


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Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: a Canadian Perspective

by

James Macintosh
York University
Toronto, Ontario


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Ottawa (Ontario)
Canada
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Abstract

This work provides a comprehensive, detailed review of the theory and history of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs).

While the term "Confidence-Building Measures" is most frequently thought of in the context of the 1973 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), many previous examples exist which the author examines. From this examination the author concludes that "CBMs are interwoven within the larger category of arms control agreements to a degree greater than is normally appreciated".

The history of the CSCE and developments at its review conferences in Belgrade and Madrid are next examined. CBMs in the CSCE are remarkable "because they are the central and dominant component of an international security agreement rather than an ancillary feature of a large agreement". The author concludes that the CSCE process so far has been, at best, modestly successful.

In contrast, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, which are next discussed, have been less productive. MBFR is, however, a confidence-building process which reveals much about the basic perceptions and approaches of the two sides. The history of MBFR is reviewed, highlighting the obstacles which have been encountered. The Associated Measures, which are the confidence-building component of these talks, are also focussed upon. As was true for the examination of pre-CSCE CBMs, the review of MBFR illustrates the definitional problem with the concept. This problem is next addressed.

Because inferring a general explanation of the CBM concept from historical examples is not productive, the author turns to the work of academic analysts "to conduct a more flexible, wider-ranging and internally consistent understanding" of CBMs. After reviewing in detail the statements provided by a variety of analysts, the author synthesizes the following definition of Military Confidence-Building Measures. They are:

1. a variety of arms control measures entailing
2. state action
3. that can be unilateral but are more often either bilateral or multilateral

4. that attempt to reduce or eliminate misperceptions about specific military threats or concerns (very often having to do with surprise attack)
5. by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those concerns are groundless
6. often (but not always) by demonstrating that military and political intentions are not aggressive
7. and/or by providing early warning indicators to create confidence that surprise would be difficult to achieve
8. and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces by adopting restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces (or crucial components of them) within sensitive areas".

Having reached a "consensus" definition of CBMs the author focusses on the types of CBMs proposed. After examining several categorizations he suggests the following typology:

(a) *Information and Communication CBMs*

1. Information Measures
2. Communication Measures
3. Notification Measures
4. Manoeuvre Observer Conduct Measures

(b) *Constraint or Surprise Attack CBMs*

1. Inspection Measures
2. Non-Interference Measures
3. Behavioural or "Tension-Reducing" Measures
4. Deployment Constraint Measures

(c) *Declaratory CBMs.*

Using this typology the author next reviews in detail proposals for CBMs made in the literature, many of which may be considered at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

The author then turns to an assessment of confidence-building theory and practice. In this section of his work he begins by discussing several generic flaws of CBM literature. Nine flaws are identified:

1. indifference to the offensive substance of Soviet defence policy and capabilities;

2. failure to understand what the USSR considers genuine military threats;
3. failure to critically analyze the NATO-WTO military balance and the threats posed to each side;
4. insensitivity to factors – domestic, external, etc. – that shape military policy;
5. failure to explicitly discuss the psychological processes involved in confidence building;
6. failure to appreciate the ramifications of the psychological nature of confidence building;
7. lack of concrete explanations of how or why “intentions” should be made transparent;
8. assumption that more accurate information will lead to relaxed anxieties; and
9. indifference to the bureaucratic realities of state security policies.

From these the author derives two fundamental types of generic error upon which he focusses in considerable detail:

- “1. inadequate assessments of Soviet conventional military forces and the nature of the threat that they actually pose; and
2. naive, simplistic or non-existent assumptions about the actual process of “Confidence Building” and its psychological dynamics”.

In addition, the author identifies a more important large-scale problem involved in CBM discussions. This is analytic oversimplification or “the incapacity to comprehend the full dimensions of and deal effectively with extremely complex international politico-military phenomena”.

With regard to the Soviet threat, the author suggests that CBMs “have differential possibilities for success depending upon the “true” nature of Soviet military doctrine, capabilities and a host of the elements having to do with Soviet foreign and domestic policies”. Several alternative “images” of Soviet intentions and capabilities are discussed, only one of which favours CBMs.

Concerning the psychological dimension of confidence building, the author concludes that the mechanisms of misperception and the cognitive processes involved must be understood before CBMs can counter these mechanisms and processes. Confidence building is also compared with decision-making and discrepancies between rational and non-rational elements in confidence building are noted.

Résumé

Ce document présente une analyse complète et détaillée de la théorie et de l'historique des mesures de confiance et de sécurité (MCS). L'expression «mesures de confiance et de sécurité» est habituellement associée à la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCE) de 1973, mais l'auteur analyse plusieurs occasions antérieures où le concept a été avancé. Il en arrive à la conclusion que les MCS s'inscrivent de façon étroite, beaucoup plus qu'on ne le croit habituellement, à cette catégorie plus large que constituent les accords sur le contrôle des armements.

Il se penche ensuite sur l'historique de la CSCE et des conférences qui lui ont succédé à Belgrade et à Madrid. L'auteur estime que les MCS ont joué un rôle remarquable lors de la CSCE, car elles constituent un élément central et dominant d'un accord international sur la sécurité, plutôt qu'une caractéristique auxiliaire d'un accord plus large. Il conclut ensuite que les résultats des CSCE se sont avérés jusqu'à maintenant, au mieux, plutôt modestes.

Par contre, les négociations sur les réductions mutuelles et équilibrées des forces (MBFR), dont l'auteur traite ensuite, ont été encore moins productives. Elles constituent toutefois un exercice de mise en confiance très révélateur des approches et de la philosophie des deux parties. L'historique des MBFR et les obstacles rencontrés sont résumés. On examine également les mesures associées, qui constituent l'élément de confiance et de sécurité de ces négociations. Comme c'était le cas pour les MCS d'avant la CSCE, l'étude des MBFR met en relief le problème de définition que suscite le concept, lequel est analysé à son tour.

Puisqu'il serait oiseux de déduire une explication générale du concept des MCS à partir des exemples historiques, l'auteur s'est plutôt tourné vers les travaux des analystes universitaires pour élaborer une compréhension plus souple, plus large et cohérente de la nature des MCS. Après une étude détaillée des déclarations de divers analystes, l'auteur en arrive à la définition suivante des mesures de confiance et de sécurité. Il s'agit :

1. d'une variété de mesures de contrôle des armements comportant
2. une action de l'État,

3. qui peuvent être unilatérales mais qui sont le plus souvent bilatérales ou multilatérales,
4. qui tentent d'atténuer ou d'éliminer les impressions erronées à l'endroit de préoccupations ou de menaces militaires précises (ayant souvent trait à des attaques surprises),
5. en communiquant des preuves adéquatement vérifiables et acceptables du fait que ces préoccupations sont sans fondement,
6. souvent (mais pas toujours) en démontrant que des intentions politiques et militaires ne sont pas de nature agressive,
7. et(ou) en offrant, à l'avance, des indices avertisseurs pour créer un climat de confiance à l'effet qu'une attaque surprise serait difficile à réaliser
8. et(ou) en limitant les occasions de recours aux forces militaires par l'adoption de restrictions sur les activités et le déploiement de ces forces (ou de leurs éléments cruciaux) dans des secteurs sensibles.

Avec cette définition globale et exhaustive des MCS, l'auteur se concentre sur les types de MCS proposés. Après examen de plusieurs classifications, il propose la suivante :

a) Mesures d'information et de communication

1. Mesures d'information
2. Mesures de communication
3. Mesures de notification
4. Mesures de conduite des observateurs de manœuvres

b) Mesures de limitation des attaques surprises

1. Mesures d'inspection
2. Mesures de non-interférence
3. Mesures de comportement visant à la réduction des tensions
4. Mesures de restriction du déploiement

c) Mesures déclaratoires

À partir de cette classification, l'auteur examine en détail les MCS proposées par les spécialistes, dont plusieurs pourraient être discu-

tées à la Conférence de Stockholm sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe.

L'auteur passe ensuite à une analyse de la théorie et de la pratique de la confiance et de la sécurité. Il commence par traiter de plusieurs lacunes courantes chez les spécialistes des MCS et cite les neuf principales lacunes qu'il a relevées :

1. l'indifférence à l'endroit du fond offensif des politiques et de la capacité militaires soviétiques;
2. l'incapacité de comprendre ce qui constitue une menace militaire véritable pour l'URSS;
3. l'incapacité d'effectuer une analyse critique de l'équilibre militaire OTAN-Pacte de Varsovie et des menaces ressenties par chaque côté;
4. l'insensibilité aux facteurs (intérieurs, extérieurs, etc.) qui orientent la politique militaire;
5. l'incapacité de discuter explicitement des aspects psychologiques en cause dans l'élaboration des mesures de confiance;
6. l'incapacité de tenir compte des conséquences de nature psychologique des mesures de confiance et de sécurité;
7. l'absence d'explications concrètes sur la raison pour laquelle les intentions devraient être communiquées de façon transparente ou sur la façon d'y arriver;
8. la présomption à l'effet qu'une information plus précise diminuera les préoccupations, et
9. l'indifférence à l'endroit des réalités bureaucratiques régissant les politiques de sécurité d'État.

À ce niveau de l'analyse, l'auteur effectue une synthèse des deux genres d'erreurs fondamentales qu'il étudie de façon très poussée, soit :

1. l'évaluation inadéquate des forces militaires conventionnelles soviétiques et de la nature concrète de la menace qu'elles représentent, et
2. les présomptions naïves, simplistes ou sans fondement sur le processus concret de confiance et de sécurité et sa dynamique psychologique.

L'auteur définit également un problème de la plus haute importance dans les discussions concernant les mesures de confiance et de sécurité. Il s'agit du simplisme analytique, c'est-à-dire de l'incapacité de comprendre toute l'envergure des phénomènes politico-militaires internationaux extrêmement complexes et d'en traiter efficacement.

Quant à la menace soviétique, l'auteur suggère que les MCS ont diverses possibilités de succès, dépendant de la nature réelle de la capacité et de la doctrine militaires soviétiques et d'une foule d'éléments liés aux politiques soviétiques intérieures et extérieures. Il traite de diverses interprétations des intentions et de la capacité soviétiques, une seule d'entre elles favorisant les MCS.

Sur le plan de la dimension psychologique des mesures de confiance et de sécurité, l'auteur en arrive à la conclusion qu'il faudra comprendre les mécanismes de fausse perception et les processus cognitifs en cause avant de pouvoir y remédier par des MCS. Le processus de mise en confiance est également comparé au processus de prise de décision, le premier comportant toutefois des éléments rationnels et non rationnels.

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5. l'incapacité de discuter explicitement des aspects psychologiques en cause dans l'élaboration des mesures de confiance;
6. l'incapacité de tenir compte des conséquences de nature psychologique des mesures de confiance et de sécurité;
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An Introduction to the Concept of Confidence Building



Chapter One

An Introduction to the Concept of Confidence Building

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), in one form or another, have existed for as long as groups of people have distrusted each other. In the most basic sense, any action or undertaking intended to reduce suspicion and uncertainty and/or clarify intentions, particularly with respect to physical security, can be said to be a Confidence-Building Measure. The term has also been used to describe measures taken to reduce economic uncertainty and fears, and has even been used to describe scientific, cultural and sporting exchanges. While such usage is reasonable in everyday language terms – these measures, after all, do (or can) help to increase mutual understanding and confidence – it is too general and imprecise for more technical applications. To avoid this sort of imprecision, we will restrict our consideration to those interstate national security undertakings designed or intended to *increase confidence in the "good" intentions of potential adversaries and/or reduce fear of attack*. The dominant national security concern is generally the fear of surprise attack and most CBMs address this fear, either directly or indirectly. This more restrictive understanding, dealing almost exclusively with military-oriented undertakings, prevents the excessive dilution of the CBM concept. It also corresponds with international political as well as scholarly usage.

What follows is an introduction to the concept of Confidence-Building Measures, their history, their prospects and their problems. This introductory study attempts to demonstrate, by example, that "Confidence Building" is actually a multifaceted concept with more shades of meaning and more intrinsic analytic problems than are normally supposed. The study examines, first of all, some historical examples of Confidence-Building Measures. This helps to make the point that *CBMs have a*

history that predates the Confidence-Building Measures of the Helsinki Final Act. While not known as CBMs *per se*, a number of international undertakings negotiated during the past several hundred years clearly performed that function. There are also a number of more recent illustrations such as "Hot Line agreements" involving primarily the strategic nuclear relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) led to the Helsinki Final Act which formalized a number of CBMs. They continue to stand as the dominant examples of Confidence-Building Measures and figure importantly in discussions of second-generation CBMs. Of particular importance, the Helsinki CBMs and the CSCE follow-up conferences at Belgrade and Madrid led to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) where a major effort will be expended to create meaningful "second-generation" CBMs. In recognition of the greater intended impact of these second-generation measures, they have come to be called "Confidence and Security Building Measures" or CSBMs. This study will present a brief history of these events.

The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations which have been underway in Vienna since 1973 also feature CBMs although in this case they are called Associated Measures. They are definitely ancillary features to the dominant concern of force reduction. The study will examine these Associated Measures, particularly because they have influenced thinking on the nature of second-generation CSBMs for the Conference on Disarmament in Europe discussions.¹

Once the historical context of Confidence-Building Measures has been established, it will

¹ It might be helpful at this early stage to establish a provisional rule about the use of the terms "CBM" and "CSBM". Despite a tendency to use CSBM as a replacement term for CBM, the term CSBM is a direct product of the Madrid review meeting and, by most accounts, it refers *specifically* to proposed measures which will extend the scope of existing (i.e. Helsinki) CBMs. Some (the Swiss, for instance) prefer to use the term CSBM to connote genuine, militarily constraining CBMs. CSBMs, however, do not yet exist as anything but proposals and the particular constraint function of CSBMs can be specified by noting functional categories of Confidence-Building Measures (see Chapter Five). As a consequence, there is a good case to be made for using

the term CSBM only to refer to the proposed "Stockholm measures." The compound term "Helsinki CBMs" ought to be used to refer to that restricted set of existing measures that appear in the Helsinki Final Act. When referring to the *general concept of Confidence Building*, it may make the most sense to simply use the most common term – CBM. Common and even professional usage has unfortunately tended to treat the two terms as synonyms and that probably will continue to be the case. In the absence of widespread consensus, this study employs the term CBM for the general concept and uses CSBM, with rare exception, only to refer to the measures which may emerge from Stockholm.



make sense to look at the multitude of definitions that various authors have devised for the CBM concept. Although there is considerable variety, an effort will be made to make a synthesis on the basis of consensus of what most analysts mean by Confidence Building Measures. This discussion will also include an examination of the different methods of categorizing or distinguishing between the various types of CBMs and the different ways in which CBMs can be conceptualized.

Obviously, the most important aspect of CBMs is their future applicability. This means a consideration of the ways in which CBMs can be used to reduce tension, suspicion and fear of surprise attack. We will examine applications designed to improve the NATO/Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) relationship in Europe (primarily in terms of the conventional military balance) as well as the Soviet-American strategic nuclear relationship and conflict-prone relations in other parts of the world.

The study concludes with a general examination of the prospects and problems associated with CBMs. In particular, this study notes several serious flaws in the existing CBM literature. Although the specific complaints have to do with predominantly academic work, the effects and the concern extend beyond academic analysis. To a significant degree, these analytic flaws or oversights also reflect more basic habits of thought typical of both theorists and policy makers. These flaws therefore can influence negotiating positions and strategies, reducing the chances for the successful construction of meaningful CBMs.

The first of these flaws is a dangerous indifference to (or ignorance of) the idiosyncratic and complex nature of Soviet defence policy and military doctrine. The CBM literature very often makes disturbingly simpleminded – and sometimes surprisingly benign – assumptions about the sort of conventional military threat that the Soviet Union poses as well as ignoring

genuine Soviet concerns and habits of thought. This translates into a lack of sensitivity to a distinctly different set of Soviet military concerns having relatively little in common with Western defence problems – and solutions – in Europe. A similar insensitivity to a distinct Soviet “strategic culture” has been evident in discussions of Soviet-American strategic nuclear CBMs as well, but there is a growing recognition of genuine differences in that sphere.

On a more general level, the existing CBM literature, while recognizing the intensely psychological nature of Confidence-Building Measures in a *pro forma* fashion, reveals a paradoxical indifference to the “mechanisms” and processes that animate “Confidence Building”. This is most evident in the literature’s failure to incorporate the contemporary insights of cognitive theory when discussing the ways in which Confidence-Building is supposed to deal with misperception and misunderstanding. The Confidence-Building literature and, more generally, Confidence-Building thinking persistently overlook the role of exceedingly important “non-rational” cognitive processes² that interfere with the supposedly “rational” decision-making and information-processing activities that underlie Confidence Building. If Confidence-Building Measures are constructed on the basis of a seriously faulty understanding of how humans deal with complex images, beliefs, and fears, then CBMs may not operate in the ways hoped for and expected. The failure to explore *how* confidence can be created and increased between adversary states is a serious and potentially dangerous shortcoming of existing research.

The existing CBM literature is also indifferent to or ignorant of the complex reality of the defence policy process in the various NATO and Warsaw Pact states. Because CBMs neces-

² The generic term “cognitive processes” means, in the simplest terms, the way the human mind operates, the way it deals with the external world. More formally, it refers to the collection of “mental” processes that, together, explain: how belief systems come to be organized as they are; how information is acquired, sorted, categorized and stored, particularly according to the influence of existing belief structures; how inferences

are drawn on the basis of existing information and beliefs; and how learning, intuition, judgement, and choice operate, especially in an uncertain and unstructured environment. Cognitive processes are particularly important to an understanding of how faulty judgements are made about the nature and operation of poorly understood phenomena. Chapter Seven gives some hint of this greater complexity.



sarily address alterations in bureaucratic and organizational behaviour, some attention should be paid to the problems associated with such changes. The literature does not concern itself with these sorts of organizational considerations.

These fundamental oversights weaken the potential usefulness of the CBM literature and influence adversely the genuine if limited opportunities for CBMs. These oversights also can mask risks associated with the unreflective adoption of Confidence-Building Measures.



Examples of Pre-Helsinki Confidence Building Measures



Chapter Two

Examples of Pre-Helsinki Confidence-Building Measures

Confidence-Building Measures – as a term and as a concept – came into common usage during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A number of specific measures were formalized in the resultant Helsinki Final Act in 1975. *They constitute the basis for many discussions of CBMs and second-generation CSBMs.* There are, however, instances of international arrangements predating the Helsinki Final Act that appear to conform to the basic idea of a Confidence-Building Measure. This historical record is worth examining because it may suggest useful CBM and CSBM proposals for future use. Indeed, as we will soon see, several contemporary proposals are based on ideas developed in earlier documents. This historical examination will also illustrate the difficulties encountered in trying to decide what should count as a legitimate example of a Confidence-Building Measure. The list of potential candidates is longer than generally supposed, suggesting that frequently drawn distinctions *between* arms control and Confidence-Building Measures may be forced or even unwarranted. At the least, it suggests that such distinctions are made with difficulty. Many of the candidate agreements appear to be *primarily* Confidence-Building Measures while others contain features that resemble CBMs.

Before examining this list of candidate measures, it would make sense to establish a preliminary understanding of what a Confidence-Building Measure is. Although we will return to the problem of definition a number of times in the course of this study, we can start with several widely accepted views. Holst and Melander wrote one of the most important early articles on the concept. They suggest that:

“confidence building involves the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats ... by reducing uncertainties and by constraining opportunities for exerting pressure through military activity. Ideally, they would shorten the shadows of

military force, and confidence would be enhanced to the extent that the option of surprise military action receded into the background.”³

Adam Rotfeld provides several good descriptions of Confidence-Building Measures. For instance, he maintains that:

“One of the basic objectives of CBMs is to eliminate the possibility of surprise attack. CBMs are designed to ensure the correct interpretation of an adversary’s intentions in order to reduce the danger arising from unfounded suspicions and misperceptions which are often the result of prejudice or misjudgement.”⁴

Dr. Rotfeld also suggests that:

“the object of CBMs is to alter perspectives and ensure the perception of partner’s aims in a more or less correct rather than imaginary light. They are primarily, therefore, measures of a political and psychological nature, although they relate to military activity.”⁵

These definitions fairly represent the range of views amongst professional analysts. They generally focus on CBMs as instruments fostering the clarification of adversary intentions, the reduction of uncertainty with respect to the nature of those intentions (and associated military capabilities), and the amelioration of surprise attack concerns. Their focus is *not* generally on force or capability reductions, *per se*. We will return to the problem of definitions and categories in Chapter Five.

With this preliminary appreciation of the general nature of Confidence-Building Measures, let us turn to a brief examination of pre-Helsinki international agreements. The following is a list of potential CBM candidates. Some are frequently recognized as CBMs (for

³ Johan Jorgen Holst and Karen Alette Melander, “European Security and Confidence-Building Measures,” *Survival*, vol. XIX, no. 4, pp. 147-148.

⁴ Adam Rotfeld, “CBMs Between Helsinki and Madrid: Theory and Experience,” in Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds.) *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe* (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983), p. 93.

⁵ Adam Rotfeld, “European Security and Confidence Building: Basic Aims,” in Karl Birnbaum (ed.) *Confidence-Building in East-West Relations* (Laxenburg, Austria: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1982), p. 107.



instance, the "Hot Line" agreements) while others are not. Amongst this latter category are those measures possessing a predominantly declaratory character. Although the list is comprehensive, it is not intended to be exhaustive. Surveying it, one can see immediately that many international agreements appear to have at least some features that look like Confidence-Building Measures. The point is *not* to claim that they are all unambiguous examples. Rather, it is to show that the CBM concept, in practice, is (and has been) widespread and imbedded in many security-related international agreements:

1. The 1688 Treaty of Munster
As part of the larger "Peace of Westphalia", this treaty called for the effective demilitarization of the east side of the Rhine through the razing of fortresses. This approach imposed disarmament as the French were able to maintain a garrison on the east side of the Rhine (at Philippsburg).
2. The Third Barrier Treaty of 1715
As did the earlier two "barrier treaties", this called for the creation of barrier fortresses in Belgium to protect the United Provinces of the Netherlands against attack from the French. It also provided for the destruction of French fortifications to the south at Liege and Huy. It is worth noting that not all "demilitarization" treaties merit even casual consideration as CBMs. For instance, although the 1774 Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji bears a superficial resemblance to the Barrier Treaties, it was nothing but a thinly veiled preparation for annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Empire. The crucial factor in deciding whether or not a treaty could count as a CBM is, I think, the presence of a recognizable concern with allaying fears about adversary intentions.
3. The 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement
This agreement limited the number of naval vessels on the Great Lakes and eventually contributed to the effective disarmament of the Canadian-American border.
4. The 1856 Treaty of Paris
The Treaty of Paris, amongst other things, neutralized the Black Sea, restricting access to only a limited number of Turkish and Russian naval vessels. This was intended to restrict the opportunities for future military conflicts in the region amongst the major powers.
5. The 1902 Convention Between Chile and the Argentine Republic Respecting the Limitation of Naval Armaments
This treaty bound the signatories to freeze current naval purchases and to reduce their naval forces within a year. It contributed to the alleviation of tensions between the two powers, tensions which had almost erupted in war in 1898.
6. The 1899 and 1907 International Peace Conferences at The Hague
The Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases (Number IV,2) and the Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets (Number IV,3) of the 1899 Conference can be seen as sponsoring some minimum understanding of adversary intentions as well as offering at least some prospect of more positive relations. In a similar vein, Convention IV (Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land) of the 1907 Conference established a sense of minimum humanitarian expectations about the conduct of land war. While not directly addressing the fear of surprise attack, such an undertaking does address adversary intentions and psychological images. Signatory states, in effect, promised not to act barbarously. Other 1907 Conventions dealing with, for instance, The Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (VIII), Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (IX), The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (XIII) and The Declaration Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons (XIV) reflect a sim-



ilar interest in making war more humane and, necessarily, war-time foes more human. A similar argument can be made for the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

7. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles
Part V (Military, Naval and Air Clauses) of the Treaty of Versailles called for the partial disarmament of Germany. Within the lengthy treaty are articles specifying the dismantling of the Rhine fortifications, restrictions on German armament industries, prohibitions against German acquisition of tanks, submarines and military aircraft, naval restrictions, training restrictions, the end of conscription, a reduced ceiling on army manpower and the abolition of the German General Staff. These measures were clearly aimed at constraining Germany's ability to attack France. Rather than addressing intentions and images, these measures focused on the means of surprise attack. They were, of course, imposed rather than mutually negotiated measures.
8. The 1920 Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen
In addition to a number of provisions regarding civil commerce and sovereignty, this Treaty called upon Norway "not to construct any fortification in the said territory, which may never be used for warlike purposes." (Article 9) This measure entailed the creation of a demilitarized zone in a sensitive and contested geographic area.
9. The 1921 Convention Relating to the Non-fortification and Neutralization of the Aaland Islands
This Convention dealt with the Aaland Island zone in the Baltic. Article 3 required that "no military or naval establishment or base of operations, no military aircraft establishment or base of operations, and no other installations used for war purposes shall be maintained or set up in the zone..." Similar to the Spitsbergen

Treaty, this Convention sought to neutralize a contested geographic area.

10. The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty
This treaty limited the maximum size of various naval vessels and established a ratio of different types of ship (by gross tonnage) among signatory navies. While possessing clear arms-control characteristics (limiting the calibre of cannon, limiting the number of different types of ships, the displacement of those ships, etc.), the Treaty could also be seen as establishing a regime under which the signatories improved and formalized their understanding of each other's naval forces within an agreed balance of forces, and sought to control the effect of misperception as a cause of naval arms racing.
11. The 1923 General Treaty of Peace and Amity, Central America (Convention on the Limitation of Armaments of Central American States)
The main aim in this Convention was to normalize relations amongst the Central American republics. It called for the creation of National Guard forces in each signatory state, limited the size of those forces, restricted the introduction of military aircraft and naval vessels into the region, and banned intra-region arms trade. The Convention called for the submission and circulation of complete reports detailing the execution of the Convention. In the words of Article 6, "The reports shall include the units of the army, if any, and of the National Guard; and any other information which the Parties shall sanction." This is a straightforward information exchange similar to a number of current CBM proposals.
12. The 1924 release of the League of Nations' *Armaments Year-book* and *Statistical Year-book*
The Secretariat of the League of Nations began the publication of both Year-books in 1924. They contained rudimentary information on force size, equipment, the arms trade, and



- estimates of defence spending. Current CBM proposals frequently include such measures. These publications were part of a larger effort to control the arms trade and arms production, as seen in The 1925 Geneva Convention on the Arms Trade and The 1929 Proposal for Supervision of Arms Production.
13. The 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
This (and similar agreements lacking verification measures) falls into the general category of agreements that may humanize the image of adversaries by demonstrating, if only in declarations, that they are not barbarous.
 14. The 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact (The Pact of Paris)
This was a purely declaratory "renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy..." proclaiming that "the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts ... shall never be sought except by pacific means." Some analysts consider such declaratory statements or undertakings to be examples of Confidence-Building Measures.
 15. The 1930 London Naval Treaty
Like the Washington Treaty preceding it, this Treaty sought to impose quantitative and qualitative limits on the navies of the great powers.
 16. The 1930 Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration between Greece and Turkey, with Protocol Respecting Limitation of Naval Armaments
The Protocol stabilized an existing balance of naval forces, in major part, by providing for the exchange of information and encouraging statements of intention.
 17. The 1930 Draft Convention of the Preparatory Commission for the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments
Part IV of this document, required the annual submission of very detailed reports specifying various numbers and types of personnel, the duration of military service, the components and their values of the defence budget. Details regarding new naval vessels were to be reported within set periods and the convention also called for the reporting of both civil and military aircraft information. Part IV of this convention is similar to contemporary "informational" CBMs.
 18. The 1936 London Naval Treaty Obligated to abandon quantitative restrictions, the 1936 London Treaty attempted to limit the qualitative characteristics of naval vessels (calibre of main armament, number of cannon, associated dimensions of different types of craft, etc.). Part III of the Treaty specified extensive requirements for the regular exchange of information detailing the characteristics of fleets.
 19. The 1936 Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straights with Protocol, Signed at Montreux (The Montreux Convention)
Part of a long series of agreements attempting to neutralize the Black Sea and the so-called "Turkish Straits", this agreement and others preceding it sought to restrict the number and type of naval vessels on the Black Sea and required verifiable modes of entry and exit through the Straits.
 20. The 1947 "Huebner/Malinen Agreement"
This agreement (and its corresponding French and British versions) established military liaison missions in the two Germanies (the Soviets in Buende, Frankfurt and Baden-Oos and the Americans, British, and French in Potsdam). Intended to permit direct contact between the military forces of the Allies, it has the basic form of some current CBM proposals.
 21. The 1955 Statement by President Eisenhower, "Aerial Inspection and Exchange of Military Blueprints" (The "Open Skies" Proposal)
This proposal suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union provide each other with detailed "blueprints" of their respective mili-



tary establishments and facilitate the unrestricted aerial photographing of those establishments to demonstrate that no surprise attack was being contemplated. This proposal was later linked with the Soviet proposal for ground control posts in the March 22, 1956 Statement by U.S. Representative Stassen. That led to the United States co-sponsoring a resolution, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, calling for the adoption of "confidence-building measures" incorporating these ideas. This is probably the first use of the term.

22. The 1958 Geneva Surprise Attack Conference

The conference demonstrated the contrasting types of "surprise" that dominated the thinking of the United States (strategic nuclear) and the Soviet Union (European conventional). The conference is noteworthy for the schemes advanced by both the Soviet and the American teams of experts. The American proposals for dealing with (strategic nuclear) surprise attack included inspection posts to monitor facilities where surprise-attack preparation could occur. These were to be supplemented by mobile inspection teams free to examine suspicious activities at both airfields and missile bases. The Soviet proposals also included static ground observation posts (88 in total) and aerial inspection, but within a zone of 800 kilometres on either side of the inter-German border. The Soviets also proposed reductions of up to one third in conventional force strength and a ban on nuclear weapons within the region. Finally, the Soviets were very interested in reaching some sort of political accommodation that would properly define the context of East-West security concerns in Europe. The United States adopted a strictly non-political approach focusing on technical details. In many ways, this remains the archetype of Soviet and American approaches to most arms control issues.

23. The 1958 Rapacki Plan

The Polish Foreign Minister outlined a proposal on November 4, 1958 that called for a Central European nuclear-free zone after existing nuclear forces in the region had been "frozen". The creation of a nuclear-free zone was to be accompanied by mutual conventional force reductions. A more elaborate and formal version was presented on March 28, 1962.

24. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty


This treaty explicitly demilitarized the Antarctic mass. Article I prohibits "any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons." Article VII declares all facilities open to inspection and requires notification of any introduction of personnel or equipment into the region.

25. The 1963 Memorandum of Understanding between the USA and the USSR regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communication Link


The United States and the Soviet Union, in this memorandum of understanding and its annex, agreed to establish and share jointly in the costs of running a direct telecommunications link (via Helsinki and London) between their capitals. This is a classic CBM measure.

26. The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water

This was a very important treaty, banning Soviet, American and British nuclear tests in all media but underground. The three parties also undertook to negotiate a complete test ban that would include underground explosions. It is said to have had a major impact in demonstrating a willingness to control the nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.



27. The 1966 Franco-Soviet Communique Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communication Line
28. The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies
Similar to the Antarctic Treaty, this Treaty prohibits the militarization of space and guarantees access and freedom to perform scientific research. Article IV requires the signatories "not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction ..." Military fortifications, bases, manoeuvres and weapons testing are also forbidden. Article XII effectively guarantees access to any facility for inspection.
29. The 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
The purpose of this Treaty is to keep nuclear weapons out of South and Central America. The contracting parties agreed to prevent the development, testing or storage of nuclear weapons on their territories. Article XVI of the Treaty provides for special inspections to investigate possible treaty violation.
30. The 1967 Agreement between the UK and the USSR Concerning the Establishment of a Direct Communication Link
31. The 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Weapons
Nuclear weapon states promised not to transfer to non-weapon states nuclear weapons or weapons materials, control over them or the knowledge necessary to make them. Non-weapon states promised not to develop or receive nuclear weapons and to permit verification of their compliance. Article VI committed the United States and the Soviet Union to undertake "negotiations in good faith" to bring the nuclear arms race to an end.
32. The 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof
This denuclearization treaty is designed to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons (and other weapons of mass destruction) on the seabed beyond a state's own 12-mile territorial limit. Article III includes relatively extensive verification measures.
33. The 1971 Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on Measures to Improve the Direct Communication Link
This agreement increased the reliability of the existing "Hot Line" by calling for two additional circuits, each using a satellite communication system of the party's own choice. A further agreement in 1975 clarified the status of the Soviet satellite system. Negotiations to significantly improve the Hot Line by installing high-speed teletype printers with facsimile reproduction capabilities were stalled in April, 1984 as part of the general deterioration of Soviet-American relations.
34. The 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
The two Parties promised to improve arrangements to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, to notify each other in the event of an accident that might lead to the detonation of a nuclear weapon, to notify each other if suspicious events are detected on early warning systems, and to provide advance warning if test missile launches are in the direction of the other state. In the event of "unexplained nuclear inci-



dents", each Party "undertakes to act in such a manner as to reduce the possibility of its actions being misinterpreted by the other Party." A similar agreement (Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on the Prevention of Nuclear War) was signed in 1973.

35. The 1972 Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas

This agreement sought to restrain overly aggressive behaviour on the high seas where near-collisions and aircraft "buzzing" had become common. The agreement called for naval vessels to manoeuvre according to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Ships and aircraft were also prohibited from simulating attacks against vessels and aircraft of the other state. There is also a 1973 Protocol which covers non-military ships.

36. The 1972 ABM Treaty

Part of the overall SALT I package, the ABM Treaty limited the U.S. and the Soviet Union each to two widely separated ballistic missile defence sites, each with 100 missiles and 100 launchers. The Treaty includes extensive and precise quantitative and qualitative limitations to prevent the upgrading of facilities. Article XIII called for the creation of a Standing Consultative Commission to consider questions of compliance, provide "on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed", and "consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification." Article XII notes that national technical means of verification will be used to ensure compliance. It also states that both Parties undertake neither to interfere with these national technical means nor to impede verification through concealment.

37. The 1972 Interim Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

The Interim Agreement froze new ICBM launcher construction in the U.S. at 1054 and in the Soviet Union at 1618. Some launcher modernization was allowed. Ceilings on SLBMs were also established (710 for the U.S. and 950 for the Soviets in combination with decommissioning older systems). The actual documentation includes a protocol, five Agreed Statements, three Common Understandings, and four Unilateral Statements. Article V of the Agreement declared that both Parties would use national technical means of verification to ensure compliance. Neither Party was to interfere with the other's national technical means nor to impede verification through concealment.

38. The 1972 Agreement on Basic Principles of Relations Between the USA and the USSR

This is a twelve-point statement affirming the desires of the Soviets and the Americans to continue, improve and expand relations between the two states.

39. The 1972 Memorandum of Understanding Between the USA and the USSR Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation

This memorandum of understanding created the Standing Consultative Commission noted in the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War. It was to "promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of" those and future agreements. It remains a frequently cited example of a successful Confidence-Building Measure. A 1973 Protocol specifies certain regulations governing the Commission's operation.



40. The 1973 Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

This agreement reaffirmed the two Parties' good intentions to seek a more extensive arms-control accord and noted some general principles that would guide that effort.

41. The 1974 Protocol to the ABM Treaty
The Protocol reduced the number of ABM sites permitted from two to one. It thus enhanced (in some eyes, at any rate) the mutual vulnerability of the Soviet Union and the United States.

42. The 1974 Vladivostok Accord
This was a joint statement of intent to seek a long-term strategic weapons agreement negotiated on the basis of equal aggregate ceilings (2400 total strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 1320 MIRVed nuclear delivery vehicles). The new agreement would also include the verification measures developed for the Interim Agreement.

Several post-1975 agreements could be added to this list:

1. The 1976 Agreement between France and the USSR on the Prevention of the Accidental or Unauthorized Use of Nuclear Weapons.
2. The 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.
3. The 1977 Agreement between the UK and the USSR on the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear War.
4. The 1979 Statement by the USSR on the Backfire Bomber.
5. The 1979 Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) (Including "Protocol to the Treaty" and "Agreed Statements and Common Understandings Regarding the Treaty").

6. The 1979 Memorandum of Understanding between the USA and the USSR Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms (Including "Statement by the USA of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of the SALT II Treaty" and "Statement by the USSR of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of the SALT II Treaty").
7. The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.⁶

In addition to these examples, there are a number of other agreements or understandings that some authors suggest are CBMs. For instance, there are arrangements from Latin America which closely resemble some of the European CBM proposals. Argentina and Brazil have participated in periodic joint naval manoeuvres, Brazil and Uruguay hold joint exercises for anti-submarine warfare, and Panama and Venezuela engage in joint exercises involving all three services. Many Latin American states invite military observers from neighbouring states to their exercises. Latin American officers often enroll in neighbouring military academies. In addition, there are frequent exchanges of military missions and the chiefs of staff of many states hold joint annual conferences.⁷ A more contemporary and specific illustration of Latin American Confidence-Building Measures can be found in the "Principles for the Implementation of the Commitments Undertaken in the Document of Objectives", adopted by the Central American and Contadora Group Foreign Ministers in Panama City, January 8, 1984. Amongst the six measures associated with "Security Affairs" are familiar CBMs: to prepare "a registry or detailed inventory of military installations, weapons, and troops by each of the Central American states, in order to establish the foundations for a policy to control and reduce these things, providing ceilings and resulting in a reasonable bal-

⁶ For texts see Jozef Goldblat, *Agreements for Arms Control: A Critical Survey* (London: Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1982) and Trevor N. Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman (eds.) *A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament* (New York: R. R. Bowker Company, 1973).

⁷ For a general discussion of Confidence Building in the region, see Jack Child (ed.) *Maintenance of Peace and Security in the Caribbean and Central America*, Report Number 18 (New York: International Peace Academy, 1984).



ance of forces in the region"; "to adopt a calendar of reduction with an eye to the elimination of foreign military advisors and other foreign individuals who are participating in military or security activities"; "to identify and eradicate all forms of support, encouragement, and financing for or tolerance of irregular groups of forces involved in the destabilization of Central American governments"; and "to establish direct communication mechanisms for the purpose of preventing and resolving incidents among states."

Excellent examples of technical Confidence-Building Measures can be found in the 1975 Egyptian-Israeli Accord on the Sinai. Article IV of that Accord called for the withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli forces from a sizeable Sinai buffer zone, the stationing of limited forces and equipment in adjacent zones and the creation of a number of early warning facilities in the region to be manned by Egyptians, Israelis, and American technicians. The United Nations Emergency Force was also to play a role in the buffer zone. The "U.S. Proposal for an Early-Warning System in the Sinai" and the "Annex to the Sinai Agreement" contained the details of various measures. The U.S. Proposal called for the creation of two surveillance stations, one to be operated by the Egyptians and one to be operated by the Israelis, each to have a complement of American personnel to "verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station." The Proposal also called for the creation of three tactical early warning watch stations in the Mitla and Gidi passes of the Sinai. These were to be manned by U.S. civilian technicians. In addition, three unmanned electronic sensor fields were to be established at both ends of the Gidi and Mitla passes. The Annex detailed the specific lines and areas covered in the Accord, specified the forces and armaments that were to be allowed within the areas adjacent to the buffer zone, and guaranteed aerial surveillance for all parties. The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty superseded some of these arrangements.⁸

There are other potential examples of Confidence-Building Measures (for instance, the use of American, British, French and Italian troops as "peacekeepers" in Beirut, the verification and reporting components of numerous draft treaties for disarmament, and various test bans and moratoria) that could be added to this already extensive list.

Recalling the composite characteristics of Confidence-Building Measures noted earlier in this chapter – they were described as measures of a political and psychological nature intended to assist in the correct interpretation of adversary intentions, to reduce uncertainties and (sometimes) to constrain the opportunities for surprise attack – it should be clear that some of the agreements, treaties, accords and arrangements noted above clearly qualify as or contain CBMs. The Sinai early warning and observation system is the most obvious case. The SALT agreements have some very visible CBMs. (The recognition that national technical means (satellites as well as aerial and terrestrial listening posts) would and should be used for verifying compliance of various SALT agreements; the agreement that their legitimate operation ought not to be impeded; and the establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission to air questions about compliance all count as relatively unambiguous Confidence Building Measures.) The various "Hot Line" agreements would seem to qualify, as would the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas. So too would the various agreements designed to prevent accidental nuclear war (such as The Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, The Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War or The Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear War). Numerous proposals noted above con-


⁸ See Lester A. Sobel (ed.), *Peace-Making in the Middle East* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1980).



tain measures that have since been proposed as CBMs (inspectors at troop exit points, provision for aerial inspection of suspicious facilities, preparation of detailed inventories of weapon systems, military exchanges, the movement of threatening forces from frontiers, and joint agreements to limit "threatening" weapon system deployments which might trigger arms races or create crisis escalation). It is less clear that demilitarization and denuclearization treaties and agreements (for instance, the Antarctic, Seabed and Outer Space Treaties) are or entail Confidence-Building Measures although they too constrain military activities, clarify intentions and have reasonable verification procedures. It is more difficult still to know whether or not to count purely declaratory undertakings (such as "no first use" offers and Hague Conventions) as CBMs. Even being generous, they appear to be on the margins of reasonable acceptance. On common sense grounds, imposed arrangements (such as the Versailles Treaty) ought not to count as CBMs. Confidence-Building Measures and agreements, at minimum, must be entered into freely.

On the basis of the foregoing examination of possible CBM candidates, it is safe to conclude only that many agreements may be or may include Confidence-Building Measures. Several seem to be clear examples by any standard and several seem beyond consideration. It is also quite clear that CBMs are interwoven within the larger category of arms-control agreements to a degree greater than is normally appreciated. If we expect to clarify our thinking about Confidence Building, it will require more than a perusal of the historical record. That record suggests that many international undertakings achieve, to at least some degree, the functional equivalent of Confidence Building. If we wish to develop a more precise understanding of this increasingly important concept, we will have to look elsewhere. One obvious place to turn is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It was the Final Act of that conference that introduced the idea of Confidence-Building Measures into common use. The next chapter traces this history and looks at the Helsinki CBMs in some detail.





The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Chapter Three

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is of special relevance to this study because the negotiated outcome – the so-called Final Act – included a number of Confidence-Building Measures. As we saw in the preceding chapter, the mere presence of undertakings intended to perform the *functions* of a Confidence-Building Measure is hardly remarkable. Many international agreements contain these sorts of undertakings. The Helsinki Final Act's CBMs are special because they are the central and dominant component of an international security agreement rather than an ancillary feature of a larger agreement. The security-related measures of the Final Act *are* CBMs. In addition, these particular measures have come to be regarded (incorrectly, I would argue) as being synonymous with the whole notion of CBMs. As a consequence, the analysis of Confidence-Building Measures – past, present and future – has become heavily structured by the actual content of the Helsinki measures. The discussion of CBMs is therefore almost always conducted in terms of a handful of modest, exploratory and voluntary undertakings never intended to bear such analytic weight. For these two good reasons, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe – and the CBMs it produced – warrant some attention.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has a history that dates to at least the 1964 proposal made by the Warsaw Treaty Organization Political Consultative Committee calling for a conference to discuss European collective security. A more elaborate proposal followed at the Bucharest meeting of the same Consultative Committee in 1966. That proposal ("A Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe") contained a specific reference to the idea of a European Security Conference (ESC) to "ratify" the East European *status quo* as well as proposals for the dissolution of NATO and the WTO, and the creation of an all-Europe economic community of sorts. The 1967 statement on European security issued at a conference of European Communist Parties at Karlovy Vary reiterated the basic ingredients of emerging Soviet policy. As had been the case earlier at the various Four Power Conferences (beginning in 1954), the major underlying concern was the neutraliza-

tion of Germany, followed closely by the desire for formal recognition of Soviet hegemony in the East. Various methods for achieving this end had been explored during these earlier years (including proposals for separate treaties to deal with Germany, collective security proposals, European-wide security conferences and agreements to disband NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization) and they continued to surface in Soviet and East European proposals.

The idea of using a European Security Conference to address basic Eurocentric issues (predominantly the problem of Germany and the status of post-war boundaries) had emerged as a consistent high-priority foreign policy goal in Soviet foreign policy thinking by 1966. Soviet efforts to interest the United States and West European governments in a ESC were unsuccessful, however, until the growing Western desire for conventional force reductions in Europe created a parallel Western requirement for a European conference dealing with security issues. The Soviets wanted a multilateral conference to address broadly political concerns (particularly the recognition of East Germany and the remainder of post-war East European boundaries). Earlier Western responses to Soviet and East European proposals for European security conferences had usually countered with suggestions for the reunification of Germany. Now, however, the West wanted a NATO/WTO negotiation to reduce manpower levels and increase stability in Central Europe. This fairly basic division in focus permitted the creation of two separate European negotiating tracks. One was to become the Mutual (and Balanced) Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna while the other was to become the CSCE. Theatre Nuclear Force negotiations emerged from these distinct tracks to become a separate undertaking a decade later.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia caused a temporary delay in the process of resolving the fates of these distinctly different conference schemes. However, by early 1969 there were numerous (mostly Warsaw Treaty Organization) proposals and declarations progressively refining the idea of a European Security Conference. In March, the WTO foreign ministers issued a declaration explicitly stating that Canada and the United States could attend such a conference. In June, another of the ubiquitous Communist Party conferences called for



the creation of a more effective European security system. By October of 1969, the Warsaw Treaty Organization had released a draft agenda for a European Security Conference. The NATO ministers responded to this flurry of activity in December 1969, indicating that some signs of good faith would need to precede any progress toward a European conference. There would need to be an agreement on Berlin, for instance. As well, the communique reiterated the importance of including mutual force reductions in such a conference.

In the several years following, the state of Soviet relations with West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany) improved a great deal and this helped to accelerate the movement toward the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The clear emergence of Brandt's *Ostpolitik* foreign policy and the signing of West German Treaties of Friendship with the Soviet Union and Poland (August 1970) improved the atmosphere, as did the conclusion of the Four Power Berlin Agreement (September 1971). The conclusion of the Basic Treaty formalizing the recognition of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) by West Germany (November 1972) represented another positive movement from the Soviet perspective. In fact, it could be argued that these bilateral agreements achieved many of the Soviet Union's basic European foreign policy aims. During the same period, Soviet-American relations improved substantially also (highlighted by the negotiation of SALT I) and the Soviet Union looked increasingly to a European Security Conference to formalize the improvement in East-West relations as well as to legitimize Soviet hegemony in East Europe. With the "institutionalization" of detente, the Soviets hoped to increase the flow of Western technology to the Soviet Union, perhaps reduce the burden of Soviet defence spending somewhat, yet minimize the negative impact of Western ideas and influence in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union hoped for a relatively speedy conference that would achieve its political goals at little or no real cost.


The participation of the United States and other NATO states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was directly conditioned upon Soviet agreement to participate in parallel negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe (see Chapter Four). Preliminary consultations and

negotiations for the CSCE began November 22, 1972. They took more than eight months to conclude and saw the Soviet Union make a number of concessions in order to expedite the proceedings. The Soviets had wanted a brief conference dealing with a narrow range of economic and political matters. They were obliged to accept a conference agenda that called for the consideration of a number of unwelcome issues, not the least of which was an expanded discussion of human rights and basic freedoms. The Conference itself opened July 3, 1973 in Helsinki, continued in Geneva from September 18, 1973 to July 21, 1975 and concluded August 1, 1975.⁹

The CSCE concluding document – the Final Act – contains four basic sections:

1. Questions Relating to Security in Europe.

This section contains a "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States" and a "Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament". The former outlined a number of understandings having to do with sovereign equality, sovereign rights, a promise to refrain from the threat or use of force, statements on the "inviolability of frontiers", the "territorial integrity of states", "peaceful settlement of disputes", and "non-intervention in internal affairs". Also included was a statement promising "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief" and a statement reaffirming "equal rights and self-determi-



⁹ The participants were Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia. Albania was the only European state not to participate.



nation of peoples". Another statement in this section dealt with cooperation among states and there was a promise to fulfill obligations according to the norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The second part of "Basket 1", the Confidence-Building-Measures document, is discussed later in this chapter.

2. Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, Science and Technology, and the Environment

This "Basket" addressed "efforts to develop co-operation in the fields of trade, industry, science and technology, the environment and other areas of economic activity." It detailed provisions for commercial exchanges, measures to encourage business contacts, the publication and dissemination of economic and commercial information, and the standardization of economic statistics, production standards and technical regulations. Also included in this basket were general undertakings to participate in industrial cooperation and "projects of common interest". Other provisions included statements of intention for improved cooperation in the area of scientific and technological research, improved cooperation in environmental protection and rational resource utilization as well as cooperation in the areas of transport, tourism and technical training.

3. Questions Relating to Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean

This section, included as a result of Maltese insistence, committed the CSCE states to consult with non-participating states bordering on the Mediterranean Ocean and to extend to those states the same treatment accorded participant states. It was, in brief, an attempt to extend the CSCE area to include the southern Mediterranean states.

4. Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

The last major category contained an extensive number of declarations calling for and promising improved human contacts (family meetings, family reunification, marriages between citizens of different states), improved information exchange, improved working conditions for journalists, more extensive cultural exchanges and improved educational exchanges.

Follow-up to the Conference

The participating States "declared their resolve" to "pay due regard to and implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference." They also promised "to continue the multilateral process initiated by the Conference" by discussing the implementation of the provisions amongst themselves and organizing meetings to discuss implementation and future conferences. Finally, they agreed to attend a follow-up meeting in Belgrade in 1977.

A detailed analysis of the entire CSCE Final Act is well beyond the scope of this study. The Final Act certainly turned out to be a more complex document than the Soviets expected and its negotiation took much longer than originally intended. Whether or not the East or the West "won" is still debated. It is probably not possible to tell at this point whether there really was a winner *per se* because processes unleashed at the time of the CSCE negotiations are still operating and many issues are still unresolved. The Final Act did not produce any genuine *de jure* recognition of immutable boundaries and it leaves open at least the possibility of German re-unification. This did not serve Soviet interests. The explicit inclusion of human rights clauses could be regarded as cynical but their presence provides a useful political and propaganda lever for the West and this, too, could be regarded as a gain for the West. Some analysts have argued that even the implication of recognition of East European boundaries was too easily traded for vague promises that the Soviets and other East European states will not hon-



our. Others argue that the encouragement and formalization of increased contacts between East and West in social, cultural, scientific and economic spheres, however limited and imperfect, can only lead to improved understanding and reduced tension. There is an element of truth in both the pessimist's and the optimist's assessments. Like detente, the virtues of the Final Act were probably over-sold and its modest achievements overlooked as a consequence. The CSCE and its Final Act provisions were certainly less than they could have been but, equally, they did serve constructive purposes. One such feature of the CSCE process and the Helsinki Final Act that deserves particular consideration is the "Document on Confidence-building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament."

The Helsinki Confidence-Building Measures

The Helsinki Confidence-Building Measures, briefly stated, called for prior notification of large manoeuvres and encouraged the exchange of military observers. The participant States, according to the Final Act, recognized

the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities.

This is a reasonable definition of the function that CBMs are supposed to perform: reduction of tension and uncertainty.

The Helsinki Final Act states that the CSCE participants have adopted the following:

Prior Notification of Major Military Manoeuvres

They will notify their major military manoeuvres to all other participating States through usual diplomatic channels in accordance with the following provisions:

Notification *will* be given of major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components ... Furthermore, in the case of combined manoeuvres which do not reach the above total land forces together with significant num-

bers of either amphibious or airborne troops, or both, notification *can* also be given.

Notification *will* be given of major military manoeuvres which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space.

In the case of a participating State whose territory extends beyond Europe, prior notification need be given only of manoeuvres which take place *within 250 kilometers from its frontier* facing or shared with any other European participating State. ...

Notification *will* be given 21 days or more in advance of the start of the manoeuvre *or in the case of a manoeuvre arranged at shorter notice, at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting date.*

Notification *will* contain information of the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the manoeuvre, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct.

Prior Notification of Other Military Manoeuvres


The participating States recognize that they can contribute further to strengthening confidence and increasing security and stability, and to this end *may* also notify smaller-scale military manoeuvres to other participating States, with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres.

To the same end, the participating States also recognize that they *may* notify other military manoeuvres conducted by them.

Exchange of Observers

The participating States will invite other participating States, *voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill* towards all participating States, to send observers to attend military manoeuvres.

The inviting State will determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and will give other information which it may consider useful. It will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality. ...



Prior Notification of Major Military Movements

In accordance with the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, the participating States *studied* the question of prior notification of major military movements as a measure to strengthen confidence.

Accordingly, the participating States recognize that they *may*, at their own discretion and with a view to contributing to confidence building, notify their major military movements. ...

Other Confidence-Building Measures

The participating States recognize that there are other means by which their common objectives can be promoted.

In particular, they will, with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to better mutual understanding, promote exchanges by invitation among their military personnel, including visits by military delegations.

In order to make a fuller contribution to their common objective of confidence building, the participating States, when conducting their military activities in the area covered by the provisions for the prior notification of major military manoeuvres, will duly take into account and respect this objective.

They also recognize that the experience gained by the implementation of the provisions set forth above, together with further efforts, could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence.

Questions Relating to Disarmament

The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political detente in Europe and to strengthen their security. ... (Emphasis added.)

There can be little doubt that the Helsinki CBMs are modest. They are voluntary, binding only in a broad political sense and address only a few very basic military concerns. As a practical matter, the Helsinki CBMs deal only with

large-scale military manoeuvres of over 25,000 personnel, calling for 21 days notice *if possible*. The pre-notification of smaller exercises is totally voluntary. The exchange of observers is also voluntary and to be guided by a principle of reciprocity. Some critics have focused unduly on the voluntary nature of these Confidence-Building Measures. While it may be an overstatement to say that CBMs *must* be established on a voluntary basis, the nature of the enterprise does place a real premium on voluntarism (i.e. "confidence cannot be coerced or forced"). It is also fair to say that while the CBMs contained in the Helsinki Final Act are very modest, the Confidence-Building idea was, at that point, a unique and tentative first step and as such probably had to be modest. The expectation was that more adventuresome and extensive CBMs would (might) follow on the basis of experience gained from the Final Act's modest beginning. As we will see, the potential for CBMs (and CSBMs) extends significantly beyond but builds upon the Helsinki CBMs. Therefore, the Helsinki CBMs are part of a larger process that stretches through the Belgrade follow-up conference to Madrid and beyond to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe. It is simply *not* appropriate to dismiss the Helsinki Confidence-Building Measures for not being what they were never intended to be. They were neither designed nor expected to seriously constrain military behaviour nor were they intended to transform the adversarial relationship between East and West in Europe. It is important that one remember this when assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the Confidence-Building concept.

In pragmatic terms, an obvious way of evaluating the Helsinki CBMs is to examine the performance of the CSCE participant States according to the criteria established in the Final Act. Have they lived up to these admittedly modest undertakings? Johan Holst has looked at this question in an extensive analysis that examines the record of implementation from 1975 to 1982. According to Holst:

the Eastern states adhere strictly to the notification period of 21 days, that is also the pattern for Western manoeuvres in the Central Front. However, Norway has adopted the practice of normally notifying manoeuvres 30 days in advance. The neutral and non-aligned (NNA) states also tend to extend the notification time



The pattern of military manoeuvres appears to be quite stable. In only two instances did the size of the manoeuvre exceed 70,000 men. NATO has invited observers to 19 out of 22 major exercises ..., the Warsaw Pact to 8 out of 17 major exercises The deterioration in international relations has been reflected in the fact that Eastern states have not invited Western observers since 1979.

Western and neutral and non-aligned states have invited observers from all CSCE states or from a cross-section in each instance. During the first years the Eastern states tended to invite only neighbouring countries, but subsequently expanded their invitations. ...

Western states and neutral and non-aligned states have chosen to announce manoeuvres below the threshold of 25,000 men. ... No states have been accused of failing to notify a major military manoeuvre. However, the Soviet Union apparently failed to supply the agreed information when notifying the exercise *Zapad-81*, No state has notified independent naval or air force exercises.¹⁰

This is a record that reflects fairly strict adherence to the letter but seldom the full spirit of the Helsinki CBMs. The limitations associated with the non-binding character of the measures and their very modest scope suggest two ways in which the use of CBMs can be improved in light of past experience. One is to shift their nature from voluntary to diplomatically binding (in the form of a treaty, for instance) and the other is to expand the scope of coverage. The process initiated by the original CSCE negotiations has moved, if haltingly, in this direction.

The Belgrade Follow-up Conference

The Helsinki Final Act contained within it the commitment to convene meetings during which the participants would conduct a "thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Conference." The first such meeting was held at Belgrade in 1977.

The main topic at Belgrade was human rights and fundamental freedoms. Although the basic division was obviously between the Western and Eastern states, modest cleavages developed and grew within the Western group of states as well. The NATO states came to Belgrade intending to review the implementation of the complete Helsinki Final Act (but particularly in the area of human rights) while the Soviets and their allies wished only for a speedy conclusion that would spare them excessive abuse on human rights issues. The neutral and non-aligned (NNA) states counselled moderation and advanced proposals of their own special interest. Despite the efforts of the Soviet Union and at least three of its allies (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany), a detailed review of the Helsinki Final Act's implementation took place. As expected, it was very critical of Soviet and East European failures to implement the Final Act. The Soviet Union listened to the criticisms but generally did not respond directly, preferring to expedite the review.

In the area of Confidence-Building Measures, the review concluded that the original Helsinki CBMs had been implemented correctly, if only to the letter of the agreement. There were lengthy discussions addressing the degree to which various states had implemented the so-called "permissive" or voluntary CBMs. Western as well as neutral and non-aligned states complained about the marginal performance of the Soviet Union and the WTO states in this respect. The information supplied about notified manoeuvres was sketchy, the

¹⁰ Johan Jorgen Holst, "Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," *Survival*, Vol. XXV, No. 1, p. 7. The Holst article contains a thorough listing of East, West and NNA manoeuvres.



conditions for observers were inadequate and the Soviets did not provide information or notification for anything not strictly called for in the Final Act.

In addition to the review of CBM implementation, a number of proposals were advanced suggesting new Confidence-Building Measures or extensions of existing ones. The Soviet Union tabled a draft that included the suggestion for a treaty regarding no first use of nuclear weapons, an agreement to limit alliance membership to existing levels, a 50,000 to 60,000-man ceiling on manoeuvres, and the suggestion that Helsinki CBMs might be extended to include southern Mediterranean states. These proposals were not well disguised attempts to handicap NATO. A no-first-use treaty would, from NATO's perspective, deprive it of a vital component in its defence policy. The membership restriction was simply aimed at keeping Spain out of NATO. The 60,000-man ceiling would restrict NATO's ability to exercise effectively diverse forces.

The Western states responded with a proposal of their own, submitted by Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. They proposed that the manpower floor for the notification of manoeuvres be dropped to 10,000 and that the information provided about the manoeuvres be much more detailed. Their proposal also suggested a thorough code of conduct for the treatment of observers. Finally, it called for the compulsory notification of all major military movements (as distinct from manoeuvres) exceeding 25,000 men. The Warsaw Treaty Organization states rejected this proposal because of its unacceptable focus on extracting what to them was unwarranted information.

The NNA states advanced a proposal of their own calling for, amongst other things, clarified Helsinki CBMs. It contained a modified definition of a major manoeuvre that included the aggregation of a number of smaller manoeuvres held in close proximity or in close succession. In addition, it called for more precise information in the notification announcements and a code of conduct for observer treatment (including greater freedom and better conditions for observers). Finally, the proposal addressed the need for the notification of naval manoeuvres and suggested that information on military budgets might serve as a useful CBM.

The entire collection of new and revised CBM proposals advanced by each negotiating group failed to achieve the necessary support, and the prospects for any progress in the CBM area looked as dim as they did in other review areas. The neutral and non-aligned states, supported by Romania, attempted to circumvent the lack of consensus by suggesting that a separate group of experts meet to consider a number of new CBM proposals. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was much in favour of this idea as each feared that such a conference would be turned to the benefit of the other.

The formulation of a concluding document acceptable to all participant States proved to be almost impossible. The Soviet Union refused to accept draft proposals that highlighted failures to implement the Final Act. The United States and the Western states refused to accept a document that implied there were no problems with implementation (particularly in the area of human rights and basic freedoms). After many efforts at compromise, a largely meaningless document was produced by Denmark on March 4, 1978 that did little more than carry the Helsinki process forward to Madrid and the next follow-up conference.

The Madrid Follow-up Conference

In the period prior to the beginning of the Madrid Review Conference, many of the participating States publicized schemes for improving the Helsinki CBMs. The Warsaw Treaty Organization indicated a willingness to lower the floor on major manoeuvres to 20,000 troops and also spoke of notifying air and naval manoeuvres. Of greater importance, the French government clarified its proposal of May 1978 for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), suggesting that it be convened after the completion of Madrid, that it deal with conventional weapons and forces only, that its provisions be mandatory and that it encompass all of Europe including all of the European portion of the Soviet Union. The conference would have two phases. The first would deal with CBMs while the second (paralleling efforts in the MBFR talks) would attempt to negotiate reductions of conventional forces. The Soviets also floated a proposal for what they called a European Conference on Military Detente. Unlike the French proposal, this one would be independent of the CSCE.



The preparatory sessions for the Madrid Review Conference began on September 9, 1980. The NATO and the neutral and non-aligned countries all made it very clear that they wanted the first part of the Review Conference to be just that – a thorough review of Helsinki Final Act implementation. The review would be followed by the consideration of new proposals. The Soviets, on the other hand, wanted the briefest possible consideration of implementation performance (recalling only too well the harsh criticism they had received at Belgrade). They felt that the bulk of the Review Conference should be devoted to new proposals. Needless to say, these divergent perspectives produced a deadlock. A compromise solution developed by Sweden, Austria, Cyprus and Yugoslavia broke the deadlock. Although the conference was to entail a six-week review, the compromise allowed for the consideration of new proposals during the last two weeks. Of greater significance, the NNA compromise stipulated that the Review Conference would not adjourn until consensus was reached on the next follow-up session.

The Review Conference began on November 12, 1980, and was almost immediately engulfed in acrimonious exchanges. The focus was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the United States was determined to press its advantage on this issue. The Soviets insisted that the discussion was beyond the scope of the CSCE. Compounding the already bitter situation was the spectre of Soviet intervention in Poland.

In the course of the Review Conference, countless proposals were advanced outlining how the Helsinki proposals could be extended, improved or supplemented. The WTO advanced its proposal for a Conference on Military Detente and Disarmament in Europe and the French introduced a further refinement of their proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe. As the months slipped by there was gradual progress toward agreement on the terms of reference for a separate conference to deal with European security issues, one based largely on the French model. By mid-summer of 1981, there appeared to be agreement on many issues associated with the proposed conference. The participant States agreed that the conference should develop second generation Confidence-Building Measures that would be politically binding, militarily "signifi-

cant" and verifiable. *These second-generation CBMs, after a Yugoslavian suggestion, were to be called Confidence and Security Building Measures or CSBMs.* The principal outstanding conference issue remained a definition of geographic limits. Although the Soviets had agreed to consider CBMs that extended east to the Ural Mountains, they refused to specify what they meant by a corresponding and offsetting western geographic extension. When the Soviets finally did clarify their thinking on this issue, the resulting extension proved to be so ambiguous and potentially enormous that the Western negotiators flatly rejected it. The definition of geographic scope continued to be a contentious issue, primarily because it represented the cutting edge of much larger Eastern and Western foreign policy aims and concerns. The Soviets wanted to restrict American reinforcement capabilities and flexibility as much as possible by extending the CSBM zone as far to the West as it could. The Soviets also sought to achieve this goal by introducing naval and air CSBMs that would impair the American ability to reinforce Europe. The United States was just as determined to prevent this. Additionally, the Soviets wished to portray the United States as being obstructionist in developing reasonable arms control agreements in Europe, thereby driving another wedge between the Americans and their European NATO allies as well as increasing anti-American sentiments within European publics.

The Review Conference made very slow progress throughout the latter half of 1981 on both human rights issues and some of the CDE issues. In an effort to produce some genuine movement, a balanced draft concluding document was formulated by the neutral and non-aligned states but the almost simultaneous imposition of martial law in Poland effectively curtailed any hope of progress for some time. Relations were so poisoned by events in Poland that no substantive progress was possible for virtually one year. The only thing that kept the follow-up conference and the CSCE process alive was the unwillingness of the United States and the Soviet Union to accept the negative consequences of actually terminating the conference by walking out. In November of 1983, the NATO states presented amendments to the NNA states' draft of 1981. These amendments generally addressed human rights issues asso-



ciated with Poland and, as a consequence, no real progress was feasible. As they had done a number of times before when the sessions encountered deadlocks, the neutral and non-aligned states made a serious effort to keep the conference going by constructing a compromise that would somehow bridge the differences between East and West. This time they revised their December 1981 draft concluding document, incorporating some of the Western human rights concerns and a more detailed proposal for the CDE. Although the Soviet Union indicated that it would accept the revised draft, the Western states continued to withhold their approval, demanding the inclusion of four human rights-related modifications. It was left to the Spanish delegation to engineer the final revisions to the draft document which it introduced on June 17, 1983. The Spanish compromise entailed the dropping of a negative reference to radio jamming in exchange for a special conference to discuss "human contacts" (particularly the reunification of families living in Eastern and Western countries). Both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the terms of the Spanish compromise and indicated that they would accept the draft version of the document.

The Madrid Concluding Document, a 35-page addendum to the Helsinki Final Act signed on September 6, 1983, contained numerous clarifications and new provisions. These dealt with journalists' rights, religious rights and the role of churches, human contacts and family reunification, access to diplomatic and consular missions, the right of workers to organize, measures against terrorism, and the right of independent groups to monitor compliance with the Final Act. The Concluding Document struck what most participants agreed was a modest balance between contending positions. Many of the human rights amendments sponsored by the West were deleted or watered down substantially. Sufficient substance remained, however, to satisfy the United States and the other Western states as well as the neutral and non-aligned states. Several of the amendments would operate as the "thin edge of the wedge" in future sessions, providing a starting point for future extensions, clarifications and elaborations. In addition, the promise of another Review Conference and a number of special follow-up meetings guaranteed that implementation performance would remain in

the public and diplomatic eye for some time. In all, eight special sessions were provided for in the Madrid document:

1. The Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament, which began on January 17, 1984, in Stockholm;
2. A six-week Experts' Meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, held in Athens beginning on March 21, 1984;
3. A seminar on Mediterranean Cooperation in Venice, October 16-26, 1984;
4. An Experts' Meeting on Human Rights, scheduled for Ottawa, lasting six weeks and to begin May 7, 1985;
5. A special session in Helsinki in 1985 to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act;
6. A Cultural Forum, to be held in Budapest during 1985;
7. An Experts' Meeting on Human Contacts, to be held in Bern, lasting six weeks, and starting April 16, 1986;
8. The third CSCE Review Conference, to be held in Vienna and commencing November 4, 1986.

The provision for a separate and specific Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE) was the culmination of many years effort. Although there were originally somewhat divergent intentions and expectations on the part of the Soviet Union on the one hand and Western participants (particularly France and Germany) on the other, the conference now offers at least the prospect of a whole new series of CBMs – Confidence and Security Building Measures – that could enhance significantly the existing Helsinki CBMs.

The Madrid Final Document states that:

"The aim of the conference is to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament.

Thus the conference will begin a process of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of



mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. ...

...[T]hese confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and air-space.¹¹ They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area and air-space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating states there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations."

The specific CSBM proposals to be considered at Stockholm includes many of those suggested at Madrid. The December 12, 1980, Proposal submitted by Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, for instance, contains a number of possible candidates. They include some obvious extensions to and revisions of Helsinki CBMs, such as a reduced floor of 18,000 men for manoeuvre notification (including aggregated manoeuvres); extended notification time (30 days); increased information about the manoeuvres; and guidelines for the exchange of observers and their proper treatment. The proposal also called for 30-day pre-notification of major military movements in excess of 18,000 men (including aggregated movements of smaller groups); 30-day (or more) pre-notification of naval exercises involving more than 5000 amphibious troops and/or

10 major amphibious warfare vessels; prior notification of major naval exercises; and openness with regard to information concerning military expenditures. Other possibilities include restrictions on force movements in "high tension" areas (the inter-German border region, for instance); the use of observers at fixed entry and exit points to monitor troop rotations in garrison areas; and the exchange of increased information about equipment and personnel. Several of these measures have already been suggested at the MBFR negotiations where they are called Associated Measures. These and other potential Confidence and Security Building Measures will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six.

The CSCE process has been, at best, only modestly successful to this point. However, it has survived – if barely – badly deteriorated East-West political relations, to give birth to the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. It is clearly too early to tell at this stage whether the CCSBMDE will lead to the adoption of meaningful Confidence-Bulding Measures or whether it will become just another victim of the larger animosities of Soviet-American relations. It seems unlikely that anything positive will emerge from the CCSBMDE process *unless* the general atmosphere of East-West relations improves. However, it is not inconceivable that a degree of good will and effort exhibited within the Stockholm conference itself might appreciably improve the general state of East-West relations.



¹¹ The text of the Final Document contains the following note: "In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe." The note is designed to temporarily "solve" the problem of an offsetting extension of the CBM zone. The Soviet use of the term "ocean area" was originally intended to include, at least potentially, vast areas of the Atlantic Ocean. The joint presence of this term and the implicitly more restrictive term "sea area" preferred by the West will have to be clarified at Stockholm.



Ironically, the other process, one which the West wanted much more than the CSCE – the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe negotiations (generally referred to as MBFR in the West) – has not been very productive and has generally failed to reduce tensions in Central Europe. The Stockholm CSBM conference and its potential follow-ons may eventually even supercede the MBFR negotiations. Given the rather unhappy history of MBFR, its lessons may prove instructive.



The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations



Chapter Four

The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations

The Negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe¹² can be considered a Confidence-Building Process despite the fact that no actual agreement has yet been negotiated.¹³ The lengthy and tortuous negotiations have revealed much about *the basic perceptions and approaches of the two basic negotiating groups* as they have sought (sometimes, perhaps, not very seriously) an agreeable formula to permit a reduction in conventional forces and a lessening of tensions within the Central European theatre. This is very much in the spirit of confidence building. As well, one part of this process has involved the development of some specific CBMs called Associated Measures. Some of these Associated Measures are re-worked Helsinki CBMs while others are very similar to more demanding second-generation CSBM proposals. Finally, it is worth recalling that the idea for MBFR negotiations was advanced by NATO as a "counter" or offset to the persistent Warsaw Treaty Organization-sponsored CSCE proposal. Since that time, the two negotiating processes have had parallel but distinct existences which, in general terms, have reflected the difference in basic arms-control approach between West and East, a difference that extends to the construction and negotiation of Confidence-Building Measures. The tendency is for the West (especially the Americans) to prefer non-political, technically-oriented arms-control negotiations while the East (the Soviet Union) has generally preferred "political" negotiations where broad matters of great power relations can be addressed. True to this basic form, the CSCE was an inherently political undertaking while the MBFR Negotiations have been much more narrowly technical. As we saw in Chapter Three, the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE produced very modest volun-

tary and non-intrusive Confidence-Building Measures. The MBFR negotiations have foundered on more intrusive CBMs and the inability to generate a common data base. The respective fates of the two sets of negotiations may be an instructive warning for those considering CSBM proposals in the future.

MBFR – A Short History

The origins of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations can be traced to the "Harmel Report" of 1967. This NATO report, the product of a study group examining future Alliance tasks, concluded that a political accommodation with the East was crucial and that part of that accommodation would have to involve conventional force reductions. The findings of the report were influenced by the growing desire of many NATO members to reduce their conventional force strengths and defence budget expenditures. This was particularly true in the United States where anti-Vietnam War sentiments were growing and where increasing Congressional resistance to funding U.S. troops in Europe was a serious domestic political reality. Also important was the growing European interest in fostering detente. The Harmel Report received NATO Ministerial approval in December 1967 and led directly to the NATO Ministerial Declaration on MBFR in June 1968 (the so-called Reykjavik Signal). The Ministerial Declaration spoke of the need for a balance of forces in Central Europe and declared that "it was desirable that a process leading to mutual force reductions should be initiated."¹⁴

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¹² This is the official term for the negotiations. In the West, they are commonly identified by the acronym MBFR – Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. In the East, the term "balanced" is never used and the negotiations are called "Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments in Central Europe."

¹³ The distinction between a Confidence-Building Measure and Process will be explored in Chapter Five. It is largely self-evident, hinging on the difference between a final product – a binding or non-binding codified measure – and an ongoing process considered apart from any final outcome.

¹⁴ Useful discussions of the MBFR negotiations include: Jonathan Dean, "MBFR: From Apathy to Accord," *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 4; John G. Keliher, *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions* (New York: Pergamon Press); Jeffrey Record, *Force Reductions in Europe: Starting Over* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1980); and Lothar Ruehl, *MBFR: Lessons and Problems* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982).



The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia resulted in the expected atmospherics and ill-will but did not interfere with the onset of negotiations as much as did a more basic reluctance to consider adversary proposals. Until March 1971, NATO and the Soviet Union continued to sponsor their own respective proposals, more or less ignoring each other's competing proposal. The Soviets continued to call for a general conference in Europe to legitimate post-war boundaries while NATO continued to call for narrow force reduction talks. On March 30, Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the 24th Communist Party Congress marked a significant shift in Soviet policy when it expressed an explicit interest in conventional force reduction negotiations. On May 14, 1971, Brezhnev was even clearer in signaling the Soviet interest in negotiating. Despite this, it took another year to make any real progress toward an agreement to actually negotiate and the final Soviet agreement seems to have been conditioned on American acceptance of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The MBFR preparatory talks began in January, 1973, in Vienna. These sessions dealt with the status of participant states and quickly became deadlocked. In particular, NATO wanted Hungary to count as a direct participant because of the geographical proximity of the 55,000 men of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces stationed in Hungary. The Soviet Union absolutely refused to consider this, declaring that Hungary was a "flank state" similar to Italy. From the Soviet perspective, its Southern Group of Forces were crucial for retaining leverage over Yugoslavia, Hungary and Romania. The status of Hungary was non-negotiable. The Western nations felt obliged to accept this position if they wished the main negotiations to proceed. The Soviets were unsuccessful in leaving participation open to non-alliance states and had to abandon their efforts to involve France in the negotiations. Although the Soviets gained the most from the preliminary sessions, it must be remembered that the NATO states – and particularly the United States – were in a weak bargaining position. There were strong sentiments in the United States to reduce American troop strength in Europe (witness the various legislative efforts of Senator Mike Mansfield) and this severely restricted NATO negotiators.

The negotiations proper commenced on October 30, 1973. There were seven "direct participants" (states having military forces in Central Europe): Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States. The five "special participants" (states near but not within the reduction zone) from NATO were Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway and Turkey. The Warsaw Treaty Organization's "direct participants" were Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union. The WTO's "special participants" were Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Conspicuous by its absence was France, a state with significant military forces in the reduction zone but no longer a military member of NATO. The French have, coincidentally, pursued alternative plans for European arms control and disarmament which have led indirectly to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe – the CDE.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization presented its first proposal on November 8, catching the Western delegates by surprise. The proposal called for negotiations to occur in one phase prior to any actual reductions. The first stage of the reductions would involve 20,000 ground and air personnel total per side from the ranks of the direct participants. The second stage would involve an additional reduction of 5 percent and would be accomplished in 1976. The third stage entailed a 10-percent reduction in air and ground personnel to be accomplished in 1977. Stationed forces (like the United States Army) were to withdraw from the continent in organic units, taking all of their equipment with them. Indigenous forces (Germany's, for instance,) were to be demobilized. There were no provisions for verification nor were any base-line force figures included. Because force levels were *not* equal to start with (according to Western negotiators), this would have amounted to an asymmetrical or unbalanced reduction, perpetuating a WTO advantage in manpower and main battle tanks. Such an outcome was unacceptable to NATO. The speed of the reductions (three years) was also regarded as being potentially destabilizing. Finally, the reductions would have had an especially severe effect on West German military manpower.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization negotiators modified their original proposal in October, 1974, when they suggested that the first reduc-



tions of 20,000 men (per side) include 10,000 Americans and Soviets and 5,000 West Germans and Poles. It was expected that additional withdrawals would be negotiated. This proposal was also lacking in any agreed figures on force size and made no real mention of verification.

The first NATO proposal (November 22, 1973) called for a two-phase reduction. The first phase entailed a 15-percent reduction in Soviet and American forces. This meant that 29,000 American troops would leave Germany (their equipment would remain behind) while the Soviets would have to withdraw a complete tank army (68,000 men and 1,700 tanks). The second phase called for reductions in indigenous forces to achieve an overall ceiling for each side of 700,000 ground force personnel. The negotiation of the second phase, however, was to be contingent on the successful completion of phase one. The disproportionate effect of these suggested reductions on the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany and the failure to directly address German military reductions (a dominant and continuing Soviet preoccupation) and other features of the second phase rendered the NATO proposal unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

The NATO proposal was altered in December, 1975. The new proposal's central feature was the addition of an American offer to remove 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads, 36 Pershing missile launchers and 54 Phantom jets as part of the American reduction proposed in November, 1973. This offer was rejected.

The Soviet Union introduced a new Warsaw Treaty Organization proposal in February, 1976. This substantially revised plan incorporated several features of the NATO proposals, calling for a reduction in Soviet and American ground and air personnel amounting to between 2 and 3 percent of total alliance strength in the reduction zone, the withdrawal of 300 main battle tanks by both sides, the withdrawal of an Army Corps Headquarters by both sides, a freeze on other participants' manpower, the withdrawal of 54 tactical nuclear capable aircraft, some missiles, 36 Surface to Air Missiles and, perhaps, 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads. A second phase of reductions would seek to cut the total alliance forces by 15 percent (but on the basis of national sub-ceilings) before the end of 1978. The withdrawn Soviet

and American forces were to be disbanded. The Soviet introduction of numerically equal limitations (tanks and nuclear launchers) exaggerated even further the existing asymmetries in the East-West balance and, on this point, was less acceptable than the original 1973 WTO proposal. Other features of the new proposal were unverifiable or aimed at producing an asymmetrical disadvantage for NATO.

Several months after the proposal of February, 1976, was advanced, the Soviet Union began to alter the basic rationale underlying its interpretation of conventional troop strengths in Europe. Prior to this time the implicit argument had been that the West enjoyed strategic advantages outside Europe and, as a consequence, the Soviet Union was entitled to offsetting advantages within Europe. In June of 1976, the European balance was characterized by Brezhnev as being approximately equal (thus abandoning the prior notion of offsetting balances). This change in basic perspective was perhaps the result of the continued growth of and improvement in Soviet strategic forces. It certainly relieved the Warsaw Treaty Organization of some obvious logical difficulties in their negotiating positions. Overnight, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization acquired equality. Figures were released to demonstrate this fact and the Soviet position shifted to one of sponsoring balanced and equal reductions in the forces of the two sides.

The Soviet Union produced another new proposal in June, 1978. This time, the WTO offer appeared to address NATO concerns about asymmetrical reductions. The Soviet proposal accepted a ceiling of 700,000 ground force personnel for the two sides (the result of an 11 to 13 percent reduction). The U.S. would reduce its forces by 14,000 and the Soviets by 30,000. The draft also included a clause that prohibited any country from compensating for more than half another alliance member's unilateral reductions (obviously aimed at the West Germans). The fatal flaw in the Soviet proposal, from the Western standpoint, was the WTO insistence that Eastern data be used to calculate reductions. Those data showed roughly equal numbers for the two alliances. This was and has remained an unacceptable condition for NATO. Other features of the 1978 proposal included a reduction of 7 percent in U.S. and Soviet ground force personnel and, basically, the trade-off of three Soviet tank divisions for



1000 American tactical nuclear warheads, 36 Pershing launchers and 54 F-4s. The Warsaw Treaty Organization proposal was rejected, primarily because of the "data problem".

In December of 1979 NATO presented a new, simplified proposal to the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In the first phase, it called for the withdrawal of 30,000 Soviet ground personnel (three divisions) and 13,000 American ground personnel. The offer of tactical nuclear weapon trade-offs (the so-called "option III") was removed from the proposal as a consequence of the NATO decision to modernize theatre nuclear weapons and the earlier American decision to remove unilaterally 1,000 obsolete tactical nuclear-weapon warheads. In a sense, the American unilateral move countered the previous "unilateral removal" of 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks by the Soviet Union. The new proposal stipulated that no withdrawals could occur until the two sides had agreed on a common data base for ground-based personnel. Only after the first phase had been completed would the more difficult second phase dealing with indigenous forces and armaments levels begin. The proposal also required that both sides agree to implement extensive Confidence-Building Measures (Associated Measures) to assist in monitoring troop movements and ceilings. The Soviet Union was concerned that the second phase of negotiations might never be completed (depriving them of the opportunity of reducing West German military strength) and was equally unhappy with Western demands that the data problem be resolved. Warsaw Treaty Organization complaints also included the unnecessarily intrusive nature of the Associated Measures (including their extension beyond the original reduction zone into the European portion of the USSR).

The Warsaw Treaty Organization made a counter-proposal in July of 1980 built around the unilateral Soviet withdrawal of forces already undertaken. It called for the withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet and 13,000 American troops and a limitation prohibiting any single country from deploying more than half the total of ground and air personnel in the reduction zone. This was obviously directed at West Germany. This proposal also came aground on the data problem. The WTO advanced a modification in November of 1980 that called for a freeze on forces between the first (largely symbolic) and second (more substantive) phase of reduc-

tions. This proposal was also confounded by disagreements over force sizes and the lack of a common data base.

Since then, the two sides have developed and promoted their own versions of draft agreements – a Warsaw Treaty Organization draft was presented on February 18, 1982, and a NATO draft on July 8, 1982. The Warsaw Treaty Organization has also revised its position on on-site inspection (beginning in June of 1983) with the Soviet Union discussing, in principle at least, the use of on-site inspectors at troop exit points. However, no specific details about such procedures have yet been discussed formally.

The negotiations were adjourned December 15, 1983, with a date for resumption having been agreed to (a Soviet reaction to the NATO decision to proceed with intermediate force modernization). However, after a three-month delay, the talks resumed again on March 16. On April 18, 1984, after difficult intra-alliance negotiations, NATO made an effort to circumvent the increasingly difficult problem of common troop figures. Largely as a result of American pressure, a suggestion was advanced for counting combat and combat-support units rather than individual soldiers of all types, at least during the first stage of withdrawal. The proposal also speaks of agreement on figures "within a certain range of uncertainty", suggesting that a degree of variation in estimates is tolerable. Some other NATO states (predominantly Germany) had pressed for a more flexible negotiating position. It is very difficult to see what type of solution to this exceptionally difficult "counting problem" would be mutually satisfactory.

Despite the difficult problems and leisurely progress of the MBFR negotiations, a fair amount of common ground exists. For instance, the two sides seem prepared to accept a collective 700,000-man ground force ceiling for each alliance, an initial U.S.-Soviet reduction followed by a more extensive and detailed indigenous force reduction (perhaps associated with a freeze on force size and equipment during negotiations) and the use of relatively extensive Confidence-Building Measures (Associated Measures) to ensure compliance and reduce surprise attack fears. Both sides have agreed not to re-deploy in a threatening man-



ner (i.e. to the flanks) forces withdrawn from the reduction zone. Agreement in principle has been reached to establish a consultative commission to guide and review implementation. There has also been agreement not to interfere with national technical means of verification. The negotiations appear to be deadlocked on the "data problem" and the issue of residual forces. The extent to which the Soviet Union and its WTO allies will accept intrusive Associated Measures is not clear and may become a major negotiating hurdle, although recent WTO positions suggest a growing acceptance of at least constrained on-site inspections and observers.

Further progress in Vienna will probably be difficult to achieve until the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) has begun. The potential for overlap between the MBFR negotiations and the CDE discussions is great and the participants in MBFR may opt to transfer their deadlocked talks to a new forum. In any event, they will likely defer any major decisions until the nature of the CDE talks is clarified. That process is likely to take at least one year.

MBFR Negotiating Obstacles

A frequently overlooked problem plaguing the MBFR negotiations has been the inherent geographic asymmetry of the two major alliances. Because the United States has significant military forces stationed in Western Europe (both conventional and nuclear), there is an intrinsic asymmetry that is bound to stymie any effort to negotiate arms control agreements. There can be no obvious equality of forces or effects because similar weapons and forces *cannot* produce similar results or threaten similar targets. However unlikely it may be, American troops can cross into Soviet territory and American battlefield tactical weapons can attack Soviet targets. The Soviet Union cannot similarly threaten the United States. However, the Soviet Union can threaten American troops and allies without attacking the United States directly. This fundamental asymmetry is purely a result of the Soviet Union being a part of Europe while the United States is not.¹⁵ The

consequences of this geographic fact of life are plainly visible in the MBFR context when discussions turn to the withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from and the reduction of German forces within the Central European reduction zone. Soviet forces need only traverse a distance of 600 or 700 kilometers while American forces must cross the Atlantic Ocean. The principal concern is the time necessary to re-introduce those forces into the European theatre if relations should deteriorate and war appear imminent. A secondary concern is the potentially destabilizing effect that *re-introducing* such forces might have in the midst of a crisis and the resultant reluctance of decision makers to respond to a genuine crisis in a timely fashion. These fears find their fullest expression in planners' scenarios that hypothesize no- or short-warning attacks by the Warsaw Treaty Organization. To be sure, there are ways to minimize this concern but it is and must remain a major underlying problem. A number of Confidence-Building Measures have been formulated in order to reduce concerns of this type but they can only address such concerns imperfectly.

An associated feature of geography influencing the MBFR negotiations is the significant difference in physical space available for manoeuvre should war occur. NATO forces would have little room for manoeuvre and would have to constantly guard against thrusts designed to split their forces in two. Much of West Germany is within 150 kilometers of Soviet Forces. The Warsaw Treaty Organization, on the other hand, has a massive space in which to manoeuvre and Soviet territory lies far to the rear. This geographic reality is also an important consideration in evaluating NATO and WTO negotiating positions. Because of the potential threat associated with Soviet reinforcement and the extensive inter-German border, NATO cannot afford to reduce its forces beyond certain limits regardless of reductions to nearby WTO forces. We will return to this concern when we look more specifically at the prospects of Confidence-Building Measures in Chapters Six and Seven. Part of that discussion will include a brief assessment of the structural and doctrinal asymmetries separating NATO and the WTO (specifically the Warsaw Pact fascination with "blitzkrieg" and "operational manoeuvre groups"). The discussion will also examine the

¹⁵ This fundamental asymmetry lies at the heart of the Soviet-American Intermediate Nuclear Force impasse. It could be argued that the bulk of Soviet and American security problems flow directly from this unresolvable asymmetry.



influence those asymmetries have on efforts to produce meaningful and realistic conventional arms reductions in Central Europe.

The basic realities of geography (and the consequences that flow from those realities) have been a major underlying factor influencing the MBFR negotiations. So too have been the basic realities of (predominantly) Soviet, American and German foreign policy. These three major players, at different times, have pursued quite dissimilar policy goals. The Soviets have wanted more than anything to constrain German military strength while the Americans have wanted to constrain Soviet military power opposing Germany and the NATO forces. Germany's interests have shifted from wishing to reduce their own forces to wishing to constrain the Soviet conventional threat. This has resulted in cross-purpose negotiating.

Without doubt, the fundamental visible problem plaguing the negotiations proper has been the disagreement over a common data base. NATO estimates now place the number of Warsaw Treaty Organization ground force personnel in the reduction zone at 956,000 while WTO figures claim only 805,000 men. Air force personnel numbers differ by at least 36,000 men. This difference in estimates is undeniably a major problem, one that can't help but obstruct further agreement. The differences are not trivial – as many as 60,000 front-line Soviet troops are involved along with additional support forces. If NATO figures are correct, the Soviets would have to remove approximately 130,000 of their troops from East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland to achieve a 700,000 ceiling. The removal of this many front-line Soviet troops may not be a tolerable course of action *under any conceivable circumstances* – even if it did lead to significant permanent reductions in the West German Army. Although such a reduction has been a

major Soviet foreign policy aim for decades, it might not constitute an adequate inducement if Soviet forces were also significantly reduced, especially given the decidedly dual-purpose nature of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. Soviet planners must allow for "policing functions" that consume thousands of soldiers who, practically speaking, are not really available for combat. The extent to which this is a real constraint on Soviet manpower is difficult to estimate. Independent of this peculiar sensitivity, it is not completely obvious that the Soviets haven't some legitimate complaints of their own with respect to "counting rules". They have pointed out correctly, for instance, that the reduction zone excludes approximately 250,000 French soldiers not in Germany but nevertheless very close to the reduction zone. From the Warsaw Treaty Organization's perspective, these forces cannot be ignored. (The 51,000 French personnel stationed in Germany are counted in the NATO total.) They have also argued that NATO has applied its counting rules incorrectly to the Warsaw Treaty Organization forces, failing to take into account the fact that Western armies use many civilians to perform non-combat administrative and service tasks that soldiers perform in the East. This, the Soviets claim, distorts the true balance of forces, making eastern forces look more combatable than they really are. Another potential counting error according to WTO officials is the inclusion of some reservists temporarily stationed in the reduction zone. The Soviets point out, as well, that the very effective FRG Territorial Army is composed of approximately 400,000 quickly mobilizable reservists who do not count in the force totals. If these claims were accepted, the force imbalance would clearly shift to NATO's favour. This Eastern response obviously discounts the massive number of Soviet forces just beyond the reduction zone to the East which would also seriously upset balance calculations. The problem, of course, is determining whose claims are correct and to what degree such differences really matter.¹⁶

Amongst the collection of lesser negotiating obstacles, the issue of residual limitations or national sub-ceilings is probably the most important. The WTO has been consistent in its effort to introduce limitations on the number of

¹⁶ It should not be assumed automatically that Western intelligence estimates are necessarily correct. There have been many significant and surprisingly foolish intelligence estimating errors on the part of Western intelligence agencies, particularly those of the United States. See, for example, John Prados, *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength* (New York: The Dial Press, 1983). The truth is probably a murky combination of deliberate deceit, a genuine Soviet desire to "discount" some of its forces because of their "policing" functions, incompatibilities in the counting rules, and Western intelligence counting errors.

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ground-force personnel that any indigenous participant could deploy after a multilateral reduction had been negotiated. The NATO position has been steadfastly opposed to any national subceilings, arguing instead for so-called "comprehensive" limits. Not only would such sub-limits constitute an extreme intrusion into sovereign matters, but also they would preclude other states from compensating for unilateral reductions by alliance partners. The point of national sub-ceilings is to constrain the possible growth of the *Bundeswehr*, a perpetual goal of Soviet foreign policy.

Former Ambassador Dean (of the United States) makes an important point about the difficulties confronting the MBFR negotiations when he identifies the absence of political will as a key problem. He suggests that Western political interest has been intermittent at best and that the necessary impetus for making important political (as opposed to technical) decisions has been lacking.¹⁷ Without sustained attention and a basic commitment at very senior levels to negotiate a breakthrough (probably on the "numbers problem"), the MBFR negotiations are likely to languish. Although he does not say so, the criticism seems directed at the United States. Most of the participants, however, have been guilty of this, probably because they no longer see a MBFR-type reduction addressing their major security concerns. In a related vein, the advent of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe has probably undercut the already tepid interest in concluding a meagre MBFR force reduction.

Associated Measures

A central feature of NATO MBFR proposals – particularly those of 1979 and later – has been the use of Associated Measures to assist in verifying compliance and to minimize the opportunities for and concerns about a Warsaw Treaty Organization surprise attack. Verification in particular has proven to be a very difficult but nevertheless crucial issue (witness the

prolonged impasse resulting from the inability to establish even common baseline figures). Lothar Ruehl makes the point very well when he says:

Only verifiable reductions of identifiable contingents from known forces of known strength and size can constitute arms control and be an additional factor for stability.¹⁸

The 1979 NATO MBFR proposal outlined a series of rigorous undertakings designed to ensure compliance and reduce concerns about surprise attack. They included a number of what John Keliher calls "inspection measures" as well as several Helsinki style CBMs. These associated Measures included:

1. The United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Canada must give prior notification of the movement of their ground forces into the area of reductions;
2. All participants must give prior notification of any "out-of-garrison" activities (manoeuvres, movements and exercises) within the reduction zone;
3. Ground-force units (and their equipment) must enter and leave the area of reductions only through designated entry and exit points. These would be located at a fixed number of sea ports, railroad border crossings, highway border crossings, and airfields;
4. Each side will have the right to place inspectors at each other's entry/exit points;
5. Each side will have the right to make up to 18 air or ground inspection trips in the area of reduction belonging to the other side;
6. There would be periodic exchange of data and information on the forces in the area after the treaty becomes effective;
7. The non-interference with the National Technical Means provision found in SALT would also be followed in MBFR;
8. A Standing Consultative Commission, similar to that found in SALT, would oversee compliance with the treaty.¹⁹

¹⁷ Jonathan Dean, "MBFR: From Apathy to Accord," *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 128.

¹⁸ Lothar Ruehl, *MBFR: Lessons and Problems*, p. 26.

¹⁹ John Keliher, *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions*, p. 135, and Lothar Ruehl, *MBFR: Lessons and Problems*, p. 26.



These measures fall into several basic categories. One group is very similar to the pre-notification CBMs of the Helsinki Final Act and calls for timely advance notification of troop movements into and perhaps within the sensitive reduction zone. The package also included a requirement to periodically exchange information about personnel and armaments. These are what most analysts would consider classic Confidence-Building Measures. Another group of proposals is borrowed from SALT (the creation of a Standing Consultative Commission to both oversee the implementation of the treaty and deal with questions of compliance as well as an undertaking not to interfere with National Technical means of verification). These are problem-solving and verification-enhancing measures of a non-intrusive kind. The third and most controversial group dealt with inspection measures. These called for the actual placement of observers at designated entry and exit points within adversary regions as well as a limited number of mobile, aerial and "challenge" on-site inspections. This last group of measures is particularly important because it is indicative of the *only* direction in which CBMs can go if they are to reduce fears of surprise attack. This has long been recognized in principle (such measures were discussed in detail at the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference) but agreement on specific measures has proven elusive.

The Soviet reaction to the idea of inspection-oriented Associated Measures has not been enthusiastic. The basic Warsaw Treaty Organization position has been that National Technical Means of verification (predominantly reconnaissance satellites but also ground-based and aerial "listening posts") are adequate to ensure verification of agreements that, in any event, have not yet been negotiated. Given the extent of Warsaw Treaty Organization intelligence gathering activities in Western Europe and the degree of natural openness in the West, the Soviets probably do not need to rely on any

type of intrusive inspection measures. Beyond this, however, the Soviets retain a deep, almost automatic suspicion with respect to these types of measures. The idea of intrusive on-site inspections has been regarded uniformly as an excuse for Western spying. Nevertheless, the WTO reaction has been undercut somewhat because the NATO proposal linked the odious inspection measures with non-invasive Confidence-Building Measures similar to those included in the Helsinki Final Act. This linkage made it difficult for the Warsaw Treaty Organization negotiators to object too strenuously to the package of proposals. There has since been marginal agreement, at least in principle, on the idea of observers at exit and entry points during troop rotation. Agreement beyond this point is likely to be very difficult and the consideration of similar inspection measures at the CDE is almost certainly going to encounter similar difficulty.

The mix of different types of undertakings in the associated Measures package (especially intrusive inspection measures and information or pre-notification measures) illustrates one of the difficulties with the Confidence-Building-Measure concept. There has been a tendency to consider only the latter as being real CBMs. This is a consequence of thinking that the term Confidence-Building Measure applies only to those sorts of measures included in the Helsinki Final Act. The larger problem associated with this misconception is the inability to decide what else (if anything) should count as a Confidence-Building Measure. This is the same sort of problem that we encountered when we looked at a number of arms control agreements and treaties in Chapter Two. Which ones were CBMs and which ones weren't? Should CBM be a term used to describe virtually anything that makes people feel more comfortable about their potential adversaries? Should the term apply only to undertakings similar to the CSCE CBMs? Or should we use the term in a moderately restrictive fashion to describe a range of interstate undertakings designed to reduce the chance of and the opportunity for surprise attack? Without a clear-cut conception and defi-



inition of Confidence Building, dealing with such questions is practically impossible. Such a conception is not going to emerge solely from an examination of the numerous agreements, undertakings and treaties that contain features that look like Confidence-Building Measures. If the Confidence-Building concept is to be useful as an arms control approach, then we will have to look beyond historical examples.



Defining Confidence-Building Measures



Chapter Five

Defining Confidence-Building Measures

Thus far in this study, we have looked briefly at Confidence-Building Measures from an historical perspective. From that perspective, we have encountered a considerable variety of illustrations: international arms control agreements that function as CBMs; the Helsinki Final Act's CBMs; and the Associated Measures of the MBFR negotiations. First, we saw that any number of international agreements either contain or are themselves CBMs. This is particularly evident if we use a deliberately general definition of the CBM concept as the basis for deciding whether or not an agreement is a CBM. For instance, if we say that a Confidence-Building Measure is a bilateral or multilateral undertaking (perhaps as formal as a treaty, perhaps quite informal) intended to clarify adversary intentions, to reduce uncertainties and to constrain the opportunities for surprise attack, then at least half the agreements listed in Chapter Two are CBMs.²⁰ This is certainly true of all the so-called "Hot Line" agreements (the American, British and French arrangements with the Soviet Union). It is obviously the case for the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War and the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas (the United States and the Soviet Union) as well as agreements on the prevention of accidental nuclear war (both France and Britain with the Soviet Union). A number of naval arms control agreements are CBMs (for instance, the Rush-Bagot Treaty, the Chilean-Argentine treaty, the Greco-Turkish treaty, the 1936 London Naval Treaty and some Black Sea agreements). The Spitsbergen and the Aaland Island non-fortification agreements are certainly good examples, as well. The ABM Treaty is clearly an example (an uncertainty reducer of the first order) as is the associated memorandum of understanding establishing the Standing Consultative Commission. The agreement not to interfere with national technical means of verification (in the SALT I Interim Agreement) is undeniably a Confidence-Building Measure. A reasonable argument can also be made for the consideration of all denucleari-

zation and demilitarization treaties and for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We could also include proposals that, while never actually adopted, still constituted CBMs. The 1930 Draft Convention of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, the 1955 "Open Skies" proposal, schemes mentioned at the 1958 Geneva Surprise Attack Conference and the Rapacki Plans all contain clear-cut CBMs. Without using deliberately restrictive criteria, all of these undertakings appear to qualify as reasonable CBM examples.

Despite the fact that these examples appear to match the *function* of a Confidence-Building Measure, some analysts might complain that this is too generous an understanding of the CBM concept. For instance, if all of these agreements are CBMs, then the presumed and often stated distinction *between* CBMs and arms control agreements appears unwarranted and insupportable. This very generous interpretation certainly seems broad to a fault when contrasted with the Helsinki CBMs. The Final Act of the CSCE specified a very precise collection of measures which many people associate exclusively with the term CBM. This may be *too* narrow, however. After all, the Helsinki CBMs are voluntary, very modest in scope and constitute but two, restrictive applications: pre-notification of large military manoeuvres (as distinct from "movements") and the invitation of observers to manoeuvres. Although most analysts and practitioners recognize that these are but tentative initial steps, the tendency is still to associate the concept exclusively with the Helsinki application.

The Associated Measures outlined in the 1979 NATO proposal at the Negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MBFR) also suggest a relatively restrictive set of measures. There, the "Associated Measures" embraced more thorough (and compulsory) notification regulations for manoeuvres *and* movements, especially those involving the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the use of inspectors to monitor the movement of forces into and out of the sensitive reduction zone, a fixed number of inspection trips into or over the reduction zone, the periodic exchange of information and data on forces, the creation of an "implementation and complaint" commission and an agreement not to interfere with each others' National

²⁰ This is by no means a misleading or "straw man" "definition". As we will soon see, it combines the elements present in the majority of analytic and substantive definitions. The multi-faceted character of the definition is an accurate reflection of the distinctive directions taken by different CBM explanations.



Technical Means of verification.²¹ Although this set of measures is considerably more extensive than the Helsinki CBMs, it still does not quite support a generalized and coherent conception of CBMs nor can it, as a consequence, accommodate comfortably the list of historical as well as contemporary arms control agreements discussed earlier as candidate CBMs. This is due less to the fact that Associated Measures are too tentative and narrow in scope (the main fault with the Helsinki CBMs) than it is to their *composite* construction. They are a combination of pre-notification measures (similar to but more extensive than the Helsinki CBMs), problem-solving and verification-enhancing measures and inspection measures. This combination of proposed measures is the result of an effort to address a number of discrete conventional-force problems and concerns specific to the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance in Central Europe. The binding together of solutions to discrete, almost idiosyncratic problems in a CBM package inevitably results in an unfocused organizing concept. Looking at the specific features of the proposed Associated Measures, could one easily infer what a Confidence-Building Measure is? Probably not.

The inference of a general explanation of the CBM concept from existing historical examples of international agreements does not appear to be a very productive undertaking. The resulting explanations of "what is a CBM?" are too dependent upon specific examples. More seriously, there is little consistency amongst the various "definitions" based on (1) Helsinki CBMs, (2) Associated Measures, or (3) the list

of arms-control-derived candidate CBMs. Each example produces a different definition and list of measures. This pattern of inconsistent and incompatible interpretations, all apparently based on the original minimalist Helsinki CBMs and all ostensibly compatible, hints strongly that there is no genuine basic agreement about the nature of the Confidence-Building concept. Once we move beyond the specifics of the exceptionally modest Helsinki CBMs, the status of potential Confidence-Building Measures (are they or aren't they?) becomes questionable.

Given this lack of clarity, perhaps we might have better luck if we turn directly to the work of academic analysts and examine their attempts to conceptualize the CBM idea beyond the confines of existing, substantive and inherently narrow applications. Looking at the *generalized* notions of the CBM concept produced and explored by analysts may permit us to construct a more flexible, wider-ranging and internally consistent understanding of CBMs and CSBMs.²² At the very least, it should expand our conception of Confidence-Building beyond specific applications. Without a measureable improvement in our conceptual thinking we will stand little chance of understanding the genuine prospects or the potential problems associated with this as yet ill-defined but potentially important arms control approach.²³

Basic Definitions

Analytic efforts to clarify our thinking about Confidence-Building Measures generally can be divided into two sorts of activity. The first is the construction of definitions – general statements telling us what a CBM is. The second approach is much more complex and entails the construction of typologies or categories. Although the two activities are seldom con-

²¹ It has been argued that not all of the Associated Measures are really CBMs. This seems to be an excessively narrow interpretation based upon the belief that only the Helsinki CBMs – or their very close analogues – define the content of legitimate measures. At best, such an interpretation is premature. It has yet to be demonstrated that this understanding of CBM status is correct or even sensible.

²² Recall that CSBMs – Confidence and Security Building Measures – are "second-generation" (that is to say, more "ambitious," demanding or constraining) CBMs in contrast to the fairly limited "first generation" Helsinki CBMs. Whether or not the two terms should be used interchangeably in a generic sense is not clear although some authors do so without remark. The usage adopted in this study employs the term CBM generically and uses CSBM to refer to specific, Stockholm-related Confidence-Building-Measure proposals.

²³ It could be argued that from a "diplomat's perspective" deliberate ambiguity can be constructive to the extent that it permits dissimilar positions to co-exist. Even if this is true, ambiguity should be a *controlled* attribute, wielded with skill and based on a keen appreciation of a concept's full meaning. What we have seen thus far suggests, to the contrary, a serious *unintentional* ambiguity – the sort that can breed serious confusion, disappointment, and eventual contention in the market place of ideas.



ducted in isolation and tend, in fact, to blur into each other quite often (definitions frequently invoke types or categories), it will be easier if we look at them separately.

While it is hardly very imaginative, perhaps the most straightforward and effective method of dealing with the variety of CBM "definitions" and descriptions is simply to reproduce a representative sampling. This will provide some sense of the flavour and the variety of Confidence-Building-Measure conceptions. Virtually none of these are brief nor are the descriptions particularly clear in many cases. They are seldom concise and, very often, they are little more than lists. It should be remembered that these descriptions are drawn from the work of the *premier* CBM analysts. The lack of both precision and consistency is instructive. Considering the difficulty already encountered in deciding what a CBM is on the basis of actual examples, we should not be surprised that a parallel variety of interpretations exist within the analytic community.

A logical place to begin is with the Holst and Melander definition introduced in Chapter Two. Their article is widely regarded as one of the very first substantive pieces to deal with the CBM concept. They said that:

*"confidence building involves the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats. Since modern technological means of surveillance have long since penetrated the shells of secrecy traditionally surrounding the military preparations of the nation state, CBM can be but a minor supplement to the various means of intelligence collection. Nevertheless, they are of political and psychological importance, because they can only be implemented on the express wishes of the states whose military activity is notified or observed. ... A major objective of CBM ... is to provide reassurance ... by reducing uncertainties and by constraining opportunities for exerting pressure through military activity."*²⁴

A much more recent article written by Holst contains a revised appreciation of what a CBM is. He states (somewhat cryptically) that CBMs are:

"measures for inducing an assurance of mind and firm beliefs in the trustworthiness of the announced intentions of other states in respect of their security policies, and the facts with regard to military activities and capabilities which are designed to further the objectives of a nation's security policy. The objectives can be furthered by increased *predictability*. Hence, CBM could be designed to facilitate recognition of the "normal" pattern of military activities and thereby make it easier for states to discern significant deviations which may indicate a possible threat. ...

Confidence may be enhanced also by *reassurance* about intentions, through opportunities to ascertain important information relating to military activities. Hence, an important purpose of CBM will be to enable states to demonstrate and confirm the absence of feared threats."²⁵

Another of the classic discussions of Confidence-Building states that they:

"operate on the perceptions of those in confrontation (and particularly on their perceptions of intentions). ... CBM can by-pass assessments of capabilities (and hence many of the problems associated with verification and accuracy of assessments) and go straight to intentions. Two rather different but mutually reinforcing kinds of reassurance are sought through CBM. The first is essentially continuous and related to the willingness of potential adversaries to demonstrate their non-aggressive postures and generally defensive concerns by opening their internal affairs to examination either by the other or by independent observers. ... The second is designed to operate primarily in times of crisis. As a result of measures agreed between the parties, both

²⁴ The first sentence of this excerpt is probably the most frequently cited brief definition of a CBM. Johan Holst and Karen Melander, "European Security and Confidence-building Measures," in *Arms Control and Military Force* p. 147.

²⁵ Johan Jorgen Holst, "Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," *Survival* vol. XXV no. 1, pp. 2-3.



should know that they are less vulnerable to the dangers of a surprise attack because they are assured of warning."²⁶

Writing in another article, Alford makes some further points about CBMs, continuing to argue that their most important attribute is that they clarify military intentions. He says that CBMs are:

"measures that tend to make military intentions explicit. ... [CBMs should] permit both sides to differentiate clearly between actions intended to be seen as hostile and those that are not. ... They are intended to help separate unambiguous signals of hostile intent from the random noise of continuous military activity. ... [T]he degree of confidence primarily depends on the degree of openness and transparency with which states are prepared to conduct their political and military affairs."²⁷

Speaking quite specifically about the potential of CBMs to assist in the negotiation of a meaningful MBFR agreement, Lawrence Freedman focuses on one basic interpretation of CBMs, treating them as if they are synonymous with Associated Measures. He says that CBMs:

"have been seized upon as the last best hope of arms control. They are presented as addressing the real issue, fear of surprise attack, rather than the more artificial question of force levels. The focus is on the factors that actually shape each side's perceptions, an approach which suggests a political benefit of more relaxed relations resulting directly from the military benefit of a reduced threat of surprise attack."²⁸

Later in the same monograph, Freedman adds some further observations about the nature of Confidence-Building Measures:

"The theory and practice of CBM imply two quite distinct effects. Over time some measures are supposed to lead to a form of military, and possibly political, detente. If, however, relations move in exactly the opposite direction, towards a major crisis, other measures might calm the situation by preventing defensive military moves from being misinterpreted and impeding preparations for a surprise attack. In this second sense, *CBM would operate as classic arms control, reinforcing the shared interest in avoiding war despite strong mutual antagonism*. The two roles are not wholly contradictory in that a demonstration of the implausibility of surprise attack has been considered the foundation of military stability and thus detente." (Emphasis added)²⁹

Hans Gunter Brauch makes a widely acknowledged, standard (but not necessarily correct) point when he notes that:

"agreements on CBMs do not directly affect the size, the weaponry, and the structure of armed forces. They only restrict the availability of forces, their activities, and their deployments in certain areas. They aim at more *transparency* in order to avoid misperceptions and wrong reactions and to increase the predictability of the behaviour of both sides. CBMs may be more easily negotiable than arms control agreements."³⁰

Adam Rotfeld is a particularly keen observer of the CBM scene. He concentrates on the psy-

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²⁶ Jonathan Alford, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects," in Jonathan Alford (ed), *The Future of Arms Control: Part III - Confidence-Building Measures* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), p. 5.

²⁷ Jonathan Alford, "The Usefulness and the Limitations of CBMs," in William Epstein and Bernard T. Feld (eds.), *New Directions in Disarmament* (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 134-135.

²⁸ Lawrence Freedman, *Arms Control in Europe* (London: Chatham House Papers, 1981), p. 29.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 35.

³⁰ Hans Gunter Brauch, "Confidence-Building and Disarmament-Supporting Measures," in Epstein and Feld, *New Directions in Disarmament*, pp. 145-146.



chological dimension of CBMs in much of his work, relating it to a primary CBM concern – reducing concerns about surprise attack:

“One of the basic objectives of CBMs is to eliminate the possibility of surprise attack. CBMs are designed to ensure the correct interpretation of an adversary’s intentions in order to reduce the danger arising from unfounded suspicions and misperceptions which are often the result of prejudice or misjudgement.

Viewed in the CSCE context, the essence of CBMs is to demonstrate a willingness to respect the security interests of others and adopt a cooperative rather than aggressive stance ... [and] contribute to breaking down stereotypes, transforming the image of “the enemy” to one of a more “cooperating partner”. By eliminating accidents and the dangers of misinformation – thereby providing predictability and stability – CBMs would further the rationalization of international relations.

In short, CBMs are primarily intended to alter perceptions, so that the intentions of states can be seen for what they actually are, rather than for what they are imagined to be. They are measures chiefly of a political and psychological nature even though they pertain to the domain of military activity.”³¹

Writing elsewhere, Rotfeld states that:

“the intrinsic object of CBMs is the *correct interpretation of the intentions* of partners in the system of international relations. ... [T]he aim was to eliminate subjective factors and evaluations which are often due to prejudice and faulty understanding. ...

[T]he operation of CBMs boils down to eliminating the chance and dangers arising from inaccurate information as well as to removing the causes of rivalry in the development of military capabilities that spring from a sense of insecurity. ...

Thus the object of CBMs is to alter perspectives and ensure the perception of partner’s aims in a more or less correct rather than imaginary light.”³²

Lynn Hansen takes a slightly more restrictive approach to explaining what a CSBM is. (Incidentally, he and Rotfeld use the terms CBM and CSBM in a virtually interchangeable fashion.) He states that:

“CSBM must involve the transmission and verification of credible evidence that military forces and their activities do not constitute a threat to the security, sovereignty or political stability of any state.

If states would undertake reciprocal and cooperative measures that would lessen the opportunity to utilize military force as an instrument of aggressive political objectives, one could begin to speak of the kind of confidence-building that would be conducive to real arms reductions. Such measures require some concrete action commensurate with the dimensions of the political-military problem.”³³

Hansen, writing in another article, is critical of an undue fascination with the psychological character of CBMs. He claims that:

“a number of analysts who have attempted to address the question of the conceptual underpinnings of confidence building have begun with the psychological phenomena of what constitutes trust. But this is approaching the problem backwards. Confidence building in Europe cannot aim at creating a warm and fuzzy feeling to fulfill a psychological need. In the first instance, confidence is (and always will be) directly related to the condition of one’s own security. The path to confidence building most frequently chosen by states is the unilateral



³¹ Adam Rotfeld, “CBMs Between Helsinki and Madrid: Theory and Experience,” in Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds), *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe* (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983), pp. 93-94.

³² Adam Rotfeld, “European Security and Confidence Building: Basic Aims,” in Karl E. Birnbaum (ed.) *Confidence Building in East-West Relations* (Laxenburg, Austria: Austrian Institute for International Affairs – Wilhelm Braumuller, 1982), pp. 106-107.

³³ Lynn Hansen, “Confidence and Security Building at Madrid and Beyond,” in Larrabee and Stobbe, *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe*, p. 145.



one, i.e. the guaranteeing of one's own security through the acquisition of additional military prowess. But confidence building need not be a unilateral process.

If states would undertake reciprocal measures that would lessen the opportunity to actually utilize military force as an instrument to pursue aggressive political objectives, one could begin to speak of the kind of confidence building that would be conducive to arms reductions."³⁴

Richard Darilek, in the summary of the discussion at a major conference on Confidence-Building Measures, made some interesting observations about Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) which suggest that they are *not* quite the same thing as CBMs.

"In view of such negative factors attendant upon their birth, it seemed highly encouraging ... that the subsequent history of CBMs ... had revealed a less narrow approach to the ultimate possibilities of CBMs, a broader conception of what they can and should be expected to do in the future, and even a new common denominator for encapsulating this broader conception, namely, the agreement at Madrid henceforth to entitle them *confidence and security building measures*. Thus, ... the history of CBMs had turned positively in the direction of improving their link to arms control and disarmament. With the addition of the possibility of more militarily restrictive measures inherent in the notion as well as the title of CBM, the first step in this direction had already been taken.

Other participants agreed that, to the extent CBMs included constraints on military activities, as CSBMs might, they were moving close to becoming actual arms control. ... [One scheme for distinguishing between the two] would class as a CBM any

measure that reduces threat perceptions (e.g. by demonstrating that they are wrong) or threat options (e.g. by restricting the use of existing forces). It would draw the line, however, and class as arms control any measure that would actually reduce military capabilities, e.g. by reducing military forces."³⁵

Henning Wegener's description of the key features of the CBMs is noteworthy for several reasons. First, it is an "official" view (that of the Federal Republic of Germany). Second, there was a deliberate effort made to produce a "flexible description of the key elements of a possible universal CBM approach."

"[C]onfidence-building measures are perceived as a specific category of state behavior relating to security and military matters, designed to provide credibility to affirmations of peaceful intentions. In order to create confidence successfully, CBMs must form a sustained pattern of action translated by measures of a militarily significant and adequately verifiable character. In order to enhance the belief of states in the absence of specific military threats emanating from a potential adversary and in the continued existence of its benevolent intentions, a large number of CBMs aim at providing more transparency and openness concerning one's own military posture. Other CBMs provide for restrictions on technically possible military options. All CBMs leave military forces and their existing composition intact."³⁶

In a comprehensive discussion of the CBM concept and its role in the United Nations policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Falk Bomsdorf distinguishes between a comprehen-

³⁴ Lynn Hansen, "Confidence Building in Europe: Problems and Perspectives," in Birnbaum, *Confidence Building in East-West Relations*, p. 53.

³⁵ Richard Darilek, "Summary of Discussions," in Karl Birnbaum, (ed.) *Confidence Building in East-West Relations*, p. 126.

³⁶ Henning Wegener, "Confidence-Building Measures: Europe and Beyond," in Larrabee and Stobbe, *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe*, p. 167.



sive Eastern understanding of Confidence Building ("everything counts") and a much more specific, predominantly Western conception. This Western version, according to Bomsdorf, views

"confidence building measures as a specific concept of security policy and arms control. In this context it relates to a specific threat to a country's security and is an attempt to eliminate or alleviate this threat by means of appropriate measures. Confidence here means confidence in the absence of certain threats posed by the other side, so it is confidence in a specific situation. Confidence-building measures as here understood are intended to give the other side circumstantial evidence indicating that the threat it fears or that a genuine threat has been either reduced or eliminated. Confidence, or trust, between nations is thus not the foremost objective of this concept. Advocates of this school of thought work more on the assumption, ... that fundamental mistrust, especially of the East by the West and vice versa, cannot be eliminated by confidence-building measures and replaced by confidence in the wider sense of the term. This mistrust must, ... be accepted as a fact and an attempt made by reaching agreement on confidence-building measures, to prevent mistrust from being heightened to the point at which it leads to open conflict."³⁷

In sharp contrast to this "Western" conception of Confidence Building is the other basic approach, an approach that is frequently associated with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. Here, the tendency is to equate the term Confidence-Building Measures with any gesture or undertaking that:

"in any way tends to promote mutual understanding between countries. Thus

³⁷ Falk Bomsdorf, "The Confidence-Building Offensive in the United Nations," *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 33, no. 4, p. 374.

³⁸ Ibid. Although the official Soviet approach to CBMs (as noted above) is distinctly inclined toward a very broad interpretation, the utility of some (narrow) military CBMs has also been acknowledged. There is a degree of latitude within the Warsaw Pact states with some members adopting perspectives that are rather similar, in some respects, to Western proposals.

any treaty signed, any negotiations, any talks, any encounter and any exchange of whatever kind between states is frequently understood as part of the confidence-building process and thus as part of a confidence-building measure. ... confidence-building measures are not, by this token, limited to the politico-military sector; they may also ... apply to the economic, scientific and technological, cultural and other sectors. Last but not least, declarations of political intent are also viewed as confidence-building measures ..."³⁸

Pavel Podlesnyi's characterization of CBMs illustrates this point:

"Soviet researchers distinguish between "confidence-building measures" (CBMs) in the military field and those in economic, political and scientific spheres, which may widen and consolidate the material bases for positive interstate relations. These latter CBMs may be very effective and may not be inferior to CBMs in the military field, such as the notification of military manoeuvres or the invitation of military observers. Soviet specialists also start from the assumption that, while no opportunity to promote confidence in the military sphere must be disregarded, such steps should not be undertaken instead or at the expense of measures aimed at curbing the arms race and furthering disarmament."³⁹

In the same vein but subtly different is Istvan-Farago's characterization of CBMs:

"The broad concept favored by the WTO states is reflected in a description offered by Polish experts: confidence building is a broad process which includes political, legal, military and even technological aspects. This broad notion embraces a wide range of strictly defined activities, undertakings and obligations which are designed to promote detente. In this view, the entire CSCE Final Act is an instrument which serves to develop confidence between states. ...

³⁹ Pavel Podlesnyi, "Confidence-Building as a Necessary Element of Detente," in Karl Birnbaum, *Confidence-Building in East-West Relations*, pp. 95-96.



In the East-West context, confidence involves the mutual recognition of the premises of peaceful coexistence; the acceptance of the approximate parity of military capabilities; the readiness to reduce the risks of nuclear war and to maintain the military balance at progressively lower levels; and the mutual respect for the other side's broad security interests. ...

CBMs have specific functions to fulfill and may have great unexplored potential. However, CBMs in and of themselves cannot be expected to solve pressing security and arms limitation problems."⁴⁰

The Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence-Building Measures, a document submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations, is a lengthy examination of the CBM concept. The understanding of Confidence Building developed in this report was produced through the use of a *functional* approach. Rather than wrestle with *a priori* characterizations, the authors of this study developed a flexible (if lengthy) understanding of the CBM concept by exploring the different *objectives* which CBMs should or ought to attain. According to the Report:

"Confidence-building should facilitate the process of arms control and disarmament negotiations, including verification; facilitate the settlement of international disputes and conflicts; ...

[O]ne of the main objectives of confidence-building measures must be to reduce the elements of fear and speculation in order to achieve a more accurate and more reliable reciprocal assessment of military activities and other matters pertaining to mutual security, which may cause mutual apprehensions and increase the risk of conflict.

All agreed that besides facilitating the dissemination and exchange of pertinent information, regular personal contacts at all levels of political and military decision-making should be encouraged and promoted... .

Confidence-building measures may serve the additional objectives of facilitating verification of arms control and disarmament. ... Confidence-building measures cannot, however, supersede verification measures, which are an inseparable part of arms control and disarmament measures. ...

Fear and insecurity resulting from important routine military activities can be allayed considerably if States agree to enlarge the scope and the area of application of confidence-building measures, which should be undertaken in such a manner as to indicate as reliably as possible their peaceful intentions. Any major deviation from agreed parameters of confidence-building measures would then give a strong indication of dubious intent. ...

Under certain circumstances it may be possible to go a step further and to agree on confidence-building measures which would put certain constraints on the respective military options. While leaving the over-all military potential intact, the objective of such constraints ought to be to make sure that the existing potentials cannot be used for aggressive purposes."⁴¹

In a treatment that captures splendidly the practical difficulty in (1) separating arms control and CBMs, and (2) describing what CBMs actually are, Abbott Brayton discusses the role that CBMs can play in reducing East-West tensions. He begins by noting that an arms race will not come to an end merely because one participant ceases to compete. This is what makes arms races so potentially dangerous. Brayton observes, however, that an arms race:

"can be slowed, perhaps reversed, by altering the perceptions of both sides. CBMs provide the first convincing means of establishing some degree of trust sufficient to induce a climate for arms reduction negotiations, by illuminating presumably peaceful behaviour patterns of either side. CBMs provide reassurance of good intentions through (a) continuous public demonstra-



⁴⁰ Istvan Farago, "Confidence-Building in the Age of Nuclear Overkill," in Larrabee and Stobbe (eds.) *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe*, pp. 32-33.

⁴¹ *Comprehensive Study of the Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence Building Measures*, United Nations Document A/36/474, pp. 11-13.



tion of non-aggressive postures, and (b) the enhancement of crisis-management capabilities commensurate with a reduction of the danger of surprise attack.

Unlike arms limitations agreements, which require the careful monitoring of numerical levels of forces, CBMs focus on intentions. Yet, the problems of assessing intentions are bypassed, for compliance requires only the verification of those major actions which presumably reflect intentions.

This raises a conceptual issue. Arms limitation agreements incorporate substantive measures, ... CBMs, however, as the stalking horses of substantive arms limitation agreements, are designed to be essentially symbolic – changing perceptions, rather than limiting forces. *This is often obscured in practice, however, for a number of CBM are de facto substantive arms limitation measures ...*

CBMs, therefore, reduce the likelihood of a surprise attack by providing early warning indicators of possible adversary preparations of aggression. Adversaries are thus able to lower their defensive postures and defence spending with a commensurate lowering of tensions and the risk of war.⁴²

The Attributes of Confidence-Building "Definitions"

Someone new to the study of CBM and CSBM could be forgiven for finding the foregoing "menu" of "definitions" overwhelming. These descriptive accounts are lengthy, often imprecise, sometimes contradictory (or apparently so) and occasionally obscure. The number of descriptive accounts of what constitutes a Confidence-Building Measure could be increased beyond the selection presented here but that would scarcely improve things. Although there is a fairly clear sense of common objectives present in these lengthy descriptions, there is also a disturbing lack of clarity or even consensus. On some attributes, the descriptions are even contradictory. If we were to extract the main points from descriptive

definitions of CBMs, we would have a sizeable and sometimes contradictory list of attributes. Such a list, however, might yield some fairly coherent general sense of what a CBM actually is.

1. CBMs encompass a *broad array* of legitimate concerns, including technological, cultural, economic, political and military matters where successful bilateral and multilateral undertakings, exchanges and agreements increase understanding and, hence, confidence and trust.
2. CBMs are a specific category of state behaviour relating to security and military matters.
3. CBMs constitute a specific concept of security policy and arms control. These measures relate to specific threats and attempt to reduce or eliminate those threats.
4. CBMs must be militarily significant and adequately verifiable to have any meaning as confidence builders.
5. CBMs entail the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats.
6. CBMs entail the transmission and verification of credible evidence that military forces and their activities do not constitute a threat to the security, sovereignty or political stability of any state.
7. CBMs are intended to provide circumstantial evidence indicating that a feared threat is reduced or eliminated.
8. The purpose of CBMs is to reduce the danger resulting from inaccurate (military) information.
9. The purpose of CBMs is to eliminate the possibility of surprise attack.
10. CBMs reduce the likelihood of a surprise attack by providing early warning and indicators of possible adversary preparations.
11. CBMs are primarily of a political and psychological nature but operate in the domain of military activity.
12. CBMs don't (shouldn't) really have very much to do with psychology.
13. The objective of CBMs is to ensure the correct interpretation of intentions.
14. CBMs are designed to lend credibility to affirmations of peaceful intentions.

⁴² Abbott A. Brayton, "Confidence-Building Measures in European Security," *The World Today*, October 1980, p. 384.



15. CBMs provide reassurance of good intentions through (1) the continuous public demonstration of non-aggressive military postures and (2) the enhancement of crisis management capabilities commensurate with the reduction of the danger of surprise attack.
16. There are two types of CBMs: (1) those that address a willingness to demonstrate non-aggressiveness through openness; and (2) those that reduce concerns about surprise attack warning.
17. There are two directions in which CBMs can go: (1) military detente and (2) crisis reduction (by preventing defensive military moves from being misinterpreted as impending preparations for a surprise attack). (This second direction is close to classic arms control.)
18. The objective of CBMs is to alter perceptions in order to lead to correct interpretations of intentions.
19. The focus of CBMs is on the factors that shape each side's perceptions of the other side.
20. CBMs operate on the perceptions of those in confrontation (and particularly on their perceptions of intentions).
21. The major purpose of CBMs in a crisis is to re-establish communications.
22. CBMs make (should make) military intentions explicit.
23. CBMs provide reassurance about intentions through opportunities to ascertain important information relating to military activities.
24. CBMs permit (or should permit) us to differentiate between hostile action and the normal "noise" of military activity.
25. CBMs do not directly affect the size, the weaponry and the structure of armed forces. They only restrict the availability of forces, their activities, and their deployments in certain areas.
26. CBMs leave military forces and their existing composition intact.
27. CBMs reduce threat perception (by demonstrating that the perceptions are wrong) and reduce threat options (by restricting the use of existing forces). CBMs do *not* include any measures that would actually reduce military capabilities.
28. CBMs are *not* arms control measures.
29. CBMs are pre-arms control measures – they (can) facilitate arms control and disarmament agreements.
30. Any CBMs that directly and obviously reduce the chance of war are undeniably an arms control measure.
31. The degree of confidence depends primarily upon the degree of *openness* and *transparency*. [These terms are important but confusing. Bomsdorf explains them in the following way: "Transparency is one of the key concepts, if not *the* key to the Western approach to confidence-building measures, which are intended to make the other side's military strategy and practice transparent. This is to enable inferences to be drawn as to its attitude and to make it more predictable and calculable. ... East Bloc countries ... reject Western demands for transparency, or *prozracnost*, because accepting them would, it is argued, be tantamount to legalizing espionage. Instead, Eastern delegates use the term openness, or *otkrovennost*, both as a formula of rejection and as basic concept of the East's views on confidence-building measures. In the West there is a widespread tendency to ignore this distinction and regard transparency and openness as synonymous. ... Transparency is a concept to which objective criteria apply and does not come in degrees. ... Openness, in contrast, is a concept that can be influenced by subjective factors. How open one is will always depend upon how open one is prepared to be." This careful distinction is seldom discussed and is typical of the carelessness that attends the translation of terms with specific meanings. Although Bomsdorf appears to be incorrect on the matter of transparency having no degrees, his larger point about complete versus relative openness is well taken.⁴³

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⁴³ Falk Bomsdorf, "The Confidence-Building Offensive in the United Nations," *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 376-377.



32. CBMs aim at more transparency in order to avoid misperception and wrong reactions, and to increase predictability.
33. National Technical Means of surveillance are extraordinarily capable and easily dwarf any explicit substantive information that can be derived from CBMs.
34. The objective of CBMs is reassurance which is achieved by reducing uncertainties and by constraining opportunities for exerting pressure through military activity.
35. CBMs are measures for inducing an assurance of mind and firm beliefs in the trustworthiness of the announced intentions of other states with respect to their security policies and the facts about their military capabilities.
36. CBMs attempt to increase predictability (i.e. they help us to recognize "normal" patterns of military behaviour).

On the basis of this list of "attributes" what can we say about CBMs and CSBMs? First of all, most conceptions of Confidence Building appear to treat it (usually implicitly) as a psychological phenomenon, one that involves *communication, perception and intentions*. According to the majority of discussions, Confidence Building addresses military concerns, particularly *fear about surprise attack*. This focus is probably a residual feature of the Central European birthplace of the CBM idea. Many descriptions

⁴⁴ Explicitly separating "military" and "political" CBMs does run some potential risk of reifying existing tendencies in the arms control approaches of the East and the West but it does recognize the intrinsic differences in the two conceptions of Confidence Building. They are not necessarily incompatible, but they are definitely different.

⁴⁵ Many analysts seem to think that this is not so. There are simply no compelling grounds, however, for saying that CBMs are not a type of arms control. A general and widely accepted definition of arms control counts those measures which reduce the chance of war occurring or the severity of war if it should occur. CBMs clearly qualify as measures designed to reduce the chance of war. That CBMs do not involve actual force reduction is not a sufficient reason for excluding them from the category of arms control measures. Indeed, there is also no obvious reason why measures involving force reductions should be excluded when measures sponsoring obvious equipment and manpower restrictions are counted as CBMs.

reveal a particular concern with rendering intentions somehow "transparent" so that potential adversaries will not misperceive (and hence not over-react to) legitimate, non-aggressive military behaviour. Most descriptions imply or state explicitly that CBMs are not arms control although the authors probably mean that CBMs do not (should not) deal with actual force reductions.

If we set aside the Eastern conception of Confidence Building with its very broad interest in political, social, economic and technical relations (what used to be called *detente* and what could now be called "political Confidence Building")⁴⁴ and restrict our attention to military CBMs, what sort of analytic definition begins to emerge from our examination of existing efforts to describe Confidence-Building Measures? Bearing in mind that we have yet to encounter two additional sources of insight ("categories" and "specific proposals") that will further enrich our understanding of the CBM concept, we can nevertheless begin to construct a working definition of military Confidence Building. On the basis of observations made by a number of analysts, we can say that Military Confidence-Building Measures are:

1. a variety of arms control measure⁴⁵ entailing
2. state actions
3. that can be unilateral but which are more often either bilateral or multilateral
4. that attempt to reduce or eliminate misperceptions⁴⁶ about specific military threats or concerns (very often having to do with surprise attack)
5. by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those concerns are groundless
6. often (but not always) by demonstrating that military and political intentions are not aggressive

⁴⁶ CBMs only deal with correcting misperception only in situations where no genuine, premeditated aggressive intent exists. It is the province of other types of arms control or unilateral action to address situations where intentions are genuinely aggressive. This distinction ignores temporarily the problem of deliberately using CBMs for coercive purposes or to mask preparations for attack.



- 7. and/or by providing early warning indicators to create confidence that surprise would be difficult to achieve
- 8. and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces by adopting restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces (or crucial components of them) within sensitive areas.

On the basis of this "consensus" definition (a logically consistent hybrid construction), Confidence-Building Measures are undertakings that try to correct the misperceptions and fears that breed mistrust in the realm of national security concerns. Although the specific measures themselves are or are related to military capabilities, the underlying dynamic is psychological. The intent is to rehabilitate the image of the adversary. The absolutely crucial assumption, of course, is that no state that is a party to a CBM regime actually has deliberate intentions to use military force. If that assumption is in serious doubt, then the Confidence-Building process is unlikely to enjoy genuine success.

Categories of Confidence-Building Measures

Another way of looking at the concept of Confidence Building is to examine the different ways in which analysts have attempted to produce categories for different types of CBM proposals. Although the construction of various categories is unlikely to produce a radical revision in our way of thinking about CBMs, the identification of patterns and categories should clarify our understanding of the concept. The development of a sensible set of categories will also allow us (in Chapter Six) to impose some sense of order on the countless CBM proposals devised thus far.

There are several useful schemes that have been developed to organize Confidence-Building Measures. Jonathan Alford suggests that there are three basic "modes of operation" of "objective" CBMs.

Type 1 CBMs: Detection of Preparations for War

Exchange of stationed observers at communication nodes and ports,
 Reconnaissance flights,
 Satellites,
 Transition to coded radio traffic from "clear" or uncoded traffic,
 Outloading ammunition (conventional or nuclear) from rear depots,
 Nonconcealment undertakings.

Type 2 CBMs: Constraints on Preparedness

Zones of limited deployment (land and sea),
 Demilitarized zones,
 Restrictions on the forward deployment of specific types of equipment (i.e. bridging equipment and strike aircraft),
 Manoeuvre limitations (by overall size, location, frequency and duration) (land, sea and air forces),
 Movement limits.

Type 3 CBMs: Clarifying Measures

Prenotification of manoeuvres,
 Prenotification of military movements,
 Observers at manoeuvres,
 Restrictions on the carriage of live ammunition on manoeuvres.⁴⁷

Freedman takes a somewhat different approach when he suggests that Confidence Building Measures can be divided into three basic categories:

1. "communication measures" to reduce the chance of war by accident, misinterpretation, miscalculation or unauthorized action;
2. "surprise attack measures" to restrict or constrain capabilities that would (could) be used for or in a surprise attack; and
3. "verification or transparency measures" such as the Associated Measures proposed for observers in the MBFR negotiations.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Jonathan Alford, "The Usefulness and the Limitations of CBMs," p. 136. The distinction between "objective" and "subjective" CBMs is far less successful. In fact, it scarcely makes any sense.

⁴⁸ Lawrence Freedman, *Arms Control in Europe*, pp. 29-31.



According to Holst, there are four categories of CBMs functions:

1. measures involving the exchange or distribution of military information;
2. measures involving the prior notification of military manoeuvres and movements;
3. measures providing for the observation of military manoeuvres and movements as well as the inspection of certain capabilities;
4. measures designed to enhance stability. This category is not usually included by other analysts. It includes undertakings intended to enhance *crisis stability* ("the relative absence of pressures to take early military action to forestall moves by the adversary"), *arms race stability* ("the relative absence of inducement to expand military forces"), and *political stability* ("the relative absence of pressures for the breakdown of the international order").⁴⁹

In addition to these four functional categories, Holst suggests that CBMs can be seen as being either *declaratory* undertakings or obligations involving *specific actions*. The category of obligations entailing specific actions can be further divided into (1) *procedural commitments* (involving the communication of information) or (2) *constraints* ("limitations on deployment, employment or movement of military forces or on their development, testing and procurement of equipment").⁵⁰

Other sets of basic categories include Hansen's

1. *Information CBMs*: These involve the exchange of information on structure, organization, location, etc., of military formations and units; budgetary information and discussions of military doctrine;
2. *Notification CBMs*: These involve the pre-notification of manoeuvres and exercises, the mobilization of forces, amphibious warfare activities, including information on the scale and range of that which is notifiable;
3. *Verification CBMs*: These measures entail observers at notified activities. on-site observation by accredited personnel, non-interference with National Technical Means of verification agreements, etc.;
4. *Constraint CBMs*: These include restrictions on the size of manoeuvres, on the area where manoeuvres and exercises are conducted, and reductions or limitations on the amount of certain types of equipment (bridging equipment is the best example) available in certain zones.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Johan Jorgen Holst, "Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," p. 4.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Lynn Hansen, "Confidence and Security Building at Madrid and Beyond," in Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds.) *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe* p. 154.



and D'Aboville's

1. Transparency and Early Warning Measures;
2. Operational Constraint Measures (designed to complicate a surprise attack by "crippling" offensive military capabilities;
3. Measures designed to establish Channels of Communication between operational actors at different levels;
4. Measures leading to an improved knowledge of and familiarity with the organizational aspects of adversary military establishments.⁵²
3. Crisis management rules and structures;
4. Proposals for "transparency" including publication of information on defence budgets, force structure, and military research and development;
5. Limitations on military options and agreements on military doctrine;
6. Geographical approaches such as demilitarization or force reduction zones;
7. Control, verification and monitoring measures and systems;

Several authors have developed more elaborate sets of categories. Brauch, for instance, lists 10 separate types of CBMs.

1. Measures to improve the conditions for CBMs on the national level (Brauch uses the example of Disarmament Fostering Measures – DFMs – such as the creation of "national governmental disarmament agencies", the publication of "arms-limitation and disarmament impact statements" and the creation of new peace research institutes.);
2. Rules for manoeuvres, movements, and observers;



⁵² Benoit D'Aboville, "CBMs and the Future of European Security," in Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds.) *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe*, pp. 193-195.



- 8. Efforts to enhance communication and to facilitate institutionalization;
- 9. Rules on the use and deployment of weapons;
- 10. "Other" measures.⁵³

Brayton also uses a large number of categories but his system is oriented toward revisions of the existing Helsinki CBMs. With some modification, it would also be a useful device for organizing our thinking about existing Confidence-Building Measures as well as proposed CBMs.

- 1. Notification Measures involving:
 - (a) Manoeuvres involving military forces beyond a certain size (10,000 men), including aggregated smaller manoeuvres;
 - (b) "Out-of-garrison activities" and other military movements involving forces beyond a certain size (10,000 to 20,000 troops), including aggregated smaller movements;
 - (c) Mobilization exercises;
 - (d) Naval and air exercises;

- 2. Observer Measures;
- 3. Communication Measures;
- 4. Ground and Air Inspection for Verification of other measures;
- 5. Measures facilitating or mandating the exchange and/or publication of information on defence budgets, forces, stationing plans, doctrine, etc.;
- 6. Measures to ensure the non-interference with National Technical Means of verification.⁵⁴

There really do not appear to be strong reasons for rejecting any of the existing sets of categories (although Brauch's seems a bit ambitious and unrealistic). We can nevertheless combine the best features of the existing sets and construct a set of categories that fits comfortably with the consensus definition of Confidence Building developed earlier in the chapter. That definition stated that Confidence Building:

was a variety of arms control measure entailing state actions that can be unilateral but which are more often either bilateral or multilateral that attempt to reduce or eliminate misperceptions about specific military threats or concerns (very often having to do with surprise attack)

⁵³ Hans Gunter Brauch, "Confidence-Building and Disarmament Supporting Measures," in Epstein and Feld, pp. 151-152.

⁵⁴ Abbott A. Brayton, "Confidence-Building Measures in European Security," *The World Today*, October 1980, pp. 387-391.



by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those concerns are groundless often (but not always) by demonstrating that military and political intentions are not aggressive

and/or by providing early warning indicators to create confidence that surprise would be difficult to achieve

and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces by adopting restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces (or crucial components of them) within sensitive areas.

To this "consensus" definition, we can add the following categories of Confidence-Building Measures:

(A) *Information and Communication CBMs*

- (1) Information Measures (the exchange and publication of technical information about military forces as well as, possibly, defence budgets);
- (2) Communication Measures (the provision for direct exchanges of information such as "Hot Lines");

(3) Notification Measures (the timely announcement of all military manoeuvres and movements beyond a specified size (whether aggregated or not), including acceptably detailed information on the nature of the movement or manoeuvre);

(4) Manoeuvre Observer Conduct Measures – a "grey" area measure restricted to establishing how observers at manoeuvres should be treated and how they should act in order to make their function useful but not too intrusive;

(B) *Constraint or Surprise Attack CBMs*

(1) Inspection Measures (the intrusive complement of Manoeuvre Observer Measures, these measures call for the intrusive monitoring of behaviour according to agreed criteria. The Inspection Measures of the MBFR Associated Measures are good examples. This category could also include the use of early warning devices);



- (2) Non-interference Measures (agreements not to interfere with and, in some cases, to cooperate with the use of National Technical Means of verification. It should be remembered that CBMs cannot directly include verification activities *per se*. They are intrinsically the unilateral province of the observer state and beyond the conceptual realm of CBMs. CBMs do, however, include measures designed to *facilitate* verification which is an adjunct function within the scope of actual Confidence-Building Measures. This should not obscure the point that verification plays an important role in establishing the credibility of promises and the accuracy of statements made within CBM regimes);
- (3) Behavioural or "Tension-Reducing" Measures (designed to constrain the risks of unintended war or crisis escalation by controlling or eliminating needlessly aggressive or provocative "testing" behaviour);
- (4) Deployment Constraint Measures (the restriction of certain specified types and/or numbers of military forces and/

or specified types and/or numbers of equipment in specified geographic zones regarded to be sensitive).

(C) *Declaratory CBMs*

This is a controversial category that is included primarily because a number of states claim that such measures are CBMs. "No First Use" pledges, and the like, lack any conceptual connection with the other CBMs discussed in this study and generally rely upon unilateral or multilateral declarations of non-aggressive intent to build confidence.

The definition and the set of categories developed in this chapter, in combination with the historical context of the earlier chapters, help us to understand what is and can be meant by Confidence Building. We can gain a further sense of the Confidence-Building concept by looking at the range of actual proposals that have been advanced, particularly those intended to find their way into discussions at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building and Disarmament in Europe. It is to that subject we turn in Chapter Six.



Confidence and Security Building Proposals



Chapter Six

Confidence and Security Building Proposals

In the first five chapters of this study we have: looked at a number of arms control agreements that could be considered to be examples of Confidence-Building Measures; traced briefly the histories of MBFR and the CSCE; looked somewhat more carefully at Associated Measures and the Helsinki CMBs; surveyed analytic efforts to describe or define Confidence Building; and, finally, constructed our own "consensus" definition of and categories for Confidence-Building Measures. We have yet to subject the general notion of Confidence Building to critical analysis and when we do – in the next chapter – we will see that there are some serious problems with the idea of Confidence Building and with analytic efforts to conceptualize it. Before we do that, however, we should take a close look at the substantial collection of specific CBM proposals discussed in the literature, many of which are being considered at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. We can gain a good sense of what the Confidence Building concept actually means by looking carefully at the functional characteristics of these proposals.

The sheer number and variety of Confidence-Building proposals discussed in the literature are daunting. Recent estimates maintain that there are between 60 and 100 distinct examples, although many of these are simply minor variations on more basic themes. Nevertheless, there are a good many distinctive Confidence-Building proposals.⁵⁵ The only reasonable way in which to deal with so many separate proposals is to group them according to an organizational scheme of categories. The set of categories developed in the previous chapter should serve this purpose well. The assignment of proposals to categories is inevitably arbitrary in some cases. Where this appears to be the case, a cautionary note is attached. The bulk of CBM proposals discussed here relate only to conventional military relationships. Some are intended to apply to strategic nuclear or intermediate nuclear relationships. A few are applicable in all three spheres. All are included in this discussion.

⁵⁵ Brayton's 1980 estimate is "over 60." "Confidence-Building Measures in European Security," *World Today* (October 1980), p. 387. Farago states (mid-1983) that recent studies "propose some one hundred possible confidence-building measures." "Confidence Building in the Age of Nuclear Redundancy" in Larrabee and Stobbe, p. 31.

Information and Communication CBMs

Information Measures

These measures encompass the exchange and publication of technical information about military forces and military policies including defence budgets, force deployments and military research and development. Because the point of many of these measures is to demystify adversary military behaviour and capabilities, measures involving military exchanges can also be included in this predominantly educational category.

1. **The publication and circulation (perhaps through a central administrative organization) of defence budget data.** This suggestion usually includes the further feature of a standardized reporting format. The obvious difficulty associated with this proposal has to do with the reliability of tendered information and its subsequent verification. The point of such proposals is to establish a baseline against which relative and absolute changes in defence spending can be noted. This will permit, it is argued, more accurate long range defence planning, thus militating against one commonly presumed cause of the arms race – over-reactions to the defence activities of adversary states. Whether acknowledged or not, this type of scheme must begin with accurate and consistent data or it cannot overcome the distrust and uncertainty it seeks to defeat. Regrettably, the Soviet Union, as well as a number of other states, does not currently publish reliable defence expenditure data for reasons of national security and there is little reason to think that this situation will soon change. Even if various states indicated a willingness to report their defence spending according to a standard format, there is no way of reliably confirming the accuracy of their submissions. Despite pretenses to the contrary, there is no available methodology that will support more than a casual estimate of the true defence expenditures of most countries.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ For an illustration of difficulties see Franklyn Holzman, "Are the Soviets Really Outspending the U.S. on Defense?" *International Security*, vol. 4, no. 4 pp. 86-104 and "Soviet Military Spending: Assessing the Numbers Game," *International Security*, vol. 6, no. 4 pp. 78-101.



Without any meaningful and accurate method of verification, the exercise of publishing "standardized" expenditure figures would be very difficult to initiate and far too prone to self-serving propagandizing on all sides. This is a good example of how some Confidence-Building proposals could actually result in "Confidence Reduction".

2. **The exchange of information on the composition of forces.** This proposal – actually a series of related proposals – calls for the (usually regular) exchange of information outlining at least one of the following: manpower figures, general deployment plans, the designation of specific deployed units, the location of specific units, the quantities of certain types of equipment, and the locations of certain types of equipment. These proposals usually focus on troops and equipment in specific sensitive areas. One proposal even includes the exchange of information about command structures. These proposals generally aim to reduce uncertainty and to institute or increase the habitual flow of information between adversary military organizations. This type of arrangement has already been initiated in SALT II which included an exchange of data on nuclear delivery vehicles. To the extent that released information can be verified with reasonable precision, such proposals would likely provide a constructive, if quite modest, improvement in military relations, thereby building confidence.
3. **Seminar on Strategy.**⁵⁷ This and several similar ideas call for formal or informal meetings amongst protagonists designed to encourage the discussion of various strategic outlooks, perhaps within the framework of a Standing Consultative Commission-like body. Military doctrine – conventional and strategic nuclear – and various aspects of broader military policy as well as deployments could be discussed and even debated amongst professional military, political and analytical representa-

tives of various countries in order to increase understanding and decrease ethnocentrism. One proposal goes so far as to suggest discussions ("elucidation") on three levels: "(1) Non-negotiable programs to be undertaken no matter what the other side does, (2) action planned but changeable if the other side is willing to do certain things, and (3) long lead-time options which both sides might usefully preclude."⁵⁸ Although similar to more straightforward exchange programmes where participants get to "know" each other, the "seminar on strategy" idea is far more narrowly concerned with sensitizing potential adversaries to each other's distinctive "strategic cultures". The aim is to counter simple-minded mirror-image thinking and thereby permit new insights into adversary behaviour. The basic difficulty with such an enterprise resides in getting participants to freely discuss sensitive defence issues. The danger (one discussed at greater length later) lies in becoming too "forgiving" of or insensitive to the physical realities of adversary military behaviour (i.e. "It's O.K. Don't worry about the number of tanks. They're paranoid about invasion and always feel safer with large defences").

4. **Exchange of defence industry data.** Primarily associated with the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues study *Common Security*, this idea assumes that one of the dominant causes of the arms race is inadequate information about adversary defence industry activity, especially in the Research and Development area. The point of the proposal is to provide a forum where representatives of defence ministries could discuss features of their own as well as other states' military research, development and acquisition policies. With greater understanding and knowledge of various research programmes – so the argument goes – there would be less chance of the typical over-reaction to

⁵⁷ Johan Holst is best known for this proposal. "Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," *Survival*, vol. XXIV, no. 1, p. 6.

⁵⁸ Joseph Nye's idea described in Alton Frye's "Building Confidence Between Adversaries: An American Perspective" in Birnbaum, *Confidence Building and East-West Relations*, p. 40. Frye has also suggested that the U.S. and the Soviet Union consciously adopt a common strategy doctrine in order to reduce current doctrinal asymmetries.



presumed activities in adversary defence industries. It is difficult to imagine, however, officials from adversary states such as the United States and the USSR discussing such intrinsically sensitive material. This scheme also assumes a far greater degree of rational control over "defence industry" than is in fact possible. It appears to be the case that senior political decision makers often do not know about and, hence, cannot control the intricacies of their own defence establishment's plans and programmes. If such a proposal were to be put into practice, it would probably operate in much the same way as would other Confidence-Building Measures. Confidence would be built to the extent that independent verification supported the claims made by various participants. Despite some natural skepticism about its practicality and usefulness, this proposal is not without some merit. A regular exchange of military research and development information, even on a rather general level, could be helpful and could be conducted under the aegis of an institution like the SALT-inspired Standing Consultative Commission.

5. **Arms Control Impact Statements.** This type of proposal is similar to the preceding one. Here, however, the idea is to consciously consider the full range of consequences flowing from particular weapon-system development and acquisition decisions. The need to provide clear rationales for and assessments of the longer-term impact of weapon systems in development would sensitize decision makers to the potentially destabilizing consequences of certain types of weapons – conventional, nuclear or dual purpose – before they are deployed or thoroughly tested. Whether or not the major powers would agree to a regime requiring such "impact statements" is hard to estimate, but such a proposal would certainly expose the careless or weak reasoning behind many decisions to public scrutiny.
6. **Standing Consultative Commission.** Several proposals dealing with European security issues have suggested that a body similar to the SALT-mandated Standing Consultative Commission be instituted in order to deal with various arms control-related procedural and compliance ques-

tions on a continuing basis. CSCE and MBFR proposals have included such a suggestion. These SCC-type bodies have also been suggested for use in resolving additional strategic nuclear problem areas, particularly the demilitarization of space. Their primary virtue resides in their private and generally depoliticized, technical character. As an institutional means of smoothing out compliance problems and questions, these bodies have much to recommend them in various existing and potential arms control regimes.

7. **Military exchange and liaison programmes.** This sort of proposal does not quite belong in this category. However, because the basic purpose of these types of exchanges is educational, they can be regarded as "information measures" without stretching the category too much. Here, the idea is quite simple and straightforward. Officers (and, perhaps, NCOs) spend time functioning with or observing adversary military forces in order to gain a more human-dimensioned understanding of the "enemy". Familiarity with soldiers from other military forces and their customary practices gained in this manner presumably decreases the tendency to view "them" as the faceless enemy and also helps to reduce some of the mystery associated with their actions. Like some other information measures, this proposal seeks to counter ethnocentrism. It has yet to be determined whether these exchange programmes, at whatever level and in whatever form, might not lead to deliberate deceit on the one hand (Let's carefully choreograph activities so we won't look bad with visiting Russians around!) or contempt on the other (a closer look may reveal ineptitude and weakness where strength and skill was previously assumed). In addition, the discovery of unexpected weaknesses could actually *encourage* instability. This highlights one of the intrinsic difficulties with many CBM proposals. *To the extent that they reduce uncertainty about military capabilities and intentions, CBMs can actually decrease stability and increase the chances of war. Uncertainty can serve a constructive pur-*



pose in military relations. Although this is not uniformly the case, Confidence-Building Measures ought to be constructed with this point in mind. Related to these exchange programmes are proposals calling for the stationing of delegations at adversary military headquarters as well as proposals suggesting the creation of military liaison posts in other states. These latter proposals are very close to another category of CBMs dealing with intrusive observers and can be separated from that category only to the extent that the function served is primarily educational rather than compliance inspection or early warning observation.

Communication Measures

This relatively restricted set of measures build on the "Hot Line" idea and is intended to facilitate emergency communication between adversary states or alliances.

1. **Hot Lines.** Proposals calling for the creation of additional "Hot Lines" of one sort or another are the most obvious and dominant communication CBM proposals. They are invariably modeled on the initial Soviet-American undertaking and its later modifications and extensions. Some proposals have suggested the creation of Hot Lines between NATO and Warsaw Pact military command centres to permit the speedy and accurate clarification of unclear actions. Others have suggested links between senior political decision makers. The capacity to communicate clearly and quickly with senior commanders (political or military) in a crisis is not without some risk (i.e. "clarifying communications" could be deliberate deceptions) but the potential gains would seem to easily outweigh any costs. This might be particularly true if war did somehow start. An existing, secure source of communication would permit the timely negotiation of a ceasefire. This is both a feasible and worthwhile CBM proposal.
2. **Joint Crisis Control through "Risk Reduction Centers".** Suggested by American Senators Nunn, Jackson and Warner amongst others, this type of proposal combines elements of a Standing Consultative Commis-

sion-like body and the Hot Line. The point would be to create a Soviet-American body to jointly monitor nuclear "incidents" precipitated by accident or by third parties. Although the specific thrust is strategic nuclear and the problem addressed primarily nuclear proliferation, the basic idea of a Joint Crisis Control organization could be extended to other fora and other types of military crisis.

Notification Measures

Notification measures are derived from the existing Helsinki CBMs which call for prior announcement of large military exercises within the European landmass, including 250 kilometers into the Soviet Union. The original Helsinki undertakings "required" notification through normal diplomatic channels at least 21 days prior to the conduct of military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops. Notification of smaller manoeuvres, multiple manoeuvres with an aggregate total exceeding 25,000 and large-scale movements were optional. Since then, a number of refinements and extensions have been suggested. This category also includes notification measures involving weapon tests.

1. **Notification of Military Manoeuvres.** Various proposals have been advanced calling for refinements in the original Helsinki CBM limits. The existing floor of 25,000 ground troops is seen by many to be too large. Various proposals by the Warsaw Pact, NATO and Neutral and Non-aligned states have suggested reductions in the floor from 25,000 to 20,000, 18,000, 15,000 or 10,000 troops. These floor reductions for single exercises have been accompanied by proposed extensions in the notification time, going from 21 days to 30, 40 or 60 days. Some proposals have also contained suggestions for more detailed notification information, including specific times, unit composition, exercise purposes and locations. Most proposals envision these measures operating on an obligatory rather than voluntary basis. These particular proposals deal only with manoeuvres involving ground forces. *These notification proposals (and similar ones noted below) are really the heart of the Confidence-Building idea. The proposals are not excessively demanding, they serve a constructive purpose in distinguishing mili-*



tary exercises from more threatening actions and they serve as a reasonable and constructive basis upon which to build more demanding and extensive agreements. As is the case with most CBM proposals, they are useful to the degree that they can be reliably verified. Combined with some closely related "constraint" CBM proposals discussed later in this chapter (i.e. maximum manoeuvre sizes, geographic limitations, exercise duration limits and activity limitations), notification measures can effectively reduce concerns about surprise attack.

2. **Notification of Aggregate Manoeuvres.**

Related to the previous category, these proposals extend the idea of manoeuvre notification to combinations of smaller exercises conducted concurrently or in close succession. The proposals seek to close a potential loophole that would permit the fractionation of large manoeuvres. Aggregate floors range through the same general limits as suggested for single exercises (i.e. 25,000 to 10,000 troops). The same requirements for detailed notification information and advance warning could be applied to these proposals as well.

3. **Notification of Naval Manoeuvres.** This type of proposal attempts to extend the idea of ground force notification to naval exercises. Although such proposals are less well developed than proposals dealing with ground forces, the principle underlying them is the same. States or alliances conducting naval exercises in the vicinity of other states' territorial waters would give prior notification of such exercises along with details of the exercise including its duration, composition and location. These proposals are similar in some respects to existing maritime practice where advance warning of military tests is now provided. Other proposals call for prior notification of "large" naval manoeuvres, presumably in larger geographic areas. The somewhat ambiguous agreement reached at the Madrid Follow-up has opened the way for the consideration of naval manoeuvre CBMs but the actual geographic extent of the notification limits has yet to be determined. The more likely and useful limit will probably be ocean areas adjoining the European landmass out to a specific distance (perhaps 500 kilometers). The importance of mari-

time manoeuvre pre-notification measures derives from two separate naval capabilities. First, either the Warsaw Pact or NATO (but predominantly NATO) can bring to bear substantial quick-reaction long-range firepower in the form of carrier-based aircraft. Second, rapid and flexible force projection is possible through the use of amphibious manpower. This is probably a capability that NATO fears more than does the Warsaw Pact. Both basic types of capability are potentially destabilizing. Notification of manoeuvres involving such capabilities would doubtless reinforce existing and proposed land force-oriented proposals. The concern about amphibious military forces is sufficient that several proposals have sought to address it specifically. One suggestion considers the presence of 10 major amphibious warfare vessels or 5,000 amphibious troops in a manoeuvre sufficient to warrant separate notification.

4. **Notification of Air Force Manoeuvres.** This

type of CBM proposal is also relatively undeveloped compared with the ground force type. Again, the idea is to provide prior notice of and basic information about air force exercises beyond a certain size. This is regarded as being particularly important because of the speed with which modern military aircraft can attack targets far to the rear. The typical reaction time for air defence crews in Europe is never more than minutes, which makes large-scale air force exercising a potentially destabilizing activity. Because of the crucial role that air forces play in the military plans of both alliances, the manoeuvres themselves must take place. As with other manoeuvres, CBMs must attempt to clarify as unambiguously as possible the status of such exercises, distinguishing them from actual attacks. One suggestion places the floor or threshold for notification at 50 aircraft. Notification measures combined with constraint measures (such as Alford's suggestion of rear basing for all attack aircraft) would significantly reduce concerns about surprise air attack which is clearly one of the dominant functions CBMs should serve. When existing and refined ground force Confidence-Building Measures are combined with possible measures designed to notify (and modestly constrain) air and



naval manoeuvres in the European "area" (airspace above and adjacent sea areas out to several hundred kilometers or more), the potential for reducing concern about "unknown" military activities and their pre-emptive possibilities seems substantial. In general, notification measures in combination with selected "constraint" measures could significantly reduce concerns about surprise attack.

5. **Notification of Military Movements and "Out-of-Garrison" Activities.** This type of CBM proposal, like many others, is best operationalized in combination with more intrusive inspection measures. The point of notifying military movements is virtually the same as that underlying the notification of manoeuvres – to clarify the purpose of military activities that could be construed as being preparations for attack. According to these proposed CBMs, movements or "out-of-garrison" activities would be notified in advance (again, times range from 21 up to 60 days) and the notification would contain information about the size, composition and movements of the military forces in question. Given the existing deployment realities in central Europe, the normal movement of military forces (for, for instance, rotation) into the sensitive inter-German border region is always a matter of concern. Relatively detailed prior notification (always in combination with the possibility of reliable verification) would reduce the anxiety-producing character of such necessary military activities for the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. Some proposals suggest maximum sizes for movements. As is the case with size limits for allowable manoeuvres, these proposals are properly "constraint" CBMs, a more ambitious category of Confidence-Building proposal which should be kept separate (at least analytically) from the more feasible notification measures. They are dealt with later in the chapter.
6. **Mobilization Notification.** The obvious logical complement of other notification measures, these proposals require timely notification of mobilization exercises, including information on the time, num-

bers and general movements of troops involved. The obvious purpose is to help distinguish between necessary exercises and highly destabilizing actual mobilizations.

7. **Nuclear Delivery Vehicle Test Notifications.** This type of proposal is intended to reduce uncertainty about the test firing of strategic (or, presumably, shorter range) nuclear weapons. As is the case with many other notification CBMs, in order to achieve maximum effectiveness, these measures are best combined with more rigorous "constraint" CBMs. Nuclear weapon test notification measures call for advance notification of scheduled missile test firings, including those that are conducted as part of major military exercises. Such proposals might also include notification of the simulated use of nuclear weapons in a military exercise. It is not clear how much information should be contained in such notifications, but they could specify general launch and impact locations as well as time of launch(es). Measures similar to these are already practiced when test launches occur over the open seas but they frequently lack detail. Recent Soviet and American proposals have included advance notification of ICBM and SLBM test flights as well as multiple bomber take-offs.

The general category of notification measures offers modest but significant potential for building confidence in both the reliability of adversary states (through the accuracy of their reports) and their relatively benign intentions (if they are, in fact, benign). The idea of declaring what will soon be evident in any event is not terribly challenging and publication of modest amounts of information about the notified activities would rarely cause any security problem. In short, they offer the prospect of at least some degree of enhanced stability, predictability and confidence at little cost and minimal risk. Invariably, notification measures can be integrated with "constraint" measures – measures calling for the actual restriction of certain capabilities – to render both more effective.



Manoeuvre Observer Conduct Measures

This is a small and very specific category of Confidence-Building Measures. The conduct measures outlined in this small set of proposals are closely related to the information measures noted at the beginning of this discussion. Their basic purpose is primarily educational rather than inspection *per se*. The idea is to establish common rules of conduct for both military observers and their hosts at military manoeuvres. This category appears to be similar to the Inspection Measures category of the Constraint CBMs but is conceptually distinct in that the activities observed are not in any way constrained and the observation is primarily educational. This suggests the fundamental distinction between the two basic groups of Confidence-Building Measures – some are devoted to acquiring information about certain military activities (and, less directly, intentions) while others have to do with actual constraints (defining or confirming them) on certain military activities.

The conduct measures are derived from experience gained with the original Helsinki CBM provisions. Those provisions stated that

The participating States will invite other participating States, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill towards all participating States, to send observers to attend military manoeuvres.

The inviting State will determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and give other information which it may consider useful. It will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality.

1. **Manoeuvre Observer Conduct Proposals.** On the basis of the disappointing experience with the Helsinki CBMs, several proposals have been advanced containing fairly detailed discussions of how manoeuvre observers ought to be treated. Some call for the removal of the almost totally voluntary character of existing measures and suggest a mandatory invitation to all notifiable manoeuvres. Beyond this basic requirement, the proposals argue for the provision of adequate opportunities to actually witness relevant parts of real manoeuvres rather than small staged events which convey no honest information. The

proposals also call for the provision of adequate information about the purpose of the manoeuvre and the course of its conduct, the provision of or allowance for the necessary equipment to actually observe a manoeuvre (i.e. the right of observers to bring their own field glasses), the opportunity to meet with participating troops and their commanders, freedom from harassment and limited freedom of movement within the manoeuvre area. Such proposals could also contain clear understandings of observer responsibilities to ensure that illicit intelligence gathering isn't encouraged. The negotiation of an "observers' code of conduct" would certainly be useful and some measure of improvement over existing conditions is possible. It is questionable, however, whether the Soviet Union and its allies would be willing to permit what to them would seem to be radical freedoms for military observers at manoeuvres. It is worth pursuing but not at the expense of more important (and intrusive) Confidence-Building Measures.

Constraint or Surprise Attack CBMs

This general grouping of Confidence-Building Measures is the second and more demanding type of CBM. While the first group is composed of information, communication and education measures, the second involves relatively intrusive inspection measures as well as actual constraints on troop or equipment deployment. The inspection and deployment constraint measures generally go hand in hand, the former confirming compliance of the latter. Also included in this basic type of CBM is a small and specific category containing non-interference measures. As was noted earlier, this second grouping of Confidence-Building Measures does *not* include any verification activities *per se*. Instead, these CBMs include measures designed to *facilitate* the unilateral determination that certain, specified undertakings (primarily constraint measures) are being honoured. This may seem to be a controversial interpretation. The reason for making this very deliberate distinction has to do with the inherently unilateral character of verification and the inherently mutual character of Confidence Building.



Although Confidence Building is necessarily a mutual or multilateral enterprise, it ultimately speaks to a very unilateral phenomenon – self-confidence.⁵⁹ Without self-confidence on the part of each participating state, there really cannot be any mutual confidence. Mutual confidence (in, for instance, the absence of a meaningful chance of surprise attack) is a group belief but it is a function of collective self-confidence. Self-confidence – *which can be achieved through either unilateral or mutual activities* – can be increased through measures designed simply to acquire information or through measures designed to assist in the acquisition of information. Verification is involved in both but only the latter is a legitimate example of a CBM. In the latter example, *the process of facilitating is the actual Confidence-Building Measure*. Both the verification information (fundamentally a unilateral acquisition) and the act of facilitating or tolerating its collection (fundamentally a mutual or multilateral activity even if performed on an ostensibly unilateral basis) can increase confidence *but only the facilitation is a CBM*. Verification – regardless of its results – is an intrinsically unilateral activity. Other states by their actions (or non-actions) can make it easy or difficult to confirm certain things, either through National Technical Means (satellites, ground-based listening posts or surveillance aircraft) or through more intrusive and inherently cooperative methods (the use of MBFR Associated Measure-type observers). CBMs cannot, however, *be* verification measures because Confidence-Building Measures entail, by their very nature, cooperative interactive acts and measures. Thus, the closest that CBMs can come to “being” verification measures is in *facilitating* verification. It is for this important but involved reason that verification *per se* is not considered in the various categories of Confidence-Building Measures.

⁵⁹ Jonathan Alford notes the distinction between self-confidence and mutual confidence in his “Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects,” *Confidence-Building Measures*, Adelphi Paper 149, p. 5. Also see Richard Darilek’s summary in Birnbaum’s *Confidence Building in East-West Relations*, pp. 117-119. The distinctions in the literature between mutual and self-confidence are neither obvious nor clear and the subject is poorly treated.

Inspection Measures

Inspection Measures call for the intrusive monitoring of military behaviour according to some set of established criteria. The criteria, however, are generally specified by another category of CBMs called Deployment-Constraint Measures. The basic nature of Inspection Measures is self-evident. Observers (or monitoring devices) within a potential adversary’s territory monitor specified activities to confirm that agreements are being honoured. It is worth stressing again that the Confidence-Building Measure is *not* the observer counting how many troops rotate through a garrison. The CBM is, instead, the fact that the observer is *allowed* to count those troops without interference. Whether or not such information could be acquired by solely unilateral means is scarcely irrelevant and it is certainly true that the information, whether acquired unilaterally or not, could increase self-confidence. The important point from the Confidence-Building perspective is that the self-confidence flowing from the successful operation of a CBM is a function of cooperative behaviour amongst potential enemies intended to reduce concerns about military threats. Verification is a vital adjunct to the successful operation of many Confidence-Building Measures but it is a separate activity.

Good examples of Inspection Measures can be found in the MBFR Associated Measures proposed by NATO. In fact, the Associated Measures are a sound archetype for several types of second-generation CBM proposals. They include:

1. The United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Canada must give prior notification of the movement of their ground forces into the area of reductions.
2. All participants must give prior notification of any “out-of-garrison” activities (manoeuvres, movements and exercises) within the reduction zone.
3. Ground-force units (and their equipment) must enter and leave the area of reductions only through designated entry and exit points. These would be located at a fixed number of sea ports, railroad border crossings, highway border crossings, and airfields.



4. Each side will have the right to place inspectors at each other's entry/exit points.
5. Each side will have the right to make up to 18 air or ground inspection trips in the area of reduction belonging to the other side.
6. There would be periodic exchange of data and information on the forces in the area after the treaty becomes effective.
7. The non-interference with National Technical Means provision found in SALT would also be followed in MBFR.
8. A Standing Consultative Commission, similar to that found in SALT, would oversee compliance with the treaty.

Of these, the first two are Notification Measures, the third is a Deployment-Constraint Measure, the fourth and fifth are Inspection Measures, the sixth is an Information Measure, the seventh is, obviously, a Non-interference Measure and the eighth is also an Information Measure.

Inspection Measures, then, provide for the cooperative placement of human and/or inanimate monitors within the territory of potentially hostile states. The purpose, generally, is to facilitate verification of specific constraints and, in so doing, contribute to improved levels of trust, confidence and predictability. They are almost always complements of particular Constraint Measures.

1. **Provision for Observers during Out-of-Garrison Activities.** This is a relatively broad collection of proposals that deals with the permanent or temporary placement of military observers to confirm the nature of several types of military manpower and equipment movements.
 - 1.1. **Manoeuvres in Sensitive Areas.** Several proposed Constraint Measures restrict the numbers and/or types of personnel and equipment permitted to exercise in sensitive areas such as border zones. The use of observers both within the zones and with the manoeuvre troops would facilitate the verification of such undertakings and, by the very acceptance of observers, increase

confidence in the benign intentions of potential adversary states. Conceptually, there are *five basic varieties of monitor arrangements possible within this type of Inspection Measure*. They are: (1) human observers temporarily placed with units in an exercise; (2) human observers temporarily placed in a sensitive zone prior to an exercise; (3) human observers permanently placed in a sensitive zone where exercises might be held; (4) electromechanical monitors permanently placed in sensitive zones where exercises might be held; and (5) electromechanical monitors temporarily inserted in a sensitive zone prior to an exercise. Combinations of these are also possible. The use of observers in this type of case should be distinguished from the non-intrusive presence of observers at manoeuvres. In the latter case, observers serve an educational function first and only indirectly any type of "early warning" function.

- 1.2. **Movements in Sensitive Areas.** Rather than supervising the conduct of manoeuvres in sensitive regions, this application calls for the provision of observers to monitor the nature of military movements from barracks to other sites within or near to a sensitive region. A good example of a sensitive region is the border area separating two hostile or potentially hostile states or alliances such as the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. The obvious sensitive region is that adjacent to the inter-German border extending in either direction perhaps 100 kilometers. As in the previous case, there are five basic ways in which military movements through sensitive regions could be monitored, ranging from temporarily placed human observers to permanent electromechanical monitoring devices.



1.3. **Troop Rotations through Designated Areas.** Although similar to troop movements in some respects, troop rotations involve large scale movements of garrison troops both into and out of sensitive regions. A number of CBM proposals have been advanced calling for the use of observers at designated points of entry and exit (railway stations, highways, harbour facilities, and airports) to ensure that personnel and equipment depart and arrive in the numbers reported and promised. Observers could be placed at designated points temporarily (during standard rotation periods) or on a permanent basis. The major fear underlying this Inspection Measure is that a state (particularly the Soviet Union but perhaps the United States or the Federal Republic of Germany as well) might build up its front-line combat forces by pretending to rotate out forces that actually remain surreptitiously. Again, it is worth stressing that the Confidence-Building Measure is the fact that observers are allowed to monitor movements fully, not the collection of information itself.

2. **Observers at "Constrained Facilities".** Several Constraint Measures call for the non-deployment of certain types of equipment within specified distances of international frontiers. Attack aircraft, bridging equipment, ammunition for artillery, fuel for armoured vehicles, and chemical warfare decontamination equipment are examples of "constrained equipment" which, in many cases, must be based at specific locations. These locations – "constrained facilities" – can be subject to monitoring to ensure that constrained equipment is not present. Conversely, monitors can be placed at known facilities where restricted equipment is based to ensure that restricted substances or devices are not removed. Observers could also be placed in barracks areas to provide reasonable assurance that personnel limi-

tations were being honoured. This is another example of how the use of observers fits naturally with undertakings to restrict certain capabilities. The willingness of participant states to allow reasonable monitoring on their own territory is at least as important to the creation of confidence as is the resultant collection of data or hypothetical provision of early warning. Although less often mentioned, the use of human or electromechanical monitors is also conceivable for Confidence-Building Agreements in the strategic nuclear sphere. Here, as well, the idea would be to monitor the absence of restricted activities and/or equipment. Given the nature of National Technical Means, it is difficult to imagine that this type of Inspection Measure would provide much in the way of new intelligence but it might create a more favorable image of intentions. Probably the best example of this type of measure would be the presence of observers at all military and civilian airports within specified regions to monitor the presence of restricted aircraft (i.e. conventional attack aircraft or theatre nuclear bombers).

3. **Observers in Sensitive Areas.** This type of proposal is a classic Confidence-Building Measure. The Sinai warning stations within the Gidi and Mitla passes are obvious illustrations. Similar arrangements have been suggested for various sensitive regions throughout the world, including the inter-German border region. According to the basic concept, observers and various types of sophisticated monitoring equipment are stationed in sensitive areas between hostile or potentially hostile states. To be effective, the monitoring facilities must provide full coverage of all potential avenues of attack and must be sufficiently removed from the actual border to provide reasonable advance notice. Their presence assures each state that a surprise attack would be difficult or impossible to stage and, hence, produces a measure of confidence. In addition, the fact that potential adversaries agree to have such facilities on their soil for this specific purpose can only contribute to a degree of confidence in their generally benign intentions. These sorts of propos-



als can also find application in the strategic nuclear realm. Several proposals have already suggested the use of tamper-proof "black boxes" in ICBM fields that would provide prompt warning of launches through secure communications. Similar arrangements at known long-range bomber bases could be proposed as well.

4. **Mobile Inspection Measures.** A number of Confidence-Building proposals have included the provision for some variety of mobile inspection team. The underlying theme in this group of proposals is the irregular use of observers (with or without extensive electromechanical aids) to inspect facilities or activities that have become special objects of concern. These types of Inspection Measures differ from those already mentioned in that they envision the *reactive* use of inspectors to investigate presumably ambiguous or unintentionally obscured activities that could be construed as being dangerous. More often than not, such activities would concern restricted equipment or the placement of offensive capabilities. The measures mentioned in previous sections are more rigid and involve the placement of observers in anticipation of certain events. The types of mobile inspection teams envisioned in various proposals range from small units operating in Jeeps to much more elaborate arrangements involving fixed-wing or helicopter inspections. Some proposals suggest that participant states be permitted a fixed number of "free" inspections of questionable facilities or activities. The intention in these cases is to discourage nuisance inspections or persistent "fishing trips" whose purpose is simply to collect as much intelligence as possible. Other proposals have suggested the use of specially constituted inspection teams – neutral or United Nations personnel for instance – in order to minimize both the perceived intrusiveness of inspections and any incidental intelligence benefits resulting from inspection trips. One proposal has even suggested that a host country might want to rely upon a neutral observer team to verify, on the request of the host state, that particular activities were not preparations for war. These

Mobile Inspection Measures are usefully applicable in virtually any part of the world, from Central Europe, through the Middle East and Africa to Central and South America. They could also be used in special regions where demilitarization regimes operate, such as the Antarctic and outer space. The primary purpose of intrusive Inspection Measures is to reduce concerns about surprise attack and, secondarily, to confirm adherence to agreements. As is the case with other Confidence-Building Measures – perhaps even more so – confidence and trust are built predominantly by the fact that participant states willingly subscribe to the measures. Obviously, the use of mobile inspection teams is extremely intrusive and, even with appropriate limitations on their freedom of movement and activity, their acceptance would represent a remarkable revision in the national security perspectives of virtually all states.

Inspection Measures, because they are intrusive, are almost certainly going to be difficult to negotiate. Their intrusiveness varies (relatively little for fixed site electromechanical or human monitors within sensitive border regions and extremely intrusive for mobile ground and air inspections carried out with virtually no constraints) but under any circumstance, the use of foreign or foreign neutral personnel in barracks, at airfields, in tank parks, at major crossroads and harbours or along border zones would be quite exceptional. Nevertheless, Inspection Measures clearly seem to be amongst the most effective potential Confidence-Building Measures. After all, what could be more effective at demonstrating benign intent than the granting of permission to potential adversaries to examine your defensive forces to their own satisfaction and allowing them to establish early warning monitors on your territory?

To some extent this must be true but such a view is ultimately predicated on a superficial appreciation of modern military forces and their capabilities as well as on a corresponding overestimation of what any type of Confidence Building can accomplish. First of all, modern military forces possess capabilities that have no obviously offensive or defensive character. Tanks and various other types of armoured



fighting vehicles including self-propelled guns and personnel carriers as well as attack aircraft and fighter interceptors can effectively prosecute both offensive and defensive functions. This makes the exclusive limitation of offensive capabilities (a frequent consideration of Constraint Measures) difficult (but not impossible) and, as a consequence, limits what can be achieved through Inspection Measures. Put simply, it is difficult to identify a purely offensive capability to constrain and therefore to inspect. This technical ambiguity is compounded by the doctrinal preferences of some states for "offensive defences". Here it is worth noting that the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany are all examples of states that claim, to different degrees, to see great merit in defences that possess an offensive or counter-offensive capability. Intentions – a primary focus for CBMs – become extremely difficult to infer purely on the basis of such evidence. *Because of these compound ambiguities, there isn't a great deal of room for building confidence purely on the basis of the presence or absence of capabilities. Inspections of the ambiguous that merely confirm its inherent ambiguity cannot create confidence.* This effectively limits the degree of confidence that can be produced or confirmed through inspections *per se* because the willingness of states to permit inspections and on-site monitoring may not lead to reduced fears about aggressive intentions.

None of this is meant to deny the utility of CBMs based on Inspection Measures. *Assuming that clear-cut criteria can be established within Constraint Measures, Inspection Measures can lead to enhanced confidence.* The problem resides in defining those criteria. It is within discussions of those criteria and Constraint Measures more generally that evidence of the ethnocentric and psychologically unsophisticated character of the Confidence-Building literature begins to emerge. We will see this again in the last category of this chapter. The problem itself is discussed at some length in Chapter Seven.

Non-Interference Measures

These proposals are based on existing understandings developed during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. A crucial feature of the SALT agreements was the acknowledged reliance upon National Technical Means of verification to confirm compliance with the numerous pro-

visions of the agreements. Equally important was the explicit commitment not to interfere with the ability of other states to verify compliance. Although interpretations of what this entails have been rather narrow at times (the Soviet use of encrypted flight test data that they regard as unnecessary for verification of SALT limitations is a good example), the basic principle is now well established. Virtually all proposals that rely upon verification in any way, directly or indirectly, now include non-interference clauses. Within the perspective developed in this study, it is the agreement not to interfere that constitutes the Confidence-Building Measure. Any CBM that includes prohibitions or restrictions on observable activities or capabilities must include Non-interference Measures.

Behavioural or Tension-Reducing Measures

These are difficult measures to categorize, hence their identification as a separate type. The main thrust of these measures is to constrain or forbid, by mutual agreement, certain types of military activity that are "needlessly aggressive" or provocative (as opposed to merely "threatening"). The sort of military activity considered here is generally small scale and "war-like" in character. It is very belligerent behaviour that could easily precipitate aggressive countermeasures and lead to crisis escalation or unintended war. The classic illustration of this sort of measure is the 1972 "Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas." Another useful illustration is the proposal that "hunter-killer" submarines and other Anti-Submarine Warfare platforms be forbidden to trail ballistic missile submarines on patrol. The intention of these measures is to constrain certain types of (often gratuitous) military activity that could trigger serious apprehensions and lead to unintended crises. This category of measure could also be included within the "Constraint Measures" category as a separate type of constraint undertaking.

Constraint Measures

In practice, Constraint Measures would almost always be associated with Inspection Measures. Their full effectiveness depends upon this association. It is, of course, possible to imagine at least some tangible Constraint Measures being undertaken without specific provisions for on- or over-site inspection but



this runs perilously close to an entirely different variety of arms control where unilateral verification is all that is necessary and where Confidence Building *per se* isn't really the object – "simple" arms control reductions. Constraint Measures are really a different type of undertaking that seek to place some operationally relevant constraint on worrisome capabilities through the restriction of certain specified types and/or numbers of military forces and/or specified types and/or numbers of equipment that are regarded as threatening in specified geographic zones regarded as sensitive. *It is the intent to address the concern that distinguishes true CBMs from simple quantitative or qualitative reductions.*

1. **Personnel Constraint Measures.** This collection of proposals deals with restrictions on the number and/or position of military personnel. Very often, these constraints are associated with geographic areas, particularly regions adjacent to borders. The main idea is to limit military forces in sensitive regions so that concerns about surprise attack are minimized or at least reduced. In terms of severity, the proposals range from a freeze on manpower within an alliance region during reduction negotiations to proposals that call for percentage reductions of manpower levels or reductions to common ceilings. Thus far, most personnel constraints have been dealt with in the context of MBFR. Several other proposals have called for a freeze on alliance membership itself and a freeze on new bases for alliance partners' troops. All of these proposals seek to restrain existing high levels of military manpower and some address reductions. They are usually politicized and sometimes reflect very obvious self-serving ends. Some proposals have suggested the creation of partially or completely demilitarized zones of varying depths adjacent to international borders. The bulk of substantive Constraint Measure proposals have tended not to deal with *in situ* or overall personnel levels. Instead, they have focused on more specific capabilities or activities that many regard as particularly threatening.
2. **Manoeuvre and Movement Constraints.** Recognizing that surprise attack is the primary military concern of some states (there are altogether too many examples in Cen-

tral Europe, Northern Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, South-east and East Asia, Southern Africa, Central Africa, Central America, and South America), a number of CBM proposals have been designed to reduce or virtually eliminate the chance of manoeuvres or military movements either masking or being mistaken for surprise attack preparations. The easiest way to accomplish this is to keep manoeuvres and movements small and to keep them away from sensitive frontiers. This does *not* provide any outright guarantee against surprise attack but it does address the problem of the misperception of "legitimate activities." These proposals call for various types of limitations on manoeuvres near the borders of adversary states. The limitations include low manpower ceilings for all manoeuvres within a given distance of borders (25, 50 or 100 kilometers), similar types of restrictions on military movements, time limits on the duration of manoeuvres (i.e. not to exceed 10 days or two weeks), limitations on how many major or meaningful manoeuvres or movements a state or alliance can stage in a year, general manpower ceilings on manoeuvres and movements, limits on multinational exercises (usually size and proximity constraints), and limits on the activities that can be practiced during manoeuvres. This last type of proposal deals with agreements such as those to limit the amount of live ammunition and other crucial supplies like fuel carried during manoeuvres and agreements to never practice simulated chemical or tactical nuclear weapons-use or associated activities like decontamination. The general idea of these Constraint Measures is to reduce potential friction and over-reaction to activities that could be viewed ambiguously. A related type of manoeuvre or test constraint proposal has to do with the testing of nuclear delivery vehicles (primarily ICBMs). These proposals call for the use of designated re-entry vehicle impact areas, prohibitions against multiple simultaneous or close-order missile test launches (in particular, from operational silos), agreements to conduct only a minimum number of test flights a year to ensure system reliability, and major test restraints on new types of delivery vehicles such as Manoeuvring Re-



entry Vehicles (MaRV) and other potentially destabilizing systems such as space-based Ballistic Missile Defence Systems.

3. **Equipment Constraints.** The basic idea here is to single out specific types of weapon systems and supplies that confer a uniquely offensive capacity on military forces and devise arrangements (generally rear-basing) that neutralize or minimize their offensive character. By concentrating on specific components of modern conventional military forces, their multi-purpose character (i.e. they can perform offensive and defensive missions with the same basic equipment) can be shifted subtly toward more purely defensive capabilities. The classic illustration of this is Alford's famous suggestion that bridging equipment always be stationed far to the rear in Central Europe. The "simple" removal of bridging capabilities precludes the possibility of a "standing start" conventional attack unless the attackers are prepared to rely on existing (very vulnerable) bridges and roadways. Alford has suggested a similar type of Constraint Measure for attack aircraft, arguing that if they were based the same distance from the borders of potential adversaries as their combat range, they could serve only a defensive function.⁶⁰ These sorts of Constraint Measures cannot promise a guarantee against surprise attack. What they can do, however, is (1) inspire confidence in the primarily benign, defensive intentions of participating states through the very process of negotiating and abiding by serious Constraint Measures (this is a fundamentally cooperative and non-aggressive sort of undertaking) and (2) provide some measure of advance warning if offensive actions are at some future point planned. The moving forward of bridging equipment, major stocks of ammunition and fuel, self-propelled artillery, and attack aircraft would be a pretty unambiguous indication of offensive intent. Other proposals have suggested constraints on the number and/or location of tanks and limitations on the positioning of major combat vessels like aircraft carriers.

4. **Nuclear Free Zones.** Proposals calling for the creation of "Nuclear Free Zones" are not necessarily associated with CBM negotiations and it is not entirely clear that such proposals ought to be considered as Constraint Measures or even as CBMs. Part of the confusion can be attributed to the fact that there are at least two basic types of Nuclear Free Zone proposals. One type calls for "promises" that no nuclear weapons will be used in a particular area (frequently a city or town) or unilaterally declares that a specified region is a Nuclear Free Zone. These might be considered Declaratory Measures. They cannot be verified in any way (other than after-the-fact) which is always true of Declaratory Measures. A second type of Nuclear Free Zone proposal has to do with the stationing of nuclear weapons. These proposals call for no nuclear weapons being stationed within specified geographic regions. They can be verified in terms of the absence or presence of the weapons themselves or their delivery vehicles. This suggests that, in principle, there is no difference between a proposal for keeping mobile bridging equipment at least 100 kilometers from a border region and a proposal to keep all nuclear weapons at least 100 kilometers from a border region. In practice, of course, it is much easier to conceal a small number of tactical nuclear weapons than it is to conceal bridging equipment and, more important, the use of those several tactical nuclear weapons could be much more consequential. This should not disqualify equipment-related Nuclear Free Zone proposals, however, from consideration as Constraint Measures.

Constraint Measures are "aggressive" Confidence-Building Measures and appear to offer substantial scope for improving the political relations between hostile states by actually imposing physical limitations on the sorts of military forces and activities that produce anxieties about surprise attack or coercion. It is not entirely clear, however, how effective these types of Constraint Measures might or can be in practice.

First of all, almost all of the Constraint Measures noted here involve steps that can be "undone" in short order. Restricted equipment or supplies can be brought up to restricted

⁶⁰ Jonathan Alford, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects", p. 11.



zones in hours or, at most, in several days. Few if any of the proposals offer any type of real guarantee against surprise attack although most do offer an extension of warning time and a reduction in the chance of genuine surprise. Any confidence created on this basis alone must necessarily be limited. Realizing this fact imposes some limit on the more general degree of confidence that can be generated in the "possibly" benign intentions of adversaries. In short, most Constraint Measures do not (and cannot) constrain dangerous or worrisome forces sufficiently to demonstrate (through their mutual acceptance) anything conclusive about benign intentions nor can they eliminate, on their own, concern about surprise attack.

On a more pragmatic level, the identification of capabilities and activities that represent genuine, unambiguous offensive-only threats may not be as simple and straightforward as it is sometimes assumed. There is great functional ambiguity associated with increasingly complex and sophisticated modern military forces. This makes the selective separation and restriction of threatening offensive components difficult to achieve. Those capabilities that pose particularly "offensive" threats such as modern main battle tanks and mechanized infantry also represent extremely potent defensive capabilities. How does one devise Constraint Measures that constrain only their offensive character? Great care must also be taken to avoid actually handicapping legitimate and necessary defensive capabilities, something which can happen with simple plans to create, for instance, demilitarized zones adjacent to border areas. In this case, offensively employed forces would have a clear advantage due to the relatively longer time necessary to adequately prepare defensive positions. A great deal of thought will have to attend the construction of proposals and their final negotiation *if unintended consequences are to be avoided.*

A particularly important consideration in devising effective Constraint Measures will have to be an awareness of the very different and evolving military doctrines of the participant states as well as their unique security concerns (or, more important, their unique perceptions of security concerns). Western proposals will have to take into account the fact that the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, its allies,

have a genuinely different perspective on national security than do various Western countries. Denying this – or failing to recognize and understand it – will doom effective negotiations and may result in dangerously inadequate proposals and/or disillusionment with the whole process of Confidence Building.

Declaratory CBMs

Declaratory Measures are not closely related to the Confidence-Building Measures discussed in this study. Practically, however, they are considered to be CBMs by many states, particularly the Soviet Union and its East European allies. In principle, Declaratory Measures are either unilateral declarations or multilateral agreements (up to and including formal treaties) to defer certain actions. The explicit promise or agreement *not* to do something is seen by some to constitute a legitimate approach to Confidence-Building. In some sense, this may be true. From a very instrumental perspective, if the leaders of some states feel more trustful or confident as a result of such declarations, *then the "declarations" have performed the function of a Confidence-Building Measure.* Typical declaratory proposals include "No First (Nuclear) Use," "No Early First (Nuclear) Use," "No Nuclear Use against Non-Nuclear States," "No First Use of Force," and "No First (Chemical Warfare) Use."

The biggest difficulty with Declaratory Measures is that they entail only a promise not to do something fearful. They do not (and, very often, logically cannot) include even a marginal substantive measure to reduce or constrain the capabilities that underly the declaration. The discovery, for instance, that "No First Use" is a false declaration can only come in one catastrophic moment. There can be no realistic demonstration that all are "abiding" by a "No First Use" declaration other than actual absence of first use. This could certainly be seen to be a very narrow – even perverse – understanding of Confidence Building.

The argument that basic declarations of good will and non-aggressive intent help to create better political relations between hostile states and, hence, pave the way for more substantive Constraint Measures has some merit. This is probably true when relations between states are already moderately good. However, the counter-argument – that these types of declara-



tions are essentially meaningless in the absence of very good political relations between states – is more convincing. The fact that the Western states genuinely question the merit of Declaratory Measures as CBMs and, frequently, suspect (whether correctly or not) ulterior motives for the floating of declaratory proposals effectively dooms those measures as genuine Confidence-Building Measures. Such grave doubts *undermine any possible confidence, predictability, reduced uncertainty or any other positive CBM outcome.*

One interesting but rarely discussed “solution” to the intrinsic “credibility problem” of Declaratory CBMs entails the linking of Constraint Measures with Declaratory Measures under a larger, blanket agreement. Here, a “no first use of force” declaration *in combination with* typical Constraint Measures, designed to constrain particularly offensive equipment and manpower capabilities and deployments, as well as thorough Notification Measures *could* serve a constructive and genuinely Confidence-Building purpose.

In principle, there may be no harm in including these sorts of Declaratory Measures in a broad discussion of Confidence-Building Measures but I think that their further consideration in this study is out of place – primarily because (1) they have (and can have) no directly observable impact on capabilities; (2) their faithful execution is immune to meaningful confirmation (intrinsic in their frequently “non-use” character); and (3) they fail to engender anything like confidence on the part of many principal states. This past point is sufficient to seriously discredit the status of Declaratory Measures as CBMs.

Conclusion

The sheer volume of Confidence-Building-Measure proposals defeats any effort to provide a concluding evaluation of individual strengths and weaknesses. The proposals have been discussed critically throughout this chapter and several more general and extensive points regarding certain types of proposals will be pursued at greater length in the next chapter. At this point, it might be convenient to summarize the CBM categories and include some typical illustrations.

Information and Communication CBMs

Information Measures

- publish technical information on force composition
- publish and discuss defence industry data
- publish regularized data on defence budgets
- publish arms control impact studies
- conduct “seminars on strategy”
- establish a “Standing Consultative Commission” to deal with questions of treaty compliance
- conduct military personnel exchanges

Communications Measures

- establish, extend and refine “Hot Lines”
- establish “Joint Crisis Control Centres”

Notification Measures

- notification of single manoeuvres involving personnel levels exceeding set floors of (variously) 25,000, 20,000, 18,000, 15,000, or 10,000 men
- notification of military manoeuvres (variously) 21, 30, 40 or 60 days prior to commencement
- inclusion of detailed information about personnel and equipment to be used during manoeuvres in the notification (unit composition, exercise purpose, location of exercise)
- notification of “aggregate manoeuvres” involving smaller manoeuvres conducted concurrently or in close succession (aggregate totals of from 10,000 to 25,000)
- notification of naval manoeuvres conducted within a specified distance of (for instance) the European landmass involving specified types and/or numbers of naval vessels and personnel
- notification of air force manoeuvres involving types and/or numbers of aircraft beyond specified limits
- notification of military “movements” and “out-of-garrison” activities involving personnel and equipment beyond a specified level and/or in specified (sensitive) regions
- inclusion of detailed information about the nature, composition, direction, duration and location of military movements and other “out-of-garrison” activities



- mobilization exercise notification, including details about the character, duration and dimension of the mobilization exercise(s)
- notification of nuclear weapon delivery vehicle tests

Manoeuvre Observer Conduct Measures

- mandatory invitations to a representative group of states to send observers to military manoeuvres
- a "code of conduct" for the provision of adequate opportunities to observe, adequate facilities and equipment with which to observe and adequate information outlining the nature of the observed manoeuvre

Constraint or Surprise Attack CBMs

Inspection Measures

- provision for observers during "out-of-garrison" activities, including:
 - manoeuvres in sensitive areas
 - movements in sensitive areas
 - troop rotations through designated areas

these observers could be:

- permanent, human
- temporary, human
- observers with manoeuvring units
- permanent, electromechanical
- temporary, electromechanical
- feasible combinations of above
- observers (human and/or electromechanical) at "constrained facilities" (tank parks, airports)
- observers (human and/or electromechanical) in "sensitive areas" (border zones, ICBM fields)
- mobile inspection teams

Non-Interference Measures

- agreements not to interfere with the use of National Technical Means of verification for confirming compliance with various treaties and undertakings

Behavioural or Tension-Reducing Measures

- measures designed to constrain the risks of unintended war or crisis escalation by controlling or eliminating needlessly aggressive or provocative "testing" behaviour

Constraint Measures

- personnel constraint measures (manpower freezes and reductions)
- manoeuvre and movement constraints limiting or forbidding the exercising or large-scale movement of military forces
 - within sensitive regions
 - with certain types of restricted equipment
 - in excess of certain, specified manpower ceilings
 - in excess of certain, specified numbers of total exercises or movements per year
- limitations or bans on specified threatening types of weapon tests (multiple ICBM test launches, large-scale bomber exercises, MaRV test flights)
- equipment constraints limiting or prohibiting specified types and/or numbers of (often) "offensive" equipment such as bridging equipment and attack aircraft
- nuclear free zones where no nuclear delivery vehicles are permitted

Declaratory Measures

- a controversial category which, if counted in this general analysis of CBMs, would include "no first use" declarations and other statements of benign intent which, by their nature, are impossible to verify or otherwise confirm.

The last major phase of this study concerns a more general evaluation of Confidence-Building Measures and the very concept of Confidence-Building, both in theory and in practice. There are some important problems that go beyond the specific weaknesses of individual CBMs noted in this chapter. It is to that more general critique that we now turn.



An Assessment of Confidence Building in Theory and Practice



Chapter Seven

An Assessment of Confidence Building in Theory and Practice

The basic approach adopted in this study has been to examine the Confidence-Building idea from a number of distinct perspectives, attempting to develop a comprehensive understanding of the CBM concept. These efforts together have yielded a relatively extensive conception of Confidence-Building. In the process of exploring existing conceptions, descriptions and definitions of CBMs, we have noted some conceptual problems and, in the process, we have constructed our own (we hope superior) composite definition along with a basic set of CBM categories. We have also looked at a great many specific CBM proposals, noting their individual strengths and weaknesses. Yet to be explored, however, are the larger-scale or generic problems that characterize the Confidence-Building literature and its treatment of the Confidence-Building concept. This is the last major perspective that we will employ in our effort to produce a useful introductory understanding of Confidence-Building Measures.⁶¹

The Generic Flaws of the CBM Literature

With relatively few exceptions, the Confidence-Building literature is oriented toward the discussion of existing CBMs and CBM negotiation fora (Helsinki and its follow-ons) as well as the assessment or advocacy of various new CBM proposals. Not surprisingly, perhaps, much of this literature is "atheoretical", employing no recognizable theoretical perspective to explicitly address and explore the *dynamics* of the Confidence-Building process and seldom incorporating any but the most anecdotal insights from contemporary political science and psychology. While there are some exceptions, the majority of the Confidence-Building literature relies upon poorly developed or

implicit assumptions about the nature and operation of "Confidence-Building." This atheoretical bias is typified by the literature's overwhelming tendency to focus narrowly on pragmatic policy concerns related specifically to the Central European conventional military balance. *In a very real sense, most Confidence-Building thinking – whether by academic analysts, policy advisors or policy makers – is the captive of these substantive considerations rather than any specific conception of how Confidence-Building works.*⁶²

Viewed from a deliberately critical perspective, the Confidence-Building literature as a whole, its specific CBM proposals and the derivative concept of Confidence-Building exhibit collectively a number of serious generic problems. Although there are partial exceptions to these observations, the Western CBM literature and the more general habits of thought that produce it are surprisingly consistent in exhibiting these generic flaws. The most significant of them appear to be:

1. an indifference to – or an unwillingness to address – the complex, idiosyncratic and apparently very offensive substance of Soviet defence policy, military doctrine, and conventional military capabilities;
2. a frequent failure to understand or appreciate what the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty Organization allies consider to be genuine military threats and "legitimate" concerns;⁶³
3. a frequent failure to perform, rely upon, include or even refer to detailed critical analyses of the actual character of the NATO-WTO military balance, its dynamics and the sorts of threats that each side poses – actually as well as potentially – for the other and for third parties;

⁶¹ There is no author by author critique developed in this study. A detailed "proof" that the literature (and most CBM thinking) actually exhibits the generic flaws noted here would require a study considerably more extensive than this one and might still be regarded as an argument by selective example. As a practical matter, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate conclusively that an extensive and diverse body of literature commits certain errors of omission or makes certain implicit assumptions. Chapters Five and Six provide suggestive grounds for these claims but only a very detailed examination of the literature itself will substantiate the case outlined in this study.

⁶² This is true of most Confidence-Building literature, whether produced by analysts from the West, the neutral and non-aligned or East European states. A partial exception can be found in some East European work which has a broader, conspicuously non-technical declaratory focus with an ideological tone and purpose. Even it could be said to have a clear policy-oriented character, albeit one expressed in very different language. Much (non-Russian) East European work, however, exhibits the same atheoretical, narrow, substantive focus typical of the Western work.



4. an insensitivity to the various factors – domestic and external, unilateral and interactive – that shape military policy, define its historical context, explain its contemporary character and determine its susceptibility to change;
5. a failure to explicitly discuss the actual psychological processes that are assumed to (a) mediate or facilitate the creation of “confidence” and (b) overcome the “misperception” of intentions and ambiguous actions;
6. a general failure to appreciate the ramifications of the fact that Confidence-Building is an intrinsically psychological process (i.e. there is a stunning disregard for the intellectual and emotional distortions that cognitive processes can wreak on perceptions of “trust”, “predictability”, “confidence”, and “certainty” – all vital features of meaningful Confidence-Building);
7. a general interest in somehow rendering intentions “transparent” but no concrete, realistic explanation of just how this can be achieved nor any serious (theoretical) discussion of why it ought to be attempted;
8. a general tendency to assume (again without any real explanation or justification) that increased amounts of accurate information will or can lead to a better grasp of adversary intentions and, as a consequence, relaxed anxieties;
9. a marked indifference to the bureaucratic and organizational realities that necessarily restrict the scope for change in any state’s security policies.⁶⁴

The pervasive influence of these generic flaws in the reasoning of the Confidence-Building literature and, more generally, in Confidence-Building thinking entails consequences beyond nattering, scholastic complaints about faulty assumptions. *These generic flaws are potentially dangerous to the extent that ill-conceived ideas developed in the Confidence-Building literature are adopted uncritically by policy makers or reflect similar shortcomings in the actual reasoning of policy makers and their advisers.* These problems could prove to be particularly relevant, given the increasing importance being accorded the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe which opened in Stockholm on January 17, 1984. With East-West relations strained and otherwise showing few signs of early improvement, there probably will be considerable pressure to produce tangible results quite quickly at Stockholm. That atmosphere could lead to the generation, negotiation and adoption of defective or meaningless Confidence-Building Measures which, when revealed for what they were, would almost certainly result in grave public disappointment. That, in turn, could soon undermine both public and political support for any further explicit Confidence-Building negotiations. This has long been a problem confounding efforts to produce meaningful arms control accords – the initial unrealistic expectations are followed by modest and/or imperfect agree-

⁶³ There is a corresponding but less pronounced tendency for East European analysts to misunderstand the nuances of NATO policy and doctrine. They often view NATO (or at least the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany) as being more “offensive” than would Western analysts. Nevertheless, both Western and Eastern CBM analysts tend to assume generally benign intentions, even if Eastern analysts may not subscribe so fully to this view. It is also questionable whether East European analysts – by dint of physical proximity and political familiarity – have a noticeably better grasp of Soviet policy and its ambiguities than do Western analysts. Furthermore, to the extent that East European analysts must rely upon Western sources to study WTO policies and capabilities, their work will tend to reproduce (with a slight accent) at least some Western errors of interpretation and fact.

⁶⁴ This list could be extended somewhat by including additional points relating to (a) faulty or unwarranted assumptions about Soviet military doctrine and capabilities, (b) careless assumptions about the dynamics of the WTO-NATO military balance, and (c) gross imprecision in explaining or accounting for the operation and dynamics of Confidence-Building. However, they would merely be refinements of or subtle variations on these three basic themes. Somewhat less global substantive problems could also be included in this list of basic flaws but those sorts of “lesser” problems have relatively little impact on the underlying character of Confidence-Building thinking. In any event, they were dealt with in the previous chapter.



ments and bitter disappointment. Worse, defective Confidence-Building Measures could prove to be counterproductive, eventually leading to increased suspicion or even masking deliberately aggressive military plans. It should be quite apparent that, as a consequence of these very real possibilities, we must pay serious attention to the generic weaknesses that characterize a great deal of Confidence-Building thinking.

Analyzing the nature of these generic flaws and suggesting directions for corrective revisions is a difficult task, one that we can only begin in this study. As an illustration of the level and type of difficulty involved in this analysis, consider the initial "discovery" of the nine generic flaws listed earlier. These nine could hardly be regarded as glaringly self-evident. It is very unlikely, for instance, that anyone's casual inspection of the largely unstructured and diverse Confidence-Building literature would produce such a list of theoretical and substantive shortcomings. In order to "discover" this extensive collection of generic flaws, it was necessary to examine the CBM literature with the aid of a suitable analytic perspective, looking beyond the more obvious superficial shortcomings for the more substantial but subtle errors of commission and omission that shape the basic reasoning of that literature. The particular analytic perspective used to identify these generic flaws, incidentally, employed a complex, multi-causal view of the security policy process and a conception of human decision making that embraces the subtle, disruptive power of everyday cognitive processes. This suited it well to highlighting the deeper faults of existing Confidence-Building thinking.

The conclusion flowing from the detailed analysis of the Confidence-Building literature (and, to a lesser extent, Confidence-Building thinking) is that a number of basic conceptual problems distort our understanding of what Confidence-Building is and can be. These problems produce an image of Confidence-Building that is: without a model of the Confidence-Building process; excessively simplified; and reliant on very unsophisticated (implicit) models of East-West military interaction. Their serious negative influence demonstrates how necessary it is to consciously develop an explicit understanding of how Confidence-Building (in its various forms) actually works, an under-

standing that draws upon contemporary psychology and political science rather than intuition and casual speculation.

Discovering the specific weaknesses of existing Confidence-Building ideas is barely half the analytic battle, however. At least as important is the problem of "correcting" the influence of these generic flaws on Confidence-Building thinking. This is an exceptionally difficult job because the "revised" assumptions, ideas and perspectives that constitute the "corrections" are, in most cases, far from being fully developed and generally lack the attractive but misleading simplicity of existing assumptions and perspectives. These new ideas about (1) how people deal with complex and inherently uncertain policy problems; (2) how various types of misperception consistently distort our understanding of complex issues; and (3) how to analyze the nature of the WTO-NATO military and foreign policy relationship have yet to be integrated into the analysis of Confidence-Building Measures. In fact, many of these ideas are only now being explored by policy analysts for the first time. As was noted earlier, even demonstrating the existence of the pervasive but almost always implicit assumptions that pre-structure so much of our current thinking about Confidence-Building is far from being a straightforward undertaking. The extensive and detailed original analysis that these complex "corrections" require is simply beyond the scope and means of this preliminary study. Nevertheless, we can explore the basic outline of these issues in order to get some idea of how Confidence-Building thinking can be revised and improved.

Perhaps the best method of dealing with this very involved set of analytic complaints is to look, first of all, for a simpler, more basic way of characterizing the problems with the Confidence-Building literature and with Confidence-Building-thinking more generally. Careful examination suggests that the existing list of nine generic flaws can be reduced to two fundamental types of generic error. The first is context-oriented and the second is process-oriented. They are:

1. Inadequate assessments of Soviet conventional military forces and the nature of the threat that they actually pose;



2. Naive, simplistic or non-existent assumptions about the actual process of "Confidence-Building" and its psychological dynamics.

The "Type One" Generic CBM Flaw

The first type of fundamental generic flaw involves the *failure to address explicitly, fully, and objectively the complex, idiosyncratic and decidedly offensive character of Soviet military doctrine and capabilities*.⁶⁵ Virtually all Western Confidence-Building thinking is animated, in the first place, by concerns about Soviet and WTO conventional military power (as well as by concerns about accidental war growing out of a crisis or misunderstanding). Beyond this very general animating concern, there is seldom any additional reference to the specifics of the "Soviet threat". However, the *perceived fact* of increasingly offensive and potent Soviet conventional military capabilities (relative to NATO forces) is a matter of serious continuing concern to many Western analysts and policy makers. This perception is an inescapable fact of life, *virtually independent of the objective determination that Soviet and WTO forces do or do not constitute a significant conventional military threat*. As a consequence of this "reality", no analytic discussion of Confidence-Building Measures ought simply to begin with the apparent assumption that Soviet military intentions are essentially benign and misunderstood, and then suggest ways in which presumably unwarranted concerns about the character of Soviet policy and capabilities can be addressed through the use of CBMs. *Whether or not Soviet policy and capabilities are essentially benign, non-threatening and misunder-*

stood is a matter that ought to be established – or at least discussed critically – within the Confidence-Building literature. Because there are equally plausible "benign" and "malevolent" models of Soviet military capabilities and intentions, the "benign view" should not be the only one to animate discussions of Eurocentric Confidence-Building Measures. While it is true that not every Confidence-Building study need begin with nor include a detailed analysis of Soviet military power, *at some point a careful, deliberately objective examination of Soviet conventional capabilities and doctrine must structure the analysis of Eurocentric CBMs*.

Thus, the Type One Generic Flaw (at least from the Western standpoint) is centrally concerned with the potential disjunctions amongst: broad foreign policy problems (the Soviet conventional military "threat"); narrow policy objectives (negotiating effective and visible CSBMs at Stockholm); and a diverse body of CBM "theory" whose benign "operating assumptions" are generally contrary to the corresponding "facts" of the broad policy perspective where the Soviet "threat" is seen to be real and serious. Reflecting these disjunctions, the Confidence-Building literature (and much Confidence-Building thinking) simply seems to bypass consideration of a crucial and exceedingly relevant question: are Soviet military intentions *fundamentally benign, fundamentally malign, or something more complex, variable and difficult to understand?* The need for and the limits upon Confidence-Building obviously change radically depending upon the answer to this question. The failure to address this question lies at the core of the Type One Generic Flaw.

An underlying analytic failure closely associated with the Type One Generic Flaw is the apparent absence within Confidence-Building thinking of any sophisticated model of WTO-NATO policy interaction. There is rarely any sense of *how* the complex policies of the two alliances interact with each other in causal terms. Sometimes there is a vaguely discernible underlying assumption that some kind of action-reaction interaction, aggravated by "worst-case" planning, drives the two alliances into a progressively more alienated and antagonistic relationship. At other times, there appears to be no interest in nor awareness of the importance of understanding the WTO-

⁶⁵ As with other instances in this study, one can replace concern over WTO capabilities with concern over NATO and/or American and/or German military doctrine and capabilities in order to capture the essence of an "Eastern perspective." It is possible of course to argue that there is much in German and American conventional doctrines and postures that "looks" offensive and threatening. However, it is not clear whether Soviet and East European analysts working in the Confidence-Building area (1) exaggerate, as do their Eastern colleagues, the offensive threat posed by NATO or (2) (like their Western counterparts) somehow overlook specific military threats and assume basically benign intentions while acknowledging a general danger of miscalculation. Whatever else, there does seem to be less inclination to blithely assume benign Western intentions and a fairly typical tendency to prefer unilateral security solutions.



NATO relationship and its role in defining the limits of and need for Confidence-Building Measures. For instance, if the dynamics of that relationship are largely autonomous and *intra-national*, the possibility of using CBMs to control or otherwise influence the military and political relationship will be seriously impaired. Although they might well be crucial to any understanding of Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, these notions are seldom examined and virtually never made a central feature of analysis.

The "Type Two" Generic CBM Flaw

The second fundamental type of generic flaw in Confidence-Building thinking addresses a very different sort of problem. *Here, there is a widespread and pronounced failure to either provide or refer to a satisfactory or even plausible model of the Confidence-Building process.* Most of the Confidence-Building literature makes some sort of reference to the ways in which "confidence" can be created or fostered – in fact, there is actually a bewildering array of casual speculation on this subject – *but there is seldom any serious discussion of the dynamic psychological process or processes that would presumably "make" Confidence-Building "work".* Related to this is the fact that the CBM literature makes reference to what appear to be many categories or types of Confidence-Building Measures, each of which may very well rely upon a different "mechanism" or process and entail a different conception of Confidence-Building. It is possible that the great variety of incompatible and inconsistent *ad hoc* CBM definitions and categories effectively frustrates whatever interest there is in isolating a clear-cut model of how Confidence-Building can "work".

For all its interest in speculating about how best to formulate successful Confidence-Building Measures, the literature exhibits remarkably little analytic or theoretical interest in exploring how ordinary individuals and groups are affected positively by the particular goals of or mechanisms underlying Confidence-Building Measures. For instance, it simply isn't good enough to assume, as a sizeable proportion of the CBM literature seems to, that knowing "all about" an adversary's forces and policies will "somehow" reduce or control "unwarranted" suspicion about intentions. There is no reference to *how or why* this will transpire. There is merely the intuitive claim that knowing "more"

about a potential adversary will correct misperception and alleviate groundless mistrust. However plausible this may seem at first glance, there is no explanation of what the Confidence-Building dynamics are and how they work. Further, there is no consideration of equally plausible alternative outcomes: for instance, the possibility that "knowing more" about an adversary state will actually increase anxiety or contempt. This is a very serious analytic shortcoming.

The bulk of Confidence-Building thinking ignores a great deal of research on the operation of perception, information processing and decision-making, subjects that appear to be very important to an understanding of the Confidence-Building process(es). The failure to employ psychological and cognitive scientific findings to understand the dynamics of Confidence-Building is a crucial theoretical and empirical oversight.

In a related vein, a good deal of Confidence-Building thinking assumes that uncertainty about intentions and capabilities is necessarily a bad thing, something that needs to be corrected. The literature seldom recognizes that uncertainty can serve a constructive purpose. It also seems to be immune to the possibility that there is unavoidable or *intrinsic* uncertainty and perhaps even "unknowability" *inherent* in the WTO-NATO relationship. Without becoming involved in a philosophical discussion of how much one can actually know about a complex social phenomenon, it is worth observing that a lot of Western CBM thinking seems to be based on the questionable (and largely implicit) belief that intellectual effort and "enough" intelligence information will "correct" the uncertainty, imprecision and outright lack of specific knowledge that plague current analyses of Soviet military policy and the WTO-NATO relationship. Whether or not the nature and dynamics of that relationship can ever be understood "fully" is an open question, not a foregone conclusion. No major view of how Confidence-Building Measures work should be predicated on the assumption that one should try to achieve, through unilateral effort as well as negotiated measures, "full" or close-to-full knowledge of what the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies are capable of doing, what they intend to do as well as what they believe, want, and fear. Confidence-Building efforts that revolve around the goal of "transparency"



are guilty of this type of thinking. They are insensitive to a host of confounding uncertainties, ranging from the vagaries of leadership dynamics and personality to the cultural-historical, institutional and organizational imponderables of all modern societies. They also ignore the realities of modern military technology. The mere fact, for instance, that both sides possess such ambiguous capabilities and doctrines that it is impossible to objectively identify them as being purely (or even largely) offensive or defensive will frustrate efforts to dispel uncertainty about intentions. Nevertheless, a large fraction of Confidence-Building thinking is prone to sponsoring the reduction of uncertainty through the pursuit of "transparency". This simply may not be possible and could even be counterproductive.⁶⁶

In addition to these psychologically-oriented problems associated directly with explaining how Confidence-Building Measures work, there is virtually no consideration of the complex processes that animate the whole problem of misperception, suspicion, faulty inferences and, more generally, the inability to see and understand complex phenomena in an objective manner. Most CBM analyses begin with the proposition that the misperception and the mistrust and the lack of confidence already exist and that "something" ought to be done about it. The origins and the mechanisms of misperception and the broader array of cognitive processes that structure the basic problems in the first place are frequently ignored. If Confidence-Building Measures to counter these mechanisms and processes are to be constructed and negotiated successfully, must not the mechanisms and processes themselves be understood first?

These two types of fundamental error summarize the basic nature of the larger collection of generic flaws listed earlier, the faulty (usually implicit) assumptions that undermine both the logic and the substance of the Confidence-Building literature and, more generally, a great deal of Confidence-Building thinking.

⁶⁶ The clearest illustration of the positive role of uncertainty in military relations is to be found in the Soviet-American strategic deterrence relationship. There, uncertainty about intentions and capabilities is thought to be crucial to the operation of successful deterrence. Any erosion of that constructive uncertainty would be counterproductive, even dangerous.

As was stated earlier, it is simply not feasible in this report to explore in detail either the full impact of these generic types of flaws or the methods and ideas currently under development to "correct" that impact. Such an undertaking would require a separate study. However, a suggestive outline of the new methods and new research can be developed in order to give some substance to these complaints about "generic flaws" and, more important, to suggest how contemporary Confidence-Building Measures and Confidence-Building thinking can be improved.

The Problem of Oversimplification

Before moving on to discuss these two fundamental types of generic error in greater detail, an important point needs to be made about their relationship with a more important, larger-scale and even more general problem that undermines honest efforts to understand virtually all defence issues. The problem has to do with *analytic oversimplification*. It is actually a more general version of the Type One CBM generic flaw. *The problem is the incapacity of both policy analysts and policy makers to comprehend the full dimensions of and deal effectively with extremely complex international politico-military phenomena.* Because they have such great trouble recognizing, assimilating and analyzing the full texture of complex policy problems and, as a consequence, devising appropriate policy solutions, *people tend to impose their own imperfect version of order, simplicity and certainty on those problems in order to render them understandable and solvable.*⁶⁷ This apparently fundamental incapacity to accommodate uncertainty and complexity is sometimes acknowledged in passing, particu-

⁶⁷ It is worth noting that policy makers are, in some ways, better able than academics to deal with complexity and uncertainty, at least on a pragmatic level. Their standard response is to adopt incremental policy choices and to sequentially address distinct sub-problem components of the overall policy problem. This is why policy responses to difficult, complex and novel policy problems often (a) seem to be based upon inconsistent or unrelated components, (b) sport weak rationales and (c) contain fairly conservative adjustments of existing policies. Analysts are more subtle in their distortions as they seek to "make" information fit into an existing conceptual, global view of a given reality. This sort of forced congruence can be very damaging, however, because it leads to the belief that analysts understand complex realities when, in fact, they only reconstruct biased portions of those realities.



larly by academic analysts, but its ramifications seldom attract even casual attention. This is regrettable because the habits of thought reflecting this quite natural incapacity to deal effectively with uncertainty and complexity play havoc with our attempts to understand and control very important national security problems.

There is an almost universal characteristic of defence policy analysis or strategic studies that reflects this incapacity perfectly. Analytic assessments of strategic studies-type phenomena – particularly but not exclusively academic analyses – can almost always be categorized as being either “hawkish” or “dovish”, “liberal” or “conservative”. These two basic “ways” of looking at, for instance, arms control issues, deterrence policies, strategic weapon system acquisition decisions or conventional military balance questions each contain a virtually complete if radically simplified set of assumptions about the operation of nuclear and conventional deterrence, the nature and intentions of the Soviet Union (and the United States, if only implicitly), and the suitable criteria by which to evaluate military doctrine and weapon systems. These two ways of seeing the larger strategic reality are in most respects incompatible with each other. “Hawks” and “Doves” can address the same basic issues but their terms of reference are sufficiently different that they rarely deal with anything approaching the “same” problem.⁶⁸ Viewed from within its own set of assumptions, each position is defensible and sensible. Of equal importance, each in its own way simplifies dangerously the character of the “real” world that it seeks to represent and explain. No careful examination of the strategic studies literature can fail to reveal these two “paradigms” of strategic reality. They are inter-

esting and illuminating not only because of their own substance *but also because they demonstrate the profound ways in which our understanding of important policy problems is the captive of styles of thought and frequently implicit models of how the world operates.* In short, academic analysts persistently distort the complex “reality” of the Soviet-American politico-military relationship. They do so by employing one of several drastically simplified conceptual models of that relationship and how it works. Policy makers are generally not as diligent in consistently employing “world-view” models. Practical demands of time, the frequent need to construct consensus, and a greater tolerance for ambiguity (as well, perhaps, as a healthy skepticism about elaborate academic constructions) buffer them against the more exotic varieties of conceptual distortion. On the other hand, policy makers fall prey to all kinds of smaller-scale distortions produced by the normal, everyday operation of cognitive processing.⁶⁹ There are two consequences associated with the “problem of oversimplification” that are relevant specifically to the analysis of Confidence-Building Measures. The first is quite direct. It has to do with the very natural tendency (noted above) of analysts to organize their thinking with the aid of relatively primitive and simplified models when their subject matter is complex, uncertain, “fuzzy” or “messy”. The environment in which CBMs are supposed to work – the WTO-NATO military relationship – is a just such a complex and “fuzzy” subject matter. It should be quite clear that CBMs can be properly understood (their limits and prospects appreciated) only when the WTO-NATO context is understood in something approaching its full complexity. It is, after all, that context that has cre-

⁶⁸ Probably the most compelling illustration of this point is the way in which “Hawks” and “Doves” configure discussions of strategic nuclear deterrence. “Hawks” freely consider ways of minimizing damage should deterrence fail while “Doves” steer clear of such “after-failure” questions for fear that deterrence will be undermined if such “precautions” are taken. Judgements about the “adequacy” of assured destruction-type policies will also vary according to strategic world view. Similarly, assessments of the utility of hard-target counter-force strategic weapons look very different depending upon which perspective is employed. Virtually all strategic studies issues possess a similar “dual character”.

⁶⁹ It is worth noting that academic policy analysts almost always adopt and retain a simplified version of one policy “reality” (that of a “hawk” or a “dove”) whereas most policy makers tend to combine sometimes inconsistent features of both archetypical conceptual models, depending upon how the current reality “looks” and what part of a policy problem is most visible and troubling at that particular time. Truly doctrinaire policy makers – absolute “hawks” or “doves” – are quite rare.



ated the need for the Confidence-Building Measures in the first place and it is that context that will determine whether or not particular CBM proposals are adopted and whether or not they are successful. Because of the cognitive processes which drive the "problem of oversimplification," however, this vital but involved and complex background has not received and is unlikely to receive adequate attention in analytic treatments of and policy proposals for Confidence-Building Measures. As a consequence, the Confidence-Building literature and Confidence-Building thinking are both impoverished.

An associated feature of the "problem of oversimplification" has to do with the actual processes that produce the problem in the first place. The oversimplifying distortions created (in different ways and to different effect) by both policy makers and analysts are a graphic and compelling illustration of how powerful everyday cognitive processes can be. It is this non-conscious power of every human mind to bend, filter, blank, distort, mask, ignore, twist, deceive, and misunderstand information, inferences and choices that is so crucial for understanding not only the analyst's need to develop and use oversimplified analytic models of reality but also the ways in which policy makers deal with complex and uncertain policy problems. It is, incidentally, the failure to consider the operation of these cognitive processes that animates the Type Two Generic Flaw.

The second major consequence of the "problem of oversimplification" flows from the first but is neither as obvious nor as easily explained. Here, the significant consequence is not the presence of two oversimplified and competitive paradigms but, instead, the apparent dominance of one – a variant of the "Dovish" paradigm. The tendency to use either a "Hawkish" or "Dovish" model of how the Soviet-American and WTO-NATO relationship operates is far less pronounced in discussions of Confidence-Building than it is in discussions of nuclear and conventional strategy and other types of arms control where the influence of two, fundamental, largely incompatible and competitive perspectives is fairly clear. The uniform tendency in both the Confidence-Building literature and in Confidence-Building thinking more generally is to use more-or-less "Dovish" assumptions about Soviet conventional force policy, intentions and capabilities. These

assumptions characterize the Soviets as being potentially dangerous but not intent upon attacking the West; fearful of the technological prowess and potential of the West; not overwhelmingly capable militarily; reluctant but determined participants in a mutually dangerous military relationship; and willing (if suspicious) potential arms control partners with a mutual interest in successful negotiations. In addition, there is an associated tendency to rely upon an understanding of Soviet conventional force policy and capabilities that is too simplified and pacific – one that leaves out too many relevant considerations that ultimately are very important to understanding the structure of Soviet forces, the willingness of the Soviet Union to modify that structure in order to implement Confidence-Building Measures, and the actual *feasibility of and need for certain types of surprise attack CBMs, given current Soviet doctrine*.⁷⁰ It is that last consideration, after all, that will ultimately determine the success or failure of Confidence-Building – unless the participants are merely interested in cosmetic rhetoric. There is no obvious reason for the virtual dominance of this particular set of assumptions. It is possible to argue that no other coherent set of assumptions would logically tolerate the prolonged discussion of CBMs – assumptions of Soviet deceit and malevolence, for instance, would certainly not encourage the analysis of Eurocentric Confidence-Building. The predominance of Dovish assumptions may also be a matter of wishful thinking on the part of most analysts working in the area. This point deserves investigation because, ultimately, it may lie at the heart of the present limitations handicapping Confidence-Building thinking.

⁷⁰ It may seem inconsistent or paradoxical to say that Confidence-Building thinking assumes benign Soviet military intentions and then say that a major strand in Confidence-Building thinking has to do with constraining surprise attack options, something which hardly seems the product of benign assumptions. It must be recalled that "surprise attack" CBMs are not intended to prevent surprise attack – although some might impede a surprise attack marginally. The point of such CBMs is to *reduce and control unwarranted concerns about surprise attack in circumstances where no current intention to attack actually exists*. These CBMs are designed primarily to correct *misperceptions*. Virtually no Confidence-Building thinking assumes deliberately concealed malign intent.



Soviet Conventional Military Power


While recognizing that Confidence-Building has applications beyond Europe and analytic perspectives beyond those of the West European's and the North American's, the practical focus of most Confidence-Building literature is *how to reduce concerns about either a genuine or misperceived surprise Soviet conventional military attack*. Whether or not those concerns are addressed directly (through constraint and information measures) or indirectly (through broader political understandings), the major focus of Western analysts and policy advisors is and must be Soviet conventional military power in Europe. Soviet and East European analysts may or may not have roughly parallel concerns about NATO conventional military power in Europe. One suspects that at least some do. In any event, because the conventional military power of the Soviet Union is the dominant consideration in most Western perspectives – and because it has been argued here that the Confidence-Building literature mishandles this most important subject – we must now turn to a more detailed discussion of the Type One Generic Flaw.

Addressing Soviet military power, whether or not the specific medium is Confidence-Building Measures or some other type of policy response, means *conceptualizing that power in the context of the dynamic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States or the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO*. No policy response to nor theory of Soviet national security policy behaviour developed *without* careful, integrated reference to the inner workings of the Soviet Union, the United States and other important national actors such as the Federal Republic of Germany *and* the way in which they interact with each other – in other words, the sources or causes of policy behaviour within and between each state – is likely to be very useful. The Type One Generic Flaw noted earlier addresses this very point.

The Type One flaw involves what were called "inadequate" assessments of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces and the nature of the threat that they actually pose to other European countries and the United States and Canada. With few exceptions, the character of that Soviet "threat" is not explored in much detail nor with much sophistication in the

course of developing arguments about CBMs. To be fair, many analysts may feel that the discussion of Eurocentric Confidence-Building Measures does not require an elaborate familiarity with nor reference to Soviet military doctrine and capabilities, merely the recognition that – although neither the WTO and NATO have any serious current intention of attacking the other – both possess "unnecessarily threatening" offensive forces which make everyone nervous and prone to miscalculation and over-reaction. Given this starting point, the task for Confidence-Building is apparently straightforward – devise arrangements that will reduce or control the threatening character of those forces, including the ways in which they are employed and deployed during peacetime. Most often, this translates into proposals for exchanging information on forces and deployments, constraining certain types of threatening exercises and manoeuvres, or (in the more radical proposals) constraining deployments of certain types of forces and/or equipment. This is all quite straightforward and non-controversial. Detailed assessments of Soviet military power are hardly necessary (or so it is thought) to arrive at these sorts of considerations.

Why does it matter if we don't look carefully at the military doctrine and capabilities of the Soviet Union? What conceivable difference could such a detailed examination make to the pursuit of effective Confidence-Building Measures? Unless a reasonable case can be made for supporting the inclusion in CBM studies of detailed analyses of Soviet and WTO military forces, the so-called Type One flaw will appear groundless. It is not sufficient simply to say that all national security issues should be analysed in the greatest feasible detail and that failing to do so limits the quality of analysis. In an abstract sense, this is almost certainly true but it is completely impractical to make this a requirement of all analytic work. Perhaps the most effective method of demonstrating why the integration of thorough studies of Soviet military capabilities *does* make an important difference in the analysis of Confidence-Building is to pose some questions concerning those capabilities. These questions illustrate how the




prospects for and scope of Confidence-Building do change – substantially – depending upon the answers to these questions. For instance:

1. What if Soviet and other WTO forces really don't constitute a credible conventional military threat (i.e. official Western assessments are completely inaccurate, massively over-estimating the absolute and relative power of the WTO)?
2. What if those forces are only a slight threat in relative terms (i.e. the WTO is militarily less effective than most estimates suggest, roughly equal in overall terms to NATO)?
3. Worse, what if Soviet military capabilities and doctrine represent a genuine and serious threat of increasingly dangerous magnitude (i.e. the Soviets could easily crush any and all conventional military opposition in Western Europe in a matter of several days)?
4. What if we cannot estimate reliably how big or small a threat those forces pose (i.e. we lack the analytic and intelligence resources to make any kind of *accurate* assessment of Soviet equipment and manpower capabilities, either in absolute or comparative terms)?
5. What if Soviet decision makers *are* seriously concerned about the "threat" from the West (as well as China and, eventually, Japan) and *genuinely believe* that their military forces must be constantly and rapidly improved to meet that growing and evolving threat?
6. What if Soviet decision makers clearly recognize the relative strength of the WTO and consciously intend to employ that strength – either through outright attack or through coercive diplomacy – in order to achieve expansionist security policy aims?
7. What if different elements within the Soviet Union hold fundamentally different and conflicting views about the true nature of the "Western threat" and the need to continue the current pace of military development?

8. What if the basic character of Soviet military forces (however great or small a threat it seems to pose) cannot be changed by any *external* pressures or influence – of any sort? (i.e. What if Soviet national security policy is, in all major respects, effectively unilateral in conception and execution – virtually beyond the control or influence of the West?)
9. What if the basic character of Soviet military forces, their doctrines and national security policies in general are largely immune to any *internally* generated pressures for or instructions to change? (i.e. Is it physically, politically, culturally and organizationally impossible for the Soviet military to adopt conventional military doctrines and force structures that are less overtly offensive and aggressive than those currently in place?)
10. What if the influence of the emerging, technocratic Soviet leadership group as well as domestic social and economic pressures, and a growing sense that aggressive, military confrontation with the West is both dangerous and pointless, render the Soviet Union uniquely susceptible to major arms control and foreign policy initiatives, including serious Confidence-Building Measures?

Will affirmative answers to various of these questions change what we *think* we can do with Confidence-Building Measures? Will they *actually* change what we can (and cannot) do with Confidence-Building Measures? Superficially, it seems obvious that they will – or, at least, that they can. This is an important point and one that can have a great impact on both analytic and policy thinking about Confidence-Building Measures. *If certain of the alternative interpretations generated by the questions above prevail, conventional thinking about Confidence-Building would need to be re-evaluated in a major way.* Although there is seldom any overt acknowledgment that a particular collection of assumptions about the Soviet Union structures thinking in the Confidence-Building literature, that literature generally seems to assume that: (1) the Soviets (and their WTO allies) enjoy, overall, only a modest and, because of nuclear deterrence, inconsequential conventional mili-



tary superiority; (2) the Soviets have no clear intention of using their military power against Western Europe; and (3) the national security policies and thinking of the Soviet Union can be altered or influenced to some extent through negotiation (and, perhaps, by "arms race coercion" as well).⁷¹ Without belabouring the point, it should be obvious that these are not the only possible interpretations of Soviet circumstances. *In fact, it is possible to generate a number of competitive interpretations of Soviet capabilities, perceptions and intentions, many of which represent plausible – if less sanguine – images of the Soviet reality.* For instance, the prospects for Confidence-Building would be radically impaired if the assessments of very conservative defence analysts were correct – that is, if:

1. the Soviet Union enjoyed a clear and massive conventional military superiority over NATO in Europe and both the Soviet Union and NATO knew it;
2. the Soviet Union did not particularly fear NATO's military policies and intended, at the first suitable opportunity, to employ its massive conventional superiority (in combination, perhaps, with nuclear superiority) to demonstrate its dominance over Europe, either through coercive blackmail or outright attack;
3. Soviet national security policy, the structure of its military forces and the content of its doctrines were the unique product of unilateral (i.e., internal to the Soviet Union's national security community) causes and immune to significant influence (either internally or externally directed) or sudden change.

This is (obviously) the "worst case" interpretation. If these three simplified elements reliably represented genuine Soviet perceptions and intentions, the possibility of Confidence-Building Measures achieving anything positive in Europe likely would be nil. Indeed, there would be a good chance that Confidence-Building Measures might actually be used to conceal aggressive plans and preparations. As a consequence, perhaps, this malign possibility is not a case that occupies much (if any) attention in the Confidence-Building literature. One complaint of the present analysis concerns this omission. The failure to explicitly address a very pessimistic yet defensible interpretation of Soviet capabilities and intentions is both theoretically and empirically unjustified.

A malign interpretation of Soviet perceptions and intentions is not, however, the only image that can be constructed from the range of questions and answers posed earlier. In fact, we can generate a completely different image. Instead of an implacable, powerful and aggressive foe, we can speculate that:

1. the Soviet Union and the WTO possess very uneven conventional military capabilities which, in their view, are less impressive than those of NATO. To the alarm of Soviet political and military decision makers, however, NATO leaders publicly state and appear to believe that the WTO enjoys major advantages, advantages that need to be countered with increased Western effort;
2. Soviet decision makers have no aggressive intentions towards Europe but genuinely believe that the West (especially the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States) is an implacable, unpredictable, and dangerous foe with aggressive designs of its own;
3. The Soviet Union is fast approaching a unique point in its history where many policies – domestic and international – will come under critical review by new leadership groups, thus making Soviet foreign and defence policy unusually susceptible to constructive external influence through new negotiating positions.

⁷¹ This last point is often associated with arms control theory and shares with it a common assumption about the susceptibility to external influence of Soviet national security policy. This view holds that demonstrations of a willingness to match or exceed an adversary in an arms race will "persuade" that adversary that a "moderated" course of action – i.e. within a negotiated arms control regime – is preferable. The crucial assumption in this thinking is that the "arms race behaviour" of the opponent is "caused" by external and interactive forces. This may simply be incorrect – with serious ramifications for a good deal of arms control theorizing and policy-making.



This image is definitely less threatening to the West, at least on a superficial level. The self-perception⁷² of weakness and the genuine fear of an aggressive and implacable West, however, do not necessarily bode well for Confidence-Building. There is no reason to suppose that the Soviets would be particularly anxious to enter into serious Confidence-Building arrangements if they regarded their position as being one of obvious weakness. It is not clear whether or not the Soviet Union would negotiate major CBMs if it felt insecure and threatened *but* also felt that increased *unilateral* Soviet effort might offset existing imbalances. The Soviet Union has generally been very reluctant to negotiate militarily significant agreements from a position of perceived weakness *unless* such a course of action offered the best prospect of redressing the imbalance in the longer term. Certainly, the Soviet perspective and Soviet goals during such negotiations would be closely focused on "correcting" or offsetting perceived imbalances. If both WTO and NATO negotiators believed themselves to be comparatively weak and their alliance adversaries to be militarily powerful, the chances of producing balanced and useful CBMs would probably be very slim.

A third image can be constructed from the range of speculations listed earlier. This image is relatively moderate in its basic features and suggests a situation where Confidence-Building Measures *might* achieve some genuine progress. Here:

1. The Soviet Union and its principal NATO adversaries possess (and are seen by each other to possess) conventional military forces that, while different in many respects, enjoy no significant (i.e. "war-winning") advantages over each other.⁷³

⁷² A phenomenon that can be noted only in passing is that of warranted perceptions. There is an apparently obvious difference between *thinking* that one is militarily superior or inferior and actually *being* superior or inferior. In practical terms, however, the belief is the reality – until external events demonstrate the correctness or folly of that belief. Significantly, both sides can think they are inferior when, in fact, only one is. The ways in which perception and misperception can influence understandings of the military balance and the prospects for CBMs deserve detailed consideration.

2. Decision makers in the Soviet Union have an unnecessarily elevated fear of the West but do not believe (a) that an attack from the West is imminent nor (b) that an attack against the West in Europe would succeed;
3. The Soviet national security policy process is primarily driven by incrementalism and a distinctly "Russian" "strategic culture" which makes it (like virtually all national security policy processes) respond primarily to internal rather than external (international) forces. Nevertheless, the strain and dangers of competing so vigorously, in possible combination with the growing influence of a new, more pragmatic leadership group, make the Soviet Union unusually willing to consider major arms control initiatives – including Eurocentric Confidence-Building Measures.

The slightly future-oriented image of Soviet circumstances and perspectives is superficially similar to the image produced by the assumptions that typify a good deal of Confidence-Building thinking.⁷⁴ However, the "third image's" explicit consideration of domestic Soviet policy processes and its sensitivity to the complexities of evaluating military balances and the role of perception are quite different in detail compared with the implicit assumptions characteristic of most Confidence-Building literature. This third, "moderate" image suggests that some scope for mutually beneficial CBMs might exist if the leadership groups of the two alliances (1) saw themselves as being in rough

⁷³ This view tolerates apparent "advantages" for one side or the other up to a certain point but maintains that neither alliance possesses military capabilities sufficient to ensure a reasonable prospect of victory in a purely conventional European war.

⁷⁴ Some Western Confidence-Building writing exhibits more than this constrained and very modest concern over the apparent strength of Soviet conventional military forces. In these (rare) cases, a CBM regime is seen as providing a way to reduce the need for the "hair-trigger" forward defence that otherwise becomes necessary in the face of significantly superior WTO power. Even these more "concerned" analysts show relatively little interest in assessing or exploring the nature of Soviet conventional military power as a *specific and integrated component of their larger arguments about Confidence-Building.*



military balance and (2) became seriously concerned about the possibilities of misperception and escalation causing unwanted war during a crisis. The extent to which domestic politics in its various forms and the "normal" processes of defence and foreign policy formulation and execution in each country would constrain the opportunities for negotiating and implementing Confidence-Building Measures remains a largely unexplored area. These internal factors could sharply limit the possibility of implementing major Confidence-Building Measures.

A fourth image of at least equal analytic interest can be constructed from plausible evaluations of Soviet capabilities, intentions and concerns. It is similar to the third image in most respects but it depicts a Soviet Union (and Warsaw Treaty Organization) that possesses significantly greater conventional military power than does NATO. As in image three, however, the Soviet Union has no real intention of attacking NATO. In this image.

1. The Soviet Union and its WTO allies possess significant advantages in a number of conventional military categories, realize this fact and are seen to enjoy these significant advantages by NATO. The advantages, although "significant," do not (and are not seen to) confer an obvious "war winning" capability on the WTO;
2. Decision makers in the Soviet Union have an unnecessarily elevated fear of the West but do not believe (a) that an attack from the West is imminent nor (b) that an attack against the West in Europe would enjoy a reasonable chance of success. Soviet leaders, however, do expect a measure of diplomatic "respect" commensurate with their recognized military strength;
3. The Soviet national security policy process is primarily driven by incrementalism and a distinctly "Russian" "strategic culture" which makes it (like virtually all national security policy processes) respond largely to internal rather than international forces and concerns. Because the Soviet Union has created its impressive conventional military capabilities primarily through unilateral efforts and at great sacrifice, it is unlikely to consider major arms control initiatives (including Eurocentric Confidence-Building Measures) unless they yield advantages to the Soviet Union that would otherwise be

more difficult to obtain. Western concerns about "stability," particularly conceptions of cooperative mutual stability are not shared by Soviet political and military decision makers. In Soviet eyes, "defence" is primarily the product and responsibility of unilateral effort.

The four images constructed above represent a rough cross-section of plausible alternative interpretations of the Soviet "reality". Each image captures the essence of a distinct and very different conception of Soviet conventional military capabilities and intentions along with the associated Soviet beliefs and fears. Each of these "images" depends upon a particular interpretation of three basic image components: (1) the perception (and the objective reality) of the conventional military balance; (2) the perception (and the objective reality) of adversary military and foreign policy intentions and plans; and (3) the susceptibility to influence and capacity for change of military posture, doctrine and overall national security policy. Obviously, more variables could be used, revised and/or additional image components could be constructed and a greater variety of interpretations for each variable could be included to create a vastly more complex set of images.⁷⁵ The frightening thing about this range of images – from both an analytic and a policy-oriented perspective – is the fact that most of them are plausible and some are extremely convincing summaries of what we (as Hawks and Doves) "know" or think we know about the Soviet Union and its military policies. This profusion of competitive images, many of which seem entirely plausible, is daunting. More dis-

⁷⁵ Casual inspection suggests that over 1290 distinct images could be constructed simply using the three existing rather gross image components. (Note that the first two components have several distinct sub-components which expand substantially the number of overall permutations and combinations.) More subtle and varied additions would catapult the number of distinct images into the tens of thousands. It is true, of course, that some combinations might be composed of logically incompatible elements (although none are obvious) and that not all of these separate images would have unique implications for Confidence-Building Measures in Europe. It does seem highly likely, however, that a considerable variety of opportunities for CBMs – from very favourable to impossible – must be associated with so many different possible Soviet (and WTO-NATO) "realities".



gressing still, one rarely sees any acknowledgement of this interpretational variety in analyses of Soviet military policies.

The point in sketching out these "alternative images" – simplified models of Soviet perspectives – is fairly straightforward. Confidence-Building as a process and, more specifically, Confidence-Building Measures, have *differential possibilities for success depending upon the "true" nature of Soviet military doctrine, capabilities and a host of other elements having to do with Soviet foreign and domestic policies*. Only one of the four alternative images discussed above appears to be favourable for the production of useful Confidence-Building Measures. If we looked at the full range of plausible images in greater detail, we would almost certainly discover a similarly uneven picture. Some images would support modest or ambitious Confidence-Building Measures but many would not. *It is important to remember that not all plausible interpretations of the dynamic NATO-WTO relationship bode well for the successful application of CBMs.*

The nature of these different "images" of Soviet "realities" is influenced in important, even crucial ways by the Soviet perception (correct or not) of NATO capabilities, doctrines and intentions; by NATO perceptions (correct or not) of Soviet capabilities, doctrines and intentions; and by WTO and NATO perceptions of their own and each other's relative strength. This complex dynamic feature is too often absent from analyses of Soviet policy and Confidence-Building Measures. Although we cannot explore this relatively elaborate perspective fully in an introductory study, we can demonstrate the importance of enhanced sensitivity to multiple (frequently conflicting) interpretations of Soviet behaviour. The most effective way of doing this is to take several selective looks at the conventional military power of the Soviet Union. Each selective "picture" suggests a substantially different Soviet "reality" and supports a different "image". A more elaborate demonstration would clearly show that there is ample evidence available to support any of a wide range of conflicting interpretations of the "Soviet military reality". While this does not mean that there is no single "truth" about Soviet conventional military power, it does mean that such a "truth" is extraordinarily elusive. It also means that the divination of that truth must overcome substantive uncertainties and methodological problems.

Soviet Military Strength – Contrasting Perspectives

There is a tendency in the Confidence-Building literature to treat Soviet conventional military power as if it represented no real threat, even while acknowledging, in a *pro forma* fashion, its apparent potency. There is an associated and generally implicit tendency to treat Soviet intentions as if they were relatively benign. Otherwise, in a sense, what would be the point of discussing CBMs? A significant conventional military superiority and the intent to use it would constitute a situation in which Confidence-Building would be next to meaningless. The reluctance to consider the awful possibility of a malign adversary is understandable, particularly in a context that supports Confidence-Building Measures. *One of the basic analytic points of this study is that these types of unpleasant consideration aren't addressed seriously in the Confidence-Building literature – and that they ought to be. This tendency to ignore the malign is unjustified, particularly given the rich variety of complex and ambiguous evidence about Soviet conventional military capabilities and, to a lesser extent, intentions.* Without necessarily subscribing to the view that the Soviet Union and its WTO allies possess overwhelming and exceedingly offensive conventional forces (as well as an undeniable urge to use them), one can nevertheless point to a number of disturbing developments in and characteristics of the Soviet conventional military force structure. These "facts" – particularly if viewed in isolation and cast in their starkest terms – suggest a distinctly inhospitable environment in which to cultivate meaningful Confidence-Building Measures.

What evidence is there to suggest an aggressive and dangerous Soviet Union? Typically, analysts who see the Soviets as extremely dangerous, capable and aggressive adversaries point to: (1) high absolute and relative (compared to the United States) Soviet conventional weapon system production rates; (2) absolute and relative (compared to the United States) qualitative improvements in Soviet weapon systems; (3) "improving" trends in Soviet military research and development (i.e. a closing of the East-West "military technological gap"); (4) overall quantitative advantages in critical weapons stocks; (5) changes in the structure of Soviet military units, stressing greater combat weight, speed and combined-arms flexibility; (6) manpower and mobilization advantages;



and (7) changes in doctrine (as seen in manuals and exercises) that clearly and increasingly stress pre-emptive attacks. In particular, the pace and character of Soviet conventional weapon system programmes and the progressive iterations of conventional military doctrine can both be cast in a threatening light.

An exhaustive summary of recent Soviet conventional weapon system advances is beyond the scope of the present study. A brief survey of some particularly impressive developments, however, should illustrate how Eurocentric Soviet conventional force improvements can look very threatening, especially when combined with a conventional doctrine that stresses the merit of rapid, pre-emptive armoured thrusts and counter-air operations.

The recent deployment of three new and very sophisticated tactical aircraft and the impending deployment of a fourth provide a striking illustration of the tremendous improvement in Soviet conventional military power. The MiG-29 *Fulcrum*, MiG-31 *Foxhound*, Su-25 *Frogfoot*, and Su-27 *Flanker* all represent significant advances in comparison with earlier Soviet tactical aircraft. The addition of AA-XP-1, AA-XP-2 and AA-10 air-to-air missiles to the capable existing arsenal of AA-7, AA-8 and AA-9 air-to-air missiles will further improve the combat capabilities of these fighter aircraft. These four Soviet combat aircraft symbolize in stark terms the unexpected and troubling capacity of the Soviet Union to produce very advanced weapon systems that appear to approach Western systems in terms of quality and performance. The giant new Antonov 400 *Condor* military transport and the II-76-based *Mainstay* AWACS also illustrate this capacity to design and build very sophisticated military aircraft in surprisingly short time periods.⁷⁶

Technical sophistication and new models are only part of the story. At least as important is the fact that the Soviet Union is currently producing interceptor and ground-attack aircraft at the rate of approximately 1,000 a year (the 1983

rate of 950 is down from the preceding four-year average of 1,300) compared with American figures slightly lower than 400. The period 1974-1983 has seen a total production of 8,400 interceptor and attack aircraft in the Soviet Union compared with 3,500 in the United States.⁷⁷ If NATO production figures are added, of course, the numbers are much closer. The official American publication *Soviet Military Power* (1983) uses an estimate of 900 (NATO including the US) versus 1,350 (Soviet Union) aircraft produced in 1981. Nevertheless, existing force ratios remain skewed strongly in favour of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The sophistication and number of new aircraft entering the Soviet inventory are certainly impressive as are indications that yet another generation of MiG and Sukhoi fighter aircraft is now beginning development. Add to this the continuing development and deployment of quite capable existing aircraft like the MiG-23/27, the Su-24 *Fencer* and the Tu-22M *Backfire*. Consider, as well, the continued production of extremely effective combat helicopters (the Mi-6, Mi-8 and, especially, the Mi-24 and Mi-26) in concert with the development of newer versions of the Mi-24 *Hind*, the impending deployment of the Mi-28 *Havoc* and a new, smaller more manoeuvrable attack helicopter (the Mi-29) and the picture of Soviet tactical air power is impressive indeed. Advances made in Soviet air-to-air and air-to-ground ordnance (new cluster bombs, fuel-air explosives, electro-optical and laser-guided air-to-surface missiles, *Hellfire*-like anti-tank and anti-helicopter missiles, and electro-optically guided glide bombs) further illustrate the increased lethality of Soviet air power. The relative improvement over existing Soviet aircraft and their weapons and the rapid closing of the "technological gap" previously thought to separate Western and Soviet combat aircraft, when combined with admittedly crude quantitative advantages of up to six-to-one in favour of the Soviet Union and its WTO allies, cannot help but generate serious concern.

⁷⁶ See the 28 November 1983 issue of *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, "Soviets Deploying New Fighters", pp. 18-20 and the 12 March 1984 issue with its "Specifications", pp. 135-173. The various editions of *Soviet Military Power* (Washington: USGPO) also contain fairly detailed information about new Soviet tactical aircraft.

⁷⁷ See *Air Force Magazine*, April 1984, p. 38.



Although far less dramatic in technological terms, the steady development, production and deployment of Soviet main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, self-propelled howitzers and mortars, rocket launchers as well as mobile anti-aircraft artillery and missile systems are also impressive and worrisome. These developments acquire special significance when viewed in the context of Soviet conventional military doctrine and its growing emphasis on "Operational Manoeuvre Groups" and related concepts. The raw production figures alone are very impressive. Recent American estimates place Soviet 1974-1983 production figures for tanks at 23,700 (6,250 for the United States), other armoured vehicles at 45,500 (6,000 for the United States), and field artillery, mortars and rocket launchers at 26,000 (1,575 for the United States).⁷⁸ 1983 Soviet production figures alone are substantial: 2,700 tanks, including 1,200 T-80s (versus a NATO combined figure of 1,650); 4,500 "other" armoured fighting vehicles (versus a NATO combined figure of 2,280); 1,700 towed field artillery pieces (versus 335 for all NATO states); 1,100 self-propelled artillery pieces (versus 155 for all NATO states); and 700 multiple rocket launchers (versus 95 for NATO). If other WTO states' production figures were added, WTO numbers would increase by about 25%.⁷⁹

The combat effectiveness of these systems is an equally important (if more controversial) consideration. Although there is some question about the actual effectiveness and quality of all current Soviet military equipment, analysts consider it to be (at least) well executed in most respects and increasingly sophisticated. Soviet tanks are frequently cited as typical examples of Soviet military design practices, with the T-80 standing as the current embodiment of those principles (both good and bad). Other good illustrations include the BTR-70 (APC), the BMP-70 (or BMP-2) MICV, the 2S-1 (M1974) 122-mm self-propelled howitzer, the 2S-3 (M1973) self-propelled 152-mm howitzer, the 2S-5 (M1981) 152-mm gun, and the BM-27 mul-

tipple rocket launcher. One could also mention a whole new generation of surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles (SA-10, SA-11, SA-X-12 and SA-13) and the follow-on on to the famous ZSU-23-4.

In virtually any category of Soviet conventional (or nuclear) weapon systems, one encounters the same picture of substantial qualitative improvement. Obviously, no effort has been made here to provide an exhaustive description (let alone complete analysis) of Soviet conventional weapon systems. This section is merely intended to illustrate how one can produce an aggressive yet factually correct characterization of Soviet military capabilities. A more analytically sophisticated evaluation of the true quality of Soviet weapon systems – and the threat that they pose – would probably be less stark, but the basic thrust of Soviet developments is hard to contest.

The Soviet Union may very well have large (and growing) numbers of good (and improving) quality tactical aircraft, main battle tanks and self-propelled howitzers as well as large numbers of reasonably well-trained personnel. Such observations (whether narrowly true or not) are not as informative as they might at first seem unless they are related to a larger operational context. In this case, the larger context is Soviet military doctrine and its growing concentration on extremely aggressive, very rapid, large-scale conventional offensive ground and air operations. According to a number of well-informed analysts, an important feature in these recent (and continuing) doctrinal revisions has been the emergence (actually, the re-emergence) of the Operational Manoeuvre Group as the cutting edge of Soviet offensive operations. However, the more important development has been the ongoing creation of progressively larger and more powerful organic Soviet military structures (and concomitant strategies) which now effectively operate at the



⁷⁸ "The New Five-Year Defense Plan," *Air Force Magazine*, April 1984, p. 83.

⁷⁹ Figures from *Soviet Military Power 1983* (Washington: USGPO, 1983), pp. 78-80 and *Soviet Military Power 1984* (Washington: USGPO, 1984), p. 98.



Group and, perhaps more importantly, at the integrated theatre level of operations (the TVD or TMO).⁸⁰ These major yet largely evolutionary changes in strategies and organization have been formulated to take advantage of improvements in Soviet weapons system technology as well as to address the changing nature of NATO conventional and tactical nuclear defence plans, particularly NATO's increased emphasis on "Active Defence." Active Defence (which has itself evolved) combines features of both passive (or positional) and mobile defence and, as a consequence, has confronted the Soviet Union and its WTO allies with a difficult collection of operational problems. The practical integration of ground, air and naval forces at a high (theatre) level of command, the development of highly mobile, massive conventional firepower, and the continued refinement of elaborate operational plans stressing the flexible use of fast-moving, hard-hitting armoured formations have been the Soviet response.

The increasingly integrated, theatre-level force structures (the TMO commands) can undertake any of a variety of air, anti-air, airborne, amphibious, naval and front (essentially "ground force") operations in order to destroy an adversary military force in the shortest possible time. The strategic objective has increasingly come to be seen as the effective penetration and destruction of NATO conventional defences *before* NATO could use tactical or theatre nuclear weapons. The use of an Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG) is only one of a number of Front options and hardly constitutes the entirety of TMO operations.⁸¹ To appreciate (but not overestimate) the importance of Operational Manoeuvre Groups, one must recall that the dominant options for the TMO com-

mand, in the event of imminent war, would include a number of air, anti-air and front operations. These options would be integrated and designed to counter NATO's "active defence" strategy before tactical nuclear weapons could be used. The air and anti-air operations would seek to destroy (in this case) NATO aircraft, air bases, air defence resources, nuclear storage sites and C3I facilities while defending against the counter-employment of NATO air resources against WTO air bases and ground forces. While air and anti-air operations are crucial to the success of any campaign, Soviet doctrine continues to place an overwhelming emphasis on the rapid and decisive use of large, highly mobile armoured ground forces. Within this context, the Operational Manoeuvre Group has become the logical extension of previous Soviet conventional military thinking – a smaller, more autonomous, more sophisticated and harder-hitting version of the attack force previously drawn from the "second echelon." However, the

OMG concept is obviously more flexible, more dynamic and potentially more materially and psychologically damaging than the more deliberate [second] echelon concept. It makes more creative use of the technical potential of new equipment [especially the mobile fire-power noted earlier in this chapter] ... [but it] can only be used effectively ... if the operation has achieved surprise. ... [P]rovided some surprise is achieved, and the defence is not well estab-

⁸⁰ The most important "Group level" for our purposes is the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) while the most important Theatre of Military Operations is the "Western TMO" which includes the central European region, the alpine region of Italy and Austria as well as the southern half of Sweden and Norway. The North Western and South Western TMOs encompass the remaining European territory.

⁸¹ See John G. Hines and Philip A. Peterson, "The Warsaw Pact Strategic Offensive – The OMG in Context," *International Defence Review*, no. 10, 1983, p. 1391 and their excellent "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theatre Strategy," *ORBIS*, vol. 27, no. 3 (Fall 1983). Other excellent discussions of OMGs and contemporary Soviet conventional doctrine include: C. J. Dick, "Soviet Doctrine, Equipment Design and Organization – An Integrated Approach to War," *International Defence Review*, no. 12, 1983 pp. 1715-1722; C. J. Dick, "Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups – A Closer Look," *International Defence Review*, no. 6, 1983 pp. 769-776; and C. N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group – A New Challenge for NATO," *International Defence Review*, no. 9, 1982 pp. 1177-1186.



lished in depth with strong reserves, it is likely that the OMG will replace the second echelon. A strong first echelon is more likely to create the necessary conditions for inserting a OMG, and such a first echelon, aided by OMG activities, will not need to be backed by [an inherently vulnerable] second echelon.⁸²

The Operational Manoeuvre Group, whether at Army level (where its strength would be approximately one division) or at the larger Front level (where it would probably be composed of two or three divisions), would include extra resources (especially transport helicopters and gunships, additional self-propelled artillery, extra engineer support such as bridging equipment, significantly enhanced mobile logistic support and additional organic air defence) and co-ordinated air support to facilitate its rapid movement into the enemy rear. The smaller Army-subordinated OMG would be intended, on a modest scale, to harass, disrupt and possibly encircle defenders, block retreats, attack reserves, destroy key enemy C3I assets and capture crucial bridges and roadways in the rear, thus expediting the overall advance of forces in the first day or two of battle. The larger Front-subordinated OMG, committed at a later stage in battle, would be intended to destroy or capture much larger, more important and concentrated targets. In both cases, Operational Manoeuvre Groups would follow thorough, pre-planned instructions designed to achieve the maximum impact. They would *not* be allowed to simply seek out targets of opportunity, a notion that is anathema to Soviet military planners.

To maximize the effectiveness of both types of OMG, the Soviets have placed increasing emphasis on the pre-emption of all NATO resources that might threaten or block the insertion of OMGs, especially NATO aircraft and front-line ground defences. This has placed special demands on Soviet tactical air power as well as artillery (including rockets and mis-

siles). It is no coincidence that Soviet divisions (both tank and motor rifle) have acquired significantly increased mobile firepower. In addition, front-line units of the GSFG have apparently received massive additional discretionary artillery assets. The increased importance of Operational Manoeuvre Groups has increased the associated importance of airborne and air-mobile (helicopter borne) combat forces – including the *Spetsnaz* or special forces – whose coordinated use would be crucial to the effective insertion of OMGs and the disruption of the NATO rear.

Probably the most important thing to understand about OMGs is the fact that they are *not* (as some would argue) the central feature of Soviet conventional doctrine *per se*, even if they do idealize its very aggressive use of armoured forces. Operational Manoeuvre Groups are but one, admittedly important, aspect of evolving Soviet conventional operational plans. By themselves, they cannot function effectively in a hostile environment. They are intrinsically high-risk formations that depend upon the coordinated initial use of massed, front-line artillery and armour as well as large-scale counter-air interdiction and continued close-air support. Nevertheless, they are an important part of what appears to be a carefully integrated and extremely offensive Soviet conventional military capability in Europe.

From the standpoint of Confidence-Building Measures, given the great sensitivity of CBMs to surprise attack concerns, the most important aspect of contemporary Soviet conventional doctrine and capabilities may be tactical air power rather than Operational Manoeuvre Groups. Without effective air offense and defence, all Soviet ground force manoeuvres would be extremely vulnerable to NATO air strikes. This point is well made by Hines and Peterson:

The OMG is the most novel and hence, in Western perceptions, the most threatening aspect of evolving Soviet strategy for land warfare. ... Ironically, improvements in the operational concepts of the air and anti-air operations, and the quantum advances in the quantity and quality of the aircraft and missiles that support them, represent a much greater threat to NATO than does the OMG. Successful air and anti-air operations would give theatre strategic fire superiority to the Warsaw Pact, in

⁸² C. J. Dick, "Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups – A Closer Look," see ref. 36 p. 773. Some recent treatments of Soviet conventional doctrine do not seem to appreciate this rather important – and ongoing – transformation in Soviet force structure and operational planning. They continue to concentrate on questions about the Soviet "second echelon". As a practical matter, the growing attractiveness of the OMG may well have eclipsed "two echelon" thinking in the Soviet Union.



any war in Europe, and thereby establish the conditions under which success of Front and army-subordinated OMG operations would be virtually assured. Warsaw Pact military writers acknowledge that the OMG can succeed only in a benign air and anti-air environment.⁸³

There were two reasons for discussing the major advances in Soviet tactical airpower, the more incremental improvements in artillery and armour, and the emergence of Operational Manoeuvre Groups in Soviet operational planning. The first was to illustrate the point that it is quite easy to paint a grim and very threatening picture of Soviet conventional military capabilities and (apparent) intentions. This has serious implications for those discussions of Confidence-Building that tend to discount or ignore the particularly aggressive character of Soviet conventional military capabilities and (possible) intentions. Bluntly, the implicitly "benign" interpretation that seems to underlie much of the Confidence-Building literature may simply be incorrect. At minimum, it is almost certainly too simplistic and, probably, too optimistic. As suggested earlier, there are many plausible interpretations or "images" of the current Soviet "situation" and at least some of them are distinctly antagonistic to any reasonable use of CBMs. Many others are ambiguous as far as supporting significant Confidence-Building Measures is concerned. Responsible analysis and policy making must address this fact. Too often, it does not.

An equally important reason for examining this less benign perspective with its explicit consideration of Soviet capabilities and potential intentions has been to suggest that a thorough knowledge of the Soviet position *might* help to identify useful and genuinely constructive Confidence-Building proposals *as well as their useful limits*. The careful identification of the most threatening aspects of a potential adversary's capabilities is a logical route to pursue in constructing practical CBMs. This very brief preceding discussion of recent developments in Soviet conventional military thinking suggests, for instance, that the common Western concentration on Soviet tanks, tank forma-

tions and tank tactics is not necessarily the only sound approach to reducing Western fears of surprise attack. Certain facets of Soviet tactical air power might be a more relevant subject for CBM constraints as well as, perhaps, other assets (such as Alford's bridging equipment) which would facilitate the rapid insertion of OMGs into the NATO rear. *At least as likely and far less optimistic, however, is the possible conclusion that Soviet conventional force structure and operational planning in Europe depend upon such carefully integrated capabilities that Constraint CBMs may be neither technically feasible (i.e. there may be no special or particular equipment or deployment limit that will actually constrain Soviet "surprise attack options") nor acceptable to a defence-through-offense conscious Soviet Union. After all, if the Soviets genuinely believe that this type of defence is necessary and effective – to either attack NATO by surprise or to pre-empt a NATO attack against the WTO – they will be reluctant to impair the carefully developed, painstakingly balanced, and elaborately integrated character of that defence. This is a conclusion that is rarely, if ever, considered in discussions of Confidence-Building – probably because the character of Soviet conventional military forces is rarely addressed as an explicit feature of analysis.*

The crucial failing that animates the Type One Generic Flaw in Confidence-Building thinking and the Confidence-Building literature is inadequate assessments of Soviet conventional military forces and of the nature of the threat that they actually pose. The obvious ramification of this failing is an inadequate understanding of CBM possibilities. In looking at the aggressive characterization of Soviet conventional doctrine and capabilities outlined above, we see an image of the Soviet Union that very well might not be seriously interested in Constraint CBMs. However, the point of this critique is not that the Soviet Union is, in fact, indifferent to the virtues of Confidence-Building and is, instead, intent on invading Europe at the earliest feasible opportunity. Although this may be true, the larger point is that there are many possible interpretations of the true Soviet situation and, necessarily, differing evaluations of the real opportunities for Confidence-Building Measures. Indeed, this section is designed to suggest the flavour of these

⁸³ Hines and Peterson, "The Warsaw Pact Strategic Offensive — the OMG in Context", *International Defense Review*, no. 10, 1983, p. 1395.



alternative interpretations, illustrating how the possibilities for Confidence-Building can shift with the interpretation of the Soviet situation.

To make this necessarily complex point clearer, consider the image of Soviet conventional military capabilities presented earlier. If the Soviet Union *does* possess, more-or-less, the capabilities and doctrines outlined above – and it seems increasingly difficult to deny that it does – but *doesn't* have clearly aggressive and offensive intentions, how else can the very aggressive forces and plans be explained? More important for the purposes of this study, what consequences would such alternative (potentially more benign) explanations have for the prospects of Confidence-Building?

Properly, such intriguing and important questions should receive detailed consideration. A more thorough analysis of this aspect of Confidence-Building would surely need to explore the widest possible range of alternative explanations for Soviet and Warsaw Treaty Organization military policy developments. For our purposes, however, the brief examination of two more alternative perspectives may better illustrate the point of this section.

While not questioning in the least the very clear and effective modernization of Soviet conventional forces and their increasing convergence with a conventional doctrine possessing a decidedly offensive tone, Joshua Epstein suggests that these developments may have a counter-intuitive cause. Rather than reflecting a deliberate *preference* for pre-emption *per se*, Epstein suggests that the current Soviet conventional posture is an accommodation to intrinsic Soviet military weaknesses.

Apparently unconvinced by the simple numerical comparisons and static assessments prevalent in the West, the Soviets themselves express profound dissatisfaction with many aspects of their forces, and with the drawbacks of ever-advancing technology – drawbacks as severe as in the (“gold-plated”) American case. *Indeed, seen in the light of the Soviets' own sharp self-criticism, the primacy of the offensive, in doctrine and capabilities, emerges as a rational accommodation to their most critical military shortcoming: inflexibility.* Far from making the Soviets less dangerous, however, that very

deficiency makes them, if anything, *more* dangerous by creating strong pre-emptive inclinations.⁸⁴

Epstein, in his analysis, refers to a wide range of self-criticism drawn from the Soviet military literature. This literature contains frequent complaints about the lack of flexibility produced by Soviet military training and, generally speaking, despairs of ever correcting it. The chief culprit responsible for this institutional inflexibility appears to be the military incentive system which creates tremendous pressures to severely simplify or distort exercises in order to ensure “good scores”. This is apparently so endemic that the traditional Soviet military tendency toward rigidity is seriously exaggerated. While senior Soviet military decision makers appreciate the great and increasing importance of “flexibility, initiative, and the capacity for creative decisionmaking in the face of uncertainty”, they also appear to realize that their present forces are plagued by many operational limitations.

These operational limitations create certain incentives. In particular, once convinced that war with NATO was unavoidable, the Soviets would have strong incentive to apply a maximum of force with as little warning as possible. ... As long as the Soviets lack flexibility, they will have every reason to avoid that necessity. The operation that minimizes the likelihood of its arising is precisely the “surprise” and “massive” attack suggested by Soviet doctrine. ... A successful pre-emption nips uncertainty in the bud. It obviates the need for great flexibility by overwhelming the adversary before he can generate the unexpected counter, thus precluding any need to diverge from the predetermined plan or the routinized mission.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Joshua Epstein, “On Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Questions of Soviet Confidence,” *ORBIS*, vol. 26, no. 1, p. 72. First emphasis added.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 82. However, Epstein notes a counter point: “the very problems that make a crushing pre-emption so attractive also make it highly risky for the Soviets to attack without prior mobilization” because they would be uncertain about the readiness of their own standing forces (p. 83).



The viewpoint developed by Epstein stresses the "rationality of pre-emption" as a Soviet solution to or compensation for self-perceived operational inflexibility. If Soviet capabilities and doctrines *are* the product of this sort of conscious design intended to compensate for known weaknesses, what are the consequences for NATO planning and what are the implications for the construction of effective Confidence-Building Measures? Epstein's analysis concludes that any NATO defence plans that (1) emphasize the "disruption of the Soviets' rigid (conventional) command and control system;" (2) offer increased protection for NATO aircraft and airbases; or (3) increase the time available for NATO mobilization and reinforcement will increase the existing uncertainty of Soviet decision makers and, as a consequence, enhance conventional deterrence. He also points out that the Soviet command structure, because of its reputed inflexibility, is particularly vulnerable to unexpected adversary actions. This leads Epstein to make a somewhat more controversial recommendation. He suggests that the perceived NATO capacity to wage local counter-offensives will also increase Soviet uncertainty and therefore enhance deterrence.⁸⁶

The notion that Soviet conventional force structure, equipment and doctrine reflect the deliberate, rational accommodation⁸⁷ to undesirable operational inflexibility suggests that Soviet interest in Constraint CBMs would be, at best, minimal. Unless Constraint CBMs could reduce, in some way, the consequences of net Soviet inflexibility – and no obvious method for achieving this end suggests itself – it is hard to see what advantages the Soviets would perceive in the pursuit of this type of Confidence-Building. Because Constraint CBMs typically would impair the ability of the Soviets to launch a pre-emptive attack, Soviet decision makers would be loathe to negotiate wide-ranging measures of this type. It is entirely possible,

however, that the Soviets would be interested in those more limited CBMs designed to reduce the chance of misperception and unintended escalation. Reduced uncertainty about and increased knowledge of NATO forces and intentions would tend to reduce the effects of inflexibility. It is not clear, however, whether the Soviets would be prepared to trade-off such knowledge in an Information CBM regime against NATO enjoying correspondingly greater access to information about the WTO.⁸⁸

Although it may be quite true that the Soviet High Command has self-consciously structured its doctrine and capabilities to compensate for intrinsic operational inflexibility (with certain consequences for Confidence-Building possibilities), this is only one of a number of possible explanations for the specific nature of and changes in Soviet conventional force capabilities and doctrine. This one happens to be a very specific and unique sort of explanation, one that is largely inner-directed, sensitive to organization rigidities but nevertheless rational in nature. As we have noted many times, there are other explanations for why the specific character of Soviet doctrine and capabilities is as it is. In the most general terms, these explanations rely upon one of two basic dynamics: (1) a fundamentally unilateral, non-rational, incremental process of force and doctrinal development; or (2) a fundamentally interactive, rational "action-reaction" process where Soviet decision makers respond consciously and deliberately to counter NATO policy. It is not at all clear whether the opportunities for Confidence-Building would be worse or better if Soviet policies appeared to be largely unilateral and non-interactive. Presumably, decision makers presiding over an inner-directed and incremental process of policy development would not be especially influenced by nor interested in technical CBMs. Such measures would likely be seen to be external impedimenta or simply extraneous. It seems more likely that

⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 84-86.

⁸⁷ It is also possible to argue – although Epstein does not – that Soviet military decision makers may have come to realize that doctrines and capabilities developed for other reasons address, serendipitously, the increasingly serious problem of inflexibility. As a practical matter, this sort of after-the-fact rationale is more likely to have been the case.

⁸⁸ Although Epstein does not say so, it does not necessarily follow that increased operational flexibility would make the Soviets any less likely to prefer a pre-emptive form of defence. Likewise, it is not necessarily the case that CBMs would deflect Soviet interest in essentially pre-emptive doctrines.




decision makers who consciously adjust (or at least attempt to adjust) their policy to external (i.e. NATO) developments would be more interested in using Confidence-Building Measures to achieve policy aims. This only suggests greater *interest*, however, and not necessarily cooperation. Such activist decision makers might be inclined to attempt to *use* CBMs to constrain NATO while allowing their own forces the greatest possible freedom of action. It should be apparent that the possibilities for successful Confidence-Building are not assured.

The basic point here is that realistic and useful evaluations of Eurocentric Confidence-Building prospects must depend upon our understanding of (1) what Soviet (and, for that matter, American, German, Polish, French, etc.) conventional military policy (including doctrine) actually entails; (2) why it has developed in the ways it has; (3) the degree to which it is influenced significantly by developments in other states' military policies; (4) the extent to which it is subject to relatively precise control and adjustment; and (5) what the true (and perceived) military balance is. One more example of how alternative interpretations of Soviet policy and the nature of the conventional military balance can alter evaluations of Confidence-Building prospects may serve to make this point more clearly. In this case, the illustration employs an "action-reaction" (rational) model of Soviet and NATO defence policy formulation, emphasizing efforts to counter each other's conventional doctrines.

The recent revision in American Army doctrine – the so-called AirLand Battle Doctrine as outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 (*Operations*) – provides an instructive example of how basic conventional doctrines can interact and produce (perhaps) unintended consequences for Confidence-Building. The AirLand doctrine of 1982 represents a fairly sharp departure from the 1976 doctrine of "active defence" (although, in practice, the revisions may not be so pronounced).⁸⁹ Rather than concentrating on forward defence, AirLand stresses a much

more aggressive extended and co-ordinated battlefield approach intended to take advantage of perceived Soviet weaknesses and American strengths. The essence of AirLand is manoeuvre and deep attack which, in combination with "battlefield air interdiction", are intended to permit American (and other NATO) forces to victimize the inflexible C3 of Soviet forces and their habit of rigid echeloning.⁹⁰ As most authors have recognized, this is a risky strategy because of: the crucial reliance it places on extremely accurate and timely intelligence information (for pinpointing Soviet forces); its central dependence on potentially unreliable and very costly deep attack "smart" munitions; and (most dangerous) the fact that it effectively requires the commitment of reserve forces for use in counter-attacks. In addition, it makes certain assumptions about the fragility and inflexibility of Soviet C3I and the deployment of Soviet forces that may not be accurate. The preceding discussion of Operational Manoeuvre Groups, for instance, suggests that the U.S. concentration on finding and attacking a TMO (theatre) or Front's "second echelon" may be a fatal error because there may not be one. As Hanne suggests, *the refinement of the Operational Manoeuvre Group approach and other developments in Soviet doctrine (and capabilities) may be a conscious and effective reaction to developments in American doctrine, actually leapfrogging the development of the AirLand Battle Concept which was formulated to counter an earlier version of Soviet doctrine.*

One can see in the development of the American AirLand Battle Concept and the Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group a reasonably good illustration of how "action-reaction" interaction works. Neither development may be a particularly effective solution to the problems each side sees itself and its adversary facing but both appear to have been driven by concerns about the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and WTO policies as well as the impact of new conventional military technology. Both the Soviet and the American "solutions" appear to entail comparatively greater risk than the doctrines they replace. Curiously, both embrace fairly rigid forward deployments in combination with relatively



⁸⁹ Colonel William Hanne describes the evolution of AirLand in "AirLand Battle – Doctrine not Dogma," in *International Defence Review*, no. 8, 1983, pp. 1035-1040.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 1035-1036.



large-scale mobile, deep attack philosophies. The consequences of these two developments are very complex but several points relevant to Confidence-Building are worth making.

First, the American adoption of the AirLand Battle Concept can easily be seen by the Soviets and their WTO allies to be threatening in ways that earlier NATO doctrines were not. The explicit discussion of large-scale, deep attack, conventional counter-offensives is a considerably more aggressive posture than those considered in "active defence" or "forward defence." Indeed, it captures the essence of Soviet fears as articulated in the "second image" of Soviet perceptions and beliefs (the image in which the Soviet Union viewed the United States and the NATO allies as fundamentally aggressive and dangerous foes). Under these circumstances, if the image corresponds even loosely to reality, then the Soviet Union might very well be interested in Constraint CBMs that would reduce their concerns about sudden American or wider NATO attacks in Central Europe. Although less clearly a dominant feature in "Image Three" and "Image Four" (where the Soviet Union is concerned about but considerably less fearful of American or wider NATO attacks), the anxiety generated by the explicit espousal of very aggressive American plans like AirLand Battle could also produce incentives to negotiate Constraint CBMs, particularly if no unilateral Soviet solution seemed likely to be as effective. Whether or not such reluctant Soviet "enthusiasm" would actually be generated by AirLand Battle is truly difficult to say, especially given the Soviet penchant for "solving" defence problems unilaterally, regardless of cost.

A serious potential problem suggested by this look at AirLand Battle and Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups has ominous consequences for Eurocentric CBM prospects. The two principals in the NATO-WTO relationship may be so heavily committed (for many complex reasons) to generating *essentially unilateral (as opposed to co-operative) doctrinal and technological solutions to their conventional balance problems* – and their respective solutions may be so interactive – *that neither side will feel safe in considering – nor be seriously interested in exploring – Confidence-Building or other arms control-type solutions.* A related point of more relevance to the West is the possibility that NATO – or, more particu-

larly, the United States – *may become so enamoured of fundamentally offensive solutions like the AirLand Battle Concept and the even more aggressive AirLand 2000 Concept that it will have no real choice but to oppose meaningful Constraint CBMs because they would seriously impair U.S. and NATO flexibility and responsiveness.* Despite the increased risk associated with the conventional military policies of both the East and the West, the WTO and NATO may now be trapped in a paradoxical relationship where (assuming neither planned immediate attack) *both would benefit from meaningful Constraint CBMs but neither feels it can now surrender the flexibility and responsiveness that their risky, manoeuvre-oriented policies would appear to demand.*

This discussion of AirLand Battle and Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups can also be viewed as part of a larger debate in the West about how best to deal with Soviet and WTO capabilities and doctrine in Central Europe. The primary question, from a Western perspective, has been whether a conventional defence of Western Europe (and, therefore, conventional deterrence) is possible. Although at the risk of serious oversimplification, one can nevertheless say that this debate has revolved around assessments of technological and mobility solutions to the present, perceived weaknesses of Western conventional forces in Europe.⁹¹ The specifics of this ongoing debate warrant at least brief consideration here because they suggest yet another perspective to use in understanding the East-West military balance and the nature of Soviet conventional military policy. This perspective, as usual, also entails certain consequences for Confidence-Building.

In one sense, the official American adoption of the AirLand Battle Concept prejudices the direction of the "debate" about appropriate Western conventional military policy in Europe. It represents at least the partial victory of "manoeuvre advocates" over "positional advocates." Nevertheless, the debate continues in academic and professional military circles and the eventual resolution is far from clear, especially given the emergence of increasingly significant political and economic constraints, both within the United States and in Europe. The essence of the debate concerns the dual claim (most closely associated with Mearsheimer) that (a) NATO can (or could, with modest adjustments to relatively traditional positional defence doctrines) provide an adequate con-



ventional defence, and (b) the NATO adoption of a manoeuvre-oriented doctrine would be extremely risky, provocative and hazardous.

Implicit in the view of those supporting the positional or more traditional approach is the assumption that the conventional military balance is "close enough" to make a conventional force defence of Western Europe feasible. Logically, a corollary of this view is that Soviet capabilities and doctrine are *not* sufficient to ensure a clear-cut or overwhelming chance of Soviet conventional victory in Europe. If Soviet decision makers share this view *but see no real offensive "counter-threat" to them in the positional, forward defence deployment and doctrine of NATO, there might be a possibility of establishing a doctrinal modus vivendi formalized, perhaps, by a major Constraint CBM regime.* Failing this joint perception of conventional military adequacy and the associated finely balanced relationship between dissimilar doctrines and forces, pressures would exist for the Soviets and NATO to acquire "peace of mind" and flexibility unilaterally. This would then become a classic illustration of another "action-reaction" process.

The alternative point of view in this debate – that existing ideas of forward defence are inad-

equate and that only the capacity to employ a manoeuvre strategy will effectively deter or defeat the Soviets – also employs an assumption about the state of the conventional military balance. This perspective assumes that the balance is seriously in favour of the Soviet Union and that more traditional methods of addressing that imbalance simply will not work. This perspective entails the same assessment – bleak – of Confidence-Building prospects as did the earlier discussion of AirLand Battle and Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups.

Again, the principal point to this exercise is to demonstrate – if only in passing – *that different images or models or perspectives of the actual relationship between East and West imply different prospects for Confidence-Building.* This was the basic argument behind the Type One Generic Flaw – inadequate assessments of the "Soviet threat" seriously handicap our understanding of the possibilities for Confidence-Building. *If the CBM literature and Confidence-Building thinking more generally are to improve markedly, they will have to address this fundamental weakness. That can be accomplished only by deliberately integrating into CBM studies thoughtful and sophisticated analyses of Soviet policy, its origins and causes, and the relationship between it and Western policies.*

There are many issues, perspectives and concerns that should be considered in efforts to understand the true possibilities of Confidence-Building. Some of them are associated with but remain distinct from the points discussed above. One relatively discrete subject that should be included in any more ambitious analysis of Confidence-Building is *Surprise Attack.* Contemporary assessments of the problems associated with detecting and reacting "correctly" to surprise attack are particularly germane to the sorts of concerns that are presumed to animate Western thinking in Confidence-Building negotiations. There is occasional reference to the theoretical literature dealing with surprise attack but no serious effort has yet been made to incorporate the

⁹¹ The "debate" began after the 1973 Yom Kippur War "demonstrated" the effectiveness of Precision Guided Munitions. Since then, many analysts have argued for the widescale adoption of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles and various other "high tech force multipliers". This advocacy has, in turn, led to wider considerations of how U.S. and NATO forces ought to be equipped and deployed and what doctrine should guide their operational planning. The current character of this debate between advocates of manoeuvre and those of less adventuresome, positional defences can be gleaned from: John Mearsheimer, "Manoeuvre, Mobile Defence, and the NATO Central Front," *International Security*, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 104-122; John Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," *International Security*, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 3-39; John Mearsheimer, "The Military Reform Movement: A Critical Assessment," *ORBIS*, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 285-300; Joshua Epstein, *ORBIS*, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 71-86; Gary L. Guertner, "Nuclear War in Suburbia," *ORBIS*, vol. 26, no. 1, pp.49-69; Richard K. Betts, "Conventional Strategy: New Critics, Old Choices," *International Security*, vol. 7, no. 4 pp.140-162; Samuel Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe" and Fen Osler Hampson, "Groping for Technical Panaceas: The European Conventional Balance and Nuclear Stability," both in *International Security*, Vol. 8, no. 3 (pp. 32-56 and 57-82 respectively). An excellent summary of current issues ("New Directions in Conventional Defence") appears in *Survival*, vol. XXVI, no. 2, pp.50-78.



(generally pessimistic) insights of this subject into the analysis of CBMs.⁹² Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of the present study to explore the Surprise Attack literature and its relationship with and potential contribution to Confidence-Building thinking. Given the common ground covered by both, there are very good reasons for thinking that it could make a rich contribution to our understanding of Confidence-Building.

The Psychological Dynamics of Confidence-Building

The Type Two Generic Flaw concerns the persistent use – very frequently, the unreflective use – of what were called naive psychological assumptions about the Confidence-Building process (i.e., how Confidence-Building actually works). This often implicit use of *ad hoc* assumptions reflects the serious failure of the literature and Confidence-Building thinking more generally to develop or refer to a satisfactory model of the CBM process. For all the literature's interest in speculating about how best to formulate successful Confidence-Building Measures, there is remarkably little analytic interest in exploring how individual decision makers and groups are affected positively by the particular objectives and mechanisms of those Measures. Intuitively sensible – but by no means correct – assertions about the importance of increasing information and reducing uncertainty about adversaries and their intentions dominate this literature. This essentially intuitive, common-sense approach ignores a great deal of research on the *counter-intuitive* operation of perception, information processing and decision making, subjects that appear to be very important to an understanding of the Confidence-Building process. The failure to employ

psychological and cognitive scientific findings to understand these dynamics and to construct a working model of the Confidence-Building process is a crucial theoretical and empirical oversight.

It is simply not possible to characterize the Type Two problem in the same manner used to highlight the nature of the Type One Generic Flaw. Neither is it feasible to contrast the literature's "faulty model" of the Confidence-Building process with a convincing collection of "alternative" images or models. In the first place, the Type Two flaw addresses what is in effect the *absence* of a discrete, identifiable model rather than a bad or narrow choice of models. Unlike the Type One flaw where one interpretation of Soviet conventional military forces and doctrine could be challenged by another, the Type Two flaw is about the failure to use *any* real model of the Confidence-Building process. However, not only is there no clearly identifiable process model present in the existing literature, there is no currently available competitive account that can better explain how Confidence-Building works. As was noted earlier in this chapter, the body of ideas that could function as a serious alternative account of how people deal with a wide range of policy problems (including Confidence-Building) is far from being well developed. This fact further frustrates what would hardly be, in any event, a straightforward discussion of process-oriented limitations in the Confidence-Building literature.

Despite these inherent difficulties, there are some observations that we can make – if only in summary form – about decision-making, cognitive processes, misperception, information processing and their potential contribution to an improved understanding of Confidence-Building and how it works. They are intended to be suggestive only and ought not to be asked to bear inordinate critical weight at this stage.

The first point to make concerns the role of "decision-making" in structuring these observations. Although it is certainly not the only way to view the Confidence-Building process, the use of an analytic perspective or approach that is sensitive to the important role of decision-making is helpful in understanding the operation of that process. The primary concerns of Confidence-Building, after all, are clarifying and increasing information about poten-

⁹² Probably the best current treatment of this subject is Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defence Planning* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1982.) Also see Paul Bracken, "Defense Organization and Management" and John H. Maurer and Gordon H. McCormick, "Surprise Attack and Conventional Defence in Europe," both in *ORBIS*, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 253-266 and 107-126 respectively; Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (eds.), *Strategic Military Deception* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982); John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter (eds.), *Military Deception and Strategic Surprise* (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1982); and "Forum: Intelligence and Crisis Forecasting," *ORBIS*, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 817-847.



tial enemies, reducing the chances of misperceiving non-hostile acts, and, to some extent, constraining deployments and capabilities that could cause "undue" anxiety about "surprise attack". *Most Confidence-Building Measures, as a consequence, attempt to improve or aid decisions about the correct interpretation of ambiguous acts and information.* Indeed, it is the ultimate objective of virtually all CBMs that potential adversaries not choose the wrong course of action because they misunderstood each other's acts (and, to a lesser extent, intentions). In a very real sense, CBMs can be seen as devices for inserting new sensitivities and concerns into the formal and informal decision-making processes of adversary states.⁹³ The importance of using a decision making approach in order to understand Confidence-Building is increased considerably by the fact that at least some social science "theories" or "models" of decision-making devote a great deal of attention to the disruptive influence of misperception and cognitive phenomena in decision-making. In fact, it is increasingly the case that academic decision-making thinking pays a considerable amount of attention to the ways in which *various natural cognitive processes interfere with the sound evaluation of information and the rational selection of choice options. THESE ARE ALSO MAJOR CONCERNS RELEVANT TO THE OPERATION OF CBMs.* Although it may not be the usual way of organizing the analysis of CBMs and Confidence-Building thinking, it seems obvious that a decision-making-oriented analytic perspective is both appropriate to and useful for a sound understanding of the Confidence-Building process.⁹⁴

⁹³ It is not clear at this stage whether decision-making is merely important to understanding the Confidence-Building process or if it can be said to function at the very core of that process to the same extent that it does, say, in deterrence. The best current treatment of deterrence – Patrick Morgan's *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1977) and its 1983 revised edition – makes a very strong case for considering deterrence theory to actually be a theory of decision-making. I have argued elsewhere that it is even more useful to consider deterrence to be a neutral procedural framework into which different decision-making process assumptions can be placed. Different assumptions animate the operation of deterrence in different ways. I strongly suspect that some varieties of CBMs are similar to deterrence in this respect while others are more clearly *facilitators* of sound decisions. These are possibilities worthy of further consideration.

Although it is true that there is no explicit model of the Confidence-Building process in the literature, it is still possible to see in most Confidence-Building thinking the *direct influence* of operating assumptions very similar to those found in social science's dominant decision paradigm – the "Rational Actor Model of Decision". This is most evident in the assumption that *increased information and reduced uncertainty can yield improved understanding of and control over events.* This facilitates "optimal" choices in decision theory and yields reduced chances of misperception, distrust and unintended conflict in Confidence-Building. Further, it is no distortion to view the Confidence-Building process as *a rational effort to control misperception and uncertainty.* To appreciate the ramifications of this, we must look, if only briefly, at rationality and rational decision-making more closely.

Although other analysts had earlier considered the limits of rational choice and rationality in human decision-making models, Graham Allison⁹⁵ is generally credited with having moved the issue of rationality in foreign policy decision-making to centre stage for the analytic community. In fact, it is fair to say that he shaped the thinking of an entire generation of analysts. Allison's basic point was simply that different facets of a complex policy reality became visible when one moved away from an exclusive reliance on the traditional analytic framework which assumed that decision-makers made more-or-less rational choices. He sug-

⁹⁴ John Steinbruner makes an even broader point about the centrality of decision-making to all political analysis in his difficult but thought-provoking book, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). He observes: "Since the making and executing of decisions is obviously a major component of what any government does, virtually all political analysis has rested in fact upon assumptions about decision making, ..." p. 7.

⁹⁵ *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971). This ground-breaking work remains interesting and useful to this day.



gested that "organizational process" and "bureaucratic politics" each constituted additional facets of the foreign policy reality. They, each in their own way, shaped and influenced what information and alternative courses of action were available to central decision-makers, predisposed those decision-makers to adopt particular positions (frequently for parochial reasons), and impaired the execution of policy choices, once made. By focusing on these other aspects of the policy process, one could gain richer understanding of foreign policy. At least as important as this point about contrasting perspectives, however, was the observation that the formal rational choice assumptions of the "Rational Actor Model" did not accommodate the limitations of human decision makers. Instead, Allison suggested that Simon's notion of "bounded rationality" provided a more plausible model of human decision-making behaviour.⁹⁶

Since Allison's *Essence of Decision*, a number of studies have been published that have developed Allison's ideas (or concerns similar to his). These studies (and the thinking behind them) can be divided into two very basic groups. The bulk of them have attempted to "rehabilitate" notions of rationality, seeing no practical alternative descriptive, explanatory or prescriptive decision-making model. Most often this entails revising rational decision making assumptions – i.e. making them less rigorous – so that they can somehow accommodate human limitations. This is sometimes called "scaling rationality to human dimensions". These efforts externalize the limitations of human information processing and decision-making and treat them as *constraints* on the fundamental human capacity to produce rational choices. These "scaling" efforts also incorporate quite constrained and probabilistic interpretations of the decision-making environment. Although the various limitations of human beings as information processors, risk evaluators and choice makers are frequently acknowledged in some detail, this

"neo-rational" approach still clings to the basic central concept of rational choice. That concept pictures choice in the following stylized terms:

Decision makers construct an explicit causal model of the policy-making environment, using logical analysis and empirical inquiry. They are open to refining the model as additional information becomes available. When preparing to make a decision, they identify the consequences that the courses of action they are contemplating will produce on the basis of the understanding of the environment their causal model provides. They then assess the outcomes they have projected in terms of their objectives, carefully measuring and comparing the costs and benefits attached to the alternative policies. By this approach they identify and select optimal courses of action and more reality in desired directions.⁹⁷

The alternative and less common approach has been to question the necessity of retaining fundamentally rational assumptions at the core of our understanding of human decision-making. Here, the inclination has been to reject such heroic measures and simply replace the rational model with alternative assumptions that better capture the way in which human minds deal with information and choice problems.⁹⁸ Steinbruner is probably the best known analyst working in this tradition but others have also pursued the effort to develop a model of "non-rational" but nevertheless effective decision-making. These attempts place great weight on cognitive phenomena but do not necessarily abandon rationality. One theorist, for instance, argues that "rationality" ought to be viewed as the conscious attempt, undertaken by inherently non-rational "cognitive decision makers", to employ a set of learned *techniques* (i.e. the canons of rational choice) in order to structure and then make a "rational" choice. The major difference distinguishing these two approaches (or paradigms, to use Steinbruner's language) is the centrality of rational assumptions. The first group insists on retaining rational choice, in some recognizable form, at the core of its

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72, 253-255, and 328 (note 6). Simon's original work appears in "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, February 1955.

⁹⁷ Miriam Steiner, "The Search for Order in a Disorderly World: Worldviews and Prescriptive Decision Paradigms," *International Organization*, vol. 37, no. 3, p. 376. This is an exceptionally interesting, thought-provoking article.



view of decision, regardless of how many psychological embellishments are added. The second group, on the other hand, places (in many cases, at least) cognitive understanding of mental functioning at the heart of its understanding of decision-making. The competing perspectives or approaches that Allison initially identified – “Bureaucratic Politics” and “Organizational Process” – remain of interest to analysts but they have receded to become parts (sometimes lumped together) of what Steinbruner has called the “context of decision” – no longer paradigm-level perspectives but rather features of the environment in which decisions occur.⁹⁹

Given Confidence-Building’s association with decision-making and given the existence of two competitive explanatory decision-making paradigms, it is worth asking whether Confidence-Building can also be conceptualized in terms of contrasting, competitive sets of process assumptions – rational and cognitive.¹⁰⁰ Bearing in mind the point of this section, we can examine the set of Confidence-Building categories developed earlier in this study and note the degree to which they appear to be dependent upon rational and/or cognitive assumptions. This may help us to understand why such naive and poorly developed assumptions about the process of creating “confidence” operate within the Confidence-Building literature. This exercise is scarcely intended to be definitive. Rather, it is exploratory and suggestive, intended to illustrate why the Type Two Generic Flaw matters and what sort of research ought to be conducted in order to explore these cognitive limitations further.

Chapter Five concluded by developing a comprehensive set of CBM categories that appeared to encompass the full range of Confidence-Building proposals. They are reproduced below with a very brief observation about the presumed operational “mechanism” underlying them.

CBMs and Rational Assumptions

(A) – Information and Communication Measures

- (1) Information Measures (the exchange and publication of technical information about military forces).

The presumption here is completely straightforward: The more that potential adversaries know about each other – their capabilities, habits, concerns, doctrines, statements about intentions, etc. – the more they will come to understand the position and concerns of the other. As a consequence, they will be less inclined to employ “worst case” assumptions about the other in their planning, be less likely to misunderstand what the other is doing and less likely to engage in behaviour that they know will elicit negative reactions on the part of their adversaries. The goal is to improve the level of knowledge about and the predictability of potential adversaries. This, it is expected (hoped), will counter the destructive effects of misperception, uncertainty and ethnocentrism. This is a clear expression of a rational outlook (rationalism) and rational objectives although the “thing” being subjected to rational expectations is clearly a “psychological phenomenon”. Although (or perhaps because) Information CBMs are the most basic of the Confidence-Building Measures, the pattern of “rational objective, cognitive object” repeats throughout all examples.

- (2) Communication Measures (“Hot Lines”).

Although related to the basic Information CBM, this category is more restricted and “pragmatic”. The capac-

⁹⁸ This basic division is discussed in John Steinbruner’s *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*. Steinbruner terms these two fundamental trends the “Analytic Paradigm” and the “Cognitive Paradigm”, with the former representing non-normative rational models of decision. In many ways, this book is at least as thought-provoking as Allison’s and certainly worth reading. In terms of this study, its greatest value lies in the central role it accords various cognitive phenomena in explaining how people “really” make decisions and interpret information.

⁹⁹ See Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, *Rational Decision-Making: Israel’s Security Choices, 1967* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980), pp. 3-87 (especially pp. 23-62) for a good overview of these perspectives.

¹⁰⁰ The identification of “animating process assumptions” is the closest that we can come to discovering actual “models” of the Confidence-Building process at this stage.



ity to communicate directly with adversaries during a time of crisis is assumed to (a) prevent a crisis from escalating and (b) control a crisis, should it begin to escalate. This type of measure is so intuitively reasonable that it seems completely non-controversial. Nevertheless, this type of CBM assumes that rational people will employ such mechanisms to resolve a crisis clearly and quickly without deceit and with minimal misunderstanding. It assumes that they *will be able* to understand each other well enough to avoid counter-productive misperception.

- (3) Notification Measures (the timely announcement of all military manoeuvres and movements beyond a specified size, including information about the nature of the manoeuvre or movement).

As in the case of Information CBMs, the presumption here is that increased amounts of information about the nature of adversary activities (in this case, potentially very threatening types of activities) will lead to increased understanding and a reduced likelihood of misperception. The advance notification of manoeuvres and military movements of various sorts, any of which *might* be otherwise mistaken for the preparation for attack, is widely thought to reduce the chances of war by accident. Again, this thinking reflects the rational "urge" to decrease uncertainty and to gain increased knowledge. The aim, as with the other measures, is to counter misperception, increase predictability and reduce uncertainty.

- (4) Manoeuvre Observer Conduct Measures (rules establishing how observers at manoeuvres should be treated as well as how they should behave).

This type of CBM is relatively restricted and deals with nothing new when compared with the other Information and Communication CBMs. As with the others, it stresses the importance of increasing knowledge about and under-

standing of a potential adversary, its capabilities and (to the extent possible) intentions in order to reduce the possibility of genuine misunderstandings.

(B) – Constraint or Surprise Attack CBMs

- (1) Inspection Measures (the intrusive monitoring of constraint-related behaviour according to specific agreed criteria as well as the associated use of "early warning devices").

These measures are, by and large, more aggressive, specific and narrow undertakings compared with the essentially "educational" information CBMs. They isolate particularly troublesome or worrisome features of adversary forces, almost always associated with "surprise attack", and attempt to provide the indicators for ascertaining the status (or, at least, broad hints of the status) of those features. The key indicators are certain types of behaviour and equipment. The basic idea is to attend to them and thus more ably interpret the real intentions of a potential enemy. Thus, one can avoid the misperception of non-hostile acts but also gain some degree of advance warning if a surprise attack is actually being prepared. Also wrapped up in these types of measures is the assumption that a party with no aggressive intentions and plans to hide could not possibly object to the use of such indicators. The willingness to participate is closely tied to the enhancement of "confidence". Also present in the reasoning behind this type of CBM is the belief that if you know where to look, you can learn almost anything – a classic expression of rational expectations. As before, the fundamental concern is to control misperception (and anxiety) through increased information and knowledge.

- (2) Non-Interference Measures (agreements not to interfere with and, in some cases, to cooperate with the use of National Technical Means (NTM) of verification).

This is a simple measure. The mere act of facilitating the use of NTM is seen to be narrowly useful for the observation



of key adversary capabilities and activities. In addition, non-interference is an indicator of non-hostile and, perhaps more important, cooperative intent. This measure elevates the acquisition of misperception-reducing information to an explicitly cooperative or joint enterprise.

- (3) Behavioural or Tension Reducing Measures (designed to constrain the risks of unintended war or crisis escalation by controlling or eliminating pointlessly aggressive or provocative "testing" behaviour).

These measures are very directly concerned with decision-making and perception. Their point is to ban or control activities that are likely to be misunderstood or, more specifically, ones likely to precipitate a crisis, thus *avoiding* the circumstances that might lead to an unintended war. These measures recognize the important role of misperception but do not really concern themselves so much with the acquisition of knowledge *per se*. They are more directly involved in *preventing* a train of events from getting underway. Thus, they are conceptually distinct from information and communication CBMs but share a degree of functional similarity with Deployment-Constraint Measures. In both cases, they attempt to directly control the problem-causing features of the international environment instead of simply trying to improve knowledge about them (although they do this too by structuring deployments according to established agreements).

- (4) Deployment-Constraint Measures (the restrictions of certain specified types and/or numbers of military forces and/or specified types and/or numbers of equipment in specified geographic zones regarded to be sensitive).

Deployment-Constraint Measures are aggressive CBMs that aim to *prevent* misunderstanding by avoiding (typically) the movement of anxiety-inducing equipment and/or troops into positions where they might be used for a surprise attack. They therefore seek to

control the environment in order to counter misunderstanding and misperception. By structuring the military relationship, these measures also facilitate the acquisition of improved knowledge about potential adversaries, knowledge which will presumably reduce the chances and dimensions of misperception.

(C) – Declaratory CBMs

This is a controversial category that is included primarily because a number of states claim that such measures are CBMs. Because the bulk of declaratory proposals appear to entail "atmospheric" rather than "technical" considerations, it could be argued that they are inherently psychological. The Western reaction to them is typically antagonistic because they do not usually contain "verifiable" features. Unlike the other type of Confidence-Building discussed here, there is no obvious information acquisition function associated with these measures. Their difference on this count underlies their basic incompatibility with other types of Confidence-Building Measures.

It should be quite clear from this brief summary (as well as from the earlier discussions) that Information and Communication CBMs as well as Constraint CBMs address problems of misperception and misunderstanding. (A plausible argument could be made to the effect that Declaratory CBMs also concentrate on problems of misperception but the method of addressing these broader political problems seems qualitatively different when compared with Information and Constraint CBMs.) The presumption (as noted in the Type One Generic Flaw) is that no Eastern or Western state actually intends to begin a conventional war in Europe. The concern is that a war might nevertheless begin (or relations continue to worsen until conflict became inevitable) as a consequence of some sort of miscalculation or basic misunderstanding – either crisis-related or longer-term. *Confidence-Building Measures are therefore intended to "correct" – or, more realistically, help to correct – the suspicious, ethnocentric, over-reactive, and anxiety-inducing national security thinking of the states trapped in an enduring adversarial relationship.* As was noted earlier, the pri-



many concerns of Confidence-Building are clarifying and increasing information about potential enemies, reducing the chances of misperceiving non-hostile acts, and, to some extent, constraining deployments and capabilities that could cause "undue" anxiety about "surprise attack". Most Confidence-Building Measures, therefore, attempt to improve the quality and/or quantity of information available to senior decision makers in order to aid in the correct interpretation of ambiguous acts and uncertain situations. *Reduced to its most fundamental level, then, the logic driving Confidence-Building Measures appears to be an uncomfortable combination of the rational and the non-rational.* There is a clear rational intention – acquire increased amounts of better, more comprehensive, predictable and systematic knowledge in order to correct and control conflict-inducing misperception¹⁰¹ even though the problem addressed by the rational intention (some might say pretension) – the process and consequences of misperception and a host of related cognitive phenomena – is not at all "rational" in nature or operation. Confidence-Building, therefore, can be considered to be a consciously rational approach to the "correction" of what is actually a collection of non-rational cognitive phenomena.¹⁰²

The ideas of misperception and "cognitive processes" which figure so prominently in this Chapter's discussion of Confidence-Building are exceptionally complicated phenomena. They do not really constitute any clearly defined "collection" of principles nor do they (to the extent that one can correctly call them a "they") neatly fit within a single psychological theory. No real effort has been made up to this point to describe or explain them beyond the very brief working definition noted in the Intro-

duction. It would be a conceit of the worst kind to try to deal comprehensively with them here. That is simply impossible. Nevertheless, we must stop briefly to gain at least a flavour of the cognitive dimension, or the outline of the argument presented here – contrasting the rational and non-rational (cognitive) elements of Confidence-Building – will not be very convincing.

An obvious place to start any examination of misperception and its role in international relations is Robert Jervis' very important and under-appreciated book *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*.¹⁰³ It contains a rich assortment of examples illustrating the variety of ways in which senior decision-makers can fail – seriously – to perceive correctly the world about them. It is a collection of "horror stories" that all policy makers would do well to study. By itself, it provides compelling evidence of the scope of misperception. As informative as *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* is, however, it is not much more than a catalogue of different psychological principles and effects. Although it discusses cognitive consistency, evoked sets, belief structures and attitude sets, and various forms of faulty inference mechanisms, it lacks a basic framework or unifying perspective. Steinbruner's *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, on the other hand, has a fairly well-developed if still rudimentary basic framework – the cognitive paradigm of decision. It, however, lacks a sufficiently sophisticated and contemporary understanding of cognitive processes. The material informing its basic content is over a decade old. Although he includes fairly lengthy discussions of the very important principle of cognitive consistency, the operation of inferential memory, the "reality principle," and the principles of "economy" (simplicity and stability), and inte-

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¹⁰¹ Thus objective and the typically instrumental methods of achieving it represented by various CBMs seem completely consistent with a normal understanding of instrumentally rational means and ends. The point here is that theorists and policy makers, if asked about it, would almost certainly describe Confidence-Building as being a rational activity (if implicitly so) in much the same way that they would describe decision-making behaviour as rational. The point of the emergent critique is that Confidence-Building probably is *not* a formally rational activity despite what its practitioners think and that many conceptual and practical problems originate with this fundamental mistake. This whole line of analysis demands considerable further thought.

¹⁰² This seems inescapably true for Western as well as (related) Neutral and Non-Aligned approaches to the problem of Confidence-Building. The Soviet approach, by and large, is not technical, lacks the appearance of such rationalistic concerns and, significantly, has a heavy ideological loading. This "substitution" of one ideology (the contemporary Soviet variant of Marxism-Leninism) for another (the belief in the utility of rational – i.e. scientific – inquiry) in the animating logic of Confidence-Building may go some distance in explaining the true differences between the Eastern and Western approaches to Confidence-Building and CBM negotiations. It also suggests just how difficult it may be for these two fundamentally different perspectives to produce meaningful CBMs.



grates them skillfully into a larger conception of cognitive decision making, the overall effect is still incomplete. Of the more recent literature, Stein's summary of cognitive research in *Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices* is perhaps most useful.¹⁰⁴ None of the contemporary political science literature, however, fully utilizes current findings from cognitive psychology. A survey of the cognitive-psychology literature would illustrate the dangers of assuming that misperception and other varieties of misunderstanding can easily be corrected.¹⁰⁵

The point in looking at various sorts of cognitive processes is to suggest that misperception (considered broadly) is a complex phenomenon that is not likely to be dealt with easily or well by unsophisticated, simple-minded and frequently ill-informed rationalistic approaches such as those seen in many discussions of Confidence-Building. The cognitive-psychology literature dealing with "judgement," for instance, provides some useful illustrations of how people make errors when they evaluate information. These sorts of errors are typical of the failures that constitute many aspects of misperception and misunderstanding. People normally use special sets of rules and structures (such as judgemental and inferential "heuristics" – simplifying problem-solving techniques – and "knowledge structures") to interpret complex information. Although these cognitive "devices" generally function quite well in simplifying the complexities of modern life, they

sometimes prove to be inappropriate. Nisbett and Ross have collected a number of illustrations. They argue that people frequently interpret events according to simple initial perceptions; frequently fail to grasp the causal relationships ("co-variation") between events; seriously over-estimate the role of dispositions as causes of behaviour; discount the importance of "base-rate data" in performing probabilistic estimates; and persevere in judgements regardless of overwhelming evidence indicating that they are wrong.¹⁰⁶

A list of information processing *biases* should serve to illustrate how important cognitive processes are to understanding how we err interpreting information in a complex, unstructured environment. Robin Hogarth¹⁰⁷ has compiled an excellent summary of biases which include: *availability* (an acquisition error that distorts the recollection or understanding of the frequency with which events occur); *selective perception* ("people structure problems on the basis of their own experience," "people seek informa-



¹⁰³ Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

¹⁰⁴ Stein and Tanter, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-47.

¹⁰⁵ Probably the most useful introduction to this literature is Morton Hunt, *The Universe Within: A New Science Explores the Human Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). A very well regarded and highly recommended text is Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Another very important book is Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgement* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1980). Two additional works of central interest are: Thomas S. Walsten (ed.) *Cognitive Processes in Choice and Decision Behavior* (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1980) and Robin M. Hogarth, *Judgement and Choice: The Psychology of Decision* (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1980).

¹⁰⁶ See Mort La Brecque, "On Making Sounder Judgements," *Psychology Today*, June 1980, for a summary of the Nisbett and Ross findings.

¹⁰⁷ *Judgement and Choice: The Psychology of Decision*, pp. 165-179.



tion consistent with their own views and hypotheses," "people downplay or disregard conflicting evidence"); *frequency* (faulty understanding of the relative frequency of events occurring); *concrete over abstract information* (concrete information such as vivid and important personal experiences dominates abstract, statistical information); *illusory correlation* (faulty inference of causal relationship); *data presentation* (the order, mode, and context of information presentation distorts its objective character); *inconsistency* ("the inability to apply a consistent judgemental strategy over a repetitive set of cases"); *conservatism* (the "failure to revise opinion on receipt of new information"); *non-linear extrapolation* ("inability to extrapolate growth processes and tendency to underestimate joint probabilities of several events"); various types of *heuristics* such as "rules of thumb" ("choosing an alternative because it has previously been satisfactory"), representativeness ("judgements of likelihood of an event by estimating degree of similarity to the class of events of which it is supposed to be an exemplar"), law of small numbers ("characteristics of small samples are deemed to be representative of the populations from which they are drawn"), justifiability, regression bias, and "best guess" strategy (discounting uncertainty); *wishful thinking*; *illusion of control*; *misperception of chance fluctuations*; *success/failure attributions* ("tendency to attribute success to one's skill, and failure to chance"); *logical fallacies in recall*; and *hindsight bias*.

These few examples illustrate why the intuitively plausible assumptions that characterize the literature's thinking about the Confidence-

Building process should be open to serious question. These assumptions are common sense estimates without any empirical grounding and, in at least some cases, clearly creatures of a rational perspective where "transparency" is the typical "solution" to misperception. The nature of misperception and its related cognitive effects, however, is such that much Confidence-Building thinking is simply incapable of understanding or dealing with the very processes it is supposed to "correct".


Confidence-Building's distinctive combination of rational and cognitive processes is very suggestive of the sorts of problem that confront current analyses of how people make (or, perhaps more accurately, attempt to make) rational choices in circumstances of uncertainty and poor understanding. The problem for decision-making theory is jointly accommodating two intrinsically different processes which are claimed to operate within the minds of men when they make decisions: the rational (as represented by the canons of rational choice) and the cognitive (the principles that explain how information is acquired, knowledge built, and judgement and intuition employed). Explanations of how people make decisions ultimately must confront and resolve this antithetical relationship. Few come close to succeeding.

In a similar sense, there is an antithetical relationship inherent in the Confidence-Building concept as it is understood in the literature. At least on the basis of what has been dis-



cussed in this study, Confidence-Building involves a clash between a *rational intention and method* and a *non-rational problem*. Not only is there a fundamental tension and even contradiction between the two central components of Confidence-Building (rational intention and method, non-rational problem), but also there is a serious potential for actually misunderstanding the nature of the non-rational phenomenon *because* it is non-rational. To see why this is so, we must recall the "lesson" about decision-making and rationality. Without reaching any definitive conclusions, we nevertheless saw that "rational decision-making" may be much less "rational" than people suppose because of the effects of various distorting cognitive processes. This much, most decision theorists would accept. If this applies to an enterprise like decision making where the potential for clear-cut, formally rational action is so great, what are the chances that the "rational" intentions (and method) operating as a driving force in Confidence-Building thinking will also be subject to serious distortions? And, given the more-or-less rational intention to deal with misperception (and the belief that the method is appropriate to the problem), what are the chances that its non-rational character will be understood? The "rational intention" is almost certainly associated with a basic way of seeing things – what some call a "rationalistic world-view" – that is likely to distort (ironically, as a consequence of the ever-present operation of cognitive processes) the nature of the "problem". Thus, we may have an under-

standing of Confidence-Building that is twice contaminated by a failure to comprehend the non-rational character of the Confidence-Building problem. Confidence-Building may not be nearly as rational a process as it is apparently assumed to be and the object of the process – avoiding misperception, for short – is a phenomenon whose non-rational character is poorly (if at all) understood. Even if the Confidence-Building process was "more rational", misperception could be, in any event, only poorly dealt with by rational efforts. Misperception and its cognitive kin are thus multiple victims of rational pretensions because they are incorrectly understood when conceptualized within a rational framework and, second, even if correctly understood to be a significantly "non-rational" collection of phenomena, they are not likely to be directly susceptible to ordinary rational efforts at correction. Although it is far from clear, there is a good chance that the naive assumptions about how "Confidence" can be created – the root of the Type Two Generic Flaw – are the result of this failure to understand the various faulty relationships implicitly operating within Confidence-Building thinking.





Conclusion



Chapter Eight

Conclusion

This study has examined Confidence-Building from a number of perspectives in an attempt to understand its limitations and its potential. The tentative conclusion is that "Confidence-Building", as a distinctive approach to arms control, may have considerable potential in some applications but our current understanding of its nature and limits is seriously constrained by three basic problems. These problems –

- (1) great definitional imprecision (one could even say confusion) and variation in delimiting *what* Confidence-Building is;
- (2) the failure to employ an appropriately realistic understanding of the Soviet conventional military "threat" in the dominant substantive area of application (Eurocentric CBMs); and
- (3) a consistent failure to provide a plausible psychological or political explanation of *how* the Confidence-Building process actually works

combine to produce an understanding of Confidence-Building that is confused and analytically very weak. If CBMs are to be employed effectively as a variety of arms control approach, these problems will have to be addressed and, to the extent possible, corrected.

In an attempt to address the problem of definitional confusion, we looked at the concept of Confidence-Building from the perspective of a number of different applications: potential historical examples; the Confidence-Building Measures from the CSCE's Helsinki Final Act; the proposed Associated Measures from the Mutual (and Balanced) Force Reduction negotiations; specific definitions and sets of categories from the Confidence-Building literature; and actual CBM proposals. In the process of doing this, we saw just how great a variety of understandings there were. "Confidence-Building" is a significantly more variegated concept than is commonly supposed.

Looking first at historical examples (Chapter Two), we discovered that many international agreements appear to be the functional equivalent of Confidence-Building Measures. This is certainly true of all the so-called "Hot Line" agreements (the American, British and French arrangements with the Soviet Union). It is

obviously the case for the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War and the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (the United States and the Soviet Union) as well as agreements on the prevention of accidental nuclear war (both France and Britain with the Soviet Union). A number of naval arms control agreements also seem to be CBMs (for instance, the Rush-Bagot Treaty, the Chilean-Argentine treaty, the Greco-Turkish treaty, the 1936 London Naval Treaty and some Black Sea agreements). The 1975 Egyptian-Israeli Accord on the Sinai contains a number of very specific conventional military Confidence-Building Measures. The Spitsbergen and the Aaland Island non-fortification agreements are certainly good examples, as well. The ABM Treaty is clearly an example as is the associated memorandum of understanding establishing the Standing Consultative Commission. The agreement not to interfere with national technical means of verification (in the SALT I Interim Agreement) is undeniably a Confidence-Building Measure. A reasonable (if not wholly persuasive) argument can also be made for the consideration of all denuclearization and demilitarization treaties and for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We could also include proposals that, while never actually adopted, still constitute legitimate *examples* of CBMs. The 1930 Draft Convention of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, the 1955 "Open Skies" proposal, schemes mentioned at the 1958 Geneva Surprise Attack Conference and the Rapacki Plans all contain clear-cut CBMs. Without using deliberately restrictive criteria, all of these undertakings appear to qualify as reasonable CBM examples. It is noteworthy that these applications cover strategic nuclear and naval arms control issues as well as land-based, conventional military arrangements. Although these agreements and undertakings perform what appear to be the functions of Confidence-Building, most discussions of CBMs are far more restrictive.

The concept of Confidence-Building owes a great deal to the Helsinki Final Act. The CBMs outlined in that document are often treated as



archetypical examples of Confidence-Building. Those Confidence-Building Measures –

*Helsinki Final Act of 1975
(Ran from July 3, 1973 to August 1, 1975)*

- (1) 21 days prior notification (if possible) of and basic information about major military manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops;
- (2) Prior notification of other military manoeuvres (purely voluntary);
- (3) Exchange of observers for manoeuvres (very loosely worded);
- (4) Prior notification (again, purely voluntary) of military movements

however, seem to be far too narrow to be of any direct use in developing a reasonable understanding of Confidence-Building. Although we also looked at the CBMs contained within the Associated Measures of the MBFR negotiations and a host of definitions from the Confidence-Building literature, none seemed to capture the essence of Confidence-Building well. Various treatments were either too narrow and substantively specific or too vague and general. Therefore, we developed a composite definition of our own, one that seemed capable of accounting for a fairly wide variety of functional CBMs without becoming too general:

CBM Definition

- (1) CBMs are a variety of arms control measure entailing¹⁰⁸
- (2) state actions
- (3) that can be unilateral but which are more often either bilateral or multilateral

¹⁰⁸ Many analysts seem to think that this is not so. There are simply no compelling grounds, however, for saying that CBMs are not a type of arms control. A general and widely accepted definition of arms control counts those measures which reduce the chance of war occurring or the severity of war if it should occur. CBMs clearly qualify as measures designed to reduce the chance of war. That CBMs do not involve actual force reduction is not a sufficient reason for excluding them from the category of arms control measures. Indeed, there is also no obvious reason why measures involving force reductions should be excluded when measures sponsoring obvious equipment and manpower restrictions are counted as CBMs.

- (4) that attempt to reduce or eliminate misperceptions about specific military threats or concerns (very often having to do with surprise attack)¹⁰⁹
- (5) by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those concerns are groundless
- (6) often (but not always) by demonstrating that military and political intentions are not aggressive
- (7) and/or by providing early warning indicators to create confidence that surprise would be difficult to achieve
- (8) and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces by adopting restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces (or crucial components of them) within sensitive areas.

In addition to this definition, we also developed an extensive set of categories in order to organize the wide range (over 100) of proposed Confidence-Building Measures.

CBM Categories and Proposals

A – Information and Communication CBMs

Information Measures

- publish technical information on force composition
- publish and discuss defence industry data
- publish regularized data on defence budgets
- publish arms control impact studies
- conduct “seminars on strategy”

¹⁰⁹ CBM deal with correcting misperception only in situations where no genuine, premeditated aggressive intent exists. It is the province of other types of arms control or unilateral action to address situations where intentions are genuinely aggressive. This distinction ignores temporarily the problem of deliberately using CBM for coercive purposes or to mask preparations for attack.



- establish a "Standing Consultative Commission to deal with questions of treaty compliance
- conduct military personnel exchanges

Communications Measures

- establish, extend and refine "Hot Lines"
- establish "Joint Crisis Control Centres"

Notification Measures

- notification of single manoeuvres involving personnel levels exceeding set floors of (variously) 25,000, 20,000, 18,000, 15,000, or 10,000 men
- notification of military manoeuvres (variously) 21, 30, 40 or 60 days prior to commencement
- inclusion of detailed information about personnel and equipment to be used during manoeuvres in the notification (unit composition, exercise purpose, location of exercise)
- notification of "aggregate manoeuvres" involving smaller manoeuvres conducted concurrently or in close succession (aggregate totals of from 10,000 to 25,000)
- notification of naval manoeuvres conducted within a specified distance of (for instance) the European landmass involving specified types and/or numbers of naval vessels and personnel
- notification of air force manoeuvres involving types and/or numbers of aircraft beyond specified limits
- notification of military "movements" and "out-of-garrison" activities involving personnel and equipment beyond a specified level and/or in specified (sensitive) regions
- inclusion of detailed information about the nature, composition, direction, duration and location of military movements and other "out-of-garrison" activities
- mobilization exercise notification, including details about the character, duration and dimension of the mobilization exercise(s)
- notification of nuclear weapon delivery vehicle tests

Manoeuvre Observer Conduct Measures

- mandatory invitations to a representative group of states to send observers to military manoeuvres
- a "code of conduct" for the provision of adequate opportunities to observe, ade-

quate facilities and equipment with which to observe and adequate information outlining the nature of the observed manoeuvre

B – Constraint or Surprise Attack CBMs

Inspection Measures

- provision for observers during "out-of-garrison" activities, including:
 - manoeuvres in sensitive areas
 - movements in sensitive areas
 - troop rotations through designated areas

these observers could be:

- permanent, human
- temporary, human
- observers with manoeuvring units
- permanent, electromechanical
- temporary, electromechanical
- feasible combinations of above
- observers (human and/or electromechanical) at "constrained facilities" (tank parks, airports)
- observers (human and/or electromechanical) in "sensitive areas" (border zones, ICBM fields)
- mobile inspection teams

Non-Interference Measures

- agreements not to interfere with the use of National Technical Means of verification for confirming compliance with various treaties and undertakings

Behavioural Measures

- measures designed to constrain the risks of war produced by needlessly aggressive or provocative, small-scale aggravating or "testing" behaviour (best illustration is the "Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas")

Constraint Measures

- personnel constraint measures (manpower freezes and reductions)
- manoeuvre and movement constraints limiting or forbidding the exercising or large-scale movement of military forces
 - within sensitive regions
 - with certain types of restricted equipment
 - in excess of certain, specified manpower ceilings



- in excess of certain, specified numbers of total exercises or movements per year
- limitations or bans on specified threatening types of weapon tests (multiple ICBM test launches, large scale bomber exercises, MaRV test flights)
- equipment constraints limiting or prohibiting the placement of specified types and/or numbers of (often) "offensive" equipment such as bridging equipment and attack aircraft
- nuclear free zones where no nuclear delivery vehicles are permitted

C - Declaratory Measures

- a controversial category which, if counted in this general analysis of CBMs, would include "no first use" declarations and other statements of benign intent which, by their nature, are impossible to verify or otherwise confirm (short of their non-occurrence)

Having more or less resolved the definitional problems associated with Confidence-Building, we then turned our attention to the analytic failings of the Confidence-Building literature and, by inference, the failings of most Confidence-Building thinking. On the basis of a detailed examination of the literature, a specific list of problems was developed. According to this analysis, the Confidence-Building literature and Confidence-Building thinking more generally tended to exhibit the following generic problems:


1. an indifference to - or an unwillingness to address - the complex, idiosyncratic and apparently very offensive substance of Soviet defence policy, military doctrine, and conventional military capabilities;
2. a frequent failure to understand or appreciate what the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies consider to be genuine military threats and "legitimate" concerns;
3. a frequent failure to perform, rely upon, include or even refer to detailed critical analyses of the actual character of the

NATO-WTO military balance, its dynamics and the sorts of threats that each side poses - actually as well as potentially - for the other and for third parties;

4. an insensitivity to the various factors - domestic and external, unilateral and interactive - that shape military policy, define its historical context, explain its contemporary character and determine its susceptibility to change;
5. a consistent failure to explicitly discuss the actual psychological processes that are assumed to (a) mediate or facilitate the creation of "confidence" and (b) overcome the "misperception" of intentions and ambiguous actions;
6. a general failure to appreciate the ramifications of the fact that Confidence-Building is an intrinsically psychological process (i.e. there is a stunning disregard for the intellectual and emotional distortions that cognitive processes can wreak on perceptions of "trust", "predictability", "confidence", and "certainty" - all vital features of meaningful Confidence-Building);
7. a general interest in somehow rendering intentions "transparent" but no concrete, realistic explanation of just how this can be achieved, nor any serious (theoretical) discussion of why it ought to be attempted;
8. a general tendency to assume that increased amounts of accurate information will lead to a better grasp of adversary intentions and, as a consequence, relaxed anxieties;
9. a marked indifference to the bureaucratic and organizational realities that necessarily restrict the scope for change in any state's national security policy.

This unwieldy list of complaints was then reduced to a more manageable size by collapsing the nine into two super categories:

1. Inadequate assessments of Soviet conventional military forces and the nature of the threat that they actually pose;



2. Naive assumptions about the psychological dynamics of "Confidence-Building" as well as the disruptive and constraining effects of "cognitive processes" on information processing and misperception.

The first general generic flaw had to do with the way in which the Soviet Union was treated analytically in the Confidence-Building literature. We noted that the *perceived fact* of increasingly offensive and potent Soviet conventional military capabilities (relative to NATO forces) was a matter of serious concern to many Western analysts and policy makers. This perception was an inescapable fact of life *virtually independent of the objective determination that Soviet and WTO forces did or did not constitute a significant conventional military threat*. As a consequence of this "reality", it was argued that no discussion of Confidence-Building Measures ought simply to begin with the apparent assumption that Soviet military intentions were essentially benign and misunderstood, and then suggest ways in which presumably unwarranted concerns about the character of Soviet policy and capabilities could be addressed through the use of CBMs. *Whether or not Soviet policy and capabilities are essentially benign, non-threatening and misunderstood is a matter that ought to be established – or at least discussed critically – within the Confidence-Building literature*. Because there are equally plausible "benign" and "malevolent" models of Soviet military capabilities and intentions, the "benign view" should not be the only one to animate discussions of Eurocentric Confidence-Building Measures. The study illustrated this point by briefly exploring four contrasting images or models of Soviet military capabilities, concerns, and intentions. The point in sketching out these "alternative images" – simplified models of Soviet perspectives – was fairly straightforward. Confidence-Building as a process and, more specifically, Confidence-Building Measures, have *differential possibilities for success depending upon the "true" nature of Soviet military doctrine, capabilities and a host of other elements having to do with Soviet foreign and domestic policies*. Only one of the four alternative images discussed in this study appears to be favourable for the production of useful Confidence-Building Measures. If we

looked at the full range of plausible images in greater detail, we would almost certainly discover a similarly uneven picture. Some images would support modest or ambitious Confidence-Building Measures but many would not.

An underlying analytic failure closely associated with the first fundamental generic flaw is the apparent absence within Confidence-Building thinking of any sophisticated model of WTO-NATO policy interaction. There is rarely any sense of *how* the complex policies of the two alliances interact with each other in causal terms. Sometimes there appears to be a vaguely discernible underlying assumption that some kind of action-reaction interaction, aggravated by "worst-case" planning, drives the two alliances into a progressively more alienated and antagonistic relationship. At other times, there appears to be no interest in or awareness of the importance of understanding the WTO-NATO relationship and its role in defining the limits of and need for Confidence-Building Measures. If the dynamics of that relationship are largely autonomous and intra-national, for instance, the possibility of using CBMs to control or otherwise influence the military and political relationship will be seriously impaired. Although they might well be crucial to any understanding of Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, these notions are seldom examined and virtually never made a central feature of analysis.

Although not explored at any length in the study, there is also a very troubling and related failure in Confidence-Building thinking to place questions about Soviet military policy and the "threat" it actually poses in the larger context of what "causes" or determines that policy (i.e. to what degree Soviet military doctrine and capabilities are the product of interactive and reactive influences – such as the nature of NATO doctrine and capabilities – and to what degree they are the product of unilateral or purely intra-national factors). *It makes little sense to advance ideas about Eurocentric Confidence-Building Measures when the basic nature of Soviet and NATO military postures and policies and the degree to which they actually interact with each other are so poorly grasped*. To divorce considerations of



Confidence-Building Measures from attempts to understand the dynamics and causes of Soviet military policy, particularly when that policy and the capabilities that it animates can be seen to be dangerously offensive, is intellectually irresponsible and practically very unwise.

The second fundamental type of generic flaw in Confidence-Building thinking addressed a very different sort of problem: *the widespread and pronounced failure to either provide or refer to a satisfactory or even plausible model of the CBM process.* Most of the Confidence-Building literature makes some sort of reference to the ways in which "confidence" can be created or fostered but, as we noted, *there is seldom any serious discussion of the dynamic psychological process or processes that would presumably "make" the CBMs work.* Related to this is the fact that the CBM literature makes reference to many categories or types of Confidence-Building Measures, each of which may rely upon a different conception of Confidence-Building process or mechanism.

For all the Confidence-Building literature's interest in speculating about how best to formulate successful CBMs, this study concluded that there was remarkably little analytic interest in exploring how ordinary individuals and groups were affected positively by the particular goals or mechanisms of those Confidence-Building Measures. For instance, it simply isn't good enough to assume, as a sizeable proportion of the CBM literature seems to, that knowing "all about" an adversary's forces and policies will "somehow" reduce or control "unwarranted" suspicion. There is no reference to *how or why* this will transpire. There is merely the intuitive assumption that knowing more about a potential adversary will reduce misperception and groundless mistrust. However plausible this may seem at first glance, there is no explanation of what the Confidence-Building dynamics are and how they work. This type of thinking ignores a great deal of research on the operation of perception, information processing and decision-making, subjects that appear to be very important to an understanding of the Confidence-Building pro-

cess. The failure to employ psychological and cognitive scientific findings to understand these dynamics was regarded as a crucial theoretical and empirical oversight.

In addition to these psychologically-oriented problems associated directly with explaining how Confidence-Building Measures work, we noted that there was virtually no consideration of the complex processes that animate the whole problem of misperception, suspicion, faulty inferences and, more generally, the inability to see and understand complex phenomena in an objective manner. Most CBM analyses begin with the proposition that *the misperception and the mistrust and the lack of confidence already exist and that "something" ought to be done about it.* The origins and the mechanisms of misperception and the broader array of cognitive processes that structure the basic problems in the first place are frequently ignored. *If Confidence-Building Measures to counter these mechanisms and processes are to be constructed and negotiated successfully, surely the mechanisms and processes themselves must be understood first.*

In the process of exploring these problems, we also developed the outline of an argument suggesting that Confidence-Building may have certain features in common with decision-making. On the basis of insights derived from contemporary decision-making theory, we suggested that, like decision making, the Confidence-Building process may combine distinctive elements of the rational and the non-rational or cognitive. When it is reduced to its most elementary form, for instance, Confidence-Building appears to entail a *rational* intention and method aimed at penetrating and correcting the destabilizing and corrosive effects of misperception and misunderstanding. However, misperception (viewed generally as a collection of faulty understandings) is a fundamentally non-rational phenomenon. Also like decision-making, Confidence-Building itself may very well be a far less "rational" enterprise than either theorists or policy makers suspect, largely because of the major role played by var-



ious sorts of cognitive processes. These processes are actively involved in both creating the "problem" in the first place – misperception – and in executing the instrumentally rational intention and technique. This potentially antithetical relationship (between rational intention and technique and non-rational problem) built into the casual logic of Confidence-Building thinking may help to explain why the existing accounts of how Confidence-Building works seem so naive, particularly when contrasted with the findings of contemporary cognitive psychology.

There are several points worth reiterating by way of a brief conclusion. What I have tried to show in this preliminary study is that (1) the concept of Confidence-Building possesses great intrinsic imprecision (the first six chapters of the study provide a graphic illustration of this); (2) the roots of that imprecision are to be found in the predominantly substantive Eurocentric origins of most Confidence-Building thinking (primarily the tendency to "rope together" a disparate collection of substantive "solutions" to defence policy problems under the rubric of Confidence-Building); and (3) the Eurocentric basis for most Confidence-Building thinking is seriously flawed in terms of (a) its assumptions about the intentions and the capabilities of NATO and the WTO and (b) naïve assumptions about the psychological (cognitive) dynamics of Confidence-Building. This all has a profound impact on the potential for Confidence-Building to contribute constructively within the larger framework of arms control. Although existing CBM proposals can be pursued to address specific (predominantly Western) policy problems related to (predominantly) surprise attack concerns in Central Europe, the possibility of generating unintended outcomes – or simply failing to produce any real CBMs at all – will remain great as long as the conceptual underpinnings of the concept remain faulty. Further analytical work must address these conceptual problems.



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