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The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

Number 18 - Winter 1991/92

UN Arms Register Marks Triumph for Canada



As part of the UN arms register, countries are asked to report exports and imports of seven categories of weapons, including combat aircraft such as the Canadian CF-18 fighter jets pictured above at their base in Qatar during the Gulf War. Canadian Forces photo

A Canadian arms control initiative achieved a major success on December 9 when the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution establishing a global arms register. The resolution passed by an overwhelming 150 in favour, none opposed and two abstentions (Cuba and Iraq). China, Djibouti, Laos, Myanmar, Sudan, Syria and Vietnam did not participate in the

vote, along with six other small states which, it is believed, were simply not present in the General Assembly rather than opposed to the resolution. The UNGA First Committee had earlier adopted the resolution by a vote of 106 in favour, one opposed (Cuba) and eight abstentions (China, Iraq, Myanmar, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Singapore and Sudan). The increased support for the resolution in plenary was the result of extensive lobbying by Canada and other countries.

Canada first called for an arms register in the fall of 1990, when then-Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) Joe Clark told the General Assembly that Canada favoured the widest possible reporting to the UN of military expenditures, procurement and arms transfers. Current SSEA Barbara McDougall repeated the call at UNGA 46. Creation of a register has been a key component of Canada's action plan to prevent excessive build-ups of conventional arms, launched in February 1991.

Although endorsed by a number of international fora including the G7, the European Community and the Commonwealth, and recommended by a UN Group of Experts, establishment of an arms register was no sure thing. The register resolution, entitled "Transparency in Armaments," was the subject of intense negotiations in the First Committee. The most contentious issues were the following:

- timing of the register. Canada and many other countries insisted that the UN should take advantage of current political momentum and establish the register immediately, with first reports required for calendar year 1992 (the first practicable year for reporting, since countries must know at the start of

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External Affairs and International Trade Canada

Canada

the year on what items they should be collecting data). Others wanted further study of the concept before implementation.

- inclusion of procurement and holdings. Many countries, including Canada, argued that arms procurement from domestic sources and arms holdings should be reported to the

Register should build confidence, promote arms transfer restraint and assist identification of excessive arms build-ups.

register from the outset, along with arms transfers. This would make the register non-discriminatory to states that rely on arms imports for their defence needs, and would provide a more accurate picture of arms accumulation than would a register of transfers alone. Others argued that the desirability of expanding the register's scope beyond arms transfers should be considered at a later stage, in light of experience with the register.

- inclusion of technology transfers. Some countries wanted the register to include transfers of technology with military applications. Other countries thought this impractical. Canada was not, in principle, opposed to the inclusion of technology transfers, but did not want to see implementation of the register delayed by the difficulties inherent in defining and tracking such transfers.
- inclusion of weapons of mass destruction (i.e., chemical, biological and nuclear weapons). Some countries argued that the register should include weapons of mass destruction — particularly holdings thereof — to avoid being discriminatory to states that possess only conventional weapons. Canada and others opposed such a move on the grounds that other, separate processes already exist or are under negotiation to monitor and control the acquisition of non-conventional weapons. In addition, including such weapons in the register would appear to legitimize their possession.

According to the terms of the resolution ultimately adopted, the register — which will be maintained at UN Headquarters in New York — will initially cover conventional arms transfers only. Member States are called upon to annually provide the register with data on their imports and exports of the following categories of weapons: battle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large-calibre artillery systems; combat aircraft; attack helicopters; warships; and missiles or missile systems. First reports are required by April 30, 1993 in respect of calendar year 1992.

However, recognition of the relevance of procurement and holdings to the exercise, and their de facto inclusion, is assured by a clause inviting Member States to provide the register with information about their military holdings, their military procurement through national production, and relevant policies.

In addition, the resolution sets in motion a multi-pronged review process to examine possibilities for early expansion of the register's scope, and to look at issues related to technology transfers and weapons of mass destruction.

As a first step, the Secretary-General will establish a panel of governmental experts to:

- 1) elaborate the register's technical procedures, such as the form in which data should be reported; and
- 2) prepare a report on procedures for early expansion of the register to (a) include further categories of equipment and (b) formally include data on military holdings and procurement. The report will be presented to the General Assembly at its 47th session (fall 1992).

In addition, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) will address, as soon as possible, questions related to excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups, including military holdings and procurement, and will elaborate means to increase openness and transparency in this field. The CD will also look at ways to increase transparency related to the transfer of high technology with military ap-

plications and to weapons of mass destruction.

The resolution further invites Member States to provide the Secretary-General with their views, no later than April 30, 1994, on:

- 1) the operation of the register during its first two years; and
- 2) the addition of other categories of equipment, military holdings and procurement to the register.

Finally, the Secretary-General will convene another group of governmental experts in 1994 to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the register and its further development, taking into account the work of the CD and the views expressed by Member States. The report will be submitted to the General Assembly with a view to a decision at its 49th session (fall 1994).

Once it is fully operational, the arms register is expected to do three things:

- build confidence among states by reducing uncertainties about their military capabilities and intentions;
- promote restraint in arms procurement and transfers by exposing states to international scrutiny; and
- assist the identification of cases where arms are being acquired beyond reasonable defence needs.

The degree to which the register fulfils these ends will depend on the degree to which it is supported by Member States. All reporting to the register will be voluntary, but given the large number of votes in favour of the resolution and the many high-level political statements of commitment to the register, there should be a high degree of reporting to it, particularly by Western arms suppliers. Reporting by some less-developed countries may be delayed as they develop the technical means necessary to collect and process the requested data.

Canada was instrumental in developing the register resolution and in gathering widespread support for it. We will continue to participate keenly in all aspects of its follow-through. The Secretary-General has already invited Canada to provide a member for the first panel of governmental experts, which begins its work in January. Canada will report to the register as requested for 1992, providing data on

arms transfers and on Canada's military holdings and procurement from domestic sources.

In the meantime, Canada will continue its practice of issuing an annual report on its military exports, which covers all categories of military equipment, not just the seven elaborated in the UN resolution. The report covering calendar year 1991 should be available in March 1992.

In a statement to the UNGA First Committee in November, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason urged other Member States to demonstrate a similar commitment to full implementation of the resolution and to provide data on both arms transfers and procurement at the earliest possible opportunity. ■

Commonwealth Heads Call for Stronger Non-Proliferation Efforts

The following is an extract from the communique resulting from the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe in October. Canada strongly encouraged its Commonwealth partners to make such a statement, as a demonstration of their political commitment to addressing proliferation issues.

Heads of Government noted with concern the continuing dangers of regional and local conflicts. These dangers, and the example of the Gulf War, underlined the need to strengthen international regimes limiting weapons of mass destruction and the need to curb the build-up of conventional weapons beyond the legitimate requirements of self-defence. In this context, they noted the recent accessions of several states to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They strongly urged all states to redouble efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. They called for the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention in 1992 and endorsed in principle the proposal to establish a register of arms transfers at the United Nations.

SSEA to UNGA: Building a More Effective UN

The following are excerpts from a speech delivered by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the 46th session of the UN General Assembly in New York on September 25.

We meet this year at a time of opportunity and challenge. The pace and direction of events of the past few months have, in general terms, augured well for a more secure and more equitable world order, and for the ultimate triumph of a world dedicated to the rule of law. But progress has presented challenges...

The challenge to the international community is one of adaptation, from a world centred on the individual nation-state to an interdependent world, from a world dominated by bilateral diplomacy to one in which multilateral institutions occupy a central place...

I believe, Mr. President, that we must look beyond a system that only inhibits armed confrontations. I believe that we need a new definition of the concept of multilateral security, a definition that takes into account the new and varied threats to global peace and security. These include the depletion of the ozone layer, the degradation of our seas, the debilitating scourge of illicit drugs, and

worldwide epidemics such as AIDS, mass exoduses of people from one country to another, and the desperate poverty that persists in many parts of the world.

We recognize as well that our collective security depends upon democracy and respect for human rights.

UN effectiveness

Mr. President, the Gulf crisis showed that the United Nations has the will and the capacity necessary to repel military aggression. But can we meet other challenges — challenges to economic and social development, to human rights and freedoms, and to the environment?

For Canada, the single most important priority is to make the United Nations stronger, more effective and more relevant to today's challenges.

Mr. President, we can begin by taking a fresh look at both the UN Charter and the Security Council. Few people, for example, realize that seven countries, which have joined the United Nations and are now serving it with distinction, are still identified as "enemy states." We can and should find ways to remove this archaic stigma.

As for the Council itself, we, like others, are looking for effective leader-

ship from the current five members who today are working together in the kind of partnership envisaged in the Charter. Canada believes it is not too soon to start looking ahead to the day when key countries, representing all regions of the globe, are permanent members on the Security Council. In the meantime, our immediate priority is to ensure that the Council in its present form functions with vision, effectiveness and wisdom.

As a starting point, we must strengthen the Security Council's capacity to take preventive or anticipatory actions. An ability to assess impending flash-points, engage the necessary political will at the earliest stage, and act effectively and decisively in timely ways, will increase the lead time in reacting to events, and will reduce the security risk by minimizing the element of surprise. Indeed, the very capacity of the UN system to provide early and effective warning may, itself, discourage recourse to conflict...

At another level, for the UN to be efficient all Member States must respect their financial obligations. This means paying obligations on time and in full. Given its enhanced role, it is unacceptable that the UN should be paralyzed by a lack of sufficient resources because assessments go unpaid.



SSEA Barbara McDougall at a press conference during UNGA 46.

Mr. President, Canada is committed to improving the UN's ability to channel the military resources of Member States to peaceful purposes. This is essential for humanitarian purposes, as well as to promote peace and security through peacekeeping and through military enforcement when necessary. We look to increasing the capability of the Secretary-General to plan and conduct peacekeeping missions. We should also explore ways of turning these military resources to humanitarian relief purposes.

Regional security

We are all aware that the UN Security Council's ability to deter aggressive action cannot by itself provide global security. In addition, we need effective regional security arrangements on a cooperative basis, arrangements that can address some of the underlying causes of insecurity and instability.

The new global climate for cooperation has created opportunities for regions to address their own problems without being used as dominoes in some wider ideological game. It has also created obligations to do so. This approach is crucial for long-lasting peace and security in regions such as Central and Eastern Europe and the Asia-

Pacific. It has been essential for the progress towards peace in Cambodia and the solution of other regional conflicts.

In the Middle East problems remain, but we believe that solutions to these difficult problems are now a little closer. Canada will continue to support constructive initiatives such as the current efforts of the United States, based on the principles enshrined in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We call for direct negotiation between the parties concerned as the only route to a just and lasting peace. We continue to hope that a peace conference can open the door to those negotiations.

In the meantime, all countries can make particular efforts in the coming session to demonstrate their sensitivity to the parties directly concerned...

Arms proliferation: a Canadian initiative

Mr. President, renewed efforts to design a comprehensive and effective framework dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are also absolutely essential. The Gulf conflict showed that conventional arms, as well as weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, can destabilize whole regions. Since 1950, the world has suffered 125 wars which have killed 25 million people, almost all as a result of conventional weapons. How many more conflicts, how many more deaths, how many more destitute refugees does the international community need before we apply the necessary political commitment to eliminating these threats?

Canada was among the first nations to call for definitive action. In February, our Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, characterized as insane the build-up of weapons that had taken place in Iraq. At that time, he launched an initiative that called for a number of concrete steps:

- universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its indefinite extension beyond 1995;
- immediate conclusion of a global, comprehensive and verifiable convention banning the acquisition, possession and use of chemical weapons;
- strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; and

- transparency of international arms sales, particularly by the establishment of a UN register.

We are, with others, moving ahead with proposals to address the areas of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. With respect to conventional weapons, transparency is vital — not only for knowing what is happening in the arms trade, but also for building confidence and trust. A global arms transfer register that is universal, non-discriminatory and effective is long overdue. That register should include national inventories as well. And we must be prepared to act on the basis of that information.

We applaud the historic advances made over the past year in East-West arms control. We urge all parties to ratify and implement the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties as soon as possible, and then to begin anew to reduce unnecessarily large arsenals further.

We are not naive. Every country has a legitimate right to assess its own defence needs and act accordingly. But no country, under guise of defence, has the right to accumulate arms that are intended to destroy its neighbours. Equally troubling, of course, are excessive expenditures on arms which sacrifice other important priorities such as health, education and agriculture.

The choice is there for all of us to make: instruments of destruction or tools for peace...

Conclusion

Throughout our deliberations, we must remind ourselves that we are not here to represent blocs or to promote ideologies but to represent people: "We the peoples of the United Nations."

Never have these words meant more or held more promise. But words alone are not enough. They cannot turn famine into bounty, discrimination into equality, repression into freedom, or brutality into compassion. They will mean little if we fail to give ourselves the tools for effective action or if we succumb to the temptation of unilateralism.

Mr. President, Canada is determined not only to honour those words, but to ensure that this Organization has the means to put them into practice. ■

First Committee Concludes Productive Session

Profound changes in the international scene, most dramatically in the former USSR, and important progress in East-West arms control and disarmament provided the backdrop for the work of the First Committee at the 46th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 46). These factors contributed to one of the most productive First Committee sessions ever, from a Canadian perspective.

The First Committee adopted 40 resolutions and four decisions on disarmament and international security issues, and two resolutions on the subject of Antarctica. The number of resolutions adopted was the lowest in several years — a reflection of the continued trend towards merging competing resolutions and rationalizing the Committee's work. The trend indicates growing consensus in some areas and, in general, a cooperative and non-confrontational approach by delegations.

The most important achievement of the session and the issue that overshadowed all others in the First Committee was the negotiation and adoption of a resolution establishing a UN arms register (see article on pages 1-3). The implementation of this resolution will represent a significant and tangible contribution by the First Committee to multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts. The broad support the resolution received, and the flexibility demonstrated by a wide range of states involved in its consideration, augurs well for the future of the First Committee as a forum that can advance the multilateral disarmament agenda in a concrete way.

Another noteworthy achievement was the adoption of a single resolution on the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT). Since 1980, two competing resolutions had been adopted on this issue, each of which outlined a different approach to the objective of a CTBT. The adoption of a merged resolution at UNGA 46 thus represents an important step towards global consensus on how to move towards the CTBT goal.

The resolution (46/29) reaffirms the General Assembly's conviction that a CTBT is a matter of priority and urges

the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to intensify its substantive work on issues related to a CTBT. These include structure and scope of a CTBT as well as verification and compliance. Resolution 46/29 was adopted by a vote of 149 in favour, two against (France, USA), and four abstentions (China, Israel, Micronesia, UK). It received the broadest support of any resolution on this issue in recent years. Canada has traditionally been one of a "core group" of co-sponsors that drafts one of the two CTBT resolutions. At UNGA 46, the Canadian delegation again played an active role in finding compromise language and in promoting support for the merged resolution.

The First Committee also adopted its annual resolution on the subject of a chemical weapons convention. Canada and Poland take turns introducing the resolution each year; Canada provided the lead at UNGA 46. This resolution "strongly urges the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of the highest priority" to resolve outstanding differences and achieve a final agreement during its 1992 session. The fact that the resolution was adopted by consensus makes it a strong global statement which Canada hopes will give political impetus to the successful conclusion of a chemical

weapons convention during the CD's current session.

As in the past, Canada introduced a resolution on the "Prohibition of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes." The UNGA 46 resolution was amended to include a positive reference to the unilateral nuclear weapons initiatives announced by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in September and October respectively. As Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason stated when introducing this resolution to the First Committee, these welcome developments "enhance prospects for the realization" of the goal of a prohibition on the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. The resolution was adopted with a record level of support although, as in the past, this majority regrettably did not include four nuclear-weapon states. The vote was 152 in favour, two against (France, USA) and three abstentions (China, India, UK).

Canada believes that the positive outcome of the UNGA 46 First Committee provides a solid foundation for continued revitalization of this forum in the years ahead, enabling the First Committee to effectively advance multilateral arms control and disarmament objectives. ■

Canada Welcomes Korean Declaration

On January 2, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall praised the joint declaration on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula reached between South and North Korea on December 31. "This important event is a further milestone in the progress realized in recent months towards improving relations between the two Koreas and lessening tensions on the peninsula," said Mrs. McDougall.

In the declaration, South and North Korea agree that neither side will develop, possess or use nuclear weapons or possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities, and that nuclear energy will be used only for peaceful purposes. The declaration also provides for the creation of a joint committee to implement inspections of nuclear facilities in both countries to verify the denuclearization of the peninsula. The declaration was to be signed by the Prime Ministers of South and North Korea on January 20, and will be subject to ratification in both capitals.

Canada also welcomes North Korea's undertaking to sign a full-scope nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We urge North Korea to sign and implement such an agreement without delay.

Resolutions on Arms Control and Disarmament and International Security Adopted at UNGA 46

Resolutions supported by Canada

RESOLUTION NUMBER (Lead sponsor or sponsors)	RESOLUTION	VOTE Yes-No-Abstain
46/25 (Germany/Romania)*	Transparency of military expenditures	Consensus
46/26 (USA)*	Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	Consensus
46/27 (Costa Rica)*	Education and information for disarmament	Consensus
46/29 (Mexico/New Zealand)*	Comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty	147-2-4
46/30 (Egypt)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	Consensus
46/31 (Bangladesh/Pakistan)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	121-3-26
46/32 (Pakistan)	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	152-0-2
46/33 (Egypt/France)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space (as a whole)	155-0-1
46/34A (Ethiopia)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	Consensus
46/35A (Argentina)	Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction	Consensus
46/35B (Australia)*	Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol	Consensus
46/35C (Canada/Poland)*	Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons	Consensus
46/36A (Finland)	Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques	Consensus
46/36B (Brazil/Sweden)	Study on charting potential uses of resources allocated to military activities for civilian endeavours to protect the environment	Consensus
46/36C (Yugoslavia)	Relationship between disarmament and development	Consensus
46/36D (Canada)*	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	152-2-3
46/36E (Canada)*	Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	Consensus
46/36F (Belgium)	Regional disarmament, including confidence-building measures	Consensus
46/36G (France)	Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe	Consensus
46/36H (Colombia/Peru)*	International arms transfers	Consensus
46/36I (Pakistan)*	Regional disarmament	154-0-4
46/36K (Ethiopia)	Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes	Consensus
46/36L (EC/Japan)*	Transparency in armaments	150-0-2
46/37A (Mexico)	World Disarmament Campaign	Consensus
46/37B (Belgium)	Regional confidence-building measures	Consensus
46/37E (Nigeria)	United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services program	Consensus
46/37F (Nepal)	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	160-1-1
46/38A (Austria)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Consensus
46/38D (Brazil)	The transfer of high technology with military applications	Consensus
46/40 (Sweden)	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	Consensus
46/42 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region	Consensus

* Resolution co-sponsored by Canada

Decisions

46/411 (Mexico)	Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 45/48 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco	Consensus
46/412 (Peru)	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	Consensus
46/413 (Peru)	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 1995 Conference and its Preparatory Committee	Consensus
46/414 (Yugoslavia)	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	Consensus

Resolutions opposed by Canada

46/37C (Mexico)	Nuclear-arms freeze	119-18-23
46/37D (India)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	122-16-22

Resolutions on which Canada abstained

46/28 (Mexico)	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water	110-2-35
46/34B (Gabon)	Nuclear capability of South Africa	108-1-49
46/36J (Yugoslavia)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	130-0-26
46/38B (Mexico)	Comprehensive program of disarmament	123-6-32
46/38C (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	131-8-23
46/39 (Arab Group)	Israeli nuclear armament	76-3-75
46/49 (Yugoslavia)	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	127-4-30

Canadian Statement to First Committee

The following are excerpts from the statement delivered by Ms Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, to the First Committee at United Nations Headquarters in New York on October 18.

Our work at last year's session of the General Assembly had as its backdrop the grave situation resulting from the Iraqi occupation and attempted annexation of Kuwait. The expansionist campaign of Saddam Hussein was reversed by the effective action of the United Nations Security Council with the overwhelming support of Member States, including Canada, but the price was appallingly high in loss of life, damage to the environment and immense suffering.

Now in this post-Gulf-War, post-Cold-War era, waves of democracy surge over diverse regions and former adversaries reach landmark agreements to reduce nuclear and conventional weapons. Conversely, many longstanding disputes are exacerbated and long-repressed destructive forces unleashed by the process of rapid and fundamental change —

change that also creates new instabilities. In this context, never has the need been greater or the opportunity more clearly present to ensure that the principles of the UN Charter govern the emerging international order. Our task is nothing less than the creation of a new, overarching security framework based on the international rule of law...

It is now overwhelmingly clear that the processes of arms control and disarmament are essential elements in the broader process of building and maintaining international peace and security. Canada is convinced that the First Committee has an important and, indeed, irreplaceable role to play in advancing arms control and disarmament objectives. While certain initiatives are most effectively pursued at a bilateral or regional level, other disarmament goals, because their realization depends on the active support of all militarily significant states, require the attention of the global community. It is incumbent upon all of us to redouble our efforts to ensure that this Committee plays its full part in

securing progress on disarmament issues. We must strive to ensure that multilateralism in the disarmament sphere fulfills its positive potential.

Iraq's actions during the Gulf crisis highlighted the urgent need for the international community to step up efforts to effectively address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to consider ways of discouraging excessive accumulations of conventional arms. Canada is committed to energetically pursuing these issues, both in their horizontal and vertical dimensions. In the spring session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and in opening statements before this Committee, concrete suggestions have been made concerning how better to utilize multilateral arms control fora to promote a broader dialogue on proliferation issues. Canada welcomes these proposals and looks forward to studying them further.

In the area of nuclear weapons, Canada commends the leadership and vision demonstrated in the unilateral measures and proposals announced by

President Bush last month. We also welcome the equally positive announcements by President Gorbachev in response. These bold steps build on the solid basis of START and clearly demonstrate the commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union to seriously pursue nuclear disarmament. The withdrawal of naval nuclear weapons from ships and submarines is a particularly welcome decision and a step that Canada has long advocated.

The elimination of most categories of land-based tactical nuclear weapons is another extremely positive component of these initiatives and one that will further enhance confidence and security. The reduction in alert status of bombers reflects the tremendous relaxation of tensions between the superpowers and, indeed, will further contribute to the lowering of such tensions.

Canada is also pleased to note that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to engage in discussions on non-nuclear defences against ballistic missiles and to explore the prospects for moving towards greater reliance on defensive systems. In this context, Canada reiterates its support for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

In the area of preventing horizontal nuclear proliferation, there have been very positive developments over the last year. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been bolstered substantially in recent months by the accessions of Lithuania, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Canada wholeheartedly welcomes these states into the NPT and looks forward to the accession of other countries that have taken the decision to join, including Angola, China, France and Namibia. Canada also commends Argentina and Brazil for their cooperation, in consultation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in developing a trilaterally-based safeguards system that has the potential to meet regional needs for reassurance while at the same time satisfying global non-proliferation concerns.

However, there remain regions of substantial nuclear proliferation concern. One of these is the Korean peninsula where the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has yet to fulfil its obligation under NPT accession to con-

clude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Canada looks forward to the early conclusion of such an agreement and to its early ratification and implementation.

Another area of nuclear proliferation concern is the South Asian region. Canada strongly urges all countries in the region that have not already done so to accede to the NPT without further delay. If states of the region are not prepared to accede to the NPT at this time, other measures to reduce proliferation-based tensions and to build confidence and security should be pursued as a matter of priority. The agreement between India and Pakistan committing each to refrain from attacking the other's nuclear facilities in the event of conflict provides a valuable first step upon which other initiatives could be built. The objective of such a process should be to achieve progress in confidence- and security-building that takes into account, as a matter of primary importance, the need for nuclear non-proliferation reassurance, aimed at assuaging both regional and broader international concerns...

Canada has long attached great importance to regional confidence- and security-building and continues to play an active role in this regard in the context of the CSCE. One of the urgent issues currently facing the CSCE is the resurgence of nationalist, ethnic and religious antagonisms, which threaten peace and stability and the consolidation of democracy in Europe. It is for this reason that Canada has made the enhancement of the CSCE's conflict prevention and resolution machinery a key priority. In order to respond to the diverse challenges in Europe, the CSCE must use all of the tools at its disposal, including regular political consultations and the new CSCE institutions and mechanisms.

The Conflict Prevention Centre should be permitted to realize its full potential in assisting the Council of Foreign Ministers in reducing the risk of conflict. Mediation, conciliation, fact-finding, monitoring and peacekeeping missions should all form part of the package of tools available to heads of government or foreign ministers in managing and resolving conflict. We

believe we must explore all avenues that might assist us in building a democratic and peaceful Europe.

As a strong supporter of the proposal for an Open Skies regime covering the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok, Canada particularly welcomes the decision reached on October 15 to resume negotiations in early November. Recalling the high priority which the Member States of the European Community attached to Open Skies in their statement to this Committee, we urge all participating states to successfully conclude these negotiations before the CSCE Helsinki Main Follow-Up Meeting in 1992. We believe that the transparency resulting from an Open Skies regime will serve to strengthen stability and enhance predictability, and will facilitate the arms control and disarmament process in the region covered.

Canada has also been involved in a recently-launched initiative to consider security matters at the Organization of American States. At the General Assembly of that Organization in June, two resolutions calling for a study on security-related issues were adopted by consensus. We hope that this study, which is currently underway, will lend support to international non-proliferation efforts and will consider regional arrangements tailored to the particular needs of the hemisphere that might go beyond what can be agreed globally.

The three UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament have consistently demonstrated the positive contribution they can make in promoting regional dialogue and confidence- and security-building measures. The Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) is also to be commended for its sponsorship of timely conferences on topical disarmament issues, such as the very successful conference held in Kyoto in May of this year.

Another area of DDA's work of strong interest to Canada is the establishment of a consolidated database of published materials, provided by members, on all aspects of verification and compliance, as requested in Resolution 45/62 of last year's General Assembly. During this session of the First Committee, I will submit to the DDA and provide to members of this Committee a

Bibliography on Arms Control Verification prepared by the Canadian government...

As co-sponsor of an annual resolution calling for the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, Canada attaches high priority to the realization of this fundamental objective. We welcome the stimulating discussion on a nuclear test ban at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) during this year's session and the valuable work of the Group of Scientific Experts, including the second technical test concerning the global exchange and analysis of seismic data. We look forward to further consideration of this important issue at the 1992 session of the CD. Canada also believes that it is time for the United States and the Soviet Union to redouble their efforts to build on the basis of existing bilateral testing limitations. Unilateral steps, while welcome, cannot substitute for the negotiation of binding measures leading to the conclusion of an effectively verifiable ban on all nuclear test explosions.

The nightmare of chemical warfare, which arose in all its horror in World War I, was long thought to have become a thing of the past. Events of the past decade, and the last year, have disabused us of this illusion. The CD's negotiations on a chemical weapons convention have made significant headway over the past year. Nonetheless, important differences on crucial issues remain and must be overcome before a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban can be concluded. We believe that these issues can be resolved in 1992...

Canada is particularly heartened with the outcome of the recently concluded Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Clearly, the international community was galvanized by real concerns that such weapons could recently have been used. As a result, substantial progress was made at the Review Conference in improving, and supplementing, agreed confidence-building measures to enhance transparency in what are very complex fields of endeavour. This was a key accomplishment and one that will now require efforts at the national level by all States Parties to the Convention to

Canada Adds Verification Bibliography to UN Database

In 1990 (Resolution 45/65), the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus the report of a Group of Qualified Governmental Experts on the role of the UN in the field of verification. Among the report's recommendations was the development of a UN "consolidated data bank of published materials and data provided on a voluntary basis by Member States on all aspects of verification and compliance." In recommending the establishment of a database, the Experts underlined the useful role the UN can play in making research and data related to cooperative arrangements and verification available to wider audiences.

During UNGA 46, Canada contributed to the UN database a detailed *Bibliography on Arms Control Verification* covering more than 1500 entries between the years 1962 and 1991. While not pretending to be exhaustive, the *Bibliography* covers publications and submissions from governments and international organizations, as well as the research community's literature on the subject. It also includes a detailed subject index. The database from which the *Bibliography* is drawn is computerized to facilitate subject searches. Canada is distributing the *Bibliography* to libraries across Canada and around the world in the hope that it will assist officials, diplomats and researchers in verification.

Canada is urging other UN Member States with relevant experience to make similar contributions to the verification database.



UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Yasushi Akashi receives a copy of the Bibliography on Arms Control Verification from Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason.

give the confidence-building measures substantial meaning and effect.

Canada is also pleased that the issue of verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention will receive a thorough examination in an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts open to all States Parties...

As Norway pointed out in its plenary statement to this Committee, there will be modest costs associated with implementing the decisions of the Review Conference. Particularly in light of the admonition from Under-Secretary-General Akashi regarding the very real and serious constraints on the resources

Forecast

Arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, February through May 1992

Ongoing: CFE 1A Negotiation, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE 1 Joint Consultative Group meetings, Vienna

Ongoing: High Level Working Group (CFE signatories plus eight successors to former USSR with territory covered by CFE), Brussels

Ongoing: Open Skies negotiations, Vienna

Ongoing: OAS Working Group on Cooperation for Hemispheric Security, Washington, D.C.

Ongoing until March 24: CSBM Negotiations, Vienna

Ongoing until March 27: CD in session, Geneva

March 11 - 13: Ninth Annual Ottawa Verification Symposium — Multilateral Verification and the Post-Gulf Environment, Montebello, Quebec

March 24 - July: CSCE Main Follow-Up Meeting, Helsinki

March 30 - April 10: Meeting of UN Panel of Governmental Experts on the Arms Register, New York

March 30 - April 10: Meeting of Ad Hoc Group of Experts on BTWC Verification, Geneva

April 8 - 10: MTCR experts meeting, Rome

April 20 - May 11: UN Disarmament Commission, New York

May 11 - June 26: CD in session, Geneva

of the DDA, we share Norway's hope that a way can be found during the deliberations of this Committee to satisfactorily resolve this issue.

In her statement to UNGA 46, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mrs. Barbara McDougall, stressed the urgent need to address the proliferation of conventional weapons... Attention to this issue by the international community is long overdue. The Secretary-General in his 1991 report on the work of the UN again expressed his "grave concern over the problem of excessive and destabilizing transfers of con-

ventional armaments." We believe that it is necessary to begin a process aimed at discouraging and preventing excessive build-ups of conventional weapons. This is an area where this Committee can make a tangible, valuable contribution.

The Canadian delegation will be working earnestly with other delegations to secure a resolution on international arms transfers that establishes an international arms transfer register. Canada believes it is of the utmost importance to build on the current political momentum in favour of a register, and on the recommendation of the UN Group of Governmental Experts that a register be established "as soon as possible." As the Experts made clear in their excellent consensus report on "Ways and Means of Promoting Transparency in International Transfers of Conventional Arms," East-West experience with the benefits of enhanced transparency in building confidence, reducing tensions and ultimately in expanding the scope for negotiated agreements has been overwhelmingly positive. The Gulf War demonstrated the urgent need to extend transparency to the hitherto untouched field of conventional arms acquisition, to extend it on a global basis and to extend it immediately.

To fulfil its confidence-building potential, the register must be effective. It must be as broadly supported as possible. It must include both suppliers and recipients. It must present an accurate picture of arms accumulation. And it must be non-discriminatory to those who rely on arms imports to supply their defence needs. This is why Canada considers it essential that domestic arms procurement and arms holdings be reported to the register at an early stage.

The provision of data to the register will in itself be valuable, as it will allow Member States to demonstrate the non-destabilizing character of their activities. But confidence-building is not a fixed point, it is a process, and to encourage maximum development of that process, we believe the resolution should specify a forum wherein Member States can annually review the operation of the register and consult about the information provided to it. An annual meeting on the margins of the First Committee, for example, might serve as an appro-

priate forum for this purpose. This will help to ensure that the register remains effective and adapts to political circumstances. Consultation will enable Member States to develop clearer understandings of one another's views on such matters as how security is affected by arms acquisition. It may also facilitate improvement of national control mechanisms and help to prevent illicit arms trade.

Canada believes it is important to confine the register to conventional arms. This is not a question of being discriminatory. As Ambassador Donawaki of Japan noted, elaborate international mechanisms already exist, or are under negotiation, to constrain the acquisition of other types of weapons. In the case of weapons of mass destruction, our aim is not simply to promote transparency and to discourage excessive accumulations — our goal is the elimination of these weapons altogether.

In short, our first task is to foster a climate conducive to voluntary restraint and more responsible behaviour on the part of suppliers and recipients alike. Canada firmly believes that an international arms transfer register can make a significant contribution to this end. But over the longer term our goal must clearly be, and again I quote the Secretary-General, "to seek to develop fair criteria for multilateral control of arms transfers while at the same time meeting the legitimate security needs of states."

The construction of an enduring system of cooperative security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter cannot be accomplished solely on a bilateral or a regional basis. We all must do our part. This Committee provides the opportunity for every UN Member State to play a concrete role in advancing specific disarmament objectives and in helping to shape the broader principles of international security. Virtually every one of the delegations that has spoken before me has stressed that the prospects for progress on the range of issues before us has never been better. In another context, Canada's foreign minister stated that there simply are no viable alternatives to practical, future-oriented results. Let us resolve to engage in a constructive, productive dialogue to that end. ■

BTWC Review Conference Improves on CBMs



Presiding over the Third Review Conference of the BTWC, from left to right: Mr. Jan Martenson, Director-General, UN Office at Geneva; Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs; Mr. Roberto Garcia Moritan of Argentina, President of the Conference; and Mr. Sammy Kum Buo, Senior Political Affairs Officer, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs and Secretary-General of the Conference.

UN photo 178173

The Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) ended on September 27 with substantial progress in improving and supplementing confidence-building measures (CBMs) relevant to the Convention. The Conference also agreed to set up an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, open to all States Parties, to look at potential verification measures for the BTWC. Canada, which had pressed for improvements to the CBMs and for detailed consideration of a BTWC compliance regime, was pleased with the outcome.

The BTWC bans the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons or agents for other than peaceful purposes. It was negotiated within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (a forerunner of the present Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament) and was opened for signature in April 1972. It entered into force in 1975. To date, approximately 125 states have adhered to the Convention.

Biological weapons rely on microbial or other agents that achieve their effects

through their biological action, i.e., they cause death or illness through self-reproduction in the target body. Toxins are chemicals produced through biological processes or, more recently, artificial synthesis. Like chemical weapons agents, toxins cause death or illness by their toxic chemical effects in the target body. Although toxins are therefore more properly considered chemical weapons, they were included in the BTWC because historically they were derived from living organisms.

The BTWC's weakness comes from a lack of any meaningful verification provisions. It contains a provision for consultation and cooperation among parties to resolve any problems, as well as a provision concerning the lodging of a complaint with the UN Security Council.

A modest strengthening step was taken at the First BTWC Review Conference in 1980, when it was agreed that States Parties have a right to request a consultative meeting at the expert level. At the

Second Review Conference in 1986, more significant measures to strengthen confidence in compliance with the BTWC were agreed. These included:

- reaffirmation of the provision for consultations at the expert level and an elaboration of procedural options at such a consultative meeting;
- agreement on exchanges of data relating to research facilities with very high safety standards;
- information exchanges on infectious disease outbreaks;
- encouragement of publication of biological research results; and
- active promotion of increased contacts among scientists engaged in research relevant to the BTWC.

The Review Conference held in September improved substantially upon these. The existing set of CBMs was expanded to require:

- a very detailed declaration of information relating to biological defence programs and facilities;
- a declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures in place to implement the provisions of the Convention and/or to control the export or import of micro-organisms pathogenic to man, animals or plants;
- a declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programs since January 1, 1946; and
- a declaration of vaccine production facilities.

While an improvement, these measures still fall short of what one expects in terms of verification. It is pos-

Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts will look at potential verification measures for the Convention.

sible that the chemical weapons convention now under negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament may include toxins within its scope. If so, this would apply the more stringent verification

provisions of the chemical weapons convention to toxin weapons. However, given the nature of modern biotechnology, verification to a high level of assurance may never be entirely feasible in relation to biological and toxin weapons.

Canada was an original party to the BTWC and has participated actively in all review conferences. We have pressed strongly for improved confidence-building measures, particularly in the form of exchanges of data on related defence research facilities. Canada is one of the few countries to have participated fully in each of these annual data and information exchanges.

Canada will continue to promote measures that would enhance confidence in compliance with the BTWC. Specific improvements and additions to the CBMs at the Third Review Conference originated with the Canadian delegation, which was led by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason. Canada, with others, also pressed for detailed consideration of a compliance (verification) regime by an Ad Hoc Group of Experts. This proposal received wide support and ultimately consensus agreement at the Conference. The Group, which will hold its first meeting from March 30 to April 10, is to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. Canada will participate in the study.

As noted in *Bulletin 17*, prior to the Third Review Conference Canada formally modified its reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol by removing them insofar as they relate to bacteriological methods of warfare. At the Third Review Conference, the Canadian delegation led the effort that culminated in the Conference stressing the importance of the withdrawal of *all* reservations to the Geneva Protocol related to the BTWC. Other States Parties, including the United Kingdom, have since announced similar action.

All told, the outcome of the Third Review Conference reflected well upon the preparations and efforts of the Canadian delegation. The next Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention review conference will be held no later than 1996. ■

A CW Convention in '92?

The use of chemical weapons (CW) by Iraq against Iran in their war and the threat of CW use during the 1991 Gulf campaign added impetus to the negotiations for a CW convention at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Last May 13, USA President George Bush called for the negotiations to be completed in mid-1992, and in June the CD set a mandate for its Ad Hoc Committee on a CW convention to complete the negotiations in 1992.

The current round of negotiations has been under way since 1984 and there are now only a few core outstanding issues. These still represent a substantial barrier to achieving a text that is rigorous, economical, adequately verifiable, adaptable and likely to attract universal adhesion.

During 1991, the CD made headway on some important technical questions such as the lists of chemicals, the thresholds for control and reporting, and on certain legal and institutional questions, including some important definitions. The USA's decision to forego retention of a retaliatory CW capacity (part of the May 13 announcement) allowed a blanket ban on CW use to be included in the agreement. Despite this progress, differences remain. In general, they are not specifically North-South or East-West, although the Group of 21 (neutral and non-aligned countries) has taken strong positions on certain issues.

Among the major outstanding issues are: challenge inspections; "capable" industries and their treatment; the role and composition of the Executive Council; trade controls in relation to the convention; and the treatment of old stocks.

On challenge inspections, there was some discussion in 1991 on how to achieve an appropriate balance between the need of international inspectors to gain early access to the vicinity of a site, secure it, and examine its installations, and the right of the inspected state to protect its most sensitive locales and installations through appropriate safeguards. Getting this balance right is central to the effectiveness of a convention.

The convention is expected to provide some means for covering the activities of

the bulk of the world's chemical industries which do not produce scheduled chemicals but could be capable of doing so. Means of demarcating the industries subject to inspection and monitoring their activities have been discussed.

Discussion of the composition of the Executive Council of the new international CW organization has as yet been only preliminary. There are certain to be differences over whether states with larger industrial or military interests should benefit from weighted or guaranteed representation.

Possible use of trade controls on chemicals has been suggested by one Western country as a means of inducing countries to adhere to a CW convention, while some Group of 21 countries have sought assurances of non-discrimination in the use of trade controls on chemicals among parties to the convention.

Old stocks of CW are a source of public concern in certain countries affected by military operations in former years, or concerned about potential problems of accountability. There are complex difficulties of ownership, liability and disposal associated with this class of problem.

In addition to these, negotiators have to deal with a range of less acute problems both of a technical and a legal/political nature. Once an agreed working text is achieved it must be made internally consistent and updated, and must then receive the attention of legal drafters to put it into treaty form. If outstanding problems are resolved quickly, a text for signature could be ready by the fall of 1992.

Canada attaches a high priority to the CW negotiations. In our estimation, conclusion of a strong, verifiable chemical weapons convention would be the most effective response to the threat of CW proliferation.

Canada has participated vigorously in the negotiations since their inception, and was an early and strong advocate of effective verification measures in a CW convention. We have made available to the Ad Hoc Committee studies and documentation bearing on its work, and have provided strong representation for its subsidiary bodies.

As the negotiations have evolved, countries have become conscious of a range of interests needing to be accommodated: security considerations; legal and competitive rights of the chemical industry; consequences of toxicity and chemical structure; and consequences of political sovereignty and national policies. Within this framework, Canada has tried to maintain the integrity of a convention that would extend the ban on CW in a comprehensive fashion and ensure that it is effectively verified. Canada has also striven inside and outside the CD to persuade other countries to become original signatories to a CW convention when it is concluded.

Canada welcomed the bilateral arrangements concluded by the USA and the USSR in 1989 under which they exchanged information on the size of each other's CW stockpiles and agreed on a program of destruction scheduled to start in 1992. However, the second phase of this agreement has been held up by Soviet internal difficulties and it is unclear what the impact on it will be of recent constitutional developments in Russia. Canada has urged components of the new commonwealth of ex-Soviet states to fulfil existing treaty obligations and to promote CW disarmament. ■

MTCR Partners Meet in Washington

Canada participated in a meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners in Washington from November 4 to 7. The MTCR, which aims to control the international transfer of missile technology, has served as a valuable nuclear non-proliferation measure since its creation in 1987. The Washington meeting focused on two issues: expanding the scope of the MTCR and clarifying membership criteria.

Given the progress in missile technology and the threat of non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction such as biological and chemical weapons, the MTCR partners agreed on the desirability of expanding the scope of the regime to include missiles capable of delivering *all* types of weapons of mass destruction. Since the current MTCR guidelines (a missile capable of delivering a 500 kg payload across a range of 300 km) may be too restrictive, the MTCR partners have undertaken to study the need for a revised set of parameters, while acknowledging the need to permit the legitimate exchange of missile technology for peaceful purposes. ■

Membership in the MTCR has increased from its original seven participants to include 18 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA. At the Washington meeting, the partners recognized that the admission of new members could strengthen the effectiveness of the regime in combatting missile proliferation. To that end, the partners established a set of criteria for considering applications by potential new members. Essentially, the criteria seek to determine the applicant's commitment to non-proliferation and its ability to implement an effective export control system.

MTCR partners considered the Washington meeting a success. They reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening and expanding the regime to better address the problem of missile proliferation. For Canada, the MTCR remains an integral part of our non-proliferation program. The partners plan to hold their next meeting in Oslo in the summer of 1992. ■

ENMOD Review Conference Scheduled

On December 6, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution noting that a majority of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (known as the ENMOD Convention) wish to convene a conference to review the Convention in September 1992.

The ENMOD Convention, which entered into force in 1978, currently boasts 53 parties, including Canada. The Convention was concluded because of a growing awareness that scientific and technical advances were opening the possibility of modifying the natural environment not only for beneficial purposes (such as increasing rainfall during a drought) but also for hostile actions.

According to the Convention, parties undertake not to engage in, or assist

other states to engage in, military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques that have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects, as the means for injuring any other State Party. "Environmental modification techniques" are defined as techniques for changing — through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes — the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space. The kind of phenomena covered by this prohibition include, among other things, earthquakes, tsunamis and upsets to the ecological balance of a region, as well as changes in weather patterns, climate patterns, ocean currents, the state of the ozone layer and the state of the ionosphere. ■

An earlier review conference, held in September 1984, confirmed that the obligations under the Convention had been faithfully observed up to that time and that the Convention's provisions remained effective.

In view of the extensive destruction caused by the release of oil into the Persian Gulf and the ignition of oil-fires by Iraqi forces in Kuwait during the Gulf War, the upcoming review conference should prove timely. While no complaint has been lodged pursuant to the Convention by any State Party including Kuwait (which is a party) against Iraq (which has signed but not ratified the Convention), a number of participants in the conference will undoubtedly raise concerns arising from the Kuwaiti experience. ■

UNSCOM Completes First-Phase Inspections in Iraq

No smoking gun but powder burns evident

The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), established to verify Iraq's compliance with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 687, has completed the survey phase of its inspections. Through this intensive set of first-phase inspections, UNSCOM has compiled sufficient information to give a general picture of Iraq's capabilities and facilities in the nuclear, chemical, biological and missile fields.

Although the proverbial "smoking gun" related to a nuclear weapons production program remains elusive, the evidential "power burns" are clear enough to cause serious concern. Indeed, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has, for the first time in its history, condemned a member state — Iraq — for violation of its safeguards agreement. It expressed its grave concern about Iraq's "deception and obstruction" of IAEA inspectors. Physical obstructionist tactics displayed by the Iraqis in the second and sixth nuclear inspections, and a general practice of misinformation/disinformation in other areas, continue to be worrisome indicators as the Special Commission turns its attention to the issue of longer-term compliance.

Inspection experience

By the end of 1991, UNSCOM — in concert with the IAEA, which leads on nuclear inspections — had initiated or participated in 24 major on-site inspections in Iraq: seven nuclear; seven chemical; seven ballistic missile; and three biological. There have been almost 500 inspection personnel deployments comprising nearly 300 individual inspectors representing more than 34 nationalities. The accumulated inspection experience is potentially precedent-setting in terms of the multilateral verification process.

December 1991 witnessed the conclusion of first-phase (baseline) inspections. The second phase (verification of removal/destruction) and the third phase (verification of future com-

pliance) are becoming increasingly dominant and will be of longer duration, though the dividing lines are not entirely clear. For example, destruction of the Iraqi ballistic missile capability has been carried out for some time now in tandem with a series of ballistic missiles baseline inspections. As well, in mid-November two Soviet aircraft undertook the removal of nuclear material to the USSR while additional nuclear inspections were underway.

The Soviet airlift, including shipping preparations, is estimated to have cost up to \$1.5 million. A subsequent longer-range British/French removal program could reach into the \$30 million range. As a result of a series of chemical baseline inspections, it is estimated that the chemical weapons destruction phase will take "millions of dollars" and "last for one to two years."

Continuation of the UNSCOM operation will thus be an extended and expensive undertaking. A rough estimate of UNSCOM's costs to the end of 1991 is \$40 million. UNSCOM's high altitude airborne imaging support, provided by a Member State, and the use of two C160 Transall aircraft plus three CH-53 helicopters in support of on-site inspections, constitute other significant expenditures.

Canadian participation

Canadians have participated in inspections in all four weapons categories. Mr. F.R. Cleminson, Head of EAITC's Verification Research Unit and Canada's representative on UNSCOM, participated in the initial nuclear inspection led by the IAEA at the Iraqi nuclear research facility at Tuwaitha in May 1991. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Knapp (Department of National Defence) and Dr. Peter Lockwood (Defence Research Establishment Suffield) have participated in senior positions in a number of chemical weapons inspections at the main chemical weapons facility near Samarra and at other locations. Captain Gilles Clairoux (DND) completed a chemical weapons

inspection in late November that covered a number of Iraqi airbases. Five other Canadians found themselves on CNN during the "parking lot" incident in Baghdad during the sixth nuclear inspection. In all, Canadians have constituted approximately five percent of the inspection personnel deployments. DND's staffing arrangements have shown a high degree of flexibility in responding to short-notice requirements, and UNSCOM has expressed its gratitude to Canada for this.

Nuclear weapons

Following the seventh nuclear inspection, and in spite of the obstructionist tactics displayed including the "parking lot" episode, Iraq provided for the first time formal, though incomplete, written acknowledgement of its nuclear weapons program:

"Various research and studies of the sort to which you refer as 'weaponization' have been carried out. The objective in carrying out such research and studies was to establish the practical, technical and scientific requirements for a program of this nature in the event that a political decision were to be taken to proceed in that direction."

Iraq's recent record in the nuclear area continues to be consistent with, if less dramatic than, its earlier actions. These included the concealment of evidence of plutonium separation, of uranium enrichment and of nuclear weapons development, refusal to permit inspection teams to enter some sites and exit others, and confiscation of documents from inspectors in the course of the sixth nuclear inspection. In sum, Iraq has not cooperated in the critical area of nuclear-weapons-related activity, and UNSCOM and the IAEA remain some distance from achieving the desired degree of transparency.

Chemical weapons

With the data compiled by major survey inspections undertaken at the AI

Muthanna State Establishment now analyzed, the Special Commission has a very good understanding of Iraq's declared primary chemical weapons site. Furthermore, discussions on the destruction of chemical weapons and agents have resulted in a considerable improvement in technical understanding by both sides, particularly as regards the potential hazards involved in some operations and the technologies potentially available for implementing the various destruction processes. The chemical agent destruction process is likely to start early in 1992.

Ballistic missiles

By the end of 1991, UNSCOM inspection teams had supervised the destruction of 62 ballistic missiles, 18 fixed missile launch pads, 33 ballistic missile warheads, 127 missile storage support racks, a substantial amount of rocket fuel, an assembled 350 mm supergun, components of two 500 and two 1,000 mm superguns, and one ton of supergun propellant. The assembled supergun was destroyed by Iraqi engineers at its site in Iskandariyah, 50 kilometres south of Baghdad, under UN supervision in early December.

Conclusion

As UNSCOM and the IAEA confront the difficult issues likely to arise in connection with the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the facilities for their production, and as the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification are put into effect, support of the Security Council, the Secretary General, the Secretariat and Member States of the United Nations will be essential.

Experience to date has shown that results can be achieved only when resolute stands are taken in response to Iraqi challenges to the implementation of the mandate of UNSCOM and the IAEA. Such resolute stands can be based only on the full support of the United Nations and its Member States in achieving all the basic objectives of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687.

Skies May Soon be Open

Negotiations on an Open Skies agreement, which resumed this past fall in Vienna among the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, appear to be overcoming difficulties encountered in previous rounds of talks. Negotiators believe an agreement could be reached early in 1992. Among factors that could complicate the final stages are uncertainty over arrangements affecting territory of the former USSR and agreement on management arrangements for aircraft and data.

An Open Skies agreement would aim to build confidence by providing for unarmed, short-notice surveillance flights of signatory countries. During earlier rounds of negotiation — the first held in Ottawa in February 1990 and the second in Budapest in April-May of that year — the NATO participants pressed for overflights to be permitted under a regime that was as open as possible. That would entail use of aircraft belonging to the overflying country, use of sophisticated "all-weather" sensors, no restrictions on

flight plans except for air safety reasons, and a relatively large quota of overflights.

The USSR, with some support from other East European participants, argued for inspected countries having the right to require use of their own aircraft and to stipulate certain areas as being permanently out of bounds, for monitoring equipment to be limited, and for the data from each overflight to form part of a universally-available pool of information. The USSR also argued for very restrictive limits on the number and duration of flights.

The current round of negotiations was able to get under way following indications that the USSR would be willing to accept some non-optical sensors on board inspection aircraft, would open all its territory to overflights, and would accept a substantially larger quota of overflights. For their part, the Western allies indicated a willingness to accept the use of aircraft from the inspected country. Overflying aircraft, from whichever country, would operate using



Canadian aircraft commander Capt. John Latulippe (left) speaking with an officer of the Hungarian Air Force during Canada's trial Open Skies overflight of Hungary in January 1990. As this Bulletin went to press, a reciprocal Hungarian trial overflight of Canada was scheduled to take place January 13 to 18.

commercially-available sensor technologies.

Negotiators are now fleshing out the means by which this framework can be put into practice. They are specifying the characteristics of the approved sensors, the procedures to be followed for approving visiting or host-country aircraft, the quotas of overflights given and received, scheduling, transit arrangements, equipment-pooling possibilities and financial aspects, among others.

Countries are already beginning to make plans for implementing the agreement. Both in Eastern and Western Europe feelers are being reported about the kind of pooling arrangements that would be practical and desirable under the agreement.

Canada is gratified to have its early work in launching the Open Skies negotiations repaid by the prospect of an early, successful outcome. The agreement will be useful to all participants, but perhaps most of all to smaller countries that otherwise have little access to this type of data. During the latest round, European neutral and non-aligned countries have been able to participate as observers in all aspects of the negotiations and are demonstrating an active concern.

The primary objective of Canada is to assist the negotiations to reach a successful conclusion. In pursuit of this goal, the Canadian delegation is developing proposals and options to cover difficulties that arise, and to provide for contingencies. It is also ensuring that Canadian interests in the procurement, processing and sharing of data are fully met.

Canadian negotiators are building on Canada's extensive experience in the remote sensing field to create a better understanding among other delegations of remote sensing's potential, and of the best means for using it in Open Skies. As well, Canada and Hungary are making plans for a trial Hungarian overflight of Canada, scheduled to take place January 13 to 18. This is a reciprocal flight to one conducted by Canada over Hungary in January 1990. As with the earlier trial, the goal is to gain practical experience about the administrative and operational procedures expected to form part of an Open Skies regime. ■

CSBM Update

The success of the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) outlined in the November 1990 Vienna Document has been impressive. The Vienna Document CSBMs, which came into force January 1, 1991, have increased transparency about military organization and predictability about military behaviour among the 38 CSCE participating states.

Under the provisions of the Vienna Document, Canada, along with the other CSCE states, has exchanged information on military forces, budgets, and plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems. Canada has also exchanged with the CSCE states annual calendars of military activities for 1992 and 1993. In addition to increased exchanges of information, the Vienna Document encourages increased military contacts. Under this provision, Canada participated in visits to air bases in Sweden and the Netherlands in 1991, and is planning to host a similar visit at Canadian Forces Base Lahr in Germany in the spring of 1992.

The Vienna Document also contains measures to ensure compliance and to allow for verification. Under these provisions, Canada conducted an inspection from September 5 to 7 in the Leningrad Military District of the former USSR. The Canadian inspection team confirmed that the Soviet notification of a reduction in its planned military exercise in this district did, in

fact, occur. In addition, the Canadian inspectors reported that the high level of cooperation between the Soviets and the Canadian team set a positive tone for future inspections and evaluations.

To facilitate the transmission of messages relating to both CSBM and CFE issues, the CSCE participating states have established a communications network. Canada's expertise in telecommunications allowed us to contribute to the development of this network, which became operational November 1. The network complements the existing use of diplomatic channels.

To review the implementation of agreed CSBMs, the Vienna Document calls for an annual meeting to be held at the CSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, located in Vienna. The first such meeting was held from November 11 to 13. Discussion extended to clarification of questions arising from implementation and operation of agreed measures, and implications for the process of confidence- and security-building in the CSCE framework.

Canada actively participated in the development of the Vienna Document. In the current CSBM negotiations, which will continue through to the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting beginning in March 1992, Canadian representatives are discussing proposals for improvements to the Vienna Document as well as for new CSBMs. Canada's experience in verification ensures that we will continue to play an important role in the negotiations and in the confidence-building process as a whole. ■

Canada Expects Ukrainian Compliance

Further to Canada's recognition of Ukraine as an independent state on December 2, a Canadian delegation visited Kiev in early December to begin negotiations on establishing diplomatic relations. Among other things, the delegation sought assurances regarding the secure control of nuclear weapons, Ukrainian compliance with existing arms control and disarmament agreements, and adherence to and implementation of all commitments embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and other CSCE documents.

Ukraine has stated that it will respect and implement international agreements entered into by the former USSR, in particular START and CFE. Ukraine has stressed its commitment to the earliest possible elimination of all nuclear weapons from its territory and to the accession of Ukraine to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapons state. It has also said that all nuclear weapons in Ukraine will remain under a single unified control. Canada welcomes these commitments. ■

CFE Update

Resolution of the counting rules dispute cleared the way for CFE 1A negotiators to begin substantive work on satisfying obligations contained in Article XVIII of the CFE Treaty. Priority attention has been given to developing measures to limit personnel strength.

Following the summer break, CFE 1A negotiations resumed in September. Work proceeded on defining the categories of personnel whose numbers will be limited, on determining cost sharing for verification activities, and on producing standardized report formats. Simultaneously, participants agreed on how to reconcile CFE provisions with the independence of the Baltic states.

A legally-binding agreement on the Baltics was reached at a meeting of the CFE's Joint Consultative Group held on October 18. It was agreed that the CFE area of application did not include the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In addition, signatories accepted the USSR's undertaking to apply CFE provisions to its forces while these were present on the territories of the newly independent Baltic states.

In November, CFE 1A negotiators added stabilizing measures to the list of topics under consideration. NATO's High Level Task Force had done considerable preparatory work on one set of measures which was tabled for consideration. This included proposals to place limitations on the future call-up of reservists, and to obligate states to notify permanent increases in the personnel strengths of military units.

As 1992 began, CFE signatories increasingly turned their attention to the consequences of the dissolution of the former USSR. Participants began to consider how the CFE obligations and entitlements of the USSR could be apportioned among the independent republics, and what legal mechanisms would be appropriate to ensure that the treaty is ratified by the individual members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. At the suggestion of the German foreign minister, the newly formed North Atlantic Cooperation Council set up a working group to begin discussions on these issues with representatives of the relevant republics. ■

Post-Helsinki Security Negotiations

In a communique issued following their meeting of December 19, NATO foreign ministers made the following comments about establishing new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building at the CSCE Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, which begins on March 24.

The Helsinki meeting will mark a turning point in the arms control and disarmament process in Europe, and we are actively engaged in developing a common approach. The CSCE Council of Ministers on 19th-20th June 1991 launched informal preparatory consultations aimed at establishing at the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building. They decided that formal preparatory negotiations for the new forum would take place at the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting. We have followed closely and participated in these informal preparatory consultations, carefully noting the views of CSCE partners. A broad measure of consensus is already apparent.

In the period leading to the Helsinki meeting and at the meeting itself, we propose that our negotiators and those of our CSCE partners should be guided by the following broad policy objectives:

- in order to achieve our goal of a new cooperative order in which no country need harbour fears for its security, we should establish a European security forum in a manner which preserves the autonomy and distinct character of the various different elements in the process, but which also ensures coherence between them;
- we should strengthen security and stability through the negotiation of concrete measures aimed at keeping the levels of armed forces in Europe to the minimum commensurate with common and individual legitimate security needs, within Europe and beyond: these may entail further reductions of armed forces;
- we should institute a permanent security dialogue, in which participants will be able to address legitimate security concerns, and which will foster a new quality of transparency and cooperation about armed forces and defence policies. This dialogue should contribute to the strengthening of the achievements of the Helsinki process in the field of security; and
- we should enhance the ability of CSCE institutions, including the Conflict Prevention Centre, to reduce the risk of conflict through the full and open implementation of agreed measures in the security field, and through the elaboration of relevant conflict prevention and crisis management techniques.

We consider it important that, in addition to setting the broad objectives for the new process, the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting should establish a concrete work program for the first phase of the process. In our view, early attention should be given to:

- the appropriate harmonization of arms control obligations in Europe, which will provide a basis for consideration of further limitations and, to the extent possible, reductions of armed forces;
- negotiated confidence-building and cooperative measures, designed to ensure greater transparency and predictability in military affairs;
- cooperation to support and enhance existing multilateral non-proliferation regimes, including in the field of transfer of conventional weapons; and
- enhancement of mechanisms and instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management.

We envisage that some measures may appropriately be devised on a selective or regional basis.

Disarmament Fund Update

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund, April 1 - December 31, 1991

CONTRIBUTIONS

1. North American Model United Nations (Toronto) — 1992 simulation of the UN General Assembly	\$5,000
2. North Coast Tribal Council (Prince Rupert, B.C.) — nuclear conference, April 1991	1,000
3. UN Association in Canada (Vancouver branch) — conference on naval arms control, November 1991	5,000
4. Canadian Association of NATO Defence College Anciens (Ottawa) — symposium on "Canada and NATO," October 1991	4,000
5. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (Toronto) — Canadian Strategic Forecast 1991 seminar	3,000
6. Division of University Extension, University of Victoria — public forum on "Canada's Role in Disarmament, Arms Control and Arms Trade," October 1991	5,000
7. Park View Education Centre (Bridgewater, N.S.) — Atlantic Coast Model UN on the Arms Trade, February 1992	5,000
8. Peace and Environment Resource Centre (Ottawa) — purchase of books about disarmament for library	1,000
9. Voice of Women (national office, Toronto) — 1991 study tour of the UN General Assembly	3,000
10. Political Studies Students' Conference, University of Manitoba (Winnipeg) — conference on "Canada, the United States and New Challenges to Security," January 1992	4,500
11. Science for Peace (Toronto chapter) — 1992 University College lectures in peace studies	1,500
TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS	\$38,000

GRANTS

1. Project Ploughshares (Waterloo, Ont.) — research and publication on naval arms control	7,000
2. Jocelyn Coulon (Outremont, Que.) — book on Canada and the Gulf War	2,500
3. UN World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund (New York) — information activities	30,000
4. UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (Lima, Peru) — seminar on the relationship between hemispheric security, weapons proliferation and military expenditure	10,000
TOTAL OF GRANTS	\$49,500
TOTAL OF GRANTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS	\$87,500 ■

Focus: On the United Nations and Disarmament

Focus is written primarily for secondary school students.

Every fall the countries that belong to the United Nations adopt a number of resolutions calling for arms control and disarmament measures. As long ago as 1959, the UN adopted the goal of "general and complete disarmament under effective international control." Yet many countries continue to possess a large number of arms, in some cases far beyond what they need for self-defence. What is the role of the UN in promoting disarmament? How effective is it?

UN role in disarmament

The UN is involved in disarmament in many ways.

1. UNGA First Committee

The UN General Assembly (UNGA) meets every year in New York from

September to December. All states that are members of the United Nations have a seat in the General Assembly. The General Assembly's role is to debate and consider issues of international interest. The General Assembly can make recommendations, but it cannot force states to follow them. The General Assembly expresses its views and makes its recommendations in the form of resolutions.

The General Assembly divides its work into seven committees. Disarmament issues are looked at by the First Committee, in which all members of the UN, including Canada, are represented. The First Committee meets in October and November. Delegations first hold a general debate on disarmament issues. They then consider draft resolutions on disarmament. Many of the resolutions are the same from year to year and cause little debate. However, a few draft

resolutions are the subject of intense negotiations. States often make changes to their resolutions to arrive at drafts that will gain the widest support possible but still achieve something useful.

After negotiations, the First Committee votes on the draft resolutions. Each Member State has one vote. A state can vote in favour of or against a resolution, or it can abstain, which is a way of saying it takes a position between "yes" and "no." A state might abstain when it does not oppose the principle of the resolution, but does oppose a particular phrase or recommendation within it. If all states are in favour of a resolution, the resolution is adopted by consensus. The aim of the First Committee is to reach consensus on as many resolutions as possible.

If a resolution receives more "yes" votes than "no" votes in the First Committee, it is sent to the General Assem-

ly for another vote. Since the members of the First Committee are the same as the members of the General Assembly, you might expect the voting results would be the same. However, since the goal is to reach consensus, supporters of a resolution sometimes try to convince non-supporters to change "no" votes to abstentions or abstentions to "yes" votes. As a result, the General Assembly voting can differ slightly from the voting in the First Committee.

At the 1991 session of the General Assembly, Member States adopted 44 resolutions dealing with disarmament, 27 of them by consensus. The resolutions and the voting results are listed on pages 6 and 7.

2. Disarmament Commission

The UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) meets in New York for approximately three weeks every spring. All members of the UN can participate in the UNDC. The UNDC looks at a much smaller number of disarmament items than the First Committee does and considers these items in more detail. At its May 1991 session, the UNDC discussed the following items: (1) objective information in military matters; (2) nuclear disarmament; (3) regional disarmament; and (4) the role of science and technology in international security and disarmament.

The goal of the UNDC is not to produce resolutions on each item, but to agree on a statement or a set of recommendations. Unlike the First Committee, the UNDC takes its decisions by consensus, not by vote. This means that all Member States must agree to the statement; a majority is not enough.

3. Conference on Disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) meets each year in Geneva, Switzerland, for about six months. Thirty-nine countries belong to the CD, including Canada. The role of the CD is to negotiate disarmament treaties. It can also set up special committees and working groups to study disarmament issues. Since 1980, the CD has been negotiating a treaty that would ban the development, production, stockpiling, possession and use of chemical weapons. The

CD is also looking at other issues, including a nuclear test ban and how to prevent an arms race in outer space. Like the UNDC, the CD can take decisions only when consensus exists. The CD reports to the General Assembly and gets its budget from the UN, but it sets its own agenda and does not have to follow General Assembly recommendations.

4. Disarmament Treaties

A number of arms control and disarmament agreements have been reached through UN initiatives. Examples include the Antarctic Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The UN regularly organizes conferences where parties can review these treaties.

5. Special Sessions on Disarmament

The UN General Assembly has held three Special Sessions on Disarmament, in 1978, 1982 and 1988. The 149 states that participated in the first Special Session — known as UNSSOD I — agreed on a Final Document calling for an end to the arms race and a reduction in arms. The Final Document contained a Program of Action to help bring this about. The Second Special Session (UNSSOD II) was not able to move much beyond the Final Document of UNSSOD I. UNSSOD III could not agree on any final statement at all.

6. Other

The UN has a Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), which helps carry out the recommendations contained in General Assembly resolutions. The DDA conducts studies, organizes conferences and distributes information about disarmament around the world.

In addition to the Special Sessions, the UN General Assembly occasionally holds special conferences on disarmament-related issues, such as the UN Conference on Disarmament and Development held in 1987. In addition, as a result of a UN Security Council decision, a UN Special Commission is now looking after the destruction of Iraq's missile, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities.

Problems with the UN in disarmament

Since almost all states in the world take part in most UN disarmament discussions, it is hard to find recommendations on which all — or even most — can agree. States often use the First Committee and the UNDC as places to talk "at" one another rather than "with" one another. Even the CD, with its smaller membership, has found it difficult to bring together states' differing opinions on the complicated issue of a chemical weapons ban.

The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly sometimes contradict one another. Resolutions that are adopted by consensus often contain language so general that it would be hard to turn them into treaties, which need to be clear and precise. Resolutions that are not adopted by consensus have less force. Moreover, the states voting against the resolution are often the ones who would have to put the recommendations into effect. It's important to remember that the UN does not exist independently of the states that make it up. If Member States are not prepared to take steps towards disarmament, the General Assembly cannot force them to.

Because of the largeness and slowness of the UN, states that want to negotiate a disarmament treaty often do so outside the UN. Over the last ten years, all major disarmament treaties have been negotiated outside the UN. These include the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the USA and the USSR, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the USA and the USSR.

Value of the UN in disarmament

The UN provides a forum for states to exchange ideas about disarmament and to identify areas where they agree. For states that don't participate in disarmament talks between East and West, the UN may be the only place they can put forward their concerns and opinions on disarmament. UN studies and conferences can explore new approaches to



General view of the opening of the 46th session of the UN General Assembly (September 1991).

UN photo 177993/M.Grant

disarmament and help them gain international attention and acceptance.

Even though UN resolutions don't always lead to the action they call for, they show clearly that Member States consider the issues to be important. And, when states do manage to agree on a disarmament issue or measure through the UN, that agreement carries a lot of weight. Resolutions adopted by consensus express the objectives, concerns and priorities of the international community. This helps to maintain the pressure for disarmament on all Member States.

Often, measures agreed to by UNGA or the UNDC help to lay the ground for further measures. For example, in 1985 Canada succeeded in persuading the General Assembly to adopt by consensus a resolution on verification. This led to a special UN study of verification issues and, eventually, to agreement by Member States on 16 verification principles. Member States also agreed to establish a database of verification material at the UN. Since verification, or checking to make sure that parties are carrying out the terms of a disarmament agreement, is a key part of disarmament treaties, this UN consensus will have benefits in many negotiations.

The General Assembly took another important step forward at its 1991 session, when it voted by a large majority to establish a UN arms register. This means that Member States will be in-

vited to provide the UN with data about their arms exports and imports, as well as with information about their overall arms holdings and their arms purchases from domestic sources. Canada was a strong supporter of this measure, which may eventually lead to international controls on the arms trade.

Although the UN disarmament process may be slow, the value of having all states involved should not be underestimated. Some disarmament agreements affect only certain states or regions and thus are best negotiated by the states involved. However, other disarmament agreements, to be effective, must include virtually all states of the globe. This is true of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was negotiated through the UN and has helped to stop the spread of nuclear weapons (see the Focus article in *Bulletin 14—Fall 1990*). It is also true of the chemical weapons convention now being negotiated by the CD.

The efforts of the UN in the disarmament field reflect the importance of disarmament to the entire international community, as well as the difficulty of reaching international agreement on issues so close to the heart of security as traditionally understood. The end of the Cold War should make it easier for Member States to make real disarmament progress through the UN. Canada is encouraging Member States to move in this direction. ■

Acronyms

- BTWC — Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
- CD — Conference on Disarmament
- CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
- C(S)BM — confidence- (and security-) building measure
- CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
- CTBT — comprehensive test ban treaty
- CW — chemical weapons
- DDA — (UN) Department for Disarmament Affairs
- DND — Department of National Defence
- EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada
- ENMOD — (Convention on the) Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
- G7 — Group of Seven leading industrialized countries
- IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency
- MTCR — Missile Technology Control Regime
- NPT — Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- OAS — Organization of American States
- SSEA — Secretary of State for External Affairs
- START — Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
- UNDC — UN Disarmament Commission
- UNGA — UN General Assembly
- UNSCOM — UN Special Commission ■

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