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COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
MEETING
VISIT TO AUSTRALIA OF
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU
PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA
1981

CONFERENCE DES CHEFS
DE GOUVERNEMENT DU COMMONWEALTH
VISITE EN AUSTRALIE DU
TRES HONORABLE
PIERRE-ELLIOTT TRUDEAU
PREMIER MINISTRE DU CANADA
1981

PREPARED BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA

PREPARE PAR
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OTTAWA



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Biographies

(August 1980)

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU

Prime Minister of Canada

Pierre Trudeau was born in Montreal in October 1919. He graduated in 1940 from Jean-de-Brébeuf College in Montreal with a bachelor of arts (honours) degree. Having graduated with honours in law from the University of Montreal, he was called to the Bar of the province of Quebec in 1943. He received a master of arts degree in political economy from Harvard University in 1945 and did postgraduate work in law, economics and political science at l'Ecole des sciences politiques in Paris and the London School of Economics.

Mr. Trudeau was subsequently employed with the Privy Council in Ottawa, and then practised law, specializing in labour law and civil liberties in the province of Quebec. In 1961 he was appointed associate professor of law at the University of Montreal, where he taught constitutional law and civil liberties, and carried out research as a member of the staff of the Institut de recherches en droit public.

Mr. Trudeau was elected to the House of Commons in 1965. He was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson in January 1966. In 1967 Mr. Trudeau was appointed Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada. In April 1968, after having been chosen as Leader of the Liberal Party, he became Prime Minister of Canada. He was re-elected in the general elections of 1972 and 1974. Following the May 1979 election, he became Leader of the Opposition. He was re-appointed Prime Minister after the general election of February 1980.

Mr. Trudeau was a delegate to the France-Canada Interparliamentary Association meetings in Paris in April 1966. In February 1967, Mr. Trudeau undertook a tour of French-speaking African states on behalf of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs to determine the role Canada should play in the formation of an association of French-speaking states. He played an important role at the 1971 Commonwealth heads of government meeting in Singapore and was host to the heads of government in Ottawa in 1973.

Mr. Trudeau has written extensively on reform in politics and the theory and practice of federalism. His articles, essays and manifestos have appeared in several Canadian and foreign publications. He is the author of *La Grève de L'amiante* and of *Le Fédéralisme et la Société canadienne française*. He was a founder of the reform review *Cité Libre*.

Mr. Trudeau married the former Margaret Sinclair in 1971. They have three sons.



Biographies

(septembre 1980)

LE TRÈS HONORABLE PIERRE-ELLIOTT TRUDEAU

Premier ministre du Canada

Né à Montréal en 1919, M. Trudeau obtient en 1940 un baccalauréat ès arts du Collège Jean-de-Brébeuf, à Montréal. Diplômé en droit de l'Université de Montréal, il est reçu au Barreau du Québec en 1943. Après avoir obtenu une maîtrise en économie politique à l'Université Harvard, il a fait ses études supérieures en droit, en économie et en sciences politiques à l'École des sciences politiques de Paris et à la London School of Economics.

Ses études terminées, il est fonctionnaire au Bureau du Conseil privé à Ottawa, après quoi il exerce le droit au Québec, surtout dans les domaines du droit ouvrier et des libertés civiles. En 1961, il est nommé professeur adjoint à la Faculté de droit de l'Université de Montréal, où il enseigne le droit constitutionnel et les droits de l'homme. Il entreprend aussi divers travaux de recherche à l'Institut de recherches en droit public de cette université.

M. Trudeau est élu à la Chambre des communes en 1965. Il est nommé secrétaire parlementaire du Premier ministre Lester B. Pearson en janvier 1966. En avril 1967, il devient ministre de la Justice et Procureur général du Canada. En avril 1968, après avoir été élu chef du Parti libéral, il devient Premier ministre du Canada. Il est réélu à l'élection générale d'octobre 1972 et à celle de juillet 1974. En mai 1979, il devient chef de l'Opposition, et après l'élection générale de février 1980, il redevient Premier ministre.

Au mois d'avril 1966, M. Trudeau fait partie de la délégation canadienne aux réunions de l'Association interparlementaire France-Canada tenues à Paris. En février 1967, il entreprend une tournée des États francophones d'Afrique, au nom du Premier ministre et du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, afin de déterminer comment le Canada pourrait participer à la formation d'une association des pays de langue française. M. Trudeau a joué un rôle capital à la Conférence des chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth, tenue à Singapour en janvier 1971. Il a reçu cette même conférence à Ottawa en août 1973.

M. Trudeau a écrit abondamment sur le thème de la réforme des institutions politiques et sur la théorie et la pratique du fédéralisme. Ses articles, essais et manifestes ont paru dans plusieurs revues et journaux du Canada et de l'étranger. Il est l'auteur de *La grève de l'amiante* et d'un livre intitulé *Le fédéralisme et la société canadienne française*. Il a été l'un des fondateurs de la revue réformiste *Cité Libre*.

M. Trudeau a épousé Margaret Sinclair en 1971. Ils ont trois fils.



PRIME MINISTER'S ADDRESS

to the

HOUSE OF COMMONS

on

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

OTTAWA

June 15, 1981



Madam Speaker, it is obvious to all of us that our world has become unpredictable and unstable. We would also agree that it has become more dangerous. Mankind is living in a state of more or less extended crisis. Violence and disorder have become banal. Injustice no longer causes indignation.

This global instability has many causes. There are many more countries in the world community than there used to be, and each is vigorously asserting its own particular needs and ambitions. Economic problems and international disputes have increased in both number and severity. While the superpowers have grown stronger, they often seem to have lost control over events. We have seen international law and economic systems break down more frequently, causing people to believe that things are out of control. There is generalized condition of crisis expectation.

We usually think of crisis as a sudden shock, a surprise, a burst of violence, an invasion. Obviously, the world needs to prevent such incidents, when prevention is possible, and to contain them, when they occur.

It must be understood, however, that such incidents usually result from pent-up tension. They are the flash-points of deep-seated problems. If the world hopes to prevent such shocks, we have to deal with the basic conditions which cause them. The only effective way to manage a crisis is to go to its roots.

Unfortunately, a succession of jarring events can so monopolize the attention and energy of governments that they neglect to deal with the persistent, underlying problems in world affairs, thus guaranteeing more shocks in the future. Effective management of crises means getting at the basic causes of the conditions we deplore, and really changing them. The challenge is extremely complex and difficult, but not hopeless. If we can muster the will to do the job, it can be done.

The necessary strength of will and sense of common purpose which is required of the industrialized democracies will not likely be forged out of any perception of immediate physical danger to ourselves, posed by the anger and frustration of the suffering peoples of the world.

The starving refugee lying in the hot dust of the Sahel can scarcely summon the strength to help himself, let alone strike out at us. If his children survive, they will remember us, and with fury in their hearts, you can be sure. But that is a threat for another time. It does not frighten us into action today.

If the more powerful countries are to summon the will to respond in a more effective way, and with greater unity, to the problems of a chaotic world, it will be because of two things: first, a decision to give practical application to the human values which we in the West say we hold in common; and second, a better understanding of the less noble-sounding but no less compelling imperative of our own self-interest.

What are these values that we hold in common? Surely the most basic is freedom, the freedom of individuals and of nations, the political freedom which distinguishes East from West, the freedom of the market system upon which our economies are based. The freedom of which I speak is not an abstract concept divorced from our daily lives, or reserved for patriotic speeches on national holidays; it is the very foundation and life-giving spirit of the societies which we have built in the various countries of the West.

Within our own borders we have long realized that there can be no freedom for some without freedom for all. An assault against the basic rights of my neighbour inevitably places in jeopardy my own rights, my own security and freedom. We have little trouble accepting the truth and the implications of that statement, within our own borders.

We have more trouble in giving a modern answer to the very old question: Who is my neighbour? Is she the woman rummaging for food in the back streets of an Asian shanty town? Is he the man in South America, in prison for leading a trade union? The people dying in Africa for lack of medical care, or clean water, are they my neighbours? Or those who are dying in the spirit in the villages of India for lack of a job, or an education, or hope? Are my neighbours the children running from the sound of gunfire in the streets of Beirut?

If we, the peoples of the North, say yes, then we will act; we will act together to keep hope alive. If we say no, then they are doomed, and so are we.

The urgency of those problems constitutes one of the major reasons why this government has been eager, as has been the New Democratic Party, to arrange time for this important debate on Canada's foreign policy.

I began, Madam Speaker, by saying that we live in an unstable world, where we no longer enjoy the comfort of being able to predict future events with a fair degree of certainty. Though political and economic instability may be most visible in the Third World, we must remember that all the great problems of the world are interrelated. The problems of East-West and North-South relations, of energy, nuclear proliferation, the Atlantic alliance, the law of the sea, the environment, refugees, sporadic outbursts of violence and war—all of these form a complex of cause and effect.

There will continue to be shocks and confrontation between cultures and technology, between rich and poor, between generations, even between neighbours, as the world community attempts to live more successfully with the one predictable factor on our planet, the inevitability of constant and rapid change. That is the theme of my remarks today: the management of change, the management of the crises which change can represent.

These are troubled times for the world. Economically, the eighties and nineties will not have much in common with the fifties and sixties, when we became convinced that rapid growth was as certain as the sunrise. Now, after having been psychologically conditioned to expect constant expansion, countries have to learn to manage the experience of economic compression.

That is another example of the instability which we must learn to manage. It will surely be one of the major preoccupations of the summit meeting here in Canada next month. In that perspective, the Ottawa Summit could be more crucially important than any of its predecessors.

The impact of a summit on world problems is not immediate, largely because it is not meant to be a policy-making occasion. Its

great value is that it permits the leaders of the principal industrialized democracies to share their analyses of problems, to strengthen their sense of common purpose, to assess where they can come closer together, and move forward together.

Originally, the subject matter, as we know, was limited to economic issues. More recent summits have turned also to international political issues. The Ottawa Summit will undoubtedly continue this trend, if only because of the preoccupations of the leaders themselves. Our meeting will derive added importance from the fact that most of the participants will be gathering together for the first time.

The international press will probably place a lot of emphasis on the ideological differences of leaders who stand on the right, or the left, or in the centre. It is true that the electorates of various countries have been sending very different signals to their respective governments. But I do not expect that we will be overly preoccupied at the summit by our differences; I think that we will be trying to chart a common course, whether on North-South questions, on approaches to East-West relations, or on international trade, for example. We shall be trying to identify the broad areas where our countries can proceed together toward shared goals, transcending the differences among our national policies.

All of the summit participants know that the world looks to them for leadership. From the Third World, the look will be skeptical. But I believe leadership is emerging, and that it will be sensitive to the priorities of our times. The test of the summit, therefore, should not be whether we come out of the meeting with specific decisions. The true test will be whether all summit participants believe that we are defining together the best approaches to the great issues of the day, based on the objectives and values which we share in common.

This summit will be not only of the most difficult ever held, but will also be intentionally different. It is designed to be relatively unstructured, so as to give leaders the maximum opportunity to discuss the broad themes of crisis and opportunity, and how both can be effectively managed.

At Venice last year, we agreed that we had to get back to these basic issues of international life, so as to strengthen our sense

of common purpose. We are attempting, therefore, to free ourselves from a set agenda this year. It is for the same reason that the meetings are being held in the relative seclusion of Montebello.

The basic international problem is, as I have said, the instability of our economic and political environment. The resulting problems in the management of the industrialized world's economies are obvious.

At the present time, the western industrialized world is having to bear with slow growth, high levels of unemployment and continuing high inflation. Added to these are the turbulent effects of exchange market movements, which in recent weeks have seen the main European currencies touch new lows against the U.S. dollar.

This decline in the relative value of some currencies, coupled with the effect of generally increasing interest rates, is having an adverse effect on real growth in many countries. There is real concern that the predicted economic recovery may be set back at least until the start of 1982.

Some of the summit countries, including Canada, are clearly concerned that domestic American policy, and its impact upon interest rates, are having a severe adverse effect internationally. The purpose of the summit is to try to ensure that different national approaches to common objectives do not produce counter-productive and competing effects.

National action needs to proceed in a way which takes into account its impact on others. That requires a prior appreciation of the economic and political situation in other countries, as well as a co-ordinated effort to minimize the areas of negative impact and of conflict.

Another source of great instability is the state of East-West relations. Here there is no denying some basic facts. The Soviet Union has invaded Afghanistan, implicitly threatening all of the countries of western Asia, and ignoring the call of the Third World to get out. In addition, there is no denying that the Soviet Union has both expanded its military presence in the oceans of the world,

and increased dramatically the weaponry which is arrayed against the West.

These challenges constitute another more traditional form of crisis to be managed. Western countries must develop the means to take a united stand, so that in the event of a direct threat, there will be a swift and concerted response, in the defence of our own interest, and the interests of those countries which look to us for strength and support.

Personally, I believe that the good sense of Soviet leaders will prevail. I believe they will not feel themselves so threatened by events that they have to respond to the challenge of change by the force of arms. We all watch the crisis in Poland. The Soviet Union should know that recourse to arms is a losing game, for them and for all the world.

But we in the West still have to act with the knowledge that we live in a dangerous world. Our security and that of the Western Alliance has to be based on reality and has to be convincing, to ourselves, and to others.

The experience of the last five years has demonstrated the fragility of "détente" as a fundamental basis for the conduct of East-West relations. The events of the coming months and years will determine what the next phase will be in relations between East and West. But I trust that all countries concerned can recognize that stabilization of the relationship between East and West is vital, not least for the countries of the South, which should, in any event, be kept apart from East-West tension. But the U.S.S.R. is a super-power, and it asserts no less right than its rival to be heard about problems in any corner of the globe. It does so for reasons of national interest, but evidently also for ideological reasons. Thus, there is an element of super-power rivalry present, at least potentially, in every trouble-spot in the developing world.

One element of weakness in détente is, paradoxically, the product of a certain measure of balance and stability in Europe. Whatever strength the concept might painfully have acquired in European surroundings, it was of untested validity outside Europe. It is evident, in practice, that there are even greater difficulties in making détente workable outside Europe. Even worse, the tensions

generated by the failure of the concept in the Third World have had repercussions in the main theatre of East-West relations. We have come to understand that these relations cannot be governed by one set of rules in one part of the world, and quite a different set elsewhere.

Is there no way out? Some elements of what might constitute a desirable framework for East-West relations come to mind. The role of the super-powers must be acknowledged, but it cannot be exclusive. While détente, if it is to survive, must be accepted as indivisible, we will have to recognize that it has been interpreted in different ways by the countries that make up the Western and Eastern alliances, and is seen in different ways again by developing and non-aligned nations. This has been a fertile source of misunderstanding. Our preferred course is to exclude the developing world as an area of military rivalry between East and West. The alternative can only escalate tensions in a game in which there are no winners in the North or the South.

It is in the interest of the Third World that developing countries be immunized from East-West competition. That was what Tito and Nehru really sought in non-alignment; and the world can only hope that the non-aligned countries will see their movement return to its original principles.

The countries of the West must re-examine the conditions applying to their relationship with the U.S.S.R., with a view to promoting stability.

A militarily strong Alliance is fundamental to this goal.

We must also recognize that a basic understanding between the super-powers is a *sine qua non* of any such stabilization. In this sense, the super-powers themselves have to work toward reaffirming the best elements of arrangements which were worked out in the early years of the seventies between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.—when the “hot line” was installed, and the world could rely on a basic compatibility of interests between the two countries.

We are likely to face more crises that carry the risk, in the worst case, of confrontation between the super-powers. Moreover, an important proportion of these crises seem likely to arise in the

developing world—in other words, in areas where the West has no coherent set of arrangements to protect its interests, such as those that link North America with Japan and Western Europe. It is sensible to ask ourselves, therefore, how well-placed we are to deal with crises in general, and with crises in the Third World in particular, to the extent that these involve western interests.

So far as Europe—the main theatre of East-West confrontation—is concerned, a more confident answer could be returned to this question today than was possible a year ago. Not that the situation in Europe is totally calm. But at least the process of political consultation in NATO has undergone useful improvement in anticipation of challenges that lie ahead. The Allies are working more effectively together in the development of a concerted approach to East-West relations. The policy of strengthening NATO's defences, while offering once again to negotiate arms control arrangements with the Soviet Union, commands the support of the whole Alliance and was confirmed at the recent NATO ministerial meeting.

Thus NATO continues to supply an indispensable framework for maintaining the cohesion and strength that ensures stability and balance in Europe. This is clearly in the western interest. And for all its public criticism of the Alliance, the Soviet Union would probably admit that its priority objectives in Europe are stability and balance as well.

It is more difficult, Madam Speaker, to speak confidently about arrangements to deal with crises outside Europe. Here neither East nor West is on its home ground. The rules of the game have not been defined. Although some lines—notably in the Persian Gulf—have been firmly drawn, much ambiguity, and potentially dangerous ambiguity, remains. The question of how best to secure Western interests in these areas, in full respect for the sovereignty of the States of the regions concerned, must continue to engage the attention of western policy-makers.

East and West must try to redefine a code of conduct for international relations, which would be mutually acceptable. Before this can be done, however, a solution must be found to the crisis in Afghanistan, whose invasion violated every standard of

conduct which the western world as well as the Third World considers acceptable.

The Ottawa Summit should provide western leaders with the opportunity to bring their views on this subject into harmony. This is a concern which should certainly be foremost on the agenda of any meeting on international affairs.

The prospect of a renewed arms race, at a time when millions of people are dying of starvation, is a real scandal. If we decided to divert, for two weeks, the money we are spending for military purposes, we could provide safe water and a basic health care system for all the peoples of the world.

However, people feel the need for even more protection, and the logic of greater defence spending in the face of Soviet arms spending is compelling. The crisis this provokes needs to be managed by western countries among themselves and, eventually, in consultation with the Soviet Union.

The SALT talks must resume, sooner rather than later, once a process of mutual confidence-building has permitted the effective participation of both parties. Ending the nuclear arms race presents awesome difficulties. But the Government of Canada continues to believe that, however daunting these difficulties and however unpromising the immediate prospects for progress, the super-powers must be urged to reflect with all possible seriousness on the consequences of embarking on yet another round of nuclear arms escalation.

The government continues firmly in the view that the nuclear arms race must be arrested and reversed, and a new balance of security sought at progressively lower levels of armaments. The "strategy of suffocation" I put forward at the first Special Session of the United Nations on Disarmament in 1978 remains valid for this purpose. Nothing has happened in the intervening period to lessen the strength of my conviction on this point.

On nuclear safeguards, Canadian policy, last set out in 1974 and 1976, has set high standards. Yet it is being implemented in a pragmatic manner that respects the sovereignty and sensitivities of our partners in nuclear co-operation. We will continue to develop

that policy, with a view both to developing a more effective international non-proliferation regime, and to ensuring, to the extent possible, that Canada's nuclear exports do not contribute to nuclear proliferation.

I have spoken about the global macro-economic situation, which affects all our lives, and about the decline in the state of East-West relations, which also affects us all. Less understood is the potential impact of North-South tensions on Canada and other industrialized countries, and the need to give priority to the management of that latent crisis.

The first step should be to understand what we mean when we refer to the North and to the South. One can legitimately question whether there is a distinct North and a distinct South in every sense. Within the Third World there are as many differences as in the world itself. From the outset it needs to be emphasized that the South is not a homogeneous group of countries. It contains countries with the highest per capita income in the world and those with the lowest, countries with the fastest growth and those suffering negative growth, countries with the world's biggest financial surpluses and those with the greatest deficits, countries with abundant natural resources and those with none, countries with sophisticated, modern industrial economies and those with rudimentary, tribal, agricultural societies.

Yet the South is not a myth. It is a group of countries, most of them former colonies, held together by a shared perception of their status in relation to the rest of the world. In their view, solidarity among themselves is the way to exert countervailing power against the weight of the industrial North. Their vision of a new international economic order proceeds from their common view that the old rules have not permitted equal opportunity or an equitable sharing of the fruits of effort.

They are right. Justice is on their side. But even if we were not moved by justice, common sense and self-interest should tell us that if we want growing markets for our products, an orderly global economy, and peace in the world, we should support reform. We should enhance the growth of opportunities of the South, selecting the best bilateral and multilateral techniques to do the job. That effort should include a process of global negotiations.

The picture today is not one of unremitting gloom. Since World War II, living standards in many Third World countries have improved dramatically. New economic power centres are emerging. The newly industrialized countries must find the markets and the means to permit them to develop.

Some countries of the South are growing stronger every day. Let us help them grow. But there are other countries, the poorest of the poor, which are struggling just to survive. Their situation will be critical for as far ahead as the eye can see. Eight hundred million people live on the margin of human existence. They live with overwhelming deprivation, with despair, and in a state of perpetual crisis. The management of this crisis is a test of both the humanity and the credibility of governments in both North and South.

The best tool with which to help the poorest is outright aid. We have to assist them to develop the potential to feed themselves and provide for other fundamental needs like health and shelter. It is a ghastly cynicism which pretends that international co-operation cannot bring these lives closer to minimum standards of human dignity.

The overwhelming fact which governments must face is that international aid efforts are inadequate. The gap between rich and poor is not closing, but opening wider, in spite of everything that has been done.

The Canadian aid record can be improved, and is being improved. My government is committed to that. But I do point out that we have made a lot of progress since the sixties. Our efforts have done a lot of good, and we have won ourselves solid friends in the world. In Canada, and throughout the developed world, there is a need for even greater public involvement—not just through round table discussions among the knowledgeable and already involved, but in communities and schools—so that growing public support will encourage governments to do more and to do it better.

I firmly believe that the world can and must grow enough food, provide clean water, decent housing, health care and real hope for all its people. It can be done, but it will require a gigantic effort.

That is the message of the Brandt Commission, reflected eloquently in the report of our Parliamentary Task force on North-South Relations. I congratulate the chairman of that task force, the Honourable Member for Gloucester, Mr. Breau, and the members of all the parties in this House who contributed to that most compelling report. Its message is one which the government can endorse and support.

I believe that, despite bleak political prospects for greatly increased aid flows from the recession-prone North, reason will prevail and a major assault on world poverty can still be launched in earnest.

The need to assist the poorest is one emphasis of Canada's efforts in international co-operation. But the primary need of those countries with growing export potential is, as the slogan says, "trade, not aid". These are the countries which are arguing that the world's economic structures work inherently to their perpetual disadvantage. The process which is required to redress their grievances involves the sharing of power, not power in the classical sense of armies and empires, but in the sense of access to the means of development. Gaining that kind of power means gaining access to the international institutions, where the decision-making process should take greater account of developing countries' specific difficulties: access to international capital markets, to greater security in commodity prices; access to technological skills, and to markets for manufactured products.

Other specific and urgent needs will require the concentrated attention of governments, as well. Energy and agriculture are priorities because of the severity of the impact of energy costs on oil-importing developing countries, and because of the danger of food production not being able to keep up with population growth.

I do not expect a sudden breakthrough toward solutions in the series of important international meetings scheduled for the coming months, but I do expect a better political focus on the major priorities. I do not expect that the world's sense of crisis will be entirely eased by whatever collective response we make to the problems of development; but I do think that the basic economic causes of instability in the Third World can be successfully attacked through a co-operative international management effort.

I have spoken of Canada's role and purposes in world affairs. I have spoken particularly of the compelling need for progress in North-South relations. I have placed the issues involved in the context of the need for the international community to mobilize itself to manage crises more effectively. The summit meeting in Ottawa in July will have a particular importance in determining our collective ability to deal with the problems I have described.

Those are the issues that I wanted to discuss in the consultations I have undertaken in the last several months with the leaders of some key developing countries. I considered it important that the views of major nations such as Brazil, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Nigeria and others I have visited, be taken into account by the summit leaders.

I am very conscious of the Canadian role and interest in these matters. Canada alone cannot come up with viable solutions. But we can contribute to them. Moreover, we need to strengthen relationships with a variety of countries whose interests in economic development correspond to our own. These include the countries I have visited.

For Canadians, the state of the world is of deep importance, and not least because a healthy international environment is vital to Canadian economic growth. We need stronger economic links not only with developing countries but also with our summit partners. Fundamentally, it is these economic partnerships which will stimulate the pace of development, both here and abroad.

I have not covered all aspects of our foreign policy, Madam Speaker. Many other vital Canadian concerns will be addressed by my colleague, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. MacGuigan, later in this debate, and by other members sitting on this side of the Chamber. I have sought to focus the attention of the House on those areas of crisis and of opportunity where the most basic interests of our people, as human beings and as Canadians, are at stake.

I have done so with confidence that Canada will rise to the challenge of our times, and in so doing will contribute to justice, stability and peace in this still wonderful world.



ALLOCUTION
du
PREMIER MINISTRE
à la
CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES
sur la
POLITIQUE EXTÉRIEURE DU
CANADA

OTTAWA

le 15 juin 1981



Madame le Président, nous savons tous que les événements mondiaux sont devenus imprévisibles. Nous conviendrons également que le monde est devenu instable et plus dangereux. L'humanité vit dans un état de crise plus ou moins permanent. La violence et le désordre sont devenus choses courantes. L'injustice ne suscite plus l'indignation.

Cette instabilité planétaire tient à de nombreux facteurs. La communauté mondiale compte beaucoup plus de pays qu'auparavant, qui s'emploient tous vigoureusement à faire valoir leurs besoins et leurs ambitions. Le nombre et la gravité des problèmes économiques et des conflits internationaux n'ont cessé de croître. Bien que leurs pouvoirs n'aient jamais été aussi grands, les superpuissances sont souvent dépassées par les événements. Nous avons vu le droit international et les systèmes économiques échouer à plusieurs reprises, laissant aux gens l'impression que la situation échappe à tout contrôle. Le monde vit plus ou moins consciemment dans l'attente d'une crise.

L'idée de crise évoque généralement un choc brusque, une surprise, une explosion de violence, une invasion. Il est évident que le monde doit prévenir de tels incidents dans la mesure du possible, et les maîtriser lorsqu'ils se produisent.

Il faut toutefois comprendre que ces crises résultent d'un excès de tension accumulée. Elles sont la manifestation violente de problèmes profondément enracinés. Pour éviter que de telles ruptures ne se produisent, il convient de s'attaquer aux facteurs qui en sont la cause. Le seul moyen efficace de remédier à une situation de crise est de s'attaquer à la racine du mal.

Malheureusement, les incidents qui surviennent au jour le jour peuvent monopoliser à ce point l'attention et l'énergie des gouvernements que ceux-ci négligent de s'attaquer aux problèmes moins flagrants qui menacent constamment l'ordre mondial et qui seront fatalement source de futurs conflits. Pour pouvoir éviter les conflits, il faut s'attaquer aux causes fondamentales des problèmes que nous déplorons et essayer de remédier réellement à la situation. C'est un défi de taille car il s'agit d'un problème extrêmement complexe, mais il n'est pas pour autant insoluble. A force de volonté, nous pouvons arriver à le résoudre.

Ce n'est probablement pas l'appréhension de menaces physiques imminentes nées de la colère et de la frustration des peuples défavorisés qui incitera les pays démocratiques industrialisés à trouver la volonté nécessaire et à faire front commun.

Le réfugié affamé couché sur le sable brûlant du Sahel peut à peine trouver la force de se sortir de sa misère, et ne saurait nous menacer. Si ses enfants survivent, ils se souviendront toujours de nous avec rancœur, de cela nous pouvons être certains. Cette menace n'est toutefois pas assez imminente pour nous inspirer une action immédiate.

Si les grandes puissances décident de s'attaquer réellement, et de façon plus concertée, aux problèmes qui accablent un monde chaotique, ce sera pour deux raisons: premièrement, parce qu'elles décideront de donner une portée concrète aux valeurs humaines que les Occidentaux prétendent avoir en commun; deuxièmement, parce qu'elles comprendront mieux le besoin impérieux d'agir, dans leur intérêt personnel, même si cette réaction est fondée sur des sentiments moins nobles.

Quelles sont nos valeurs communes? La principale, c'est sans conteste la liberté, la liberté des citoyens et des pays, la liberté politique qui distingue l'Occident de l'Orient, la liberté du système de marché sur lequel sont fondés nos régimes économiques. La liberté dont je parle n'est pas une notion abstraite coupée de nos réalités quotidiennes, ni celle que l'on réserve aux discours patriotiques prononcés le jour de la fête nationale. C'est le fondement même et l'âme du type de société que nous avons édifiée en Occident.

Ici même au pays, nous nous rendons compte depuis longtemps qu'il ne peut y avoir de liberté réelle si elle n'est pas généralisée. Si l'on empiète sur les droits fondamentaux de mon voisin, mes propres droits, ma sécurité et ma liberté sont inévitablement compromis. Il n'est pas difficile d'admettre cette vérité et son incidence à l'intérieur de nos frontières.

Nous éprouvons toutefois plus de difficulté à trouver une réponse moderne à une question vieille comme le monde: qui faut-il considérer comme son voisin? Est-ce la femme qui est à la recherche de nourriture dans un bidonville d'Asie? Est-ce l'homme

qui est en prison à cause de ses activités syndicales en Amérique du Sud? Faut-il considérer comme nos voisins les Africains qui meurent faute de soins médicaux ou parce qu'ils boivent de l'eau polluée? Et les habitants de certains villages de l'Inde qui meurent moralement parce qu'ils n'ont pas d'emploi, pas d'instruction et aucun espoir? Et les enfants qui se sauvent en entendant les coups de feu dans les rues de Beyrouth?

Si nous, les peuples du Nord, répondons oui, alors nous passerons à l'action, et nous agirons de concert pour que survive l'espoir. Si nous répondons non, tous ces gens sont perdus, et nous aussi.

L'urgence de ces problèmes est l'une des principales raisons pour lesquelles le gouvernement actuel était impatient de trouver un moment pour tenir ce débat important sur la politique étrangère du Canada.

Au début de mon allocution, j'ai dit que nous vivions dans un monde instable où il n'est plus possible de prédire l'avenir avec une certitude raisonnable. L'instabilité politique et économique est sans doute plus visible au Tiers-Monde, mais il faut se rappeler que tous les grands problèmes mondiaux sont liés entre eux. Les relations Est-Ouest et Nord-Sud, l'énergie, la prolifération des armes nucléaires, l'alliance Atlantique, le droit de la mer, l'environnement, les réfugiés, les flambées sporadiques de violence: tout cela forme un ensemble complexe de problèmes reliés par des liens de cause à effet.

Il continuera d'y avoir des heurts et des affrontements entre les cultures et la technologie, entre les riches et les pauvres, entre générations et même entre voisins pendant que la communauté mondiale tentera de composer plus efficacement avec le seul facteur prévisible sur notre planète: une évolution rapide et constante. Voilà le thème de mes propos aujourd'hui: la maîtrise du changement, la gestion des crises que le changement peut provoquer.

Le monde connaît une période troublée. Sur le plan économique, les années 80 et 90 contrasteront fortement avec les années 50 et 60, époque où on ne mettait pas plus en doute la croissance rapide que le prochain lever du jour. Après avoir été psychologi-

quement conditionnés à attendre sans cesse une expansion constante, les pays doivent maintenant apprendre à se débrouiller en période de compression économique.

Voilà un autre exemple de situation instable que nous devons apprendre à maîtriser. Cela sera sûrement l'une des préoccupations majeures à la réunion au sommet qui se tiendra au Canada le mois prochain. Dans cette perspective, le sommet d'Ottawa pourrait être d'une importance plus cruciale que tous les précédents.

Les sommets n'ont pas de répercussions immédiates sur la conjoncture internationale, principalement parce qu'ils ne sont pas conçus pour élaborer des politiques. Leur grande valeur réside dans le fait qu'ils permettent aux dirigeants des principales démocraties industrialisées de partager leurs analyses des problèmes, d'harmoniser leurs objectifs communs et de déterminer sur quels points ils peuvent effectuer des rapprochements ou progresser ensemble.

A l'origine, les sommets se limitaient aux questions économiques. Ces dernières années, on s'est également penché sur les grandes questions de politique internationale. Cette tendance se poursuivra sans aucun doute au sommet d'Ottawa, ne serait-ce qu'à cause des préoccupations des dirigeants eux-mêmes. Notre réunion revêt une importance accrue du fait que la plupart des participants se rencontreront pour la première fois.

La presse internationale insistera sans doute beaucoup sur les différences idéologiques des dirigeants, selon qu'ils se situent à droite, à gauche ou au centre. Il est vrai que l'électorat des divers pays a transmis des consignes contradictoires à ses gouvernements respectifs. Mais je ne pense pas qu'au sommet, nous soyons indûment préoccupés par nos différences; je crois plutôt que nous tenterons d'élaborer un plan d'action commun, que ce soit sur les questions Nord-Sud, sur la façon d'aborder les relations Est-Ouest ou sur le commerce international. Nous tenterons de recenser les vastes domaines où nos pays peuvent progresser ensemble vers des buts partagés sans tenir compte des différences qui les séparent en matière de politique nationale.

Tous les chefs d'État qui prendront part au sommet économique savent pertinemment que le monde entier aura les yeux

tournés vers eux. Et le regard du Tiers-Monde sera particulièrement sceptique. Mais avec un leadership plus marqué, nous saurons nous adapter aux priorités de notre époque. On ne devra pas juger du succès du sommet par le nombre de décisions particulières qui y auront été prises. Le critère déterminant sera de savoir si, pour tous les participants, les solutions proposées aux grandes questions du jour auront été le fruit d'une concertation et auront été adaptées aux objectifs et aux valeurs que nous partageons tous.

Le sommet ne sera pas seulement le plus complexe qui ait jamais été tenu; il sera aussi d'un caractère différent. Nous avons évité de lui donner une structure précise, de façon à laisser aux chefs d'État tout le loisir d'aborder de front les crises et les perspectives qui s'offrent à nous, et de découvrir les meilleurs moyens de régler les premières et d'exploiter les secondes.

Nous avons convenu au sommet de Venise, l'année dernière, qu'il nous fallait reprendre ces sujets fondamentaux intéressant la scène internationale, dans le but de consolider nos visées communes. Nous avons donc cherché cette année à ne point nous fixer d'ordre du jour précis. C'est aussi pour la même raison que nos réunions à Montebello auront lieu dans un huis clos relatif.

Les problèmes les plus fondamentaux auxquels nous nous heurtons sur le plan international sont liés à l'instabilité de notre environnement économique et politique. Et la gestion des diverses économies du monde industrialisé n'est pas le moindre de ces problèmes.

A l'heure actuelle, le monde industrialisé occidental doit faire face à de faibles taux de croissance, de hauts niveaux de chômage et une inflation qui ne démord pas. A ces facteurs s'ajoutent des perturbations sur les marchés de change alors que les devises européennes ont connu, ces dernières semaines, des dévaluations sans précédent par rapport au dollar américain.

Cette dévaluation des devises européennes, jointe à la hausse générale des taux d'intérêt, affecte de façon adverse la croissance économique de plusieurs pays qui participent au sommet. On craint désormais que la relance économique prévue ne soit retardée au moins jusqu'au début de 1982.

Certains participants au sommet, dont le Canada, s'inquiètent des retombées internationales négatives de la politique interne américaine et de ses conséquences, par exemple, sur les taux d'intérêt. Le rôle du sommet est de faire en sorte que les diverses politiques nationales visant des objectifs communs ne soient pas incompatibles et contre-productives. L'action entreprise par un pays doit être menée en tenant compte de son impact sur les autres nations. Cela suppose qu'il y ait d'abord connaissance de la situation économique et politique des partenaires et décision de coordonner ensuite les effets pour minimiser les conflits et les retombées négatives.

L'état des relations Est-Ouest est une autre source de grande instabilité. Et ici, on ne saurait nier certains faits fondamentaux. L'Union soviétique a envahi l'Afghanistan, menaçant implicitement tous les pays de l'Asie occidentale et ignorant l'appel au retrait lancé par les pays du Tiers-Monde. En outre, il est indéniable que l'Union soviétique a à la fois accru sa présence militaire dans les océans du monde et augmenté radicalement son arsenal pointé contre l'Occident.

Ces défis représentent une forme de crise plus classique qu'il nous faut aussi gérer. Les pays de l'Ouest se doivent d'adopter une position commune, de sorte qu'en cas de menace directe, il y ait action rapide et concertée pour défendre nos propres intérêts et les intérêts des pays qui sollicitent notre appui moral et stratégique.

Personnellement, je crois que le bon sens des dirigeants soviétiques prévaudra. Je crois qu'ils ne se sentiront pas menacés par les événements au point de recourir à la force des armes pour répondre au défi posé par le changement. Nous avons tous le regard tourné vers la Pologne. L'Union soviétique devrait savoir que le recours aux armes ne peut être qu'une défaite morale pour elle-même et pour le reste du monde.

Cela dit, nous devons malheureusement agir en sachant que nous vivons dans un monde dangereux. Notre sécurité et celle de l'Alliance occidentale doivent se fonder sur la réalité et être crédibles à nos propres yeux et à ceux des autres. L'expérience des cinq dernières années a démontré la fragilité de la «détente» comme fondement des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Mais je crois que les événements des prochains mois et des prochaines années

détermineront ce que sera la prochaine phase des relations Est-Ouest. Je pense que tous les pays en cause reconnaissent que la stabilisation de ces relations est vitale pour tous, et en particulier pour les pays du Sud, qui devraient être tenus à l'écart des tensions entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Mais l'URSS est une superpuissance qui exige le droit d'être entendue au même titre que sa rivale sur les problèmes qui affectent n'importe quelle région du monde. Elle l'exige pour des raisons d'intérêt national mais aussi, cela est évident, pour des raisons d'ordre idéologique. Il y a donc potentiellement un élément de rivalité entre superpuissances dans chaque région troublée du monde en voie de développement.

Une des faiblesses de la détente est paradoxalement d'avoir été conçue dans un contexte européen relativement équilibré et stable. Quelle que soit la force avec laquelle une telle notion s'est imposée en Europe, on n'en avait jamais éprouvé la valeur en dehors du continent européen. Or la pratique a montré à l'évidence qu'il est encore plus difficile d'appliquer cette idée hors de l'Europe. Chose plus grave, les tensions engendrées par l'échec de la détente dans le Tiers-Monde ont eu des répercussions sur la scène principale où se joue la partie entre l'Est et l'Ouest, c'est-à-dire l'Europe. Nous avons pris conscience du fait que les relations Est-Ouest ne peuvent obéir à certaines règles dans une région du globe et à d'autres règles tout à fait différentes ailleurs dans le monde.

N'y a-t-il donc aucun moyen de nous en sortir? Quelques éléments de ce qui pourrait constituer un cadre souhaitable pour les relations Est-Ouest nous viennent à l'esprit. Le rôle des superpuissances ne peut être nié, mais il ne doit pas être exclusif. Bien que la détente, pour survivre, doive être acceptée comme indivisible, force nous sera d'admettre qu'elle a été interprétée de façons différentes par les pays de l'Alliance occidentale et par ceux de l'Alliance orientale, de même que par les pays en voie de développement et les pays non alignés, ce qui fut une source intarissable de malentendus. La voie à suivre consiste à refuser d'étendre au monde en voie de développement la rivalité militaire entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Agir autrement ne peut qu'exacerber les tensions dans un jeu où personne ne gagne, ni le Nord ni le Sud.

Il est dans l'intérêt du Tiers-Monde que les pays en développement soient tenus à l'écart de la compétition entre l'Est et

l'Ouest. Voilà ce que Tito et Nehru recherchaient vraiment dans le non-alignement, et le monde peut seulement espérer que le mouvement des pays non alignés reviendra aux principes qui l'ont inspiré. Les pays de l'Ouest doivent réexaminer les conditions de leurs relations avec l'URSS afin de promouvoir la stabilité dans le monde. Une Alliance forte sur le plan militaire est essentielle à la réalisation de cet objectif.

Nous devons aussi reconnaître qu'une condition *sine qua non* de la stabilité serait qu'une entente fondamentale existe entre les superpuissances. A cet égard, les superpuissances elles-mêmes doivent s'efforcer de réactualiser les meilleurs arrangements qui ont été pris entre les États-Unis et l'URSS au début des années 1970, à l'époque où le «téléphone rouge» fut installé, et où le monde pouvait compter sur une compatibilité fondamentale d'intérêts entre les deux pays.

Nous serons probablement témoins d'un plus grand nombre de crises qui risqueront, si l'on met les choses au pire, de provoquer un affrontement entre les superpuissances. Il semble de plus qu'une proportion importante de ces crises prendra naissance dans le monde en voie de développement; autrement dit, là où l'Ouest n'a prévu aucun ensemble d'arrangements pour protéger ses intérêts, comme ceux qui lient l'Amérique du Nord au Japon et à l'Europe de l'Ouest. Il est donc bon de se demander de quels moyens nous disposons pour répondre aux crises en général et à celles surgissant dans le Tiers-Monde en particulier, dans la mesure où les intérêts de l'Ouest y sont en jeu.

En ce qui a trait à l'Europe, théâtre principal de l'affrontement entre l'Est et l'Ouest, nous pouvons répondre aujourd'hui à cette question avec plus de confiance qu'il y a un an. Non pas que la situation en Europe soit complètement calme, mais au moins le processus de consultation politique au sein de l'OTAN s'est nettement amélioré pour faire face aux défis que l'avenir nous réserve. La collaboration des alliés à la mise au point d'une stratégie concertée dans la conduite des relations Est-Ouest en Europe est plus efficace. La politique qui consiste à renforcer les moyens de défense de l'OTAN; tout en proposant de nouveau à l'Union soviétique de négocier les accords sur le contrôle des armements, reçoit l'appui de l'Alliance tout entière, et cela a été confirmé à la récente réunion des ministres de l'OTAN. Ainsi l'OTAN continue

d'être un instrument indispensable au maintien de la cohésion et de la force qui garantissent la stabilité et l'équilibre en Europe, ce qui est de toute évidence dans l'intérêt de l'Ouest. Et l'Union soviétique, malgré ses critiques ouvertes au sujet de l'Alliance, admettrait sans doute elle aussi que stabilité et équilibre sont ses objectifs prioritaires en Europe.

Il est plus difficile de se montrer confiants dans le cas des arrangements pris pour faire face aux crises à l'extérieur de l'Europe. Ni l'Est ni l'Ouest ne sont ici sur leur propre terrain. Les règles du jeu n'ont pas été établies. Bien que quelques limites fermes aient été tracées, notamment dans la région du Golfe, la situation reste ambiguë, et cette ambiguïté peut être dangereuse. Les dirigeants des pays occidentaux doivent continuer de s'interroger sur la meilleure façon de protéger les intérêts de l'Ouest dans ces régions, tout en respectant la souveraineté des pays en cause. L'Est et l'Ouest doivent s'efforcer de redéfinir un code de conduite dans les relations internationales qui leur soit mutuellement acceptable. Mais il faudra avant cela qu'une solution soit apportée à la crise en Afghanistan, dont l'invasion a été une violation de tout ce que l'Occident aussi bien que le Tiers-Monde considèrent comme admissible.

Le sommet d'Ottawa devrait offrir aux leaders occidentaux l'occasion de mieux harmoniser leurs vues globales sur ce sujet. Il s'agit indéniablement d'une préoccupation qui doit figurer en tête de l'ordre du jour de toute réunion portant sur les affaires internationales. La perspective d'une nouvelle course aux armements alors que des milliards de personnes meurent de faim est un véritable scandale. Si nous décidions de consacrer à des fins pacifiques les sommes que nous dépensons en deux semaines à des fins militaires, nous pourrions fournir de l'eau potable et des soins élémentaires de santé à toute la population du globe. Mais les gens ressentent le besoin de se protéger encore davantage; et l'accroissement de nos dépenses militaires pour contrer l'augmentation des sommes que l'URSS consacre aux armements semble inévitable pour le moment. Il appartient à l'Ouest de trouver une réponse à ce grave problème en consultation, si possible, avec l'Union soviétique.

De plus, les négociations sur la limitation des armements stratégiques devront reprendre dès que les deux parties auront acquis une confiance mutuelle suffisante pour y participer de façon

efficace, et je dois dire que le plus tôt sera le mieux. Mettre fin à la course aux armements nucléaires présente de formidables difficultés. Mais le gouvernement du Canada continue de croire que, aussi décourageantes que soient ces difficultés et aussi infimes que paraissent les chances immédiates de progrès, il faut inciter les superpuissances à réfléchir avec tout le sérieux qui s'impose aux conséquences qu'aurait une reprise de l'escalade nucléaire. Le gouvernement continue de croire fermement qu'il faut arrêter et renverser la course aux armements nucléaires, et chercher un nouvel équilibre à des niveaux d'armement de moins en moins élevés. La stratégie d'étouffement que j'ai proposée à la première Session spéciale de l'ONU sur le désarmement, en 1978, reste valable à cette fin. Rien de ce qui s'est passé dans l'intervalle n'affaiblit la force de ma conviction sur ce point.

La politique canadienne de sécurité nucléaire, révisée en 1974 et en 1976, fixe des normes élevées. Nous l'appliquons toutefois avec pragmatisme, dans le respect de la souveraineté et des susceptibilités de nos partenaires dans le domaine nucléaire. Nous continuerons à perfectionner cette politique afin de mettre en place un régime international efficace de non-prolifération et de garantir, dans la mesure du possible, que les exportations nucléaires du Canada ne contribuent pas à la prolifération nucléaire.

J'ai parlé en termes généraux de l'état de l'économie mondiale et de la détérioration des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest, qui ont tous deux une incidence sur notre vie. Ce que l'on comprend moins, c'est l'impact que pourraient avoir sur le Canada et d'autres pays industrialisés les tensions entre le Nord et le Sud et combien il importe de donner priorité à la résolution de cette crise en puissance.

La première chose à faire est de comprendre vraiment ce qu'on entend par Nord et Sud. On est en droit de se demander s'il y a un Nord et un Sud en tant que tels. Le Tiers-Monde est en fait aussi diversifié que le monde lui-même. Il faut souligner au départ que le Sud n'est pas un groupe de pays homogène. Il comprend des pays dont le revenu par habitant est parmi les plus élevés au monde et d'autres pays dont le revenu par habitant est parmi les plus bas. Certains pays du Sud connaissent un taux de croissance des plus rapides alors que d'autres accusent une croissance néga-

tive. Le Sud compte des pays dont les surplus financiers sont les plus élevés du monde et d'autres qui ont les plus grands déficits, des pays aux ressources naturelles abondantes et d'autres qui n'en ont aucune et enfin des pays à économie moderne, voire d'avant-garde, à côté de pays où une société tribale vit d'une économie fondée sur une agriculture rudimentaire.

Pourtant, le Sud n'est pas un mythe. C'est un groupe de pays, pour la plupart d'anciennes colonies, reliés par une commune conception de leur statut par rapport au reste du monde. Ils sont persuadés que leur solidarité peut faire contrepoids à la puissance du Nord industriel. Leur vision d'un nouvel ordre économique international procède de leur conviction que les vieilles règles ne leur ont donné ni des possibilités égales ni un partage équitable des bénéfices.

Ils ont raison. La justice est de leur côté. Mais même si nous n'étions pas sensibles aux exigences de la justice, le simple bon sens et l'intérêt personnel nous disent que, si nous voulons des marchés croissants pour nos produits, une économie mondiale ordonnée et la paix dans le monde, nous devons appuyer la réforme. Nous devons contribuer à multiplier les chances de développement du Sud, et choisir les meilleures techniques bilatérales et multilatérales pour le faire. Ces efforts doivent comprendre un processus de négociations mondiales.

Même s'il est sombre, le tableau ne présente pas que des aspects négatifs. Depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le niveau de vie s'est sensiblement amélioré dans bien des pays du Tiers-Monde. De nouveaux centres de pouvoir économique sont en train d'émerger. Les pays nouvellement industrialisés doivent trouver des marchés et les moyens de pouvoir assurer leur développement.

Certains pays du Sud deviennent chaque jour plus puissants. Aidons-les à croître. Mais il y a d'autres pays, les plus pauvres des pauvres, qui se débattent simplement pour survivre. Leur situation restera critique aussi loin que nous regardions dans l'avenir. Huit cent millions de gens vivent en marge de l'humanité. Ils vivent dans un dénuement total, dans le désespoir et dans un état de crise permanente. Le règlement de cette crise met à l'épreuve la crédibilité et l'humanité des gouvernements du Nord et du Sud.

Le meilleur instrument pour venir au secours de ces pays est encore celui de l'aide directe. Nous devons les aider à se doter des moyens de nourrir leur population et de satisfaire d'autres besoins fondamentaux en matière de santé et de logement. On fait preuve d'un cynisme révoltant lorsqu'on prétend que la coopération internationale ne saurait suffire à permettre à ces gens d'atteindre un seuil minimal de dignité humaine.

Ce que les gouvernements doivent absolument reconnaître, c'est que les efforts actuels d'aide internationale sont inadéquats. Loin de se combler, l'écart entre les riches et les pauvres continue de se creuser, malgré tous les efforts déployés.

L'aide canadienne peut s'accroître et sera accrue, mon gouvernement s'y est engagé. Je ferai cependant remarquer que nous avons fait beaucoup de progrès depuis les années 1960. Nos efforts ont donné d'excellents résultats, et nous avons noué de solides amitiés dans le monde. Au Canada et dans tout le monde industrialisé, il faut susciter un plus grand intérêt chez les gens—non seulement au moyen de tables rondes où les participants sont bien informés et déjà engagés, mais par une action à l'échelle locale et dans les écoles—de sorte que le public encourage les gouvernements à accroître leurs efforts et à se surpasser.

Je crois fermement que le monde a la possibilité et le devoir de produire des denrées alimentaires en quantité suffisante pour nourrir tous ses habitants et leur fournir de l'eau potable, un logement convenable, des soins médicaux et leur permettre vraiment d'espérer une vie meilleure. Nous pouvons le faire, mais il faudra fournir un immense effort. Tel est le message de la Commission Brandt, que réitèrent éloquemment les recommandations du rapport de notre groupe d'étude parlementaire sur les relations Nord-Sud. J'en félicite le président, le député de Gloucester (M. Breau), et les députés de tous les partis à la Chambre qui ont contribué à ce rapport.

C'est un message que le gouvernement peut aisément appuyer et prendre à son compte.

Même si nos espoirs ne sont pas reluisants de voir le Nord, malheureusement enclin à la récession, accroître son assistance, je

crois que la raison finira par l'emporter et qu'on pourra quand même vraiment s'attaquer à la pauvreté.

Les efforts que déploie le Canada en matière de coopération internationale sont axés sur la nécessité de venir en aide aux pays les plus pauvres, mais le besoin primordial des pays possédant un potentiel croissant d'exportation consiste, comme le dit le slogan, à obtenir des échanges, non de l'assistance. Ce sont ces mêmes pays qui soutiennent que les structures économiques mondiales ne peuvent faire autrement que fonctionner à leur perpétuel désavantage. Il faut, pour réparer les torts dont ils sont victimes, procéder à un partage du pouvoir, non pas le pouvoir au sens classique des armées et des empires, mais au sens d'accès aux moyens de développement. Pour obtenir leur part de ce pouvoir, ces pays doivent pouvoir être représentés dans les institutions internationales. Et lorsqu'elles prennent leurs décisions, ces dernières devraient davantage tenir compte des besoins particuliers des pays en voie de développement, notamment l'accès aux marchés financiers internationaux, une stabilité plus grande du prix des matières premières, l'accès aux techniques de pointe et l'accès aux marchés pour leurs produits manufacturés.

D'autres besoins précis et urgents nécessiteront toute l'attention des gouvernements. L'énergie et l'agriculture constituent des priorités, à cause de la forte incidence des prix de l'énergie sur les pays importateurs de pétrole et sur les pays en voie de développement, à cause aussi du risque que la production alimentaire n'augmente pas au même rythme que la croissance démographique.

Je ne crois pas que l'on trouvera subitement des solutions au cours des importantes rencontres internationales qui auront lieu dans les prochains mois, mais je m'attends à ce qu'on y fasse une meilleure évaluation politique des priorités. Quelles que soient les solutions que nous trouvions aux problèmes de développement, je ne crois pas que nous arriverons à assainir complètement le climat de crise qui existe dans le monde, mais je pense que les principales causes économiques de l'instabilité du Tiers-Monde peuvent être maîtrisées si tous les gouvernements du monde s'entendent pour y arriver.

J'ai parlé du rôle et des objectifs du Canada dans les affaires internationales. J'ai surtout parlé du besoin pressant d'améliorer les relations Nord-Sud. J'ai insisté sur le fait que la solution de tous ces problèmes réside dans la volonté de la communauté internationale de régler les crises plus efficacement. La réunion au sommet qui aura lieu à Ottawa en juillet revêtra une importance particulière, car elle déterminera dans quelle mesure nous sommes capables de régler collectivement les problèmes que j'ai énoncés.

Ce sont ces problèmes que je voulais aborder lors des consultations que j'ai entreprises depuis quelques mois avec les dirigeants de certains des principaux pays en développement. J'estime capital que les leaders réunis au sommet tiennent compte de l'opinion de pays importants comme le Brésil, le Mexique, l'Arabie saoudite, l'Algérie, le Nigeria et d'autres encore que j'ai visités. Je suis très conscient du rôle et de l'intérêt du Canada à l'égard de ces questions. Le Canada ne peut, à lui seul, trouver de solutions viables. Mais nous pouvons y contribuer. En outre, il nous faut renforcer nos relations avec une multitude de pays dont les intérêts correspondent aux nôtres en matière de développement économique. Les pays que j'ai visités sont de ce nombre.

La conjoncture internationale intéresse vivement les Canadiens, notamment—et ce n'est pas la moindre des raisons—parce qu'une conjoncture internationale saine est vitale pour la croissance économique du Canada. Il nous faut renforcer nos liens économiques non seulement avec les pays en développement mais également avec nos partenaires du sommet. Essentiellement, ce sont ces associations économiques qui stimuleront le rythme du développement tant ici qu'à l'étranger.

Je n'ai pas abordé tous les aspects de notre politique étrangère, Madame le Président. Mon collègue, le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (M. MacGuigan), ainsi que d'autres députés de ce côté-ci de la Chambre parleront d'autres facteurs qui préoccupent vivement les Canadiens. J'ai tenté d'attirer l'attention de la Chambre sur les secteurs de crises et les secteurs de promesses où se jouent nos intérêts, en tant qu'êtres humains et en tant que Canadiens. J'ai fait cet exposé animé de la conviction que le Canada saura relever le défi de notre époque et qu'il contribuera ce faisant à la justice, à la stabilité et à la paix dans ce monde malgré tout merveilleux.

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Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government,
Melbourne, Australia,
September 30 - October 7, 1981
Background Notes

This year's meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government will be the twenty-second such occasion since the biennial meetings began in 1944. In earlier years, from 1911 to 1937, Imperial Conferences of Prime Ministers and other Ministers of Britain and the Dominions were held periodically to discuss matters of common concern. This year's meeting in Melbourne will be the first held in Australia and Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, as host, will act as Chairman.

The Heads of Government Meeting is the most important of the several levels of Commonwealth Conferences. It was last convened in Lusaka, Zambia in 1979. Unlike most international conferences, the meetings of Commonwealth leaders are private and confidential gatherings for an informal exchange of views. They are not intended as negotiating sessions and unanimity is not necessarily a primary objective of these gatherings; where decisions are reached they are on the basis of consensus.

Details of the proceedings of Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings are not published but it has generally been the practice for a communiqué to be issued at the close of each meeting summarizing its results.

In 1966, there were two Heads of Government Meetings. The earlier of these, held in Lagos, Nigeria, was the first to be held in a Commonwealth capital other than London, the first to be held in Africa and the first to be devoted to a single subject (Zimbabwe/Rhodesia). No meetings were held in 1967 or 1968.

The Commonwealth Secretariat organizes Heads of Government Meetings in close co-operation with host governments. By the Singapore meeting of 1971, because of the growing size of the Commonwealth, the facilities and in some respects the procedures had little resemblance to those of the first meeting in 1944.

Recognizing that the increasing size of the Commonwealth presented a challenge to the desired informality of discussions, Commonwealth Heads of Government recommended at their 1971 Singapore meeting that Senior Officials examine ways of restoring greater informality to future meetings. These officials, most of whom were Cabinet Secretaries or the equivalent, met in Ottawa in October 1972 and made recommendations at their meeting in Ottawa in 1973

which resulted in Heads of Government restoring the informality which remains a feature of general Commonwealth relations. At subsequent meetings in 1974, 1976 and 1978, senior officials again reviewed procedures and agreed that the style and format of the 1973 Heads of Government Meeting in Ottawa be continued.

In Melbourne, the formal opening session on the morning of September 30 will be open to the news media, but government leaders will meet in closed executive or restricted sessions for the balance of the conference. An outline of their discussions will be given in the Final Communiqué and there will be daily news media briefings by the Commonwealth Secretary-General. Facilities for press conferences and interviews by national delegations will be made available.

Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting - Lusaka, 1979

The preoccupations of Commonwealth Heads of Government during the Lusaka meeting in 1979 were the situation in southern Africa and particularly Zimbabwe, the situation in South East Asia, the international refugee problem, North/South economic issues and other political, economic and social problems of common interest such as Cyprus, Belize, and the Middle East. As well, they reviewed the progress of Commonwealth cooperation in a wide variety of functional programs.

The most publicized result of the meeting was the plan to assist the achievement of a lasting settlement and peace in Zimbabwe. It was in Lusaka that the important first steps were taken in the process which led to a free and independent Zimbabwe taking its place in the world community in April 1980. The nine-point plan for peace and self-determination in Zimbabwe and the atmosphere of friendship and cooperation which marked the Lusaka meeting demonstrate the unique nature of the Commonwealth and its ability to assist in promoting international cooperation and world peace.

At their meeting in Lusaka, the Heads of Government unanimously approved the Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice. The Declaration expressed the desire of the members of the Commonwealth to work for the eradication of all forms of racism and racial prejudice. They rejected as inhuman and intolerable all policies designed to perpetuate apartheid or any policy based on theories that certain racial groups are inherently superior or inferior.

Main Themes Expected at Melbourne

The agenda for the Melbourne meeting has not yet been approved in final form - this will be one of the first items of business at the opening session. However, it is expected to focus on important world political and economic developments, in particular providing a link between the discussions at the Ottawa Summit and the Cancun Summit in Mexico on the North/South dialogue. As usual, the agenda will also provide for discussion and follow up on specific programs of Commonwealth economic and functional cooperation such as the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation and related topics.

Réunion des chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth,
Melbourne (Australie),
du 30 septembre au 7 octobre 1981

Documentation

Les chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth se réunissent cette année pour la vingt-deuxième fois depuis que ces rencontres bisannuelles ont été instituées en 1944. Auparavant, de 1911 à 1937, les Premiers ministres et d'autres ministres de la Grande-Bretagne et des dominions se réunissaient en "conférences impériales" pour discuter de sujets d'intérêt commun. La réunion de Melbourne sera la première tenue en Australie; le Premier ministre Malcolm Fraser en sera l'hôte et le président.

La réunion des chefs de gouvernement est la plus importante des conférences du Commonwealth. La dernière s'est déroulée à Lusaka, en Zambie, en 1979. Contrairement à la plupart des conférences internationales, les rencontres des chefs du Commonwealth sont privées et confidentielles et favorisent les échanges de vues dans une atmosphère dénuée de tout formalisme. Elles ne se veulent pas des séances de négociation et, si l'unanimité n'est pas nécessairement de rigueur, c'est par consensus que se prennent les décisions.

Les détails des travaux des réunions des chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth ne sont pas rendus publics, mais il est d'usage qu'un communiqué soit publié à la clôture pour en faire connaître les faits saillants.

En 1966, les chefs de gouvernement ont tenu deux réunions. La première, celle de Lagos (Nigéria), innovait à plus d'un titre. En effet, c'était non seulement la première à se tenir dans une capitale du Commonwealth autre que Londres, mais c'était aussi la première à avoir lieu en Afrique et à être consacrée à un seul thème: la Rhodésie-Zimbabwe. Aucune réunion n'a eu lieu en 1967 et 1968.

C'est le Secrétariat du Commonwealth qui organise les réunions des chefs de gouvernement, en collaboration étroite avec les pays hôtes. Au fil des ans, et notamment à partir de la réunion de Singapour, tenue en 1971, l'infrastructure et, à certains égards, les modalités des réunions sont devenues, en raison de la croissance même du Commonwealth, très différentes de ce qu'elles étaient lors de la première réunion de 1944.

Conscients que la croissance de l'organisation risquait de porter atteinte au caractère familial des discussions, les chefs de gouvernement réunis à Singapour en 1971 ont en effet recommandé que des hauts fonctionnaires veillent à ce que les réunions subséquentes se déroulent sous le signe d'une plus grande intimité et d'une plus grande simplicité. Ces fonctionnaires, dont la plupart étaient secrétaires de cabinet ou occupaient un poste équivalent, se sont rencontrés à Ottawa en octobre 1972 et ont formulé l'année suivante, lors de la réunion d'Ottawa, des recommandations qui ont eu pour effet de rétablir ce climat d'intimité qui reste le propre des relations du Commonwealth. Lors de leurs réunions subséquentes en 1974, 1976 et 1978, ils ont de nouveau passé en revue le modus operandi de la réunion des chefs et convenu de rendre permanente la formule adoptée à Ottawa en 1973.

A Melbourne, la séance inaugurale officielle en matinée du 30 septembre sera ouverte aux journalistes, mais pour le reste de la conférence, les chefs de gouvernement se réuniront à huis clos ou en séances à accès restreint. Les grandes lignes de leurs discussions seront divulguées dans le communiqué final. Chaque jour, le secrétaire général du Commonwealth rencontrera les représentants de la presse pour les tenir au courant des événements et les délégations des différents pays disposeront de tous les moyens nécessaires à la tenue de conférences de presse et d'interviews.

Réunion des chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth - Lusaka, 1979

Lors de leur réunion à Lusaka en 1979, les chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth se sont surtout préoccupés de la situation en Afrique australe, plus particulièrement au Zimbabwe, et en Asie du Sud-Est, du problème des réfugiés internationaux, des questions économiques Nord-Sud et d'autres problèmes d'ordre politique, économique et social d'intérêt commun, tels ceux de Chypre, de Belize et du Moyen-Orient. Ils ont aussi passé en revue les progrès des multiples programmes fonctionnels de coopération mis en oeuvre au sein du Commonwealth.

Le fait le plus marquant de la rencontre fut sans doute l'adoption d'un plan en neuf points en vue d'un règlement durable du conflit au Zimbabwe. En effet, c'est à Lusaka qu'ont été faites les premières démarches importantes qui allaient permettre au Zimbabwe d'accéder à la liberté et à l'indépendance et d'entrer dans la communauté des nations, ce qu'il fit en avril 1980. Le plan de pacification et d'autodétermination du Zimbabwe et le climat d'amitié et de coopération qui a marqué la rencontre de Lusaka témoignent de la nature unique du Commonwealth et de sa contribution effective à la coopération internationale et à la paix mondiale.

A Lusaka, les chefs de gouvernement ont approuvé à l'unanimité la Déclaration du Commonwealth sur le racisme et les préjugés raciaux, par laquelle s'exprimait le désir des pays membres de travailler à la suppression de toutes les formes de racisme et de préjugés raciaux. Ils ont qualifié d'inhumaine et d'inadmissible toute politique destinée à perpétuer l'apartheid ou s'appuyant sur l'hypothèse que certains groupes raciaux sont intrinsèquement supérieurs ou inférieurs à d'autres.

Grands thèmes possibles de la réunion de Melbourne

L'ordre du jour de la réunion de Melbourne n'a pas encore été approuvé dans sa forme finale - ce sera l'une des premières tâches de la séance inaugurale. On prévoit toutefois qu'il portera sur les grands événements de la scène politique et économique internationale et tentera notamment de faire le lien entre les discussions du Sommet d'Ottawa et celles du Sommet de Cancun (Mexique) sur le dialogue Nord-Sud. Comme à l'habitude, l'ordre du jour prévoira également la reprise des discussions sur les différents programmes de coopération économique et fonctionnelle, comme celui du Fonds du Commonwealth pour la coopération technique, et sur des sujets connexes.

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The Commonwealth

As the colonies within the British Empire became self-governing and independent, similarities of language, habits, institutional traditions and working methods convinced many national leaders of the value of maintaining some form of association. The fruit of that belief is the modern Commonwealth. The Commonwealth (or Commonwealth of Nations, as it is also called) is a voluntary association of 44 independent countries from six continents and five oceans. The two most recent members to join the association on achieving independence are Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia and Vanuatu, formerly the New Hebrides. Nauru, Tuvalu and St. Vincent are special members which may take part in functional meetings and activities but which do not participate in Heads of Government Meetings.

The Commonwealth, which embraces a rich variety of races, languages, religions and cultures, is a unique association in which leaders in various fields may, on a level of informality and intimacy, meet to exchange views on a multitude of questions and try to determine what may usefully be done together. In a world that seems in danger of splitting into antagonistic groups based on sectional interests such as ideology, race, region, economic level of development, and religion, the Commonwealth is able to transcend such interests, and so bring a global perspective to bear on matters of concern to all members.

The principles of the association have been clearly defined in the Commonwealth Declaration, issued at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Singapore in January 1971. This statement of common principles affirmed the belief of Commonwealth members in the United Nations and its efforts to promote international peace and order, the liberty of the individual and each citizen's inalienable right to participate in creating his society, the evil nature of racial prejudice and discrimination, the principles of human dignity and equality, and the iniquity of colonial domination, the need for the progressive removal of disparities in wealth between different sections of mankind, and the value of the Commonwealth as a means to promote international cooperation. In pursuing these principles, the members of the Commonwealth believe they can provide a constructive example of the multinational approach, which is vital to peace and progress in the modern world.

In its widest sense, the Commonwealth is understood to include: member states and self-governing states associated with a Commonwealth member for the purpose

of foreign policy and defence; protected states; trust territories administered by a member on behalf of the United Nations; and territories still dependent on a member. Including dependencies, the Commonwealth covers one-quarter of the world's land surface and embraces well over one quarter of its population.

Of the 44 full members of the Commonwealth, 19 have retained a monarchical form of government. Queen Elizabeth II is Head of State of Canada and of 13 other member countries. Malaysia has a monarch as Head of State who is elected for a five-year term by the nine hereditary Malay rulers of West Malaysia. On attaining independence, two members of the Commonwealth, Lesotho and Swaziland, had their paramount chiefs declared King and Head of State. The Kingdom of Tonga remained a monarchy after Britain relinquished responsibility for the external affairs of that country in 1970. Twenty-four members of the Commonwealth have adopted a republican form of government, but all members recognize Queen Elizabeth as the symbol of their free association and, as such, the Head of the Commonwealth.

Associated states within the Commonwealth

The term "associated state" means a country that has attained full internal self-government while Britain retains ultimate responsibility for its external affairs and defence. The association is a free and voluntary one; an associated state may choose independence at any time. In the Caribbean region, Antigua (expected to become independent on November 1, 1981), St. Christopher-Nevis and Anguilla remain associated states, and, by agreement with Britain, exercise delegated authority over a wide area of external relations. Britain is also responsible for the external affairs of Brunei, a sultanate on the northwest coast of Borneo, and cooperates in arrangements for its defence. Brunei has been protected by Britain since 1888. The Cook Islands and Niue in the South Pacific are self-governing territories associated with New Zealand; in December 1976, the island of Tokelau assumed a similar status. The inhabitants of all three territories are New Zealand citizens.

Dependent territories

In Commonwealth terminology, the phrase "dependent territories" designates some 20 remaining colonies and trust territories exercising self-government to a greater or lesser degree. Most of these are dependencies of Britain and Australia. New members are drawn from associated states

and dependencies that may on independence apply to heads of Commonwealth member governments for full membership in the association.

Evolution of the Commonwealth

The Commonwealth evolved from the British Empire through a gradual process that began in the nineteenth century. Many important developments first occurred in relation to what is now Canada. While there are many possible starting points, a convenient one is Lord Durham's Report, published in 1839 following an inquiry into the causes of rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada in 1836-37. One of Durham's key recommendations was that full self-government should be granted to the governments in the Canadian colonies in all matters of concern to them. Under the recommendations of the report, authority was reserved to the Imperial Government only in those fields considered necessary to maintain imperial unity; these included control of foreign relations, the regulation of commerce, the determination of the Constitution and the disposal of public lands. All other powers and functions, including the expenditure of public funds, were to be transferred to the colonial governments, to be exercised by executive councils responsible to elected legislative assemblies, and exercised only so long as they retained the support of the majorities in these assemblies. Following the Union of Upper and Lower Canada in 1840, this recommendation was implemented by stages, the testing-point being the acceptance by the Governor General, Lord Elgin, and the British Government of the Rebellion Losses Bill of 1849. This effectively established the practice of full responsible self-government over the very wide range of matters within the control of colonial governments. Subsequently, the conception of responsible government with a wide area of local autonomy was extensively applied throughout the British Empire, and the changes flowing from its general application have been immense. In 1867, Canada became, by virtue of the British North America Act, the first self-governing dominion; Australia achieved dominion status in 1901, New Zealand in 1907, and South Africa in 1909. The emergence of the British Commonwealth, as distinct from the British Empire, may be said to have begun with the Colonial Conference of 1897 in London, which was restricted to representatives from Britain and those colonies with responsible government. The Colonial Conference of 1907 decided that in future these meetings would be called Imperial Conferences, to reflect the new status of the dominions.

Major developments occurred during the period of 1914-1939 as Canada and other self-governing dominions assumed more and more responsibility for their relations with other countries. After the First World War, Canada, supported on occasion by the other dominions, succeeded in asserting its independence from the imperial power by a series of agreements and precedents that in turn became the basis for further political developments. Beginning with Versailles in 1919, the dominions successfully asserted their claim to separate representation at international conferences and then, in the 1920s, to diplomatic representation in foreign countries. This new relationship was set out in a communiqué from the Imperial Conference of 1926. Drawing upon the recommendations of the Balfour Report, the communiqué defined Britain and the dominions as "autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic and external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations". The Statute of Westminster of 1931 gave legal effect to the substance of the decisions reached in 1926 and established the legislative equality of the dominion parliaments with the British Parliament.

The decision of the Imperial Conference of 1926 also gave rise to another significant development in the character of relations between the dominions. Even before the First World War, the dominions had maintained High Commissioners in London to deal directly with the British authorities. Canada appointed its first High Commissioner to London in 1880. When the 1926 Conference decided that the Governor General in each of the dominions should cease to be the representative of the British Government and become the representative of the monarch, the British Government appointed High Commissioners to the dominions. High Commissioners gradually assumed a diplomatic identity and functioned as the usual channels of communication between the dominions and British Government; eventually, the dominions exchanged High Commissioners among themselves. A significant aspect of the High Commissioner's function, which differentiates it from that of an ambassador, is that High Commissioners are accredited to the head of government rather than to the head of state. This practice has been maintained despite the decision of many Commonwealth countries not to retain the British monarch as their common head of state. Today the British monarch is valued as a reflection of the special relations between members of the association. Most Commonwealth countries have now exchanged High Commissioners among themselves as well as with Britain.

In part as a result of developments during the Second World War, the movement towards independence in the colonial areas of South and Southeast Asia became irresistible. On August 15, 1947, the Indian subcontinent was divided, to create the two sovereign countries of India and Pakistan. A year later, Ceylon (since 1972, Sri Lanka) achieved complete independence.

An important step in the evolution of the modern Commonwealth was taken soon after these countries attained independence. When India decided to become a republic yet opted to remain within the Commonwealth, it became clear that common allegiance to the Crown was no longer a suitable criterion for membership in the association. The communiqué of the April 1949 Prime Ministers' Meeting expressed the new conception of the role of the British monarch within the Commonwealth -- that of a symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and, as such, Head of the Commonwealth. This new definition enabled countries to join or to continue as members of the Commonwealth without any strict uniformity of constitutions.

During the 1960s, membership in the Commonwealth increased significantly, as practically all Africa became independent, and all except three of the British African territories (Sudan, British Cameroons, Southern Togoland) decided to remain within the association. This development was crucial to the evolution of the Commonwealth, as it reinforced its multiracial character -- a point perhaps most significantly registered at the Prime Ministers' Meeting in London in March 1961, when Commonwealth representatives discussed with the assent of the South African leader, racial policies within that country. So great a number of representatives expressed their disapproval of the principles of apartheid contained in the new Constitution of South Africa that the South African Prime Minister decided to reassess his government's desire to remain within the Commonwealth, and later withdrew from the association.

Until its independence following elections in 1980, the issue of white minority rule in Zimbabwe was a prominent concern of the association. The Commonwealth Sanctions Committee was established by Heads of Government at their meeting in Lagos in January 1966, among other things to review regularly the working of United Nations sanctions against the Rhodesian Government and also the special needs that might, from time to time, arise in honouring the Commonwealth's undertaking to come to the support of Zambia when its economy was adversely affected as a result of its applying sanctions. In 1976, the

Commonwealth extended similar assistance to Mozambique, even though that country was not a member of the Commonwealth. The Committee met at least once a year to review developments during the period of illegal independence.

Throughout this metamorphosis of the Commonwealth, a small number of countries have either withdrawn from the association or chosen not to become members of it. The last member of the Commonwealth to withdraw was Pakistan, which severed its connection in January, 1972, because of the recognition of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) by a number of Commonwealth countries. South Africa withdrew on May 31, 1961, after choosing to disassociate itself from the Commonwealth as it was then emerging. Ireland left the Commonwealth on April 18, 1949, owing to strained relations with Britain during the previous two decades. The Japanese conquest of Burma during the Second World War accelerated the growing desire of that country to attain complete independence from Britain. Unwilling to remain within the Commonwealth association as it then was under the terms of the Balfour Report, Burma chose to become an independent republic outside the association in January, 1948.

Nature of Commonwealth association

The essential functions of the Commonwealth may be expressed in two words: consultation and cooperation. As stated in the opening paragraph of the Commonwealth Declaration, Commonwealth governments consult and cooperate in the common interest of their peoples and in the promotion of international understanding and world peace. Members have, however, complete freedom to belong to any grouping, association or alliance, or, of course, to remain non-aligned. Membership carries no obligation to come to the assistance of another member that may be attacked, though, not unnaturally, Commonwealth countries would be seriously concerned about such an occurrence. At an earlier stage, commerce was an important cohesive factor within the association. With the liberalization of trade on a multilateral basis following the Second World War, the Commonwealth preference system became progressively less significant as a unifying element. The value of the Commonwealth preference system with regard to trade with Britain was, of course, affected by Britain's entry into the European Economic Community on January 1, 1973. On a broader scale, Commonwealth trade links remain important, particularly for the developing countries.

The Commonwealth, it should be remembered, is an international association and not, like the United Nations or the Organization of American States, an international organization. It was not created at any particular time as a result of the desire of its members to pursue a particular policy or to work towards the resolution of specific problems. Instead, the Commonwealth has evolved gradually in response to individual stimuli and initiatives and has, at the request of member governments, undertaken a wide variety of activities and programs. Since it is not an international organization, the Commonwealth has no charter outlining jurisdictions and responsibilities, nor has it a structured hierarchy of councils and committees that reach decisions by formal debate and majority vote. It does not have a continuing executive structure and operates largely by consensus.

The Unofficial Commonwealth

Extensive governmental and official relations are supplemented by the wide variety and number of Commonwealth contacts at the unofficial level. Well over 200 non-governmental bodies form the human element of the association and contribute much to the strengthening of Commonwealth ties. Of the many Commonwealth conferences, events and meetings in any given year, approximately 50 per cent usually are sponsored by non-governmental organizations. Some of these are financed or partially funded by the Commonwealth Foundation.

To encourage the voluntary sector within the Commonwealth, a Heads of Government meeting created the Commonwealth Foundation in 1965. Its purpose is to promote interchanges between organizations in professional fields and to assist, when required, in the establishment of non-governmental institutions or associations where these have not previously existed. At the 1979 Lusaka meeting, Heads of Government decided that, subject to a review, the Foundation's mandate might expand to include culture, information, social welfare and rural development while maintaining its interest in the professional organizations. All members of the Commonwealth contribute to the Foundation's budget.

Commonwealth Secretariat

In 1965, Commonwealth Heads of Government decided to establish the Commonwealth Secretariat to facilitate communication between member governments and to administer programs of cooperation. The Secretariat, based in London exemplifies "the spirit of cooperation which animates the Commonwealth", and is staffed by officers from more than 20 Commonwealth countries. Its budget is financed by assessments on all member governments. The Secretariat, responsible to Commonwealth governments collectively, is headed by a Secretary-General who has direct access to Heads of Government. It works to encourage the exchange of opinions in a friendly, informal and intimate atmosphere, and, since its establishment, has become the centre for multilateral communication between Commonwealth governments. The Secretariat also serves as the focal point and link for many of the Commonwealth's functional institutions. Its responsibilities include the following: facilitating and promoting consultation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, among members; preparing and circulating factual papers on international questions of special concern to Commonwealth governments; acting as focal point and link for various specialized Commonwealth institutions; undertaking studies on various subjects in the economic, social, administrative and cultural fields; and organizing and servicing the many Commonwealth governmental meetings.

Of particular interest to Canada are links between the Commonwealth and la Francophonie. Working meetings are held regularly between the Secretariat and l'Agence de coopération culturelle et technique. Canada, Mauritius, Seychelles and Vanuatu are all members of la Francophonie.

The first Secretary-General of the Commonwealth was Arnold Smith, a Canadian diplomat who relinquished this post in July 1975 after ten years' service. His successor, Shridath S. Ramphal, formerly Foreign Minister and Justice Minister of Guyana, has shown similar dedication to an outward-looking, active Commonwealth.

COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>DATE OF INDEPENDENCE</u>	<u>HEAD OF GOVERNMENT</u>
Britain	55,932,000	Monarchy		Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher
Canada	24,000,000	Monarchy	July 1, 1867	Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau
Australia	14,420,000	Monarchy	January 1, 1901	Prime Minister, John Malcolm Fraser
New Zealand	3,148,000	Monarchy	September 26, 1907	Prime Minister, Robert D. Muldoon
India	631,726,000	Republic	August 15, 1947	Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi
Sri Lanka	14,097,000	Republic	February 4, 1948	Prime Minister, Junius R. Jayewardene
Ghana	10,634,000	Republic	March 6, 1957	President, Hilla Limann
Malaysia	12,961,000	Own Monarchy	August 31, 1957	Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad
Nigeria	78,982,000	Republic	October 1, 1960	President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari
Cyprus	644,000	Republic	March 13, 1961	President, Spyros Kyprianou
Sierra Leone	3,210,000	Republic	April 27, 1961	President, Siaka Stevens
Tanzania	16,363,000	Republic	December 9, 1961	President, Julius K. Nyerere
Jamaica	2,101,000	Monarchy	August 6, 1962	Prime Minister, Edward Philip Seaga
Trinidad and Tobago	1,118,000	Republic	August 31, 1962	Prime Minister, George Chambers
Uganda	12,049,000	Republic	October 9, 1962	President, Milton Obote
Kenya	14,614,000	Republic	December 12, 1963	President, Daniel T. Moi
Malawi	5,597,000	Republic	July 6, 1964	President, H. Kamuzu Banda
Malta	333,000	Republic	September 21, 1964	Prime Minister, Dominic Mintoff
Zambia	5,128,000	Republic	October 24, 1964	President, Kenneth Kaunda
Gambia	554,000	Republic	February 18, 1965	President, Alhaji Dawda Jawara
Singapore	2,319,000	Republic	October 15, 1965	Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew
Guyana	817,000	Republic	May 26, 1966	Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham
Botswana	728,000	Republic	September 30, 1966	President, Quett K. Masire
Lesotho	1,250,000	Own Monarchy	October 4, 1966	Prime Minister, Leabua Jonathan
Barbados	248,000	Monarchy	November 30, 1966	Prime Minister, Tom M. Adams
Nauru	7,000	Republic	January 31, 1968	President, Hammer DeRoburt
Mauritius	906,000	Monarchy	March 12, 1968	Prime Minister, Seewoosagur Ramgoolam
Swaziland	511,000	Own Monarchy	September 6, 1968	Prime Minister, Mabandla Dlamini
Tonga	92,000	Own Monarchy	June 4, 1970	Prime Minister, Fatafehi Tu'iipelehake
Western Samoa	154,000	Republic	August 28, 1970	Prime Minister, Taisi Tupuola Efi
Fiji	589,000	Monarchy	October 10, 1970	Prime Minister, Kamisese Mara
Bangladesh	81,219,000	Republic	April 18, 1972	Acting President, Abdus Sattar
The Bahamas	220,000	Monarchy	July 10, 1973	Prime Minister, Lynden O. Pindling
Grenada	105,000	Monarchy	February 7, 1974	Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop
Papua New Guinea	2,857,000	Monarchy	September 16, 1975	Prime Minister, Julius Chan
Seychelles	62,000	Republic	June 29, 1976	President, France Albert René
Solomon Islands	205,000	Monarchy	July 7, 1978	Prime Minister, Solomon Mamaloni
Tuvalu	10,000	Monarchy	October 1, 1978	Prime Minister, Toalipi Lauti
Dominica	77,000	Republic	November 3, 1978	Prime Minister, Eugenia Charles
St. Lucia	118,000	Monarchy	February 22, 1979	Prime Minister, Winston Francis Cenac
Kiribati	55,000	Republic	July 12, 1979	President, Ieremia Tabai
St. Vincent	103,000	Monarchy	October 27, 1979	Prime Minister, R. Milton Cato
Zimbabwe	6,683,000	Republic	April 18, 1980	Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe
Vanuatu	100,000	Republic	June 30, 1980	Prime Minister, Walter Lini

Le Commonwealth

Au fur et à mesure que les colonies de l'Empire britannique devenaient souveraines et indépendantes, nombre de leurs dirigeants acquéraient la conviction qu'en raison de l'emploi d'une langue commune et de l'affinité des moeurs, des institutions et des méthodes de travail de leurs peuples, il serait bon de maintenir leurs liens au sein d'une association. C'est ainsi que devait naître le Commonwealth actuel (ou Commonwealth des nations), une libre association de quarante-quatre pays indépendants (en date de juillet 1981) répartis sur six continents et situés en bordure de cinq océans. Le Zimbabwe, anciennement la Rhodésie du Sud et Vanuatu, les anciennes Nouvelle-Hébrides, sont les deux derniers pays à s'y être joints, lors de leur accession à l'indépendance. Quant à Nauru, Tuvalu et Saint Vincent, ils jouissent d'un statut spécial : ils peuvent participer à toutes les réunions et activités du Commonwealth sauf aux réunions des chefs d'État.

La diversité des races, des langues, des religions et des cultures que l'on rencontre au sein du Commonwealth est prodigieuse. Celui-ci forme une association unique en son genre. Elle permet à des personnalités spécialisées dans divers domaines de se réunir sans formalisme pour échanger en toute confiance leurs points de vue sur une multitude de sujets et essayer de déterminer la meilleure voie à suivre. Face à un monde menacé par la division, un monde où religions, idéologies, races, régions ou niveaux de développement économique sont autant de facteurs de discorde, l'association du Commonwealth parvient à s'élever au-dessus des intérêts nationaux et à envisager les problèmes des pays qui la composent dans une seule et même perspective.

Les principes de l'association furent exprimés de façon très éloquente dans la Déclaration du Commonwealth, publiée en 1971 à Singapour, à l'issue de la Conférence des chefs d'État du Commonwealth. Cet énoncé des principes communs à tous affirme la croyance des membres du Commonwealth dans les Nations Unies et les efforts qu'elles font pour favoriser la paix et l'ordre dans le monde; à la liberté individuelle et au droit inaliénable de tous les citoyens de participer à l'édification de la société dans laquelle ils vivent; au caractère condamnable des préjugés raciaux et de la discrimination; aux principes de la dignité humaine et de l'égalité des hommes et à l'iniquité de la domination coloniale; à la nécessité de faire disparaître progressivement les inégalités dans la répartition des richesses dans le monde; et au rôle du Commonwealth en tant que moyen d'encourager la collaboration internationale. Dans la poursuite de leurs objectifs, les membres du

Commonwealth croient pouvoir donner un exemple positif de collaboration entre les diverses nations, collaboration qui est indispensable à la paix et au progrès du monde moderne.

Au sens le plus large, le Commonwealth regroupe, autour de ses États membres, des États qui jouissent d'une pleine autonomie interne et sont associés à un membre du Commonwealth pour les besoins de la politique étrangère et de la défense; des protectorats; des territoires sous tutelle administrés par un membre agissant au nom des Nations Unies et des territoires qui dépendent encore d'un État membre. Avec ces dépendances, le Commonwealth englobe le quart de la superficie terrestre, et sa population dépasse bien au delà du quart de la population mondiale.

Parmi les quarante-quatre États membres de plein droit du Commonwealth, dix-neuf ont gardé une monarchie constitutionnelle. La reine Elizabeth II est le chef d'État du Canada et de treize autres États membres. En Malaisie, les neuf dirigeants héréditaires des États malais de l'ouest de la Fédération élisent un souverain parmi eux. Celui-ci devient le chef d'État de l'ensemble du pays pour une durée de cinq ans. Lors de leur accession à l'indépendance, deux pays membres, le Lesotho et le Swaziland, ont proclamé leurs Grands Chefs rois et chefs d'État. Le Royaume du Tonga a conservé un régime monarchique après avoir repris de la Grande-Bretagne, en 1970, la direction de ses affaires étrangères. Vingt-quatre membres de l'association ont adopté le régime républicain, mais tous les membres reconnaissent la reine Elizabeth comme symbole de leur libre association et comme chef du Commonwealth.

États associés au sein du Commonwealth

Un "État associé" est un État ayant accédé à une autonomie interne totale mais qui, en matière de défense et d'affaires extérieures, continue à dépendre de la Grande-Bretagne. Cette association est libre et volontaire; un État peut à tout moment proclamer son indépendance. Dans la région des Antilles, Antigua (dont l'indépendance est prévue pour le 1^{er} novembre 1981), Saint-Christophe-Nevis et Anguilla demeurent des États associés et, en vertu d'un accord avec la Grande-Bretagne, ils en exercent les pouvoirs dans un large secteur des relations étrangères. La Grande-Bretagne se charge aussi des affaires étrangères du Brunei, sultanat de la côte nord-ouest de Bornéo, et participe à l'élaboration des dispositions relatives à la défense de cet État. Le Brunei est un protectorat de la Grande-Bretagne depuis 1888. Les îles Cook et Niue, dans le Pacifique-Sud, jouissent aussi d'une pleine autonomie

interne mais elles ont choisi de s'associer à la Nouvelle-Zélande. comme l'a fait, en décembre 1976, l'île Tokelau qui est également autonome. Les habitants de ces trois territoires sont citoyens néo-zélandais.

Territoires dépendants

Dans le vocabulaire du Commonwealth, les territoires dépendants désignent environ vingt colonies et territoires sous tutelle qui exercent leur autonomie à des degrés plus ou moins importants. La plupart d'entre eux dépendent de la Grande-Bretagne ou de l'Australie. De nouveaux membres sont recrutés parmi les États associés et les dépendances qui, à leur accession à l'indépendance, peuvent demander aux chefs des gouvernements membres du Commonwealth de les admettre comme membres de plein droit de cette association.

Faits saillants dans l'évolution du Commonwealth

Le Commonwealth est le fruit d'une évolution de l'Empire britannique, qui a commencé au XIX^e siècle et dont plusieurs étapes importantes sont liées à l'histoire du Canada. Les faits saillants sont nombreux, mais comme point de départ, on pourrait choisir l'année 1839. Cette année-là, le Rapport de lord Durham était publié à la suite d'une enquête sur les causes des rébellions survenues dans le Haut-Canada et le Bas-Canada en 1836-1837. Parmi les recommandations formulées par lord Durham, l'une des principales était d'accorder une pleine autonomie interne aux gouvernements des colonies pour toute affaire qui les concernait. Selon les recommandations de lord Durham, le gouvernement impérial n'exercerait son autorité et ses fonctions que dans les domaines indispensables au maintien de l'unité impériale, dont le contrôle des relations étrangères, la réglementation du commerce, les révisions de la constitution et la vente des terres domaniales. Tous les autres pouvoirs et fonctions, dont ceux ayant trait à la dépense des fonds publics, seraient transférés aux gouvernements coloniaux qui les attribueraient à des conseils exécutifs responsables devant des Assemblées législatives élues. Les gouvernements coloniaux n'exerceraient ces pouvoirs et fonctions qu'aussi longtemps qu'ils conserveraient l'appui de la majorité des assemblées. Après l'union du Haut-Canada et du Bas-Canada en 1840, cette recommandation fut appliquée progressivement et reconnue officiellement lorsque l'Acte, pour indemniser les personnes du Bas-Canada dont les propriétés avaient été détruites durant la rébellion, fut accepté par le gouverneur général, lord Elgin, et le gouvernement britannique en

1849. Cette loi établissait effectivement le principe de la pleine autonomie des gouvernements coloniaux en ce qui concernait la vaste gamme des questions relevant directement de leur compétence. Par la suite, ce principe d'un gouvernement responsable jouissant d'une grande autonomie à l'égard des questions intérieures fut largement appliqué dans tout l'Empire britannique. Son application générale entraîna d'immenses changements. En 1867, en vertu de l'Acte de l'Amérique du Nord britannique, le Canada devint le premier dominion autonome; l'Australie acquit le statut de dominion en 1901, la Nouvelle-Zélande en 1907 et l'Afrique du Sud en 1909. On peut sans doute considérer que la naissance du Commonwealth britannique, en tant qu'association distincte de l'Empire britannique, date de 1897, année où se tint la Conférence des colonies à Londres. Cette conférence était réservée aux représentants de la Grande-Bretagne et des colonies pourvues de gouvernements responsables. Lors de la Conférence des colonies en 1907, il fut décidé qu'à l'avenir on appellerait ces rencontres Conférences impériales afin de refléter le nouveau statut des dominions.

Des changements importants sont survenus entre 1914 et 1939, époque où le Canada et les autres dominions autonomes assumèrent une part grandissante de responsabilités dans la conduite de leurs relations avec d'autres pays. À la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale, le Canada, appuyé parfois par les autres dominions, réussit à affirmer son indépendance par rapport à la puissance impériale grâce à des accords et à des précédents qui, à leur tour, jetèrent les bases de l'évolution politique ultérieure. Dès 1919, lors des négociations de Versailles, les dominions obtinrent le droit de représentation distincte aux conférences internationales, et, dans les années 20, le droit à la représentation diplomatique dans les pays étrangers. Ces modifications apportées à la nature de leurs relations avec l'Empire firent l'objet du communiqué publié à l'issue de la Conférence impériale de 1926. Reprenant les recommandations présentées dans la déclaration de Balfour, le communiqué définissait la Grande-Bretagne et les dominions comme des communautés autonomes au sein de l'Empire britannique, égaux en statut, et n'étant en aucune manière subordonnés les uns aux autres tant pour leurs affaires intérieures qu'extérieures, quoique unis par une allégeance commune envers la Couronne, et librement associés comme membres du Commonwealth des nations britanniques. Le Statut de Westminster (1931) traduisit sous forme de loi les décisions prises en 1926, et établit que les pouvoirs législatifs des parlements des dominions étaient égaux à ceux du Parlement britannique.

La Conférence impériale de 1926 fut également à l'origine d'une réorientation importante des rapports entre les dominions. Avant l'époque de la Première Guerre mondiale déjà, ces derniers étaient représentés à Londres par des hauts-commissaires qui négociaient directement avec les autorités britanniques. (Le premier haut-commissaire du Canada à Londres fut nommé en 1880.) Lorsqu'il fut décidé, à la Conférence de 1926, que les gouverneurs généraux des dominions ne représenteraient plus le gouvernement britannique mais plutôt la Couronne, celui-ci se fit représenter dans les dominions par des hauts-commissaires. Ces derniers assumèrent graduellement des fonctions diplomatiques et commencèrent à jouer le rôle d'intermédiaires entre les dominions et la puissance impériale; puis les dominions eux-mêmes échangèrent des hauts-commissaires. (Les hauts-commissaires se distinguent des ambassadeurs principalement en ce qu'ils sont accrédités auprès des chefs de gouvernement plutôt que des chefs d'État.) Aussi cette pratique s'est-elle perpétuée bien que nombre de pays du Commonwealth ne reconnaissent plus le souverain d'Angleterre comme leur chef d'État commun. Elle reflète les relations spéciales qui unissent les membres de l'association. Actuellement, la plupart des pays membres du Commonwealth échangent des hauts-commissaires entre eux aussi bien qu'avec la Grande-Bretagne.

Déoulant en partie de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le mouvement d'indépendance des colonies de l'Asie du Sud et du Sud-Est devint irrépessible. Le 15 août 1947, le sous-continent indien fut divisé en deux États souverains : l'Inde et le Pakistan. Un an plus tard, Ceylan (Sri Lanka depuis 1972) accédait aussi à l'indépendance.

Un grand pas fut fait dans l'évolution du Commonwealth moderne peu après la naissance de ces nouveaux États. Lorsque l'Inde décida de devenir une république tout en souhaitant demeurer au sein du Commonwealth, l'allégeance commune envers la Couronne cessa d'être le critère essentiel de l'appartenance à l'association. En 1949, le communiqué de la Conférence des premiers ministres définit le nouveau rôle du monarque britannique au sein du Commonwealth, à savoir, celui d'un symbole de la libre association de ses États membres indépendants et, à ce titre, de chef du Commonwealth. Cette nouvelle définition a permis à de nombreux pays dont les constitutions sont différentes de demeurer ou de devenir membres du Commonwealth.

Par suite de l'accession à l'indépendance de presque tous les pays africains au cours des années 60, les adhésions au Commonwealth se sont multipliées; en effet, les

anciennes colonies anglaises ont décidé de ne pas s'en tirer à l'exception du Soudan, du Cameroun britannique et du Togoland méridional. Cette étape décisive de l'évolution du Commonwealth a confirmé le caractère multiracial de l'association, réalité qui devint évidente lors de la Conférence des premiers ministres à Londres, en mars 1961, quand, avec le consentement du premier ministre d'Afrique du Sud, les représentants du Commonwealth discutèrent de la politique raciale de ce pays. Un si grand nombre de représentants exprimèrent leur désapprobation au sujet des principes de l'apartheid contenus dans la nouvelle Constitution de l'Afrique du Sud, que le premier ministre de ce pays décida de réétudier le désir qu'avait manifesté son gouvernement de demeurer au sein du Commonwealth, et se retira de l'association par la suite.

Avant l'accession à l'indépendance du Zimbabwe suite aux élections de 1980, la question de la domination du pays par la minorité blanche était aussi l'une des principales préoccupations de l'association. Le Comité des sanctions fut établi par les chefs d'État du Commonwealth réunis à la Conférence de Lagos en janvier 1966, notamment afin de réviser régulièrement l'effet des sanctions imposées par l'O.N.U. au gouvernement de la Rhodésie ainsi que les obligations particulières qui, éventuellement, découleraient de la tâche que s'est donnée le Commonwealth de venir en aide à la Zambie lorsque l'application, par ce pays, des sanctions prévues serait source de difficultés pour son économie. En 1976, le Commonwealth a accordé une aide analogue au Mozambique, bien que ce pays ne fasse pas partie du Commonwealth. Durant la période d'indépendance illégale, le Comité se réunissait au moins une fois l'an.

Cette évolution du Commonwealth a amené un certain nombre de pays à s'en retirer ou à ne pas y adhérer. Le dernier retrait -- celui du Pakistan -- survint le 30 janvier 1972, après que certaines nations du Commonwealth eurent reconnu le Bangladesh, l'ancien Pakistan oriental. L'Afrique du Sud, quant à elle, a rompu ses liens (31 mai 1961) avec l'association parce qu'elle en désapprouvait la nouvelle orientation. La République d'Irlande s'en était dissociée le 18 avril 1949, après vingt ans de relations tendues avec la Grande-Bretagne. Enfin, ses aspirations grandissantes pour une autonomie totale vis-à-vis de la Grande-Bretagne ayant été aiguës par l'occupation japonaise, au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la Birmanie rejeta les modalités d'association établies dans la déclaration de Balfour, et opta, le 4 janvier 1948, pour le retrait en faveur de l'indépendance.

Nature de l'association du Commonwealth

Les fonctions essentielles du Commonwealth se définissent en deux mots : consultation et coopération. Comme l'indique le paragraphe liminaire de la Déclaration du Commonwealth, les gouvernements des pays membres du Commonwealth se consultent et collaborent pour favoriser les intérêts communs de leurs peuples, la compréhension internationale et la paix mondiale. Ces pays ont toute liberté d'appartenir à d'autres groupements, associations ou alliances, ou, bien entendu, d'adopter une politique de non-alignement. Ils ne sont pas tenus de prêter leur assistance à un autre membre en cas d'agression, quoique la décision de l'un d'entre eux de ne pas agir, en un tel cas, ne manquerait pas d'inquiéter les autres. Au début, les relations commerciales étaient la principale source de cohésion. Puis, avec le processus naturel de la croissance économique et de la libéralisation du commerce multilatéral survenu après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le système préférentiel du Commonwealth perdit de son importance. L'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans la Communauté économique européenne (C.E.E.), le 1^{er} janvier 1973, devait lui porter un autre coup. Cependant, les liens commerciaux entre les pays du Commonwealth, d'un point de vue général, gardent leur importance, surtout du point de vue des nations en voie de développement.

Le Commonwealth, il faut le souligner, est une association internationale et n'est donc pas, au contraire des Nations Unies ou de l'Organisation des États américains, une organisation internationale dotée d'une charte assignant des pouvoirs et des responsabilités, d'une hiérarchie s'appuyant sur des conseils et des comités chargés d'adopter -- à la majorité -- des résolutions officielles, après les avoir officiellement débattues. Le Commonwealth ne possède enfin aucun organe exécutif permanent; les décisions y sont normalement prises d'un accord commun. Il n'a pas été créé à un moment défini par la volonté de ses membres de poursuivre une politique particulière ou de s'attaquer à la résolution de problèmes précis. Au contraire, le Commonwealth a évolué lentement, au rythme des initiatives et des aspirations de ses membres et, à leur demande, il a mis en oeuvre divers programmes et activités dans de multiples domaines.

Le côté officieux du Commonwealth

Aux innombrables relations entre gouvernements et aux liaisons officielles s'ajoutent une vaste gamme de rapports officieux au sein du Commonwealth. Celui-ci compte

bien au delà de deux cents organisations non gouvernementales qui lui donnent son aspect humain et qui concourent, dans une large mesure, à renforcer les liens au sein de l'organisme. Les organisations non gouvernementales parrainent environ 50 p. 100 des nombreuses conférences, manifestations et réunions organisées chaque année par le Commonwealth. La Fondation du Commonwealth en finance certaines, entièrement ou en partie.

C'est lors de la conférence de 1965 que les chefs de gouvernement créèrent, en vue d'encourager le secteur bénévole du Commonwealth, la Fondation du Commonwealth. Celle-ci a pour but de favoriser les échanges entre les associations professionnelles et, au besoin, d'aider à organiser des institutions ou des associations non gouvernementales. Lors de la conférence de 1979, tenue à Lusaka, les chefs de gouvernement décidèrent que, sous réserve d'un examen, le mandat de la Fondation pourrait en outre incorporer les domaines de la culture, de l'information, du bien-être social et du développement rural tout en s'attachant toujours aux organisations professionnelles. Tous les membres du Commonwealth contribuent au budget de la Fondation.

Le Secrétariat du Commonwealth

En 1965, les chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth décidaient de doter l'association d'un Secrétariat afin de faciliter la consultation entre les membres et d'administrer des programmes de coopération. Le Secrétariat, dont le siège est à Londres, témoigne de l'esprit de coopération qui anime le Commonwealth; il se compose de représentants de plus de vingt pays du Commonwealth. Tous les États membres versent une contribution à son budget. Le Secrétariat, qui rend compte de ses activités à l'ensemble des gouvernements du Commonwealth, est dirigé par un secrétaire général qui a des contacts directs avec les chefs de gouvernement. Sa fonction est de créer des conditions propices à des échanges de vues dans un climat de bonne entente, de confiance et de simplicité, et depuis sa création, il constitue un centre de communications multilatérales entre les gouvernements du Commonwealth. Il sert aussi d'organe de centralisation et de liaison aux diverses institutions spécialisées et fonctionnelles du Commonwealth. Ses responsabilités sont les suivantes : faciliter et promouvoir la consultation bilatérale et multilatérale entre les membres, préparer et distribuer des mémoires sur les questions internationales qui intéressent particulièrement les pays membres, effectuer des études sur diverses questions d'ordre social,

administratif, économique et culturel, organiser les nombreuses réunions du Commonwealth et y assurer les services de secrétariat.

Le Canada s'intéresse vivement aux liens établis entre le Commonwealth et la Francophonie. Le Secrétariat du Commonwealth et l'Agence de coopération culturelle et technique au sein de la Francophonie tiennent régulièrement des réunions de travail. En outre, le Canada, l'île Maurice, les Seychelles et Vanuatu sont tous membres de la Francophonie.

Le premier secrétaire général du Commonwealth fut Arnold Smith, diplomate canadien qui a pris sa retraite en 1975 après dix ans à ce poste. Son successeur, Shridath S. Ramphal, ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères et de la Justice de la Guyane, a montré qu'il voue le même intérêt à un Commonwealth actif et ouvert sur le monde.

PAYS DU COMMONWEALTH

<u>PAYS MEMBRE</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>STATUS CONSTITUTIONNEL</u>	<u>DATE D'ADHESION</u>	<u>CHEF DE GOUVERNEMENT</u>
GRANDE-BRETAGNE	55 932 000	Monarchie		Premier ministre: Margaret Thatcher
CANADA	24 000 000	Monarchie	le 1 juillet 1867	Premier ministre: Pierre Elliott Trudeau
AUSTRALIE	14 420 000	Monarchie	le 1 janvier 1901	Premier ministre: John Malcolm Fraser
NOUVELLE-ZELANDE	3 148 000	Monarchie	le 26 septembre 1907	Premier ministre: Robert D. Muldoon
INDE	631 726 000	République	le 15 août 1947	Premier ministre: Indira Gandhi
SRI LANKA	14 097 000	République	le 4 février 1948	Premier ministre: Junius R. Jayewardene
GHANA	10 634 000	République	le 6 mars 1957	Président: Hilla Limann
MALAISIE	12 961 000	Monarchie du pays	le 31 août 1957	Premier ministre: Mahathir Mohamad
NIGERIA	78 982 000	République	le 1 octobre 1960	Président: Aljahi Shehu Shagari
CHYPRE	644 000	République	le 13 mars 1961	Président: Spyros Kyprianou
SIERRA LEONE	3 210 000	République	le 27 avril 1961	Président: Siaka Stevens
TANZANIE	16 363 000	République	le 9 décembre 1961	Président: Julius K. Nyerere
JAMAÏQUE	2 101 000	Monarchie	le 6 août 1962	Premier ministre: Edward Philip Seaga
TRINITE-ET-TOBAGO	1 118 000	République	le 31 août 1962	Premier ministre: George Chambers
UGANDA	12 049 000	République	le 9 octobre 1962	Président: Milton Obote
KENYA	14 614 000	République	le 12 décembre 1963	Président: Daniel T. Moi
MALAWI	5 597 000	République	le 6 juillet 1964	Président: H. Kamuzu Banda
MALTE	333 000	République	le 21 septembre 1964	Premier ministre: Dominic Mintoff
ZAMBIE	5 128 000	République	le 24 octobre 1964	Président: Kenneth Kaunda
GAMBIE	554 000	République	le 18 février 1965	Président: Alhaji Dawda Jawara
SINGAPOUR	2 319 000	République	le 15 octobre 1965	Premier ministre: Lee Kuan Yew
GUYANE	817 000	République	le 26 mai 1966	Premier ministre: Forbes Burnham
BOTSWANA	728 000	République	le 30 septembre 1966	Président: Quett K. Masire
LESOTHO	1 250 000	Monarchie du pays	le 4 octobre 1966	Premier ministre: Leabua Jonathan
BARBADE	248 000	Monarchie	le 30 novembre 1966	Premier ministre: Tom M. Adams
NAURU	7 000	République	le 31 janvier 1968	Président: Hammer DeRoburt
MAURICE	906 000	Monarchie	le 12 mars 1968	Premier ministre: Seewoosagur Ramgoolam
SOUAZILAND	511 000	Monarchie du pays	le 6 septembre 1968	Premier ministre: Mabandla Dlamini
TONGA	92 000	Monarchie du pays	le 4 juin 1970	Premier ministre: Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake
SAMOA OCCIDENTALES	154 000	République	le 28 août 1970	Premier ministre: Taisi Tupuola Efi
FIDJI	589 000	Monarchie	le 10 octobre 1970	Premier ministre: Kamisese Mara
BANGLADESH	81 219 000	République	le 18 avril 1972	Président intérimaire: Abdus Sattar
BAHAMAS	220 000	Monarchie	le 10 juillet 1973	Premier ministre: Lynden O. Pindling
GRENADE	105 000	Monarchie	le 7 février 1974	Premier ministre: Maurice Bishop
PAPOUASIE-NOUVELLE-GUINEE	2 857 000	Monarchie	le 16 septembre 1975	Premier ministre: Julius Chan
SEYHELLES	62 000	République	le 29 juin 1976	Président: France Albert René
ILES SALOMON	205 000	Monarchie	le 7 juillet 1978	Premier ministre: Solomon Mamaloni
TUVALU	10 000	Monarchie	le 1 octobre 1978	Premier ministre: Toalipi Lauti
DOMINIQUE	77 000	République	le 3 novembre 1978	Premier ministre: Eugenia Charles
SAINTE-LUCIE	118 000	Monarchie	le 22 février 1979	Premier ministre: Winston Francis Cenac
KIRIBATI (ILES GILBERT)	55 000	République	le 12 juillet 1979	Président: Ieremia Tabai
ST. VINCENT	103 000	Monarchie	le 27 octobre 1979	Premier ministre: R. Milton Cato
ZIMBABWE	6 683 000	République	le 18 avril 1980	Premier ministre: Robert Mugabe
VANUATU	100 000	République	le 30 juin 1980	Premier ministre: Walter Lini

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Survey of Canada in Commonwealth Affairs

Canada believes in and supports the constructive role that the Commonwealth plays in world affairs and places particular value on its consultations as a means of broadening understanding and consensus in important international issues. The Commonwealth association also provides an opportunity to enrich and deepen our bilateral relations with member countries. Internationally, Canadian participation in the Commonwealth reinforces the thrust of Canadian foreign policy generally and provides Canada with the opportunity to reach its goals with the help and understanding of fellow members. For these reasons, membership in the association is an important aspect of Canada's international relations.

As Prime Minister Trudeau said at the 1973 meeting in Ottawa,

The Commonwealth is for many of us our window on the world... To contemporary observers and, I am confident, to future historians, the word Commonwealth will be irrevocably associated with the desire of free men and women representing more than a quarter of the world's population to gather, to discuss and to understand....

Canada's Role

Canada and Canadians have played a major role in the evolution of the Commonwealth. Canadian leaders have taken a keen interest in maintaining the informality, candor and breadth of Commonwealth Heads of Government discussions. Canadians work in senior positions at the Secretariat in London, and Canadian experts have participated in the preparation of virtually all the major Commonwealth special studies which have formed the basis of political and economic action in the Commonwealth. Canada has encouraged the established cooperation between the Commonwealth Secretariat and la Francophonie through the Agence de coopération culturelle et technique in Paris. Canadian private citizens and parliamentarians as well as officials are active year-round in Commonwealth conferences and programs conducted by the large number of non-governmental organizations which exist throughout the Commonwealth. Last, but not least, Canada has shown its support by being the second largest financial contributor to Commonwealth budgets.

The Canadian Government has taken its turn as host to a number of Commonwealth conferences: the Senior Officials' Meeting and the Ministerial Telecommunications Conference in 1972, the Heads of Government Meeting in 1973 and the Finance Ministers' Meeting in 1974. In 1975, the Commonwealth Air Transport Council met in Canada as did the Tenth Commonwealth Mining and Metallurgical Conference. In June 1976, the Commonwealth Human Ecology Council and the Commonwealth ad hoc group for Habitat met in Vancouver before the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements. The twenty-third Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference was held in Ottawa in September 1977, and the meeting of Commonwealth law ministers in Winnipeg in August the same year. In April 1978, the Fourth Commonwealth Youth Affairs Council meeting took place in Ottawa, and in June, the Commonwealth Defence Science Organization in Toronto. In 1980, there was the Duke of Edinburgh's Fifth Commonwealth Study Conference on People in an Industrial Society. In September 1981, the fourth general assembly of the Commonwealth Association of Surveying and Land Economy was held in Ottawa.

In addition, a major Commonwealth event marking 1978 was the Commonwealth Games held in Edmonton.

Canadian Financial Contributions to Commonwealth
Institutions and Programs

Canada's financial contribution to Commonwealth institutions and programs has been substantial over the years, second only to that of Britain and, to all the voluntary programs, in excess of our assessed share of the Secretariat budget. Several departments and agencies are concerned in the payment of Canada's contributions, which in 1981/82 will exceed \$22 million. Moreover, our total bilateral aid to Commonwealth countries was approximately \$254 million in 1980/81, or some 43 percent of Canada's total bilateral aid.

The following list, though not exhaustive, includes contributions to the major official Commonwealth institutions and programs as well as to some of the smaller, but significant, ones (contributions to non-governmental organizations have not been included). A distinction has been made between payments on the basis of assessed shares and those which are voluntarily pledged by members.

Commonwealth Secretariat

All members of the association are assessed on the basis of the UN assessment schedule. For 1980/81, Canada's assessed share will amount to 17 percent of the total budget or approximately \$1,616,000 (External Affairs funds).

Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation

The CFTC, created in 1971, is the principal multilateral mechanism for development assistance within the Commonwealth. It is financed by voluntary contributions from all Commonwealth countries, both developed and developing. Over the last few years, Canada's contribution has amounted to over 40% of the total budget. For the years 1979/80, Canada contributed \$8.8 million (a 50% increase over the previous year) and approximately \$10 million in 1980/81 (Canadian International Development Agency funds).

Commonwealth Foundation

Established in 1965 to foster the development of professional organizations and societies in Commonwealth countries, the Commonwealth Foundation is financed by voluntary contributions from all member countries. For the fiscal years 1976-80, Canada contributed 32% of the Foundation's budget, which is approximately \$676,000 in 1980/81 (External Affairs funds).

Commonwealth Youth Program

Inaugurated in 1973 at the Ottawa Heads of Government Meeting, the Commonwealth Youth Program is aimed at encouraging and facilitating the exchange of ideas and experiences between people involved in youth programs at all levels. Voluntary contributions are made by all Commonwealth countries. Having contributed approximately \$3 million to date, Canada has been the major contributor to this program, contributing approximately \$500,000 in 1980/81 (External Affairs funds).

Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan

Awards are granted on a voluntary basis by 15 Commonwealth countries. For the fiscal year 1980/81 Canada contributed approximately \$2.8 million (approximately 300 scholarships). The program in Canada is administered on behalf of the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan

by the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (External Affairs funds).

Commonwealth Zimbabwe Scholarship Program

Contributions to this program are voluntary. For the year 1980/81, Canada contributed approximately \$200,000. Now that Zimbabwe has become independent, the program will gradually be diminished over the years, but scholarships which have already been awarded will continue to be funded (Canadian International Development Agency funds).

Commonwealth Science Council

The Council's aim is to promote collaboration between member countries to increase the capabilities of individual nations to use science and technology for their economic, social and environmental development. Contributions are voluntary. Canada's contribution for 1980/81 was 17 percent of the total budget or approximately \$95,000 (External Affairs funds).

Commonwealth Air Transport Council

The Council, which includes membership from nearly every Commonwealth country, serves to keep members up-to-date on developments in civil aviation and as a medium for the exchange of views and information. For 1980/81 Canada contributed approximately \$56,000 or 17 percent of the total budget (External Affairs funds).

Commonwealth Advisory Aeronautical Research Council

The Council is composed of eight Commonwealth countries and serves to facilitate the exchange of views and information on aeronautics and allied subjects. Canada's contribution for the fiscal year 1980/81 was approximately \$8,000 representing 25 percent of the total budget (National Research Council funds).

Commonwealth Legal Advisory Service

The British Institute of International and Comparative Law operates this service on behalf of the Commonwealth Governments. It provides advice, information and surveys on legal topics of Commonwealth concern. Contributions are voluntary; Canada's contribution for the fiscal year 1980/81 was approximately \$10,000 (Department of Justice funds).

Commonwealth Forestry Institute

Funded by grants from Commonwealth countries, the Commonwealth Forestry Institute provides a comprehensive information service and organizes courses on forest research and planning for foresters from the Commonwealth. Contributions are voluntary. Canada agreed to contribute approximately \$8,000 for 1980/81 (Department of Environment funds).

Commonwealth Institute

The Commonwealth Institute aims to foster the interests of the Commonwealth through information and education services designed to promote a wider knowledge of the association and greater understanding among its peoples. Contributions to the Institute are voluntary. For 1980/81, Canada contributed approximately \$20,000. The forecast for 1981/82 is approximately \$160,000 which includes the development of a new permanent Canadian exhibit at the Institute headquarters in London (External Affairs funds).

Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau

Established in 1929, the CAB is composed of ten bureaux which together provide member countries with a wide range of scientific information, as well as four institutes providing biological control services. Voluntary contributions are made by 28 Commonwealth countries. For the fiscal year 1980/81, Canada contributed approximately \$500,000 or 17 percent of the total budget (Department of Agriculture funds).

Commonwealth War Graves Commission

Established to mark and maintain the graves of all members of the Commonwealth forces who died in the two World Wars, the Commission's membership includes both Pakistan and South Africa. Canada contributed approximately \$2.6 million for the fiscal year 1980/81, representing 10 percent of the total budget (Department of Veterans Affairs funds). Contributions are assessed on the basis of the number of graves per member.

MAIN FEATURES OF CANADIAN
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
AND BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH
COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE PROGRAM

Canadian aid began in the early 1950s and was initially concentrated on cooperation with Asian countries through the Colombo Plan and relief and welfare programs through the United Nations. The bilateral program reflected concerns of the period with capital formation and development of infrastructure to support industrial development. Only limited weight was placed on social or rural development, and the program was concentrated in a restricted number of countries.

During the 1960s the development assistance program was broadened in a number of respects: total resource flows were about five times larger than during the 1950s; the bilateral program was expanded to include new or greatly expanded assistance to the Caribbean, Latin America and Africa; and the emphasis within multilateral programs shifted from relief and welfare programs to economic assistance.

The 1970s have been a period of consolidation and refinement of the aid program. The aid program has grown in real terms, and there has been some increase in the ODA ratio of GDP. Increased emphasis has been placed upon maximizing the effectiveness and impact of aid by improving procedures for planning, implementing and evaluating projects and ensuring that recipient governments are able to competently manage and operate a project once Canadian resources and expertise are withdrawn. Recent trends in overall disbursements are shown in Table 1.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE STRATEGY

A comprehensive review and reformulation of Canadian Development Assistance strategies was brought forward in September 1975 as the Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975-1980. The strategy included a number of key points including the following:

1. Priority to the poorest: The poorest developing countries receive the largest share of Canadian bilateral development assistance. In 1977, for example, 76% of new Canadian ODA commitments were for low-income countries as compared with an average of some 57% for all members of the Development Assistance Committee. A number of Commonwealth countries including Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Tanzania are in the low income category.

2. New forms of cooperation: This concept refers to the idea of establishing new, more appropriate mechanisms to supplement and gradually replace the donor-recipient relationship in middle income developing countries. Such Commonwealth countries as Malaysia, Jamaica, Barbados and Nigeria are in the middle income group.
3. Attack on major world problems: The strategy calls for greater attention to the most crucial aspects of development: food production and distribution, rural development, education and training, public health and demography, shelter and energy. These aspects have received increasing attention in planning the Canadian development assistance program.

CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMONWEALTH

Canada has no special policies for Commonwealth countries per se, but a wealth of long-standing cultural, historical, political and commercial links between Canada and a number of developing Commonwealth countries has exerted a significant impact on aid relationships between Canada and the Commonwealth.

Canadian ODA expenditures to the Commonwealth are made through channels:

(i) Bilateral Program

Bilateral aid is provided on a government-to-government basis in the form of grants or highly concessional loans - in recent years about evenly split. Grants are generally given for technical assistance or small projects which include the provision of advisers and training. Food aid is normally given as grants. Loans are extended for the purchase of Canadian goods and for large capital projects. However, as an outcome of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation held in Paris in 1976-77, Canada decided to provide all-grant assistance to countries in the "least-developed" category and forgive all outstanding ODA loans to them.

While bilateral assistance is mostly spent on the procurement of Canadian goods and services, up to 20% of total annual bilateral funds may be used to procure non-Canadian resources, where warranted, to meet developmental objectives most effectively.

Details of Canadian bilateral disbursements to Commonwealth Countries for 1979 and 1980 are shown in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. (This information is given in U.S. dollars on a calendar year basis in accordance with usual reporting to the Development Assistance Committee. This facilitates comparisons among donors).

(ii) Multilateral Program

Assistance is also provided to developing countries indirectly through contributions to international development organizations of which Canada is a member. Canada supports two general categories of multilateral institutions and their programs - international financial institutions including the World Bank Groups (of which the International Development Association receives the largest financial support) and four regional development banks covering Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and development organizations which are part of the UN family, the Commonwealth (notably Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation), Francophone institutions or international research institutions, and the UN Fund for Population Activities. With the exception of the World Food Program, the multilateral program involves untied funds.

(iii) Special Programs

Activities grouped under this heading are designed to support Canadian private sector initiatives in the development of Third World countries. The Non-Governmental Organizations program provides resources on a matching basis with funds raised for development projects by over two hundred Canadian or international volunteer groups, service agencies, universities, churches and professional associations. It funds three agencies that send volunteers to LDCs or operate exchange programs (CUSO, CESO and Canada World Youth) and also funds activities directed at increasing the participation of Canadians in international development through the education efforts of NGOs. The Industrial Cooperation Program provides seed money to Canadian companies to encourage the investment of our capital and technology in viable joint ventures in developing countries.

(iv) IDRC

Canadian ODA supports the activities of the International Development Research Centre in undertaking research in, and for the benefit of, developing countries. Areas of particular interest to IDRC include agriculture, food and nutrition sciences, information sciences, social sciences and communications. Although the IDRC is funded by the Government of Canada, its policies are established by an international Board of Governors.

TABLE I

DISBURSEMENTS OF CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) (C \$ MILLION)

	Total 5 Yrs. 1971/75	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80
Bilateral	1,708.9	507.8	465.8	541.4	559.3	598.8
Multilateral	755.7	340.6	435.7	425.2	490.4	500.5
Special Programs	83.7	32.0	39.2	50.0	72.8	84.4
IDRC	46.0	27.0	29.7	29.5	35.8	35.7
Other	<u>8.2</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>21.8</u>
TOTAL	2,602.5	909.6	972.5	1,050.5	1,166.0	1,241.1

CANADIAN ODA DISBURSEMENTS TO COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES 1979 (US \$000's)

COUNTRY/REGION	ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE			TOTAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GRANTS	FOOD AID GRANTS AND LOANS	EMERGENCY RELIEF	COUNTRY TOTAL
	GRANTS	LOANS	MINUS LOAN REPAYMENTS					
<u>AFRICA</u>								
BOTSWANA	1,640	-	-	1,640	1,080	-	-	2,720
GHANA	3,180	11,340	-	14,520	930	-	-	15,450
KENYA	1,460	2,210	-	3,670	5,420	-	-	9,090
LESOTHO	3,030	-	-	3,030	1,040	-	-	4,070
MALAWI	11,950	-	-	11,950	1,340	-	-	13,290
NIGERIA	740	270	(-390)	620	80	-	-	700
SWAZILAND	440	230	-	670	620	-	-	1,290
TANZANIA	24,140	-	-	24,140	1,520	2,940	-	28,600
ZAMBIA	160	1,110	-	1,270	2,200	-	-	3,470
REGIONAL AND OTHERS	290	10	-	300	1,130	-	-	1,430
TOTAL - AFRICA	47,030	15,170	(-390)	61,810	15,360	2,940	-	80,110
<u>ASIA</u>								
BANGLADESH	21,120	-	-	21,120	10	38,080	-	59,210
INDIA	630	15,080	(-3,000)	12,710	200	4,510	-	17,420
SRI LANKA	1,620	10,620	(-160)	12,080	210	4,970	-	17,260
MALAYSIA	80	1,450	(-340)	1,190	160	-	-	1,350
OTHER (INCLUDING OCEANIA)	70	-	-	70	-	-	21	91
TOTAL - ASIA	23,520	27,150	(-3,500)	47,170	580	47,560	21	95,331
<u>AMERICAS</u>								
BARBADOS	560	1,950	(-150)	2,360	-	-	-	2,360
BELIZE	460	4,190	-	4,650	110	-	-	4,760
GUYANA	200	4,770	(-90)	4,880	610	-	-	5,490
JAMAICA	310	1,580	(-500)	1,390	190	5,940(L)	21	7,541
LEE WARD/WIND WARD ISLANDS	2,030	450	-	2,480	100	480	37	3,097
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	50	170	(-390)	(-170)	40	-	-	(-130)
OTHERS	660	-	-	660	970	-	-	1,630
TOTAL - AMERICAS	4,270	13,110	(-1,130)	16,250	2,020	6,420	58	24,748
<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>								
SCHOLARSHIPS	2,400	-	-	2,400	-	-	-	2,400
EUROPE (MALTA)	-	350	-	350	-	-	-	350
TOTAL - MISCELLANEOUS	2,400	350	-	2,750	-	-	-	2,750
GRAND TOTAL	77,220	55,780	(-5,020)	127,980	17,960	56,920	79	202,939

CANADIAN ODA DISBURSEMENTS TO COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES 1980 (US \$000's)

COUNTRY/REGION	ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE			TOTAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GRANTS	FOOD AID GRANTS AND LOANS	EMERGENCY RELIEF	COUNTRY TOTAL
	GRANTS	LOANS	MINUS LOAN REPAYMENTS					
<u>AFRICA</u>								
BOTSWANA	1,220	-	-	1,220	1,440	-	-	2,660
GHANA	4,360	8,620	(-250)	12,730	1,130	-	-	13,860
KENYA	2,830	2,880	(-10)	5,700	3,870	-	-	9,570
LESOTHO	4,440	-	-	4,440	1,340	-	-	5,780
MALAWI	7,650	-	-	7,650	1,310	-	-	8,960
NIGERIA	460	-	(-180)	280	40	-	-	320
SWAZILAND	670	160	-	830	590	-	-	1,420
TANZANIA	14,480	-	-	14,480	2,350	2,540	-	19,370
ZAMBIA	1,560	7,830	-	9,390	3,580	2,990	-	15,960
OTHERS	1,000	-	-	1,000	750	-	128	1,878
TOTAL - AFRICA	38,670	19,490	(-440)	57,720	16,400	5,530	128	79,778
<u>ASIA</u>								
BANGLADESH	22,890	-	-	22,890	50	34,180	-	57,120
INDIA	630	21,780	(-3,950)	18,460	410	16,920	-	35,790
SRI LANKA	1,600	24,200	(-180)	25,620	410	3,250	-	29,280
MALAYSIA	300	900	(-340)	860	130	-	-	990
OTHERS (INCLUDES OCEANIA)	430	-	-	430	-	-	-	430
TOTAL - ASIA	25,850	46,880	(-4,470)	68,260	1,000	54,350	-	123,610
<u>AMERICAS</u>								
BARBADOS	320	410	(-290)	440	-	-	-	440
BELIZE	260	730	-	990	100	-	-	1,090
GUYANA	170	3,480	(-140)	3,510	570	-	-	4,080
JAMAICA	140	5,590	(-700)	5,030	130	2,510(L)	-	7,670
LEE WARD/WIND WARD ISLANDS	3,030	590	-	3,620	180	300	43	4,143
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	10	40	(-340)	(-290)	20	-	-	(-270)
OTHERS	2,300	-	-	2,300	1,420	-	-	3,720
TOTAL - AMERICAS	6,230	10,840	(-1,470)	15,600	2,420	2,810	43	20,873
<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>								
SCHOLARSHIPS	2,320	-	-	2,320	-	-	-	2,320
EUROPE (MALTA)	-	20	-	20	-	-	-	20
TOTAL - MISCELLANEOUS	2,320	20	-	2,340	-	-	-	2,340
GRAND TOTAL	73,070	77,230	(-6,380)	143,920	19,820	62,690	171	226,601

Le Canada et le Commonwealth

Le Canada, parce qu'il y croit, appuie le rôle constructif que le Commonwealth joue dans les affaires mondiales et il voit dans les consultations qui s'y déroulent un excellent moyen d'étendre la compréhension des grandes questions internationales et de faire le consensus à leur sujet. Sa participation au Commonwealth lui permet d'enrichir et de renforcer ses relations bilatérales avec les pays membres. Sur le plan international, elle donne plus de poids à sa politique étrangère en général et lui fournit des appuis précieux dans la poursuite de ses objectifs. Pour toutes ces raisons, le Canada considère sa participation au Commonwealth comme un aspect important de ses relations internationales.

En 1973, devant les chefs de gouvernement réunis à Ottawa, le Premier ministre Trudeau disait:

"Pour nombre d'entre nous, le Commonwealth est une porte ouverte sur le monde... Aux yeux de nos contemporains et, j'en suis convaincu, des historiens de l'avenir, le mot de Commonwealth sera irrévocablement associé à la volonté d'hommes et de femmes libres, représentant plus d'un quart de la population mondiale, de se réunir, de s'entretenir et de se comprendre...."

Le rôle du Canada

Le Canada et les Canadiens ont joué un rôle majeur dans l'évolution du Commonwealth. Les dirigeants canadiens ont montré qu'ils souhaitent vivement préserver l'atmosphère détendue, empreinte de franchise, dans laquelle se déroule la vaste gamme des discussions des chefs de gouvernement. Des Canadiens occupent des postes élevés au Secrétariat de l'organisation, à Londres, et des

experts canadiens ont participé à la préparation de presque toutes les grandes études spéciales sur lesquelles repose l'action politique et économique du Commonwealth. Par l'entremise de l'Agence de coopération culturelle et technique de Paris, le Canada s'est fait le promoteur de la coopération entre le Secrétariat du Commonwealth et la Francophonie. A longueur d'année, des fonctionnaires, des parlementaires, mais aussi de simples citoyens participent à toutes sortes de conférences et de programmes organisés par les nombreuses organisations non gouvernementales qui ont vu le jour dans le Commonwealth. Dernière précision, mais non la moindre, le Canada a démontré le soutien qu'il accorde au Commonwealth en se plaçant au deuxième rang des cotisants à son budget.

Son tour venu, le gouvernement canadien s'est fait l'hôte d'un certain nombre de conférences du Commonwealth: la réunion des hauts fonctionnaires et la Conférence ministérielle des télécommunications en 1972, la réunion des chefs de gouvernement en 1973 et celle des ministres des Finances en 1974. En 1975, il accueillait le Conseil des transports aériens du Commonwealth, de même que la dixième Conférence du Commonwealth sur les mines et la métallurgie. En juin 1976, le Conseil de l'écologie humaine et le groupe spécial du Commonwealth pour la conférence Habitat se réunissaient à Vancouver en prévision de la Conférence des Nations Unies sur les établissements humains. En septembre 1977 se déroulait à Ottawa la vingt-troisième Conférence parlementaire du Commonwealth, un mois après la réunion des ministres de la Justice, tenue à Winnipeg. En avril 1978, le Conseil du Commonwealth pour la jeunesse tenait sa quatrième assemblée à Ottawa et en juin de la même année, l'Organisation des sciences de la défense du Commonwealth se réunissait à Toronto. En 1980 avait lieu le cinquième Congrès d'étude du Commonwealth sous la présidence du duc d'Edimbourg: L'homme et la société industrielle. Enfin, en septembre 1981 se déroulera à Ottawa la quatrième

assemblée générale de l'Association du Commonwealth pour l'arpentage et l'économie foncière.

Par ailleurs, la ville d'Edmonton fut en 1978 le théâtre d'un grand événement sportif, les Jeux du Commonwealth.

Contribution financière du Canada aux institutions et programmes du Commonwealth

La contribution financière du Canada aux institutions et programmes du Commonwealth a toujours été considérable, dépassée seulement par celle de la Grande-Bretagne. D'ailleurs, au titre des programmes à contribution volontaire, le Canada fournit toujours au delà de sa quote-part du budget du Secrétariat. Plusieurs ministères et organismes participent à l'effort financier du Canada, qui en 1981-1982 dépassera les 22 millions de dollars. De plus, en 1980-1981, le Canada a versé quelque 254 millions de dollars en aide bilatérale aux pays du Commonwealth, soit environ 43 pour cent de son budget global d'aide bilatérale.

La liste suivante n'est pas exhaustive, mais fait état des contributions aux principaux programmes et organismes officiels du Commonwealth, ainsi qu'à d'autres programmes et organismes de moindre envergure, mais quand même importants (les contributions aux organisations non gouvernementales ont été omises). Il est à remarquer qu'on fait une distinction entre les quotes-parts établies par le Secrétariat du Commonwealth et les contributions volontaires laissées à la discrétion des pays membres.

Contributions du Canada aux organismes du Commonwealth

Secrétariat du Commonwealth

La contribution des membres du Commonwealth est fixée d'après le barème des quotes-parts des Nations Unies. Pour 1980-1981, la quote-part du Canada s'établit à 17 pour cent du budget total, soit environ \$1 616 000 (crédits des Affaires extérieures).

Fonds du Commonwealth pour la coopération technique (FCCT)

Créé en 1971, le FCCT est le principal mécanisme multilatéral d'aide au développement du Commonwealth. Il est financé par les contributions volontaires de tous les pays membres, qu'ils soient développés ou en voie de développement. Depuis quelques années, la contribution du Canada excède 40 pour cent du budget total. En 1979-1980, le Canada a versé 8,8 millions de dollars (soit une hausse de 50 pour cent par rapport à l'année précédente) et en 1980-1981, environ 10 millions de dollars (crédits de l'ACDI).

Fondation du Commonwealth

Créée en 1965 pour favoriser la mise sur pied d'associations professionnelles dans les pays du Commonwealth, la Fondation est financée par les contributions volontaires de tous les pays membres. De 1976 à 1980, le Canada a fourni 32 pour cent de son budget et, en 1980-1981, environ \$676 000 (crédits des Affaires extérieures).

Programme du Commonwealth pour la jeunesse

Inauguré en 1973 par les chefs de gouvernement réunis à Ottawa, le Programme du Commonwealth pour la jeunesse vise à promouvoir et faciliter les échanges d'idées et d'expériences entre les intervenants des programmes de tous niveaux destinés à la jeunesse. Tous les pays membres y versent des contributions volontaires, la plus élevée étant celle du Canada, qui a jusqu'à ce jour déboursé environ 3 millions de dollars. Sa contribution pour 1980-1981 est d'à peu près \$500 000 (crédits des Affaires extérieures).

Programme de bourses d'études et de perfectionnement du Commonwealth

Ces bourses sont accordées à titre gracieux par 15 pays du Commonwealth. En 1980-1981, le Canada a accordé quelque 300 bourses totalisant environ 2,8 millions de dollars par l'entremise de l'Association des universités et collèges du Canada, son mandataire auprès du Programme de bourses d'études et de perfectionnement du Commonwealth (crédits des Affaires extérieures).

Programme de bourses d'études du Commonwealth pour le Zimbabwe

Les contributions à ce programme sont laissées à la discrétion des pays membres. En 1980-1981, celle du Canada s'est élevée à quelque \$200 000. Maintenant que le Zimbabwe est devenu indépendant, le Programme sera graduellement abandonné, mais les bourses déjà accordées seront honorées jusqu'à leur échéance (crédits de l'ACDI).

Conseil des sciences du Commonwealth

Le Conseil a pour objet de favoriser la coopération entre les pays membres afin que chacun puisse mettre davantage la science et la technologie au service de son développement économique, social et écologique. Les contributions y sont volontaires. Pour 1980-1981, celle du Canada équivaut à 17 pour cent du budget total, soit environ \$95 000 (crédits des Affaires extérieures).

Conseil des transports aériens du Commonwealth

Composé de représentants de presque tous les pays du Commonwealth, le Conseil tient ses membres au courant des progrès de l'aviation civile et sert de tribune aux échanges de vues et de renseignements. En 1980-1981, le Canada lui a versé environ \$56 000, soit 17 pour cent du budget total (crédits des Affaires extérieures).

Conseil consultatif du Commonwealth pour la recherche aéronautique

Composé de seulement huit pays du Commonwealth, le Conseil facilite les échanges de vues et de renseignements dans le domaine de l'aéronautique et les sujets qui s'y rapportent. La contribution du Canada pour l'année financière 1980-1981 a été d'environ \$8 000, soit 25 pour cent du budget total (crédits du Conseil national de recherches).

Service juridique consultatif du Commonwealth

Administré par le British Institute of International and Comparative Law pour le compte des gouvernements du Commonwealth, ce service prodigue des conseils, fournit des renseignements et effectue des enquêtes sur des questions de droit qui intéressent le Commonwealth. Les contributions sont volontaires et celle du Canada pour 1980-1981 s'est élevée à \$10 000 environ (crédits de la Justice).

Institut de sylviculture du Commonwealth

Financé par les dons des pays du Commonwealth, l'Institut offre un service complet de renseignements et organise à l'intention des forestiers du Commonwealth des cours en recherche et en planification forestières. Pour l'exercice 1980-1981, le Canada a convenu de verser environ \$8 000 (crédits de l'Environnement).

Institut du Commonwealth

Financé par des contributions volontaires, l'Institut du Commonwealth offre des services d'information et d'éducation destinés à mieux faire connaître le Commonwealth et à susciter une plus grande compréhension entre les différents peuples qui le composent. Le Canada, qui a déjà versé quelque \$20 000 en 1980-1981, est censé déboursier encore \$160 000 pour aménager une nouvelle exposition permanente au siège de l'Institut, situé à Londres (crédits des Affaires extérieures).

Bureau de l'agriculture du Commonwealth

Créé en 1929, le Bureau de l'agriculture regroupe en fait dix bureaux qui fournissent aux pays membres toutes sortes de renseignements de nature scientifique et quatre instituts qui offrent des services de contrôle biologique. Il est financé par les contributions volontaires de 28 pays du Commonwealth. En 1980-1981, celle du Canada s'est élevée à quelque \$500 000, soit 17 pour cent du budget total (crédits de l'Agriculture).

Commission des sépultures de guerre du Commonwealth

La Commission est chargée de graver et d'entretenir les sépultures de tous les soldats du Commonwealth qui sont tombés au cours des deux guerres mondiales. Le Pakistan et l'Afrique du Sud en sont membres, bien qu'ils ne fassent pas partie du Commonwealth. Chaque membre verse une contribution établie d'après le nombre de ses sépultures. En 1980-1981, celle du Canada s'est élevée à quelque 2,6 millions de dollars, soit 10 pour cent du budget total (crédits des Anciens combattants).

PRINCIPALES CARACTERISTIQUES DE L'AIDE
PUBLIQUE CANADIENNE AU DEVELOPPEMENT
ET DE LA COOPERATION BILATERALE DU CANADA
AVEC LES PAYS DU COMMONWEALTH

CROISSANCE ET STRUCTURE DU PROGRAMME

Entreprise au début des années 50, l'aide canadienne était concentrée à l'origine sur la coopération avec les pays asiatiques visés par le Plan de Colombo et la participation aux programmes de secours et de bien-être mis en oeuvre par les Nations Unies. Le programme bilatéral se voulait conforme aux besoins de l'époque, c'est-à-dire la réunion de capitaux et la mise en place des infrastructures nécessaires au développement industriel. On accordait encore peu d'importance au développement social ou rural et seul un petit nombre de pays bénéficiait de l'aide dispensée.

Au cours des années 60, l'aide au développement s'est accrue et diversifiée. Dans l'ensemble, les transferts de ressources sont devenus cinq fois plus considérables que ceux de la décennie précédente. Le programme bilatéral s'est étendu: les pays déjà bénéficiaires ont reçu davantage et d'autres sont venus s'ajouter à leur liste, notamment dans les Antilles, en Amérique latine et en Afrique. Les programmes multilatéraux, pour leur part, ont porté moins sur les secours et les services de bien-être et se sont orientés davantage vers l'aide économique.

Dans les années 70, le programme d'aide est devenu plus efficace et plus rationnel. Le volume de l'aide s'est accru en termes réels et le rapport APD/PIB a légèrement augmenté. On s'est attaché davantage à maximiser l'incidence de l'aide fournie, notamment en améliorant la marche à suivre aux différentes

étapes des projets (planification, exécution et évaluation) et en s'assurant que les gouvernements bénéficiaires seraient à même de bien administrer les projets une fois privés de l'aide canadienne. Le Tableau 1 ci-joint montre l'évolution récente des décaissements du Canada au titre de l'aide publique au développement.

STRATEGIE D'AIDE AU DEVELOPPEMENT

Après avoir été revues de fond en comble, les politiques canadiennes d'aide au développement ont été reformulées en 1975 dans un document intitulé Stratégie de coopération au développement international 1975-1980, qui énonçait un certain nombre de principes directeurs, dont les suivants:

1. Priorité aux plus pauvres: Les plus pauvres des pays en développement reçoivent la plus grande part de l'aide bilatérale canadienne. En 1977, par exemple, 76 pour cent des nouveaux engagements d'aide du Canada étaient destinés à des pays à faible revenu, comparativement à 57 pour cent pour l'ensemble des membres du Comité d'aide au développement de l'OCDE. Parmi les pays du Commonwealth, le Bangladesh, l'Inde, le Kenya, Sri Lanka et la Tanzanie font partie de cette catégorie prioritaire.
2. Nouvelles formes de coopération: Celles-ci s'adressent particulièrement aux pays à revenu moyen, comme le Malaysia, la Jamaïque, la Barbade et le Nigéria, si on s'en tient au Commonwealth. Il s'agit en fait d'établir de nouveaux mécanismes plus appropriés afin de faire disparaître graduellement la relation donateur-bénéficiaire.

3. Offensive contre les principaux problèmes mondiaux: La Stratégie fait appel à une plus grande concentration sur les aspects les plus cruciaux du développement: la production et la distribution des aliments, le développement rural, l'éducation et la formation, l'hygiène publique et la démographie, le logement et l'énergie. Désormais, ces aspects sont traités en priorité dans la planification de l'aide canadienne au développement.

AIDE CANADIENNE AUX PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT DU COMMONWEALTH

L'aide canadienne aux pays en développement du Commonwealth n'obéit pas à une politique particulière, mais ces pays sont en quelque sorte privilégiés parce qu'ils sont unis au Canada par un riche réseau de liens culturels, historiques, politiques et commerciaux établis de longue date.

L'aide canadienne à ces pays est acheminée par quatre voies:

(i) Programme bilatéral

L'aide bilatérale, c'est-à-dire de gouvernement à gouvernement, est consentie sous forme de dons ou de prêts à des conditions extrêmement favorables, la proportion entre les deux étant à peu près égale depuis quelques années. Les dons sont généralement affectés à l'assistance technique ou à de petits projets nécessitant la présence de conseillers et de moniteurs. L'aide alimentaire fait normalement partie des dons. Quant aux prêts, ils sont consentis pour l'achat de biens canadiens ou pour la réalisation de grands projets d'équipement. Toutefois, à la

suite de la Conférence sur la coopération économique internationale tenue à Paris en 1976-1977, le Canada a décidé que toute l'aide acheminée aux pays considérés comme les moins développés serait dorénavant composée exclusivement de dons et il a annulé l'encours de la dette de ces pays au titre de l'APD.

Si l'aide bilatérale est principalement affectée à l'achat de biens et de services canadiens, un pourcentage maximal de 20 pour cent de l'ensemble des crédits bilatéraux d'une année peut servir à l'acquisition de ressources non canadiennes lorsque cela s'avère nécessaire pour répondre le plus efficacement possible aux besoins du développement.

Les Tableaux 2 et 3 donnent la répartition des décaissements bilatéraux consentis aux pays du Commonwealth en 1979 et 1980, respectivement.

(Comme le veut l'usage établi pour les rapports au Comité d'aide au développement, les montants sont indiqués en dollars US en regard de chaque année civile. Il est ainsi plus facile de faire des comparaisons entre les pays donateurs.)

(ii) Programme multilatéral

Le Canada fournit également une aide indirecte aux pays en développement par ses contributions aux organismes de développement international dont il fait partie. Il appuie les programmes de deux grandes catégories d'institutions multilatérales: 1) les institutions financières internationales, dont le Groupe de la Banque mondiale (c'est l'Association

internationale de développement qui y reçoit l'aide financière la plus importante) et quatre banques régionales de développement qui couvrent l'Asie, l'Afrique, l'Amérique latine et les Antilles; 2) les organismes de développement de l'ONU, du Commonwealth (notamment le FCCT) et de la Francophonie, les institutions internationales de recherches et le Fonds des Nations Unies pour les activités en matière de population. Si on exclut le Programme alimentaire mondial, les contributions au programme multilatéral ne sont liées en aucune façon.

(iii) Programmes spéciaux

Les activités regroupées sous cette rubrique visent à appuyer les initiatives de l'entreprise privée canadienne susceptibles de contribuer au développement de pays du tiers monde. Le Programme des organisations non gouvernementales fournit des ressources en contrepartie des fonds recueillis aux fins du développement par plus de 200 groupes canadiens ou internationaux de bénévoles, clubs philanthropiques, universités, Eglises et associations professionnelles. Le Programme finance trois organismes qui envoient des bénévoles dans les PMD ou administrent des programmes d'échanges (SUCO, SACO et Jeunesse Canada Monde) et finance également des activités de sensibilisation menées par les ONG pour accroître la participation des Canadiens au développement international. Le Programme de coopération industrielle fournit des capitaux de démarrage à des sociétés canadiennes pour les encourager à investir capitaux et technologie dans des entreprises rentables de coparticipation dans les pays en développement.

(iv) CRDI

L'APD canadienne appuie les activités du Centre de recherches pour le développement international, lequel effectue des recherches dans et pour les pays en développement. Les domaines qui intéressent particulièrement le CRDI comprennent l'agriculture, les sciences de l'alimentation et de la nutrition, les sciences de l'information, les sciences sociales et les communications. Bien que le CRDI soit financé uniquement par le gouvernement du Canada, ses politiques sont établies par un Conseil des gouverneurs à composition internationale.

TABLEAU I

DECAISSEMENTS AU TITRE DE L'AIDE CANADIENNE AU DEVELOPPEMENT (APD) (en millions de \$CAN)

	Total des 5 années 1971-1975	1975-1976	1976-1977	1977-1978	1978-1979	1079-1980
Bilatéraux	1 708,9	507,8	465,8	541,4	559,3	598,8
Multilatéraux	755,7	340,6	435,7	425,2	490,4	500,5
Programmes spéciaux	83,7	32,0	39,2	50,0	72,8	84,4
CRDI	46,0	27,0	29,7	29,5	35,8	35,7
Autres	<u>8,2</u>	<u>2,2</u>	<u>2,1</u>	<u>4,2</u>	<u>7,6</u>	<u>21,8</u>
TOTAL	2 602,5	909,6	972,5	1 050,5	1 166,0	1 241,1

APD CANADIENNE AUX PAYS DU COMMONWEALTH EN 1979 (en milliers de \$US)

AIDE ECONOMIQUE

PAYS/REGION	AIDE ECONOMIQUE			TOTAL AIDE ECON.	AIDE TECHNIQUE DONS	AIDE ALIM. DONS ET PRETS	SECOURS D'URGENCE	TOTAL PAR PAYS
	DONS	PRETS	MOINS REMBOURSEMENTS					
<u>AFRIQUE</u>								
BOTSWANA	1,640	-	-	1,640	1,080	-	-	2,720
GHANA	3,180	11,340	-	14,520	930	-	-	15,450
KENYA	1,460	2,210	-	3,670	5,420	-	-	9,090
LESOTHO	3,030	-	-	3,030	1,040	-	-	4,070
MALAWI	11,950	-	-	11,950	1,340	-	-	13,290
NIGERIA	740	270	(-390)	620	80	-	-	700
SOUAZILAND	440	230	-	670	620	-	-	1,290
TANZANIE	24,140	-	-	24,140	1,520	2,940	-	28,600
ZAMBIE	160	1,110	-	1,270	2,200	-	-	3,470
AUTRES (Y COMPRIS LES REGIONS)	290	10	-	300	1,130	-	-	1,430
TOTAL - AFRIQUE	47,030	15,170	(-390)	61,810	15,360	2,940	-	80,110
<u>ASIE</u>								
BANGLADESH	21,120	-	-	21,120	10	38,080	-	59,210
INDE	630	15,080	(-3,000)	12,710	200	4,510	-	17,420
SRI LANKA	1,620	10,620	(-160)	12,080	210	4,970	-	17,260
MALAYSIA	80	1,450	(-340)	1,190	160	-	-	1,350
AUTRES (Y COMPRIS L'OCEANIE)	70	-	-	70	-	-	21	91
TOTAL - ASIE	23,520	27,150	(-3,500)	47,170	580	47,560	21	95,331
<u>AMERIQUES</u>								
BARBADE	560	1,950	(-150)	2,360	-	-	-	2,360
BELIZE	460	4,190	-	4,650	110	-	-	4,760
GUYANE	200	4,770	(-90)	4,880	610	-	-	5,490
JAMAIQUE	310	1,580	(-500)	1,390	190	5,940(L)	21	7,541
ILES SOUS-LE-VENT	2,030	450	-	2,480	100	480	37	3,097
TRINITE-ET-TOBAGO	50	170	(-390)	(-170)	40	-	-	(-130)
AUTRES	660	-	-	660	970	-	-	1,630
TOTAL - AMERIQUES	4,270	13,110	(-1,130)	16,250	2,020	6,420	58	24,748
<u>DIVERS</u>								
BOURSES D'ETUDES	2,400	-	-	2,400	-	-	-	2,400
EUROPE (MALTE)	-	350	-	350	-	-	-	350
TOTAL - DIVERS	2,400	350	-	2,750	-	-	-	2,750
TOTAL GENERAL	77,220	55,780	(-5,020)	127,980	17,960	56,920	79	202,939

APD CANADIENNE AUX PAYS DU COMMONWEALTH EN 1980 (en milliers de \$US)


AIDE ECONOMIQUE

PAYS/REGION	DONS	PRETS	MOINS REMBOURSEMENTS	TOTAL AIDE ECON.	AIDE TECHNIQUE DONS	AIDE ALIM. DONS ET PRETS	SECOURS D'URGENCE	TOTAL PAR PAYS
<u>AFRIQUE</u>								
BOTSWANA	1,220	-	-	1,220	1,440	-	-	2,660
GHANA	4,360	8,620	(-250)	12,730	1,130	-	-	13,860
KENYA	2,830	2,880	(-10)	5,700	3,870	-	-	9,570
LESOTHO	4,440	-	-	4,440	1,340	-	-	5,780
MALAWI	7,650	-	-	7,650	1,310	-	-	8,960
NIGERIA	460	-	(-180)	280	40	-	-	320
SOUAZILAND	670	160	-	830	590	-	-	1,420
TANZANIE	14,480	-	-	14,480	2,350	2,540	-	19,370
ZAMBIE	1,560	7,830	-	9,390	3,580	2,990	-	15,960
AUTRES	1,000	-	-	1,000	750	-	128	1,878
TOTAL - AFRIQUE	38,670	19,490	(-440)	57,720	16,400	5,530	128	79,778
<u>ASIE</u>								
BANGLADESH	22,890	-	-	22,890	50	34,180	-	57,120
INDE	630	21,780	(-3,950)	18,460	410	16,920	-	35,790
SRI LANKA	1,600	24,200	(-180)	25,620	410	3,250	-	29,280
MALAYSIA	300	900	(-340)	860	130	-	-	990
AUTRES (Y COMPRIS L'OCEANIE)	430	-	-	430	-	-	-	430
TOTAL - ASIE	25,850	46,880	(-4,470)	68,260	1,000	54,350	-	123,610
<u>AMERIQUES</u>								
BARBADE	320	410	(-290)	440	-	-	-	440
BELIZE	260	730	-	990	100	-	-	1,090
GUYANE	170	3,480	(-140)	3,510	570	-	-	4,080
JAMAIQUE	140	5,590	(-700)	5,030	130	2,510(L)	-	7,670
ILES SOUS-LE-VENT	3,030	590	-	3,620	180	300	43	4,143
TRINITE-ET-TOBAGO	10	40	(-340)	(-290)	20	-	-	(-270)
AUTRES	2,300	-	-	2,300	1,420	-	-	3,720
TOTAL - AMERIQUES	6,230	10,840	(-1,470)	15,600	2,420	2,810	43	20,873
<u>DIVERS</u>								
BOURSES D'ETUDES	2,320	-	-	2,320	-	-	-	2,320
EUROPE (MALTE)	-	20	-	20	-	-	-	20
TOTAL - DIVERS	2,320	20	-	2,340	-	-	-	2,340
GRAND TOTAL	73,070	77,230	(-6,380)	143,920	19,820	62,690	171	226,601

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**Commonwealth
Heads of
Government**

**The Lusaka
Communiqué
August 1979**



Commonwealth Secretariat

Commonwealth Heads of Government

Meeting in Lusaka 1-7 August 1979

Final Communiqué

1. Commonwealth Heads of Government met in Lusaka from 1 to 7 August, 1979. Of the 39 countries which attended the Meeting, 27 were represented by their Presidents or Prime Ministers. The President of Zambia, Dr Kenneth Kaunda, was in the Chair.

2. They sent a message of felicitations to Her Majesty the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth. They welcomed with special pleasure the opportunity of meeting in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, an African nation in the forefront of the struggle for human emancipation. They expressed deep appreciation for the excellent arrangements for the Meeting made by the Zambian Government and gratitude for the hospitality extended to them.

3. Heads of Government warmly welcomed their colleagues from Solomon Islands, Dominica, St Lucia and Kiribati, which had become members of the association since their last Meeting, and extended similar greetings to Tuvalu which had acceded to special membership.

4. Heads of Government, recognising the growing contribution which the Commonwealth is capable of making to the solution of world problems, reaffirmed the importance

**Lusaka
Declaration of the
Commonwealth on
Racism and Racial
Prejudice**

which they attach to meeting together and the opportunity this gives for consultations aimed at forging a consensus on some of the major issues facing the world.

5. Heads of Government approved unanimously and proclaimed the Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice.

**World and
Commonwealth
trends**

6. In considering political trends since their last Meeting, Heads of Government were conscious of the gravity and complexity of the problems now facing the international community, in particular in South-east Asia, Southern Africa, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. They were concerned that many of these problems, some of long standing, were now assuming critical dimensions. Their analysis of political trends was made against the sombre background of mounting economic difficulties which they subsequently examined in greater detail. They noted that the intractability of international economic problems was increasingly a cause of political instability in many parts of the world and frequently made it difficult for governments to take positive steps within their own societies necessary to promote social and economic justice consistent with respect for basic human rights. In Southern Africa the stubborn persistence of apartheid and racist policies was seen as a matter of grave concern to the Commonwealth and Heads of Government acknowledged that further delay in the satisfactory resolution of that issue could lead to divisions within the Commonwealth itself and jeopardise further the peace and security of the entire region.

7. Focusing on these and other international problems, Heads of Government recognised that no single power or group of powers could any longer impose solutions; lasting solutions required collective action by the international community as a whole. Heads of Government looked to the Commonwealth to play a significant part in upholding shared principles, reconciling differences of approach, harmonising divergent interests and building a more secure basis for world peace and prosperity.

South-east Asia

8. Heads of Government reviewed the serious situation in South-east Asia resulting from the armed conflicts in Indo-China. They expressed concern at the continuing conflicts and tensions in the region, and the fact that these were being exacerbated by outside powers. They warned that there was a real danger of the conflicts escalating over a wider area.

9. Heads of Government condemned all acts of armed intervention in the region which violated the universally accepted principles of respect for a country's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. Affirming the right of the peoples of the region to determine their own future free from outside interference, subversion or coercion, they called for the speedy withdrawal of all foreign forces from the areas of conflict. Urging all states in South-east Asia to develop peaceful, friendly and harmonious relations, Heads of Government noted with approval the efforts being made for the early establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in the region, and called upon all states to lend their fullest support to these efforts.

Refugees 10. Heads of Government expressed deep concern at the global growth of the international refugee problem. They turned their attention to the particular problems of refugees in Africa, South-east Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean.

11. They recalled the longstanding concern of the Commonwealth at the enforced movements of refugees as a result of harassment by the authorities in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. They expressed their concern at the additional burden thus imposed on independent countries in Southern Africa in discharging a humanitarian obligation to receive and support the peoples concerned.

12. Heads of Government expressed grave concern at the enormity of the problem of refugees leaving the countries of Indo-China, in particular Vietnam, arising from the situation in that region and which is causing severe political, socio-economic and security problems for the other countries and territories in South-east Asia. They noted that this problem, if unchecked, will have a destabilising effect on the region. They expressed their appreciation for the contribution being made in the South-east Asian region by Malaysia and Hong Kong in particular, and the large-scale programmes for resettlement including those being undertaken by Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand. They appealed to all members of the international community to increase their contributions to and actively co-operate with the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for whose operations they expressed their admiration and support.

13. In this regard, they noted with approval the statement of the United Nations Secretary-General Dr Waldheim that 'the

countries of origin must respect the right of emigration and family reunification, while avoiding any action leading to their people departing the country under conditions which would put their lives in jeopardy. This obligation stems from the basic right of individuals to stay in their country or to leave as a matter of free will.' They also noted that at the recent United Nations Geneva Conference on Indo-China Refugees, Vietnam had undertaken to co-operate with the international community in regulating the orderly departure of these refugees. They expressed the hope that Vietnam will continue to show a positive attitude and assist in finding an effective and permanent solution to this refugee problem.

Southern Africa 14. Heads of Government had a frank discussion on the current problems of Southern Africa and their implications for the Commonwealth and the wider international community. While recognising that certain developments since their Meeting in London have added new dimensions, they remained concerned by the potential dangers inherent in the existing situation. They therefore stressed the urgent need for finding satisfactory solutions to the remaining problems of this region.

15. In relation to the situation in Rhodesia, Heads of Government therefore:

- a. confirmed that they were wholly committed to genuine black majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe;
- b. recognised, in this context, that the internal settlement constitution is defective in certain important respects;
- c. fully accepted that it is the constitutional responsibility of the British Government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule;
- d. recognised that the search for a lasting settlement must involve all parties to the conflict;
- e. were deeply conscious of the urgent need to achieve such a settlement and bring peace to the people of Zimbabwe and their neighbours;
- f. accepted that independence on the basis of majority rule requires the adoption of a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities;
- g. acknowledged that the government formed under such an independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers;

- h. welcomed the British Government's indication that an appropriate procedure for advancing towards these objectives would be for them to call a constitutional conference to which all the parties would be invited; and
- i. consequently, accepted that it must be a major objective to bring about a cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of implementation of a lasting settlement.

16. Heads of Government stressed that the grave problems afflicting the Southern Africa region stemmed from the racist policies of the South African regime embodied in the system of apartheid. In order formally to express their abhorrence of all forms of racist policy, wherever and however they might be manifested, they had agreed to make a special declaration on this subject. This has been published as the Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice. This declaration reaffirms the Commonwealth rejection of all policies designed to perpetuate apartheid, racial segregation or other policies based on theories that racial groups are or may be inherently superior or inferior.

17. Heads of Government deplored South Africa's continued refusal to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions providing for Namibia's independence and the UN Secretary-General's proposals outlined in his report of 26 February 1979. They commended the positive response of those Commonwealth Governments which had been requested by the Secretary-General to provide military or civilian personnel as part of the proposed UN Transitional Assistance Group for Namibia.

18. Heads of Government condemned the steps taken by South Africa to establish an illegal National Assembly inside Namibia following the holding of the so-called elections last December. They declared that these developments contravened the relevant Security Council resolutions and were in defiance of the efforts of the international community to bring to an end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and to secure for its people genuine independence.

19. Heads of Government recalled that in repeatedly condemning South Africa's policies, the UN General Assembly and Security Council had warned South Africa that it faced international action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter if it did not agree to the implementation of the UN

proposals for Namibia. They therefore called upon South Africa to comply with the decisions of the international community.

20. Taking note that two of their members had played a role as part of a Five-Power Initiative with the South African authorities in attempting to secure South Africa's co-operation in implementing the decisions of the Security Council with regard to Namibia, Heads of Government expressed the earnest hope that this effort would contribute to expediting Namibia's passage to genuine independence.

21. Meeting for the first time in full Session in Africa, Heads of Government paid tribute to the outstanding contribution of African countries in general and African Commonwealth countries in particular, to the development of a more humanitarian international community and to the evolution of the Commonwealth along relevant and enlightened lines. They paid special tribute to the Front-Line States and to Nigeria for their active support to the various initiatives seeking negotiated solutions to the problems of Rhodesia and Namibia.

22. Heads of Government expressed satisfaction at the effective manner in which the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa had discharged its responsibilities in the past two years. Having considered its Report, Heads of Government endorsed those recommendations which were put forward unanimously. They authorised the Committee to continue its work, and to intensify its collaboration with the United Nations on all questions of mutual concern and interest.

23. In endorsing the recommendations of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa regarding Commonwealth humanitarian assistance to Southern Africa, Heads of Government noted with approval the contribution of the Commonwealth, made both bilaterally and multilaterally, to international assistance for manpower development for Zimbabwe and Namibia. In this context, Heads of Government commended the Secretariat's assistance programmes as cost-effective and efficiently administered and agreed that they should be expanded in scope, subject to the availability of resources.

24. Heads of Government noted with concern that as the conflict has escalated in Zimbabwe, its effects have increasingly spilled over into the neighbouring Commonwealth

states of Botswana and Zambia as well as into Mozambique. The Meeting called on the international community to increase its assistance to the Front-Line States in order to alleviate the damage to their development caused by the persistent problems of Southern Africa. Heads of Government, noting with approval the technical assistance programme financed by the Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique and recognising that the Government of Mozambique would welcome continued Commonwealth assistance, agreed that the Fund should continue to remain available to member Governments as a channel for such assistance. The Meeting concluded that, while significant bilateral and multilateral assistance is already being provided to the Front-Line States and Southern Africa to which individual Commonwealth countries make an important contribution, the needs of the region justify further international assistance on a substantial scale. Against the background of a collective Commonwealth commitment and in response to the requests of member Governments, the Secretary-General was asked to supplement the activities of other international agencies by assisting in contingency planning including regional studies in anticipation of the emergence of independent and internationally accepted governments in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Cyprus 25. Reviewing developments concerning Cyprus since their last Meeting, Heads of Government noted with satisfaction and endorsed the Kyprianou-Denktaş agreement of 19 May 1979 under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General but expressed their grave concern at the failure to achieve a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.

26. They regretted the lack of progress in the inter-communal talks which should be based on the said agreement and expressed the hope that these talks could be resumed at the earliest possible date with a view to reaching a just and lasting solution on the basis of the United Nations Resolutions relevant to the question of Cyprus and in accordance with the Kyprianou-Denktaş agreement of 19 May 1979.

27. Heads of Government also regretted the non-implementation of General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions on Cyprus. They called once more for the urgent implementation of General Assembly Resolution 3212 (XXIX) as endorsed by Security Council Resolution 365 (1974) which, together with subsequent United Nations Resolutions, were to form the basis of settling the Cyprus question.

28. They expressed concern at the fact that foreign troops still occupied part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and stressed the urgent need for the voluntary return of displaced persons to their homes in safety, respect for the human rights of all Cypriots, including the tracing of and accounting for those missing on both sides, and non-interference in the demographic structure of the Republic of Cyprus.

29. They noted the proposal of the President of the Republic of Cyprus presented at the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament for the total demilitarisation and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus which was put forward as a significant contribution to the search for a solution of the Cyprus problem.

30. They reaffirmed their solidarity with the Government and people of Cyprus and in this respect reiterated their determination to help in the achievement of a political settlement based on the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus.

31. Heads of Government believing further that the Commonwealth Committee on Cyprus, established in 1975 at their Meeting in Kingston, could play a more constructive role in the achievement of a just and lasting solution of the problem of Cyprus, decided to ask the Commonwealth Secretary-General to convene the Committee at Ministerial level whenever appropriate and under the same terms of reference.

Belize 32. Heads of Government reviewed developments over Belize and noted with appreciation the work of the Commonwealth Ministerial Committee on Belize. They reaffirmed their full support for the legitimate aspirations of the people of Belize for early and secure independence on the basis of territorial integrity, and again acknowledged that any settlement of the question must command the full consent of the Government and people of Belize. Heads of Government renewed their commitment to the search for an acceptable solution and in this regard requested the Committee, consonant with its mandate, to intensify its efforts to mobilise even further international support for Belize. Noting that there were on-going talks with Guatemala and bearing in mind the special responsibilities of Britain as the administering power, they welcomed the British Government's readiness to resume negotiations with a view to producing an internationally acceptable settlement in accordance with the Charter and relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

Middle East 33. Heads of Government reviewed the serious situation in the Middle East with particular reference to the central question of Palestine. Recalling the relevant United Nations Resolutions they emphasised that a just and permanent peace can only be achieved on the basis of a fully comprehensive solution which upholds the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including their right to a home land. In this respect the Commonwealth members of the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People drew particular attention to the Committee's recommendations. Heads of Government expressed their grave concern that the Palestinian problem is still unresolved and that it continues to pose a serious threat to peace and security in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and throughout the world. Most Heads of Government recognised that the Palestine Liberation Organisation is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people struggling justifiably for an independent Palestinian State.

Mediterranean 34. Heads of Government emphasised that the security of Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East were interrelated and that Europe has a contribution to make to the search for just and durable solutions to conflicts in the region. In this respect, the further implementation of the Mediterranean Chapter agreed upon and incorporated in the Helsinki Final Act, four years ago, would enhance both European and Mediterranean security as well as Middle East peace, thus contributing to the development of security and co-operation throughout the area. Heads of Government agreed that greater stability in the Mediterranean would enable the countries of the Region and Europe to pursue freer and closer co-operation amongst themselves and also with Commonwealth members.

Indian Ocean 35. Heads of Government reviewed developments in the Indian Ocean region since their last Meeting. They noted, with regret, that not much progress had been made in implementing the United Nations Declaration of 1971 on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. They also noted that Great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean, instead of decreasing, had actually increased. They urged the Great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to co-operate more actively with the littoral and hinterland States and with the Ad Hoc Committee of the United Nations for the implementing of this Declaration.

36. Heads of Government noted, with satisfaction, that the USA and the USSR have agreed that their representatives would meet to discuss the resumption of talks, which they hoped would contribute to the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. They expressed the wish that these talks would be resumed early.

South Asia 37. Heads of Government noted with satisfaction that the countries of the South Asian subcontinent were making earnest efforts to increase co-operation among themselves, thus contributing positively to stability and peace in the area.

Economic matters 38. Heads of Government reviewed developments in the world economy since they last met in London in 1977. They noted with deep concern the deterioration since then in the world economic situation. A continuation of this trend would pose grave problems for all countries. The developing countries, especially the poorest among them, were facing particularly grim prospects and there was a real danger that unless remedial measures were taken urgently, existing disparities in income and wealth between the rich and poor countries would widen further. They noted that a large part of the world's population continued to live in intolerable poverty with little hope for a better future. They recognised that this persistence of mass poverty further highlighted the urgent need for a more rational and equitable economic order. They reaffirmed their commitment to structural change and policies to improve growth in order to reduce poverty and increase living standards.

39. Heads of Government noted that the increasingly interdependent world economic system depended for its healthy functioning on the efficient deployment of global resources and affording all countries an equitable opportunity to participate in it. This would require acceptance by all of structural change and the adoption of policies to effect such change and to improve prospects for global economic growth, the restraint of inflation and the fuller employment of human and material resources. Higher rates of growth were particularly urgent for the developing countries.

40. Heads of Government noted that the period since 1973 had witnessed slower growth in international economic activity and in international trade by comparison with the previous quarter century. Recent assessments by international organisations for the medium term outlook were for a

continuation of slow growth or even a further deterioration in growth prospects.

41. Heads of Government considered that a continuation of slow growth in the global economy would further damage the prospects for reducing poverty and raising living standards in developing countries. Such a continuation would also be contrary to the economic interests of developed countries and could have adverse effects on the economic, social and political structures of all countries. These circumstances called for bolder endeavours and a new approach to the formulation of policies and to improving the public understanding of the need for change in the countries participating in the interdependent international system. For the decision-making process to be sufficiently responsive, it would require better information and involvement at the highest political level.

42. Against this background, Heads of Government requested the Secretary-General to commission an in-depth report by a group of eight to ten independent experts from Commonwealth countries chosen from appropriate fields. Their task would be to investigate and report on the factors inhibiting structural change and a sustained improvement in economic growth in both developed and developing countries, in particular the acceleration of growth in developing countries. The report, which should be clearly focused, should assess the importance of and the relationship between possible constraints, such as protection and adjustment policies, inflation, subsidies both on production and exports, fluctuations in commodity prices, availability and cost of energy resources, including oil, and factors inhibiting investment, transfer of technology and international flows of official and private resources.

43. The report should identify specific measures by which developed and developing countries, Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth, might act to reduce or eliminate such constraints as a matter of urgency. They recognised that this would require attention at the highest political level. The group, which would be assembled by the Secretary-General after appropriate consultation with member Governments, should report in time to assist Commonwealth Governments in their preparation for the Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1980.

44. Heads of Government expressed concern about the serious balance of payments problems faced by many

developing countries and some developed countries also. They noted that, among other serious and persisting factors, recent developments in the oil market had aggravated these problems. This would call for appropriate adjustment policies and might necessitate emergency assistance in many cases. They recognised that orderly arrangements for financing these deficits were in the interest of all countries and therefore constituted an important challenge to the international community. They welcomed recent agreement on an increase in the IMF quotas, new allocations of SDRs and the establishment of the Supplementary Financing Facility since it represented a step towards the goal of much-needed monetary reform. They also welcomed prospects for an early enlargement of the capital of the IBRD, and stressed the need to keep under close review the resources available from international institutions.

45. Heads of Government noted the new guidelines on conditionality which had been adopted by the IMF. While all countries accepted the need for reasonable conditions, and the need to adopt appropriate adjustment policies, it was important to have regard to individual domestic, social and political circumstances. These considerations are of special importance to small island developing and other specially disadvantaged states. They accordingly recognised the need for the international financial institutions to keep their operational policies under review.

46. Heads of Government discussed the effects of recent developments in the field of energy on the growth prospects of developed and developing countries. Mindful of the serious effects on the world economy of recent trends, they noted that the developing countries consumed only a small proportion of the world's oil and this mostly for essential purposes in agriculture, industry and transport. In discussing the relationship between the supply and cost of energy they recognised the particularly difficult economic problem that the energy-deficient developing countries were currently having to face. Heads of Government noted that many countries had embarked upon major programmes to conserve energy and reduce their dependence on imported oil. They called upon the international community to develop the necessary institutional mechanisms to deal with this most important subject and to ensure that the necessary financial and technological resources were mobilised to ensure rapid development of both renewable and non-renewable sources of energy. The Heads of

Government noted that special measures would need to be taken to assist the energy-deficient developing countries to reduce this deficiency and the effect it is having upon their economic development.

47. Heads of Government noted that the Multilateral Trade Negotiations had been concluded since their last Meeting and that agreement had been reached on tariffs and some non-tariff barriers. Heads of Government recalled the hope expressed at their last Meeting that the Negotiations would provide significant benefits to developing countries. They recognised that the results fell far short of the aspirations of the developing countries. They noted that there had been little or no progress on liberalisation of world agricultural trade and trade in tropical products. On the other hand, they noted that progress had been made in the liberalisation of trade in industrial products. While noting failure so far to reach agreement on a safeguard code, they expressed the hope that the negotiation of such a code, satisfactory to all concerned, would be completed without delay. They agreed that countries should not take unilateral action against imports in a manner inconsistent with established international trade rules. They noted that the danger of protectionism was ever present and urged countries to resist protectionist pressures wherever they arise. They believed this would assist the efforts of developing countries to secure better and more stable access to the markets of industrialised countries, and hoped that every effort would be made to achieve this.

48. Heads of Government noted the strong dissatisfaction of the Commonwealth African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries with the outcome of the negotiation for a successor to the Lomé Convention. This concerned many aspects of the Lomé Convention, including the dissatisfaction of the mineral-exporting ACP countries with the proposed mineral assistance scheme and its failure to deal with the urgent problem of unstable export earnings for minerals.

49. They reviewed developments in the North/South dialogue, particularly the results of the Fifth Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Manila. They expressed disappointment at the lack of faster progress towards more effective international co-operation in the areas of trade and finance, and concern at the slow pace of recent international negotiations on specific measures to promote the evolution of a new international order from which

all countries could benefit. They acknowledged, however, that one element of progress had been the agreement regarding the basic elements of the Common Fund. They welcomed this development and noted with satisfaction the contribution made by the Commonwealth in helping to bring about a convergence of positions on the Common Fund following initiatives taken at their last Meeting. They urged early completion of final arrangements for the establishment of the Fund as scheduled, including pledges to the Second Window. They stressed the need to accelerate the setting up of effective international commodity agreements, in respect of commodities of export interest to developing countries, to stabilise commodity prices, and to fulfil the objectives of the Common Fund. They recognised the need for effective mechanisms for consultations between producers to be developed within the framework of the Commonwealth.

50. Heads of Government noted that the Final Report of the Team of Industrial Specialists had been completed and considered by a Meeting of Commonwealth Ministers on industrial co-operation held in Bangalore in March 1979. They acknowledged that effective industrialisation was an essential element in development strategy and that international action must support and reinforce policies to accelerate the pace of industrialisation in developing countries. In this context, they endorsed the Commonwealth Action Programme agreed at the Meeting of Commonwealth Ministers. They approved the establishment of an Industrial Development Unit in the CFTC with proposed additional financial resources of £5 million for the initial three-year period, and requested the Secretary-General to proceed with the establishment of a Unit with functions and initial staffing as proposed by him.

51. Heads of Government expressed concern over the international food security situation. They agreed that a meeting of Commonwealth Ministers of Agriculture and Food be held before or during the forthcoming FAO Council Meeting. The meeting could usefully encompass such essential elements as food security, production and distribution, as well as the transfer of technology for the manufacture of agricultural inputs. To facilitate the discussion at the proposed Ministerial Meeting, the Secretariat was asked to prepare a study of these issues.

52. Developed Commonwealth countries recognised the importance of increased and stable flows of aid, finance and

investment to developing countries. Heads of Government expressed deep concern at the declining trend in Official Development Assistance in relation to national income, having regard to the internationally agreed 0.7 per cent target. They called for further improvement in the terms and conditions of aid, particularly for poor countries. In this connection, they noted with satisfaction the improvement effected by major Commonwealth donor countries in the terms of their aid to developing countries.

53. Heads of Government welcomed the opportunity to discuss for the first time the special disadvantages that beset the growing number of smaller member countries, particularly the island developing countries and certain other specially disadvantaged member countries. They agreed that in order to offset the disadvantages of small size, isolation and scarce resources which severely limit the capacity of such countries to achieve their development objectives or to pursue their national interests in a wider international context, special measures of support were required. They noted in particular the growing needs of small island states for specialised assistance to enable them to take effective advantage of the resources within their 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones. In order to facilitate the exploitation of such resources, they hoped for early completion of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in a manner which would reflect in a balanced way the interests of all countries.

54. Heads of Government considered a memorandum by the Secretary-General analysing the problems of island developing and other specially disadvantaged countries, and proposing a wide range of measures designed to supplement existing bilateral and multilateral assistance to these countries. They commended the memorandum as a constructive basis for practical action. They requested the Secretary-General to pursue the programme of action recommended for the Secretariat, as resources permit and recipient countries request, and urged member Governments carefully to consider implementing those measures recommended. Heads of Government believed that the Commonwealth could thus respond both multilaterally and bilaterally to the special needs of smaller and specially disadvantaged members. They requested the Secretary-General, acting in close consultation with the countries concerned, to convene as necessary a committee to make recommendations on additional or improved programmes of assistance for consideration by Commonwealth Governments.

55. Heads of Government reaffirmed their belief in the value of regional co-operation as a means of promoting accelerated growth and development. They noted the active participation of Commonwealth countries in a wide range of regional associations in five continents and agreed that the Secretariat should continue to assist efforts directed at fostering and strengthening regional and inter-regional co-operation. Recognising the valuable contribution which Commonwealth consultation at the regional level could make in enhancing co-operation on matters of Commonwealth interest and promoting Commonwealth objectives, Heads of Government expressed satisfaction at the successful outcome of the first meeting of Heads of Government of the Asia/Pacific region held in Sydney in February 1978. They commended the initiatives flowing from the Sydney Meeting and hoped that progress in the consultative and working groups that had been established would contribute to the success of the next Heads of Government Regional Meeting in New Delhi in 1980.

**Commonwealth
Fund for Technical
Co-operation**

56. Heads of Government recorded their appreciation of the work of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation, and in particular of the expeditious and flexible way in which the Fund responded to a wide variety of requests. They agreed that, while maintaining its reputation for informality and cost-effectiveness, the Fund expressed in a practical way the ideals of mutual assistance and functional co-operation and thus strengthened multilateral links amongst Commonwealth countries and peoples. Recognising the need of the Fund to grow in order to maintain its ability to meet the expanding requirements of Commonwealth Governments, and to be innovative in response to new needs, including housing, urbanisation and protection of the environment, Heads of Government called for a positive approach by all members to the provision of additional real resources and they welcomed the intention expressed at the Meeting by a number of developed and developing countries to make significant increases in their contributions.

**International Year
of the Child**

57. Cognisant of the fact that their Meeting was taking place during the International Year of the Child, Heads of Government recognised that the future economic and social wellbeing of all Commonwealth countries depends in large measure on the extent to which the special needs and aspirations of children are fulfilled. They agreed that all future development planning should reflect this important priority.

**Commonwealth
Youth Programme**

58. Heads of Government reaffirmed the original objectives of the Commonwealth Youth Programme and noted that it was the only programme providing for extensive inter-governmental co-operation in this field. They recognised that the need for mobilising young people to assist in the development process was even more pressing now than when the Programme was first launched in 1973. It was therefore a matter for concern that inadequate funding of the Programme was severely limiting its capacity to assist Commonwealth Governments in a crucial area of co-operation. In commending the work of the three regional centres in providing essential training for young administrators and field workers it was recognised that unless the Programme received more funds this vital aspect of its activities would be placed in jeopardy.

59. Heads of Government strongly endorsed the request of the Secretary-General for an increase of at least one-third in pledges to the Commonwealth Youth Programme. They agreed that the funds available to the Programme for the biennium 1980-82 should be increased to £1 million per annum. In determining its minimum voluntary contribution to the target figure they suggested that each Government might be guided by its assessed percentage contribution to the Commonwealth Secretariat's administration budget and that all member Governments should endeavour to increase their pledges to make good the deficit. They also agreed that the Commonwealth Youth Affairs Council at its meeting early in 1980 should review the management, budget, structure, activities and future direction of the Programme.

**Commonwealth
Foundation**

60. Heads of Government commended the cost-effectiveness and imaginative work of the Commonwealth Foundation in developing and strengthening professional co-operation throughout the Commonwealth. They agreed that the Foundation's mandate should, subject to a review of its priorities, be expanded as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Relationships between the Official and the Unofficial Commonwealth in areas including culture, information, social welfare and rural development. In order to make good the erosive effects of inflation, and to permit the envisaged expansion in the Foundation's activities, the target for the Foundation's income was set at £1.1 million, although it was recognised that realisable resources were unlikely to exceed £900,000 in 1979-1980.

**The official and
unofficial
Commonwealth**

61. Heads of Government considered the Report of the Advisory Committee on Relationships between the Official and the Unofficial Commonwealth and endorsed the conclusion that non-governmental organisations were an under-utilised resource. They agreed that official Commonwealth bodies at all levels, national, international and regional, should make a determined drive to establish regular exchanges with the unofficial sector. In this way the energies and expertise of non-governmental organisations would be more effectively harnessed to programmes of social and economic development, and to increasing information, understanding and appreciation of the Commonwealth among the general public. At the national level, Governments should take appropriate measures to improve contact with NGOs and to channel assistance to and through them. They requested the Secretary-General to encourage Commonwealth consultative bodies dealing with technical and professional matters to invite representatives of NGOs to meetings in an observer capacity.

**Women and
development**

62. Heads of Government noted that in conformity with the decision taken at their London Meeting in 1977, the Secretary-General had carried out an assessment of all Secretariat programmes with a view to ensuring that appropriate provision was made for women both as participants in and as beneficiaries of such programmes.

63. Heads of Government also noted that the review revealed scope for greater involvement of women in Secretariat programmes and for those programmes to be more relevant to the needs of women. They recognised that to achieve significant and quick progress in this area a focal point was needed within the Secretariat to assist the Secretary-General in responding to identified needs and priorities of Governments and help the Secretariat to plan its programmes so as to take full account of the needs of women. They, therefore, agreed that an Adviser to the Secretary-General be appointed, with such supporting staff as were necessary, to co-ordinate and monitor action in this area.

64. It was recognised, however, that to a large extent progress depended on the policies of member Governments. In particular Governments should be encouraged to ensure that women played their full part in activities organised and training programmes funded by the Secretariat, and that in their requests for assistance, development projects which would be of direct benefit to women should receive due priority.

**Commonwealth
Human Rights
Commission**

65. Heads of Government reaffirmed the importance attached by Commonwealth Governments to the observance of human rights as proclaimed in the Singapore Declaration and other international instruments and welcomed in principle the initiative by the Government of The Gambia for the establishment of a Commonwealth Human Rights Commission. They decided that Governments be urged by the Secretary-General to communicate to him by the date of the next Commonwealth Law Ministers' Meeting, the views requested on the subject by Law Ministers at their Winnipeg Meeting in August 1977. They also requested the Secretary-General to appoint a suitably qualified and representative Working Party to make recommendations for the consideration of Commonwealth Governments.

**Commonwealth
Film and
Television Institute**

66. Heads of Government welcomed in principle the proposal by the Government of Cyprus for the establishment of the Commonwealth Film and Television Institute which would operate as a non-governmental institution. They invited the Secretary-General to undertake, with relevant Commonwealth institutions, a detailed study for the feasibility of the proposal and report to Commonwealth Governments, if possible within a year.

**Communication
and media in the
Commonwealth**

67. Heads of Government endorsed the establishment of a select committee to identify the most pressing communication and media problems, with particular reference to the needs of developing countries, as a basis for the identification of regional and national communications priorities in Commonwealth countries and of suitable forms of practical co-operation to meet these problems. They asked the Secretary-General to determine, in consultation with Commonwealth Governments, the size and composition of the select committee bearing in mind the need to obtain a representative cross-section of Commonwealth opinion. The Committee could include representatives not only of Commonwealth Governments but also of relevant Commonwealth non-governmental organisations.

68. Heads of Government acknowledged the desirability of expanding media exchanges between Commonwealth countries and proposed that such exchanges be co-ordinated by the Secretariat, in consultation with the Commonwealth Foundation and the Governments concerned, and on the basis of voluntary contributions.

**Report of the
Secretary-General**

69. Heads of Government commended the Seventh Report of the Secretary-General and noted with appreciation the progress made in various areas of Commonwealth activity since their last Meeting.

Next Meeting

70. Heads of Government accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Government of Australia to hold their next Meeting in Australia in 1981.

Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice

We, the Commonwealth Heads of Government, recalling the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles made at Singapore on 22 January 1971 and the statement on Apartheid in Sport, issued in London on 15 June 1977, have decided to proclaim our desire to work jointly as well as severally for the eradication of all forms of racism and racial prejudice.

The Commonwealth is an institution devoted to the promotion of international understanding and world peace, and to the achievement of equal rights for all citizens regardless of race, colour, sex, creed or political belief, and is committed to the eradication of the dangerous evils of racism and racial prejudice.

We now, therefore, proclaim this Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice.

United in our desire to rid the world of the evils of racism and racial prejudice, we proclaim our faith in the inherent dignity and worth of the human person and declare that:

- (i) the peoples of the Commonwealth have the right to live freely in dignity and equality, without any distinction or exclusion based on race, colour, sex, descent, or national or ethnic origin;
- (ii) while everyone is free to retain diversity in his or her culture and lifestyle, this diversity does not justify the perpetuation of racial prejudice or racially discriminatory practices;
- (iii) everyone has the right to equality before the law and equal justice under the law;
- (iv) everyone has the right to effective remedies and protection against any form of discrimination based on the grounds of race, colour, sex, descent, or national or ethnic origin.

We reject as inhuman and intolerable all policies designed to perpetuate apartheid, racial segregation or other policies based on theories that racial groups are or may be inherently superior or inferior.

We reaffirm that it is the duty of all the peoples of the Commonwealth to work together for the total eradication of the infamous policy of apartheid which is internationally recognised as a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind and the very existence of which is an affront to humanity.

We agree that everyone has the right to protection against acts of incitement to racial hatred and discrimination, whether committed by individuals, groups or other organisations.

We affirm that there should be no discrimination based on race, colour, sex, descent or national or ethnic origin in the acquisition or exercise of the right to vote; in the field of civil rights or access to citizenship; or in the economic, social or cultural fields, particularly education, health, employment, occupation, housing, social security and cultural life.

We attach particular importance to ensuring that children shall be protected from practices which may foster racism or racial prejudice. Children have the right to be brought up and educated in a spirit of tolerance and understanding so as to be able to contribute fully to the building of future societies based on justice and friendship.

We believe that those groups in societies who may be especially disadvantaged because of residual racist attitudes are entitled to the fullest protection of the law. We recognise that the history of the Commonwealth and its diversity require that special attention should be paid to the problems of indigenous minorities. We recognise that the same special attention should be paid to the problems of immigrants, immigrant workers and refugees.

We agree that special measures may in particular circumstances be required to advance the development of disadvantaged groups in society. We recognise that the effects of colonialism or racism in the past may make desirable special provisions for the social and economic enhancement of indigenous populations.

Inspired by the principles of freedom and equality which characterise our association, we accept the solemn duty of working together to eliminate racism and racial prejudice. This duty involves the acceptance of the principle that positive measures may be required to advance the elimination of

racism, including assistance to those struggling to rid themselves and their environment of the practice.

Being aware that legislation alone cannot eliminate racism and racial prejudice, we endorse the need to initiate public information and education policies designed to promote understanding, tolerance, respect and friendship among peoples and racial groups.

We are particularly conscious of the importance of the contribution the media can make to human rights and the eradication of racism and racial prejudice by helping to eliminate ignorance and misunderstanding between people and by drawing attention to the evils which afflict humanity. We affirm the importance of truthful presentation of facts in order to ensure that the public are fully informed of the dangers presented by racism and racial prejudice.

In accordance with established principles of International Law and, in particular, the provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, we affirm that everyone is, at all times and in all places, entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of the right to be free of racism and racial prejudice.

We believe that the existence in the world of apartheid and racial discrimination is a matter of concern to all human beings. We recognise that we share an international responsibility to work together for the total eradication of apartheid and racial discrimination.

We note that racism and racial prejudice, wherever they occur, are significant factors contributing to tension between nations and thus inhibit peaceful progress and development. We believe that the goal of the eradication of racism stands as a critical priority for governments of the Commonwealth, committed as they are to the promotion of the ideals of peaceful and happy lives for their people.

We intend that the Commonwealth, as an international organisation with a fundamental and deep-rooted attachment to principles of freedom and equality, should co-operate with other organisations in the fulfilment of these principles. In particular the Commonwealth should seek to enhance the co-ordination of its activities with those of other organisations similarly committed to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

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