The Legal News.

VOL. XI. MARCH 24, 1888. No. 12.

Re Dwight and *Macklam*, before the Ontario Court of Appeal, presented a point of some interest. Upon the trial of a petition under the Ontario Controverted Elections Act, a telegraph operator was examined as a witness, and was asked to produce the originals of certain telegrams alleged to have been sent by the respondent to certain voters the day before the election. The witness stated that the telegrams had been burned after he had been subpœnaed, upon instructions received in the form of a telegram from the general manager of the telegraph company. He said the telegrams should have been destroyed before, in accordance with a standing rule of the company, but that he had neglected to do so at the proper time. The Court held that the general manager and the operator were guilty of a contempt of court. Documents which had been in existence were destroyed during the trial by the deliberate action of the general manager, and the Court was thereby hindered in the prosecution of an investigation of a public nature. It was held that no privilege attaches to telegrams in the possession of a telegraph company, and that the operator was the proper person to subpœna to produce them, as he had the control of them, and the ability to produce them.

The judges in France appear to be resolved that no political element shall enter into the proceedings before their tribunals. The incident, unimportant in itself, of a member of the legislature using paper with the official heading, gave rise to the following dialogue in the Cour d'Assises de la Seine :—

M. le Président : Maître Laguerre, vos conclusions sont rédigées sur du papier avec un entête de la Chambre des députés. Je vous ferai observer qu'ici nous ne connaissons ni député, ni sénateur. Ce n'est pas convenable.

M. Laguerre : Je n'accepte pas cette expression de " pas convenable." J'ai rédigé ces conclusions à la hâte sur le papier que j'avais sous la main, et je trouve l'observation de M. le président très singulière.

M. le Président: Je suis ici l'interprète de toute la magistrature. Pour elle, il n'y a pas de députés, il n'y a que la justice. Il ne faut pas qu'on paraisse se servir d'un titre comme celui-là pour impressionner ses juges. Ici vous n'êtes plus député, vous êtes simplement avocat et au nom de la magistrature française je maintiens mon observation.

M. l'avocat général Reynaud: Messieurs, je veux qu'il ne reste rien de l'incident. Je suis convaincu que Me. Laguerre a agi par inadvertance.

Me. Falateuf: C'est entendu et j'en suis aussi sûr que possible.

M. le Président: C'est évident, mais je devais faire cette observation.

A certain collection "association" in the United States seems to be very fond of the term "reliable." He is not content with professing to give the "reliability" of the sixty thousand lawyers in the United States and Canada (see Vol. 10, p. 49), but he now essays to give a list of the most "reliable" law periodicals in the same territory. We have urgent appeals to join this glorious band, concluding with "We hope we shall not have to leave you out of the list,"—the condition of being represented as "reliable" being the payment of two dollars for the aforesaid guide to "reliability." We should have no objection to contribute to this person's needs if a deserving applicant for relief; but to the coercive methods of the sturdy beggar, so happily described in *Gil Blas*, we have a decided objection, and we trust we have no reader so ignorant or ill-advised as to be misled by this form of importunity.

Another kind of application reaches us from time to time. It is a request for the terms upon which certain announcements, generally known as "medical advertisements," will be inserted in the *Legal News*. One answer may suffice for all. No advertisements of this class will be inserted on any terms in this journal.

NEW PUBLICATION.

The Mercantile Law of England and the United States, by John William Smith, with notes, etc., by C. C. Pomeroy. San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney Co., publishers.

This is an American edition of a standard text-writer. The editor has adhered to the general plan and scope of the original work,

while showing the course of development of the law affecting corporations, fire and life insurance, and other branches of law. The notes are extensive and valuable, and the edition is in the compact and convenient form in which the publishers have issued several other works.

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA.

QUEBEC.]

STEPHENS v. CHAUSSÉ.

Elevator—Negligence of employee—Liability of landlord—C. C. 1054—Vindictive damages—Cross appeal—No notice of.

On the 13th of April, 1883, C., an architect, who had his office on the third flat of a building known as the "Ottawa Building," in the city of Montreal, in which the landlord had placed an elevator for the use of the tenants, desiring to go to his office, went towards the door of the elevator, and seeing it open, he advanced to enter, but instead of putting his foot on the floor of the elevator, which was not there, he fell into the cellar and was seriously injured. In an action brought by C. against R., the landlord, claiming $15,000 damages for the injury and loss, it was proved at the trial that the boy (an employee of R.) in charge of the ele vator at the time of the accident, had left the elevator with the door open to go to his lunch, leaving no substitute in charge. It was shown also that C. had suffered seriously from the fracture to his skull, had been obliged to follow for many months an expensive medical treatment, and had become almost incapacitated for the exercise of his profession. C. had been in the habit of using the elevator during the absence of the boy. The trial judge awarded C. $5,000 damages, and on appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal side), Montreal, that amount was reduced to $3,000, on the ground that he was not entitled to vindictive damages.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada:

Held, affirming the judgment of the Court below, M. L. R., 3 Q. B. 270, that R. was liable for the fault, negligence and carelessness of his employee (Art. 1054, C. C.), and that the amount awarded was not unreasonable.

Held, also, that in the opinion of this Court, although the sum of $5,000 awarded in a case like the present could not be said to include vindictive damages, the judgment of the Superior Court could not be restored, there being no cross appeal.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Carter for appellant.

St. Pierre, Q.C., for respondent.

Quebec.]

CITY OF MONTREAL v. LABELLE.

Damages—C. C. 1056—Solatium—Cross appeal—No notice of.

In an action of damages brought against the Corporation of the City of Montreal, by Z. L. *et al.*, the descendant relations of L, who was killed while driving down St. Sulpice street, (alleged to have been at the time of the accident in a bad state of repair), by being thrown from the sleigh on which he was seated, against the wall of a building, the learned judge, before whom the case was tried without a jury, granted Z.L. *et al.*, $1000 damages, on the ground that they were entitled to said sum by way of solatium for the bereavement suffered on account of the premature death of their father.

Held, reversing the judgments appealed from, that the judgment could not be affirmed on the ground of solatium, and as the respondents had not filed a cross appeal to sustain the judgment on the ground that there was sufficient evidence of pecuniary loss for which compensation may be claimed, Z. L. *et al's.* action must be dismissed with costs.

C. P. R. Co. v. *Robinson*, 10 Leg. News, 324; 14 Can. S. C. R. 105, followed.

Appeal allowed with costs.

Mathieu, for appellant.

Stephens, for respondent.

Quebec.]

QUEBEC COUNTY CONTROVERTED ELECTION CASE.

O'BRIEN v. Sir A. P. CARON.

Election petition—Judgment on motion to dismiss, non-appealable—R.S.C. ch. 9, sec. 50.

The election petition in this case was presented on the 9th April, 1887. On the 12th of September, an application was made to a Judge in Chambers to have the case fixed for

trial, and the trial was fixed for the 31st of October at Quebec, on which day it was continued by consent to the 19th of December. On this last mentioned day the respondent moved the Court to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petitioners had not proceeded to trial within six months from the presentation of the petition. On the 26th of December, the Court, Mr. Justice Caron presiding, dismissed the election petition without costs. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, it was :—

Held, Fournier & Henry, JJ., dissenting, that the Supreme Court of Canada had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from said judgment. *Montmagny Election Case* decided this term followed. (See next case).

Per Henry, J., affirming the judgment of Mr. Justice Caron, that as the petitioners had not made an application supported by affidavit to enlarge the time for the commencement of the trial as provided in section 33 ch. 9, R. S. C., the election petition was properly dismissed.

Appeal quashed with costs.

Martin and *McDougall, Q.C.*, for appellant.
Bossé, Q.C., for respondent.

QUEBEC.]

MONTMAGNY CONTROVERTED ELECTION CASE.

CHOQUETTE v. LABERGE.

R.S.C. ch. 9, sec. 11.—Service of Election Petition Defective—C. C. P. 57—Preliminary Objection.

The service of an election petition made in the Province of Quebec, at the defendant's law office situated on the ground floor of his residence and having a separate entrance, by delivering a copy thereof to the defendant's law partner, who was not a member of, and did not belong to, the defendant's family, is not a service within Sec. 11, Ch. 9, Revised Statutes of Canada, and Art. 57 C.C.P., and a preliminary objection setting up such defective service was maintained, and the election petition was dismissed; Gwynne, J., dissenting.

Appeal allowed with costs.

Belcourt, for appellant.
Belleau, for respondent.

*COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH—MONTREAL.**

Surety—Cash security—Deposit receipt held by Government—Failure of Bank—Responsibility.

The appellant agreed to put up a cash security of $15,000 to the Government for the performance of a contract by the respondents, which security was to remain in the hands of the Government until the contract should be fulfilled; and the respondents were to pay to the appellant $2,000 per annum until the security should be released. By arrangement with the Exchange Bank a deposit receipt for $15,000 was accepted by the Receiver-General, and that sum was placed to his credit in the Exchange Bank and remained under his control.

HELD :—That the loss of the $15,000 by the failure of the Bank, was a loss to be borne by the Government and not by the appellant, and that the appellant was entitled to recover the $2,000 from the respondents, notwithstanding the tender back to him of the deposit receipt; that the terms on which the appellant obtained the credit at the Exchange Bank were not material to the issue, the appellant having furnished what was accepted by the Government as equivalent to cash at the time it was given; that the amount being entered in the books of the Bank to the credit of the Receiver-General, the deposit thereby became a debt due by the Bank to the Receiver-General, and was at the risk of the Government.—*Gilman & Gilbert et al.*, Tessier, Cross, Baby, Church, Doherty, JJ. (Baby and Church, JJ., diss.), Dec. 22, 1887.

Bill of exchange—Liability of acceptor—Imputation of payments.

J, a customer of the Exchange Bank, respondent, discounted with that Bank appellant's acceptance. When it fell due, appellant failed to pay it, and the Bank charged it to J's account, who at the time owed the Bank a small balance, which balance was augmented by subsequent transactions, wherein, nevertheless, if the credits were imputed to the earliest indebtedness, the balance due when the acceptance matured

* To appear in Montreal Law Reports, 3 Q. B.

would be more than covered. The Bank retained possession of the acceptance and brought this suit against appellant, the acceptor, to recover its amount. Appellant pleaded payment and compensation.

HELD :—That the Bank was entitled to recover from appellant the amount of his acceptance, and that appellant was not discharged by the credits in the Bank's account with J.—*Goodall & The Exchange Bank of Canada*, Dorion, Ch. J., Tessier, Cross, Baby, Church, JJ., (Church, J., *diss.*), Sept. 17, 1887.

Insolvency—Estate reconveyed to insolvent—Registered judgment—Action to set aside hypothec after reconveyance of estate.

HELD :—That a debtor, against whose property a judgment has been registered, and who afterwards makes an assignment and obtains back his estate by a composition with his creditors, in which he undertakes to pay the hypothecs on his property in full, cannot have the hypothec so registered set aside, at his own suit, on the ground that it is a fraud on his creditors.—*Foster & Baylis*, Dorion, Ch. J., Monk, Ramsay, Sanborn, Tessier, JJ. (Monk and Sanborn, JJ., diss.), June 22, 1877.

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*SUPERIOR COURT—MONTREAL.**

Libel—Privileged communication—Interest of writer of letter.

HELD :—That a letter written in good faith and without malice, by the lessor of premises occupied by a manufacturing company of which the plaintiff was manager, and addressed to one of the directors and principal shareholders, charging the manager with inefficient administration, the writer at the time having reason to be anxious respecting his interests as landlord of the company, is a privileged communication.—*Macfarlane* v. *Joyce*, in review, Johnson, Papineau, Loranger, JJ., Dec. 20, 1887.

Libel—Fair and honest report of proceedings before court of justice—Absence of damage.

HELD :—1. A fair and honest report in a newspaper of proceedings before a court of justice, whether condensed or not, and even if injurious to persons referred to therein, is privileged.

2. The defence of justification is strengthened by evidence showing that the plaintiff's character was such that he suffered no damage by the publication.—*Downie* v. *Graham*, Davidson, J., Oct. 17, 1887.

Fire insurance—Alteration in use of premises—Increase of risk—Verdict contrary to evidence—New trial.

Premises insured as a tannery and leather-dressing house were used for drying nine bales of cotton—a substance which it was proved was more inflammable than the stock of a tannery. The fire first appeared in the cotton. By a condition of the policy, the use of the premises for more hazardous purposes avoided the contract. The jury found that the drying of cotton was not a material alteration in the use of the premises, and that the alteration did not increase the risk.

HELD :—That there being evidence that the insured, by the use of the premises for drying cotton, increased the risk, the verdict was against evidence, and a new trial was ordered.—*Mooney* v. *Imperial Ins. Co.*, in review, Johnson, Torrance, Loranger, JJ., April 30, 1886.

THE COMMON LAW AS A SYSTEM OF REASONING, — HOW AND WHY ESSENTIAL TO GOOD GOVERNMENT; WHAT ITS PERILS, AND HOW AVERTED.

[Continued from p. 88.]

Need and functions of jurists—Codification.

We now come to the weak place in our common law,—the place which needs to be mended and strengthened. I can state only approximately the number of adjudged cases in our books of reports. The labor of counting them would be too great to be compensatory. A rough estimate places them at half a million. A man does not live who, if he gave his whole time to ascertaining the judicial deductions from the differing facts they recite, could thus go through with the half of them; and, if this were accomplished, there never was a memory strong enough to stand up under the load; or, if there was, it would

*To appear in Montreal Law Reports, 3 S. C.

crush out the reasoning powers, and reduce the intellect to idiocy. In every view, therefore, we need jurists. If the Roman jurists, to illustrate the applications of their principles, had possessed these printed reports of facts, how incomparably glorious would be their commentaries! Or, if our law, with its multitudinous reports, had men like those jurists to present it for professional use, how immeasurably above what it now is would it practically be!

Every lawyer acknowledges that there is no such number of legal principles as of judicial decisions. And there is a class of lawyers, by many claimed to include all the best ones both in England and in the United States, who are clamorous to have the principles legislatively enacted into a code, a process familiarly known as codification. This tumult may well remind us of the familiar instance of the husband and wife who quarrelled over the question where in their room to set the bureau. The domestic storm, you remember, rose so high that the priest had to be called in. Said the holy man, "show me the bureau." "We have no bureau, your *riverence*, it has not been bought." Let me suggest, therefore, that we suspend our quarrel over this question of codification until our law has received such juridical culture as to inform us, and enable us to agree among ourselves, just what and how many are its elementary principles, reduced to their smallest proportions. We have already seen that to ascertain this is the proper work of the jurist; it is absolutely outside the functions of the judge, who can do it only by departing from his duty of relieving his docket from the press of cases upon it, and without the possibility of having before him the materials or tools indispensable to jurist work. When we have jurists, and they have done this work, a question which has of late been much discussed by the American Bar Association will, it is submitted, more properly arise than now. You remember that, at the close of the debate last year, it was by a small majority resolved, "that the law, so far as in its substantive principles it is settled, should be reduced to the form of a statute." And you remember that, for a considerable time past, there has been in New York a chronic quarrel as to whether or not a particular draft of a code shall be legislatively adopted. Now, if this or any other proposed code truly embodies the principles of the common law reduced to their smallest proportions, the Courts can be made to know the fact more readily than the legislature. And if this great juridical work has really been done, we may well set up here our Ebenezer. Any man who has done it has only to publish the book; and if the world is sufficiently enlightened, it will receive it. What is already established does not need to be established by a second process to make it stand. The utility of the writing can be made as well to appear without the legislature passing upon it as with. And after its utility has become universally recognized, —after the bureau has been bought,—its position, whether among the written laws or the unwritten, can be more intelligently determined upon than before.

You will call to mind that a well-known English advocate of codification, Mr. Justice Stephen, has prepared and published what he proposes for codes. That, so far, is an attempt at something like jurist work. Let our American advocates of codification do the same; and, when they have produced what all our Courts accept as the embodied principles of the common law, reduced to their smallest proportions, the further question of their legislative enactment will present itself, not prematurely, but at its proper time. Then, if the codification doctrine as expounded by the American Bar Association prevails, we shall have the multiplication table and the entire arithmetic, together with all the learning of the schools, put into form for the use of pupils, under the name of a statute.

Our legal text-books—Piracy.

But I am here reminded that we have immense numbers of legal text-books, and I am asked whether I deny that they proceeded from jurists. I reply, that they are of vastly differing qualities, and that no one characterization could properly be applied to all. Though the common law itself invites the culture of jurists, almost the sole thing which it has overlooked is the fact that they cannot live on uncooked electricity and air. They

are not disembodied ghosts, but real men, requiring the same sort of subsistence on which practising lawyers and judges live. A jurist must have all the natural faculties which would qualify him to be a first class practitioner, or a judge of the highest eminence; added to which he must possess natural gifts not required of either. If the great lawyer must be refreshed with three pounds of roast beef per day, or the great judge with five, surely your jurist requires not less than ten. But how is a man whom God made to be a jurist to carry out the divine decrees? In England, there never was a time when any man could earn his salt by juridical writings. In the United States, where books purporting to be juridical have a wider sale, one who, to the naturally juridical mind, added the necessary culture, could obtain from his writings what would pay for his salt, his clothes if patched and second-hand, and his whisky and tobacco,—were it not that, as fast as he wrote, the thieves would steal his work and publish it as their own. So that his labor honest would come into competition with his labor stolen, reducing directly the profits, and indirectly, by mingling his expositions with those of the thieves, delay the recognition of his merits, whence naturally and legitimately would otherwise flow increased profits. The consequence whereof has been, that many or most who in England have essayed to write what should be juridical works have drawn largely on their predecessors by piracy; and the same thing has followed in this country. And the courts, instead of frowning upon this, have smiled upon it, and petted it. There are even exceptional judges who will scarcely listen to a thing until it has been stolen at least once, and some appear to be happily satisfied only with about the seventh theft.

It was once my fortune, in my younger days, to be present when one of the most eminent of law publishers was endeavoring to contract with a young author for a book. The author described the labor which the making of it would cost him, and added, "I cannot afford to do it for the price you offer." "Oh," replied the publisher, "we do not expect you to do it so. There are two English books on that subject; cut them up, arrange the matter for yourself, work in with it a little American law, and we shall be satisfied. That is the way the old heads do. Why, in So-and-So's copy for the printer, one could scarcely find any chirography."

Many years ago there were within the circle of my acquaintance, two men who made a somewhat smaller law book than another then in use on the same subject. The larger book was the whale, and the smaller was Jonah. So the whale, in a plunge for life called a new edition, swallowed the choice parts of Jonah,—not the whole of him; I think it was something like one-third. It may be a little more or less; for I speak only from memory, the verification having been made some years ago. So voracious was the whale that, though gobbling for head and heart, it got boots and spurs also. In other words, the printed matter of the smaller book appeared in the larger without the correction of those little mistakes which are unavoidable in books, having evidently been sent to the printer of the larger without copying. Jonah died, but the whale lives. It took at the same time a smaller gulp from another book, which survived, like the original Jonah; but, unlike him, was never cast up upon dry land. Nothing more of sufficient magnitude worth mentioning was ever done for the enlargement of the whale; and, to drop the figure, it remains now one of your honored books, progressing from edition to edition, and reverently cited by the bar, and bowed profoundly before by the judges.

In these days of rapid stealing, when typewriters and copyists "cover a multitude of sins" and avoid some of the former methods of detection, the scissors have, if I mistake not, somewhat declined as the newer and brighter glory has arisen. I know a very modern case, not in the reports, wherein the pirate was so confident of having covered his stealings beyond detection as to allow a suit for an injunction to be brought, and remain in Court until the judge had set down a day for the hearing; thus subjecting the defendants to the payment of several hundred dollars more than would have settled the claim before suit. In making the book, the person whose name stood before the public as author had this help. The method of the purloin-

ing was the same as that of the burglar, who walks through what are deemed the richest parts of the house, the parlor, the dining-room, and the china-closet, taking what seems most like gold and silver, and departs; then melts down his treasures sufficiently to destroy their identity. The pirate went through the chosen portions, seized each coveted sentence and changed its form as far as appeared necessary; then shuffled the order of the cited cases, so as to bring them as chance would if his work had been original. He did not even attempt the obliteration of the author's order, and he had no conception of the deathless nature of our English sentences. In making up from these purloinings the better part of a hundred pages, he did not by his transmutings so change a dozen sentences as to leave the question of their identity a fair subject for argument. When the folly of the mistake appeared in the light of an impending hearing, involving the introduction of one of your honored law books to the Court in a manner not quite usual, and leading us to a luminous case for the reporter, nothing was left for the plaintiff but to accede to proposals for an honorable settlement. The stealing in this instance was not done with the scissors; for, though the original author's little errors were copied, adding to the evidences of the theft, the thief made similar errors of his own, thus showing that his instrument was the pen.

A manner of making your honored text-books which I have heard stated—not within any personal cognizance of mine, but corresponding in the results with what I have observed, is the following: The individual whose name is to stand on the title-page as author selects the books to be stolen. With pencil in hand, he goes through them, and marks the coveted matter. Then he passes them to copyists,—supposed to be competent to cover while they scratch,—directing them to change the expression as much as possible; lastly, he takes the copied matter, mixes with it such other matter as he can conveniently scrape together, and with his own more powerful genius completes the work of destroying, or satisfying himself that he has destroyed, the identity. Even on this plan I am told that there is danger of slipping; for, as one observing upon it said, he had occasion to compare your honored text-books on a particular subject, and found an entire section in a new one identical with the section in the old.

It is not necessary for me to go on, under this head of the subject, with further particularizations of what you all, in a general way, know. I will quote the words of a very competent writer in your neighboring State of Georgia, one who evidently wrote them without any idea he was describing an abuse, but plainly deemed himself speaking of what existed as of course. "The more modern book," he says, "will usually repeat from the former all that part which is still in force, and will give besides the subsequent alterations." In other words, the author "usually" pirates the work of his predecessor, edits it, then publishes it as entirely his own production. I should insult you if I asked your opinion whether a scamp like this is a jurist. And still this writer informs us that such is your "usual" legal author, honored by the practicing profession, and bowed before and followed by the judges.

Our copyright and false-pretense laws.

But the noteworthy part of this matter remains to be stated. While our copyright laws, as expounded and administered by Courts smiling on piracy, are so defective as to seem almost worthless, not so are the laws which punish cheating by false pretenses. The latter exist in all our States, and the violators of them are shut up in the penitentiaries, except when the persons cheated are lawyers. One who, as author, presents to the public a book into which stolen matter enters, under the semblance of its being all his own, breaks the laws against obtaining money by false pretenses, whenever and wherever an innocent bookseller sells a copy to one who purchases it relying on the representation implied in the semblance of authorship, whether the ostensible author is or is not present in the same county or State. And before a single sale is made, down to any time before the edition is exhausted, he is indictable for the criminal attempt to cheat. These are propositions which no one familiar with the criminal law will question. Yet, while the cheats which

I have described have been going on, were the defrauders ever known to be set to hammering stone in a State prison? Surely their high position was not their protection. I do not know how you do things in South Carolina, but we in Massachusetts put into our penitentiary great lawyers, great senators, presidents of immense corporations, clergymen; and, in one instance, we received into it one of your honored South Carolina ex-Governors. Why exempt your honored authors? The only reason I can imagine is, that the men of our noble and generous profession, deeming with Hudibras that

> "The pleasure is as great
> Of being cheated as to cheat,"

scorn to make complaint of those who have been to them the source of such profound happiness.

Helpers in law-book making.

Another method of producing legal text-books is for an older man to mingle his work with that of boys helping. If this is done, not under the false pretense that the whole proceeded from the ostensible author, but accompanied by an honest statement to the public, there is no wrong in it; and the result may be, in some circumstances and for some uses, excellent. Where the aim is simply to set out the opinions of the Courts, condensed, with little or no juridical work interwoven, and there is a large field to be gone over, this production of a dozen co-operative minds may be greatly better than no book. But it is not a jurist work. It matters not how eminent or how able a lawyer is, he cannot gather up and state the reasons and doctrines of the law at second-hand, traversing the juridical field beyond where the footsteps of the judges are distinct,—whether the helpers, whose sight is to take the place of his own, are competent or incompetent.

Testimonies as to our text-books.

Do not understand me as affirming that all your honored text-books are made in the ways I have described. I assure you that, in my opinion, not all are. But a sufficient proportion of them are, to sustain what I have said of the need of jurists.

Some years ago, in the course of a correspondence with a very eminent judge and law professor, I was startled by what he said of the impossibility of selecting truly juridical works for students. It had not quite occurred to me that, assuming the mass of our text-books to be trash, there were not enough left of the better sort to satisfy the demands of study.

[To be continued.]

INSOLVENT NOTICES, ETC.

Quebec Official Gazette, March 10.

Judicial Abandonments.

Henry Gardner, trader, St. Ferdinand d'Halifax.

Curators Appointed.

Re Damase Benoit, district of St. Francis.—Thos. Darling, Montreal, curator, March 5.

Re Athanase Boucher, St. Guillaume.—Kent & Turcotte, Montreal, joint curator, March 6.

Re A. P. Caron & frère, dry goods, Quebec.—H. A. Bedard, Quebec, curator, March 6.

Re Olivier Champigny, St. Hyacinthe.—J. Morin, N.P., St. Hyacinthe, curator, Feb. 28.

Re Louis S. Clayton.—Angus McKay, Montreal, curator, March 6.

Re Dame Valerie Boucher, wife of C. Mongeon, Sorel.—Kent & Turcotte, Montreal, joint curator, March 5.

Re Dame Elizabeth Smith (Mrs. P. Lemieux), district of Quebec.—Kent & Turcotte, Montreal, joint curator, March 1.

Re Dame Marie Monique St. Aubin (M. Leduc & Co.) Kent & Turcotte, Montreal, joint curator, March 6.

Re Apollinaire Leduc, St. Benoit.—Kent & Turcotte, Montreal, joint curator, March 8.

Re Joseph Camille Marchand, wholesale grocer, Montreal.—J. McD. Hains, Montreal, curator, March 7.

Re Pierre Martin, Laprairie.—A. J. A. Roberge, Laprairie, curator, March 6.

Re J. A. Riopelle, Montreal.—Kent & Turcotte, Montreal, curator, March 8.

Re Arthur Roy, St. Cyrille.—H. A. Bedard, Quebec, curator, March 8.

Dividends.

Re H. R. Beveridge & Co., Montreal.—First and final dividend, payable March 27, A. W. Stevenson, Montreal, curator.

Re Augustin Brodeur, Sherbrooke.—First and final dividend, payable March 27, J. McD. Hains, Montreal, curator.

Re A. T. Constantin & Co.—Fourth dividend, payable March 23, H. A. Bedard, Quebec, curator.