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A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

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What's Inside

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Open Skies:

Canada Hosts Major Negotiation

From February 12 to 28, 1990, Canada will play host to its 15 NATO allies and the seven member-states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) as these two groups negotiate an agreement providing for regular overflight of each others' territory using unarmed surveillance aircraft.

Open Skies, as the concept is called, is not an arms control proposal *per se*. No arms will be limited or reduced as a direct result of an Open Skies agreement. Rather, Open Skies is a confidence-building measure. Its purpose is to increase the openness of the two sides about their military activities, and thus strengthen the developing atmosphere of cooperation between NATO and the WTO and enhance the feeling of security of all participating states.

Agreement will strengthen NATO-WTO cooperation

Although Open Skies will be negotiated separately from any arms control agreement, the arrangement is likely to contribute significantly to the verification of a range of existing and future arms control agreements. Indeed, Canada believes that Open Skies will be a useful adjunct to the verification methods eventually agreed to in a treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe.

The government favours a broad Open Skies agreement, with as few restrictions as possible. Although the original agreement will be negotiated among the states of NATO and the WTO, nothing should, in principle, preclude other European states from joining Open Skies at some future date.

The Open Skies Conference, to be held in Ottawa,

will be divided into two portions: a ministerial session from February 12 to 14, at which the foreign ministers of all 23 NATO and WTO states will be present; and an official session from February 15 to 28, during which teams of officials from each country will carry out the negotiations. The Conference will be opened by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark will host the ministerial portion of the Conference. The head of the Canadian delegation at the official level will be Mr. John Noble, Director General of the International Security and Arms Control Bureau of External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC).

The Ottawa Conference will be a work-oriented gathering, the purpose of which will be to establish the outlines of an Open Skies regime. The negotiations are expected to be concluded and an agreement signed at a second Open Skies Conference, likely to be held later in 1990 in Budapest, Hungary.

Canada offered to host the first Open Skies conference because of its commitment to improving East-West relations. It has long viewed Open Skies as a valuable proposal which, once implemented, will enhance both Canadian and international security and speed progress in arms control. In addition, Canada's longstanding expertise and credibility in the field of verification, both at NATO and in the UN, made the country a natural leader on the Open Skies issue.

The Ottawa Conference will be the first major East-West gathering of the 1990s, and the first meeting of the NATO and WTO foreign ministers since the dramatic events that swept Europe in the fall of 1989. As such, it will help to set the tone of East-West relations for the coming decade. Canada intends to work vigorously to ensure that the Conference, and its follow-up in Budapest, result in an Open Skies agreement that can form the basis of a new East-West security relationship characterized by openness and cooperation rather than secrecy and competition. ■

Why Open Skies?

Canada has been a strong supporter of Open Skies since the idea's inception. Not only will an Open Skies agreement benefit its immediate signatories, it will also contribute to the cause of international peace and security by improving the prospects for East-West stability. The benefits of Open Skies are outlined below.

Independent monitoring: An Open Skies agreement will allow participants that do not have surveillance satellites — including Canada — to independently monitor areas of particular interest or concern. The technology and facilities for aerial surveillance are well within the reach of all members of NATO and the WTO. Open Skies will let these states determine for themselves whether agreements are being adhered to and whether their security is being threatened.

Burden-sharing: An Open Skies agreement will provide an opportunity for Canada and the USA to demonstrate their willingness to shoulder some of the intrusive monitoring that the emerging era of greater political openness and conventional arms control is going to require of their European allies.

Confidence-building: Open Skies will play an extremely significant role in building confidence between the states of East and West in the 1990s. An Open Skies agreement will enable all members of the two alliances to satisfy themselves regarding the peaceful intentions of the other side. It would be virtually impossible to hide plans for a conventional attack from frequent, random reconnaissance flights.

Spur to arms control: Because the decision to participate in Open Skies is, in fact, a decision about a country's commitment to openness in its military relations, an Open Skies agreement will help to create the political climate necessary for rapid progress in arms control. In addition, although the Open Skies agreement will be negotiated and will stand separately from any arms control agreement, short-notice overflights would help to fulfill the verification requirements of both a strategic nuclear arms agreement and a conventional arms agreement. Open Skies would allow participants to monitor ongoing activities such as weapons destruction, troop withdrawals and troop movements. Overflights would have to be supplemented by on-site inspection, but the result would be a very high confidence in compliance. ■

Acronyms Used in this Issue

ADM — Assistant Deputy Minister
CBC — Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CD — Conference on Disarmament
CDE — Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CFB — Canadian Forces Base
CFE — Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CSBM — Confidence- and Security-Building Measure
CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTBT — Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada
ICAO — International Civil Aviation Organization
ICO — Open Skies Conference Task Force
INF — Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
RCMP — Royal Canadian Mounted Police
START — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
UN — United Nations
UNGA — United Nations General Assembly
WTO — Warsaw Treaty Organization

An Open Skies Chronicle

The Birth of Open Skies

The original Open Skies proposal was conceived in 1955 by a group of analysts working for Nelson Rockefeller, then advisor to US President Dwight Eisenhower. Rockefeller had asked his colleagues to think of some bold initiatives that the President could put forth at the four-power (France, UK, USA, USSR) summit to be held in Geneva in July of that year. In June, the group spent five days at the US Marine base at Quantico, near Washington, D.C., and it was here that the idea of mutual, unarmed overflights was first advanced.

Aerial reconnaissance reached its zenith as an effective method of collecting data during World War II. It is therefore not surprising that in the early post-war period, this type of surveillance was seriously considered as a means of verifying possible arms control and disarmament agreements. Indeed, a 1946 plan for the international control of atomic energy suggested aerial surveillance as a means of policing an agreement.

The Quantico panel was attracted by the simplicity of Open Skies, and by the fact that it emphasized the Western value of openness, in contrast to the secretive nature of the Soviet Union. Moreover the plan, if adopted, would have been of tremendous benefit to US security. Satellite reconnaissance systems were not yet in operation and the Americans had little idea of the true state of Soviet military preparations. As this was during the pre-ballistic missile era, the main US interest was to determine the extent of the Soviet long-range bomber capability and identify the staging airfields for intercontinental bomber attack.

Open Skies did not enjoy a smooth passage through the US bureaucracy, however. Opposed by then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (as much because of his desire to remove Rockefeller as a foreign policy advisor as for substantive reasons), the proposal was not on Eisenhower's agenda when he left for Geneva.



LCol. Joszef Kovencz of the Hungarian Air Force points out a landmark to Capt. John Latulippe, commander of the Canadian aircraft that flew over Hungary in a test of Open Skies on January 6 (see pp. 7-8).

As the summit proceeded, it became clear that Eisenhower's performance had not captured the public's imagination. In this context Rockefeller was able to catch the President's ear with Open Skies. Eisenhower was less receptive to Dulles' objections than he had been in Washington and, after consultations with his staff and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, he rose on July 21 to make the following statement:

Panel attracted by simplicity of idea

"Gentlemen, since I have been working on this memorandum to present to this conference, I have been searching my heart and mind for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament.

"I should address myself for a moment principally to the delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fears and dangers of surprise attack.

"I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves — immediately. These steps would include:

"To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other: lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

"Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country — we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study; you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are

providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tensions.

"Likewise we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning."

The British and French leaders indicated immediately that they would respect and join such an overflight regime. The Soviet delegation promised to study the idea but appeared wary, with Nikita Khrushchev complaining at one point that the concept was "nothing more than a bald espionage plot against the USSR." By the time he left Geneva, Eisenhower was convinced that the Soviets would not accept his proposal.

The Canadian government welcomed Eisenhower's proposal and played a considerable role in advancing the discussions on Open Skies that took place over the next few years. These talks centred on the possibility of establishing various Open Sky zones, and it was in this context that Canada proposed an Arctic zone in August 1957. Eisenhower had been correct in his initial assessment, however; the USSR was not disposed to consider any proposal for overflights sympathetically at that time.

The institution, beginning in 1956, of American high-altitude U-2 photo-reconnaissance flights, and the advent of the ballistic missile age, which effectively began with the launch of the Soviet Sputnik in 1957, also dampened enthusiasm for Open Skies in the US administration. Little was heard of Open Skies during the next 30 years.

What Canada Said

The following is from a statement issued in September 1957 by then Prime Minister John Diefenbaker in support of Open Skies.

"In order to ensure that all parties to the agreement are carrying out their obligations, and in order to diminish the dangers of surprise attack, the Western Powers have put forward a number of proposals regarding control and inspections.... They would include provisions for aerial and ground inspection designed to assist in guarding against surprise attack. It is our belief that it is of the greatest importance to have in operation such systems of inspection if we are to ensure that under a disarmament treaty the nations will enjoy no less security than their present defences provide. Because of this belief, the Canadian government has agreed, if the Soviet Union will reciprocate, to the inclusion of either the whole or a part of Canada in an equitable system of aerial inspection and will do its utmost to ensure that the system works effectively." ■

Open Skies Reborn

Shortly after taking office in January 1989, US President George Bush asked his advisors to undertake a thorough review of arms control issues with an eye to developing initiatives. During the course of regular arms control consultations with their American counterparts in April, Canadian officials became aware that a renewal of Open Skies was under consideration as one of these initiatives.

Canada was of the view that while Open Skies would be an excellent initiative in a bilateral USA-USSR context, it would be of even greater value if it included the territory of all members of NATO and the WTO, and if those states could also participate in the program of overflights. On May 2 Prime Minister Brian Mulroney wrote to President Bush with Canada's views, and on May 4 he discussed the subject with the President, urging him to put forward the proposal and to enlarge it to include all NATO and WTO states. On May 11, the President phoned the Prime Minister to tell him that he intended to proceed with the initiative, in an expanded form.

The President publicly proposed Open Skies in a speech to the graduating class of Texas A&M University on May 12. He suggested that Eisenhower's original plan be explored again, "but on a broader, more intrusive and radical basis." The President elaborated on his initial statement later that month in Brussels, and the plan was endorsed by NATO leaders in a communique on May 30.

Canadian officials spent the summer quietly encouraging their counterparts in Western and Eastern Europe to consider Open Skies. On September 21, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze indicated to US Secretary of State James Baker, during discussions at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, that the USSR would participate in an international conference on the subject. On September 24, Canada offered to host a conference to negotiate an Open Skies agreement. Invitations to attend were extended to all members of NATO and the WTO.

Throughout the fall of 1989, representatives of the member states of NATO met frequently in Brussels to arrive at a consensus position on the structure of an eventual Open Skies regime. The result of this process is the Basic Elements Paper, issued on December 15, which sets out the unanimous view of the 16 NATO countries as to how an Open Skies regime would work in practice.

The Ottawa Conference will be held February 12 to 28. Representatives of NATO and the WTO will meet in Budapest, Hungary, January 30 to February 1 to discuss organizational and procedural questions related to the Conference and to evaluate the trial Open Skies overflight of Hungary by Canada (see pp. 7-8).

The Ottawa Conference is expected to be followed later in the year by a conference in Budapest to complete the negotiation of an agreement. Thirty-five years after its birth, Open Skies is nearing fruition. ■

Verification Symposium Examines Open Skies Issues

The negotiators of an Open Skies agreement will have a number of complex issues to deal with. These will range from technical issues, concerning the types of aircraft and sensors to be used, to operational and organizational issues, such as the amount of notice required and the frequency and duration of overflights. In addition, legal issues, such as the status of foreign inspectors and the ownership of collected data, and political issues, such as the general objectives and structure of an Open Skies regime, will figure prominently on the agenda.

In order to promote an international discussion of these and other questions related to Open Skies, the Verification Research Unit of EAITC devoted its Sixth Annual Symposium on Arms Control Verification to the subject. The Symposium, held in Ottawa, November 21 to 24, 1989, was organized by York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies on behalf of EAITC.

Political will essential to smooth functioning of agreement

Approximately 40 people attended the Symposium, including civilian and military officials from Canada, the USA, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Netherlands and Hungary, as well as selected academics and representatives from industry.

Working informally, participants explored the technical, organizational, legal and political issues surrounding Open Skies. They drew the following conclusions:

— in any confidence-building regime, the most essential ingredient for success is sufficient political will to make the agreement work. While one could spend hours identifying ways in which a state could obstruct or thwart an Open Skies agreement, such discussion should be largely irrelevant. If the political will to sign and abide by an agreement exists, ways will be found to overcome specific problems through consultation. If such a will does not exist, the possibilities for obstruction are infinite;

— an Open Skies agreement should be as simple and flexible as possible. Excessive concern with minutiae should be avoided. To a certain extent, the specific problems associated with running a regime cannot be identified until the regime is in place. Keeping the regime as flexible as possible will allow it to evolve as participants gain an understanding of its day-to-day operations;

— the range and capabilities of commercially-available aircraft and sensors are impressive. Each participating state should be able to mount credible overflights and acquire a large amount of useful information for confidence-building purposes;

— the negotiations would be facilitated if they were restricted to the 23 states of NATO and the WTO in the first instance. It would be desirable to invite other European states to join the regime once it was in operation. Exactly when such an invitation should be issued would depend on the nature of the agreement;

— the international air traffic control system is capable of accepting Open Skies overflights with a minimum of change. To the extent that modifications will be required, they revolve around the need to streamline existing procedures to ensure that overflights can be conducted on a short-notice basis. Persons with technical or organizational expertise in areas relevant to Open Skies should be included in the negotiations from the start, in order to facilitate discussions;

— partial legal precedents for an Open Skies regime exist in the relevant agreements on international civil aviation as well as in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Stockholm Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Because of the need to bring commitments undertaken in an Open Skies regime into line with participating states' domestic law, an Open Skies Treaty would be preferable to an agreement. ■

International air traffic control system can accept Open Skies with minimum of change

A Little Learning...

In arms control and disarmament, as in many other areas, most people's information about government policy and activities comes from the media, usually the print media, often from a single source.

Consider, then, the following headlines, all based on a press conference held by the chief US and Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiators in Geneva on December 8, 1989:

"Arms negotiators, friendly and confident, announce agreements"
[The New York Times]

"Nuclear talks end with little progress"
[The Ottawa Citizen]

"Negotiators say arms pact within reach"
[The Globe and Mail] ■

Airborne Versus Space-Based Remote Sensing

Some may wonder why airborne surveillance, as proposed in Open Skies, is relevant in the 1990s, given that an effective space-based remote sensing capability now exists. These two types of systems constitute quite different capabilities, however, and should not be seen as mutually exclusive. There are, moreover, a number of advantages to airborne reconnaissance systems, some of which are listed below.

Technical Flexibility

Airborne surveillance offers the following technical advantages:

— the scale of the imagery can be varied by changing, for example, the focal lengths of lenses or the flying height of the aircraft;

— the effective ground resolution of the imagery can be controlled, providing either very high resolution, if required, or coarser resolution, possibly limiting sensitivities regarding the intelligence potential of the data;

Aircraft can collect data at specific times or on short-notice

— sensors can be specifically adjusted to monitor a particular situation, for example, by using particular wavebands in a multispectral scanner;

— aircraft, if stationed locally, can collect coverage at specific times or on short notice (for satellites, this is more difficult or not possible), provided suitable weather conditions prevail;

— real-time data can be provided using a downlink; alternatively, data can be recorded on tape or film and be available in a period of several hours or several days;

— aircraft and airborne sensors can be repaired and replaced more easily than satellite-based reconnaissance systems;

— airborne reconnaissance systems do not require the same degree of specialization in equipment as do satellite sensors. They can use ordinary commercially-available aircraft and sensors. There are likely to be fewer problems associated with factors such as survivability in a potentially hostile environment.

Political Acceptability

Airborne surveillance offers the following political advantages:

— the capability is within the technical competence of a relatively larger number of countries than is a space-based capability;

— the ability to restrict overflight coverage may make airborne imagery more politically attractive for some states in a multilateral/international context. It would be less difficult to demonstrate that the coverage was restricted to specified areas;

— host-country personnel can be placed onboard an airborne platform to ensure that illicit data collection does not take place;

— civilian technology or non-sensitive military technology can be used since it should not be necessary to operate from excessive stand-off distances, or at the high speeds that might be required for reconnaissance of hostile territory;

— multilateral agreements are made more verifiable and acceptable for all concerned by reducing the requirement for national satellite-based systems.

Reconnaissance Capability

Airborne surveillance offers the following advantages in reconnaissance capability:

— countries without their own satellite systems could develop an airborne reconnaissance capability over which they have control. They could do so independently or cooperatively;

— the possession of such a reconnaissance capability by a number of countries would likely relieve pressures on countries with their own national satellite-based capabilities to make data available;

Airborne coverage cheaper

— an airborne capability working in an Open Skies framework would provide an opportunity for those countries that have a space-based capability to direct their limited satellite-based assets elsewhere.

Cost-Effectiveness

Airborne surveillance offers the following cost advantages:

— states are more likely to be able to build up an indigenous airborne capability than a satellite-based capability;

— airborne coverage is likely to be cheaper than satellite-based coverage when the costs of the infrastructure for satellite construction, launching and control are factored in;

— for example, an airborne capability to meet surveillance requirements in Central Europe is estimated to cost approximately 1/20 the amount of a space-based system. ■

Canada Conducts Trial Open Skies Overflight of Hungary

In preparation for the Open Skies Conference, Canada conducted a trial Open Skies overflight of Hungary on January 6, 1990. The purpose of the trial was to test the administrative and operational procedures that are expected to be necessary for an Open Skies agreement.

Because Open Skies overflights could follow a wide variety of routes (likely to be quite different from those used by normal civilian aircraft) and might feature considerable variations in altitude, existing civilian air traffic control procedures will have to be modified. Initial studies have shown that these modifications need not be excessive or expensive. They would primarily involve streamlining existing procedures for handling international air traffic so that requests for overflight clearances on complex and unique routes could be dealt with quickly by national authorities.

The need to identify the main technical requirements of a system for processing overflight requests led Canada and Hungary to examine the possibility of staging a trial overflight. After consultations, it was decided that a Canadian military aircraft would overfly Hungary in early January, with a possible overflight of Canada by Hungary to take place later in the month.

Overflight tests administrative and operational procedures for Open Skies

While trying to ensure that the overflight mirrored the procedures that might be agreed to in the Open Skies negotiations, Canada and Hungary recognized that more lessons would be derived if extra time was taken to evaluate each stage of the process as it happened. Thus, the periods devoted to notification and flight planning were slightly longer than those that might be agreed to at the Ottawa Conference. In addition, in an important difference from the likely regime, the Canadian aircraft carried no onboard sensors. It was therefore incapable of collecting any data on Hungarian activities.

LCol. Laszlo Forgacs, Chief Navigator for the Hungarian Air Force, gives a pre-flight briefing to the Canadian crew: from l. to r., Lt. Darryl Klassen, Navigator; Capt. Frank Silver, First Officer; and Capt. John Latulippe, Aircraft Commander. Looking on is Major John Zandbergen, Navigator, from the Directorate of Air Plans, Ottawa.

A Canadian Forces C-130 Hercules left CFB Lahr in the Federal Republic of Germany for Budapest Airport on January 4. The aircraft flew over Czechoslovakia *en route* to Hungary with the full cooperation of the Czech authorities. Upon landing at Budapest, the aircraft was inspected by Hungarian authorities. They were allowed full access to the aircraft in order to assure themselves that it was not armed. Since the aircraft was not carrying sensors, there was no check to make sure that the sensors conformed to whatever specifications may be agreed to in negotiations. The right of the host country to conduct both inspections is expected to be a standard feature of an Open Skies agreement.

While the aircraft was being inspected, the Canadian crew filed a flight plan with the Hungarian authorities. The plan called for a flight of approximately three-hours duration that cut across a variety of air routes with considerable altitude changes *en route*. The Hungarian authorities had 24 hours to process the plan. The overflight itself took place the morning of January 6. The plane flew a huge figure eight over Hungary, viewing both Hungarian and Soviet military installations.

Hungarian observers were onboard the C-130 during the flight. The right of host governments to place such host observers is envisaged as a feature of the eventual agreement. The observers had full access to all areas of the aircraft and monitored the aircraft's route to make sure that it was in keeping with the agreed-upon flight plan. Since there were no sensors on the aircraft, the host-observers did not monitor the operation of the sensor suite. It is believed that

host-observers will be permitted to monitor the sensor operations in an Open Skies regime.

After the overflight, the plane returned to Budapest where officials of the two governments discussed the trial and identified areas for further discussion at the Open Skies Conference. Both Hungary and Canada expressed pleasure with the results of the trial flight, which was itself a small exercise in confidence-building between East and West.

In addition to the flight crew and officials from the Department of National Defence, the Canadian government sent officials from EAITC and Transport Canada to observe the overflight and participate in discussions on its results. The Canadians left Budapest on January 7. ■

Organizing the Conference: A 'Behind-the-Scenes" Look

Organizing a conference at which the foreign ministers of the 16 NATO and 7 WTO states, between 250 and 500 delegates, and between 500 and 1000 representatives of the Canadian and international media are expected to be present for at least three days is no small matter. This is the job that has fallen to the Open Skies Conference Task Force, or ICO as it is known in the argot of EAITC.

The Task Force is headed by Mr. Bill van Staalduinen of EAITC, who was among the organizers of the three international summits hosted by Canada during 1987 and 1988 (the Francophonie in Quebec City, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Vancouver and the Economic Summit in Toronto). In recruiting the ICO team, he has tried to draw as much as possible on the expertise that was built up during those events.

The Task Force numbers approximately 50 people, drawn from the permanent staff of EAITC and other government departments, as well as from the private sector. In the period immediately prior to the Conference, this staff is expected to grow to a total of 100, to meet the day-to-day demands of the Conference itself.

The Task Force is responsible for all physical preparations for the Conference. These range from arranging ministers' motorcades to making sure that the right flags are displayed in the Conference Centre. To help ensure that no tasks are left undone, ICO has divided itself into four major areas: finance and administration; logistics and protocol; conference operations; and media services.

The finance and administration unit began its work before the rest of the team, preparing estimates for the cost of the Conference and obtaining Treasury Board approval for the expenditure. The unit looks after the staffing, printing, communication, supply and other needs of the Task Force itself, and is responsible for paying Conference bills as they come in.

Accommodation, transportation, conference accreditation and official hospitality fall under the purview of the logistics and protocol unit. Delegates and media will be responsible for their own hotel costs, but ICO has made block bookings at various hotels around Ottawa to ensure that space will be available for all who require it. ICO will also be providing motorcades for all foreign ministers while they are in Ottawa, as well as a car for each delegation, using vehicles obtained under a special arrangement with General Motors of Canada Ltd. The logistics and protocol unit works closely with the RCMP and the Department of National Defence, which will provide drivers for the vehicles, and with the City of Ottawa in mapping out motorcade routes and arranging for police escort.

The logistics and protocol unit is also responsible for conference accreditation. To ensure that unauthorized individuals do not gain access to the site, colour-coded photo-identification cards have to be provided for everyone who will come into contact with the Conference, from hotel staff to heads of delegations.

As suggested by the second half of its name, this unit also looks after meeting ministers as they arrive in Ottawa, organizing dinners hosted by Canada, arranging food services for delegates if they are held up in meetings and providing the other official courtesies required at a gathering of this nature.

The conference operations unit is responsible for providing a facility for the Conference — in this case the Government Conference Centre — as well as a facility for the numerous media expected. It takes care of equipping these facilities for the Conference — providing furniture, communication links, electronic systems for speakers and interpreters, for example — and makes sure that necessary support services, such as an emergency medical team, will be available during the Conference.

The conference operations unit also looks after the provision of liaison officers for the Conference. These are regular foreign service officers from EAITC who will work with the individual delegations prior to and during the Conference to ensure that all of their conference needs are met.

ICO has to make sure the media will be able to do its job, and this is the task that falls to the media services unit. The old National Gallery in Ottawa, known as the Lorne Building, will be turned into a media centre for the duration of the Conference, complete with studios for radio and television broadcasters as

OPEN SKIES CONFERENCE – CONFÉRENCE CIELS OUVERTS

The Open Skies Conference logo. It depicts the two halves of the globe at a point of convergence, encircled by an ellipse representing the flights of Open Skies.

well as working areas for the print media.

ICO will be offering a host broadcast unit, in this case the CBC, which will provide electronic coverage of the Conference and make the feed available to all other media representatives free of charge. The media services unit is also responsible for notifying the media about the Conference ahead of time, accrediting them so they will be able to gain admission to the media centre, and providing briefing rooms and theatres where ICO and national delegations can keep the media informed about what is happening at the Conference.

Inter-departmental cooperation important to Conference preparation

The Task Force has been working on Conference preparations since mid-October, and even this four-month period has been tight given the range of tasks that fall under ICO's responsibility. The normal planning period for a conference of this scope ranges from six months to one year. Mr. van Staalduinen attributes ICO's ability to cope so ably with the planning challenge to the expertise and skill of his staff, and to the cooperation the Task Force has received from all involved.

An important element of Conference preparation is inter-departmental cooperation. Although the Task Force is part of EAITC, it includes representatives from a number of federal government departments and works closely with many others. As mentioned above, the RCMP and the Department of National Defence are playing a major role in providing security and transportation for the Conference. The Department of Supply and Services is involved in meeting Conference procurement and printing needs. Secretary of State Canada is providing interpreters and translators so that the Conference can be conducted in six official languages: English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish. Transport Canada (responsible for the airports where the foreign ministers will be arriving) and Public Works Canada (owner of the conference and media centres) are also involved in Conference planning. In addition, ICO is in daily contact with the embassies of participating countries and is working closely with the City of Ottawa and the National Capital Commission.

ICO will probably remain in existence for a couple of weeks after the Conference, dismantling facilities, preparing the necessary reports and settling finances. After that, the staff will disband to return to their regular occupations — at least until the next time Canada plays host to a major international gathering. ■

Bild Appointed Conference Secretary General

Mr. Fred Bild, formerly Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for Political and International Security Affairs at EAITC, has been appointed Secretary General of the Open Skies Conference. As Secretary General, Mr. Bild is responsible for the preparations for and operation of the Conference. The Conference Task Force, in charge of physical and logistical preparations, and the Conference Secretariat, in charge of the operation of the meeting itself, both report to Mr. Bild.

Born in 1935, Mr. Bild was educated at Sir George Williams University in Montreal, University College in London, England and the Ecole Nationale d'Administration in Paris. Since entering the foreign service in 1961, Mr. Bild has served overseas in Tokyo, Laos, Paris and as Ambassador to Thailand. ■

Kinsman Appointed Political and International Security ADM

Mr. Jeremy Kinsman has been appointed to the position of Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs at EAITC. He replaces Mr. Fred Bild, now Secretary General of the Open Skies Conference.

Born in 1942, Mr. Kinsman joined the Department of External Affairs in 1966. He has served overseas in Brussels, Stockholm, Algiers, New York and Washington. Immediately prior to his appointment, he was the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for Cultural Affairs and Broadcasting at the Department of Communications. ■

How NATO Envisions Open Skies

The following is the text of the Basic Elements Paper on Open Skies, agreed to by the North Atlantic Council meeting in Ministerial Session at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, December 14 to15, 1989.

I. Introduction

1. On 12th May 1989, President Bush proposed the creation of a so-called Open Skies regime, in which the participants would voluntarily open their airspace on a reciprocal basis, permitting the overflight of their territory in order to strengthen confidence and transparency with respect to their military activities.

This proposal expanded on a concept that had already been proposed during the 1950s but had failed to reach fruition because of the unfavourable international political climate prevailing at the time.

Today, this new initiative has been made in a very different context as openness becomes a central theme of East-West relations and the past few years have been marked by important advances in the areas of confidence-building and arms control.

2. The provisions for notification and observation of military activities specified in the Helsinki Final Act were strengthened and made obligatory by the Stockholm Document concluded by the CDE in 1986.

With respect to arms control, in 1987, the INF Treaty, apart from its immediate goals, represented a very important precedent because of the extent of its verification provisions.

All this leads one to expect today that even more spectacular advances will be achieved in the near future. In particular, a two-pronged effort is under way in Vienna: on the one hand, to deepen the measures for confidence-building and transparency among the 35 countries of the CSCE, and on the other, to reach an unprecedented agreement between the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization on the elimination of large numbers of conventional arms.

Furthermore, one awaits important developments in other sectors of disarmament such as chemical weapons and the Soviet-American strategic arms negotiations.

3. All of these agreements will naturally require their own verification regimes, often of a highly intrusive nature. Moreover, the specific provisions of each verification treaty will be supplemented by the habitual means by which countries verify compliance with agreements (national technical means).

"The willingness of a country to be overflown is, in itself, a highly significant political act"

It seems useful, however, particularly in the prevailing context of improved East-West relations, to reflect on other ways of creating a broadly favourable context for confidence-building and disarmament efforts.

In this context, the Open Skies concept has a very special value. The willingness of a country to be overflown is, in itself, a highly significant political act in that it demonstrates its availability to openness; aerial inspection also represents a particularly effective means of verification, along with the general transparency in military activities discussed above.

This double characteristic of an Open Skies regime would make it a valuable complement to current East-West endeavours, mainly in the context of the Vienna negotiations, but also in relation to the other disarmament efforts (START, chemical weapons).

It would seem desirable to focus now on the European region, while also including the entire territories of the Soviet Union, the United States and Canada. Accordingly, we will be ready to consider at an appropriate time the wish of any other European country to participate in the Open Skies regime. This element could be complementary to their efforts at confidence-building and conventional arms control and would conform to the objectives of those negotiations.

4. To this end, the Open Skies regime should be based on the following guidelines:

— The commitment of the parties to greater transparency through aerial overflights of their entire national territory, in principle without other limitations than those imposed by flight safety or rules of international law.

— The possibility for the participants to carry out such observation flights on a national basis or jointly with their allies.

— The commitment of all parties to conduct and to receive such observation flights on the basis of national quotas.

— The establishment of agreed procedures designed to ensure both transparency and flight safety.

— The possibility for the parties to employ the result of such overflights to improve openness and transparency of military activities as well as ensuring compliance with current or future arms control measures.

II. Purpose

The basic purpose of Open Skies is to encourage reciprocal openness on the

part of the participating states and to allow the observation of military activities and installations on their territories, thus enhancing confidence and security. Open Skies can serve these ends as a complement both to national technical means of data collection and to information exchange and verification arrangements established by current and future arms control agreements.

III. Participation and Scope

Participation in Open Skies is initially open to all members of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. All territories of the participants in North America and Asia, as well as in Europe, will be included.

IV. Quotas

1. Open Skies "accounting" will be based on quotas which limit the number of overflights. The quotas will be derived from the geographic size of the participating countries. The duration of flights can also be limited in relation to geographic size. For larger countries, the quota should permit several flights a month over their territory. All of the parties will be entitled to participate in such observation flights on a national basis, either individually or jointly in cooperation with their allies.

Overflight quotas to be based on geographic size

2. Effective implementation of a quota system requires agreement that a country will not undertake flights over the territory of any other country belonging to the same alliance.

3. Quota totals for participating states should be established in such a manner that there is a rough correspondence between totals for NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and, within that total, for the USSR and the North American members of NATO.

4. Every participant, regardless of size, would be obligated to accept a quota of at least one overflight per quarter.

5. Smaller nations, that is, those subject to the minimum quota, may group themselves into one unit for the purposes of hosting Open Skies overflights and jointly accept the quota that would apply to the total land mass of the larger unit.

V. Aircraft

The country or countries conducting an observation flight would use unarmed, fixed-wing civilian or military aircraft capable of carrying host-country observers.

VI. Sensors

A wide variety of sensors would be allowed, with one significant limitation — devices used for the collection and recording of signals intelligence would be prohibited. A list of prohibited categories and types of sensors will be agreed among the participating states which will be updated every year.

VII. Technical Cooperation among Allies

Multilateral or bilateral arrangements concerning the sharing of aircraft or sensors, as well as the conduct of joint overflights, will be possible among members of the same alliance.

VIII. Mission Operation

1. Aircraft will begin observation flights from agreed, pre-designated points of entry and terminate at pre-designated points of exit; such entry and exit points for each participating state will be designated by that state and listed in an annex to the agreement.

2. The host country will make available the kind of support equipment, servicing and facilities normally provided to commercial air carriers. Provision will be made for refuelling stops during the overflight.

3. An observing state will provide 16 hours notification of arrival at a point of entry. However, if the point of entry is on a coast or at a border and no territory of the receiving state will be overflown prior to arrival at the point of entry, this pre-arrival period could be abbreviated.

4. The crew of the observation aircraft shall file a flight plan within six hours of its arrival at the point of entry.

5. After arrival and the filing of a flight plan, a 24 hour pre-flight period will begin. This period is to allow time to determine that there are no flight safety problems associated with the planned flight route and to provide necessary servicing for the aircraft. During this pre-flight period, the aircraft will also be subject to intrusive but non-destructive inspection for prohibited sensors and recorders.

6. Prior to the flight, host-country monitors will be able to board the observation aircraft. During the flight they would ensure that the aircraft is operated in accordance with the flight plan and would monitor operation of the sensors. There would be no restrictions on the movement of the monitors within the aircraft during flight.

7. The flight will be from the agreed point of entry to an agreed point of exit, where the host-country observers would depart the aircraft. The points of entry and exit could be the same. Loitering over a single location will not be permitted. Aircraft will not be limited to commercial air corridors. Observation aircraft may, in principle, only be prohibited from flying through airspace that is publicly announced as closed to other aircraft for valid air safety reasons. Such reasons would include specific hazards posing extreme danger to the aircraft and its occupants. Each country will make arrangements to ensure that public announcements of such hazardous airspace are widely and

promptly disseminated; each country will produce, for an annex to the agreement, a list of where these public announcements can be found. The minimum altitudes for such flights may vary depending upon air safety considerations. The extent of ground control over aircraft will be determined in advance by agreement among the parties on compatible rules such as those recognized by ICAO. In the application of these considerations and procedures, the presumption shall be on behalf of encouraging the greatest degree of openness consistent with air safety.

8. The operation of the Open Skies regime will be without prejudice to states not participating in it.

IX. Mission Results

The members of the same alliance will determine among themselves how information acquired through Open Skies is to be shared. Each party may decide how it wishes to use this information.

X. Transits

A transit flight over a participating state on the way to the participating state over which an observation flight is to be conducted shall not be counted against the quota of the transmitted state, provided the transit flight is conducted exclusively within civilian flight corridors.

XI. Type of Agreement

The Open Skies regime will be established through a multilateral treaty among the parties.

XII. Open Skies Consultative Body

To promote the objectives and implementation of the Open Skies regime, the participating states will establish a body to resolve questions of compliance with the terms of the treaty and to agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the effectiveness of the regime. ■

CFE Update

Spurred by calls for an early agreement by both Western and Eastern leaders, and encouraged by political developments in the USSR and Eastern Europe, the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is proceeding rapidly and in a business-like fashion.

Shortly after the West tabled its Chapter III position on September 21, 1989 (see Fall 1989 *Bulletin*), chief Soviet negotiator Oleg Grinevsky announced that the USSR was moving to assuage Western concerns by raising its proposed ceiling on frontal tactical aircraft to 4,700 (per side) and on combat helicopters to 1,900. These revised ceilings continued to exclude Soviet air defence interceptors. The Soviet announcement was followed, on October 17, by East-West agreement on a definition of artillery, which would allow for limits on current and future systems.

Negotiation is progressing rapidly

The third round of negotiations ended on October 19 with the East tabling its own Chapter III (verification, stabilization and information exchange) proposal. Commenting in plenary sessions, Western negotiators expressed the view that there was a great deal of convergence between the Western and Eastern packages and that work on reaching agreement should proceed as quickly as possible in the next round. A Canadian proposal that additional weekly working group meetings be held beginning in Round Four was adopted unanimously.

NATO used the time between rounds to complete drafting work on a proposed treaty text. Though Round Four got off to a slow start, the extra meetings on Chapter III paid off quickly, as both sides reached agreement on certain measures related to information exchange. On November 28, the East added to its package of stabilizing measures by proposing ceilings on the number of equipment and personnel permitted in exercises.

The importance of regular high-level political involvement to progress in the CFE negotiation was underscored in December. A series of Heads of Government meetings early in the month, and a NATO Ministerial meeting mid-way through, resulted in a fast pace at the negotiating table. On December 12, the West tabled a new proposal on main battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles that covered a previously-excluded range of light tanks and heavy armoured combat vehicles. The inclusion of these "grey area" vehicles went a long way toward accommodating Eastern concerns, but necessitated an increase in the proposed armoured troop carrier ceiling from 28,000 (per side) to 30,000. This was followed two days later by the tabling of both Eastern and Western draft treaty texts. The texts, which contain many similarities, are now being subjected to serious scrutiny in Round Five, which opened on January 12, 1990.

During 1990, developments in Eastern Europe in particular will continue to put pressure on the negotiators to achieve an agreement by the end of the year. Appreciating the significance of this dynamic, the 23 foreign ministers of NATO and the WTO have agreed to hold a separate discussion on CFE issues when they meet at the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa in February.

Both East and West recognize that it is in the interests of long-term stability in Europe to have a CFE agreement as a major vehicle for political and legal consolidation of the emerging politico-strategic realities on that continent. ■

Progress in First Committee at UNGA 44

The 44th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 44) concluded in New York in December 1989. Issues related to arms control, disarmament and international security were assigned, as usual, to the First Committee of the General Assembly, in which all member states of the UN are entitled to participate. In the First Committee, national delegations make statements about, debate and then vote on resolutions introduced there. Resolutions passed by the Committee are forwarded to the UNGA plenary, where they are officially adopted.

The First Committee is not a negotiating forum, with the power to draft and implement disarmament measures. Rather, it is a deliberative forum, in which countries exchange views on disarmament-related issues. Adopted UNGA resolutions are therefore not binding agreements but, instead, declarations of principle or recommendations of action to be taken. Those resolutions that are adopted by consensus can have considerable influence in promoting progress on specific disarmament measures, by making recommendations and arriving at positions that are acceptable to all UN members.

Canada particularly prominent on chemical weapons issue

In keeping with the importance that it attaches to the UN system, Canada plays an active role each year in the consideration of disarmament issues at the First Committee. The Canadian delegation to the 1989 session, headed by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, took the lead on several resolutions and joined in co-sponsoring a number of others.

The Canadian delegation assumed a particularly prominent role on the issue of chemical weapons. Three resolutions dealing with different aspects of this subject were adopted by the General Assembly, all of them by consensus and all co-sponsored by Canada. The Canadian delegation drafted one of these resolutions and, in collaboration with Poland, ensured that the concerns of all delegations were incorporated into the text, allowing it to receive unanimous support. The Canadian-Polish resolution urges the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts toward the conclusion of a convention for the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and for the destruction of existing stocks. Canada hopes that this resolution will give impetus to the important goal of ridding the world of all chemical weapons in the near future.



The flags of some of the member-states of the United Nations in front of the Secretariat Building at UN Headquarters in New York. United Nations photo

The issue of nuclear testing also attracted considerable attention in the First Committee. Achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the arms control and disarmament priorities of the Canadian government. Canada was one of a group of six countries, under the leadership of New Zealand, that formulated a resolution entitled "Urgent need for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." Because of fundamental differences among, in particular, the five nuclear-weapon states, it was not possible to arrive at a text that could attract unanimous support. However, support for the resolution among non-nuclear-weapon states was overwhelming. From Canada's perspective, the resolution takes a realistic approach to this difficult issue by acknowledging the progress that has been made and outlining a program of work for the Conference on Disarmament that will lead to further steps toward a CTBT.

As in past years, Canada introduced a resolution entitled "Prohibition on the production of fissionable materials." The resolution emphasizes that the production of such materials for weapons purposes — they are required to detonate nuclear devices — is an important element in any progress toward nuclear disarmament. It requests that the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on nuclear testing, pursue consideration of this matter. Like the CTBT resolution, this text was adopted with widespread support.

In addition to its work on the resolutions mentioned above, Canada participated actively in the range of First Committee discussions, which included themes as diverse as the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, conventional disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Over 60 resolutions pertaining to disarmament and international security were adopted at UNGA 44, twenty-three of them by consensus. Canada co-sponsored ten disarmament-

related resolutions and voted in favour of more than 40 of the resolutions adopted.

The Canadian delegation was pleased with the First Committee's work at UNGA 44. The improving international political climate contributed to a business-like and constructive atmosphere. This resulted in movement toward overcoming differences of opinion or approach that have for years hindered progress on many crucial disarmament issues.

However, much remains be done to invigorate the UN's consideration of dis-

Canada pleased with progress, but much remains to be done to invigorate UN disarmament discussions

armament questions, so that discussions and negotiations at the global multilateral level can catch up to the current rapid pace of talks between the superpowers and in the NATO-WTO context. Profound differences remain on many disarmament issues on the UN agenda, and these will only be resolved through patient and serious discussions accompanied by flexibility and realism on the part of all countries.

Canada looks forward to building on the positive atmosphere of UNGA 44's First Committee at the 1990 session. Progress on disarmament matters is, by nature, a complex and slow process. The Canadian government is convinced, however, that there currently exists the potential for the UN to make an unprecedented contribution in the area of disarmament. Canada will continue to do its best to ensure that this potential is lived up to. ■

Recent Statements on Arms Control and Disarmament

On Arctic Arms Control

The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister: "In Moscow, I...raised with Mr. Gorbachev the Arctic arms control proposals he had set forth in his Murmansk speech several years ago. I pointed out to him that Mr. Clark had responded to those proposals on several occasions but that we were quite prepared to discuss with the Soviets any refinements they might have to make to their original ideas. I pointed out, as well, that I continued to believe that current ongoing arms control negotiations between the two superpowers and the two alliances had proven successful and were the best avenues for making progress on these issues. He understands fully our position and agreed that further review of this issue should be pursued by the Secretary of State for External Affairs [Mr. Clark] and [Soviet Foreign Minister] Mr. Shevardnadze."
[Statement to the House of Commons on his visit to the USSR, November 27, 1989]

On NATO

The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister: "We are entering a new and important era of relationships between East and West. We should be sensitive to all opportunities for change. We should not reject ideas out of hand simply because they have not been tried before or they have been tried and found wanting.... [Mr. Gorbachev said to me] that the most imprudent thing that could be done at this time, given the enormity of the changes in Eastern Europe, would be changes in the structures of the alliances, because at this particular time any such changes could be destabilizing with regard to the efforts that he and others are trying to bring about.... The progress we have made so far, and it has been remarkable in the last number of years, has been brought about in large measure because of the leadership of President Gorbachev on the one side, but [also because of] the solidarity of NATO on the other. We propose to keep that."
[Question Period, House of Commons, December 6, 1989]

On NATO and CFE

The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs: "[The money that Canada spends to keep troops in Europe] in part [is] an investment that yielded the agreement on one nuclear arms treaty and could yield agreement on other nuclear arms treaties. It could yield an agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe... [O]ur participation in NATO is based very strongly on the view that the solidarity [of NATO] is not a theory; solidarity is a technique that has worked.

"I personally believe that there will be a change in the nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and that it will begin to put more focus on some of the political activities that have always been part of its mandate, but have taken second place. Regarding troops specifically, we are not anticipating any movement back of troops. This round of CFE negotiations in fact would not affect our troop levels. We have made it clear that we are prepared to be in Europe as long as our allies want us to be there. It may be that if we get into other rounds of conventional force discussions...that may reduce the need on both sides for troops. But we won't be looking upon that as an economy measure. Any efforts that we might take in the future...would be as part of alliance decisions and as a result of negotiations."
[Interview with Don Newman on "This Week in Parliament," December 8, 1989] ■

Resolutions on Arms Control and Disarmament and International Security Adopted at UNGA 44

Resolutions Supported by Canada

RESOLUTIONNUMBER (Lead Sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE(Yes/No/Abstain)
44/104 (Mexico)	Treaty of Tlatelolco	147-0-3
44/107 (NZ)*	Urgent need for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	145-2-6
44/108 (Egypt)	Nuclear-weapon-free zone in Middle East	Consensus
44/109 (Pakistan)	Nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	116-3-32
44/110 (Bulgaria)	Security of non-nuclear weapon states against use of nuclear weapons	131-0-21
44/111 (Pakistan)	Assurances against use of nuclear weapons	151-0-3
44/112 (Egypt)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	153-1-0
44/113A (Kenya)	Denuclearization of Africa	147-0-4
44/114B (FRG)	Military budgets	127-0-15
44/115A (Canada/Poland)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	Consensus
44/115B (Australia)*	Chemical and biological weapons: measures to uphold authority of Geneva Protocol	Consensus
44/115C (Australia)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	Consensus
44/116B (UK)*	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	91-0-61
44/116C (China)	Conventional disarmament	Consensus
44/116D (China)	Nuclear disarmament	Consensus
44/116E (UK)*	Objective information on military matters	132-0-13
44/116F (Denmark)	Conventional disarmament	Consensus
44/116H (Canada)*	Prohibition on the production of fissionable materials	147-1-6
44/116I (France)	Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe	Consensus
44/116J (Bulgaria)	Conversion of military resources	153-0-1
44/116L (Yugoslavia)	Disarmament and development	Consensus
44/116M (Sweden)	Naval armaments and disarmament	154-1-0
44/116N (Colombia)*	International arms transfers	143-0-12
44/116O (Brazil)	Seabed Treaty Review Conference	Consensus
44/116Q (Cameroon)	Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission	Consensus
44/116R (Kenya)	Hostile dumping of radioactive material	150-0-4
44/116T (USSR)	Radiological weapons	Consensus
44/116U (FRG)*	Contribution of confidence- and security-building measures	Consensus
44/117B (Belgium)*	Regional disarmament	Consensus
44/117E (Nigeria)	UN program of fellowships for disarmament	Consensus
44/117F (Nepal/Peru/Togo)	UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia, Africa and Latin America	153-1-1
44/118B (GDR)	Science and technology for disarmament	154-0-1
44/119A (Mexico)	Comprehensive program of disarmament	154-0-1
44/119C (Zaire)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Consensus
44/119F (NZ)	South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty	151-0-4
44/119G (Mongolia)	Disarmament Week	Consensus
44/119H (Nigeria)	Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade	Consensus
44/122 (Chairman)	Compliance with arms control agreements	Consensus
44/123 (Costa Rica)	Education for disarmament	149-0-5
44/125 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean	Consensus

* = resolution co-sponsored by Canada

DRAFTDECISIONS

(Sweden)	Conventional Weapons deemed excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects	Consensus
(Czechoslovakia)	International cooperation for disarmament	Consensus

Resolutions Opposed by Canada

RESOLUTIONNUMBER (Lead Sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE(Yes/No/Abstain)
44/114A (Romania)	Reduction of military budgets	116-10-19
44/117C (India)	Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons	134-17-4
44/117D (Mexico)	Nuclear arms freeze	136-13-5
44/119B (GDR)	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	129-17-7
44/119E (GDR)	Cessation of nuclear arms race and prevention of nuclear war	138-11-6

Resolutions on which Canada Abstained

RESOLUTIONNUMBER (Lead Sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE(Yes/No/Abstain)
44/20 (Brazil)	Zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic	146-1-2
44/105 (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	136-3-13
44/106 (Mexico)	Partial Test Ban Treaty Amending Conference	127-2-22
44/113B (Kenya)	Nuclear capability of South Africa	137-4-10
44/116A (Iraq)	Prohibition of development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	124-2-26
44/116G (USSR)	Implementation of UN General Assembly resolutions	129-1-25
44/116K (Yugoslavia)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	134-0-18
44/116P (GDR)	Defensive security concepts	131-0-19
44/116S (Peru)	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	119-1-31
44/117A (Mexico/Sri Lanka)	World Disarmament Campaign	144-0-10
44/118A (India)	Impact of scientific and technological developments	137-3-14
44/119D (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	138-8-9
44/120 (Sri Lanka)	Indian Ocean — Zone of Peace	137-4-14
44/121 (Jordan)	Israeli nuclear armament	104-2-43
44/126 (Yugoslavia)	Strengthening of international security	128-1-24

Diplomatic Appointments

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney recently announced the following diplomatic appointments:

Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, to the post of Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, effective January 1, 1990. Mr. Marchand's public service spans a 30-year career including five years as Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and assignments as Deputy Minister of both Energy, Mines and Resources and Communications.

Mr. Gerald Shannon, Deputy Minister for International Trade and Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the post of Ambassador for Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Chief Negotiator, effective October 18, 1989. Effective January 1, 1990, Mr. Shannon also assumed the responsibilities of Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Mr. Shannon is a career diplomat with extensive experience in international trade and finance.

Canadians Observe an Exercise in Armed Neutrality

Canadian observer Colonel Megill speaking to Swiss soldier during exercise.

From November 20 to 23, 1989, two Canadian officials watched as over twenty-five thousand Swiss troops turned the north-eastern corner of Switzerland into an armed fortress as part of a military exercise. The exercise was designed to demonstrate the rapidity with which the Swiss could mobilize and deploy to defend against an attack.

The Canadians — Mr. Gordon Vachon, Senior Verification Research Officer at EAITC, and Colonel William Megill, Military Adviser with the Canadian delegation to the CFE and CSBM negotiations in Vienna — were invited, along with officials of the other participating states of the CSCE, to observe the exercise in accordance with the Stockholm Document on confidence- and security-building measures, signed in 1986. They were to confirm that the exercise was carried out in conformity with the exercise notification. The Swiss authorities arranged for observers to receive briefings and witness activities at all levels of the corps exercise.

One mechanized and one field division were involved in the exercise, including 150 main battle tanks, 60 heavy artillery pieces, 22 helicopters and some 250 aircraft sorties for reconnaissance and ground attack. The observers saw elements of all of this, including such rarities as bicycle battalions and fully operational — but empty — hospitals on constant standby, awaiting casualties they hope will never come.

Half of the troops had already completed two weeks of refresher training at various military installations, in the classroom and on the ranges. When the call to mobilize came, these troops were deployed to provide a screen for forces reporting to depots, drawing mechanized equipment and heavy weapons, and moving to pre-arranged defensive positions. Virtually all of the troops were militia. Within hours the defences were taking shape, under pressure from the exercise's invading force. What the observers saw was the partial transition of a corner of Switzerland from a peacetime to a wartime footing.

The observers had an opportunity to gauge the meaning of armed neutrality and the national commitment involved therein. Not only does it mean that every able-bodied male is liable for a period of basic training; it also means that he must attend regular refresher training over the next thirty years, including participation in mobilization exercises such as the November one. The active regular force is minimal in size, with some 6,000 personnel, but there are over 600,000 militia capable of being mobilized within 24 hours and of being combat-ready in less than 48 hours. Heavy equipment is stockpiled and maintained in depots, while each soldier keeps his own weapon and ammunition at home.

During the exercise, troops and vehicles moved freely through towns and countryside. Vehicles hid among buildings; headquarters and bivouacs were established in factories, warehouses and underground parking lots; units had the use of public buildings; and, wherever they were, the troops had access to hot, fresh rations obtained locally. Nonetheless, there was genuine discomfort, not to mention the disruption of daily lives and the hidden costs to the Swiss economy, all of which the Swiss are willing to accept. The Canadians spoke to the Chief Executive Officer of a large private bank (regimental commander), a Swissair pilot (air operations officer), a civil engineer (cyclist soldier), an architect (bridge demolition guard commander) and many others whose employers had long ago become accustomed to the absences required by such an exercise.

The Swiss exercise succeeded in the following: demonstrating that the mobilization system, properly prepared and regularly exercised, works; demonstrating that the country's military potential was essentially defensive, not offensive, in the way it was configured and deployed; and conveying to all observers the important political message that an attack on Switzerland would be a costly and lengthy undertaking. The exercise also demonstrated to the Canadian observers that defending the national sovereignty of a neutral state carries with it sizeable real costs. ■

Symposium on Space Without Weapons

Over 100 academics and outer space specialists, representing 24 countries, gathered in Montreal, October 25 to 27, 1989, for a symposium on "Space Without Weapons." The symposium was organized by McGill University's Centre for Research in Air and Space Law in association with the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of EAITC.

For the past several years, the Centre for Research in Air and Space Law has been associated with the Arms Control and Disarmament Division in a study of the role of international law with respect to the military use of space. In 1985, the Centre organized a symposium entitled "An Arms Race in Outer Space — Could Treaties Prevent It?" This was followed in 1987 by a symposium on "Space Surveillance for Arms Control and Verification: Options." The October symposium represented another step in the progressive study toward the continuing use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

It is generally recognized that without the military use of outer space in terms of space-based remote sensing for verification purposes, the strategic arms control agreements between the USA and the USSR would not have been possible. In this sense, the military use of space has had a stabilizing effect. However, the introduction of weapons into space, termed the "weaponization" of space, could have the opposite result. This symposium studied the weaponization issue in its various forms.

Canadians played a key role in the proceedings. Dr. Peter Hughes from the University of Toronto and Dr. Lucy Stojak from McGill University examined the technical and legal aspects of the issue respectively. Dr. F.J.F. Osborne of SPAR Aerospace and Mr. Robin Gubby of Telesat Canada added industry's perspective to the discussion. Representatives from the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the USA and the USSR provided an international dimension. Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Mr. de Montigny Marchand, summarized the proceedings at a closing banquet.

The symposium was particularly timely given that Canada has been confirmed as Chairman of the 1990 Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space at the CD in Geneva. The discussions undertaken at the symposium related directly to the Committee's mandate, which is to prevent an arms race in outer space. Proceedings of the symposium will be made available to CD members early in the CD's 1990 session. ■

Forecast

A list of arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, January through May, 1990.

January: Third session of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Verification, New York

January11-12: Meeting of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, Cornwall, Ontario

January 12 - February 22: CFE Round 5, Vienna

January16: Phase 2 of the Group of Scientific Experts' international seismic data exchange experiment begins

January 16 - February 23: CSBM Negotiation Round 5, Vienna;

January 16 - February 5: CSBM Negotiation seminar on military doctrine, Vienna

February12-28: Open Skies Conference, Ottawa

Mid-February - mid-April: Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

March 15 - April 26: CFE Round 6, Vienna

March 19 - April 27: CSBM Negotiation Round 6, Vienna

April 23 - May 4: Third NPT Preparatory Committee, Geneva

April 23 - May 11: Open Skies Conference, Budapest (proposed)

May 7 - May 29: United Nations Disarmament Commission, New York

May17: CFE Round 7 opens, Vienna

May21: CSBM Negotiation Round 7 opens, Vienna ■

Canada-USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea

On November 20, 1989, in Moscow, Canada and the Soviet Union entered into an Agreement Governing the Prevention of Incidents at Sea Beyond the Territorial Sea. The purpose of the agreement is to ensure the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective armed forces and of the flight of their military aircraft beyond the territorial sea.

Among other things, the parties agree to observe strictly the letter and spirit of the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Ships of the parties operating in proximity to each other are required to remain well clear of each other to avoid risk of collision. The parties also agree that their ships shall not simulate attacks by aiming weapons in the direction of ships and aircraft of the other party, and shall not launch hazardous objects in the direction of ships of the other party. Similarly, they agree that their aircraft shall not simulate attacks nor perform aerobatics over ships of the other party, nor shall they launch hazardous objects in the direction of ships of the other party. The parties agree to exchange, in a timely manner, appropriate information concerning instances of collisions or other incidents at sea between their ships and aircraft.

The actions prohibited by the agreement are also not to be taken against non-military ships and aircraft of the parties. ■

Focus: On Confidence-Building

Focus is our column for secondary school students.

Canada is about to play host to a major East-West gathering. The 16 states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which Canada is one, and the seven states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) will meet in Ottawa from February 12 to 28 to negotiate an Open Skies agreement. The agreement will allow individual states of each alliance to fly over individual states of the other alliance on short-notice, using unarmed surveillance planes. The notice will be long enough to make sure that air safety is not threatened but short enough to prevent the covering up of any major military activities.

The flight of a Soviet military plane over Canada would normally be considered a threat to Canadian security. Indeed, when military planes from one alliance occasionally stray into the airspace of the other alliance, it is usually viewed as a chance to test the

Why Open Skies will not be a threat

opponent's air defences, or to do some spying. In fact, when Open Skies was first proposed by the USA over thirty years ago, the Soviet Union rejected the idea as an espionage plot. What has changed? Why is Canada going to agree to let WTO countries fly over Canadian territory and take detailed photographs whenever they want to? (Remember that the planes will not be carrying weapons, so there will be no danger of Canadians being bombed or shot at.)

Open Skies is what is known as a confidence-building measure. The goal of a confidence-building measure is to

Swiss army vehicles on the move during recent military exercise. Being allowed to watch an exercise like this one gives countries confidence in the intentions of other countries.

reduce wrong impressions and suspicions about the possible use of military force. It thus improves relations between states and makes it much less likely that a war will start by mistake.

Say, for example, that Canada was suspicious about what was happening at a military base in Czechoslovakia. Under an Open Skies agreement, Canada would be able to fly over the base, see what was going on there and decide for itself — based on what it saw — whether its suspicions were justified. Without Open Skies, Canada would have to operate on the basis of suspicions alone.

Just as important as what Open Skies will do to clear up suspicions is what it will say about intentions. If a country were preparing for an attack it would not likely agree to Open Skies, because its preparations would be discovered. Movements and gatherings of troops and weapons can easily be seen from the air. So in signing an Open Skies agreement, countries will be saying to one another: "Look, you can trust me. My intentions are peaceful and I want you to see this for yourself."

Open Skies will not be the only confidence-building agreement in existence. Last November two Canadians were invited to Switzerland to observe a military exercise there. Switzerland, like Canada, has signed what is known as the Stockholm Document (1986). Under this agreement, countries are required to invite observers from the other signatory countries to watch military exercises above a certain size. Again, this is a way of letting countries see for themselves that the military exercises are just that — exercises — and not preparations for an attack.

NATO and the WTO are in the process of negotiating an agreement on reducing their conventional (i.e., non-nuclear) armed forces in Europe. Canada hopes that agreement on Open Skies will speed this negotiation and others, leading to many arms control agreements throughout the 1990s.

Open Skies will be able to help in the verification of some of these future arms control agreements, that is, with seeing whether or not the other side is living up to its commitments. Right now the United States and the Soviet Union are the only countries in NATO and the WTO that have reconnaissance satellites capable of seeing detailed military activities. Their allies have to rely on them for this information. Under Open Skies, the allies without satellites will be able to see for themselves that arms control agreements are being lived up to and that their security is not being threatened. This should make them more willing to sign agreements.

Building confidence is an important step in the process of limiting arms and building security. An agreement on Open Skies will be such a step. ■

Disarmament Fund Update

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund, Fiscal Year 1989-90

To January 15, 1990

CONTRIBUTIONS

1.	*Canadian Federation of University Women* — student essay contest: "What I am prepared to do for peace"	$500
2.	*Dr. Jules Dufour* — preparation of a university course on arms control and disarmament	$1,900
3.	*Voice of Women* — orientation tour of the UN Disarmament Commission	$6,050
4.	*Peace Education Centre* — Youth for Global Awareness Conference	$4,000
5.	*Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament* — Ballistic Missile Defence study	$19,760
6.	*Science for Peace, Toronto Chapter* — University College Lectures in Peace Studies	$3,000
7.	*Centre de Ressources sur la Non-Violence* — research on non-violent civil defence and common security	$7,000
8.	*Polish-American Parliamentary Debate Institutes Canada* — lecture tour of Poland	$2,500
9.	*Inuit Circumpolar Conference* — participation in Fifth Inuit Circumpolar General Assembly, Greenland	$4,000
10.	*David Cox, Queen's University* — peacekeeping workshop	$18,000
11.	*Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament* — conference on Canadian-Soviet Arctic cooperation	$20,000
12.	*United Nations Association in Canada, Montreal Branch* — UN General Assembly simulation	$2,000
13.	*Political Studies Students' Conference, University of Manitoba* — "End of the Cold War? Prospects for East-West Security in the 1990s" Conference	$4,500
14.	*North American Model United Nations* — simulation of the UN	$6,000
15.	*Canadian Disarmament Information Service* — publication of a special issue of *Peace Magazine* on common security	$3,000
16.	*Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University* — conference on naval arms limitations and maritime security	$12,778
17.	*Canadian Council for International Cooperation* — directory of Canadian women specializing in global issues	$6,000
18.	*International Institute for Strategic Studies* — program of publications	$11,308
TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS		**$132,296**

GRANTS

1.	*Dr. Michael Mepham* — Language and Ideology: a study of the nature of the peace movement's participation in the arms control and disarmament debate	$7,000
2.	*Canadian Student Pugwash* — chemical weapons workshop at annual conference	$9,488
3.	*William Epstein* — participation at Pugwash Symposium, Dublin, Ireland, May 5 to 7, 1989	$320
4.	*Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies* — publication of proceedings of seminar on "Nuclear Strategy in the 90s: Deterrence, Defence and Disarmament"	$7,500
5.	*Canadian Peace Alliance* — preparation of Canadian peace catalogue and database	$15,000
6.	*Project Ploughshares* — preparation of manual on common security issues	$17,000
7.	*United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research* — research on verification	$10,000
8.	*International Institute for Strategic Studies* — program of research and publications	$38,692
TOTAL OF GRANTS		**$105,000**

TOTAL OF GRANTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS **$237,296** ■

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