



STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

INFORMATION DIVISION
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No. 55/14 DEBATE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Statement made in the House of Commons on April 21, 1955, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, closing the debate on External Affairs (see Statements and Speeches No. 55/10 which opened the debate).

In rising to close this debate I would be ungrateful indeed if in the first place I did not express my appreciation of the encouragement and support I have just received from the hon. member who has just taken his seat, and tell him in reply that I shall be very glad to play third base for him any place, any time.

This debate began on March 24 and, with appropriate intermissions, is finishing on April 21. During the days that have been allotted to the discussion of this subject-- and there are few subjects which will come before us which will be more important--the discussion has ranged far and wide, from the atomic pollution of the atmosphere, on which my hon. friend from Nanaimo (Mr. Cameron) speaks with such enviable assurance, to the Old Testament, its history and its mores, about which the hon. member for Vancouver-Burrard (Mr. MacDougall) talked to us some days ago.

To a very large extent however, the discussion has been focused on the situation in the Far East, though other subjects have been brought up, and a great many questions have been asked. Tonight I hope to deal with some of these questions. Also I feel I must challenge one or two observations made during the course of the debate which I do not think were correct. It may be that I shall not be able to deal adequately with all the matters raised, in which case I ask the pardon of those whom I have overlooked,

When the Committee on External Affairs has the estimates before it--and that is the purpose of our present resolution--of course there will be opportunity before that Committee to question the Minister on any matter raised in this debate, or any other matter concerning the policy or the administration of the Department of External Affairs. As is customary, I shall be very glad to make myself available to that Committee for as long as it desires to question me.

In this debate more than one speaker has referred to the valuable part being played in these tense and difficult times by the association to which we belong, and of which we are very proud, our Commonwealth of Nations. I believe we are all conscious,

probably now as much as ever before in our history, of the value of that association--especially, in the service it is now performing not only for the nations of the Commonwealth, but for the world at large in providing a bridge, one of the few effective bridges, between the free East and the free West.

In his contribution to the debate the hon. member for Oxford (Mr. Nesbitt) devoted most of his speech to our Commonwealth of Nations. He advocated--and in certain sections of the House this has been advocated for years--what he called the strengthening of our Commonwealth. Among other things he asked what was the basic difference between the Commonwealth and, let us say, the United Nations. He asked what was the difference between our relationship with members of the Commonwealth and with, let us say, a country like Brazil.

Well, if he had attended meetings of the United Nations assembly or other United Nations agencies--and I hope he will have that opportunity--and if he had attended Commonwealth discussions, I think he would sense at once the difference between the two associations. And that is not of course to depreciate the value of the association of the United Nations.

The basic difference in the Commonwealth relationship is that it has been formed, has grown up and has been built on the habit and the tradition of co-operation. We have developed within the Commonwealth a feeling of close unity. There is a genuine understanding among its members to work together in peace and in war, and a strong desire to co-operate and to work out agreed policies and agreed solutions to problems, even when it is not always possible to do so. And then of course we have the great advantage of a common head in the Commonwealth, both for the monarchial and the republican members, and also the bond of common Parliamentary institutions and Parliamentary traditions.

The hon. member for Oxford feels that we should strengthen these bonds, and that we should develop what he has called a central secretariat. He says that we should also try to work out an intra-Commonwealth defence force. Well I would suggest to the hon. member--and this is a matter which has been discussed often both in and out of the House--that if the members of the Commonwealth tried to build up some strong and centralized machinery, if they tried to build up a centralized intra-Commonwealth defence force, far from strengthening this association it might, indeed, weaken it to the point where it would disappear at least in the sense in which it exists today.

I think the Commonwealth in its present form and organization is doing a most valuable and important service. One of the most useful things about the Commonwealth is that it does include within its membership a variety of peoples, at times antagonistic peoples; and if we tried to bring those peoples together in any formal and organized way, for defence or by exclusive economic co-operation, far from strengthening the association we might indeed weaken it.

The hon. member to whom I have referred, while he did not underestimate the difficulties, rather expressed the hope that by this kind of development--and I think I am quoting him correctly--the Commonwealth might become or lead to a third power bloc which would be powerful enough to act as a counterbalance to the United States and Russia.

With all respect, I submit that this third force concept, whether it is a Commonwealth concept or any other group of states, is a dangerous one, because it would mean that, in a sense, we in the Commonwealth were separating ourselves from the United States and coming between the United States and the NATO powers on the one hand and Soviet imperialist communist powers on the other.

I think it is much better to stick to the concept of two blocs, two forces in the world--if there have to be two--the forces of peace and the forces that we think threaten the peace. It is better to line ourselves up with the former and welcome into its ranks any free states wishing to join it. One specific respect in which the Commonwealth has been playing a useful part in recent years--and this is a matter which has been referred to by a good many speakers--is in the provision of technical and capital assistance to underdeveloped countries, especially those in Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent under what we call the Colombo Plan. The Colombo Plan, of course, is more than a Commonwealth arrangement; but it was Commonwealth in inspiration and organization. It has proved its value and I hope it will continue to do so.

In this debate, some very strong criticism has been levelled at the Government by my hon. friends opposite and by some members of the official opposition, that we have not played an honourable part in this Colombo Plan; that what we have done was--I think the words were--a mere pittance, or, as it was referred to by one speaker, an insult to the needs of the problem. Well, of course, as is nearly always the case in any human endeavour, we could have done more. But to keep this project in perspective I need only point out that in the four years of the plan, capital and technical assistance from outside the countries which are members of the plan has been contributed to the amount of \$1,300,000,000; last year \$340 million, of which Canada will have contributed \$128,400,000. That is not large in terms of expenditure on other things. I would be the first to admit that; but I would point out to those who criticize us so bitterly--perhaps "bitterly" is not a fair word, but criticize us so strongly--and I am not objecting to that--and who relate our expenditures in this field to those which we have to make on defence, that the primary of expenditures on defence is admitted by those very countries which we are helping and who need our help; it is admitted to a point where some of these countries which are receiving capital assistance--and I say this in no way of criticism at all--are now devoting more than half of their already inadequate budget to defence. And some of those countries that are devoting such a high percentage of their budget to defence are the first to proclaim that they have no feeling of menace from attack by outside communist states.

I mention this merely to try to show that this is not as simple a problem as is sometimes portrayed. Also, while not unduly satisfied or smug, or certainly not boasting about what we have done, I am not going to be apologetic about it.

I would prefer in this regard to quote the verdict of an outside source, the Economist, a magazine which is often quoted in this House and which, writing about the Colombo Plan progress report on December 25, 1954, had this to say:

"On the contributing side of the Plan, the part played by Australia and Canada is particularly striking.

The Economist went on to say:

"In spite of the undoubted achievements of the Plan in the past three years, it will be necessary not only to maintain the momentum of economic development in the area but to increase it.

I agree with that, I continue.

"But it is not simply a question of finance. Expert technical advice and training is of equal importance, and in this direction the technical co-operation scheme, together with other parallel projects of technical assistance, has undoubtedly played a major part. It is equally important to get more effective planning as well as better management and administration. None of these tasks can be solved quickly. The Colombo Plan's future tasks are measured not in years but in decades."

And so, while none of us needs to be satisfied with what we have done, I think we can look forward to a continuation of this Plan with resources from this and other countries and with an even greater field for usefulness than it has had in the past.

A planning conference has been set for Singapore next September, when the whole future of the Plan is to be examined, particularly in its relationship to United States support, which has been, if I may say so, somewhat more forthcoming in recent months than previously.

The discussion of the Colombo Plan brings me to the main subject which has occupied most of our attention in this debate and which I dealt with when I introduced the resolution some time ago, namely international developments in the Far East. Discussion of that subject has, to a very large extent in this debate, revolved around our Canadian relationship with the United States, to a point where it has been difficult at times to disentangle the two things. I think it is a normal and healthy sign that we should be so preoccupied in this house in a debate on external affairs with the most important aspect of our foreign relations at the present time namely our relationship with the United States of America. I think of that relationship, important as it is bilaterally to us, in terms of collective action, in terms of collective defence, not merely as something between Canada and the

United States, but as something between Canada, the United States and its friends in NATO and in United Nations. I also try to distinguish in this defence relationship with the United States, the problems which may come from what we have begun to call peripheral conflicts from those which will be posed by a major all-out war of extermination

Hon. members will recall that when I spoke some time ago in this debate I tried to make this distinction clear. So far as these peripheral wars, those smaller wars, if you wish to call them that, are concerned, Canada, both through its relationship to the United States and through its relationship to the United Nations or to NATO, might be involved in them. But Canada can hardly remain aloof from the latter. We are also concerned with those smaller conflicts because of the danger that they may spread into a larger conflict. There is no better example of that danger than the situation in and around Formosa and the coastal islands. It is possible of course, that even if trouble were at the beginning limited to that area, it might spread to this continent. If it did spread to this continent it would be very difficult for us to remain aloof from its effect. The facts of geography, apart from other things, would indicate that. Well, how can it spread? It might spread not by any all-out massive attack from some Chinese communist government on the North American continent because that would not be possible under present conditions. It might spread by a reaction on the part of the Chinese government's allies, a reaction on the part of the Soviet Union, which would result in a massive all-out attack on this continent, the Soviet Union being the only power today on the other side which is capable of that kind of reaction.

Now, if that reaction took place as a result of a local conflict in China, that would be an aggression; it would be a violation of the United Nations Charter and we would be asked to undertake the commitments which we have accepted as members of the United Nations, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

When speaking on this aspect of the question some days ago, the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker), said that if war broke out over Formosa or over the coastal islands that kind of chain reaction would be absolutely inevitable. I think I ought to quote him at this point because this seems to me to be of importance. Referring to the Secretary of State for External Affairs he said, as reported on page 2350 of Hansard of March 24:

"He has but to read the words of Molotov in which he stated that the situation in Asia was of equal concern to the U.S.S.R. In that case it is but fantasy to say that what might happen over there would not become an all-embracing conflict."

I did not go as far as that and indeed I do not think the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Drew) went quite as far as that in his statement, but I do admit that that kind of conflict might spread even though it was not inevitable that it would. I feel, and I am sure that hon. members on all sides of the house must feel, that if it did spread, if that did happen and there was a massive aggressive air attack on this continent, a struggle in which the very existence of the people of the

United States and of Canada would be at stake, all our continental, all our NATO defence arrangements and our whole system of collective security which we have built up over recent years would come into play. - In that kind of situation, and I limit it to that kind of situation, how could we be neutral?

The hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles) himself admitted this in his statement. I should like to quote from what he said, as reported on page 2877 of Hansard of April 6:

"Now, if the Minister were merely saying that if a world-wide conflagration breaks out, particularly bearing in mind the power blocs that exist in the world today, because of our geographical position, to put it in the vernacular, we would have had it, one could hardly argue with him."

His leader, the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell), had this to say, as reported on page 2356 of Hansard:

"Perhaps the Minister is right. Perhaps if they-- Referring to the United States of America. "were engaged in a major war it would involve us automatically, because of our geographical position with them."

I think that in the circumstances which I have mentioned that is self-evident, but I do not from that draw any such deduction as has been drawn by certain members of this house, most noticeably this afternoon, the most irresponsible being that by the hon. member for Three Rivers (Mr. Balcer); I do not draw any deduction from that statement of automatic assurance of support or willingness to intervene on behalf of or with the United States in any war, major or minor, on the continent of China or any place else where that kind of intervention would take place. Whether support in those circumstances could be counted on from Canada would depend entirely on whether our commitments under NATO were involved, whether there was aggression under the United Nations Charter.

I want to be quite clear about that. Anything that I said in Toronto and anything that I have said here-- I hoped I had made this quite clear the other day but apparently it was not clear enough for the hon. member for Three Rivers--does not mean nor could it fairly be interpreted as meaning that whenever the United States is at war we are bound to participate. It does not mean that we have any obligation to participate in any war except a war against aggression within the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Now when I say that, and I am merely repeating what I said the House the other day, the hon. member for Prince Albert complains that this--I use his own expression-- is watering down our support for United States policy which I gave in my Toronto speech. I do not think it is watering down anything at all. What I tried to do the other day, and what I am trying again to do tonight, is to squeeze some water out of the interpretation given to that Toronto speech by careless commentators. Nevertheless, whatever I may have done in the way of squeezing water out, the speech still seems to remain too strong

for my friends of the C.C.F. party.

The position that they take, if I interpret that position correctly, is that while this statement in the circumstances which I have mentioned may be true, I should not have said it because it might be misconstrued in the United States and because of that misconception they will feel, as someone put it, that they now have Canada in the bag, that our influence will have been weakened or will even possibly have vanished in Washington.

Who would be fooling whom by remaining silent about Canada's position in the conditions which I have outlined? We certainly would not be fooling the United States government by our silence, because they know of our relationship to them in NATO and they know of the relationship which we have built up with them under NATO in respect of continental defence. I hope that silence in this matter would not be fooling any potential enemy, because if it did that it would be had.

However, it might possibly fool our own people. Silence might be misinterpreted in this country with unhappy results for which the government would rightly be criticized. I prefer the verdict in this matter of the Daily Telegraph in London to that of my hon. friends opposite. The Daily Telegraph, referring to Canada and the United States, had this to say in an editorial

"The conclusion to be drawn from the interdependence of the two nations in a major war is not, as some of Mr. Pearson's critics have suggested, that the United States can take Canadian support in a circumstance for granted, and therefore may disregard Canadians views. On the contrary it gives the Canadian Government both the right and the duty to warn and to dissuade."

That remains our right and I hope that we will exercise it on appropriate occasions in Washington. It is also our duty and I hope that we will discharge it on appropriate occasions. It seems to me that the moral of this position is that if all these dangers surround us, little wars with their obligations, or big wars with all their catastrophes, if we are surrounded by these dangers, then the moral is to do everything we possibly can to stop any war before it starts.

I am sorry that the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggart is not in his seat tonight, but I know he has good reason for not being here. I would prefer to refer to his speech in his presence, but I should like to quote what he said, as reported on page 2356 of Hansard:

"But I wish to suggest this, that the Canadian people want our Government to state forthrightly and without equivocation that we will do everything we possibly can do to ensure that Canada's influence and Canada's policy, especially in its relations with the United States, will be directed toward the avoidance of conflict, political and economic."

We have already given that assurance, but if it will make my hon. friends feel any better I am quite happy to repeat unequivocally that assurance tonight in this House. If we fail, and we might fail, then I suggest that our policy be this: when possible, to limit conflicts, to prevent them spreading, and then to add them. There is no other policy in the mind of any member of this government.

This debate has done something else which has caused a good many of us--I know that it has caused me--some anxiety. In certain sections of the House--and I am referring now to the members of the C.C.F. party--it has underlined a very deep uneasiness which they in particular feel about United States policy. That anxiety--and "anxiety" is certainly not too strong a word in view of some of the expressions that have been used in this debate. --was expressed both by the leader of the C.C.F. party and by the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles). In my view these hon. members, for whom as they know, I have great respect, and others in their group who spoke, presented an unfair and unbalanced picture of the situation, especially in respect of the United States attitudes and policy towards Asia. I am now talking about the situation in the Far East. I was especially disappointed, and indeed distressed, by the analysis which was made by the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre, not so much of the policy, but of the purpose of the policy of the Secretary of State of the United States. On page 2878 of Hansard he said this:

"I think it is Mr. Dulles' primary purpose to keep war away from the United States."

A few words later, he says:

"If he can keep war away from the United States --if he can keep it in the Pescadores, in Quemoy, in Matsu or in northern Canada--his aim is met. His aim is to keep war away from continental United States."

We may have differences of opinion with Mr. Dulles on matters of policy. I have had them myself, and no doubt will continue to have them. We may have one view or the other about the wisdom of his policy, but I think that it is most unfair to suggest that the Secretary of State of the United States, who is serving in the government of President Eisenhower, has any other purpose than that which we have in this House, to keep war away and not merely away from the continental United States. I would not like that kind of statement to go on the record of this House without the kind of challenge that I am giving it now.

The hon. member also said--and this sentiment was echoed by other members of his group--that our foreign policy should be made in Ottawa only and not in Washington. Well as long as Canada is a sovereign state, the decision in foreign policy and any other policies have to be made in this Parliament of Canada. That is a very different thing from saying that our policy can only be made in Ottawa and should not be made or even influenced anywhere else. Foreign policy in this world of interdependence cannot be made in any one country or any one capital no matter how powerful that country or capital

may be. We are working together today in a peace coalition, and the very essence of that coalition is that every member of it acts only after discussion and consultation with others. In that sense each member must influence the other members' policy, and I hope it will remain that way, because that is the way it should be. That gives our best chance for peace, by collective policy and collective action. In this respect I am distinguishing between decision and the formulation of policy. Suppose the United States adopted that maxim and made its own policy solely in Washington, or the United Kingdom decided to make its policy solely in London, or the French Government solely in Paris; it would not be long before the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would itself dissolve. If it dissolved we would not be worrying so much about whether we were making our own policy; we would be worrying far more about our protection against potential enemies even than we do now.

Foreign policy in a coalition working for peace is bound to operate collectively if it is to succeed. That does not mean that we are merely tagging along behind American decision. It may be that my hon. friend from Winnipeg North Centre and some of his colleagues think so. He himself said, as reported on page 2877 of Hansard:

"We feel the result is that Canada has said--"

This refers to my statement in Toronto.

"--that we regard ourselves as quite free to make any decisions we want with regard to foreign policy, so long as they are agreed to by Washington."

Well, with all respect, that is a distorted and unfair interpretation of what I said in Toronto or what I have said in this house, and I only need mention one example to prove how unfair it is. Has Washington agreed to our statement of policy that we will not intervene in Matsu or Quemoy if they are attacked by the forces of communist China? We have made that statement and I am happy to repeat it tonight, but it was not made, nor was the policy decided, after any agreement in Washington; on the contrary. That statement then was unfounded.

Another statement from the same group was made to the effect that apparently I feel now that I have to go along very easily and readily with the views of the Secretary of State of the United States. I hope that Mr. Dulles' views will be such that I can go along with them easily and readily, but I can assure you sir, if any assurance is needed, that I will not hesitate to disagree with them when I feel that it is undesirable and unwise to support them. It seems to me that the trouble with my hon. friends in the C.C.F. party in these matters is that they take a jaundiced and morbidly suspicious view of everything that goes on in the United States, or at least in the United States official circles. As was pointed out this afternoon in what I thought was a very effective intervention by the hon. member for Vancouver South (Mr. Philpott), sometimes they mistake the clamour and confusion of voices in that vigorous, free democracy for the authentic expression of United States policy. I suggest, therefore, that occasionally they look a little more closely behind the headlines. I

also suggest with respect that they look across--not across the border so often--but across the ocean to some of the real sources of danger to peace in the world today from communist imperialism.

The hon. member for Rosetown-Biggart (Mr. Coldwell) and others have done just that. They have looked across the Pacific, and they have found many things which they did not like. I think we can all share to some extent their feeling of uneasiness. But I myself thought--and I hope I am not being unfair to him in saying it--that the statement of the leader of the C.C.F. party on this matter was not a fair presentation of the case. He attacked very vigorously indeed the Chinese Government on Formosa and its leader Chiang Kai-shek and what he called his "blood-thirsty war lords". He did not see fit in this statement of his to make any such attack on the Chinese communist government in Peking. He emphasized the danger to peace from Chiang. But I want to point out--as has been pointed out by others, particularly I think by my friend the hon. member for St. John's East (Mr. Fraser)--that it is not Chiang Kai-shek that we are concerned with on Formosa. It is peace and the defence of a people against communist aggression.

He also--and I take particular exception to this--talked about not only danger from Chiang Kai-shek but danger from the United States. This is at page 2357 of Hansard. He emphasized the danger of being dragged into a war by the policies that are now being pursued by the Secretary of State of the United States. I suggest that we are in much more danger of being dragged into war by policies that are pursued by the foreign minister in Peking and by the foreign minister in Moscow than we are by the policies pursued by the Secretary of State of the United States.

No one wishes to adopt a provocative or bellicose attitude toward any government, communist or otherwise. We are obliged to co-exist with them in this world, whether we like it or not. But when the leader of a party in a debate of this kind will spend so much time attacking the policies of our friends, I think he might have spared a word or two for the dangers which might come to peace from the policies of those whom we have some reason to fear.

In his statement he outlined what his own policy--and I presume he was speaking for his group--towards China in the present situation would be. I have just jotted down the four points he made on that occasion. The first was that we should exile Chiang Kai-shek--and this suggestion has been repeated by other members of his party--presumably by force. I do not know who is anxious to take part in that particular expedition.

I have no brief for the government of Chiang Kai-shek. I am not going to object to the facts which the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggart (Mr. Coldwell) stated about the atrocities that were committed in Formosa in 1947, just about 10 years ago. It was a dark page in the history of that island and in the history of China. But I would ask him to go a little bit beyond 1947 and to read

reports which have been appearing in the Manchester Guardian recently by their correspondent, a wise and unprejudiced observer, as to the improvement that has taken place in the government of Formosa in recent years. We do not in this Government have to subscribe to the policies of Chiang Kai-shek--we also have a fairly open mind about the future of Formosa and indeed we have been criticized because we have not been more specific in our policy in this regard. But I certainly do not subscribe to any policy which would ask us to share in the ejection of Chiang-Kai-shek and half a million Chinese Nationalist soldiers from Formosa.

The second suggestion the leader of the C.C.F. made was that we should neutralize Formosa and place it under a trusteeship. I think there is a good deal to be said for that suggestion. That may prove to be the wisest solution to this extremely difficult problem. I think however, it is premature to be dogmatic on the point to make up our minds finally on anything like that at the present time. A great deal of discussion is now going on in diplomatic channels as to how this problem of Formosa can be solved in a way which will meet the wishes of the Formosan people and will take that island out of conflict. The solution may turn out to be the neutralization of Formosa and a trusteeship under the United Nations. That may turn out to be the wisest solution. But I would point out that that particular solution, namely to put Formosa under United Nations trusteeship, is about the only single thing on which the Chinese communists and the Chinese National Government agree. They are both violently opposed to it.

So far as Canadian responsibility is concerned over Formosa--I think this had better be repeated, and I will try to make it clear--we have no other commitment in regard to Formosa, than that which arises from our membership in the United Nations. That was the position a year ago and that is the position today. We feel that the status of Formosa has not yet been finally determined. but we also feel that the communist government in Peking should not use force to bring about that determination. This afternoon my friend the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre--or rather the hon. member for Winnipeg North (Mr. Stewart) had something to say about a press report of a statement made or alleged to have been made in Australia by my friend the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Howe). I have seen the report to which he has referred and we expect to have a more complete report shortly, but even on the basis of the press report, my colleague the Minister of Trade and Commerce, in answer to a query at a press conference, merely stated that Canada was prepared to go full out for Formosa. To me that does not sound like an alarming statement and it certainly does not indicate any change whatsoever in Canadian policy in this matter. When he talks about going full out for Formosa, no doubt my colleague had in mind going full out to keep Formosa out of this Far Eastern conflict. In that sense I am sure he will have the support of all members in this House.

Then the third point made by the leader of the C.C.F. was that we should seat communist China at the present time in the United Nations, and he contrasted our policy or the Canadian Government's policy in this

regard unfavourably with that of the Government of the United Kingdom. But I should like to point out that the government of the United Kingdom--which has, of course, recognized the Government at Peking as the Government of China--has not at any time, so far as I am aware, supported the application of that government for membership in the United Nations.

Then the fourth point he made was that we should not intervene in the struggle between the two Chinese governments over the offshore islands. This afternoon the hon. member for Three Rivers (Mr. Balcer), by a process of misinterpretation of remarks of mine which I find to be completely astonishing and almost unbelievable, somehow or other got the impression that our policy was to intervene in the struggle for the offshore islands, and he contrasted our policy with that of the United Kingdom. It has been said more than once--I have said it already tonight and I do not mind repeating it, if necessary--that it is our policy to stay out of this struggle for these offshore islands, and I think that other governments would be well advised to adopt the same policy. I am even bold enough to hope that that will be the policy which will be adopted in due course by all governments concerned.

Then the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggart, supported by some of his friends, criticized the United States because the line of defence which the United States administration was drawing was too far from North America. My friend the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles), as he will remember, made quite a point of the same criticism. In that part of his speech the leader of the C.C.F. had this to say about the United States, as reported at page 2358 of Hansard:

Why not for a change--

And I think he was referring to me.

--he outspoken about United States policies that are equally imperialist in a sense, not in the same sense as the old imperialism used to be, but in the sense that there is an attempt to control a very large part of the world through bases and by display of arms.

He worried, as did some of his friends, that in that attempt to control, as he put it--and I do not think this is a fair description--the United States Government had extended its front lines of defence across the Pacific Ocean far away from the shores of continental United States.

The hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green) brought up the same point, but instead of criticizing the United States for its faraway defence line, stated flatly that we should follow this example and our first line of defence should be Formosa, as it is for the United States. Well, I think that this whole concept of geographical defence lines used for political purposes is misleading and can even be dangerous. On the one hand, if Formosa is a vital first line position for the United States or for any other far-off country, then it could be argued with great validity that the offshore islands should be

protected as vital to that vital first line position. If that is so, then the coast of China is vital to the protection of the islands, and so on until every bit of territory you could secure becomes a first line.

I believe, however, it is equally dangerous to suggest that no country in its search for security has any right to establish a line of defence outside its own borders. Where was our first line of defence in 1939? Hitler said it was not in continental Europe, that we should be out of continental Europe. It had nothing to do with us because we were across the channel. He said "Clear out; this is not your line of defence". If our line of defence must be a geographical line close to our own territory, what are the British and ourselves doing in Europe today? It is because the first line of defence of Canada, in that sense, is in Europe that our men are there. Therefore, the argument does not seem to be impressive, one way or the other, as a geographical argument. The fact is, surely that our own line of defence is attacked and our own security is jeopardized whenever a free people anywhere is the victim of aggression. In fact, our safety is endangered whenever there is any war any place. Our only safe line, therefore, is peace: Our only safe policy is to join with friendly states in maintaining that peace and preventing war by collective action.

The hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra--I am sorry he is not in his seat tonight--asked me three other questions in addition to this question about our first line being in Formosa. One of them was, is it the belief of the Canadian Government that the offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu, should be handed over to red China in the hope of inducing the communists to stop fighting? I think I have answered that.

His second question was, does the government believe or does it not that in the Pacific communist aggression can be stopped by giving up territory? I think I have tried to answer that.

Then he added, will the minister tell us whether the Canadian Government believes that the British should give up Hong Kong? This does not seem to be a very relevant question in the context of this debate. Certainly it is not relevant to the situation of the offshore islands or indeed in Formosa. I know that in certain quarters it is being suggested that because the British are reluctant to help in the event of the invasion of the offshore islands, other people should be reluctant to help the British maintain their position in Hong Kong. The offshore islands, of course, are part of China and are incidental to a war between two Chinese governments so that is not the same thing either legally or politically as the position of Hong Kong, whatever one may think of it in other respects.

Then the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra came back to his favourite question. I was quite certain he would not make an intervention in this debate without tackling me once again with it. He asked me, will the Canadian government work for and advocate a protective grouping of the nations of the Pacific such as exist in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I wish he were

here so that I could give him exactly the same answer as I have given him six or seven times before. It would be along this line. There is no single arrangement in the Pacific at present which is along NATO lines. It has been considered that the arrangement should not be along NATO lines because of different conditions in the Pacific. The Southeast Asia defence organization, which he had in mind, has no such commitment as NATO at all. The main reason why it has not got such a commitment is that the United States would not accept one in those circumstances.

I could tell him tonight if he were here, as I have told him before, that we are not therefore taking any initiative or accepting any invitation to extend our commitments in that area, that is in the Pacific, beyond those which we now have and which include our commitments under the Charter of the United Nations. I do not think he had any right to go on to say, as he did, that because we would not extend our commitment in this way we were not alert to things happening in the Pacific and we were more interested in Europe. I would suggest that what has happened in Korea, and what is now happening in Indo-China, is sufficient evidence that we have and retain a very genuine interest in what goes on in the Pacific and Asian areas.

In closing I would return almost to where I began. The subject which has loomed so large throughout this debate has been our relations with the United States and our preoccupation with those relations. This preoccupation, indeed this anxiety, is understandable over our relations economic, our relations political and our relations strategic. I suggest that that relationship, vitally important as it must be to us and as it has been in the past, will be even more so in the future. A relationship to be successful on both sides must be based on mutual respect, a freedom to hold and to express our views. I assure my hon. friends who have been criticizing the Government because we have not, as they have said, had enough courage to express those views, that they do not feel any more strongly about that than we do. However, we in the Government happen at this time to have some responsibility for the conduct of international relations. It is not always advisable in the conduct of diplomacy and international affairs, even with our best friends, to shout from the housetop and throw our weight about, in order to impress our own people with the fact that we are very independent.

This relationship must also be based on recognition of the fact that if our coalition, which is now headed by the United States, breaks up, then indeed there will be a grave danger to peace and security. I suggest, therefore, that while we must be independent and speak up when it is necessary to do so, we must be sure we do nothing avoidable by our words and by our deeds to further that wrong end of disunity and division. When we do disagree with the United States we must be sure that that disagreement is not based on a narrow conception of our national interest, but is a disagreement which goes to the very basis of the coalition policy and which we maintain on the highest principles of peace and international security.

It is quite true that there are strains and stresses on the coalition at the present time. There has never been a coalition, even in wartime, which was easy to manage. In peacetime, they are not very often necessary. But in a period such as we have at present, between peace and war, a coalition is not only desperately required, but it is very difficult indeed to manage. So there are stresses and strains now pressing against it, but we will be able to weather them. It is quite true that the greatest of these at the present time is in the Far East. I have not come across a better short expression of the nature and the importance of these Far Eastern strains than I found in a paragraph in the April 9 edition of the Economist. It reads as follows:

"The danger of the next few months is that, confronted by the threat of renewed fighting off the China coast, many otherwise sensible people in Britain--"

And the writer could have added Canada.

"--we will say that they would rather have peace than the American alliance. Nothing, in fact, could be sillier, for there is no such choice. It is still possible to have both peace and the alliance. It is certainly not possible to have peace for long without it."

We wish to have in this Parliament and in this country both peace and alliance--not merely the American alliance but an alliance for friendly co-operation with all peace-loving free countries of the world.

S/C