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CANADA

THE CRISIS
IN
THE MIDDLE EAST

OCTOBER—DECEMBER
1956

Hon. L. B. PEARSON
Secretary of State for External Affairs

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QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1957

M 161807869

Dept. of External Affairs
Min. des Affaires extérieures

DEC 9 1956

THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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The invasion of Egypt by Israel on October 29, 1956 precipitated an international crisis of major concern to Canada as to other states. The United Nations, the first purpose of which was "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace", was quickly seized of the situation, and urgently examined various proposals for dealing with it. It is the purpose of this paper to record in brief form the actions taken by the United Nations, and the part played by the Canadian Government. Texts of the most significant documents will be quoted in whole or in part.

It is proposed first to outline the troubled conditions which form a background to the crisis immediately arising in October and which help to explain it.

From the time the United Nations established the State of Israel in 1948 following the termination of the British mandate, there had been no real peace between that country and its Arab neighbours. Until the first week of January 1949 there was open warfare between them, punctuated by a series of cease-fire arrangements, an agreed truce of limited duration and a subsequent truce imposed by the Security Council, which broke down in mid-October 1948. Between January and July 1949 armistice agreements were negotiated between Israel and its four Arab neighbours with the assistance of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine. These armistice agreements, though varying slightly in wording, all ruled out aggression by either party against the other, and established demarcation lines which bore a relation to the military positions as they stood at the time of signature of the various agreements. Neither civilian nor armed forces of the parties were to cross these lines. Furthermore, there were set up four mixed armistice commissions, each composed of nationals from both parties together with a senior officer of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization as Chairman. Each commission, too, was to employ such observers as it required, drawn again from the parties and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. The agreements were explicitly described as not prejudicing the claims of the parties in the peace settlement which was to follow.

It can be credited to the armistice agreements that for seven years they prevented major hostilities from being resumed, but they proved inadequate to prevent civilian and military raids and counter-raids across the demarcation lines. Such occurrences, which were all too frequent, caused a heavy loss of life to both Arabs and Israelis, served to maintain a sense of unrest and apprehension, and symbolized the failure of the states concerned to make progress toward a political settlement. The cause of failure was more basic than a difference on the details of frontiers. On the one hand the Arab States continued to regard Israel as an illegal creation whose very existence they believed to be a threat to their own economic and political security. On the other hand Israel saw what she believed to be her just right to live and develop threatened by inveterate Arab hostility, including threats to exterminate her.

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The territory on which the State of Israel had been established offered no short-cut to economic progress. Its agricultural and industrial development had to be fostered by unremitting effort, both private and governmental, and depended to a considerable extent on contributions from abroad. Among the obstacles to development which the Israelis encountered was an effective economic boycott imposed by the Arab States, in particular the Egyptian action in denying the use of the Suez Canal to Israeli ships and to ships of other nations carrying oil and certain other cargoes to or from Israel.

Protests to Cairo by individual governments brought no change, and in 1951 the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution calling on Egypt to end its embargo on shipping bound for Israel. There for a time the matter rested. The issue was raised in the Security Council again in February and October of 1954, but no resolution was forthcoming on either occasion because of the Soviet Union's use and threat of the veto.

Since the status of the Canal is relevant to the phase of the Middle East crisis which began on October 29, 1956 it may be useful now to recall the series of events affecting the Canal which immediately preceded the invasion of Egypt. By a presidential decree of July 26, the Egyptian Government declared that:

Article I

The Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal (Egyptian joint-stock company) is hereby nationalized. All its assets, rights and obligations are transferred to the Nation and all the organizations and committees that now operate its management are hereby dissolved.

Stockholders and holders of founders shares shall be compensated for the ordinary or founders shares they own in accordance with the value of the shares shown in the closing quotations of the Paris Stock Exchange on the day preceding the effective date of the present law.

The payment of said indemnity shall be effected after the Nation has taken delivery of all the assets and properties of the nationalized company.

Article II

An independent organization endowed with juristic personality and annexed to the Ministry of Commerce, shall take over the management of the Suez Canal Transit Service. The composition of the organization and the remuneration of its members shall be fixed in an order of the President of the Republic. Insofar as managing the Transit Service is concerned the organization shall have all the necessary powers required for the purpose without being restricted by Government regulations and procedures.

Without prejudice to the auditing of its final accounts by the State Audit Department, the organization shall have an independent budget prepared in accordance with the rules in force for commercial concerns. Its financial year shall begin on July 1 and end on June 30 each year. The budget and final accounts shall be approved by an order of the President of the Republic. The first financial year shall begin on the effective date of the present law and end with June 30, 1957.

The organization may delegate one or several of its members to implement its decisions or to discharge any duty assigned to these members.

It may also set up from among its own members or from among other people, a technical committee to assist it in its own research work and studies.

The chairman of the organization shall represent it before the courts, government agencies, and other places, and in its dealings with third parties.

Article III

The assets and rights of the nationalized company in the Republic of Egypt and abroad, are hereby frozen. Without specific permission obtained in advance from the organization provided for in Article II above, banks, organizations and private persons are hereby prohibited from disposing of those assets or making any payment requested them or due by them.

Article IV

The organization shall retain all the present officials, employees and laborers of the nationalized company at their posts; they shall have to continue with the discharge of their duties; no one will be allowed to leave his work or vacate his post in any manner and for any reason whatsoever except with the permission of the organization provided for in Article II above.

Article V

All violations of the provisions of Article III above shall be punished by imprisonment and a fine equal to three times the value of the amount involved in the offense. All violations of the provisions of Article IV shall be punished by imprisonment in addition to the forfeiture by the offender of all rights to compensation, pension or indemnity.

Article VI

The present order shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall have the force of law. It shall come into force on the date of its publication. The Minister of Commerce shall issue the necessary administrative orders for its implementation.

Within a few days a meeting was held in London of representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as a result of which a tripartite statement was issued on August 2 which read in part:

They [the Governments of the three States] do not question the right of Egypt to enjoy and exercise all powers of a fully sovereign and independent nation, including the generally recognized right, under appropriate conditions, to nationalize assets, not impressed with an international interest, which are subject to its political authority. But the present action involves far more than a simple act of nationalization. It involves the arbitrary and unilateral seizure by one nation of an international agency which has the responsibility to maintain and to operate the Suez Canal so that all the signatories to, and beneficiaries of, the Treaty of 1888 can effectively enjoy the use of an international waterway upon which the economy, commerce and security of much of the world depends...

They consider that steps should be taken to establish operating arrangements under an international system designed to assure the continuity of operation of the Canal, as guaranteed by the Convention of October 29, 1888, consistently with legitimate Egyptian interests.

The statement ended with the announcement of a further meeting in London, to which were to be invited the eight parties to the Convention of 1888⁽¹⁾ and sixteen other states⁽²⁾ "largely concerned in the use of the Canal either through ownership of tonnage or pattern of trade." Of these countries only Egypt and Greece refused invitations, and the conference of twenty-two states sat from August 16 to August 23.

An agreed statement of views reached by eighteen of the twenty-two governments⁽³⁾ was presented to President Nasser by a committee representing five of the eighteen. This statement read as follows:

The Governments approving this Statement, being participants in the London Conference on the Suez Canal:

Concerned by the grave situation regarding the Suez Canal;

Seeking a peaceful solution in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations; and

Recognizing that an adequate solution must, on the one hand, respect the sovereign rights of Egypt, including its rights to just and fair compensation for the use of the Canal, and, on the other hand, safeguard the Suez Canal as an international waterway in accordance with the Suez Canal Convention of October 29, 1888;

⁽¹⁾ Egypt, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R.

⁽²⁾ Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden, United States.

⁽³⁾ Those not concurring were Ceylon, India, Indonesia, U.S.S.R.

Assuming for the purposes of this statement that just and fair compensation will be paid to the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal, and that the necessary arrangements for such compensation, including a provision for arbitration in the event of disagreement, will be covered by the final settlement contemplated below.

Join in this expression of their views:

1. They affirm that, as stated in the Preamble of the Convention of 1888, there should be established "a definite system destined to guarantee at all times, and for all the Powers, the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal".

2. Such a system, which would be established with due regard to the sovereign rights of Egypt, should assure:

a. Efficient and dependable operation, maintenance and development of the Canal as a free, open and secure international waterway in accordance with the principles of the Convention of 1888.

b. Insulation of the operation of the Canal from the influence of the politics of any nation.

c. A return to Egypt for the use of the Suez Canal which will be fair and equitable and increasing with enlargements of its capacity and greater use.

d. Canal tolls as low as is consistent with the foregoing requirements and, except for "c" above, no profit.

3. To achieve these results on a permanent and reliable basis there should be established by a Convention to be negotiated with Egypt.

a. Institutional arrangements for co-operation between Egypt and other interested nations in the operation, maintenance and development of the Canal and for harmonizing and safeguarding their respective interests in the Canal. To this end, operating, maintaining and developing the Canal and enlarging it so as to increase the volume of traffic in the interest of the world trade and of Egypt, would be the responsibility of a Suez Canal Board. Egypt would grant this Board all rights and facilities appropriate to its functioning as here outlined. The status of the Board would be defined in the above-mentioned Convention.

The members of the Board, in addition to Egypt, would be other States chosen in a manner to be agreed upon from among the States parties to the Convention with due regard to use, pattern of trade and geographical distribution; the composition of the Board to be such as to assure that its responsibilities would be discharged solely with a view to achieving the best possible operating results without political motivation in favour of, or in prejudice against, any user of the Canal.

The Board would make periodic reports to the United Nations.

b. An Arbitral Commission to settle any disputes as to the equitable return to Egypt or other matters arising in the operation of the Canal.

c. Effective sanctions for any violation of the Convention by any party to it, or any other nation, including provisions for treating any use or threat of force to interfere with the use or operation of the Canal as a threat to the peace and a violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

d. Provisions for appropriate association with the United Nations and for review as may be necessary.

President Nasser rejected these proposals. The three powers—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—then agreed on the desirability of setting up a users' association; and to this end a further conference sat in London, September 19-21. A declaration was agreed to on the following terms:

DECLARATION PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUEZ CANAL USERS' ASSOCIATION, SEPTEMBER 21

I. The Members of the Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA) shall be those nations which have participated in the second London Suez Conference and which subscribe to the present Declaration, and any other adhering nations which conform to criteria to be laid down hereafter by the association.

II. SCUA shall have the following purposes:

(1) to facilitate any steps which may lead to a final or provisional solution of the Suez Canal problem and to assist the members in the exercise of their rights as users of the Suez Canal in consonance with the 1888 Convention, with due regard for the rights of Egypt;

(2) to promote safe, orderly, efficient and economical transit of the Canal by vessels of any member nation desiring to avail themselves of the facilities of SCUA and to seek the co-operation of the competent Egyptian authorities for this purpose;

(3) to extend its facilities to vessels of non-member nations which desire to use them;

(4) to receive, hold and disburse the revenues accruing from dues and other sums which any user of the Canal may pay to SCUA, without prejudice to existing rights, pending a final settlement;

(5) to consider and report to Members regarding any significant developments affecting the use or non-use of the Canal;

(6) to assist in dealing with any practical problems arising from the failure of the Suez Canal adequately to serve its customary and intended purpose and to study forthwith means that may render it feasible to reduce dependence on the Canal;

(7) to facilitate the execution of any provisional solution of the Suez problem that may be adopted by the United Nations.

III. To carry out the above-mentioned purposes:

(1) the members shall consult together in a Council on which each member will be represented;

(2) the Council shall establish an Executive Group to which it may delegate such powers as it deems appropriate;

(3) an Administrator, who shall, *inter alia*, make the necessary arrangements with shipping interests, will be appointed to serve under the direction of the Council through the Executive Group.

IV. Membership may at any time be terminated by giving 60 days' notice.

In a statement issued by the Users' Conference it was said that "the Association will be established as a functioning entity at an early date after the Delegates to this Conference have had an opportunity to consult in relation thereto with their respective Governments". By September 21, fifteen of the governments—i.e., excluding Ethiopia, Japan and Pakistan—had indicated their intention to become members of the Users' Association. However, the Conference had also considered the proposals of the eighteen powers and the Egyptian counter-proposal of September 10 to call an alternative conference. The latter was considered by the Second London Conference as "too imprecise to afford a useful basis for discussion", but the former, "still offer a fair basis for a peaceful solution of the Suez Canal problem." The Conference also noted that the Governments of the United Kingdom and France on September 12, and the Government of Egypt on September 17, had sent communications to the Security Council.

Subsequently all three Governments asked for a meeting of the Security Council, and this took place on September 26. The meeting had before it two proposed items. The first was an Anglo-French submission:

Situation created by the unilateral action of the Egyptian Government in bringing to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal, which was confirmed and completed by the Suez Canal Convention of 1888.

The second was submitted by the Egyptian representative:

Actions against Egypt by some Powers, particularly France and the United Kingdom, which constitute a danger to international peace and security and are serious violations of the Charter of the United Nations.

The meeting on September 26 was concerned only with the adoption of an agenda. It was agreed that the two items should be taken up on October 5.

On the latter date the United Kingdom and France sought endorsement by the Council of the 18-power proposals. This was not forthcoming. However, as a result of public sessions, closed sessions, and private direct talks among the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and Egypt, and the Secretary-General, there emerged a resolution adopted by the Council on October 13:

that any settlement of the Suez question should meet the following requirements:

(1) there should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert—this covers both political and technical aspects;

(2) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;

(3) the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country;

(4) the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users;

(5) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development;

(6) in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due.

Such then is a brief outline of developments up to the end of October when fighting began. When news arrived of the Israeli military moves, the United States requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider "The Palestine Question: steps for the Immediate Cessation of the Military Action of Israel in Egypt." The Council met on the morning of October 30. The Secretary-General reported that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization had already sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel a request for withdrawal of troops and a cease-fire.

On the same day, October 30, the French and United Kingdom Governments delivered to the Israeli and Egyptian diplomatic representatives in London written communications. The outbreak of hostilities, it was said, "threatens to disrupt the freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal, on which the economic life of many nations depends". "The Governments of the United Kingdom and France are resolved to do all in their power to bring about the early cessation of hostilities and to safeguard the free passage of the Canal." Both countries were, therefore, requested to stop all warlike actions forthwith. Israel was asked to withdraw her forces ten miles east of, and Egypt ten miles from, the Canal. In addition, Egypt was asked, "In order to guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal by the ships of all nations, and in order to separate the belligerents, to accept the temporary occupation by Anglo-French forces of key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez". Both Governments were asked to reply within twelve hours; and it was added that, if at the end of that time one or both had not agreed to "comply with the above requirements, United Kingdom and French forces will intervene in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance".

It will be noted that the action provisionally proposed by the United Kingdom was not based on the Agreement Regarding the Suez Canal Base signed by representatives of the United Kingdom and Egypt on October 19, 1954. By an Agreed Minute the two Governments recorded ten interpretations of certain points in the Agreement. One of these read:

The expression "outside Power" as used in Articles 4 and 6 of the Agreement means any country other than (i) the countries referred to in those Articles and (ii) Israel.

The Articles mentioned are:

Article 4

In the event of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States, signed in Cairo on the 13th of April, 1950, or on Turkey, Egypt shall afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary in order to place the Base on a war footing and to operate it effectively. These facilities shall include the use of Egyptian ports within the limits of what is strictly indispensable for the above-mentioned purposes.

Article 6

In the event of a threat of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country which at the date of the signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States or on Turkey, there shall be immediate consultation between Egypt and the United Kingdom.

At the Security Council meeting the United States representative introduced a draft resolution which called on Israel to withdraw its armed forces behind the established armistice lines; and upon all members "to refrain from the use of force or the threat of force in the area in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations", to assist the United Nations in ensuring the integrity of the armistice arrangements, and to refrain from giving assistance to Israel until it had complied with the resolution. The draft resolution was opposed by two permanent members (France and the United Kingdom) and therefore lost. A Soviet draft resolution, which embodied the first part of the United States one—withdrawal to the armistice line—and a Yugoslav amendment asking the Secretary General to report on compliance were similarly defeated.

On the following day, October 31, the Yugoslav Delegation proposed that an emergency special session of the General Assembly be called since "the lack of unanimity of its [the Council's] permanent members . . . has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". The resolution was given seven votes in favour and was adopted, although opposed by France and the United Kingdom, since it was not subject to veto. Thus there had been invoked for the first time the "Uniting for Peace" resolution by which the General Assembly had, in 1950, agreed

That if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the members of the United Nations.

The General Assembly met on November 1 at 5 p.m. By that time Egypt had rejected the Anglo-French proposals⁽¹⁾; Israel had accepted with the condition that Egypt should also accept; and the United Kingdom and France had begun to bomb airfields and other military targets in Egypt. After some general statements had been made by various delegations, the United States introduced a new draft resolution:

The General Assembly

Noting the disregard on many occasions by parties to the Israel-Arab Armistice Agreements of 1949 of the terms of such agreements, and that the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel,

Noting that armed forces of France and the United Kingdom are conducting military operations against Egyptian territory,

Noting that traffic through the Suez Canal is now interrupted to the serious prejudice of many nations,

Expressing its grave concern over these developments,

1. *Urges* as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and as part thereof halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area;

2. *Urges* the parties to the Armistice Agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the Armistice lines, to desist from raids across the Armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the Armistice Agreements;

3. *Recommends* that all members refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of this resolution;

4. *Urges* that upon the cease-fire being effective steps be taken to re-open the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to observe and promptly report on the compliance with this resolution, to the Security Council and the General Assembly, for such further action as they may deem appropriate in accordance with the Charter;

6. *Decides* to remain in emergency session pending compliance with this resolution.

As the debate proceeded, a proposal was accepted that a vote be taken after hearing from three more speakers for, and three against, the resolution. The United States resolution was then carried by sixty-four delegations in favour, five (United Kingdom, Australia, France, Israel and New Zealand) against, and six (Portugal, South Africa, Belgium, Canada, Laos and the Netherlands) abstaining.

Because of the decision on voting procedure a number of delegations, including that of Canada, had no opportunity to speak on the draft resolution before the vote was taken. After the vote, and in the early hours of November 2, Mr. L. B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, explained the abstention of the Canadian Delegation:

I rise not to take part in this debate, because the debate is over. The vote has been taken. But I do wish to explain the abstention of my delegation on that vote.

⁽¹⁾ In a letter from the representative of Egypt received late on October 30 by the Security Council, the position of the Egyptian Government was expressed in regard to "flagrant violation of the rights of Egypt and of the Charter of the United Nations." The letter calls for a meeting of the Security Council (already in session); and states that, "until the Security Council has taken the necessary measures, Egypt has no choice but to defend itself and safeguard its rights against such aggression."

It is never easy to explain an abstention, and in this case it is particularly difficult because we are in favour of some parts of this resolution, and also because this resolution deals with such a complicated question.

Because we are in favour of some parts of the resolution, we could not vote against it, especially as, in our opinion, it is a moderate proposal couched in reasonable and objective terms, without unfair or unbalanced condemnation; and also, by referring to violations by both sides to the Armistice Agreements, it puts, I think, recent action by the United Kingdom and France—and rightly—against the background of those repeated violations and provocations.

We support the effort being made to bring the fighting to an end. We support it, among other reasons, because we regret that force was used in the circumstances that face us at this time. As my delegation sees it, however, this resolution which the General Assembly has thus adopted in its present form—and there was very little chance to alter that form—is inadequate to achieve the purposes which we have in mind at this Assembly. Those purposes are defined in that resolution of the United Nations under which we are meeting—resolution 377 (V), Uniting for Peace—and peace is far more than ceasing to fire, although it certainly must include that essential factor. This is the first time that action has been taken under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, and I confess to a feeling of sadness, indeed even distress, at not being able to support the position taken by two countries whose ties with my country are and will remain close and intimate; two countries which have contributed so much to man’s progress and freedom under law; and two countries which are Canada’s mother countries.

I regret the use of military force in the circumstances which we have been discussing, but I regret also that there was not more time, before a vote had to be taken, for consideration of the best way to bring about that kind of cease-fire which would have enduring and beneficial results. I think that we were entitled to that time, for this is not only a tragic moment for the countries and peoples immediately affected, but it is an equally difficult time for the United Nations itself. I know, of course, that the situation is of special and, indeed, poignant urgency, a human urgency, and that action could not be postponed by dragging out a discussion, as has been done so often in this Assembly. I do feel, however, that had that time, which has always, to my knowledge, in the past been permitted for adequate examination of even the most critical and urgent resolution, been available on this occasion, the result might have been a better resolution. Such a short delay would not, I think, have done harm but, in the long run, would have helped those in the area who need help most at this time.

Why do I say this? In the first place, our resolution, though it has been adopted, is only a recommendation, and its moral effects would have been greater if it could have received a more unanimous vote in this Assembly—which might have been possible if there had been somewhat more delay.

Secondly, this recommendation which we have adopted cannot be effective without the compliance of those to whom it is addressed and who have to carry it out. I had ventured to hope that, by a short delay and in informal talks, we might have made some headway, or at least, have tried to make some headway, in securing a favourable response, before the vote was taken, from those Governments and delegations which will be responsible for carrying it out.

I consider that there is one great omission from this resolution, which has already been pointed out by previous speakers—more particularly by the representative of New Zealand, who has preceded me. This resolution does provide for a cease-fire, and I admit that that is of first importance and urgency. But, alongside a cease-fire and a withdrawal of troops, it does not provide for any steps to be taken by the United Nations for a peace settlement, without which a cease-fire will be only of temporary value at best. Surely, we should have used this opportunity to link a cease-fire to the absolute necessity of a political settlement in Palestine and for the Suez, and perhaps we might also have been able to recommend a procedure by which this absolutely essential process might begin.

Today we are facing a feeling of almost despairing crisis for the United Nations and for peace. Surely that feeling might have been harnessed to action or at least to a formal resolve to act at long last and to do something effective about the underlying causes of this crisis which has brought us to the very edge of a tragedy even greater than that which has already taken place. We should then, I think, have recognized the necessity for political settlement in this resolution and done something about it. And I do not think that, if we had done that, it would have postponed action

very long on the other clauses of the resolution. Without such a settlement, which we might have pushed forward under the incentive of fear, our resolution, as I see it, may not make for an enduring and real peace. We need action, then, not only to end the fighting but to make the peace.

I believe that there is another omission from this resolution, to which attention has also already been directed. The armed forces of Israel and of Egypt are to withdraw or, if you like, to return to the armistice lines, where presumably, if this is done, they will once again face each other in fear and hatred. What then? What then, six months from now? Are we to go through all this again? Are we to return to the status quo? Such a return would not be to a position of security, or even a tolerable position, but would be a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion which the United Nations Armistice Commission would be powerless to prevent and possibly even to investigate.

I therefore would have liked to see a provision in this resolution—and this has been mentioned by previous speakers—authorizing the Secretary-General to begin to make arrangements with Member Governments for a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out. I regret exceedingly that time has not been given to follow up this idea, which was mentioned also by the representative of the United Kingdom in his first speech, and I hope that even now, when action on the resolution has been completed, it may not be too late to give consideration to this matter. My own Government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations police force, a truly international peace and police force.

We have a duty here. We also have—or, should I say, we had—an opportunity. Our resolution may deal with one aspect of our duty—an urgent, a terribly urgent, aspect. But, as I see it, it does nothing to seize that opportunity which, if it had been seized, might have brought some real peace and a decent existence, or hope for such, to the people of that part of the world. There was no time on this occasion for us to seize this opportunity in this resolution. My delegation therefore felt, because of the inadequacy of the resolution in this respect, that we had no alternative in the circumstances but to abstain in the voting.

I hope that our inability to deal with these essential matters at this time will very soon be removed and that we can come to grips with the basic core of this problem.

Speaking shortly after the Canadian delegate, Mr. J. F. Dulles, the United States Secretary of State, said:

I know that the resolution was far from perfect and far from satisfactory to all of us, including, perhaps, myself. I felt that it was a situation where the importance of acting promptly was very great.

In my opening remarks, I spoke of the importance of a constructive and positive development of the situation, and not merely attempts to turn the clock back. Mr. Pearson, the representative of Canada, also spoke rather fully upon that point, and I want to emphasize my complete agreement with what he said, and not only my personal agreement, but the feeling of President Eisenhower, with whom I talked a few hours ago about this aspect of the matter. It is a phase of the situation which we deem of the utmost importance, and the United States Delegation would be very happy indeed if the Canadian Delegation would formulate and introduce as part of these proceedings a concrete suggestion along the lines that Mr. Pearson outlined.

In the subsequent discussions and developments three main themes may be distinguished: further "cease-fire and withdrawal" resolutions along the line of the United States proposal of November 1; attempts by the Soviet Union to organize alternative types of action; and definition and implementation of the Canadian proposal for an emergency force.

Although the first occupied a good deal of time it may be recounted briefly. At the meeting of the Assembly on November 3 a draft resolution was submitted by 19 countries. This re-affirmed the United States resolution which it noted had not been fully complied with, authorized the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for implementation of a cease-fire and report on compliance

within twelve hours, and requested the Secretary-General to arrange for withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines. Again on November 7 the same 19 delegations put forward a draft resolution which affirmed the determination of the General Assembly to implement its previous resolutions, called for immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory, and urged the Secretary-General to communicate the resolution to the parties and to report within twenty-four hours to the Assembly. Both resolutions were adopted. The Canadian Delegation voted in favour in each case. On the first, for which 59 delegations voted, Australia, France, Israel, New Zealand and the United Kingdom were opposed. On the second, four of these delegations abstained while Israel voted against it.

The two new proposals by the Soviet Union were both outside the General Assembly. One was in the Security Council. A meeting was called on November 5 at the request of the U.S.S.R., which invited the Council to consider a proposal that, in accordance with Article 42 of the United Nations Charter,⁽¹⁾ all member states, "and especially the United States and the Soviet Union", should give military and other assistance to Egypt, unless military action by France, the United Kingdom, and Israel ceased within twelve hours. Inscription of the item was opposed successfully by four representatives, including that of the United States. A parallel suggestion was made by the Soviet Government in a Note to the President of the United States. It was that the United States and the Soviet Union should unite their forces to halt Anglo-French intervention in hostilities in the Middle East. President Eisenhower replied that such a suggestion was "unthinkable".

Concurrently with the first two approaches mentioned, the proposal of an international force was made and carried forward. At the meeting on November 3 (which again ran well into the following morning) the Canadian Delegation put forward a draft resolution which Mr. Pearson introduced with the following explanation:

The immediate purpose of our meeting tonight is to bring about as soon as possible a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces, in the area which we are considering, from contact and from conflict with each other. Our longer-range purpose, which has already been referred to tonight and which may ultimately, in its implications, be even more important, is to find solutions for the problems which, because we have left them unsolved over the years, have finally exploded into this fighting and conflict.

In regard to this longer-range purpose, important resolutions have been submitted this evening by the United States Delegation. We value this initiative and our Delegation will give the resolutions the examination which their importance deserves and will, I hope, make its own detailed comments concerning them later.

So far as the first and immediate purpose is concerned, a short time ago the Assembly passed, by a very large majority, a resolution which is now a recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly. And so we must ask ourselves how the United Nations can assist in securing compliance with the terms of that resolution from those who are most immediately concerned and whose compliance is essential if that resolution is to be carried out. How can we get from them the support and co-operation which is required, and how can we do this quickly?

The representative of India has just read to us, on behalf of a number of delegations, a very important resolution which deals with this matter. In operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of that resolution, certain specific proposals are made with a view to setting up

⁽¹⁾ This article forms part of Chapter VII, "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression". The article reads: "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 [non-military measures] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the United Nations."

machinery to facilitate compliance with the resolution. I ask myself the question whether that machinery is adequate for the complicated and difficult task which is before us. I am not in any way opposing this resolution which we have just heard read. I appreciate its importance and the spirit in which it has been put forward. But I do suggest that the Secretary-General be given another and supplementary—not conflicting, but supplementary—responsibility: to work out at once a plan for an international force to bring about and supervise the cease-fire visualized in the Assembly resolution which has already been passed.

For that purpose my Delegation would like to submit to the Assembly a very short draft resolution which I venture to read at this time. It is as follows:

The General Assembly, bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with the resolution (A/3256) of 2 November, requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the terms of the above resolution.⁽¹⁾

I would assume that during this short period the Secretary-General would get into touch with, and endeavour to secure co-operation in the carrying out of the earlier resolution from, the parties immediately concerned—whose co-operation, I venture to repeat, is essential—as well as endeavouring to secure help and co-operation from any others whom he thinks might assist him in his vitally important task.

This draft resolution which I have just read out and which will be circulated shortly, has an added purpose of facilitating and making effective compliance with the resolution which we have already passed on the part of those whose compliance is absolutely essential. It has also the purpose of providing for international supervision of that compliance through the United Nations, and, finally, it has as its purpose the bringing to an end of the fighting and bloodshed at once, even while the Secretary-General is examining this question and reporting back in forty-eight hours.

If this draft resolution commended itself to the General Assembly—and I suggest that it is not in conflict with the draft resolution which has just been read to us by our Indian colleague—and if it were accepted and accepted quickly the Secretary-General could at once begin the important task which the draft resolution gives him. I apologize for adding to his burdens in this way, because they have already been added to in the immediately preceding draft resolution, but we know that he can carry burdens of this kind both unselfishly and efficiently.

Meanwhile, during this period of forty-eight hours we can get on with our consideration of and decision on the United States draft resolutions and other draft resolutions before the General Assembly which deal with this grave and dangerous situation which confronts us, both in relation to its immediate as well as its wider and perhaps even more far-reaching aspects.

At the same meeting this draft resolution was adopted by 57 affirmative votes, with none against. There were 19 abstentions, including the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet bloc.

At the meeting of the Assembly on the following day, November 4, the Secretary-General's first report was presented. It recommended that a United Nations Command be set up immediately, and that the present Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Major General E. L. M. Burns, be appointed Chief of the Command. General Burns

Should be authorized immediately to organize a small staff by recruitment from the observer corps of the Truce Supervision Organization of a limited number of officers, drawn from the countries which are not permanent members of the Security Council; that, further, General Burns should be authorized, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to recruit directly from various Member States, with the same limitations, the additional number of officers of which he may be in need; and that the Secretary-General should be authorized to take such administrative measures as would prove necessary for the speedy implementation of the decision.

⁽¹⁾ The United States draft resolution of November 1-2 calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces.

In the continuing consultations which, in my view, will be considerably facilitated in case the General Assembly would decide immediately on the establishment of a United Nations Command, I would try to determine from which countries the necessary troops might be drawn without delay, as well as from which countries recruitment may be possible for a somewhat later stage. For both stages I would endeavour to develop a plan where, as a matter of principle, troops should not be drawn from countries which are permanent members of the Security Council.

The next day, November 4, the General Assembly acted on the Secretary-General's report by accepting a resolution sponsored by Canada, Colombia and Norway which established a United Nations Command, appointed General Burns as Chief of Command on an emergency basis, and authorized him to recruit as proposed by the Secretary-General. This resolution was also adopted by 57 votes to none, with 19 abstentions, including France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet bloc.

In speaking briefly on the resolution, Mr. Pearson informed the Assembly that the Prime Minister had announced, a few hours before, "that the Canadian Government was ready to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force as is visualized in this draft resolution if that force is to be established and if it is thought that Canada could play a useful rôle in it".

Three approaches have been mentioned. Of these the Soviet initiative had not proved acceptable. The remaining two approaches—the cease-fire and the emergency force—were regarded as complementary by the majority of delegations, and both were followed up at the next meeting of the Assembly, on November 7.

The Assembly by then had before it the "second and final" report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an Emergency International Force. After reviewing previous discussions and the action taken and examining possible forms the Force might take, the report went on:

6. In its resolution on the United Nations Command, the General Assembly authorized the Chief of Command, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to recruit officers from the Truce Supervision Organization, or directly from various Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council. This recruitment procedure affords an important indication of the character of the Force to be set up. On the one hand, the independence of the Chief of Command in recruiting officers is recognized. On the other hand, the principle is established that the Force should be recruited from Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council. The first of these elements in the new approach has an important bearing on the interpretation of the status of the Chief of Command. The second point has an equally important bearing on the character of the whole Command. It may in this context be observed that the Anglo-French proposal, to which I have already referred, may imply that the question of the composition of the staff and contingents should be subject to agreement by the parties involved, which it would be difficult to reconcile with the development of the international Force along the course already being followed by the General Assembly.

7. The resolution in which the General Assembly requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan for the international Force gives further guidance. Thus, it is said that the Force should be set up on an "emergency" basis. The situation envisaged is more clearly defined in the terms of reference of the Force which are "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms" of the General Assembly resolution of 2 November 1956.

8. A closer analysis of the concept of the United Nations Force, based on what the General Assembly has stated in its resolution on the matter, indicates that the Assembly intends that the Force should be of a temporary nature, the length of its assignment being determined by the needs arising out of the present conflict. It is further clear that the General Assembly, in its resolution of 5 November 1956, by the

reference to its resolution of 2 November, has wished to reserve for itself the full determination of the tasks of this emergency Force, and of the legal basis on which it must function in fulfilment of its mission. It follows from its terms of reference that there is no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict. By the establishment of the Force, therefore, the General Assembly has not taken a stand in relation to aims other than those clearly and fully indicated in its resolution of 2 November 1956.

9. Functioning, as it would, on the basis of a decision reached under the terms of the resolution "Uniting for Peace", the Force, if established, would be limited in its operations to the extent that consent of the parties concerned is required under generally recognized international law. While the General Assembly is enabled to *establish* the Force with the consent of those parties which contribute units to the Force, it could not request the Force to be *stationed* or *operate* on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Government of that country. This does not exclude the possibility that the Security Council could use such a Force within the wider margins provided under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. I would not for the present consider it necessary to elaborate this point further, since no use of the Force under Chapter VII, with the rights in relation to Member countries that this would entail, has been envisaged.

10. The point just made permits the conclusion that the setting up of the Force should not be guided by the needs which would have existed had the measure been considered as part of an enforcement action directed against a Member country. There is an obvious difference between establishing the Force in order to secure the cessation of hostilities, with a withdrawal of forces, and establishing such a Force with a view to enforcing a withdrawal of forces. It follows that while the Force is different in that, as in many other respects, from the observers of the Truce Supervision Organization, it is, although para-military in nature, not a force with military objectives.

QUESTIONS OF FUNCTIONS

11. The question of determining the functions of the United Nations Force has been dealt with in part in the preceding paragraphs. It is difficult in the present situation and without further study to discuss it with any degree of precision. However, the general observations which are possible should at this stage be sufficient.

12. In the General Assembly resolution the terms of reference are, as already stated, "to secure the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms" of the resolution of 2 November 1956. This resolution urges that "all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and as part thereof halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area"; and also "urges the parties to the Armistice Agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the Armistice Agreements". These two provisions combined indicate that the functions of the United Nations Force would be, when a cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of 2 November 1956. The Force obviously should have no rights other than those necessary for the execution of its functions, in co-operation with local authorities. It would be more than an observers' corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed; nor moreover, should the Force have military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that the parties to the conflict take all necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly. Its functions can, on this basis, be assumed to cover an area extending roughly from the Suez Canal to the armistice demarcation lines, established in the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel.

QUESTIONS OF SIZE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE

13. Time has so far not permitted the necessary technical studies. It is therefore not yet possible to say what should be the size of the Force. In my first report, I pointed out that the situation is likely to involve two stages: the first one when

certain immediate tasks have to be fulfilled, the second one when somewhat different tasks, although within the framework set out in paragraph 12 above, will fall upon the Force. It is likely that the size of the Force will require some adjustment to the development of the tasks. Further study of such matters is required, and I have invited the Chief of the United Nations Command, Major-General E. L. M. Burns, to present his views urgently.

14. It is not possible at this time to make any proposals as to the general organization of the Force beyond those clearly following from the resolution of 4 November 1956. General experience seems to indicate that it is desirable that countries participating in the Force should provide self-contained units in order to avoid the loss of time and efficiency which is unavoidable when new units are set up through joining together small groups of different nationalities. The question requires additional study and is obviously closely linked to the condition that various Member countries will provide sufficiently large units. The difficulty in presenting a detailed plan of organization need not delay the establishment of the Force. It is likely that during the first period, at all events, the Force would have to be composed of a few units of battalion strength, drawn from countries or groups of countries which can provide such troops without delay. It is my endeavour in the approaches to Governments to build up a panel sufficiently broad to permit such a choice of units as would provide for a balanced composition in the Force. Further planning and decisions on organization will to a large extent have to depend on the judgment of the Chief of Command and his staff.

The Secretary-General then suggested that the finances, composition, and functions of the Force should be given further study. He proposed that "these open matters" be explored by a small committee of the General Assembly, and that "this body, if established, might also serve as an advisory committee to the Secretary-General for questions relating to the operations".

The Assembly proceeded to adopt on the same day a draft resolution sponsored by Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia and Sweden which incorporated the Secretary-General's recommendations. After noting its previous resolution on November 5 the Assembly

1. *Expresses its approval* of the guiding principles for the organization and functioning of the emergency international United Nations Force as expounded in paragraphs 6 to 9 of the Secretary-General's report;

2. *Concurs* in the definition of the functions of the Force as stated in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report;

3. *Invites* the Secretary-General to continue discussions with Governments of Member States concerning offers of participation in the Force, toward the objective of its balanced composition;

4. *Requests* the Chief of the Command, in consultation with the Secretary-General as regards size and composition, to proceed forthwith with the full organization of the Force;

5. *Approves provisionally*, the basic rule concerning the financing of the Force laid down in paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's report;

6. *Establishes* an Advisory Committee composed of one representative from each of the following countries: Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan, and requests this Committee, whose Chairman shall be the Secretary-General, to undertake the development of those aspects of the planning for the Force and its operation not already dealt with by the General Assembly and which do not fall within the area of the direct responsibility of the Chief of the Command;

7. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to issue all regulations and instructions which may be essential to the effective functioning of the Force, following consultation with the Committee aforementioned, and to take all other necessary administrative and executive actions;

8. *Determines* that, following the fulfilment of the immediate responsibilities defined for it in operative paragraphs 6 and 7 above, the Advisory Committee shall continue to assist the Secretary-General in the responsibilities falling to him under the present and other relevant resolutions;

9. *Decides* that the Advisory Committee, in the performance of its duties, shall be empowered to request, through the usual procedures, the convening of the General Assembly and to report to the Assembly whenever matters arise which, in its opinion, are of such urgency and importance as to require consideration by the General Assembly itself;

10. *Requests* all Member States to afford assistance as necessary to the United Nations Command in the performance of its functions, including arrangements for passage to and from the area involved.

The above draft resolution was approved by a vote of 64 in favour, none opposed, and 12 abstentions (Soviet bloc, Egypt, Israel and South Africa).

As mentioned above, the other aspect of the subject—withdrawal of forces—was also dealt with on November 7. A draft resolution sponsored by nineteen countries read as follows:

The General Assembly

Recalling its resolutions adopted by overwhelming majorities on 2, 4 and 5 November 1956,

Noting in particular that the General Assembly, by its resolution of 5 November 1956, established a United Nations Command for an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of its resolution of 2 November, 1956,

1. *Reaffirms* the above-mentioned resolutions;

Calls upon Israel once again to withdraw immediately all its forces behind the armistice lines established by the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949;

3. *Calls upon* the United Kingdom and France once again immediately to withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory, consistently with the above-mentioned resolutions;

4. *Urges the Secretary-General* to communicate the present resolution to the parties concerned, and requests him promptly to report to the General Assembly on the compliance with this resolution.

Before a vote was taken on the draft resolution it was necessary to clarify the meaning of the word "immediately" in the text. The representative of the Lebanon said that his Delegation's understanding was that withdrawal should take place in not more than forty-eight hours. The Indian representative argued that ". . . the removal of these troops must begin forthwith and its termination must take place without any delay." The New Zealand representative, however, gave as the view of his Delegation that "the withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces must be related to the readiness of an effective and suitably constituted United Nations Force to establish itself in the area." The representative of Peru said it was his Delegation's view "that these draft resolutions [the two before the Assembly] do not reflect different views; they do not even reflect parallel views. Rather, they reflect converging views since both resolutions are designed to ensure a prompt implementation of the General Assembly resolution calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops."

Mr. Pearson then gave the Canadian interpretation:

. . . my delegation supports the view which has been expressed by the representative of Peru and others as to the interconnection between the two resolutions which are before us—the close relationship between the two of them—and the impossibility of separating

one in its implementation from the other. In that sense we give an interpretation to the word "immediately" which has been given by others as meaning as quickly as possible. In our mind there is a relationship bearing on this word "immediately" between the withdrawal of the forces referred to in the resolution and the arrival and the functioning of the United Nations Force.

With the adoption of this draft resolution by a vote of 65 in favour, 1 opposed (Israel), and 10 abstentions, the remaining action by the special session of the Assembly on the Middle Eastern question was to adopt a resolution (66 in favour, none opposed, 2 abstentions) placing the Middle Eastern question on the provisional agenda of the regular session as a matter of priority.

The Eleventh Session of the General Assembly quickly agreed that the Middle East item should be included on its agenda and regarded as a priority matter; and that to gain time, it should be discussed in plenary session. Opinions were expressed on the substance of the question throughout the course of the general debate, but it was some days before draft resolutions were examined.

The special session of the Assembly had concentrated on two methods of dealing with the immediate situation. The first of these was to secure a cease-fire and withdrawal of French, United Kingdom, and Israeli forces. The second was to organize and send to Egypt an emergency force. It appeared to be the consensus in the Assembly that these two measures were interdependent; in particular this was the view of the powers involved in hostilities. The cease-fire became effective on November 7, soon after the first landings of United Kingdom and French troops. By November 8 withdrawal had been accepted in principle by the three Governments concerned, but its implementation was related by all three to the presence and functioning in Egypt of the United Nations Force.

There was now, however, a third and urgent problem before the United Nations; the clearance of the Suez Canal made necessary by the sinking of ships and destruction of bridges during the hostilities.

On November 9 advance units of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) reached a staging area near Naples, and on November 15 advance units arrived in the Canal Zone near Ismailia. During the same period both the Secretary-General and General Burns visited Cairo to discuss arrangements. Before the former's visit he had been able to announce that Egypt had accepted in principle the entry of the UNEF. On leaving Egypt he announced that the Egyptian Government had asked that the Canal be cleared with United Nations assistance after French and the United Kingdom forces had been withdrawn from the Canal area; and that he had told that Government that the United Nations was "willing in principle" to assume the task.

Apart from comments made in the course of the general debate, it was not until November 23 that the Assembly specifically addressed itself to the Middle East question. It then had before it four reports from the Secretary-General and two draft resolutions.

Two subjects—or groups of subjects—were before the Assembly for two long days of debate on November 23-24, and may be examined in the order in which they came up for vote.

The first had to do with the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory. In a report dated November 21 the Secretary-General referred to the Assembly request that he report on compliance with the resolutions calling

for a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces. To the report he attached communications from the states concerned. The French reply stated the cease-fire was being strictly observed by Franco-British troops, but drew attention to four attacks by Egyptians. Approximately one-third of the French forces had been withdrawn. "The French Government remains ready to proceed with the withdrawal of its forces as soon as the International Force, which is being established, is in a position to discharge the functions which have been entrusted to it under the General Assembly resolutions of 2, 5 and 7 November."

The reply from the United Kingdom was on some points similar to that of the French Government. A cease-fire was being observed by the Anglo-French forces but Egyptian elements had opened fire. The forces would be withdrawn as soon as UNEF was capable of carrying out its functions. Although UNEF was not yet in a position to operate, the United Kingdom Government, "as an indication of their intentions", would at once withdraw an infantry battalion from Port Said.

The Israeli reply on November 24 was in similar terms regarding the cease-fire and the relation between withdrawal and the effective operation of UNEF. It also stated that "the equivalent of two infantry brigades have been [by November 24] withdrawn from Egyptian territory into Israel".

Such was the information provided by the Secretary-General. A draft resolution on the same subject was then sponsored by twenty delegations. It read as follows:

The General Assembly

Having received the report of the Secretary-General on compliance with the General Assembly resolutions of 2 and 7 November,

Recalling that its resolution A/RES/396 of 7 November 1956 called upon Israel immediately to withdraw its forces behind the demarcation lines established by the Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949,

Recalling further that the above resolution also called on France and the United Kingdom immediately to withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory in conformity with previous resolutions,

1. *Notes with regret*⁽¹⁾ that, according to the communications received by the Secretary-General, two-thirds of the French forces remain, all the United Kingdom forces remain, although it has been announced that arrangements are being made for the withdrawal of one battalion, and no Israel forces have been withdrawn behind the armistice lines though a considerable time has elapsed since the adoption of its relevant resolutions;

2. *Reiterates* its call to France, Israel and the United Kingdom to comply forthwith with its resolutions of 2 and 7 November 1956;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General urgently to communicate this resolution to the parties concerned, and to report without delay to the General Assembly on its implementation.

The second aspect of the general question—the organization and functioning of UNEF and the clearance of the canal—was discussed on the basis of three further reports from the Secretary-General. The first two of these were on UNEF. Of these, one will be quoted in full since the later draft resolution referred directly to it.

⁽¹⁾ The original wording was "Notes with Concern". In view of the reports on withdrawal 20 of the original sponsors made this change. Egypt, however, withdrew its sponsorship.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON BASIC POINTS FOR THE PRESENCE
AND FUNCTIONING IN EGYPT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
EMERGENCY FORCE

After the adoption, 7 November 1956, by the General Assembly of the resolution concerning the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force, the Government of Egypt was immediately approached by the Secretary-General through the Commander of the Force, Major General E. L. M. Burns, in order to prepare the ground for a prompt implementation of the resolution.

The Government of Egypt had, prior to the final decision of the General Assembly, accepted the Force in principle by formally accepting the preceding resolution on the establishment of a United Nations Command. Before consenting to the arrival of the Force, the Government of Egypt wished to have certain points in the resolutions of the General Assembly clarified. An exchange of views took place between the Secretary-General and the Government of Egypt in which the Secretary-General, in reply to questions addressed to him by the Government of Egypt, gave his interpretations of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, in respect of the character and functions of the Force. At the end of the exchange, he gave to the Advisory Committee a full account of the interpretations given. Approving these interpretations, the Advisory Committee recommended that the Secretary-General should proceed to start the transfer of the United Nations Emergency Force.

On the basis of the resolutions, as interpreted by the Secretary-General, the Government of Egypt consented to the arrival of the United Nations Force in Egypt. The first transport of troops took place on 15 November 1956.

While the Secretary-General found that the exchange of views which had taken place was sufficient as a basis for the sending of the first units, he felt, on the other hand, that a firmer foundation had to be laid for the presence and functioning of the Force in Egypt and for the continued co-operation with the Egyptian authorities. For that reason, and also because he considered it essential personally to discuss with the Egyptian Authorities certain questions which flowed from the decision to send the Force, after visiting the staging area of the Force in Naples, he went to Cairo, where he stayed from 16 until 18 November. On his way to Cairo he stopped briefly at the first staging area in Egypt, at Abu Soueir.

In Cairo he discussed with the President and Foreign Minister of Egypt basic points for the presence and functioning of the UNEF in Egypt. Time obviously did not permit a detailed study of the various legal, technical and administrative arrangements which would have to be made and the exchange of views was therefore related only to questions of principle.

The Secretary-General wishes to inform the General Assembly of the main results of these discussions. They are summarized in an "Aide-mémoire on the basis for presence and functioning of UNEF in Egypt", submitted as an annex to this report.

The text of this Aide-mémoire, if noted with approval by the General Assembly, with the concurrence of Egypt, would establish an understanding between the United Nations and Egypt, on which the co-operation could be developed and necessary agreements on various details be elaborated. The text, as it stands, is presented on the responsibility of the Secretary-General. It has the approval of the Government of Egypt.

The Secretary-General, in this context, submits below a few indications as to the numerical development of the Force.

As of 20 November 1956 a total number of 696 were at the staging area in Egypt at Abu Soueir. At the same time a total number of 282 were at the staging area in Italy at Naples. According to the present planning a total number of 2,241 will be transferred to Egypt in the immediate future. A further number of 1,260 are to be transferred to Naples or directly to Egypt at times still to be determined.

The extensive practical arrangements, necessary for a successful development of the Force and its activities, are making progress. A report on the situation in this and other technically relevant respects will be presented to the General Assembly as soon as the initial stage is passed.

The initial activities of the Force are determined by the fact that, as yet, no withdrawals have taken place in compliance with the Resolutions of the General Assembly 2 and 7 November 1956. In pursuance of these two Resolutions I shall

report to the General Assembly on this matter as soon as I receive clarifications from the Governments concerned. I am sure that the General Assembly, in view of the great urgency, will wish to give their immediate attention to the matter raised in this report so as, by consolidating the basis for the presence and functioning of the Force in Egypt, to contribute to speedy progress towards the ends it has set for the United Nations activities in the area.

ANNEX

AIDE-MÉMOIRE ON THE BASIS FOR PRESENCE AND FUNCTIONING OF UNEF IN EGYPT

Noting that by cablegram of 5 November 1956 addressed to the Secretary-General the Government of Egypt, in exercise of its sovereign rights, accepted General Assembly resolution 394 of the same date establishing "a United Nations Command for an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the Resolution of the General Assembly of 2 November 1956";

Noting that the General Assembly in its Resolution 395 of 7 November 1956 approved the principle that it could not request the Force "to be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Government of that country" (paragraph 9 of the Secretary-General's report of 6 November 1956, A/3302);

Having agreed on the arrival in Egypt of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF);

Noting that advance groups of UNEF have already been received in Egypt,

The Government of Egypt and the Secretary-General of the United Nations have stated their understanding on the basic points for the presence and functioning of UNEF as follows:

1. The Government of Egypt declares that, when exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it will be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of the General Assembly Resolution 394 of 5 November 1956.
2. The United Nations takes note of this declaration of the Government of Egypt and declares that the activities of UNEF will be guided, in good faith, by the task established for the Force in the aforementioned Resolutions; in particular, the United Nations, understanding this to correspond to the wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirms its willingness to maintain the UNEF until its task is completed.
3. The Government of Egypt and the Secretary-General declare that it is their intention to proceed forthwith, in the light of points 1 and 2 above, to explore jointly concrete aspects of the functioning of UNEF, including its stationing and the question of its lines of communication and supply; the Government of Egypt, confirming its intention to facilitate the functioning of UNEF, and the United Nations are agreed to expedite in co-operation the implementation of guiding principles arrived at as a result of that joint exploration on the basis of the Resolutions of the General Assembly.

The Secretary-General also reported on the administrative and financial arrangements of UNEF. The responsibilities of the Commander were first outlined. Attention was drawn to provisional arrangements for meeting UNEF costs, and to the necessity of deciding the method of allocating those costs to Member States. Other questions were also raised: the currency of payment of troops, and compensation for deaths, injury, or illness of troops of the Force.

The third report was on the arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal. The text follows:

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR CLEARING THE SUEZ CANAL

In the course of the recent hostilities in Egypt great damage was done to the Suez Canal. The Canal is now out of function, and considerable efforts of a most urgent character are needed to clear it from obstructions.

In its resolution of 2 November 1956, the General Assembly urged that steps be taken to re-open the Suez Canal. Immediately upon the adoption of the resolution the Secretary-General proceeded to explore the technical possibilities of engaging the services of private firms for assistance in the clearing operation. For that purpose the Secretary-General addressed himself to the Governments of Denmark and of the Netherlands. On the basis of replies received, contacts were made with a number of private firms.

During the visit of the Secretary-General to Cairo, 16-18 November 1956, he had an opportunity to discuss the matter directly with the Government of Egypt. In view of the urgency of clearing the obstructions of the Suez Canal, and the scope of the task, the Government of Egypt addressed to him a request for assistance from the United Nations in arrangements for this purpose, as a matter of high priority. The Government of Egypt considered that the work should be started immediately upon withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces from Port Said and the Canal Area.

Under the authority given to the Secretary-General under the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General gave his assurance, in principle, that the United Nations would seek to provide such assistance. In pursuance of this assurance, the Secretary-General now wishes to submit the question to the General Assembly.

The exploration undertaken has indicated that various private enterprises, with important resources, might agree to co-operate in the clearing of the Canal. The Secretary-General would propose that the General Assembly, confirming in this respect its previous decisions, should authorize the Secretary-General to proceed with his exploration of existing possibilities, and to negotiate agreements with such firms as might speedily and effectively undertake the clearing operations. As indicated above, he would, given the approval of the General Assembly to this proposal, intend to address himself to firms in countries outside the present conflict. In his contacts with the firms approached, he would try to clarify to what extent they, in turn, may need assistance from enterprises not directly approached by the United Nations.

At the present stage the Secretary-General is not prepared to indicate how the costs should be shared. He intends to revert to this question when the approximate costs have been estimated. He will at the proper stage of the negotiations request the necessary authority to conclude agreements concerning the operation.

In the course of the discussions between the Government of Egypt and the Secretary-General, the Government of Egypt expressed its wish to see the operation completed with the utmost speed. In view of the interest of the Government of Egypt, as well as of the interest of all the users of the Canal, the Secretary-General feels that the most expeditious procedure to achieve the desired results should be followed in connexion with the matter. That is why he suggests to the General Assembly to authorize him, in consultation with the Advisory Committee set up under the resolution of the General Assembly of 2 November 1956, to enter into the financial commitments that are unavoidable, although he is not now in a position to indicate the size of those initial commitments.

As a first result of the further exploration and negotiations the Secretary-General anticipates that experts would have to be sent in order to survey the work to be undertaken. It would be his intention to use experts now employed within the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, assisted by representatives of the firms approached.

Although the work is not proposed to begin until after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces from the Port Said and the Canal Area, the Secretary-General considers it possible to pursue negotiations and, in agreement with the Government of Egypt, to arrange for the necessary survey of the conditions in the Canal without delay.

After the Reports had been received a draft resolution was put before the Assembly, sponsored by six delegations, those of Canada, Colombia, India, Norway, United States, and Yugoslavia:

The General Assembly

Having received the report of the Secretary-General "on basic points for the presence and functioning in Egypt of the United Nations Emergency Force",

Having received also the report of the Secretary-General on arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal,

1. *Notes with approval* the contents of the *aide-mémoire* on the basis for the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, as annexed to the report of the Secretary-General;

2. *Notes with approval* the progress so far made by the Secretary-General in connexion with arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal as set forth in his report;

3. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to proceed with the exploration of practical arrangements and the negotiation of agreements so that the clearing operations may speedily and effectively be undertaken.

There were two draft resolutions now before the Assembly, one on withdrawal and the other on UNEF and the Canal. They were discussed at some length. Speaking on the afternoon of November 23 Mr. Pearson suggested that the draft resolution on withdrawal was unnecessary "at this time", while, of course, supporting the other draft resolution of which Canada was a sponsor. He said:

There are two draft resolutions before the Assembly, one of which my delegation has the honour to sponsor, along with the Delegations of Colombia, India, Norway, the United States and Yugoslavia (A/3386), but, before saying a few words about that draft resolution I should like to comment on the draft resolution contained in document A/3385, which deals with compliance with previous resolutions which have been passed by the Assembly on the question of withdrawal of forces from Egypt.

It seems to me that this draft resolution, at the present time—and I emphasize "at the present time"—is unnecessary because steps are being taken to bring about the withdrawal in question. Indeed, that withdrawal has begun; we believe that it will soon be completed, and we expect that to be done. We believe also that one way of expediting that process which has begun would be to do our work here quickly and satisfactorily in setting up a United Nations Force, with functions which are agreed on, under the authority of the United Nations and of the United Nations only—a matter which is dealt with in the second draft resolution, which I hope will receive, and very quickly receive, the endorsement of the General Assembly.

The withdrawal, as we see it, has begun. Now, resolutions reiterating previous resolutions are, I think, useful and often necessary when the original resolution of the Assembly has been treated with contempt and has been defied, as is the case with the United Nations resolution on Hungary. But when a resolution deals with a matter on which action has begun in compliance with a former resolution, and when that compliance is under United Nations supervision, then I do not think, myself, that reference to the former resolution is positively helpful in achieving the objective which we have in mind. Indeed, it often merely takes up the time of the Assembly which, as in this case, could be surely used for the task of bringing about a settlement, the creation of an atmosphere within which progress could be made to such a settlement, and expediting the solution of practical problems, such as the clearing of the Suez Canal and the maintenance there of freedom and security for navigation for all countries.

It seems to me that the draft resolution which we have the honour to sponsor with other delegations (A/3386) is designed for this purpose. It "Notes with approval the contents of the *aide-mémoire* on the basis for the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, as annexed to the report of the Secretary-General"—and I hope that we can give that approval to the *aide-mémoire*. It is important, however, in giving that approval, to know what we are approving.

What are the functions of this United Nations Emergency Force? Those functions and the task—and it is a very difficult task indeed which confronts the Force—have been laid down by resolutions of the General Assembly, and they are found also in the Secretary-General's second and final report, which has been approved by the Assembly. The basic resolution for these purposes is that which we adopted on 4-5 November (A/RES/394), which states that the function of this Force is "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all"—and I emphasize the word "all"—"the terms of the resolution of the General Assembly of 2 November 1956" (A/RES/390). In that latter resolution, as representatives will remember, provision is made for a cease-fire, for a prompt withdrawal of forces, and also—and this is no time to forget this provision—"that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution". And in paragraph 4 of that resolution we have this provision, namely, that, upon a cease-fire, steps are to be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation.

Later, by resolution A/RES/395 of 7 November, the Assembly approved certain principles for the organization and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force and those principles were stated in certain paragraphs of the Secretary-General's report (A/3302) which was attached to the resolution.

There is very strong, enthusiastic support in my country for this Force—but only as a United Nations Force, under United Nations control, and as an effective and organized Force which can do the job that has been given to it and which, if it can do that job, may be the beginning of something bigger and more permanent in the history of our Organization: something which we have talked about at United Nations meetings for many years, the organization of the peace through international action. Therefore, it is important that this Force should be so constituted and so organized that it will be able to do the work that it has been given to do and thereby set a precedent for the future.

It is also important that the principles on which the Force is to operate are sound. What are these principles? They have been laid down for us in the Secretary-General's report. The Force must be fully independent, in regard to its functions and its composition, of the political situation of any single member. The United Nations alone controls it and is responsible for it.

I agree, of course, that the Force—I am not talking about individual elements in the Force, but of the Force as such—in the circumstances and on the basis of which it was set up, could not operate in the territory of a country without the consent of that country. That is why we are happy that Egypt has given that consent in principle and I am sure that we all agree that, in giving that consent to the constructive and helpful move, no infringement of sovereignty is involved. It is rather an example of using national sovereignty to bring about peace and security and a political settlement through United Nations action.

The control, then, of this Force is in the hands of the United Nations and must remain there. Otherwise it would not be a United Nations Force but it would be merely a collection of national forces, each under the control of its own Government and serving in another country with the consent of and under conditions laid down by that country. That, I am sure, would be unacceptable to most of the Governments of this Assembly.

Having said that, however, I do agree that the Secretary-General should certainly consult with the Government of the country in which the Force is serving, on all matters of any importance that affect it; also, as we understand it, the Force is to remain in the area until its task is completed, and that would surely be for the determination of the United Nations itself. It operates, according to the principles as we understand them, where it is necessary to operate in order to accomplish its task, certainly between the opposing Powers to prevent conflict from recurring. As the Secretary-General has said in his report, its functions can be assumed to cover an area extending roughly from the Suez Canal to the armistice demarcation lines, and in that area to facilitate and aid the establishing and securing of peaceful conditions, as an indispensable prerequisite to a just and agreed political settlement.

Surely we must not for one moment lose sight of that objective. It seems to me that it is high time that we began the process of achieving it through United Nations action, because at best the achievement is going to be a long and difficult undertaking.

So I venture to repeat that we should without unnecessary delay get on with the business before us, the constitution and the functioning of this Force, which has been made possible by the cessation of hostilities, and with the clearance of the Canal.

The draft resolution to which I am referring, in paragraph 2,

Notes with approval the progress so far made by the Secretary-General in connexion with arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal as set forth in his report; (A/3386).

We cannot make much more progress unless we pass this draft resolution. Then there is paragraph 3, which is as follows:

Authorizes the Secretary-General to proceed with the exploration of practical arrangements and the negotiation of agreements so that the clearing operations may speedily and effectively be undertaken.

That paragraph is, of course, without prejudice to the allocation of costs and, of course, it is without prejudice to the normal procedures of the United Nations in dealing with expenditures.

So I suggest that our immediate task, now that the process of withdrawal has begun, is to back up the Secretary-General in the terrific undertaking we have imposed on him. His industry and his intelligence deserve our full support. We have faith in him, as he has faith in the good faith of those he is dealing with. We hope, therefore, that we can help him with his work, that we can get ahead with that work in this Assembly instead of having to listen to long, distorted propaganda diatribes such as the one to which we have just had to listen—speeches we have already heard three or four times, which do not improve but, indeed, deteriorate with age.

However, this is not a time for recrimination among those who are anxious to find a solution for the problems with which we are faced. It is not a time for recrimination between delegations who are anxious to get ahead with this work. It is a time for restoration; first, the restoration of the sovereign rights of Egypt over all of its territory by the withdrawal of foreign forces from that Egyptian territory. It is a time for the restoration of free passage for all through the Suez Canal. It is a time, above all, for restoration, not of the situation which because of the failure of all of us at the United Nations and elsewhere has brought about this critical situation, but for the restoration of peace, security and decent conditions of life in an area of the world which has not seen such conditions for many years.

While there was opposition to the draft resolution on UNEF and the Suez Canal only from the Soviet bloc, there were many doubts as to the wisdom of the 20-power resolution. In an attempt to bridge the gap on the latter, the Belgian representative, M. Spaak, offered an amendment to the first two paragraphs of the operative portion, designed to express recognition of the fact that some withdrawal has taken place. The amended wording read:

Notes that according to the information received one third of the French force has been withdrawn, the United Kingdom Government has decided to withdraw one infantry battalion immediately, and Israel has withdrawn a part of its troops, and considers that France, the United Kingdom and Israel should expedite the application of the resolutions of 2 and 7 November in the spirit in which they were adopted, particularly with regard to the functions vested in the United Nations forces.

The voting took place on November 24. First the Belgian amendment was put, and lost by 37 against, 23 (including Canada) in favour, and 18 abstentions. The main resolution on withdrawal was passed by 63 to 5, with 10 abstentions (including Canada). The six-power resolution was then adopted by 65 votes to none, with 9 abstentions. Canada, of course, voted in favour.

By the end of this debate the situation on the Middle East had been thoroughly discussed and the views of all states members of the United Nations had been made known. Furthermore, decisions in principle had been taken by the General Assembly on all the immediate aspects of the problem. There was

to be a withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory; the United Nations Emergency Force was to be built up, and arrangements made for financing and other administrative matters connected with it; and the Suez Canal was to be cleared under United Nations auspices.

To turn first to the progress of withdrawal: On December 3 the permanent representatives of the United Kingdom and France to the United Nations each sent to the Secretary-General a *Note verbale*. The communications, which were identical in substance, noted that an effective United Nations force was now arriving in Egypt; that the Secretary-General accepted the responsibility of arranging for expeditious clearing of the Canal; that free and secure transit through the Canal would be re-established when it was clear; that the Secretary-General "will promote as quickly as possible negotiations in regard to the future régime of the Canal on the basis of the six requirements set out in the Security Council decision of 13 October".

The Notes went on:

Her Majesty's Government and the French Government confirm their decision to continue the withdrawal of their forces now in the Port Said area without delay.

They have accordingly instructed the allied Commander, General Keightley, to seek agreement with the United Nations Commander, General Burns, on a timetable for the complete withdrawal, taking account of the military and practical questions involved. This timetable should be reported as quickly as possible to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

In preparing these arrangements the Allied Commander will ensure:

- (a) That the embarkation of personnel or material shall be carried out in an efficient and orderly manner;
- (b) That proper regard will be had to the maintenance of public security in the area now under allied control;
- (c) That the United Nations Commander should make himself responsible for the safety of any French and British salvage resources left at the disposition of a United Nations salvage organization.

In communicating these conclusions Her Majesty's Government and the French Government recall the strong representations they have made regarding the treatment of their nationals in Egypt. They draw attention to the humane treatment accorded to Egyptian nationals in the United Kingdom and France. They feel entitled to demand that the position of the British and French nationals in Egypt should be fully guaranteed.

The withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces duly proceeded and was completed by December 22. Meanwhile elements of the Israeli forces continued to be withdrawn behind the armistice line.

The United Nations Emergency Force involved a number of problems for which there were no precedents that were fully relevant. One clear-cut decision—and it was an early one—was that no countries which were permanent members of the Security Council should take part. In drawing from the large number of other countries which offered contributions⁽¹⁾ it was considered desirable to have as wide and as balanced representation as was practicable. In his second report to the Assembly the Secretary-General suggested that countries should provide self-contained units. It was thought at first that UNEF would be composed of a few infantry units, together with supporting, administrative, communications, and headquarters elements. An

⁽¹⁾ The countries which offered were: Afghanistan, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Laos, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Roumania, Sweden, Yugoslavia.

air component was also essential. The Force itself had to be organized so that the various elements were in proportion to the requirements dictated by the tasks to be performed.

Canadian willingness to contribute was expressed at the time that UNEF was first considered. On November 4 Mr. Pearson wrote to the Secretary-General that "the Canadian Government has decided to make an appropriate contribution, the details of which will be communicated to you shortly, subject to the required constitutional action which will be put in motion without delay". On November 7 the following press announcement was made by the Prime Minister:

To comply with the resolutions of the United Nations, the Canadian Government has agreed to make an offer of a Canadian contingent to the emergency international United Nations Force for the Middle East. This proposal is subject to adjustment and/or re-arrangement after consultation with the United Nations Commander. Arrangements have already been made for a group of Canadian officers to be available today for consultation with the UN Commander in New York as soon as he arrives.

It is proposed to offer a Canadian contingent of battalion strength, augmented by ordnance, army service corps, medical and dental detachments to ensure that the battalion group is self-contained and can operate independently from a Canadian base. The size of the contingent is expected to be over 1,000 men.

Canada will be prepared to have this force lifted by the RCAF to the Middle East.

It is proposed to provide this contingent with a temporary mobile Canadian base for the first phase of its policing operations. The Canadian Government is prepared to use HMCS MAGNIFICENT for the purpose of transporting vehicles and stores to the Middle East and for use as a temporary mobile Canadian base for rations, medical supplies, ammunition, fuel and limited accommodation stores. HMCS MAGNIFICENT will also provide a small hospital to accommodate the sick and injured in the force; accommodation for a force headquarters; and communications between the force and Canada.

A written reply to Mr. Pearson's letter was not sent until November 19, but meanwhile the Canadian offer had been orally accepted. Discussion in New York in the early days of November had suggested that the form of Canadian contribution described in the press release quoted above would be welcomed; but developments in the next few days showed the need for further consideration. There were two separate reasons for the pause in completing arrangements.

The first was the need for consultations between the Secretary-General and the Government of Egypt about the entry of the Force into Egypt. The Egyptian Government tried to assert a right to determine what troops should participate in the Force and the Secretary-General reported to Mr. Pearson that, when he was in Cairo, a question had been raised with him as to the possibility of incidents resulting from the similarity of Canadian and United Kingdom uniforms. This was advanced as a reason why Canadian infantry should not participate in the Force.

Since the composition of UNEF was the responsibility of the United Nations and not of individual governments, it would not have been appropriate that the Egyptian Government should agree or disagree on the form of Canadian participation. On this there was no difference between the Canadian Government and the Secretary-General.

As the study of the composition of UNEF developed, however, the second reason for delay on the character of Canadian forces to be contributed became the effective—and the only—cause of a modification of the earlier plans. As

has already been pointed out, the Secretary-General was required to construct a balanced force, and both he and General Burns began to discover that most of the national offers were solely of infantry units. To this General Burns drew attention when he arrived in New York on November 16 for discussion with civil and military representatives of contributing governments. At the same time the Secretary-General, who was in Cairo, telegraphed to Mr. Pearson that there was not "a lack of troops for the immediate task but of possibilities of bringing them over and maintaining their lines of communication". After the Secretary-General's return from Egypt, he and General Burns again discussed the matter, and, as a result, suggested that the Canadian infantry battalion be for the present held in reserve, and that the Canadian Government should concentrate on meeting the need for air transport, administrative units, signals, engineers, army service, and medical units.

In view of the explanation made, the Canadian Government accepted these suggestions. On November 12 a small Canadian advance party left for the staging-base near Naples, and other units were sent at intervals. As time went on, the Canadian Government received more requests for specialized units and the possibility that the Queen's Own Rifles—the battalion which had been chosen earlier—would be required became more remote. A press release, issued by the Acting Prime Minister on December 10, explained the situation which had developed:

The Acting Prime Minister, the Right Honourable C. D. Howe, announced today that a request has been received from the United Nations, on recommendation of Major-General Burns, the UN Commander in the Middle East, for the immediate provision by Canada of additional maintenance, support and communications personnel for the UN Emergency Force.

Major General Burns states that the detachments of similar troops which have already been sent from Canada have filled a most important and essential role in the rapid build-up of the United Nations Emergency Force and now, as additional infantry units arrive in the Middle East from other countries, there is developing a need for more signals, servicing and maintenance units.

He has accordingly requested, and the UN has authorized the despatch by Canada of a signals squadron of approximately 150 all ranks, a RCEME workshop of about 150 persons and two transport platoons of 120 all ranks.

In addition to these Army personnel, General Burns has asked that upon completion of the airlift between Naples and Egypt, which is now being carried out by the RCAF, an air component for communications and observations be established by Canada in the Middle East as a part of UNEF. The number of RCAF personnel involved in this operation will be between 250 and 300.

In addition to the above-mentioned Army and RCAF contributions, there will be a small number of Canadian officers employed on the staff of General Burns' headquarters.

When the foregoing personnel are despatched to the Middle East the Canadian Army and air force component of the UNEF will comprise over 1,000 service personnel.

The Canadian army component as stated above, with vehicles and equipment necessary for them to perform their tasks, will be despatched in HMCS MAGNIFICENT before the end of the month.

Because of Canada's comparatively favourable position among the nations contributing forces to the UNEF it is apparent that requirements for the support of elements so necessary to round-out and weld the UNEF into an effective and efficient force can best be supplied by Canada. The number of these specialists to be provided by Canada has now reached the point where we are about in balance, so far as numbers are concerned, with the other contributing nations. It is desirable from the UN point of view to preserve this balance and as a result it now appears doubtful whether an infantry unit will be required from Canada. For this reason it has been decided to return, at least for the time being, the 1st QOR of Canada to their home station. This will be done during the next few days. The members of this unit are to be commended

for the speed and efficiency with which they prepared themselves for overseas service and for their exemplary conduct during these weeks of waiting in Halifax, and we all regret that changes in United Nations plans have not made it possible for the battalion to proceed overseas as originally planned.

By the end of the year offers of contributions had been accepted from nine countries: Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. The contributions made by the countries other than Canada consisted almost entirely of infantry units. On the other hand Canada provided as requested, signals, transport, and infantry workshop units, together with a base unit including engineers, medical, dental, ordnance, legal and clerical personnel. The total number of Canadian army personnel in Egypt, at the staging-base near Naples, or *en route* at the end of December, was slightly under 800. In addition the Canadian Government had, in response to the Secretary-General's request for transport aircraft for UNEF, provided a squadron of twelve C-119 transport aircraft, later reduced as the need diminished to seven, with 350 personnel at the end of the year. At the same date the total strength of UNEF in Egypt was approximately 4,000.

It has earlier been mentioned that the financing of UNEF was a question remaining to be settled. This matter has already been discussed at some length in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. The Secretary-General proposed that expenses be borne by member states according to the 1957 scale for the apportionment of general expenses of the United Nations. Various alternative plans were put forward. The Soviet Union, with support from other members of the Soviet bloc, insisted that expenses be borne by the "aggressor countries". India and eighteen other Asian and Arab countries suggested that a nine-member group be appointed to discuss the question further. Twenty Latin American countries proposed that the UN scale be followed up to a maximum of \$5,000,000 with subsequent amounts derived from voluntary contributions. The United States proposed that the 1957 scale be followed up to a maximum of \$10,000,000.

On December 20 the Fifth Committee adopted a recommendation that the expenses of UNEF be borne by the United Nations. Up to \$10,000,000 of the cost would be apportioned among member states in accordance with the scale of assessment for the regular budget for 1957. The question of apportioning expenses beyond \$10,000,000 was to be examined by a special committee consisting of representatives from Canada, Chile, El Salvador, India, Liberia, Sweden, United States, and the U.S.S.R. The draft resolution containing this recommendation thus combined the United States proposal with a modification of the Indian one. It was adopted by 57 in favour, 8 against, and 9 abstentions.

Clearance of the Suez Canal had been accepted by the General Assembly as an urgent necessity, and was, of course, of particular concern to the many countries whose economies were affected by its closing. As indicated in his report of November 20 on arrangements for clearing the Canal, the Secretary-General, immediately after the adoption of the resolution of November 2, had begun to explore the technical possibilities of engaging the services of private Dutch and Danish firms to assist in the clearing operation. A retired United States Army engineer with broad experience in salvage and reconstruction work, Lieutenant-General Raymond A. Wheeler, was named chief technical adviser to the Secretary-General on the clearance undertaking. Surveying of the sunken obstructions, which included approximately fifty ships and two bridges, began

early in December, although it was recognized that actual salvage operations in the section of the Canal under Egyptian control could not begin until the withdrawal of Anglo-French forces had been completed. Immediately after the cease-fire became effective, Anglo-French vessels had started clearing the harbour of Port Said and the northernmost twenty-five miles of the waterway, which were held by United Kingdom and French troops; and by early December a channel navigable by ships of up to 10,000 tons' displacement had been cleared through this section.

Negotiations between the Secretary-General and Egyptian authorities over details of the United Nations clearance operation, particularly with reference to the use of Anglo-French salvage facilities, resulted in agreement as to how the work was to be organized. There was assembled a salvage fleet of vessels under UN control and including units from the Anglo-French fleet. It was understood that these latter would all be "phased out" of the clearing operation by the end of January 1957, at which time the work in the northern part of the Canal would be near completion. The United Nations salvage fleet had begun work at various points throughout the remainder of the Canal on December 28. The question of financing the clearance operation is a complicated and difficult one and was under consideration at the end of the year.

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October-December 1956 43225466