efforts of others. Only the UN was in a position to sit down and evaluate and point up what was really needed. There were all kinds of possible needs, but to be specific about the needs of 35 million people in 20 countries in 10 000 or more locations isn't easy. Then, to mobilize the resources and move relief supplies in from a thousand locations around the world, streaming them in to more than 10 000 locations in Africa through a small number of seaports—that takes a degree of orchestration and co-ordination which no one government could provide; and only the UN was able to do that kind of thing.

"Then there was the troubleshooting. When ports got clogged, when there were policy blockages, when there was too much wheat on the way and not enough medical supplies, when there was an excess of trucks in one area where people had already got their food supplies and there was a dearth of trucks in another area. We are the command post. We don't do it all. But we are the ones who see what needs to be done, and see who is the best party to do it and go to that party.

"Take for example the Sudan, under Nimeiry: Tires were sitting in the seaports that for bureaucratic reasons could not be released, and food was not moving because of a shortage of tires. Also, Ethiopian refugees were streaming into a camp, 120 000 people with no water supply, and someone had to get the government to agree to break an impasse that was preventing the opening up of new sites. That was the sort of thing we did: We would fly in and see the president, or see the provincial governors, and get the necessary decisions.

"In each country we established an Emergency Operations Group. In most cases the UNDP [United Nations Development Programme] resident representative is also the resident co-ordinator for the UN; and we would beef up their staffs, help them develop their operational game-plan and then make sure they have the additional resources they need to implement it. They work with the donors on the ground, chairing donor meetings, just as we are working with the donors upstream at the level of their capitals.

"When we started it was quite evident where the most affected populations were. The first main thing we had to do was to ensure that our people in the field had the right back-up, which sometimes meant replacing people. When I arrived, Kurt Jansen had already been installed as a kind of supremo in Ethiopia for the UN. We replaced our regular man in the Sudan after I went down and felt that was necessary. And, usually we had to bring in other people underneath them as well.

"Then we staged the big conference [in Geneva] in March, at which we were able to dramatize the needs and really push the donor governments to produce more money and more supplies to meet those needs. We basically looked on ourselves as supporters of the people in the field, and our people in the field were in turn there to support the government. In some cases, like Ethiopia, the government was very intimately involved and in command. In other cases, like the Sudan, where there was political turmoil and a state of

virtual administrative and management breakdown, they were very friendly and co-operative, but in effect the UN had to do it all.

"So it varied from country to country, and our role was really to see that they had the resources, in the sense that the money and grain and trucks and medical supplies were mobilized and were put into the pipeline, and were not all going to arrive at the same time. Then internally, we worked with our people in the field to ensure that they had the capacity, with the governments, to make sure that, once the material arrived, it could be distributed to those who needed it. All of which was a massive operation. It was like the invasion of Normandy, but with less time to plan. It was almost an instant plan and instant action at the same time.

"There were lots of glitches, there were lots of problems. But the fact is that, a year ago, some 35 million people were not expected to live—and most of them have lived. The UN didn't do it all; but it couldn't have been done without the UN.

"It was probably one of the most interesting and challenging things I have ever been involved in. Although a lot of things went wrong, a lot of other things went right. One of the great success stories was the dramatic increase in the capacity of the ports and the improvement of overland transport infrastructure. The UN's World Food Programme worked with the governments of the countries concerned on this task. The off-take at the port of Douala in Cameroon, the principal port of entry for Chad, was increased six times; and a 'land bridge' combining rail and road transport was put in place which ensured delivery of relief into Chad. Again, the off-take capacity of Ethiopia's principal port of entry, Assab, was increased by three times and that of Massawa six times.

"To ensure the survival of 35 million people is like averting a major war. One of our problems now is our own success. If this thing is receding from public consciousness, it is because people are not dying in the same numbers. That doesn't mean they are not suffering. It isn't as acute as it was: the rains and better crops have helped. But there are still some 19 million people in dire need.

"That is the problem ahead. But it doesn't diminish the achievement in 1985. You know how hard it is to spend money effectively in foreign aid. For the African emergency we raised $2.75 billion and spent it in one year, which is quite a thing. So it is quite a story, basically. It shows that the UN can respond...."

Stephen Lewis
Lower Our Sights—And Aim at Africa

"Elevate those guns a little lower," General Stonewall Jackson is said to have shouted to his high-firing troops at the Battle of Bull Run. Canada's present ambassador to the United Nations, Stephen Lewis, suggests that this is not a bad slogan for the United Nations. After two years in that post he says: "I have developed what may be an indefensible view, but a strong view, about lowering sights." His argument is that, on arms control measures, "we will always be playing at the periphery, we'll always be dealing with confidence-building measures, we'll always be just vaguely touching each other, until the Soviets and the Americans decide that the UN has a role." Similarly, questions of regional conflicts are big power issues.

On the other hand, Lewis says, the UN seems to be able to deal with social questions, expressing "civilized human instincts and advancing the codification of international law"—a current example being the convention against torture. He is proud that Canada has taken the international lead in the long campaign for the equality of women, insisting that countries which had entered "reservations" when they signed the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1979) explain their reasons and inviting other countries to comment on these "reservations." He says: "We didn't like the way countries were rushing in to sign, adding reservations that amount to a rejection. But now some 30 countries have written their comments on this practice, and we are having a full debate in plenary session, which has never happened before. All initiated by Canada."

The other major role he sees for the United Nations is to press ahead with the economic development of the poorer countries, and particularly to play a central part in the recovery of Africa after years of famine. He took heart from the General Assembly's Special Session on Africa in May 1986, in which he chaired the committee that drafted the five-year Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development. "I sense that this coming together over Africa is giving the UN a new lease of life." Might other regions of the Third World become resentful of this concentration on Africa? Perhaps, but what may be more dangerous is that these countries, apart from India and Brazil, that are not among the contributors—are essentially African states and Western donors. Accepting a broadly defined task as special adviser to the Secretary-General on this program, Lewis thinks that part of his job is to keep all these other countries "constantly informed" of progress.

Africa is in Stephen Lewis's blood. After university, and before he launched on a 15-year political career as a member of the Ontario New Democratic Party, which included 8 years as the party leader, he taught and travelled in Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya for 18 months. In 1984, he told the General Assembly: "Africa leaves an indelible mark on the mind and spirit. The vitality, the exuberance, the determination, [and] the potential live with one for a lifetime. Nothing I have ever done or experienced has so shaped my own sense of developing societies ... their immense prospects, and their sometimes unimaginable adversities."

To elaborate on the points summarized above, we take extracts from a speech Stephen Lewis made, with all the oratorical skill for which both his father David and he have gained fame, to a reception during the 10th

anniversary meeting of the Foundation for International Training in June 1986. He hailed the unanimous resolution passed in the Security Council and General Assembly on the issue of international terrorism, but then regretted the UN's inability to follow it up with any sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter—or to deal with any political regional conflicts:

"One of the things the United Nations would so often wish to do would be to use Chapter VII of the Charter [of the United Nations] and apply universal economic and other sanctions to the individual countries who are engaged in activities which the international community finds are pariah activities. We could not even get an invocation of Chapter VII six years ago at the beginning of the Iran–Iraq war. There were many who felt that that was a touchstone for the UN. Men like Brian Urquhart [under-secretary-general for Special Political Affairs until he retired in 1986] felt that, once you passed that point, the Security Council had indeed diminished itself in a qualitative way from subsequent intervention at times of crisis.

"We have obviously not been able to apply [universal economic sanctions] on South Africa and we certainly were not able to do it in the instance of international terrorism. And what, when you strip away all of the rhetorical camouflage, we are dealing with is this vexing question of sovereignty. Sovereignty is rooted in the Charter of the United Nations: the UN does not have the right to intrude in the internal affairs of member states.... If it cannot impose Chapter VII as a fashion of bringing a country to its senses, the UN is then reduced to a pattern of moral suasion; and if individual countries are bound and determined not to observe the prescriptions of the Charter, then there is no obvious way to change their patterns of behaviour. It is not therefore the United Nations as a body corporate that is at fault; it is the behaviour of individual nation states. But, as the debate on international terrorism demonstrated, even when there is consensus in the international community, it is very difficult to move from consensus to resolution."

Lewis turned to the cancellation—at least in 1986—of the proposed UN Conference on Disarmament and Development after the United States' announcement that it would not attend. This announcement "threw everyone into an ideological tizzy" and France withdrew its offer to host the conference:

"It showed vividly again that, in the areas of arms control and disarmament, in the areas of regional confrontations—whether it is Afghanistan, Iran–Iraq, Cyprus, southern Africa, Central America or Kampuchea—in all of these difficult political and arms control issues, the United Nations is necessarily abridged. It has imperfections, it has frailties, it has limitations—and it is worth recognizing that.... When the superpowers thumb their noses at the UN, they can do so with a certain impunity. What redeems the UN in that context is how it keeps the pressure on, how indefatigable it is, how unrelenting it is, how it never gives any of the major parties a moment's pause.... I honour it for that, but I recognize that the detractors have a field day if they root their views of the United Nations in that wonderful ringing phrase of the Charter, 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.' Because that we have not yet done."

At that point Stephen Lewis swung into the positive aspects he sensed are emerging in social and economic development:

"I see the ethos shifting. I see the validity of the organization in the realm of international law which it has articulated with expertise and creative intellectual energy. I see a massive documentation on human rights which sustains a great many international activities. I see the work of the agencies, all of whom make inestimable contributions from time to time. And ultimately I see for the next 40 years—I hope this is not too heretical—the UN moving into economic and social issues with an authority and a primacy and a centrality which will give it a rebirth. And that is demonstrated on all the social issues which are coming to the fore, whether it is the struggle for the rights of equality for women, or the rights of the disabled, the rights of the ageing, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, or drugs and drug trafficking—that whole melange of activities.

"It was shown with immense force in the response of the United Nations to the Special Session on Africa.... I sat and watched this event unfurl and I thought to myself, 'Stephen, this is what this international organization is all about!' One should not be preoccupied or have that blessed *idée fixe*, that just because it does not work on political subjects sometimes, it must somehow be berated or rendered impotent. There is this whole other world which speaks to the human condition, which talks about changing the lives of real people in their millions. And it is this ethos, as the United Nations moves into its second 40 years, that gives it the imprimatur of legitimacy."

Stephen Lewis led his audience with some modesty—"it is not ringing prose, it will not make your heart sing or the blood run torrid; but it says more than most documents say in a substantial way"—through the document GA/7307 of July 2, 1986, which contains the four sections of the UN Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986 to 1990.

The first section gives an analysis of the historical background "and in seven paragraphs rather neatly puts the dilemma. It does something more. It commits the international community to a recognition that increased support for Africa is necessary and allows the international community to admit that a bunch of external factors called trade and recession and interest rates and commodity prices and debt and debt servicing cripple the African continent and are beyond the capacity of Africa to influence. For their part, the Africans admit to internal problems which are everything from human resource development to misplaced agricultural priorities. What is also good about the analysis is that it talks about the genuine and shared partnership that must flow from it.

"In tracing the roots of the crisis, it makes reference to factors that lie 'in the colonial past.' It is interesting how that word 'colonial' almost caused the end of the session. I always thought in left-wing innocence that it was merely descriptive! How surprised I was to learn that for some it has pejorative overtones! In any event, we managed to meld the various disputants and get an agreed upon analysis.

"The second part was APPER—Africa's Priority Program for Economic Recovery. It's Africa's program, self-contained and explicit. It says, in effect, that they are going to spend 45 per cent of their budgets on agriculture hereafter and on agro-related industries; [it] speaks of the amounts then to go on measures to combat drought and desertification; [it] speaks of the amounts that will go to health and education and human resource development; and [it] raises the knotty and anxious questions about population, and deals with them in a highly forthright manner. Then in a kind of exuberant finale it sets out the dollars that are required.

"Africa says that from 1986 to 1990 it will require $128 billion; $82 billion of that will be internally generated, and $46 billion—i.e., $9 billion a year—will be required from the international community. I think it is fair to say that the international community was marginally exercised by the figures, and there were some calm and sedentary discussions in the catacombs of the United Nations. On the occasion I attended there were only three cardiac arrests ... in the first hour.

"And then an event happened that gave me so much pleasure. On May 12, we invited as a preparatory committee a number of agencies with international credentials to appear before the committee; and along came the World Bank. Now some of you will know that the World Bank is not a Trotskyite sect. The World Bank has a certain establishment reputation, and the World Bank said in its analysis that the African figures—which had been pulled together with scrupulous care on a country-by-country basis—not only were by and large accurate but, where they are inaccurate, they may indeed be an underestimate. And that ended the debate.

"The third part became the response of the international community. It said that we have to find more resources, we have to do our best to meet the African estimates of need. There was not a simple affirmation of the figures, nor was there an endorsement of the full implementation of the program, but there was suffused through that part of the document the clear intention that the international community was prepared to take it seriously. And that, despite rumours to the contrary, was what Africa wanted. Africa didn't want a pledging conference and a bidding war. Africa didn't want a lot of rhetorical, hyperbolic overkill. Africa just wanted an explicit, dispassionate, no-nonsense agreement that these were the needs and, to the extent possible, the West would respond.

"Indeed, there was even a paragraph on debt and the extraordinary consequences for Africa which such a huge and unseemly debt imposes, and the need to do something for those countries whose debt servicing obligations are so great as to imperil their capacity to reform or to grow and have a viable economy where they have made the necessary internal reforms. A great many countries and individuals did not think that that would ever find its way into the document. It is there, subsequently to be relied upon.

"Finally, there is the monitoring and evaluation machinery, the like of which—I am told—has never been inherent in any similar document. There is follow-up machinery at the national level, the sub-regional level, the regional level and the global level; and the Secretary-General is required to report to

the UN General Assembly on a yearly basis. There will clearly be data and information on individual countries, what they have done internally and the nature of the international response. It will be possible, in other words, for us to know where it goes right and where it goes wrong.

"That is what the UN is all about. That is what it does best. That is its essential legitimacy. In all the other areas I have enumerated there is frustration, immobility, impatience and sometimes failure. That is in the nature of the organization and, much more broadly put, it is endemic to the international polarization which bedevils this world. But when it comes to responding to economic and social issues, the United Nations is still and will, I suspect, continue to be an indispensable organization.

"And the beauty of it for Canada is that it precisely meets our own priorities and our own instincts. It was not lost on the United Nations that Canada had one of the highest per capita responses in the Western world to the famine. It was not lost on the United Nations that David MacDonald with his exemplary crew of colleagues fashioned one of the most imaginative responses to the famine and indeed served as a model for some aspects of the UN program. It was not lost on the United Nations that Madame Vézina came and announced the debt moratorium, for which there was a spontaneous burst of applause offered no other country during the course of these five days; and indeed there was resounding applause at the end, because of the countries feeling good or expectant about these grass roots projects and village programming that might flow from the suggestions that were in her statement. And then, by a matter of good fortune, we were involved in the fashioning of the document.

"So that for Canada it was absolutely the right relationship that speaks to everything we are as a country. It speaks to generosity; it speaks to planning; it speaks to principle; and it speaks to enduring commitment. It speaks, in other words, to a belief in multilateral institutions, from which belief we will not be deterred however difficult the obstacles."

Charles Lankester
When "Rowdy Rebels" Move to Save the Forests

In September 1985, a bugle "call to action" was sounded by a task force that had been assembled by the World Resources Institute, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The task force produced horrific statistics about deforestation in tropical countries. Among those statistics: that 11 million ha (27 million acres) of tropical forest, or an area about the size of Austria or Portugal, are being cut down and not replaced every year; and that irrigation systems supporting over 400 million people on the lowland plains of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh are increasingly threatened by the often destructive land-use practices of 46 million hill dwellers.

But the task force also documented 39 success stories in a variety of activities everywhere from Zambia and Panama to Nepal, to show that there are feasible solutions. And it set out a plan for accelerated action that involved doubling the worldwide expenditure in this sector to $8 billion over the subsequent five years—as a first step. Staggering as that figure may sound, it is little more than a deposit on the cost of what must be spent if reasonable ecological equilibrium is to be restored.

The plan received political endorsement at an international meeting convened and chaired by President François Mitterrand of France, and in July 1987, a conference of world leaders and forestry experts was held at Bellagio, Italy, to give the program even greater momentum. Among the people behind this ambitious—but realistic—plan are two foresters who enjoy the description of "rowdy rebels" for having stirred their organizations into action on the broadest front. They are John Spears, an Englishman who is the senior forestry adviser in the World Bank, and Charles "Chuck" Lankester, who is the principal technical adviser with the UNDP.

Chuck Lankester was born in England—his great-grandfather was director of the British Museum. As an infant, he was the sole survivor in his house following an air raid on the city of Leicester. At the age of 17, Lankester flew alone to Vancouver to start a new life; he had $100 sewn into the lining of his tweed coat. That was in 1957. He did odd jobs before finding work as a forest surveyor, which helped pay his way through university. Then he worked with a forestry firm in B.C. until 1961, when he was recruited (by telegram) to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome. In 1963, he became the FAO consultant to the newly established World Food Programme (WFP), which was building up its forestry sector. He moved to the UNDP in 1969.

Here, speaking in advance of the July 1987 conference of world leaders and forestry experts at Bellagio, Italy, Lankester describes part of his work with the World Food Programme, focusing on a successful program in Turkey, before commenting on the current campaign for tropical forests:

"I was the most junior person by far—23 or 24 [years old]—in our division at FAO, when at a staff meeting one day my director said [that] someone would have to keep an eye on this new organization down the street. He pointed to a rotund Sudanese forester, who claimed he was too desperately busy; so the job was given to me. When I started liaising with the World Food

Programme, we had not one pound of their food commodities available for forestry operations, let alone any outside cash to give technical or capital assistance. When I left in 1969, I think we had a flow of about $100 million a year. But it nearly killed me: in a [two-year] period ... I did more than 50 country missions, touching down in dozens of countries for formal negotiations or fieldwork.

"We had a fascinating program in Turkey. They had large forest resources in the south-central part [of the country]. Within an economic transportation distance of Antalya, the port on the Mediterranean, they had extensive resources of natural pine [that] had been chipped away at for centuries by itinerant herdsmen, people who wanted to raise a patch of wheat. The competition for land had, by the 1960s, reached the point where, if something was not done fairly soon, this forest area could not be brought under management[, nor] a large industry established that would be dependent on it. Once, of course, you have the demand for wood and the employment, then the management follows—and the protection of the forest. But this whole situation around Antalya seemed to be one of progressive deterioration.

"My director, a remarkable Austrian called Egon Glesinger, had planned a series of projects in the late 1950s and early 1960s in the Mediterranean, where he began to look at the impact of forestry on employment, and on social and rural development, in an integrated way. Forestry was for the first time no longer seen as a single-minded profession in a narrow context. Rather, its linkages were explored with agriculture, with grazing, with the use of water, with rural development, and even with such questions as tourism, health and education.

"So, when we went to Antalya in 1964, there was already a sketchy plan. But there was also something close to civil war between the forestry department and the local population. There had been several instances of forest guards being shot and killed, and of the local people being severely punished for illegal grazing or raising wheat within the forest boundaries.

"We sat down with a few village leaders and said, 'Isn't there something here that can be in everybody's interest? What would happen if we were to offer to those people, who are grazing animals and raising wheat, some kind of program over two or three years whereby they would agree at the end of the period to sell their animals and stop cultivation and we would agree to provide them with permanent salaried work in the forest for a guaranteed minimum number of days a year? In that way, we would provide the very people who are threatening the forest with an interest to protect it for their own future livelihood. And, if we can protect the forest, since we know [the] kind of annual removal of wood [that] we can make, then we can establish a major industry.'

"Well, we were asking them to change their way of life totally. Some of them said, 'Are you crazy? Trust the forest department? How can we trust them?' The other thing they were scared about, [was that] they were completely dependent on their livestock for some cash from the sale of milk, meat and skins, and on raising a bit of wheat for their protein. Asking them not to do that was basically seen as asking them to commit suicide. That's where we

brought the WFP food aid in. We said, 'We will not only provide work and lira, but for these two or three years we will also give you sufficient food for yourselves and your families.' And we offered them a generous amount, sufficient to show we meant business but not enough for them to sell.

"We got a few families to sign contracts, and we started giving them special training and moving them into forest villages where they were given housing. They found cousins to look after their animals at first, but eventually the animals were sold. By the time we finished that program in Turkey about 10 years later, I would guess that between 25 000 and 35 000 families were involved nation-wide. Today there is a large, thriving, integrated forestry industry—sawmills, and pulp and paper—based in the Antalya region. Not only has the management of that progressively degrading forest been brought under control, but they have gone into the establishment of new plantations; so they have raised the annual allowable cut of that forest. They have built permanent roads in to protect it, and it is the forest workers who prevent villagers now from raising animals or wheat.

"So we were able to turn 'round and transform a situation of progressive destruction and despair into one of hope and gainful employment and restoration of the forest area. It was a rewarding story.... But we had many, many good projects.

"The World Food Programme is probably the largest single supporter of forestry development projects. Labour-intensive activities like watershed management, road construction and reforestation are ideally suited to a combination of food aid with modest and complementary inputs of technical and capital assistance. I would guess that the WFP portfolio for forestry is now $140 million a year; and forestry is easily the biggest single sectoral type of program they have, much larger than roadbuilding and harbour works.

"Can a transformation come anywhere? I believe so. The peasant farmer in any society is a remarkably intelligent individual, and don't ever underestimate his understanding of market forces and of what the government can or cannot do. But farmers often have problems with a forestry officer, who is sometimes the sole representative of authority in a district. He has been taught how to scale logs, how to apply the law in cases of grazing infractions, and how to do his books; but he rarely has the skills he needs to communicate. So there is a basic suspicion between the peasant and the forester.

"Only when you can demonstrate a sincere commitment and back it up with a written, legal contract—which is what we did in Turkey with every single family—and when you can gather a small group of trusting people, then you can make progress. And, maybe a year later, people come from other villages to a football match or a wedding, and see the trees on a terrace, and ask a lot of questions, ending with 'And how can we get on board?' Once you have got that spark ... I believe in the intelligence and goodwill of the peasants in virtually every society on the face of the earth. Provided you have an educated, alert staff with good communications and have good extension workers, you can change almost any situation around. They don't shoot forest guards for the pleasure of shooting forest guards. They shoot them because in deteriorating situations the forest guard stands between them and survival."

These remarks led to discussion of the worldwide Tropical Forests campaign launched on four continents in January 1986:

"Its genesis was really a few international foresters sitting down together, scratching their heads and saying, 'Where have we gone wrong? There is a remorseless deterioration, and we don't seem to be getting anywhere. The loss of 11.5 million hectares a year is certainly not decreasing.' And we decided that what we were doing wrong was that foresters were just talking to themselves. We're still doing that. I'm just back from a meeting of heads of all the forestry administrations in Latin America, and there wasn't an agricultural engineer or a livestock specialist, a sociologist or an anthropologist anywhere around.

"So for this campaign we tried to bring in people from outside the forestry profession and to do something quite new. We have begun to get a handle on how much forest we are losing—we didn't really get that information until the early 1980s through the FAO and satellite imagery. We said, 'Instead of talking about the rate of destruction, why don't we try to find out why it is happening, what series of programs can address this problem, where are projects incorporating these ideas that have been successful, what are the countries most critically affected, and how much would it cost to do something corrective on a meaningful level?'

"It was a crazy business getting 10 members of a task force from all over the world to two week-long meetings and to produce this study. The study is full of inaccuracies, but in every sense it broke trail. I firmly believe that, if you have an approximation, you should publish it and others will come along and improve on it. We launched the study at a press conference in Washington on October 22, 1985, with representatives of the three sponsoring organizations and the three governments who gave most support—Canada's $75 000 was critically important.

"The media coverage was flabbergasting. For the first time we said, 'Listen, we estimate we are spending $400 million a year in external assistance to forestry, and the governments concerned are spending about the same amount. Over five years that is a program of $4 billion. But, in order to make any sort of impact on the problem of deforestation, we absolutely have to double that figure in the next five years.' Now, funds are damned difficult to come by. If we can succeed in doubling expenditure, it will already be a monumental achievement. But we will have got our feet just off the ground towards the first rung of a rather high ladder.

"Take two examples. The Task Force calculated that, in the Sahelian zone and the Indian subcontinent, 400 million tonnes of animal residues are used each year as a source of basic energy, to cook and to keep warm. That translates conservatively into about 14 million tonnes of lost cereal production. In 1985, the total grain shipments to all developing countries, including those to Africa during the famine crisis, amounted to 9.7 million tonnes. So we could in fact save twice the amount of food aid that is now flowing, if we could reduce the loss of animal fertilizer and thus improve soil fertility. Isn't that a powerful argument why all governments should support community fuelwood plantation projects?!

"Again, take Nigeria. In 1984, the trade deficit in forest products was more than $200 million—this, in a country where, for the last 30 years, great forests were being harvested and the export value of those products was used, in large measure, to build up the infrastructure of roads and bridges, schools and hospitals. There is something obscene about pine being imported [to] Nigeria from Chile, New Zealand, Finland and Canada, while the natural forests are approaching disappearance. We have a huge task ahead in Nigeria and many other countries.

"The 39 case studies in the report of the task force were carefully selected to demonstrate projects that have worked in the fields of fuelwood and agro-forestry, watershed management and the conservation of ecosystems and genetic resources, which I think is one of the most critical issues we face today. There are also examples of success in industrial wood plantations, and new approaches to education and training and research—and to recycling older foresters, for we have taken some of them back to the classroom and shown them how to make big shifts in their ways of analysis. It is these examples we want to talk about now with world leaders, to show them that it doesn't have to be all downhill to destruction....

"It is always the same thing with these success stories: finding the right combination of people. I use the phrase 'packaging.' You have to bring together the good will of the people, which you can count on unless they have been very seriously abused, together with local political support and support back in the capital; you have to get some external donors with their capital and technical assistance initially involved; and you have to have a few other people involved, maybe the local witch doctor. There is a whole group of people who have to come together. But if they are agreed in the interests of the project, there is no limit to the success you can have!

"The Task Force's report has been remarkably well received. The forestry advisers of all the development agencies endorsed it within a month of its publication and agreed on the target of doubling expenditure. They have since met three times in 12 months to assign priorities and to make sure that all forestry projects are better co-ordinated. One typical result is that 10 agencies recently combined in a single forestry sector mission to Kenya, to help the government prepare a plan over the next 15 to 20 years and to divide up amongst the agencies the responsibilities for providing the necessary technical and capital assistance for the various projects. We, in the agencies, were in serious need of getting our act together; how could we go 'round asking for a doubling of the funds to forestry, when we could not demonstrate that the money we were getting was being used responsibly?

"The meeting President Mitterrand called in February 1986 demonstrated unprecedented political support for this approach. Among the 62 countries represented, there were five heads of state: Chancellor Kohl, 4 prime ministers and 53 other ministers. They gave political endorsement to what the technicians had said, and President Mitterrand himself stood up and promised to double French assistance to forestry in the next five years.

"The Bellagio meeting in July 1987 will be asked how we are going to tackle what is surely now, short of nuclear contamination, the biggest single

global environmental problem we face in the world, with its loss of genetic resources and its possible impact on climate change; to address a problem [that] is deteriorating and [that] foresters, for a variety of reasons and not necessarily their own fault, are clearly incapable of handling alone. The meeting will be very important, to get some new, far-reaching ideas from the mixture there of politicians, foresters, agriculturalists, industrialists, experts in climate and energy questions, and representatives of NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations]. The NGOs need to be buttoned in more than they are at the moment, because there isn't a forestry department in the world that can raise either the human or the financial resources to do what they are supposed to. Unless we have the people, the concerned citizens, working with us, we haven't got a hope in hell of succeeding.

"Unpopularly, I believe that a major problem we face is that there is more appreciation of this situation in development aid agencies, the World Bank and regional development banks than among the developing countries themselves. This is primarily because the forestry profession in the developing countries has not been able to translate the problem beyond cubic metres of wood into questions of jobs, health, energy savings, foreign exchange and all the things that forestry and deforestation mean. The transfer of concern from external institutions into the countries themselves is the biggest hurdle that we face—and the Bellagio meeting will be a key part of tackling that hurdle."

Yvonne Kupsch
Planting a Partnership in Africa

Yvonne Kupsch made her first journey to West and East Africa in mid-1986, on behalf of "Trees for Africa," which is an initiative of the Vancouver branch of the United Nations Association in Canada (UNAC), and which is linked to the The Tree Project at UN headquarters. Kupsch had with her a list of 16 working groups in British Columbia that were eager to make links with community-based organizations in Africa that had forestry projects. The plan was for her to identify indigenous groups working in forestry in six countries and to bring back a contact list. The next stage was to be a conference in March 1987, in Vancouver, to which some African representatives would be invited to give a firsthand account of the problems at the village and community level—problems of deforestation and the need for fuelwood, problems of resources and information. The eventual hope is that links can be made between the B.C. groups and African communities and associations, links that may help meet these needs and solve these problems.

After returning from Africa in 1986, Kupsch talked about the tree project—and a bit about her own life:

"The Tree Project began in 1983 and has since developed into an international clearing house for information on NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] working in forestry. However, its first big effort was to support a worldwide tree planting campaign during International Youth Year [IYY] in 1985.

"That's how I got involved. I was working in Saskatoon in the regional office of Katimavik, which was a national youth volunteer program. My parents are both from the Netherlands; my father is a geologist and my mother has been very active in the multicultural movement. They came to Saskatoon in the 1950s, and that's where I grew up. Saskatoon, by the way, prides itself on having a lot of trees. I'm 31 now and, although my background is in foreign language studies, I've worked mostly in information services, public relations and communications. I worked in that capacity in the Saskatoon office of Katimavik, which served the Prairies and the Northwest Territories.

"Katimavik has always linked the idea of youth with environmental awareness. We then promoted International Youth Year and the fact that Katimavik participants could get more involved in environmental questions by having a tree planting campaign. It was really successful. Over a two-year period, because Katimavik ran a pilot year first, participants planted well over two million trees in 300 communities across Canada. And they participated in many other related activities, [such as] awareness programs on the importance of the environment, the tree being a symbol for the greater setting.

"During the planning for Youth Year, Katimavik had a representative on the advisory committee of The Tree Project in New York, the central clearing house for the worldwide IYY tree planting campaign. So I was sent down on a six-month internship. I ended up working there on the project—which is part of the Non-Governmental Liaison Service [NGLS]—with another Canadian woman, Jill Carr-Harris, for a year and a half!

"My present project started when the United Nations Association in Canada, Vancouver Branch, decided to launch a 'Trees for Africa' partnership program. The Vancouver branch of the UNAC under its president,

David Cadman, is very dynamic, and it put up a proposal to CIDA [Canadian International Development Agency] and to David MacDonald's office of Canadian Emergency Co-ordinator/African Famine. There was also the link to The Tree Project's clearing house in New York, going back two years to the time when the NGLS people put on a road show and made contacts in Vancouver. The people of British Columbia, having some appreciation for forests responded with enthusiasm for this idea. They wanted to go beyond simply sending a few dollars over for relief and were interested in setting up a long-term partnership.

"The working groups in B.C. represent a cross section of society: everyone from business and labour union representatives to students, municipalities, women's organizations, environment and development groups (obviously), church groups and so on. My trip in Africa, though, convinced me that it was premature to think about direct linkages between these Canadian working groups and projects undertaken by small communities in these countries.

"Here in B.C., we are simply too far away to be in touch with the daily changes at the local level in Africa, changes that can dramatically affect a development project. An awareness of local conditions and the ability to respond quickly are critical in building effective programs that are in the best interest of the community. For a partnership to exist, a fundamental sense of knowledge, understanding and trust must be established on both sides. This requires time, patience, open communication and interaction on a continuing basis. The ability to communicate is indispensable to the development process.

"Therefore, it is impractical to forge direct linkages between groups who are thousands of kilometres apart and don't know each other. How can we expect them to understand the dynamics of their separate circumstances? In all likelihood, they will not even share the same language. Even if they did, many village groups just don't have the writing skills or the means (telephones, for instance) for easy, long-distance communication. And we in B.C. have to learn more about the specific problems in different countries and have to scale down our expectations—nobody is going to 'regreen the Sahel'; it's a question of small successes, of increasing food crops locally, for example.

"So, certainly the best way will be to work through an intermediary at the field level. That can be a Canadian NGO [that] has a long-term commitment to forestry projects, or an indigenous organization [that] knows the capacity of various communities. Part of our program, meanwhile, is to extend a greater awareness of Africa through the province's high schools, providing students with up-to-date videotapes on the situation in these countries, and encouraging discussion of the real factors obstructing Africa's development.

"In west Africa I went to Senegal, Niger, Togo and Burkina Faso, spending an average of two weeks in each country and travelling as much as possible overland and by public transport. In the northwestern coastal area of Senegal, for instance, there were many small forestry projects: windbreaks along the coast, and nearby a group of young farmers at Meckhe experimenting in agroforestry, extending their tree nursery to interplant with food crops, and elsewhere groups growing trees for fuelwood or for timber. Throughout these

countries I discovered that groups were not in touch with each other as much as might be; I became a sort of travelling minstrel, sharing information as I went along.

"These NGO intermediaries I spoke of have a big job to do, because there has to be more emphasis on extension services and on training local people to work with NGOs. If a project is going to succeed, it is more than a technical problem of how to plant trees at a particular site. Everyone has to be very sensitive to what the village's needs are and what the economic, cultural and political situation is like. A forestry project, even a small one, is all-encompassing. It affects land tenure and the village economy: who is going to benefit from these trees, if the women want firewood and the men want timber and building poles? Often there is a conflict there. Whose land are they going to use? Does the farmer have to give up a part of her cropland to grow trees that she cannot harvest for several years? In the short term, she needs that land.

"I heard these concerns reflected everywhere I went, including later in Ethiopia and Kenya. I was really interested in a play that was being popularized by the Kenya Woodfuel Development Programme. This play has been written and performed by local people, and it illustrates the fuelwood crisis in one region of Kenya. In this particular region the men have control of the land and say what is to be planted. So the men are planting wood for timber, and they are taking the timber to market, selling it there and keeping the money. The women are continually having to struggle to find firewood, and walking further and further afield for it; and they have not been successful in persuading their men that they need to plant trees for that purpose.

"The play illustrates this problem without providing an obvious solution at the end. It draws attention to the facts in a humorous way, and both men and women have reacted extremely positively. They see the problem, and they recognize that it is not their individual problem but it is quite widespread. At the end of the play the people are encouraged to have discussions about it, and to pick up seedlings, which are being distributed for free. I think it is an innovative approach to the problem, and it is told in terms that the local people can enjoy and relate to. That is the key in this whole extension and education process."

In May 1986, the Non-Governmental Liaison Service of the United Nations published a 64-page directory entitled *NGOs in the Forestry Sector—Africa Edition*. In the introduction, Jill Carr-Harris writes: "This is the first step in a process [that] will eventually document the tremendous contributions of grass roots organizations in the forestry sector."

Mairuth Sarsfield
For Every Child a Tree

Mairuth Sarsfield, who says she has been "a dreamer all my life," has despite that—carried through several practical as well as remarkable programs as a communicator. A graduate of McGill University and the Columbia School of Journalism, she helped plan the "People Tree" exhibit of the Canadian government at Expo '67 in her hometown of Montreal. She says of that extraordinary structure: "We wanted to tell the people of Canada what they were really like.... People walked through the leaves of the tree, so we had the leaves of the tree as the faces of people and, instead of the wind coming through, we had the murmur of Canadian tongues and voices: not only dialects and languages, but also Ottawa valley English [and] the Prairies way of saying the same things. So we were able to show the diversity of Canada in a way that seemed very pleasant to people."

Mairuth joined the department of External Affairs as an information officer in 1971, and worked with the Canadian delegation to the United Nations during the early days of the Law of the Sea Conference. This led eventually to a four-year assignment in Nairobi as a senior information officer with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and to her outstanding work with their worldwide campaign in 1982, "For Every Child a Tree." She explains:

"One of the big problems in Africa and Asia at that time was the creeping desert. They had done a lot of scholarly work, and in fact very solid research, on desertification. And UNEP had organized the Desertification Conference. I thought we had to reduce this ... to understandable levels. We were coming up to 1982, which was 10 years after the Stockholm Conference [on the Human Environment] where Canada took the lead and everyone was very much committed to the environment. In those 10 years, things had changed rapidly for the worse. It is true that there were environmental agencies in nearly every country, but there was also more spewing out of toxic chemicals and far more deforestation. The deserts were creeping rapidly, acid rain was killing lakes, and the sea was being ravaged without concern. We decided to try for a re-dedication in 1982.

"So we said, 'Let's see if we can't bring in a spirit of caring.' We used the word 'management' instead of 'protecting,' because we had to deal with the way people saw the environment. Most of the things we planned were in environmental education, but the magic for me was the program 'For Every Child a Tree,' I didn't think it should only be governments organizing workers to plant masses of trees somewhere; it should be individuals putting in a single tree. That was the way to make it real.

"I also thought that, if you could get children to feel they were a tree, you might solve lots of problems. When you have so many refugees who had nowhere to put down their roots and were damaging the country and camps where they were; when you think of the black children in North America who feel alienated from their society; when you think of the children in India who were soon going to have to be nomads if there was no land for their parents to farm—there was a close connection between this rootlessness and our idea for a campaign.

"The basic idea was to get parents to plant a tree as a birthday gift for their child: the child would feel a sense of the land and of being part of nature, and the parents would do something to replenish the earth. In Israel, for example, when couples are married or old people die or children are born, they plant a tree. So our team in UNEP said, 'Why can't this be done all over the world?' There would be billions of trees planted.

"But you cannot reach everyone. So I thought we should narrow the field and try to get a tree planted for every child born on June 5, 1972—the opening day of the Stockholm Conference. We worked out a program to approach every member state of the United Nations with the questions: Approximately how many children in your country were born around that time in 1972, and would you be willing to make available the same number of seedlings for these children to plant?

"Denmark came back with the first positive answer: about 2 500 children, and they certainly had a good tree planting program—but if I could identify 2 500 children some place else who needed trees, Denmark would donate that number of seedlings in the name of Danish children. So we named Kenya and Botswana, and told this story to other countries with trees to spare. Some responded well, others not at all. But what made the job at the UN exciting was that there were always NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] who took up these challenges. In Senegal, there was a mixture of government and NGOs; in the Sudan it was the academic community; in the United States the Spirit of Stockholm Foundation linked up with about seven other groups.

"We also had to promote the campaign, and I thought it would be nice to do posters. But there was no budget in UNEP for this unorthodox way of working—we didn't have a penny! Our idea was to get 10 posters, so we got in touch with 20 countries and asked if they would have their leading artists, whose works were known to children, to design a poster for us. Eventually we had to write directly to the artists ourselves. But meanwhile the library people—Joie par les livres in Paris, and the International Federation of Library Associations in The Hague—said our campaign should work through the libraries. They said, 'We can encourage libraries to put up displays of books and see that you get that kind of audience of children who are thinkers.' And, what was exciting, UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] was doing a very active development of libraries in the Third World.

"Anyway, I picked up my pen and wrote to Bjørn Wiinblad in Denmark to tell him what the project was. People said, 'You're crazy, that man doesn't lift a pencil [for] under $25 000.' I knew his work was unbelievable: posters for the Tivoli, sets for the Royal Danish Ballet and pottery sold internationally. We went to see him in Copenhagen: he's a bunny rabbit, gentle and round and merry, and his work is like that, too. He said, 'Of course,' when I asked him if he would do a poster for the children of the world. He did it and his government looked at it and, to give them their due, they said, 'If he will give you that poster, we will print it, taking good care the colours and everything are up to the standards of this leading artist.' So I asked them to print

50 000 posters, and said UNESCO would distribute 40 000 of them to libraries all 'round the world.

"We got other artists the same way. In Japan, there was Mitsumasa Anno, whom the librarians approached for me. Adults buy the books he illustrates for children. He did a fascinating poster with animals hidden among the leaves of trees. The Japanese government paid for the printing, and it led to a campaign in which Japanese children planted two million trees.

"Mexico did a very modern poster, and the Swiss illustrator Jörg Müller produced one of an arid landscape with goats and hills [that] he had researched with great care. And the Swiss government agreed to print it—after I told them that otherwise the Russians could print it.

"An enchanting one came from the Oodi Weavers of Botswana, a tapestry of a rural family under a big tree. It was wrapped in straw to protect it, and their letter said: 'The tree is our village. Under it we pound the maize, the men sit and talk, the children play hoping the fruit will drop down for them to eat, and the roots hold the water that protects our crops.' We got a Norwegian designer to prepare the poster, and the librarians in Holland said they would pay for it. I was so pleased, because I had been determined that not all the artists should be from northern countries.

"And then Heidi Lange, a Swedish artist who lives in Kenya, gave us a piece of art that went 'round the world. It was on the cover of a booklet, a guide for teachers, explaining the dangers of deforestation and urging children to plant a tree. She took the same design—of children with an elephant and giraffe under a glorious tree—and made it into a batik which was presented as a VIP gift. Many other people in different countries helped, and several governments offered seedlings....

"The posters and booklets were ready by February, and UNESCO shipped them to libraries all over the world. (And they were really used: I saw one still up on a library wall a year later in Nebraska.) So then you had a theme for governments and a plan of action that was practicable in many different countries. And on June 5, the NGOs marched out and planted trees, so that television and newspaper reporters and heads of government had to go with them.

"It wasn't a one-shot thing. For a long time, scientists had been reporting a shortfall of trees, but no one paid them much attention. From 1982, you had a far more serious look at what the scientists were saying. The Aga Khan had been talking about a different, more efficient kind of cooking stove. All these things were coming together. What was needed was a catalyst, and 'For Every Child a Tree' proved to be a global catalyst.

"Lots of things happened. We got an official letter from China saying that every child over 10 will plant three trees 'and the army will help.' In India, our campaign helped reinforce the Chipko movement of women, who had been hugging trees to prevent the industrial forces from cutting them down. We told these stories, and we highlighted the tree planting programs in countries like Kenya and Zimbabwe; for it was important that people know that the Third World is capable of taking tree planting seriously.

"I guess that was the success of the campaign. Every little report you got, you sort of kicked yourself in the ankle and said, 'Yah, they're really doing it!' That was our reward."

Dominick Sarsfield
Housing for the Poorest

Dominick Sarsfield is a chartered accountant whose career in banking and finance took him from England to Canada and—after he became director of the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA's) Business and Industry Division in 1972—to distant places such as Papua New Guinea, where he helped to establish the National Investment and Development Authority (NIDA). Sarsfield was also involved in the negotiations to set up a common fund for the integrated commodities program sponsored by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). He was seconded in 1980 by CIDA to work under Dr. Arcot Ramachandran, executive director of the UN Centre for Human Settlements (known for short as Habitat), and went out to Nairobi a few months after his wife Mairuth.

"In May 1980, Ramachandran was coming back from Mexico City, from his annual Habitat Commission meeting, and one of the things he had been requested to do by member countries was to set up an *ad hoc* group of experts on how to finance human settlements on an international scale. He was looking for someone to fill this slot, and my name was suggested because of my financial and business background. I met him in New York, and he asked me to set up this group and [to] produce a report in time for the next Commission meeting the following year.

"I spent the summer preparing the groundwork because I knew the timeframe was tight. Because of the contacts I had made as director of the Business and Industry Division of CIDA, I knew some key personnel around the world who were friends and colleagues. I got on to people like Willi Engel, director of Kreditaustalt fur Wiederaufbau of Frankfurt and Henri Neumann, president of the Société internationale d'investissements in Belgium. There was a lawyer from Papua New Guinea and a former mayor of Brasília, who had housing experience rather than financial, whereas others, including Harold Dunkerley of the World Bank, were experts in international finance. They were a very good geographical spread, covering an area from the South Pacific to Europe to Latin America.

"We didn't start meeting until December 1980, and we finalized the report by early February and submitted it. Well, I think it was a very good report and most people did who took the trouble to read it. The main recommendations may sound simple. They were that a much greater effort would have to be made to establish proper financing institutions in the countries themselves, institutions that were properly managed and organized. Then to move on and do the same thing on a regional base, and build up to a kind of apex. Then they would get an opportunity of financing from a regional development bank, the World Bank and the sort of institutions that Willi Engel and Neumann were representing themselves. But without an institutional arrrangement being established in the countries concerned, there was very little hope that they could do anything on a worthwhile scale.

"We were looking obviously at the poorest people, and we were talking about human settlements in the full meaning of the term: it wasn't just housing, it was access roads, and proper sewerage and fresh water and so on. A house by itself is not a home. There must be security of tenure, access to jobs and health care and schools. In fact, if housing is pursued as an isolated

activity, it is perhaps one of the principal causes of deteriorating conditions in so many human settlements.

"Unfortunately, too, development planners often regard housing to be of secondary importance. They think investment in this sector is like throwing money into a bottomless pit, because of the almost limitless needs and the lack of prompt monetary returns. As a result, low-cost housing for the lower income households has been largely ignored. Which is a mistake. After all, housing construction has a wide multiplier effect in terms of creating jobs and in stimulating a demand for a large variety of housing components and fittings.

"Again, in many developing countries most of the public funds allocated for housing benefit only middle-income households. But of course middle-income people can usually get personal home loans from the private sector—from commercial banks, building societies or savings associations. The poorer sections of the community are very largely neglected. Yet there are mechanisms available by which mortgage facilities can be made available to low-wage earners: you can have a judicious mix of government and market funds, and also interest subsidies. Governments can probably play their most useful role in establishing what should be a revolving fund, and then let the housing finance system operate by itself.

"Anyway, we duly reported, and by May 1981 it was in the commission's hands. Meanwhile Ramachandran, who wanted to keep me on as his special adviser on housing finance, wrote to all developing member countries to say I was on staff and available for short-term missions to talk to them and try to help establish this type of institutional arrangement.

"I was very keen. But, before we knew what had happened, we had 38 replies asking me to come to 38 different countries. I think I managed to do 15 of them, staying for periods of between a week and a month. I was away from Nairobi more than half the time.

"The countries had different needs. The longest I spent was a month in Amman, Jordan. There they didn't need to establish a national corporation, for they had one—but it was getting into a bit of a mess. They wanted it evaluated and projections made on how it would become self-financing over a period of years.

"I went for two weeks to Kabul during the Russian period in Afghanistan, to do something nearly the same. They had a corporation that was in a chaotic muddle and was badly administered. They needed help to improve its performance. So I wrote a project proposal, which was submitted to Habitat, and they found a man to go out for a year's stay and work with them to do what I had suggested.

"In most of the countries I found [that] the problem was that they didn't know what the problem was! Much of my task was holding their hands and trying to suggest where they ought to go. A few guys in one office here were doing something, a few people here doing something else, and there was no organizational structure—and nothing was really happening. It is a very difficult problem when you are trying to house people and you have very limited resources indeed to do it. But it is mainly a question of organization, of

mobilizing resources. Otherwise, everyone is doing his own thing and you are wasting a lot of money and human resources.

"In almost all cases I was greeted with a great deal of enthusiasm. I got the message that these people desperately needed this kind of help and needed to be put on the right sort of course, but they didn't really know how to tackle the problem.

"Community effort was very much stressed, and co-operative financing schemes where people pooled both their human and financial resources. It is a reasonable hope that local government will provide something, when the people are getting involved and using their own labour. So you build up, and perhaps the central government will come in and, in due course, when they have got some proper organizational structure in place, there is a chance they can get some overseas finance.

"There has been a lot of talk about 'site and services,' which is a wonderful concept: you give them a site and you put in services and you say, 'Get on and build your house!' But the site and services scheme is better in theory than it turns out to be in practice. What you find is that it starts off fine and a couple of guys complete their houses—and then the rest is a complete shambles and the whole place goes downhill and the people move off as they would rather not live there. You end up with a semi-ruin. I have seen that happen many times, unfortunately. It is a pity, because it should work if they had this community concept.

"And the follow-up to our report and my missions? Well, I'm out of touch with many of the countries now, but in Sierra Leone there was considerable follow-up, because I helped them draft legislation to set up their housing finance corporation and that went into effect. In Afghanistan, this guy went out there from Habitat. In Western Samoa the problem was that the brightest people went to New Zealand for university training and, when they came back, there was no housing for them between the big houses, where the wealthy Samoans and the expatriates lived, and the communal houses where the villagers lived. These graduates wanted smaller homes where they could raise a family.

"To sum up, I would say that shelter development is as much a function of administrative and organizational structures as of unlimited availability of funds. When all is said and done, the provision of shelter and essential supporting services does not require enormous amounts of external finance. What it needs is organization, mobilization of available resources and the political will to see the job through."

Thomas M. Franck
Turning UNITAR Around

The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) has been one of the more misunderstood bodies in the UN system. Some people would say that it has really been misguided, and that, since being set up in 1965, it has wandered off the course that was marked out for it. Certainly it was thought necessary in 1984 to produce a pamphlet entitled *The Real Face of UNITAR*, with a final section on "the new face"; and William Barton, as chairman of UNITAR's Board of Trustees, wrote in it of plans "to revitalize the institution ... and to fulfill its mandate, provided it is given the means it needs for meaningful action."

With a touch of self-criticism, the pamphlet also says that "the real mandate of UNITAR" had been overshadowed by other things. Article 1 of UNITAR's statute defines it as an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations established "for the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations in achieving the major objectives of the Organization, ... in particular the maintenance of peace and security and the promotion of economic and social development." No other UN body has this mandate.

Thomas Franck, born in British Columbia, is professor of Law and director of the Centre for International Studies at the New York University School of Law. He became director of research at UNITAR in late 1979 and, during his three years in that post, obviously proved to be a brisk broom. He says: "It was really our intention simply to focus again and again, against all of the odds, people's attentions on the problems of bureaucratic redundancy. Were they wasted years? Not at all. They were wonderful years, and they indicated what could be done."

Later, on sabbatical leave from New York University, Franck wrote a provocative critique, well supported with case studies, of the record of the United Nations from the viewpoint of American national interest. His book, *Nation Against Nation: What happened to the UN dream, and what the U.S. can do about it*, was published by Oxford University Press in 1985. But the following comments, focusing on UNITAR and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), comes from a conversation in New York in 1986:

"When UNITAR began, it was going to be the training ground and think tank of the United Nations. It was originally thought to be the place where the staff college would be located, that there would be a central place to which people in transit from one level of the civil service to another would repair for short or long courses of a staff college type. They would come from the whole UN system, and it would be one of the unifying factors. Of course, one of the problems in the system is that it is so hard to maintain any sense of a unified system. There are so many baronial fiefdoms. The barons intensely resisted the idea of a bottleneck through which all of their liege lords would be passing, and the idea [of a staff college] never got off the ground.

"On the research side, it was intended that there should be a single place at the United Nations where there would be middle-range contingency planning, where options would be examined, where you would look to see how various parts of the system were operating and test that against the missions that had been assigned to those parts of the system when they were first

created. I guess the model was the Brookings Institution, a kind of Brookings-on-the-Hudson for the UN; and it was a good idea.

"When I came in late 1979, the function of UNITAR's research department, as it had been defined in practice, was to do studies of various global problems that might impinge on the future of world peace. For example, there was a major project underway, ... a sociological study of population movements in the Caribbean. There was a whole gaggle of projects underway on what came to be known as South–South relations, ways in which the Third World countries could help each other to help themselves, roughly under the rubric of the New International Economic Order.

"The major change I introduced was to try to get the institute away from those kinds of outward-looking studies and into inward-looking studies. I thought that our function ought to be to look at the UN system, rather than looking at sectoral and regional problems. That was not because I gave the UN system personal priority over the question of Caribbean population movements, but because there were lots of other institutions that had equally good or better access—including the IDRC [International Development Research Centre] in Ottawa. Our particular strength—and it was really our only strength—was the fact that we had access to all of the nooks and crannies in the UN system, and that nobody could refuse to see us or refuse to let us look at the documents.

"One of the surprising things that I found was ... that nobody from UNITAR had ever gone to the archives. For all practical purposes, the UN has no archives. It has a storage warehouse, several miles away, where boxes are stored. But there is nobody in the UN who is in charge of seeing to it that, when a particular operation—let's say, the Bangladesh disaster relief operation—has run its course, Sir Robert Jackson turns over all the papers. There's nobody who does that, even today.

"The only way they get papers in the archives is if somebody runs out of room in his office and, instead of throwing the papers out—which is what they usually do—he calls up the archives and says, 'Send a truck.' They put the papers in a box and it goes off. There is a rudimentary cataloguing system, but it's cataloguing in terms of boxes, and there is simply nobody in charge of making sure that, at the end of each chapter [of events], somebody catalogues and systematizes all of the available paper and makes it available to scholars and to people in the system who want to know what went before. So there is, in fact, no history. The UN is not leaving any history behind, except to the extent that individual outside historians want to go 'round doing interviews.

"Brian Urquhart [under-secretary-general for Special Political Affairs until his retirement in 1986, and biographer of Dag Hammarskjöld], who is the one person who does care about the history, and I tried to convince a group of ambassadors to the UN that, if we could get a foundation to pick up costs for the first year or two, they might commit themselves to getting the General Assembly to fund the appointment of a reputable historian with experience in something like the British Museum or the National Archives [of Canada] who would come and do a study of what it would take to get a systematized retrieval system going and establish a UN history section. But

nothing ever came of it because, although some foundations indicated interest in funding that sort of thing for a year or two, none was interested in funding it forever, and none of the ambassadors really believed they could get the General Assembly to pick up the cost in perpetuity. So there still isn't anything, and it is a matter of real regret.

"That was why I felt we in UNITAR were in a unique position, because we could get into whatever there was, both into the filing cabinets of those who were working in the Secretariat and also into those boxes stored way down on lower Fifth Avenue. No outside agency could do that. So that when, for example, it came to examining the work of seven disaster relief operations to see whether there were certain common elements, which could be systematized so that you didn't each time have to start from scratch to negotiate about health regulations, priority access to ports and things of that sort, we were able to do that; and we were therefore able to staff a series of meetings between diplomats that led to the eventual drafting of a set of common terms for the initiation of disaster relief operations.

"I thought that that was where UNITAR had a real role to play, that they could be useful ... in looking back at what had happened to see [the] lessons [that] were to be drawn from the past [and] that would help to make the future a little less repetitious—make it possible not to have to leap through all of the same hoops again—and, prospectively, it could afford to look at a series of probable middle-range futures [to] see whether the existing machinery of the UN was well adapted to dealing with those kinds of contingent futures. And we did that ... [W]e also did a lot of harebrained things: we did attitude surveys of what diplomats thought, in which they told us how little they thought of various projects in the UN system. Always anonymously, of course.

"In the prospective sector, while I was there, we did 14 or so studies, called Policy and Efficacy Studies, which looked at the prospects, over usually 10 years ahead, of various established institutions to see what kinds of problems they were likely to encounter, and whether the established machinery was sufficiently adaptable to be able to meet the requirements of the contingency needs that those futures were likely to pose.

"It's not quite fair to say that we picked the institutions out of a hat. In each of the three years I was there, we had a two-day meeting of a broadly based group of diplomats who seemed to be sympathetic to what we were trying to do at UNITAR. They would help us to identify the institutions [that] they thought were either most vulnerable, because of inelasticity of their structures or their procedures—of which the International Law Commission was one and ECOSOC was another—or [they] would help us pick institutions [that] they thought had become in some way radically different from what had originally been intended. The object, then, was to see whether that departure from the original intent was justified and would continue to be justified in the future. An example ... was the Joint Inspection Unit (which was a particularly interesting subject [and] which we never did study, though it was on our list), because a lot of the more thoughtful diplomats at the UN felt it was important that somebody inspect the inspectors....

"A lot of the things we did were quite radical. We called for a very radical restructuring of the International Law Commission. We felt quite strongly that ECOSOC had become obsolete. One of the problems of the UN system is that it is virtually impossible, once an institution is created—no matter how small, no matter how overtaken by events—it is virtually impossible to get rid of it. Now, we would have been quite happy to settle for a radical restructuring of ECOSOC and [to] give it a different role; but the way to get people to think about ECOSOC is to say, 'Look, this thing was created in 1945 to do something [that] has long since been overtaken by events, and it is now an obsolete and extremely expensive institution. Start from the assumption that, unless we can find something else for it to do that would justify the expense, we ought to get rid of it.'

"ECOSOC to me is like a fourth reading in Parliament. The history of the UN has been towards specialization and, when that works, that's the right way to go. You have, say, the Human Rights Commission and then agencies that are quite jealous of their specialized content, and they are mostly in the social and economic and cultural field[s]. Those have become increasingly specialized. The diplomats who serve in the capacity of national representatives on the councils of those agencies are almost certain[ly] the same people who are representing those countries in ECOSOC and then represent[ing] them again in the General Assembly in the committees that receive the reports from ECOSOC.

"So what you have is a group of specialized civil servants—some of them very good, some of them not so good—doing their thing within the context of the specialized commission or agency or unit; and they then report to the diplomats who supervise their work on their council. The same people show up again four months later, read the report that is made by the specialized group in the context of ECOSOC, debate the report that they have already debated once as members of the Human Rights Commission or whatever. They then go ahead and approve the report that they approved in the first place when they were meeting as the Human Rights Commission, [and] send it along to the appropriate committee of the General Assembly, which then debates it again with the same people.

"There are lots of unexceptionable reasons why they don't act unanimously to end this redundancy. Not every country is represented on ECOSOC; they are elected by the larger body, the General Assembly, and it is considered a very nice thing to be elected to ECOSOC. It is a kind of popularity contest; it is also a funnel through which things pass on their way from the specialized unit to the most generalized unit, the General Assembly. And since only about half the members of the General Assembly are on ECOSOC, it means that the half that are on ECOSOC get to have twice as much time to speak, and get to be twice as influential in voting something up or down. Now, since ECOSOC is constituted exactly on the same proportions in regional strengths as the General Assembly, the results are bound to be the same. But still, it's very difficult to get the half of the countries of the UN that are on ECOSOC to vote themselves out of business; and the half that are not on ECOSOC see themselves as being on ECOSOC next year. It means that you

have an extra set of ambassadors and they get an extra set of *per diems*, and so on. It's just very difficult bureaucratically.

"I think it is also difficult because ECOSOC is written into the UN Charter, and amending the UN Charter is very difficult again because it requires not only a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly but also unanimity among the Big Five. We never thought for a moment we were going to abolish ECOSOC; we did propose several other functions that ECOSOC could usefully provide. It was simply our intention again and again, against all of the odds, to focus people's attentions on the problems of bureaucratic redundancy."

As for the future role of UNITAR, Franck recalled how it had, in his time, arranged with three leading American universities to send students—economists, lawyers, political scientists, sociologists—to work for a year with UNITAR in return for a half-credit, and UNITAR used their tuition money to bring Third World students into the same program. "It was a wonderful training experience for the students. We were, in effect, the only operating campus of the United Nations University [UNU], because UNU [based in Tokyo], is not a university in the ordinary sense.

"There are basically two ways UNITAR can go, given the financial crisis and political problems. It could either become the Secretary-General's think tank, and then the research done would become relevant by bureaucratic definition, because people would have to read it [as] coming out of his office. To some extent we moved in that direction, when we got the General Assembly to request some studies—that was something new to the system.... The other way would be to go ... in the opposite direction, and become the New York campus of UNU; and there have been some discussions and negotiations in that direction. That might conceivably be where it ends up."

Nancy Yates
Livestock, High Tech and TOKTEN

During nearly 20 years with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Nancy Yates has lived and worked in Ethiopia, Brazil, New York and Barbados. She has taken these very different places in her stride and says it was easy after her childhood homes. She was born near Portage-la-Prairie in Manitoba and grew up, from age 11 to 18, in Churchill, Manitoba. After those years in Churchill, she says, "I could probably have lived anywhere and not felt any physical hardship." She claims she enjoyed that bleak town on the shore of Hudson Bay and always hoped to see a polar bear walk down its main street. She graduated from the University of Manitoba in 1966 and was recruited directly into the External Aid Office (a forerunner of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)) to work in the training division.

It was partially an accident that Yates was drawn into international work. She was interviewed by people from a number of federal departments, who were touring the universities; the recruiting team from the External Aid Office showed particular interest. But she was already involved with the International House in Winnipeg and with helping foreign students. After two years in Ottawa, Yates was posted to Ethiopia as a junior professional officer with the UNDP, and stayed there for a little over two years. Then the UNDP offered her a posting in Brazil as a program officer. After four and a half years divided between Rio de Janeiro and Brasília, she was based at headquarters in New York for seven years. During that time she became chairperson of the staff council, and worked vigorously—but not with any striking success—to open up more senior posts for women. A posting followed in 1982 to Barbados, where she was the deputy resident representative for the eastern Caribbean, which comprised 10 islands. In 1987, she was back in New York as senior area officer in the Caribbean unit. She talks here about all these stages in her career, and about how the UNDP has evolved:

"When I thought in 1968 about a first assignment abroad, I decided I wanted to go to somewhere completely different from what I had known in Canada, somewhere exotic. With Ethiopia I got exactly what I wanted. In some ways it was very shocking, seeing many people living in terrible conditions. But it was also most exciting. Addis Ababa had recently become the headquarters of two important institutions. The Organization of African Unity was new, and people of all sorts of nationalities were working at the Economic Commission for Africa. The UN program included a geological survey, agricultural research, UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization] book production, and improvement of livestock. My particular job had a lot to do with South African refugees.

"The program in Brazil was totally different. The UN there was helping Brazil absorb high technology. We had a professor from Harvard help[ing] the Brazilians [to] work out this kind of policy, to get something worthwhile out of the UNDP. In terms of money, the UNDP was not that important to Brazil, but they decided to use us as a conduit to get high technology. For example, they wanted to export civilian aircraft—no, not counterinsurgency aircraft—and we helped them with that, and also with nuclear techniques in agriculture, radioisotopes and so on. Then there was research on fruits and

vegetables in the North East. In contrast with the program in Ethiopia, we were responding to much more sophisticated needs; and it was an excellent program, because the Brazilians were very interested. Eventually they themselves made a large cost-sharing contribution to UNDP, both paying local costs in agricultural and other projects, and also [making] a cash payment in convertible funds to bring in outside experts. This was on top of the voluntary contribution Brazil and nearly every country pledges to the global program of UNDP.

"I took my son David to Ethiopia when he was six, and he came on with me to Brazil. He loved both countries and in fact he didn't want to leave Brazil after our four years there. He wanted to be a soccer star like Pelé, and he didn't feel much of a Canadian at all. I found that a problem. He's in Canada now, doing his first degree, and he's written some plays....

"Back in New York for seven years, I worked in what was called the European and Middle East Bureau, and then that changed to the Arab Bureau. So I went [to the Middle East] and was dealing with Lebanon, Jordan and some regional programs among the Gulf States. But at the same time, I became the chairman of the staff council here, and I got very interested in a women's committee that was trying to push the status of women in the UNDP. It got almost nowhere. Even now we have only two or three women at the D1 level, which is one level below a very senior position. One of them is an American, and a Swedish woman retired at that level in 1986 after many years in UNDP, so she wasn't someone who had been recently appointed. This is in contrast to CIDA, where women have really gone ahead—I'm furious every time I visit there!

"In UNDP we had a lovely policy statement put out in 1981, but very little happened. Women inside the organization were not groomed—I'm talking in general, for there were one or two exceptions—and women were not hired from outside at a high level. Or else, one or two who were hired soon left for greener pastures: one American woman walked out after two weeks, because she was downgraded and not given a specific job to do—and she became the person in charge of all the Peace Corps volunteers in Morocco. Mind you, there has been a change in attitude about married couples: they will make an effort to find a job for ... the spouse. There have been three or four cases where a husband and wife have been placed, although [the woman] didn't get any senior job—it just meant they didn't have to refuse a posting. In terms of real authority and power and responsibility, hardly anything has happened. A few women have been promoted, but they are not in charge of anything: the Swedish lady was an expert on women in development, and she was just in charge of herself, not of a unit. She wasn't promoted to the level of supervising a lot of other people.

"To go back to my field assignments, I went to Barbados in July 1982, as the deputy resident representative. I was in charge of the eastern Caribbean office and the overall program for those 10 islands when the resident representative was travelling, which was about half the time. In the Caribbean, you have a similar situation to, say, South Asia: you have the trained people, but you don't have governments that can pay them a sufficient salary to keep them

on a small island. Of course, every circumstance is different but I think the UNDP adapts quite well to these different circumstances. We tried there a 'modified TOKTEN' approach. That stands for Transfer Of Know-how Through Expatriate Nationals, and it was started in Turkey. There you got expatriate Turks to come back and make a contribution for two or three months. Their own organization would continue to pay their salary; UNDP would pay their travel and maybe a *per diem*; and the government would provide the housing or something like that.

"We modified the TOKTEN approach in the Caribbean and assisted these expatriates for a longer period of time, to get more use out of nationals ... who didn't live there any more. The Asia Bureau of UNDP has been doing the same thing, bringing American Chinese back to work in China for several months. In the Caribbean, we hoped that these expatriates would be integrated back into the structure and that, by the time their first assignment had ended, the government would adapt some kind of salary scale to induce them to stay. For example, we financed an economist/planner to go back to St. Lucia, paying him on the Caribbean Development Bank [CDB] scale, above a national wage but below an international salary. He is still there. We have done this also in Grenada, [at first] with the Bishop government and now with the new one.

"We don't know how successful it will be, in terms of their staying permanently; but at least they are contributing. The Caribbean Development Bank has also hired a lot of people who used to be in Canada and the United States. I think a good number of Caribbean people will go back, if they can have a reasonable salary and job satisfaction. Canadians and other outside donors have provided most of the capital for the CDB; in effect it's been a matter of setting up an institution and staffing it with people from that region. It's worked very well. So what I'm saying is that there's a lot of Caribbean talent, but it won't necessarily be found in the Caribbean.

"The UNDP resident representative also has the job, since the reforms recommended by Sir Robert Jackson, of being the 'resident co-ordinator' of the family of UN agencies in that country or region. Success in this role depends very much on the experience, energy and personality of the resident representative. Now, that may sound an obvious statement; but what I mean is that agencies will try to avoid being co-ordinated. There is a problem of co-ordinating the work of two or more agencies, to avoid overlap—say, work on water projects by UNESCO, FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] and UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund]—but usually their mandates are different. The bigger problem now is to co-ordinate [the projects that] agencies are [undertaking] independently of UNDP with their own funds.

"Until 1975, agencies used to depend almost entirely on UNDP for their technical assistance funds. But in 1975, UNDP had its financial crisis, and we had to fire people already working on projects because we didn't receive enough pledges of voluntary contributions for the projects [already] under way. That was a big trauma for the agencies and, from that time, agencies said, 'Phooey! We cannot depend on the UNDP.'

"So they started to build up their own technical co-operation programs, because they have their own governing bodies. Donors contributed to, say, FAO's program while also contributing to our program; and the agencies got money here and there, for instance from the Arab fund. More and more, all the agencies—and FAO has been the most successful—have gone out to get trust funds, appealing to the Saudi Arabian government, saying 'We'll do this activity with you. You just place your money in trust with us and we will execute projects. UNDP doesn't have to be involved at all.' So that's the problem: Is UNDP the centre of all technical assistance now? In some countries we manage fewer resources than some agencies—so who are we to boss them around? That's the attitude in some agencies. So the resident representative has to be very senior, has to be a good diplomat and has to have all sorts of qualities. That's not always been the case.

"As a senior area officer in the Caribbean unit, I handle the headquarters work for 20 English-speaking countries plus St. Helena, which we just acquired. With the process of 're-centralization' that has begun, it means an awful load of work! But not so many of these 20 countries will have projects above $400 000, and the UNDP resident representative can approve projects below that figure without taking it to New York. That's not like the situation in Africa. The voluntary contributions to UNDP were projected to increase by eight per cent a year, but resources have been lagging. As well, the UNDP Governing Council decided some years ago that 80 per cent of resources should go to the poorer [states], leaving 20 per cent for the Caribbean, Latin America and most of the Arab states.

"In the Caribbean there has been adaptation. We use United Nations volunteers, who each cost $15 000 a year. We use consultants from the region—again paying them less than international fees. We use national professionals. We use TCDC [Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries]. We still have long-term experts, who cost $80 000 to $100 000 a year, but to a much smaller degree than previously.

"As well, there is the Caribbean Group for Co-operation in Economic Development, which draws together 18 donor countries and the 20 Caribbean countries. Since 1977, [this group] has done really useful work in calling attention to the special problems of the region. It set up an Inter-Agency Resident Mission, backed by the UNDP and five other agencies as well as by Canada, Britain and the United States, and the mission has helped these countries [to] improve their public sector management and to prepare investment programs. One result is that they have avoided the enormous problems of indebtedness that plague Latin America.

"So really, there have been some positive results from the crisis period of 1975. We have learned to adapt, sometimes painfully but also with imagination."

Richard Foran
Too Many Eggs in One Basket?

In 1986, the highest ranking Canadian in the United Nations Secretariat was Richard Foran, the controller. His full title is Assistant Secretary-General for Financial Services, and he is a cool and cheerful person in the face of the worst fiscal crisis the UN has experienced in 40 years. In January 1986, he said calmly, "I think we will have run out of money by November," but he added that the United Nations would then be "flat broke but not bankrupt." He also pointed out that "the amounts we are talking about are not large; we're talking about an annual budget of $800 million (U.S.), which is what New York city spends on garbage collection." Anyway, he added, "this is primarily a political, rather than a financial, problem."

Although at Queen's University he studied what seem precisely appropriate subjects for his present job—English, economics and psychology—Foran came to the hottest seat in the UN Secretariat by a roundabout route. His early jobs were in public relations, first with the Canadian Council for Crippled Children (where he worked with the wrestler "Whipper" Billy Watson), and then in New York for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine refugees. After a year of fundraising for the American University of Beirut, he rejoined the United Nations as an administrative officer. He went to Vienna for two years soon after the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) was set up there in 1967, and he became head of administration of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in its early days in Nairobi. From 1980 to 1982, he worked in Geneva as director for Programme Support and as secretary to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), before returning to New York to become controller.

Here, he talks a little about those earlier experiences in the UN system, before launching on the subject of the financial crisis with a candor unusual for someone whose role is equivalent to that of a finance minister of any UN member state.

"When I came back to the UN in 1965, there was no UNIDO; there was just a Centre for Industrial Development. Then, in 1967, UNIDO was formed, and the decision was made to go to Vienna. In 1967 and 1968, I commuted back and forth from New York, and then transferred to Vienna for two years. UNIDO is basically an aid-giving organization. We devised a recruitment system, which I thought was good, to put ultimately about 1 000 people a year into the field. When I left after two years, we were putting in 500.

"UNIDO has done some very good work. I remember, back in the 1960s, we had a huge program in Iran, helping to set up industrial estates. But UNIDO faced problems almost from the start. Like UNCTAD, it was an idea that came from the developing world. Both were perceived to be a threat to a lot of vested interests. So they did not have immaculate conceptions, either of them; and they each had mixed reviews. UNCTAD started off a bit better, because there was first-class conceptual work done there in the early days; [that work really caught] the imagination of economic professors around the world. Very few people who were getting PhDs did not take at least one

course in economic development, and their professors were relying heavily on UNCTAD.

"For its part, UNIDO ran into difficulties when it moved from doing research into becoming operational. Many of the industries it helped had counterparts in the north, so there were problems over trade competition and cheap labour. But its programs were quite successful, for example, in North African countries—Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia—in terms of advising on industrial policies; also in the East African Community, before it broke up. In the late 1960s, developing countries saw industrialization as the golden road to Utopia; so there was political pressure to get industrialized.

"I was a bureaucrat in UNIDO, being in charge of recruitment; but in that job you learn about programs and policies. Then in October 1985, I was back in Vienna helping UNIDO in the process of converting into a specialized agency. Originally, it was an autonomous department of the United Nations, directly linked to the General Assembly. UNIDO's budget amounted to about 10 per cent of the central UN budget, and it never had cash problems. Now it will be funded on its own, following the UN scale of assessments.

"I am afraid the timing of this conversion is very unfortunate. If UNIDO had become a specialized agency at the time of the 1974 Lima conference, when it was first proposed, it would have been different. But to stand on one's own, at a time when there have been giant steps back from multilateralism, is going to be difficult. When Gamani Corea was secretary-general of UNCTAD, we used to discuss seeking more autonomy for UNCTAD in some administrative matters, but he would always add: 'I don't want any part of becoming a specialized agency. UNCTAD needs the political power of the General Assembly.'

"We are talking about comparatively small sums. UNIDO's whole budget for a year doesn't represent, in dollars, a respectable addition to a GM factory. This money, therefore, has in some way to be serving a catalytic or demonstration effect. The main strength comes from the political 'oomph' behind the money. UNIDO is a good organization, and the Austrians have built a beautiful headquarters for it. UNIDO could do a lot—but where will it be without that tie to the General Assembly?"

Of UNRWA and UNEP, Foran says: "They were the best experiences I had. They were both so small that you learn[ed] everything." During his time with UNEP, there were only 90 professional staff.

Regarding the financial crisis, there were, in early 1986, high-level discussions with the United States Government, aimed at bringing home to Washington the consequences of allowing the Kassebaum Amendment and the Gramm–Rudman Act to take effect. But, as for the hope that this could lead to a change of view, Foran said: "I think it's too late for that."

Senator Nancy Kassebaum of Kansas sponsored an amendment that would cut the U.S. contribution to the UN regular budget from 25 per cent to 20 per cent of the total. (In 1945, the United States was paying 40 per cent.) The cut could be waived if Secretary of State George Shultz could certify that the UN had adopted a system of weighted voting on budget matters ("grant to each member state voting rights on matters of budgetary consequence

proportionate to the member state's contribution") and had also reduced salaries and pensions to the level of the U.S. civil service. Salaries are about 15 per cent higher at the UN, due to an expatriation premium. To change that would be difficult, and to move to a system of weighted voting similar to that in effect on the World Bank board of directors would require an amendment to the UN Charter.

The immediate effect of the Kassebaum Amendment was to cut $42 million (U.S.) from the amount the United States should have been paying into the regular UN budget for 1986. The effects of the Gramm–Rudman Act, which aims to eliminate the U.S. federal budget deficit within five years by automatic cuts in designated sectors, are less quantifiable but could involve an even more severe reduction in the UN contribution.

As Foran explains, these cuts came without any advance warning: "The United States and the UN have never had the same fiscal year. The United Nations has always been on the calendar year. The United States used to operate a fiscal year from July through June ... [In] the 1970s[, they] moved to October through September. In 1983, the United States started paying after October for the UN contribution of that calendar year. This has made things very difficult. For they pay 25 per cent of the budget and provide it only in the last quarter of the year. The Kassebaum Amendment was to come into effect only in the U.S. fiscal year 1987, but it affect[ed] us in 1986. The same with any reduction because of the Gramm–Rudman Act.

"If we go back to January 1985, the UN regular budget had $166 million in contributions payable from previous years. Of that amount, the Soviet Union was in arrears for $42 million and the United States for $11 million. Most of the Soviet arrears—more than $40 million—were withholdings accumulated over about 20 years, and so were $7 million of the U.S. arrears. But by September 1985, it was a different picture. At that point the United States owed $205 million, more than half of the contributions then outstanding. In the last quarter it paid $120 million, so at the end of the UN's fiscal year it still owed $85 million. So what has changed and is critical is the U.S. behaviour. It is certainly not the total problem, but it has made a problem into a crisis.

"The Working Capital Fund was at a level of $40 million in 1962, and then increased in 1982 to $100 million by assessing all member states for contributions. But by December 1985, the withholdings of 18 states amounted to $99.7 million, and that simply wipes out the assets of the working capital fund. Withholdings from peacekeeping operations are listed in a separate account, and the bond issue that was floated to cover the Congo operation is now amortized, except for the last $20 million, which will be amortized within the next couple of years.

"There are always late payers, which accounted for much of the $66 million in January 1985 that was not actually being withheld. The Kassebaum cut of $42 million, together with the cuts dictated by the Gramm–Rudman Act, means that the U.S. contribution for 1986 has amounted to $100 million instead of the assessed $210 million. The Secretary-General brought in economy measures amounting to $60 million. Putting all these figures together, we will just manage to finish 1986 without going broke. I am more optimistic now

[November 1986] than six months ago when we were on the brink of bankruptcy. But there are plenty of problems ahead: for a start, we have to raise $60 million to get through January, and—while we can put the reforms of the Group of Eighteen into effect—like supertankers, we can't turn on a dime. It will take time to alter course. About 75 per cent of the UN budget consists of staff costs. It's the most labour-intensive public administration I know. Most other public administrations are dealing with grants and construction work and other areas where you can control your expenditures. But our budget is basically our payroll.

"This problem has a thousand and one angles. What is fascinating about working in the United Nations Organization is that there is simply nothing that is straightforward. This is primarily a political problem, and one should never forget that.

"The argument put forward by Maurice Strong and Sadruddin Aga Khan that assessments should be reorganized so that no member state is responsible for more than 10 per cent of the budget—and, conversely, [so that] the United Nations is not vulnerable to a single large contributor—has a lot of merit. This could be done by the General Assembly under Article 17 of the Charter, on a recommendation from the Committee on Contributions. Until a couple of years ago I thought ability to pay was the most equitable way of financing the UN. Now I tend to favour the assessment of member states on a pragmatic basis, which would assure the financial viability of the organization. When I was a small boy, the one thing my father taught me was never to put all my eggs in one basket...."

Ginette Ast
The View from the Gallery

What does the United Nations look like from the press gallery? Do journalists who have been covering events there for many years become linked to particular points of view and dismissive of other opinions? Has the United Nations suffered from an unfriendly Western press corps during, say, the last 20 years? Is there a real problem for reporters in the sheer complexity of an organization comprising 159 member-states whose delegations tend to tell the press—if they talk at all—several different versions of an event? Ginette Ast, who is CBC's producer in charge of United Nations programming, addresses these and other questions.

Ginette began at the United Nations in 1966 as an editorial assistant on the *Los Angeles Times*, and moved to the CBC a year later, just before the Six-Day War in the Middle East. "I was thrown into this office, and there were masses of people here. We were going live day and night, television mainly. For me it was quite frightening, because I had never worked in this kind of a business."

She soon found her feet, and for many years has been in charge of the office, operating it as a clearing-house for CBC and Radio-Canada (her first language is French) for news stories and documentaries on all the international issues coming out of the UN.. She suggests stories to the Corporation's various desks and makes sure they know what is happening. "I am fortunate enough to have a range of outlets, not necessarily news, but there are shows like 'Sunday Morning' and 'Présent Dimanche' and 'Le Point' [that] do interviews on something that does not necessarily thrill every person in New York City. And sometimes I am a part of an important story outside—say, the famine in Africa—and crews go there; so it won't have a UN dateline. A lot of my American colleagues have a problem, because they have very few outlets, except for the pure news-desks."

Nevertheless, she has noted "a clear decline" in Canadian media interest in the UN. "Look at the print media. There used to be a number of Canadian correspondents here, but no more. And you can't cover the UN from Washington. It's very difficult to cover this place unless you are here every day. You cannot come in here cold, on a deadline, and expect to get the story *in toto*. You will get one point of view, maybe two. It is a complex place, very complex, because of the personalities and because of the nature of diplomacy. You are dealing with diplomats; they are not politicians, except for a few people like Ambassador [Stephen] Lewis. Your classic diplomat will be very careful before he or she will speak to a journalist. So what happens is a lot of people clip newspapers—*The New York Times* and the *Washington Post*—and they will have seen names mentioned in those stories. The same names end up being their sources when they come to do the story. It's a vicious cycle, because you cannot hit and run on UN stories.

"There's another problem at the level of the UN *per se*. The UN is not used to dealing with—I have to be careful how I phrase this—a very aggressive, hardnosed press corps. A lot of UN officials don't even know how a newsroom works. A lot of UN officials come from societies where the press is viewed in a certain way. I'm not saying that our way is necessarily the ultimate best. All this is part of the complexity of UN coverage.

"Quiet diplomacy may be very effective, but lousy business for the press. You are easily led, or misled, by people who will claim to know the undercurrents of various wonderful issues. There are times when you would rather have it from the horse's mouth! The most difficult thing to cover nowadays is a major Security Council debate where some difficult negotiations are taking place behind closed doors. The press will be gathered at the exit of that chamber, and they are waiting desperately for some clue as to what has been happening in that room. Well, every speaker who comes out is going to be a member of a certain delegation, every speaker will be projecting their wishful sentiment, in a way. Some less experienced UN press people have been burned when, let us say, they are on deadline and they are waiting for a resolution to come up for a vote ... and the representative of country X comes out and says, 'Yes, we expect a vote within the hour'; the person goes on the air and says there will be a vote within the hour. Not necessarily so. The trick here is to get as many points of view to a conflict as possible. It is much more complicated than most stories.

"The 40th anniversary raised interest in the United Nations, but Stephen Lewis has done so even more. The average ambassador does not generate that kind of interest but Stephen Lewis, because of his personality, his eloquence and his approach to an issue, will grab your attention. People may not agree with him, but they listen. A few years ago we had Ivor Richard of the United Kingdom, [an] excellent speaker; we had [Senator] Daniel Moynihan of the United States at the same time; we had Salim Salim of Tanzania—and we had fantastic exchanges, there were excellent press conferences. It is a theatre—some would say a theatre of the absurd—; it depends what your beliefs are. But the press looks for a good show, and, especially if you work for radio and television, you need to have a good clip.

"Being at the United Nations for many years, as I have been, forces you to realize—not necessarily to accept—that there are many different points of view on most issues; and that those various points of view have their merit if viewed from the speaker. I'm curious by nature, and like to know why even the most outrageous thing is said. When Iran speaks, as it does very frequently now, about Israel, which it refuses to name by name, it's flabbergasting but it is a reality. When people say that the UN is a joke, and hysterical things are being said left and right, and it is said that the UN means nothing, it has no relevance to the outside world—I disagree with that. I think we would all be smart to listen, get some signals...."

One consequence of the United Nations being poorly covered—and poorly regarded as a news source—by news organizations is that important stories that first break at the United Nations are sometimes ignored for months. Ginette Ast gives an example:

"The famine in Africa didn't suddenly pop up because the BBC went to take pictures there. It had been an issue that had been discussed here for some time. The Secretary-General had issued appeals, but it seemed that it just wouldn't register. One colleague a few years ago, who worked around the major wire services, used to say he can sell anything to his editors, but he better not use the UN dateline. He was exaggerating the point; but a good

story datelined Washington or Geneva or London will sell. If you put a UN dateline on it, in the eyes of some it will not negate the story, but it will certainly diminish the value of it. This is what the UN is up against. There is a sort of psychological climate in which it is operating. In Canada it is different still, but in the United States if you put the UN dateline, somehow it is not credible or it is biased.

"This was certainly not the case when I first came here in 1966. Things went downhill very quickly because of two things: the Middle East and economic issues ... when the Security Council and the General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions [that] displeased Israel. When the issue of Palestinian rights came up, culminating with Arafat's visit, at a time when the PLO was quite actively blowing up planes, there were demonstrations across First Avenue where you could not cross the street. The Jewish community felt very strongly that there were some horrible things happening at the UN—that was their perception of it—to the point that Africans and Arabs suggested that some of the meetings be held in Geneva, where they thought there would be a more neutral atmosphere. Ever since that time, the UN, in the eyes of the pro-Israel community, has lost credibility. Is it because they sense great danger that, if these resolutions were really pushed to the ultimate, Israel would lose, if not totally, at least some territory and certain things?

"At the same time there is on both sides a very irrational dislike or hatred, depending on the speaker, on some of the key issues. There has been a sort of liberation of speakers. They feel freer now to use ridiculous language, very forceful language. It is no longer the diplomatic language one might have been used to in the early 1960s. I wonder, if Khrushchev came here now and banged his shoe on the table, whether it would be such a big deal. It was then, because there were certain things you just didn't do. But now, in both the Security Council and the Assembly, very often on both sides of the argument, they go for the jugular. The Middle East is probably the roughest, for the language is less virulent on Central America and southern Africa. Of course, for the press corps it isn't a bad thing: it makes for a good story.... I'm not a missionary!

"Again, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the whole issue of the New Economic Order came up, Henry Kissinger—using him as the ultimate tip of the iceberg—did not like such ideas. And the UN was speaking out. Here you had all these newly independent nations and there had been an awakening of all sorts of thoughts and ideas, and people came here to express those thoughts. And the New Economic Order became another issue [that] disturbed the Western world generally. When Algeria said that, if we had an equitable relationship around the world in the economic field, one would not need aid—that was the extreme point of view, that aid was just the symptom of something that was very wrong and, in their eyes, the West was at fault.... And then, of course, later on you had the oil embargo connected to the Middle East—it was lethal.

"This is why I go back to what is happening now. I see a return to much more caution by the majority of developing countries; I put aside Libya and Iran. The debt problem, the lowering of oil prices, all these things have their

effect here, too. These issues are being dealt with bilaterally. This is what the more powerful countries want, because they have more control, and they have moved these issues out of the UN. It is short-term, it is not going to resolve the issue. We are in a cycle where people are going to be careful. I think it is simplistic to say it is a result of the Reagan administration's policies. It is probably also a reflection of the more conservative world we live in, generally, even in developing countries. People who are hungry at one point, they really feel threatened; they are going to be very careful. They just cannot afford to antagonize someone who they sense may be ruthless enough to say, 'To hell with it!'"

Of the journalists who have covered the United Nations since the earliest days, Ginette says she is "in two minds" about the merit of staying so long. "I did not know the UN in the 1950s, when the West comfortably controlled the United Nations. Therefore I cannot go back to that nostalgia; my point of view is not, shall we say, tainted with 'the good old days.' The only thing I will admit to is that, because there was more interest in the UN in the late 1960s, I miss those days. Maybe this is why my colleagues of a previous generation regret those days. In some cases, I think it is more than just that: it is because they truly were of a certain outlook, and they feel they have lost something. I try not to be drawn into that. It is a different reality now. The world has changed, and what do you do? You don't regret either the Renaissance or the Middle Ages; you just say it was a different time.

"The thing is, I would hate to become Miss UN! Because that is another distortion. You almost need a balance between a healthy dose of cynicism and hope at the same time, and yet remember constantly that this is a beat. One is not here to join a cause, because that is not my business. And yet to be fair to the story—it is that kind of balance.

"You have to be very vigilant to keep a balance, and say, 'Come on now, listen; hear them out; see what it is.' You have to be a listener. A sense of humour helps, because it puts things in perspective. The UN deals with so many emotional issues. The ideals are there and they are certainly laudable, but the application of those ideals by, I would say, every single member state is far from perfect. No one has a monopoly of self-righteousness in this day, and the danger is—and I have seen it happen with some members of the press corps of various ideologies—that they will decide that wherever they come from has the answer to the problem. My feeling is, it's not that simple: everyone is right, and everyone is a bit wrong. Let's hear them out, and then let the viewer and the listener decide. It's a tricky game....

"In a place like this you need what Voltaire called for, which was a bit of humour, compassion and tolerance. There's a lot happening that is either outrageous, silly, very threatening or—just let it be, it's not that important. But everyone in here is an actor. If you are an actor in this theatre, you have to take yourself very seriously; you have to play your part. I am not an actor, and so my point of view is: let's see the show, does it convey a message, is it interesting? Every member state has to sell a line and, the more you know about various member states, the more interesting it becomes to hear what they have to say."

Angus Archer
A Third Window with a Fresh View

Since graduating from Carleton University in history and political science in 1963, Angus Archer's career has been almost entirely devoted to building coalitions between and among Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). He worked first with the Overseas Institute of Canada under Roby Kidd, then spent three years with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) helping to run its Young World Appeal Program, in which links were made between youth groups in industrialized countries and young farmers throughout the Third World. After six years in Ottawa building up the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, he became chief of special projects with the UN's Centre (now Division) for Economic and Social Information (CESI) in New York. But, as he says, he did not enjoy working with the media as much as with NGOs, and he took steps to return as quickly as possible to the latter. After returning, he helped to set up the "third window" for NGOs to gain access to the UN system: the Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS), of which he is the co-ordinator in New York.

"I quickly saw the tremendous difference between working with NGOs and working with press and media. In my view, media people are flighty, they don't take issues seriously for any sustained period nor do they look at issues in depth and follow through. .They write their story and run away.... In my work with CESI I found myself jumping from one issue and one set of journalists to another. The thing that bothered me most was the lack of follow-through. You would have, for instance, a World Conference on Population in Bucharest in 1974—my first assignment—and the Food Conference in Rome also in 1974; and you would come back from those conferences—there were close to 2 000 journalists at the Rome meeting—and talk to Canadian or American journalists and say, 'Now what can you do on these issues beyond that?' and you would hear inevitably, 'Oh, no, I've been reassigned. I'm sorry. I'm dealing with the environment [or local politics] now.'

"It was at the World Food Conference that we saw a gleam in the eye of many NGO representatives and the beginning of the Non-Governmental Liaison Services. A few of us saw a unique phenomenon there, of NGOs from developed countries doing an extremely effective job of influencing their own governments, knowing as much about food aid and food security issues as the government delegates did, sending regular telexes back to their friends in Parliament or Congress so that the right questions were raised, and to newspaper editors so that editorials were written. This happened to the point that the Canadian delegation became aware—for the first time—that it was being closely watched and monitored as to what it was doing in Rome and that this was being publicly aired back in Canada. I think the food aid contribution of Canada doubled within a week of the conference. I don't believe that would have happened without this pressure. And the Dutch were doing the same, and the Nordics, and to a lesser extent the Americans.

"Two of us already in the UN—Ross Mountain from New Zealand, who was in the Social Affairs department, and I—called an *ad hoc* meeting during the Rome Conference of all the activist NGOs, about 50 people, and explored the idea of a new kind of service that the UN might provide, which would be system-wide and not just from the UN or from FAO or from UNESCO

[United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization], and which would focus at that time very much on trade and economic issues leading up to UNCTAD-4 [the fourth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development], which we were very concerned about, in Nairobi in 1976. Such UN services—there is one in Geneva and one in New York—would provide much more in-depth material, both research and study material, through NGOs and also gain access to their research.

"We created, almost by popular demand, this notion that the UN needed a 'third window' in its relationship with NGOs. The UN has in its Charter, in Article 71, the mandate to implement the first three words of the Charter—'We the peoples.' Article 71 says that peoples' organizations—NGOs—can have status—if accorded—through the Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC]. Therefore there are about 650, mainly international, NGOs that have consultative status. The kind of organizations that have this status is determined by governmental committee, with lots of politics involved, and it is a rather slow and bureaucratic process. But once you have that status, you have definite rights and can make interventions at some ECOSOC meetings and produce papers and so on. That's 'window 1.'

"'Window 2' is an information window, through the Department of Public Information [DPI]. The DPI has an NGO section, which holds weekly briefings in New York and Vienna and other UN capitals, and [which] pumps out a lot of information to NGOs. It is very much an information-out process.

"NGLS is the 'third window,' and we have limited ourselves both in geography and in subject matter to the NGOs of the industrialized world and to the issues of economic and social development. This is because our mandate comes from the 1974 Declaration and Program of Action on the New International Economic Order [NIEO], which urges the Secretary-General to do all he can to educate the public of member states, particularly those in the industrialized world, about the urgent issues of world development. It really does focus very much on development education in the North about the problems in the North; its scope has broadened to include many social issues (e.g., women and development), but it is not deeply involved with, say, decolonization or political issues, and only with disarmament so far as it is linked to development.

"In many ways, 1974 was a turning point: not only were there the global oil and food crises and the NIEO declaration, but for the first time in the UN's history the departments of information or of external relations of the whole UN family came together and formed the Joint United Nations Information Committee [JUNIC], composed of all the heads of information, about 35 or 40 representatives. JUNIC is an important point of co-ordination on things that are not specifically agency-oriented and where there is no rivalry, say, between UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] and WHO [World Health Organization] to get some statement out first. Two of the ongoing projects of this committee, JUNIC, are the publication Development Forum and our NGLSs.

"What has NGLS–New York actually done? Well, my territory is North America and Japan; Thierry Lemaresquier, who succeeded Ross Mountain,

and who works out of Geneva, deals with the European countries. In North America, we started by dividing the continent into manageable chunks and putting on five big regional conferences on the NIEO themes: these were in Los Angeles, Seattle, Minneapolis, Atlanta and the last one in Denver in 1982. Each took up to two years to organize, and cost about $250 000, but 90 per cent of that was raised in the community itself. The conference was only part of the exercise—an important part. There were speaking tours before and after, and lots of follow-up; and there was the end result of building NGO networks in the U.S. and linking them with Canada. Much research was done on the global–local links, and background kits and study materials were prepared.

"We went into Denver, for instance, and, it's a strange role for the UN, but we in fact introduced the local representative of the American Friends Service Committee to the Denver Council of Churches! They had worked side by side, but [had] never really known each other. Afterwards we linked that group with the University of Denver, and then tried to bring in the corporate sector. The NGLS, as a neutral, catalytic lever, was useful in doing that.

"We weren't of course neutral on the issues. But it was essentially the local community's agenda that took precedence. The Denver conference, called 'Hemisphere 82,' is perhaps the best example. We tried to take the issues of the New International Economic Order, particularly the trade and food production and transnational corporations issues, and overlay them on the Rocky Mountain's regional economy, saying 'All right, you may not think it affects Denver and Phoenix and Cheyenne, and Calgary and Edmonton, but in fact it does. The price of your agricultural commodities depends on the world market; the aerospace industry is related to a lot of the ways in which transnationals function.' We brought in as many issues as we could to the mix, but always tried to make the local–global connection.

"On the other side of the coin, we took to the Denver conference itself 25 to 30 UN people, including ambassadors and staff, for four or five days, to sit and work with those people and talk and be discussion leaders. This in itself was an educational process, for them to try to relate to the people there. There was a major effort in Denver to reach corporations and the political leadership. We ended up with a real coup, I think, in getting Coors Brewing Company to be a major co-sponsor of the conference, at a time when Joseph Coors was one of the most anti-UN conservative influences on the Reagan administration and [was] a founder of the Heritage Foundation. Whether we influenced him personally or not, I don't know; but the company thought this conference was such a big thing in the city of Denver that they had better not be left out, [and] so they provided a young woman executive to be co-chairperson of the plenary committee.

"Minneapolis was another good example, where only with someone from outside coming in as a catalyst could you bring the farm and labour activists, who were totally anti-corporate in the agricultural debate, to sit down in the same room with Cargill and Green Giant and Pillsbury and General Foods and General Mills. Again, I'm not saying they solved all their problems or even

liked each other any better after they left; but at least they came to the same meeting and understood each other's position a little better.

"We go back to these cities later for follow-up. The cities have taken different turns. Atlanta, the whole community, has become very much concerned with Africa.... Seattle is a wonderful city to work in, in terms of NGO follow-up action—and so is Vancouver. Those two cities have not stopped doing city-wide development education work since our conference in 1979. Every year there have been major events on topics that were UN-related, like renewable energy, 'Target Seattle' (disarmament and development), foreign investment, reforestation and so on.

"When you take a country the size of the United States, or Canada, I think you get better effect in changing public attitudes and changing public policy if you work outside of Washington and Ottawa, or even New York and Toronto, and go instead to outlying regions and work with politicians at that level, and have them hear from their constituents that they are concerned about these world issues.

"Since 1982, we have done a series of smaller workshops and seminars, easier to organize, in places like Boston, Winnipeg and Toronto. And we have taken UN people to meet and talk with members of the NGO community. We try very hard not to be hurtling into a city and acting like an instant cadre of experts, but rather to be resource persons, listening as well as providing a global perspective ... [and] real liaison work.

"We have also done a lot more publishing, compiling and editing UN materials into readable form for North American or Japanese development education groups. In the 1980s, we see many more specialized NGO coalitions on pesticides, or the debt crisis, or women or the economic crisis. Over these 10 years both NGLS offices have developed into information clearing houses of useful materials for and about NGOs. They feed the sustained involvement of these NGOs in UN-related topics!

"In going 'round the United States and Japan I haven't found any antagonism at the fact that I am a Canadian. In fact, it's an advantage, for two reasons. First, if one is speaking to, say, the League of Women Voters in Minneapolis and is introduced as a Canadian, then immediately there is that perception of the UN as international; whereas, if one of my American colleagues speaks, albeit with almost the same style and message, it is amazing how many U.S. audiences will come away with the idea that the UN is run by Americans and should be much more for Americans. Secondly, Canada has a good reputation both in development and the development education field, and I can cite the NGO effects on the Canadian Government in fairly honest but impressive terms; and that's a good example for those who know and envy it."

John Holmes
The United Nations at 40: An Upbeat Assessment

It may seem paradoxical to start the fourth decade at its end, with an assessment of the United Nations, and particularly of the General Assembly, at 40. On the other hand, because of his long involvement—and hardly anyone has had a longer one—John Holmes can set the fourth decade in perspective through comparisons with earlier years. His is a large canvas, while many of the other contributors properly concentrate on a single part.

John Holmes was not only there at the outset; he served in the mission in New York during Canada's first period (from 1948 to 1949) on the Security Council and he was again closely involved with United Nations affairs during seven years (1953 to 1960) as assistant under-secretary of state in External Affairs. He also served as a diplomat in London and Moscow. From 1960 to 1973 he headed the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. All this experience has gone into the authorship of important books on Canadian foreign policy: the two-volume work *The Shaping of Peace*, which focuses most sharply on Canada's UN record. In February 1986, he wrote an essay for *The Ottawa Citizen* after attending the 40th session of the General Assembly as a member of the Canadian delegation, and the following is a shortened version of that essay:

"Forty years ago, in January 1946, the first session of the UN General Assembly opened in London. I was in the back row as an adviser to the Canadian delegation, full of awe and hope and anxiety, the mood of the times. During the 40th session, recently completed in New York, I was privileged to spend three weeks with the delegation as an 'observer' at the invitation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

"There had not been a 40-year gap in my experience of the Assembly. For the first 15 years I had been actively involved. Then, as a member of various UN boards and as a compulsive student of international institutions, I had tried to keep in touch. How did the battered Assembly look to one who had experienced the first fine, but not so careless, rapture and who had been around during what has been mythologized as 'the golden age' of Canadian diplomacy at the UN?

"A stranger is easily dismayed by the cacophony, but as an old hand I came away heartened by the behaviour of the Assembly and even more so by the skill and enterprise of the Canadians. I should make clear, however, that I have more of a Hobbesian than a Utopian approach to international institutions and take for granted that the sense of community is a fitful growth. I was neither surprised nor greatly dismayed by a good deal of raucous rhetoric and scholastic debates on meaningless or malicious resolutions. After all, I could still hear in those halls the echoes of Andrey Vyshinsky and Krishna Menon in full rancorous flight; and a few weeks earlier I had listened to Barbara McDougall being pilloried in the Canadian House of Commons.

"The General Assembly, of course, is not the House of Commons. It is not a legislature. It is not, as its critics would like to portray it, the United Nations. It is one important but not supreme body in a vast, loosely connected system of UN bodies without which we could not fly airplanes, send cables,

control cholera, or try to save the international banking system. It is all that which is at stake when one lightly says that the UN is a bust just because one doesn't like much of what is said in the Assembly.

"The Assembly is a meeting place for representatives of sovereign states. It is they, not the UN, which have difficulty agreeing on actions and attitudes. And it is no wonder, given the economic and social diversity and historic enmities of a world which has only recently begun to submit to international self-discipline.

"It is easy to be discouraged (and smart to be cynical), but one can find grounds for optimism in the remarkable extension since 1946 of international law and regulation through the vast network of committees and subcommittees in the UN system. Many of them, of course, are quite useless, but enough are so successful that we are unaware of them and take their good works for granted.

"In the Assembly, as in all international institutions, there is the constant struggle for consensus. Rules and regulations cannot be imposed by force. That is the major lesson we have learned in 40 years. They have to be accepted because states recognize, as they do increasingly, that they need rules. The mutual advantages of recognized fishing zones or controls on nuclear testing eventually become obvious.

"I have never shared the view that a beautiful UN was set up in 1945, which fell apart or was betrayed by its members. The Charter was a noble effort to get consensus among the powers in accordance with the emotions at the end of a terrible war, but it was flawed by understandable illusions—that a system of collective security could be universal on this unruly earth, that 'aggression' could be easily and unanimously identified, that revived prosperity in the rich countries would 'trickle down' to the poor.

"What has ensued is four decades of learning experience. We have worked our way through the illusion and also the rapture, one reason why the UN has a bad name in popular parlance. We cannot cope easily with the contradictory realities of the world, and it is tempting to blame the structure.

"However, it is politically impossible to change the Charter, and we don't need to. The UN provides the necessary instruments to keep the peace and move towards a better economic order if we can achieve sufficient agreement on how to use them. It is the agenda that should occupy our attention, not the concoction of some new improved UN.

"For one accustomed to the earlier Assembly, the most striking difference is, of course, the size and diversity of the membership. Having sat behind Paul Martin in the 1955 Assembly when he successfully led a small power revolt against John Foster Dulles and friends to open up the membership, I have often had to ask myself if we had been wise in releasing the floodgates. There are disadvantages in having tiny powers present; but they have been greatly exaggerated. The UN could not have survived if it had continued to represent less than half the world's population. The vote of Burkina Faso may in principle be equal to that of the superpowers; but it is obvious, as one watches the voting, whose vote counts. The UN is beset with checks and balances. The Assembly is best regarded as a useful poll of world opinion.

"Out of stalemate has come the effort to act by consensus.... This greater sophistication of approach to action is one of the trends which encourages an old-timer.

"The most successful consensus operation I witnessed was in fact pulled off by the Canadian delegation when they managed, after several years of trying, to get acceptance without a vote of a resolution promoting attention to verification procedures in arms control. Neither the Americans nor the Russians much liked it, and the Indians were suspicious.

"The Canadian ambassador for disarmament, Douglas Roche, and his extraordinarily able team did as professional a job of arm-twisting, cajoling, bargaining and friendly persuasion as I ever saw in the so-called 'golden age.' It was obvious to me, furthermore, that their success was attributed to the respect in which Canada is held as a constructive and independent-minded force in the Assembly. I noted with admiration how our team had already established relationships of trust with colleagues from all the blocs, an essential precondition for successful Assembly diplomacy. As a unilateral crusader, Canada can achieve little; but as a constructive force in coalition-building it can be and is a country of consequence.

"Although there is much to deplore in the words and behaviour of Third World countries in the Assembly, there are encouraging signs of recognition that they achieve little by ritual denunciations of the West in general and the United States in particular. Leading members of the Non-Aligned [countries], and many of their very able delegates, were often endeavouring to put together genuinely constructive rather than merely denunciatory resolutions.

"Regrettably their efforts were too often snubbed by the Americans and the British. One such case concerned the Falklands. A group of the Non-Aligned negotiated energetically to get consensus on a resolution which would simply urge Britain and Argentina to talk with each other, a classic effort to get a conflict resolved before it gets violent. To get consensus they scrupulously removed any phrase that would seem to favour the position of one side or the other. The British delegation, in spite of the pleas of their friends, was isolated in opposition with Belize, Oman and the Solomon Islands.

"In some ways the most dismaying aspect of this affair was the misreporting in the British media of a kind sure to enkindle anti-UN hostility. The BBC insisted in its news reports that the resolution had supported Argentina's claims, and [British Prime Minister] Thatcher chided her friends for opposing self-determination. Her friends, including Canada, deserve an apology, for they did no such thing. It is wise for us to realize that even in our free West what the media tells us—or doesn't tell us—about the UN is frequently misleading.

"For a friend of the United States it is not pleasant to hear the strident and unfair attacks on that great country. Irrational anti-Americanism is an anarchical force in the world and one does not [care] to see it fomented. Too often it is simply scapegoating, bypassing the intricacies of world problems by identifying a villain.

"That, of course, is an error that the Americans too often make themselves. There was something to be said for their getting tough with those who

irresponsibly denounce them and expect their bounty, ignoring as well the enormous contribution the U.S. has made to the establishment of the UN system. The UN cannot act, however, unless it is managed by a consortium of member states in appropriate balance. It needs in particular the ballast of the largest Western power, but the U.S. in the Assembly stands aloof, barely concealing its scorn, apparently getting satisfaction from the number of times its red light flashes alone on the voting machine.

"If the Russians were much more often on the winning side, it was not because it was really their side. They voted to please, joining the majority without worrying much about the text. It must be said of the Americans that they were more scrupulous about approving language they didn't agree with. However, they had instructions, for example, to vote against resolutions with budgetary implications, a well-intentioned policy carried to unreasonable lengths.

"The present U.S. team, although it came in with a new ambassador only recently and has much to learn, struck me as considerably more professional [than the one it succeeded], or at least UN-smart. General Walters, who has replaced Jeane Kirkpatrick, is a least less abrasive than his predecessor, and one might hope that he will recognize that the General Assembly cannot be scorned away. It is a potent force in the international system which, for good or ill, cannot be exorcised.

"Critics like to say that the world of the powerful is the real world. The Assembly, without power, is the unreal world. It depends on how you calculate power and how it can be applied. Granted that the control of nuclear weapons is the most important issue in the world and only the superpowers can do much about it, surely almost all the rest of the world's problems are to be found on the agenda of the Assembly or some other UN body. Few of them could be managed alone by the superpowers, whose power is too ungainly.

"The Assembly, needless to say, is groping with a horrifying agenda with little spectacular success. Success, however, is not necesssarily spectacular. Perhaps it can be found in the slow grinding down of conflict and the gradual instinct for consensus. And when a decision is reached everyone feels a responsibility for it.

"Mine is admittedly an upbeat assessment. My observations are frankly intended as a corrective. The dark side of the UN is what we hear of most often. The UN is a long, continuing experiment in international self-discipline. We need to heed the lessons of failure, but it is more important to seek out what works and build on it."

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