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
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NOTICES.

All correspondence connected with the *C. M. Review* should be addressed to the Secretary, R.S.G., Kingston. Communications intended for publications in the next issue of *C. M. Review*, must reach the Editor not later than the 20th of the month.

NOTE.—Officers of the Militia are requested to kindly forward the Editor, for insertion in the "Militia Item" column, any information respecting their own regiments which they think might be of interest to their brother officers.

List of useful scientific books for sale, published at the Royal School of Gunnery, Kingston, Ont.:

Canadian Militia Field Artillery Manual, (by Lt.-Col. T. Bland Strango)	75
Respect of the late Franco-German War (same author) ..	50
Field Gun Drill, (extract from C.F.A.M.)	10
Exercises for Competitive Practice for Artillery	15
Star Drill	15
Army Ordnance, (drill and exercises)	15

AVIS.

Conformément à la loi, toute personne qui reçoit un journal et qui ne le renvoie pas, se trouve abonnée de droit.

Les personnes qui auraient quelques communications à nous adresser sont priées de nous les envoyer avant le 20 de chaque mois.

Les personnes qui désirent entrer dans la Batterie "B" sont priées de se présenter au Commandant, (Kingston,) tous les jours de 10 heures à midi, ou de lui envoyer leur demande avec leurs certificats de bonne conduite. Il faut aussi qu'elles sachent lire et écrire qu'elles jouissent d'une bonne santé, que leur hauteur ne soit pas moindre de 5 pieds 4 pouces, la mesure de la poitrine de 34 pouces. Enfin, nous les prévenons que les ouvriers charpentiers, menuisiers et forgerons ont une extra paie de 20 cents par jour.

La Batterie "B" informe le public militaire qu'elle tient à sa disposition les ouvrages de *drill* pour le *smooth bore*, le mortier, les canons rayés etc., ouvrages imprimés par les presses de l'Ecole Royale d'Artillerie sous la haute surveillance du commandant.

The Canadian Military Review,

JANUARY 1st. 1881.

Correspondence.

To the Editor of the CANADIAN MILITARY REVIEW.

DEAR SIR,—Thanking you for your kind indulgence for space in your columns, I wish to point out some weaknesses in our militia system, and where changes would do good.

Owing to Government mal-administration, to the pernicious influence of party politics, and above all to the apathy of and want of sympathy on the part of the public, volunteering has become unpopular, the best men do not join the ranks, and officers are retiring disgusted and disappointed. Now, as far as this city is concerned, I would advocate the amalgamation of all the different corps (excepting the Cavalry and Field Battery) into two strong battalions, each to comprise ten companies of fifty-five men. The same remedy might with advantage be applied also to all the force where practicable. We would then have fewer exhibitions of skeleton drill. Again the internal dissensions in some of the corps point to a remedy as above suggested.

I would advocate the appointment by Government of one paid officer and one paid non-commissioned officer to each corps, the former to act as drill instructor, quartermaster, and musketry instructor, and the latter as orderly room clerk and quartermaster-sergeant. The appointment of these paid regimental officers should be, as far as possible, from graduates of the Kingston Military College. The additional expense could be met by reducing the present staff of Deputy Adjutant-Generals and Brigade-Majors, one officer to each Military District to be considered sufficient. In the event of active service, the senior regimental officer to take command, and calling to his staff such other officers who were acquainted with the topography of the part of the country about to be the theatre of operations and who were otherwise efficient. Maps and other information to be obtained from the Brigade Office of the district.

GOVERNMENT PAY AND REGIMENTAL EXPENSES.

The individual members of the militia should not receive pay. A certain sum (sufficient to defray all expenses without the necessity of the commissioned officers being constantly called upon to put their hands in their pockets) should be paid by the Government to each corps at the rate of so much per man inspected and passed. A better class of men would then be induced to join the ranks.

INTERIOR ECONOMY.

Thousands of dollars have been thrown away in the course of years by most corps (it is especially the case in this city) from want of a proper system. As a general rule the quartermaster's department is inefficiently managed, and the quartermaster-sergeant appointed for other reasons than his efficiency as such. Clothing and accoutrements have had to be bought from the Government stores and elsewhere to make up for these articles lost, and the spectacle is often furnished (in this city at least) of officers and non-commissioned officers scouring the old clothes shops, previous to an inspection, to supply deficiencies. Knapsacks, haversacks, waterbottles, canteens and the other paraphernalia of camp life are generally stowed away where "moth and rust do corrupt." The neglect of Governments and Corporations to provide suitable armories is partly responsible for this.

DRILL.

The great improvement in rifled guns has rendered the old stiff formations and great precision of movement (formerly con-

sidered so desirable) to a great extent obsolete. The great requisites of the present day are "prompt obedience to orders," "rapidity of movement," and above all a practical knowledge of the rifle and how to use it effectively. Consequently the greater part of the time at present occupied in drilling in a comparatively small hall is thrown away. It is very seldom that skirmishing and extended order drill is practiced in the open, and judging distance drill for rifle practice is entirely neglected, the militia when firing at the targets always doing so from known distances. Within the past two years an improvement in this respect has taken place in the shape of skirmishing matches, but even then, competitors have an easy task with a firing point in front and another behind. This brings us down to

RIFLE SHOOTING PRACTICE.

This is most deplorably neglected. In the first place Government provides twenty rounds per annum, with which the unfortunate militiaman is supposed to perfect himself in rifle shooting, and to make matters worse these twenty rounds are generally of inferior quality (this past season notoriously so). There is no provision made for marking, the expense generally bearing on the officers of the corps practicing.

In addition to above difficulties, when a mechanic has to sacrifice a half day's pay in order to get to the "butts," it is not surprising that so few of the force know anything of the use of the rifle, and I maintain that however well drilled a man may be otherwise, without a practical knowledge of his weapon he is useless.

Very few officers commanding companies take any interest in this important branch of training, beyond complying with the militia regulations, and even that is not conscientiously done. Government gives a large amount of money annually in sending a team of marksmen to compete at Wimbledon, and grants to the Dominion Rifle Association, and to the several Provincial and regimental associations. This money is annually competed for by pretty much the same men, and goes largely into the pockets of a few (if we may use the term "pot hunters" or professional shots, men who are not otherwise distinguished for their enthusiasm in the Volunteer cause). These grants of money to rifle associations should be largely reduced and the regimental allowance of ammunition increased to at least 100 rounds per man to be fired under the personal superintendance of the musketry instructor, assisted by the officers and sergeants of the company. The pay of each man not completing his 100 rounds to be withheld from the corps. In England every non-efficient volunteer is fined the amount of his pay.

UNIFORM.

The Canadian Militia officers still uniform their soldiers as to effect neatness and precision rather than usefulness, and while hundreds of dollars are annually thrown away by themselves on fancy head-dresses and other ornaments (if Government not furnishing these things) the force is unprovided with uniform suitable for a winter campaign, most corps not even having fur caps. A sorry spectacle would these same corps present if suddenly called upon for active service any time between November and March.

When may we hope to see a Canadian corps in light war clothing, adapted to our winters, say blanket coat, beef moccasins, fur caps and woolen mits, and each man provided with snow-shoes and taught to use them.

Much more might be written in favor of reform, but we of time prevents at present.

Hoping I have not transgressed the bounds of your indulgence as to space,

I am, Sir,

Yours truly,

REFORM

P.S.—Since writing above, your issue of 1st inst. has come to hand with Major MacPherson's elaborate defence of the General Officer Commanding. It seems a pity that the gallant major, an enthusiastic officer, and one of the best rifle shots (theoretically and practically) in Canada, should write as long a letter with so little in it. *Parturiunt montes, sacætarum ridiculus mus.*

If English officers placed in command of the Canadian Militia would tell us in plain frank words our faults and the best way to remedy them, and be less cynical and ready to sneer at us, they would be more popular and there would be no necessity for the clerks of the Militia Office, Ottawa, rushing into print to defend them. Although a firm believer in and upholder of "Canada first," I recognize fully the advantage of having at our head an officer who has seen service and devoted his life solely to the profession; but if the inspections of that officer produce no result beyond pointing out what is ridiculous, then I say his services are no use to the country.

I agree with you in disagreeing with many propositions of Major MacPherson's letter. I, however, endorse his remarks about the necessity of every militia man knowing how to use his rifle. His paid regiments would no doubt present a fine appearance, he would perhaps advise the placing of five of them at Ottawa for guard duty at Rideau Hall, and to make a fine show on opening of Parliament. *This is not what the country wants.* We have too much officialism at Ottawa already, as well as elsewhere, and our stock of Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors is already overflowing. By-the-bye, ten regiments would hardly be enough, as we would require *one for each parliament of two houses in each Province.* Major MacPherson seems to be ignorant of the fact that the Government has always provided means of instruction for officers in the shape of "Military Schools," (one was open in this city last winter, as well as other places throughout the country). Then there are "A" and "B" Batteries which have given certificates to a great many.

With respect to your remarks about head-dress, I have to inform you that that expense has come out of the pockets of the commissioned officers more than from the rank and file.

R.

Montreal, Dec. 13, 1880.

Great Guns.

We are glad to be able to state that the long-pending and indecisive controversy with respect to the type and character of our heavy ordnance is likely to be brought to an issue at last. As our readers will remember, we have constantly urged that the startling events which have recently led to so much disputation in the case of the "Thunderer's" guns and other controversial matters had justified doubts too grave to be set at rest by anything short of a thorough and impartial inquiry into the whole system. Some important changes have been foreshadowed, but the public will look askance at the adoption of any definitive plan until the whole question has been examined in the light of the newest theories and with the advantage of the most mature experience, whether official or non-official. We now understand that the War Office and Admiralty authorities have in consideration the appointment of an Ordnance Committee to report on the changes in contemplation in the Land Ordnance Service and in the armament of the Navy. The committee will consist of artillery, naval, and engineer officers, together with one or two eminent civilian mechanical engineers, and it will conduct such experiments as from time to time will be found to be necessary. It is stated that the officers of the Government manufacturing establishments will not be appointed on the committee. This is entirely satisfactory. We do not for a moment call in question either the ability or the equity of those officials, but the truth is the system which they have developed is on its trial, and those responsible for that

system cannot properly sit among those who are to pass judgment upon it. It will be for the Woolwich authorities to vindicate, if they can, the excellence of their methods and results must be also inquired into in a perfectly impartial spirit. It is not reasonable to suppose that those who are identified with any one system can show real impartiality in pronouncing upon others. At all events, it might not be easy to convince a sceptical public that the result had been attained. The committee will necessarily have power to conduct such experiments as may be found requisite from time to time, and thus will have opportunities of bringing competing theories and schemes to a practical test. We may hope that when the inquiry has been brought to an end there will be no difficulty in arming our forts and fleets with the best gun that science can devise and money buy. What we have deprecated is an expenditure on an immense scale upon the manufacture or purchase of weapons the supremacy of which has been loudly challenged until an effort has been made to ascertain whether there is any ground for the criticisms directed against them, or for the advantages claimed on behalf of rival ordnance systems.

"So the Woolwich ring is to be smashed up at last, and General, now Sir Something Campbell, who has had a very long innings, will be bowled out. I wonder if the whole eleven he got together so cleverly will go too? By constantly removing those who opposed him, and appointing men who would help him with his schemes, this clever officer has managed for many years to work the Woolwich Ring most successfully. With Armstrong in the ring he felt strong enough to defy all antagonists. In vain did the *Times* protest in unusually strong language against the iniquities of the Woolwich monopoly. In vain did Sir W. Palliser, Colonel Moncrieff, and other inventors show up the grave errors which were being made at a cost of millions. In vain was the loud protest of two gigantic Armstrong babies and a Woolwich infant, which burst with a noise that found an echo in every corner of the world. Such little mishaps were easily explained away by the Woolwich authorities and their committee, but the end of all this jobbery is approaching. An ordnance committee, consisting of artillery, naval, and military officers, with one or two civilian engineers of note, is to be appointed; but no officer from the Government factory, alias Woolwich Ring, will be on the Committee.—*London World.*

The *World* is always censorious but not always just. The term "ring" is an Americanism for an association of swindlers more or less working through politicians. We can still be thankful that no charge of money peculation can be brought against the officers designated by the *World* as the "Woolwich ring." That Britain is armed with the worst guns in Europe is a fact patent from any table of figures giving the initial velocities or momentum, and the parallelogram of accuracy of the guns in use by various Powers. And it is equally true that inventors have been for years systematically suppressed by the officers employed for that purpose. But who is responsible? Surely not the Royal Artillery, they did not appoint Sir Something Campbell, nor did they give him a second innings. Nor are they responsible for the systematic exile or retirement from the service for many years past of all progressive officers with opinions, as Sir Henry Lefroy, sent to the Antipodes, and the late General Eardly Wilmot, who went to his grave unemployed and unrecompensed, with many another honored name in whom the Artillery service had confidence. The transfer of the symposium clique from Woolwich to the War Office was not the work of the Royal Artillery, who have been allowed no professional head or chief since the abolition of the Ordnance Department, and the result has been what might have been anticipated. The present Surveyor-General of the Ord-

nance has raised himself into his accidental position by his transcendent ability, and the "halo" of a war service carried out in the days of weapons now obsolete, but his post is more political than regimental, and his proclivities and antecedent views have hitherto coincided with those of the Director of Artillery and the appointment of safe men on the grand old R. A. principle that "any change was to be deprecated."

But, after all, these things are a necessity in all military officialism in constitutional countries. Military improvement is thought to mean money expenditure, therefore, safe, slow men are selected to offer the necessary obstruction until it is found the accumulation costs more to clear off than the progressiveness of a live man at the head of a Department.

Sir Frederick Roberts.

General Sir Frederick S. Roberts, V.C., G.C.B., Royal Artillery, was present yesterday afternoon at a grand concert given in the Recreation Rooms, Royal Artillery Barracks, Woolwich, by the Royal Artillery band, and met with a most enthusiastic reception.

Last evening the gallant officer was present at a banquet given in his honor by the officers of the Royal Artillery, in their mess-room, Woolwich, Lieutenant-General John Turner, C.B., commandant of the district, presided, and the guest of the evening sat on his right.

The toasts of "Her Majesty the Queen" and "The Prince and Princess of Wales and the rest of the Royal Family," having been duly honored.

GENERAL TURNER said he rose to propose the toast of the evening. He was commanded by H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge, as colonel of the regiment, to say how glad he should have been to have been able to take the chair that evening, but, as they all know, he was with the Prince of Wales at Sandringham, to celebrate the anniversary of the birth of Her Royal Highness the Princess; the duty, therefore, devolved upon him.

SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, who was for some time kept silent by applause, said it was with great pride that he found himself the honored guest at the head-quarters of the regiment in which he began his soldier's career 29 years ago. (Cheers.) In that old mess-house, so long associated with the history of the regiment, surrounded by so many of his brother officers, he felt at home, and he might say a few words without reserve respecting their especial branch of the service. The campaign in Afghanistan was remarkable for the fact that he, an Artilleryman, held a high and responsible army command; but he was glad to say that he was not the only Artillery officer in that position. (Hear, hear.) He congratulated the regiment on so many of its representatives being employed in duties beyond the regiment; and if the verdict of the Army and the country was in favor of their conduct, he hoped that opportunities would be found in the future for their successors to aspire to and qualify themselves for high and responsible commands. In commending the officers of the corps who had distinguished themselves, he referred to Sir Michael Biddulph as one of the first to reach Candahar and the Helmand, and to Major-General Hills, who, after performing delicate and troublesome duties as Governor of Kabul, was selected to command a division in Afghanistan.

General Roberts, whose appointment as Deputy-Adjutant-General of Royal Artillery had afforded much satisfaction, held an onerous and difficult position on the line of communication, and proved an able and efficient commander. Lieut.-Colonel Chapman was senior officer of the Army Staff under Sir Donald Stewart during the march from Candahar to Cabul, and accompanied him (General Roberts) in the same capacity from Cabul to Candahar (cheers); and in Major Pretyman as aide-de-camp he had a valued friend, upon whose tact and judgment he could always rely. Among those who had achieved honor more especially in connection with the regiment he enumerated Major-General Alexander Lindsay, Colonel Johnson, Colonel William Stirling, Captain Phipps, Lieutenant-Colonel Sydney Parry, Major Sir John Campbell, Captain Stude, and others, with a special tribute to the merits of each; and in speaking of those whom they mourned as dead, he said that Major Blackwood and the whole of the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of his battery, in the hour of defeat and in the most trying circumstances, bravely upheld the credit of the regiment. (Cheers.) He testified not only to the bravery, but to the irrefragable behavior of all ranks throughout the campaign. Among those they mourned were Captain Kelso and Lieutenant Maclaine, so cruelly cut off in his promising career. Captain Shafto, and, he added, Quarter-Master Sergeant Mansfield of the Horse Artillery, who performed the duty of Provost at Cabul, and who was one of the steady, reliable, non-commissioned officers who were the pride of the Army. Altogether the regiment had well maintained the character which the Gunners had earned in years past while fighting for their Sovereign and their country. He had spoken too long, for a soldier's speech should be short, and he would conclude by expressing his regard for the regiment and thanking General Turner and his brother officers for the gratifying welcome they had given him to Woolwich. (Loud cheers.)

The return of General Sir F. Roberts from the scene of his recent successes leads, not unnaturally, to an investigation of the theory so commonly accepted, that officers of Artillery and Engineers are unfit to hold important commands in the field. Whilst the principle has been tacitly approved by many, none have, we believe, evinced sufficient courage or honesty to place on record the hypothesis which led to the assumption of this fallacy.

It is, of course, the most elementary truism of military science that infantry is the mainspring of the fighting machine, and that other arms are merely auxiliaries. But whilst conceding readily this axiom, we must, at the outset claim a certain equality for the arms thus set aside. We are anxious to discover the process

of elimination by which the opponents of the Ordnance Corps remove them from consideration, and grant to the cavalry a species of second place verging, so far as the question of the fitness of its officers for command is concerned, on equality. Regarding the officers of the Army in the abstract, we cannot at the outset discern any material difference in the stamp of young men presenting themselves as candidates for admission to Sandhurst and Woolwich, or striving to slide into the Service, as it were, by the newly-invented *facile desensus* of the Militia. Any difference which may exist tends naturally as regards education somewhat in favour of the candidates for Woolwich, whereas these youths, judging from statistics of the running-path and the cricket field, are in no marked degree inferior to stamina or physique. A scrutiny of the curriculum followed at Woolwich or Sandhurst does not, in our opinion, tend to disclose any inherent disability for the exercise of command generated or fostered in the alumni of the Royal Military Academy.

Passing next into a consideration of the conditions existing in the service, we arrive at the first position tending in any degree to support the case of those who would exclude alike the "ginner" and the "sapper" from commands in the field.

Regarding first the case of the Engineers, we find the officers of this corps too often placed at a disadvantage as regards the acquisition of a practical knowledge of the art of war. Many of them from their high scientific attainments are tempted by high salaries to turn their backs for a time on soldiering proper, and to perform the functions of various important branches in semi-civil employ, for which they are especially qualified. Others, again, are even in the performance of their military duties too often isolated and removed from any possibility of intercourse and association with other arms of the Service. This state of affairs is, however, intermittent, and we have no hesitation in affirming that the early training of Woolwich, strongly supplemented by the exhaustive studies, practical as well as theoretical, carried on at the School of Military Engineering, implants in the officer of this arm a substratum of general military knowledge, which very little practice will always bring to the surface. As regards a leaning or bias with respect to the use of troops of any arm, we defy the most bitter opponents (and there are such) of the Royal Engineers to show anything in the conditions of early training or subsequent service of officers of this cloth conducive to a tendency on their part to give undue prominence in a strategic or tactical sense to any one arm of the Service.

The artilleryist, unlike the comrade of his cadet life, is not, as a rule, separated from intercourse with those of other branches of the Service, but there is, perhaps, much in the nature of his work to render him a specialist, and it may, with some show of justice, be urged that he might, if entrusted with command, display a tendency to make too lavish a use of his special weapon, and to relegate the infantry at his disposal to a subordinate part quite out of keeping with the immense power derived by them from the use of the modern small arm.

In strong opposition to this single argument we urge the advantages accruing to a general who is acquainted with the exact powers and failings of an arm which, though only auxiliary, has of late years played such a prominent part in the majority of campaigns. And further, it is patent that the acquisition of a general knowledge of the functions and capabilities of infantry is in the reach of most earnest students of the art of war, whereas the study of artillery, however closely pursued in theory, confers no practical knowledge to the student of the real powers and failings of the arm. The instances of generals whose earlier years were passed in the infantry, who on assumption of command displayed a total disregard of their artillery, could be cited freely. There are few cases of artillery commanders to investigate, but we do not think it can fairly be urged that their dispositions have displayed any gross ignorance of the general principles involved in the use of the dominant arm.

Perhaps the greatest stain on the straightforward manliness of the officers of the British army is the unfortunate but too palpable jealousy they have shown of the old ordnance corps in the attempt to bolster up the theory that such officers are not fit for the command of all arms. It is perfectly well known that garrison artillery are infantry in blue coats in addition to being gunners, and that a field or horse artilleryman has to learn all cavalry drills and duties; indeed, the effectual command a field battery, which is in itself an often independent, tactical unit necessitates the habitual exercise of the tactical qualifications of a General, and yet when a complete revolution in the weapons and conditions of war was first discovered to the British nation, the want of scientific military education among the officers entrusted with commands, it was found necessary to establish the Staff College. The only text-book on the modern art of war that existed in the English language had to be written by an Artillery officer, Col. Hamley, who also may be said to have formed the Staff College, since which he has been carefully excluded from any army command. The Staff College was at first said to be competitive for all arms, but has only taught to officers between 25 and 40 what Woolwich cadets learn at 16, it was naturally found at the first examination that the first half of the list were Engineer and Artillery officers. These corps were at once so heavily handicapped as to be practically excluded from army staff employ. Those who did force themselves through in spite of the restrictions against their entry were always thrust back into regimental or gunnery employ, to the exclusion of their better qualified brother officers who had made gunnery their speciality. By the way what was taught of that art at the Staff College, was taught by a Royal Engineer, a gunnery instructor or professor of artillery has never been sanctioned as part of the instructional staff at the Staff College.

*An artillery General has shown how to dispense entirely with his own arm, wheeled artillery, when necessity prescribed such a course.

In spite of these disabilities, in moments of real danger to the Empire, the officers of the ordnance corps come irrepressibly to the front—India having been won by the sword has to be maintained by the sword without reference to the color of a man's coat, and so it has been that the first reverse of our arms in Cabul in 1842 had to be avenged by an artillery officer, General Pollock, another artillery General (Roberts) has been permitted to perform the same task in our own time.—Dohi was taken by Sir Achudais Wilson, an artillery General, and Lucknow defended till his death by Sir Henry Lawrence a fourth glorious gunner, and yet the honorary Colonel of the Royal Artillery and Engineers, has never been able to appoint an officer of either of those condemned corps to the command of even a Brigade at Aldershot. It seems that poor General Roberts is to be hustled back to India as soon as his health permits, and relegated to a command in the benighted Presidency of Madras, where Boltons has slumbered for 100 years. While the festive favorites will twitter round Pall Mall, to fly off in a staff flock to the first holiday war that turns up.

Our Brave Defenders.

SOME ACCOUNT OF HAMILTON'S VOLUNTEER FORCES.

Major-General Luard, inspected the Thirteenth Battalion on the 25th November. Hamilton's battalion of volunteer infantry was constituted such in 1862, and gazetted on the 13th of December in that year. It consisted of seven companies, three of which had previously been in existence—Nos. 1, 2 and 3, the latter the Highland company of Captain (now Colonel) Skinner.

The first commandant was Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. Isaac Buchanan, who retained command till December 30, 1864. On the occasion of his retirement the following was published in the general orders: "Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. Isaac Buchanan is hereby permitted to resign the command of this corps, and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is pleased to permit him to retain his rank in the militia, as a special case, under the provisions of General Order No. 1, of the 1st of August, 1861, in consideration of the valuable services he has heretofore rendered to the militia of this Province."

In 1863 the colors of the battalion, after being consecrated by the Rev. J. Gamble Geddes (now Dean of Niagara), were presented by Mrs. Buchanan, with an eloquent and feeling address; and in 1839 the same lady, on behalf of the ladies of Hamilton, presented the battalion with a beautiful and costly mace to be borne by the Drum-Major.

In 1863 the Thirteenth participated in a review at Brantford and was well thought of.

In 1865 Mayor Alfred Booker till that date commanding the Hamilton Field Battery; was appointed to the command of the Thirteenth, with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. His soldierly qualities made themselves felt and have left their impress upon the corps. Colonel Booker gave a great deal of time and a great deal of study to his military duties, and the result was very marked. In the year of which we are now speaking a company from the Thirteenth was sent to Prescott for active duty where it was incorporated with a provisional battalion and remained on duty from April till November. On its return another company was sent to join the provisional battalion at Windsor. Major Cuttley commanded the former company and Captain Irving the latter. In the early part of the year Colonel Booker commanded the provisional battalion at Niagara.

In March, 1866, threats of invasion by bands of outlaws in the United States made military preparations in Canada necessary; the Thirteenth was ordered into active service, with daily drills, and ordered to hold itself in readiness to march at a moment's notice. Permanent guards were established at the drill shed, the magazine, and at the Mountain View hotel. During this period

Major-General Napier inspected the battalion and afterwards expressed his "gratification at the creditable and soldier-like appearance" it made.

On the 1st of June the Fenians having crossed the Niagara river, the regiment was ordered to Port Colborne, where it passed the night, and on the following day it was engaged in the skirmish at Ridgeway. It is not at all necessary now to rewrite the history of that unfortunate day. It is sufficient to say that the mistake was made of attempting to manoeuvre raw troops under fire, an experiment which does not always succeed with veteran troops. Unmerited obloquy was cast upon Col. Booker, which no doubt aided materially in hastening his death. Eight men were wounded, among them Lieutenant Routh. The battalion remained on duty till the 20th, when it returned home.

In August, 1866, the Thirteenth went into camp at Thorold, the brigade being under command of Colonel (now Sir Garnet) Wolseley.

Lieutenant Colonel Booker resigned his command and was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel James A. Skinner, now member of Parliament for South Oxford, who has since retained the command. Colonel Skinner has proved himself both a popular and an efficient officer. His corps has borne a proud place among the military organizations of Canada, and there is no reason to doubt that it will continue to do so.

In 1869 the Thirteenth turned out to receive Prince Arthur and the Governor-General on their visit to Hamilton, and furnished guards of honor for their residences during their stay here.

In 1870, 3 sergeants, 2 corporals and 8 privates of the corps volunteered for service in Manitoba. In the same year the first regimental camp for drill was formed at Grimsby. In 1871 a brigade camp was formed at Niagara; in 1872 a divisional camp was formed at the same place, the battalion doing duty at both, and in 1874 it was again in the brigade at that place. Its subsequent history has been uneventful.

For most of the facts given above we are indebted to "A Sketch of the Thirteenth Battalion," published in 1875 by Major Moore.

Hamilton Field Battery.

The artillery arm of the military service is year by year assuming more importance. The breech-loading musket has not effected half the change in infantry tactics which the rifled gun has effected in artillery. The immense importance of this arm has always been understood by great military leaders, and he who was quickest to mobilize his artillery, to introduce improvements and to so manoeuvre it as to mass it most effectively at the critical moment upon the most exposed part of his enemy's line was the man who gained success in war. Longstreet's tremendous onslaught on the third day at Gettysburg was beaten by Hunt's artillery, and almost at the moment of impact when the long line came gleaming on down the slope from Seminary ridge, Hancock, galloping off in person to "hurry up two more batteries of those Napoleon guns." It was not the greater weight of the German battalions which crushed the French armies in the struggle of 1871, but the greater number and better massing of the German batteries. Whole brigades of infantry were often destroyed by artillery before they ever fired a shot. The most superficial study of the history of war will show the vast importance of this branch of the service.

In artillery Hamilton is creditably represented. Her Field Battery is one of which she has no reason to be ashamed. It is a fine organization of good men, well commanded, well drilled, with good material in good

order, and no body entertains the slightest doubt that if the need should ever come it would be able to give a good account of itself.

The Battery was organized about 1855 by the late Colonel Booker. Its beginnings were modest enough. It had two little smooth-bore 6-pounders, and these were private property. In fact, beyond a mere Government authorization, the whole affair was as strictly private as a club. The men not only received no pay or allowances but the whole expense of the Battery was borne by private liberality. Col. Booker deserves a great deal of credit for his energy in organizing and rendering efficient our infant militia organizations.

In 1860, on the occasion of the visit of the Prince of Wales, the Battery marched to Queenston Heights, where it fired a salute in honor of the royal guest.

In 1862, at the suggestion of Sir George Cartier, and in consequence of the feeling which followed the Trent affair, the Government reorganized the militia system. The Hamilton Field Battery was then regularly constituted, and four guns were issued to it. Three of these were smooth bore bronze 9-pounders, and one was a bronze 21 pounder howitzer. Harness and other material were also furnished, the gun-shed on Ferguson avenue was built, and pay and allowances were granted for men and horses during sixteen days of drill annually. The personnel of the Battery was not, however, changed. It was brought into closer relations with the Government, and frequent reports became necessary, though outwardly little change was apparent. Some of our best citizens were members in those days. Captain Booker had resigned to take the lieutenant-colonelcy of the Thirteenth, Colonel Villiers was in command of the Battery, and among its members may be mentioned Messrs. James Matthews, Anthony Copp, W. H. Glasco, A. Green, James Amor, John Blatchford (quartermaster), the Messrs. Allan, etc. Sergeant-Major Brown was for many years caretaker and drill-instructor for the Battery, but in 1870 his pay and allowances were cut off. He now lives in Toronto. He was very highly esteemed, and did good service in his day.

Under the more regular drills the Battery improved and reached a high state of efficiency. Captain Villiers resigned the command to take the position of Brigade Major, and was succeeded by Captain Harris, who resigned when business recalled him to Europe. He was followed by Captain McCabe, who was compelled to retire on account of ill-health, and died shortly after. Captain Smith succeeded him, and remained in service till 1878, when he was succeeded by the present highly efficient commandant, Captain W. F. McMahon.

When first established on its present footing 6 horses were allowed to each gun and 4 to each ammunition wagon. This number has since been cut down, and now the ammunition wagons are not taken out for drill, while only four horses are allowed to each gun. On a recent march to Toronto this number was found insufficient, and it would manifestly be insufficient in active service.

In 1878 the new gun shed on Hughson street was occupied by the Battery. It supplies very good quarters for the guns, and the harness room is ample, but the accommodations for the command are insufficient. There is no room to drill without running the guns out of doors, and the ward rooms are entirely too small. We understand the authorities will shortly enlarge the building.

The regulations at present in force grant pay and allowances for ten days' continuous drill in camp; but no pay is allowed for the Sunday necessarily spent, nor for the days lost in going into camp and returning. The principal hardship in this regulation is that the horses must be paid for for three days more than the Government allows, and this expense must be borne by private persons. Under these circumstances Captain McMahon declined to go into camp last summer.

The Canadian Army.

WHAT A CHICAGO PAPER HAS TO SAY ABOUT IT.

The Canadian militia is divided into two parts, the active and what is called the reserve. The total number of the active militia is about 42,000 men. Of this number about one half drill for twelve days in each year, for which each militiaman receives \$6. The corps are made up of city and country battalions, and as the authorities think the city corps the most useful, they always give them the preference, and all the city corps are allowed to put in their annual drill. These corps, in round numbers, muster about 10,000 men, and thus the remaining 11,000 who are entitled to drill are selected by rotation, year after year. No country corps drill two years in succession, and many of them have been three or even four years without having a muster. In the cities some of the corps are fairly efficient in drill. The men are clean, well dressed, obedient and willing. No one can find a reasonable fault with the rank and file of the Canadian militia; and in physique they stand in comparison with any troops in the world. The climate makes them hardy, and more than once they have proved themselves of use to the State. But here it ends. Of internal economy the majority of the corps know nothing. There is not a semblance of a commissariat in the whole Dominion. There are simply 21,000 good men in uniform provided each-year, put through a few evolutions, and there is the beginning and end of it. The officers make heroic sacrifices to keep their corps efficient; the State makes political capital out of their service, and so it goes on from one year to the other. There is not an ambulance wagon in Canada, and the medical staff is a fiction. In the principal cities in the Dominion the militia are without a drill-shed, and the men are obliged to drill in places which in our country would only be regarded as fit for hen roosts. With all this there are some good corps—the Queen's Own, of Toronto, undoubtedly coming first; and then the Montreal brigade, the Eighth Quebec, the Governor-General's international guards, and a couple of other corps in Ontario. But still these 21,000 are, all things considered, fairly efficient. Now, as for the country corps in general, they are in most cases men in uniform—nothing more and nothing less. The money spent on them is often money thrown away. They meet, they love, and they are parted, knowing no more of their duties than could be gathered by two day's drill under the hands of an experienced instructor. This is no assertion of mine. It is almost word for word what the General in command (Auard) told a country corps near Quebec a few days ago. But they are there; and they are ready, and if required could soon be equipped into shape, but at present they count for little and they show for less. The officers are miserably deficient in their duties, the arms are in bad order, the equipment is far from serviceable and none of the troops are supplied with the Martini-Henry rifle. But let us grant that there are 42,000 fairly equipped men. If put to the test no doubt those men would respond with alacrity and would submit to the discipline necessary to get them into shape with resignation. But here is the beginning and the end of the Canadian militia. As for reserve there is none: When I say none I mean none—not one mother's son: The reserve of the Dominion is a delusion, and it is no more its existence than the man in the moon. But in order to impose on themselves, or the outside world: I know not which, a number of colonels, majors, captains and others appear in the army list as belonging to the reserve militia, while of that militia there is not one, I venture to say, a muster roll in the country. It does not exist even on paper, except that the officers are duly gazetted. These officers never had uniform on their backs, never saw the men that they are supposed to command, and they laugh at the thing as a huge joke. Marshal Saxe once said that it was legs, not arms, that won campaigns, but the Canadian militia reserve has neither legs or arms. A stranger to the country who takes up the army list and counts 250 men of each Lieutenant-Colonel on the reserve militia might, I suppose, count 400,000 or 500,000 men, but if a militia reserve can be manufactured by simply placing a certain number of names on the army list then good-bye statistics forever. Here is the condition of the Canadian militia. There are 42,000 men all told. Of these 42,000 there are about 21,000 drilled on an average six days in two or say three years. But to put it in round numbers we call out 42,000 men and good men too, but that is the strength, stock, lock and barrel of the service, and it is to that the 600,000 vanish like a dream.

["To see ourself's as others see us"—what about our 300 men who garrison our two Thermopylae, Kingston and Quebec, and our two dozen and one Leonidas, two for each Military District, and one in reserve at the Capital?—E. C. M. R.]

General Roberts' Campaign.

The following are the details of the general action at Mazra on the Argandab:—General Roberts' force was composed of Sir Frederick Roberts in command; Colonel Chapman, Chief of Staff; Major-General Ross, in command of infantry division; Brigadier-General Gough, commanding the cavalry brigade—7th Lancers, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, and 1st Regiment of Central India Horse; the mountain batteries, under the command of Colonel Johnson; Brigadier-General M'Pherson, in command of the 1st Infantry Brigade—92nd Highlanders, 2nd Ghoorkas, 23rd Pioneers, and 24th Punjab Native Infantry.

At six a.m. on Sept. 1 the generals commanding and the principal staff officers of the Cabul and Candahar forces were assembled at General Roberts' headquarters at the Sapper gardens, and the proposed plan of attack was explained to them, which was as follows: A strong body of infantry of the Candahar force to hold the right

of Picket Hill, and while our 40-pounders engaged the guns on Baba Wali Kotal to keep the enemy in the pass and on the hills in front; the cavalry of the Candahar force to watch the Moorcha Pass and support the infantry, and six companies of infantry to occupy the village of Goondogaum and the adjoining hills, while General Gough with the cavalry of the Cabul force worked down past them to the Argandab River to cut off the enemy's retreat; the three brigades of the Cabul force to be massed in rear of Picket Hill and to deliver the real attack by clearing the gardens, storming the village of Ghundi Mulla Sahi Adad in front, then turn the corner of Pir Paimal Hill, and take the Baba Wali Kotal in rear and the enemy's position at Mazra in flank. The programme was carried out with great precision. The troops of the Candahar force, under General Burrows' command, took up their positions about 8.30, and the 40-pounders at the north end of Picket Hill, four companies of the Fusiliers, and the 19th Native Infantry behind the walls of the cavalry lines; the 4th Rifles and Ghoorkas in the village, two companies of the 1st Grenadiers, four companies of the 66th Regiment, and two companies of the 28th Native Infantry, under Brigadier-General Daubeny, continuing the line to the left along Picket Hill and Karez Hill to Ghilzina.

About 9 a.m. the 40-pounders opened on the Baba Wali Kotal, and were replied to by a very brisk fire from the enemy's guns posted there. The duel between them continued for the next two and a half hours. Shortly after the commencement of the artillery fire General Baker's Brigade, composed of the 72nd Highlanders, 5th Ghoorkas, and 2nd and 3rd Sikhs, started from the left of Karez Hill, whence Sir Frederick Roberts and his Staff watched the movements, and disappeared into the dense gardens on that side. C 2 Royal Artillery opened fire on the village of Ghundi Mulla Sahi Adad from the ground between Picket and Karez Hills and the screw-gun battery from the front of the latter. After a brief artillery fire some horsemen and infantry were seen escaping from the village. It appeared unoccupied, but when the 2nd Ghoorkas advanced in skirmishing order from the left a hot fire from the houses showed that the place was full of men. The 92nd Highlanders in the meantime had formed up behind a garden on the right, and their leading companies working round behind it, advanced at a run in splendid style without firing a shot, and got into the village just as the Ghoorkas reached it from the low ground on the left. The enemy, all Ghazis, were soon seen streaming out beyond it towards Pir Paimal, but were quickly followed by General Macpherson's men, and the united brigades (General Baker having worked round so as to touch Macpherson's left) pushed on towards the Pir Paimal shoulder. General Ross now sent forward and took command of the 3rd Brigade remaining in reserve under the immediate orders of General Roberts. General Ross found the enemy's regulars strongly posted in front of the village of Pir Paimal, and in two camps on the level beyond it. They belonged, it is believed, to the Candahar regiments, and held their own steadily for some little time. But the British troops were not to be denied, and the enemy were soon in full flight up the valley under a hot artillery fire from our guns. This was enough for the main body of the enemy's infantry, and those posted in the Baba Wali Kotal, as soon as they saw their flank turned, retreated to the camp at Mazra, preceded by Ayub Khan and most of his officers. After this there was no more fighting as far as the infantry were concerned, and when General Roberts arrived with the 3rd Brigade the battle was over.

The cavalry of the Cabul force, under General Gough, left camp at eight a. m., and waited at Ahasalb for the development of the attack on Pir Paimal. At about

11 o'clock they proceeded to Kokaran, and, crossing the Argandab, pursued the straggling parties of the enemy to Shupin and the country round, and returned to camp at night via the Baba Wali Pass. About 300 of the enemy were cut up; two officers and twelve men were wounded. The cavalry, under General Nuttall, moved into position at eight o'clock to watch the Moorcha Pass and the hills in front of Baba Wali. At 2.30 the 3rd Cavalry and the 3rd Sind Horse pushed through the Baba Wali Pass, which was deserted, and pursued the enemy fifteen miles up the Argandab on its left bank to a point about four miles beyond Kaja Mulla, cutting up over 100 between the villages and the hills. Had it not been for the numerous dense gardens and orchards in which the flying enemy took refuge, and where the cavalry could not get at them, the punishment of the enemy would have been much greater. Their loss was about 500 killed and the same number wounded, not including those cut up by the cavalry.

Thirty-one of Ayub's guns fell into our hands, the whole of his camp equipage, and a large quantity of ammunition and some grain and forage; also a few mules and an elephant. The 1st Brigade under General Macpherson, remained at Nazra, to guard the captured camp, and a strong picket was posted at the Baba Wali Pass.

The Indian Army.

The letters from India printed from time to time in our columns, as well as the official despatches which have been made public regarding the late operations in Afghanistan, will have prepared our readers for a consideration of those important questions concerning the improvement of the Indian Army, which must before long engage public attention. It will be necessary to decide whether the present system of employing and distributing a portion of the British Army in India is the best that can be devised, but it is undoubtedly of still more vital moment to the welfare of our Oriental Empire that the success of wise economy and dexterous management should mark whatever scheme we adopt for maintaining an army of native Indians. What good and daring service was done by the armies of Madras and Bombay in the troubled days of our early occupation of Hindostan is a matter of history. In later years the army of Madras has seldom seen fighting, and, with the exception of the interval of the Burmese wars in which it was engaged, has led since 1824 a life of almost unbroken ease. Bombay troops have fought more recently, and by their part in the first Afghan war, in the subjugation of Scinde, and in the Mooltan campaign were saved from so early a submission to habits of peace. The advance of our territory and the growing complication of our interests with external affairs towards the north and the west have placed upon the Bengal army the main burden of our later military operations, and it is accordingly the men of that army who to a natural superiority of warlike temperament have added more than any other section of the Indian people, the soldierly virtues created by the trial of active service. When the East India Company first formed its soldiers into battalions, each battalion, numbering one thousand men, had no more than a single European officer, who exercised the command. It was while thus composed that the armies of Madras, Bombay, and Bengal earned the title of brave and active soldiers. The Special Commission appointed in 1879 by the Governor-General of India to inquire into the organization and expenditure of the army in India, says, in its report, with regard to the early merit of these troops:—"During the long wars of the Carnatic and in the fierce campaigns against Mysore, native troops of the Madras and other armies displayed endurance, loyalty and courage, though they were often many months in arrears of pay, though they encountered many privations, and though the history of the native army during these forty years was that of a . . ."


mutiny and disaster. Not only did the disciplined troops of the East India Company vanquish superior native forces led by HYDER ALI and TIPPOO's best captains, but they fought side by side with the King's English foot and horse," and were, it is added, no unequal match for the French soldiers. Later on a larger complement of European officers were given to each corps, and before the Mutiny the regular regiments of the native army, having at least two for each company, possessed in all twenty-five European officers. There had also been formed by this time the so-called Irregular Regiments, whose strength of British officers was only three. Though the Regular Regiments of the Bombay and Madras armies stood by us in the Mutiny, it was mainly the regular regiments of the Bengal army that revolted, while the irregular regiments, with few exceptions, remained faithful, and when after the suppression of the Mutiny, the army of India came to be reconstructed, it was a form of the old "irregular system," which had the advantage of being cheaper, and of providing a career for native officers of ability, that commended itself for the new organization. From that time the native regiments of the Indian Army have had each seven English and seventeen native officers, to the latter of whom is intrusted the command of troops and companies.

The Madras army, though admitted to be now of inferior value has of late been tried little by the test of active service, but of the Bombay army it appears to be unfortunately true that experience has proved its troops to be lacking in some of the qualities necessary in an efficient soldiery. What are the causes of this deterioration in two divisions of our Indian army? The population of Madras seem to have unlearned in a continued life of established tranquillity the lessons of daring and hardihood taught them in the struggles of their earlier existence. British government in Southern India has stopped the wars of native against native, and the sepoys of Madras, accustomed to fighting when we first came among them, have acquired under our strong rule an appreciation of the pleasures of a quiet life. On this point the Commission quotes the verdict of Sir C. Trevelyan, given in 1873, to the Select Committee on East India Finance—a verdict largely supported by general opinion. Sir C. Trevelyan said: "It is a fact that the famous old coast army, which not merely established our supremacy in the South of India, but formed the nucleus of the Bengal native army and fought the battle of Plassy, so that the principal Bengal regiments to the day of their death were called after their old Madras officers, has become a very peaceable, unmilitary, respectable sort of body." But it is by no means certain, or even probable that there has been a similar evanescence of warlike spirit among the troops of the Bombay army, though there would appear to be reason for believing that with them, as with the rest of the native army of India, a flaw in their constitution comes from the paucity of English officers belonging to each regiment. That there is this flaw seems to be admitted in India by a verdict almost universal. The Commission thus records its judgment: "But though we adhere to the system whereby native officers are company and troop commanders, yet we cannot fail to attach weight to the opinion expressed by a majority of regimental commanders, that the present strength of British officers does not suffice for the casualties and requirements of a regiment in the field, and we recommend that the two extra officers hitherto attached in the room of officers absent on furlough or other duty should form part of the sanctioned strength of each regiment." If, therefore, effect is given to the proposal of the Commission in this matter, the number of British officers serving with a native infantry regiment will be raised for the future from seven to nine. On account of a recommendation, connected with a comprehensive reform of the whole Indian Army, to the effect that a fourth squadron shall be added to every cavalry regiment, cavalry regiments under the new scheme will have eleven officers as compared with the seven they have hitherto possessed.


Immediately connected with the question of providing a

sufficient complement of British officers for the native regiments is the discussion of the value of native officers for exercising command over their own fellow-countrymen. At present, in the armies of Bombay and Madras, the native officers are selected solely from among the non-commissioned officers and men. In the Bengal and Punjab armies the same practice prevails, but it is varied by the occasional direct appointment of members of trusted and warlike families to be officers without any preliminary training in the ranks. It is clear that there are many disadvantages in a system which places as officers over bodies of men individual men who have no natural claim to their respect and obedience. In European armies, notwithstanding the rapid growth in Europe of Democratic ideas, it has not yet been found possible, in the provision of persons most suitable to take command of their fellow-creatures, to dispense with the aid of those political and social forces which have formed in the course of ages, and still maintain in the present, distinct classes in each nation. But among the native races of India it is harder still to surmount with success these hereditary barriers. The power of caste and the constitution of society upon the primæval basis of family groups tend to keep each individual closely within the circle in which he is born. A native who has raised himself by superior intelligence and diligence to be an officer over men of his own class must still be subject to family authority, and cannot transcend the strict orbit of his caste. He may as an officer have commanded his elder brother who was in the ranks of his regiment, but so soon as he passes within the precincts of family life, the elder brother resumes over the officer the customary supremacy of the head of the family. It is unnecessary to point out how shallow are the sanctions of a manufactured authority of modern foundation, and how difficult must be the effective maintenance of discipline in the face of forces that have preserved unimpaired for so long this primitive constitution of society. A remedy for the difficulty has been proposed in the appointment of cadets from native families of rank to be officers in the native regiments. Against such a change the regimental officers of the Bombay and Madras armies protest with almost complete unanimity. Such cadets of suitable character, they affirm, could not be obtained in the territories from which their recruits are drawn, and they fear that the distribution of such appointments would destroy the inspiring confidence in a good prospect of high promotion, which at present animates the sepoys in the ranks. On the other hand the regimental officers of the Northern armies are favorable to the plan, and the Commission recommends that in these armies a proportion of the vacancies in the appointments of native officers shall be filled by cadets of good family, for whose education it is proposed to establish a military school. It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of these questions, touching so closely upon the social life of the natives of India, and involving in their settlement the efficiency and value of the Indian Army. Whatever course Her Majesty's Government may take in regard to a sanction of the proposed reforms deserves to be awaited with a general and earnest attention:—*London Times*.

—A correspondent writes: "The 11-inch United States experimental rifled gun has completed 400 rounds and is reported serviceable. The weapon is lined with coiled wrought-iron barrels, placed loose in their casing in the same manner as the Canadian breech-loading guns designed by Sir W. Palliser. The system was recommended for breech-loaders by the Ordnance Select Committee in Woolwich in 1863. In consequence of the success of the experiment the United States have ordered four 40-ton breech-loading guns to be commenced at once."



Canadian B. L. Palliser Rifled Gun.



Light 7-inch Palliser Rifled Gun, as fired doubly-loaded last summer.