



STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

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Statement, by Mr. L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, made in the House of Commons on February 2, 1951.

....We all know that these are fateful days in the relations between nations. Those relations involve many complicated and indeed dangerous issues which at times divide even friends. In dealing with some of them today--and I certainly shall not be able to deal with all of them--there are certain general considerations which I think we should keep in mind.

The first consideration seems to me to be absolutely fundamental: Our belief that freedom is valuable and precious in itself, and that the loss of freedom anywhere in the world means an impairment and indeed endangering of our own freedom. We may not always be in a position to defeat attempts to reduce the area in which men can breathe freely, but we should never voluntarily give our consent to that process, because we know that by so doing we would be betraying the principle which is one of the chief inspirations of all free men. Freedom cannot be cloistered in one country, in one continent, or indeed in one hemisphere. To the limit of our resources, therefore, we must try to maintain and even hope to extend the jurisdiction where the writ of freedom runs. Only in that way can we be true to ourselves and to the inheritance we have received.

The second general consideration which I should like to mention is our faith in the United Nations. The aggression against the Republic of Korea has tested the United Nations in a searching way and has led to a re-appraisal of its role in maintaining the peace of what it can and cannot do in a divided world of two superstates around which all others tend to group, on the one side willingly and on the other side by compulsion. It has certainly been made clear by recent events that our world organization is not yet in a position where it can safely undertake all the tasks which may be imposed on it by resolutions, and I think it is dishonest to pretend that it can. Whatever may be the result of this re-examination, however, it is certain that the United Nations still fulfils a number of functions which are indispensable if peace is to be maintained on any tolerable basis. For one thing, it holds out the promise of freedom to all. Second, it provides a framework in which men of good will can work for their collective defence and for the coming of the day when the rule of law will replace the rule of force in international relations. Third, by reason of its universal character it keeps alive the idea of the human community.

I do not feel that it should be a reproach to the United Nations that its reach exceeds its grasp. None of us can have doubted that the effort to form a world community under the rule of law would be long and difficult and strewn with disappointments. If that were not the case, there would be neither need for faith nor any credit in cherishing it in bad times as well as in good. This is no time to give up on the United Nations. Indeed we would be betraying the United Nations forces fighting in Korea if we denied the loyalty and faith which we owe to the principles of our charter and our world organization.

There is another debt--and this is the third of the general considerations which I think we should bear in mind. We owe it to those men in Korea and to ourselves to make as cool and rational an appraisal as we can of the dangers which threaten the free world, not only in Korea but at many other points as well, and, in the light of that appraisal, to decide what is the proper policy for the United Nations to pursue in the Far East. For many weeks now the headlines have kept us vividly aware of the fighting in Korea. Unless, however, we are careful to cultivate and maintain a balanced judgment, we may forget that there are forces poised at many other points which could quickly strike against the free world. Only if we remember these other dangers can our policy toward China and Korea be soundly based. There is a depressingly large number of such danger spots, and I should like to mention only a few of them.

Moving westward from Korea we must, I think, take into account the danger that overshadows Indo-China. The Chinese guerrillas and volunteers--"volunteers", an ominous word--have long been assisting the Viet Minh in their attacks on the three new associated states of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia. Such indications as we had before June 25 of the possibility of an attack on the Republic of Korea are now appearing in the case of Indo-China; and a full-scale attack on that country must be regarded as a real possibility. If the valiant efforts now being made by France to defend and complete the independence of Indo-China were to fail, the whole of South-East Asia, including Burma, Malaya and Indonesia, with their important resources of rubber, rice and tin might well come under communist control, and the position of India and Pakistan in that event would in the long run, or in the not so long run, be precarious indeed.

Persia and the Middle East are also vulnerable. At the present time the armed forces of the Soviet Union face this area and those vital oil fields, in strength sufficient, I think, to overrun it without too much difficulty.

Across the Mediterranean another country immediately threatened is Yugoslavia. Marshal Tito's government is facing great economic difficulties, partly as a result of the serious drought there last year, and partly as the result of the economic blockade imposed on that country by the Cominform. Moreover, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania are now, contrary to the provisions of the peace treaties, in possession of sufficient military forces to make them collectively powerful, as well as threatening and aggressive, neighbours.

But the danger to the free world is still greatest in Western Europe itself. Recognition of that fact was the reason for the signing of the North Atlantic Pact in the spring of 1949. Since that time progress has been made in increasing the military strength of the countries associated in that pact; but this progress, although it is being accelerated, has not been swift enough to remove anxiety. Western Europe is still relatively weak, and still stands open to Soviet conquest. It is a glittering prize. Its capture would put the Soviet Union in possession not only of the source and centre of western civilization, but also of industrial capacity which would enable them to rival the productive resources of the whole of the western hemisphere. We over here would then be in a desperate position indeed.

It is therefore of the utmost importance that our involvement in other areas of the world should not prevent us from recognizing that Western Europe is the key point for the defence of the whole of the free world--which includes, incidentally, India and Pakistan as well as Canada and the United States; and we should co-operate with our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty in building up forces large enough to deter the Soviet Union from launching an attack in that area.

We in Canada hope and believe that the North Atlantic Treaty, founded as it is on the common values of our common civilization, will also grow into something far deeper than any military alliance--into an enduring association among nations which share the same aims and the same aspirations. We in Canada are making, and will make, the best contribution we can to that end, and we are encouraged in that resolve by developments of the last two or three months.

Hon. members will have had an opportunity of reading the statement of General Eisenhower before Congress yesterday on the subject of North Atlantic preparedness, and the efforts which are being made and still greater efforts which will be required to build up our defensive alliance against any threat of aggression. So far as Western Europe is concerned--and this, I repeat, is the most vital area in the front line of our defence--the effort required is partly military and partly, in the broader sense of the term, political. The free nations of Europe are profoundly aware that their future security and prosperity depend in large measure on the unity which they can achieve among themselves. In this development French statesmanship is playing a great part. indeed, under the wise leadership of Prime Minister Plevin, whom we delight to honour in our assembly today.

If there were not other reasons for pressing ahead with these policies of European unification, the problem of Germany itself would make imperative the need for some form of European unity. If democratic Germany is to play her constructive part in a free Europe, it is essential that she should do so within the framework of a freely co-operative Europe coming closer together, economically, politically and militarily.

The present state of the European continent is, as we all know, one of tragic division. The lines which Soviet aggressive policies have drawn across the continent

run contrary to the political, cultural and economic interests of the European peoples. This unnatural division, which may hold within it the seeds of future conflict, could be ended tomorrow if the Soviet Government sincerely wished to bring it to an end. The three western occupying powers in Germany--the United Kingdom, the United States, and France--have now received from the Soviet Government proposals for a four-power meeting on Germany. I do not intend on this occasion to discuss the character of the Soviet invitation, or the terms of the replies which the western occupying powers have returned to the Soviet Government. Suffice it to say that if a satisfactory basis could be found for their talks--and it has not been found yet--the Canadian Government and I am sure the the Canadian parliament, would welcome such a meeting. On the other hand I think it would be a very great mistake indeed to build great and optimistic hopes on the outcome of any such meeting. The truculence and falsehoods contained in the Cominform declaration on Germany issued at Prague not long ago are not a foundation upon which any genuine negotiation can be founded. Nevertheless we believe that no occasion should be neglected to attempt to achieve an enduring and honourable settlement of differences with the Soviet Union.

These western European dangers and developments must, then, never be forgotten in determining our Far Eastern policy. In formulating that policy--and this is another general consideration--I think we should bear in mind also that here is a new and great tidal movement of nationalism sweeping Asia. In some countries, China for example, it is mingled and confused with, and possibly it is at the moment dominated by, the aggressive forces of Soviet communism. But it is operative in other Asian countries besides China, and it has a vitality of its own. It is something which I believe is deeper and more lasting than communism. Indeed, nationalism--allied to a restless and insistent demand for a better life--is the most important political phenomenon in Asia today. Therefore in framing our policies we must try to avoid offending the legitimate national and social aspirations of Asian peoples, or their desire to have a chief part in the determination of Asian affairs.

We must also do what we can to improve the economic conditions and human welfare in free Asia. We must try to work with rather than against the forces struggling for a better life in that part of the world. Such co-operation may in the long run become as important for the defence of freedom--and therefore for the defence of Canada--as sending an army to Europe, in the present immediate emergency. Economic and technical assistance is one form of such co-operation. Many members in the house will have read the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia. This imaginative, and, I think, well-founded report, which was published last November as the result of the work of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee, points the way to the kind of effective assistance which we in the west can offer to the free peoples of Asia. They stand in very great need of capital for economic development, and of technical assistance. For Canada to supply either the capital or the technical assistance in any substantial volume would mean considerable sacrifice, now that the demands of our defence programme are imposing new strains on our economy.

On the other hand, I personally have been struck by the modesty and good sense with which such countries as India and Pakistan have shown in drawing up plans for their own development for the next six years. The countries of South and South-East Asia which have drawn up programmes for inclusion in the report--with populations involved including nearly one-quarter of the population of the world--state that they require, over the six-year period, external finance to the amount of \$3 billion, the greater part of which will be supplied by the release of sterling balances held in London. I believe that a Canadian contribution to those programmes, even if it has to be smaller than we might be able to make if we were not bearing other and heavy burdens, would have a great effect, not only in doing something to improve the standard of living in that part of the world, but also in convincing the people there of our sympathy and our interest. It is for these reasons that the government has decided to seek the approval of the House for an appropriate Canadian contribution to the Colombo Plan.

In dealing with these Asian problems we sometimes run the risk of differences with tried and dependable allies. And that brings me to another of the cardinal considerations which I think we must keep in mind, the necessity of preserving solidarity with our friends in the west--above all, of preserving unity of purpose and action between the United States and Canada and the Commonwealth of Nations.

During the past few months we have had some differences of opinion with our friends in Washington on Far Eastern questions. While I do not gloss over these differences, I should like to warn against exaggerating their importance, because they have not weakened the basic good understanding between us, resting as it does upon a harmony of abiding interest, and on the recognition of common values and common rights, one of which is the right to disagree as friends with each other, and the other the obligation, again as friends, to resolve these disagreements peaceably.

In spite of certain differences there is complete agreement between the Canadian and the United States Governments on, among other things, four fundamentals; we agree that peace is now in jeopardy; we agree that the extension of Soviet imperialism must be opposed; we agree that the principles of collective resistance to aggression must be maintained; and we agree that the main front which must be defended is Western Europe.

Those, then, are the general considerations shaping our policy--unshaken faith in freedom and realistic faith in the United Nations; awareness of the world-wide scope of the danger threatening us; respect for Asian opinion, and a desire to help the Asian people achieve a better standard of life; solidarity with our partners in the Commonwealth and in the North Atlantic alliance; and the determination to do everything possible to maintain peace.

Now I come to our policy on certain specific matters concerned with Korea and the Far East.

Almost the first issue which arose in this field after the House adjourned last September concerned the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations.

This presented itself in a concrete form at the General Assembly on September 19 last. A draft resolution was presented that day by the Indian delegation calling upon the assembly to decide that the Chinese Government in Peking should represent China at the United Nations assembly. Persuasive arguments could be adduced both for and against such action.

It could be maintained, and it was maintained, that the United Nations would have more chance of dealing effectively with the situation that then existed in the Far East if the Chinese Government, which had effective control of the mainland of China, were represented in its deliberations. It was argued that the United Nations would be a healthier organization if dissenting views were stated within rather than without the organization. On the other hand, it was difficult for governments which had not recognized the Peking regime to see representatives of that regime seated in the United Nations. To seat representatives of the Chinese Communists had also become far more difficult after the attack by North Korean forces on the Republic of Korea had taken place. It was apparent that the Indian resolution, on which our delegation abstained from voting, would not command the required majority in the assembly, and it was suggested--the suggestion in fact came from the Canadian delegation--that the question of Chinese representation should be considered by a special committee. It was hoped that in this way the question could be deferred for a short time until a suitable solution could be reached.

It may be asked why, if our abstention on the Indian resolution showed that we did not actively object to China being represented in the United Nations by the People's Government in Peking, we had not taken previous action in Canada to recognize that government. We had in fact, as the House knows, given serious consideration to such action. We had been impressed by the argument that recognition by Canada and other countries would facilitate the representation of China within the United Nations, and consequently might make easier the peaceful settlement of certain Far Eastern issues. We had nevertheless also been influenced by what still seem to me to be valid views about making such a change at that time, and by advice which we had received from many quarters, including many quarters in this House, to proceed very cautiously in this matter. Furthermore, a number of countries which had recognized the Chinese Communists had had great difficulty in getting the Chinese Communists to recognize them, at least to the point of entering into effective diplomatic relations with them. For example, the United Kingdom had recognized the regime in Peking but it was far from clear that that regime in any effective sense recognized the United Kingdom. Then came the attack on Korea in June. There was much evidence that that attack had been prepared with the approval, and indeed with the support, of the Chinese Communists, and we did not feel justified in taking any action toward recognition until the circumstances surrounding the aggression in Korea had become clearer. I need hardly add that when late last year the Chinese government in Peking joined in the aggression in Korea, it was inconceivable that countries which had hitherto withheld recognition would at that time decide to change their policies.

I feel, however, that the Far Eastern problems could be more readily solved if diplomatic relations existed with the Government of China, which has the whole of the mainland of China under its control. But the Peking Government can hardly expect recognition now from those member states of the United Nations against whom they are fighting in Korea. The remedy for the situation now lies with the Communists themselves. They should not think that they can bludgeon or blackmail their way into recognition or into the United Nations.

The next specific and controversial issue which arose at Lake Success on Far Eastern questions, and which I want to discuss, was whether or not General MacArthur should be authorized by the United Nations to extend military operations beyond the 38th parallel in Korea. The 38th parallel was not important from the military point of view, but it was obvious that its crossing would have political and symbolic significance, indeed as its re-crossing would have even more significance. At this time I do not need to remind the house that it was never intended by the United Nations that Korea should be cut in two along the parallel. In resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations the objective of a free, independent and united Korea had been clearly laid down. Nevertheless, in spite of those resolutions this line, which had originally been merely a line of military convenience, had become a Rubicon, the line which marked in that part of the world a division between the Soviet world and the free world. The decision to authorize the United Nations forces to cross that line could not be taken lightly, and it was not taken lightly.

There were strong reasons at that time for giving such authorization. Although the North Korean forces had been badly defeated by General MacArthur's skilful campaign, large elements had escaped, and those remnants could not be made harmless unless the United Nations commander had the opportunity of pursuing them into North Korea. If they were not overpowered, the risk would remain that, after they had regrouped and been re-equipped, they might once again fall on Southern Korea after the United Nations had been withdrawn. Moreover, as I have stated already on a number of occasions, the United Nations itself had passed resolutions in favour of a united and independent nation in Korea.

The members of the Canadian delegation were impressed by these arguments, and by certain military information given to us, and we agreed, along with a great many other delegations, with the resolution proposed in the United Nations assembly authorizing the United Nations forces to take any action which was necessary to unify the whole of Korea. We, along with others, realized that risks would be involved, and efforts were made in the United Nations to reduce those risks to the minimum. For that purpose we proposed sending a mission which would have been the last appeal to the North Korean Government to give up the fight before the line had been crossed, but we were not successful in establishing communications for that purpose.

After that line had once been crossed, the possibility of an early settlement depended on the campaign in North Korea itself. During the discussions which were had on the crossing of the parallel we had reason to believe that

it was not the intention of the Unified Command to pursue the North Korean forces right up to the Manchurian border. We had reason to believe that a defensive line could be established across the narrow waist of North Korea, and that the two northern provinces of Korea would be left, for the time being at least, as a kind of unoccupied frontier area. That scheme seemed sensible to us, and we hoped it could be carried out.

With many other delegations, including indeed the delegation of the United States of America, we felt that very great care should be taken to avoid offering any unnecessary provocation to the Chinese government at Peking. At the same time we realized, on this and on other occasions, that the Unified Command was responsible for the operations of a force which was very largely composed of soldiers of the United States. That command and those soldiers were bearing the brunt of the responsibility and of the fighting, and they had the full right to make the military decisions within the limits of the authority given them by the United Nations. When those decisions turned out well, we all rejoiced with them. When they were wrong, I think it would have been improper and ungrateful to be unfairly critical and emphasize our own lack of responsibility. However, all of us who supported the action of the United Nations in Korea had not only the right but the duty to make our views known to the Unified Command through the positions we took at Lake Success, and also through our contacts with the United States delegation there.

In this connection it will be recalled that on October 5 last the foreign minister of the Chinese People's Government, Mr. Chou En-lai, stated that his government would not stand aside if the United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel.

That warning came to us through the Indian ambassador at Peking. We ourselves did not think it a sufficient reason for refusing the United Nations commander permission to complete the task which had been assigned to him; but many delegations, including our own, considered it to be a good reason for conducting military operations in North Korea, with, shall I say, great circumspection. So when we began to receive indications that it was intended to carry the campaign to the Yalu river, we expressed our misgivings confidentially to the United States authorities in Washington as early as November 6. It may also be recalled that I publicly made clear the position of the government on this matter when I spoke in Windsor on November 15. On that occasion, after stating that the marches where the free world rubbed together with the Soviet world were obviously the most critical points, I went on to voice this hope:

Those primarily responsible for safeguarding the security of such areas of the world should carry out their mission in as steady and unprovocative a way as possible.

In keeping with this point of view we supported, in private discussions at the United Nations, the proposal that a buffer state should be left along the northern boundary of Korea in order to avoid giving any

excuse for suspicion on the part of the Chinese Government that its legitimate interests might be in danger.

Intervention by China in this war in North Korea on an increasing scale throughout the whole of November brought sharply into view the third of the critical issues with which we have been asked recently to deal. Should we at once condemn this as aggression, or should we enter into discussions, on certain conditions, with the Chinese Communists in an effort to bring it to an end? It seemed pretty clear that a stable settlement in Korea could hardly be achieved without some agreement, even though a tacit one, with the Central People's Government of China; but after the Chinese Government at Peking had intervened in force and were driving back the outnumbered forces of the United Nations at the end of November, some voices--and this is quite natural--were immediately raised in favour of whatever United Nations military action against China itself might be necessary in order to end the war.

We opposed at that time and have continued to oppose any such action against Chinese territory which was not dictated by the most urgent considerations of immediate military necessity. Already such large forces have been committed in Korea that the risk of Soviet or Soviet-inspired attacks at other points, strategically far more important to the free world, is serious. For this and other reasons we have joined from the beginning those who urged that the conflict in Korea should be limited and localized as far as possible; and we still believe that the arguments in favour of that course are as strong as ever.

If, then, a war with China, in which a decision could hardly be achieved, had to be averted by every means possible, what alternative methods were there for reaching a settlement in Korea? Speaking over the air on December 5, I stated my own belief that nothing should be left undone which might conceivably result in an honourable and peaceful settlement in Korea. I went on to say:

If, for example, provided the military situation is stabilized, there could be a cease-fire followed by negotiations--possibly covering more subjects than Korea--in which the Chinese Communists would participate, there might still be hope of reaching such a settlement. At least we would have done our best and the responsibility for failure could be placed where it would belong.

In that same speech, however, I insisted that a cease-fire must precede and not follow peace negotiations, and that is the position from which we have never wavered. I believe we in this government, in this House and in this country are as anxious as anyone to secure a peaceful settlement in Korea, but I think we know that such a settlement would be bought at too high a cost if it denied and betrayed the obligations we, as a member of the United Nations had already undertaken in respect to Korea.

In my view it would have been such a betrayal if we had entered into political negotiations, as distinct

from cease-fire negotiations, with the Peking Government while its troops were still attacking United Nations forces. We have been willing to have the United Nations discuss with the Chinese Communists a settlement in Korea and throughout the Far East, but we have not been willing at any time to ask members of the United Nations to participate in such discussions under duress while their men were being killed in Korea. The point of principle here, and the practical consequences of abandoning it, I think are of such crucial importance that this is one issue on which we have never been prepared to compromise.

There are those in this country who assert, and do so quite often and quite vehemently, that our willingness to seek an arrangement on the issue of a cease-fire first and talks afterwards was dishonourable and, as they called it, "appeasement". Those who hold such views I think are mistaken about the character of our policy and about the nature of appeasement itself. What they have in mind, no doubt, is such action as was taken at Munich in 1938. Appeasement as defined by those events begins with illusions about the potential aggressor, and ends with the betrayal of a friend in response to pressure exercised by that aggressor in the hope that such yielding will give one immunity from attack. How different such a course is from the policy which has been advocated by this government in this matter may be seen by examining the same broadcast in which I suggested negotiations with the Chinese Communists. Having made that suggestion I went on at once to say:

We must not allow this process--or the situation which makes it necessary--to weaken our resolve or interfere with our plan to strengthen our defences. Above all, we must not allow it to weaken the unity or friendly co-operation of those countries in the free world who are now working together so closely for the good purpose of establishing conditions of stability and peace in the world.

In that, and in other statements made at the time, I stressed the danger in which we stood and the sacrifices which it demanded of us. Far from trying to lull our people into a sense of false security by a move which could rightly be interpreted as appeasement, I have said, and other members of the government have said time and again as I say now, that the free world is in the greatest possible danger. A cease-fire in Korea would not have removed that danger, but it would, however, have put us in a stronger position to meet it.

If those of us who have advocated negotiations of this kind with the Chinese Communists are appeasers we are in very good company. It will not, I think, be argued in this house that Mr. Churchill is a man likely to truckle to or appease aggressors. What are his views on the present situation? Speaking in the House of Commons at Westminster on December 14, he said:

The only prudent course open to the United States and ourselves is to stabilize the local military position ...

That is in Korea.

...and if the opportunity then occurs, to negotiate with the aggressors...

Later in the same speech he said:

Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble, and might be the surest and perhaps the only path to world peace.

The United Nations in Korea, as events have now shown is, thanks primarily to the magnificent effort of the United States, not weak or frightened, and it is getting stronger. From that strength I think it will always be wise to negotiate, to "appease", to use Mr. Churchill's words, in order to bring this diversionary and weakening struggle to an end on honourable terms as soon as possible.

One of the vehicles for this so-called appeasement was the United Nations cease-fire committee, on which I had the honour to be associated with the president of the assembly, Mr. Entezam of Iran and Sir Benegal Rau, the Indian delegate. I assure you in taking on that work I was no volunteer. I was the victim of conscription, because it was not a job which anyone would willingly choose. I do not intend today to go into the details of the work of that committee, but there are some things about this particular initiative which I should like to make clear.

In some quarters it has been assumed that this was a sterile, if not dangerous, exercise undertaken by naive idealistic persons merely to placate Asian opinion. It is quite true that the Asian countries had taken the lead in suggesting that a committee should be set up to determine the basis upon which a satisfactory cease-fire could be arranged. It is also true that many other members of the United Nations, including Canada, had been anxious, whenever possible, to take advice from Asian countries as to the best method of restoring peace in the Far East.

I should like to point out, however, that the resolution to establish the cease-fire committee secured the support of all members of the United Nations with the exception of the Soviet bloc. The United States in particular actively assisted and encouraged the members of our committee in their work. The task of the committee was an up-hill one, and often a frustrating one. In one article which I read not long ago we were referred to as three men in search of a cease-fire. Our search was not successful. After we had secured from the Unified Command in Washington a basis for stopping the fighting which we thought reasonable, we tried to enter into effective contact with the People's Government at Peking. But for a long time our efforts were unavailing, and I must say were not treated even with very great politeness.

However, on December 21, the Chinese foreign minister broadcast a reply to our approaches in which he claimed the cease-fire committee had been illegally constituted. He demanded that negotiations for a political settlement should precede rather than follow a cease-fire

in Korea. Such a procedure, of course, was totally unacceptable to us, and to the United Nations. Nevertheless, in spite of this somewhat sharp rebuff it was felt by the United Nations that it might be worth while for the cease-fire committee to make another attempt to convince the regime at Peking of the genuineness of our offer, to which the United States completely subscribed, to enter into negotiations on a wide range of Far Eastern issues if a cease-fire could only be established. After considerable difficulty, we drew up a statement of principles which was presented to the Political Committee of the Assembly on January 11. This statement combined proposals for ending the fighting in Korea with others for political negotiations of outstanding Far Eastern problems. The proposal secured the approval of fifty of the sixty member nations, including the United States and India.

A great deal of the credit for securing such widespread approval of the statement of principles must be ascribed to the fact that, at the time it was being prepared, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers were meeting in London. This was an occasion on which the Commonwealth association was extremely valuable in harmonizing the views of the free nations of the east and west. The Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, played a central role in the discussions in London to reconcile the various points of view.

The first reply from Peking to our statement of principles was certainly ambiguous, though it seemed to be a rejection since it contained an apparent reaffirmation of the theory that a cease-fire must follow rather than precede negotiations. In order to try to remove what we thought might be ambiguity, and indeed turned out to be ambiguity, our Prime Minister suggested to the Prime Minister of India, in a message on January 18, that since the Government of India maintained an embassy in Peking it would be helpful if clarification could be sought through Indian channels to certain points in the reply which the Chinese Communists had returned to our statement of principles. It was in answer to this initiative on the part of our Prime Minister and Mr. Nehru that the Chinese Government provided the clarification requested, in their message of January 22. That clarification seemed more hopeful, since it stated for the first time in fairly clear language that a cease-fire could be agreed upon in the first meeting of a conference called to discuss Far Eastern issues and that this discussion of political issues would not take place until after the cease-fire had been agreed on. That reply was considerably encouraging to some of us.

During the time that these cease-fire discussions were going on, proposals to name the Chinese Communists formally in the United Nations as aggressors had remained in abeyance. As soon as the first reply, that of January 17, was received from Peking, the United States, considering that reply to be wholly unsatisfactory, pressed the other members of the United Nations to proceed without delay with such condemnatory action. That presented our delegation with the fourth and final issue of critical importance about which I wish to say something, especially in view of the amendment to the address in

reply submitted yesterday by the leader of the C.C.F. party. We felt at that time, as indeed the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggarr (Mr. Coldwell) said yesterday, that the passage of such a formal resolution of condemnation in the United Nations at that particular moment, when we had just received the second reply from Peking, would be both premature and unwise. If it were not followed by some action against China, it would throw into high relief the sharp limitations of United Nations resolutions. On the other hand, if it were followed by the imposition of sanctions, however modest against China, the risk of the west becoming involved in a war with China would be increased; and we were and are determined, along with other delegations, to do everything we can to prevent a war with China, whether limited or unlimited. We were all also loath at that moment to support a formal condemnation of China in the United Nations because we felt that the clarification which had come from Peking afforded some possibility of satisfactory negotiation with that regime. There was also a real danger at that time that a resolution of condemnation in the United Nations, in the terms of the United States' resolution as it stood at that time, would unnecessarily highlight and exaggerate differences of view between the Asians and the western members of the free world and indeed bring about a formal division between the members of the western world in the United Nations. Nevertheless there could be no doubt that the Chinese Communists had engaged in aggression and had attacked the forces of the United Nations; and in the last resort we could not refuse, as I saw it, to recognize that situation in a resolution of condemnation if that resolution were pressed to a vote, if it stated the actual position fairly, if it were not couched in unnecessarily provocative terms, and if it included within it provision for negotiation. In all of my discussions with the Indian delegate at the United Nations--and I have had a great many with him in the last two or three weeks-- I made that position perfectly clear to him; and he at no time was under any misunderstanding or misapprehension about the Canadian position.

Last week we had two resolutions before us at the United Nations and we were faced with a decision as to what we should do about them. We realized that that decision might indeed have far-reaching consequences. The first of these two resolutions was the Asian resolution providing for a seven-power conference in which both the U.S.S.R. and communist China would be represented, a seven-power conference not only for political discussions but for cease-fire discussions, and a seven-power conference the terms of the invitation to which seemed to us to be couched in a form which might have made possible protracted discussion with Peking before the conference ever met. For that reason we did not find that resolution satisfactory, and in a speech last Friday January 26^A we suggested certain points which we thought would remove the danger from the Asian resolution if those points could have been included in it, because they would have laid down in a resolution a concrete and definite programme for talks without delay. In those points we even suggested a date for the convocation

^A Statements and Speeches Series, No. 51/3.

of a conference, a place where it might be held and a time limit after which, if Peking did not reply, we would assume that they would not accept it. In those points we tried to remove from the aegis of this seven-power conference--which included a good many states who were not joining in the police action in Korea, including the U.S.S.R., which had refused to support action from the beginning--the negotiations for a cease-fire and send them to a more appropriate body of three; the United Nations Commission in Korea and the United States and the Peking Governments. If those points which we put forward and had discussed previously with the Indian delegation and the United States had been included in the Indian resolution, we would have voted for it. One of them was included. The others were not, I presume because it was felt that the inclusion of those other points might have made it more difficult for Peking to accept the resolution.

The United States' position with regard to our points was a simple one. They felt that the time for any further approach to Peking was over until the resolution of condemnation and setting up the good offices committee had been passed. So when the Asian resolution came to the vote, we could not vote for it, for the reasons which I have indicated. We could not vote against it because the principle of negotiation was one which we had stood for. Therefore we abstained from voting. In our attitude on this matter, so far as Canadian policy is concerned, I do not think anybody in India has any reason to feel that they were let down.

The second resolution was submitted by the United States. We had been unsuccessful in our efforts to secure postponement of that resolution. We had been successful in our efforts to get that resolution changed and also to get it clarified and interpreted by the United States delegate, which interpretation removed most of the doubts we had had with regard to it at the beginning. Our first objective, postponement, was not successful. Our second objective, to get the proper kind of resolution voted on, I think was reasonably successful. We were anxious to make clear beyond any possibility of doubt that any resolution which the United Nations passed on this subject would be exceedingly clear indeed on the following points. We were anxious that it would not establish any new aggression but would emphasize that the Chinese Government at Peking had merely participated in an old aggression and therefore was guilty of that but not of starting a new aggression in any other part of Korea. We were also anxious that the paragraph of condemnation should be couched in unprovocative terms, and it was. That paragraph does not brand anybody as an aggressor. It is a finding of fact that, by assisting the aggressors in Korea and by invading North Korea from China, the People's Government in Peking had itself engaged in aggression. That was a finding of fact which we certainly could not deny. The third point we were anxious to make clear was that the collective measures committee set up by this resolution and as to which many delegations had grave doubts, would not be a vehicle for rash and unwise action but might indeed become a brake on such action; and that this collective measures committee, far from jumping into resolutions and reports on sanctions at once, should not

even report to the United Nations General Assembly as long as there was any possibility of the good offices committee completing its work satisfactorily. That was made clear by an amendment to the United States' resolution proposed by the delegate for Lebanon. Fourth, we were anxious to make it quite clear in this resolution that the work of mediation and conciliation could go on after the resolution passed, and indeed that that work would be given priority over any enforcement. We wanted to make it clear beyond doubt that, so far as the United Nations was concerned, we had not slammed any doors on anybody. And then finally we wanted to make it quite clear that this resolution did not give anybody any authority to take any action which he did not already possess. It certainly does not give the United Nations, or any agent of the United Nations in Asia, any power or right to use United Nations forces to liberate Asia from communism. The mandate of the United Nations in this operation remains the same, namely, to defeat aggression in Korea, and nothing else.

Having had these amendments put forward, and having received these clarifications from the United States delegation, which removed most of our doubts, we felt that to vote against this resolution, or to abstain in regard to it, would have been to refuse to accept as true the statement that the Chinese Government had participated in aggression--something we had no right to do without denying the justice of United Nations action in Korea. Furthermore, it would have meant breaking the unity of the western nations on an issue of timing and tactics. We did not take that course. We voted for the resolution, and I think we were right in doing so. Forty-four other countries, including every member of the North Atlantic alliance, agreed with us.

But we have made our view abundantly clear that this resolution does not give anyone on one side any shadow of excuse for rash and adventurous courses, or anyone on the other any shadow of excuse for refusing to discuss an ending of hostilities or a peaceful solution of this problem. Why should it? It was said at Lake Success by the Indian delegate, and it was said yesterday by the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell): "You have now branded them as aggressors. How can you expect them to talk to you?" Well, they have been branding us in the United Nations as aggressors steadily for the last two or three months, and they have shown no reluctance to talk with us on their terms, or any feeling that we should not talk with them because they have called us aggressors in very rude and uncivilized tones. So I am optimistic, and I hope my optimism is justified, that the passing of our resolution will not be followed by the catastrophic consequences that some people sincerely believe will result.

We do not believe that by passing this resolution we are slamming the door to subsequent negotiation, or that the Government in Peking would have any justification for interpreting our action in this way. I hope, and I expressed this hope in my last statement at the United Nations before I came back to Ottawa, that whatever happened to this resolution--and it is now part of the law of the United Nations--the work of cease-fire, discussion and peaceful settlement, through the machinery provided in the

resolution, will proceed with a view to ending the war in Korea and removing the causes of war in other areas of Asia.

That is our position. It is not one which, in my opinion, warrants support for the amendment^A of the C.C.F. party which is now before the house. To support that amendment would, I think, be to accept the despairing but sincere plea of that wise and saintly gentleman, Sir Benegal Rau, that by passing this resolution we had ended all hope of a peaceful solution of Far Eastern questions. I do not accept any such counsel of despair; and I hope that the Indian Government, on second thought, will not do so either, and will continue to participate in the work of negotiation and conciliation, to which it has already made such a magnificent contribution. We in this government will do what we can, in any way open to us, to assist that work, and to prove that the prophets of impending calamity are wrong. And events may, I think, work in our favour along this course. I am even bold enough to think that the Chinese Government in Peking will come to realize before long that the true interests of the Chinese people cannot be served now by an alliance with Russian Communist imperialism, as they could not be served in the past by Russian czarist imperialism.

In conclusion, I return from Asia to our own western and North Atlantic world. Here we are now entering the period of greatest danger in the months ahead. Our hope of coming through this period without war lies in the growing collective strength, military, economic and moral, of the free world. If we increase that strength, and use it wisely, we do not need to fear. There are in the hearts and minds and souls of free men qualities which can never be matched by slaves. If we use them we shall accomplish our own salvation. If we do not, but give way to smug complacency on the one hand or unreasoning panic on the other, we shall become, and deserve to become, slaves ourselves.

May I end with a paragraph from a magazine often quoted in this house and elsewhere, namely, The Economist. Writing on January 20 last, the editor said:

Nothing is certain about the course of events in 1951; and anyone who questions this should ask himself frankly what he was prophesying for 1950 just a year ago. The die is not cast for war or peace; events can still be controlled and minds influenced, but only if the leaders of the Kremlin can be convinced that they have equally little to hope from pressing an armed attack on the free world or to fear from withholding it. Neither strength alone nor peace

^A"We further regret that while Your Excellency's advisers have generally followed a constructive course in relation to the Korean dispute, they have in relation to the resolution branding China as an aggressor supported a course which is premature and unwise at this particular moment, and which should not have been pursued until the methods of peaceful negotiation had been completely exhausted."

alone is an adequate cry for the west--neither rearmament alone, which is the means of the one, nor negotiation alone which is the means of the other. The only hopeful policy is peace through strength, arms and diplomacy.

s/c