



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



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



DUNNETT'S ESSAY.

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AN ESSAY,

CONCERNING THE

Philosophy of the Memory

AND THE

LAWS WHICH GOVERN IT;

ALSO, OF THE

NATURE AND POWER OF THOUGHT.

BY THE

REV. SAMUEL DUNNETT.

BRANTFORD:

Published by the Author,

PRINTED AT THE OFFICE OF THE BRANTFORD COURIER.

1862.

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BY

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PRINTED:

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1824.

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OF
THE MEMORY.

INTRODUCTION.

In introducing this little work to the public, my principal apology is, should any be desired, or looked for, my ardent desire to serve, though feebly, the cause of truth. And I consider that a thorough knowledge of this great and invaluable principle, especially in so far as it relates either to Natural, Mental, or Moral Philosophy, to be essential to the social, civil, moral and religious happiness of our race. And therefore *truth* being public property, claims protection from every virtuous mind. Hence whenever *truth*, which has a direct, or even an indirect bearing upon the intellectual, moral, or religious interests of men, comes to be concealed or distorted, any effort which may be put forth in an honorable way, having due regard to the opinions and feelings of others, with a view to correct mistakes, (through oversight or errors transmitted, or adopted from others, or originated by themselves,) and present this priceless pearl in its proper dress, and in its real character is, in the humble opinion of the writer, a sufficient apology for any effort of this kind, even though the object contemplated thereby might not in every respect be secured, or especially, be immediately realized. I most frankly confess however that I am not a little astonished at myself, and it is only natural for me to think that many who might condescend to read this little book,

will wonder at my boldness in presuming to dissent, especially in so public a way, from popular theories which have been advanced by great and learned men, and which have glided gracefully, rapidly, and easily on the current of popular opinions, from generation to generation, and are brought down to the present time, relating to the *Philosophy of the Memory*.

1. I have ventured to differ with those who use the term "faculty of the soul" to apply the memory without giving the explanations which the real nature of the case require. The Memory, we admit, is a "faculty of the soul," *i. e.*, if the term "faculty" is understood to mean all the various powers of the soul. But inasmuch as there is a distinction in those powers, and a difference in their dependancy and the degrees of that dependancy on each other, it comes to be a question whether the simply using of the term "faculty of the soul" to describe the *reason*, *imagination* or the *memory* is sufficient to place any one of them in their proper light. If we use the term "faculty of the soul" to the memory, and only use the same term to the perception or consciousness of the soul, without any more explanation than the terms themselves contain, and seeing that the term "faculty" is used to mean the same in kind and degree, in the same individual person at all times, how shall we ever know the difference between an element of the soul, and an act of the soul? If all the powers of the soul are to be designated faculties, then an explanation of the difference should be given of the different classes of those powers. This however does not come within the limits of my plan. Yet I would venture to ask if *perception*, *consciousness*, *sensation*, and the *will*, do not constitute the elements of the soul? And these, if I were permitted, I would call "faculties of the soul," and the others such as reason, imagination, memory, &c., I would call "powers" as they are the result of the action of the other four, but if all must be called "faculties," I have no objection, providing that the distinction

be kept in mind as it exists in nature. 1. In nature there are the elements which make the soul. 2. There are the powers of the soul. The memory I conceive not to belong to the first class, but to the second.

2. I have ventured to dissent also, from the popular views in reference to the nature of its office, which is supposed to be to recollect and lay up the thoughts for future use. Much as I esteem the name of Locke, Reed, Watts, Upham, and others who have written on this subject of Mental Philosophy to enlighten mankind, yet on this point, the *memory*, I beg to differ from them. And I wish at the same time to show why, and also to show where I think they, and all others who have adopted their theory, have misapprehended the nature and office of the memory.

I hope that no one will mistake the object of the writer which they surely will if they suppose this work was intended for the learned—it is not designed for those deep thinking intellects, and who have given that time and attention to the study of mind which the importance of the subject demands—and who can discriminate minutely between right and wrong—who can compare human experience with metaphysical speculations on the nature and office of our intellectual faculties ; but it is for those who have not had these advantages, and consequently are not placed in such favourable circumstances. Hence, we have good reason to hope that this effort, weak as it is, and powerless as it necessarily will be on the more intellectual and learned portion of the community because it does not come up to their standard, will not be depreciated by them, seeing it aims at another class of society.

It appeared to the writer that notwithstanding much has been ably written on the Philosophy of the mind, yet something more

was needed to be said on that important power which we call the memory, seeing it has not received, in my opinion its proper share of attention. How far this little book will go towards supplying that deficiency will be for the reader, and not for the writer to determine.

Those impediments too that stand in the way of an easy and rapid development of our intellectual powers, and those rules for improving the memory at which I have glanced, I hope will be carefully examined, and especially by the youthful reader.

I have purposely laboured, according to the best of my ability, to condense my remarks on every topic discussed, so as to say as much as I could in the smallest possible space. This I have done principally, for two reasons. 1st, To save the time both of the reader and writer, and 2d, To save unnecessary expense. Much more might have been said on almost every point discussed especially on some, but we think enough has been said on each particular to fully explain our views on the Philosophy and Identity of the Memory, which is the principal object at which we aim.

PHILOSOPHY

OF

THE MEMORY.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE FREQUENT USE OF THE TERM MEMORY, AND DIVINE BENEVOLENCE.

Section 1: *Memory.* The memory is a term of very frequent use—of every day occurrence. It is used in many cases, hundreds of times, in one shape or another, by the same individual in the course of a few hours. And the term *memory*, has hitherto, and is at the present time used, perhaps, by a great majority of mankind, to represent what they have been taught to believe, and do believe, (if they have any belief about the matter at all) to be a faculty of the soul. In virtue of the exercise of this "faculty," all who believe in its existence attribute their knowledge of past events to its influence and action. That there is such a power associated with every mind, no matter how strong and capacious, or how minute and diminutive that mind may be, to remember the past in a greater or less degree, is a

truth which will be readily conceded. And this power we designate by the term *memory*. And with the existence of such a power and its mode of operation there are many things connected which are of the deepest possible interest to every rational mind. And things too which authoritatively demand our most sincere attention and ardent investigation—truths indeed of incalculable, yea of infinite worth, but which facts, sentiments, practices, doctrines, &c., notwithstanding their importance, without attention, perseverance and deep research, will never appear within the consequent circumscribed sphere of our mental vision in their full and proper light. Indeed the more we look at the action of the memory the more we are astonished at its amazing energies. And although we are comparatively lost in the mystery connected with its complicated and astonishingly active operations, yet intimately associated with its origin and peculiar modifications, with all its power, strength and action, may be seen in legible characters by every truly reflecting mind, the indelible impress of Infinite Wisdom, Benevolence and Power. Yes, the benevolence of the great Author of the Universe is most clearly seen, and forcibly felt, while a reflective mind minutely examines the powers and modifications of the memory, fully as much so as in any faculty of the soul. This great truth is one that should not only be appreciated and applied to the purposes of life at the present time, but one that is worthy to accompany us through all the journey of future life as a suitable companion, a profitable handmaid, a philosophical instructor, a theological expositor, and one that will serve, to a mind inclined to piety, to which great practical principle all minds should tend, like water, to a common level, as a constant stimulant to faith and virtue. The real value, however, that such a sentiment would prove to us, cannot be fully ascertained without a thorough, impartial, and deliberate investigation into its nature and associations.—Hence, when we speak of the Benevolence of God in the construction of the mind, and endowing that mind with a power to remember, that is to say, with a power to know the past, we not only look at the existence of the power by which we go into the past, and the actual and positive advantages which we derive from the action of *that power*, but we are inclined also to look at its opposites. In fact, we find it exceedingly profitable to look at those matters of Providential interposition, not only

positively to see what we are with them, but negatively, to see what we would be without them. The very acknowledgment, whether publicly or tacitly, that the mark of Divine Benevolence is engraven in the human memory, naturally enough suggests to the mind that is open to the force of truth, a train of thought something like the following: "Had the Almighty seen proper to make man without the capacity to remember, and to continue that existence through a series of generations, what might we naturally suppose would have been the consequences?" To which we might answer, had man been created without a memory, whatever might have been his other qualifications or endowments, whatever intellectual or physical excellences he might have possessed or presented, he would after all have been entirely incapacitated to answer the purposes of human life—entirely unfit for either social, civil, intellectual or religious enjoyment.

Every person knows, I presume, that the enjoyment of civil life depends, in a great measure, upon our knowledge of the civil compact, *which implies*, a knowledge of the science of political government and of the propriety and necessity of a judicious civil administration, a knowledge of the customs and usages of nations and the principle on which any law having a general application is founded. Intellectual enjoyment depends chiefly upon our knowledge of the intellect, its powers and operations, its capacities and the uses to which they may be applied. It implies a knowledge of those laws by which the mind expands, strengthens, and by which it becomes invigorated—a knowledge of the will, the perception, the consciousness, the judgment; also the moral faculty and its office in the soul, a knowledge of the motives, the desires and the actions, with a knowledge of the memory which reveals them. Social enjoyment is derived from a knowledge of others, their disposition and qualities; from the presence of others, their manners and conversation, all of which brings us into the past. And every person can see that there can be no religious enjoyment *without gratitude*, which virtue is a legitimate offspring of our knowledge of the past. Or, in other words, which perhaps will be more comprehensive, we would say, had we no power to remember we could possess no grateful feelings, and if we are not grateful we are not religious. So that although

we had been made intellectual beings, and with a moral faculty as we now are, yet, being at the same time destitute of memory the moral sense would have been nearly, if not altogether, useless. Here let me observe, and, O! may this truth be deeply impressed on the youthful reader who may peruse this little book, that, if there were no other argument to be found within the wide range of the human mind to prove a wise and benevolent design in the formation of man, the existence of the memory, its amazing energies, its inconceivably rapid movements, its numerous laws, their actions and the effects of them on the emotions and upon every sense and power of the soul, *this would be sufficient.*

Facts of this kind, which are within the reach of all, and which are to be seen too in such vast numbers and so great in their magnitude, by the simplest process of reasoning, suggested by observation, and drawn from this source alone, must surely be sufficient to bring pungent conviction to the most sceptical mind, if he would but take time and pains to investigate, or, in other words, if he will but refrain from offering violent resistance to its force, that we have in the human memory an amplitude of ever living and irresistible arguments as clearly demonstrated, that Infinite wisdom, benevolence and goodness, as well as Infinite power, are seen in the formation of memory, as any demonstration ever was or ever will be. And from its uniform and constantly active operations, we know, with as much certainty as we know that we exist, that it is constantly adding to the social, intellectual and moral happiness of all who are disposed to act from right principles. Therefore it was given to us for a wise and gracious purpose. This is the only legitimate and rational conclusion to which we can come; consequently we conceive the opposite of this to be false.

Sec. 2: Importance of understanding the nature and strength of the Memory. The fact that there is something within us that tells us, in language which we cannot fail to understand, that we lived yesterday, or that we have been in a certain place, and that we have been in such and such circumstances, ten, twenty, thirty, or fifty years ago, as the case may be, is a fact as universally acknowledged as the existence of that consciousness which tells us that we live at the present time.

This something that tells us these things is what we call memory. And yet it does appear, notwithstanding the universal existence, and the universal acknowledgment of the existence of that operative *something*, to be a fact and a lamentable one too, that the nature of the memory, and the laws which govern it is a subject with which the great majority of men, even in this age of light and intellectual improvement are no better acquainted than an untaught pagan is with the science of Scriptural Theology, and the practical working of Gospel truth. In fact this subject, the "Philosophy of the Memory" notwithstanding its importance, and how deeply it ought to interest every intellectual and moral being, seems to the great majority to have no beauties in it that they should desire a knowledge of its practical workings. And being so indifferent to the nature of the memory they will use but little effort to become acquainted with the laws which govern it, and are therefore ignorant of its powers. In consequence of this indifference, and unpardonable ignorance, they soon become through this neglect, doomed to vacillation and doubt in regard to the past, and perplexed with fears, and wild in their calculations for the future, are necessarily unsuccessful more or less in their business, and as a natural consequence do entail upon themselves, and frequently upon their posterity, an incalculable amount of physical and mental suffering, which a little intellectual industry and precaution might have prevented. If this is true, it follows as a matter of course that it is a duty which we owe to ourselves and to others, and which cannot be neglected with impunity, to labour hard and spare no pains to understand the philosophy of the memory, its capacity and its use. Hence, it becomes an imperative duty from personal considerations of intellectual and pecuniary advantages, to prize the memory highly, to foster it carefully, to strengthen it by action, to employ it constantly, and so improve it. And yet were we obliged to resort to arguments and incentives remote from all personal considerations, the very fact of having power to remember is sufficient to attract the attention of all rational intelligences, to excite their admiration, and also to increase the gratitude of every one who values, as he ought, the free and inestimable gifts of God.

Sec. 3. The action of the Memory. When we say that there is no power of the mind more active than the memory,

we not only speak a great philosophical truth, but we speak also the experience of every rational being. For we know it is almost constantly operating during our waking moments, and frequently when we are asleep. We also know that we are continually depending upon *this source*, and upon this alone for all the knowledge we gather from the past. And the greatest part of the knowledge which we possess comes from the past, indeed I cannot perceive how it is possible to know anything, that is, in the ordinary way of getting knowledge, unless it is derived from the past. It is true, we might, and would, have present perceptions, but they are fleeting as the moments, and are constantly passing away on the wings of time, or in other words, we are constantly passing away from them. The truth of this, and the natural force of *this truth* will be easily enough perceived by any one who might be disposed to watch intently the actions of his own mind for the short space of five minutes. It will be seen, and the fact will be felt, and an honest man will be forced to confess that we cannot hold before the mind one truth, be the same great or small, not even for the space of one moment, or a second, or the thousandth part of *a second*. These events, whatever may be their nature, will remain in the past the only possible sphere of their existence, and we can no more hold them than we can arrest the progress of time, or the motion of the earth. So that the scenes of the present, however much we may be interested in them, exist only in the past when *that moment* which first produced them is gone, or more properly speaking when we are gone from it. And as all present time is *so fleeting*, and passes from us with such rapidity and does not afford sufficient material from which to draw what information we require for the purposes of life, and as past time is so much more abundant and fruitful in events, we necessarily have to resort to it. And though *this moment* which is now present time, will never, so long as eternal ages roll their rounds, be present time again, but will always be past time, yet we can have access to it, however remote that particle of time may be, and at our leisure, by the helps of the memory, we can draw information, fully reliable, and of the most important and useful character. In view of these indisputable facts, it must appear more or less interesting to every intelligent being to be able to know the process by which the

memory makes us acquainted with the past. This process we shall endeavour hereafter to explain.

Sec. 4: A power in us by which we think. Now, as every person knows he has a power by which he thinks, that is to say, he has a power, which we frequently designate by the term "faculty" by which certain impressions called "ideas" are made, and are being constantly made, which we call thoughts; the simple meaning of this is, according to our understanding of it, that we have a faculty in us, and which is born with us, by which we perceive present events that are within our own sphere of action. And it is equally true, and equally clear to the most ordinary conception, and consequently as readily discovered, and admitted, that the mind has also a power to perceive the past. Now that intellectual state in which the mind is found while perceiving the past, we commonly represent by the term remembering. This term "remembering" is understood by some to represent a peculiar action of the mind, in the past, by which action it recollects, or gathers together the events which exist in any given space of past time; but the use we intend to make of the term "remember" is to express the reperception of any event, or of any specific number of events, without any reference to this supposed collecting of thoughts by literally gathering them, and placing them in juxtaposition. And therefore "remembering" is a term which we design to use, for the following purposes, and no other, viz.: to represent two distinct states of mind, namely, perception of that which is in the past, and a consciousness that the thing so perceived has been, or has not been, as the case may be, perceived by the mind before.

Sec. 5: Of the use and application of different terms to the memory. This mental state which we call "remembering" like everything else in nature is represented by different terms, and considering that words are only signs of our thoughts, and are always used to represent our perceptions to others, whether these perceptions are in the present or in the past, and are also quite arbitrary in their rule of action, it will make but little difference what words we use, providing nevertheless they fully express, according to the general meaning and application of words, the nature of our perceptions. But when any term or

any number of terms obtain common consent by the approbation of public opinion as being proper to apply to *such* and *such* things, when they are not thus applied *we* who make a part of the public who have approved of such application, cannot but feel that we have just cause of complaint. For it must be obvious to all, that when words are used which do not express the real nature of our perceptions, they are calculated to perplex and embarrass both our own minds and the minds of others, and it will tend to lead us from the truth instead of directing us to the truth. It happens sometimes with writers and public speakers that half a dozen or perhaps a dozen words are used where one word would answer every purpose, both for explanation and application. This we would call tautology, repetition or a useless multiplication of words. And we look upon this practice as not only unpleasant to the eye of the reader, or offensive to the ear of the hearer, but one for which the more intelligent part of mankind feel unwilling to make any allowance, or to receive any apology, or extend any pardon. If then the useless repetition of words, for the purpose of making a long discourse, or a large book, excite our displeasure, how much more so should we feel to dissent from the practice of misapplying words, and calling things by wrong names, and which also have not obtained public consent? If for example, I should say that I sat at my writing desk and call my children, who all obey that call and rally around me, so that I have them all before me at once, the words which I have used are such as would justify every person to suppose that my children heard my voice and left their various occupations, the one lays down his book, another his top, and a third his composition and actually comes to the place where I was sitting, what else could any one suppose? Now, it turns out that they, the public, have misapprehended my meaning, because instead of their coming to me, I wished to be understood to mean, by what I said, that I went to each of them, in this and all similar cases the public are not in fault, but I am in fault, because the very words that I have used, and the manner in which I have used them, would lead to no other conclusion than, that *they came to me*, whereas *I went to them*. I would therefore observe, with all defference to those great men, that the language of some writers on the Philosophy of the mind, is calculated to lead the illiterate to the same conclusion, that is, the opposite

of the truth, and to embarrass, to perplex, and confuse them, instead of helping them. And therefore persons who write for the public, or who speak to the public, as teachers, should be careful never to misapply words whose meaning have become established by common consent on the plea that "words are arbitrary," or that the wise and learned will understand the use of words from the "tenor of the discourse." It is not for the wise we write, but to instruct the ignorant, therefore words which express the simple naked truth, language that will come down to the illiterate, even to the child, should not be considered beneath the dignity of any mind however strong he may be, whose object is to enlighten his fellow beings, and defend the cause of truth.

Sec. 6: *Of words, of figures, and of facts.* It is a truth which is readily admitted that we can speak but seldom, on any subject, that is long enough to be called a conversation, without using comparative terms, or accomodated phrases. But though we claim this right, which public opinion has granted in all ages, to use such expressions, we must still bear in mind that our latitude even in this respect should be bounded by common consent, and the sense of the subject. Hence, when we have a knowledge of any particular portion of the past, we merely say for brevity sake, "we remember" which term is not only perfectly harmless, but quite appropriate because it merely expresses our knowledge of the past without any reference to the mental process or mode of action by which we obtain such knowledge. But to use the following popular phrases commonly used by scientific men is, notwithstanding unwarrantable because it does not, and indeed cannot express or lead an illiterate person to form anything like a just idea of the action of the mind in remembering. The expression to which we allude is this: "when we remember we called from the deposit of the mind those thoughts which are there laid aside for future use." Now, this manner of speaking, though very common, and also very popular, does not express the nature of the memory and its mode of operation, any more than it expresses the nature and uses of a crowbar, or explains the mystery of the philosopher's stone. For whatever might have been the idea which those learned men entertained in reference to the nature and mode of operation of the memory, the words which they use,

their manner of expression is calculated to misrepresent its real nature, and its natural mode of operation. Because, the explanation of the memory, and its manner of operation as given by them in this quotation which in substance is this: *that the office of the memory is to lay aside those thoughts which come under the mind's notice and call them up as occasion may require.*

This explanation of the memory and its mode of operation as given above, has been, and still is, regarded as satisfactory by the generality of men. The principal reason appears to be that, like many other things of equal, and some, if it is possible, of paramount importance, it has been received on trust rather than go to the necessary trouble of investigating into its propriety and truthfulness. And as the knowledge of Philosophy and literature have been for centuries past principally confined to the higher schools, and is yet to some considerable extent, although in this respect the present age is very far in advance of the past, yet there is still but a small proportion of mankind, that have access to those higher institutions where the sciences are taught with that facility, and to that perfection as to fully meet the wants of men. And as the mass of men in every age and country, have either been contented to remain in ignorance altogether, or take on trust the speculations and Metaphysical explanations of those who had aspired to higher professions, and in a great measure, it is so still, therefore *the explanation* of the memory now under consideration, and to which we object, has hitherto been satisfactory, and still is, so far as our knowledge extends. We have taken the liberty at different times to introduce the question, for the purpose of information, but have not had the good fortune, as yet, to find one person who has given sufficient attention to the subject to enable him to detect the popular error to which I allude, and it is difficult so far as my experience goes to find any one who has thoroughly investigated the Philosophy of the memory, so as to enable him to give a satisfactory explanation of its nature and office, in any other way than by adopting the thoughts and theories of others. We repeat it, that we have never, not even once in our life, heard the "Philosophy of the explanations of the memory" as given above, called in question. It has passed down from the father to the son, from the teacher to his scholars, from generation to

generation, as an established truth in its stereotyped form, no one appears to intercept its progress, and it claims universal homage, principally on the ground of its antiquity, and the claim is almost universally obeyed.

We often read, and hear, from the social circle, the pulpit and the lecture-room, of thoughts "laid in the memory," or thoughts laid in the "countless chambers of the brain," but no one has ever attempted to explain, or even professes to be able to explain to us what this laying aside means; no one who adopts this theory has as yet been kind enough to show mankind the proper place of their deposit. They tell us, it is true, that they speak figuratively, but what satisfaction is this to unlearned people? But are men justified in using a figure and living in profound ignorance of the relative fact? If thoughts laid aside in the "countless chambers of the brain" is used as a figure, we have no objection, providing it is so explained and so understood. Men have a right to use figures, but then these figures are designed to represent facts, and every one who hears the figure has a right to enquire after the fact. It is the fact we desire; figures are good, but facts are better. And for any one to write or speak in ironies, hyperboles, or figures, and have no facts, is to spend his precious strength for naught, like one who beateth the air. And it is a little remarkable that those who have dealt so freely and fluently in what they call figures, have not seen fit to give us the fact at all. This would lead us to conclude that there is no fact to which the figure will apply.

When we say that the wicked man shall be cast into the bottomless pit, we use a figure, and a very strong one, and we are justified in the use of it because it is in the bible; but the same good book suggests to us its corresponding fact: where is it? We answer, in this, that he shall be shut out of heaven and shall be sensibly confined in eternity. When we say that wicked men shall suffer the fire of hell and brimstone, we use a figure, but we have an idea at the same time of its corresponding fact, that is, that they shall be punished extremely in another world. In like manner when we speak of good men receiving and wearing a "crown" on their heads in another state of existence, and "palms in their hands," and dwelling in a city whose streets are

of pure gold, &c., we make use of a figure, and where is the fact? We answer, the *crown* is descriptive of honour, the *palm* of victory, *golden streets*, of a glorious residence, &c. Now, in speaking of the mind of man, that thoughts are laid in the mind, or in the memory, or especially when we say they are laid in the brain, it is not sufficient to say "we use a figure," supposing that this will justify for the latitude we use, and the liberties we take with language, unless we can show, especially when called upon to do so, something like corresponding facts.

Now, memory, as we before remarked, is that power of the mind by which we come to know things that have passed under our former observation. And thoughts in the memory, if any meaning can attach to it at all, must surely mean thoughts before the mind. Now, there is no difference that I can perceive between the expression "thoughts before the mind," and thoughts that are "present to the mind." If, then, those thoughts that are "laid in the memory," means the same as thoughts "before the mind," and thoughts before the mind means thoughts that are present to the mind, it would follow as a necessary consequence, that the mind must have a knowledge of all those thoughts said to be laid in the memory. On this principle of argument it will be seen that no circumstance that has ever come under the mind's observation can possibly be forgotten. Because if the theory is correct that thoughts are to be laid in the mind, and thoughts that are forgotten are to be laid in the memory, those that are not forgotten, of course, are also present to the mind. And if those that are forgotten are laid up in the memory, that is the same as to be "laid up in the mind," consequently they would all be present to the mind. It is something strange that those close thinkers who have made such great discoveries, and brought to light so many interesting truths relating to mental philosophy, should have failed to see these palpable inconsistencies. The inconsistency of this theory to which we allude may be seen by a simple process of argument, commencing at the proposition that memory implies a "calling up of the thoughts that are laid in the mind," we shall soon be forced to the conclusion that a man can forget nothing. And yet this conclusion, to which we must arrive, will be such as contradicts the experience of all men. Because it is universally acknowledged that a very great part of those things which come under

our observation, come to be lost sight of by the mind, and consequently forgotten for the time being, and many of them are never perceived again. Hence, it comes to be an acknowledged fact in our experience, that some thoughts, that is to say, *some perceptions*, which we have had, and we know that we have had such perceptions in times past, not because we can now perceive them in detail, for that would be to have them as before, but we have a consciousness of a kind of outline, although we have forgotten the minute particulars, which we may not perceive again for years, and perhaps never. Now, as these thoughts, whether they be few or many, great or small, of great importance or of no consequence, are forgotten, they are therefore not remembered, and if they are not remembered they are not present to the mind; and if they are not present to the mind they are not laid up in the mind. Our intention, however, for the present, is to confine our enquiry more particularly to those thoughts that appear to return to the mind at certain intervals, or, in other words, to enquire how the soul obtains a knowledge of events that have so long ago transpired, and whether it can or cannot be said of them that they are shelved up in the memory.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE POSITION OF THOUGHTS WHEN THEY ARE FORGOTTEN.

Sec. 1: *Thoughts not shelved up in the memory.* To understand this matter correctly we will need to be very explicit, and perhaps may have to indulge in a little repetition. Therefore we would remark that the business of the memory is to take cognizance of the past, as it has nothing to do with the present, nor with the future. And no power of the soul can notice, perceive, and know the past but the memory. But this does know the past. And if memory implies to know the past, and if to know the past implies the calling up of those thoughts that have been "deposited in the memory," the mind must of necessity have a consciousness of their deposit, viz. must know the place where they are laid, as well as the number of those thoughts deposited, and also the proportionate strength and nature of each thought. This, so far as we are able to perceive must be the case, unless it were possible for thoughts to exist in the mind, of which the mind at the same time has no knowledge. Should it be urged that thoughts can exist in the mind of which the mind has no knowledge, the query would then be how any man could convince himself that thoughts exist in his mind about which he knows nothing, of which he has no consciousness whatever. It looks to me that a man would find himself as much embarrassed, and perplexed in attempting to convince himself of a proposition of this kind being true, as he would be, should he attempt to convince himself that he is not the same man that he is, but that he is another man altogether. And he would, were he to test both by his own original powers, meet with no more success in the first proposition, than he would in the last. Now, the same obstacles, both in regard to number and magnitude would exist, were we to attempt the same imposition on any other person, who is capable of appre-

ciating an argument, and has decision enough to chose the right and reject the wrong, because the theory, which we here repudiate, being so completely destitute of proof, he who adopts it must fail when it is brought to the test, seeing he cannot appeal to the judgment or consciousness of himself, or those of any other person, with the least chance of success. To say that thoughts are "laid up in the memory" merely because a certain train of thoughts which we once had and have forgotten for a considerable length of time, perhaps several years, appear again to the mind, that is, come again under the mind's observation, proves nothing to the point, so far as we can perceive. Neither would an assertion of this kind, that "thoughts are laid up in the memory" because they appear again after having been forgotten, afford the least satisfaction, or be in the least appreciated as an argument, but would be looked upon only in the light of a declamation, by any person who is accustomed to look into the nature of things and judge for himself. To say that thoughts are in the memory and at the same time are not present to the mind, is in substance the same as if we should say we remember that which is not present to the mind. And in fact every one tacitly admits this who holds to the doctrine of shelving up in the memory, thoughts for future use. This being shelved up seems to imply, that while they are "shelved up" they are forgotten, which is just as much of a contradiction as it would be to say; we remember that which we have forgotten, we know that which we do not know, we perceive that which we do not perceive, we feel that of which we have no sensation. It must be obvious to every person, who will reflect a moment, that thoughts which we do not *now remember*, although they were once present to the mind, and at which time we had a knowledge of them, because we perceived them; yet the soul has no more knowledge of them *now* seeing it does not remember them, than it has of perceptions which it never had. The question then which we need to understand is this: Do these thoughts, while they are forgotten, lay in any department of the mind? To this we answer, if they do we conceive it is possible to find them out, although this can only be done by the person himself, yet surely it can be done by him if they lay on his mind, as it is said those thoughts do that are forgotten. To admit the opposite would be fatal to our moral accountability, because, if one class of thoughts are in the mind of which the soul is not

conscious, why should there not be another class in the same position? And if thoughts lay in the mind of which we are not conscious of their exsitence, we of course would be ignorant of their nature, whether they are good or bad, and therefore could not with any degree of justice be held accountable for such mental operations. Therefore the doctrine that teaches that thoughts which are forgotten are laid in the memory, we conceive to be a great philosophical error, and one which, when properly investigated, if fully believed must effect, more or less, our belief in the Christian Scriptures, the Goodness of God, and our conduct towards him.

Sec. 2: *Thoughts forgotten.* Thoughts which we have forgotten appear to be nothing more or less than events or circumstances, which were once present, but when *forgotten* are absent from the mind, or more properly speaking the mind is absent, viz: it leaves them. And this appears to be the view which the *mind* is naturally inclined to take of it when it exercises its own original powers free from any previous bias. Such expressions for example, as the following, when reference is made to us of past events which we know were once observed by some one present, the person to whom the reference is made, if he has forgotten the circumstance at once makes use of the very familiar and common sense phrase, "the thing is out of my mind," or, "it has escaped my mind." The first is philosophically correct, the second is designed to convey the same idea, but must be understood to mean the opposite of what it says, viz: when we say "it" "the thought has escaped my mind" the expression gives action to the past thought, as if it had actually run away from the mind, whereas the truth is, that the mind has gone away *from that.* We say, when we have forgotten any thing that, "we have no knowledge of it at present." And this is the fact in reference to that thing which we have forgotten. This being our experience, the idea that these things, *thoughts*, are all the while in the "memory" safely deposited for future use, we see, is, repudiated by the common sense expression of every man, who explains his own mental operations by his own originality, in his own common sense way. And when we listen to the jumbled mass of half digested thoughts of a certain class of public speakers, how much inclined, with their *adopted* collection of metaphysical declamations, they are to display their vocabulary

of words, which excite the astonishment of the ignorant, and the indignation of the wise, did we not know that they live entirely on borrowed capital, we should be inclined to think, if not tempted to say to such, "*much learning hath made thee mad.*"

Sec. 3: *Where are the thoughts we have forgotten?* The question therefore still remains to be answered, where are those thoughts which were once present to the mind, of which we, at the present time, have no knowledge? To this we answer, they cannot be in the memory, as the popular opinion goes to say, for if this were the case they would be in the mind. For the memory, as we shall show hereafter, is not only in the mind, and identified with the acts of perception and consciousness in the past, but constitutes an essential *power* of our intellectual existence. We feel upon remembering, and those feelings we naturally express in the plainest possible way that we know, when we remember, that is to say, *we know now*, this *present moment*, what we did not know a few moments ago. And why do we know it now? Not because it has been called up from its *cell* in the "memory," but because it is *now* at the time of being remembered, within the reach and under the notice of the memory. To speak in plain facts, and according to the true philosophy of the case, it would be appropriate to say that the memory has now come to the said event or circumstance, and not that the circumstance has *now* come to the memory.

Sec. 4: *Propositions.* Perhaps the following propositions would better enable us to bring before the reader an appropriate train of thoughts that will aid in the better understanding of the nature of memory. The propositions that we will introduce are three, viz: (1) That those thoughts which were once before the mind but are *now* forgotten, cease to be as the mind leaves them; or, (2) They exist in some department of the mind; (3) Or else they exist beyond the boundary of the mind. If therefore one of these three propositions be true, and only one of them, and if we can show either two of them to be false, and only two of them to be false, then the other remaining one will be the true one, and consequently the one on which we can confidently rely.

To suppose that the individual thoughts of a man exist beyond the boundary of his soul, and thoughts too, of which the man has no knowledge, for he can know nothing beyond his bounds, would be to introduce something "new under the sun," a strange doctrine indeed, and so strange and so inconsistent in its nature, that no person who would allow himself to think at all on its reasonableness, could for one moment suppose it to be true. For although it might be said that it cannot be proved that thoughts do not exist beyond the boundary of the soul, and from that urge the possibility of such existence, at the same time it should be remembered that this would only assume the character of a quibble. And suppose we should admit, say for the sake of argument, the possibility of the thoughts of a man existing beyond the bounds of his soul's existence, this admission would be very far from proving the thing to be a fact, which is necessary to be done before we could adopt it as an opinion; at all events, we would need to prove the possibility of the thing in order to justify such an opinion. But let it be remembered that the position which we take lays us under no obligation to prove, or even to make any attempt to prove, such a negative proposition as this, "that we cannot prove that thoughts do not exist beyond the bounds of the soul's existence." But those who wish to introduce objections of this kind and draw inferences from the negative, would, in my opinion, to maintain a character as honest reasoners, be bound to prove the positive, that *thoughts do so exist.* For although it might appear at first sight to be destitute of proof on both sides, yet it will appear, upon more mature consideration, that there is, if not what might be called a positive, yet a very strong presumptive evidence, that the position which we have assumed is correct.

To suppose, for example, that thoughts exist beyond the boundary of the soul's sphere of action, would of course be equal to the supposition that they exist *without* the soul. And if they exist without the soul they would be independent of the soul, and consequently could not in any sense whatever, that I can perceive, be considered the thoughts of the soul. So that it comes to be a proof after all that a man's thoughts do not exist beyond the boundary of his soul's existence, because, if that were admitted it would imply a contradiction, for such

thoughts could not be the man's thoughts, and therefore if existing at all as we have supposed, they must be separate existences, or parts of some other beings. In addition to what has been said on this topic, I wish to observe that the doctrine which teaches the existence of thought, either in any department of the mind, or beyond the boundary of the soul, in virtue of any law of the memory, or resulting from any act thereof is, to say the least, *exceedingly questionable*, which we think we will be able to show more fully hereafter.

Sec. 5: *Do thoughts exist beyond the sphere of the soul's action?* The intimations which we have given above would not be satisfactory, nor yet shall the explanatory observations which we have made in reference to the nature of the memory, unless we are able to show more fully what its real nature is. In this line of argument we shall continue to proceed, but in the meanwhile the reader will bear in mind that but one proposition out of the three has been discussed. But we purpose now more particularly, though as briefly as possible, so as to be understood, to discuss the second proposition, that is, relative to the memory implying a deposit of thought.

Sec. 6: *Memory said to imply a resurrection of thought.* We conceive that memory is not, as many have supposed, a "resurrection of thought." For a resurrection of thought would seem to imply: 1, That those thoughts, so raised, were once in being and in action as individual things. 2, That they must have ceased to exist, and of course to act, and according to our views of death, they must have literally died. 3, That those identical thoughts come to be revived and literally brought up from the dead. Now, it should be observed that if those thoughts which we once had, and have now forgotten, have ever died, and are literally dead, the conclusion is legitimate and unavoidable, that they once did possess life, and that too before this death took place. If therefore these thoughts that are in the past are dead, we know as positively as we can know anything that *we* are now alive. Therefore, to admit that those thoughts that are in the past are dead, and can be raised from the dead, and that we can positively live, and do live, whether those thoughts remain dead, or are brought again to life, to say the least it would intimate that thought is some-

thing existing, dying, and then again raised from the dead, &c. all in the abstract, and separate from the intellectual existence of the man, after the first intellectual act which produced *the thought* in the first place. If this theory should prove to be correct, then *thought* is a something which can exist without the soul, just about as possible in our opinion, as it is for the blood to circulate without a body. The conclusion to which we have now arrived is such as will justify us in detaining the reader a moment or two, for the purpose of enquiring into the probable nature of thought, admitting those that are forgotten to be dead.

If then it is a philosophical truth that thoughts that are forgotten are dead, and also that they were once alive, it is also an undeniable fact that thought is, instead of being what we have hitherto conceived it to be, a something which is composed of particles of matter so constructed and placed, either by the hand of the Divine Being directly applied, or in virtue of regular laws made and provided by the same Almighty hand, as to form by their co-operation an active and vital existence, that can enter and pass through the deepest water, penetrate the hardest rock, soar to the highest star, that can enter through skin, blood, and bone, and operate for a while on the brain, and then hasten to its destiny the chamber of death, where it must lay in quiet and undisturbed till it is raised by some irresistible power. Or else it must be made up of particles of immateriality, or of both, in something which is made of matter and mind, but in either case it must be subject to a perpetual exchange of life and death. But it is scarcely possible to suppose, that but few, if any one at all, would be willing to entertain an opinion so derogatory to the Divine government, if they will but give themselves time to think, as to believe this will bear any resemblance to a just and proper description of the nature of memory. Because, this description of memory would, as we before intimated, suppose thought to be an individual something existing principally of itself. For if the mind can live and act, when thought which it once had is dead, which it does, if they are dead when they are forgotten, then it would go to prove that *thought* which has been once under the mind's observation, and it is not thought at all till that time, and comes to be raised from the dead, is a separate, individual ex-

istence. But another difficulty that grows out of the idea that thought exists in the abstract, and subject to death, which it must be if it is subject to a resurrection, is this: thought being subject to death would imply organization, and this means something made up of parts, which imply youth, maturity, and old age, as well as death. Now, this idea of physical growth, and diminution and death, when applied to the memory, *which is the same as thinking in the past*, and which application would be appropriate if memory means a resurrection of thought, but seeing that it does not mean that, but that it means something vastly different from *that*, it is both unphilosophical and contradictory.

Sec. 7: Is Memory a resuscitation of dormant thought? Another view of the nature of memory is the following, viz: the thoughts that have been but are not now under the mind's notice, these thoughts in remembering come to be revived, so that memory, according to this theory, means a "reviving of thought." Those who hold this view of the memory, do not admit the resurrection of thought, because this would be an acknowledgment of their death; but they merely contend for the principle of resuscitating or reviving of thought. This looks at the first glance, and especially to a superficial observer, to be a more plausible theory. And indeed it does to some extent remove the absurdity of that necessary and perpetual interchange of *life* and *death* by the theory of the resurrection of thought; but it introduces another difficulty in many respects as great. For if the memory implies a reviving of thought, as those who adopt this theory would have us believe, and those thoughts not revived, are what we are to understand by thoughts forgotten, common sense would lead us to the conclusion that those thoughts that are not revived are supposed to be dormant. And this, I believe, the advocates of this theory do not presume to deny, for they admit the principle of dormant thought. And to acknowledge the principle that thoughts are dormant, and that all thoughts in the past that are not remembered are in this condition, is equal to admitting that those thoughts are somewhere in existence, but are destitute of any power to act. Now, it follows as a legitimate conclusion, which no man can reject, that if thoughts are somewhere in existence, they must either be within the mind which first originated them, or else

they must be without the mind. If those thoughts that are forgotten and are dormant, are within the mind, the mind of necessity takes cognizance of them. It is impossible in the nature of things to be otherwise. The mind must see itself and must know what is within it, and it cannot pass over them without noticing them. For if we were to admit, *which is very far from our intention*, that the mind possessed the supposed power of classification of thought, and disposed of them by actually depositing them in their various places, even this admission would be no proof that thought laid in the mind unnoticed and unknown. For the very act of arrangement itself presupposes a discrimination of every thing to be arranged, so as to deposit each thought in what might appear its proper place, according to the general principles and plan of such arrangement. The mind, we conceive, must see them; it cannot avoid seeing those thoughts that are within it, and therefore it knows them, and consequently they are not forgotten. So, that to say, "thoughts that are forgotten lay dormant in the mind," is an effort to say that *nothing is forgotten.* Because, all that is within the mind is under the notice of the mind, at the same time it is in the mind, and all the while it is in the mind, because being in the mind, is *to be perceived by the mind.* But if those thoughts of which we hear speak, are existing as individuals without the mind, they cannot, so far as we can see, be termed the property or thoughts of the mind, and consequently the mind can exercise no power over them. For if the mind can monopolise and claim as its own any one thing which exists beyond its boundary or possible sphere of action it can another, and on this principle it might claim for its own every thought, no matter where or by whom it was originated. It will be perceived, I presume, that the idea we wish to convey is this: that thoughts laid in the "brain," which we suppose is designed to mean *thoughts laid in the mind*, whether they be dormant or not, will not affect in the least the undeniable fact that they must be present to the mind, if that theory is correct, that they are "deposited in the mind." And therefore the idea, however popular it may be, of thoughts laying dormant in the mind while they are present to the mind, and all must be present that are in the mind, because they are present to the perceptive faculty and consequently under the very act of thinking, at the same time that

they are so perceived, involves a contradiction, and is therefore impossible in the nature of things.

Sec. 8: *A conscious perception is thinking.* It might not be amiss to remark here, although we shall have occasion to speak more fully on this point hereafter, that *thinking* implies an action of the mind; and an action of the mind does not appear to us to be a possible thing without thinking at the same time. The one appears to be identified with the other, so much so that it does not appear possible for us to be the subject of intellectual action without thinking, or to produce a thought, great or small, without an action of the intellect. It is true, however, that sometimes, for want of interest in those actions of the mind, many of them are but slightly noticed, but that does not make them any the less real. And at other times, owing to mental derangement, though the action of the mind at such times may be more rapid and intense than when acting under ordinary circumstances, but for want of a proper equilibrium and corresponding activity in the operating faculties it is unconscious of the greatest part of its actions. But still he thinks as really, though not as correctly, as he ever did. And these, of course, are properly actions of the mind, though they are not rational, therefore these are exceptions to the general rule, and as such should be treated. But with such exceptions anything in the mind implies a conscious action of the perception, and such action implies sensible and rational thought.

Sec. 9: *How can thoughts be laid by?* But another difficulty which the doctrine of shelving up in the brain, or in other words, depositing in the mind produces, is this: that those thoughts represented as individuals whose number is in a constant and rapid increase, and some of which appear in tremendous magnitude, must be subject to a very extensive classification and constantly new plans of arrangement, and which arrangement must be made for every rising thought, because every thought is *new*. For it should be remembered that our thoughts are constantly springing up, and out of circumstances too for which no previous calculation can provide. Now, if such work of arrangement must be made, there must of necessity be some faculty of the mind whose business it is to keep in order those thoughts so to be arranged and deposited. To

say that a law of our mental nature does this, will not meet the case nor help the matter at all, but will rather throw new obstacles in the way. Because this, as it appears to us, would impeach the Divine Being by representing him as having made a law whose operations, in spite of anything which we can do to the contrary, force us to retain within the mind any and every unprofitable thought which we may have had, and which we in after life would gladly discharge. Now such thoughts we know are not at all to the glory of God nor to the benefit of ourselves or our fellow men, but yet on this principle of mental deposit, the mind, or some faculty of the mind, must be employed in laying them in their destined place with as much care and attention as it does those that are of a better class, or those of the best class.

Sec. 10: *Thoughts not dormant individuals.* We would further remark that the philosophy which teaches the individual deposit of thoughts in some department of the mind is exceedingly questionable from another consideration, namely: what appears to us to be an unnecessary burden that such a process would entail upon the mind. Now, the mind of every finite being every man must acknowledge has its bounds; and the mind of man is reasonably enough supposed to be more circumscribed in his present stage of existence than some other orders of beings. Now, as those thoughts that are said to be deposited, and are consequently represented as individual things, have to lay in the mind as their only place of residence, they could not fail, so far as we can perceive, to prove a clog to the understanding, and consequently an impediment to the progress of the mind. Should it be said that the expressions "laid in the brain," and "shelved up in the memory," are not designed to represent thoughts as individual things laying one upon another in the mind; what such expression as the following was designed to represent and what it does represent are two things. We cannot tell what a person means by what he thinks, because we do not know his thoughts; we therefore have to tell what he thinks (means) by what he says, because we know his words. How then will any person understand the following?

"Lulled in the countless chambers of the brain,
Our thoughts are linked with many a hidden chain;
Wake but the one and lo! what myriads rise,
Each stamps his image as the other flies."—*Upham.*

Mr. Locke, who is justly held in very high repute by the learned and intelligent of all nations for his original powers of close thinking, conclusive reasoning, and deep penetration into the nature of things, and especially into the laws of mind, of which he has given the fullest evidence in his "Essay on the Human Understanding," yet it appears that there is a degree of obscurity that attaches to that part of his "Essay" where he treats on the human memory. We will take a sentence or two, for example: "For the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view and consideration at once, it was necessary to have a repository to lay up those ideas which at another time it might have use of."—*Locke's Essay, Book 2, Chap. 10, Sec. 2.* On the defects of the memory, Mr. Locke in the same chapter, section 8, page 104, speaking of the first defect says: "That it loses the idea quite, and so far it produces perfect ignorance; for since we can know nothing farther than we have the idea of it, when that is gone we are in perfect ignorance." And of the second he says: "That it moves slowly, and retrieves not the ideas that it has, and are laid up in store, quick enough, to serve the mind upon occasion. This, if it be to a great degree, is stupidity, and he who through this default in his memory, has not the ideas that are really preserved ready at hand when need and occasion call for them, were almost as good without them quite, since they serve him to little purpose. The dull man, who loses the opportunity whilst he is seeking in his mind for those ideas that should serve his turn, is not much more happy in his knowledge than one that is perfectly ignorant. It is the business therefore of the memory to furnish to the mind those dormant ideas which it has present occasion for; in the having them ready at hand on all occasions consists that which we call invention, fancy, and quickness of parts." The explanation which the author gives is simply this: that the mind has a power to revive dormant ideas or perceptions which we once had; but the whole tenor of his remarks go to show that he looks to the mind to produce those "dormant ideas" from itself. I will not trouble the reader with lengthy quotations but will

refer him to the work itself, and I will only add that I conceive Mr. Locke's view of the memory not to be exactly correct, and his explanations I think are not sufficiently clear to place this part of his work, from which we have made the extract, on a level with the rest of his Essay.

Sec. 11. *The constant reception of particles a burden.*—We leave the references which we have made, without any further comment on them, with the reader, and shall proceed to make some further observations pursuant to a fuller explanation of our own views of the memory. Now, as we before remarked, *thought* is nothing more nor less than mental action. And a little reflection will soon lead us to discover that *pleasure or pain* depends, to a very great extent upon the nature and degree of that action in which we engage, or of which we are the subjects. We say, upon the nature and degree of the action, because, if the action be a bad one, though it might afford a little sensual gratification, yet the fact is, that from bad actions, whether they apply directly to God, to ourselves or to others, no true happiness ever springs.

And if the action is *good* its legitimate product is *happiness.* Yet to continue *that state* we need so to study and ascertain, not only the kind, but also the degree of action in each kind that is necessary, least we overstretch the mark of prudence, and become so wedded to some good actions, as to think that the whole duty of the Christian is there. When we become thus extravagant in the degree of attention and time which we pay to, *even those religious duties,* the actions themselves fail to produce that degree of religious enjoyment which they otherwise would do. Perhaps our idea would be better understood by the following illustration, for example: suppose an individual to be placed in such circumstances as to be obliged to constantly receive upon himself particles of matter, though they might be as small as the finest dust, yet continually falling, and each particle remaining in its place as it falls; this process, every person may see, would eventually become burdensome, and in the course of time unendurable. So in like manner, does it appear that, it would be with the mind if it is constantly receiving thoughts as individual things and has no way of dis-

charging them, but must keep them for ever within its own circumference, either in an active or in a dormant state.

Sec. 12 : *Expansion not sufficient to meet the case.* Should the idea of expansion be urged as sufficient to meet the emergency of such a case as we have supposed? To this we remark that though the body, it is very true, is capable of growth and expansion, yet not at all in proportion even to the addition of particles here supposed. And what would our physical frame now be, were it not relieved from its increasing bulk by constantly evaporating particles? Hence, the expansion of our bodies is not such as would sustain it under the continual dropping of the smallest imaginable particles of matter, supposing them to be equal in their decending number, only, to the thousandth part of those thoughts that occur to the mind and, according to the theory here alluded to, and from which we dissent, rest upon or in the mind. And yet if the body, on this principle of growth could be made equal to the pressure of matter here contemplated, it could only be for a certain portion of the life of the body, seeing, according to the principles and laws of nature no organized being is capable of growth at all, beyond a certain stage, when it arrives at its maximum and can expand no more: so that the addition of matter to the organized body, even under the circumstances here supposed that it were possible to sustain the pressure till the maturity of the organized body, without the relief which evaporating particles afford in all ordinary cases, the same rule could not apply after the maturity of the organized body, because, expansion would then cease. The mind in like manner, if the memory is a depository of individual thoughts, would naturally become encumbered with their bulk, and exceedingly burdened with the weight of those intellectual somethings with their constantly increasing pressure. And should it be said that the perpetual expansion and development of our intellectual faculties is sufficient to sustain this mental pressure, we beg to say that it appears otherwise from the following consideration, viz. : the mind is the subject of constant action during its waking moments, to say nothing of its sleeping hours, and those intellectual actions we call thoughts. Now, if those thoughts are individual somethings, as they must be if they lay deposited in the mind, to be "called up as occasion may require;"

or are laid anywhere else for the same purpose; the mind therefore becomes the receptacle of a constant succession of intellectual particles. And in order that these particles may not prove an intolerable burden, it would be necessary for the mind to enlarge with equal rapidity. Now, we cannot say, if experience is to be our expositor, that this is the case with mind of man. It is true, he is capable of vast improvement, and to what extent no one can tell, and never will be able to do any more than guess, because, the mind of all pious intelligences, at least, will be continually improving. But great as this improvement is and long as it will continue, it is not now, and in the nature of things never will be, in proportion to the influx of thought which every man has, and always will have, all through time, and whether they are rational or irrational they will be equally effectual, in the principle here aluded to, and so on through eternity. For every person knows, that is if he takes any notice of the operations of his mind at all, that thousands of thoughts in the course of one day occur to the mind, in other words, takes place in the mind, which are in no respect calculated to improve the mind, in any sense whatever but rather prevent its improvement. This is true in any department of study, whether it is Philosophy, Literature, Politics, or Religion. Let any man who is not satisfied already of the fact, try any one of these, or any department of any one of them, and he will soon find that to make any improvement he must wade his way through a sea of opposing, conflicting and troublesome thoughts, which instead of helping him in his studies are constantly throwing impediments in his way. And as the expansion of the mind is not in proportion to the thoughts which it has, and if thoughts are individual things, and memory means laying them by in the mind, and seeing that the mind cannot expand in proportion to the number of thoughts which it has, it does appear that by this process it would gradually become weakened, and eventually of its own weight be overpowered and unable to act at all. So that mental action according to this principle, instead of being as we suppose it is, a help to the mind, it is a hinderance, and though under such circumstances would eventually render the memory inactive. But all this is contrary to our experience, for every man, and every child who is large enough to know that he has a mind that can think, reason, and remember, knows that habitually

remembering daily occurrences has the opposite effect to this above mentioned. So much so that the more we remember, the more we can remember, and the more the memory does in any one line of thought, the stronger it gets and the more it is able to do.

Sec. 13 : *Of the three propositions.* Now, it will be perceived by the attentive reader that we made three propositions, and two of them, we conceive, prove to be false, and only two of them, therefore the remaining one is the true proposition. That is to say, the thoughts which were once before the mind, but are forgotten, cease to be in the mind, for as the mind passes on it takes not these events (thoughts) with it, and never can bring them after it, but leaves them all in the past. Nevertheless, this proposition requires some explanation which we shall endeavour to give in its appropriate place. Still, it might be proper for me here to remind the reader that thought implies an action of the mind, and anything that is forgotten is not under the mind's observation, therefore it is not *in action*, and consequently ceases to be as an action. The fact may be the same in the history of the past, but the fact may not be the thought, indeed it is not the thought, and cannot be made to be the thought; but the perception of the fact is, because, to perceive is an act of the mind, and an act of the mind is thinking.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE ELEMENTS AND ACTIONS OF THE SOUL.

Sec. 1: *What the elements of the soul are.* Having made those observations, many of which are of a negative character, principally to show what the memory is not, we shall next proceed briefly to show what we conceive the memory to be. And for the better understanding of this part of our subject, upon which we are now about to enter, it will be something to our advantage to take a glance at that immaterial and immortal principle which dwells within us, and by which we think, reason and remember. We do not mean that we are to stop here for the purpose of explaining its various powers, and all the laws by which it is governed, but simply to remind the reader that the soul, as we understand it, is made up of different faculties. But if we apply the term faculty to all the powers of the soul, then I conceive a distinction should be noticed, as it appears to exist in nature. Some appear to be essential to its existence, and others only to its rational action. Some of these look to me to be elements of the soul, others more like intellectual compounds. The elements I would like to call *faculties*, or at any rate I would like to have the liberty of calling them *primary faculties*, because they are essential to the soul's being, which appear to me to be these; Perception, Consciousness, Sense and Will. Now, it is evident that all these are essential to the very being of the soul, and neither one of them can cease to act without rendering the others useless in a great degree for practical purposes. And again they cannot be analyzed, any more in imagination than in fact, for who would presume to start the question with any expectation of success, in reference to what perception is made up of, the answer is in itself, it is made up of perceiving, and how much further can we get if we

repeat the attempt a thousand times? We might indeed turn and say, what is perceiving made up of? The answer would be, of *perception.* The same may be said of consciousness. What is it made of? The answer is, of being conscious. And what is being conscious made up of? It is like reasoning in a circle, for we have simply to answer, of *consciousness*, and so of the others. It is true, consciousness has its degrees of action, and so has perception, but that does not disprove the fact that they are *elements* of the soul. But when we speak of reason, imagination and memory, although important, and even essential to the intellectual, moral, and religious well being of the soul, yet, they are not to be looked upon as primary, or what we call, elementary faculties, because they cannot exist without the others, and they cannot exist only as *that existence* is produced by the others. *Reasoning*, as we understand it, is merely perceiving the argument or disagreement of things, and consciousness that the things so perceived do agree, or disagree, and hence it is the result of certain modifications of the elementary faculties alluded to. *Imagination* is simply another modification of perception, and *memory* is the result of the action of two of these faculties. But as these will all be noticed in their appropriate places, we do not deem it proper to dwell on them any longer here.

Whatever may be the opinions of learned men in reference to a distinction of the faculties of the soul—or the number of them—and whether they may properly be considered as some *elements*, and others secondary, compounds, and subordinate to, and depending on the elements for their existence and their action, or not, one thing is certain that the existence of the faculty to perceive things, is so apparent, so plain and operative that no person can doubt it, no matter how hard, and how long he may try. And if it were possible for him to entertain a doubt of its existence, the very doubt itself would prove the existence of a power in the soul to perceive, because he perceives a doubt existing in himself.

Sec. 2: Perception in the present, in the future and in the past. The faculty of the soul which we call perception, possesses the power to look into the future and into the past, as

well as into the present. And as we shall have occasion frequently to speak of those intellectual states in the course of our remarks on this topic now under consideration, and to avoid any misapprehension that might arise through the use of ambiguous terms, that intellectual state into which the soul enters when looking into the future, we shall here represent by the term *contemplation*. This state of the mind is sometimes represented by the term *imagination*, which will apply equally to the past and the present; but the former term though it applies more forcibly to the present, yet perhaps less forcibly to the past, and is equally as appropriate for the future as the term *imagination*, and appears on the whole to be more comprehensive. And here I beg to remark, that this faculty which perceives, or looks into the future, is not another faculty from that which perceives the present; and that which looks into the present is the same as that which looks into the past. Taking this view of the subject, the supposed number of faculties of the soul will be greatly diminished, for instead of being faculties of the soul many of them will be seen to be only modifications of the same faculty. And in proportion as the philosophy of the mind proves a reduction of the number of its elementary faculties from the general estimate, in the same proportion will it be better understood, viz: it will be better understood by that class of the community whose circumstances in life will not allow them a very great many books, nor much time to read them.

Sec. 3: The fact of transition. Now, it is important to remark that this intellectual state, of looking into the future, is not the result, as some seem to imagine, of some abstract individual thought or thoughts, thrown by a mighty effort of the mind, into the future, far beyond the boundary of the soul's existence, and there to exist independent of the soul. That is to say, it is not to be regarded as a separate existence, as if the soul existed here, and the thought existed yonder. We do not wish to be understood to mean, by what we here say, that the soul while contemplating the future is not in the act of thinking at that time, for the very opposite of this is the fact. We only design to repudiate the idea as unphilosophical, that thought means individual somethings coming to the soul for practical purposes, and returning after having been used. But the true

sense and proper idea of the state alluded to, appears to be this: that when we contemplate the future the mind takes a transit; that is to say, the soul, or in other words, a faculty of the soul, whose province it is to perceive things, by a power with which the Divine Being, who is its Author, has endowed it, stretches itself beyond the present state of things. And this appears to be the view which here and there those, who have exercised their own natural discrimination and judgment, have taken of the subject. This sentiment is expressed, and beautifully too, in the following very appropriate words of a certain poet: "My soul leaps forward at the thought."

Sec. 4: Transition consistent—its cause. This leaping into the future, or rather, this view of the transition of the perceptive faculty in contemplating the future, will, we think, appear perfectly consistent with the philosophy of the mind, which is according to, and will be corroborated by our experience. And though it will not be difficult for a close observer of mental operations to see that many of those transitions are the result of accident, while others are produced in the mind from portions of Divine Revelation with which we are acquainted, containing predictions relative to future events, yet both are real transitions, only the one is based upon supposition and ends in imagination, and the other, being based upon Revelation, eventually ends in fact. But, in contemplating the future, whether in fact or in fancy, that faculty of the soul which is the principal acting agent in this internal operation, seems evidently to leap out, or in other words, it seems to stretch itself beyond the present existence of the man. Now, this stretching out is what we call, *not another faculty of the soul*, but a power of the perceptive faculty, assuming that peculiar modification adapted, to some extent, to the investigation of things that have not yet arrived.

But to make this subject appear as plain as possible, and it is important that we get a correct idea of this item, let me observe that the perceptive faculty seems to possess what I would call, a peculiar relaxing quality by which it stretches itself to an amazing and immeasurable distance, and so much so that we often become astonished at ourselves. Indeed any attempts to follow this faculty of the soul, through the various stages of its

rapid exits, especially when it soars to its privileged heights, or penetrates to its accustomed depths, or extends to the length of its intellectual fields, would be fruitless. It is all a mystery to us, in reference to how the perception exercises this power, we only know the fact that it does. But to undertake to explain its mode of operation through all its various stages, or even through any of its stages, we make no attempts, and we do not feel disgraced by a confession of our ignorance therein; and therefore we shall leave this for others who may feel that the difficulties connected with such explanations, are far less than we at present conceive them to be.

Sec. 5: *The power of stretching out, a mystery.* This power however that the mind possesses of stretching into the future, though it is a mystery, is no greater mystery than that power which it possesses to return, neither is it any greater truth. This power we have to represent by another name, and would call it mental contractibility. By this we mean that the faculty whose business it is to perceive things by a certain modification, stretches itself into the future, and by another modification adapted to the purposes thereof contracts itself back to the present.

These mental states to which we here allude may, perhaps, be to some extent illustrated by the following reference to anatomy. The anatomist tells us that in the body of man there are about 400 fleshy strings called muscles, which are endowed with powers of elasticity and contractibility, operating thereby upon the bones which serve as *levers* or *pries*, the joints serve as *fulcrums* or *baits*, and the muscles are the moving power, or in other words, the *lifting at the pry*. From this it will be seen that the motion in the body originates in the muscle, which motion is continued by the shortening and stretching of the fibers that compose the muscle. So that the power to move is in the muscle, which power when stimulated by the nervous system acts of itself. Now, although we connot tell how those muscles stretch themselves, so as to produce motion, so inconceivably quick and powerful as they do, yet we can no more deny the fact, than we can deny the fact of motion itself. And so we might say in reference to the mind, or rather, in reference to the perceptive faculty. We cannot see how the muscles can

stretch themselves to produce the motion of the arm or the leg, *all is mystery*, but we cannot deny the fact. Neither can we see how the mind can stretch itself into the future, and so *far into the future too*, and return again in such an inconceivably short space of time, and yet it appears, upon deliberate reflection, to be a truth equally as great and forcible in the mind, as the other is in the body. Now, the muscular system is endowed with power to move from the benevolent hand of our Almighty Creator; yet that same Infinite wisdom that provided such power has, at the same time, for reasons best and only known to himself, made it necessary that the muscles should receive their stimulating power from the nervous system; by which relaxation and contractibility alternately act. So also has that same wise and benevolent hand endowed the mind with a motive power, which power is intimately connected with, and very operative in that modification of the perceptive faculty which looks into the future. In virtue of the same motive power, by the law of mental contractibility it is called back from any imaginable distance, in a time immeasurably short. And although we cannot conceive how all this is done, any more than we can comprehend the contractile power of the muscle, yet every man is as sensible of intellectual motion, as he is of physical existence.

Sec. 6: *The soul does not leave the body at such times.* We must not be understood to mean that the soul, when contemplating the future, leaves the body and goes into the future beyond the present existing state of things; for this would be a great error seeing that by such a process of operation the body would be left without the soul. For as no man has, or can have in the nature of things, more than one soul, if that soul at any time goes out beyond the present existing state of things, or if it go out from the body into the past, the present or the future, it makes no difference in reference to the effect, for in either case it leaves the body without the soul, and consequently, without the principles of life, and therefore in a state of death. But the opposite of this we know is the truth, for however intently our minds may be placed on any subject, whether of the present, of the past, or of the future, the body lives, acts and breathes regularly, which it could not do even for one moment if the soul were absent. And as the soul of man, like all other finite beings

is necessarily bounded in its existence, and can only be in the one place at the same time, and as the body cannot live *one moment*, according to the laws of our nature, without the present sustaining and operating power of the immortal principle, and as man does have perceptions in the future beyond the present existence of himself, it follows as a legitimate conclusion that it is not literally the soul that goes into the future while contemplating, or in other words, it is not the soul that leaves the body when the man looks (thinks) ahead of himself, in order that he may prepare for a "*rainy day*." Yet there is perception, though it might exist in its weakest form (*i.e.* imagination) but it is still perception that is beyond the present existence of the man, and beyond the present state of things. And therefore we humbly conceive that the true philosophy of such intellectual states, is to be explained only on the principle of mental elasticity and contractibility.

Sec. 7: *Of time and distance.* It is worthy of remark that neither time nor distance appear, so far as we can conceive, to be any impediment to the mind in those excursions, for the rapidity with which it communicates by its inexplicable transits is beyond all calculation! Now, it is very different with matter; for we find in matter of every description, whether in large or small quantities, and whether solid or liquid, time is always proportionate to the distance it travels. That is to say, if matter travel one mile it requires a certain portion of time, but if it should travel two miles, or twenty miles, it would require an additional increase of time in proportion to that distance. But this does not appear to be the case with that faculty of the mind which is employed on exploring expeditions. For the perceptive faculty by assuming the necessary modification, which appears to be very easily done by a law of our mental nature, can step into the future, or into the past, a thousand years with as little apparent difficulty as we can look forward to the setting of the sun, or backward to the morning light.

Sec. 8: *Of certain forms assumed.* But there is another form which the perceptive faculty assumes, which is represented by the term *imagination*. This, so far as I can conceive, is not another faculty that constitutes any constituent or essential

part of the soul's existence; but it is merely a power of perception, in other words, another modification of the perceptive faculty. But this *form* appears, for some cause which I confess I have failed to discover, exceedingly prone to associate itself with perception in its operations both in the past, and sometimes in the present, as well as in the future. Hence, in consequence of the forwardness of the mind, in our fallen and corrupt state, for there is no reason to believe that this inordinacy in any part of the mind would ever have taken place had not sin through the fall of man spread its paralyzing influences through the empire of the soul, thousands of things in the course of a very short time, are seen in a kind of phantasma that never will exist in any other form, while contemplating the future. And so it is when perception extends itself into the past. For there is very frequently a kind of fanciful vision of things presented to the mind. This is the work of what we call imagination, which is a very useful power of the soul when kept under proper discipline, yet if it is held only by a loose rein, which is too often the case, for want of sufficient mental cultivation, it, at certain times, becomes very troublesome.

Sec. 9: *What is the office and power of imagination?* To explain the office, power, and usefulness of this form of mind, which is called *imagination*, does not come within the limits of our plan of arrangement, yet, as it frequently presents itself while perception and consciousness act in reference to the past, *which is what we call memory*; and as we have already adverted to this power, and may again hereafter, it might be proper to devote a short space to the consideration of this mental state.

Sec. 10: (1) And first, we remark, that its special business appears to be to assume certain forms totally irrespective of their character or the effect that they would be likely to produce, the imagination does not appear to have any regard for effects or consequences that might result from its fanciful modifications.

Sec. 11: (2) And secondly, it appears to have no reference to truth or falsehood, by way of preference to the one, or the other, and we are not able to discover wherein it has any

respect either for virtue or vice. It appears to study no selection and generally disregards any systematical arrangement, any form it can assume, whatever that form may be, it will assume the first opportunity, no matter what the soul's engagements are, for it regards them not. And it can only be controled by a vigorous effort of the will. And indeed there appears to be circumstances under which the *will* cannot fully regulate this form of the perceptive faculty. For sometimes the laws that produce, govern, and control these secondary intellectual powers are so operative, and the circumstances that call them into action so numerous, and so powerful, that troublesome, perplexing, and terrific modifications are assumed, and repeated, in spite of all the authority and remonstrances of the *will*.

Sec. 12. (3) In the third place, as a general rule its power is subordinate, and is bounded firmly by certain unalterable principles of the mind, beyond which it never can go in its inventive career. For though its modifications are numerous and irrespective of consequences, yet, it does not appear to be capable of painting, or presenting any form before the mind that does not resemble some fact existing either in the present or in the past. That is to say, it can assume no modification that does not agree with some real thing. This form of mind, therefore, which is called *imagination* is drawn from something which does exist, and with which we have been made acquainted by the agency of our senses. Let an individual try to imagine something, and the question would immediately arise what shall I imagine? He begins to look around for something in order to create in his mind a resemblance to that something, and if he could find no real thing that would attract his fancy, he could imagine nothing. Suppose we imagine we see something suspended high in the air, we must either imagine that to *be something*, or nothing at all. We cannot imagine it to be nothing, because it is something, and we can form but a very inadequate idea of nothing, at any rate. Then we would have to form an idea of something, because we say *something* is suspended in the air. That which is not something is nothing, and that which is nothing cannot be perceived by the sense, and consequently no figure can be drawn from it. So that if we have to form an idea of something suspended in the air, we will have to go to something from which to draw that idea, or form, or figure, or whatever

else it might be called. So that it makes no difference how active our imagination may be, or how anxious we might be to produce something new under the sun, we shall most assuredly imagine that we see a man, a horse, a tree, a house, a book, a beast, a bird, a fish, a fowl, a metal or mineral, a solid or liquid, an ariel or gaseous something, of which we have heard or seen. Hence, we say that all its forms are drawn from real things, and such things too that are known to the mind, of which truth a thousand illustrations might be given did we not consider the above sufficient.

Sec. 13. (4) In the fourth place, we remark that *imagination* is not as well described by the term "faculty of the soul," seeing it is so closely identified with perception as it is by calling it by what we conceive to be its proper name, viz: a power of the perceptive faculty. At all events, there does not appear to be any good grounds for calling perception and imagination two distinct faculties, unless it is proper to call every act of the soul a faculty of the soul; because their actions do not appear to be distinct and independent actions. For it does not appear that there is any difference in the kind of actions produced by the imagination and those produced by the perception, for the actions of both are actions of perceiving what difference there is in the degree of perception. The one perceives but dimly, or in part, the other clearly and distinct.

To illustrate the principle of identity in perception and imagination more fully, let a man imagine himself to be in a future state, and in that place where we all desire to go, which we call heaven; let him not merely entertain the desire to go there, or the hope that he will get there, but let him *if he can* imagine himself to be absent from the body and present with the Lord, and then let him see if he can discover any difference between that intellectual state, in reference to *its kind*, and his perceiving himself to be in heaven. What difference there is, is in the degree. The imagination draws the form of what it supposes heaven to be; it perceives that form; it draws also the form of the body, but it has no form for the soul, that form of body it perceives to be in heaven.

Sec. 14: Cannot perceive and imagine at the same time. If a man imagine himself to be in France, he perceives nothing that transpires in Canada, the place of his residence, at the same time that he imagines himself to be in France. If he perceives himself sitting in his parlor, or writing at his desk, he cannot imagine himself to be in the legislative hall, or to stand pleading at the bar at the same time. We do not say he cannot sit in his parlor and image himself to be in some other place, but we say he cannot perceive or imagine himself to be sitting in his parlor, by his own fireside in Canada, and perceive or imagine himself to be in France or any distant part of the globe at the same time. If this view which we here express is a correct one, and agrees with our experience, it is clearly established that imagination is nothing more nor less than a certain modification of the perceptive faculty; in other words, a perceiving in fancy instead of perceiving in fact.

We remark further, that whenever we imagine anything, either in the past or in the future, we engage the perceptive faculty; and it is thereby prevented from acting in any other intellectual capacity for the time being. It is worthy of remark too, that we can perceive simple truths through the senses, without the help of the imagination, while we can imagine nothing without the direct help of the perceptive faculty. By using irrelevant expressions, and random phrases, whose proper meaning would represent the opposite of what they are frequently used to express, we get wrong ideas of things, and by slow degrees come to entertain very absurd ideas of the actions of our own minds. And so we get in the habit of saying we imagine *this* or *that*, and when asked to explain the philosophy of the imagination, we readily answer we form certain figures and place them before the mind. It would not be a very difficult thing for a man in Canada to imagine himself in England, but it would be a very different thing were he to attempt to bring England to Canada.

Sec. 15: Imagination a dull, and, frequently, a wrong perception of things. To say, as is frequently said, that we "bring things to the mind," and "hold them before the mind," may answer as a figure, if it is so explained, and not allowed to pass as a fact. For strictly speaking it is not philosophically

correct. Whatever expressions we may use, and whatever may be the sense they are intended to convey, the fact is, we hold nothing before the mind in the sense in which it appears generally to be understood. The action of the mind appears at times as if it were arrested and held to a certain point, and yet it is a question, after all, whether this state of mind does not exist more in imagination than in fact. If a person will look intently at the dial plate of a clock, and try this experiment, to see how long he can keep his attention fixed upon the minute hand, and how long he can keep pace with it, he would soon find it to be impracticable to hold the mind even to a slow motion for one minute—yes, for half a minute; and we may go farther still, and say, it would doubtless prove impracticable to hold the mind there for ten seconds. If, then it would be so difficult to hold the mind for so short a time to a certain motion, how much more so might we suppose it would be to hold the mind without any motion at all? What appears to a superficial observer as an arresting or staying its progress, and diminishing its action, is in fact the very opposite, for at such times, when we seem to hold things before the mind, the action of the mind is increased. And this enormous array of events which are represented as standing before the mind, all take place by virtue of the law of mental transition. And their contiguous position which they appear to occupy at certain times, is not because these individual somethings which we call thoughts, by a desperate intellectual effort are brought into a phalanx, and placed into a contiguous position before the mind; but this mental state is positively the result of the rapidity of those transits of the perceptive faculty from one subject to another, stimulated by the increasing interest which the soul has in the investigation of the matter, and prompted to act by the authority of the will, it leaps from one circumstance to another with that astonishing swiftness, that though a close observer of himself will be fully conscious of the transits being made, yet the intellectual activity which is manifest in making them is such, that the mind becomes so astonished at itself that it finds it difficult at times to credit its own achievements. But the observations which we have here made in reference to the imagination, though we can scarcely entertain a hope that they will be regarded as conclusive and satisfactory by all that may read them, must suffice for the present, and I will only

add that their relevancy will be more fully seen and more forcibly felt as we proceed in our explanations of the nature and operation of the memory.

Sec. 16: *What memory is.* To remember is to perceive the past. And we cannot perceive the past only by that faculty of the soul which possesses the power to go and look *into the past.* So that according to this, memory implies an action of the perceptive faculty extending to past events. It does not mean that past events (thoughts) are brought to the present time. And should this explanation be doubted, it can be tested by a reference to our experience. We are not to go to *authors* for an explanation of this matter, this is not necessary, but we must look at the operations of our own minds, which will give us a true statement of the case. And with all deference to, and respect for those great men, who have expressed themselves on this subject, as holding opinions opposite to those we feel compelled to entertain, we are strongly inclined to believe that a little cool reflection will assist us more in understanding the real nature of memory than the reading of huge volumes of opinions. Not that we should depreciate the labours, nor the talents of those who have written to assist the understanding, and diffuse useful information through society; but nevertheless, we should learn to exercise our own judgment, we should hold that *inalienable right* as a sacred treasure, and yield not that prerogative to any man, however great or good, or to any class of men, however wise or numerous. Neither should we allow ourselves to think, *no, not for one moment,* however diminutive we may appear to ourselves to be, or however small we may look in the eyes of others, in point of literary and intellectual achievements, that it is not our prerogative, as well as the greatest philosopher on the continent, to be *original thinkers.*

Sec. 17: *Imagination and perception in the future.* Here we must make another observation or two in reference to imagination with perception in the future. Let us then take our minds into the future, and watch the operations thereof for a few moments, and we shall find that the faculty of perception and its corresponding power of imagination invariably go together. And it will be seen too, that they are subject to a continual interchange of action according to the specific office which each is de-

signed to fill in our mental nature. And by further investigating this point we shall see that imagination can do nothing without an instantaneous and continued action of the perceptive faculty operating on this power, and in harmony with it, taking cognizance of the modification assumed, by virtue of such power, which we call "imagination," and reporting the anticipated result to the soul. We conceive that nothing can be done by the soul in the present time, or seen in the future, without the assistance of the perceptive faculty modified, and by the said modification become adapted to the purpose therein required. So that nothing can be formed or seen, even by the "imagination," without the direct agency and positive action of the perceptive faculty. Now, while perception is expatiating in the future, and intently fixed on perceiving things, it forms no obstacle to the action of the affections or desires, or hope, or to consciousness, but it seems rather to furnish them employment, and excites them to action, especially that of consciousness, whose action is always required in immediate connection with that of perception. For it cannot be said with any degree of propriety that we perceive *that* of which we are not conscious. Let it be remembered that while the action of the *perception* furnishes action and necessary employment for consciousness, it at the same time *prevents* the action of the memory. For it does appear to be absolutely impossible for any person, let him try his best if he doubt this remark, to remember the past, and he can remember nothing but the past, for he cannot remember the past at the same time that perception is fully and really, or in its modified state, *imagination*, is engaged in the future. If a man could remember the past at the same time that he is contemplating or intently thinking on the future, we might have some plausible grounds to suppose that memory is a deposit of individual somethings in the mind, and there reserved for future use, which we have called by the name of *thoughts*.

Now, we find by close observation, that the perceptive faculty operates in a similar manner in its investigation of the past. For it cannot perceive the past and contemplate the future at the same time. The transitions are indeed rapid, so much so that the mind at certain times of deep interest seems so to connect the past and the future with the present, that to a superficial observer all appears to be blended into one view, and brought

before the mind. But the transitions from the present to the future, and from the future back to the present, and so on to the past, are nevertheless real and unavoidable. Now, to remember is to perceive that which has been under our observation before. How can we say that we remember what we do not perceive, or that we perceive in the past what we do not remember? Every man who is capable of connecting his thoughts from a simple proposition to a legitimate and rational conclusion, could easily enough be led to see that whenever he remembers, he finds the faculty of perception in the past, and not in the future. Neither are its efforts directed *to the present*, rummaging in the brain in search of *thoughts*, which, learned men tell us, are deposited there.

Sec. 18: *Perception goes into the past.* When an individual remembers a circumstance that has transpired a year, a month, a week, a day, or an hour ago, he finds the perceptive faculty in the very place where, and back to the very time, when, such event or circumstance transpired. And in thus remembering, we perceive by minute investigation that no other faculty of the soul is employed in the transition, by which the discovery of any past event is made, that has been under our observation before, only that of perception. When we speak of perception as going into the past under the circumstances here intimated, we represent it as acting in its simple native form, and under regular laws, of which we shall speak hereafter. It is true, however, as we before remarked, that imagination often goes into the past, in other words, the perceptive faculty often assumes in the past, as well as in the present, a presumptive, or perhaps it might be more proper to say, a complex form. But such forms of the *perceptive*, which constitute what we mean by imagination, do not appear to be strictly necessary in the investigation into the true state of things, which appears to be the ordinary and natural business of perception in its simple state. And it is only when perception acts in its *simple form* that the truth, in all its force and beauty, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth of any circumstance, whether in the present, in all its departments, degrees, and bearings, can be discovered. Hence, we look upon perception in what we here term its simple form, to constitute a most important, and a most essential and constituent part of the memory. In-

deed, it appears to constitute all that part of the memory which is necessary for the discovery of any event that has once been under our observation and is within reach of the mind. It therefore constitutes all that part of our memory which perceives the past.

And this, that is to say, the perceiving part in connection with consciousness, which is also a very operative faculty, and of which we shall have occasion to speak hereafter, constitutes that power of the mind which we call *memory*. And therefore memory, as we before remarked, is not, according to our conception of its nature, another faculty distinct from perception and consciousness, as they are from each other, but we apprehend it to be the result of a mutual and natural combination of the two original elementary and independent faculties, viz: perception and consciousness. And let it be remembered also that the perceiving part of the memory is affected on the principle of mental transition. The strength which the memory gains by action can, we think, be accounted for and explained better on this principle than on any other. It is a fact known and acknowledged by all intelligent persons that the memory gains strength by action, that the more we remember the more we can remember, that is to say, the more we accustom ourselves to look into the past, the easier, by far, these transitions are made. This view of the memory, gaining strength by action, is known to every school-boy that is old enough to write a copy, recite a verse, or do a sum; and is abundantly confirmed by our own observation and experience. But while the fact has been universally acknowledged, its philosophy has not been sought for, only by a few, and consequently not generally understood.

Sec. 19. *Of partly remembering things.* A treacherous memory, as it is frequently termed, can be better comprehended and explained, in our humble opinion, on this principle of *mental transition*, than on any other. Now, all men know that they experience, and too often too, that mental state which they call *partial remembrance*, which if memory is a *deposit of thought*, would be so destitute of meaning, so contradictory, so absurd, as to be utterly unworthy of notice. For such expressions as, "I partly remember," &c., would be just equal to

saying, I have thoughts partly asleep and partly awake, or, partly dead and partly alive, or partly dormant and partly active, that is to say, neither in motion nor at rest. How can these inconsistencies be reconciled, how can these opposites be made to agree? Whose experience will agree with this description of the memory? Who can see any philosophy therein? But if we admit that memory does really consist in a transition of the perceptive faculty, which appears to be the true state of the case, we see a philosophy in this intellectual state of *partial remembrance*, which can be brought down to the comprehension of every one who is capable of knowing that he is endowed with perception and consciousness.

Sec. 20: Perception widely distributed. Now, the power to perceive, that is, the perceptive faculty, we remark, is widely distributed among the inhabitants of earth, but man possesses it in a very high degree. Yet that which he has differs not, according to our conception of its nature, in kind, as some have supposed, from that with which the lower animals are endowed, although there is a vast difference in the degree. To say that inferior animals are not endowed with perception would be to assume, and to say a great deal, and would be tantamount to saying they have no knowledge of their being. And to say that they have no knowledge of their being would be to say that which is opposed to the sensible observations of every man in the daily occurrences of life. No being can remember without the existence and exercise of the faculty of perception. Those that do remember must therefore have this faculty, and we leave the reader to decide for himself whether he thinks he has reasons or not for believing that the lower animals can remember things relating to their existence, interest, safety and general welfare. For if they know anything, *they know their existence*, and no one could suppose for one moment, that it is possible for any being to know its existence and not perceive it, any more than it is possible for a being to perceive its existence and not to know it at the same time. Now, perception, wherever it exists, and in whatever degree it may be found to exist, we mean so far as applies to this our present state of being, whether its action is directed to the future, the present, or the past, and whether it acts in its simple or complex form, it is quite liable to meet with obstacles in its way, and which indeed is a very common occurrence.

Sec. 21 : *Steady perseverance essential.* By watching the actions of the mind we shall see that sometimes in the course of its travels it gets repulsed in such a degree, and to such an extent that it retreats. Like as it were a man on an exploring expedition who with great courage enters a dense forest with buoyant hopes and lively expectations of success; but the difficulties and dangers from within, to which he unexpectedly and suddenly finds himself exposed, compels him to retire and abandon the enterprise; and perhaps in no future period of his life could be induced to make another attempt, and if he should he might meet with no better success. And so it is, to a considerable extent, with this faculty of the mind, whose business it is to penetrate into, and perceive the nature of things. But it is not very difficult to perceive the mere existence of *compounds* within our sphere of action, the discovery of which depends upon the natural exercise of our intellectual powers; but of all those simple items that combine to make up those compounds, whether they are of a physical or mental nature, we often know but little. Yet a mind possessed of a great amount of vitality, courage, perseverance, resolution, determined to see all it can see, to know all it can know, at all hazards, at all expense of time and means within its reach, makes repeated and vigorous efforts to look into the nature of things, into these knotty questions, and it often succeeds. And this is the kind of mind that will succeed, and no other can be very successful in intellectual advancement. And this is why millions of our fellow race live and die ignorant of the simplest truths, in Politics, Domestic government, Literature and Religion. *Knowledge has its price!* Therefore, when perception, thus engaged in the pursuit of a certain subject or thing, assumes that modification which represents the truth of the case, it must be remembered that such discovery is not the result of a sudden and easy transition into the depth of such subject, or into the nature of such thing, but rather it is to be considered as the result of *ardent* and *progressive* research.

Sec. 22 : *The different stages through which the mind passes.* But to be a little more explicit, and to place our views before the reader, in such a way as to preclude the possibility of any misunderstanding, we would observe that, the idea is this. When this inconceivably swift transition of the perceptive

faculty is made from the present existence of the man, to some circumstance of which the mind has only a kind of general outline, its progress appears to be at once arrested the moment it arrives at the object of its pursuit. Having but the general outlines to direct its course, and the authority of the will to direct its action, and having arrived at the territory to be explored, or having struck upon the compound, and as the perceptive faculty can only go in one channel at the same time, it must now proceed to examine its parts, and every simple part too, which make up this compound, in order that it may alight upon the circumstances of which the mind requires full and correct details to serve its present purpose. The perceptive faculty having entered upon the special work now before it, progresses through its various stages till it arrives at the centre, or more properly speaking, till, as we commonly say we partly remember, that is, we partly perceive again that which has been under our observation before. There is evidently an intellectual state of this kind which we always pass through in remembering, though at certain times, owing principally to the influence of habit, that is to say, being so habituated to certain intellectual channels the mind passes through them with such rapidity, and ease, that we are not conscious either of the progress that it makes, nor the stages through which it passes in those easy transits. But yet it is true that we always experience that state of partial remembrance, before we fully remember anything. Yet we are not conscious of that state only when it encounters those obstacles which are sufficient to sensibly arrest the progress of the mind. Now, if the obstacles are not of that nature which compels the perceptive faculty to retire and abandon the attempt of further investigation; but only appear to be such as can be removed, perception continues to progress till it arrives to the uttermost extent of the subject or thing to be investigated, or rather, till it fully perceives all those references, dependencies, relations, and facts that lay, for the present time within our reach.

Sec. 23: Upon what our success principally depends. The progress however which the perceptive faculty makes in its investigation into the nature of things depends, (1st) upon the natural strength of the intellectual faculties. There is a vast difference in this respect, both among the human family; and

also among the lower animals of the same species. It depends, (2nd) upon the nature of the subject to be investigated. For as extensive physical combinations of a great many elementary properties render such compound more difficult of analyzation; so also it is with the mind, the more items connected with the subject under consideration, the more obstacles will be in the way of the mind's progress. Yet we often find it to be the case, in meeting with ordinary obstructions, though the penetrating faculty is arrested, yet its stay is short, and its passage through them, comparatively easy; but at other times obstacles, in the way of the mind's progress, are presented of greater magnitude and more in number. Those frustrate and embarrass and consequently hinder the progress of the mind for a greater length of time. Hence, partial remembrance does not imply that thoughts are partly aroused from their dormant condition, but that in such an intellectual state we partly perceive things.

Sec. 24; Memory a blank without consciousness. The memory would be a perfect blank, notwithstanding the existence, activity, and penetrating power of the perceptive faculty, were it not for the existence and continual action of consciousness. For while it is the business of the perception to go into the past and perceive, and investigate certain circumstances which the soul requires for its immediate use; the action of consciousness is indispensible to constitute that state of mind which we call remembrance. Its action is required that we may know whether such circumstance, now under the mind's observation, was ever under our observation before; and whether it was ever investigated in any part of our past life. If it were not for the action of this faculty which we call consciousness we should be continually perplexed with uncertainties, and never could know whether anything which we now perceive, was ever before the mind in any former period or not, or whether it originated yesterday, or twenty years ago. But consciousness, which is an essential element of the soul, is also a constituent part of the memory, whose province it is to decide in all such cases; and also to decide the difference between real things and imaginary ones.

This may be illustrated by the following example, viz.: a person perceives his having been in the town hall, in the city of London, in the Province of Canada, in the month of May, and heard an eloquent and interesting lecture on a certain subject. And again, he perceives himself to have stood by Paul, the great Apostle of the Gentiles, in the country of the Barbarians, when the viper jumped out of the fire and fastened upon his hand, and he shook it off and received no harm. Now, the one case is a real thing, he perceived himself in the town hall because he was there, and he was there when he perceived himself to be there, so that it is the perception of a fact and not of a phantom; but the other, though it is an acknowledged fact in sacred history, in reference to Paul and the viper; in reference to his being there with Paul and at the time of the circumstance, is purely imaginary. And how does the soul come to know the difference between this fact and this phantom? There is inward consciousness which decides with irresistible authority, that although both circumstances alluded to really exist in past time, yet only one of them was ever before the mind, as a fact connected with its own life. And from this decision there is no place of appeal, and no power in the soul to dissent—no disposition to murmur—no ground of complaint, it is regarded by the soul as a settled truth, and remains as such. Hence, though we cannot remember without the action of the perceptive faculty; neither can we without the interference and prompt decision of consciousness. But we cannot conceive that anything more is required to constitute the act of remembering, and anything less than the mutual co-operation of these two faculties, would not be sufficient to answer the purpose.

Sec. 25: *Perception in the past also assumes different forms.* It should be observed also that the *perceptive* while engaged in the past, as well as when in the future, often appears to be burdened with strange and perplexing imaginations. Whenever a circumstance is supposed to have transpired, of which we possess but a faint conception of its general outlines, which conceptions are often the result of involuntary mental action, the particular business of the perceptive faculty is to go in search of its details. Now, whatever it perceives in that sphere, or channel, in which it moves through past life, it presents to the mind, whether such are real circumstances or whether they

are merely imaginary. It does not appear to be the business of the perception to make selections in the general of appropriate items to present to the soul, while it acts in the capacity of memory. This intellectual state, or rather, these modifications of the mind which we represent by the terms, *selection* and application, or "collecting our thoughts," &c., which terms express that state of the mind which we call reasoning, appears to have nothing to do in the direct act of remembering. For it is not for the soul to act upon the principle of selection of items in remembering, as much as to say, Is it pleasant to admit this or that circumstance as a part of past experience? But it is for consciousness to settle the question in regard to the simple fact; which it invariably does whenever the perceptive faculty extends itself to all the circumstances connected with the case, that are necessary to produce a verdict.

Now, it would appear that when the soul is engaged in a course of reasoning, and when we particularly stand in need of the assistance of the memory; for reasoning requires a complication of circumstances that are principally in the past to prove the point in hand; that the mind collects and holds these circumstances before it for the time being, by an unusual effort of its own. This however, is not true. The mind does indeed put forth vigorous efforts, owing to the intense interest which it feels in the subject, but it is not to hold before it those thoughts like so many soldiers in battle array; but to adapt its increased activity to the circumstances required. This state of mind then, which we call *reasoning* is in a great measure the result of the increased, rational, regular, and systematical activity of the perceptive faculty.

Sec. 26: How transition can be proved. In times of very deep interest, which are occasionally experienced by the soul, when the perceptive has to fly into the past with its uttermost speed in search of truths, which are at the present moment required; it would be impossible for the most discriminating, the most acute, and the most "retentive" mind to form any conception of its speed and power, in those extraordinary cases. Nevertheless, in all ordinary cases its transitions are obvious. And more especially are they to be seen in cases in which the soul takes but little interest. Seeing this is the case, we come to

the conclusion that inasmuch as in matters of little interest, the transition of the perceptive faculty can be traced into the past, and also in matters of ordinary interest there is a consciousness of transition identified with the act of remembering; and as the soul has but one general mode of operation in remembering things, *remembering* is done in all cases by the transition of the perceptive faculty into the past. Increased motion in the perceptive faculty is all that is required of that part of the memory in the time of the soul's most important reasonings. For it makes no difference, in a course of reasoning, when the memory is called to action, whether a circumstance lays as nigh by our present existence as yesterday, or fifty years from us, if the velocity of the perceiving faculty can be increased in proportion to the distance of each circumstance, and the number of the whole that may be necessary to meet the emergency of the case. The extension of the perceptive faculty into the past to any conceivable distance, appears to be a natural action, and therefore quite easy; but those transitional reactions which are necessary to be made from one circumstance to another, and the selection that always needs to be made, to form a connecting link between them, and more especially to become expert and judicious in making those *selections*, is the result, at least to a great extent, of practice, which in this, as well as in other departments of life, comparatively speaking, makes "perfect."

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE DIFFERENT DEGREES OF DECEPTION TO WHICH THE SOUL IS LIABLE.

Sec. 1.: *A deceitful or treacherous memory.* This intellectual state, so far as we can discover, does not appear to be produced by any natural, or voluntary treachery by the perceiving powers of the mind. For although there is a difference in the nature of the perceptions, according to the different modifications of the perceptive faculty; yet every rational being must feel, must see, must know that there is a marked difference between perceiving a thing in reality, *such as*; a man perceives himself to be the same man that he is, sitting by his own fire side, eating at his own table, or conversing with his own family; all of which are facts perceived by, or rather through the senses; or he imagines himself to be another man, a king or a beggar, a general in the army or a private soldier, or far from home, a stranger and forsaken, or immersed in wealth, having suddenly become heir to a large fortune, and concludes to purchase a large estate; and if the difference between this phantom and the fact is not perceived till after he thinks he has purchased the estate, it will be when he puts his hand in his pocket for his cash, or issues his cheque on the bank. The same result will follow in all similar cases, because, "*facts are stubborn things.*" For whenever we perceive a circumstance in the past, that is real, we feel the action of consciousness deciding to that effect. And though we might try with all our native energies, the judgment having been given from this source, we can no more doubt the fact than we can doubt our own existence. For as the fact has been perceived, and felt and known as such, it becomes an established truth through the whole empire of the soul.

Sec. 2: What interest may do in the soul. Though the facts, in reference to the soul's decision in regard to real things or imaginary ones, it is nevertheless true that interest might lead us, as it has thousands of others, to conceal the truth, and it might lead us to deny that truth to others, who might desire to know it, or to modify it, or express it ambiguously; nevertheless, it is still the truth, and the mind knows it and feels its force, and tacitly bows to its supreme authority. Now, this internal submission of the soul to the truth, as a truth, though not always for the sake of truth, is invariably the case with all men whenever they perceive a real circumstance in the past, that is to say, whenever they remember any thing. But when we merely "think we remember," we are in another intellectual state altogether. For here we find ourselves surrounded with doubts, and perplexed with fears. Now, in this state of mind, if our interest, and man in his present fallen condition is very much inclined to follow that, should lead us to prefer the image instead of the real thing, the mind will in course of time become deceived. And the preference which we thus give, will lead to a very important intellectual action, that is to say, he will be led to receive that for a real thing which in fact had its origin in nothing but imagination. For although that intense interest which led the soul wrong in the first place, may not exist to the same extent twenty years afterwards, and at that period the same kind and degree of interest may not exist at all, so as to prove any impediment to a perception of the true state of things; yet the mind having acquired the habit of assuming *such modifications* in connection with such a subject and though *these modifications* do not present the fact, yet through the influence of habit, *created in the first place by self-interest*, the present form has become fastened to the mind and passes as the truth, though it is not the truth. And notwithstanding the soul's intention may be honest, at the time now alluded to, and may prefer the truth; yet through its own voluntary impositions produced by selfish motives, practised upon the judgment in former days, the soul may be consigned to deception *on that point*, and which is, to all appearance, not unfrequently the case, as long as life and being last in their present form, "for whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap." This deception may be imposed upon the mind in a manner similar to the following, viz.: Interest leads the will, or more properly

speaking, the will prefers the image, chooses the form presented, and it is well known that the will controls, to a very great extent, the other faculties of the soul, especially at certain times. Now, although the perceptive faculty would as readily present the real truth, as the modification thereof, by imagination, yet the continual preference of the will to the image, and the authority, which at such times it can exert over the perceptive faculty, tends to produce *that modification*, both in kind and degree, which at every presentation places the truth further from the mind. And this form of mind under such circumstances is generally very active, and can be made to present any congenial forms; seeing that it can bend any way, and can go to any extravagance. And it appears also to be governed principally by present ruling emotions, whatever may be their nature.

Sec. 3: *Is the soul deceived at once, or by degrees?* It must not be supposed that in thus remembering and in thus being deceived, that the truth immediately disappears, for this cannot be the case. Because, it is reasonable to conclude that in every case of this kind, viz: of self deception, the soul must be the subject of opposite and extremely painful feelings. And what produces this inward struggle is this: the natural tendency of the soul to the truth, which principle the conscience of every man tells him should be preferred to falsehood. In consequence of this ruling principle of our nature, notwithstanding the selfish interest of the soul to the contrary, will occasionally be presented, that is to say, the perceptive faculty will *now* and *then* assume a true and correct form. And therefore to perfect such deception, it requires a vigorous effort of the will to oppose the truth, to modify it, and to misrepresent it to the soul. For I presume that every person's experience will go to say that it requires no effort of the mind to an internal acknowledgment of the truth, although it might, to give an outward expression to it. But to reject the truth *inwardly*, and expel it from the mind, requires not only an effort, but a desperate one. And before it can become easy to the soul, and the conscience be quieted and put to rest, it will require a long course of intellectual violence to be used against this invaluable principle. This can be proved by reference to our experience in all matters relating to practical morality, but more especially by referring to our youthful days. A child who has been taught

in the home circle by his parents and friends, to respect the truth, and never to tell a lie, knows well what amount of effort it cost him when he first made up his mind to equivocate, or modify any truth, or especially when he resolved to tell a lie, how many restless hours, how many pangs of conscience, how many chills ran through his blood, how many sober thoughts on what a fond mother, an affectionate father, kind brothers and loving sisters have told him in reference to the consequences of telling a lie. Yes, his cogitations would alight upon the hour of Sabbath School, its appropriate lessons, the teacher's advice, the superintendent's exhortation; and from there to the circulating library, what warnings have been given to others, what punishments have followed and befell the disobedient, the disgrace he has brought upon himself, and the grief that he has brought upon his parents, teachers and friends, and a thousand thoughts of a similar nature and tendency, will pierce him like daggers plunging to his heart, producing alarming fears, occasional regrets, trembling nerves, awful forebodings, the silent tear, a momentary repentance, a partial retreat but a new resolve, and truth, *at all hazards*, is again repulsed.

Sec. 4. The struggle is long, repeated, and voluntary. But this struggle is not merely one of a moment and then passes away to be no more seen; it is repeated, and although with diminished force, is nevertheless cogent, brings with it conviction and remonstrance, which may be felt by the soul for years. And the reason of this is because the truth, though expelled, will occasionally be seen, and when it is seen the soul naturally inclines to that. Hence, when the real circumstance is perceived in its true and proper light, the will interferes and truth is repulsed. But the other form which has been modified to suit the selfish purposes of the soul, is indulged and cherished by the same faculty, viz: by the preferring or choosing power of the soul. And by a repetition of this process *that* which in reality is but a phantom, by a constant succession of presentations, by the direction and authority of the will, in process of time, may actually pass in the soul for an established truth, with the person who has allowed himself to practice this course of deception. Though what we have here stated is possible, yet this must be regarded more as an

exception than as a general rule. For in most cases of remembering, though imagination may be ever so active, some faint traces of the truth may be found. And though this is not as easily susceptible of proof as many other things in nature, yet a careful observer of human conduct, by taking particular notice of countenance, gestures, and frequently a degree of embarrassment that attaches to the person who relates a circumstance in which he is deeply interested, will be fully justified in coming to this conclusion. Nevertheless it is an universally acknowledged truth, that the more we abuse the natural powers of the memory the more we are deceived by it, and the more we practice deception on one faculty of the soul, the easier it can be done upon another, and so on upon all. And so it follows that the soul, whose natural tendency is to truth, as water to a common level, may be deceived relative to things which it has seen and known, and thus create by its own voluntary effort that state of mental derangement which we call *a treacherous memory*. But if a man is so deceived by the memory as to observe a phantom instead of a fact, and is induced to receive the phantom for the fact, the blame, as a general thing, is his own. There is certainly a wrong somewhere, but that wrong is not in nature; its origin may be attributed to the predominancy of voluntary selfish principles, *and a want of preference to the truth.*

Sec. 5: Of false forms assumed by the mind. It should be observed also that after having taught the mind to practice deception by such a rigorous discipline, and violent and repeated outrages on our mental nature, it will become easy to the *perceptive* to assume a false form; and although the judgment can never decide that that which appears to the soul to be a false form is a true one, yet, by having it so constantly under the observation as a substitute for the truth, every faculty and power of the soul may eventually lose so much of its native strength, vitality, and action, *on that point*, as to become deceived, viz.: the soul is in a wrong position—assumes improper and incorrect modifications. And having been deceived by such a terrible process in any given case, the imagination, which has been a prominent agent of the *will* in the one instance, and when that agency, in that form and degree, is quite acceptable to the will, or preferring or choosing part of the soul, as we

call it, may ere long impose deception upon us, to our disgrace and sorrow, when we do not desire it. And if this should be the case an apology that our memory "does not serve us," or "has deceived us," will but very poorly atone for the suffering, both in character and circumstances, to which such deception may subject us.

Sec. 6. Where does the blame rest? Let it be remembered that in the above cases, and in all cases of a similar nature, the fault is not to be attributed to the memory, *but to the will.* The perceptive faculty is always honest in its presentations to the mind, when it acts in its natural and simple form, and no other form appears to be necessary in searching for past events, seeing that it is facts that are required. And perception in its simple form invariably searches for facts and not for phantoms. And *consciousness* which is the other constituent part of memory, cannot be bribed, nor driven from its position. For just as long as we are conscious of anything forming a part of the history of the past, we are conscious of it, and cannot be any other way. Neither can consciousness be put to silence, except it is done by a long continued violence practiced on our mental nature by the arbitrary power of the will, in repeatedly rejecting its discussions, and preferring those modifications and phantoms presented by the imagination; and by this course of action lose sight of the truth. But then, in such case the soul is not conscious of the truth. So that under such a circumstance as this, the consciousness may indeed be said to be silenced, and the result is the memory is deceived, or as we commonly say, "it has deceived us." And yet there are bounds to this deception beyond which the soul cannot go. For after all the exertions that the most perverted will might make, prompted by self-interest and inflamed by strong and appropriate emotions, assisted by the most vivid imaginations, there will yet be left many circumstances connected with the past history of every man, whether he is virtuous or wicked, ignorant or wise, pious or profane, industrious or indolent, rich or poor, honest or dishonest, that will always be seen, when they are seen at all, in their true and proper character. But these are generally such circumstances as, to use a familiar figure, have taken a "deep hold of the mind." By which we mean that from the deeply interesting and excit-

ing nature of some circumstances, and the harmony which exists, in reference to such cases, between the memory and the will, in the repeated investigations thereof, that through habit the transitions, in the course of time, become so exceedingly easy, and the perceptive faculty so accustomed to observe, and the consciousness to decide on a certain point, that it is beyond the power of the soul to turn the tide of observations from its accustomed channel, and therefore these things are not forgotten.

Sec. 7: Memory deceitful—why? But relative to the deceitful memory of which we speak, we would add that, by attention to this subject an honest mind will be convinced that some men appear scarcely to relate a solitary circumstance as it occurs, and as they knew it did occur, if they conceive it to be, either directly or indirectly connected with their interest. There is a manifest disposition in a large portion of mankind to detract from the truth under certain circumstances. For example, of naval exploits, of military manœuvring, of diplomatic intercourse, of large government contracts, and so on down to our little daily occurrences of bargain and sale. This is done either by the concealment of some item, as by withholding a part, and then endeavoring to satisfy the conscience by urging that they are under no obligation to tel. all the subject because they have told a part any more than a man is compelled to tell everything he knows in all matters because he may have told some things in some matters. Or else it is done by adding to the truth by misrepresentations, as explaining certain words as meaning such things and showing that such words were used, but knowing himself that the speaker did not intend such construction, or by using some special emphasis at certain stages of the detail, or by certain gestures, such as a nod of the head, or a smile of the face, of a peculiar turn of the eye, and in a thousand other ways too numerous to mention here. But the question is frequently asked by these parties, What harm is there in that? The harm is here: there is 1st, an effort made to deceive others, which if we succeed we do them an injury by imposing upon their credulity; 2nd, that imposition on their judgment may lead to an injury in their circumstances by way of loss sustained; 3rd, there is an injury done to their feelings, they are wounded,

offended, and grieved. And what greatly augments the moral guilt of the practical deceiver is, it is unsuspected, unprovoked, and of course uncalled for. But while the mind is so intent on deceiving others, to gratify its own sordid and selfish motives, it will invariably palm, whether it intends it or not, a degree of deception upon itself.

Sec. 8: *Of different and just rewards.* But in most such cases it appears that men are trying to deceive themselves, either by trying to make themselves believe that things are as they represent them to others; or, if they are not, that it is right for them to represent them in that light, *seeing that others do so*, and that it is greatly to their interest to do the same. And in this way, from time to time, we can easily learn from conversation with men, that they invite this state of mind by voluntarily practising such misrepresentations, and thereby deceive themselves, and *they try to deceive themselves*, they *buy falsehood*, and at a very dear rate too, *and sell it not.* All men who are disposed to do right, take the opposite course, because, they "buy the truth and sell it not." They bind it about their necks, they chain it to their arms, they write it on their hearts. And in a philosophical sense, as well as in a moral, such persons reap rich diamonds, invaluable pearls, priceless jewels, brilliant laurels, and *immortal fame*, as their reward. But the other character, though a slave to wrong principles, and of course wrong practises, seems to take a degree of unholy pleasure in persuading himself that such a course is to his interest, though even in this, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred they prove themselves mistaken, and yet they seem to rejoice in every stage of that deception. And it is not very difficult to conceive how a mind, *so prone to wrong*, when it first takes that turn on any given point, and begins to lose sight to some extent of the truth, would feel that it had achieved a victory in favour of its ruling principle. And a victory it is, too; but a victory over what? Over truth, and in favor of error. But what is the result? Loss of intellectual strength. Truth gives strength to the mind, not falsehood; of moral purity, nothing contaminates the soul more than the practise to which we here allude, for it is an imposition on the intellect, violence done to the moral nature, God insulted, man deceived, abused, and wronged; loss of confidence by all the better class of society,

a person who will thus lie to himself and to others, will not be really respected by any; loss of enjoyment, no man can be happy without friends; loss of character, no man has a character that is worth a fig unless he is countenanced by the intelligent, respectable, moral, and religious portion of community. And does he not get his reward? But time would fail to tell, for in many instances Eternity only will develop the results and show the consequences of such *mental abuse.*

Sec. 9. The difficulties under which we labour from this state of mind at the present time are great. One inconvenience under which we labour, and which arises from this state of mind is, the *want of that truth*, in its plain, naked form, and in which light we once perceived it, but cannot have it *now*, because it has become so mixed up with error that it cannot be severed therefrom. And however valuable it may be to serve the present purposes of life, the soul cannot *have it now.* The time may have arrived for the soul to mourn over its imprudence and past follies touching this matter, but no labour, no amount of anxiety, can place it within reach of the mind again, and self-condemned the soul must do the best it can without it. If the person has laboured to deceive himself, he must now begin to feel some of the consequences.

And this often proves a very serious injury to a man's character. Suppose, for example, that a circumstance occurred, say, several years ago, to which we were eye-witness, and suppose we thought at that time that it would serve our interest, to put some degree of misconstruction on it, and tried to think there was no harm in it, and suppose we commenced to ponder that misconstruction, and continued to revolve it in the mind till we thought that in that plausible form we might be comparatively safe in telling it to others. After telling it once in this mutilated form, knowing it was not correct, yet, to appear consistent, when relating it again it must be told in the same way. Now, by this time it is reasonable to suppose, and a daily observation of human conduct proves it, that the mind gains additional confidence in its undertaking, and feels itself to be under stronger obligations to relate the circumstance the third time agreeable to the two former times, this must also be done to appear consistent. Thus having related the circumstance several times, and in

different places, the man is driven to one of three things. Either (1) to abandon the subject altogether and say it is forgotten, which is a very difficult thing, and next to an impossibility, for he could not fail to commit himself upon being interrogated, especially as he has openly professed to have witnessed such circumstance. (2) Or else he must deny of ever having known the subject at all, or any part of it, and this he could not do without proving himself guilty of fabricating the whole. (3) Or else he must come out and frankly confess *the truth*, viz.: that he has misrepresented it to himself and to others, a thing which to the most of men is very hard to be done. Hence, the same principle, *self-interest*, which prompted to misrepresent in the first place, continues to urge him forward, that he may repeat the same kind of representation as the only available means to save his credit. But having trammelled the mind in the outset, it will be no very difficult matter afterwards to overshoot the mark, which indeed is, judging from human conduct, too often done. But suppose we carry this matter a little further, and imagine that when the circumstance was first observed that some other person stood by and observed it too, though that person was unnoticed, and the fact of his having been there at that time was entirely unknown to us. But now several years having passed away, in the course of which time the mind has invariably presented it in this irregular form, so that the real truth is lost. That is to say, the mind has for many years assumed improper modifications, which do not present the fact, but *a form* which greatly lessens its force, or amalgamates it with foreign matter or irrelevant forms, and the proper modification is *now*, not assumed. And suppose that, under these circumstances, we should be called upon to give our testimony to that occurrence, much as we might desire, at our present stage of life, because we are supposed to be several years in advance of this circumstance, to present it in its true character, yet we can only give it as we have it, and that is in its irregular form as we have for the several years past been accustomed to view it. What now would this person think of our integrity who witnessed both circumstances, the first as it took place and the second as we told it? Would he look upon us as telling the truth? Certainly not. For although we might indeed desire to tell the truth, and at this time might be strongly inclined to believe it *was the truth*, yet the stranger could not see our motives, *for they are hidden things*, and conse-

quently would not be prepared to give us any credit for them, but would judge us according to the actions which he sees to be incompatible with the principles of truth. Now, all this we justly charge upon the memory which has deceived us, but the will or choosing part of the soul, in the first place is the cause for having forced the *perceptive* out of its naturally inclined channel, in which by the same power it has been kept till the truth is lost to the soul.

Sec. 10 : *Of contradictory evidences.* Many of those conflicting and contradictory statements that are given in a civil court, are the result of this deception practised on the memory. Not that every false statement that is given in evidence either on public occasions or asserted to in private is the result of a false memory ; for in many instances the person giving evidence in misrepresentations, has the truth in his own possession, but voluntarily, deliberately, and obstinately refuses to give it. In this case the memory is not deceived, though the truth is not presented, but the will is making efforts to effect the deception. It happens also that persons under oath before a bench of Magistrates will relate a circumstance diametrically opposite ; and a circumstance too which they both witnessed with equal advantages. Now in cases of this kind if one is right, it can only be the one, for as they are opposite, and truth cannot be opposed to itself, therefore both statements cannot be true. Now, it is among the possibilities that one party may be sincere, and the other party may be insincere. And it is also possible that both parties are insincere. But the most charitable view, and the one which we would be inclined to take of the matter is, that in many cases both parties are sincere and honest at the time. This at least appears to be as possible as either of the others. Now, in these two cases alluded to, in giving evidence under the circumstances described, the difference will, I think, be seen to be altogether in the motive. For in the first case the evidence is given with a conscious knowledge of the truth, and at the same time an unwillingness to give *in the truth* as an evidence ; also a deliberate and firm determination to present false features in the case, and by so doing to deceive others, and prevent the ends of justice. But in the second case, though the truth is misrepresented to an equal extent, and with as much apparent firmness and deliberation, yet this

case may agree with the one alluded to under *italics* of "Memory deceitful, why?" and the truth may be lost to this person; and that which is not the truth having passed for *so long* as a substitute for the truth, by this time claims to be the *truth*. Yet it should be remembered that both parties are guilty, though not equally guilty, at the present moment. The one labouring at the present time to misrepresent the truth, and thereby doing violence to his intellectual and moral nature; the other having done the same heretofore is guilty for the past, and is now suffering the penalty in the delusion entailed on him, and in his character, and perhaps in his circumstances.

Sec. 11. *How such cases involve moral responsibility.* And it should not be forgotten that the moral features of the case are analogous to the intellectual above alluded to. For if an individual commit a crime, or a course of crimes, in early life which began and ended in a day, or the effects of which do not extend beyond his youthful days, when he, through repentance towards God and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ obtains a pardon, he becomes justified, that is to say, he is no longer guilty in the sight of God, for *that* or *those* transgressions; and his business *now* is to cease a repetition of the same conduct to prevent a recurrence of moral guilt from the same cause. But there are other cases of moral practice which, according to our conception of them, cannot be disposed of exactly on the same principle; because, the effects of them are extended, by a law of our nature, through a person's whole lifetime. If for example, a person in early life contracts the habit of drinking strong drinks, smoking and chewing tobacco, taking snuff, or any other hurtful practice, to a great excess; they being of such a nature as to operate powerfully upon the nervous system, their poisonous substances entering the blood, find their way to the heart, intestines, liver, digestive organs, and even to the lungs, and finally to every part of the human body. These practices if continued for a term of years lay the foundation of various and malignant diseases; many of which affect the intellect, the moral sense, and pervert the will. Now, though in after life the person may be led to see the evil of such practices, reform from their use, and repent before God of the sinfulness of such a course, and obtain pardon; but does the pardon of sin in such, or any similar case, restore to the man

pure blood, healthy digestive organs, and sound lungs? We answer, no. The reason is, because the law of God, as recorded in Revelation, does not conflict with, nor contravene in any way the regularity and harmony of those laws which the same Great Author has implanted in our physical and mental natures. But the moral feature in this case may perhaps be more forcibly seen in the case of a "deceitful memory" than even in the one here alluded to. For an individual who in early life should commence to practice deception upon his memory or his judgment, or upon his reasoning powers, and continue that course till mature life; may then be led to see the evil of such a course and repent before God and obtain the pardon of sin. By the sense of pardon, Divinely bestowed, the guilt of such conduct is taken away. But the memory having been deceived on many points which involve moral character, brings down with it a variety of false forms, which through habit it now assumes for truth, and the person may tell them for truth, with the present motives, induce others to do the same, is the more readily believed because of his present religious professions, still it is all false! Now, the question is, must nature have its course in the future, as it has had in the past; or will the sense of pardon which is bestowed, counteract its workings, impede its progress, neutralize its laws of cause and effect, and thus restore lost time, injured faculties, and mutilated truths, or does it leave the effect as it is produced by its natural cause? We answer, the truth, the great eternal truth holds good, and we think it is no perversion of the sacred text to apply it here, that "whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap." A glance at the world with the mirror of truth in our hand, and what shall we see? Temperance, with its train of healthful enjoyments; Prudence, with its provision laid up for the winter; Diligence, making rich; Honesty, the best policy; and Truth, nothing afraid; Self-denial, with its superstructure of noble achievements; Benevolence, with its returning tide of blessings; and Piety, serene in the tempest, and beaming with hope. On the other hand, Insobriety, darkened with gloom and bloated with disease; Sloth, eaten to the bone; Dishonesty, in fetters, and Falsehood hiding its face; Imprudence, fallen by a false step; Self-indulgence, with its downward course; Selfishness, with its cheerless solitude; and Impiety, striving, in old age, to deny the faith, swearing on a death-bed, anticipating judg-

ment, and muttering curses from an inward hell. Here then we may plainly see the law of cause and effect, both in the physical, mental, and moral world. From these and a thousand other considerations may be seen the importance of correct habits in early life. Therefore it is impossible to pay too much attention to the cultivation of the youthful mind. No expence, nor pains should be spared to direct those young intellects to the proper channel, and keep them there, till their habits are formed for truth, sobriety and virtue, when in a few years it will become an easy practice.

Sec. 12: An honest forgetful memory. In what we have said above, it will be observed, that we have not spoken of an honest forgetfulness. There is a wide difference between that and a deceitful memory that we have already endeavoured to describe. For though in the case of a "deceitful memory" we have shown that those particles of truth of which the mind has lost sight, are really forgotten; yet not all the portions of truth in that subject, for in almost every case of this kind some truth will be retained and by so doing the misrepresentation will undoubtedly look the more plausible. And this being the case, it will be seen that there must have been a voluntary exertion of the mind put forth in order to make the selection between truth and falsehood. For those particles of truth which were severed from the subject, and by which the chain was broken in the first place, must have been done by a conscious exertion, and the supplying of those vacancies with foreign matter, to make up the breach occasioned by the obstruction of truth, required also the same kind of action. Hence in cases of deception of the memory, and in almost every degree of that deception, there will be some particles of truth that are preserved from the original circumstance, though they are rendered powerless by the amount of error that is mixed with them. And this view of the subject, which we think will appear, from a close scrutiny into human conduct, to be correct, throws the blame where it ought to be (viz.) on the person himself. And for this violation done to his mental nature he is held accountable to that Almighty Being, who will judge him, and all mankind in the last day. But in reference to an honest forgetfulness a person may be an eye-witness to a circumstance, and one

of considerable importance too, though not so much to himself, but to others; yet, if called upon to relate it twelve months afterwards, he could not state enough of it by which even its prominent features could be ascertained, or its general outlines understood; but this is because he has honestly forgotten it. He may remember a few incidents, those he honestly gives, one here, and another there, but they have no connection sufficient to form a chain of events, he makes no effort to supply those vacancies with *error*, merely because he cannot remember the truth! Now, this will be seen to be a very different case from a "deceitful memory," that is to say, one that has acquired the habit of misrepresenting, and mixing real things with imaginary ones, till the truth becomes so obscured that when, in after life, it is honestly sought for, it cannot be found. The difference in the two cases is this, the one tried to prevent the truth from being known, the other merely neglected to remember it.

CHAPTER V.

ON A WEAK MEMORY AND ITS REMEDIES.

Sec. 1: *What is the cause of a weak or poor memory?* We shall now proceed to devote a short space to the consideration of that mental state so generally complained of by mankind, which we call a "weak memory." This state of mind, most of men know by experience, is exceedingly troublesome and often militates against our influence, our circumstances, and personal happiness. And seeing this is the case, a remedy for such a disease must be very desirable. Now, that there is a difference in the natural strength of the human mind, we unhesitatingly admit, that is to say; there is a manifest difference between one set of intellectual faculties which the Great Author of nature has, by the institution and continuance of certain laws, combined to make up one human mind, and another set of intellectual faculties which make up another human mind. But though there is this natural difference in the intellectual capacity of mankind, and though there is such extensive hereditary weakness, and physical and mental deformity, arising from causes too numerous to mention here, yet these causes, we humbly conceive, are not primary causes instituted by our Benevolent Creator, but are secondary, and are the result of man's insubordination to the Divine commandments. And therefore it is not impossible that these causes may, in a great measure, if not altogether, eventually, be removed. And should we judge from the improvement that has been made in the course of the last half century, in scientific discoveries for mental improvement, and intellectual development among our race; we might reasonably hope that at the same rate of improvement, many of these abuses that now obtain, will be corrected. Whether this state of things will ever be experienced by mankind or not in his present state, when all those evils

will be corrected, one thing is certain, that we cannot but desire to see those causes removed that now contribute to make that intellectual and moral difference among nations, and portions of nations, and individuals of different localities, so offensive to the ear, so painful to the eye, and so afflicting to the heart. So that mind can come forth in its true native form, free from the trammels of blind superstition, and the cruel bondage of despotic laws. When *learning* shall no longer in any part of our wide world be monopolized by the rich and the great—when all shall have equal access to the great principles of a wholesome literature, and a pure system of moral teaching—then, we say; that difference which now appears, to our disgrace and shame, in the world of mind will to a great extent be banished. But we must take things as we find them, and though we can scarcely hope to correct all the abuses to which mankind are heirs; yet, we can do much towards the accomplishment of so desirable an object, and especially if every one would do what he can.

But bad as our case may be from prevailing secondary causes, and numerous hereditary defects, and a want of access to the best means and facilities for literary attainments, and intellectual development; yet, the weakness of the memory, of which we so often, and so bitterly complain is, to a great extent, the result of our own indolence; so much so, at all events, that we forget many things merely because we do not try to remember them. We have said before, and repeat it here, that memory becomes improved just in proportion to the action, that is; the intellectual effort directed to any one circumstance. And this action of the memory on these circumstances is, just in proportion to the interest which the soul feels therein.

Sec. 2: A want of interest one cause of a weak memory. We say then, that one cause of a weak memory is a want of interest in the subject or thing, whatever that may be, which comes under our observation; and this is easily demonstrated by a reference to the general conduct of mankind. For example, persons who have but little regard for religious things, though they are often present, for many causes, the most of which are unknown to any but themselves, in religious assemblies; especially at the public preaching of the Gospel, and have

access to religious books of every description, and hear religious conversations every day; yet, how little do the majority of those persons know about bible truth, the Providence of God, or his moral government of the world. How strangely, and how profoundly ignorant are they, of the nature of that duty which they owe to themselves, both to the body, the intellect, and moral nature, to their fellow beings, to civil rulers, to religious ministers, the church of Christ, and suffering humanity, to their Creator, by way of repentance, of reverence for his name, his law and person, of faith, of prayer, and of praise. And what is the reason for all this? It is not because they have had no privileges, not because they have not heard, not because they have not had line upon line and precept upon precept, and not because these truths are more difficult to remember, but because they had, comparatively, no interest in the "things which they heard." The mind not being especially directed towards them when they occurred, any more than to give a passing observation, subsequent events would take the attention of the *perceptive*, and events, too, of far less consequence, came to occupy the mind's attention, while things of paramount importance were lost. Now, the whole of this is the result of carelessness, for in not giving "heed to the things which we have heard, *we have let them slip.*"

This fact can be illustrated by referring to our daily occupations. For example, why does a man while working in his accustomed employment lay down his axe in one place and his hammer in another place, and forget, perhaps twenty times in a day, where he laid his tools? Suppose he has a note of hand or a bank bill, and of no more value than the axe and the hammer, but has occasion to lay it down as he does his tools; would he forget as readily, or would he be apt to forget at all the place where he laid the note or bill? We answer, he would not. The reason of this is obvious. The mind, by having the tools so frequently under its notice, and having known them to be laid aside from time to time, and lost occasionally, but always found with but little trouble, contracts a degree of indifference in regard to their locality, and borrows from the past a confidence that they are safe, *though not seen.* Whereas money not being in the same position, nor handled in the same

manner, nor estimated on the same principle, and not so easily found when lost, nor identified when found, is considered of more value, excites more interest, gets more attention, and occupies more of the mind's time, and consequently is better and more distinctly remembered. We merely introduce this, being fully sensible that it will not apply in every case as we have applied it in this, because, there might be cases found of persons not accustomed to use such tools as we have alluded to, but are in the habit of handling a great amount of money daily, would place more value upon the tools than upon the amount of money that would purchase them; and in this case they would remember the tools better than they would the money. Nevertheless the principle is the same and they remember that in which they are the most interested, and on which they place the most value.

Again, it will be seen that though some people are great readers, and good readers too, that is, correct readers, and yet with all their reading they seem to know but very little. We do not refer here to persons of deranged or defective intellects, but to those who are capable of understanding and remembering what they read, and the reason why they know so little with all their reading is, they do not read for information, but merely for pastime and amusement; and therefore those books that will gratify and please the sense, get the greatest share of attention. And it is for this very reason that men, and millions of them too, can remember tales of *novelty* and romance, of fun and merriment, of vanity and foolishness, of licentiousness and profligacy, so much better than they can sacred truth. But the great difficulty is, they have no interest in sacred things, therefore they cannot remember them. And inasmuch as a weak memory is owing, in part, to a want of interest in the things which we perceive, in order to improve the memory one important consideration is, to cultivate an interest in those principles and practises that are recommended in the Christian Scriptures, as best adapted for the purposes of life.

Sec. 3: *Cannot expect to remember everything.* Now, inasmuch as we can scarcely hope, even with the best possible mental discipline, and with every facility which this age of improvement can furnish, to remember everything, we shall see the

propriety of exercising great care and solicitude in making selections of those subjects that are likely to prove of the greatest practical benefit to us. These are:—

Sec. 4: (1) Things relating to practical morality, and theoretical, emotional, experimental, and practical piety towards God and man. This is according to the Revelation given to us from heaven, because, it says: "seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness." And to seek that kingdom is to seek the will of God, and to obtain that kingdom is *to do his will.* And we cannot do his will unless we perceive it, and we cannot practice those perceptions unless we remember them. Yet the whole of this may be summed up in a few words, and condensed within a small compass, such as, "do justly, love mercy, and humbly walk with God." Or, the whole may be embraced in the following: "Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter, fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man."

Sec 5: (2) The second class which ought to claim our attention is composed of intellectual studies of every kind that are calculated to develop, strengthen, and invigorate those faculties which the Divine Being has given us for wise and gracious purposes. Here we are thrown again upon our own discretionary powers, for those topics are so numerous, and constantly increasing and extending their branches further, and still further, into the various departments of science and literature, that no previous arrangement could give an exact detail. But this we know, not only that the practice is good for our intellectual and moral benefit, but also that the sacred writings encourage the improvement of the mind by study, both by express commands and incentives interspersed through the old and new testaments. Time would fail to notice all the instances in the Bible where encouragement is given to man to study into the laws of God which govern the material universe and the world of mind. But we might notice *that* given by the Royal Psalmist, "When I consider the heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained, what is man?" And the blessed Saviour when on earth and preaching to the Jews, said: "Behold the lilly of the field, it toils not, neither does it spin, and yet I say unto you that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of

these." Here are encouragements for us to study natural philosophy, and therefore it should be selected for that purpose. And in regard to the study into the nature of mind, and how to improve it, we may gather encouragement from the great Apostle of the Gentiles, in his letter to Timothy: "Study to be approved a workman who needeth not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth." Hence, in making selection for the study of this important department of science, we conceive, that, elementary works would be preferable to any other kind. Because they direct the mind at once to the elementary properties of nature, from which all compound bodies are made. But to study into the nature of things means a great deal, and seeing we cannot reasonably hope to master them all, *either in time, or in eternity*, in its fullest extent of meaning; we must therefore be content to do what we can. And we must be careful to exercise our better judgment in selecting those portions of *natural philosophy* which will familiarize us with the leading principles of human nature; seeing we have much to do with man, and also with those laws by which the health of our bodies and minds is preserved.

Sec. 6: (3) The third class which is entitled to due consideration from every rational mind, consists of those various departments of industry and occupations in life, that are best calculated to procure an honest and comfortable livelihood, both for ourselves and those committed to our care. And here again we shall find a plenty of exercise for all our mental powers, of discrimination, judgment, memory, will, and *discussion*. And after the selection is made, and a course determined on, and no man will ever accomplish anything in the world till that is done, there will still be work enough for the mind to collect information by reading, conversation, and in the use of experiments, that he may prove successful in the business of his choice. A timely selection will appear the more important when it is considered that, in the nature of things, it is impossible to remember all that comes under our observation; for each circumstance requires a certain portion of time for practising the perceptive faculty, to get it accustomed to the intellectual channel which leads to such circumstance. We merely mean by this, that we require time to





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





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prepare the mind to remember it. And may we not say that, as a general thing, more than ten times the length of time is required to remember a circumstance, than what is required for a circumstance to transpire. And as time is just as full of events as it is full of moments, and if it takes as much longer to remember an event as it does for the event to transpire, as we have supposed it does, it is not possible that we could remember half the occurrences of life. Therefore as so much time has to be occupied in remembering, the caution, prudence, and deliberation, that should be exercised in the selection of the subjects and current events to be remembered, is of the greatest importance to every accountable being, and it is an acknowledged truth, and the more so because it enters into the experience of all who have trained their minds to the study of the memory, that for the amount of effort expended, however great the effort may be, upon the exercise of the judgment in the selection of appropriate subjects to be remembered, the soul in after life gets amply repaid in the amount of intellectual strength, pecuniary income, domestic happiness, moral purity, and religious enjoyment, as the result of such a wise and timely selection. It is a lamentable fact however, that men will generally remember things relating to their temporal interest more readily than they will those relating to their spiritual welfare. For some things can be remembered so remarkably easy that we are scarcely sensible of their having cost the soul an effort. The reason is, the interest which the soul takes in the thing to be remembered is so intense that every other consideration is lost in that. If then the soul's interest comes to be fixed on any one subject more than another, the memory becomes proportionably strengthened *on that subject.*

Sec. 7. Timely and vigorous effort important to strengthen the memory. But we proceed to remark that another cause of weak memory is a want of proper, timely, and vigorous effort. For it should be observed that it is not sufficient for the soul to possess an interest that will merely give the preference and make the selection, but that interest should be felt in a high degree, so as to stimulate the soul to a vigorous, decided, and immediate action, because preference to a certain proposition or circumstance may be given, and some degree of interest felt

in it, yet it may not be sufficient to excite the will to influence the memory to become familiar with such circumstance. It happens frequently to be the case that men feel conscious and acknowledge, that if they would take a certain prescribed course, and pursue that regularly, and persevere therein, it would greatly accrue to their advantage; and yet they neglect to adopt and carry out that policy which they conceive to be both honorable, *feasible*, and profitable. This neglect is sometimes the result of a kind of wilful obstinacy, *which often leads men wrong*; at other times it is the result of physical indolence or intellectual laziness, which in too many instances besets the soul. And this is one reason, if not the principal one, why men have so often to complain of having "such a poor memory."

Sec. 8: *Interest felt and effort put forth.* Interest in things exists in the soul in a great variety of degrees, from that of which the soul is scarcely conscious, up to that which moves the mind to act with such vehemence, and inspires the soul with such an instantaneous stimulant that it is scarcely possible to discover any difference between the interest felt and the effort put forth to remember the circumstance. But though the mind in times of such excitement can scarcely discern the difference between the interest which it feels in the subject and the effort which it puts forth to remember it; yet, they are positively two distinct and separate intellectual states; so that great as the interest may be which the soul feels in any subject, it still requires the authority of the will, and repeated actions of the perceptive faculty and consciousness in order to remember it.

Sec. 9: *Increasing and repeated effort essential to strengthen the memory.* Another important consideration is to persevere in, and repeat the effort to remember until we succeed; for if the thing to be remembered is merely a simple circumstance, and not subject to any division of parts by analyzation; yet, we cannot expect to make ourselves masters of that and thoroughly remember it by merely entertaining a desire, a wish to do so, or by an expression such as, "I must try to remember that," or throwing all the energies of the soul into a single effort or two, to do so. Experience teaches us that in order to make the mind familiar with merely one simple circumstance, many efforts have to be put forth; and each of these often

requires the whole strength of the soul. If then this is the case with one simple circumstance, what must be the effort required to be put forth before the mind is sufficiently acquainted with a circumstance that is made up of several *simple* ones? It will be easily enough seen from this, that with the exception of a few extraordinary cases, if a man will have what we call a "good retentive memory" he must *work for it.*

Sec. 10. *Every exertion to remember gives additional strength.* But though each simple circumstance requires many efforts of the will, of the *perceptive*, and of consciousness to familiarize the soul with the subject; yet, it must be encouraging to all to know, and this all can know from experience, that every effort put forth has two important and profitable effects upon the mind; that is to say, the diminution of the effort, required to remember any thing, is in proportion to the number of *efforts* that may be put forth in any given case; so that the more exertions that are made, the less vigour is required in each successive exertion that is made. And every *exertion* that is made, gives additional strength, vitality and action to the memory, in the subject, or thing to be remembered. Hence, in remembering, or rather, in [illegible]ering the mind to remember, we have, as a general thing, to put forth our strongest efforts first; but by persevering we soon find the soul to incline in that direction, when a perceivable effort will scarcely be required. And thus every subject, whether great or small, simple or "complex," and whatever may be its nature, whether Politics, Literature, Morality, or Religious, if remembered by successive voluntary exertion adds an additional amount of strength to the memory, because, the perceptive faculty becomes habituated to the direction, and distance, and time and place, where these circumstances transpired, and where they are to be found. And every person knows that habit is one of the most operative, and powerful laws in the human mind.

Sec. 11. *Explanation.* The interest of which we have spoken, and which moves the soul to action, and remembrance, is not always of that nature which invites a preference for the thing perceived, and so excites an action to remember it; for the very things, in many instances, which we remember the most distinctly, are things which appear to us to be destitute of

every feature of loveliness and beauty. But these are exceptions to the general rule, both in regard to the original perception, which was *involuntary* and the remembrance of the same; for we were forced to see it, and forced to see it as it was—and we were forced to see it when we did, and where we did—and we were forced to feel the effects of that on our nervous system. And these effects whenever felt, remind us of the circumstance, so that when we feel the *effects*, we perceive the cause that produced them; and so there is an involuntary remembrance, as well as an involuntary original perception.

Sec. 12: *According to the principle above, memory never comes to be full.* Now, as it is a fact universally acknowledged that the mind gains strength by every effort to remember; the increasing strength and activity, *so gained*, come to be fully equal to any increasing demand that can be made upon the memory, arising from the influx of ideas, or increase of circumstances. But if the memory had been so constructed as to hold just so many circumstances, and no more; which it must be if it is a place where our "thoughts are deposited," from the pressure of current events, in the nature of things, the period must eventually come to every man when he could remember no more. But this period does not come to any, either in this life, or that which is to be hereafter. We speak of the human mind in its rational state. And therefore the memory can only be full comparatively, not positively; and only in this sense, viz.: when the soul refuses to put forth an effort to remember any more. And when will that time arrive? Not while any thing of interest is perceived through the senses. And it is impossible to live, for any considerable length of time without perceiving something, either in others, or ourselves, that the soul judges to be worthy its attention. And as things of more or less interest are daily coming under the observation of every man, and as there is implanted in the breast of every human being an undying thirst for knowledge; and as the passing events of every day afford a variety of topics, many of which cannot fail to please and profit; and as this will always be the case, more or less, while our present state of being lasts, there will always be employment for the memory.

But when this present state of being ends, the soul, which is immortal, will enter upon another state of existence; and this present state only develops to a limited extent our intellectual faculties; but the other state of being will more effectually do that, by furnishing perpetual and eternal employments for every one. And as the improvement of the memory depends, in a great measure upon the voluntary exertion of the soul; and the efforts put forth will be in proportion to the amount of interest felt in current circumstances; and as eternity through all its *countless ages*, will be unfolding a constant succession of new events to the redeemed of the Lord; where there will be employment for the memory while endless ages roll their rounds, in which employment according to our view of the nature of memory, it will be always learning, always growing, and never lose its action, its vitality, nor its strength.

Sec. 18. *Of resorting to writing as a help to the memory.* From the pressure of business and crowd of circumstances which daily come under our observation, in many of the occupations of life, men have recourse to writing as a help to the memory. Now, as there are many of these from the complicated state of our business transactions, and the extent of our social intercourse need to be referred to again; it looks reasonable, and indeed appears to be necessary that some mechanical record should be made. But though writing appears to be necessary in such cases; yet, it ought not to be used as a substitute for the memory, whenever the circumstance is of that nature as to afford time to remember it. For writing does not appear, so far as we have been able to discover, to help the memory in the *long run*; it only affords to the person a temporary relief. But still, the advantages of mechanical records are obvious, and are not, by any means, to be depreciated; the use and benefit thereof may be seen from the following considerations. (1) In recording events by writing a vast amount is saved; for were it not for *this practice*, very many of these events that come under our observation from day to day, and which ought to be preserved would be lost entirely. (2) As these things cannot all be remembered principally for want of time to make the mind familiar with them; and as only a partial knowledge of certain things proves, at times, to be worse than no knowledge at all; and as they may

be, in the future, of great benefit to others as well as ourselves, it comes to be a general benefit to record them.

Sec. 14: *Men will go to extremes.* But though there are some advantages which might be mentioned in addition to those above, yet men are apt to go to extremes in this practice, as they do in many other things to their own hurt. Hence, because to write some things appears to be necessary, some people seem to conceive it to be to their advantage to write down every thing of importance, in which they suppose the public interest is concerned. And in this consists the *extreme*; because it is an imposition practised upon the memory. In writing down events, which we desire to remember for our own intellectual and moral benefit, we do not mean for the purpose of litigation, or book-keeping, we should be careful not to rob the memory of what it might have had, by preventing it at the time from doing what it was abundantly able to do. For in committing to writing we invariably take a great part of the subject, so committed, from the memory, and in many instances the whole. And this is one reason why those persons who are in the habit of writing all important occurrences have, as they invariably do have, such very "poor memories." And it is especially, a great injury to public speakers to get themselves in the habit of writing down their sermons, or lectures, or the heads of them, in what we call making notes, &c., which very many of them do. And though we scarcely expect to dissuade, by anything that we could say here, or anywhere else, persons who have been long in this practice, from the use of it; nevertheless there are young people growing up to usefulness and fame, and will have to act their part, and take our place, when we are dead and gone. And it is very desirable that they should learn, not only from our wisdom, caution, prudence, and piety; but should also make intellectual capital out of some of our mistakes and metaphysical errors. But in order to do this their attention must be called to them in time, that is, before they contract the same habit, or else there will be but little more hope of them than there is of us. We do not speak against the studying of a subject, nor against the use of writing, or any other method for the purpose of helping us to remember; but against the practice of writing and laying aside, and afterwards trusting to the *writing*, and so making

paper and ink hold what the memory might have known. The practice is justified only on the ground that the subjects were put in writing merely because of their multiplicity and complication, and the want of time and opportunity to make ourselves masters of them at the present. But then even this should be done with a view of taking them up at the very first opportunity. And when they are taken up, the object of so doing should be more for the purpose of investigating thoroughly into the meaning, the object, and general tendencies of such manuscript, of its contents, and what its effects will be upon ourselves and others; more than for the purpose of being able to perceive its eloquence, its emphasis, its phraseology, its selection of words, and recite them. Because if the principle thing perceived and remembered happens to be the words in the subject we hear, or in the manuscript we read, we would be deserving all the credit and praise that are due to an intellectual and moral being, who has managed to place himself in this department of literature just as far above a parrot, and no further, than as he has learned and is able to recite more words. But what satisfaction would this be to any person who possesses the pluck, soul, vitality, intellect, hope, desires, emotions, privileges, and prospects of a human being to know that he can recite a longer piece of prose or poetry than a parrot? And yet in remembering merely the words for the purpose of recitation it is all the satisfaction such a person could have; who, appears to be perfectly willing to jump over all the logic and sentiment, the nature of the propositions and reasonableness of the conclusions, the philosophy, theology, morality, and Divinity embodied in the lesson to be learned and piece to be recited; so they can only shine for the moment in brilliant colours, like the blazing comet, and obtain encomiums, and expression of praises loud and long, from that part of community, who do not penetrate very deeply into human nature, and who are very easily excited, and frequently pleased with public speakers, and but seldom profited by what is said.

CHAPTER VI.

IN REFERENCE TO READING BEING A HELP TO THE MEMORY.

Sec. 1. *Remarks on reading.* Great injury is often done the memory by our popular habits of reading. Many read entirely too fast. Their only object appears to be to read just so much every day. And one would really think from the method that many have of galloping over huge volumes, that they think true wisdom and great knowledge consist in reading many books. But this practice proves itself to be a failure. For if we should ask some of this kind of readers to give us the leading features, not to mention the detail, of some book that they have read in this hurried way, in many instances we should not get enough, from the person, to satisfy us that he has read the work at all had we not confidence in his integrity. Now, this is not only a great waste of time, and consequently a great evil in that respect to all accountable beings, but it is an injury done to the whole mind, and especially to the memory. And the evil which the memory is made to sustain, as a general thing, by such a method of reading is twofold. (1) In this hurrying way of reading, and the variety of subjects and sentiments and phrases that come under our observation, the mind becomes, to some extent, confused, and lost in the multiplicity of subjects and disorder of things so presented. For the act of reading being continued *at such a rapid and unjustifiable rate*, that though we might perceive, in a great measure at least, the meaning as we passed along; yet, the necessary time, and in fact, scarcely no time at all, not being allowed for meditation or investigation into its nature, the memory does not get familar with the subject, and only here and there an idea attracts sufficient attention to excite any of the soul's interest at all; and consequently nearly all the good

that an individual derives from such a method of reading is, the gratification that he has read a certain book, written at such time, in such place, by the author therein named. (2) The other evil is the habit which such a practice creates. For no person in reading a book that is tolerably interesting expects to let it go with such a careless perusal, but intends, and forms the resolution as he passes along that, in some future day, he will give it a *second reading*, when he expects to take time to investigate its contents and to commit its leading truths. But habit is very active, remarkably operative, and gains strength imperceptibly, and so much so, that in the second reading should it ever take place, we find ourselves hastening on to the end, at the same rapid speed, and perhaps faster if possible, leaving a great many, and these perhaps of the most important items, to be explained in a future day.

To do justice to the memory then in reading a book, that is one that is worth reading and studying at all, and we have no business to read any other, is to allow no sentence to pass without a proper investigation, and if possible a thorough understanding of the subject. This method gets up an interest in the soul. Therefore inattentive reading is positively an injury to the memory; but to read attentively and no more at a time than the mind can properly manage will add strength and vigour to the memory beyond all description.

Sec. 2: Reading, a great source of information. Seeing that it is from reading we obtain so much of our information, and that the amount of information which we obtain from this source is governed by the amount of reading and the manner in which we read, it is all important to obtain correct habits of reading in early life, therefore, in addition to what has been said above, I would remark, (1) That to profit by reading it would not be amiss, and it cannot do any harm to any person to spend a moment or two, on taking up a book that is worthy of our attention, and we have no business with any other, to enquire into our motive of reading at that time; for it is scarcely possible to suppose that any sensible person will take a book and make a business of reading it without a motive for so doing. Now, if a person should read merely for the purpose of committing, or excelling others in recitations, or to be able

to say he has read the bible through so many times, or to show that he has read so many authors, or to be able to display his correct habits of reading, he will find that but a very small amount of intellectual or moral benefits will accrue to him from time thus spent, though he might read a thousand volumes. (2) Upon examining our motive we shall need to be in possession of a rule by which to decide on the profitableness or unprofitableness of the motive which may at any time prompt us to read. And this is important because men read, and especially young people, from various motives. But the great principle that should govern all minds in this exercise in regard to when, where, how, what, and how much we read, should be that of profit. If we read in private, the motive ought not to be so much to move the emotions and please the fancy as to profit ourselves, that we might be able to help others; and if we read in public, our motive should be to profit ourselves and others at the same time. Now, if the object of reading is to profit the mind and improve the morals, the necessity of adopting a proper method to secure that object must be obvious to every one. And to be a little more explicit on this topic we might notice more particularly some of the bad effects of reading too fast.

Sec. 3: *Effects of fast reading.* Fast reading is, what it is not generally supposed to be, a very great waste of time, and consequently a great loss sustained by the intellect, and as all men should read for profit, and as fast reading is here suggested to be unprofitable, every sensible person who would rather make profit to his intellect than loss, would be willing to enquire into the matter to see if he is in the habit of wasting his time in this way, and improve if occasion require. But if that person has a high sense of morality, and wish to act from a sense of duty, he will see that as he has no authority from the holy scriptures to consume any portion of time to no good purpose, not positively to say a bad one, to do so involves the principle of moral accountability. But fast reading most generally defeats its own object; for whereas the object of fast reading, if it has any object at all, must be to become fast thinkers, or at any rate to think fast while in the act of reading, and whereas fast readers are generally slow thinkers, though they may be sometimes fast talkers, that is, not clear

thinkers, but more or less confused in their ideas, and bewildered in their minds, so that although the mind may flutter and jump from word to word, from line to line, from page to page, yet, reading at this kind of railroad speed will take the mind a long time after all to get one well digested and clear thought from among hundreds at which it has in its hurry merely glanced.

Sec. 4: Reason of this. Now, in reading so as to profit the memory, and give it all the advantage which this combined physical and mental exercise is calculated to impart, there is more to be done, perhaps, than many are aware of. It is important to acquire the habit as early as possible of adapting the action of the eye to the work which the mind has to do, and not allow the action of the one to confuse or paralyze the action of the other, especially in the act of reading, when by close watching it can be prevented. This, my young friend, you will be able to comprehend fully by trying the following experiment: we will refer to the face of the clock again but for another purpose, that is to say, place your eye on the dial plate of a clock in motion, and direct it to the minute hand with a determination to keep it there for five minutes; this, it is very possible you will be able to do, but you will fail to keep the mind there on such a slow intellectual motion as to correspond with the motion of the minute hand for one-fifth part of that time. For as soon as the eye strikes the minute hand, its outlines are at once presented to the mind, and the soul perceives that there is nothing of special interest to be investigated, it leaves it, and is sure to go either into the future to imagine something, or into the past to look over what has been. And this wandering will always be the case, more or less, whenever an attempt is made to prevent the regular action of the mind, and which is but little better, if any, than an attempt to stop the motion of the mind entirely. For though there is a mechanical motion in the minute hand, even going at the rate it does, yet if the mind could be fixed on that minute hand and follow it for five minntes, properly speaking the mind would not move. For just as long as the mind is placed upon the one object, no matter how large or small that object may be, neither does it matter, as I conceive, whether that object is in motion or at rest, philosophically speaking *the*

mind does not move. But if the construction of the minute hand should be such as to consist of a variety of parts, and each part displaying its appropriate amount of mechanical skill in the combination of a variety of ingredients into its different portions, and each ingredient being a compound, it might excite sufficient interest so as to engage the attention of the mind, for not only five minutes, but for many hours, or more. But it will be perceived that in this case the mind will be in action, for though the attention is directed to the minute hand which occupies but a small place on the dial plate, yet from the great variety of its parts, as before intimated, it forms a very large field of intellectual labour, and any attempt to prevent its regular action by confining the mind to any one thing, is doing a very great injury to the intellect, and it will be found that the *perceptive* will always resist an attempt of that kind by leaping beyond the boundary thus laid down by the arbitrary authority of the will. Now, while it is a fact that to prevent the regular action of the intellect by an effort of the will to confine the *perceptive* to a mechanical motion, tends to perplex the intellect and weaken the memory; so also it is always the case when the mind is led on through the pages of a book by the physical motion of the eye, without proper time being allowed for the examination and proper investigation of the different ideas, propositions, and conclusions with their relations to each other. Let us consider for a moment on what both have to do in the act of reading, for example, the eye, it will be remembered, is merely an organ of the mind, the eye perceives nothing, but is only an instrument of the soul. Now, in the act of reading, *the eye*, to speak in the common way, runs along the line, and alights upon the different characters formed thereon, after which its work is done. But the mind has something more than this to do. Its business is (1) to perceive all the characters. (2) The identity and diversity of those characters. (3) Their relation to each other in syllables. (4) The idea that every word is designed to represent. (5) The relation which one word bears to another, so as to perceive the relation between one idea and another which the words express. (6) The object of all these relations from a single letter to a syllable, from a syllable to a sentence, from a sentence to a period, from a period to a para-

graph, from a paragraph to a section, from a section to a chapter, and so on to the end of the book. Reader! if you do truly desire to be fully remunerated for your labour in reading the Bible or any other good book, you will need to hold the eye to words and sentences long enough to give the mind an opportunity to lay out its full strength upon every idea presented, because a proper understanding of one may serve as a key to many contiguous ones; and this method also, if closely adhered to, will greatly strengthen the memory.

CHAPTER VII.

HOW MANY PEOPLE INJURE THE MEMORY.

Sec. 1 : *The memory capable of gaining great strength by proper action.* The strength to which the memory might arrive under proper discipline, regular action, and select subjects, is beyond all calculation. And should the youth commence with a determination to remember all the valuable truth that he could remember, and continue firm in his purpose, fully and firmly resolved never to yield to idleness on the one hand, or difficulties however great and numerous on the other, we can see no reason why almost, if not, all the important circumstances of life that have a special reference to the real interest and permanent welfare of ourselves, our children, and the community with which we are associated, might not be remembered, and related correctly without having to resort to the printed or written document that contains the narrative. Our *sheet anchor* in this respect is *resolution*, that is, I can remember, I have time to remember, I have a mind capable of remembering, *and I will remember*, so help me book, pen and ink, and paper, noonday sun and midnight stars, morning light and evening shade. For I will be a man, not a drone, I will be wise not a novice, I will know for myself, and I will not depend on the knowledge of others, I am willing to be led, but I mean also to be a leader.

Sec. 2 : *Of laying out all the strength in one direction.* Great injury is done sometimes to the memory by laying out, as many do, almost all the intellectual strength in one direction. This is practised more, perhaps, in the present day than many of us are aware of; and especially with person who are solicitous to excel in any one point. Such for example as public speakers, and often ministers of religion, who do themselves great injury in

occupying so much time in committing sketches and portions of sermons, and sometimes whole sermons, simply to serve the present purpose and to meet their present emergencies; which though they can relate with considerable fluency, and often verbatum; yet, I will venture to say that this course of study does not bring sufficient amount of intellectual benefit to justify the continuance of the practice. Not that the evil of which we complain is in the thing committed to memory, for this may be good in itself; but it is rather in occupying so much in one particular department, or class of things, whereas, there are other things equally as good, and consequently deserve equally as great a share of our attention, and would be as much to our advantage, and usefulness; but these long lessons, that have to be studied verbatum, require so much time, that there is not enough left to enable the person to be a proficient in anything else. To become satisfied of this, let us talk to these persons and, even though they are ministers of religion, we shall soon find that they know but little of scripture, the book which they profess to teach, and can scarcely quote a text correctly unless it is connected with some of those favourite selections. Ask them of history, they have read both ecclesiastical and profane, and remember a few prominent particulars therein recorded, with the names of the historians, ask them of theologians and commentators, they have read them, and have them still in their libraries, and when they are interrogated they are made sensibly to feel their deficieney, and sometimes to acknowledge with shame that they know but little of the contents of those works over which they have glanced, but which they have *not studied.* Now, what is it that makes this difference, is it because the natural powers of the mind are better adapted to the remembering of sermons and sketches, and anecdotes, than things in general, or the elements of things? Not at all, but because *so much time* has been applied to the study of one class of things, of one branch of literature, in which the person is determined at all hazards to excel; that there is not sufficient time left, or in other words, there is not sufficient time applied to the study of other subjects to furnish the mind with general information. There is reason to fear that some of those persons, whose ultimate object, as public speakers, is to be popular with the masses, labour harder to tickle the ear, with high-sounding words, funny stories, and spicy anecdotes, than to inform the

judgment and improve the moral condition of men. They desire to shine, and it is a pity that they cannot, occasionally at any rate, call to mind the old proverb that "*it is not all gold that glitters.*" And they do shine at times, and like "blazing comets too," but it is only on certain topics, *but they are limited,* and on special occasions, and *they are but few.* Call them unexpectedly to speak before an audience, and if they cannot have the privilege of introducing some one of those old studied and well remembered pieces, and so travel in their accustomed tract, they will either remain silent, which would look bad under the circumstances, or make an effort to speak and save their credit, and if an attempt is made at originality, in nine cases out of ten they make a bad matter worse. Now, this need not be the case, and it would not be, were it not for the imposition practised upon the memory by forcing it into one channel constantly, and thereby depriving it of that variety which gives efficiency to all its operations. The injury done to the memory by habits of this kind is incalculably great. And the benefits that will accrue to the habitual thinker who pursues with diligence and avidity the opposite of this, appears to a person who does not think and remember for general occasions, more like a miracle wrought in the man than a natural consequence, resulting from an application of the mind to subjects of equal worth, with sufficient time allotted to each, and due attention to all.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ACTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN REMEMBERING.

Sec. 1: Classification of memory and consciousness. To classify the memory into "constitutional memory," "philosophical memory," and intentional recollection, &c. serves, in our opinion, more to throw a mist over its real nature than to explain its powers and operations. And any man who might follow the description which is given by some popular authors, or writers at any rate, of the principles of mental philosophy might very easily be led to form erroneous ideas of the memory. And this is not unfrequently the case, with persons not very well informed in this particular subject, and being rather credulous withal, and acting under the general impression that has passed current for centuries, that, *learning* only remains with a favoured few; and who are in consequence of these peculiar views entertained, imbibed, and cherished from childhood, who are in the habit of reading, when they read at all, certain favourite authors, and adopting their sentiments without ever indulging a thought that they should be submitted in any degree to philosophical scrutiny. Now, the error that is most likely to occur from reading this complicated and exceedingly mystified description of memory, as above adverted to, is; either to suppose it exists in different kinds, and that each kind is adapted to the remembrance of a certain course of things and nothing else; or that memory is a something in the soul that is made up of a variety of parts which constitutes one faculty of the soul that acts of itself, and from itself, and for itself; neither of which, according to our conception, is philosophically correct.

Let it be remembered that we do not state here that there is only one faculty of the soul employed in what we call remembering, for, as we have stated before, this is not the case. But we

need to be very cautious how we speak on subjects like this, and should spare no pains to make them plain and clear; and indeed we feel anxious to bring it down to the youth, and every degree of intellect that is, or can be made to understand simple facts of this nature at all. And the reason is lost while we admit the power of the memory to grasp in different subjects, to comprehend different ideas, to present before the mind different circumstances, we mean by all this *we perceive different things in the past*, we should believe it ourselves as and represent it to others as existing in a complicated form, as a faculty composed of many parts, which as we conceive is not true. The phrenologist however tells us that the memory is better adapted to the remembrance of some things than others. Such for example, that some persons can remember countenances but not names, individuals, but not their localities, &c., and that there are certain organic developments in the cranium and face that indicate their adaptation to the remembrance of some things and their forgetfulness of other things. But whatever the phrenologist might suppose the bumps in the head to indicate, and whatever may be the inference that he may draw from their existence and their size; one thing looks to me to be certain that if the individual would take as much interest in the *name* of a person as he does in his *countenance* he could remember the one just as well as the other.

Sec. 2. *Of the will in remembering.* The *will* is very often and very actively engaged in this mental operation which we call "remembering," both in directing, planning, approving, and repudiating, as well as in many instances, in controlling, to a great extent, the perceptive faculty, and in exciting, increasing, and fostering an interest in the things to be remembered, but it forms no part of the memory.

Sec. 3. *Of consciousness and the part which it fills in remembering.* This faculty of the soul is also a very operative one, and its action is essential in all cases of remembering. And as its action is so necessary to remember correctly, and as it forms one of the essential elements of memory, and as what we have said above in reference to the supposed parts of the memory requires a little more explanation, and as an explanation of the nature and operation of *consciousness* will, to a great extent

answer this purpose, it may be proper to introduce it here in connection with our explanation of the "classification" of memory; and more especially as we have briefly glanced at this before with a design to advert to it again. And in doing so we would remark that consciousness appears to assume two distinct forms, that is to say, a positive form, and a negative form. There are also many degrees in each of these forms, both of the negative and the positive. Hence, that *presumptiveness* that invariably exists in the soul before the perception of anything in the past, which we have perceived before, and which we now desire to perceive again to serve our present purpose. We do not speak of the perception of that presumptiveness, because that would only be to perceive that *we presume*; but the perception of which we here speak is the perception of the real nature of the subject with its associations and dependencies, which in the first place was only presumed. And therefore the authoritative and positive form of consciousness appears after the presumption and the perception. This also can be proved from our experience. For example, a person who is desirous to prove a certain point that is both of advantage to himself and others, but he has to resort to his past experience to accomplish that object, has an *inward consciousness* that there is something in the past bearing on the point, a something that has already been under the mind's observation. And here it must be observed that the soul assumes a suggestive modification. For the person is not conscious, at the time of this presumption or suggestive form assumed, of the real nature and strength of the evidence which can be produced, for this would be to remember it already; but the individual feels something within him that stimulates him to indulge the hope, and prompts him to believe, and on the strength of this he ventures, there is something in my past history that will assist me in the better understanding of this subject now before me, the general outlines of which I have a feint idea. Now, this degree of consciousness appears to have sufficient influence in the soul to arouse the energies and action of the will. And when the *will* comes to be once aroused to action, in any given case, the degree of that action, to a very great extent, if not to every extent, will be governed by the importance of the subject, that is to say, by what appears to the soul to be of great value and importance to itself.

Sec. 4: *Of the soul's decision.* When the consciousness in its suggestive degree has produced sufficient interest in the soul by which the will is induced to exercise its authority over the perceptive faculty, and when the perceptive faculty is, by the authority of the *will*, sent in search of those supposed truths, which may be far in the distance, and when it reports the results of its investigations, consciousness acts through every stage of that mental process in its positive form. And thus it is that the process of remembering begins with this presumptive form of the soul, which action is repeated and increased in its degree till it secures the action of the will in any given point, and then it is that the perceptive faculty is called to action in this direction, now required by the soul for its present purposes, called to act by the *will*, the nature of which actions are subject to the decision of consciousness, in its positive form.

Sec. 5: *Consciousness has many degrees of action.* Consciousness assumes more forms or degrees of action than we can find words to express. For example, when a sound, that is, a certain kind of sound strikes the ear, we are conscious that we heard a noise, and as conscious of it as we are of our existence; yet of the origin, cause, or nature of that sound we may be totally ignorant. And if we hear it again we are conscious it is the same kind of sound, and this perhaps is all that we are conscious of, only that we are conscious we do not know what it is. But we hear it again and we think it is a human voice, but we are not sure, yet we experience a degree of assurance above the former degrees, because, then we only heard the sound, without having any presumption in reference to what it was, but now we think it is a human voice; but we merely *think* it is, and the mind, as it were, becomes suspended, we pause, we listen attentively, we strain the eye and the ear, and hush to silence all around us, waiting with the deepest anxiety —with thrilling interest, that at this time pervades the soul, to hear again; and then we become conscious from certain articulations in the sound, that it is *a human voice.* And when we hear again, we are not only conscious that it is a human voice, but it is one with which we are acquainted; here we perceive another degree. But when the sound strikes the ear again we are able to recognize it to be the voice of a friend, a near relative, perhaps of a brother. Now, in every act, in

this mental process, consciousness assumes a new form, or another degree in the exercise of its power. But this does not prove, as we conceive, that this faculty is a compound, but only that it has power to assume modifications suited to the important part which it is designed to fill in the soul. A want of attention to this principle of our nature has led some to confound the idea of the power of our *elementary faculties* to assume certain modifications, with a supposed notion of parts in the memory, and thereby have been led to suppose, as we have before observed, that the memory is a faculty of the soul made up of a great variety of parts, whereas it is simply the result of the combined action of two of the most prominent faculties of the soul, viz., perception and consciousness.

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE LAWS OF THE MEMORY.

Sec. 1: *The memory is governed by regular established laws.* We shall now proceed to notice some of those laws which govern and regulate the action of the memory. And the first which we shall call attention to is the law of *time and place*, which is obviously operative in remembering of circumstances of great interest to the soul; for at such times it appears to be the uniform practice of the perceptive faculty to go both to time and place. And this fact can be made plain to any person who will spare a few moments, now and then, to think on the subject and examine his own experience. Suppose then, an individual relates a circumstance to me affecting the interest of another person, and several weeks, and perhaps months elapse, and no further mention is made of it, but eventually it comes to be known to the interested party that such things were told to me, and consequently I am called upon to relate, and as correctly as possible, seeing it is a matter of great importance, all the particulars of the conversation. Now, in doing this, I find my mind inclining as naturally as water inclines to a common level, to the place where the circumstance was related to me by my informant, and not to the place where it was said, by the person who related it to me to have occurred, but directly to the place where the person and I were when he related the circumstance to me.

Sec. 2: *Perception alights upon the time.* The next effort which the perceptive faculty will make is to alight upon the time when; and this effort is increased or diminished in proportion to the importance or non-importance of ascertaining the exact time that such conversation took place. If the exact time happens to form no important ingredient in the occurrence,

its progress will not be at all arrested by particularizing the precise day of the week, or even the exact month of the year; but yet if it is perceived at all it must be perceived within the bounds of some time as well as within the limits of some place. Therefore, in perceiving any circumstance, the law of mind appears to be such that some definite settlement in regard to what portion of time it occurred in, must be made by the mind. And it is impossible also for any person who might be called to state what was told to him, under circumstances above described, not to take notice of, though he might not find it necessary to relate, the features, complexion, stature, and many of the gestures of the individual who related the circumstance to him; but the process through which the perceptive faculty goes in remembering these various and minute particulars we will not now attempt to describe. Nevertheless we might remark that the law of time, like every other law which our Almighty Creator has made, seems evidently to hold the memory within certain circumscribed limits, and exerts over it a mysterious power. For example, a certain subject is presented to the mind which requires corroborating testimony, something that requires to be denied or affirmed from the past. Now, it is in the power of the *will* to direct the memory, more properly speaking, the perceptive faculty to search for such circumstance, seeing that the soul has already an inward consciousness of something existing in the past bearing on the point in question, although it is only conscious of some of its leading features. And where the circumstance thus presented creates a faint conception of the probability of corresponding circumstances in the past, the perceptive faculty, by the direction of the *will*, takes a wide, and it appears a kind of random glance. It leaps from day to day, from month to month, and from year to year, backwards and forwards, upwards and downwards, with inconceivable swiftness, till it alights upon some portion of time in which it perceives the circumstance to have taken place, while the consciousness of the soul by the authority of its suggestive form settles the perceptive faculty to these limits. Now, this portion of time, so determined on, whether it is great or small, nigh by us or far from us, appears by an established law to attract and hold the perceptive faculty, while it scrutinizes and diligently searches its bosom for the hidden treasure. And so it is that when a circumstance is represented to the soul as having taken place in

the last week, then the last week forms the boundary, the field of investigation for the perceptive faculty; and though it may occasionally leap beyond its limits, yet, it is made to feel, and that very soon too, the powerful and irresistible law of time, which, in connection with the previous decision of the soul on this point, will speedily bring it back.

This can be more fully illustrated, perhaps, by a reference to our youthful days. Suppose then, a circumstance to have transpired in our childhood, and the soul being desirous to ascertain all the particulars of such circumstance, the *will*, viz. the choosing power, calls to action the proper agent to investigate the matter, that is, perception. Now, the portion of time that embraces our youthful days, holds, as a general thing, the perceptive faculty, as if it were bound in a circle, yet, it can leap over a term of thirty or forty years, and appears to perceive no circumstance that has transpired therein, while its attention is arrested by the law of time and held by its connecting portions till it examines our infant days, and presents to us a variety of youthful scenes in connection with the one which was the more specific object of its pursuit. What has been said in reference to time may also be said in regard to connecting portions of place. For while place is under the consideration of the soul, the connecting portions thereof, to a certain extent, seem to measure out limits for the mind's especial attention, and the memory seems to seize upon the opportunity of investigating and presenting to the soul surrounding localities, such as houses, gardens, orchards, villages, towns, &c., that are near to the place under its more immediate notice.

Sec. 3: *Law of relation.* But the law of relation is susceptible of a very wide application, and with some degree of propriety may be said to include, to a great extent those of time and place which we have briefly noticed above. Because, it is quite evident that one portion of time, be it ever so small, has some relation to another portion of time which transpired before it, and also to that portion of time which immediately succeeds it. And the same may be said of place. For from the mutual dependance of places arising from trade and commerce of various description, from joint stock companies, railroads, canals, and from various other connectional circumstances

too numerous to mention, that grow out of social life, from relation between places, and especially between those that are near. But in reference to the law of relation and how it governs the memory we might observe :

Sec. 4 : (1) That the memory is not always under the control of the will, that is to say, we cannot remember things merely because we choose to remember ; and the same may be said of many things which, though we do not choose to remember, at the same time we cannot forget.

Sec. 5 : (2) To will to remember any one specific event or circumstance, in all its details is to suppose the thing already remembered ; because, the objects cannot be specified without perceiving them, and perceiving these objects to be in the past, is to remember them.

Sec. 6 : (3) As we cannot remember merely by choosing, or by preferring to remember rather than not ; for if this were the case the most of people would have a "good memory." Yet, as we do remember, and we know we do, and yet not always by merely putting forth our volition to do so ; it follows that the memory is called into action by some law which is regular, operative, and established for that purpose, and acts in conjunction with other laws, by which the memory becomes regulated, stimulated, and strengthened.

Sec. 7 : *Extent of relation.* This term relation that we have used here is very extensive, and if we understand it in its uttermost latitude of meaning, it may be considered universal, viz. : it exists between all subordinate existences and the Almighty Being. Forasmuch as all beings whatever may be their nature, or wherever may be their locality, must as a matter of necessity have derived their existence from God ; they are therefore related to him by these obligations and dependencies, as being his creatures, and as such are depending on him for life and comfort. Therefore, viewing relation in this light it may be said to exist between the creature and the Creator in extent equal to the *wide universe.*

But relation is susceptible of a more minute and definite explanation, a brief description of which we now proceed to give. And for the better understanding of this part of our subject, we might glance at that relation which exists between material things; and therefore we would observe that, all organized beings are properly related to each other on one great principle, that is derivation from the same elementary substances. Not that the same number of *elements*, nor the same amount of each *element* enters into the organization of every being but we simply mean that there are certain elementary substances which will be found in greater or less quantities in all organized beings. And it is this sameness of elementary substances that is found to exist, more or less, in all organized beings, which appears to us to constitute a relation between them. And it might not be altogether an unprofitable thought, though a very humiliating consideration, for the *proud despot* who sways his sceptre over nations and rules them with a tyrant's hand, to call to mind the great philosophical truth that the same elements, in kind, which constitute the organization of his watchful dog, or the *sow* of his humble peasant, that wallows in the mire, or the worm that crawls beneath his feet, enters into his own organization, and are essential to the preservation of his life and health. Which great leading principle, that predominates, through organic life, not only constitutes a relation between him and the beggar on a dunghill, but also between him and his *shepherd's dog!* But to trace this in detail would be impossible in many instances, and if it were *possible* language would find herself inadequate to provide words to express the millionth part of the degrees of that relation. Notwithstanding, no one, I should suppose, could be found who would presume to say that there was no relation between a *horse* which lives to-day, and a *horse* which lived 1000 years ago. And the same may be said of every species of the animal creation if we could trace their pedigree back to Noah's Ark. So also is the relation in the vegetable world equally as legitimate and obvious. The oak of the present century, which occupies such a conspicuous place in our forest, and spreads its towering branches to every point of the compass, and shelters the weary traveller beneath its mighty foliage, may indeed look to be a merely *isolated plant*; but it has its thread of relation, though we may not be able to trace it. And yet it is as much related

to some oak that lived before it, as we are to our parents who lived before us; and could we follow on that chain of relation, as correctly as it exists, we should be taken back from century to century till we should eventually find ourselves in the days of Adam, and among the first generation of animals and vegatables, where we could no longer trace descent only to that Almighty hand that formed the universe and world.

Sec. 8: *Of relation in the world of mind.* Having briefly glanced at relation in organized matter, we are now prepared to devote a short space to the consideration of that classification and relation which exists in the world of mind.

Sec. 9: *Of moral truth.* And here we might observe that it requires no great amount of effort for any one who possesses discernment enough to constitute him a rational being to discover a state of mind which is called *morality*, that is, a class of moral truths, precepts, and obligations which hold us with a tenacious grasp and authoritatively demand attention to their claims. This system of morality when properly carried out resolves itself into two branches, one to God the author of our being, and the other to his intelligent creation. It will be observed also that an intimate relation exists between all moral truths. For example, we take it for an established truth that there is an Almighty Being who created all things, and that he is infinitely wise and holy in all his thoughts, and just and true in all his ways. And we believe that he was before all things, and by him all things were made, that he himself made man. To believe the opposite of this would not only be to commit a great outrage on the intellectual department of the soul, but would be immoral in the highest degree. Hence, this is a great moral truth, and it is related to the one that man is laid under the most solemn obligations to love and serve him; and *that moral truth* which exhibits man's duty of subordination to God is related to the one that *he should love his neighbor as himself*; and thus we easily discover that one moral truth is related to another *moral truth*.

Sec. 10: *Philosophical truth.* This is another class of truths, and differs something from moral truth, inasmuch as its method of proving is by *demonstration* "while moral truth

can only communicate the highest degree of probability." (Locke.) Now, it must be observed that philosophical truth has its countless branches, widely diffused through the universe of *matter*, and the universe of *mind*; and yet, they are all related to the one great prominent and ruling principle, around which they rally, and to which they invariably *cling*, and in which they all concetrate, that is to say, the principle of *demonstration*.

Biblical truth. It is well known to every sincere biblical student that one bible truth, though recorded two thousand years before another, and under circumstances the very opposite, in many respects, relates to another bible truth and is corroborated thereby; and all bible truth is governed by and related to the great principle and plan of *atonement*.

Sec. 11. *Historical truth.* This department of knowledge naturally forms itself into classes; such for example as, ancient and modern, ecclesiastical and natural; each class holding in its own circumference its appropriate events. And these events possess a mutual relation in each separate class; while every class and every branch and department in every *class* is related to the great principle, which is the essence and soul of all history, viz., a true and correct *record of events*. But to attempt to give a minute delineation of every subordinate branch of history that grows out of those more prominent ones, to which we have alluded, would not only be foreign from our intention in this small *Essay*, but might in reality prove as uninteresting and tedious to the reader as is anticipated by the writer. Enough, however, has been said on this topic to serve our present purpose; which is to show that the natural world though related and bound by one great principle, viz. elementary substances, yet, it is formed into numerous classes, and modified into an infinite number of sizes, qualities, and forms. And also though the mental world is governed by and intimately related to one great principle, *knowledge*, yet it forms itself into an infinite number of classes, and that besides the general tie of relation which holds each prominent part to its appropriate or governing principle, there is existing in each class a peculiar relation which keeps together, as a general thing, the various items of knowledge which compose such class.

Sec. 12 : *Of attraction and how it applies.* Now, let it be observed, that in the physical world there is a law which is called *attraction.* This law of attraction is mysteriously powerful, and exists through the whole material universe; but still it is not uniform in its operations, though it is found to exist equally through all bodies; that is to say, it does not operate in all bodies in the same manner. Some bodies by the law of attraction of gravitation are put in motion and so continued by a power which it has to keep such body at a sufficient distance from surrounding impediments; while the motion of other bodies is arrested by the same law. This is obvious from the following facts, viz: some bodies are drawn to the centre of attraction when their motion ceases, like the apple which falls from the tree, or a brick that falls from the chimney; whereas the opposite is the case in other instances, like water in a straw, or liquid in a sponge, or the blood in the animal system; yet this is all done by the same great and universal law of *attraction.*

Now, the use that we design to make of the above is to suggest the possibility of the law of attraction in matter as analagous to the operation of the law of relation on *mind.* That is to say, the law of relation, as a general thing, holds the memory to their own appropriate events, as the law of attraction holds the various bodies under its power to their own appropriate operations. The one is a great mystery, but universally admitted to be a fact; the other is certainly equally mysterious and, as we conceive it, no less true. But to be a little more definite and explicit we would remark that the law of relation in the world of mind, seems to serve a twofold purpose.

Sec. 13 : (1) It works in a manner very powerful, extensive, constant and remarkably operative with the senses, and it appears that it is always present at the exercise of every sense of the soul. It watches the sensation intently and faithfully, and is always ready to suggest, with the sight of every object that strikes the sense, a similarity between that and some other object. We cannot describe this law, because, we do not understand it, we do not know how it is done, we only know that it is done; and yet we know as much about this as any other law connected with either our body or mind. But it

appears evident that it is owing to this law principally that the mind is kept in such constant action, viz., by suggesting resemblances in almost every thing that strikes the senses.

Sec. 14 : (2) This law of relation not only seems to suggest the resemblance between things, but it seems to stand as a great centre of attraction, not only on the *perceptive*, whether it is engaged in the past, the present or the future, but upon every element of the soul. And it seems to put in a claim on the soul's attention, which it cannot well resist, for all classes of events as a whole, and for each class separately and individually, as circumstances may require, as if from the consideration that each individual circumstance belongs in fact, and necessarily, to its own appropriate class; and being so suggested this law demands, from time to time, the soul's attention to the connection, relation, agreement, or disagreement of things, as the case may be. Thus the law of relation implanted in our mental nature, appears to resolve itself into a form, through the instrumentality of the senses, by which the soul conceives a similarity in things under the notice of the *perceiving faculty*, which is called by some "involuntary conception." And we will venture to say that if proper attention is paid to the operation of our own minds we shall soon be able to see that nothing can be remembered, whether great or small, whether we desire it or not, whether it is pleasant or unpleasant, which is not subsequent to the exercise, and produced by the influence of an original, or conscious conception, which appears under many instances, if not under most, to be purely involuntary, and yet the natural offspring of the law of relation.

CHAPTER X.

ON RECOLLECTION.

Sec. 1. Recollection. This is supposed to be a state of mind which, in addition to our remembering of things, collects them together, which, in our humble opinion, is more imaginary than real; and the "gathering together" upon a minute investigation into the fact will be found to consist, as we have before suggested, in the activity of the perceptive faculty; for it does not appear to be possible for any individual to remember distinctly more than one object at the same time. We frequently talk of holding a collection of ideas before the mind at once, as if we could grasp 20, 50, or 150 thoughts all at one time. Now, this is true in a comparative sense, because, the time in which it can be done is, under certain circumstances, *so short* that it can scarcely be measured at all; but then it is not true positively, and the reason is, the mind cannot think twice at one time. Let any one try the experiment for his own satisfaction, and he will see, *if he look sharp*, how many ideas he can hold before his mind at one time; let him place his mind intently upon as many objects as he can, and I shall be greatly mistaken if he will not be forced to acknowledge that the numerous collection which he thought to embrace at a single glance, is reduced to one idea. But to make this as plain as possible, to those portions of the community for whose benefit we write, viz., the youth who have not had time to study this subject closely, and the illiterate who have not had sufficient advantages and facilities to enable them to study works of larger dimension, and of deeper penetration; we will suppose an individual to try to remember two circumstances: the one to have been in company with a certain stranger, and the other the nature of the conversation which took place at the time. Now, it will be seen that the relation between these two circumstances is intimate and strong; never-

theless, they cannot both be remembered distinctly, at the same time. And let us suppose the person who saw the stranger, to be interrogated in regard to his personal appearance, and that he proceeds to describe. In so doing, he finds his perceptive faculty intently placed, with all its discriminating power, on the features of that man; and he will find too, that in giving that description, the more he particularizes and subdivides, the more stages he will have to pass through in his description. Perhaps a hundred motions, yea, a thousand of the perceptives; the will, the consciousness and sense of the soul, will be required in surveying the stranger from head to foot, the colour of his hair, the shape of the head, the complexion of his face, the height of his statue, the size of his body, the color of his coat, the shape of his hat, and the quality of all; and each of these, and scores of others of a similar nature, requires a thought, viz., a motion of the soul. And the reason why we do not pass through all these intellectual stages every time we think of the stranger is, because the circumstances of the case do not demand it, and therefore, no effort is made to particularize. But, as we before observed, here is the law of relation that attracts the memory, when the *will* prefers a description of any complicated circumstance. Now, it should be remembered that every one of these subordinate particulars at which we have hinted, be they ever so minute, which compose that thread of events, occupies for a time the perceptive faculty, though it may be that the portion of time is so inconceivably short, that language may not be able to describe it. And on the other hand, if the mind is directed to the nature of the discourse, it loses sight of the stranger, that is, his personal appearance, and passes step by step through the various stages of the conversation, and all other incidents, while the discourse is under consideration, are out of sight. And what often makes us think we have the whole before us is, we do not take notice of these occasional transits which the mind takes from the conversation had with the stranger, to the person of the stranger. Yet there are but few, if any at all, who have ever undertaken to follow a thread of reflection, but have been troubled more or less with this wandering of the mind; which is sufficient to prove to all persons who can see the force of an argument, that the great difficulty with them at such times is because they cannot investigate more than one

thing at one time. Hence, this wandering of the mind, which every one experience, at times, is a proof of the existence and action of the law of transition, and which law, as we believe, is remarkably operative on the perceptive faculty in the act of remembering. Recollection, therefore, so far as we conceive, simply implies a transition of perception into the past, and an act of consciousness deciding that such things then perceived by the mind, have been perceived by the mind before. Nevertheless, the term "Recollection," may be used to express a remembrance in a high degree; that is, remembering a great many things in a short time; but to use it to represent the mind as collecting these thoughts that it once had, from distances of time and space, and bringing them all to the present time and place, is an abuse of the term, and the *idea* is philosophically incorrect.

CHAPTER XI.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND DERANGEMENT, AND WHY.

Sec. 1. Of consciousness again. In connection with what has been said on "Recollection," we deem it proper to make a remark or two more on some forms assumed by consciousness, not noticed in our former observations. Consciousness then, acts differently under different circumstances. For example, sometimes when an object is presented to the mind by the *perceptive*, we become immediately conscious of having observed such object before; which state of mind is frequently produced by the sight of a circumstance connected with the same thing in a similar way. At other times consciousness acts in another form, because we become conscious that we never saw such circumstances before as are now presented to the mind. And at another time, consciousness differs both in its form and degree of action, from either of the other two cases, as it seems to have only a negative consciousness, viz., we are not *conscious* of having seen such circumstances before as are now presented to the mind. The last state to which we allude, leaves the soul in suspense, and it has to wait for corroborating circumstances, and sometimes with considerable anxiety too, but always in proportion to the amount of interest in the subject connected with the suggestion. And if it is a matter of but very little, or of no interest, it is generally dismissed.

Sec. 2. Exceptions. There are some exceptions, however, which we may briefly notice, relative to the power of the mind to discharge matters of comparatively small, or what might appear of no interest to the soul. Sometimes the memory appears to break through all restraint and wages war with every faculty of the soul, determined, for the time being, to go its own way;

sporting itself in expaciating and presenting to the mind hosts of circumstances in a confused mass of perplexing opposites, while all the entreaties of the *choosing faculty*, called the *will*, are ignored, and its authority utterly disregarded. And this is a state of mind which, I presume every person has experienced, more or less, and to his great annoyance too; the facts of which can be far better tested than its philosophy can be explained. Yet it does appear quite plain that the soul at such times is labouring under a degree of derangement; and still, this itself may look rather strange; but that the mind is deranged, more or less, whenever the combined authority of the judgment and the will, fail to keep in subordination the rest of the faculties, or any one of them, is, I think, a truth so obvious, and so universally experienced, and also, so forcibly felt, that scarcely any one could be found to deny it. So that though, as we before remarked, the memory is governed by regular laws, this exception does not militate against the existence, or authority of such laws. Because, derangement defies all laws, more or less, and always in proportion to the degree in which it is found to exist.

Sec. 3. Cause of this state of mind. There are many causes that contribute to produce this state of mind, too many to notice here, but one cause may be, repeated exertions mingled with intense desire, excitement, and resolves, to comprehend any subject, that our ambition, pride, love of fame, or profit, or whatever else, may suggest as important to our interest. And being prompted by, what we conceive to be, the value of the subject, and the interest which the soul feels in it, hurry, urge, and drive the *perceptive* beyond a reasonable speed, for the soul not only has its natural elements in which to move, but also its *natural rate of motion*. And to keep, or try to keep, the soul behind its natural rate of motion in the appropriate channel in which it moves, is to weaken its action in proportion to our success, in the attempt to obstruct. So also if the soul is urged beyond a reasonable degree to hasten on, the effect will be the losing sight of the law of relation, the only effectual one to lead to a safe conclusion; the perceptive faculty is driven by the iron rod of interest, and those laws which nature has designed to regulate the memory become violated by the authority and coercion of the *will*. And inas-

much as the *will* cannot, for any great length of time, command the memory only in accordance with these laws which govern it, and the same being violated, the memory becomes deranged and remains so until the cause is removed. Much time, labour, perplexity and disgrace will be saved by cultivating a love for truth and virtue, and by allowing the moral law to hold the highest place in our affections, let this be the ruling principle of every young person, who may read this little book, when they first commence in life, and to feel that they assume the responsibility of their own actions, to seek the practice of morality, as a practice the most essential to give correct tone, mutual control, and proper balance to all the intellectual faculties. Reader! if you wish to become an independent thinker, useful in society, and really great in future life, *choose this course.*

Sec. 4. *Preventative.* But we may just observe that, on philosophical principles, the principal preventative to this state of mind is a careful and constant submission to the law of relation. For this will hold the memory in its appropriate sphere, unless opposed by an undue excitement of the preponderate intellections produced by the extravagant self-interest which may possibly be indulged. Hence, the propriety, and necessity too, of deliberating on every subject of real worth, as it comes under our notice, and of regulating the passions and affections in order to assist the memory in keeping in its naturally intended channel, lest by granting repeated indulgences in violating the law of relation it eventually, on certain subjects, becomes unmanageable, and to that degree too, that no pains which could be taken in after life could cure; and even if it could, as it is said of a certain botanic doctor, speaking on the science of medicine, says; "an ounce of preventative is worth a pound of cure," and the very same may be said of the memory, to speak in a figurative sense; for it certainly is much easier to prevent derangement of the memory than it is to cure it. And if a prudent course is taken, derangement will but seldom if ever occur from such causes as mentioned above.

CHAPTER XII.

CAUSES OF THE DERANGEMENT OF THE MEMORY.

Sec. 1: *Of habit and declining interest.* Now, it appears to be much easier to account for the derangement of the memory on the ground of intense and growing interest in any thing, than it is in the case of *declining* interest. For there are perhaps but few, if any at all, who have not at times been perplexed and grieved, and *provoked* by reiterated presentations of past experience, a thousand thoughts of a useless, uninteresting, and painful nature take place, in which the soul has no interest, and for which it has no relish, and by which our repose at night is disturbed and our sleep taken from us; and feign would we dismiss them, but all our efforts fail. If no further explanation could be given of this mental state, it remains as a standing proof that the mind can become wearied with its own exercises, and nauseous of its own practices. In our physical nature there is a law which by the use of our senses, organs, and various members, in a reasonable degree, afford a great amount of solid pleasure, but by long continued and extravagant repetition the use of the same senses, organs, and members, become sources of pain and weariness; so also in like manner it is with the mind. For the remembrance of scenes that are past often affords a gratification which no language can express, but to dwell on them beyond a certain limit, they will produce in the soul the opposite effect. Indulging therefore too freely in any chain of reflections, no matter what the quality of these reflections may be, or whether they are in what we commonly call the present time, which embraces the immediate moments connected with the present *moment*, according to the common meaning, or use of the term, or whether it is in the past, will detract from the subject much of its original beauty; and though, as in the case noticed above, the soul may not be interested in the current ex-

ercises of the memory, yet there may have been a time when these *same exercises* were just what the soul took delight in, and by so doing has formed relations and associations which it is now difficult, and perhaps impossible to dissolve. That is to say, by indulging in any given train of thought, beyond a certain limit prescribed, defined, and established by nature, because it is pleasing to us, produces a reaction in the mind and eventually substitutes a pain for a pleasure.

Sec. 2: Of the effects of certain habits through future life. This can be made plain to any person by reflecting on the law of habit, which we all know is a very powerful one in our nature. For it is an easy matter to see the effect of habit upon our physical nature; how soon a person can acquire certain peculiar, and disagreeable habits of snapping the eye, of shaking the head, of appetite, such as, eating and drinking certain articles, though injurious, and the person knowing it at the time, are easily acquired, but hard to break off. Habits of certain phrases and gestures, though improper and unpleasant, when once acquired, follow a person through a long lifetime, and down to his grave. And the law of habit is just as powerful in the more rational parts of the man, operating as powerfully on the *will*, the judgment, and the memory, as on the appetite, the passions, and the physical nature. The wonder then need not, after all, be so great, that at times we find ourselves troubled and perplexed with a train of circumstances from our past experience, seeing that in days and years that have passed away, we have accustomed and trained the memory to dwell thereon until it has acquired the habit, and the strength of which may now at times resist successfully every power of the soul. And who cannot see from these remarks, and this experience, which is, more or less, the experience of all men, how eminently important that the mind should have its proper turn in youth? How careful then should we be, as christian fathers and mothers, ministers and teachers, to impress the rising youth of every land with the intellectual, moral and religious benefits arising from an early application of the mind to the remembrance of all those things, and those only, that will be serviceable for the practical purposes of life. The amount of precious time that is consumed in teaching young people certain novel tales, and romantic stories, and the rules

of foppish, sickening, and to common sense, a disgusting etiquette, which is unnatural, and as difficult for nine out of every ten to learn, as it has been for the monkey to learn to walk erect ever since *heaven's decree* was made that upon his "belly should he go," the most of which teaching is worse than nothing; if that time were otherwise improved by the same intellects, with the same degree of education, zeal, fervency and perseverence, it would in one short generation, by the blessing of God, which it would be sure to have, be sufficient to cure more than half the domestic immorality which now exists in our christian land. The effect which fear, guilt, desire, and the operations of conscience, either to regulate or derange, produce upon the memory is so obvious to every one that all the explanation which is required is simply to refer to the fact.

Sec. 3. *Of bodily weakness—one cause.* But another cause of the derangement of the memory is physical weakness. For though the body and the soul are made of materials very different from each other, yet, they are so intimately united that when one becomes affected the other is affected also. We know that excessive bodily exertion will produce physical weakness, which weakness, when it arrives to a certain stage, produces paralyzing effects which become visible on the mind. Fever on the brain, in its incipient stages, does not appear to affect the mind, yet, if it is allowed to hold its seat it will not be long before violent inflammation will follow, and derangement of the memory immediately succeeds. Sometimes bodily disease will affect one particular organ, and in proportion thereto will affect its corresponding faculty, and thus it is that the memory sometimes refuses to act even at the request of the *will*, while at other times it acts vigorously on topics in which the soul takes no interest. Now, the cause of bodily disease is not unfrequently that of intemperate habits, which will include eating, drinking, and excessive exercise; those therefore who "wish they had a good memory," should be careful not to throw obstacles in the way of its improvement, by indulging in the inordinate use of appetite, and thereby produce settled dyspepsia, which can be done in a few years on most constitutions, by following the popular habits of Canadians in middling circumstances, while a life time of subsequent regret will not

make sufficient atonement to wipe away its effects on the body and mind. When the natural tone of the stomach becomes changed by long abuse of the laws of nature, and the digesti apparatus fails to do its naturally alotted work, the nervou system becomes materially affected, and inasmuch as this is th organ of the mind, and the only one upon which it can direct operate, if it becomes paralysed, the mind must be proportionately affected, and the memory will be more or less deranged.

We are not apt to think, nor willing to believe, that practices so general among all classes of the community, embracing every degree of wealth, literature, and religion, are fraught with such baneful, paralyzing, and malignant consequences, as in after life they prove themselves to be. What harm can there be in a *kind* and affectionate parent, to please and gratify the little prattling children, in spending a few coppers, or a york shilling, now and then, for bull's eyes and other sweetmeats, or what harm in giving the little child at noon after breakfast, for fear he should suffer through hunger, a fried cake, or a biscuit, or a piece of bread and butter with a little sugar spread on, or molasses, or some very rich *preserves*, and so on several times through the day? What answer might we naturally expect from intelligent people to the following question: What harm would it be, not to say to heathens and idiots, but to intelligent christian parents, to learn their children to dig their graves with their teeth, and then mourn their untimely death? We shall not answer the question, but we think *it has its own moral.*

CHAPTER XIII.

IN REFERENCE TO A NONENTITY.

Sec. 1. *Can we remember a nonentity?* The question, Can we perceive a nonentity? has been often asked. If we cannot, it is said that as we do perceive the past, these events, which we perceive, "must exist either in the form of matter or mind, and therefore they must be something." This is supposed to favour the notion of living thoughts existing as individual somethings in the past. To which we would remark that when we speak of remembering, we mean of course, to remember something, and not to remember nothing. But sometimes our remembering consists altogether in the perception of what we have seen *through the eye*, and at other times in the perception of something that we have heard *through the ear*, while in other cases it merely perceives certain modifications that have previously taken place in the mind, which we call original ideas. And inasmuch as to remember is to perceive that which has been under the mind's observation before, it is not a *nonentity* for which we contend, but something that exists in the past and always will. And as nothing can be made in the past that has not been once made in the present, we must perceive *what has been*, or nothing at all. For example, I have read *Kitto's History of Palestine*, is a true circumstance which exists in the bosom of past time, not in the present, nor in the future, and nowhere only in the past, and if it is not in the past the fact is annihilated and does not exist at all. Now, it cannot be annihilated, because, *it is a fact*, and it will be just as true a billion years hence that I did read *Kitto's History of Palestine* as it is now, or as it was the very year, or month in the year, in which I read it.

Sec. 2: We become conscious of certain facts. Now suppose a certain person to have been in company with me all the while I was reading this history, and saw, and heard me read it, he would of course see a real circumstance, for he would perceive the act of reading, and the act of reading so as to be heard in company, requires not only the physical motion of the muscles of the eye, but an additional motion of the organs of speech. Here are physical motions that are made in the reading of that history, which were made in time that was then *present time*, and the perception of those motions was made by the individual at the same time, which required an act of the mind from him as well as from the reader, so that there were two kinds of motions, the one mental and the other physical. Now, the question which remains *is this:* Do those motions of the body and mind still exist, or either of them? We answer, that both exist as circumstances, real facts, as much as they ever did, but not as motions, because they do not exist in the present time, and cannot, any more than they can a thousand years before they took place. We might ask then, on what principle can the past be seen at all? We answer, on the same principle which we perceive the present, and no other. The present is perceived because we are in the present time, we cannot take the present into the future, for every particle of time claims its own place, and its own events. So in regard to the past, we cannot bring the past into the present any more than we can take the present into the future, and we can only perceive the past on the principle which we have already endeavored to explain before; that is, by the transition of the perceptive faculty into past time. We humbly conceive that, not that we would presume to speculate on the Divine essence, or attempt to pry into the mysteries of his nature, the principle of Omniscience, or knowing all things, on the part of the Almighty Maker of the universe is based upon the extent of his existence, that is to say, God knows all that is in the present because he pervades all present time, and all that is in the past because he pervades all past time, and he knows all that is in the future because he exists in all future time equally the same. Man's knowledge of the present depends upon various circumstances in connection with the activity and strength of his mind, and his knowledge of the past depends upon the adaptation of his *perception* to extend into the past in connection with the harmonious working of consciousness in its different forms.

Sec. 3. *Illustration of the above principle.* To illustrate, let us suppose that the circumstance to be remembered is a something that we have heard. Now, that something, in proportion to its extent, consists in sounds, more or less, as the case may be. These sounds are produced, and tolerably well accounted for, on natural principles, viz.: by an adaptation of certain portions of our physical constitution to the surrounding atmosphere, its relation to electricity, and connection with immateriality. But though electricity, atmosphere, mind, nervous tissue, and muscle, whose combined action produced that sound, in the first place, all exist at the present moment, yet it cannot be said, with any degree of probability, that the sounds have a contemporary existence, and that the sound that we heard twelve months ago exists at the same time with the sound we hear at the present moment. For inasmuch as the sounds were known to exist only because they were such, and they proved to be such by sensible impression, it follows as a matter of course, that no one could be certain of their existence only from the very same impression, and these impressions must be identified with the first impression, and so on through every stage of subsequent life; but this we conceive to be impossible in the nature of things; for a sound once made and heard cannot be heard again. It is very true that we may hear a similar one, and that may produce similar impressions; but that does not make it to be the same sound, nor the impressions to be the same impressions, and therefore cannot be identified with the first, and can only be made to agree with it. For if the sound always exists, it must always be sounding, for there is nothing else to exist in a sound but *sounding*. And the very same is true of every motion of the body, and of the mind, and of every motion in and through all materiality and immateriality, both in time and in eternity. A man may make a motion with his hand, but he never can make that same motion again, he may make a similar one, but that is very different from the same one. For that same motion cannot exist as a motion *without moving*, and therefore that motion which was made yesterday cannot exist to-day as a motion, and all there is left is the truth, fact, certainty, that such a motion existed or took placd yesterday, and we have to perceive back to yesterday to be made sensible of that same fact.

Sec. 4 : The same motion cannot be made twice. There is a very striking analogy between physical and mental motion. And the act of thinking is purely an intellectual motion, which can be done either in connection with matter, or disconnected therefrom. And to remember as we have said is to think, and to think is to be the subject of intellectual motion, and should we admit the possibility of intellectual motion, under some circumstances without thinking a rational thought, even that itself would not by any means alter or do away with the fact that no being can think without intellectual motion. And I submit to the judgment of any well informed mind, who is an original thinker, whether that motion which is made by the intellect in the perception of any present circumstance, will ever be made again, either by that same intellect, or by any other, either in time or through eternity. And to say that that motion (thought) exists is to say that which appears to me to be entirely destitute of all proof. Because if that thought exists, then the motion exists, and not another motion but the same motion, and if the same motion exists, it exists where it first took place in the mind, or in other words, it is the action of the mind in the perception of that thing, and only one perception can possibly take place in the mind at the same time, and this *thought* being a present perception of the mind, and must be a present perception, if it is a perception at all, prevents any other perception during the actual existence of same perception (motion.) We may make similar perceptions, and this is how we think, and this is how we remember. Not by the existence of old perceptions, but by the creation of new ones. For we never could know that we ever had a perception unless we could perceive again. So that to perceive the past is to perceive again, and to be conscious we perceived before not the same perception which we now have, but a similar one which led to similar conclusions and by which we now perceive the same fact. We shall make some further remarks on motion and the laws thereof, but reserve them for another place in reply to the infidel theory that "all thought is either material or immaterial," and they will be found under italics of *all thought material or immaterial*, to which we refer the reader.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE IDENTITY OF MEMORY AND THE LOWER ANIMALS.

Sec. 1. *Identity of the mode of remembering.* We shall not now stop to notice, at least, to explain, the various opinions that men have formed relative to the principle on which the different creatures of God remember the past, but shall proceed at once to give our own opinion, which is this; memory is alike in kind and governed by the same principles all the world over. And as this recording to the explanation which we have given before means to perceive with a consciousness of having perceived the same before; it follows that every creature that does remember must have, to say the least, those intellectual elements of perception and consciousness which are essential to constitute the process of remembering. And it appears that all animals the lowest as well as the highest have power to remember. "The ox knoweth his owner and the ass his master's crib," that is to say; the ox remembers his owner, it perceives him to be the same person that he is and not another one, and it is conscious it has seen him; "for the ox knoweth his owner, &c." We mention this to prove the existence of memory in the lower animals from the highest authority, that is, from the Creator himself. But we may say the same of the horse, the dog, the elephant, the bee, the ant and the spider, with equal certainty, as far as observation and reason will determine; yet we think it not necessary to dwell on these points as they are too obvious to require explanation; only we would observe that what we have said of these which we have named we design as a specimen of the whole animal creation; so that whether we speak of the elephant that traverses the forest, the ox that feeds at the stall, the dog that watches at his kennel, the bird that flies in the air, the ant that provides his food in the summer, or the worm that crawls beneath our feet all give evident marks

of memory the same in kind, *though not in degree.* There is an evident difference in the same species of animals in regard to the strength of their memory, and which appears to be natural. Take the horse for an example, and but few persons can be found, who have been in the habit of using these animals for a term of years, that have not discovered a marked difference in the strength of their memories. If then there is such a sensible difference in the same species of animals, no wonder that there should be a difference between the different species themselves. Now, as we have already observed that to remember is to perceive, so we would now remark that to perceive is to *think*, therefore all creatures capable of remembering, are endowed with a thinking principle.

Sec. 2. The thinking principle in the lower animals, what? It has been frequently observed, by persons who have not been backward to make their thoughts known to others, that if the lower animals are endowed with a thinking principle it must be of an inferior kind to that of the human family. To this sentiment I cannot subscribe, for with the same propriety it might be said that if the lower animals are endowed with memory, it must be of a different kind, that is, it must be made up of different materials; which supposition would amount to this, that the memory of the lower animals is either made up of matter, or of something that is neither matter nor mind, because, the memory of the human family is made up of mind, something in the man that is immaterial acts in him to produce remembrance, and if the memory of the lower animals is of a different kind, then we shall be forced to this conclusion.

Sec. 3. Why do not men explain this instinct to which they refer in the lower animals? Those who are unwilling to admit the identity of the thinking principle tell us that the lower animals remember by "*instinct.*" To say that they remember by instinct is the same as to say they *think* by instinct, and should we adopt this manner of speaking it would only represent the thinking principle by another name; but the use that *those persons* design to make of it is to represent a different quality of thinking principle from that which is operative in more rational beings. We have no doubt but it would afford a great degree of

satisfaction to thousands of others, as well as to us, for those persons who are capable of discerning the difference between *instinct* which thinks and *mind* which thinks, to explain and make the matter simple enough to be understood. But unless we can obtain this information we must get along as well as we can, in our ignorance of this problem, and try and be content to take our own roundabout way and so approximate as near as we can to an understanding of the nature of this *instinct*, or as some have called it "instinctive memory." Inasmuch then as it has been a prevailing opinion heretofore, and still is, that the lower animals are, to use the popular phrase, "merely creatures of instinct," and as this phrase does not appear to be properly understood by many, and according to our conceptions of it, is misapplied by others, we think it not improper, in connection with the identity of the memory, to call attention to the discussion of this subject for a few moments.

Sec. 4 Instinct a natural endowment. Now, according to our conceptions of *instinct* it means a natural endowment, and by this we mean something which the Almighty has imparted to his creatures and associated with either their physical or mental natures. Admitting this to be a correct exposition so far, we need in the next place to understand the nature of this endowment; and in order to this we shall proceed to enquire whether this endowment, called *instinct*, and by which the lower animals are said to think and remember, is material or immaterial. Now, it must be remembered that spirit and matter comprehend the entire universe of God. Or at all events we can form no idea of any thing existing any where, either in heaven, earth, or hell that does not consist of one of these properties or both of them together. And what we state here as our own opinion we believe to be general, if not universal, among that class of mankind who have any opinion at all on the subject. The character and position that some attribute to electricity, as occupying in the universe appears to be that of a medium state between matter and mind. It is said that the nearer we approach to electricity the nearer we are to motion, such as to take a lump of lead any given size it requires a certain force to move it, while a lump of wood the same size requires much less power, being so much nearer electricity in the wood, than at the lead, but if we take a body of water of

the same dimensions, it can be moved much easier than the wood; whereas atmospheric air is moved with much more ease still, and gas of the same proportionate bulk would require a power so small, to produce motion, that when compared with the power required to move the lead, it would be scarcely perceived at all; this is explained on the principle of being so much nearer electricity at the gas than we are at the lead. Now, we do not find fault with the above theory, in so far as we have traced it, but we cannot subscribe to the inference that is drawn therefrom by its advocates: *that "no motion can exist without electricity."* Because, if it is true that no motion can be produced without the primary action of electricity, motion in the animal system would stand thus; bone, muscle, nerve, mind *electricity*, this would make electricity the stimulating power, and so mind would receive its stimulent from matter; whereas we suppose matter receives its stimulent from mind. We cannot conceive how it is possible for motion to exist anywhere without receiving its first impulse from mind, neither can we conceive it possible for mind to depend upon matter, even in its most refined condition, of electricity, for its own motion.

Sec. 5. *This endowment either matter or mind.* Now, this endowment of which we speak is either matter or mind, and it cannot in the nature of things be matter, because, this *instinct* remembers, perceives, *thinks*, which is impossible for matter to do. Matter, it is true may be endowed with a thinking principle, but matter cannot think any more than it can move itself or stop its motion. And inasmuch as the lower animals do remember, which it is impossible to do without *thinking*, and as no being can think without a mind, it follows as a legitimate conclusion that the lower animals are endowed with mind. To say that the lower animals might be made to think without a mind, viz., without an immateriality, because "all things are possible with God," is to say nothing to the point under consideration. For although all things are possible with God yet they are only so in a consistent and rational sense. The very same authority tells us that "it is impossible for God to lie," and also that he cannot deny himself. Therefore any person who can dispose of the case under consideration by saying that "all things are possible with God," shows not only that he

has a very easy way of reconciling opposites and inconsistencies, but that he is a mere stickler for a point, which the very nature of his quibble goes to prove, and which the nature of the case shows he cannot fully believe. The zeal of a man, which is not according to knowledge, might lead him to suppose that he confers great honor upon God by ignoring the great philosophical principle alluded to, and substituting for that the "*all things are possible to him*," but the very opposite of this will prove to be the truth in this, and all cases of a similar kind when it goes to show, as this does, that it is possible for God to do that which involves a contradiction. What others may think possible to be done I shall not now stop to determine, but, I find it equally as impossible for me to believe that this paper on which I am now writing, or the pen which I hold in my hand can think, or can ever be made to think; as it is for me to believe it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time. Should this pen with which I now write these lines be made to possess a power to think and move, so that it would hide itself and lay concealed and unperceived by me when I required it for my use, what might be said of the pen? To use a familiar phrase we would say that the pen thinks and reasons, and would answer very well as a common mode of expression on all ordinary occasions; but philosophically speaking it would not be correct, for in such case the pen would be endowed with a thinking principle. For in this case something must have been added to the pen which it had not before, and something too of an entirely different nature from that of the pen itself, and this something any one can call by what name he pleases, it makes no matter to me, *but the nature of it is mind.* But a case of this kind, as in the motion of the pen would, in all probability, be called an *instinctive motion*, or it would be said that the pen was merely a creature of *instinct.* And what this instinct is about which we have heard and read so much we cannot tell unless it is another name for mind. If that be the case we would not dispute for a moment about mere words, for if a person chooses to apply the term mind to the immaterial part of man and think that the term *instinct* is more appropriate to the immaterial part of the lower animals, we shall offer no objection, nevertheless, we do well to remember that using different terms will never alter the real nature of things.

Sec. 6: Why men eall the lower animals merely creatures of instinct. We purpose now to enquire after what it is that has led men to call the lower animals "merely creatures of instinct;" but before we proceed to this, we will first enquire after the popular definition of the term *instinct.* Now, we have already shown that what men call *instinct* is a something added to matter by the all wise Creator; and this something must differ from matter in its nature because it produces voluntary motion. And would also remark that it is not our intention to deny that the lower animals are creatures of instinct, this we admit, and so also are the higher orders, viz., human beings; but that all the movements of the lower animals are purely instinctive movements, according to the general received opinion of the meaning of the term, we do deny.

Sec. 7: The popular definition of instinct. Mr. Walker's definition of instinct, I must say with all deference to him as a highly educated man, and popular linguist, appears to me as contradictory, as the old calvinistic explanations of *free grace.* I cannot conceive what philosophy, or common sense, there is in the following definition; "*Instinct*, the power which determines the will of brutes," "a desire or aversion in the mind not determined by reason or deliberation." The question that would naturally arise in the enquiring mind is: What is the *will* that is thus determined by this power called instinct? The will, says the same author, "is choice, arbitrary determination." Now, the common sense meaning of the *will* is a power of volition or choice which the creature has in itself. How then can the idea of will, which if it does not mean a power of choice it means nothing, be reconciled with the idea of a power which determines and controls that choice, viz., a power to choose in itself? For according to this exposition it follows that either the lower animals have no will, or if they have it must be that power which determines the preference and which is called by the name of instinct. Now if there is a power in any creature which determines his w[illegible], directs his choice, and decides his preference for one thing above another; that power must be intelligent, it must perceive and discriminate. And if this could not be admitted that such a power is within the creature, if there is such a power at all which determines his will, it must be without the creature; and if it is without him, how can it be called the

instinct of him? If instinct is the power which determines the will of brutes, instinct must have the power of choice, or how could it determine the will? And if it has the power of choice it is the will, for what else can be the will of any creature but that power of choice which is within it? So that according to the definition as given by Mr. Walker and others that he has followed, the "brute" must either have two wills or no will at all. They can have no will if we admit the theory of instinct determining the will, because, this would not leave the will free, and therefore it would be no will at all, but only a power which is called "instinct," and which is said to determine the will. But if on the other hand we admit the will according to the explanation above referred too, to be really such as determines the choice of the individual then the power which is called instinct, and which is said to direct and control the will would constitute another will. Now, the upshot of the whole is this; if there is a something in the brute which determines his will that something whatever it may be called destroys the influence, the action, and the very nature of the will, because, whatever determines the choice is the will.

Sec. 8. *The power of choice in brutes.* The brutes have a power of choice as well as men, and which power they exercise in things relating to their interest with as much freedom, accuracy, and independence as the generality of men manifest in *their* choice. They are influenced with motives to seek their own happiness, and study their own comfort, which arises from appetite, exercise, or rest, as the case may be, and their affections are invariably placed on a similar principle of preference to that of men. They love their young and will defend and protect them, in proportion to their power to do so, with as much resolution and original decision of character as mankind. The heel of the horse, the horn of the ox, the bill and claws of the bird, and the trunk of the elephant, are used by them as instruments of self-defence, or aggressive movements to secure certain objects with which their gratification is connected, and in which they judge their happiness to consist, they therefore evince a motive of action which influences their will. This motive of action, whether it is in men or animals, in proportion to its degree, exerts a power on the will, and is intended to lead the soul to prefer, or put forth its choice, for whatever

might appear to conduce to its own gratification, profit or happiness. Should this great principle of preference for happiness be extracted from our nature, it would greatly paralyze all our efforts and frustrate all our plans, if it did not put an end to all voluntary motion, which in all probability it would do. In the brute creation, gratification is the ultimate object of every voluntary action, and so it is among the human family when the action is prompted only by the animal propensities; but when the action is prompted by the moral principle, a faculty which the brutes do not possess, at all events in a degree sufficient to influence any action, or choice of any action, purely on the principles of right and wrong. But man, while he retains his life, and thought, and immortality, must prefer happiness to misery, yet under the influence of the grace of God, and knowing as he does his liability to err in judgment, relative to what may be best for the general good, he often relinquishes his preference for happiness at the present time, and submits to the most excruciating pain, nevertheless he has still an eye to the future comfort that he expects will grow out of the present affliction.

Sec. 9. Preference to happiness a controling principle. Now, inasmuch as all creatures capable of voluntary motion must possess a *will*, for this is necessary to direct such motion, so likewise do all creatures which possess a will require an original power to excite the *will* to action, which we would call the *motive power*. To say that it determines the will in all subordinate cases, or in any subordinate case of preference, would not be strictly true, yet to say that it determines the will on the general principle of the choice of happiness instead of misery, would only be to say that which agrees with the principles of sound philosophy and the experience of all beings capable of voluntary action. For no creature can, in the very nature of things, deliberately desire misery in preference to happiness. This we call the great *motive power*, a leading principle, which is as widely diffused through Jahovah's empire as animal or intellectual existence, and will continue to exert its leading and controling influence through the present state, and will remain a living and continually active principle through all eternity. But though this principle ever lives in and through all sensitive beings, viz., a desire for happiness, yet the means

to be used to really obtain that object, by rational and accountable beings like as we are, must be explained according to the higher principles of our nature, because it requires the volition and effort of moral agency assisted by an enlightened intellect. It is not so however with the lower animals, although they are creatures of preference as well as man, and so much so that they are frequently disposed to take their own course and that too, in opposition to a very rigorous discipline. We therefore conclude that the will of all beings is so far controled by an original power which the great creator has implanted in their nature, that they desire and prefer happiness as naturally and as easily as they breathe. Indeed it requires no effort of the soul to desire or make choice of happiness. I question very much whether any one can remember the period when he did not desire to be happy, or when he felt indifferent either to happiness or misery. It is doubtful indeed, whether any man can remember any circumstance of his life that ever occurred which led him to depreciate or think lightly of his own happiness. Therefore, this tendency to happiness, more properly speaking, does not come within the province of the *will*, because there is no alternative, there is no choice in a strictly philosophical sense, there is no effort, the soul requires no effort, happiness is not rejected, *it cannot be rejected!*

Now, we have no objection that this great ruling principle, to which we have alluded above, should be called by the name of *instinct*, so that we can only come to know when we speak of instinct, what is meant by the term. But we are not willing to acknowledge that this principle, even according to our views, and the explanation we have given, controls the will of "brutes" any further than it does the will of men. It is a natural endowment, a law of mind which is beyond the power of any to ignore, it is a something imparted, something different in its nature from matter, so that this instinct after all is a power of mind and not of matter.

Sec. 10. *What it is that has led men to call the lower animals "only creatures of instinct."* But we do not design, however, to trace back the origin of this opinion through the dense wilderness of ancient philosophical speculations, this would be a very tedious undertaking, and one of no real benefit

after all. We shall merely remark that the notion has been entertained, and it has gone its rounds, for how long we cannot tell, and it is enough to know that it is now generally applied to them, and for the purpose too of distinguishing the supposed difference between their thinking principle and that of the human family.

We would therefore remark in the first place that the kind of teaching which men have had is one reason why this opinion is so prevalent, or rather we might say, why this phraseology is so general. For it is doubtful whether half the people who tell us that the lower animals are "merely creatures of instinct," have any opinion at all in the matter; any further than they have been taught this theory, and the amount of teaching perhaps, has been simply that they have learned that certain teachers and prominent men, and authors that they have read, were of that opinion. And we all know that there is a large proportion of *reading persons* who are governed altogether by authors, for whatever is said by their favorite class of writers is swallowed down, without any suspicion, by wholesale. The ancient stamp and a popular name are sufficient with this class of men to cover all defects and reconcile all contradictions that any book written by such particular favorites may contain. And as these persons have read in so many places and have found it to be the opinion of so many respectable and intelligent men, that the lower animals are merely creatures of instinct, they have, on this authority admitted it as a standing truth; and now, after having been an acknowledged truth, for centuries, according to their principles of philosophy, for any one, and especially any one who makes no pretensions to any more than an ordinary share of common sense, to call in question the truth of it, appears to them the very height of presumption.

Sec. 11. (2) Mental indolence is another cause that has contributed largely to the currency which this kind of philosophy has received among men. Many ten thousands of mankind would much rather be ignorant than they would submit to endure that amount of mental exercise which is the price of such knowledge, and without which they themselves appear to be fully aware it cannot be obtained. But to use their own words, they cannot "rack their brains about such matters,"

that is to say, they cannot, they will not purchase truth at so high a price, they would rather run the risk of embracing an error, and especially what might be considered a harmless and popular error, like the one under consideration, than to have to work so hard to get the truth.

Sec. 12: (3) But there is another class of men who, although they have a thirst for knowledge, are but little better off. They are in the habit of looking into the nature of things to some extent, but their intense desire to know as much, and if possible a little more than their neighbors, their ambition prompts them to leap to conclusions without fully investigating the subjects under their consideration. And thus in their haste to excel all others, they do not exercise that deliberate discrimination which the importance of the case demands; they do not pursue the subject through all its bearings with sufficient attention and diligence to enable them to fully arrive at the truth; and being rather credulous withal, they find no very great difficulty in receiving enough *on trust* from popular writers to make up for what they perceive they lack. And by this course, these persons come to adopt an opinion which has scarcely been half digested yet, hoping they have the truth they become settled down therein, and so rest till to their astonishment and shame, when it comes to be put to the test, they find themselves unprepared to sustain it by argument. Now, the subject under our consideration, which is the identity of memory, has been treated in a similar manner, for it appears to have received but a few occasional glances, which will account for many of those erroneous ideas connected with the intellectual state of the lower animals.

Sec. 13: *Afraid to meet the infidel on his own grounds.* The theory that the lower animals "are merely creatures of instinct," has obtained much of its popularity from the supposition that such a view of the matter answers effectually the queries of the infidel on the subject of immateriality. Now, suppose we admit that such a view of the nature of the lower animals is competent to do all that its advocates say it can do, what would the cause of truth gain if one false position is assumed merely to put another to the blush? Nothing. And truth will never thank its advocates for the superabundance of

their zeal in attempting to defend her cause with such flimsy weapons. Truth is not ashamed to appear in her own simple, native, and unadulterated form, or to show herself in her own real character.

Many christian people appear to be afraid to meet the infidel on the ground that he has assumed, for fear that the cause of christianity should suffer loss. The position of infidelity, I believe is this: all thought is either material or immaterial. And the inference which they draw from this proposition is, if thought is all material, the existence of man will end with the present state of things, that when the body dies the soul ceases for ever to live; but if all thought is immaterial, as the lower animals think, then, the brute creation will necessarily live for ever. This being the conclusion of the infidel, and appears to many to be unanswerable in the shape in which it stands; attempts have been made to show a difference in the nature or essence of thought so as to answer the query of infidelity which is the following: That though the lower animals do think and remember, which is a fact acknowledged from daily observation, nevertheless they think and remember by the *instinct* of their nature, and are consequently "merely creatures of instinct," and will not always live, because they are *creatures of instinct*, whereas man is endowed with mind, intellect, soul, or whatever else it may be called, and will consequently live forever. But unfortunately for those who assume this position, it fails to accomplish its object; it does not quash the bold and independent "free thinker," he proceeds to interrogate:—

Sec. 14. *The ground which each assumes. Infidel:* You assume that the lower animals are merely creatures of *instinct*. Please tell me what this instinct is, or what you understand it to be, as I apprehend you conceive a difference in the nature of the intellect of an animal and that of a man?

Christian: Why, it is a natural endowment, to be sure, for this is what we mean by "instinct."

Infidel: That does not answer the question, it leaves me as far in the dark as I was before, my anxiety is to know the

nature of this endowment. You, as a christian, believe, I presume, that the whole universe of God is made up of matter and mind, and you say that matter cannot think nor move itself, neither stop its motion; now, I wish to know whether that which you call *instinct* in the lower animals is of a material organization, or of an immaterial construction? Thus the infidel will press the question, and there is no way to get around it, it cannot be ignored, its force must be felt. The christian may reply by saying he sees no propriety in urging a point that neither party can fully understand, he may tell the infidel that the lower animals are called creatures of instinct merely to distinguish them from the higher position that man holds in the scale of intellectual being, and that his thoughts can reach as high as heaven and the throne of God, and that the thoughts of the lower animals are confined to their sensual enjoyments, and that these are the reasons why they are called *creatures of instinct*. And this is about all the satisfaction any one can get from the generality of those persons who hold such sentiments as are here represented by *the christian*, and whatever may be the opinion of others, our own opinion is that to resort to such means of defence against the attacks of infidelity tends to do the cause of revealed religion more harm than good. But the question might arise what shall we do with the proposition of the infidel, which is this: if the lower animals are endowed with immateriality, they will necessarily live for ever, unless we can dispose of it in some way similar to that above?

We humbly conceive that an unwillingness to allow them a place in eternity is owing perhaps more to the difficulties which are supposed to be connected with their existence in a future state, and, as they conceive, the impossibility to reconcile that existence with the consistency of the Divine character is what have led many to deny the immateriality of their endowment. But whatever amount of obstacles, either in number or magnitude, may appear to be, or may in reality be, in the way of their supposed future existence, it is a miserable shift, and one that I hold to be beneath the integrity and dignity of the christian character to attempt to obviate them, either by denying the powers of thought, memory, perception, and consciousness, in those creatures, and thus deny their immateriality, or on the

other hand by admitting, either directly or indirectly, or by intimating anything that would lead to the conclusion, that all those noble powers of thought, perception, memory, consciousness, &c., with the *will* and sensation, are of a material construction.

Sec. 15: *God's way is the best, whatever that may be.* Now, the difficulties connected with the reconciliation of mind in the lower animals (which mind has power to remember, and remembering proves the existence of a thinking principle) with the Divine attributes, when viewed in the light of true philosophy, appear to be but few. If God has designed the lower animals for a future existence, whether for a limited period or to all eternity, as an individual worm of earth depending constantly upon his Divine Power and Goodness for life, both in time and eternity, I have no objection to offer, but feel perfectly satisfied that such arrangement will contribute to the good of creation and the glory of the Creator. But of this, like many other things connected with the Divine economy, we must be satisfied to remain comparatively ignorant, until the Great Author of our being shall see fit to remove us to another state of existence. The great Creator has not cramped himself for room, there is a plenty in his vast domains, and if he has designed the lower animals to live in the future, he will find them all a place.

CHAPTER XV.

IMMATERIALITY AND IMMORTALITY, AND WHY?

Sec. 1. *Immateriality of memory.* There does not appear to be any reason that can be assigned why any person should believe in different kinds of memory, that is, for an angel to have one kind, man another kind, and the lower animals another kind. True, there is a difference, a marked difference, and a very great difference, but that is not in the kind, it is to be sought for and found in the degree. We call the memory immaterial, not because the memory is a faculty in the abstract, such as we would call the will a power to choose, or the sense a power to feel, but because it is a power belonging to and essentially connected with those faculties which are of an immaterial construction, and because it is identified with perception in the past, that is, it is an immaterial action in past life; so that the memory is only immaterial comparatively, not positively, because it is merely the act of immateriality, and not the immateriality itself; the mind is the immateriality of the creature, and the memory is an act of the mind, or more properly speaking, actions of the mind. And the power to remember or perceive the present, is a power that belongs to nothing but *pure immateriality.* So that it is not the act of the mind, whether in the past by remembering, or in the present by thinking, that is to be looked upon as an abstract immateriality, so far at least as we can see, only that it is knowledge perceived by the action of immateriality, viz.: *thinking* or *remembering* is knowledge perceived by the mind. Perception, every one must know, is not in the past without perceiving, for there can be no such thing as perception existing without perceiving, because, this would be a contradiction; just as much so as it would be to suppose that perception could take place without an intellectual action. But nevertheless,

the action is one thing, and the intellect that produces the action is another thing. And the intellect may be called immaterial, which name it deserves, and so may the *action* by way of accommodation to distinguish it from an act indirectly produced by matter, viz., through the instrumentality of matter, but philosophically speaking it is not immaterial. For it would be just as reasonable to suppose that every physical motion, as we commonly call it, produces an additional amount of matter in the material universe, as to suppose that every intellectual motion is constantly adding to the original stock of immateriality in the world of mind, and to suppose that all thought is either material or immaterial is to suppose either one or the other of these. It will be perceived from what we have stated that while we acknowledge the immateriality of the thinking principle, we conceive there is a difference between *that* and the *thought*, which the materialist tells us must be all either material or immaterial. But this we admit, that all beings capable of thinking and remembering are endowed with perception and consciousness, yet neither of these can possibly be of a material construction. And if it is the will of our Almighty Maker that all beings endowed with immateriality shall live always, *so let it be.* Whether they shall live as mind and matter united, as they do in their present state of being, or whether that immateriality that now animates them shall live independent of and without the physical part—we speak of the lower animals—mortal man has no right to complain. The whole depends on the will of the Creator, and whatever is his will *should be our will.* And if this should be the Divine arrangement, he is fully competent to produce from that inexhaustible fountain of goodness which is in himself, a sufficient variety to engage their attention and amuse their minds through the numberless ages of eternity without throwing any obstacle in the way of his more intelligent creatures relative to their fulness of happiness and the perpetual expansion and growth of their minds. Therefore, from considerations of this kind we are led to conclude that to admit the possibility of the eternal existence of the lower animals, that is, of their minds with consciousness that they once existed with a body, or even to suppose their resurrection and a spiritual body to be given them, could not be considered a supposition at all beyond the bounds of possibility.

Sec. 2: Immateriality no sure proof of immortality. But the idea conveyed by infidelity, and the same is entertained by, perhaps, a large majority of christian people, who have formed any opinion on the subject, is, that the fact of immateriality in any being is an incontestible proof of the immortality of the same being. Now, this inference does not appear to be just, I cannot conceive it to be legitimate. I know it is generally regarded as a proof, and looked upon as conclusive, but to me it looks to be a mere presumption. There is nothing in subordinate immateriality, innate or acquired, from which can be proved its eternal existence. It cannot be urged that it always lived, for this would be true only of God himself. And to say that its nature is spirit is to say a very great and interesting truth, but to suppose this to be a sufficient argument to prove its eternal existence is a great mistake; one might as well say that because matter is made in certain forms that it must forever remain so. And if we say that the spirit was created for the glory of God and therefore must always live, the same may be said of matter that it was created for God's glory, for we are told by God himself "that he created all things for his pleasure." If a mere proposition and conclusion are to be regarded as proof in any given case, there is no difficulty in proving anything, even the greatest absurdity, and the most conflicting opposites can be proved to agree if this mode of operation is all that is required. The proposition is, every immaterial being is a pure spirit, and the inference is, all spirits must live forever. Now suppose we try the opposite and see if it cannot be proved by the same kind of argument, that is, every being endowed with a thinking principle is endowed with immateriality, which is pure spirit, and all subordinate immateriality must finally cease to be. So that the same argument that is used, and supposed to be conclusive proof of the eternal existence of all immateriality, can also be used to prove the annihilation of the soul. But still we think that metaphysical reasoning is fully sufficient to prove the immateriality of all beings that are capable of thinking and remembering, but it is altogether inadequate to prove the immortality of any being except the Almighty himself. Therefore, if immateriality be admitted as a property of soul of man, which will not be denied by any except infidels, we include the lower animals as possessing immateriality also, yet the same is no positive proof of the immortality of either.

Sec. 3: *God's power is not limited.* We would be very far from attempting to set bounds to the power of our Almighty Creator by supposing that he could not consistently make and impart to any organized being a mind for any less period than a boundless eternity. This would be in effect to say that God could make nothing to serve, exclusively, the present state of things, especially if that same thing should need to be endowed with a thinking power to serve the same purpose. This would go to say, that the power of God was limited. Now, we know and admit that it is impossible for the Almighty to do that which involves a contradiction, and is inconsistent with itself; but this is certainly not a case of that kind, and the only question involved in the supposition is that of power, which no one who acknowledges the existence of the Supreme Being can deny. And there is perhaps not one to be found, who believes in the Almighty, that would presume to say that it is impracticable for our Creator to endow the lower animals with immateriality to serve the present state of being. And seeing God has not thought proper to acquaint man with all his designs in reference to these creatures, for him to affirm on the one hand that if they are immaterial they must always live, or seeing they are below us in the scale of existence, they can have no immateriality, and though they may think and remember it must be accounted for on some other principle, is a speculation which is not justifiable and may lead to dangerous results. The truth is, God has power to make a body to a specific purpose for a definite time, and then to be no more. And it is equally true that God has as much power over mind as he has over matter, therefore he can make mind to serve his purpose for any limited period, and then to be no more. No being is necessarily immortal because it lives, or because it is made as it is, and endowed with the powers that it has, nor yet because it may desire to live always.

Sec. 4: *The immortality of all depends on the will of the Creator.* The immortality of all created beings is continually depending on the will of the Creator, their immortality is not absolute, and it does not appear to be necessary, neither are we sure it is general, much less universal. But it might be asked, would not this view of the subject militate against the immortality of the soul of man? The real question is not whether one

opinion will come in contact with another opinion, and make this the rule by which to judge of its correctness, but it is this, is the thing true in itself, truth is the thing to be sought for and revered. But this is certain, no created being can be proved immortal from the constitution of the same being, and no metaphysical argument hitherto advanced has proved sufficient to settle the question.

Sec. 5: Immortality of the soul cannot be proved from metaphysical reasoning. If the immortality of the soul could have been proved from its nature, it is natural to suppose that the heathen philosophers whose whole attention was absorbed in metaphysical subjects, studying into the nature of things, would have discovered the fact centuries ago. But they came short of this knowledge, and so should we were it not that we have "a surer word of prophecy." Socrates, who spent a lifetime in speculating on morality desired earnestly and laboured ardently to know the soul's future destiny, yet, with all his knowledge of philosophy and speculative morality, he died ignorant of the immortality of the soul. "Plato, also, who wrote essays on this subject, leaves himself and his readers in utter uncertainty in regard to the soul's final destiny." Here are two of the most enlightened philosophers of ancient date. Greece and Rome with all their boasted sons of science, cannot produce on the pages of their history any among their philosophers, their poets, or their statesmen, that could surpass in point of true philosophy or speculative, or practical morality, the two that we have named. And what did they know of the immortality of the soul? Comparatively nothing.

Sec. 6: Immortality proved only from the Christian Scriptures. The immortality of subordinate beings, whether they are angels, men, or devils, is proved only from the christian scriptures, which we take, and are not ashamed to take, as a foundation for our belief in this matter. And we venture to say that there is no other source which will afford any conclusive proof but this. And we who now live in this Province of Canada, in this 19th century, if it were not for the light of revelation, would be as confused in our views, and as dark in our minds on the subject of the soul's immortality, as were the ancient Greeks and Romans. The very justly celebrated Drs.

Dick and Paley, and also many others, who were eminent both for their learning and piety, have written many excellent things both amusing, instructing, and encouraging, on the immortality of the soul; but what does it all prove without the bible? That alone is proof on this subject which is drawn from the sacred writings. And there is ample proof here of the immortality of the soul of man, but I am not aware that they produce any proof of the immortality of any class of inferior animals. This subject I regard as purely speculative, and in reference to their future existence exceedingly doubtful. But before we dismiss the subject in reference to the query of infidelity we shall make some further remarks on motion, and before doing that may offer a suggestion to the christian, should these lines meet the eye of any who might chance to have more zeal for the cause of christianity than prudence in defending it. And the suggestion is this, the shortest and most effectual way is to acknowledge frankly and honestly the facts of the case, and then compel the infidel to put his proposition in a right shape. The infidel says, "all thought is either material or immaterial." At this the christian looks, and admits the proposition, but is still anxious to maintain his orthodoxy, and to do that takes a course which defeats the object, in a great measure, because he virtually contradicts himself. And yet the truth is, though tens of thousands might fail to see it, that the proposition of the infidel is a sophistry, for it cannot be made to appear, properly speaking, that thought is either matter or mind, and to call it either one or the other, or something made up of both, does not give it its proper representation.

CHAPTER XVI.

ON MOTION AND ITS LAWS.

Sec. 1: *Of physical and intellectual motion.* We call motion physical motion, or intellectual motion as the case may be. But what right have we to do so beyond that of accommodation? It is merely a figurative way of speaking, and it does not express the fact in a plain, simple, philosophical sense. Matter we know can not produce motion at all, and if it could, the motion so produced would not be a physical motion. There would be nothing physical about the motion, there would be something physical in the body moving; but all there would be, or could possibly be in the nature of things, is this, that a certain body would be moving instead of being at rest. But when it stops where is the motion; and what is the motion when the thing is not moving? The motion is nowhere, because the body does not move. But the fact in reference to the body having moved just so far, so fast, and kept moving just so long, continues to be a fact that the body did move. This fact took its origin with the motion, and remains the same when the motion ceases, it is not increased nor diminished, and never will be through time nor eternity. But what idea can any man form of a motion existing aside from the body moving? To talk about the nature of that motion not connected with the thing moving, appears to me to be absurd, for a thing has no nature that has no existence, and seeing the body does not now move, there is no motion, if it did move now, there would be motion, but it would not be that motion that has been made, but another one. No one, I should suppose, would attempt to explain this by saying the nature of motion is to move, seeing that it would reflect no light on the subject, but would leave the matter just where it is. And to say that a

motion can stop, may, it is true, be admissible for purposes of accommodation, but is nevertheless a philosophical contradiction, because a motion is one thing, and stopping is another. For when it stops it is not motion, because it is not moving, and when it moves it is not stopping, because it is moving. But nevertheless, we call this a material motion, not because it is of a material organization, or possessing any material parts, but merely because a material object is moving. Now, what is here said of matter will in a great measure apply to mind. For the thought is not to be considered as an immaterial something merely because the soul that produces it is immaterial, The thought is simply an act of an immaterial being, and the act does not exist as an action when the act is over, how is it possible that it should, because an act is an action while it acts, but when it ceases to act the action is over, and does not act, and there is nothing in an action that we can conceive but acting. But the fact exists as a fact, that such action did take place, and will remain forever true.

Sec. 2: No material object created by the motion of a material body. The earth moves around the sun but what material object is created by that motion, and what is the motion but the moving of the earth? Now, the earth has moved around the sun more than 5,000 times, but does any one think that there are 5,000 somethings that are designated by the term motion, existing in its orbit? But the simple fact, the unalterable truth remains, and ever will remain, that the earth has moved around the sun just 5,000 times up to a given date, and no more. So also does the mind move, and the motion of the mind is thinking. We are in the habit of saying that the mind makes thought, but what do we mean by this expression? We simply mean, we think. What then does the mind make when it makes a thought? It moves, this is thinking. And when the mind does not move we do not think, we cannot think.

Sec. 3: To perceive a similarity requires a new perception. And a motion, whether by the mind or body, once made can never be made again. A similar one may be made, but not the same. Hence, to use the common phrase, a thought

which we have once thought can never be thought again. To perceive that which we once thought in the past requires a new perception, or in other words, it is by every subsequent motion of the mind that we perceive any motion in the past, viz., by these subsequent motions the soul becomes sensible of certain facts in the past, in any number or to any extent. So that the real nature possessed, and the only nature in either case of the motion past is, the fact that the sun did rise yesterday morning, the moon did change on the 14th ult., at 2 o'clock, a. m., and that I did think last evening, that I never heard such heavy thunder before. These are all facts in the past, the rising of the sun, the change of the moon, and that motion of my mind. But that change of the moon, that rising of the sun, and that motion of my mind, will never occur again; but it is a truth this day, and always will be, that all these things took place, yet in order to become acquainted with either truth we must have a new perception, and this would be to remember it.

Sec. 4: Remarks on the laws of motion. We frequently talk and hear others talk, and quite fluently too, on what we call the laws of motion. And no one will dispute the fact of there being a law of motion as well as a law of rest. But the question is; what is that law of motion and of rest? Is it a material something or an immaterial something? Who knows anything about it any further than this; it is a law? Now, when we think of that law, we do not think of it, at least I do not, and I do not suppose any other person does, as a great material something existing independent of other material objects, and yet in them and through them all at the same time. So when we speak of the law of mind by which it moves we do not look at that law as an immaterial something existing in the abstract, and yet in all mind, and through all mind at the same time. Then what would we naturally conceive it to be? Simply this; that the Almighty has made it possible for mind and matter to move under certain circumstances and rest under others; but in reference to the law of mind, or matter, we are totally ignorant of its nature and manner of operation, we know the effects, and are confident there must be a cause.

Sec. 5 : We say things move by the will of God. We attempt to satisfy ourselves that these things move by the volition of the Creator, which indeed is very true; but what is this choice of God? We cannot say that the will, or choice of God exists in a form of matter, or in an abstract form of mind. It is simply the Divine preference, will, choice, decree, decision, that such things should move and rest. It is an act of the Divine mind, *a thought*. But how subordinate minds are made to feel the effects of that *choice*, we know but very little about, and much less how matter yields perpetual submission to the dictates of that Sovereign and Almighty will.

Sec. 6 : What do we know about the law of attraction? We also talk about the law of attraction, we know there is such a law, and we say that by virtue of that law one body moves towards another which is a fact in nature that we know, from observation and experience, to be true. But what do we know about that law in reference to its nature and mode of operation, and how one body, in virtue thereof, is made to feel that it is smaller than another body, or the other body is made to feel that it is the larger of the two? We can discover nothing that comes from the large body to the small one by which the small body is brought to the surface of the large one, and yet it is evidently drawn there. We say it is drawn by attraction of gravitation, but what is that attraction of gravitation and where does it exist, and what is its mode of existence? Does it exist in the body, as a separate existence either of "mind or matter," or below the body, or above it? Now, it is quite an easy matter to start just such questions as these, and any number of them to prove our ignorance, and these many have the tendency to humble us before Him who knows all things. But to start the question, "what is the nature of these thoughts that we have once had," and then to answer it by saying that they must all be ether material or immaterial, proves either great ignorance of the nature of things, or a deliberate intention to misrepresent them. For it is not true to say that all thought which we have had exists either as a material thing, or as an immaterial thing; for no thought exists in us only while we are thinking, and if we are not thinking we have no thoughts, and if all beings in the universe would cease to think, there would

be no thoughts existing; for if there could be thoughts existing when all beings cease to think, then thinking could take place without rational beings, or without any being at all, and who could believe this contradiction? Hence, as we before remarked, thinking is an intellectual motion, and an intellectual motion is thinking. The motion exists while moving, and to perceive the fact of that motion requires a new perception, and not a repetition of the same, for this is impossible in the nature of things.

CHAPTER XVII.

ON PERCEPTIONS, DEMONSTRATIONS, AND IMPOSSIBILITIES.

Sec. 1: *The operations of the memory in perceptions and demonstrations.* Much of our time is occupied, and especially in early life, in investigating into the identity and deversity of things, which are perceived through the senses. For example; I perceive an agreement between a certain tree in my garden and one that I saw in a neighbouring orchard, I perceive also a relation between them and the cause of their existence; yet I do not perceive that relation, which exists between the trees and the first cause of their existence, through my senses, I perceive the tree through the senses, and then reason from the trees as an effect until I arrive at the cause; and I soon become confident that there is a relation between the cause and the effect. Now, after having perceived an object we may then close our eyes and yet remember the size, shape, colour, and various dimensions of the object as we understood it when we perceived it through the sense of sight. This state of mind is said to be the result of the impression that the thing when first perceived made on the mind. We must not forget that when we remember any colour, say *red* we must remember a red something, because we cannot remember a *red* nothing. Now, this that we remember is said to be the image of the original, this is explained to be a notion, an idea, &c., and the meaning is a thought, or a motion of the mind. The original may be out of existence, such as a red house that may be burned down, and utterly destroyed, and it cannot be seen, but when it was perceived first the soul assumed certain modifications adapted thereto, and now it comes to be remembered the soul is resolved into a similar modification, and becomes conscious that it had modifications before that led to the same results. Thus the soul is led back to the time and place where such ideas were formed

and entertained, and it is on this ground that we say the soul perceives the thing in the past, because, it becomes sensible of previous ideas, motions, modifications, or what else they may be called, that it once had.

Now, although we can thus perceive an object in the past yet it is never with that clearness of perception which we see in the present, but the reason is obvious; and it is because in the present we have the help of our senses, in the past we have not. But it is no less a perception, though not directly of the original object, yet, it is a perception of the modification assumed by the soul at the discovery of the original object.

Sec. 2: Can a person know that which is gone out of his mind. It is contrary to our theory to suppose it possible for a man to know anything that is not in the mind, and yet we find by maintaining this principle we come in contact with the great philosopher Mr. Locke, on this point, viz., if we understand him correctly, for he says: "Thus a man that remembers certainly that he once perceived the demonstration that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is certain that he knows it because he cannot doubt the truth of it, in his adherence to a truth, where the demonstration by which it was at first known is forgot, though a man may be thought rather to believe his memory than really to know," and this way of entertaining a truth seemed formerly to me like something between opinion and knowledge; a sort of assurance which exceeds bare belief, for that relies on the testimony of another; yet upon a due examination I find it comes not short of perfect certainty and is in effect true knowledge. That which is apt to mislead our first thoughts into a mistake in this matter is, that the agreement or disagreement of the ideas in this case is not perceived as it was at first by an actual view of all the intermediate ideas, whereby the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in the proposition whose certainty we remember. For example, in this proposition, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, one who has seen and clearly perceived the demonstration of this truth knows it to be true when the demonstration is gone out of his mind; so that at present it is not actually in view and possibly cannot be collected; but he knows it in a different way from what he did

before. Now, it still looks to me that what Mr. Locke calls knowledge, in this case, is not really such as can be relied upon, neither do I think it is anything beyond what it once seemed to that great man, viz., "something between opinion and knowledge, a sort of assurance which exceeds bare belief." And on what principle of philosophy it can be said that a man may know that which is "gone out of his mind," I cannot conceive. For if a man can know one thing that is gone out of his mind, why could he not know another, and so on another, and where would be the stopping place to his knowledge in reference to things that may be "gone out of his mind." How it is that the "retaining in the mind the conviction without the proof," is intellect to be called true knowledge, I fail to understand. For what amount of knowledge would a man have more than this; that the conviction which he now has he once had before, but of what use will it be to any one to know that the convictions which he now has, he had before, when at the same time he is not able to satisfy himself whether these convictions are right or wrong. And the uttermost, so far as I can understand it, that can be said of this which is called true knowledge is; it is merely supposition, excepting the existence of the conviction. For to know that such conviction exists in our mind that such a demonstration is true, and to know the truth of such demonstration, are entirely different things. Therefore, an individual who merely knows that he has a conviction that he once concluded that a certain demonstration was true knows no more about the truth of the demonstration than if he had not this conviction.

Sec. 3.: *Impossible to know anything which is out of the mind.* Mr. Locke says on page 341 of his essay on the human understanding, that "one who has seen and clearly perceived the demonstration of this truth, knows it to be true when that demonstration is gone out of his mind." Now, we are at a loss to understand how that any person can know the truth of any proposition, and not be able to perceive that truth. For how can it be said that a man knows a demonstration to be true which he cannot perceive, any more than it could be said that a man perceives a demonstration to be true which he does not know? For if the demonstration is gone out of his mind it is clear that he knows nothing of that demonstration, while it

remains out of his mind, because, remaining out of his mind is the same as not perceiving it.

Any person who may have seen for the first time the proposition demonstrated "that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones" perceives there and then the truth from the demonstration, so that he may be said to know it. But the mind passes on the wing of time and leaves that whole circumstance, and will never see that demonstration again only in the past, and inasmuch as the demonstration, originally, presented the truth, held the truth, and was the truth when it was first discovered, and held the mind to the truth during that discovery, and refuses to be separated in the present; so it appears to be just as impossible for any man to perceive the truth in the past, that is to remember, without perceiving the demonstration also; as it is for him to perceive the truth in the present time without perceiving the demonstration; as the truth and the demonstration are inseparable both in the present and in the past. I leave every person who may entertain a doubt of the philosophy of what we have here stated to try the experiment and see that notwithstanding subsequent conclusions of the truth of such demonstration which he may, from time to time have formed in his mind, yet whenever that truth is called in question he finds himself not resting in the subsequent conclusions of his mind for the truth of such demonstrations, but invariably he finds his perceptive faculty back to the very time and in the very place where the demonstration was originally made. If a man has never seen the demonstration made he has never perceived the truth of that proposition, therefore he does not know it, yet he may believe it to be true from what he has heard others say, but his belief does not constitute true knowledge, though true knowledge can never ignore belief; for if a man believes a thing, he may be correct, or he may not be, but if a man knows a thing, he knows it, and must believe it also, hence, the advantage of knowledge over that of belief. And therefore our conclusion is that it is impossible for any man to remember the truth of the demonstration that "the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones," without remembering the proofs by which the demonstration was made, and so also is it impossible to remember that such proofs were once before the mind without remembering the proofs themselves.

CHAPTER XVIII.

UNIVERSALITY OF THE LAWS OF MEMORY.

Sec. 1: *Memory in all beings governed by the same general laws.* We may proceed to remark now that the law of relation, to which allusion has previously been made in connection with another topic, has a powerful and commanding influence over the memory of the lower animals. This is proved from observation, thus; the horse which has been the subject of a severe discipline discovers in the hand of his driver *a whip* and though it may not be the same which the driver has been accustomed to use, nevertheless the relation between that whip and the one with which the animal has so often been severely striped, brings to its remembrance the painful sensations produced by the unmerciful use of the instrument; and which remembrance is evinced by the terror and fear manifested by the creature, in his eyes, ears, and more especially in the trembling of his limbs. The evident marks of pleasurable anxiety exhibited at the sound of his master approaching the corn bin, and the very different feelings manifested at the sight of the harness, saddle and bridle is enough to conceive any one that the law of relation operates forcibly on and governs the memory of the lower animals. It is on this same principle that the dog will endeavour to abscond himself at the sight of a gun, providing he has ever been shot. The sight of the gun, though it may not be the same gun with which he was shot, but there is a relation between that and all other guns, and the dog perceives that relation, and he is from that circumstance made to remember the painful fact of having once been shot. The elephant knows the voice of his keeper, on the same principle of relation between the sound of that voice which now speaks to him and that voice which spoke to him an hour ago or yesterday. It is therefore evident that the lower animals not only possess memory

but that their memory, as we have before shown, being the same in kind with that of the human family is also governed by the same law of relation. But there evidently is a great difference among the lower animals in the strength of their memories, and many of them not only show great retentiveness but great discrimination, cunning, judgment, and at times appear to display a considerable amount of reason. But we have not time to discuss this subject here, neither does it properly belong to a work of this kind, but we will give one example bearing directly on the point under consideration, viz.: a few years ago a circumstance was noticed in our public papers in reference to a certain man, giving his name and place of residence, who lived by the side of extensive woods, missed his child, and fearing it might be lost in the forest, proceeded at once in search of it, but had not gone far before he saw a heap of leaves under which he found his lost child, he took the child and in its place put a chunk of wood, about the size of the child, and covered it with leaves, and being suspicious of foul play, waited to see the result, which was in a few moments, a most dreadful howling as if all the wolves in the forest were coming upon him. Very soon one of the company darted from the thicket and sprang to the place where the child had been covered with leaves, and commenced with furious anxiety to uncover its intended victim, but to its extreme mortification nothing was there but the chunk of wood, he cringed down as if he knew his fate, while his comrades immediately fell upon him, and tore him limb from limb and devoured him. We may learn from this circumstance: (1) The power of memory, the wolf knew where the child was laid, and could go to the very exact spot. (2) This power of calculation, or reasoning, he had caught the child asleep and knew him to be asleep, and had carefully covered him up that he might continue his repose till he could call together his companions when he would have the honour of treating them to a sumptuous feast. (3) His sense of shame at his disappointment led him to look abashed, his power to anticipate led him to fear the consequences of having been the cause of such deceiving the company then present and frowning with rage, and his power of discrimination and judgment led him to conclude there was no possible way for his escape from the death which he intended to inflict upon his innocent victim, therefore he cringed, and without a struggle

passively submitted to his melancholy and unwelcome fate. Hundreds of instances of a similar character might be noticed did we judge it necessary, to corroborate the sentiments which we have advanced relating to the lower animals.

Sec. 2. Why we have discussed this subject at such length. Our object in dwelling on this subject as lengthy as we have done is: (1) To call attention to the divine benevolence. (2) To notice and discuss the identity of the principle by which all beings are able to think and remember. (3) To show that though it is the same in kind, yet there is a vast difference in the degree of that immaterially, without which not even the smallest of God's creatures can think or remember one sentence. (4) Though all that think and remember must possess mind, because matter cannot think, yet it does not necessarily follow that all beings must always live that possess immateriality. (5) That the inconsistency of supposing that the lower animals are necessarily endowed with mind by which they remember, is nothing compared with that theory which represents them as thinking and remembering without mind. (6) To admit, as many do, that they possess mind by which they remember and yet do not possess immateriality is, in effect to admit, that there is something that can think besides spirit, something that exists in the intermediate between mind and matter.

CHAPTER XIX.

AN ADDRESS TO THE YOUNG.

Sec. 1: We purpose now to direct our remarks more particularly to young people, and many of you, my young friends, will, I presume, look upon me as being "far behind the times," seeing that some things that I shall be compelled to say in addressing you, may be unpalatable to your taste, who prefer a short life of fun, of frolic, of levity and vanity, not to say of dissipation and profligacy, to a long life of steady habits, of health and virtue. But we intend to introduce here a few rules, which if adopted and carried out, will be of unspeakable benefit to all who are desirous of deriving the benefits resulting from a good memory.

Sec. 2: *Rule the first, interest in things.* Remember your happiness for the present time depends to a great extent on the amount of interest you may have in things from which happiness can be drawn. In order to this you must learn to exercise your own judgment, but seek advice and counsel from the experienced within your reach. The trouble with young people generally is, that just as soon as they enter their teens, and stretch a little above the boy and girl that they feel themselves to be full grown, and generally think that they know more than father, mother, and friends. Now this is going too fast, advice is offered, but refused; instruction presented, but disregarded; in their hurry how can they stop, they will risk it all, and so thousands of them do till they run their heads against a snag, which alone can open their eyes and cause them to cry out for help. Now, we admire independence but this is too much of it. Do not think yourself to be the only judge of what is best for you at all times, but yield not the right of private judgment, only exercise it with great caution. You

will find it to be a nice point to guard these extremes, and keep the mind in a proper equilibrium, but it is possible. Never tell anybody, as thousands do, "I have a very poor memory," it may be in a certain sense true, but it is a kind of truth that one had better keep to himself, for allowing that it is none of our own fault, there is nothing to be gained by it, and if it should happen to be that the blame is in us, it only brings public disgrace on our own heads, while we become the accuser, the judge, and the jury. And besides, it has discouraging tendencies for a person always to be crying out against himself, and if we depreciate ourselves before others, we virtually invite them to depreciate us also, and to which the majority of them will not be backward to respond. If you look down upon yourself you must expect others will look down upon you. Look up then, and feel that you can be somebody, feel that you can be great, and resolve that you will be good; place your target in the clouds, and if you never reach it, after you have tried and tried again, you will have the satisfaction that you aimed at it and aspired towards it, and you will certainly shoot higher than if you had only placed your mark upon a molehill. Ever bear in mind that knowledge is within your reach, call it yours, and do not think so little of your soul as to entertain the idea that you have a poor memory, which is almost equal to saying you have a dull apprehension, a lazy discrimination, and a want of interest in things relating to practical purposes.

Sec. 2: Selections. "Mark the perfect man," is the advice of the highest authority in the universe. You must be observing, take notice of men and things, not merely for the purpose of ridicule, or personal gratification for the time being, but for the purpose of making profit out of daily occurrences. And any course of policy in temporal matters which you may see, or credibly hear, to have failed in others to secure their temporal support and comfort, mark that and train the memory on that point, and compare such cases with others engaged in a similar pursuit, and see if the failure is general, viz., look at the general tendencies of the business, or policy, and if it is, do not venture on such enterprise under such circumstances, because if men generally fail, you being young could hardly expect to succeed in an enterprise where older heads and maturer minds have failed, nevertheless you might succeed, but it is too much of a

risk for you to run; because your reputation is at stake, and if you make so great a blunder and lose that in almost your first outset, you will get very much discouraged. And this is apt to be the case with such tremendous failures, because young people generally express themselves more positively at 20 years old, than they do at 40, and the reason is because they think they know so much more, and when they come to fail after feeling so sure that they know more than seven men that can render a reason, they feel so ashamed that sometimes they fall actually below their proper place in life, because they go to the other extreme, and whereas they first thought they knew almost everything, they have now got to think they know almost nothing. Both these extremes may be avoided with a moderate degree of care, and attention to counsel and advice, which no young person in this enlightened age and land need be without.

Sec. 3: *Economy.* Make a proper and wise distribution of all you have to bestow, and here you will find a very extensive field for intellectual action; but we have time only to notice a few of the more important items embraced in this department. Be sure at all events to make a proper use of words, you will find this, and especially at your stage of life, to be of the uttermost consequence; for men have not anything near as many words to throw away to no good purpose as they generally seem to think they have. Do not get the habit of using your words to waste and speaking them at random for the sake of saying a great deal. You must try at all times to remember that it is not the greatest talkers that perceive the most, for many who talk a great deal have no more meaning or perception of a great portion of what they say than a parrot or a jackdaw. No doubt you will wish to be pleasing in your appearance, affable in your manner, and agreeable in company, and to do so you will have to converse in the social circle. But after all I think you will find it better in the long run, both for yourself and others, to be a little unpopular with the mass than to have to purchase their popularity at such a dear rate, as to have all the while you are in their company to be talking about a thousand things that are of no benefit for the sake of what they call being sociable.

Sec. 4: Time. Time, who can tell its value, and the extent of its abuse? Time itself, and pen and ink, and muscle and mind, would fail to tell the thousandth part of the violent, deliberate, and wilful abuses of that precious pearl which the divine being has kindly continued to man for wise and gracious purposes. To make a proper use of time, be regular in your habits, be systematical, and let no ordinary matter disconcert your plan; but you will have to learn to say no, or you will be robbed of much valuable information, of much real enjoyment and usefulness in this life, of temporal means, of political influence, of intellectual and moral worth, and may peril the immortal soul at death. Always make it a point in reading to select, as you cannot expect to remember all that you might read in half an hour itself, but that amount of reading has, to speak figuratively, a body and a soul, take the soul for yours and pack it in as small a compass as you can, but be sure and get it, do not mind the words so much, but get the sense, examine it thoroughly, digest it fully, and you will remember it perfectly. But let not even this small amount of that time which you will require to make yourself master of the substance of half an hour's reading, be left to chance; take a certain time to muse on these, and review them at regular intervals. You may learn a lesson from the natural inclination of the body, that is to say, it likes regular exercise, regular rest, regular supplies of nutritious food, regular action of the blood, liver, stomach, &c., in order to preserve it in a healthy condition, and so the mind requires regular mental treatment to give a healthy tone to all its faculties. Some people, in their temporal matters never seem to know or care anything about regularity in diet, and therefore they have always either a feast or a famine; and so it is with many in reference to the mind.

Sec. 5: Idleness. Remember this term, and understand its meaning. Look at those who are idlers in any respect, but especially those that are idle in all respects for useful purposes, and you will soon see what amount of wealth and influence they possess, and remember that "the diligent hand maketh rich." You cannot fail to see as you pass through life, the diversity that there is in men's circumstances. You will find some very poor, and their poverty will furnish useful employment for your discrimination, judgment, and memory. Inquire after

the cause of this destitution. And if it proves to be the result of idleness, bad economy in domestic matters, or extravagance out doors, as it will very often be found to result from one or more of these, or similar causes, you should try to make capital out of their scarcity. And if this poverty upon close examination proves to be Providential, you will still lose nothing, but will be amply rewarded for the pains you have taken; for every such observation adds to your store of knowledge and strengthens the memory, besides, it has a natural tendency to inspire a thoughtful mind like what yours, reader, ought to be, and what we hope it is, with gratitude to the Divine Disposer of events, that you are in better circumstances. The same may be said in regard to the mind, for though you are young, yet you have seen a great diversity in intellectual acquirements. Some are ignorant of almost every useful topic, and strangers to the true philosophy of almost every subject, both in politics, civil government, in morals, both theoretical and practical, in science and in religion. And to make great improvement, which you ought to make, and learn wisdom from the defects of others, you will need to remember distinctly this diversity, and, as much as possible, the reasons why.

Sec. 6: *Accidents.* Another great subject is that of accidents, which, from the amount of suffering they entail upon mankind, call with a trumpet voice upon every intelligent being to labour hard to ascertain their causes. And here I beg to repeat, for I wish this fact to take a firm hold upon the mind, that you cannot preserve a profitable remembrance of the particulars of this, nor indeed any other subject, without close observation and laboured discrimination into current circumstances—if you wish to know what has been, *take notice of what is.*

Suppose your occupation to be that of a farmer, you of course would like to prosper in your business; to do so you will find it to your advantage to observe with careful inquiry into the amount of losses which this class of men sustain in the course of one year, and endeavour to ascertain by an impartial investigation, what portion of them occur through carelessness and neglect, and what are purely accidental; and what appear to be Providential. This, too, will give great scope to the exer-

cise of our sympathy; for the more we sympathize with our fellow-man in his trouble, whatever may be its cause, the more likely we shall be to investigate into the true nature and real cause thereof, and the more apt we shall be to remember it and profit by it. Now, the benefits of the course here recommended will, perhaps, be more appreciated if we should suppose a case, say, a team of horses become unmanageable and run violently down a steep hill, and upset the waggon, one man is killed, another has a broken leg, another a dislocated shoulder, and another with fractured scull. This circumstance would be called by different names, by some it would be called a Providence, by others an accident, which appears to answer a kind of medium explanation between Providence and carelessness, that some use for the purpose of shirking responsibility on the one hand, and disgrace on the other. But suppose upon strict investigation we find the driver was intoxicated, or the harness partly broken and gave way just at that time, and caused the misfortune, or the tongue too short which threw the carriage against the horses, or something of a similar nature; now, however we may be disposed to sympathise with the sufferers, and however anxious they may be to evade the responsibility, we are forced to the conclusion that the whole was the result of carelessness. But the object of such observation should always be to find out the truth of any case, if it is otherwise, we injure the memory and lay the foundation for what we call a "treacherous memory; no digression from the plain simple truth should be allowed, however small that departure may be, no partial examination should be allowed to pass for a full one, no palliation should be admitted where the circumstances of the case do not fully call for it. The losses which many sustain in their stock and growing crops, and of which they so bitterly complain, are traceable directly to themselves, and to find out these things and reflect thereon will contribute greatly to our physical and intellectual comfort, and add increased strength to our memory.

But by making these observations you will see wherein others have failed and the cause of these failures, and you will see plainer than ever, that, unless by strict economy and industry you become enabled to acquire and collect means, your benevolence will be completely crippled and unable to bestow anything

to charitable purposes but simply a few expressions of kindness and good wishes, such as: I wish it was in my power to help, I wish you every success, I hope you will be able to accomplish your project, if I was as well off as *such an one*, I would give freely and liberally; these and many others of a similar nature which will never send the bible to heathen lands nor destitute christians, nor the missionary to preach and expound its sacred truths, nor build chapels, nor support our own ministry, nor purchase sabbath-school libraries, nor, in fact, help at all, in any way, the institutions of benevolence and religion.

If the crops fail through a course of seasons, if a certain kind of sickness comes to be common in a family, if bilious complaints generally prevail in a certain locality, you will know, of course, that there is a cause; and while you are not to forget the all important truth that there is an overruling Providence, at the same time never allow yourself to attribute that to Providence, that is, to the special interference of the Almighty, that can be traced to a natural cause. For by doing this you will injure the intellect, pervert the judgment, and weaken, in a great measure, the action of the moral faculty.

CHAPTER XX.

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING GOOD HEALTH.

Sec. 1: *All desire good health.* There are none who are entitled to be called rational beings, that do not desire to enjoy good health, although, in too many instances, they are utterly regardless of those great leading principles and their subordinate dependencies, which should be observed to secure that end. And as we know this to be the case, and cannot but feel grieved for those who volunteer to become victims of irregular habits, that invariably deprive them of personal enjoyment, health, and long life, we venture a few remarks on this subject, especially so far as it may relate to the improvement of the memory.

Sec. 2: *Physical health contributes to the health of the mind.* Now, there is scarcely a person to be found, who has any regard for morality and religion, but will admit that the great object of human life is to get good to ourselves and to do good to others; and that the more good we can obtain in this life, and the more good we can do to others, the better we shall answer the end of our creation. If this be true, and if our usefulness in this life depends in any degree upon the health of our bodies, and every one, who has even a moderate knowledge of the purposes and practices of human life, knows that it does to a very great extent; it therefore becomes our imperative duty to preserve and improve, by every rational and lawful means, the health of the body. That physical health contributes much to the strength of the memory, will be perceived when the intimate connection of mind and matter is taken into consideration. Because it must be evident to all, that the health of the body tends very much to preserve a healthy and vigorous intellect. And while the health of the body is conducive to a healthy intellect so also does a healthy intellect, under

proper management, contribute very much to a healthy state of the moral faculty. Not that all persons who possess a bright, clear, and active intellect, have purity of morality in proportion thereto, because they can pervert the moral sense, and such persons when so disposed can do it effectually; but we simply mean that a person cannot possibly have a very high sense of moral obligation, who is seriously defective in any of the intellectual faculties. Thus, if a person is defective in discrimination, or what we would call natural discernment, every one may see how this defect, in the same proportion as it may be found to exist in that department of the mind, will affect the desires, the imagination, the will, the conscience, and the memory.

Sec. 3: The object of these remarks. Now, what we wish to impress upon the mind of the reader is: (1) The intimate connection between the memory and every faculty of the soul. (2) The impossibility of injuring any part or faculty of the soul without doing a proportionate injury to the memory. (3) The intimacy that exists between the whole mind, and consequently between every faculty which makes up *that whole*, and the physical man. (4) The necessity of preserving the health of the body to secure a vigorous and active mind, and a strong and "retentive" memory. (5) The importance of a proper and timely culture of the intellect to secure a high sense of morality; and finally, the necessity of a high sense of moral obligation to render us truly and permanently useful, as well as to secure to ourselves a life of real enjoyment in this world, and eternal happiness in that which is to come. From what has been said, and from what every ordinary mind can see, might be said, it must be obvious that in the same proportion as we injure our bodily organs, whether by idleness, intemperance, undue exposures and want of proper protection, or excessive bodily exertions, or whatever else, we throw obstructions in the way of our mental progress, and consequently greatly paralyze the memory.

Sec. 4: Be careful what habits you contract. This being the case it becomes important, and I think I may venture to add indispensible, for young people who do not wish to live in ignorance, but who desire to enjoy life and make the best of it, and who do not wish to be looked upon by the intelligent as

intellectual *dwarfs*, and who feel too proud to acknowledge they have to depend on others for the greatest part of their small stock of information which they collect from day to day, but who would like to take their part with men of genius, of mind, of learning, of influence, and great prominence, such as statesmen, poets, philosophers, and orators, and to understand theoretical and practical science, to be able to converse freely and intelligently on all useful and interesting topics, to refrain from the use of every article of food and unnecessary stimulant that is calculated to produce nervous debility, or to prevent the regular action of any of the internal organs. Be careful then to contract no such habits as the following, and if you have, break off at once: the use of spirituous liquors, of tobacco in any of its forms, such as smoking, chewing, and snuffing, of strong green tea, black is not so hurtful, but cold water is better, it possesses a great tonic, try it. Pork is not fit to eat at all for persons of sedentary habits and weakly constitutions. See how much the great Dr. Adam Clarke thought of these two articles that form the principal luxuries of quite a large portion of mankind. It is said that he was heard to express himself on a certain occasion thus: "If I had a disposition to offer a sacrifice to the devil, it should be a hog stuffed with tobacco." Good enough, you are ready to say, and so indeed it is, but if they are only fit for that, what shall we say? Irregular rest and diet are making dreadful havoc among our young people, and amongst the better class too, men are living entirely too fast, but no warning voice appears to be sufficient to stop them, needless self-indulgences so hurtful to our intellect, our health, and morals, appear to have resolved themselves into an institution, and become the order of the day. Now, the regular use of any of those articles that I have mentioned, with others of a similar character, and especially the constant use of all of them, which is quite a common thing in our day of boasted intellectual improvements, cannot fail eventually to weaken the intellectual faculties.

CHAPTER XXI.

CONTAINING A FEW EXTRACTS AND MAXIMS.

Maxim 1: Think much and pray much, and let your words be few, and uttered with seriousness and deliberation as in God's presence. And yet regard may be had to times and seasons. We may innocently act the child with children, which in the presence of grown persons would have the appearance of thoughtlessness and levity.

Maxim 2: There are many persons who would willingly be christians, and eminent christians too, if christianity were limited to great occasions. For such occasions they call forth whatever pious and devotional resources they have or seem to have, and not only place them in the best light, but inspire them, for the time being, with the greatest possible efficiency. But on smaller occasions, in the every day occurrences and events of life, the religious principle is in a state of dormancy, giving no signs of effective vitality and movement. The life of such persons is not like that of the sun, equable, constant, diffusive, and beneficent, though attracting but little notice, but like the eruptive and glaring blaze of volcanoes, which comes forth at remote periods, in company with great thunderings and shakings of the earth; and yet the hearts of the people are not made glad by it. Such religion is vain, and its possessors know not what manner of spirit they are of.

Maxim 3: In proportion as the heart becomes sanctified, there is a diminished tendency to enthusiasm and fanaticism. And this is undoubtedly one of the leading tests of santification.

Maxim 4: It is not high crimes such as robbery and murder which destroy the peace of society. The village gossip, jealousies, family quarrels, and bickerings between neighbours, meddlesomeness, and tattling, are the worms that eat into all social happiness.

Maxim 5: *Of laws.* The law of honour consists of a set of maxims, written or understood, by which persons of a certain class agree to regulate, or are expected to regulate their conduct. It is evident that the obligation of the law of honour, as such, results exclusively from the agreement, tacit or expressed, of the parties concerned. It binds them because they have agreed to be bound, and for no other reason. He who does not choose to be ranked amongst the subjects of the law of honour, is under no obligation to obey its rules.

The law of nations, so far as it is founded upon the principles of morality, partakes of that authority which those principles possess; so far as it is founded merely upon the mutual conventions of states, it possesses that authority over the contracting parties which results from the rule, that men ought to abide by their engagements. The principal considerations which present themselves upon the subject appears to be these:—

(1) That the law of nations is binding upon those states who knowingly allow themselves to be regarded as parties to it.

(2) That it is wholly nugatory with respect to those states which are not parties to it.

(3) That it is of no force in opposition to the moral law.

Maxim 6: The moral law should always be regarded as paramount to every other law. The will of God, the only right and safe rule of human actions, is to be ascertained principally from the Christian Scriptures. Information it is true may be drawn from other sources, and rules for human conduct laid down, but they are all subordinate, and must be subjected to the decisions of the moral law.

Maxim 7: "Do violence to no man," therefore never misrepresent them if you know it, never try to depreciate your neighbour, your brother, or friend, nor even an enemy, as you will be no real gainer thereby, even though these might sustain some loss. Seek for truth, and seek it ardently, earnestly, and perseveringly, and at any amount of cost, both of time, means, and mental exertion, *because it is truth.* While we regard the natural rights of others, we should at the same time always regard their feelings, and especially their character, as a matter of right and justice to them, for we have no more right to slander their character than we have to shed their blood!

Civil Law. The authority of civil government as a dictator of individual conduct is explicitly ascertained in the New Testament. See *Romans* xiii. and 1 *Peter* ii. 17. By this general sanction of civil government a multitude of questions respecting human duty are at once decided. In ordinary cases, he upon whom the magistrate imposes a law needs not to seek for knowledge of his duty on the subject from a higher source. The Divine will is sufficiently indicated by the fact that the magistrate commands. Obedience to the law is obedience to the expressed will of God. "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the king as supreme; or unto governors," &c., see 1 *Peter* ii. 13 and 16. But the authority of civil government, it should be remembered, is only a subordinate authority. If from any cause the magistrate enjoins that which is prohibited by the moral law, the duty of obedience is withdrawn. "All human authority ceases at the point where obedience becomes criminal." The reason is simple; that when the magistrate enjoins that which is criminal he has exceeded his power, "the Minister of God has gone beyond his commission."—*Dimond's Essay.*

He who knows his ignorance is the possessor of the rarest kind of valuable knowledge.

There is no such thing as an easy chair for a discontented man; yet, "a contented mind is a continual feast."

Economy is no disgrace; it is much better living on a little than outliving a great deal.

It has been said, and truthfully that we can earn genuine manhood only by serving out faithfully the period of boyhood.

Some people will never learn anything, for this reason, because they understand everything too soon.

A good word is an easy obligation; but not to speak ill only requires our silence, which costs us nothing.

The pleasantest things in the world are pleasant thoughts; and the greatest art in life is to have as many of them as possible.

Ingratitude is a crime so shameful, that the man was never yet found who would acknowledge himself guilty of it.

Pitch upon that course of life that is the most excellent, and habit will render it the most delightful.

Work your passage, for if you wait for others to advance your interests in this world, you will have to wait so long that your interests will not be worth advancing at all.

A man should never be ashamed to own he has been in the wrong; which is but saying in other words, that he is wiser to-day than he was yesterday.

One of the sadest things about human nature is, that a man may guide others in the path of life, without walking in it himself, that he may be a pilot, and yet a castaway.

END.