The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of national and international disarmament and arms control activities

The Disarmament Bulletin is published periodically by the Department of External Affairs. It is intended to be a source of information on arms control and disarmament issues to a broad spectrum of Canadians. If you wish to be placed on our mailing list, or need additional copies, please write to:
The Editor, *The Disarmament Bulletin*,
Arms Control and Disarmament Division,
Dept. of External Affairs, 125 Sussex Drive,
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2.
— ISSN 0715-7134 —
Cette publication existe également en français.

SSEA Comments on Changes in USSR

The following is the text of a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Canadian Club in Toronto on May 3, 1989.

"Five months ago Alexander Rabinovich was again denied the right to leave the Soviet Union, because 'he was party to state secrets, having worked a decade ago, in a Soviet communications facility.' Last Sunday, the Rabinoviches were reunited with their family in Canada, because the question had been brought to the direct attention of the highest leadership in the Soviet Union.

That is but one sign of what can only be called a revolution sweeping Soviet society. It is one of the most significant, intriguing, and hopeful trends in the world today, and has profound implications for East-West relations generally, and for Canada's relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact.

The reaction of the West to these developments in the Soviet Union has been mixed;

— we are awed by their pace and scope;

— we are sceptical of their permanence and intent;

— we are apprehensive about both their success and their failure;

— and we are hopeful for ourselves and our children.

Those mixed reactions are understandable, and appropriate.

When frames of reference collapse, when some tried and true concepts are tested, when old limits shatter and new horizons emerge, the intuitive response is often to deny the change or to say



The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark.

that everything has changed. The challenge is to identify what has changed, and what that means for us.

Some scepticism is natural. After all,

— we have seen hopes raised before, only to be dashed;

— we have seen promises made, only to be broken;

— and an earlier generation was promised 'peace in our time' only to return to conflict and recrimination.

But today, I believe we have entered a watershed. We are there partly due to our own persistence and prudence. The unity and the initiatives of the Western Alliance have made it possible and necessary for changes to come within the Soviet Union. But the fact that the changes have come, and are so pervasive and profound, is due to Mikhail Gorbachev, and the reformers he has brought to power. Mr. Gorbachev is

embarked upon a journey of almost unprecedented risk, challenge and promise. He has undertaken to re-make Soviet society — initially from the top down and eventually from the bottom up.

This is an effort of *almost* unimaginable proportions. For *any* leader, *anywhere*. For we are not talking here about tinkering. We are talking about massive, structural change across the board — in all sectors and in all walks of life. And we are talking about changes in attitude and spirit as well as the concrete components of a society.

But this task is even more difficult for a *Soviet* leader.

The Soviet Union is a society of immense potential wealth — a massive territory, a large population, a storehouse of resources. But it is a society drained of spirit; an economy bereft of initiative; a populace deprived of freedom and driven to conform.

Not only does Mr. Gorbachev have to reform his society; he must teach his people to *want* reform: to replace complacency with initiative; conformity with variety; defeatism with optimism; and collectivism with individualism.

What is Mikhail Gorbachev up to and why?

In my view, he has discovered a simple but profound truth: the Soviet system of the past has not worked, will not work and *cannot* work. It has failed, and failed miserably.

He also realizes that to change it requires more than a slogan, an adjusted 5-year plan, a special Party Congress or plenum.

It requires a revolution.

And so we have *elections*. For the first time, millions of Soviet citizens freely voting for multiple candidates. Real election platforms; candidate debates; differences of view. And the results? Reformers elected. A fired Politburo member, Boris Yeltsin, swept to victory in a landslide. And the old guard rejected in many areas through an extraordinary act: the crossing off of their names by a majority of the voters, even when they were the only candidate. A Canadian politician trembles at the thought.

Of course, this is not a Western democracy. The Communist Party still rules. The limits remain severe. The flower has barely shown buds.

But it is a beginning, a spring. And an important beginning at that, for once given the opportunity to express their views, the people are difficult to humble.

The Soviets are also engaged in fundamental *economic reform*. New words are being heard: decentralization; privatization; and the hallmark of capitalism — profit. It is here where the stakes are highest and where the difficulties are greatest. It goes to the heart of the structure of privilege, corruption and complacency which has characterized the Soviet nightmare. It also demands that choices and opportunities not only be made available, but that they be treated as valuable by the worker.

Gorbachev has embarked upon a journey of almost unprecedented risk

This call to initiative, this exhortation to work harder and with pride is where Mr. Gorbachev's greatest vulnerability lies. For there is a quid pro quo. Soviet workers want *evidence* that their new efforts will be rewarded. They have to be *enticed*. Their attitudes will not change overnight, nor will they change because others want them to. They must be *convinced*. And the proof so far has been remarkable largely by its absence.

The dilemma is clear: the Soviet economy will not improve until attitudes and behaviour change. But attitudes and behaviour will not change until the economy improves. That is the most urgent test of Mr. Gorbachev's revolution.

There is another basic change, less publicized, but equally important. Mr. Gorbachev wants to reform the *legal system*. Much of the work is underway, largely quietly and behind closed doors. It is of abiding importance. For it demonstrates that Mr. Gorbachev wants to make his society less arbitrary, less capricious, less cruel. He seeks, in effect, to make it a society of laws, laws which many of us would still find repugnant, but laws nonetheless — with due process, with rights, with duties and responsibilities. If he fails, he will not gain the confidence of his countrymen that the system has changed. And if he does not safeguard the progress he has made through legal guarantees, his own grip on power becomes more tenuous.

And throughout, history is being rewritten. Just as the present is precarious and the future uncertain, the Soviet past — once graven in stone — has been shattered. Old idols have been discredited. Joseph Stalin is now seen as being at the root of the Soviet economic failure. Leonid Brezhnev is now judged to have institutionalized stagnation. Unmentionable events are now documented — whether the bloody purges of the pre-war period or the Stalin-Hitler pact to dismember Poland. Criticism is encouraged. They say in Moscow that the most difficult problem today is 'predicting the past.'

It is in light of this multi-faceted revolution that we must evaluate the new reality in East-West relations. Mr. Gorbachev believes that prosperity and progress at home can only be purchased through peace abroad. That is not simply a question of reducing the stranglehold of the military on scarce resources. It is also a matter of seeking stability and prestige abroad to foster stability and prestige at home. And, eventually, it is a question of trying to benefit from the energy and resources of the Western economic system to help pull the Soviet economy out of its 19th century doldrums.

Throughout the arena of global politics, Mr. Gorbachev has established new rules, new goals, and new attitudes for Soviet foreign policy. The withdrawal from Afghanistan, a more constructive approach to Southern Africa and the Middle East: all testify to a willingness to compromise, to seek realistic solutions, and to back away from the trouble-making and obstruction of the past.

Reform in Eastern Europe is not only being tolerated, but encouraged. Poland and Hungary are moving toward a form a pluralistic democracy, without let or

hindrance from Moscow. And the repressive regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania are criticized by Moscow for their adherence to the old, cruel ways.

A new attitude has been brought to international organizations and multilateral cooperation. Part of the reason the UN system has been reinvigorated is that there is a new Soviet acceptance of its relevance and utility.

And in those areas most fundamental to Western security — arms control and other aspects of the East-West relationship — we have seen a remarkable transformation. Western proposals previously rejected as untenable are now seized by Moscow and advanced as their own.

That happened when Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan signed this historic agreement which eliminated a whole class of nuclear weapons.

It is reflected in the Soviet Union reversing the previous policy to embrace other Western arms control proposals — on a chemical weapons ban and on asymmetric force reductions in Europe.

Real compromise, real give and take, the beginnings of acceptance of Western concepts of stability and confidence-building: that has become more the rule and less the exception.

Naturally, Mr. Gorbachev still seeks to preserve national advantage and advances some proposals whose primary intent is to cause domestic political problems for Western governments. But there is a fundamental dynamic to the new Soviet attitude which is refreshingly flexible, even reasonable in its tone and content. Rather than strangers playing games according to different rules, using different concepts, and seeking different ends, one now has the sense of a traditional negotiating process between players who accept the rules, share the concepts and know where the areas of compromise lie. One can see this in the new negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, as well as in nuclear arms control.

Now, what should our attitude in the West be to all of this?

And what stake and interests do we as *Canadians* have in this process?

To me, the most fundamental question for the West is this: Is it in our interest to see Mr. Gorbachev succeed? From this, everything else follows.

To me, the unequivocal answer is 'yes.'

Why should we fear a more prosperous and free Soviet society? Are the processes of social and economic development which turned Western societies away from war and toward diplomacy invalid for the USSR and Eastern Europe? Is the Soviet leadership incapable of seeing the advantages of peace, and the costs of war? Just as within the West, the webs of trade and prosperity act as a damper on conflict, is it not possible to envisage a similar fabric between East and West? And should we not strive to bring that to pass?

If we are suspicious of Mr. Gorbachev; if we deride the pace of his reforms or the degree of his success; if we shun opportunities for mutual advantage, then we must ask ourselves some troubling questions.

Canada has much to offer

Would the alternative be better?

Do we wish to see the Old Guard returned?

Despite what we've been saying for years, do we really prefer Stalinist repression, inefficiency and imperialism?

Are we so fearful of change that we seek a retreat to the past?

The answer to all these questions is surely 'no.'

Now, this of course does not mean we slide into escapist dreams or flights of idealism divorced from reality.

We cannot forget, after all, that the Soviet military remains enormous, enjoying tremendous numerical advantages over our own forces in Europe.

Again, the obstacles Mikhail Gorbachev faces internally are major ones. His eventual success cannot be taken for granted.

We must remain prudent, always careful to safeguard our interests and advance our values.

The Soviet Union has no tradition as do we of democratic institutions or individual liberties.

In any negotiations with the Soviets, we must bargain hard.

And we must, above all, continue to be guided by that combination of defence and dialogue which has served the NATO Alliance so well for 40 years, which helped create the incentive for Mr. Gorbachev's reforms.

But it is not a choice between 'our' interest and 'theirs'; between dialogue and silence; between their future and ours.

Canada and the West have a big stake in Mr. Gorbachev's success.

We must encourage his reforms. We must applaud his efforts, while asking for more. We must be patient. We must state our support for his domestic goals clearly and unequivocally. We must help the Soviet citizen develop that sense of self-confidence so central to the success of reform.

How does Canada fit in to all of this?

In one sense, we have no 'special' interest. We are a country like others which seeks peace, strives for stability and searches for new avenues of cooperation. But we also have much that *is* special. We are the next-door neighbour to the Soviet Union, a Northern country, an Arctic nation. We too have a resource-based economy, and skill and experience in developing it. We share environmental concerns and problems. We are a multicultural society that works — and that has direct family connections to the East — one in ten Canadians are from Russian or Eastern European backgrounds. And we have much to offer a Soviet Union which seeks Western know-how and experience as it enters a new economic era.

I believe we must capitalize on this commonality of situation, this mutuality of interest — both out of our narrow national interest and a recognition of the

value of cooperation for a more stable East-West relationship.

The Prime Minister's trip to the Soviet Union this fall will be an important catalyst for this process.

Our relationships with Moscow are already extensive and improving across the board. They range from artistic exchanges through the scientific and environmental communities. There is active Arctic cooperation. The flow of human contacts is quickening and widening. Family reunification cases have been resolved at an unprecedented rate. A little more than two years ago I handed Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze a list of 42 cases we wanted to see resolved. Everyone of them has been resolved.

Peace must be earned

Business contacts with the Soviet Union are thriving. Canadian business leaders have been beating the path to Moscow. They report to me that the opportunities are real and that the Soviets are serious. Ten joint ventures are underway, involving Lavalin, Olympia and York, Abitibi-Price, Fracmaster, Foremost, and others, and more are in the works.

Many of you have personal experience doing business in the Soviet Union. Canadian firms are building the world's largest off-road, all-terrain transporter with a Soviet partner. McDonald's of Canada will soon be serving hamburgers to Muscovites. Other Canadian companies are improving Soviet dairy herds, making tooling for the automotive industry and working in Soviet oilfields. Our geographic similarity gives us a natural opportunity to sell and buy technology and products useful in the resource and agricultural sectors.

The Government of Canada seeks new trade in both directions, with the USSR and with Eastern Europe. We will support it, and we encourage you to go for it.

As some of you will know, doing business with the East requires flexibility, patience and persistence. My Department stands ready to assist you in this process, in making contacts, obtaining data and providing follow-up.

The Prime Minister will take some senior business leaders with him to the USSR. We hope deals will be signed. But we also hope that contacts will be made and that President Gorbachev will appreciate the interest of Canadian business in his country.

I know that the changes gripping the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and East-West relations have triggered mixed emotions among Canadians of Eastern European and Russian ancestry. Many families bear the bitter scars of unbearable experience. These wounds induce a natural scepticism, and sometimes cynicism, about the meaning of perestroika.

"But I also know that there is concern for relatives and friends who remain, a desire that things improve and a hope that they will. We cannot assume that the past will persist indefinitely into the future. Certainly, where real change begins, we should encourage it.

We must steer between the extremes of euphoria and retribution. Change will not be immediate. Set-backs will occur. But we should not react, knee-jerk, to such disappointments by withdrawing into our shells, or refusing to offer our hand.

Nor should we glide into complacency, confident that the world will evolve as it should, toward harmony and prosperity, without effort or vigilance. Peace must be earned; it is not given.

We have to be alert to change. Real change is occurring in the Soviet Union, reaching into other countries, holding the prospect of a transformation in East-West relations. The change is based on the realization that the Soviet system doesn't work, and must be changed. There are many risks ahead, for Mr. Gorbachev and for all of us. We must act with prudence and imagination, conscious of the probability that we are part of a genuine watershed in modern history.

With effort, sincerity — and luck — we may be on the verge of the grandest reconciliation of them all.

I ask that we join together on this remarkable journey of such epic importance to us all." □

Don't Dismiss Open Skies

The following article by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, appeared in the New York Times on June 5, 1989. This article is reprinted with the permission of the New York Times.

President Bush's call for a new, enlarged "open skies" arrangement displays imagination. The value of this initiative was recognized by the endorsement it received at the NATO summit meeting.

Arms control verification from satellites alone is not adequate to the tasks ahead, Canada therefore supports the call for open skies, which would open all national airspace to surveillance by unarmed aircraft.

Aircraft surveillance would make it harder to hide military movements or noncompliance with arms control agreements.

Aircraft can see more than satellites can. They fly lower. They can get around or below clouds and observe from different angles. Satellites pass in fixed orbits, at predictable times, so suspect activity can be thoroughly hidden; short-notice overflights would complicate this kind of masking significantly, and could make it impossible. Should a satellite see something significant, its ability to take another look is constrained by its orbit time. Open skies could allow an early second look from aircraft.

Open skies would provide the ability to monitor ongoing activities such as weapons destruction, withdrawals or troops movements. Unlike a satellite, which passes in a matter of minutes, an aircraft can circle over an area for hours.

If secrecy breeds suspicion, open skies builds confidence. Nations have no choice about satellite surveillance. They can't stop it, so they accept it.

An open skies agreement would be a positive political act of opening a nation's activities to detailed, intrusive monitoring — a symbolic opening of the doors. It could be a clear, unequivocal gesture that a nation's intentions are not aggressive.

Open skies would let all members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact participate fully in arms control verification and monitoring.

Satellites are inadequate to the verification tasks ahead

The rapid pace of negotiations for the conventional arms control agreement proposed by Mr. Bush and endorsed at the NATO summit meeting adds to the importance of open skies. Since open skies is a straightforward concept, it can be easily and readily available to assist in verification as soon as an agreement is reached.

Only large countries have satellites in the skies. Yet, if we are to have conventional arms control in Europe, it is essential that all parties to the agreement have the ability to assure their publics, on the basis of their own judgments, that these agreements are being adhered to, and that their security is intact.

It is not politically acceptable to rely solely on the good will and judgment of another nation. The US would not do this, and open skies demonstrates that it does not expect its allies to do so.

Open skies would bring glasnost to the public discussion of arms control compliance. The debate over the Krasnoyarsk radar in the Soviet Union went on for years before anyone was able to publish photographs of the installation. For national security reasons, nations don't publish satellite photos.

That rule need not apply to the results of serial surveillance — especially not to photographs taken by low-flying aircraft. The availability of this kind of evidence cannot but enhance the public discussion of the Warsaw Pact's military activity and of arms control compliance.

Monitoring would become more reliable. It would no longer be subject to the vagaries of satellite failure. Under the current system, it can be years before a capability is replaced if a satellite fails before schedule.

The verification of a conventional arms control agreement, especially if defenses are to be greatly reduced, will require continuous monitoring to prevent a rapid military build-up and to maintain confidence that a surprise attack is not being planned. If we remain subject to significant periods during which our monitoring capability is impaired, our confidence in these agreements will diminish.

By his actions, Mikhaïl Gorbachev has demonstrated his commitment to improve East-West relations. He has offered to do more and has put forward a wide array of proposals that will further change the relationship. President Bush has wisely asked him to create the conditions that will enable us to move ahead together without risking the security of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. ☐

PM Welcomes Bush Initiative

The Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, recently welcomed the initiative of President George Bush in proposing an agreement on "Open Skies." He also indicated that Canada would be willing to join in an "Open Skies" arrangement that would allow for short notice overflights of Canadian territory by unarmed aircraft. Traditionally, he stated, this concept has symbolized the West's commitment to transparency. It serves as a clear reminder of our interest in both arms control and peaceful cooperation with the East.

The Prime Minister noted, that an "Open Skies" agreement could lead to an important increase in confidence between East and West. It could provide major benefits in the verification of arms control agreements, he said, especially for states which do not possess satellite monitoring capabilities. As well, an "Open Skies" agreement would provide benefits to the superpowers, in that overflights by aircraft would be less predictable than those by satellites.

Aware of USA interest in re-examining "Open Skies," the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, raised this subject with President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker during their recent visit to Washington. At that time, the Prime Minister offered his support, urging the President to put this initiative forward. He stressed to the President that it would be particularly useful if this initiative could include all of the nations, members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Prime Minister Mulroney urged the NATO Allies to join the initiative. In addition, Canada will actively encourage a positive response to this idea on the part of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact Allies. ☐

The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister.

Officials Visit Eastern Bloc

Officials from the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence, headed by Mr. John Noble, Director General, International Security and Arms Control Bureau, travelled to Prague, Czechoslovakia on June 6 and Warsaw, Poland on June 8, 1989 for the purpose of reviewing recent developments in the field of arms control and disarmament.

Such visits, on a reciprocal basis, constitute a routine element in the dialogue in which Canada engages on current arms control and disarmament issues with several Eastern European countries. Canadian officials also hold regularly scheduled consultations in this area with their Soviet and USA counterparts, NATO Allies and with members of the non-aligned nations. ☐

Clark Welcomes Soviet SNF Proposals

On May 11, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, welcomed the announcements made in Moscow by Soviet President Gorbachev with respect to unilateral cuts in Soviet short-range nuclear forces (SNF) and further precision concerning proposals for cuts in conventional arms which are currently being negotiated in Vienna.

Mr. Clark noted that the cuts in Soviet theatre and short-range nuclear arms (284 SNF missiles, 166 bombs, and 50 artillery) still leave the Soviet Union with a massive advantage in these weapons. The Soviets have approximately 3,000 SNF missiles on 1,766 SNF missile launchers, at least 5,500 nuclear-capable artillery systems and over 5,000 aircraft capable of delivering theatre nuclear weapons. NATO has only 88 SNF missile launchers and less than 1,000 SNF missiles, less than 3,000 nuclear artillery and less than 2,600 aircraft capable of delivering theatre nuclear weapons.

Mr. Clark noted that Canada supports the commencement of negotiations on reductions, but not total elimination of SNF missiles and is also prepared to support modernization of NATO's SNF forces. The first step in any such negotiation should be to bring the continuing Soviet asymmetry down to NATO levels.

Mr. Clark indicated that he would want to give the Soviet proposals on conventional cuts further study before commenting in detail. He looks forward to seeing the additional details Mr. Gorbachev has promised to put forward in Vienna. He welcomed the Soviet willingness to reduce their tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery systems down to NATO levels, which responds to the proposals put forward by the West at Vienna. □

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was a series of conferences and agreements which followed from the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and had as its objectives the enhancement of security and confidence, the breaking down of barriers between East and West, and the facilitation of the freer flow of people, information and ideas. The Vienna Follow-Up Meeting closed on January 19, 1989. The following is the text of a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the conclusion of the meeting.

"We are gathered here this week to conclude more than two years of successful negotiations on the whole range of interrelated subjects essential to security and cooperation in Europe.

When this Conference began, I said in my opening statement that our task would not be easy, and it has not been. The problems have at times seemed intractable; the language often bitter; the negotiations tense and at times frustrating. There has been the temptation to gloss over difficult issues, to hide real differences. But only by speaking frankly, by facing our differences directly, could we achieve the real changes our people have a right to expect.

Our world has changed since we began this negotiation, and generally changed for the better. For the first time in history, there is an agreement to abolish a whole class of nuclear weapons. The two superpowers have a better attitude toward one another and toward multilateral institutions like the United Nations. Some regional conflicts have been resolved or are on their way to resolution in the Middle East, in Africa and Asia. Soviet forces are withdrawing from Afghanistan, and Mr. Gorbachev has offered unilateral force reductions in Eastern Europe. Our political environment has become more positive, more hopeful.

From the beginning of the Vienna Meeting, Canada raised the fundamental issue of compliance with CSCE commitments. Candidly, but factually and fairly, we called attention to shortcomings, because we were convinced that unless there were better compliance, or a demonstrated willingness to improve it, further promises were unlikely to be meaningful. Far from building a climate of confidence, they would have eroded it.

We firmly believed that this Conference should produce real progress on the whole range of issues covered by the Helsinki Final Act. Canada played an active role in all three Baskets in sponsoring and supporting measures that addressed the most serious issues. We pursued these goals patiently, constructively, and at times stubbornly. We were convinced that we would deserve to be judged harshly by future generations if we failed to make the most of the Vienna Meeting. That was a common purpose of the Canadian Government and of the non-governmental organizations, here and at home, with whom we were able to work so constructively.

Incrementally, and by hard bargaining, the Vienna Concluding Document took shape. Subjects whose introduction into a CSCE forum would earlier have been denounced as 'confrontational' or 'interference in internal affairs' were considered openly and debated freely. We could begin to see that the opportunity open to us was even greater than we had thought, if we had the will and the patience to exploit it to its fullest extent.

Our efforts have now been rewarded with success. The Vienna Concluding Document is a welcome milestone in East-West relations and in the evolution of Europe. It reflects and builds on recent changes. It makes significant strides in all the areas covered by the Helsinki Final Act. Canada is proud to have played a role in formulating some of its key elements.

When the Vienna Meeting opened, we had just succeeded in the Stockholm Conference in establishing a set of confidence- and security-building measures that carried considerable political and military significance. But what we

did not know then was how these measures would work in practice. Since 1986, we have seen gratifying progress in adherence to both the letter and the spirit of Stockholm. We now have the confidence to believe that we can further increase transparency and predictability in military affairs. We wholeheartedly support the establishment of negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures to build upon the work of the Stockholm Conference

We now also have the confidence to embark on ambitious negotiations touching on conventional armed forces themselves. These negotiations will take place within the framework of the CSCE process, but will be autonomous — a condition we regard as vitally necessary for their efficiency. They will not be easy. Success will depend at all stages on frankness and trust, which in turn depend, in some measure, on developments outside the arms control arena.

We wish these negotiations success. Canada will play its full role. We will be second to none in seeking imaginative solutions to complex problems.

I should not leave this subject without referring briefly to a negotiation which will conclude before the commencement of the new negotiation on conventional arms control. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks were a pioneering attempt to arrive at conventional arms control measures in a crucial area of Europe. Much of what has been learned from the successes and failures during the many years of these talks will prove useful in the new negotiations.

Other specific elements of this Concluding Document are very important to Canada. We have achieved firm commitments that will improve the conditions under which business people and entrepreneurs can perform their central role in economic cooperation. We have sharpened our commitment to promote contacts between business people and potential buyers and end users, and to publish useful, detailed, and up-to-date economic information and statistics. These measures will expand the economic dimension of our cooperation and growing interdependence. The Conference on Economic Cooperation, with business people and experts participating, will be an important first step in this process.

We are particularly pleased with the agreement to promote direct contacts between scientists and institutions and to respect the human rights of scientists. In science, as elsewhere, it is free movement and contacts that contribute to the spread of knowledge and understanding.

We are encouraged that the importance of environmental protection has been recognized. In addition to specific commitments on air and water pollution, hazardous wastes, nuclear safety and other measures Canada supports, we welcome the essential message of this Document: the environment of Europe and the world is a common trust, in which people themselves have a critical stake and role. Governments must cooperate in its protection, but it is above all the commitment, dedication and sacrifice of aware and concerned citizens that will ensure ultimate success.

We think the progress on tourism is important. Eliminating minimum exchange requirements makes tourism more attractive, and easing contacts between tourists and the local population (including permitting them to stay in private homes) will offer greater human contact and understanding.

In the section on principles, we have adopted a firm statement on terrorism and have made a breakthrough in acceptance of the principle of third party involvement in the peaceful settlement of disputes.

In the field of human rights and humanitarian cooperation, our achievement at Vienna has been remarkable, especially when one looks back to the days of the Ottawa Meeting of Experts. Some of the accomplishments of special interest to Canada are:

— the commitment to respect the right of all citizens to associate together and participate actively in the promotion and protection of human rights and in monitoring their government's performance. We have undertaken not to discriminate against those who exercise these rights, and to ensure that remedies are available to those who claim that their human rights have been violated. We have recognized the role of non-governmental organizations and individuals in promoting human rights.

— the undertaking to ensure freedom of religion and to allow religious communities to have places of worship, institutional structures and funding, and to participate in public dialogue and to have contacts with believers elsewhere. We have recognized the right of anyone to give and receive religious education in the language of his choice, and to obtain, possess, and use religious publications and materials.

Protection of movement within and between countries

— the commitment to protect the human rights of national minorities, to promote their ethnic, cultural, and linguistic identities and their cultural expression, and to allow contacts with counterparts elsewhere.

— we have committed ourselves to ensuring that no one is subject to arbitrary arrest, detention and exile, to improving the treatment of prisoners, and to protecting individuals from abuses of psychiatric practices.

— we have undertaken to respect the right of people to move within and between countries, including an explicit statement of the right of an individual to leave any country, including one's own, and return to one's own country, subject only to exceptional restrictions.

— we have agreed to a range of measures to remove bureaucratic obstacles to family reunification and travel, to publish laws and allow appeals, to respect the wishes of applicants regarding how long they wish to travel and where they want to go, to remove restrictions on the movement of people, to eliminate the punishment of individuals who wish to travel simply because a relative may have breached exit control regulations, to implement tight, clear-cut time limits for decisions on travel, and to resolve outstanding cases within a very short time after the conclusion of the Vienna Meeting.

— we have acknowledged the qualitative difference between the right to leave and practical commitments regarding entry policy.

— we have taken a large step toward preventing State action against an individual wishing to exercise his right to leave through the arbitrary imposition of restrictions based on national security grounds. The Vienna Concluding Document also ensures that long-term refuseniks will have the time since they were last involved in national security work retroactively credited against any limit during which any restriction will be applied.

— we have undertaken to respect the privacy and integrity of postal and telephone communications, to allow people to listen to radio from outside the country, and to receive, publish, and disseminate information more freely. Scholars and teachers will be able to have more direct contacts and access to research materials.

— we have taken important new steps to protect the rights and improve the working condition of journalists, and provide for the freer flow of information and greater access to culture.

Importance of Conference on the Human Dimension

Built on this solid achievement in human rights and Basket III, and providing a mechanism for its protection and enforcement, is the Conference on the Human Dimension. We welcome the agreement of all participating States to respond to requests for information and to consult bilaterally on specific cases and situations. We look forward to the meetings in Paris, Copenhagen and Moscow where we can pursue the issues of compliance and of new measures to enhance our achievements, as well as to deal with unresolved cases and situations. This Conference and the ongoing mechanism will keep human rights, human contacts, and related humanitarian issues, central to the CSCE process, ensuring that they become a permanent part of the European political landscape.

A symbolic but important aspect of the Conference on the Human Dimension is that one of its meetings will be held in Moscow. It is a measure of the changes that have occurred in the Soviet Union during the Vienna meeting that this idea, initially received with skepticism by many participating States, should ultimately have been considered seriously and adopted. It is no secret that the record of compliance of the USSR with its human rights commitments was a subject of scrutiny and criticism by my country and others. It is also no secret that Canada was one of the last to be convinced that such a proposal could be considered. This was not a matter of politics or ideology. It was an issue of principle and practice — one in which Canadians, including the many whose roots lie in Eastern Europe, have a direct and personal interest.

Two things should be clearly understood. First, by accepting the Moscow meeting, Canada has not signified that problems of human rights and human contacts in the Soviet Union no longer exist. On the contrary, much remains to be done. Indeed, the USSR has undertaken to continue its work over the next two years of making Soviet society more open, democratic, and governed by the rule of law. Reforms are to be securely institutionalized. We welcome these promised undertakings, and will look forward to their fulfilment.

The second point I want to emphasize is that, having discussed this matter with the Soviet Union, having examined all the facts and assessed its performance against criteria we know to be important to the Canadian people, we consented to the Moscow meeting not just as a compromise or as a political gesture. Our consent should be seen as an expression of hope, based on recent improvements, and of confidence that the future will bring even more.

We trust that when our delegations, and the hundreds of groups, individuals, and journalists that traditionally assemble for CSCE meetings, gather in Moscow in 1991, they will find an open and tolerant environment for frank exchange.

There are many, many more provisions on human rights and humanitarian cooperation in the Vienna Concluding Document which take account of the differing interests of our peoples. Canada considers all of them important. Together, they are a great achievement. In most cases they are clear and unequivocal. We recognize that there is still room for improvement, but what is in this Document will, if fully implemented by all participating States, lead to great changes in the lives of millions of people, and will have a real impact on European confidence and security. Let me illustrate by one example from our own experience.

On December 7, many communities in Armenia were struck by a devastating earthquake that killed outright some 25,000 people and injured thousands more. At one time, the Government of the Soviet Union and some other participating countries faced with a similar disaster might have said there was no problem, no help was needed. But this time it did not. From all over the world, offers of help came forward spontaneously, inspired by a natural human feeling of sympathy. The Canadian Government responded to the need for assistance.

But what was most remarkable to me was the response of the Canadian people. Those of Armenian descent rallied in fervent support of their ancestral homeland. Many ordinary Canadians, moved by nothing more than their fellow feeling with those in distress, donated money, clothes and supplies. In Ottawa, during the busy Christmas period, I saw volunteers spending days collecting money. Some of the prejudices of decades fell like autumn leaves. The Red Cross and the Soviet Embassy received funds from thousands of Canadians. Giant Soviet transport planes landed in Montreal to pick up tons of supplies, supplementing deliveries to the Soviet Union by the Canadian Government. In the face of disaster, governments cooperated, and people came together.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think anything could better demonstrate what we have been saying for many years — that the ties between people, that grow naturally from common experience and humanity, are one of the keys to a peaceful world. When people know the truth, when they can have contact with each other, they will reach out across barriers, they will forge links far stronger than govern-

ments can ever build. When people are barred from travelling, from visiting with families, from having ordinary contacts, from worshipping freely, from speaking a language or practising a culture, their frustrations breed fear, resentment and instability. When arbitrarily imposed and artificial barriers are removed and people, ideas, and information can move without restraint, when freedom becomes a reality, then there will be no limit to the possibilities that will open before us.

Some participating States have learned that lesson in the past two years. But we must also remind ourselves where these changes have fallen short of expectations and commitments and of what remains to be done. Candour and openness have done much to achieve the success we now enjoy. This is not the moment to abandon them.

Not all participating States have made the same progress. Even in those participating States where reforms are being implemented, there remain pockets of resistance and all-too-frequent lapses into old ways. In some participating countries, minorities and religious believers continue to be harassed and persecuted, and attempts are made to deny them their rights, indeed their very existence, and to eradicate their cultural and religious identities. The human anguish caused by the forced separation of families due to the harsh restrictions on emigration continues in some countries.

In some countries, individuals are still being punished for exercising their right to know and act upon their rights, for criticizing their governments, and for

Frustrations breed fear, resentment and instability

conducting allegedly subversive activity. Indeed, one participating State has, at the very moment of the adoption of this forward-looking Concluding Document, trampled, in Prague, on both its old and its new commitments by taking violent action against groups engaged in the peaceful exercise of their human rights under the Helsinki Final Act and the Vienna Concluding Document.

Another participating State has, in the face of CSCE tradition and procedures, declared that, notwithstanding its action in giving consensus to the whole Concluding Document, it assumed no commitment to implement those provisions which it considered to be 'inadequate.' By taking this approach, the Government of Romania seems to be attempting to treat the Vienna Concluding Document as a menu from which it would choose those items it would abide by and those it would ignore. This is clearly an untenable interpretation. Our CSCE commitments, arrived at by consensus, are indivisible. My Government, therefore, considers that all participating states must comply with all aspects of this Document, to which we have all given consensus.

The Governments of these participating States must in coming years decide whether they want to move forward in renewal and reform, or cling to policies and methods that are not only distasteful, but now demonstrably outmoded and counterproductive. Canada will continue to encourage change, to criticize shortcomings, to urge the breaking down of barriers. We have no desire to impose our system or beliefs on anyone, but we are convinced that Europe can be a stable and secure place only when all its people can enjoy freedom and personal dignity, and feel safe from the arbitrary exercise against them of the force of the state.

Before closing, I should like to pay special tribute to the Government of Austria for its exemplary hospitality, the standard of openness set at Vienna, and its determination to encourage progress at key moments during the Vienna Meeting. I join as well with my colleagues in expressing our heartfelt thanks for the tireless efforts of the Executive Secretary, Dr. Liedermann, and his efficient and courteous staff. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the crucial role of our colleagues from the Neutral and Non-Aligned participating states, who provided competent and dedicated co-ordinators, and undertook the difficult and delicate task of embodying our deliberations in draft Concluding Documents.

Mr. Chairman, the Vienna Follow-up Meeting has given us a new framework, new mechanisms, and new avenues for the building of security and cooperation in Europe on a broad front. It has launched a balanced, varied and useful program of follow-up activity with innovative meetings such as the London Information Forum and the Kraków Cultural Symposium. It has provided us with more accurate yardsticks by which we can measure compliance with CSCE commitments and encourage further change. The opportunities and challenges are indeed momentous. As an active and dedicated member of the CSCE community, Canada will be there to meet them." □

The following are some highlights of the Vienna Concluding Document:

— In military security, two distinct negotiations are being launched:

— a negotiation based on the achievements of the Stockholm Conference in developing confidence- and security-building measures to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe;

— within the same CSCE framework, an autonomous negotiation among the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact will seek to eliminate any capability for large-scale aggression and achieve a balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels.

— In human rights and humanitarian cooperation, governments agree to:

— respect the right of citizens to participate actively in the promotion of human rights; ensure that those exercising rights are not discriminated against; ensure that the remedies are available, including appeal to governmental or judicial organs, and the right to a fair hearing; recognize the role of NGOs and individuals in promoting human rights and allow them information, contacts, and free expression.

— ensure freedom of religion and prevent discrimination against religious communities and individuals; recognize

the status of religious communities and ensure their right to places of worship, institutional structures, sacred books and publications in the language of choice, and to appoint personnel and secure funding;

— protect the human rights of minorities; promote their identities; allow their cultural expression; and allow contacts with counterparts elsewhere.

— respect freedom of movement within and between countries including the right to leave any country and return to one's own country.

— ensure that no one is subject to arbitrary arrest, exile or detention; protect individuals from abuse of psychiatric practices; improve treatment of prisoners.

— make decisions on applications for travel for family meetings within one month, and for family reunification and marriage within three months; decide on urgent humanitarian cases as soon as possible; allow families to travel together;

— shorten the time of refusal of emigration permission on grounds of access to security; provide regular reviews on appeal; resolve long-term refusenik cases.

— resolve all outstanding applications for exit permission within six months and conduct regular reviews thereafter.

— provide information and consult bilaterally on specific cases and situations; convene a Conference on the Human Dimension, meeting in Paris (1989), Copenhagen (1990), and Moscow (1991), to consider human rights, human contacts, and related humanitarian issues, and to deal with unresolved cases and situations.

— guarantee the freedom and privacy of postal and telephone communications.

— facilitate the freer and wider flow of information;

— convene follow-up meetings including an Information Forum (London, April-May 1989), a Symposium on the European Cultural Heritage (Kraców, 1991), and discussion of the application of third-party involvement in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.

— In economic and related cooperation, governments agree to:

— improve business contacts and information;

— convene an Economic Conference including business persons (Bonn, 1990) to discuss ways to improve East-West commercial relations.

— improve cooperation in science and technology including direct contacts among scientists and respect for the human rights of scientists.

— strengthen environmental cooperation and promote public awareness and involvement. □

Conclusion of MBFR Talks

On February 7, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué:

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, today took note of the final plenary meeting of the Negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe in Vienna. The decision to conclude these negotiations was taken by the participating states in light of the agreement to open the new Negotiation on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, in March of this year. Canada, a participant in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, will play a full role in the new negotiation.

"The MBFR negotiations, which began in 1973, have provided a valuable multilateral forum for the discussion of proposals aimed at strengthening security in Europe, although there has been insufficient common ground for the conclusion of a treaty. However, the experience which Canada has gained in this pioneering attempt to arrive at conventional arms control measures will serve us well in the new negotiation, as we pursue a stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels," said Mr. Clark. □

MBFR Concluding Western Statement

Concluding Statement made on behalf of the Western Participants by the Head of the Delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Ambassador L.W. Veenendaal, on February 2, 1989.

"Today we are meeting for the last time in this splendid hall. The Governments of the States represented around this table have decided to conclude the negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe, because in another forum agreement has been reached to begin the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. It is of importance to stress that East and West have reached this decision by consensus. Not only have we by common agreement decided to terminate the talks, but we have also come to agree on the modalities and the procedures adopted for this meeting. The joint communiqué we are issuing today bears witness of this agreement in all its aspects.

Our talks come to an end without our having signed an agreement of substance. In the view of the West, this does not diminish the importance of fifteen years of negotiations and serious efforts to reach for a more stable relationship in Europe. I will not try to deliver a final assessment of these negotiations, but I believe that already now some important conclusions can be drawn. Let me use this opportunity today to put together some of our experiences and try to come to something of an evaluation.

Such an evaluation can only be done correctly if one puts the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations in their proper perspective. The decision to convene these talks should of course be understood in the light of the political circumstances which prevailed in the early seventies. In 1967 the West has taken the important initiative of outlining its views on the improvement of East-West relations in

the 'Harmel Report,' called after the then Foreign Minister of Belgium. In the same period, efforts were undertaken to convene the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which finally opened in Helsinki in 1973 involving not only all members of the two Alliances but also the neutral and non-aligned countries in Europe. But the West believed that an improvement of the political situation in Europe should go hand in hand with a lessening of the military confrontation on this continent. And so, Western proposals to discuss force reductions in Central Europe finally led to the convening of our talks here.

The Western participants came to Vienna in 1973 with great expectations, and with the firm resolve to avail themselves of this unique opportunity to contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. But at the same time it was clear that embarking on this venture meant breaking new ground, politically and militarily, conceptually and practically. Our talks were the first multilateral negotiation on conventional arms control in the post-war period and the participants soon discovered the tasks set by the mandate as laid down in the Final Communiqué to be a great challenge. The complex subject matter obviously required a very careful and tenacious approach, which has inevitably been time consuming.

In the course of the negotiations, both sides have developed their respective negotiating positions, both at the conceptual level and in the form of concrete proposals for an agreement. Proposals by one side were followed by counter-proposals from the other side, usually building on the proposals that preceded them. Although this continuing process did not in the end lead to an agreement, it is important to note its value in enabling both sides over the years to gather a wealth of experience and deeper insight in the complex issues of conventional arms control as well as a better understanding of the concerns of the other side.

This, then, is the first and perhaps most important experience we have gathered in MBFR: it has been an irreplaceable learning process which has enabled us to understand better the whole issue and the security considerations which are at stake. But there has been more to it. In our talks we have proceeded well beyond formal exchanges and have undertaken thorough discussion of the subject matter itself. And in doing this, we have discovered that we were indeed able to move closer to each other. Despite the great political and practical difficulties, many points of convergence have emerged, both at the conceptual level and on concrete issues.

At the point that we have reached now, there is a large measure of agreement between the two sides on a number of general aims and principles, such as the aim of increased stability at lower levels of forces, the commitment to limit forces after reductions, the requirement for effective verification, the need to proceed on a step-by-step basis and to ensure at each stage that the security of participants is not adversely affected, and the need for appropriate accompanying measures to enhance stability and confidence.

The site of the recently concluded Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna.

The fact, however, that after fifteen years an agreement has not been reached is ample evidence that notwithstanding substantial common ground some important problems remain which East and West have not been able to solve. During our negotiations we have identified main areas of particular difficulty being the data problem, the modalities of verification, the geographical factor and the question of the treatment of armaments. These points are well known to all of us. At this moment, it is enough for me to remark that for the West these areas of disagreement touch upon fundamental requirements for its security. It is not a simple matter of negotiators having failed to find some suitable compromise formula. Rather, these problems require a durable solution which does justice to the West's legitimate security requirements, contributes significantly to the strengthening of peace and security, and at the same time increases confidence between the participants. In this sense, the issues we have not been able to resolve here around this table might well prove to have a wider significance which goes beyond the scope of our negotiations.

Each side will wish to preserve its own judgment as to why and where opportunities have been missed to solve these important problems. As far as the West

is concerned, we have consistently taken the objective of our mandate very seriously and have done much to fill out the framework it provided with concrete proposals. Throughout all these years, and in all our proposals, the guiding principle of our position has been to seek a genuine improvement of the security relationship in Europe reflected in a meaningful agreement that takes into account the requirements of security and stability.

West has sought improvement in European Security

The West has played its full part in filling the conceptual void that existed at the outset of our talks. It has contributed a number of important concepts, which in the course of the negotiations have gradually been adopted by the East in principle, and have thus become common ground. Examples are the concepts of parity expressed in common ceilings, collectivity, strict and effective verification and the need to solve the problem of asymmetries. We have contributed a number of other ideas, such as the necessary link between reductions and ensuing limitations and the need for associated measures designed to promote the general goal of increasing security and stability. We have proposed numerically ambitious reductions, and more modest ones, reductions including armaments and reductions focussing on manpower only. In the course of these fifteen years, we have made a number of different proposals for a possible agreement: a phased approach, a comprehensive agreement and a time-limited first-phase agreement.

Despite these efforts, we did not reach an agreement in this forum. However, the West is optimistic as we prepare for a new beginning in conventional arms control. We welcome the expressed willingness on the part of the East to engage seriously in conventional arms control issues. There is now general recognition that significant disparities exist in the conventional force balance, which need to be eliminated.

Looking back on these fifteen years of negotiations, our conclusion is that, despite the absence of an agreement, 'the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks were a pioneering attempt to arrive at conventional arms control measures in a crucial area of Europe.' This is a quotation from the speech of the Canadian Foreign Minister, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, at the CSCE concluding plenary meeting only two weeks ago. Our talks have made a valuable contribution to an increasing mutual understanding between East and West of each other's positions, to raising public awareness of the importance of the issues involved and to the gradual creation of a better security relationship in Europe. The experience of the process of negotiating on conventional arms control which we have thus gained is of great and lasting value. And finally, our talks have been a useful instrument to maintain the dialogue between East and West on security issues, even during the more difficult periods of our relationship. As such, our talks have formed an element of stability in themselves.

Our talks end here today. But the efforts to bring about greater security and a more stable relationship in Europe must and will go on. The conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty proved that — given political will on both sides — it is possible to find solutions for seemingly intractable problems. At the same time, it has heightened the awareness of governments and publics alike of the vital importance of the conventional aspects of security and has emphasized the need to try to achieve a more equitable conventional force relationship in Europe at lower levels. The general improvement in the East-West climate, as seen most recently in the successful conclusion of the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting, also points to optimism about the prospects for arms control. The Governments of the West remain committed to the process of arms control, which is an integral part of the West's security policy. Our Governments will continue to explore all opportunities consistent with our security requirements, for effective and verifiable arms control agreements. As has been stated by the NATO Heads of State and Government in their Brussels declaration 'The Way Ahead' on 3rd March 1988: 'We seek negotiations not for their own sake but to reach agreements which can significantly reduce the risk of conflict and make a genuine contribution to stability and peace.'

Mr. Chairman, I have already mentioned that our discussions have contributed to a better understanding between East and West. I think this is now the right moment to add that these many years have also given great satisfaction on a personal level, as they have forged so many bonds of friendship and mutual esteem. I am sure these bonds will last, for which we should be most grateful.

It is also the right moment to address a word of thanks to the authorities of the Republic of Austria. The impeccable and hospitable way in which the authorities have contributed to the organization of our talks deserves our gratitude. We are also indebted to our interpreters who have faithfully rendered their services to our talks for so many years." □

New Conventional Talks Underway

On March 9, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué:

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, today announced that Canada, at the opening sessions of the two new negotiations on conventional arms control in Vienna, tabled a series of proposals aimed at enhancing stability in Europe. Canada tabled these proposals on behalf of all the states members of the NATO Alliance.

In the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Mr. Clark noted that Canada and its Western Allies seek: the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability; and the elimination of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. To achieve these ends, we have proposed: a radical reduction in the overall levels

of those weapons systems most relevant to surprise attack and offensive action (main battle tanks to 40,000; artillery to 33,000; armoured troop carriers to 56,000); a limit on the amounts of these armaments which can be held by any one country (no more than 30 percent of the overall limits); and additional limits on armaments stationed outside a country's national territory in active units (main battle tanks 3,200; artillery 1,700; armoured troop carriers 6,000). We have also proposed an annual exchange of information regarding military holdings and troop levels, and have underlined the need for stabilizing measures and rigorous verification arrangements.

In the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM), Mr. Clark explained we seek to build upon the successful implementation of the Stockholm Document on CSBM in Europe by creating greater transparency about military organization, as well as military activity. To achieve this, we have proposed: an annual exchange of information concerning military organization, manpower, equipment and major weapons deployment programmes, subject to a system of random evaluation; greater information exchange on military activities; improvements to observation/inspection modalities; the lowering of thresholds for observation and for longer notice of larger scale activities; as well as measures designed to improve contacts and communication. To enhance the free exchange of ideas and further reduce misunderstandings, we have also proposed the holding of a seminar among all 35 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) participating states on military doctrine.

Mr. Clark noted that the proposals put forward by Canada and its Allies in Vienna enjoy the advantage of being realistic. They involve reasonable steps which, if implemented, could result in a new architecture for security, upon which to build a more stable Europe. It is our hope, Mr. Clark added, that these proposals will be received in the spirit of cooperation in which they have been put forward. □

West States Position at Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The following is the position paper recently provided by the delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States at the commencement of the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Objectives

1. The objectives of these negotiations as agreed in the mandate, are:

— the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels;

— the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security;

— the elimination, as a matter of high priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.

2. Through the approach outlined below, the Western Delegations will seek to establish a situation in which surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are no longer credible options. We pursue this aim on the basis of equal respect for the security interests of all. Our approach offers a coherent whole and is intended to be applied simultaneously and in its totality in the area of application.

Rationale

3. The rationale for our approach is as follows:

— the present concentration of forces in the area from the Atlantic to the Urals is the highest ever known in peacetime and represents the greatest destructive potential ever assembled. Overall levels of forces, particularly those relevant to surprise attack and offensive action such as tanks, artillery and armoured troop carriers, must, therefore, be radically reduced. It is the substantial disparity in the numbers of these systems, all capable of rapid mobility and high firepower, which most threatens stability in Europe. These systems are also central to the seizing and holding of territory, the prime aim of any aggressor;

— no one country should be permitted to dominate Europe by force of arms: no participant should, therefore, possess more than a fixed proportion of the total holdings of all participants in each category of armaments, commensurate with its needs for self defence;

— addressing the overall number and nationality of forces will not by itself affect the stationing of armaments outside national borders: additional limits will also be needed on forces stationed on other countries' territory;

— we need to focus on both the levels of armaments and state of readiness of forces in those areas where the concentration of such forces is greatest, as well as to prevent redeployment of forces withdrawn from one part of the area of application to another. It will, therefore, be necessary to apply a series of interlocking sub-limits covering forces throughout the area, together with further limits on armaments in active units.

4. The following specific measures within the area of application would fulfil these objectives:

Rule 1: Overall Limit

The overall total of weapons in each of the three categories identified above will at no time exceed:

— main battle tanks	40,000
— artillery pieces	33,000
— armoured troop carriers	56,000

Rule 2: Sufficiency

No one country may retain more than 30 percent of the overall limits in these three categories, that is,

— main battle tanks	12,000
— artillery pieces	10,000
— armoured troop carriers	16,800

Rule 3: Stationed Forces

Among countries belonging to a treaty of Alliance, neither side will station armaments outside national territory in active units exceeding the following levels:

- — main battle tanks 3,200
- — artillery pieces 1,700
- — armoured troop carriers 6,000

Rule 4: Sub-limits

In the areas indicated below, each group of countries belonging to the same treaty of Alliance shall not exceed the following levels:

(1) In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania and the Territory of the Soviet Union west of the Urals comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Moscow, Volga, Urals, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, Trans-Caucasus, North Caucasus military districts:

- — main battle tanks 20,000
- — artillery 16,500
- — armoured troop carriers 28,000 (of which no more than 12,000 AIFVs)

(2) In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the territory of the Soviet Union west of the Urals comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Moscow, Volga, Urals military districts in active units:

- — main battle tanks 11,300
- — artillery 9,000
- — armoured troop carriers 20,000

(3) In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the territory of the Soviet Union comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian military districts in active units:

- — main battle tanks 10,300
- — artillery 7,600
- — armoured troop carriers 18,000

(4) In the area consisting of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Poland in active units:

- — main battle tanks 8,000
- — artillery 4,500
- — armoured troop carriers 11,000

(5) Rule 4 is to be seen as an integrated whole which will only be applied simultaneously and across the entire area from the Atlantic to the Urals. It will be for the members of each Alliance to decide how they exercise their entitlement under all of these measures.

Rule 5: Information Exchange

Each year, holdings of main battle tanks, armoured troop carriers and artillery pieces will be notified, disaggregated down to battalion level. This measure will also apply to personnel in both combat and combat support units. Any change of notified unit structures above battalion level, or any measure resulting in an increase of personnel strength in such units, will be subject to notification, on a basis to be determined in the course of the negotiations.

Verification stressed

Measures for Stability, Verification and Non-Circumvention

5. As an integral part of the agreement, there would be a need for:

— stabilizing measures: to buttress the resulting reductions in force levels in the ATTU area. These should include measures of transparency, notification and constraint applied to the deployment, movement, and levels of readiness of conventional armed forces which include conventional armaments and equipment;

— verification arrangements: to include the exchange of detailed data about forces and deployments, with the right to conduct on-site inspection, as well as other measures designed to provide assurance of compliance with the agreed provisions;

— non-circumvention provisions: *inter alia,* to ensure that the manpower and equipment withdrawn from any one area do not have adverse security implications for any participating state;

— provision for temporarily exceeding the limits set down in Rule 4 for pre-notified exercises.

The Longer Term

6. In the longer term, and in the light of the implementation of the above measures, we would be willing to contemplate further steps to enhance stability and security in Europe, such as:

— further reductions or limitations of conventional armaments and equipment;

— the restructuring of armed forces to enhance defensive capabilities and further to reduce offensive capabilities. □

Canada-USSR Talks

Mr. Fred Bild, Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs, visited the Soviet Union from June 12 to 16, 1989 to participate in a United Nations regional conference on arms limitation and disarmament at Dagomys. Mr. Bild, who was requested by the UN Secretary-General to undertake the chairmanship of an 18-month Study on Verification, made a presentation on the study's progress. The study is being undertaken by a representative group of 20 experts on verification who will assess and identify possible roles for the United Nations in the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements.

While in the Soviet Union, Mr. Bild held bilateral consultations on arms control and disarmament with senior officials of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow. □

Collins Addresses Opening of CFE

The following is the text given by the Honourable Mary Collins, Associate Minister of National Defence, at the new Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe on March 7, 1989 in Vienna.

"It is a great honour for me to be here to speak for the Government of Canada at this landmark meeting. I know that Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, regrettably unable to be here today, would have appreciated as much as I do the gracious hospitality which has been extended to us by Dr. Mock and the Austrian authorities.

We have come together this week, here in Vienna, a city whose history extends both to the East and West, to mark the opening of two new negotiations on military security. The significance of these negotiations cannot be overemphasized.

We are here to help banish the threat of war in Europe and to search for new expressions of peace and security. We are here to establish new traditions of cooperation for future generations of Europeans and North Americans.

Forty-four years after the end of the Second World War, Europe remains a house divided between two military alliances, with over five million men and women still facing one another under arms. Despite the enormous progress made since 1945, Europeans continue to live with the spectre of sudden military attack. The present concentration of armed forces in Europe is the highest ever known in peacetime; its destructive potential is enormous.

Clearly, this is a situation which cannot be allowed to continue. Europe has seen, over the years, more than its share of war, and well understands its horrors. Canadians too understand the horrors of war; over 100,000 Canadian men and women have died in Europe in two World Wars. Such wars must never be allowed to happen again.

On March 9th, our delegations will sit down at two new negotiations, with the goal of lessening the possibility of war. One of these negotiations, dealing with Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, will attempt to build upon the already considerable results achieved at the Stockholm Conference; the second, a Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, will attempt to establish a balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels in Europe.

Ms. Mary Collins, Associate Minister of National Defence.

The negotiations which we are about to begin promise to be the most significant arms control and disarmament deliberations yet undertaken on a multilateral basis. If successful, they will have implications for negotiations in other areas as well, and will help consolidate the growing political will for a more stable Europe.

Today, all our peoples have grounds for new hope that the peace we now enjoy will continue — but in a more secure and less confrontational world. We are the makers of our own history. Let us harness our collective energy and direct it toward the creation of a more harmonious and stable European security framework.

The work that has gone into preparing these negotiations, both at the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting and in the Mandate Talks, has been protracted and arduous. However, the results are worthy of the effort. No arms control undertaking has ever started off on a firmer footing than the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, nor has any begun with more clearly stated objectives and guidelines than the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The signs are encouraging. True, a serious imbalance in conventional forces in Europe still exists. Yet, dramatic progress in arms control and disarmament has been made over the past few years, and problems which previously seemed intractable have yielded, or are in the process of yielding, to long-sought solutions.

The successful conclusion of the Stockholm Agreement in 1986 marked a major step forward toward enhanced security in Europe. The soundness of the agreement signed in Stockholm has been amply confirmed in its implementation.

Since January 1987, some 35 observations of military activities have been carried out under its terms. Canadian soldiers are among those who have been inspected and observed, and have themselves participated in observations. These observations have contributed materially to the heightened sense of confidence which now exists; they have helped entrench such important gains as the right to on-site inspection.

The pattern of observations and contacts among military personnel that has been established is unprecedented in both its nature and scope. A great opportunity exists to enhance this new climate for trust and cooperation. We must build carefully and well on this foundation.

All of our efforts, of course, have not been equally fruitful. Last month, for example, we concluded the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks without having reached agreement. The extent of common ground proved to be insufficient. However, even here we gained invaluable experience.

Earlier this year at the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Mr. Clark described the MBFR talks as a

pioneering attempt at conventional arms control: the positions of the two sides converged on a number of issues and the participants gained a clearer picture of what will be necessary to achieve mutually agreeable and verifiable reductions and limitations of forces and armaments in Europe.

Solid progress has also been achieved in other areas of arms control. The 1988 Intermediate-Range Nuclear forces (INF) treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union has been hailed, quite rightly, as an historic achievement. The progress that these two countries have continued to make toward an agreement on major reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals provides grounds for optimism. I was pleased yesterday to hear both Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary Baker renew their commitment to progress in this crucial area.

On another front, we believe that the political momentum developed at the Conference on Chemical Weapons in Paris, in January, will make it easier to conclude a ban on such weapons at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. In this connection, Canada welcomes and supports the proposals relating to chemical weapons announced here yesterday by Secretary of State Baker. We look forward to working with the United States, Australia and others in the implementation of these proposals. For its part, Canada has recently made public details of its Chemical Defence Research Programme, and we have invited representatives of the Soviet Union to visit the single Canadian facility at which this research is carried out.

This progress reflects the determination with which the Western Allies, including Canada, have pursued arms control and disarmament objectives throughout this decade. All too often it is forgotten that the origins of many key arms control proposals are to be found in the West. It was the unswerving determination of the members of the Western Alliance which ultimately resulted in an acceptance of the 'zero option' for INF. It was in Halifax, Canada, in May 1986, that NATO foreign ministers took decisions to prepare for the negotiation of mandates and arms control proposals relating to conventional arms in Europe that have led to our meeting here today. It was our call for the elimination of asymmetries in conventional forces in Europe to which the member states of the Warsaw Pact responded in declaring a readiness to reduce their forces in Eastern Europe.

Our proposal will seek to promote enhanced stability

Today we face an emerging new dynamic in East/West relations, in part brought about by changes which are taking place in the Soviet Union. Along with glasnost and perestroika has come a new political thinking in the USSR, which has had its impact in the area of arms control as well. Soviet leaders and their Warsaw Treaty partners now espouse a concept of 'reasonable sufficiency' in military doctrine, which suggests a shift to a more defensive posture. There appears to be a growing appreciation that the West's military approach reflects its own perception of its legitimate defensive needs, in the face of Warsaw Pact force levels and deployments.

Eloquent testimony to this change in thinking was provided by President Gorbachev's statement to the UN General Assembly last December, in which he announced his intention to reduce Soviet force levels and to change the Soviet force posture. This was followed by the announcement of further reductions by other Eastern European countries. Mr. Shevardnadze provided further elaboration yesterday. These were welcome announcements and we look forward to their implementation.

These developments augur well for our undertaking here. Yet the challenge before us in these new security negotiations remains a daunting one. We shall surely need great reserves of political will, confidence and determination when confronted with the enormous complexity of the issues involved. Our will for a stronger peace, based on enhanced mutual security, must drive these negotiations forward.

Canada's interest and engagement in these negotiations results from the long history and rich traditions which we share with the countries of Europe. Our cultural and linguistic ties with the countries of both Eastern and Western Europe reach back over the centuries, and remain strong; commercially, we prosper as good neighbours. The very foundation of our state was linked to our participation in European affairs. In recognition of this shared heritage and of our continuing common security interests, Canadian soldiers remain in Europe today, firm in the fulfilment of our responsibilities as a member of an Alliance committed to the defence of freedom and human rights.

At the start of the new negotiations on Thursday, Canada will join in tabling detailed, concrete proposals as outlined here yesterday by Sir Geoffrey Howe. In the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, we will work to improve and expand the measures agreed upon in Stockholm, seeking greater transparency both of military organizations and of military activities. We will propose measures for an annual exchange of information concerning military organization, as well as measures designed to produce greater openness and predictability regarding military activities. Convinced that contacts at the military level should be extended in order to improve our understanding of each others military thinking, we will propose as well an organized exchange of views on military doctrine.

These Confidence- and Security-Building Measures will be put forward with a view to affecting an increased openness about military matters; they will seek to dispel the suspicion which is a cause of tension between East and West.

In the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, our proposals will seek to promote enhanced stability through a reduction in the capability of states to mount surprise attacks and large-scale offensive actions. To this end, we will propose an overall limit on the total holdings of armaments in Europe which most threaten us, such as tanks, artillery and armoured troops carriers. These weapons systems are capable of rapid mobility and high firepower and are central to the seizing and

holding of territory. They must be reduced and limited, with equal numbers on each side. As well, we will propose limits on the quantity of those armaments held by any one country, both on its own territory and stationed on the territory of others. No one country should be permitted to dominate Europe by force of arms.

A critically important aspect of these negotiations will be agreement on effective verification measures. Acceptance of verification of compliance as an essential element in the arms control and disarmament process has been formally registered through the adoption of consensus resolutions at the UN General Assembly.

Arms control verification has its own distinct and specific characteristics. It is not equivalent to unilateral monitoring by national means. Neither can it be equated to the observation of unilateral measures under conditions determined by one or more countries without benefit of negotiation. Real verfication measures must be a product of negotiation. They must be acceptable to, and equally applicable to, all parties to an agreement. International experience with the negotiation and implementation of such verification measures is still scarce. However, in the bilateral area, the INF agreement is pointing the way, and multilaterally, the implementation of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures under the Stockholm Agreement is providing valuable experience.

Here in Vienna, our negotiators must draw on their experiences in both bilateral and multilateral contexts to develop an effective verification régime, capable of providing confidence in compliance. It will not be sufficient to work toward agreement on reduction measures and subsequently to attempt to devise verification provisions. It will be necessary to examine closely the verification implications of all proposals under negotiation to ensure that compliance with agreements reached can be verified.

A meaningful verification régime will have to be built on a variety of techniques. On-site monitoring, surveillance from space and from aircraft and challenge inspections will probably all have to be used. We were, therefore, much encouraged by Mr. Shevardnadze's statement that in these negotiations there is no verification measure that the USSR would not be ready to consider and accept on the basis of reciprocity.

In Canada, we will devote considerable resources to this aspect of the negotiations; we have in the past shared the results of our research with the international community. We hope that other nations will devote similar efforts to these important issues. In both negotiations, Canada will be active in devising means to ensure the reliable verification of any agreement.

The proposals that Canada and its Allies will put forward are, in our view, realistic. They will require important changes, not just in the deployment of conventional forces but in our thinking about how peace and security can best be preserved and strengthened in Europe. They will require an unprecedented willingness to draw aside the veil of secrecy which often obscures military operations. The proposed changes are possible and workable. They involve reasonable steps which will further reduce mistrust and the risk of miscalculation. We must now get down to the hard work involved in translating these proposals into agreed measures which, as the Foreign Minister of Poland has just said, will strengthen the security of all.

Today, a growing sense of optimism exists about East/West relations. There is a sense that the world has entered one of those special, if infrequent, period in the history of states when political will and imagination can fruitfully be brought to bear on previously intractable problems. Let us seize this opportunity to redeem the reputation of our century for unprecedented destructiveness and bloodshed. Let us devote all the energies and resources at our disposal to building a genuine and stable security framework for Europe and North America in the 21st century. As a Minister of my Government, as a concerned citizen and as a mother, may I say that we owe no less to our ancestors and to our children." □

Diplomatic Appointment



Mr. David Peel, Canadian Ambassador to the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in Vienna.

The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, recently announced the following diplomatic appointment:

Mr. David Peel from Truro, Nova Scotia, as Ambassador to the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe beginning in Vienna in March.

Mr. Peel (BA, 1954; LLB., Dalhousie University, 1957; Doctorate de l'Université de Paris en droit international public, 1959) joined the Department of External Affairs in 1959. He has served abroad as Second Secretary in Ankara from 1961 to 1963; as Second Secretary in Madrid from 1963 to 1966; as First Secretary in Prague from 1966 to 1968; as Counsellor in Moscow from 1972 to 1974; as Ambassador in Prague from 1981 to 1984. In Ottawa, he was Secretary, Visits Panel Eastern European Division from 1968 to 1972; Deputy to the Chairman, Policy Analysis Group from 1974 to 1975; Deputy Director, Legal Advisory Division from 1975 to 1977; Director, Industry, Investment and Competition Policy Division from 1977 to 1981; Director General, Economic Intelligence Bureau from 1984 to 1985. He was Director General, International Security and Arms Control Bureau from 1985 to 1988 and since that time has been Adviser on Conventional Arms Control. He is married to Diana Roberts. They have two children. □

Western Position Paper on CSBM Issues

The following position paper was provided by the Delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

On 9 March 1989, negotiations will open in Vienna among the 35 states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process in order to build upon and expand the results already achieved at the Stockholm Conference with the aim of elaborating and adopting a new set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). The notes below may serve as useful background on the opening.

What are CSBMs?

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures are designed specifically to dispel suspicion and mistrust about military capabilities and intentions. They achieve this through increased openness about military matters: for example, states may provide other states with information about their military exercises, and give the opportunity to watch them.

Historical Background

Confidence-building in Europe began with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The Final Act included a number of relatively modest confidence-building measures which, *inter alia*, encouraged nations voluntarily to notify each other of their plans to conduct certain large military activities.

Voluntary notification was a good start, but did not go far enough. At the Madrid CSCE meeting (1981-83), the Western Allies, therefore, proposed new negotiations to expand upon the measures agreed at Helsinki and to make them mandatory. These negotiations, known as the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) ran from 1984 to 1986. The Conference agreed on a far-reaching programme of interrelated measures, based largely on Western proposals. These introduced predictability, openness and confidence into the process of training and exercising military forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Among the measures were: the notification of military exercises (at a level below the voluntary Helsinki provisions); invitations to all CSCE states to observe larger exercises; and, most importantly, a system of on-site challenge inspections of military activities as a means of verification. This inspection régime has served as a model for other arms control negotiations.

The CSBM régime agreed at Stockholm has made a substantial contribution in the past two years to increasing the flow of information and introducing predictability and openness to military activities. It has also had a positive effect on the broader East-West political relationship.

Since the Stockholm Agreement came into force in January 1987 more than 35 military activities in 12 countries have been formally observed by representatives of other participating states and 18 challenge inspections — in which one country exercises its right under the Stockholm Document to check that the military activities of another state are consistent with CDE commitments — have been carried out. Inspections have proved their value in building mutual confidence. The increased contacts, especially among military personnel, created by the observation and inspection of exercises have also contributed to better reciprocal understanding. These achievements far exceed what many observers would have believed possible a decade ago.

This has represented an encouraging advance, but again there is more we can do. Further steps are needed toward our goal of reducing tension by clarifying military capabilities and intentions and fostering cooperation. When the new round of CSBM negotiations begins in Vienna in March the Allies will propose a strong, integrated set of measures aimed at propelling forward the process of confidence-building that we launched so successfully in Helsinki, Madrid and Stockholm.

I Transparency About Military Organization

The following measures would create more openness and confidence about the military force disposition of each participating state. This would be achieved by regular exchanges of information on forces on land in the zone and on major weapons deployment programmes. The information exchanged will be subject to evaluation.

Inspections build mutual confidence

Measure 1: Exchange of Military Information

Participating States would exchange information concerning military organization, manpower and equipment in the zone. This would include annual information on:

— land forces command organization in the zone;

— the designation of major ground units, down to and below divisional level;

— the normal peacetime locations of these units;

— the personnel strength of these units;

— the major weapons systems and equipment belonging to these units;

— land-based air units and their aircraft strength.

It would also include immediate notification of:

— the relocation in the zone of major ground units as specified above from one normal peacetime location to another;

— the calling up of a significant number of reservists.

Measure 2: Information Exchange on Major Conventional Weapon Deployment Programmes

Each participating State would inform the others of those major conventional weapon systems and equipment specified in Measure 1 which it intended to introduce into service with its armed forces in the CDE zone in a specified period.

Measure 3: Establishment of a Random Evaluation System

In order to evaluate the information provided under Measures 1 and 2,

participating States would establish a random evaluation system in which:

— they would have the right to conduct a number of pre-announced visits to normal peacetime locations specified under Measure 1;

— these visits, of a limited duration, would be carried out by personnel already accredited to the host State or designated by the visiting State;

— evaluators would be allowed to observe major weapon systems and equipment;

— appropriate arrangements for the evaluation visit would be made by the host state whose representatives would accompany the evaluation teams at all times.

II Transparency and Predictability of Military Activities

These measures would build upon those agreed in Stockholm by refining them in order to enhance openness and produce greater predictability of military activities.

Measure 4: Enhanced Information in the Annual Calendar

Participating States would provide in their annual calendars more information, and in greater detail, about future military activities. This would include the designation, number and type of ground units down to divisional level scheduled to take part in notifiable military activities in the zone.

Measure 5: Enhanced Information in Notification

To improve the notification concerning military activities, participating States would communicate more information, and in greater detail, about the engagement of their armed forces as well as their major weapon systems and equipment in such ground force activities.

Measure 6: Improvements to Observation Modalities

Participating States would facilitate observation by organizing more detailed briefings, providing better maps and allowing more observation equipment to be used. Furthermore, in order to improve the observers' opportunities to assess the scope and scale of the activity, the participating States are encouraged to provide an aerial survey of the area of the activity. Moreover, the duration of the observation programme should be improved.

Measure 7: Lowering of the Observation Threshold

Participating States will invite observers to notified activities whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 13,000 or if more than 300 tanks participate in it.

Measure 8: Improvement to Inspection Modalities

Participating States will adopt measures for a substantial improvement of the inspection which include:

— increasing the number of passive inspections;

— shortening the period between the inspection request and access of the inspectors to the specified area;

— permitting, on request by inspectors, an aerial survey before the commencement of the inspection;

— improving the equipment and communications facilities that the inspecting team will be permitted to use;

— improving the briefings to inspectors.

Measure 9: Lowering the Thresholds for Longer Notice of Larger Scale Activities

Participating States will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 50,000 troops unless they have been the object of communication stipulated in the Stockholm Document.

III Contacts and Communication

These measures are designed to increase the knowledge about the military capabilities of the participating States by developing communications and military contacts.

Measure 10: Improved Access for Accredited Personnel dealing with Military Matters

In order to implement the principle of greater openness in military matters and to enhance mutual confidence, the participating States will facilitate the travel arrangements of accredited personnel (AP) dealing with military matters and assist them in obtaining access to government officials. Restrictions on the APs' activities in the CDE zone should be reduced.

Measure 11: Development of Means of Communication

Participating States, while using diplomatic channels for transmitting communications related to agreed measures (calendars, notifications, etc.), are encouraged to consider additional arrangements to ensure the speediest possible exchange of information.

Measure 12: Equal Treatment of Media Representatives

Participating States will be encouraged to permit media representatives to attend observed military activities; if media representatives are invited, the host State would admit such representatives from all participating States and treat them without discrimination.

IV Exchanges of View on Military Policy

Confidence-building is a dynamic process which is enhanced by the free and frank interchange of ideas designed to reduce misunderstanding and misrepresentation of military capabilities. To this end, participating States would in the forthcoming negotiations avail themselves of the following opportunities.

— to discuss issues concerning the implementation of the provisions of the Stockholm Document;

— to discuss, in a seminar setting, military doctrine in relation to the posture and structure of conventional forces in the zone, including *inter alia:*

— exchanging information on their annual military spending;

— exchanging information on the training of their armed forces, including references to military manuals;

— seeking clarification of developments giving rise to uncertainty, such as changes in the number and pattern of notified military activities. □

True North Strong and Free Addresses Arctic Issues

The following is the speech given by the Honourable Mary Collins, P.C., MP, Associate Minister of National Defence to the True North Strong and Free Arctic Inquiry held on March 18, 1989 in Edmonton, Alberta. The Disarmament Fund of this Department provided financial assistance to the organizer of the Conference, the True North Strong and Free Inquiry Society.

"I am pleased, on behalf of the Government of Canada, to congratulate the True North Strong and Free Society for organizing and promoting this second meeting in its continuing dialogue about Canada, the world and the future.

On a cold and blistery November weekend in 1986, we witnessed an event, unique in contemporary Canadian public policy — the first True North Strong and Free Conference. Five thousand Canadians, from all walks of life and shades of opinion, participated in a public discussion of defence policy and nuclear arms issues. The stuff real democracy is made of.

Your deliberations then, as they do today, touched upon many of the social and political issues that are before Canadians. I am impressed by the broad coverage of Arctic affairs to be offered by the distinguished panel of speakers that you have gathered here for your Conference; and in particular I am pleased to see that my colleague Johan Holst, the Norwegian Minister of National Defence, is with us for the Conference.

My participation in your deliberations today is not pure coincidence or based on the luck of the draw. Over the five years which I spent working in the Arctic, I came to know, and be part of the people of the north, their hopes and dreams, as well as their concerns. I am here not only as a Minister of a Government committed to the preservation and enhancement of life in the north, but also as an individual who seeks to be part of a solution, and not part of the problem.

Having said that, the central issue facing any government is to seek consensus and to find the right balance between the competing interests. Prudence and patience are inextricably linked to this delicate balancing act, as we seek out solutions on issues that are not always absolute.

Those of us whose nations lie around the Arctic Basin must become more involved in and informed about Arctic affairs if we are to make clear judgments about peace and security. The pace of technological, political and climatic developments which affect the Arctic is also increasing.

New developments in communications, transportation, resource extraction and in military capability have increased the strategic importance of the Arctic. Discoveries about the ozone layer and the greenhouse effect underline the very sensitive environmental role of the Arctic region. These developments are drawing together the northern peoples of the world and focussing attention on common interests and opportunities.

It has been said that this is the age of the Arctic, and it is most appropriate that the focus of this Conference is on the choices for peace and security in that region.

In 1985, the Joint Parliamentary Committee that reviewed Canada's international relations pressed for a northern dimension to Canada's foreign policy. The Government's response to these recommendations, in 1986, focussed on four broad policy themes. They were:

— buttressing our sovereignty over Arctic waters;

— modernizing our northern defences;

— preparing for the commercial use of the Northwest Passage; and

— expanding our circumpolar relations, including contacts among northerners of different nations.

The Government's response also stressed the need for consistency between foreign and domestic policy initiatives to ensure a comprehensive and coherent Arctic policy.

Canada has been and continues to be active in circumpolar cooperation. Recent agreements have been entered into with Denmark on environmental cooperation and with the Soviet Union for the exchange of Arctic scientists and scientific data.

Additionally, we are supporting the development of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference which will meet this June. We have intensified our cooperation with Norway on northern issues, resulting in a bilateral conference held in Tromso in 1987, led by our respective foreign ministers.

On the home front, the Government is pursuing a domestic agenda that includes the devolution of provincial-type

We must make every effort to preserve the traditional values of our northern peoples

programs to the governments of the Territories, and moving toward an early settlement of native land claims. In doing so, we must make every effort to preserve the traditional values of our northern peoples as we focus on political and economic change, and as we look for security and prosperity in the north.

Limiting excessive militarization of the Arctic in the interests of strategic stability, within the context of our arms control and disarmament effort is of particular interest to this Government. However, as we pursue these goals, we must temper our idealism with realism. We cannot gamble with our freedom and security — they are too precious.

Over the next two days, we will hear a lot about security, freedom and prosperity — they are, after all, the handmaidens of peace. But they do not exist for nations in an abstract sense — they are highly dependent on:

— the extent to which the rights, values and freedoms of the people and the environment in which they live, are protected;

— the economic and social health of the people, individually and collectively; and

— the degree of military security enjoyed.

A nation cannot ignore these factors, in any of its regions, and consider itself truly secure. The multi-dimensional approach taken by the organizers of this conference recognizes these relationships and I hope will promote a balanced debate on the choices for peace and security.

For my part, let me say a few words about security, defence and arms control. The security of the Arctic is inseparable from that of Canada as a whole. The threat does not originate in the Arctic, and its solution does not lie there. It lies in the resolution of East-West tensions.

We cannot regard the security of our Arctic in isolation from our national security

Let me look for a moment at the East-West relationship, which is unquestionably in a state of flux. Its fundamental nature is changing — we hope for the better.

There is no doubt that the changes we have seen in the Soviet Union — in the field of human rights; in declarations about, and changes in, foreign policy; and in the unilateral commitment to disarmament — are all positive developments. In responding to these changes, we must ask ourselves how far will they go? And how long will they last?

Neither of these questions, of course, have definitive answers. A process that is so volatile can change dramatically in a very short time. Our responses must be crafted to benefit fully from the progress that is made while protecting us from reversals which could result and threaten our security. This is not an easy challenge and it must be met with imagination and prudence.

I have just returned from Vienna, where I represented Canada at the opening of the new Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. I sensed that the assembled Ministers from NATO, the Warsaw Pact and neutral and non-aligned European nations shared an awareness that we have an opportunity now, which we may not have again, to reduce the level of conventional armed confrontation on the fault line of East-West relations.

The results we achieve through these negotiations will set the tone of the East-West relationship for the next generation. Should we fail to act constructively and with patience and determination, the talks could suffer the paralysis experienced in negotiations of the early eighties. In that event, our security will continue to be threatened by the presence of large imbalances in conventional forces in Europe in favour of the Warsaw Pact.

But never before have the prospects for a mutually beneficial, verifiable agreement been so bright — an agreement that would eliminate the asymmetries in stationed forces and severely reduce the potential for mounting surprise attacks or large-scale offensive operations.

Can you imagine what a different world it would be if the confrontation in Europe was contained and defused? What better impetus for future arms control could there be than a successful completion of a verifiable agreement to this end?

As we stand on the threshold of these negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, we can also be optimistic that the START talks between the Soviet Union and the United States, aimed at a mutual reduction of fifty percent in strategic systems, will gain momentum as the year unfolds. There is also hope that good progress will be made toward a treaty to ban chemical warfare.

Indeed, this would appear to be an occasion in the course of East-West relations when the interests of both sides coincide. A shared interest exists in reducing the size of armed forces and siphoning resources from the defence to the civilian sides of the respective economies. We must not let such a chance slip through our fingers. I had the opportunity to convey Canada's desire for progress toward a peaceful, less confrontational world to Mr. Shevardnadze and other foreign ministers in Vienna last week.

Over the next two days, as you explore the choices for peace and security in the Arctic, I know that you will approach these issues critically and seriously. And I hope that you will agree with me that peace, security and freedom are not alternatives or add-on options — they are integral parts of a whole. An insecure people are not at peace, and peace without freedom is a hollow condition.

We cannot regard the security of our Arctic in isolation from our national security, and we cannot regard Canadian security in isolation from the security of both East and West.

Peace, security and freedom are the aims of the Government of Canada as surely as they are the aims of the many groups, associations and individuals here today — let us all work together to build a lasting peace and let our legacy to future generations be a true north, truly strong and free." □

North Atlantic Council Declaration

The following is the press communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, May 29-30, 1989.

NATO's 40 years of Success

As our Alliance celebrates its 40th Anniversary, we measure its achievements with pride. Founded in troubled times to safeguard our security, it has withstood the test of four decades, and has allowed our countries to enjoy in freedom one of the longest periods of peace and prosperity in their history. The Alliance has been a fundamental element of stability and cooperation. These are the fruits of a partnership based on enduring common values and interests, and on unity of purpose.

Our meeting takes place at a juncture of unprecedented change and opportunities. This is a time to look ahead, to chart the course of our Alliance and to set our agenda for the future.

A Time of Change

In our rapidly changing world, where ideas transcend borders ever more easily, the strength and accomplishments of democracy and freedom are increasingly apparent. The inherent inability of oppressive systems to fulfil the aspirations of their citizens has become equally evident.

In the Soviet Union, important changes are underway. We welcome the current reforms that have already led to greater openness, improved respect for human rights, active participation of the individual, and new attitudes in foreign policy. But much remains to be done. We still look forward to the full implementation of the announced change in priorities in the allocation of economic resources from the military to the civilian sector. If sustained, the reforms will strengthen prospects for fundamental improvements in East-West relations.

We also welcome the marked progress in some countries of Eastern Europe toward establishing more democratic institutions, freer elections and greater political pluralism and economic choice. However, we deplore the fact that certain Eastern European governments have chosen to ignore this reforming trend and continue all too frequently to violate human rights and basic freedoms.

Our vision of a just, humane and democratic world has always underpinned the policies of this Alliance. The changes that are now taking place are bringing us closer to the realization of this vision.

We want to overcome the painful division of Europe, which we have never accepted. We want to move beyond the post-war period. Based on today's momentum of increased cooperation and tomorrow's common challenges, we seek to shape a new political order of peace in Europe. We will work as Allies to seize all opportunities to achieve this goal. But ultimate success does not depend on us alone.

Our guiding principles in the pursuit of this course will be the policies of the Harmel Report in their two complementary and mutually reinforcing approaches: adequate military strength and political solidarity and, on that basis, the search for constructive dialogue and cooperation, including arms control, as a means of bringing about a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.

The Alliance's long-term objectives are:

— to ensure that wars and intimidation of any kind in Europe and North America are prevented, and that military aggression is an option which no government could rationally contemplate or hope successfully to undertake, and by doing so to lay the foundations for a world where military forces exist solely to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of their countries, as has always been the case for the Allies;

We want to overcome the painful division of Europe

— to establish a new pattern of relations between the countries of East and West, in which ideological and military antagonism will be replaced with cooperation, trust and peaceful competition; and in which human rights and political freedoms will be fully guaranteed and enjoyed by all individuals.

Within our larger responsibilities as Heads of State or Government, we are also committed

— to strive for an international community founded on the rule of law, where all nations join together to reduce world tensions, settle disputes peacefully, and search for solutions to those issues of universal concern, including poverty, social injustice and the environment, on which our common fate depends.

Maintaining Our Defence

Peace must be worked for; it can never be taken for granted. The greatly improved East-West political climate offers prospects for a stable and lasting peace, but experience teaches us that we must remain prepared. We can overlook neither the capabilities of the Warsaw Treaty countries for offensive military action, nor the potential hazards resulting from severe political strain and crisis.

A strong and united Alliance will remain fundamental not only for the security of our countries but also for our policy of supporting political change. It is the basis for further successful negotiations on arms control and on measures to strengthen mutual confidence through improved transparency and predictability. Military security and policies aimed at reducing tensions as well as resolving underlying political differences are not contradictory but complementary. Credible defence based on the principle of the indivisibility of security for all member countries will thus continue to be essential to our common endeavour.

For the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to the Alliance strategy for the prevention of war. This is a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up-to-date where necessary. We shall ensure the viability and credibility of those forces, while maintaining them at the lowest possible level consistent with our security requirements.

The presence of North American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe just as Europe's security is vital to that of North America. Maintenance of this relationship requires that the Allies fulfil their essential commitments in support of the common defence. Each of our countries will accordingly assume its fair share of the risks, roles and responsibilities of the Atlantic partnership. Growing European political unity can lead to a reinforced European component of our common security effort and its efficiency. It will be essential to the success of these efforts to make the most effective use of resources made available for our security. To this end, we will seek to maximize the efficiency of our defence programmes and pursue solutions to issues in the area of economic and trade policies as they effect our defence. We will also continue to protect our technological capabilities by effective export controls on essential strategic goods.

Initiatives on Arms Control

Arms control has always been an integral part of the Alliance's security policy and of its overall approach to East-West relations, firmly embedded in the broader political context in which we seek the improvement of those relations.

The allies have consistently taken the lead in developing the conceptual foundations for arms control, identifying areas in which the negotiating partners share an interest in achieving a mutually satisfactory result while safeguarding the legitimate security interests of all.

High Level Task Force to examine troop reductions

Historic progress has been made in recent years, and we now see prospects for further substantial advances. In our determined effort to reduce the excessive weight of the military factor in the East-West relationship and increasingly to replace confrontation by cooperation, we can now exploit fully the potential of arms control as an agent of change.

We challenge the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to join us in accelerating efforts to sign and implement an agreement which will enhance security and stability in Europe by reducing conventional armed forces. To seize the unique opportunity at hand, we intend to present a proposal that will amplify and expand on the position we tabled at the opening of the CFE negotiations on 9th March.(*) We will

— register agreement, based on the ceilings already proposed in Vienna, on tanks, armoured troop carriers and artillery pieces held by members of the two Alliances in Europe, with all of the withdrawn equipment to be destroyed. Ceilings on tanks and armoured troop carriers will be based on proposals already tabled in Vienna; definitional questions on artillery pieces remain to be resolved:

— expand our current proposal to include reductions by each side to equal ceilings at the level 15 percent below current Alliance holdings of helicopters and of all land-based combat aircraft in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone, with all the withdrawn equipment to be destroyed;

— propose a 20 percent cut in combat manpower in US stationed forces, and a resulting ceiling on US and Soviet ground and air force personnel stationed outside of national territory in the Atlantic to the Urals zone at approximately 275,000. This ceiling would require the Soviet Union to reduce its forces in Eastern Europe by some 325,000. United States and Soviet forces withdrawn will be demobilized;

— seek such an agreement within six months to a year and accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993. Accordingly, we have directed the Alliance's High Level Task Force on conventional arms control to complete the further elaboration of this proposal, including its verification elements, so that it may be tabled at the beginning of the third round of the CFE negotiations, which opens on 7th September 1989.

We consider as an important initiative President Bush's call for an "open skies" regime intended to improve confidence among states through reconnaissance flights, and to contribute to the transparency of military activity, to arms control and to public awareness. It will be the subject of careful study and wide-ranging consultations.

Consistent with the principles and objectives set out in our Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament which we have adopted at this meeting, we will continue to use arms control as a means to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of armed forces, and to strengthen confidence by further appropriate measures. We have already demonstrated our commitment to these objectives: both by negotiations and by unilateral action, resulting since 1979 in reductions of over one-third of the nuclear holdings assigned to SACEUR in Europe.

Toward an Enhanced Partnership

As the Alliance enters its fifth decade, we will meet the challenge of shaping our relationship in a way which corresponds to the new political and economic realities of the 1990s. As we do so, we recognize that the basis of our security and prosperity — and of our hopes for better East-West relations — is and will continue to be the close cohesion between the countries of Europe and of North America, bound together by their common values and democratic institutions as much as by their shared security interests.

Ours is a living and developing partnership. The strength and stability derived from our transatlantic bond provide a firm foundation for the achievement of our long-term vision, as well as of our goals for the immediate future. We recognize that our common tasks transcend the resources of either Europe or North America alone.

We welcome in this regard the evolution of an increasingly strong and coherent European identity, including in the security area. The process we are witnessing today provides an example of progressive integration, leaving centuries-old conflicts far behind. It opens the way to a more mature and balanced transatlantic partnership and constitutes one of the foundations of Europe's future structure.

To ensure the continuing success of our efforts we have agreed to

— strengthen our process of political consultation and, where appropriate, coordination, and have instructed the Council in Permanent Session to consider methods for its further improvement;

— expand the scope and intensity of our effort to ensure that our respective approaches to problems affecting our common security are complementary and mutually supportive;

— renew our support for our economically less-favoured partners and to reaffirm our goal of improving the present level of cooperation and assistance;

(*) France takes this opportunity to recall that, since the mandate for the Vienna negotiations excludes nuclear weapons, it retains complete freedom of judgment and decision regarding the results contributing to the implementaiton of its independent nuclear deterrent strategy.

— continue to work in the appropriate fora for more commercial, monetary and technological cooperation, and to see to it that no obstacles impede such cooperation.

Overcoming the Division of Europe

Now, more than ever, our efforts to overcome the division of Europe must address its underlying political causes. Therefore, all of us will continue to pursue a comprehensive approach encompassing the many dimensions of the East-West agenda. In keeping with our values, we place primary emphasis on basic freedoms for the people in Eastern Europe. These are also key elements for strengthening the stability and security of all states and for guaranteeing lasting peace on the continent.

The CSCE process encompasses our vision of a peaceful and more constructive relationship among all participating states. We intend to develop it further, in all its dimensions, and to make the fullest use of it.

We recognize progress in the implementation of CSCE commitments

We place primary emphasis on basic freedoms

by some Eastern countries. But we call upon all of them to recognize and implement fully the commitments which all CSCE states have accepted. We will invoke the CSCE mechanisms — as most recently adopted in the Vienna Concluding Document — and the provisions of other international agreements, to bring all Eastern countries to:

— enshrine in law and practice the human rights and freedoms agreed in international covenants and in the CSCE documents, thus fostering progress toward the rule of law;

— tear down the walls that separate us physically and politically, simplify the crossing of borders, increase the number of crossing points and allow the free exchange of persons, information and ideas;

— ensure that people are not prevented by armed force from crossing the frontiers and boundaries which we share with Eastern countries, in exercise of their right to leave any country, including their own;

— respect in law and practice the right of all the people in each country to determine freely and periodically the nature of the government they wish to have;

— see to it that their peoples can decide through their elected authorities what form of relations they wish to have with other countries;

— grant the genuine economic freedoms that are linked inherently to the rights of the individual;

— develop transparency, especially in military matters, in pursuit of greater mutual understanding and reassurance.

The situation in and around Berlin is an essential element in East-West relations. The Alliance declares its commitment to a free and prosperous Berlin and to achieving improvements for the city especially through the Allied Berlin Initiative. The Wall dividing the city is an unacceptable symbol of the division of Europe. We seek a state of peace in Europe in which the German people regains its unity through free self-determination.

Our Design for Cooperation

We, for our part, have today reaffirmed that the Alliance must and will reintensify its own efforts to overcome the division of Europe and to explore all available avenues of cooperation and dialogue. We support the opening of Eastern societies and encourage reforms that aim at positive political, economic and human rights developments. Tangible steps toward genuine political and economic reform improve possibilities for broad cooperation, while a continuing denial of basic freedoms cannot but have a negative effect. Our approach recognizes that each country is unique and must be treated on its own merits. We also recognize that it is essentially incumbent upon the countries of the East to solve their problems by reforms from within. But we can also play a constructive role within the framework of our Alliance as well as in our respective bilateral relations and in international organizations, as appropriate.

To that end, we have agreed the following joint agenda for the future:

— as opportunities develop, we will expand the scope of our contacts and cooperation to cover a broad range of issues which are important to both East and West. Our goal is a sustained effort geared to specific tasks which will help deepen openness and promote democracy within Eastern countries and thus contribute to the establishment of a more stable peace in Europe;

— we will pursue in particular expanded contacts beyond the realm of government among individuals in East and West. These contacts should include all segments of our societies, but in particular young people, who will carry the responsibility for continuing our common endeavour;

— we will seek expanded economic and trade relations with the Eastern countries on the basis of commercially sound terms, mutual interest and reciprocity. Such relations should also serve as incentives for real economic reform and thus ease the way for increased integration of Eastern countries into the international trading system;

— we intend to demonstrate through increased cooperation that democratic institutions and economic choice create the best possible conditions for economic and social progress. The development of such open systems will facilitate cooperation and, consequently, make its benefits more available;

— an important task of our cooperation will be to explore means to extend Western experience and know-how to Eastern countries in a manner which responds to and promotes positive change. Exchanges in technical and managerial fields, establishment of cooperative training programmes, expansion of educational, scientific and cultural exchanges all offer possibilities which have not yet been exhausted;

— equally important will be to integrate Eastern European countries more fully into efforts to meet the social, environmental and technological challenges of the modern world, where common interest should prevail. In accordance

with our concern for global challenges, we will seek to engage Eastern countries in cooperative strategies in areas such as the environment, terrorism, and drugs. Eastern willingness to participate constructively in dealing with such challenges will help further cooperation in other areas as well;

— East-West understanding can be expanded only if our respective societies gain increased knowledge about one another and communicate effectively. To encourage an increase of Soviet and Eastern studies in universities of our countries and of corresponding studies in Eastern countries, we are prepared to establish a Fellowship/Scholarship programme to promote the study of our democratic institutions, with candidates being invited from Eastern as well as Western Europe and North America.

Global Challenges

Worldwide developments which affect our security interests are legitimate matters for consultation and, where appropriate, co-ordination among us. Our security is to be soon in a context broader than the protection from war alone.

Regional conflicts continue to be of major concern. The coordinated approach of Alliance members recently has helped toward settling some of the world's most dangerous and long-standing disputes. We hope that the Soviet Union will increasingly work with us in positive and practical steps toward diplomatic solutions to those conflicts that continue to preoccupy the international community.

We will seek to contain the newly emerging security threats and destabilizing consequences resulting from the uncontrolled spread and application of modern military technologies.

In the spirit of Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, we will increasingly need to address worldwide problems which have a bearing on our security, particularly environmental degradation, resource conflicts and grave economic disparities. We will seek to do so in the appropriate multilateral fora, in the widest possible cooperation with other States.

We will each further develop our close cooperation with the other industrial democracies akin to us in their objectives and policies.

We will redouble our efforts in a reinvigorated United Nations, strengthening its role in conflict settlement and peacekeeping, and in its larger endeavours for world peace.

Our "Third Dimension"

Convinced of the vital need for international cooperation in science and technology, and of its beneficial effect on global security, we have for several decades maintained Alliance programmes of scientific cooperation. Recognizing the importance of safeguarding the environment we have also cooperated, in the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, on environmental matters. These activities have demonstrated the broad range of our common pursuits. We intend to give more impact to our programmes with new initiatives in these areas.

The Future of the Alliance

We, the leaders of 16 free and democratic countries, have dedicated ourselves to the goals of the Alliance and are committed to work in unison for their continued fulfilment.

At this time of unprecedented promise in international affairs, we will respond to the hopes that it offers. The Alliance will continue to serve as the cornerstone of our security, peace and freedom. Secure on this foundation, we will reach out to those who are willing to join us in shaping a more stable and peaceful international environment in the service of our societies. □

Mulroney Comments on NATO Summit

The following are notes prepared for Prime Minister Mulroney's Press Conference following the NATO Summit.

"We came to Brussels to celebrate 40 years of Alliance cooperation — 40 years which have assured our nations peace and prosperity. At the same time, we were able to welcome a man of great experience and wisdom in foreign affairs, the new President of the United States.

We also came to chart the future.

In so doing, we faced two challenges: one, the question of how to make the most of the opportunities presented by the revolution shaking the Soviet Union, and second, the adoption of a framework for all arms control negotiations the Alliance will undertake in the foreseeable future.

Over the last 24 hours, all 16 delegations have demonstrated in their work the qualities that continue to keep this Alliance strong and forward-looking.

We have had to tackle difficult problems, and we have had to reconcile a number of conflicting approaches. By taking into account the particular concerns of some and the welfare of all, we managed once again to come to an agreement. And we did so by reaching a genuine understanding on what we wanted collectively — not by simply papering over the cracks.

Canada played its part in all of this.

As you know, President Bush put before us a far-reaching proposal to advance the conventional force negotiations now taking place in Vienna. The proposal is imaginative and ambitious.

We are challenging the Soviet Union to come to an early agreement on all categories of conventional arms (tanks, artillery, armoured personnel carriers, strike aircraft and helicopters) which the USSR want to negotiate. The United States is also offering to limit, on a reciprocal basis, the number of Soviet and American troops stationed in Europe between the Urals and the Atlantic.

President Bush's proposal was important in its own right; it also was key to helping unblock the short-range nuclear forces (SNF) impasse because it opens the possibility for negotiations on short-range missiles immediately after implementation of a conventional agreement is underway. That could be in the next year or two.

At Canada's suggestion, NATO unanimously endorsed the proposal and agreed to prepare it for formal presentation in Vienna, within 60 to 90 days.

NATO experts responding to Canadian verification initiative

The Summit endorsed President Bush's call for an open skies regime, a proposal Canada had urged upon President Bush some time ago.

It could turn out to be a significant confidence-building measure and play an important role in the verification regime for the Conventional Arms Agreement we hope to reach in the near future.

While we are meeting here, experts from all NATO countries are responding to another Canadian initiative made some months ago. They are meeting in Canada at Collège militaire royal de St-Jean to examine how a conventional agreement could be properly and persuasively verified.

On a non-military and perhaps less dramatic note, the Declaration issued today contains a decision to establish a scholarship fund to enable participants from East and West alike to study democratic institutions. I was very pleased to note that my colleagues welcomed this Canadian proposal, put forward earlier by Ambassador Smith.

Forty years ago, Canada fought hard and successfully to have the Atlantic Treaty recognize the intrinsic value of political and economic, as well as military, security for this Alliance.

At this Summit, we reaffirmed our common purpose, and charted a course for achieving a stable structure of peace and stability. The fact that the SNF issue has been successfully resolved and given the right place in the Alliance's comprehensive concept is a particularly happy event.

It clears the way for a systematic and reasonable approach to all arms control negotiations the Alliance will undertake in coming years. It will enable us to conduct those negotiations with the assurance that our security is sound as we progress toward our goal of stability at reduced levels of armaments.

In particular, it sets out clearly when negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons can start.

When taken together with the proposals made by President Bush yesterday, this could mean that within a matter of a few years the two superpowers could find themselves with no more than 275,000 troops each in Europe outside the Soviet Union, radically reduced levels of conventional armaments and on the way to cutting SNF to below 88 launchers each.

When one considers that the Soviet Union now has approximately 1,800 such missiles at the ready, one can understand what an achievement it would be simply to bring them down to parity with NATO.

Once we have actually begun those programs of weapon destruction and troop withdrawal, we will be well on the road to a safer and more stable world. We hope it will also be one in which we shall have established significant cooperation with the East bloc on global issues such as the environment. These are some of the objectives toward which we have taken important steps these last two days.

The Alliance has come out of this Summit in robust health. We had some differences; we resolved them to everyone's satisfaction. Every member is a winner because of that.

The Political Declaration lays out a road map for our future relations with Eastern Europe. The approach is clear — we want Mr. Gorbachev's reforms to succeed. We have offered him an opportunity for early agreement on a Conventional Arms Agreement of historic proportions; we have agreed to SNF negotiations; we have challenged Mr. Gorbachev to match our willingness to open up our territory to aerial inspection.

This was a Summit of celebration and substance. I return to Canada reinforced in my convictions about the importance of the Alliance to Canada and of Canada's role in it." □

NATO a Cornerstone of Canadian Foreign Policy

The following is the statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the House of Commons on the occasion of NATO's 40th Anniversary, on April 4, 1989.

"I rise today to pay tribute to the 40th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizaton which has been a cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy for successive Canadian governments. What we celebrate is not only 40 years of uninterrupted peace in Europe, but also the values which brought us together then and which still unite us today.

When he signed the treaty on behalf of Canada, the Right Honourable Lester Pearson stated:

'This treaty, though born out of fear and frustration, must, however, lead to positive social, economic and political achievements which will extend beyond the time of emergency which gave it birth, or the geographic area which it now includes.'

We must keep in mind the situation prevailing at that time: fully armed Soviet troops were still stationed in Europe; the West Berlin blockade was on; a Communist takeover had just crushed Czechoslovakia's nascent democracy; and the nations of Western Europe, barely through with the war, were openly threatened by a similar fate. There is a striking contrast with the prosperous times we are experiencing today, and NATO has been and still is an essential instrument of such progress.

The unity and determination of the Alliance have often been put to the test: recurrent troubles in Eastern Europe, the uprising in Hungary, the Suez Canal crisis, the crushing of Prague's springtime demonstrations, detente in the Seventies, Afghanistan and the double decision. In every instance, NATO came through stronger and more relevant.

Today NATO provides for the common security of over 600 million people in 16 nations on both sides of the Atlantic. The modern era is marked by conflict, yet Europe, the region with the highest concentration of sophisticated weaponry in the world, is enjoying the longest sustained period of peace and stability since the height of the Holy Roman Empire. That peace was made possible through NATO's persistent commitment to pursue complementary goals: first, to maintain adequate defences to deter aggression; second, to control and limit armaments through carefully negotiated and verifiable agreements; and third, to constantly promote dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe.

Has the Alliance met the test that Lester Pearson set for it 40 years ago? Has it led to positive social, economic and political achievements? Is it more than just a military alliance? Clearly, the answer is 'yes' to all questions.

It was through NATO in 1972 that we and our Allies set down our objectives for the conference on security and cooperation in Europe. Through that process, we have secured from the Soviet Union, and its East European Allies, real commitments in human rights, economic cooperation and military security. Today, in the East, there is greater respect for the rights of individuals, greater freedom to travel to visit friends or relatives and greater freedom to worship, That progress would not have been made without the tenacity with which the allies pressed the East to extend to their publics the privileges and rights which we take for granted.

We are at an historic juncture now. The two superpowers have agreed to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. Significant progress has been made on a treaty to reduce by approximately 50 percent the size of their strategic nuclear arsenals. A new sense of purpose has been injected into their efforts to control and ultimately ban chemical weapons. And perhaps most important of all, new negotiations to reduce conventional forces in Europe are under way in Vienna. With imagination and good will on both sides, we have every reason for optimism.

Europe is enjoying the longest sustained period of peace and stability since the height of the Holy Roman Empire

President Gorbachev is claiming credit for much of this success and certainly he deserves a good deal of credit. After all, he is redefining the Soviet Union. However, it is important to remember that President Gorbachev has been responding to ideas and proposals originally made by the West. He has been responding to the unity and to the fidelity to Western values which are at the heart of the success of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Every Canadian of good will celebrates the changes that are appearing in the Soviet Union and in parts of Eastern Europe. They represent the kind of genuine progress toward the social, economic and political achievement that Mr. Pearson described. The challenge is for NATO to continue to bring down the tensions between East and West and to continue to build up confidence and cooperation. That will require the same unity and determination which have allowed the NATO alliance to contribute so strongly to the progress so far.

Some have suggested that Canada should step aside from the responsibilities of membership in this Western alliance. Had we stepped aside before, NATO would not have been able to contribute as constructively to the progress the world sees now. Canada has many means to influence peace in the world. One of those, which has worked for 40 years, and is essential to continued progress in East-West relations, is the NATO alliance whose anniversary we mark today.

NATO has been good for Europe, good for North America and good for Canada. This government is committed to ensuring that Canada continues to play a full and leading role in NATO in helping to shape a new era in East-West relations." □

Canada to Host Seismic Workshop

From 9-15 September 1989, Canada will host a workshop of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) associated with the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. Meeting in Edmonton and proceeding to Yellowknife, the GSE will discuss technical matters related to detection of seismic events, satellite data communications, and data base management and processing facilities. In addition to these technical matters, the GSE will discuss other arrangements for the second large-scale experiment of a communications and data processing infrastructure scheduled for 1990 and for which the overall (global) coordinator is the senior Canadian representative to the GSE, Mr. Peter Basham of the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources.

Agreed arrangements for the international exchange of seismic data would be needed to verify a complete ban on nuclear testing. The mandate of the GSE is to define the characteristics of a system that would provide such data exchange with a reliability and speed acceptable to all parties to a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Continuing the well-established cooperation between the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs and the Geological Survey of Canada of the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, the workshop will also provide a suitable occasion for the opening of the recently upgraded Yellowknife Seismic Array. The presentations will include a detailed summary of some particularly interesting research being conducted at the University of Toronto under sponsorship of the Verification Research Unit and under the scientific supervision of Energy, Mines and Resources. □

Crise de crédibilité

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" of the international community. Constituted in its present form in 1978, it meets in Geneva and has a unique relationship with the United Nations. It is not a subsidiary body of the General Assembly and defines its own rules of procedure and develops its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations made by the General Assembly.

The following are excerpts from the statement by Mr. Fred Bild, Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs, Department of External Affairs, before the Conference on Disarmament, June 20, 1989, Geneva.

"Mr. President. It is time we took stock of the multilateral arms control and disarmament process. It seems to me that we may be approaching a *crise de crédibilité* with our publics in the way disarmament issues are dealt with on an international level. No one doubts the dedication, patience and integrity of the people who study, discuss and negotiate these matters on behalf of their countries. But, in the best tradition of self-criticism, perhaps we should see whether, in the ceaseless round of discussions, meetings, deliberations and negotiations in the various multilateral forums dedicated to disarmament issues, we are not somehow engaged in a faster and faster dance rather than in the process of advancing the dialectic. Instead of attempting to achieve a higher level of unity by reconciling opposites and revealing the truths of the underlying idea, it may seem to the man in the street that the dance just swirls on, frenetically. I don't wish to overtax this metaphor, but it seems somehow an appropriate way of interpreting events of the last while.

Many of the distinguished representatives present here at the Conference on Disarmament will have shared my disappointment at the failure of last year's UNSSOD III to achieve agreement. At what point does the failure to reach



Mr. Fred Bild, Assistant Deputy Minister, Political and International Security Affairs, Department of External Affairs.

agreement at large, highly publicized meetings begin to call the effort itself into question? The paucity of results at most recent meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in the wake of the disappointing outcome of UNSSOD III, cannot help but feed the public's scepticism as to the value of these meetings.

Against this, we have witnessed the gratifying thaw in East-West relations. The superpower relationship seems well poised to reach further accommodation in creating a framework of mutual security. Recent developments in the conventional force reduction negotiations just underway in Vienna have shown dramatically what can be achieved among sovereign states when the spirit of compromise infuses and directs disparate political wills. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) talks will be no Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR). Agreement was forged in a setting where all joined in a quest for a common position from which to address the largest security transition since the end of the Second World War. They are embarking on a venture that seeks to supplant the military confrontation in central Europe with defensive systems restructured into few units with regulated and reduced offensive capabilities.

Although these are early days, the commitment by the NATO countries, led by President Bush's suggestion for an accelerated timetable to get moving in negotiations with Warsaw Treaty Organization (WPO) member states gives one hope that disarmament is not the preserve of only the utopian and the idealist. What we are seeing is the effort of the pragmatist to translate noble aspirations into reality. It is the pragmatist who sees the pay-off in disarmament, not just in its promised economic benefits but also in a heightened sense of security — mutual security. The relevance of these comments to the present meeting, Mr. President, is that we are watching in Vienna an unfolding of a multilateral arms control and disarmament process which promises to refute those who argue that only in bilateral arrangements can a country work out a satisfactory security relationship with a potential adversary.

We must also recognize, however, that the quest for disarmament should not be too far in advance of what relevant political conditions can sustain. Until those conditions are dealt with, until, that is, determination is shown by all parties involved to bring their mutual understanding and political accommodation to a level where practical steps toward arms control or actual disarmament can take place, our sights must be lowered somewhat to the level of confidence-building. It is still pertinent to recall the familiar observation that one must learn to walk before one can begin to run.

The achievement of the Stockholm Conference provided a salutary lesson in this regard. The accord reached in September 1986 on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe ushered in an era of greater transparency and openness between military blocs without excluding the neutral and non-aligned states of the region. In so doing, it set the stage for the Conventional Force Reductions we all hope will be the outcome of the CFE negotiations. If these actually manage to bring about the destruction of military equipment before international observers, as proposed, we shall finally have achieved multilateral disarmament without any lessening of security. There is another aspect to the legacy of Stockholm we must not forget: it successfully incorporated short-notice challenge inspection to verify compliance with the provisions of

the Agreement. The acceptance of such powerful verification measures in support of greater transparency in military activities has provided us with a practical, workable recipe for building confidence on a multilateral basis.

Mr. President, verification and transparency are two subjects that have formed a central part of the Canadian Government's approach to multilateral arms control and disarmament. They are central elements in the building of confidence and consensus. It will come as no surprise, I am sure, to the distinguished representatives to this Conference that verification ranks high in our priorities. Canada has endeavoured through its Verification Research Programme to contribute in an effective way to the very foundation of modern arms control. Some of the studies we have initiated have looked at technical problems associated with various methods of verification, while others have sought to clarify the conceptual basis of verification, bearing in mind that much will depend on the type of arms control and disarmament to be verified. Ambassador Marchand's Plenary statement last March illustrated this approach through mention of the projects we have pursued in the past and those we are currently pursuing. I shall not repeat them in detail here.

I should like, however, to add several points on verification as it pertains to multilateral arms control and disarmament. In 1985, attention was initially focussed on this subject in the UN General Assembly through a Canadian initiative which led to the adoption by consensus of a Resolution (40/152 (o)) which crystallized the increasing worldwide awareness of the importance of verification in facilitating the negotiating process. Since then, this awareness has grown and become more sophisticated. For example, the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) during 1987 and 1988 developed a set of general principles of verification. We call them 'the 16 principles.' The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 43 called for a study by the Secretary-General on the role of the UN in verification. This led to the setting up of a Group of Experts from 20 countries who started their work in February this year. They paid me the honour of electing me Chairman; I, in turn, have pledged to the group that I shall spare no effort in guiding our work to a fruitful conclusion.

The Group's acceptance of the 16 principles as a foundation for its work was a positive development. As one might well expect, the exact nature of our recommendations cannot be determined at this early stage of our work. But progress so far has been good, and I remain optimistic that we shall produce a report that is technically competent, politically realistic and one which will strengthen the multilateral arms control process and the United Nations itself.

Allow me at this point to offer some thoughts on how multilateral verification and the quest for greater transparency and openness surrounding military activi-

Acceptance of 16 principles of verification a positive development

ties can come together to build confidence. Last month, President Bush unveiled a proposal for 'Open Skies.' It would involve, as the name suggests, opening a country's national airspace to short-notice overflights by unarmed aircraft, on the basis of reciprocity. The proposal has been laid out in bilateral terms, involving the territories of the United States and the Soviet Union. President Bush, however, clearly indicated that the proposal could easily be reworked to include member states of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. At the moment, 'Open Skies' is seen as a confidence-building measure independent of any specific arms control or disarmament agreement. It seeks to improve transparency and openness in a way that is accessible to all countries. Highly sophisticated satellite technology would not be required. Nor would any information be gathered that would not be similarly available to other countries, especially in the area of most concern to all: military preparations for surprise attack and offensive action... .

Over the past two years, agreement has been reached on vitally important issues relating to verification, methods and timetables for CW destruction, and declarations in advance of a treaty. The next few steps — hammering out the details — will not by their very nature give the appearance of dramatic progress. But appearances cannot be a substitute for real, if slower and more arduous, headway in completing the draft Convention before us. The key lies in keeping the negotiations free from artificial deadlines and from the inclination to force issues ahead of what consensus can sustain. Progress over the next session will be step-by-step and will depend on appropriate attention to detail. I commend the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel, in facilitating this progress through his well-focussed and practical work programme.

Mr. President, we must not lose sight of the fact that the sixteen verification principles agreed by consensus at the UNDC constitute the cornerstone of an emerging common approach to disarmament. Accordingly, this consensus must be protected and nourished to allow its roots to sink deeply into the multilateral disarmament process. Naturally, these roots, as they develop, will become more intertwined and complex, but this is true of any firmly established system. We should not be dismayed at the prospect of complexity in verification. The question is how we can carry out practically and effectively that which has been agreed to in principle and by all member States of the Conference.

In the modern age, arms control and disarmament have become, to the surprise of some, perhaps, increasingly reliant on short-notice, on-site inspection. The feature is found in the USA/Soviet Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, as well as in the multilateral Stockholm accord on confidence- and security-building measures. Both agreements have been successfully implemented and fully complied with, a result, I would argue, to a large measure attributable to the possibility of such inspections.

Allow me to amplify these remarks by applying them to the draft chemical weapons convention. I find it difficult to

imagine that any future disarmament treaties can be reached without the prospect of potentially intrusive international verification. Should this be alarming or a cause for disquiet? Not at all. We should always bear in mind that no verification measures will come into play without their being carefully tailored to the requirements of the treaty at hand. Moreover, cooperation and consensus over these details will make the intrusiveness of international on-site inspection into a means of assuring all concerned that the treaty is being fully complied with by all parties.

No verification measures will come into play without their being carefully tailored to the requirements of the treaty at hand

I have heard it suggested that in the case of the CW Convention, requests for challenge inspections would generate political sensitivities and suggestions of guilt. This outlook misconstrues the objective of such inspections. They need not be regarded as provocative, but rather confidence-inspiring. Until such time as experience and technology permit more systematic methods of inspection to carry the full load of verification, I submit that challenge inspections will be *de rigueur* in virtually all disarmament treaties, the CW Convention being one of the more prominent. What we could be encountering is an 'attitudinal' problem, a problem that can be overcome as long as we keep our eyes firmly on the following: first, an essential concern of the Convention is to ensure that international inspectors have access to any facility where clandestine activities might be undertaken; second, the essential obligation is on the challenged state to demonstrate its compliance, and not on the requesting state to prove non-compliance.

As we have all indicated an abiding interest in a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable CW Convention, this objective in regard to verification should be fully embraced, with the obligations willingly, indeed cheerfully, shouldered. There is thus no reason to shrink back in fear. Since we have already agreed with the UNDC conclusion that the request for inspection not carry with it implications of guilt but rather be considered a normal element of verification, let us put this 'attitudinal' problem behind us and move to a more practical, less anxious understanding of what challenge inspections imply.

By the same token, we should not venerate challenge inspections as the 'be-all and end-all' of CW verification. Careful thought should be given to elaborating a verification régime that would avoid unnecessary recourse to the challenge provision. Indeed, we can also explore other avenues, perhaps by making challenge inspections as 'routine' as possible; by keeping them as multilateral as possible in execution and reporting of findings; and by allowing as much flexibility as possible in solving compliance problems to everybody's satisfaction through other means. These could include, *inter alia*, mutually agreed bilateral measures, fact-finding 'clarification visits' or other means of demonstrating clarification short of invoking the challenge provisions. I have every confidence that, with ingenuity and perseverance the Ad Hoc Committee will find a way to accommodate the concern over intrusive on-site challenge inspection *without* jeopardizing the integrity of the 'mandatory, short-notice' principle.

Let me now turn to the issue of a comprehensive test ban. Ambassador Marchand outlined Canada's position in his March statement. We consider Ambassador Vejvoda's compromise proposal as the one which offers the greatest promise of a basis for consensus. We look forward to hearing from those who have remained silent in that regard.

But let us again step back for a moment and survey the scene as we end the second disarmament decade. Here we are, on the one hand, stalemated in reaching agreement on a mandate which would allow us to discuss the important issue of a nuclear test ban. All of us have indicated, at one time or another, either unreservedly or with qualifications, our belief that a negotiated comprehensive nuclear test ban is desirable and achievable. Realism, however, suggests that we cannot allow our expectations on a ban to outstrip what is politically feasible or technically achievable. Again, the need for candour brings us to an uncomfortable prospect: that achieving a test ban, even if it could be done overnight, may not prevent the development of nuclear explosive devices and their possible use in a future conflict, regardless of their being untested. Looking this squarely in the eye is indeed disconcerting.

We in Canada can well understand the frustration of many states at the slow progress in achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but we do not think that it is wise to try to resolve this issue through the back door, so to speak. As you all know, there is an active move afoot to amend an existing treaty — the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) — to achieve a CTBT. Those who favour this course should consider carefully the longer term implications of this move for the whole multilateral disarmament process. Forcing arms control and disarmament treaties to be opened-up for radical amendment is a dangerous game, especially if there is no pre-existing consensus for this among the treaty's signatories. The very future of the existing agreement may be placed in jeopardy. Even more disconcerting is the apparent readiness of at least some to tie this call for a PTBT amendment conference to the future continuation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Any such efforts should be firmly resisted. I cannot think of a better example of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. To threaten to bring down the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation régime in the quest for an amendment which, however well intentioned, in reality gives no promise of producing a global, comprehensive and verifiable test ban is, quite simply, irresponsible.

What we *can* do, however, is to remain relentless and single-minded in preparing the ground for a test ban. Until such time as the nuclear powers are persuaded that a ban is in their security interests, pleas for negotiations will fall on stony ground. Yet this is no excuse for being unprepared when circum-

stances change, as I am hopeful they will. The trepidation the nuclear powers and the rest of us will undoubtedly feel in taking tentative steps into the *post*-nuclear weapons era will largely be assuaged by assurances that no one is cheating. That is why improvement and refinement of our ability to monitor adequately such a ban should remain paramount on the multilateral disarmament agenda. We need to continue energetically experimentation with, and testing of, seismic data exchanges. Only by improving the expertise and coordination with which seismic events can be globally monitored will a level of verification be reached that is comforting and assuring to all. Let us not be caught in a position where the nuclear powers are ready to call a halt to their testing but the required verification instruments are not yet in place.

Mr. President. The prevention of an arms race in outer space is something that we all wish to achieve. The march of technology is relentless: more and more countries are developing know-how and the means to send rockets with satellites, space probes and other scientific instruments into space. Our task is to try and assure our publics that these activities, even ones carried out under military auspices, are for purposes that contribute to, not detract from, international security.

But before a start can be made in this regard, we must know what international security means as it relates to the uses of space. International security, as Ambassador Marchand has recently pointed out, implies not only the absence of weapons as such in outer space, it entails the responsibility of the two major space powers to maintain a stable, controlled relationship between themselves on space issues. This means that all efforts to consider the relationship between international security and outer space are predicated on the enhancement of stability. It is our job to identify measures concerning the use of outer space that can be taken on a multilateral basis and through consensus, and that will enhance stability, admittedly a daunting task. That is all the more reason to ensure that the first step provides a strong building block from which further proposals can proceed.

A general view of the Conference on Disarmament in plenary session. UN Photo 163792

Let me reiterate the contention already put forward by the Canadian Delegation. Much more attention has to be given to the basic framework involved in the use of space. The current régime on outer space, comprising a number of international agreements and treaties, can be strengthened: we can search for agreement on the definition of key terms, clarify the issue of stability and, in general, thereby set up a solid foundation to guide our work in the coming years. We could make a start, for example, in applying principles of transparency to activities in space by urging more States to sign the Registration Convention and by persuading the parties to the Registration Convention to agree to provide more timely and specific information on the functions of the satellites they launch, including whether specific satellites are intended to fulfil civilian, military or combined functions.

As I am sure you are all aware, Canada is ready and eager to move forward on the negotiation of a treaty banning radiological weapons. We have had a draft before us for many years now. Yet any possibility of advance has been sidetracked by issues which, while important in themselves, are not, in our estimation, fundamental to reaching agreement on banning a new form of weapons of mass destruction. We need not reiterate the arguments that have brought us to this impasse: rather, let us stand back and put things in their proper perspective. What will this impasse do to all our other endeavours? Will it not undermine the credibility of the multilateral process?

Fortunately, radiological weapons do not at present exist. Simple logic would dictate that now is the time to prevent their future development by agreeing to a comprehensive and effective ban. To some, it may seem a hollow victory that a weapon that does not exist is being prohibited. But look at the other examples of international treaties that have sought, implicitly, if not explicitly, to cut off a potential development before it can take root. We have examples before us: the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Seabed Treaty, the Environmental Modification Treaty.

On a bilateral basis, the ABM Treaty prevents the development, testing and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and their components, whether based on current or future technological principles. Many states would concur that blocking the unilateral deployment of ABM systems through this Treaty constitutes a cornerstone of nuclear arms control between the superpowers and helps give the whole process its legitimacy. I would argue that a treaty on radiological weapons would contribute in a similar fashion to the legitimacy, as

well as the credibility, of the multilateral disarmament process and should be viewed from this more positive perspective.

Mr. President, it strikes me that the forward strides the USA and USSR are beginning to make bilaterally in arms control and disarmament, and those which we may yet see over the next year in the multilateral process at Vienna, serve both as an encouragement to the work being done here in Geneva and as a strict reminder that the international spotlight may focus even more directly on the Conference on Disarmament as a result. We have received a taste of this kind of attention over the past year as world concern mounted over the use of chemical weapons. Similarly, international anxiety is bound to keep growing over arms build-ups in numerous regions of the world, over new types of weapons, new areas of deployment (including outer space), and over the renewed use of weapons we had long hoped would never be used again. The world will thus ask this body pointed questions and will expect it to offer meaningful results.

Yet, we must protect the multilateral arms control and disarmament process from excessive demands, remembering the old adage that the best is often the enemy of the good. We cannot ask the arms control process to resolve all the problems, or carry all the burden of existing political differences. Mr. President, let us work assiduously to allow the CD to begin achieving what in principle it ought to be able to achieve: maintenance and enhancement of the credibility of the multilateral disarmament process. We cannot let this credibility slip away." □

Canada Addresses Conference on Disarmament

The following is the text of the Statement by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand before the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on March 7, 1989.

"In this, my initial plenary statement of the current session, I would like to begin by stressing that Canada shares the generally hopeful assessment, already expressed by most preceding speakers, that our session is being held at a particularly propitious time, a period when new, encouraging prospects appear to be opening up in international relations, including in the disarmament field. Here I would begin by recalling the generally positive atmosphere that was attached to the Third Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD III), even though it ended without agreement on a substantive final document. This positive atmosphere was even more perceptible in the First Committee at the United Nations General Assembly 43 (UNGA 43), which Canada had the honour to chair. When the representative of the USSR addressed the final meeting of the First Committee on November 30th on behalf of the group of socialist states, I suspect he spoke for us all when he noted that, as never in the past, the Committee's work had been promoted by a positive international political climate. Whereas the number of resolutions and decisions adopted increased over UNGA 42, so also had the number of consensus resolutions. The next major development was, of course, the January Paris Conference on the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Final Declaration of which was officially presented to us on February 7th by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Roland Dumas. Most importantly, there was the successful conclusion last month of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting of the CSCE. This included the major decision to open two new negotiations relating to conventional armed forces in Europe. Little wonder that we should, therefore, be beginning our work for this session with heightened expectations of further progress.

That being noted, however, we should not allow too great a sense of euphoria to blind us to the very difficult outstanding issues that still confront us in relation to each of the eight substantive items on our agenda. When I first spoke in plenary, last year, on March 10th, I emphasized that for Canada a fundamentally important element which must characterize both the bilateral process and our multilateral work is effective verification, to be achieved through efficient, agreed implementation mechanisms. I further suggested that, to maintain confidence in compliance, precise and often intrusive verification provisions are a necessary and central element of viable, politically sustainable arms control and disarmament agreements. That is still our view, a view which I hope all of us share. If this is so, then all of us must also agree that, particularly in the context of our ongoing work on a Chemical Weapons Convention, we must give intensified effort to resolving outstanding issues to formulate verification measures which will be both practical and effective.

Mr. President, in a few moments time I shall speak further and in greater detail about some of our specific concerns relating to Chemical Weapons, Outer Space and a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. But before doing so, I would like to support our colleagues Ambassador Von Stulpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany in his plea, delivered on February 16th and Ambassador Rivero of Peru, in his suggestion on February 28th, that we consider focussing our work somewhat more on those aspects of it where lie the best chances of making genuine progress. I realize, of course, that each of the items on our programme of work has its own intrinsic value. Moreover, there is none among those items that does not find particular support among at least some of the countries which participate in our work. Nevertheless, because of their subject matter, in some cases, or because of the views about them held by some countries in other cases, not all are equally amenable to further productive negotiation at this stage. Perhaps we should, therefore, spend more of our collective time and efforts, both of which

are clearly finite and are already stretched almost to the breaking point, on areas such as a Chemical Weapons Convention, where we are slowly but surely progressing and where virtually the entire international community of sovereign states has specifically requested that we redouble our efforts.

We should spend more of our time on areas where we are progressing

For these same reasons, Mr. Chairman, I also share Ambassador Von Stulpnagel's reservations about any possible expansion in the number of items with which we are seized. No doubt there are other subjects of importance to which the Conference on Disarmament could give attention; but not, I would suggest, until we have been successful in disposing of at least some of those already on our plates.

Now, Mr. President, I would like to address in more detail three among our agenda items which are of particular concern to Canada: items 1, 4 and 5. I shall speak only briefly about item 1, a Nuclear Test Ban. It is a subject where the views of all among us have already been clearly stated; moreover, it is one where responsibility for real movement forward lies ultimately with the nuclear weapons states. It is they who must be persuaded that a regime providing for a comprehensive ban on testing can be in their own national security interest. They also must have a key role in determining the possibilities for devising verification measures in which we all can have real confidence. To this end, it is important that the bilateral dialogue and joint experimentation on nuclear test verification between the USA and the USSR continue and that it make progress toward further agreed test limitations. In the meantime, other states which strongly favour a comprehensive test ban, such as Canada, must do what they can to advance this process.

One area, in which we have considered for many years that we could make a national contribution of genuine worth, has been the area of verification. This commitment was re-emphasized by the Government of Canada in December of 1986 when, in response to one of the recommendations in an earlier joint Canadian House of Commons and Senate Committee Report supporting the need for adequate means of verification as a way of pursuing arms control, the Government confirmed that 'through the work of the Verification Research Unit' of the Department of External Affairs it would be 'advancing practical suggestions for verification procedures.' Many of you will already have seen some of the numerous papers and research documents in various fields that we have already produced and circulated to you.

Of particular relevance to our work in relation to agenda item 1 was our participation in the International Seismic Data Exchange experiment that was conducted late in 1984. We followed that up with a workshop on the exchange of Seismic Waveform Data held in Ottawa in October 1986. Since then we have been devoting part of our resources, along with other Canadian governmental agencies, to upgrading and modernizing the Yellowknife Seismic Array, an internationally recognized facility which, when that modernization programme is completed later this year, will constitute a world-class facility which we hope will serve as a prototype for other international stations to be developed to participate in an International Seismic Data Network.

In one of my plenary statements last year, in which I had also referred to the Yellowknife Seismic Array, I mentioned that, in the autumn of this year Canada would be hosting a technical workshop in Yellowknife. Members of the GSE (Group of Seismological Experts) will be invited to the official opening of the Array at that time. The occasion will include reporting on the discussion of Canadian research on nuclear test ban verification, as well as informal discussions of preparations for the forthcoming large-scale data exchange experiment which is being coordinated by the Canadian representative to the GSE. In fact the Canadian representative will be extending the invitation to participants at its present meeting, scheduled from March 16-17.

Mr. Chairman, before leaving the subject of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), I would be remiss not to say something, also, about the proposal to convene an amending conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), with the objective of somehow finding agreement to convert it into a CTB. Clearly such a conference could be convened (I understand that at least 34 among the required 38 requests have already been received by the depositories). But to what avail? It is evident that amendment of the PTBT as proposed will not obtain the assent of all three of the nuclear states who are original parties to the Treaty, as required for any amendment to come to effect. Moreover, not all among the present nuclear powers are parties to the treaty. For this and other reasons, including difficult issues such as CTB verification which remain to be resolved, we in Canada, therefore, see little benefit in such an exercise. Further, we remain convinced that direct negotiations constitute the only practical means of achieving a comprehensive, genuinely verifiable test ban. We at the Conference on Disarmament might make our best contribution by reaching agreement on a mandate for establishing an ad hoc Committee. There are practical things we could be doing, and Canada would welcome our beginning to work in this area, on the basis of the suggested mandate in CD/863 of August 23rd, 1988, as proposed by our former colleague, Czechoslovakian Ambassador Vejvoda.

Now, Mr. President, let me turn to our agenda item 5, on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It seems to us that, in our consideration of item 5 we are perhaps too often overly selective in our focus. Given the importance of the use of space for the present and future development of mankind, it is clearly of particular importance for us to give serious thought to one very broad and somewhat imprecise issue—namely, the relationship between international security, on the one hand, and the uses of space, on the other. Both of the two elements that comprise this relationship deserve greater conceptual thought, as does the relationship itself.

International security in this context relates not only to the absence of weapons as such in outer space. The

responsibility of the two major space powers, both to themselves and to the rest of us, is to maintain a stable controlled relationship between themselves. We, in the multilateral area, must not forget this point. That is why this Delegation has emphasized both that we must take great care to ensure that the results of our work will enhance stability, rather than detract from it, and that our negotiations complement the bilateral negotiations that are taking place between the two major space powers.

We must also consider the actual use being made of outer space. Until recently, space activities have been effectively dominated by the two major space powers. They have allocated huge resources and developed revolutionary technologies with the goal of managing their strategic relationship to which I have just referred. That situation is, however, now changing everyday. One of the specific challenges for the multilateral disarmament world will be not only to put technological developments in space to good use but, even more important, to come to a common understanding as to what such 'good use' is.



Map of nuclear test sites. The Yellowknife seismograph array is within 10,000 km of all principal underground nuclear explosion test sites.

The point of the foregoing, Mr. President, is to underline our contention that the ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should give much more attention to the basic framework involved in the use of space: to strengthen the current regime, to agree on the definition of key terms, to clarify the issue of stability and, in general, thereby to set up a solid foundation to guide our work in the coming years. I would further contend that this is one area where multilateral efforts would be particularly appropriate.

This exhortation, that we seek better to set out the essential parameters of our work in this field, is not to say that the ad hoc Committee (once it is established) should not also focus on particular questions. In that regard, we in Canada continue to believe, with respect to the Registration Convention, that it would be a helpful confidence-building measure were the Parties to provide more timely and specific information concerning the functions of the satellites they launch, including whether specific satellites are intended to fulfil civilian, military or combined functions.

Mr. President, as a member of the Conference on Disarmament with a special interest in progress in this field, and as, moreover, this year's coordinator for the Western Group, we in the Canadian delegation had hoped that the ad hoc Committee on item 5 could have been established this time with a minimum of procedural wrangling. This has not proved to be so, but my delegation regards the attention being given to this item as hopeful indication of our shared desire to look seriously at what is involved in the prevention of an arms race in outer space and, through our collective work, make some gains in pursuit of that objective.

Before I leave this item, Mr. President, I would like to inform the Conference that our Verification Research Unit has already completed the preparation of a single volume Outer Space compedium covering all the statements made during the course of our 1988 sessions and including all the working papers that were issued. This document, which we hope will prove a useful working tool and point of reference for our future use, was distributed by the Secretariat on February 28th under cover of CD/891 of February 22nd.

Finally, Mr. President, let me turn to the fourth subject on our agenda, Chemical Weapons. Here too we have papers to distribute, which we hope will also prove useful to you. One is the first issue in a new series which we will be preparing of arms control verification occasional papers. It is entitled 'International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Observations on Lessons for Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention.' Others among these occasional papers will be issued periodically. They are primarily intended for a specialist audience, and they represent the results of selected independent research undertaken for our Verification Research Programme. For this reason, the views expressed in them are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent

those of the Canadian Government. The second set of papers we have to distribute is a three volume compendium on Chemical Weapons covering our 1988 Session. The volumes cover (a) Plenary statements (PV), (b) Plenary Working Papers (WP) and (c) Ad Hoc Committee Papers (CD/CW/WP). I would draw to your attention that several Ad Hoc Committee Papers which were tabled after the close of the 1988 formal session in September 1988 are not included in the third volume. We hope to receive these volumes from Canada any day now and will distribute them to you soon afterwards.

This leads me, Mr. President, to the more substantive remarks on our work on Chemical Weapons with which I would like to conclude this statement. Essentially, they comprise a reiteration of some of our long-standing concerns about difficult aspects of our work that, nevertheless, must be resolved if ever we are to succeed. As I have already stated, probably the single most important task before us, without which we can never hope to find broad support for any convention, is to establish an agreed and effective verification framework. In the words of the Paris Conference Final Declaration, the convention must be 'global and comprehensive and effectively verifiable.' In our view, to be effective, the verification regime must be practical. It must use resources efficiently and at tolerable cost. In this context, you may recall that on March 31st last year Canada circulated CD/823, a working paper which examined factors involved in determining verification inspectorate personnel and resource requirements. We are at present working on a follow-up paper, examining the cost implications of establishing an inspectorate, which we hope to be able to provide to you later this year. Again, our purpose is to advance the process of discussing this crucial aspect of our work on verification in the Chemical Weapons Convention context.

If we are to make further progress, it will be important for us to come to grips with those important problems which still lie ahead that have a political as well as technical dimension. One is Challenge Inspections: here, notwithstanding what appears to be a general acceptance, at least in principle, of this concept, a number of states still seem to have difficulties in accepting the degree of intrusion which will be needed to make challenge inspection an effective verification measure. Another thorny issue is that of the composition of and the powers to be assigned to the proposed Executive Council. Here we will have to reach agreement among a number of hard choices about the degree of authority this organ will require in order to supervise implementation of the Convention and how to hold it accountable for its actions. How to select its members has also still to be settled. There remain still other problems. Articles X and XI are particularly sensitive, but solutions that fully respect the concerns of the various participants in the negotiations on them ought to be available. It will be a matter of making the necessary choices, keeping in mind that our overall objective is an effective convention. On undiminished security during the transition period, the problem is different: we do not yet have sufficiently clear ideas of what the concerns of some among us about this matter really are. But, if we can resolve related outstanding issues respecting the principles and order of destruction, surely some of those concerns will be alleviated. Another different but still difficult issue is that of confidentiality. It is of special interest for countries with highly developed chemical industries operating in a highly competitive international environment, and whose legitimate commercial concerns must be taken into account.

There are other aspects of our work on a Chemical Weapons Convention which can best be dealt with by experts. Perhaps the most important issues in this sense relate to definitions and criteria under Article II and to the content and number of the schedules to be required under Article VI. Among those inputs required from legal experts there are two of particular concern to Canada. One is the need for us to consider the meaning of the phrase 'jurisdiction and control,' a phrase that gives rise to issues of extra-territoriality. Canada would prefer that this phrase be deleted from the text and that more specific wording could be found to describe a signatory's obligations. Another relates to Article XII, where for now I will merely recall the Canadian suggestion, made last August, that this separate article may not in fact be required.

Another important point I wish to register relates to suggestions which have been made, here and at the Paris Con-



The Conference on Disarmament meets at the Palais des Nations *in Geneva, the European office of the United Nations. Before the Second World War, the* Palais des Nations *was the headquarters of the League of Nations and the scene of a number of historic events.*

UN Photo 1365

ference, to the effect that conclusion of a Convention on chemical weapons should be conditional on progress in nuclear arms control. The Canadian Government emphatically disagrees. A complete ban on chemical weapons is desirable in itself. It is, in the Canadian view, in the interest of countries of all regions. It should not be conditional on progress in other areas.

Mr. President, my list of outstanding 'difficult' issues is by no means exhaustive. Nor is it intended in any way to downplay the importance of others which I have not cited. My purpose has been, rather, to remind us that more than mere good will and the intention to work harder will be required from us if we are to make the sort of progress at this session which both UNGA 43 and the Paris Conference have called for.

Mr. President, in concluding, I am pleased to be able to tell the Conference that Canada will be joining those member states that have already carried out or plan to carry out test inspections. We will provide the results as soon as they become available." □

Verification Research Programme Hosts Seminar

On June 1st, 1989, the Verification Research Unit of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs, hosted a one-day seminar for NATO officers and officials, during which Canadian research relevant to the verification of a Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement was discussed. These officials were also in Canada to attend a meeting of the Verification Working Group of the NATO High Level Task Force on Conventional Force Reductions which Canada hosted at Collège St-Jean, May 28-31, 1989. Held at the National Arts Centre in Ottawa, the seminar enabled the Verification Research Unit to demonstrate some of the expertise which has been generated in Canada since the inception of its Verification Research Programme.

The day began with a briefing from Spar Aerospace on Space-based Remote Sensing as a potential contributor to CFE Verification. The briefing drew heavily upon the PAXSAT "B" project which envisages the use of satellites for a treaty such as the CFE. It was concluded that a space-based verification system holds considerable potential as a contributing element to a multi-layered CFE verification package. Satellite verification platforms were held to be particularly effective because of their ability to cover large areas quickly, and detect anomalies which could then be fully investigated through the use of various other verification techniques. However, it was recognized that current and planned civilian satellites because of their insufficient resolution could only provide "detection" level data. It would not be until into the next century, however, that such satellites could be used in such multilateral verification.

The next presentation was jointly given by INTERA Technologies and Boeing Canada (de Havilland Division), and concentrated on the potential for the use of aircraft as verification platforms for a CFE agreement. The presenter from INTERA described that company's successful use of airborne sensing techniques to conduct land-use and resource surveys, as well as to measure heat loss from buildings over a wide area using infra-red technology, and he drew general conclusions as to how INTERA's experience might be useful in CFE verification. The presenter from de Havilland discussed the potential aircraft requirements in terms of capabilities and numbers, in order to obtain suitable coverage of the area within which the limitations are expected to occur under a CFE agreement. The de Havilland presentation focussed on the DASH 8-300 series aircraft as representative of the type of airframe most suitable for the CFE verification mission given its durability, low life-cycle cost and operational flexibility.

Following lunch and a tour of the National Arts Centre, the afternoon presentations began. The first of these was by Dr. Marc Kilgour of the Department of Mathematics at Wilfrid Laurier University. Dr. Kilgour has been working on the application of game theory to arms control verification under contract to the Verification Research Programme, and presented some tentative findings. In his presentation, Dr. Kilgour discussed the optimal allocation of inspections using mathematical modelling techniques, and concluded that an emphasis should be placed upon both the randomness of inspections and the spacing of inspections over the life of the agreement as a means of deterring (and discovering) potential violations.

The final presentation of the day was given by a representative of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), and outlined AECL's experience in verifying so-called Secure Storage Facilities. Such facilities could be important in a CFE agreement since considerable numbers of Treaty Limited Items may be stored in such areas in order to facilitate monitoring their numbers, AECL's experience with secure storage facilities stems from its responsibilities to store and safeguard spent fuel for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency under terms of Canada's Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. AECL has developed an extensive range of perimeter security and materials accounting techniques in order to fulfil these obligations, and many of these techniques could be directly relevant to CFE verification procedures.

Seminar participants were pleased with the results of the day's efforts. Several of them voiced their appreciation of the degree to which the Canadian Verification Research Programme has spawned such practical and useful research. Far more of its kind will need to be undertaken, as the challenges of verifying a Conventional Forces Agreement become clearer everyday. □

Little Progress at UN 1989 Disarmament Commission

The 1989 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) met in New York from May 8 to May 31. Discussions on various arms control and disarmament topics under the Disarmament Commission are open to participation by all 159 member states of the United Nations. The goal of the Disarmament Commission is to draft consensus reports on disarmament issues for the consideration of the UN General Assembly.

Whereas the UN General Assembly can pass non-binding resolutions by a simple majority vote, the UNDC is required to formulate its recommendations with the approval of all participating states. Some of the topics considered again this year have been examined for a decade. That progress on these items was once more absent at the 1989 session was cause for frustration among many delegations. During the closing interventions, several delegations requested that structural changes to the Disarmament Commission be examined to enhance advancement of the disarmament process. The lack of results at the 1989 session was in sharp contrast to 1988 when work on two topics, verification and confidence-building measures, was completed.

This year, the Contact Group working on a compilation of proposals for recommendations on "Nuclear Disarmament" and other priority measures on disarmament achieved agreed texts on two recommendations regarding the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) negotiations and on conventional disarmament. However, 20 of 35 proposals for recommendations that were deliberated remain without agreed texts.

Consideration of the item "Reduction of Military Budgets" remained at an impasse over the voluntary or obligatory submission by States of the UN matrix on military expenditures. Informal discussions were organized by the UNDC Chairman, Ambassador Bagbeni Adeito Nzengeya of Zaire, in an effort to find a compromise but to no avail.

Delegations involved in the debate on "South Africa's Nuclear Capability" agreed some progress was made during review of new text proposals. Advancement on this item is hindered by irreconcilable differences between delegations as to South Africa's actual nuclear capability and whether or not external assistance was available to attain that capability.

The Working Group reviewing the "Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament" managed to incorporate some material from the UNSSOD III Machinery Report in its Chairman's Working Paper. However, this paper is heavily burdened with alternate text proposals.

Examination of the "Naval Armaments and Disarmament" issue continues to be contentious. Discussions on this topic are held under the auspices of the UNDC Chairman as open-ended consultations because a working group cannot be established due to the objections of one delegation. The exchange of views on this topic between interested delegations reflected the considerable divergence of attitudes and opinions on naval disarmament and confidence-building measures.

Vigorous debate characterized the Working Group on Conventional Disarmament. Strong representations by delegations were made to emphasize many of the recommendations under consideration, including international arms transfers and disarmament and development.

Concern over the proceedings of debate on the "Third Disarmament Decade" led to the unexpected recruitment of Canada's head of delegation, Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche, as Chairman of the Contact Group examining this item. Ambassador Roche produced a draft declaration which attempted to address the desire of some delegations for a concise document and others who wanted an all-encompassing arms control and disarmament manifest. Although consensus on the declaration was not forthcoming, the draft was preserved as a Working Paper for future reference. □

Change of Editor

Following this issue, the editorship of the Disarmament Bulletin will change hands. Mr. Paul Bennett, Editor of the Bulletin since July 1987, is being posted to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and will be replaced by Ms. Shannon Selin, former Editor of the Arms Control Chronicle of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament (CCACD).

We hope our readers find our publication of interest and we welcome your comments on it. If you know of others who might benefit from receiving the Bulletin, please let us know. □

Canadians Inspect Czechoslovak Military Exercise

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, and the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Bill McKnight, announced on June 13, 1989 that Canada has addressed a request to the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to inspect a military exercise. Under the terms of the Document of the Stockholm Conference, agreed to by Canada and by Czechoslovakia in 1986, each participating State has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State, within the zone of application for the confidence- and security-building measures described in the document.

Four inspectors from the Canadian Forces will travel to Czechoslovakia on June 14, 1989 to conduct a 48-hour inspection of a military activity notified by Czechoslovakia for June 12-16, 1989. This training activity will be a command and staff exercise. The tactical setting for the field portion of the exercise will be at divisional level with a partial deployment of troops.

Mr. McKnight announced that the inspection team will be led by Colonel Ken C. Mitchell of Montreal, who is the Commanding Officer of three Canadian

Forces Technical Services Agency in Toronto. The team will fly in a Canadian Forces aircraft to Czechoslovakia on Wednesday, June 14, from Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Lahr in the Federal Republic of Germany. There, in accordance with the Stockholm Document, the team will inspect the Czechoslovakian military operations, using host nation vehicles and aircraft.

At the completion of the 48-hour period, the team will return to CFB Lahr, where it will write a report which will be forwarded to all nations who are signatories to the Stockholm Accord.

This inspection constitutes the first time Canada has availed itself of the rights granted under the Stockholm Document. It demonstrates Canada's firm commitment to the confidence- and security-building measures adopted in the Stockholm Document, and our conviction that by their implementation, these measures serve to strengthen confidence in Europe, giving expression to the duty of States to refrain from the use of force.

Numerous inspections by member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact have taken place over the past two and a half years, firmly establishing the principle that on-site inspections can be politically uncontentious and make a positive contribution to the transparency of military activity in Europe.

Under the challenge inspection provision of the Stockholm document, a reply from the receiving state is required within 24 hours of the receipt of an inspection request. Within 36 hours after the issuance of the request, the inspection team will be permitted to enter the territory of the receiving state. The inspection team consists of no more than four inspectors who are allowed 48 hours to complete their task. The receiving state supplies both ground and air transportation, as well as communications facilities to the team during the inspection. Board and lodging are also provided to the team. After the inspection is completed, a report is prepared by the inspecting state that is distributed to all CSCE participating states.

It was agreed by Ministers earlier this year that given Canada's interest and recognized expertise in the field of verification, that this country could contribute constructively to this on-going confidence-building process by conducting a challenge inspection under the provisions of the Stockholm Document. On June 12th, Canada addressed a request to the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to inspect a military exercise, notified under the terms of the Stockholm Document. The inspection of this military activity is intended to reinforce Canada's commitment to the measures of the Stockholm Document. It is our conviction that by their implementation, these measures serve to strengthen confidence in Europe, giving expression to the duty of states to refrain from the use of force. It is incumbent upon Canada to continue to play an active role in negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) working to achieve improved openness regarding military forces and their activities. Canada's experience in the field of verification, augmented by this inspection, will allow us to better contribute to the design and implementation of the means to verify future agreements. □

Departure of Ambassador for Disarmament

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, recently announced the departure of Douglas Roche on the completion of his term as Ambassador for Disarmament. Mr. Roche has served the cause of arms control and disarmament with dedication and effectiveness, Mr. Clark stated, and the Government counts on his continuing advice.

Mr. Roche was appointed to the position of Ambassador for Disarmament in October 1984. In that position, he has served each year as the Head of the Canadian Delegations to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. A highlight of his term as Ambassador for Disarmament was his successful chairmanship of the First Committee of the 43rd United Nations General Assembly in 1988.

Mr. Roche also served with distinction as Head of the Canadian Delegation to the Third Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, and as Deputy Head of the Canadian Delegations to the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in 1987 and to the Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament in 1988.

His role as the Government's principal point of contact with Canadian non-government organizations and members of the public interested in issues relating



Mr. Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament.

to arms control, disarmament, peace and security was pursued with tireless dedication and patience. It was under Mr. Roche's direction that the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs became a knowledgeable and effective mechanism for the frank exchange of views between Government officials and interested members of the public.

The nomination of a successor is expected shortly. Meanwhile, the Minister said that Mr. Roche has agreed to remain in the position until the summer, in order to facilitate the transition. □

Focus

With this issue, the Disarmament Bulletin *is launching what we hope will be a regular feature: a column for secondary school students. Your comments and suggestions for future topics are welcome.*

Verification

It's found in everyday life. . . at the hockey rink or at the bank. . . in games or in business. Everyone agrees to play fairly and if someone's caught cheating he's penalized. Some games run on the honour system; others have referees. In dealing with banks, when we get our monthly statements we're verifying how much money we have in the bank. Arms control verification works the same way, by establishing agreed ways of checking and monitoring to make sure that a country is actually doing what it says it will.

Canada's commitment to weapons reductions and limitations, leading to eventual disarmament around the world, is well known. Such goals are achieved through negotiations and treaties. But a treaty is only as strong as the faith its parties have in it. If you don't trust your bank, you won't deposit your money in it. In the absence of trust between nations, verification is essential. It's easier to believe in a treaty if you can check to make sure the other side is living up to its terms. By monitoring compliance with their agreements, countries increase their national security, because, if a treaty is adequately verified and everyone is confident of that, it's in their best interests to stick to it.

Whether an agreement is verified adequately is a difficult thing to determine. In a bank, some depositors may insist on seeing their money in the vault but most will settle for monthly statements. In arms control, determining what is adequate verification is one of the main stumbling blocks in negotiations. Some countries may believe that every single violation must be detectable, that the terms of the treaty must be one hundred percent verifiable. Others might be willing to settle for a verification regime which will be good enough to catch violations which are military significant, but not so sensitive that it can detect every minor violation. The idea here is that a verification mechanism need only catch those violations which pose a threat, because other violations don't really matter to security anyway. Obviously, the task of defining what is a militarily significant violation, as opposed to an insignificant one, is very difficult and has led to many disagreements in the past.

The actual means of verification usually involve a wide range of information-gathering systems. To monitor any given activity several of these systems can be used. The use of several reinforcing verification methods is sometimes referred to as setting up a verification gauntlet. This means that though it may be possible to fool some of the verification methods, it will be very difficult to fool them all consistently.

Verification systems include photo-reconnaissance satellites which can take pictures of things, electronic reconnaissance satellites to intercept messages, infrared detectors on satellites to sense heat emitted from man-made devices and radar which can track movement. If a nuclear blast is involved, seismographs can detect vibrations through the earth. These remote sensors are known as National Technical Means and are the primary method of verification for both the United States and the Soviet Union, because they don't violate each other's sovereignty. These two superpowers are also the only ones with enough sophisticated hardware (and money) to make National Technical Means a viable means of verification.

Other, less technical methods of verification might include on-site inspections, the use of control posts or monitoring government records and various publications. Generally speaking, these methods are much more intrusive because they tend to require actual physical access to a country's military installations. Up to now, the USSR has refused to allow such access. Things have changed in the last few years, however. During the negotiation of the Treaty to Eliminate Missiles of Intermediate or Shorter Range (the so-called INF Treaty), for example, the Soviet government showed that it is now willing to accept a much greater degree of intrusiveness than ever before. This change in Soviet attitudes towards verification is one of the most encouraging developments in arms control in recent years.

We've talked so far about verification in general. Let's now look at the important role it plays in specific arms control agreements. With regard to nuclear weapons, two of the most familiar agreements are SALT I and SALT II. SALT stands for Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. These treaties set ceilings on the numbers and types of strategic nuclear weapons systems the United States and the Soviet Union can deploy. The National Technical Means of the superpowers are the primary means of verifying the SALT treaties.

Other major treaties refer to nuclear testing. In 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed, prohibiting nuclear testing everywhere except underground. For this treaty, monitoring the ban is less of a challenge, as any atmospheric and underwater explosions are usually conspicuous. Other treaties that have been negotiated between the Americans and Soviets include the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits underground explosions of more than one hundred and fifty kilotonnes. Since 1977, many countries including Canada have advocated a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, one that would prohibit all nuclear testing, of any magnitude. By far the most effective method of verifying such an underground test ban would be to use seismic sensors. They can determine, with reasonable accuracy, the origin of a seismic event, whether it was an explosion or earthquake, and its size.

The above examples tend to demonstrate the importance of verification as it relates to bilateral arms control treaties. As the name suggests, bilateral arms control agreements are those which are reached between two parties. Another area of arms control is that which takes place in a multilateral setting. Multilateral means that several parties are involved in an arms control treaty and its verification. Multilateral arms control and verification is of special interest to Canada, as it is unlikely that we will be required to enter into any strictly bilateral arms control treaties in the foreseeable future. Let's look at some examples of multilateral arms control and discuss their verification aspects.

In the effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons and stop the arms race, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968. Under this treaty, states with nuclear weapons agreed not to transfer the technology necessary to make these weapons. In return, states without nuclear weapons agreed not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire them. Nuclear weapons nations also agreed to work towards reducing the size of their nuclear arsenals. Through its inspection system, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for verification of this treaty. Though it has several functions apart from monitoring the NPT, the IAEA is the primary agency responsible for ensuring that non-nuclear weapon states which have signed the NPT do not attempt to divert nuclear material from peaceful purposes to weapons production. The IAEA has developed several techniques for this purpose, and relies upon its ability to account for fuel and to inspect nuclear facilities to ensure that the amount of spent fuel which comes out of a nuclear reactor is consistent with the amount which went in.

The IAEA and its methods are all examples of what is known as a treaty specific verification regime. A treaty specific verification regime is one in which the authority to inspect a given site devolves from the principles and practices outlined in a specific treaty. Furthermore, the inspecting agency has the authority to look for potential violations of the treaty and no more. It is not empowered to go on general fishing expeditions designed to ferret out information on a wide variety of subjects. Thus far, only treaty specific verification organizations have been established. At present, there is no plan to establish any verification organization which would not be tied to a specific treaty, though this idea has been discussed.

Outer space is another highly sensitive issue. At present, the most important treaty dealing with this area is the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. It forbids the stationing of any nuclear weapon or any other weapon of mass destruction in space or on the moon. The Treaty itself is silent on how the ban on nuclear weapons in orbit will be verified. Current technologies to identify satellites and their purposes include ground-based telescopes and electronic listening devices. In the future, space-based sensors may also become more frequently used.

Verification has been recognized as the most significant factor in international disarmament and arms control negotiations in the last decade. Over the years, Canada's External Affairs ministers have pledged Canadian expertise to the development of verification procedures. For example, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, has said "in large measure, our survival may depend on the confidence we have in arms control agreements. This confidence must be built on reasonable assurance that the terms of the agreement are being fulfilled. We are committed to providing an intelligent opinion in arms control and disarmament negotiations. Verification is an integral part of those talks. Without it, no meaningful treaties can be negotiated." It comes back to the example of the bank. If we're sure our bank isn't mismanaging our money, we will feel safer leaving it there. We may be giving up a little control over what it's used for when we don't need it, but we know that it's safe. When we all play by the rules, we all can win the game. □

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund to June 30, 1989
Fiscal Year 1989-1990

CONTRIBUTIONS

1.	*Canadian Federation of University of Women* — essay contest	$500.00
2.	*Dr. Jules Dufour* — preparation university course	$1,900.00
3.	*Voice of Women* — UNDC orientation	$6,050.00
4.	*Peace Education Centre* — Youth for Global Awareness Conference	$4,000.00
5.	*Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament* — BMD study	$19,760.00
6.	*Science for Peace - Toronto Chapter* — University College Lectures in Peace Studies	$3,000.00
7.	*Centre de Resources sur la Non-Violence* — Research on civil non-violent defence and common security	$7,000.00
8.	*Polish-American Parliamentary Debate Institutes Canada* — Polish visit June 11 - July 8	$2,500.00
	TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS	**$44,710.00**

GRANTS

1.	*Dr. Michael Mepham* — Langage et Ideologie	$7,000.00
2.	*Canadian Student Pugwash* — annual conference	$9,488.00
3.	*William Epstein* — participation at Pugwash Symposium, Dublin, Ireland, May 5–7, 1989	$320.00
4.	*Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies* — publication of May 89 Seminar proceedings	$7,500.00
	TOTAL OF GRANTS	**$24,308.00**
	TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND GRANTS	**$69,018.00**