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
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND

CANADIAN INTERESTS

Report of a Working Group

June 1988

INSTITUT CANADIEN POUR LA PAIX ET
LA SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALES



This report on "International Security and Canadian Interests" was prepared at my request by a group of former officials with wide experience in the fields of foreign and defence policy. They met periodically during 1987 under the able chairmanship of John Halstead, former Canadian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO, who took responsibility for preparing the final draft of the report. Their terms of reference were as follows:

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND

CANADIAN INTERESTS

The Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security is happy to report that this is an important contribution to the on-going debate on Canada's security interests. One of the features of this debate tends to be mutual suspicion--on the one hand of official "propaganda," on the other hand of "political" motivations. Those who have retired from government service and can therefore speak more freely are often absent from the debate, either because long years of exposure to the world of classified documents induces a certain reticence, or because they prefer to take up other careers and pursuits. It is hoped, therefore, that this initiative will add a new dimension to the debate and act as a useful precedent for the future.

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Geoffrey Pearson

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PREFACE

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Geoffrey Pearson

PRÉFACE

Le présent rapport intitulé International Peace and Canadian Interests a été préparé à ma demande par un groupe d'anciens fonctionnaires possédant une vaste expérience en matière de politique étrangère et de défense. Ils se sont réunis périodiquement en 1987 sous la gouverne habile de M. John Halstead, ancien ambassadeur du Canada en République fédérale d'Allemagne et à l'OTAN, qui s'est chargé de rédiger la version finale du rapport. Le mandat du groupe est énoncé dans l'Introduction.

L'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales est heureux de publier ce rapport qui éclaire énormément le débat qui se poursuit sur les intérêts du Canada en matière de sécurité. Il semble que ce débat soit empreint d'une suspicion mutuelle à l'égard de la "propagande" officielle, d'une part, et des motivations "politiques", d'autre part. Les personnes qui ont quitté la fonction publique et qui peuvent par conséquent parler plus librement s'abstiennent souvent de participer au débat, soit parce qu'après avoir vécu au milieu des documents classifiés pendant de longues années, elles hésitent dans une certaine mesure à prendre la parole, soit parce qu'elles préfèrent poursuivre d'autres carrières ou intérêts. Il est donc à espérer que le rapport ajoutera une nouvelle dimension au débat et qu'il constituera un précédent utile pour l'avenir.

Geoffrey Pearson

According to its terms of reference, the Working Group on International Security, seeking to contribute to a better informed public debate in Canada on issues of international security, undertook to:

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- (3) prepare a report for presentation to the Executive Director of CIIPS.

The group aimed for the broadest possible consensus on these issues, while respecting and reflecting all views being expressed. It divided its report into five substantive parts, dealing with: superpower relations; NATO; North American defence; other regions and issues; and arms control and disarmament. In each area the group had a look at what is going on and what can be expected, asked itself what this means for Canada, and made some suggestions about things Canada could be doing about it.

INTRODUCTION

According to its terms of reference, the Working Group on International Security, seeking to contribute to a better informed public debate in Canada on issues of international peace and security, undertook to:

- (1) examine the impact of current and future developments in the international situation on Canada's security interests and requirements;
- (2) for this purpose assess in particular the evolution of East-West relations, especially relations between the superpowers, the state of the NATO alliance and changes in strategic doctrine or practice, the implications of actual and potential conflicts arising outside the NATO area, the significance of emerging technologies, especially space-based, and the prospects for arms control and disarmament, all with an eye to their relevance for Canada; and
- (3) prepare a report for presentation to the Executive Director of CIIPS.

The group aimed for the broadest possible consensus on these issues, while respecting and reflecting all views being expressed. It divided its report into five substantive parts, dealing with: superpower relations; NATO; North American defence; other regions and issues; and arms control and disarmament. In each area the group had a look at what is going on and what can be expected, asked itself what this means for Canada, and made some suggestions about things Canada could be doing about it.

Not every member agrees fully with every point in the text, but each subscribes to the overall approach and to its main conclusions. At the same time the views in the report are those of the group as a whole and do not commit the Institute in any way. It is hoped, however, that the report will contribute to the purpose of the Institute "to increase knowledge and understanding of the issues of international peace and security from a Canadian perspective." Following is a list of those participating in the group:

Chairman: John Halstead, Former Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO. Distinguished Research Professor, Georgetown University, Washington, and Paul Martin Professor of International Relations, University of Windsor, Ontario. Member of the Board of Directors, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament;

Members: John Anderson, Former Assistant Deputy Minister of Policy, Department of National Defence;

Clayton E. Beattie, B. Gen. (Ret'd) in the Canadian Armed Forces. Former Commander of Canadian Forces Northern Region; Former Director General of Policy and Planning Department of National Defence. Former Chief of Staff United Nations Forces in Cyprus, and Commander, Canadian Contingent, Strategic Planning and Management Consultant. Chairman, National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute for International Affairs;

W. M. Beckett, Former Director, Nuclear and Arms Control Policy, Department of National Defence;

R. Cameron, Former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Poland and the German Democratic Republic, Former Director General, Bureau of International Security and Arms Control Affairs, and External Affairs Member Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board of Defence;

Robert Falls, Former Chief of Defence Staff; Former Chairman NATO Military Committee; President of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament;

Ivan Head, Former Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Canada (1968-1978); Member of the Board of Trustees of the International Food Policy Research Institute; Member of the Inter-American Dialogue, Commissioner of the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues. President, International Development Research Centre;

James E. Hyndman, Former Canadian Ambassador and Career Diplomat; Professor of International Affairs, Ottawa University;

Charles R. Nixon, Former Deputy Minister of National Defence;

Jim Nutt, Q.C., Former External Affairs Member Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board of Defence; Deputy Undersecretary of State for External Affairs and Consul General, San Francisco, New York and Los Angeles.

Rapporteur: Peter Gizewski, Research Assistant, CIIPS.

INTRODUCTION

Selon son mandat, le Groupe de travail sur la sécurité internationale, qui cherchait à favoriser la tenue d'un débat public plus éclairé au Canada sur les questions intéressant la paix et la sécurité internationales, avait pour mission :

- 1) d'examiner l'incidence que l'évolution de la conjoncture internationale a sur les intérêts et les besoins du Canada en matière de sécurité;
- 2) à cette fin, d'examiner en particulier l'évolution des relations Est-Ouest, notamment celle des rapports américano-soviétiques, l'état actuel de l'Alliance de l'Atlantique-Nord et les changements apportés à la doctrine stratégique ou aux méthodes, les conséquences des conflits réels et potentiels sévissant ou risquant d'éclater en dehors de la zone de l'OTAN, l'importance des nouvelles technologies et surtout des nouveaux systèmes spatiaux, et l'avenir du désarmement et de la limitation des armements, toujours en situant toutes ces questions par rapport au Canada; et
- 3) de rédiger un rapport à présenter au directeur général de l'ICPSI..

Le groupe s'est efforcé de parvenir au plus vaste consensus possible sur ces questions, tout en respectant et en traduisant toutes les opinions exprimées. Il a divisé son rapport en cinq grandes parties qui portaient donc sur les relations entre les superpuissances, l'OTAN, la défense de l'Amérique du Nord, les autres régions et questions, et enfin, la limitation des armements et le désarmement. A l'égard de chaque thème, le groupe a examiné la conjoncture actuelle et ce qu'on pouvait en attendre, il s'est demandé qu'elle était

la position du Canada, et il a formulé des idées quant au plan d'action que notre pays pourrait adopter.

Chaque point abordé dans le texte ne fait pas toujours l'unanimité au sein du groupe, mais chaque membre de celui-ci souscrit à la méthode générale employée et aux grandes conclusions. Parallèlement, les opinions exprimées dans le rapport sont celles du groupe considéré dans son ensemble et elles n'engagent en rien l'Institut. Il est à espérer, cependant, que le rapport aidera ce dernier à remplir sa mission, c'est-à-dire à "accroître la connaissance et la compréhension des questions relatives à la paix et à la sécurité internationales d'un point de vue canadien". Le lecteur trouvera ci-après une liste des membres du groupe.

Président : John Halstead - Ancien sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures et ancien ambassadeur du Canada en République fédérale d'Allemagne et auprès de l'OTAN. Professeur émérite à l'Université de Georgetown (Washington) et titulaire de la chaire Paul Martin (Relations internationales) à l'Université de Windsor (Ontario); membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales, et du Centre canadien pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement.

Membres : John Anderson - Ancien sous-ministre adjoint (Politiques) au ministère de la Défense nationale.

Clayton E. Beattie, brigadier-général (ret.) dans les Forces canadiennes et ancien commandant de la Région du Nord des Forces canadiennes; ancien Directeur général - Politiques et planification au ministère de la Défense nationale. Ancien chef d'état-major de la Force des Nations-Unies à Chypre et ancien commandant du contingent canadien; expert-conseil en planification stratégique et en gestion; président du chapitre de la Capitale nationale au sein de l'Institut canadien des affaires internationales.

W.M. Beckett, ancien Directeur - Politique nucléaire et contrôle des armements, au ministère de la Défense nationale.

R. Cameron, ancien ambassadeur du Canada en Yougoslavie, en Bulgarie, en Pologne et en République démocratique allemande, ancien Directeur général du Bureau de la sécurité internationale et du contrôle des armements aux Affaires extérieures. Membre de la Commission canado-américaine permanente de défense.

Robert Falls, ancien Chef de l'état-major de la Défense, ancien président du Comité militaire de l'OTAN, président du Centre canadien pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement.

Ivan Head, ancien adjoint spécial du premier ministre du Canada (1968-1978), membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut international de recherche sur les politiques d'alimentation, membre d'Inter-American Dialogue, membre de la Commission indépendante des questions internationales d'ordre humanitaire, président du Centre de recherches pour le développement international.

James E. Hyndman, ancien ambassadeur du Canada et diplomate professionnel, professeur d'études internationales à l'Université d'Ottawa.

Charles R. Nixon, ancien sous-ministre de la Défense nationale.

Jim Nutt, Q.C. ancien représentant des Affaires extérieures au sein de la Commission canado-américaine permanente de défense; sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures et consul général à San Francisco, New York et Los Angeles.

Rapporteur : Peter Gizewski, auxiliaire de recherche à l'ICPSI.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As Canada prepares to host the next summit of the seven leading industrialized countries, it is timely for Canadians to review the international security situation and to assess the impact on Canada and the implications for Canadian policies, of current and future developments. There have been significant events in the evolution of East-West relations, and in particular the relations between the superpowers, and more can be anticipated. These in turn are having an influence on the state of the Atlantic Alliance and the strategic doctrine of NATO. Strategy and technology are also in flux in respect to the defence of North America and Canada's role in it. In other regions of the world there are actual and potential conflicts which can affect Canada directly or indirectly. And the prospects for arms control and disarmament have an important bearing on Canadian security interests and policies.

There are two concurrent developments which deserve special attention. One is the convergence of interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in favour of restraining their rivalry, negotiating arms control agreements and perhaps even limiting regional conflicts. This convergence owes as much to the domestic pressures operating, though for different reasons, on both sides as to any international dynamic, however, and its future evolution is therefore vulnerable to the vagaries of internal politics in both countries. Moreover, it does not necessarily coincide fully with the interests of the allies on both sides. It is therefore likely that both the United States and the Soviet Union are going to face increasing complications in their respective relations with their allies.

The other development is the continuing change from a bipolar to a multipolar world, with the rise of other power centres. With this has gone a relative decline of US hegemony, an accompanying shift in the balance of power within the Atlantic community and a consequent change in the nature of the relationship between North America and Europe. It has for some time been an anomaly that a Europe which can compete economically with the United States and follow an independent foreign policy line should remain so dependent on the United States for its defence. Now the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, the anticipated reduction of strategic nuclear missiles and the possibility of significant cuts in conventional forces all presage a gradual reduction in the US presence in Europe and are thereby forcing the Europeans to come to grips with the organization of their own defence. There is renewed talk of building a "European pillar" within the Atlantic Alliance, based in the first instance on closer Franco-German military cooperation.

These developments could have profound implications for Canada. While the emerging detente between the superpowers is to be welcomed, it would not be in Canada's interest if it were to lead to a weakening of cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance, or to divisive differences over NATO strategy. Canada has as much as any ally to lose from a breakdown in transatlantic cooperation, for it would tend to isolate Canada in North America and thus increase our dependence on the United States still more. We should therefore encourage closer European cooperation but within a more reciprocal transatlantic partnership which recognizes that NATO is for the defence of North America as well as Europe. We should also do what we can, working both bilaterally and with like-minded allies in NATO, to help manage East-West relations, since those relations are too important to be left to the superpowers. NATO needs a long-term strategy and Canada could

make a significant contribution by elaborating the concept of a new regime of mutual security based on mutual interests, mutual benefits and mutual confidence.

The threat to North America is likely to remain what it has been for some time; that is, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)--but long-range cruise missiles may well loom more important and the eventual deployment of land-based or space-based ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems is not to be excluded. Such developments could have direct implications for Canada and for Canada-US defence cooperation, and could force some awkward choices on the government. On the one hand, there are serious differences between Canada and the United States on such matters as the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI); on the other, Canada will find it difficult to influence US policies if it goes it alone. These problems will not be made any easier if they are dealt with in a purely North American context, where the disparity of power between Canada and the United States is bound to weigh. We should therefore do what we can to promote the strategic unity of NATO by ensuring the alignment of US strategy and NATO strategy.

Beyond the NATO area, there are trouble spots in Central America, in the Caribbean, in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, in Southern Africa and around the Pacific Rim, some of which are of concern because they carry the seeds of wider destabilization and conflict, and some of which could lead to Canadian involvement in a peacekeeping role or otherwise. Particularly disturbing is the trend toward state-supported terrorism and the dangers that flow from the availability of ever more lethal weaponry. It would obviously not be practical for Canada to involve itself in all these situations; priorities must be set in terms of our special skills and

limited resources. In those terms we are well suited to deal with the economic, political and social causes of conflict and we should contribute what we can to their resolution. In this respect, Canada's continued support for Official Development Assistance (ODA) is an essential complement to defence expenditures in contributing to international security. We should also continue to be ready to contribute to peacekeeping operations in appropriate circumstances and under adequate safeguards. For the longer term Canada should take increasing account of the rising importance of Japan and China and of the security implications that go with our growing trade across the Pacific.

As for arms control and disarmament, the recently concluded Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty is not only a substantial achievement by the superpowers in restraining their military competition; it also sets a precedent of great symbolic value in actually reducing their nuclear arsenals, providing for intrusive verification and dealing with the problem of asymmetry for the first time. It paves the way for further agreements--on a 50 per cent cut in strategic nuclear forces (provided the problem of a link with space-based defence can be resolved), on a chemical weapons (CW) ban and on conventional forces--but it does not guarantee their accomplishment. And it brings into sharper focus European concerns about the progressive denuclearization of Europe and the remaining imbalance of conventional forces. In light of this, Canada could usefully contribute to an examination of the implications for NATO strategy of the INF agreement. We should also study the strategic implications for Canada in particular, and for NATO in general, of the United States' moving toward a more defence-reliant nuclear posture--a study which hopefully could become part of a broader NATO exercise. Finally, we should continue our efforts to strengthen the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT),

since the most dangerous threat to world peace and security in the next decade could well be the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the present five nuclear powers.

SUPERPOWER RELATIONS

Several features characterize the current state of superpower relations. The military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and more generally between East and West, has proven to be remarkably stable, although by no means static. The fundamental divisions between the two sides persist, of course, but there is no imminent danger of armed confrontation and there seems in fact to be a disposition on both sides to reach at least limited accommodations with regard to arms control and perhaps even regional issues.

The positive outcome of the last meeting of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Washington, and the signature by them of an agreement to eliminate intermediate-range missiles (INF) from their respective arsenals over the next three years, have given tangible evidence that both superpowers are ready to accept restraints on their military competition. In this way the indications of the earlier meeting in Reykjavik have been confirmed, that the superpowers have concluded that far-reaching nuclear arms control and disarmament measures will serve their mutual security interests.

Noteworthy is the fact that these promising developments have been impelled, on both sides, as much by domestic political forces as by the dynamics of the international situation. In the Soviet case, acceptance by Gorbachev of the need for internal economic reforms, and his related desire to limit defence spending and to bolster his position at home by diplomatic successes abroad, are evidently moving Soviet

foreign policy in a more accommodating direction. In the American case, mounting budgetary and trade deficits and the restrictions placed by Congress on the defence budget, as well as the President's desire to go down in history as a peace-maker and to remove the tarnish on his reputation left by the Iran-Contra affair, have combined with other factors to persuade the Reagan Administration to look for ways of reducing the risks and expense of the arms race.

Thus the present conjuncture favours a certain convergence in the interests of the two superpowers. But this convergence is not necessarily in full harmony with the interests of the respective allies on both sides; indeed, it may exacerbate certain differences. For example, those who govern the countries which are allies of the Soviet Union, while welcoming the improvement in East-West relations, are nervous about the possible repercussions of glasnost and perestroika for their tenuous hold on power. And some at least of the European allies of the United States are concerned about the implications for their security of the INF Treaty. Moreover, the convergence of the superpowers' interests will depend in part at least on the further course of internal developments in each country and their interaction. For example, the fund of American public goodwill toward Gorbachev could dissipate rapidly should conservative elements force a brake on his reform programme, particularly as it relates to human rights. On the other side, the Soviet leader could find it more difficult to obtain support for further arms control and disarmament measures in the air of uncertainty which always attends a change of Administration in Washington.

It is all the more important to keep the so-far-limited degree of accommodation between the superpowers in perspective. The INF Treaty will reduce the combined superpower holdings of nuclear weapons by only some five percent, and even if an agreement is reached next to reduce strategic weapons by 50 percent, the residual stocks of nuclear weapons on both sides will still constitute a formidable capability for destruction. Moreover, while both superpowers seemed ready in Washington to give them new impetus, negotiations to limit or reduce the conventional forces of the two sides have yet to get off the ground. Only reductions in conventional forces can reduce defence expenditures substantially, but such reductions beyond a certain point could also affect global stability by restricting the ability of the superpowers to project power in an increasingly multipolar world. Beyond this, arms control and disarmament agreements, while they can improve the East-West political climate, cannot of themselves eliminate the fundamental divisions--of interest, of ideology, of value systems and political conceptions--which will remain.

Strong and consistent political leadership will therefore be required to offset exaggerated public expectations in the Western democracies. Premature relaxation of vigilance or imprudent assumptions of "peace in our time" could otherwise undermine the will of governments to maintain the political solidarity and deterrent strength of the Western alliance, which have been major factors in bringing about the improved prospects now in sight and which will remain the keys to future security.

Importance to Canada

The East-West relationship has long defined, and will continue for the foreseeable future to define, the imperatives of Canada's national security. This is so because of Canada's geo-political position. Changes in the East-West military balance and shifts in the security policies of the superpowers, directly or indirectly, bear upon Canada's strategic circumstances. East-West relations are therefore too important to Canada to be left to the superpowers.

Irrespective of alliances, Canada has a major stake in the superpower relationship and in the way it is managed. Our membership in NATO both expresses that stake and gives us the means of playing it. It is by contributing to the collective defence of the Alliance that Canada can best hope to influence the management of the superpower relationship and to ensure that specific Canadian concerns are recognized and taken into account.

Recommendations for Canadian Policies

Canada should do what it can to make East-West relations as stable and reassuring as possible. It would not be sufficient either to snipe at the superpowers or to follow US policies blindly for the sake of Western solidarity. As far as bilateral relations with the Soviet Union are concerned, we should make every effort to convince it that a more constructive relationship can be mutually beneficial. Canada should adopt a cautiously welcoming approach to Gorbachev's reforms, testing words against deeds.

We should also develop ideas of our own and actively participate in the multilateral management of East-West relations. Canada should urge the formulation of a comprehensive, long-term Alliance strategy and should contribute to it by elaborating the concept of a new regime of mutual security. It would be based on the premise that one side's security cannot be bought at the price of the other side's insecurity, and that the political and military dimensions of security are but two sides of the same coin. Such a strategy would envisage a progressive move from mutual interests to mutual benefits to mutual confidence.

The most basic mutual interest is in survival and it can best be served by measures aimed at promoting restraint and preventing confrontation, wherever possible, and by anticipating and defusing potential conflicts. Measures should also be devised to create machinery and procedures for crisis management.

Mutual benefits can be generated by renewed efforts to expand East-West cooperation into other fields such as the promotion of trade, industrial and environmental cooperation, and scientific and cultural exchanges. Such efforts should be aimed at improved implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly with regard to the freer movement of people and ideas and respect for human rights. Efforts should also be made to encourage the Soviet Union toward greater integration into the international trade and monetary system--the Soviet Union has already expressed an interest in joining GATT and the IMF, for example--and to foster trade and economic interdependence between East and West. At the same time, the West should avoid any one-sided dependence on the East, and should not allow the East to gain any one-sided advantages in credits, technology or goods with military application.

Policies aimed at building mutual confidence would include further arms control and reduction measures and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). These latter have already contributed to creating an environment favourable to arms control negotiations and Canada should continue its active role in working them out further. Such policies should be based on principles of stability and balance. They should be aimed at achieving mutual deterrence at the lowest possible level of armaments, and they should promote transparency (that is, greater mutual openness and predictability) by means of verification and compliance measures. Agreements should also be pursued to deal cooperatively with the implications of new technologies and to avoid either side seeking or allowing one-sided advantage.

This strategy should be accompanied by a well defined set of tactics on the Western side. Such tactics would entail: firm but non-provocative policies; a realistic but non-ideological approach; application of the principle of reciprocity to govern exchanges and cooperation; and a common understanding of the limits of acceptable Soviet conduct, along with incentives and deterrents to be used to gain respect for such limits.

NATO

For some time now the attention of NATO has been focussed on the US-Soviet relationship and the negotiations leading up to the Washington Summit and the signature of the INF Treaty. That achievement has been warmly welcomed by the allies, for several reasons. The solidarity and resolve of the Alliance were obviously important factors in bringing the years of intermittent negotiations to a successful conclusion in the face of strong opposition to missile deployment in a number of

countries. And the development of a more effective consultation process in NATO undoubtedly assisted in shaping a US negotiating position which commanded wide allied support. Certainly this success served to restore some of the confidence in US leadership which had been shaken by the Iran-Contra affair and the confusion surrounding the Reykjavik summit.

At the same time there are reasons for concern. In the near future the way the ratification process is dealt with in Washington is bound to have repercussions on relations between the US and its allies. Looking further ahead, it is not yet clear what the implications for the Alliance will be of the new, less confrontational relationship between the two superpowers. It is feared that the resulting atmosphere of detente could make it much more difficult for the European governments to obtain public support for more emphasis on conventional defence. It is also feared that the removal of a substantial number of US nuclear weapons from Europe could lead to the progressive denuclearization of Europe and to a reduction in the US presence there, before there is any guarantee of a lasting improvement in East-West relations.

Taken together, these considerations have made the Europeans increasingly aware that they are entering a new phase in the transatlantic relationship. The INF Treaty has underscored a long-standing ambivalence in their attitude. They have always wanted the nuclear threshold to be low enough to deter the Soviets but not so low as to conjure up the prospect of a war confined to Europe. And they have wanted the United States to be on sufficiently good terms with the Soviet Union to avoid a confrontation but not so good as to do a deal over their heads. Now there are indications that the Europeans are beginning to come to grips with the growing realization that any durable East-West accommodation must

involve a gradual reduction of US forces in Europe. Recent discussions among the Europeans and the revival of their interest in the Western European Union (WEU) indicate a consciousness that over the long term they must prepare for a greater degree of responsibility for their own defence, with all that implies for closer defence cooperation.

On the nuclear weapons front, the British and French Defence Ministers have been discussing the possibility of coordinating the targeting plans of their missile carrying submarines as well as cooperating in the production of a new generation of shorter-range missiles. With the removal of US Pershing II and cruise missiles from their territory, the Federal Republic already appears to be uneasy at the prospect of relying heavily on the remaining short-range tactical nuclear weapons the use of which would devastate FRG territory. How this problem is resolved will be one of the key questions facing the Alliance in the months ahead.

The French are also concerned about the security implications of the INF Treaty. While avoiding any moves toward reintegrating their forces into NATO, they have for some time been moving toward practical cooperation with NATO forces through bilateral arrangements. Recently a joint French-German mechanized brigade was formed. As if to underline France's intention to play a more active role in defence matters, the French Prime Minister reportedly said at a recent press conference that, if the Federal Republic were attacked, France would come to its aid "immediately and without reservation." And both President Mitterand and Prime Minister Chirac attended the NATO Summit in March, a first since France withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure.

Another potential source of division in NATO is the question of "out-of-area" activities. While the Persian Gulf has recently been the scene of an impressive show of cooperation among certain allies in providing escort and minesweeping services, there is still no common NATO approach to such matters. Given the diversity of interests in the Alliance it may be unrealistic to expect otherwise, especially with respect to such areas as the Middle East. The minimum we should aim for, however, is to talk things out, preferably before a situation reaches crisis proportions. A formula along these lines was adopted several years ago, on Canadian initiative, and was reaffirmed as recently as the December 1987 meeting of Foreign Ministers. It sets out an obligation to engage in timely consultations on events outside the NATO area if it can be established that "the vital common interests of the Alliance" are involved, with a view if possible to fixing common objectives. With this qualification, any ally in a position to do so may answer a request from a country outside the NATO area, on the basis of a national decision. However, the underlying understanding must be that sufficient military capabilities will remain in the Treaty area to assure an adequate defence posture.

Importance to Canada

Through its combination of conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear forces, NATO continues to provide a solid degree of East-West stability in the face of very large potentially hostile Soviet conventional and nuclear forces. Canada continues to participate in the Alliance because it believes that European security and North American security are interdependent and that the values and institutions which Canada shares with its allies are fundamental to Canadian interests. In addition to providing a congenial and effective

framework for defence cooperation, the Alliance gives Canada an opportunity which it would not otherwise have to influence the course of Western policies in a forum where other members often share our concerns. Consequently, Canada would have as much to lose as any other member should the Alliance lose its vitality and cohesion. Moreover a serious weakening of the close bonds between Europe and North America would result in even greater Canadian dependence on the United States.

Recommendations for Canadian Policies

Given current events and trends, Canada should adopt policies aimed at promoting Alliance cohesion and the strategic unity of NATO. To this end, it is of course essential that Canada continue to maintain a credible contribution to the collective defence in Europe. It would also be desirable for Canada to seek to strengthen the planning and operational links between NATO and North American defence arrangements, with a view to achieving greater integration of the latter in the Alliance framework. Canada and the United States could, for example, submit an annual report on NORAD to the North Atlantic Council.

In addition, Canada could propose measures aimed at giving more practical expression to NATO as a reciprocal transatlantic partnership. In this regard, we could attempt to obtain a European contribution, if only symbolic, to North American air defence. Another possibility would be to press actively for more reciprocity in arms procurement and a greater sharing of technology between the United States and its allies.

Canada should also seek means to establish still better coordination between NATO's political and military tracks. This would involve helping to reaffirm NATO's political role

in both the management of East-West relations and the articulation and elaboration of overall strategic objectives and concepts. Efforts should be made to improve the quality of political consultations in NATO by making better use of its machinery. Indeed, Canada should press for greater discussion of matters of common interest to the Alliance at every possible opportunity. In this regard, Canada should itself ensure that it practices what it preaches.

A related Canadian goal should be to seek means of bringing Alliance strategy and arms control into closer alignment. To this end, Canada should press for the establishment of a NATO consultative committee to discuss the impact of strategic defensive systems on NATO strategy, deterrence and arms control. In this regard, consideration might be given to adapting the successful consultative process developed for the INF negotiations, i. e., the Special Consultative Group.

NORTH AMERICAN DEFENCE

The primary purpose of Canada's participation in North American defence, in cooperation with the United States, is to deter a strategic nuclear attack from the Soviet Union, armed as it is with ballistic missile forces, and for this purpose to provide warning and assessment of potentially hostile activities by Soviet forces. The possibility of such an attack is the principal direct military threat to North America, and since there is as yet no effective defence against such an attack, it is necessary to rely for deterrence on the threat of a retaliatory attack by the United States. The main function of NORAD is to provide warning and assessment of activities which might presage a Soviet attack.

Recent developments and trends in the international security environment may well modify the specific nature of the threat. While inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) still constitute the lion's share of the threat, it is likely that long-range cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) will play a more prominent role in the future. Moreover, should there be extensive ballistic missile defence (BMD) deployment, the entire offense-defence relationship could become even more complex and uncertain than is currently the case.

Significant technological advances have already taken place, and more are also likely to occur in the way of space-based systems for a variety of military and civil applications, such as attack and defence, warning and surveillance, communications, navigation, air traffic control, search and rescue, and ice, crop and resource monitoring. As in the past, each successive advance is likely to raise policy questions. Such questions could relate to whether the space technology developments are non-military or military, are intended for offense, for surveillance and warning or for active defence. They could also be related to perceptions of whether such developments are relevant to Canadian sovereignty or to North American defence, are directed to North American or to international applications in the use of space.

Canada has already addressed some of these issues. For example, Canada has taken a position against participating on a governmental basis in the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) programme. More recently Canada has agreed to participate in the US Space Station programme, but on condition that the programme not be used for military purposes. Further difficult decisions will be required, and Canada's objective

should be not only to ensure that its sovereignty is recognized, but also to participate in maintaining effective deterrence and defence, while contributing to arms control and arms reduction measures.

Another problem arises from the emergence of cruise missiles as strategic nuclear weapons and therefore as a significant consideration in North American defence. This development may challenge the capabilities of existing surveillance and warning systems, requiring modifications and perhaps new systems to deal with these weapons. In any event, space-based warning and surveillance systems are likely before long to replace the current terrestrial systems. This evolution could give rise to profound changes, and even dissension in the Canada-US defence relationship. If it developed its own space-based warning and surveillance systems under exclusively national control, the United States would not have to rely on Canadian territory. Moreover, Canada could theoretically operate its own space-based system for warning and surveillance as well as for Canadian air traffic control without feeding into or being reliant on the United States or the NORAD system.

Finally, there is the matter of defence and the related problem of sovereignty protection in the Canadian Arctic. The core sovereignty issues are: the waters claimed by Canada (there is in fact no challenge to the Canadian status of the Arctic Islands); and the juridical situation regarding rights of passage of ships.

The "Northwest Passage" from Baffin Bay to the Beaufort Sea consists of a number of routes through the interconnecting waters of the Arctic Islands. It has been navigated on only a few occasions over the centuries and always in experimental circumstances. Canada claims as historic internal waters all

sea areas within baselines drawn about the perimeter of the Arctic Islands, which, of course, include the Northwest Passage(s). As well Canada claims as territorial sea, the waters and ice 12 miles seaward of the baselines. Canada also has more limited jurisdiction in the contiguous 200-mile fishing zone, on the continental shelf and in the anti-pollution zone.

In making these claims, Canada considers that it is in conformity with accepted international practice and with the UN Law of the Sea Treaty. However, the United States has not recognized Canada's action in encircling the Canadian Arctic islands with straight baselines, nor the Canadian claim to the interconnecting waters, including the shipping routes. Moreover, the United States claims the right of innocent passage through these waters for merchant vessels (subject, significantly, to Canadian anti-pollution rules) as well as for government vessels including warships. Without prejudice to this position the United States has recently agreed that it would seek Canada's prior consent for the movement of United States government-operated icebreakers in waters claimed by Canada.

Going beyond Canada-US differences about Canadian sovereignty and related rights of passage is the possibility that the connecting waters of the Arctic Islands could be used by Soviet submarines. This would constitute not only a challenge to Canadian sovereignty but also a substantial security concern. Obviously Canada needs to be aware of traffic through waters claimed by Canada. We also need to recognize, from a defence viewpoint, the fact that Soviet submarines can operate in the Arctic Ocean under the icecap and in the international waters of Davis Strait and Baffin Bay.

Importance to Canada

Canada has a direct interest in doing what it can to see that the security of North America is assured and that in the process Canadian sovereignty is respected. The best way to assure the security of North America is to prevent war in general and to deter a strategic nuclear attack on North America in particular. Canada serves this interest by participating, within the NATO framework, in the joint operational control arrangements embodied in NORAD and in other cooperative arrangements. For reasons of geography and technology Canada's contribution is centred on warning and interception of the air-breathing threat (bombers and cruise missiles) as well as surveillance of Soviet submarines off the East and West coasts. In this way Canada is active in: supporting the survivability and thus the credibility of the US strategic deterrent force; influencing US deterrent, defence and arms control policy; promoting the security and integrity of NATO territory; and maintaining the sea lines of communications.

The best way to ensure respect for Canadian sovereignty is to exercise effective control of Canadian territory. In a territory so vast and inhospitable this is a daunting task. It can be made more manageable if control is undertaken in cooperation with our allies and if the security and sovereignty interests are regarded as two sides of the same coin--our defence efforts being a contribution to protection of our sovereignty, and vice versa.

Recent Canada-US cooperation in the defence of North America has been relatively free of controversy. This period may now be coming to an end, as a result of the changes mentioned above and the issues they have raised. For example, the SDI has introduced potentially divisive issues. Canada's

decision to stand aside on a government-to-government basis from the SDI programme may have isolated Canada from certain aspects of North American defence deliberations of the United States. Yet a US decision to deploy an operational ballistic missile defence system may well require the use of Canadian territory for optimum performance.

A somewhat similar situation could arise with the Space Station Programme. If the Space Station came to be seen by the United States as having the potential to make a significant contribution to the defence of the United States--be it for a ballistic missile defence or for military surveillance, warning or communications--then there would likely be a divisive effect on Canada-US defence relations if Canada did not withdraw the caveat on the non-military use of the Space Station.

Recommendations for Canadian Policies

The renewal of the NORAD agreement, the construction of the North Warning System, the provision of forward-basing facilities for air defence deployment, and the weapons testing agreement all mark improvements in Canada-US defence cooperation. At the same time there are frictions over SDI, territorial claims in the Arctic and the movement of US vessels in Arctic waters claimed by Canada. It is to be hoped that, in addressing these contentious issues, both countries will balance their respective national interests against the interest they share in cooperating for the defence of North America within the larger NATO framework.

For Canada this will not be easy. Canadians are hypersensitive to US actions, especially in the Arctic, which seem to disregard Canadian sovereignty. There are also certain US programmes, particularly those associated with SDI and the Air

Defence Initiative, which raise potentially serious questions about strategic stability and arms control. Until these questions are satisfactorily answered, Canada will continue to have reservations about cooperating in such programmes. On the other hand, Canada has an evident interest in continuing to be involved in future systems in order to have a voice in the direction of the development of North American air defence. A case in point is the space-based air surveillance system which the United States is currently developing. It would make sense for Canada to participate and carry its commensurate share, provided the United States was prepared to agree. Canada should make every effort to resolve these problems in such a way as to maintain the integrity of the bilateral defence relationship, and only in the event of being unable to influence or find common cause with the United States, should Canada decide to embark on an independent programme.

Canada has traditionally resorted to bilateral channels to deal with such issues. In doing so, it has of course suffered from the disparity of power which exists between Canada and the United States. And this disparity has been made worse by the further disparity which exists in the defence budgets of the two countries as expressed as a percentage of GNP (5.6 per cent in the case of the United States and just over 2 per cent in the case of Canada). Until this disparity is reduced, the United States is not likely to view Canada as carrying its share of the common defence burden.

In the absence of any ministerial mechanism to manage the bilateral defence relationship the main institution at our disposal is the Permanent Joint Board of Defence. When this body has been capably manned and strongly supported by the two governments, it has been able to play an effective role in

developing common positions on defence and anticipating potentially divisive issues. This has not always been the case, however, and fuller use can and should be made of the PJBD in future.

Canada should also resort to multilateral approaches whenever possible, in order to emphasize the basic point that the defence of North America is an integral part of the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area. Specific proposals for doing so have already been mentioned above in the section on NATO. Consideration should also be given to creating some sort of North American Maritime Defence arrangement which would enhance Canada-US cooperation within the NATO framework.

The recent Defence White Paper promises to improve the capacity of Canada to contribute both to the defence of North America and to the protection of Canadian sovereignty. In particular, the proposals to create a three-ocean navy, to reinforce the capability for surveillance and defence of Canadian territory, and to enlarge and revitalize the reserve forces will enhance Canada's ability to exercise effective control and if necessary to defend Canadian territory. At the same time, the proposed acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines has been the subject of considerable public debate.

The government's case is based on the advantages of nuclear-powered submarines, as part of a balanced force, for maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare tasks in the Atlantic and the Pacific, and only secondarily of their under-ice capability in the Arctic. In this broader context they may well be cost effective, but one qualification should nevertheless be mentioned. It is that the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines may place an enormous strain on scarce defence resources at a time when the Canadian Forces are facing so many other problems of shortages and obsoles-

cence. Consequently, confidence must exist that the requisite defence budget will be forthcoming before a nuclear submarine acquisition contract is finalized. Otherwise it may be done at the expense of other equipment requirements of the Canadian Forces.

OTHER REGIONS AND ISSUES

There are conditions of instability and conflict in various other regions of the world, some of which threaten international peace and security. A greater disposition toward cooperation between the superpowers could have a moderating influence on the danger of escalation of local conflicts, and could enhance the acceptability of a UN role. On the other hand, the growing trend toward regional solutions may decrease the opportunities for UN peacekeeping.

While the military dimension of Third World conflicts appears frequently to be the predominant factor, it is in most instances only the consequences of underlying political, economic and social conditions. Any attempt to reduce or resolve such conflicts must therefore come to grips with the root causes of economic disparities and social grievances, and not simply the symptoms of instability. Moreover, as long as such conflicts rage, they consume resources more vitally required to reverse serious environmental degradation which is assuming global proportions. Thus it is clear that military responses alone can only be inadequate and ineffective.

Closest to home and most prominent in terms of Canadian public interest is Central America. There the double pressure of internal uprising and outside intervention has prompted the countries concerned to try, under the Arias plan, to find a regional solution. Progress has been slow but encouraging, aided on the one hand by the failure of the US-backed Contras

to turn the conflict into an East-West dispute, and on the other, by the desire of Nicaragua to avoid more overt US intervention. The most favourable result so far has been the opening of direct negotiations between the Nicaraguan Government and the Contras.

In contrast, the Caribbean region, traditionally an area of Canadian interest, is relatively quiet for the moment. There remains the potential for instability, however, as seen in the recent Haitian election. Moreover, against the background of the disappointing results of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the very small states of the Eastern Caribbean in particular, may be especially vulnerable to invasion by paramilitary forces, and to secessionist problems.

Both the Middle East and the Persian Gulf promise to remain highly volatile. The Palestinian uprisings on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip are symptoms of the running sore left by the failure to reach an Arab-Israeli settlement. Unfortunately, the prospects for making progress in that direction are not good as long as both the Israelis and the Arabs are internally divided. There is also no end in sight for the Iran-Iraq war, in spite of the call for UN mediation. Continuation of the war poses an ever present threat to free navigation in the Gulf and a danger of further escalation in the use of exotic weapons systems. For the longer term it raises some troublesome questions for Western interests, for an Iranian victory would pose the danger of a spread of Islamic fundamentalism. With the successful conclusion of negotiations for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, there may be hope for similar resolutions of conflict elsewhere.

In South Africa opposition to apartheid continues to increase. Violence has become endemic and is likely to grow more intense. The debilitating effect of South African

policies and actions upon the front-line states is a matter of serious concern to them and to Canada.

The Pacific is currently a region of comparative stability. Kampuchea and the Philippines are notable exceptions, however. Kampuchea is a festering wound which affects the whole of South-East Asia. And the uncertainties within the Philippines hold worrisome implications for security in that region, particularly if the future of the US bases is put in doubt. The situation in Korea, divided and therefore inherently unstable, will also bear watching. Looking further into the future, the Pacific balance of power will be substantially affected by the evolving roles of Japan and China. Japan can be expected to play a larger political and security role commensurate with its economic strength, and the way Japan's trade and economic relations with the United States are managed will likely colour future security cooperation between the two countries. China is likely to be preoccupied with its own internal development for some time to come, and the trend toward greater opening to the West is to be welcomed, but China also has the potential in the longer run for bringing the United States and the Soviet Union closer together.

Finally, it should be noted that there are disturbing trends toward terrorism and factionalism throughout the developing world. The increased availability of ever more lethal weaponry exacerbates these trends. There is also a deplorable tendency among Third World states to use defence industries and arms exports as part of their development strategies, often citing the practices of industrialized countries as their precedent.

Importance to Canada

Canada has a clear interest in a stable world and in reducing the risks of local and regional conflicts. The developments taking place in the various regions can affect Canada in a number of ways, directly or indirectly, in terms of material interests or humanitarian concerns. They may, as in the case of the Persian Gulf, affect NATO strategy, and thus have a bearing on Canada's commitments to the Alliance. They may, as in the case of Central America or the Gulf, raise the possibility of a peacekeeping role for Canada along the lines of the role it is currently playing in the Middle East and Cyprus. To take the case of the Gulf again, they may affect world oil supplies and therefore Canada's oil needs and its policy in the Arctic. Or they may, as in the Caribbean region and South Asia, have an impact on immigration and on related ethnic communities in Canada.

Recommendations for Canadian Policies

Clearly, it is impossible for Canada to address all the challenges which problems in these various regions present. Careful assessment of their impact and prioritization of Canadian efforts must be undertaken so as to ensure that the most effective contribution is made to their resolution consistent with our limited resources. In general Canada should approach these security issues in a holistic fashion, recognizing that its continued support for Official Development Assistance (ODA) is an essential complement to defence expenditures in contributing to international security.

In Central America Canada may well find that it has a role to play in promoting the peace process. That role could be either civilian or military; it could even include an

initiative in designing a peacekeeping force for the region.

In the case of the Caribbean, Canada has a unique opportunity to help the states with major development projects as well as bilateral military, para-military and civil security assistance. While much is already being done (e.g. the Caribbean Maritime Training Assistance programme, and the military assistance programme) there is room for additional efforts along these lines.

In the Middle East Canada should continue to work through the UN in support of its peacekeeping forces. We should also stand ready to consider a similar role with regard to Iran and Iraq in the event that UN efforts are successful in ending the war.

With regard to peacekeeping in general, Canada should continue to be ready to deploy forces if required, provided the circumstances meet appropriate Canadian criteria for participation, with particular reference to mandate, principles of operation, force composition, terms of employment, duration of the commitment, etc. In addition, we should be prepared to share our peacekeeping experience with others.

With regard to terrorism, while no specific policies suggest themselves, it is clear that Canada, along with other nations, must possess adequate intelligence networks and training systems which sufficiently prepare military and police elements to deal effectively with this threat.

Finally, in view of the increasing political and economic importance of the Pacific Rim countries, there may be long-term security implications for Canada which we should sooner or later face up to if we intend to increase trade across the Pacific Ocean.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

For some time arms control has been both the focus and the barometer of East-West relations. The superpower agreement on INF is particularly significant, both as an achievement in itself and as a precedent of great symbolic value. Although marginal in strategic terms (5 per cent of total warheads), it is notable in three important respects. It is the first arms control agreement which actually reduces the weapons inventory and, in the process, gets rid of an entire class of weapons (land-based ballistic and cruise missiles in the 500-5500 km-range band). It provides for a remarkably intrusive verification system which may well be a precedent for future agreements. And it deals with the problem of asymmetry for the first time.

The INF Treaty does not modify NATO's deterrent strategy. As mentioned above in the section on NATO, however, it could sow fears in the Alliance of a gradual denuclearization of Europe and with it of "decoupling" Western Europe from the United States. Thus, while there is the prospect of negotiating more constructively with the East on a wider range of security issues than before, there are at the same time concerns that the level of risk for the European allies may have increased. There is ready acknowledgement that reductions in nuclear weapons could serve the security interests of all nations if the threat of non-nuclear aggression is also reduced, in part by conventional arms reductions. But there are few signs that the latter requirement will be easily met.

The INF Treaty demonstrated that the way to mutually advantageous, negotiated solutions to security problems lies through resolve to maintain strong defences. It remains to be

seen whether the same lesson will be applied to the conventional field, where reductions could have an even greater impact on defence budgets.

An effective global ban on chemical weapons (CW) will similarly tax Western negotiating ingenuity. While the recent US decision to produce a new binary CW may strengthen the West's hand, very difficult problems of verification, which go well beyond those negotiated for INF, remain.

The next major US arms control goal is a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear forces. In the strategic arms reduction talks (START) the basic framework has now been established, and an agreement to drastically reduce offensive arms seems possible, if the relationship to defensive concepts, in particular space-based defence, can be satisfactorily resolved. At a minimum, agreement on development and testing to be permitted under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and its duration for such purposes, will be necessary. However, serious dialogue on strategic defence, both within the Alliance and between the superpowers, has barely begun. In Europe, as in Canada, there is considerable unease about the implications of the SDI notwithstanding the technological participation of a number of governments in the research programme. As reassurance the allies can be expected to ask for confirmation of the approach agreed by President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher in December 1984, to the effect that the deployment of any new BMD system would be a matter for agreement in NATO and negotiation with the Soviet Union.

Long-range cruise missiles add another dimension to the arms control challenge in the future, including from the viewpoint of North American defence. The prospect of future BMD deployment is likely to accelerate development and deployment of ALCMs and SLCMs. More broadly, given the

likelihood that BMD will be effective only if there are deep cuts in offensive systems, pressure to negotiate acceptable limits on both BMD and offensive systems will probably increase. Success in this area will, however, require that greater attention be focussed on the air breathing threat (i.e. bombers and cruise missiles) and perhaps on the defences to counter it.

One of Canada's long-standing goals has been a comprehensive test ban (CTB) but the opposition of both the United States and the Soviet Union has in the past rendered its accomplishment problematical at best. Now the more cooperative attitude of the superpowers may hold out the prospect that some progress at least can be made in that direction.

Perhaps the most dangerous threat to world peace and security in the foreseeable future is nuclear proliferation, when nuclear weapons and their delivery systems get into hands which are not subject to the restraints which operate on the five-nuclear powers (USA, USSR, Britain, France and China). That time could come in the next decade. It is to be hoped that in the meantime substantial reductions of their nuclear arsenals by the existing nuclear weapons states will ease pressures for horizontal proliferation by present non-adherents to the NPT.

Importance to Canada

There are few if any direct implications for Canada in recent arms control developments that do not apply to other countries as well. All states in the international system stand to suffer if the military rivalry is mismanaged.

While the INF Treaty was not as strategically sensitive for Canada as for our allies, other Canadian purposes were well served. Not only were our arms control objectives advanced, but impressive consultation machinery was also established where all allies had a voice. This augurs well for the future. Canada can look back on the process with satisfaction.

Major reductions in strategic offensive arms, however, could have direct implications for Canada. Limitations on ballistic missiles could increase the importance of long-range cruise missiles and the importance of limiting them as well. On the other hand, failure in START could give even greater prominence to the SDI, which in turn would raise questions so far largely avoided by Canada.

Recommendations for Canadian Policies

In addition to the continued pursuit of Canada's six objectives for arms control (as outlined by the Prime Minister) there are two broad areas of enquiry in which Canada might usefully engage.

First is the question of the strategic implications for Canada in particular, and for NATO in general, of the United States' moving toward a more defence-reliant nuclear posture. This should be examined regardless of whether the United States sees fit to barter constraints on strategic defences for major reductions in offensive weapons. And it should be examined not only by Canada but also by NATO. Integral to such an examination is the question of whether or not nuclear vulnerability is to continue to be regarded as a desirable, or the least undesirable, condition, and whether or not the United States and the Soviet Union seem likely to continue

their search for means of reasserting greater control over their fate. If there were a 50 per cent cut in strategic offensive forces, it would be of unique importance to Canada. But it would also be a development that should cause Canada to look more closely at long-range cruise missiles (ALCMs and SLCMs) and the desired regime for their control, as well as possible warning and defence against such weapons.

Second is the question of the implications for NATO strategy of the INF Treaty. The ban on land-based INF missiles surely requires that NATO re-examine the links in its defensive triad of conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear forces. With the strengthening of the link between nuclear and conventional arms control comes a need for the West to redefine its objectives in the latter. Regardless of what Soviet intentions may or may not be at this time, the capability of the Warsaw Pact to conduct offensive operations cannot be ignored. The task of the Western allies is therefore to negotiate away as much as possible of the Warsaw Pact's conventional advantage. That task will be long and difficult, even with the current political impetus and the precedents from the INF negotiations, because of the West's lack of any significant military bargaining leverage. But conventional stability in Europe will come only from structural adjustments to the forces of the Warsaw Pact and probably also of NATO. Success in these negotiations, and in the follow-on negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), where the aim should be to constrain threatening military activities, would make a decisive contribution to an easing of tensions and improved security in Europe, as well as to the reduction of military expenditures.

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