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BULLYING BARRISTERS.

THE evolution of the perfect gentleman from the throat-cutting savage is a tedious process. It may be doubted whether the centuries necessary for the operation do not exceed the lapse requisite for the elevation of the ascidian to the savage. The stages are as wide apart, and the work becoming more intricate, involved and entangled, progresses more slowly. In one sense the molusk retrogrades as the savage kicks the shell. Nothing can be more dignified and gentlemanly than the unruffled equanimity of a jelly-fish; while the savage, especially in his civilized form—the rough—is objectionable and offensive to every living creature, be it man, bird, beast, or (we believe) devil.

If the christian maxim, "Love one another," be apparently unattainable for some more millions of years, civilization has for present use evolved another, which professional men at least should be able to assimilate—"Consider one another." A barrister's life being a record of changes of opinion on almost every point upon which he had deemed his professional education completed, respect and consideration should rapidly take the place of any natural egotism or bullying bumptiousness. And usually this is the case, but in some constitutions the savage or rough is too strongly latent, and with these a little opposition produces the same disorderly results as centuries ago were always associated with antagonism. Conflict and good humor were formerly violent repellants, impossible of united existence; and as the primeval

man may still be seen in the forests, the partially developed gentleman may still be seen at the bar.

Bullying barristers usually confine their offensiveness to witnesses and opposing counsel; some, however, of less perfect development cannot restrain their virulence even when combatting the bench, and their education is the less rapid that with some judges insolence ofttimes is plainly seen to bear down mental opposition. The bully revels in a row; noise and ill-nature are repulsive to a judge of gentlemanly breeding; and thus the bully sometimes has his way that the judge may have his peace. Peace obtained by submission, however, is short-lived. A nation or a judge may only have peace at the expense of such appearance of power as ensures respect. Apparent imbecility provokes imposition. Let a judge be wrong every time but every time let him be decided and strong—his self-possession will give him an opportunity to be right, and he is a dullard indeed if, once feeling free to think, he does not soon learn sufficient law to keep him free from gross mistakes.

In Ontario at present there is at the bar a curious mixture of ability and abuse. A man whose intellect is of the finest order but who would infinitely prefer championing his client in the old wager of battle than in orderly debate. He has some success. One judge in particular—one who was never known to say an unkind word—at the first sneering sentence throws up his helpless hands and wonders how it comes that Mr. ———— can always be right. The judge acts as though he said—

> "Vociferated logic kills me quite,—
> A noisy man is always in the right;
> I twirl my thumbs, fall back into my chair,
> Fix on the wainscot a distressful stare,
> And when I hope his blunders are all out,
> Reply discreetly—'To be sure—no doubt!'"

Juries being more "ready for a row," sometimes find themselves antagonizing a bullying counsel and deciding

against him as a mere matter of opposition. A feeling of sympathy, too, for the person bullied is often at work, and while the bully has his fling his opponent secures the verdict. A marked case of this kind occurred very recently at the present assizes; and, be it well founded or not, (we trust it is not) the jury is supposed to have felt that one adverse verdict was not a sufficient punishment for the offence; or perhaps, to put it more fairly for the jury, they were unable for some time to overcome their resentment and to act without the personal bias which they had acquired. Juries cannot separate entirely the clients from their counsel, and neither can complain if an overbearing insistance upon a verdict secures one for the other side.

As against a weak opponent or with a timid judge, success may sometimes be obtained by bullying,

"Asseveration blustering in your face,"

seems to make

"Contradiction such a hopeless case."

But such success, gained as it is by the infliction of pain upon others, is far from enviable. The great majority of barristers would, as a matter of free choice, prefer a less prominent position with the esteem and friendship of the bar and the public, than a leadership won by inconsiderate and indiscriminate abuse of all opponents.

Emerson, in writing of "men of this surcharge of arterial blood"—as he calls them—allows that "the affirmative class monopolize the homage of mankind," and that "all *plus* is good;" but he carefully adds, "*only put it in the right place.*" Such men, he says, "are made for war, for the sea, for mining, hunting, and clearing; for hair-breadth adventures, huge risks, and the joy of eventful living . . . Their friends and governors must see that some vent for their explosive complexion is provided. The roisters who are destined to infamy at home, if sent to Mexico will 'cover you with glory,' and come back heroes and generals. There are Oregons, Californias, and Exploring Expeditions

enough appertaining to America to find them in files to gnaw and in crocodiles to eat . . . . In history the great moment is when the savage is just ceasing to be a savage, with all his hairy Pelasgic strength directed on his opening sense of beauty, and you have Pericles and Phidias not yet passed over into the Corinthian civility. Everything good in nature and the world is in that moment of transition, when the swarthy juices still flow plentifully from nature, but their astringency or acridity is got out by ethics and humanity . . . We say that success is constitutional; depends on a *plus* condition of mind and body, on power of work, on courage; that it is of main efficacy in carrying on the world, and though rarely found in the right state for an article of commerce, but oftener in the supersaturate or excess which makes it dangerous and destructive,—yet it cannot be spared, and must be had in that form, *and absorbents provided to take off its edge.*" Bullying barristers ought then either to be sent off in search of physical glory, or be required to spend half an hour with a prize fighter before appearing in court.

It is more cowardly to bully a witness than an opposing counsel, as it is less sportsmanlike to shoot barn-yard fowls than grizzly bears. But the fowls must sometimes be killed, and so witnesses must for their disingenuousness frequently be vigorously attacked. But this is the exception—the rule must be based on the right of every witness to be treated civilly, *if he answer fully and fairly the questions put to him.* Counsel may disbelieve a witness—usually a cross-examiner thinks he has good reason for his disbelief—but the witness may, nevertheless, be perfectly honest and truthful, and counsel has no right, upon his own opinion of a statement—the truth of which he, personally, has no means of testing—to tell the witness that he lies. If it were otherwise, in every case each counsel would be justified in assuming his opponent's witnesses to be perjurers, and in treating them accordingly. Counsel is entitled to receive a full and fair answer to his questions, and that is all; evasion he may denounce, and assumed stupidity he may ridicule, but this

is permissible, not because rudeness is right, but for the purpose of eliciting a complete answer to the question put. Frequently the first question asked in cross-examination is of an insulting character, the object being to terrify or infuriate the witness. This is wholly unjustifiable, and should not be tolerated either by the witness or the court. It tends to degrade the dignity of the profession and disgrace the administration of justice. The following, clipped from a Toronto newspaper, is a good sample of what civilians say of their treatment by the bar, and we cannot say that it is any respect too strong :—

"If there is one thing more than another against which the community ought to protest, it is the outrageous insolence with which counsel often badger and seek to confuse and discredit witnesses who are subjected to their cross-examinations. There is not a court, there is not a trial at which notable instances of this unworthy, insulting insolence are not presented. Even respectable men who at other times are passably fair and considerate in their words and actions, seem to think that a witness under cross-examination is fair game, and that no question is too insulting and no proceeding too disreputable if only his evidence can be discredited and his character for veracity incurably destroyed.

"The Stryvers and the Buz-Fuzes are by no means extinct, as this very case in question before the Police Magistrate made abundantly evident, and had Col. Denison not kept a more than usually tight hand upon the gentlemen of the long robe there would have been still stronger proof of that fact. Now why should this be permitted? It is notorious that in many cases the most reliable witnesses are so badgered and brow-beaten that they contradict themselves at every second sentence, and go down wilted and dishonored as if they were themselves not sure but they were the greatest villians and liars alive. The fact is that a very large number of lawyers have got so accustomed to this sort of work that they are perfectly unconscious when they *are* insolent, or what unfairness means, when they have under their hands any witness whose evidence, however truthful it

may be, has to be broken down and discredited, not in the interests of justice, but in those of him who finds their fee and pays them for getting him off. Every one can recall most abominable instances of this kind in which even some who afterwards became ornaments of the bench figured in anything but a creditable fashion.

The plain truth is that these gentlemen seem to think that in this matter they are 'chartered libertines,' and the sooner a good strong word is put in favor of witnesses, and in protection of their feelings and character, so much the better."

ROWS IN COURT.

THE occurrence of rows in court is becoming too frequent and, like continued turbulence in school, the fault may, primarily, be with the parties to the quarrel, but more justly laid to lack of discipline. When such epithets as "jackanapes," "jack-in-the-box," "contemptible cur," "blackguard," are freely thrown across the court room, it is time that the press speak out. Such words are never heard when Mr. Justice Taylor presides, for it is well understood that he would assert and protect the dignity of the court in very summary fashion. There is no use in a judge threatening to adjourn the court when two bellicose barristers are threatening to punch one another's heads, or to bind them over to keep the peace when the reply is "I will break the bond and pay the fine." There is no use in trying to smooth the matter over with the repetition of anecdotes, or in declaring that "Mr. ——— did not mean what he said." Here is a disgraceful scene being enacted in the face of the Court, and it must be stopped and the parties promptly punished—there is no other way to deal with the matter.

Do the judges think that "the boys will get better as they grow older?" and are they trusting to time to quiet the turbulent spirits? Are they prepared to allow themselves to be insulted until human nature changes? If not, they must put aside some of their good nature and come down with heavy and vigorous hand sharply upon all transgressors of propriety, and save our courts from sinking beneath the level of the bar-rooms.

BRIBING A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT—IS IT A CRIMINAL OFFENCE?

THE following is the judgment of the Toronto Police Magistrate in a case recently before him, so far as it contains an exposition of the law. It is of general interest and importance, and will not appear in the reports.

"The defendants are charged with unlawfully conspiring to corrupt, deprave, impair, alter, and frustrate the constitutional procedure and action of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario and the members thereof in their votes and proceedings therein at the last session by bribing members of the said Legislative Assembly to vote in opposition to the existing administration of the Executive Government of the Province of Ontario and the members of the said Assembly supporting such Government upon questions arising and to arise in such Assembly. Conspiracy is defined to be an agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. The object of the conspiracy charged is said to be to defeat the Mowat Government and the establishment of another in its place. This in itself is not an unlawful object, if accomplished by lawful means, within the spirit of the constitution, but if done by bribery and corruption the effect might be to change the whole course of legislation in this Province from its proper and

legitimate channel. The defendants are charged with conspiring to bribe certain members of the Legislature with money and offices to vote against the Mowat Government, and the question naturally resolves itself under two heads :

(1) Is the bribing or offering of bribes to members of the Legislature to vote in any particular way an unlawful act?

(2) Does the evidence show a conspiracy among the defendants for the purpose of accomplishing the defeat of the Mowat Government by bribing the members of the Legislature?

In *Russell on Crimes, vol. 1, page 318*, bribery is defined to be :

" The receiving or offering any undue reward by or to to any person whatever whose ordinary profession or business relates to the administration of public justice, made to influence his behaviour in office, and incline him to act contrary to the known rules of honesty and integrity, and it seems that this offence will be committed by any person in an official situation who shall corruptly use the power or interest of his place for rewards or premiums."

There is no exact precedent either one way or the other of an indictment at common law for the bribing of a member of the Legislature, and it will be necessary to examine closely the state of the law in order to determine whether the general principles of the common law in relation to this subject make the bribing of a member of the Legislature an offence at common law.

There can be no doubt that the bribery of voters to vote for a member of Parliament has always been an offence at common law. Lord Coke (2 Inst., 200) says :

" It is a maxim in the common law that a statute made in the affirmative, without any negative express or implied, does not take away the common law."

In *Rex* v. *Pitt* (3 Burrows, 1,335,) Lord Mansfield said :

" Bribery at elections for members of Parliament most

undoubtedly has always been a crime at common law, and consequently punishable by indictment or information. This crime still remains a crime at common law."

Here we find the crime of bribery recognized as an offence at common law in matters not connected with the administration of justice except in so far as the members elected to Parliament have the power of passing, amending and repealing laws, and if this is the ground upon which the common law principle rests, it applies with much greater force to the bribery of a member of the Legislature itself. In the *King* v. *Plympton*, (Lord Raymond's Reports II., page 1,377) an assistant burgess of the town of Tiverton was offered a bribe of £500 to vote for a certain person as mayor of the town, the mayor being chosen under the charter by the 12 capital and 12 assistant burgesses. An indictment was laid at common law against the defendant for attempting to bribe an assistant burgess, and Serjeant Bengally, for the defence, urged that:

"Here was no offence charged for it is lawful for one member of a corporation to ask and persuade another to vote for his friend, and if he made such a promise as is alleged in this information it will be no crime without showing the fact done. . . . . But the Court were of opinion that to bribe persons either by giving money or promises to vote at elections of members of corporations *which are created for the sake of public government*, is an offence for which an information will lie."

It will be noticed that the Court makes no reference to the administration of justice, but to the question of *public government*. The next most important case of *Rex* v. *Vaughan* (4 Burrows, p. 2,499), where the defendant offered the Duke of Grafton, a Privy Councillor and Cabinet Minister, a bribe of £5000 to induce him to recommend the defendant for an appointment in Jamaica. Lord Mansfield held that it was a crime to offer a bribe to a Privy Councillor to advise the King. Mr. Justice Yates said:

"No doubt this is an offence at common law."

It was not put upon the ground that it interfered with the administration of justice further than that the office was a semi-judicial office in Jamaica, but there is nothing in the judgment that would not apply to the recommending for any office of any kind. In the case of *Rex* v. *Beale*, cited in *Rex* v. *Gibbs* (East Reports, 185), the bribing of a clerk to the agent for the French prisoners of war to procure the exchange of some of them out of their turn was held to be an offence at common law, although not connected with the administration of justice. These are all the English cases I have been able to discover on the point, and one can therefore only apply to this particular case the general principles of law as laid down in the above cases. While there are no English cases, there has been a parallel case to this in the State of Pennsylvania in 1846 (*Conn* v. *McCook*, quoted in Wharton's Precedents II., 1,012), and there Judge Eldred, who tried the case, was placed under circumstances exactly similar to those in which I am now placed. He had only the common law of England to guide him, and although the case is not an authority in this country, still it is important as showing the views of the judge, who has tried the only case of this kind that I have been able to discover in any country in which the common law of England is recognized. As his views completely coincide with mine upon the law upon this point, I shall quote his words and adopt them as my own.

'It seems from the ancient definition of this offence that the person liable on this charge must be one connected with the administration of justice, or one whose ordinary business relates to the administration of public justice. But the highest judicial tribunals both in England and this country, have decided that the offence extends to persons not immediately connected with the administration of justice. It has been decided in England, before our revolution, that the offence of bribery can be committed by any person in any official situation, who will corruptly use the power or interest of his place for rewards or promises, as in the case of one who was clerk to the agent for French prisoners of war, and indicted for taking bribes in order to procure the

exchange of some of them out of their turn. (*Rex* v. *Beale.*) It has also been held to be a misdemeanour to attempt to bribe a Cabinet Minister and a member of the Privy Council to give the defendant an office in the colonies. (Vaughan's case, 4 Burrows 2499.)

This case, the counsel for the defendant insist, supports their views of the question, inasmuch as the office that was selected was one that related to the administration of justice, but it will be noticed that the definition of the offence on which they rely relates to the person who is liable to conviction and not to the office or thing solicited or desired. Many other cases might be referred to in England on this subject if it were necessary. It is difficult to reconcile these cases with the definition of the offence of bribery as contended for by the defendants' counsel. They rather establish, and clearly so, that in England bribery was an offence at common law, and is extended to persons in official station of great trust and confidence, although their office or business did not relate to the administration of justice in their courts.

If those authorities can be relied on, the ground taken here that an attempt to bribe a member of the Legislature is not an offence, because a member of the Legislature is is not an officer connected with or concerned in the administration of justice in our courts, is quite too narrow and limited. A member of our Legislature certainly has much to do with, and his ordinary business relates as much to, the administration of public justice in the language of one of the definitions given as the clerk to the agent for French prisoners, or as a person who may bribe another at an election for members of Parliament, or as Worrall who was charged with attempting to bribe a commissioner of the revenue of the United States. There are cases where the legislative and judicial powers so commingle that the exercise of a certain kind of judicial authority in the passage of a law is in accordance with the precedents, and not contrary to received constitutional provisions. I have given the subject a careful examination and consideration. It is one of vast

importance to the community and to the individual concerned, who, it appears, has heretofore sustained a good character for honesty, integrity and morality. The offence charged is one highly injurious to public morals, and strikes at the root of our Government. The power to preserve itself is necessary, and I believe concomitant with its existence, and through its law tribunals may punish offences of this nature tending to obstruct and pervert the due administration of its affairs. So far as the peace and quiet and happiness of the people are concerned, it is of as much importance that the law-making power should be as free from the imputation of corruption as the judicial power that administers the laws thus made. The community have as deep an interest in protecting the law-makers from all corrupt and seducing temptations of bribes as they have the judges who expound the laws. I am unwilling, if I had the power, to extend the criminal law one step beyond its known and defined limits, and the argument so earnestly and ingeniously urged by the defendant's counsel, that the offence charged was not indictable or there would have been some precedent, either in England or in this country, found where there was an indictment against a member of Parliament or member of the Legislature, has received due consideration, and although precedents and similar cases are as stars to light our way, in examining questions of this kind we must not, in looking for them, lose sight of general principles or give up the principle because we cannot find a precedent."

These arguments of Judge Eldred seem to be the correct interpretation of the common law in relation to this matter. I will now consider this subject from another point of view. *Roscoe* in *Criminal Evidence*, page 410, says:

"As to conspiracies, of course, it makes no difference whether the final object be unlawful, or the means be unlawful. Here 'unlawful' does not mean 'criminal,' for there are many cases in which a combination to do anything is a crime, although the act itself if done by an individnal would not be a crime."

The revised statutes of Ontario, chap 12, sec. 45, gives the Assembly the rights and privileges of a court of record for the purpose of summarily enquiring into and punishing, among other things, "the offering to or the acceptance of a bribe by any member of the said Assembly, to influence his proceedings as such." This clause seems to give the Legislature a certain judicial status.

31 Vic., chap. 71, sec. 3, of the Statutes of Canada provides:

"That any wilful contravention of any Act of the Legislature of any of the Provinces within Canada, which is not made an offence of some other kind, shall be a misdemeanor and punishable accordingly."

Had there been no offence at the common law, these two statutes would make the combination of two or more to bribe members of the Legislature, to influence their proceedings as such, an "unlawful" means of effecting a legal object, and therefore a conspiracy.

Mr. McMaster argued with much force, and the argument was reiterated by Mr. Murphy, that a conspiracy must be for the purpose of doing some act that would be an injury to some innocent third party, and there is no doubt that there is authority for that view. The answer to that argument is, however, that in accordance with our constitution the people govern themselves. Members of Parliament are usually elected to support a certain policy; should they be bribed to take the opposite course in Parliament it would be a betrayal of trust, and a wrong to those who had chosen them to represent their views. If such a thing were allowed a few men with money might change the whole legislation of the country, and the minority might pass laws which would govern against their will the majority of the people of the Province. No one can pretend that this would not be a wrong to innocent third parties, in fact a wrong to the whole community. I think, therefore, that the charge is properly laid, and the only point left is whether the evidence discloses a conspiracy between the defendants as charged.

It will be well to consider first what the law requires as evidence of a conspiracy.

Judge Fitzgerald in *Regina* v. *Parnell* (*14 Cox Criminal Law Cases, page 675*), says:

"There is no necessity that there should be express proof of a conspiracy such as that the parties actually met and laid their heads together, and then and there actually agreed to carry out a common purpose, nor is such proof usually attempted. It is not necessary that the alleged conspirators should have ever seen each other, or corresponded. One may have never heard the name of the other, and yet by the law they may be parties to the same criminal agreement."

In Murphy's case (1837) Justice Coleridge told the jury:

"It is not necessary that it should be proved that these defendants met to concoct this scheme, nor is it necessary that they should have originated it. If a conspiracy be already formed, and a person joins in it afterwards, he is equally guilty."

ANOTHER JUDGE.

THE Dominion Government has at last agreed to appoint another judge. Our present judges have had a better title to the sympathy of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals than many of the objects upon which it expends its pity. Mr. Justice Dubuc is happily recovering from a severe and painful illness attributable directly to overwork; but no man can indefinitely stand the strain which now for at least two years has been sapping his strength. The profession will be glad to hear of the recovery of so popular a judge, and all the more that in the future he will be able to enjoy some diminution of labor.

ADVERTISING.

WE are assured that the barrister referred to in the newspaper clipping inserted in our last issue was in no way responsible for its original insertion. For this we have the gentleman's word, and while we thought him guilty of an indiscretion, we have always had far too high an opinion of his character and actions to question for a moment his veracity. His abilities and genial bearing will win him his way without the doubtful aid of newspaper puffs, which, while no doubt meant in kindness, in reality tend with the profession and the thinking part of the public, to injure those they are intended to serve.

We are glad to think that our explanations, privately made, have been accepted, and as nothing was "set down in malice," so no undue offence has been taken.

The following, clipped from a Brandon paper, merits reprobation:

A. M. PETERSON,

BARRISTER, SOLICITOR, ETC.,

Of Ontario.

LAW OFFICE, ROSSER AVE., NEXT DOOR

TO LAND OFFICE,

BRANDON, MAN.

Mr. Peterson has not been admitted to practice in this Province, and will perhaps retort that he never said he had. He certainly does say "of Ontario"; but does not many a professional man (more particularly among the doctors) advertise his foreign education; and do the words "of Ontario" convey any other idea than that Mr. Peterson

claims to have had educational advantages not enjoyed by natives. The card appears in the "Legal" column among other professional cards; it tells the locality of a "Law Office," and it is not Ontario work that comes in response to the advertisement.

The Canadian Law Times should appoint an inspector of its advertising columns—some one to separate the loan negotiators, lightning claim collectors, insurance agents, etc., from the barristers and attorneys. Here are two pretty specimens:

D. J. WELCH,

BARRISTER AND ATTORNEY-AT-LAW,
NOTARY PUBLIC,

Special attention given to collection of claims in all parts of the Dominion and negotiation of loans.

Office—Main Street,

MONCTON, - - - - - N. B.

PELTON & CLEMENTS,

BARRISTERS, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW, NOTARIES PUBLIC, MARINE, FIRE, ACCIDENT AND LIFE INSURANCE AGENTS.

Agents for the Nova Scotia Building Society.

YARMOUTH, - - - - N.S.

Edgar N. Clements.
Sandford H. Pelton, Q.C.

Com. for Ontario and New Brunswick.

CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor of the Manitoba Law Journal.

DEAR SIR:—I am sure every member of the bar must appreciate your article on "Arguing v. Wrangling," in the last number of the LAW JOURNAL, though all respectable members must and do regret that there is any need for such words to be spoken or written.

One's regret at the present state of things here, is only exceeded by one's surprise, that even *one* member of the bar can be found who has so little regard for the dignity of the profession, that he can bemean himself and it, by such conduct as has recently been displayed in the assizes just closed.

At the same time one could wish that the bench would hold a somewhat firmer hand, and even enforce by a deserved commitment for contempt of court, the transgression of rules of courtesy which are hardly to be borne when transgressed by one barrister to another, but become, when transgressed towards the court, little short of gross insolence of the most unbearable character.

One is almost at a total loss to conceive the reason for the present state of things, when one considers that the large majority of the bar have received their training in Ontario, and have had before them there for years, the ensamples of how things should be done, both decently and in order.

In the time of the late Chief Justice Wood an order was promulgated, that on Tuesday trials no fees should be allowed to counsel unless they appeared in proper court costume; that unless they did so, only attorney's fees should be taxed.

What has become of this order? And what do we find now on the trial of a non-jury case? Neither judge or counsel wearing the slightest mark to distinguish them from their lay brethren, so that a stranger would not even know who was judge and who messenger.

Then on the trial of criminal cases, why should not the guards of the jail, or the constables of the court be clothed in some style that would lend some dignity to the occasion, for let those who deride my sentiments do their best, they cannot get over the fact that to the untutored mind justice comes with far greater force when accompanied with outward signs of dignity and pomp, than when conducted in the shiftless manner now oftentimes witnessed.

The Government of the Eastern Judicial District Board have provided the governor of the jail with a most impressive looking suit decked with gold braid, for what purpose it is hard to say, not to wear, for he never wears it; why should he not be ordered to be in court alongside the prisoner to guard him, gold chain and all. Everyone who was in court at the last assizes when the prisoners from the penitentiary were brought up, charged with attempting to escape, must have noticed the guards who accompanied them, as they were dressed in proper habiliments, and were distinguishable from mere court loafers, which is more than you can say for the constables usually employed.

It seems too bad to have to write in this strain, considering that your journal will be read by not only our eastern brethren, bnt also those across the line, and even across the ocean, but if the learned gentlemen of the long robe, who are supposed to be gentlemen, (heaven save the mark as to some of them,) would only think of the position they occupy, as they ought to do, they would not need such remarks as have been made by a

READER.