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## RECIPROCAL RELATIONS OF MAN AND THE UNIVERSE.

BY PROF. WARD.

### III.

LAMARCK seems to have been the first clearly to recognize and systematically to formulate the laws of the interdependence and mutual relations of living organisms and their surrounding influences. The latter factor he characterizes in various ways and denotes by several appropriate terms. Geoffrey St. Hilaire had used the expression *monde ambiant*, to which Lamarck adds that of *milieu* ("Philos. Zool.," i. 154), giving it a wide sense, and often qualifies it as the *milieu environnant* (ib. ii. 5, 304), thus anticipating both Comte's *milieu* ("Phil. Pos.," iii. 201) and Herbert Spencer's admirable English equivalent, "environment." But, upon the whole, Lamarck employed most frequently, as most completely conveying his idea in the greatest number of cases, the simple word *circonstances*, and the title of his famous Chapter VII. of the "Philosophie Zoologique" is as follows: "De l'influence des circonstances sur les actions et les habitudes des animaux et de celle des actions et des habitudes de ces corps vivants, comme causes qui modifient leur organization et leurs parties."

Perhaps no better word could be chosen to express the whole idea of the various mutual actions and reactions taking place between the universe and the human race—the macrocosm and the microcosm—each at times both active and passive, than this plain word of common parlance, *circumstances*.

All philosophy aims to account for phenomena. The human mind is so constituted that no power can prevent it from perpetually striving towards this end. All systems of thought naturally fall, in this respect, under two general divisions, the *teleological* and the *genetic*. The only system that even claimed to disavow both these bases is that of Comte, which in this respect must be regarded rather as a revolt against philosophy than as a system of philosophy. Under both these general divisions there have grown up numerous more special doctrines, which, each in its turn, have formed nuclei for minor systems, to which, according to the special mental proclivities of each individual, men have given in their adhesion. To the teleological division properly belong the doctrines of pure theology, or divine free-will, of predestination, and of fatalism. To this division also should be added that modern dualistic school who hold that all

phenomena are the result of unvarying laws once arbitrarily impressed upon the universe. This school, however, except in so far as the primal origin of these laws is concerned, may consistently be classed in the genetic division.

This last-named general class does not possess the number or variety of special sects found in the other, and in all their essential tenets its adherents may be regarded as practically at one. Though apparently of modern origin, the genetic school is in reality as old as the fully developed mind of man. There have always existed the two antithetical ways of looking at the world, and no age has been wholly without adherents to both of these schools. But there are reasons in the nature of things why the teleological habit of thought should, down to within a quite recent period, have maintained an overwhelming supremacy over the genetic habit of thought.

The only philosopher who seems to have clearly perceived the true nature of this fundamental antithesis and attempted a systematic analysis of the principles upon which it rests, is Immanuel Kant. In his celebrated "Antinomies" ("Kritik der reinen Vernunft," s. 304), and the profound discussion that follows them, he has laid down the foundation in psychology, where it properly belongs, for a thorough understanding of this most vital and practically important condition of human thought. His "theses" and "antitheses" differ only in the character of the examples given from the primary postulates of the modern teleologists and genetists, respectively, and his choice of terms by which to characterize the defenders of these propositions, while they are not those which either party would now select, are perhaps as little objectionable to the one as to the other of these parties.

He called the one the *dogmatic*, the other the *empirical* view of the world, but in his time and country the former of these terms had not acquired the stigma which has since been gradually fastened upon it, and meant a very different thing from that which Douglas Jerrold defined as "puppyism full grown;" while as to the latter, the practice of opposing empiricism to quantitative scientific determination has also principally grown up since his day. Still, as if somewhat unsatisfied with this word, he sometimes employs a substitute for it, and calls this mode of thought the "critical" or "sceptical" method.

In using the term "dogmatic" as applicable to the teleological school, Kant doubtless had in view the fact, so apparent to all, that it was this school that assumed to teach philosophy, being greatly in the ascendancy; and, in the words "empirical," "critical," and "sceptical," he no doubt recognized the tendency of a few minds at all times to revolt against the prevailing conceptions, examine their assumed principles, and subject them to mechanical and numerical tests, and to logical criticisms upon rational grounds. For he declares that, in favor of accepting the former, or dogmatic, view of things, there exist three principal arguments: 1, that derived from a *practical interest*, since upon it appear to rest the claims of religion and morality; 2, that derived from a *speculative interest*, since by its aid the entire field of speculation can be compassed by the mind, and the conditioned directly derived from the uncondi-

tioned ; and 3, that derived from *popularity*, since he conceived that the great majority would always be found on that side.

It is interesting and remarkable that so great a mind should have been able to find no higher motives than these upon which to base the claims of dogmatism, which meant, and still means, the acceptance of the main body of beliefs of the age. The first is of so low an order that it would seem to be beneath the dignity of a philosopher to entertain it. For what has man's practical interest to do with philosophy, with the attainment of truth in the domain of abstract thought? The argument employed by Bishop Butler,—that a particular religion should be embraced, on the sole ground, if on no other, that there could be nothing to lose and might be much to gain by so doing, while, in the failure to do so, there was nothing to gain and might be much to lose ("Analogy of Rel.," p. 274),—has been generally condemned as of a low order, in appealing to practical interest where a question of abstract truth was involved. But Bishop Butler was avowedly a sectarian writer, defending his particular religion, and such low appeals were to be expected. How, then, could Kant justify an analogous argument? As a disinterested philosopher, this would seem impossible. Yet Kant's justification, from his own peculiar point of view, though somewhat amusing, will appear to be quite satisfactory. It is this: Neither the thesis nor the antithesis of any of his antinomies is capable of proof, or rather, both are capable of formal demonstration; and, being contradictories, all argument becomes absurd. With him, the universe is a great dilemma, of which any one may take either horn with exactly equal chances of reaching the truth. He had better, therefore, of course, choose the one which is most to his interest, and this, Kant thought, was unquestionably the dogmatic.

Precisely the same might be said of his third reason for choosing that side—viz., the advantage to be derived from its greater popularity. If possible, this claim possesses a still lower moral weight than that of practical interest, of which it is, indeed, merely a temporal form. Only politicians now urge it as a means to influencing men's opinions. It certainly could never be decently put forward except in just such a case as Kant conceived this to be—a case in which it would otherwise be absolutely immaterial which side one took. The truth itself was hopelessly unattainable, and, if any ulterior consequences were, as a matter of fact, to follow either decision, one was as likely to escape them by the one course as by the other. The only guide left, therefore, was simply present advantage; and, be that the least greater on the one than on the other side, this would be sufficient to determine the decision.

Kant's second ground for accepting the thesis rather than the antithesis—viz., that of speculative interest—being highly philosophical, deserves more attention. And, logically enough, we find him enumerating, among the advantages which the mind is to derive from choosing the dogmatic side of these antinomies, that of *convenience*, or ease (*Gemachlichkeit*), and also that of *respectability*. Nothing is truer than that teleology is a relief to the overstrained intellect striving to build a universe between two infinities. It is the philosophy of the indolent brain, the *ignava ratio*, and is

thus adapted both to the childhood of the world and to all those who are weary of intellectual effort. These may be good reasons where all hope of arriving at objective truth is renounced; they could scarcely be admitted under any other circumstances. That there is any greater intrinsic dignity or nobility in a universe created by design than in one created by evolution, few men with scientific habits of thought will probably be able to admit. These qualities are not objective, but subjective. They do not belong to the world, but to those who contemplate it, and thus so much of the supposed speculative interest is relegated to the class of practical interest.

The empiricist of Kant loses all of these advantages. In embracing the antithesis, he removes the foundations of religion and morality, the latter conceived as deriving all its sanctions from authority. "If there is no primordial Being (*Urwesen*) distinct from the universe; if the universe is without a beginning, and therefore without a creator, our will not free, and the soul of the same divisibility and perishability as matter, moral ideas and principles lose all validity, and fall with the transcendental ideas which formed their theoretical support." In this passage he evidently fails to distinguish the fine shades, on the strength of which many modern scientists so stoutly reject the charge of materialism; yet he has clearly in view the stern mechanical connection between phenomena which constitutes the basis of the causal philosophy of science.

To those who would disdain material things as unworthy, it has been well replied that "we know no more essentially what matter is than what mind is" (Dr. Henry Maudsley, *Fort. Rev.*, Aug., 1879, p. 249). It may be added that, so far as the mind or soul is concerned, there are two widely different classes of materialists, whose views are perhaps more completely distinct than those of either are from those of avowed spiritualists. The one class regard the soul, or mind, as a material substance, differing from other material things only as these differ from one another. Or, if they deny that this spiritual entity is just the kind of matter of which the visible objects around us are composed, they still maintain its materiality as constituting it a substance independent of other substances—a real thing.

The other class, who have also been called materialists, do not regard the mind, or spirit, as in itself anything at all. They maintain that it is simply a property of a certain specialized kind of matter,—a mode of manifestation possessed by that organized substance called brain, or nerve-substance. Nothing could be more *immaterial* than this conception of mind, while in purity and delicacy it certainly occupies a much higher rank than either the idea of actual materiality, already described, or that of spirituality, whatever that term may mean, which also attributes to it identity and independence.

#### IV.

EMPIRICISM, thus defined, is not, however, entirely without its advantages. It, too, possesses a certain speculative interest, in defining which Kant still more clearly shows that he was contemplating that same universal antithesis in the human mind which

concerns us here. "Empiricism," says he, "affords advantages to the speculative interest of the reason, which are very fascinating, and far exceed those which the dogmatic teacher of rational ideas can promise. In the former, the intellect is always on its own peculiar ground, viz., the field of mere possible experience, whose laws it can trace back, and by means of which it can expand its own certain and comprehensible knowledge without end. . . . The empiricist will never allow any epoch of nature to be assumed as the absolutely first, or any limit of his outlook into the surrounding world to be regarded as the outermost, or any of the objects of nature which he can resolve by mathematics or by observation and bring synthetically under his contemplation (*Anschauung*)—the extended—to pass over to those which neither sense nor imagination can ever represent in *concreto*—the simple." Surely his "empiricist" is here none other than a modern geneticist, evolutionist, or scientist.

Even admitting all that Kant maintains for and against the two opposing views, it may still be a question whether the manly independence necessary to the empiricist would not be preferable to the idle respectability characteristic of the dogmatist.

Still better to illustrate the two antagonistic phases of thought, Kant asserts that they embody the contrast between Platonism and Epicureanism. Whether the teleologists can fairly regard Plato as the founder, or first great representative of their views in philosophy may, it is true, be open to some question, but that Epicurus foreshadowed, as faithfully as could be expected from the state of knowledge in his time, the teachings of modern science and the principles of the evolutionary, causal, or genetic school, cannot be candidly denied. And, if his sect did nothing else, they clearly proved that this apparent question of opinion really has a psychological basis, and exists deep in the constitution of the human mind, more or less independently of the state of knowledge in the world. There always have existed a few minds unwilling to accept the dogmatism of the mass. There always crops out in society a more or less pronounced manifestation of rationalism as opposed to authority. While this class of views finds few open advocates, it always finds many tacit adherents, and, when uttered, a large but usually irresponsible following. Criticism of received beliefs is always sweet to a considerable number who rejoice at the overthrow of the leaders of opinion or the fall of paragons of morality. And this it is which often renders the peace of society insecure. The established code of morals is dimly felt by the lower classes to be, in some respects, radically unsound. The broad contrast between men's nominal beliefs, as spoken, and their real beliefs, as acted, is apparent even to children. The standard of conduct is so much higher than that which the controllers of conduct can themselves line up to, resulting always in the punishment of the weak and the poor for the same transgressions as are daily committed with impunity by the rich and influential, that the lowest miscreant feels that there is some fundamental wrong underlying the entire social fabric, although he can not tell what it is. All this must be regarded as the legitimate consequence of the undue supremacy of dogmatic ideas and teleological conceptions in society. So far from favoring moral-

ity, they are the direct cause of the most dangerous form of immorality, viz., a mutinous revolt against too severe and unnatural moral restraints. Rules of conduct based on these conceptions are necessarily arbitrary, while the normal intellect naturally asks a reason for its obedience.

But the worst criticism which Kant's doctrines admit is that directed against his antinomies themselves. It is not true that both sides of this question admit of equal proofs and disproofs. Disregarding Kant's logical demonstrations as worthless, at his own showing, since they reduce the argument on either side to an absurdity, and appealing to the inductive method, which, without claiming infallibility, has wrought such mighty results for man, we may with safety maintain that the side of these questions which Kant calls the empirical has gained upon that which he calls the dogmatic in about the same proportion as the knowledge of the nature of things has increased in the world. The spirit of opposition to teleology could make no headway so long as so little was known of natural processes. Lucretius might write "*De Rerum Natura*," but what he could say that was true must go unsupported by facts and be discredited while much that he must say that was false would be disproved and throw still greater discredit upon his system. In such a state of profound ignorance of the universe, teleological explanations were the only ones that the world would accept. They could be understood; genetic explanations could not. Appearances were all on one side. The deeper truths could not be seen nor realized.

The greatest paradox which nature presents is that of *adaptation*. The word itself contains an ambiguity. It has both an active and a middle or reflective sense. The former is teleological, the latter genetic. Adaptation, in a purely passive sense, is admitted by all. No one doubts that there exists a great amount of correspondence between apparently very distinct objects. It is evident that they have, in some way, been made to correspond. The vital question is, How and by what power have they been so made? The teleologist says, By a power from without—by design. The causationist says, By a power from within—by adaptation. Just here is the grand schism.

As showing how nearly all facts admit of both a teleological and a genetic explanation, and puzzle the world, witness those which hasten maturity and fecundity. When a plant is bruised near the root or deprived of fertile earth and moisture, it blooms prematurely, and hastens to perfect its fruit. The teleologist says it is warned that it must soon die, and enjoined not to fail to leave a posterity; hence its haste. The evolutionist says that the secondary function, reproduction, is accelerated because not so strongly antagonized by the primary function, nutrition. In either case, the optimist may claim a special adaptation. The genetist shows that the result is a necessary consequence of the given conditions.

It is easy to see, too, why the teleologists should at first acquire, and for a long period maintain, a supremacy. The teleological answer to any question requires comparatively little intellectual effort. It is the easiest way of explaining things, the first

explanation that suggests itself. Not only is it intrinsically more simple, but it is more in accord with human experience and the natural habit of thought. In other words, it is anthropomorphic. The mind will spontaneously explain natural phenomena in the same way that artificial phenomena are explained. A garment is adapted to the body that is to wear it. A duck's foot is adapted to the element it lives most in. The explanation of the first of these facts is known; that of the second is unknown. Why not infer it from that of the first? There exists no other *known* explanation. To sit down and evolve one of an entirely different kind is not only a laborious task, but, when announced, remains unproved until a large amount of scientific investigation shall have established a broad basis of induction.

(To be continued.)

### HOLLAND'S "LIBERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY."

FREDERIC MAY HOLLAND some years ago put Freethinkers under obligations to him by the publication of "The Rise of Intellectual Liberty," a scholarly work issued by G. P. Putnam's Sons, which has had no circulation distinctively among radicals commensurate with its value, though widely read by scholars and thinkers.

The same publishing house has just issued another work by the same author, entitled "Liberty in the Nineteenth Century."

In looking through this book of 257 pages I have been impressed very favorably by the author's wide range of thought, his independence and candor, his sympathy with the scientific *versus* the old *a priori* method of dealing with philosophical, religious, and social problems, and his freedom from a bias or partizan feeling, which so often dominates not only illiterate people but educated minds.

Mr. Holland was, in his early life, a transcendentalist. He was one of the brilliant lights of the Unitarian ministry for which he was, by literary and theological education in America and in Germany, thoroughly equipped. A master of many languages, ancient and modern, and familiar with the world's best thought, he gave promise of rising to great distinction in his profession and denomination. But he was too broad for any sect, and soon abandoned the pulpit and became an advocate, with the pen, of the most radical ideas on all religious questions.

His latest work is the result of forty years' study of the development of political and religious liberty. It is full of facts and arguments of deepest interest to all Freethinkers.

As a history and defence of Freethought during the nineteenth century the work is most valuable for the information which it contains. The various reform movements which have enlarged liberty, from the time of "Napoleon and his work," the influence of Owen and the philanthropists, of Byron and the poets, of English free trade; the revolution of 1848 and the liberation of Italy; the Garrisonian movement in the United States; mob-law; Lincoln and emancipation; Emerson and other transcendentalists; the platform *versus* the pulpit, woman's rights, Bradlaugh, Ingersoll, and other speakers; Liberal leagues and the parliament of religions, the Evolutionists—Darwin, Spencer, and the religious tendency—these are among the subjects treated in this comprehensive work.

I commend the work to the perusal of all liberal minds.

B. F. U.

## THE MILITANT ATTITUDE OF THE FRENCH CLERGY.

*(Correspondence of New York Tribune, Oct. 2, 1892.)*

THE militant attitude of the Roman Catholic clergy of France from the very outset of the Dreyfus agitation may be followed by far-reaching consequences. Not since the clerical encroachments which led to the *coup de etat* of May 16, 1877, have the French clergy taken such violent part in active politics. It will be remembered that the "Seize Mai" drove even Liberal Republicans into a persecuting mood that led to the laicizing programmes of Paul Bert and Jules Ferry, resulting in the dispersal of the religious congregations in 1880. It was then that Gambetta, as President of the Chamber, denounced clericalism as the enemy, and thereby consolidated the strength of the republic and made it impregnable. Are reprisals more drastic than those that followed the clerical conspiracy of the "Seize Mai" about to be repeated?

M. Jonnart, the influential Deputy from the Pas du Calais, a Moderate Conservative Republican and a Liberal Catholic, who occupied the portfolio of Minister of Public Works in the Casimir-Perier Ministry in 1893, has written a remarkable letter to M. Cornely, in which he points out that the Dreyfus affair has been utilized by the Clericals and monarchists solely as a pretext for making a desperate onslaught on the republic and upon all liberal institutions and ideas. M. Jonnart's words are indorsed by the *Figaro*, the *Temps*, the *Matin*, the *Siecle*, the *Aurore*, and by all the newspapers that had the courage or honesty to espouse the cause of truth and justice. Clear-headed conservative Catholics like M. Hebrard, the Editor of the *Temps*; M. De Rodays, Editor of the *Figaro*; M. Cornely and M. Jonnart, do not hesitate to declare that the open hostility of the French clergy towards the republic is such that they fear not only that there will be anti-clerical reprisals, but when these reprisals once begin they will become so vindictive that no one can say where they will end. The Radical and Socialist press already demands the expulsion of the Jesuits and all the religious congregations. The clericals utterly ignore the encyclical which Leo XIII recently addressed to the French bishops enjoining them in mild academic language to use their influence to restrain the partisan zeal of the lower clergy. This encyclical is very different from the forcible one of February 16, 1892, in which the Pope so clearly indicated to French Catholics that it was their bounden duty to accept the republic as the firmly established form of government. Both of these Papal admonitions are unheeded, and the clerical organs, more violent than ever, insist that in order to be a good Catholic one must first of all be an "anti-Dreyfusard."

The trend of opinion is that an uncompromising issue is being framed between the Gallican clergy and the republic. A glance at the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church in France during the Dreyfus agitation may be of interest in view of coming events. During the last five years the religious



congregations, which were dispersed in 1880, have re-established themselves, and, adroitly profiting by their former experience, have more than regained their former power. This is especially so with the Jesuits and the Assumptionists of Paris. It is the Assumptionists who have their headquarters in the Rue Francois Premier, and who began the fierce propaganda against Dreyfus. Under the leadership of Fathers Picard and Bailly, who threw themselves into the movement with an impassioned conviction worthy of Peter the Hermit, the Assumptionist newspaper, the *Croix*, was converted into an effective instrument to attain their ends.

The *Croix* was founded twenty-six years ago. Although rarely seen outside of France, it has an enormous influence with French Catholics. The subscription lists opened in its columns for the dome of the Church of the Sacred Heart at Montmartre speedily reached the sum of nearly \$200,000. Its Paris edition is estimated to have a circulation of three hundred thousand. There are over sixty subsidiary *Croix* throughout the country districts. There is a *Croix de Rennes*, the *Croix d'Auvergne*, the *Croix de Bordeaux*, and there are *Croix* in every department and important town of France. All these *Croix* have the same general appearance. In the left hand upper corner there is a large figure of the Crucifixion, with the motto, "Adveniat Regnum Tuum." There is a prominent rubric, entitled "Le Courrier Militaire," in which purely military topics are treated, and in which answers are given to all sorts of queries from soldiers relating to their comfort and welfare in barracks or elsewhere. *La Croix* has a large circulation in the army, and it is distributed to the soldiers gratuitously. The price of the paper, which usually consists of eight pages, is one cent. It was in the *Croix* that the subscription was started to commemorate the memory of the late Colonel Henry, the forger. The *Croix* on September 12 contained the following editorial reference to the Rennes verdict: "Justice has been done, Dreyfus has been condemned! . . . As Frenchmen we rejoice over it! As Catholics we praise God for it!"

When Dreyfus was pardoned the *Croix* published the following explanation in large characters: "The Dreyfusards were themselves astonished at the haste with which President Loubet signed the pardon. Many of them counted upon another trial, from which they anticipated an acquittal. They were forced to abandon this project under the threat of the production of a photograph of the original bordereau upon which was an annotation in the German Emperor's handwriting, of which the following copy is certified as absolutely authentic: "Send me as soon as possible the documents mentioned. See to it that that canaille Dreyfus hurries up.—Wilhelm."

The *Croix* of September 23 published telegrams from Cannes announcing that Dreyfus had "passed through the railway station there on his way to Monaco, where he would pass the winter." As it is a matter of common notoriety that Dreyfus is with his family at Carpentras, the only inference is that this false news was published to prejudice the public against Dreyfus, whom it usually refers to as "that traitor." It must be remembered that the *Croix* is the most popular and widely read religious organ in France. It

enjoys the highest ecclesiastical patronage, and has done more than any other instrument to poison the public conscience in regard to Dreyfus, as may be readily imagined from the instances already cited.

The violent reprisals demanded against the Roman Catholic clergy by the Radicals and Socialists, by men like Clemenceau, Jean Jaures, Yves Guyot and Pressense, may be here passed over in silence. But it is now the Moderate Conservative Republicans, who are themselves liberal Catholics, who accuse the leaders of the Roman Catholic Church in France of identifying the cause of religion with that of perjured generals and forgers, and who charge most shameless falsehood to attain their ends. M. Jonnart's letter to M. Cornely, which appeared on the front pages of the *Figaro*, the *Temps*, the *Matin* and other Republican papers with strong editorial commendation, is producing an effect which recalls that of Gambetta's memorable declaration from the tribune: "Le Clericalisme, voila l'ennemi!"

C. I. Z.

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### THE "CHRIST" OF JOSEPHUS.

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THE Rev. S. Baring-Gould, author of many religious and historical works, says:

"It is somewhat remarkable that no contemporary or even early account of our Lord exists, except from the pens of Christian writers."

This is the first sentence in his "Lost and Hostile Gospels," 1874. On page 3, after quoting the celebrated passage in the "Jewish Antiquities" about Jesus who "was (the) Christ," he says:

"That this passage is spurious has been almost universally acknowledged."

But Josephus recognized another "Christ." In his "Jewish War," Book 6, chapter 5, section 4, he says that the prediction in the sacred writings of the Jews concerning a governor of the habitable earth was fulfilled when Titus took Jerusalem. "The Jews," he says, "took this prediction to belong to themselves in particular, and many of the wise men were thereby deceived in their determination." And then he adds: "Now this oracle certainly denoted Vespasian, who was appointed emperor of Judea." In other words, Vespasian was the promised Meshiach, the Christos, the anointed, the "Christ."

Josephus appears to have been a renegade Jew, and Prof. Edwin Johnson maintains that he did not live in the first century, but some time after the revival of learning; that he was an apostate Jew who aided the Basilian or Benedictine monks in the fabrication of Christian literature.

*Truth Seeker.*

ANTICHRIST.

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Who on earth at the present day would pretend to settle any scientific question by a text from the Bible?—Ingersoll.

## KRUGER'S DREAM.

—O—  
BY G. W. FOOTE, EDITOR "FREETHINKER," LONDON, ENG.  
—O—

ACCORDING to the *Daily News* war correspondent's report of the battle of Eland's Laagte, there was a very curious item among the "spoil" taken by the 5th Lancers. It was a flag with an Orange emblem of the United States of South Africa. Now, this bit of news—though, of course, we cannot vouch for its truth—suggests to us the following article, which may interest a great many of our readers, if not all of them, in the present critical state of affairs.

We desire to say, at the outset, that it is far from our intention to join in the passionate struggle of party politics, especially in regard to questions of foreign policy. Experience and reading have shown us that the difference between Liberals and Conservatives, with respect to the government and extension of the British Empire, is mostly fantastic and insincere. The point of view of either party depends chiefly on whether it is in office or in opposition. Mr. Gladstone, it is true, conceded independence to the Transvaal after our defeat at Majuba Hill; but the same Mr. Gladstone bombarded Alexandria, occupied Egypt, and watered the Soudan desert with the blood of men "rightly struggling to be free." Had the present struggle in South Africa arisen while the Liberals were in power, it would probably have been dealt with in very much the same fashion. The language of diplomacy might have been somewhat different, there might have been more rather than less verbal hypocrisy, but all this would not have affected the final and substantial result. The fact is, if you will have an empire you must be imperial. We can understand and respect the ideal of those who maintain that England should be self-contained and have no empire at all; we can understand and respect the ideal of those who maintain that the extension of the British Empire is a great factor in the world's civilization; but we cannot understand or respect the ideal—if it may be so called—of those who want the British Empire maintained, but also want it maintained without soldiers and without fighting; and we simply despise those politicians who say, for instance, that it is right for us to maintain our hold on India at any cost, but who are always found on the side of every power, big or little, with which we happen to be disputing. We like logic and consistency, and we dislike men who try to take credit for both of two opposite principles.

We also desire to say that we protested, many weeks ago, in the *Freethinker*, against the frightful crime of an avoidable war. No doubt a very wise and honest diplomacy on both sides would have prevented the present bloody strife. But as the world goes such diplomacy would be phenomenal. What is talked about is too often not the actual object of concern. Negotiation is too apt to be insincere, moving on the surface of things, and concealing or disguising the real causes of difference. Sometimes it is felt

all along to be no more than the preliminary to a duel, as in the case of the correspondence between America and Spain over the question of Cuba; and sometimes, when it is not so felt, it sooner or later discloses an irreconcilable antagonism of interest and intention; and then, unless arbitration is resorted to, the almost inevitable result is war. For our part, we are most strongly in favor of arbitration. We believe it is the only means of bringing war to an end. But nations are not yet civilized enough to submit to arbitration, or even to invite it, when their passions are excited, or when the advantages in the struggle are very largely in their favor. Arbitration will have to grow by degrees. It will have to settle small disputes first, larger ones afterwards, and the largest last of all. That will be just prior to the millennium.

Meanwhile, it is of no use to say that England is the worst sinner, because she declines arbitration so soon after the Czar's Love Feast. America would not arbitrate over the Philippines affair, France would laugh at arbitration if she saw a chance of getting back Alsace-Lorraine, Germany would not arbitrate her least little quarrel with China, and assuredly Russia would scorn the idea of arbitration if she wished to carve another slice out of the Celestial Empire, or to make a descent upon Persia or Afghanistan. It is useless to blink the truth. The world all round is but superficially civilized. There is a thin veneer of civilization—rather of manners than of conduct; and beneath it is the solid old bulk of inherited savagery. Those who desire the reign of peace on earth must trust to time, to the spread of liberal ideas, to the growth of commerce and other forms of international communication, to the slow development of culture, and, above all (as we think), to the decline of supernaturalism and its gradual supersession by Science and Humanity.

Many Liberals, most of the Radicals, and all of the Socialists, devote a large part of their time and energy to denouncing Mr. Chamberlain. This illustrates the personal method of political controversy. Mr. Chamberlain is not Prime Minister. He is not the whole Cabinet. He has not been acting alone. It is monstrous to suppose he has been allowed to play the game "off his own bat." He has certainly been acting in concert with the rest of the Ministry. He is supported by them in both houses of Parliament. One would imagine, from the way in which some people talk and write, that he held Lord Salisbury and all his other colleagues in the hollow of his hands. This is sheer absurdity. Mr. Chamberlain's diplomacy is the diplomacy of the Tory Government. We think it, therefore, a waste of time and temper to vivisect the Colonial Secretary. Not that we ever had much admiration for him, even in his Radical days, as an English statesman. Whatever his motives were, and whether it was by design or accident, he did the country a real service in helping to defeat Mr. Gladstone's first crude Home Rule Bill, which combined the disadvantages of nearly every conceivable way of settling the Irish problem. We said so at the time, and we are not aware that we have ever been grateful to Mr. Chamberlain since. But it is nonsense to assert that this is *his* war in South Africa. He is not great enough, to begin with, to make a war on his own account. The war is explained by the situation of

affairs, by the history of the past twenty years, by the clash of interests, and by the temper of both parties to the quarrel.

It is not our intention to go through the whole history of the Transvaal during the past twenty-three years. Still, we shall go back to 1877-8, in justice to England, which has no doubt often acted wrongly, but not quite as wrongly, perhaps, as some of her severest critics represent. The annexation of the Transvaal by Sir Theophilus Shepstone was done without the firing of a shot. The country was in a terrible state of disorganization; the Treasury was empty, except for the sum of 12s. 6d.; the Government £1 bluebacks were selling at 1s., and the salaries of civil servants were all in arrears; and, what was still worse, the Transvaal was menaced by two powerful native chiefs, one of whom, the famous Cetewayo, commanded at least 30,000 warriors. Well, the British government took over the country, paid its debts, laid the foundation of its prosperity, and, at the cost of much money and many lives, broke the power of Cetewayo and Secocoeni—not the least assistance being rendered by the Boers in the warfare, although it is quite certain that Cetewayo, at any rate, simply wanted to fight *them*, and had no sort of quarrel with the British, except on account of their interference. In one sense, of course, the annexation of the Transvaal was a political crime; but, in another sense, it was just the kind of thing that expanding empires have always been doing, and have often had to do. At any rate, it seems to have saved the country from anarchy, and it was largely acquiesced in by even the official Boers. Joubert protested and threw up his post, but Kruger accepted office under the British occupation, and only resigned at last because he was refused an increase of salary. When the Boers rebelled, as they had a perfect right to, they began by what was very much like an act of treachery. Then they invaded Natal, precisely as they have done recently, so that this policy of theirs is an old one. They defeated Sir George Colley at Laing's Nek, Ingogo, and Majuba. This General was not a great commander, but he had very few men; even at Majuba his force only numbered 554 soldiers. It was therefore by no means a big battle. Lord Rosebery has called it merely a skirmish. Nor did it end the war, as is often supposed. Sir Evelyn Wood came up with much larger forces, and Sir Frederick Roberts was soon after these at the head of 10,000 men. It was Mr. Gladstone who ended the war. Not another blow was struck after Majuba. An armistice was arranged, and the Transvaal was given back to the Boers by the Treaty of 1881. Mr. Gladstone, in the opinion of his friends, acted magnanimously; in the opinion of his enemies he acted with pusillanimity. Probably his motives were mixed. But, in any case, the settlement was wise and just in the circumstances. It was not given to Mr. Gladstone to be a prophet. He could not foresee that the situation contained the secret germs of future trouble. No one knew that the Boers would henceforth look upon the Britishers as weak and contemptible. No one knew that the hidden gold and diamonds in the Transvaal would attract crowds of immigrants, until at length the Boers would be largely outnumbered by the Outlanders—that is, the "foreign" white population.

The Boer victories over the small forces under Sir George Colley seem to have filled them with a lasting sense of their military prowess. They appear to have felt ever since that they could beat British soldiers at any time they chose. President Kruger, unless he is much belied, has often expressed his contempt for our "army," upon which word he has been accustomed to lay a scornful emphasis. And this feeling was intensified by the easy capture of Dr. Jameson's raiders. This was as much a "fluke" as the older victories. But the Boers did not look at it in that light; as they saw it, it confirmed their view of their own invincibility. Moreover, they are extremely pious folk. Their one book is the Bible, and they read it attentively. Like our own Puritan forefathers, they are fonder of the Old Testament than of the New Testament. They devoutly believe in Providence. They see the finger of God in public events; and, like all superstitionists, they see it most clearly when the events tend to their interest and flatter their vanity. No doubt the great majority of them—simple, Bible-reading farmers, dwelling in isolation—really accept the religious ideals of President Kruger's speeches, and imagine themselves to be favored and protected by the God who made the ancient Jews his chosen people, and confirmed them in their occupation of the land of Canaan.

President Kruger is probably quite pious himself. But a long official life must have qualified his piety to a certain extent. He has been President of the Transvaal ever since 1882. No one has been able to oust him. He is a striking personality, but he has had to practise the arts of the politician. We see no reason in the nature of things why the common laws of political action, and the common motives of political ambition, should not obtain in the Transvaal as they obtain (for instance) in England. We believe it is a profound mistake to regard President Kruger as a plain, unsophisticated, pious Dutchman, whose sole object is to govern a community of poor farmers and to keep them from being swamped by outsiders. Small as is the Transvaal population, his post is worth £7,000 a year—that is, £2,000 more than the salary of the Prime Minister of the greatest empire in the world. The Secret Service Money of the Transvaal may be all honestly spent, but it is nearly double the Secret Service Money of the British Empire, and must necessarily offer great temptations to those who administer it. Bear in mind, too, that the Salary List of the Transvaal government, according to the 1889 Budget, is no less than £1,216,394. Mr. J. P. Fitzpatrick, in his extremely able and interesting book, "The Transvaal From Within," calculates that this sum amounts to £40 per annum for the total male Boer population. Fancy a government whose officials receive salaries equal in the gross to a contribution of £40 by every male in the country! Evidently the Boer officials are standing up for something besides their country's independence. The fact is, the Boer officials receive this money, but it is not paid by the Boer farmers. It is paid, for the most part, by the Outlanders. Their industry supplies the means for paying these salaries, for buying guns, rifles and ammunition, for building fortifications, for carrying on negotiations with European powers, and for subventioning European organs of "public opinion." President

Kruger's budget last year showed an income of £4,087,852. When the Boer Government began it had an income of £33,442. What an amazing difference! Now that four millions is not spent on the Outlanders, from whom it is principally raised. President Kruger has even refused to pay out of that money for their children's education, although he pays readily enough out of it for the education of the Boer children. The money is chiefly used for purely Boer purposes. And it is a colossal sum for the government of such a small population. In the nature of things it could hardly help producing some kind of mischief. But the chief mischief—that is, from the British point of view—is that these tremendous resources have ministered to what we call President Kruger's dream. And what that is we shall now try to show.

A few words will be necessary about the man Paul Kruger. Friend and foe alike agree that he is a strong man, gifted with great patience, tenacity, and courage. It would be too much to say that he possesses the higher intellectual endowments, but few men are his match in shrewdness and cunning. What we wish to convey is, that Paul Kruger is in our opinion a past-master in the game of politics. He is simply wonderful in shifts and wiles. The way in which he has kept his seat all these years, and got the better of almost everybody who has crossed his path or plans, is really amazing. He seems to have the art of deceiving without exactly telling lies, of making promises which he does not intend to keep in the spirit, and of qualifying every offer with conditions that are by-and-by found to render it valueless. To the impartial student of finesse there is something infinitely engaging in the history of Paul Kruger's dealings with the leaders of the Reform movement among the Outlanders, and even with British diplomatists. But obviously such a character has its weak side. It is ultimately powerless against an adversary who is bent upon bringing things to a crisis, and has the strength and determination to face the worst issue.

Let us pause to consider the view of Paul Kruger taken by Mr. Fitzpatrick, who was secretary of the Reform movement in Johannesburg, and whose book, "The Transvaal From Within," as far as its facts and figures go, was none too highly praised by Lord Rosebery. Taking all things into account, it can hardly be said that Mr. Fitzpatrick's picture of the head of the Transvaal is drawn with bitterness, or even with unfriendliness:

"In the history of South Africa the figure of the grim old President will loom large and striking—picturesque, as the figure of one who by his character and will made and held his people; magnificent, as one who in the face of the blackest fortune never wavered from his aim or faltered in his effort; who, with a courage that seemed, and still seems, fatuous, but which may well be called heroic, stood up against the might of the greatest empire in the world. And, it may be, pathetic too, as one whose limitations were great: one whose training and associations—whose very successes—had narrowed, and embittered, and hardened him; as one who, when the greatness of success was his to take and hold, turned his back on the supreme opportunity, and used his strength and qualities to fight against the

spirit of progress, and all that the enlightenment of the age pronounces to be fitting and necessary to good government and a healthy State."

Here is another striking passage from Mr. Fitzpatrick :

"President Kruger does something more than represent the opinion of the people and execute their policy ; he moulds them in the form he wills. By the force of his own strong convictions and prejudices, and of his indomitable will, he has made the Boers a people whom he regards as the germ of the Africander nation : a people chastened, selected, welded, and strong enough to attract and assimilate all their kindred in South Africa, and then to realize the dream of a Dutch Republic from the Zambesi to Capetown."

This is a great and splendid dream, and we cannot think the worse of President Kruger for cherishing it, however it conflicts with the other dream of a great British empire in South Africa. He is not to be blamed for being a Dutchman and preferring his own race to ours. We may have a right to our own ambitions, but we have no right to dictate his ; nor is it conceivably his duty to further our ends at the expense of his own. Both sides have an equal right in the eye of impartial justice. But in the very nature of the case these rival ambitions were bound to end in open hostility.

But is it a fact, the reader may ask, that President Kruger has cherished this dream ? Well, we think the facts tend to prove the affirmative. We do not wish to dogmatize upon the subject. We are quite prepared to hear our own opinion controverted. All we shall protest against is the partisan spirit which seeks to denounce and suppress free discussion in the interest of ready-made conclusions.

It is a general impression among one school of politicians in England that President Kruger's exclusive policy and military preparations date from the Jameson raid—a mad and criminal act, which entailed altogether incalculable trouble, bitterness, and eventual bloodshed. But the truth, as far as we can ascertain it, is that President Kruger's policy has been one and the same ever since he was first elected President in 1882. His visit to London to negotiate the Convention of 1884 was a bold and masterly stroke, although we do not agree with him that this Convention abolished the suzerainty expressed in the Preamble of the Treaty of 1881. The Articles alone were altered ; and there was no necessity to repeat the Preamble.

Then, with regard to the Franchise, it is simply not true that the Jameson raid nipped President Kruger's reforming tendencies in the bud. Directly after the Treaty of 1881, in spite of the verbal assurances given to Sir Evelyn Wood, the Franchise was narrowed ; it was narrowed again and again, until the Dutch were put in full possession of political power, and the Outlanders, especially the British, were put in the position of political helots ; and, by arranging that children born in the Transvaal should take the political status of their parents, the next generation was also cut off from participation in the rights of citizenship. Even when a Municipality was granted to Johannesburg, it was so devised that the Boers, who numbered about one-tenth of the population, held the preponderance of power. One of the two representatives of



each ward had to be a burgher ; two of the wards were entirely in the hands of the Boers ; and the Burgomaster was appointed by the Government with a right of veto. President Kruger made many promises with respect to the Franchise, but he never kept them. The Jameson raid was not the *cause* of the exclusiveness ; it was one of the *symptoms* of what the Outlanders regarded as an intolerable condition of things.

Look next at the Education question. Even as late as the end of 1896, while the sum spent on Dutch schools was £63,000, the sum spent on Outlander schools was only £650, the conditions being such that no more could be obtained. President Kruger's policy was to keep everything he could for his own race, and when the Boers were inadequate to supply the *personnel* of his government he imported Dutchmen from Holland. We do not believe he ever meant to give the franchise to the Outlanders. To do so would have been to sound the death-knell of absolute Dutch supremacy. It was nothing to him that the Dutch enjoyed equal rights with the English in Cape Colony and Natal. He meant to maintain the Boer oligarchy. No doubt the Jameson raid gave him a fine opportunity in this direction. President Kruger's enemies were all put in the wrong, and had to sing small. The Johannesburg reformers were all muzzled. The right of public meeting was practically suppressed. But the Outlanders' industry contributed more and more funds to the Transvaal exchequer, and the President went on arming his own people to the teeth. There seems no room to doubt that he was preparing for war. A series of military flukes, though he did not see them in that light, had led him to despise the British soldiers and regard them as an easy prey. When he launched his ultimatum at the British government he was ready, and the Orange Free State was ready, and they expected to win by swamping Natal before the British reinforcements could arrive. It was grandiose, but it was fatuous. President Kruger would probably have done much better if he had remained strictly on the defensive. By assuming the aggressive he has played his last big trump, and it seems likely to be taken. If he is beaten, and no other end seems possible, he will have to pay the penalty. What that will be we do not pretend to say. But we venture to hope that the victor in this struggle will not forget justice and mercy ; and also that the settlement after the war will secure equality for Dutch and English throughout the whole of South Africa.

## CONFUCIUS AND HIS TEACHINGS.

BY MAJOR-GEN. J. G. R. FORLONG, F.R.S.E., F.R.A.S., ETC.

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### III.

LAO-TSZE, on the other hand, positing like Westerns, a Tāo, Shang Ti, and Ti-s, the Hindu Vedāntist's Brāhm and Brahṁā and minor spirits, insisted that man can only be regenerated by belief in and communion with divinity, and must first seek and find this if he would be finally absorbed in Tāo or "God the Absolute"—an annihilation theory which Confucius described as "a flight into boundless space!"

Frequently Confucius shows that he never quite overcame the influences of his heredity and surroundings, alike in regard to gods or spirits and the powers of "Diviners." He often strives, however, to explain away the occult, as when Mencius, in "The Chung Yung" classic ("Doctrine of the Mean") shows him explaining the phrase of "gods revealing themselves to us," i.e., "Divine Inspiration," by which he meant those feelings which led us to worship and perform the sacred duties of purification and sacrifice. In this light the gods, though possibly everywhere, are hidden and not to be depended on; hence do statesmen exclaim: "Trust God but maintain strong battalions"; but Confucius said: "Trust not in any arm of flesh, but fast and be moderate in all things if thou wouldst prepare thyself for any duties, sacred rites or studies." His highest and constant advice was, "Be virtuous and pure of heart"; and this, rather than theology, is the theme and purport of his great classics, and especially of "The Golden Mean."

Yet in spite of his plain, stolid and practical Agnosticism, Confucius occasionally speaks with deference of the all-prevailing belief in deities and divination. But whatever may have been his inner thoughts concerning these or a Supreme Intelligence, he clearly felt it to be the duty of a leading teacher of masses of busy ignorant men and women, to put aside these speculative fancies they were so prone to. Thus he often counseled his disciples that it ill became the learned to add the great weight of their opinion in favor of any views or doctrines concerning matters which, as cultured men, they could not substantiate, especially theories postulating ex-mundane souls, spirits, heavens and hells. "When we are not cognizant of the facts and fully assured thereof," he used to urge, "let us be silent, and tell the busy multitudes not to waste their substance, abilities and time on what is very doubtful and dark, but to study Nature's Laws and Order, which are clear, divine and universal, and live in accordance therewith."

Only a brave and very sanguine spirit could hope that wise, but to the masses cold, unemotional Agnosticism, would make a successful stand against the many warm,

responsive religious rites and systems of the poor and ignorant Chinese of the 5th and 6th centuries B.C. Like ourselves, they diligently in private and public practised ancient and well defined rites and ceremonies, which comforted them in troubles and sorrows; rites and duties which their pious ancestors had severely enjoined, and which had an assured commercial value to themselves, their priests, and all purveyors of temple and funereal services.

As a wise, kindly, and manly teacher, Confucius held that we should live in the world and take our part in all apparently beneficial social and public intercourse; a line of conduct which he frequently laid down with great minuteness, and on which he based alike political, social and individual morality. He considered the parent and family the base of the national superstructure, which led up, he said, to the monarch, "the father of his people," and to all the virtues, which were thus capped with loyalty and patriotism.

Unless, he said, we carefully attend to the instruction of the young, the state can neither be orderly nor healthy; therefore the wise must set a good example in public and private life, and insist on rectitude and good government on the part of ruler and ruled. "We must all," he said, "give ourselves up earnestly to the duties due to our fellows, and respect their religious customs or spiritual leanings; but," he added, "let us keep ourselves apart from these last, and curb rather than encourage speculative or pious theories concerning gods and spirits, good and bad, and the origin and end of all things." He humbly thought he was "part of a stupendous mechanism not given to man to understand," but which might be indefinitely called *Ti-en*, "the Heavens" or Sky-power, and all that it enshrouded or mayhap governed.

With these practical views of life, thought and conduct, Kung-fu and Lāo necessarily and seriously differed. The strong, reasonable common-sense of the younger rebelled though he spoke not, against the reign of sentiment and spiritualism in the dominions of ethics and government of men and women.

He reproved Lāo-tsze and his disciples for teaching that "injury should be recompensed with kindness," saying it was only fitting to "recompense injury by justice. . . . that kindness should only be the reward of kindness." He condemned the idea of turning his cheek to the smiter or giving his cloak to a thief; believing as a statesman and legislator that such doctrines must be suppressed as hurtful to society and general civilization: Of Gotama, Confucius could scarcely have heard, though the wise teachings of previous Jaina Bodhists had permeated all central Asia, including upper India, ages earlier, and true Buddhism was in the air. This accounts for the Chinese statements that "*The Buddha*" lived about 1000 B.C., yet he never left India and was rather a contemporary of Puthagoras the Butha-guru of the West, who travelled about the East, circa 540, but Gotama said that three previous Buddhas taught as he taught. Cf. "Ben. As. J.," I, 2, 1882 and Mr. C. S. Das' "Buddhism in China."

Lāo-tsze's mystical doctrines regarding souls, spirits, or ghosts apart from matter, had long before this been the teachings of Drāvido Jains, Brāhmins, and Vedāntists.

They believed in "an ever-present eternal divine Essence," through which men, especially Yogis and other ascetics, could hold communion with gods and spirits, and learn how to please and propitiate them with rites, prayers and sacrifices. Earlier still, say 1200 to 1700 B.C., Mazdean spiritualists had been urging the same from the plains of the Oxus to the Mediterranean, and teaching the far older Soteriology of Turano-Akkadians regarding their Apollonic Savior and Redeemer—Silik-mulu-khi—the Sâôsh-yant or "Holy and Strong" of Irânians, at whose coming hell and the devil are to be destroyed. Zoroaster, we may believe, combatted such mythologies, which were noxious though natural growths of his own teaching of the sinfulness of the heart and man's need of heavenly assistance.

The pious Buddha had long emancipated himself from the thralldom of Vedas and other mythologies, and had done for upper India, about 500 B.C., what the teaching of Confucius accomplished later in upper China. Both the great men moved on the same philosophic plane, urging their followers to work out their salvation not "with *fear* and trembling," but *fearlessly*, earnestly, thoughtfully, and diligently. They and all great teachers were called infidels and atheists, not excepting Jesus and Mahamad, but the philosophers held on their way with a refreshing faith in the ultimate rise of their people which 2300 years have justified, for slow but sure of foot is the march of truth and morals.

In both cases the faiths degenerated like all religions from the purity of the first principles of the founders; taking up, according to their idiosyncrasies, the coarse superstitions among which they grew; but to both, the world is enormously indebted, and the civilized West even now is building up on their foundations an eclectic religion or reverent system of ethics.

#### IV.

REV. DR EDKINS wrote in 1884 ("Chinese Budd.," p. 152): "The virtues of the Chinese are due to the Confucian system . . . The far-travelled Buddhism has reached China in a very corrupt and idolatrous condition, giving to the Confucianist false views . . . and omitting many of the best doctrines and practices of Gotama. Buddhism is therefore in China a feeble faith than that of the Confucian, but . . . the educated Chinese know that the popular Buddhism was not the teaching of either Gotama or his disciples . . . They neither permitted image worship nor the taking of money, and especially not as a protection against demons or on the groundless tales of future bliss"—matters regarding which they openly professed ignorance.

Confucianism has suffered in a less degree, but the life of the sage is encrusted with miracles and legends utterly foreign to his nature and teachings. His coming is said to have been long foretold by prophets and holy men, and it is believed his mother conceived him through the afflatus of the Supreme God. East and West loved and varied these legends of births and childhood. None cared to deny them, and for centuries they were accepted in faith; to deny them was to incur social ostracism, if not death; so the birth of Confucius was said to have been heralded by many strange

portents and miraculous appearances. Heavenly messengers announced to Ching-tzai the honor that was in store for her, divine hosts attended the nativity, etc.

Kings and courts seem to have been always anxious to have Confucius near to them, although he boldly inveighed against every form of corruption and tyranny, insisting that the king as chief ruler and all the magistrates were but the chief servants and guardians of the people. He said to these as well as to merchants: "Let justice be your profit. In a kingdom, gain is not to be considered as gain. The true gain will be found in justice. Let it be the aim of all to do justly, and to regard this as prosperity"—words which he attributed to a forefather.

He was as loyal as he was conservative, urging that "tyranny and crime were a breaking away from the good traditions of the past, which made the king 'the father of the people';" therefore did the sage make it *the* business of his life to collect, collate, translate and edit all the teachings to be found in ancient history, in poetry, art, rituals and ceremonies, and the examples and sayings of the great kings and sages of antiquity. He traced these back to the "Chronicles of Yâu and Shun," of 2356-2205 B.C.; in the Hsia dynasty, 2205-1766; in the Shang or Yin dynasty, to 1122, and finally to the Châu dynasty and the sage's own times. He strove to perpetuate all the good he could find scattered through these eighteen-and-a-half centuries, as did Ezra about a century later for his little exiled tribes. Dr. Edkins, indeed, calls Confucius "the Chinese Ezra . . . the chief guide of China in education, statesmanship, and morality, and the establisher of the canons of religion."

But Kung-fu-tsze neither wished nor tried to "establish a Religion"—a term which, if he knew, he would no doubt say meant a superstitious system of rites and worship founded more or less on fallacies. He summarized his views on what mankind required to guide them through life, and give them a right to whatever may hereafter be the lot of the good and true man in the following words, quoted in Alexander's "Confucius," p. 116:

"Nothing can be more natural or simple than the principles of morality I seek to inculcate. Neither is there anything new in my teaching. My maxims are but the outcome of the experience of the sages of old. The principles by which they were guided, and which were accepted by them all, were easily comprehended, and may be reduced to the following 'Three Fundamental Laws,' viz., those which regulate the relations between king and people, parent and child, and husband and wife. But outside, though forming part of these, stand the 'Five Cardinal Virtues':

"HUMANITY—or that sympathy which should ever exist between man and man, irrespective of class or race.

"JUSTICE—which gives to each his due without favor or affection.

"CONFORMITY—to prescribed rites and established customs, so that all may equally participate in the privileges as well as disqualifications of the social organism.

"RECTITUDE—or Righteousness: the love and desire for truth for its own sake.

"SINCERITY—i.e., integrity and veracity; open-hearted straight-forwardness, which, whether in speech or action, uses no reservations or disguises."

Confucius, however, had very different views of the sanctity of *history* from those of Ezra and other Hebrew chroniclers. He absolutely declined to chronicle what he could not prove. Rev. Prof. Legge says ("S. B. E.," iii. 14): "He refused to affirm or even relate anything for which he could not adduce some document of acknowledged authority." Even when writing his "Analects," he refused to support his views and facts by descriptions from ceremonies, etc., of the Hsia dynasty, with which he was well acquainted, because they were not sufficiently attested by descendants of this dynasty. No Hebrew Old Testament stories could have reached us through a Confucius.

The wise old sage is therefore blamed for skipping the ancient poetic *quasi*-history of his nation; yet he gives us many sweet pictures of the manners of the early time, praise of its heroes, and idyllic descriptions, lays and sonnets, showing a refined taste and love of the primitive and antiquated. His three works on ceremonies detail the laws, grades, and duties of kings, princes, officials and private individuals, and all the quaint customs of the time. His books on music—then far more advanced than those of any other nation—the names and scope of the instruments, the melodies performed at sacrificial rites, etc., are all detailed, and he was himself no mean composer and a fair musician. He says "the rites and music must be always slow and solemn, like the accompanying dance; that the object to be ever kept in view is to inspire the performers with calm, reverential feelings suitable to a holy religious service."

His "Tractate on Divinations"—a subject no Chinese historian or philosopher could avoid—was one of his last writings, and although much of it is now as frivolous to us as the magic and sorcery of our Middle Ages, which brought death and misery upon millions, yet Confucius evidently felt compelled to show what his revered "Ancient Ones" said and thought regarding the universally acknowledged "spirits of heavens, earth and ancestors." So no history of Europe would be complete which avoided our dark mediæval superstitions, and the lynching and legalized murders with unspeakable horrors—not yet two centuries old—of poor demented "witches and wizards." The Chinese sage, however, was far more in his element descanting on the good valuable moral sentiments of the ancients; and these, with his wise and kindly comments, yield us a true picture of Chinese life and thought to about as far back as B.C. 2400.

Even in his days of distress, Confucius refused all salary for teaching, and this even from Governments and princes. To these he freely gave a loyal support, but always and only in favor of justice, righteousness, and mercy; this led to courtiers telling their rulers that "he was an impracticable, conceited man, with a thousand peculiarities." He undoubtedly lived in a time ill-suited to his quiet administrative views.

As Prof. Douglas wrote, his fitting place was the Council Chamber, for "his ideas required a sustained period of peace and quiet for their development; whereas he was nurtured amid the clash of arms. He found the states administered by armed men, governors who despised his offers of peaceful services and sneered at philosophy and theories." No man, says the Professor, has been so condemned during his lifetime and so worshipped by posterity. His standard of morality was too high and his doc-

trines too pure for his times. He strove to reproduce the heroic age of Yā-ou and Shun among a contented and law-abiding people, which he was not fated to see. Yet his system, with all its incompleteness, has for 2,400 years gone far towards giving to a great and populous empire good and fixed principles, and a marvellous educational system suited to its felt wants; while his teachings and writings have nurtured, or at least set forth all that is pure and noble in public and domestic life, and in language suited to the highest as well as the meanest intellects.

*(To be continued.)*

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### CONVERTING THE JEWS.

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GIVEN an amount of intelligence no higher than can manifest itself in a species of crude cunning, or a state of honest but hopeless ignorance; given, further, a smattering of religious phrases belonging to the lower forms of evangelical Christianity—whether conviction is behind or not matters little—and there is no career under the sun that holds out so much promise to such an individual as that of a missionary. The foreign mission-field is an almost inexhaustible sphere of operations; and even the home mission-field, although necessarily circumscribed, holds out many promising openings to men of enterprise not overburdened with conscience. So long as these latter are of a generally benevolent character, aiming at reducing some of the misery that centuries of Christianity have bequeathed to us, we may, if we are charitable and gullible, put them down to mistaken benevolence. It is when we turn to purely propagandist missions that the nature of the imposture becomes clear; and of this class of missions there is none more open to criticism and censure than “The London Society for Promoting Christianity Amongst the Jews,” or, as it has been called, “The Society for Turning Bad Jews into Worse Christians.”

One surprising feature I have noticed about missions to Jews is the proportionately large number of retired army officers that support them. The London Society has no less than three out of five vice-presidents belonging to this class. A man goes to India, serves a few years in the army, returns home with a ruined liver and the effects of a sunstroke, and at once develops a passionate desire to convert the lost sheep of Israel. I remember one retired Major-General who was in the habit of attending some of my provincial meetings, and who would give me no rest until I accepted an invitation to take tea with him. After repeated refusals, I went. Woe is me! For two mortal hours I suffered a martyrdom while my goodnatured but cranky host lectured to me on the glories of Israel and its ultimate salvation in Jesus. I never before realized so thoroughly the force of Heine's remark, that “Judaism is not a religion—it is a misfortune.”

I have just finished the report of “The London Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews” for 1898-9, and I find the account of the last year's work quite in

line with the Society's previous performances. The aggregate income of the Society for the past twelve months was £37,669 4s. 7d., the expenditure £38,439 14s. 11d., leaving a deficit of £770 10s. 4d. to be added to an already standing debt of over ten thousand pounds. The two secretaries of the Society, the Rev. W. Fleming and the Rev. W. T. Gidney, share between them £833 annually, so that these two gentlemen can hardly be said to sacrifice much in laboring for the "Lord's people." In England the Society has 109 stations, and employs 51 agents, voluntary helpers not being reckoned in the report. There is a staggering list of the number of tracts, etc., distributed, the Society evidently treasuring up an exact account of all leaflets given away. In London alone 60 Bibles, 445 parts of Bibles, 417 New Testaments and 1,774 parts, with 7,130 tracts, were distributed, with what result we shall see presently. This branch of the work evidently admits of almost universal extension.

When we ask what result this distribution of literature bore in the shape of converts, the reply is somewhat discouraging. London, which takes over £3,000, £2,081 of which goes in salaries alone, does not seem to have provided a single convert. Throughout England, the Society claims to have made in twelve months twenty-eight converts. Of these twenty-eight, however, twenty turn out to be children—secured by what methods we are left uninformed—so that we may fairly put down the converts for the year at eight. Further, as four of the converts belonged to the "Operative Jewish Converts' Institution," we may not unreasonably assume that poverty had something to do with their conversion. It is, indeed, notorious that Jewish converts usually belong to the needy foreign class. The better-class Jews, better intellectually or socially, are seldom or never touched. One agent, Miss Dora Barry, confesses she has "tried to reach a Jewish family of the better class, but, though I have been again and again, I cannot gain admittance" (p. 23). Miss Barry must be a beginner, or she would be on her guard against speaking the truth in such a dangerous and un-missionarylike manner. And the Rev. S. T. Batchert, another missionary, says: "I have met on several occasions Jews of high intellectual calibre who have forsaken Judaism, not, however, to enter the Christian Church."

No, it is the needy foreigner who is captured, and the *modus operandi* is simple. In a large percentage of cases the convert is one who is well known as a professional "Schnorrer," and who has drained Jewish charitable organizations of all that they feel inclined to give. When further charity is refused, it is a common threat that they will go to the mission for help. Their next step is to get placed on the missionary's list as an "inquirer," a title that figures prominently in the reports. All the missionaries tabulate the number of "inquirers" they have, and "an inquirer" may mean anything from one who asks a question out of pure curiosity to one who is on the point of conversion. Usually these inquirers have a regular weekly allowance, and are, of course, quite willing to keep on "inquiring"—at a salary—for an indefinite period. This, however, is not allowed. After he has served the purpose of figuring in the annual report, he must either become converted or leave; and even after conversion, when he



has figured in a second annual report, he is got rid of as speedily as possible. Another plan is for a missionary, in the guise of a brother Jew, to visit a possible convert, sympathise with him upon his poverty and his ignorance of English, and then promise to find him a place where the language will be taught him and work found. He is taken to the "Operative Jewish Converts' Institution," and for the time being is set to work for a small sum weekly. But here he cannot remain for more than six months, unless he accepts Jesus. Many leave, a few remain and agree to conversion. During the time of probation, all goes well. After being baptized and ranking in the report as a convert, trouble begins. The object is to get rid of him to make room for new comers. Ultimately, in spite of an original promise that he would be employed for at least three years, the poor devil is got rid of. What becomes of him after, the society neither knows nor cares. In the majority of cases he simply rejoins a Jewish community where he is not known. Indeed, if the existence of the society depended upon the production of ten per cent. of the converts it claims to have made during the last ten years, it could not produce them. This is no idle boast, but the expression of an actual fact.

We have not yet finished with the twenty-eight converts—twenty of which are children, be it remembered—that figure in the annual report. Their appearances in the report remind one of a lightning-change artist on the stage of a music-hall. Page seven gives the twenty-eight at one sweep; page eight gives another instalment of a score; page ten gives two instalments of eleven and nine; page twelve impresses the reader with two batches of five and two respectively; and finally page twenty-one lands another instalment of four. By this method twenty-eight converts appear in the report as *sixty-nine*. The latter number is not actually named, but the report is evidently designed so as to produce that impression. Practically all the converts number, as I have said, eight, each one representing the work of six missionaries for twelve months and an expenditure of nearly £5,000.

Apart from conversions, some very wonderful feats are achieved. The Rev. O. J. Ellis, chief of the London Mission, reports the glad tidings of having "held conversations with 420 Jews during the year." The Rev. A. Bernstein has also held "interesting religious conversations." He reports no converts, but drags in two of the irrepressible and omnipresent eight. The Rev. N. Herz, who attends the Mission Hall, Goulston-street, has made no converts, but "one great and blessed result of our united endeavors is, that in no previous year have they given so many copies of the Scriptures away." Highbury seems to be making rapid progress. In 1897 the Rev. Paul Bendix noted the "significant sign that many Jews at present take part in the celebration of Christmas, not religiously, but socially." This year the power of the Gospel has shown itself, and the same individual writes: "It is a fact that some of them have a Christmas-tree." Hallelujah! First Christmas festivities, then a Christmas-tree; soon we may expect to see the Jews of Highbury helping to celebrate the birth of Jesus by getting drunk "alleep samee Clistian," as Bret Har e's Chinaman would say.

Mrs. Guttman is a lady who gets on remarkably well. She visited 2,011 houses, spoke to 3,005 people, gave away 201 Bible portions and 527 tracts besides other books, and her conquests consist of a woman who is reading a book and "whose questions to me are delightful," and an "elderly Jewish gentleman who is always pleased to receive me and to converse on the Messiahship" (p. 20).

There is the same story of progress (?) in the provinces. Mr. G. Priestly, Swansea, plaintively remarks that the attitude of the Jews "towards me is one of supreme contempt" (p. 23). Liverpool makes no converts, but has given away 6,053 Bibles, etc. Miss Werfel, Birmingham, is "thankful that the work of the past year has been most encouraging." Her encouragement consisted, from her report, in having induced a rich Jewess to accept a tract. And, finally, the Rev. E. T. Sherman, Hexham, reporting for Newcastle and district, has no converts, but about twenty Jews came to his house, "*some for help, others as pedlars.*" I think this last is the gem of the report. And these are the wonderful results that are considered worth chronicling, and all that the Society has to offer as the result of a year's expenditure and work in Great Britain! Is the game worth the candle? To the two rev. gentlemen who draw £53 annually, or to their subordinates who squeeze a living out of the movement, probably yes. But what of the general public? How long will it take to convert 8,000,000 Jews at the present rate of increase? How much will it cost to convert the 8,000,000 at the present rate of payment? And how much are they worth when they are converted?

Of all Christian missions, that to the Jews has the least justification. Other missions may plead that they are taking to lower races a superior civilization; that by the introduction of different habits of life these peoples will be benefitted. The Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews can plead no such justification. No one pretends that the Jew is made any better in any of the relations of life by becoming a Christian. Whatever he was before conversion, that he remains afterwards. The sole object here, from the standpoint of the misguided subscribers, is a religious one; from that of the agents employed, a means of relieving the over-stocked clerical labor market; and from neither point of view do the results justify the outlay.

*Freethinker.*

C. COHEN.

EPICURUS:  
HIS CHARACTER AND HIS ETHICAL SYSTEM.

BY B. F. UNDERWOOD, QUINCY, ILL.

It is concurrently attested by numerous writers of antiquity that Epicurus was one of the most abstemious of men. His disciples, too, lived on the plainest fare. Diocles says that water was their common beverage, and that of wine they never allowed themselves more than a small cup. It is related that during the siege of Athens by Demetrius, when the inhabitants were reduced to the greatest extremity, the scholars of Epicurus bore up under the calamity with less inconvenience than any other class of citizens.

It is sufficiently clear, from the writings of Plutarch, Cicero and Seneca, that a spirit of envy among many of his competitors for public fame fixed upon Epicurus and his disciples charges of living in luxury and excess, and of teaching principles subversive of morality, which have caused his name to be proverbialized as a name for general licentiousness. His exposure of the absurdities of the popular religion of his country and day was the main ground of the popular calumny with which he was assailed. All the stories about immoralities practised in the famous garden are fictions. W. Wallace, LL.D., says in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*:

"But there is scarcely a doubt that the tales of licentiousness which ill-tempered opponents circulated regarding the society of the garden are groundless. The stories of those who sought occasionally to refute the views of Epicurus by an appeal to his

alleged antecedents and habits were no doubt in the main, as Diogenes Laertius says, the stories of maniacs."

When Epicureanism had become confounded with license and libertinism, there were not a few who professed to accept the philosophy, modifying it to make it conform to their superficial theories and loose morals, but still retaining the name, in order to give to their notions the dignity and importance of a philosophical system which should justify the lives they lived. "They corrupted the theory, and so combined the conception of its friends and foes that they ended by having a theory of Epicureanism corresponding to their habits." Have we not seen the same process gone through more than once in regard to "Atheism," "Liberalism," and "Secularism," in these latter days?

That the philosophy of Epicurus, in its basic principles, really encouraged the gratification of the "appetites" in excess is neither evident *a priori* or from a consideration of that philosophy, nor is it proved by the facts of history. Epicurus made pleasure in the most comprehensive sense—the same as did John Stuart Mill, the same as does Spencer—the object of morality. But pleasure comprehends love of the beautiful, the true and the good. With him virtue was the means of happiness, "the only permanent element of pleasure."

In one of his letters to Menæceus, which

has survived the ravages of time, occurs the following passage :

"Wisdom is the chief blessing of philosophy, since she gives birth to all other virtues, which unite in teaching us that no man can live happily who does not live wisely, conscientiously, and justly ; nor, on the other hand, can he live wisely, conscientiously, and justly without living happily ; for virtue is inseparable from happiness. Let these, then, and maxims like these, be the subjects of thy meditation by night and by day, both when alone and when with the friend of thy bosom ; and never, when asleep or awake, shalt thou be oppressed with anxiety, but live as a god among mankind."

It has been said of Seneca, the moralist, who though nominally a Stoic was really an Epicurean, that he "draws nearly all his suavity and much of his wisdom from Epicurus." It was the moral beauty and simplicity of the thought of Epicurus that attracted to it the Roman poet Lucretius, who amid the confusion and turbulence of civil war "sought some stay for his inner life and found it in the philosophy of Epicurus," in defence and exposition of which he gave to the world the grandest didactic poem of classical antiquity, "De Rerum Natura."

Of course, it is easy to quote almost anything against the teachings and the influence of Epicurus that is needed to sustain the false and slanderous statements which his Pagan opponents originated, or which prejudiced theological writers, or writers who have written under the influence of the popular belief, have added in regard to Epicurus, but such statements should not carry with them the weight of authority unless they can be shown to

have a basis in fact and reason. Take, for instance, the statement of Ritter,— "The great moral corruption of ancient Greece and Rome can in part be traced to the influence of this system" [Epicureanism].

How can this be proved? What evidence of it can be adduced? The statement is in conflict with the facts of history and with the history of philosophy ; for, as Lange, the profound historical and philosophical writer, says : "In the centuries when the abominations of a Nero, a Caligula, or even of a Heliogabalus, polluted the globe, no philosophy was more neglected, none was more foreign to the spirit of the time, than that of all which demanded the coldest blood, the calmest contemplation, the most sober and purely prosaic inquiry, the philosophy of Demetrius and Epicurus."

Epicureanism as a philosophical or ethical system did not prevail during the dark ages in Christian monasteries, when they were little better than brothels ; it did not prevail during the periods of witchcraft and persecution, of torture and wholesale destruction of life on account of religious belief. Epicureanism, as philosophy, did not make Spain what she is now by reason of her superstition, cruelty, and crime.

Epicurus's ethical system was certainly utilitarian. With all the details of his system we are not acquainted, for, though it is said that he wrote three hundred works, none of them have come down to us from the rich harvest field of the past, and on minor points we have to depend upon conflicting interpretations of his thought. This we know : it was essentially, in its ethical aspects, the same as that of our modern utilitarian thinkers,

though less completely developed, of course.

"In Epicurus's system," says a writer, "none of the virtues was to be practised or pursued for its own sake, unless it should be the means of securing the greatest happiness of the agent."

Leave off "of the agent," and the statement need not be criticized. That any philosophical thinker should teach that virtue is to be practised only so far as it will secure the happiness of the individual is absurd. Did Epicurus teach that when a man can escape punishment by lying, fraud and murder, that he should commit those crimes; that when he can, as he imagines, add to his pleasures by drunkenness, licentiousness, etc., that he should yield to them? Certainly not.

Epicurus taught that the path of happiness is the path of virtue, and he understood perfectly that the happiness of the good man is promoted by doing his duty, even though thereby he suffers and sacrifices his life.

In teaching that virtues should be practised or pursued as a means of securing the greatest happiness, Epicurus proved that he was much wiser than our modern ethical teachers who talk about "virtue for its own sake," an expression which has befogged the minds of many Liberals.

Why should a man act rationally rather than irrationally? Why should a man be honest rather than dishonest? For the sake of rationality, for the sake of honesty? No. Because rational conduct and

honesty are conducive to our well-being; in other words, because they are better for us than are irrationality and dishonesty.

If folly and dishonesty would add to the well-being of mankind—i.e., would make man's condition more comfortable, harmonious and pleasant, now and hereafter—then the practice of what we call folly and dishonesty would be a duty.

Why should we be moral? Because it is better to be moral than immoral. Why and how better? Because morality conduces to health, longevity, harmony, and peace—in short, happiness.

The question, Why should we want to be happy? nobody asks. Happiness is the ultimate; virtue is the means. "Virtue for its own sake" is a phrase which connotes nothing that has any meaning in philosophy or ethics. The Christian may say that the object of virtue is holiness, to please God or to gain heaven. But what is the object of being holy, pleasing God, and gaining heaven, but to advance our well-being; in other words, to escape ills and to secure happiness? A comprehensive utility is the only rational foundation of morality, and "virtue for its own sake" is an irrational expression, though a popular one.

The essential truth and value of the ethical system of Epicurus are confirmed by the teachings of modern science, which declares that the good is the useful, and that the useful is whatever makes mankind better and happier.

## THE ROMAN CHURCH TO THE RESCUE.

BY CHARLES CATTELL.

THE true religion is safe at last. That is, if any religion is credible, Christianity—under the protection of the Roman Church—may meet the demands of the intellect of the present age by absorbing the great principle of Evolution and making it all its own, Herbert Spencer furnishing the basis of the proceeding. The author of this patent medicine for grinding scepticism and unbelief to powder is Mr. W. H. Mallock, who discloses his remarkable invention in the *Nineteenth Century* for November.

How true it is that, when infidelity comes in like a flood, the Holy Spirit sets up a standard against it. But it must be very mortifying to Protestants, for their religion is at present in a state corresponding to what biologists term "protoplasmic:" evolution has barely begun in that structureless system of faiths, almost devoid of organs or functions, to say nothing of brains or backbone. The Roman Church is a continuous personal organism, whose history corresponds with the process of organic evolution: it is a single organ of thought and historic memory, able to personally attest the earliest facts of its history as though from personal experience. That is a downright good character. Possibly some may think this only a string of bald unsupported assertions, as I do, but note the issue.

Is there any doubt about the Resurrection or the Ascension? If so, "the Church replies, 'I was at the door; my eyes saw the Lord come forth.'"

Is the miraculous birth a stumbling-block? "The Church replies, 'I can attest the fact, even if no other witness can, for the angel said "Hail!" in my ear as well as Mary's.'"

If anybody can credit the report of this continuous organism, the result must be confusion to unbelief and the defeat of rationalism.

It should be mentioned that this scheme is only formulated by Mr. Mallock as suggestive to some future apologist of the Roman Church. The occasion of it naturally arises after Mr. Mallock's demonstration that the Reformed Christianity of Protestants has been completely annihilated by modern cosmic science and scientific historical criticism, "in the eyes of every thinking man." It appears a benevolent suggestion on the writer's part to meet the emergencies arising out of the failure of the dominant faith in England at the present day.

As Mr. Mallock takes this scientific stand, we are clearly entitled to inquire: In what strata of the early centuries of Christianity can the first forms of this continuous organism be found? Is this organism anything but the creation of Mr. Mallock's fertile brain? I think not. If the varieties of the Gospel stories in early times prove anything, it is that there existed many churches and no organized centre of authority at all.

Moreover, we are told, on scientific authority, that things that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. Now, some of the special and important doctrines contained in the annihilated Protestantism are common to the teachings of the Roman Church also, and necessarily become equally extinct. Among those enumerated are the Miraculous Birth, the Resurrection, and the Ascension. I should think the organism must suffer from the manifold amputations.

One of the main supports that has given way is the Bible, which affords no external authority for its truth, and which gives merely its own warranty for its truth and the correct report of true religion. Now, repeating the above aphorism, that is precisely the case with the Roman Church—we have only its own warranty for its early and continuous existence, to attest its "personal experience" of "the earliest facts of its history."

There can be no room for doubt on the point that we have only the Church's own word to attest its conscious unity,—“a single organ of thought and historic memory.” The conclusion is thus thrust upon us, that whoever rejects the Protestant religion because it rests upon an authority having only its own warranty for being reliable, must for the same reason reject the Roman religion, because it also only presents its own warranty for its infallibility.

We are told that the Church of Rome has been compelled to take up this matter “under the pressure of criticism and evolution.” That remains to be proved. But, any way, it will require time; for, if it required two centuries to absorb the discoveries of Galileo, it will require many more centuries to assimilate the transcendently anti-theological ideas of modern Evolution.

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#### DREAM DISCOVERIES.

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THE Rev. Mr. Wodrow, the historian of the Covenanters, is an enthusiastic Calvinist. It was he, I think, who told a poor woman with a large family that “it would be an uncouth mercy if all her children were saved.” This was logical, from his point of view: they that be saved are few; here is a family of a dozen, and their mother actually expects to meet them all in the New Jerusalem! Such a mercy would be “uncouth.” Then Wodrow believes in every kind of portent, and miracle, and warning, and bogie, down to Cotton Mather's lost sermon, marvellously pursuing him and rejoining him as he rides.

The following anecdote would have delighted Wodrow, though how he would have classed it I cannot guess. A gentleman, very well known in many ways, was at his house in the country, where a young lady was visiting himself and his wife. She lost a pearl from a ring. It could not be found, and she went home. Four or five weeks later she again visited her friends, arriving in the evening, and, as it happened, not going into the library that day. Next morning, while dressing, her host said to his

wife: "Did you remember to take away the pearl that Mary lost from the place where I put it?"

"You never said anything about it," answered the lady.

"Oh, excuse me! I told both you and her that I found it in a chink in the library and put it on top of my papers, and I asked you to take it lest the servants should dust it away in the morning."

The lady then went to her guest's room, and asked her if she remembered being told about the discovery of the pearl. She agreed with her hostess that the subject had not even been mentioned.

"Then the maids will have swept it away," said my friend, and he ran down to his study in his dressing-gown. The pearl was not where he remembered having laid it. But he looked in the crevice where he said that he had found it, and there lay the pearl.

One explanation would be that he had dreamed the whole affair, the dream being suggested by an unconscious, or sub-conscious, perception of the pearl in the crevice. But he cannot recall any dream on the subject. He was certain that he had found the thing when wide awake, taken it out of the chink, placed it on top of his papers, and told both ladies.

It is just conceivable that he actually did find it and place it on the papers; that, meaning to inform the ladies, he believed that he had actually done so; and that the pearl was accidentally swept back by the housemaid into the chink of the bureau whence he had rescued it. This would not have been Wodrow's explanation, but it would have recommended itself to Dr. Carlyle.

I know personally of four cases in which lost articles were discovered by a dream of the loser's. The last case was that of the key of the cellar—an awkward thing to lose. After it had been missing for some days, the owner dreamed that it was lying in a certain drawer, where it was found, though why, how or when it was placed there memory could not recall. Sleep seems occasionally to have this power of reviving lost memories of things done or perceived with imperfect waking consciousness.

*Longmaus'.*

ANDREW LANG.

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### BEGAN WHEN YOUNG.

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It would seem that almost all the prominent actors and actresses of our day began an early apprenticeship at the profession, as the following list indicates:

Mary Anderson made her first appearance before the public when she was fifteen.

Lotta went on at eight and she is now forty-eight.

Henry Irving went on at fifteen and is now fifty-seven.

Joseph Jefferson, though he appeared on the stage when two years old, did not go on for good until he was four.

Mrs. Kendal appeared first at four and is now forty-seven.

Lydia Thompson went on at thirteen and she is now fifty-nine.

Ellen Terry began at eight and is now forty-seven.

Mrs. Scott Siddons went on the stage at the age of eight and lived to be forty-eight.

Neilson went on at fifteen, and Patti sang in public at the tender age of nine.