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PLATO'S WATCH DOG

IN a very charming book by a charming writer, "The Future in America," by Mr. H. G. Wells, I find the author auguring good for America in proportion to the attention given to political science in its Universities, and evil for America on the strength of the Greek alphabet which he also found inscribed upon the blackboards of some of the same Universities.

Now this is a hard augury. I have been reading Greek letters, chiefly in Plato, for a third of a century and more, and I have been reading Mr. Wells for a third of that time, and I thought until I came across that augury that I was reading in *pari materia*. I fancied Plato a forerunner of Mr. Wells and Mr. Wells a later Plato. I had supposed, therefore, that Mr. Wells would welcome the study of Plato in America, as leading directly to that scientific socialistic Utopia, to which he also devotes himself; his ability, his imagination, and his charm of style. He is strangely ungrateful to the H. G. Wells of Athens.

However, it is of Plato that I am writing here. Plato's mission, said Emerson, is to raise in Athens all the problems which are still interesting thoughtful men. Among these is the problem of incompatible virtues, the problem of virtue casting out virtue, or of Satan also being divided against Satan.

For Plato is at once confronted with this problem when he starts out to found an Ideal State: the first requisite for any state or family or individual, as I understand him, is that virtue which was Virtue to the ancient world; Virtus, manliness, self-reliance, aggressiveness; the power of government and organization; and the spirit of adventure; the Imperial or the Roman spirit, as it has been called since his

time. Aristotle, for example, remarks that Sparta would never have lost her Empire, if she had retained her "virtue," that is, the military spirit, which is to him (and to Plato) a considerable factor in perfection. A modern humanitarian Christian might retort, that Sparta would never have gained her Empire had she been more "virtuous"; so profoundly has the connotation of the word altered.

But if Plato does not put our "Virtue" first, he puts it second, for he continues his argument with the proposition, that the second requisite for any state or family or individual, the second great commandment, is unlike the first, is even the opposite of the first; it is the virtue of gentleness and sweet temper; of patience and amiability, of loyalty and consideration; or, more broadly—for Plato, characteristically, overlooks even deep distinctions and lumps together qualities moral and qualities intellectual, such as we (or Aristotle) should certainly have sharply distinguished—the virtue of thought, intelligence, and philosophy. Without this second and opposite virtue Plato sees no salvation for the state or the individual: Christianity therefore, by interpretation, is only less necessary and original than Paganism; it comes in, as its Founder said, not to destroy but to fulfil the older dispensation: Christian virtue—self-restraint, mercy, pitifulness, sweet reasonableness is only less necessary, if it be really less necessary, than Pagan and Roman virtue.

Each alike, continues Plato, is necessary, but how are they compatible? and if incompatible, what becomes of the new vision of the Ideal State, the Heavenly Jerusalem? or rather what becomes of the chance of any state or any individual prospering, except for a moment? One will be submerged because it has waxed fat and kicked (like Jeshurun) and has turned its hand against everyone (like Ishmael), and another because it has yielded its individuality, its will and its own way at the bidding of the first aggressor; and has turned the other cheek to every neighbour. And so the Ideal State begins to vanish again, and with it also the lesser hope of some small progress in civilization or at least of some fair

stability. And Plato is becoming despondent, when his mind's eye falls on a familiar and homely figure, the common watch-dog. Why surely out of the bark of sucklings Nature has perfected praise ! for has not even this poor simple creature the two virtues feigned to be incompatible ? Is he not full of all gentle virtues, of all patience, of all trust, and loyalty, and old memories towards his master ? Nay, is he not friendly to all the faces that are familiar to him, even though their owners have never noticed him ? while conversely he is full of all virtuous vice (or of all Pagan virtue) and of all aggressiveness to the stranger, and the wayfarer; even though these strangers be from God, these wayfarers be angels unawares; obviously then the dog is a natural philosopher; all his virtues are based on knowledge (as ideal virtue is), all his vice is based on ignorance, which is, as Plato knows, the real root of all vice; here then, even in the kennel, as in the stall of Balaam's Ass, is discovered the paragon, who seemed undiscoverable, and yet who must be discovered if man is not to despair; and now why should man despair where his poor servant and poor relation has succeeded ? If a dog is a philosopher, cannot philosophers be dogs ? (Antisthenes indeed and his friends had already earned this proud title.)

It is this vivid passage by the way which has prompted that good scholar Mr. W. L. Newman to offer the conjecture that it was from Plato that Aristotle learned that a dog barks at strangers; poor Aristotle whom the world has fondly supposed to have been a naturalist ! happy Aristotle, who had no other and more painful and personal "Evidences of Doghood."

However, to return, all this is very characteristic fooling on Plato's part; it is his habit to protest "with scholarly seriousness, and with that playfulness which is seriousness' twin-sister" ; and who shall say of his protests where the seriousness ends and the playfulness begins ? did he know this himself ? does any philosophic humorist or humorous philosopher know as much about himself ? But my point to-day is not to try and plumb the depths of Plato's seriousness or of his

humour, but to set up a rival against that same watch-dog for the possession of the two (or three) incompatible virtues : the moral virtue of self-reliance and self-will; the moral virtue of self-sacrifice and loyalty : the intellectual virtue of thoughtfulness. Let us now call up the ghost of Plato and invite him to judge the claims of another Ideal State, not of dogs, which may seem to rival his watch-dog, and point more hopefully to the realization by man of the Platonic Callipolis. We will ask him to debate with us this question, but first to be merciful and speak to us not with the voice of a ghost (which is also the ghost of a voice); for that voice says Homer, is as abhorrent as the squealing of bats ! or, in our days, as the phonograph; which is truly bat-like, and proves that Homer was never deaf at any rate, but measured quite accurately the ghostliness of voice and the voice of ghostliness: he will speak to us then, we beg of him, not through any portentous modern mis-invention into which, fortunately for him, he never spoke, but quite simply and colloquially.

“ Plato,” we shall begin, “ there is in the isle of Atlantis a people who ought to combine these opposite virtues; in the first place all great civilizations arise from the blending of races; your own civilization has been ascribed to the blending of aggressive Dorians with reflective Myceneans; and of reflective but still vigorous Mycenaean with the more dreamy brooding sensitive spirit of Asia; whence the civilization of Greece and of Ionia. Well, then this race comes from a land conspicuous for its blend of races; for the blend of the Anglo-Saxon (himself a blend of Norman, Saxon, Dane, and British) with the Huguenot and the Celt; so blended, the resulting type, the British type, has displayed those virtues which you place first, the gift of organization and administration, of self-reliance and mastery; it has reproduced the Roman type which overthrew Greece and ruled the ancient world. But it has done more than that; it has mixed once again in Atlantis and this time with the race which is foremost in the world for everything that your Greece contributed to the Empire of Rome; for literature, language, logic, science, and art,

for everything that was greatest in the Roman Empire, except the masterful spirit of the Roman; it has mixed itself with the French race.

“If then the British element in this Atlantean blend can provide the primary virtue, the French element can provide the secondary, can ‘soothe us with their finer fancy, touch us with their lighter thought’: can supply the keener intelligence and the more feminine grace. Or if there be still doubt of this, Plato, look at another element in this kingdom of Atlantis: one section of the British stock of this kingdom came up from the south when their neighbours, henceforth called Americans, quarreled with their British mother-country, as your Greeks always quarreled with their mother-city. This part of the people refused to quarrel lightly with their mother-country; they thought of their duties no less than of their rights: they cherished ancient memories: they were loyal to old ties: they refused to break with all their past for an old man’s obstinacy and a few pounds of tea: and they sacrificed their American homes and came north in recognition of the virtue of patience, loyalty, considerateness; yes and they must have had their measure too of the other and first virtue, or they could never have hewed them hopes and homes out of the northern wilderness, where the timber-wolf howled after its prey and sought its meat from God.

“And so, Plato, have not these Atlanteans the promise of the three virtues, self-reliance, forbearance, intellect? The masterfulness of the Briton, the fidelity of the Loyalists, and the genius of the Frenchman? What do you say?”

“I say,” whispers the ghost, “that they may discover the second and third virtue perhaps: I am doubtful of the first: I have seen no men who combined the three; certainly my own Athenians did not: they never possessed the faculty of administration, organization, conquest, and government. I was a ‘Little Athenian’ myself: but Pericles and those who were not, failed no less to make Athens an Imperial City; neither did the Athenians possess the loyalty that clings in spite

of slights, to old ties ; they were fickle as well as anarchical : they had nothing but intelligence ; not instinct : and too much intelligence ; they knew everything and did nothing. I never found these virtues combined in man, when I was upon earth : only in what men call the lower animals, especially in well-bred dogs ; a good dog, my mind misgives me, is still better than a clever man. He is not debauched by cleverness ; and besides I have another reason for my doubts. This state of yours, as I understand your description, is still a colony : united to its mother-country ; with all the virtues of a colony, fidelity, patience, loyalty : but you cannot have everything ; you cannot have the passive and gentle virtues of a colony with the masculine and aggressive virtues of an independent state ; you cannot be like these Americans of whom you speak, who resented British dictation, and yet retain also the virtues of your ' Loyalists ' who submitted thereto ; a colony which is still a colony, and an independent state have antithetic virtues."

" Plato," we shall answer, " much Elysium has made you melancholy : we have heard all about this antithesis : and we are convinced our mission is to show the world that, however it may have been, the antithesis holds no longer ; we have the secondary virtues already, you are willing to believe as much ; well we cannot, if we would, escape the primary also ; for many reasons which can be reduced to one ; that all the forces which make the American type are moulding us also, unconsciously even and even against our will.

" And first and foremost these same Americans, who withstood the mother-country and broke loose from her, are about us and around us and go in and out among us, influencing us in a thousand ways. These Americans antagonise and Americanise us equally.

" In the second place we have the same climate which moulded them, only keener and more bracing ; and philosophers have told us by your lips and other lips, that a keen climate, if it does not produce the earliest civilization, produces the most enduring.

“ We have the same influx of all the enterprising spirits of Europe, only fewer of the neglected and unbalanced southern immigrants, and more immigrants of the sturdy northern races ; and a large number too of Americans and of our own Americanized native-born citizens, for a time lost to us, and now returning to our commonwealth.

“ We have the same simple conditions of life only more so ; the conditions which make a man a jack-of-all-trades, a handy useful man. We have the same scantness of wealth, ease, and culture, only much more so ; these things breed the highest triumphs of art and science, but they also enervate men and make civilization as weak and helpless as it is artistic and refined.

“ We have the same consciousness of countless acres and virgin resources which the Americans once had : the same hopes as boundless as the acres, the same self-confidence as indestructible as the resources.

“ In brief we have all the same conditions which made the Americans great, only not the unhappy quarrel with the mother-country, which gave a twist to their civilization at its start ; and has left the trail of rebellion, demagogism, arrogance, and ignorance ever since, across their politics ; which hampered their hero Washington from the first with unscrupulous demagogues for colleagues ; which led them then and ever since to mistake sharp practice for statesmanship, in their dealing with the mother-country ; in the maps which they produce or do not produce, when boundary-treaties are being negotiated, and in the ‘ jurists of repute ’ whom they appoint to represent them for these purposes : for men bear a long grudge against those whom they once have wronged.

“ But from the same conditions we expect the same results : from our general stock, from our American climate, our American neighbours, our Americanised citizens, the primary virtues ; from our British immigrants and our ‘ loyalists ’ the virtues of patience, loyalty, and fidelity to our past and to the mother-land ; and from our French partners—

if we do our duty by them and unite with them and add the Fleurs-de-Lys of France, which has now no other home upon the wide earth, to the flag of Great Britain and Ireland and to the Maple-leaf of Canada—from the French we expect all that Greece gave to Rome; language, literature, logic, science, and art; courtesy, good manners and the power of attracting alien races (as the Briton and Roman have never attracted them); historic memories and a sense of the past; independence of mind and freedom from that tyranny of custom and convention under which the Briton and the Roman have continually fallen; in short the genius and imagination, which reach their highest power only in Greeks and Frenchmen; the genius and imagination which renewed the world once, at the Renaissance, by the rediscovery of Greek literature (a literature whose geographical speculations prompted in some measure the discovery of Atlantis) which renewed the world again, two hundred years later, one hundred years ago, by the spirit of the French Revolution.

“And now, Plato, I have exhausted myself, and you, and my theme: Is there not here in this part of Atlantis material adapted to your trinity of virtues? Is not this ‘Canada’ of ours (so it is called), is not ‘Canada’ a dog, yea and more than a dog, that she also should do this great thing?”

MAURICE HUTTON

WHY THE CONSERVATIVES FAILED

TH**ERE** is a sound basis in human nature for the existence of a Conservative and a Liberal party. There are men who by temperament will hold fast by that which has been tried, who will rather endure the ills they have than fly to others that they know not of. These are the Conservatives. There are also those who have less dread of change, who have a clearer perception of the evils which they endure than of the good, and think that the two can be made more clearly distinct. These are the Liberals.

When the people holding these opposing opinions band themselves together in the public interest, as Burke puts it, to make those opinions to prevail, then two parties are created. A contest between these parties compels both to occupy a middle ground, as neither the one nor the other can prevail extremely. A compromise between extremes is the essence of political wisdom, since neither can be exactly right or exactly wrong; the foolishness of two fools is of more value than the wisdom of one. At any rate such is the system which the genius of British Institutions has decreed.

One who offers an opinion upon the one side or the other is thereby interesting himself in public affairs, is engaging in politics; but there is a tradition sedulously propagated by interested persons that public affairs must be left to a special class known as "politicians". Therein lies the root of all public evil. It breeds oligarchy, whether it be the oligarchy of a royal or priestly caste; and tyranny, whether it be the tyranny of king, caucus, committee, or boss.

The "politicians" would have us believe that it is they alone who understand politics, that no one is qualified to express an opinion upon public affairs unless he has stood for election; and, if elected, that his authority is increased

if he has undergone the ordeal of petition or counter-petition for his unseating. A political economist is, according to him, a mere theoretician, a moralist concerned only about the right and the wrong of things; and a University chair a convenient place from which abstractions may be uttered to boys. But the impression is not now so strong as it used to be that a professor is necessarily a fool, and that he must look this way and that when he speaks upon public affairs.

All truth is one, and an investigation into any part of it reduces the proclivity for lying about the rest. A man whose business it is to disclose the truth as he sees it in any one department of knowledge is more liable to stumble upon the truth in another department—even of public affairs—than he who is only concerned about success in controversy. One of the most interesting phenomena of human life is an election, and its results lend themselves to investigation as readily as any other operation of the common mind. It is in this spirit that I shall endeavour to set forth the reason why the Conservatives failed in their appeal to the electors of Canada on October 26th, 1908; and we shall begin with the assumption which few will contradict, that they have failed; though, by making this bold assumption, one may lay one's self open to the charge of being an enemy either secret or open. Possibly also, on the other hand, one may be considered a friend in virtue of telling the truth, or even an enemy for the same reason.

It is a sound maxim in politics as well as in many other departments of life that words do occasionally convey a meaning to intelligent persons, which cannot be entirely taken away by a further arrangement of words. When Mr. Borden declared, for example, that the State should own the telephones and telegraphs he was so understood; and no reservations, or limitations, or restrictions which he made served entirely to remove the impression from simple minds that he had meant something when he announced State ownership as a principle of the Conservative party.

The more cynically minded laid more stress upon the qualifications of the statement than upon the statement itself, and in the end the question became so involved that both simple and cynical arrived at one of two conclusions: that he meant nothing or did not know himself what he meant. He pleased neither Socialist nor Conservative. He confused those electors whose intelligence is not very acute, and who yet demand that they shall be told in plain terms what they are asked to vote for. It is a good practice in politics to have a meaning, or in default of that to say the same thing on each successive occasion when speech is required. At Halifax, Mr. Borden declared for public ownership: in Parliament he proposed to put the National Railway under a Commission, which is an example of different things.

In face of his own demonstration that whatever a Government does it does badly, it was assuming too great a degree of simplicity on the part of the electors to expect that they would entrust to any Government which he might provide further opportunities for mismanagement. A man may be a Socialist or a Conservative. Few men are both at the same time, and it was to this small minority Mr. Borden appealed with his proclamation of State-ownership. That is the first reason why he failed; not being Conservative, and not being Radical when he seemed to be so.

On the Monday preceding the election Mr. Borden issued from Halifax a manifesto which bears evidence of having been written by his own hand without the advice which his colleagues might have given. In it he told the people what he proposed to do, but he neglected to tell them how he was going to do it. He promised them a Cabinet worthy of their highest ideals, but he neglected to mention the names of those ideal ministers whom he proposed should sit with him. He did not tell them who was to be Minister of Finance instead of Mr. Fielding, who was to replace Mr. Fisher as Minister of Agriculture, who was to be Postmaster-General instead of Mr. Lemieux, who was to have Mr. Graham's portfolio of Railways, who was to be Minister of Customs, of Inland

Revenue, departments, be it noted, against which no breath of scandal has been uttered.

Everyone knows that it is not customary for a leader of a party to disclose this information in advance, in case certain interests might be alienated. But in the present circumstances the people were of an enquiring mind and no longer disposed to open their mouth and shut their eyes. If the leader had given some sign it would have been welcome to a perplexed public. It would have been just as useful to the Conservatives if Mr. Borden had issued the Decalogue as a manifesto; and when he promised restitution "by all constitutional means of the pillaged public domain" he might well have made clear that such restitution would be exacted from his own friends as well as from his opponents. By being all things to all men one may gain some: more commonly one loses all. That is the second reason why Mr. Borden lost.

The liberal policy of expending money which has been carried out so faithfully for the past twelve years appealed to the imagination of the electors. People like to see things done in a grand way,—ships going in search of the North Pole, railways building to frozen seas, and bridges projected across mighty rivers. They are not much concerned if the bridges fall down, if the railways have their terminals in a wilderness, or if their Arctic expeditions never get much beyond Quebec. They would more willingly build an ice-breaker to force the North-West passage than one to make daily and continuous trips across the Northumberland Straits upon the homely business of carrying freight, passengers, and mails, even if the solemn terms of Confederation are flagrantly broken by the neglect of these humble services.

The electors have the impression that, somehow, a great deal of money has been spent, much wasted, and probably a portion of it misapplied; but under the present fiscal system they have no clear apprehension of where that money came from. Each elector supposes that his neighbour supplies it, or the local merchant, or the importer in Montreal, or the producer or the consumer—anybody but himself—and there

is nothing so delectable as spending money which one has not earned. Indeed there is something amusing in the spectacle of persons spending money foolishly so long as it is not one's own. For example, it is intensely comical to hear that a ship has been despatched into the North with provisions enough for thirty years, especially when " pemmican " forms part of the cargo. An elector will not vote against a Government which amuses him at the expense of his neighbour.

The fact of the matter is that primitive communities like our own look with a lenient eye upon public robbery. It is only when men have robbed enough from the common store that they have an apprehension of the heinousness of robbery. That has been the history of the race. At first men robbed with a club in their hands, then with a sword, and now they employ the most efficient means of all, a vote of Parliament. Until we have country houses in Canada, inhabited by important families, represented as such in the councils of the country, satisfied, and resolute to protect what they have procured, by creating a sentiment in favour of vested rights, we shall probably see the policy of adventure succeed.

The masterly management by the Liberal leader of the last session of Parliament produced its effect. He looks upon British Institutions with a fresh eye. He admires them unreservedly and allows to them their perfect work. With dignity and patience he permitted the utmost freedom of discussion; and when his opponents chose to obstruct the business of the country he admitted their perfect right to follow that procedure. The country grew tired of the performance and placed the blame where it obviously appeared to belong, failing to remember that the Opposition had been striving to retain the privilege of examining original documents. He allowed one of his followers to make the amazing assertion—amazing, though perfectly true—that the minority has no rights except those which the majority allows to it, only to have an opponent protest, " You have had your turn, it is our turn now," in utter forgetfulness that possibly it might

occur to the people at large that perhaps it was their turn to govern themselves.

The record in Canada shows that a man of strong personality can retain the government so long as he chooses, unless he commit some flagrant breach of public morality such as happened in 1872. The Conservatives endeavoured to fasten a like charge upon their opponents, but the people did not believe that they were telling the truth. When a person cries, "stop thief," and the person who is addressed stops and demands that the charge be proven, the situation is embarrassing for him, and no great commotion is likely to ensue. If he does not prove the charge he is apt to be regarded as a traducer or a disturber of the peace. In these days the people are interested not in what a man says but in what he can prove. At any rate the Conservatives did not prove up to the limit of their assertions; certainly not in the way in which the Liberals proved it in 1873, and again in 1891, though it must be conceded that the Government did not display any great alacrity to assist them, as Sir John Thompson did on the previous occasion. The country was offended by the aspersions which were cast upon it and did not look with toleration upon the traducers of its public men. Canada occupies too important a place in the world to permit indulgence in the political methods of the mining camp. There is an obligation upon us to behave with the reserve which is proper for self-respecting people, and upon public men to remember the maxim, that whilst they are patriots they must not forget to be gentlemen.

An explanation which appears to find favour in the defeated party is that the country was bought. To accept that as a reason is either a mark of political stupidity or perhaps it would be more charitable to consider it merely a sign of temporary irritation. You cannot buy a million voters any more than you can buy rain or sunlight. Of course, water and candles may be procured in the proper

markets, and there are some electors who would sell their votes as quickly as they would sell a sheep. Indeed they fail to see any object in giving a man a vote if he is prevented from disposing of it to such advantage as he thinks best.

One must not, however, neglect to estimate the importance of that most subtle of all influences, the suggestion that upon certain conditions a public expenditure of money will be made in a constituency for a building, a canal, a railway, or a tunnel. People will do in the mass what they will not do as individuals. If all the promises which were made before the elections are fulfilled, one will see such canals in Canada as were never dreamed of by the Martians, and edifices which will rival the Pyramids of Egypt or the Stonehenge of the Druids.

There is another and a more sinister reason why the Conservatives failed. In comparison with it "practical" politicians agree that all else is mere conjecture and fanciful speculation. The party actually in power has the money, and always will have it so long as the contributors believe that the party will succeed. If, from dissension within or from clamour from without, they judge that there is grave danger of defeat, they will transfer their fund to the opposite side as they did in 1896. This fund contributed by beneficiaries of the Government is not necessarily used for purposes which are condemned by the "Election Act." It is employed for the accessories of the campaign, hiring speakers, sending out "literature," paying for bands and processions, purchasing torches and newspapers, and other engines for influencing public opinion.

The publication of election expenses by candidates is a feeble farce. In one case which came into the Courts in Montreal the candidate had given his expenses as under three hundred dollars, whereas it was proven that seven thousand had been spent. A candidate may allow a reasonable sum to his agent for legitimate purposes: there is nothing to prevent a well-disposed outsider from coming into the constituency and operating on his own account. Under ordinary circum-

stances these contributors hold the balance between the two parties, and will continue to hold it until each party is compelled to publish the amount of its campaign fund and the names of the contributors to it.

A defeated candidate has written over his own name (*Montreal Gazette*, November 14th) that his opponent, who occupied a high place in the last Parliament, made use of the following words at a joint meeting:

"Gentlemen: the Government Engineer is here with me. He will take contracts after the meeting for the construction of the new breakwater. See him and arrange with him for loading the stone and hauling the timber."

This writer continues: "The purchase of timber needed for the breakwater was divided up between nearly all the electors of the place, so that each sold three pieces. We used to meet them even on polling day carrying their three logs and stopping at the polls to cast their votes. . . . Of course, men were working at piers and breakwaters in several places on contracts which had been held back until the campaign."

To put the matter briefly, the Conservatives failed because their campaign was too picayune. The issues which they presented were too small. In reality there are only two questions which could vitally interest the country: whether it shall be handed over entirely to manufacturers for exploitation, and what arrangements shall be made by which Canada shall take her proper place in the Empire. Upon the Imperial question Mr. Borden said nothing and Sir Wilfrid Laurier did something. He gave to English goods a preference in our markets and Mr. Borden declared that something should have been exacted in return. Mr. Chamberlain thought this preference was not of much value to England. Lord Milner thinks it is. We think that it is of value to us.

Speaking before the assembled Premiers in 1902, Mr. Chamberlain said: "While I cannot but gratefully acknowledge the intention of this proposal and its sentimental value as a proof of good-will and affection; yet its substantial results

have been altogether disappointing to us. The total increase of the trade of Canada with foreigners during the period named was 69 per cent. and the total increase of British trade was only 48 per cent."

Speaking before the Montreal Board of Trade, November 20th, 1908, Lord Milner said: "Every now and then some belated or ill-informed free-importer still ventures to deny the benefit which the trade of the United Kingdom has derived from the existing Canadian preference. But it is impossible for any fair-minded man to resist the conclusion that 'preference has kept Great Britain from losing such trade with Canada as she still has got.'" He also quotes as an authority a Canadian Customs officer who ventured "to assert in the strongest way that, if such preference had not been granted, British trade with Canada would be on a very small basis to-day." Possibly Mr. Chamberlain is one of these belated and ill-informed free-importers, though one would not suspect it from reading his speeches.

The Edinburgh *Review* is not over confident that a preference will be given to Canadian goods in England. It declares that, in England "Preference is of no value as a topic for speeches: pure Protection must be preached." This *Review* affirms further in the October number that the speeches of Lord St. Aldwyn and Lord Cromer have "demolished the scheme," and that it is improbable that any Unionist Government will attempt to restore it.

However this may be, the electors knew that the Liberals had done something towards reducing the taxation against the Mother Country, which has been more brutally taxed by the Colonies than ever the Colonies were taxed by her, even under the worst of the Georges; and they voted accordingly, at the same time signifying in a poor blind way their allegiance to the principle of a freer trade, which even in the moment of casting the ballot they were aware had been abandoned by those for whom they were about to vote. There are now in Canada two pseudo-Conservative parties, both standing for the same privileges and for the interests of the same class.

It is little wonder then that the voters neglected to exchange the one for the other.

At any rate the preference has been of value to us. It has given us cheaper clothing, and we have endured with some equanimity the sufferings of the woollen manufacturers who apparently cannot succeed with a tariff of thirty per cent. in their favour. Had they themselves borne their sufferings more heroically and refrained from traducing their competitors in Leeds and Bradford, they might have excited our sympathy. At the moment we are more likely to offer them open charity than to allow them the opportunity of benefiting us by charging us higher prices for the clothing which we wear. We would be quite willing to entertain them for the period of their natural lives at the many excellent hotels and clubs in which Montreal or Toronto abound, provided that they release their employés so that they may engage in more lucrative employment, and allow to us the poor privilege of buying our clothing where we can procure it on the most advantageous terms.

In the manifesto to which reference has already been made, Mr. Borden declared for adequate Protection to all Canadian industries, forgetting that protection to all industries is no protection at all, since the essence of all protection is that one industry shall be favoured at the expense of another. As Mr. Crawshay-Williams has explained so sensibly in the *Toronto Globe*, it is obvious that, if any article on which a duty is levied be the raw material of any other industry, that raw material is made more expensive, and the working costs of that industry increased. Those increased costs must be recovered by an increase in the price of the article manufactured, which may very probably be the raw material of some subsequent industry. And so through the whole chain of raw materials and finished products goes the effect of increased prices, and with it, naturally, a demand for protection or further protection on the part of the manufacturers, who in turn are hit by the increased cost of their raw materials and enlarged working expenses.

Mr. Borden was extremely solicitous about the interests of the "labouring men". He would apply the principle of Protection to justify the payment of a fair wage; but he gave no assurance that such wage would be paid by the employers even if it were justified; and he appeared to forget that those of us who are farmers, physicians, professors, ministers, teachers, and clerks are also labouring men for whom no provision was to be made. The country apparently is willing to endure the burden which it carries; it is in no temper to allow that burden to be increased. One at least of Mr. Borden's followers was loud in his protestations that he was "an ardent protectionist," which led men to enquire into the causes of his ardency, and they could not be blamed for concluding that it lay in self-interest.

Tariff reform, if Lord Milner forecasts correctly, is bound to succeed in England, though Mr. Hirst of the London *Economist* prophesies differently. It is a safe guess based upon the results of the elections, that tariff reform would succeed in Canada too. The Conservatives failed, because the oracular utterances of their leader conveyed the impression that it would be reformed, if they succeeded, in a direction contrary to the desire of the electors at large. The Manufacturers' Association affirm that they have taken the tariff out of politics. The people are very likely to bring it in again when they get the chance. By refusing to exact a *quid pro quo* Sir Wilfrid Laurier declared himself to be the true Imperialist. Men who are not traders are extremely suspicious of an Imperialism which is based upon trade and not upon family affection and loyalty to the ideals of the race. A tariff reform Imperialist comes to Canada protesting that the endurance of the Empire depends upon the adoption of a certain economic theory; "and straight he turtle eats; claret crowns his cup"; but one may ask, "what porridge had Mr. Crawshay-Williams?"—for example; and the turtle and claret are supplied by men who are enthusiastic that a preference be given to the manufacturers of England upon all articles, save only those which they themselves produce. It is not this meagre thing

the people of Canada would give to England if they had their way at the polls; but they did what they could by voting for a party which has made some small beginnings in the direction of freer trade.

The electors at large cannot be expected to possess such profound knowledge of the philosophical basis of Government by Party as Mr. Chipman, for example, displays, but in course of time they have developed an instinct that privilege and monopoly are the portion of the Conservatives—prerogatives of the throne, doctrines and practices of feudal times, and the denial of the franchise to men. On the other hand they have learned that Liberalism has always been the voice of popular discontent and the instrument by which those evils were to be overcome. They have not learned that the strife is at an end. The struggle was over in Canada thirty years ago, and Macdonald gave the sign when he named the Tories "Liberal-Conservatives". The present writer ventures to suggest to the Liberals that they designate themselves "Conservative-Liberals"; and with the neatness of an algebraic equation the question is solved, or rather by a process of cancellation it vanishes into nothing. It takes a hundred years to remove a notion from the public mind. There are men in Virginia who think that they are yet voting for Andrew Jackson, and at the last election there were Liberals who voted for Laurier under the impression that they were supporting the principles of Hampden and Pym against those of Wentworth and Laud.

Parties do not change when it is to the interest of the most of the people that they should remain as they are. These interests are often of the slightest but in the bulk powerful. In the smallest village there is at least one person, postmaster, station-master, road-inspector, who thinks his position might be influenced by a reversal. He has friends and relatives, and though they may suppose that they are casting a portentous vote for the eternal principles of Liberalism or Conservatism, in reality they are voting that their neighbour shall not be disturbed in his little place.

It is a principle of which much is heard in these days, that a small "preferential" will produce great results. Even terms have their value. A man will accept a small "honorarium," a larger "fee" or a still larger "salary" for services which could only be procured for very high "wages". A secretary will engage to do work for a salary of fifteen dollars a week for which a stenographer will demand eighteen dollars in wages. Indemnity will apply very well to fifteen hundred dollars a year, but the electors are disposed to view twenty-five hundred dollars in a different light. They are disposed to think that they are paying full value for the parliamentary services which they are receiving, and it must be admitted that there is ground for that view of the case. They have been taught most sedulously that the Liberals might be expected to lay violent hands upon the public money, but they did not discover any resolute opposition on the part of the Conservatives against the "grab" as the procedure was called with some degree of correctness.

There are various minor reasons so insignificant in themselves as to appear almost fanciful, and yet they were not without their force. Many persons were influenced unconsciously to vote for the Liberals because Sir Wilfrid Laurier is possessed of a certain strangeness to them, in his manner of speech, his gesture, his appearance, and because he makes a fine display in public places. When he visits London he is believed to enjoy the unique privilege of "going in by the King's Door." This takes no account, of course, of his urbanity, his sweetness of temper, his vision; since, if one were to insist upon these, one would feel obliged to dwell upon the qualities of his opponent, which if equally admirable are at least not so alluring.

Up to this point we have been upon the firm ground of fact, and saying only those things which any one might discover for himself if he were diligent in reading the newspapers. But there were factors which made for failure in every province and in every riding. They partake more of the nature of surmise, and their estimation may well be undertaken by

the professors of "practical politics" when they meet together in Ottawa during the winter. Reference may be made, however, to the local conditions which prevailed in Ontario and the West to illustrate the importance of a good tactical position.

Sir James Whitney helped Mr. Borden with his hands tied. He could not go into the contest unreservedly because a large portion of his support in Ontario comes from the Catholic and French, who curiously enough, if left to themselves, are nominally Conservative. By attacking Sir Wilfrid Laurier he would alienate this support from himself. Also the Irish Catholics were appeased by the admission of Mr. Murphy to the Cabinet. In the West the people feared that the Grand Trunk Pacific would be hampered if Sir Wilfrid Laurier were beaten. This fear was exaggerated by the action of certain members of the Manitoba Ministry, who in conjunction with an old newspaper campaigner of British Columbia delivered an attack upon the Grand Trunk Pacific. This pamphlet fell into the hands of an unusually undiscerning correspondent of the London *Times*, who cabled its contents to London; and Mr. Hearst's American newspapers participated in the onslaught. The whole incident resembled that of 1892, when the operations of a Canadian journalist in the United States proved so disastrous to the Liberals. Quite improperly the Canadian Pacific Railway which has behaved with benevolent neutrality throughout was blamed for instigating this attack upon its rival. A counter-attack was made upon the Canadian Pacific Railway and the idea was propagated that its whole power was against Sir Wilfrid. This led to a strong movement in his favour, as no Railway Company is enthusiastically beloved by the people whom it serves. Until the Grand Trunk Pacific is finished it will have friends enough in the West to resent any interference with the project; but their enthusiasm will give place to lukewarmness when they begin to pay for using it and they will sigh for "the good old days of the C. P. R." But all this is the com-

mon wisdom of every corner grocery in Canada, and may well be left to the philosophers who spend their spare time in "talking politics" in those comfortable resorts.

And yet, no true Conservative need lament the result. His party is in no condition to undertake the burden of Government. Canada is in the situation of a man who has mortgaged his farm up to the limit, and everyone knows what happens to the heir of an encumbered place. The present good harvest alone averted disaster, by enabling the West to meet or renew its obligations. The last loan of twenty-five million dollars which was offered on the London market ended in a fiasco, notwithstanding the allegations of the "Canadian Associated Press," that organization which costs the country fifteen thousand dollars a year and concerns itself most with recording the manifold activities of Mr. Obadiah Smith and other eminent "Anglo-Canadians."

We have seen that the essential of British Institutions is two properly constituted parties. Canada will be best served if both Liberals and Conservatives get back into those lines which are prescribed by experience. In the present disorder fundamental principles are lost sight of. When there are no principles mere partyism takes their place, and that is commonly referred to as a "curse" which the country will not endure for ever. Possibly government by party is a worn out thing, and when members of Parliament get tired of the present farce they will begin to exercise their common-sense and transact the business of the country as if it were their own. It is now nearly twenty years since the Conservative party abandoned their principles, or about four years before the Liberals abandoned theirs, especially the one which had to do with freer trade.

The break-up began about the time of Macdonald's death. The guiding principle of that statesman was the maintenance of good will between races and between the holders of creeds; but after his death a section of the party became restive. Led by Dalton McCarthy it reverted to the ideas of George Brown, and refused to follow Bowell in his campaign in favour

of the minority in Manitoba. In the last Parliament the Conservatives had 75 members. In the next it will have 87, drawn more generally from the country at large. In a sense it will be more national and less dominated by the influence of one Province and of the ideas referred to. The next occasion of magnitude on which the party showed that it had ceased to be Conservative was the South African war. Had they taken the ground that the war was a just, necessary, and provoked war; that Canadians wished to send a contingent but that the sending should be preceded by a parliamentary vote in its favour, they would have conserved the political status of Canada; they would have assumed a position of deliberative dignity; and when the contingent went it would go after due formality and with a more impressive result. Instead of this they tried to stampede the Liberals into sending a contingent summarily, which displeased Quebec and the Conservative spirit of Canada at the same time. The Liberals made some demur, then yielded. They held Ontario by sending the contingent, and they held Quebec by appearing to yield to an overwhelming public opinion which had been created in its favour.

The Conservative party had always been the real progressive one in Canada, but by their opposition to the building of the Transcontinental Railway they reversed their position and gave fresh colour to the view that they were actuated by a spirit of affection towards the railway which they themselves had created. Again they failed to act Conservatively in the case of the Autonomy Bills. The heart of the situation was that new Provinces were to be created out of a territory in which Catholics had long enjoyed separate school privileges. To deprive any section of the community of its privileges is the exact reverse of the Conservative tradition. But they were under the impression that the Liberals had won in 1896 in virtue of the cry for "provincial rights" instead of by reason of the break-up of the Conservative party; and by adopting that policy they lost their position and the election at the same time.

No party can expect to succeed in Canada which does not recognize frankly and absolutely that the rights of the French are exactly the same as the rights of the English. There must be no suggestion of concession, because there is nothing to concede. There must be no air of condescension or superiority, because politically all are equal. There will be Catholics in Quebec as long as there are Protestants in Ontario, and for every Orangeman there will be at least two Nationalists. Catholics may have their own prejudices in favour of going to church, of educating their children in an atmosphere which is tempered by religious influence, of electing men of their own language to represent them in Parliament. They do not compel us to go to their churches or to our own either; they do not ask us to educate our children in their schools, or even to educate them at all; they do not demand that we shall not vote for a man because he speaks English. The Conservatives will continue to fail until they become Conservative again.

ANDREW MACPHAIL

FISCAL FAIR PLAY

And for the greater security of the weakness of the many, he gave general liberty of indicting for an act of injury: if any one was beaten, maimed, or suffered any violence, any man willing and able was given the right to prosecute the wrongdoer; intending by this to accustom the citizens, like members of the same body, to resent and be sensible of one another's injuries. And there is a saying of his agreeable to this law, for, being asked: What city was best modelled? "That," said he, "where those that are not injured put themselves forward to punish the unjust as much as those that are."—Plutarch's "Solon," XVIII. 5.

MANY persons in considering questions of political economy give undue prominence to the attainment of some political end; and, as practical men, they seek the attainment of their object by the shortest path, regardless of expense. There is some excuse for these, owing to the fickleness of public opinion, and the brief space given to any public man to work out any scheme for the public benefit.

Other political economists give such exclusive attention to economy, that they ignore the political consequences of the rigorous application of their principles. It is the latter reproach to which the Manchester School in England has laid itself open, causing its supporters to be identified with those who are called "Little Englanders."

Both of these classes fail to reach the highest level to which political economy, wisely applied, is capable of bringing a nation. The former have need of patience and must be content to follow sound moral as well as political principles, leaving it to their successors, and to the blessing of an over-

ruling Providence, to bring their schemes to a successful issue. For notwithstanding the achievements of master-minds at important crises in the history of a people, it is, in the long run, righteousness that exalts a nation.

The second school of economists often lose sight of the great political force that binds people into the condition of a perfect nation, when they seek to attain economy at the expense of the higher ideals that lead men and nations to the accomplishment of great deeds.

The true conception of a perfect state is perhaps as clearly as anywhere outlined in the reply of Solon, prefixed to this article, to the enquiry put to him as to what was the most perfect City or State. For there is little doubt that a nation can only reach its highest aim, if every citizen is prepared to make common cause with every one of his fellow-citizens in protecting each from injustice. To make a strong nation, it is much more important that every citizen should feel that he can count on the help of his fellow-citizens when an injustice is done to him, than that the Government of the country should be carried on at the least possible cost, or with the greatest facilities for the acquisition of wealth.

"Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
When wealth accumulates and men decay."

The application of these thoughts to the economic conditions of life, both in the United Kingdom and in Canada, suggests the expediency of a somewhat radical departure from the maxims that have governed our statesmen during the past generation. The triumph in Great Britain of the Free Trade school has silenced, during many years, the voice both of those who claim for agriculture more than it has been allowed to draw from the storehouses of national wealth, and of those who have urged the need of co-operation between the great British communities scattered over the world. Wise, farseeing statesmen fully recognize the need of a material bond uniting peoples together by special privileges, if they are to remain permanently in political union under a common

flag, for we have the highest authority declaring that where the treasure is, there will the heart be also.

The want of a central authority for the direction of imperial affairs, which shall be shared in on equal, or on equitable, terms between all British citizens, not simply under the Crown, but under the Crown with a harmonious body of constitutional advisers drawn from every part of the realm, is a question which remains for solution by the statesmen of Great and Greater Britain. But the question of co-operation in trade is not less important, and does not call for new machinery to put it into operation. It requires simply the recognition on the part of each existing branch of the Empire that it should seek the welfare of every other branch in a special degree, by reason of their common allegiance.

This may call for a change in the trade policy of the Mother Country, partly in the interest of the home agriculturists, who are entitled to the co-operation of their fellow-citizens in taking the necessary steps to offset the unfair conditions to which they are exposed in competition with the outside world, and partly from motives of high imperial policy. The Home agriculturist, having to pay heavy taxes to meet a large national debt and to maintain a powerful naval and military establishment, should be protected from unequal competition with rival producers who are free from such charges; and while, under present conditions, he is entitled to this protection against the colonist, as well as against the foreigner, it is easy to recognize that a condition of affairs may easily be brought about which would make it just and right that the colonist should be relieved from such a charge, when he assumes his proper obligation to defend the British flag. And even anticipating a practical working arrangement to that end, if Great Britain values her external empire, it will be wise for her to take a share in promoting their development, while they are still young, thus creating at least a moral claim to their co-operation against external foes in case of need.

It is in Canada, however, that the full recognition of the duty that rests upon us should be fully realized. At present our trade policy is highly unjust to the Mother Country. It will serve no useful purpose to discuss where the blame lies for this condition of affairs. It suffices to point out that the conditions actually are unfair and call for a remedy. This remedy lies in our own hands. The means for applying it have already been found in the introduction by the Canadian Government of the British Preference. The British world is under a deep debt of gratitude to the Government for the introduction of this principle into the administration of our trade and tariff affairs, and it only remains to carry forward its application to its legitimate and beneficial consequences. And future Governments will deserve well of the nation in proportion to the degree to which they apply its beneficent influence.

It so happens that another line of cleavage exists, practically identical with the line of political allegiance. It lies in this circumstance, that most of our foreign trade is with a nation that maintains a high protective tariff against the products of this country, as well as against the rest of the British Empire and other foreign countries. The fact that we are excluded from American markets by heavy customs duties, while we are admitted freely to the markets of the Mother Country, makes it just, even apart from the question of political allegiance, that we should accord more favourable treatment to the Mother Country which takes our goods free, than to the United States, which does not.

Nor must we make a mistake as to the proper remedy to apply. It is not seeking reciprocity on a large scale with the United States, because that would involve our adopting in some degree their tariff against other countries, or at the very least, would require us to maintain duties relatively even heavier than now on imports from British countries as compared with those on imports from the United States. We can and should seek no relief in this quarter, because it would simply increase the measure of injustice that we at present

display towards the Mother Country. Even those who believe in universal free trade as the proper goal to aim at, should recognize that, before we are justified in moving in that direction, the United States must be prepared for free trade with the whole British Empire, if not with the world at large.

Our proper course is, therefore, to maintain the British preference, treating foreign countries less favourably than the countries of our own Empire. But not only should we maintain this, but we should extend the preference until at least the average rate on British imports is as low as the average rate on imports from the United States. At present the former is 18 per cent. and the latter only 12 per cent. We should not cease extending the British preference until its rates have been reduced to at least the same average as the rate against the most favoured of all foreign countries.

So long as we thus discriminate against British countries on the pretext that our imports from the latter are what are arbitrarily termed raw materials or necessaries of life, so long will the bulk of our imports come from the United States. There is no justification for such a distinction, except on the narrow principles of industrial protection, which have nothing in common with the protection which results from the great political object of binding the different countries of our Empire together.

Heretofore, the trend of tariff reformers in Canada has been to appeal for the support of the farmers by calling for low duties on agricultural implements, and other articles that come mainly from the United States, the effect of which reductions would be simply to aggravate the injustice from which British trade now suffers and which it should be our object to remove.

But the farmers of Canada are no less capable than other classes of realizing the obligations that must be assumed by all good citizens. The farmers are perfectly well aware that Canadian manufacturers of agricultural implements are excluded from selling their goods in the markets of the United States, and therefore, on the principle laid down by Solon,

they are bound to rally to the support of their fellow-citizens in protecting them from the injustice that would arise from their American competitors being allowed free entrance to the markets of Canada. If the farmers are not willing to co-operate with the Canadian manufacturers, in securing fair play in the game of supplying the markets of the two countries, they are recreant to their duty as good citizens. If we are ever to be a great nation, we must stand shoulder to shoulder together, and must secure for one another fair play and equal treatment.

But the main object of this paper is to show that, not only would it be unjust to subject Canadian manufacturers to the free competition of their American rivals, who exclude the Canadians from selling in the American markets, but that the interest of the farmers, contrary to the perhaps prevailing impression, is much greater in securing free or freer trade with the Mother Country, than in securing it with the United States. The best market for our export of agricultural produce is the United Kingdom. The price we have to receive for that export we should be allowed to spend there to the greatest advantage. The articles imported from the United States are, in a general way, those for which we in Canada possess equal facilities with the people of the United States for manufacture; and although it is true that manufacture on a large scale is more economical than on a small, the market of Canada for agricultural implements is amply sufficient to permit of their production in Canada on a large enough scale to secure cheapness of output.

It may be quite true that if any one manufacturer in the United States had a monopoly of the supply of the whole United States market, he could turn out his goods on a larger scale than one restricted to the Canadian market; but if we consider that the number of American manufacturers is even larger in proportion to the population of the United States, than the number of Canadian manufacturers is to the population of Canada, our Canadian manufacturer has on an average as large a range of customers as the American, while the

Canadian manufacturers have the same opportunity of manufacturing for the outside world as the American, and therefore there is no legitimate reason why Canadian implements should not be sold as cheaply as American. And if, by and by, a preference is given in the market of the United Kingdom to the colonies over foreigners, the Canadian will have even a better opportunity of profitable manufacture than the American. So much is this realized by the Americans themselves that many of them have established manufactures in Canada for the supply, first, of the Canadian market, and secondly, of the British market in case of a preference being given.

In a word, the Canadians have every natural advantage for the supply of the Canadian market with agricultural implements as cheaply and of as good a quality as the Americans can supply their people. And there is a sufficient number of them to ensure competition among themselves, while a low tariff even on these things from British countries would be a safety valve against combinations to keep up the price.

But coming to the main contention, farmers should be asked to consider how much greater an interest they have in freer trade in those things that are imported from the Mother Country. It may be premised regarding these, that if the Canadian manufacture were to cease entirely, this would still leave untouched the great body of Canadian manufactures, and it would not cease under a 15 per cent. duty. Some three-quarters of Canadian manufactures are of articles chiefly imported from the United States, and only one-quarter of them are imported largely from the United Kingdom.

The following list, representative and not exhaustive, shows the consumption in Canada of various articles of general consumption which can be advantageously imported from the United Kingdom and from other British countries. And although it is not possible to affirm precisely the quantity of these things consumed by the farmers, as distinct from the other inhabitants of Canada, the list is sufficiently

large and the amounts sufficiently great to show that the farmers, who constitute the preponderating element among our people, are the chief consumers of such articles imported or importable from the United Kingdom.

The first column of this list shows the Canadian manufacture according to the bulletin of 1905; the second column the import of the same class of goods in the last complete year for which the returns are published; the third column the annual consumption composed of the manufacture and import combined.

IN THOU. \$	CANADIAN MANUFACTURE	IMPORT 1906	ANNUAL CONSUMPTION
Cotton Manufactures.....	14,223	9,491	23,714
Woollen Manufactures.....	5,764	17,481	23,215
Clothing, Men's and Women's.....	17,020	248	17,268
Hats, Caps and Furs.....	9,104	2,277	11,381
Hosiery and Knit Goods.....	6,682	1,435	8,117
Gloves and Mitts.....	2,423	1,165	3,588
Glass.....	1,630	2,664	4,294
Flax, Dressed (linen, etc.)	241	3,080	3,321
Harness and Saddlery.....	4,800	88	4,888
Rubber Clothing.....	725	50	795
Vinegar and Pickles.....	543	261	804
Sugar, Refined.....	18,268	10,598	28,866
	81,423	48,838	130,251

In the item of clothing, men's and women's, factory and custom made, are all added together, and the raw material (as given in the census of 1901, with 34 per cent. estimated increase, corresponding to the increase in the value of product in the bulletin of 1905) has been deducted, because already included in cotton and woollen manufactures.

We have here \$130,000,000 worth of goods consumed annually, much of which could with advantage be bought from our best customers in the United Kingdom, but for high duties. If the rural population of Canada is over 62

per cent., as it was in the last census, it is fair to assume that a very large proportion of the above articles are consumed by the farmers and their families.

It is, therefore, a much more serious matter for the farmers of Canada to be charged 25 or 30 per cent. over their value for the clothing they wear, for the blankets, flannels, and cottons they use, and for the sugar they consume, than to be overcharged from 12½ to 20 per cent. on agricultural implements and similar things; of which the consumption is slightly over \$20,000,000 a year, of which the details are:

(IN THOU. \$)	CANADIAN MANUFACTURE	IMPORTS.	TOTAL.
Agricultural Implements.....	12,835	1,614	14,449
Carriages and Wagons, Sleighs, Buggies, Wheelbarrows.....	8,347	402	8,749
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	21,182	2,016	23,198
Less exports.....			2,497
			<hr/>
			20,701

The duties collected on the several articles mentioned in the first list, namely, on the articles importable from British countries, amount to \$12,000,000 on an import value of \$48,800,000. If the price of the Canadian manufactures is advanced by the import duties to the full amount of the duty, this would represent, on the \$81,000,000 of Canadian manufacture, a sum of \$20,000,000 paid by the people, none of which reaches the treasury. Of course on many of the articles this is not the case; but on many of them it is literally true, particularly, in those things for which the manufacturers have been demanding an increase of duties.

To put the matter in a more concrete form, take the \$5,700,000 worth of woollen goods manufactured in Canada. The British preferential rate on blankets and flannels, under the latest tariff is 22½ per cent.; on tweeds, over-coatings and other kinds of cloth it is 30 per cent. It is reasonable to believe that prices equal to these rates, added to the price at

which they could be imported, are already charged in full on Canadian-made goods, because the Manufacturers' Association is clamouring for an increase in the rate of duty. The duties on woollen goods imported in 1907 from British countries averaged twenty-seven per cent. Assuming that the \$5,700,000 represents a value equivalent to the British export price plus twenty-seven per cent., it is reasonably certain that consumers in Canada are paying 27 per cent. on \$4,538,000, the reduced value of the output of the Canadian mills. It is possible that this may include, perhaps two per cent. paid on partly manufactured materials. Deducting this, it will be fair to infer that we are paying 25 per cent. additional price for our woollens over the value at which they could be imported, none of which goes into the national treasury. This means that the people of Canada are paying \$1,134,500 a year more than their worth for the privilege of having these goods manufactured in the country, with the effect of destroying a natural and profitable trade with the United Kingdom, which receives free of duty all the agricultural produce we can send.

And this is no infant industry; it has been in existence since long before the National Policy, and if it is not able to stand on its feet by now, it is reasonable to think that it never will be, and that our farmers and the other consumers of Canada will continue, in the future as in the past, to pay over a million dollars a year for the purpose of crippling this branch of import trade.

If the farmers could be brought to understand the full meaning of this duty, they would see that it is just as unfair to our own people and to the other British people who buy our farm produce, as it would be to fine every farmer who wanted to buy a set of blankets, or a suit of clothes, from Carsley or Eaton, who offered them to him 25 per cent. less than another storekeeper. The pretence that the farmers should be forced to pay a dollar and a quarter for a dollar's worth of goods implies that their British customers are not entitled to the fair play which they grant to us in their markets.

There may be some force in the contention that we should not extend the British preference until Britain is prepared to reciprocate by giving us a preference in her markets over her foreign competitors. But if we expect that such a preference will be given us in the near future, we ought to be very careful not to encourage further investment of capital in those industries that would suffer by British competition when the duty is taken off. I fully believe that there are certain branches of our woollen industry that would not suffer if the duty were reduced to $12\frac{1}{2}$ or 15 per cent. There are certain lines in which we are able to compete with all the world, although the manufacturers will not be ready to admit it. But we should confine the manufacturing industries to those lines which can maintain themselves on a fifteen per cent. duty, because unquestionably the people of Canada will not long consent to be taxed for their benefit, and will not allow the continued denial to our British customers of the only offset we are able to make in the way of tariff concessions for any preference they may be willing to grant us on our Canadian produce.

Let us confine our manufactures to those things in which the competition of the Mother Country is not an important item, or in which we are able to hold our own in competition with them, and any preference that she may decide to give in her markets will extend to Canadian manufactures as well as to Canadian farm produce, unless we foolishly refuse to make any return for the preference that she is likely to offer us.

One contention of the manufacturers is that we should maintain these duties in order that they may pay higher wages to their employees than are paid in Great Britain.

The wages paid in the woollen manufacture average \$325.00 per employee per year (bulletin 1905). In the figures given for the number of men and women respectively, the wage-earners only are evidently included, and those on salary excluded, and the rates paid amount to \$6.50 per week for men, and \$4.28 for women. Comparing these with the

rates paid in the United Kingdom in the textile industries, as given in the supplement to the Encyclopædia Britannica, the rates there are \$5.79 per week for men, and \$3.31 for women. A duty of 8.6 per cent. would suffice to offset the difference in rate of wages paid.

If our farmers think that the Canadian employees are being paid unreasonably small wages: if they can get their blankets and clothes manufactured at this price, but if they are so self-denying as to be willing to pay more; they will be simply offering encouragement to labourers to leave the farms, where more labour is urgently needed, and to flock to the cities, where the conditions of life are less advantageous to the country as a whole than in the rural districts. Three hundred dollars a year would be pretty good wages in the country, and it is hard to see why farmers ought to be willing to pay more to those who choose to work in the cities, for the purpose of producing goods which will cost, when produced, at least one-quarter as much again as they are worth, that is 25 per cent. more than they can be laid down for in Canada, after paying freight, insurance, and other charges.

The same is true of cottons, in which the rate of wages in Canada was \$295.00 a year, and the rate paid to men \$7.00 per week, and to women, \$4.81; compared with the rate given above in the United Kingdom for textiles of \$5.79 for men, and \$3.31 for women. In this industry we are paying at the very least 20 per cent. above the value of the goods for the purpose of having them manufactured in Canada, instead of having them imported from the Mother Country. The Canadian manufacture is given at \$14,223,000, on which 20 per cent. would be \$2,844,000, but even if we allow that this value is equivalent to the import price, plus the lowest rate of import duty, we may reduce the census value to \$11,850,000, on which 20 per cent. represents a loss of \$2,370,000 in a single year, paid by the people, but not into the public treasury. On these two items, of cottons and woollens, the loss is there-

fore \$3,600,000 to the detriment of our trade with the Mother Country, and to the farmers and other consumers in the country.

A word may be added on the item of clothing. It may be that a similar loss occurs in these; but many in that trade, including the largest manufacturers, declare that they could compete with the Mother Country, if they could obtain their cloth free of duty, or if the cloth be not free, at a rate upon clothing sufficient to offset the duty on their raw material.

A great deal is being said by the woollen manufacturers of the great injury the people are doing themselves by persisting in buying shoddy, that is cloth made from old cloth, instead of the excellent wares made in the Canadian mills from raw wool. They have been very aptly told that if the people want shoddy, they are entitled to have shoddy; and there is no reason why a man should be prevented from buying a new suit of clothes every year, instead of having to wear the same suit for two years.

The accusation that disease may be carried from the use of shoddy cloth, if the rags from which shoddy is made have come from an unhealthy quarter, is a wilful libel against trade rivals. No one knows better than those making the charge that rags used in making cloth are subjected to chemical processes which completely disinfect them, and make it impossible for any impurity to remain. But if this contention were an honest one, the remedy is evidently to exclude such goods and the materials they are made from altogether; and what would then become of the Canadian manufacturers, who also make shoddy or cloth from rags; and not from rags obtained in Canada, but imported from the very same places as those that are used in the factories in Yorkshire, whose goods have a world-wide reputation for excellence both in quality and finish?

The item of sugar would have to be dealt with in a different manner, as a very large revenue duty is levied on the raw sugar, and it would require a special examination to determine whether the duty on refined sugar is excessive

or not. The other articles in the list given follow, for the most part, the course of reasoning suggested for woollens and cottons, and in a general way it is quite certain that protective duties impose a burden on the Canadian public equal to the rate of the minimum tariff, and any reduction in that tariff which would encourage return imports to a value approximating the value of our exports would either largely increase the revenues required for national purposes or would be a direct saving to the farming and consuming population of Canada.

ARCHIBALD MCGOUN

THE PLAINT OF ALL LOVERS

O, let me plead with thee to have a nook,
A garden nook, not far from thy domain,
That there, with harp, and voice, and poet-book,
I may be true to thee, and, passion-fain,
Rehearse the songs of nature once again ;
The songs of Cynthia wandering by the brook,
To soothe the raptures of a lover's pain,—
And thou, of Phyllis with her shepherd's crook.

I die to serve thee, and for this alone,
To be thy bard elect from day to day,
I would forgo the right to fill a throne.
I would consent to be the famine-prey
Of some fierce pard, if ere the night were flown,
I could subdue thy spirit to my sway.

MAX HEINRICH


BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND CANADA

IV.—THE ASHBURTON TREATY : AN AFTERWORD

SINCE the article upon the Ashburton Treaty was printed in the University Magazine, October, 1907, the writer has examined in the British Museum, a map which originally formed part of the library of King George III. It contains internal evidence that he used it as a map of reference respecting territorial, fishing and other rights in North America, the various coloured lines being added from time to time, and, in all probability, it was used when conferring with his Privy Councillors respecting North American affairs. It must therefore, so far as it goes, be considered as the best authority possible upon the understanding of the British Government respecting the terms of the Treaty of 1783. The base map is the same as that used during the negotiations in Paris, known as Mitchell's map of 1755. There is absolutely nothing to show that it is, as stated by Mr. Everett, United States Minister to Great Britain, in his dispatch of March 31st, 1843, the copy used during the negotiations ; but, on the contrary, other lines, doubtless added by the King's direction, show that he had been using it as a map of reference prior to the Revolution. Nor is it a matter for surprise that both the King and the negotiators of the Treaty of 1783 used the same map, inasmuch as the Mitchell map was the best large-scale map of North America then extant ; rather would the reverse be surprising.

Part of an exact copy of this map has been photographed and is here reproduced in fac-simile. It shows conclusively that the boundary line as agreed on by the plenipotentiaries of the Treaty of Paris in 1783, was essentially the line which was afterwards claimed by the United States. The boundary is shown by a broad red line marked "Boundary as described

Photo-reproduction of portion of King George III map



by Mr. Oswald." It is a fair inference that the line was either drawn by Oswald or under his immediate direction and is, in the highest degree, authoritative. Ignoring the geographical inaccuracies of the map, it shows a due north line running from the source of the St. Croix in Kousaki lake, to the southern watershed of the St. Lawrence and terminating about twenty miles from the latter; thence it follows the watershed southwestward to the head of the Connecticut river. Like all contemporaneous maps, it shows the source of the Restigouche east of the due north line whereas later surveys showed that the line intersected the upper portion of its drainage area. This, however, is an unessential detail, and the spirit of the treaty would have been followed had the boundary been carried westward and northward along the Restigouche watershed till it intersected the St. Lawrence watershed.

As indicated in the main article, the writer is of the opinion that, despite the wording of the Treaty of Paris, Great Britain had, prior to 1842, by possession, exercise of jurisdiction etc., acquired a good title to part of the area lying west of the due north line, north of the St. John river and east of the St. Francis, but that the remainder of the territory south of the St. Lawrence watershed was acquired by the diplomacy of Lord Ashburton, who, therefore, deserves well of Canadians as one who, in part at least, repaired the injury done by the inept and inefficient Oswald whose ignorance of diplomacy made him a pliable instrument in the hands of the United States negotiators. Those who habitually extol United States diplomacy and decry British diplomacy should mark carefully, (1) that, in 1802, the United States Minister at London was instructed that it had been found that the "highlands" had no existence and that he suggest the appointment of a Commission to "determine on a point most proper to be substituted for" the northwest angle of Nova Scotia (the point at which the due north line intersected the highlands) and to fix an arbitrary boundary between the northwest angle and the Con-

necticut river. These instructions "having been communicated to Congress, and thus made a matter of public record, conceded a point which it was never possible to regain."

(2) In 1831, the arbitrator, the King of the Netherlands, rendered his award, which awarded the United States two-thirds of the disputed area and Great Britain one-third. The United States Minister at the Hague, though without instructions, immediately protested the award. "President Jackson was inclined to accept the award. He afterwards regretted that he had not done so." His regret is easily understood, as the Ashburton Treaty awarded Great Britain 900 square miles more than the King of the Netherlands had given. The possession of the area thus obtained, permitted the engineers of the National Transcontinental Railway to locate the line so as to avoid the mountainous region west of Lake Temiscouata.

Reference should be made to the famous "Red Line" map. Shorn of all unnecessary and mythical details, the story runs as follows: Subsequent to the Treaty of Paris, Franklin, at the request of the Count de Vergennes, sent the latter a map on which he, as he stated in a covering letter, had drawn in red the boundary line as agreed on. In 1842, when all the negotiators of the Treaty had passed away, a map was found in the archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Paris. On it was a red line which approximated to the line contended for by Great Britain. It was one of the thousands of maps in the Department; there was no record concerning it; no letter attached to it; no memorandum respecting the authorship of the red line; nothing to give it an authoritative character; nothing to identify it as the map sent by Franklin to Vergennes. When the Ashburton Treaty came before the Senate for ratification, Webster produced this map as evidence that the United States was gaining territory to which, under the Treaty of Paris, she was not entitled. Bearing in mind that Maine and New Hampshire were violently opposed to the terms of the treaty and that the unyielding attitude of their representatives had so embarrassed

Webster that he had been forced to conduct personal negotiations with Lord Ashburton which were reduced to writing only when they had arrived at a definite understanding ; that the settlement was a much more favourable one to Great Britain than the award which the United States had rejected, and that the failure of the negotiations meant the outbreak of hostilities, the writer is convinced that the astute Webster, with an exhibit of very doubtful authenticity, convinced the New England representatives that they were getting more than they were entitled to and thus induced them to accept what was, in reality, a settlement which favoured, in some degree, Great Britain. Unfortunately, Webster also convinced the people of Canada that the Mother Country had been over-reached ; but, as the British Government was aware of the existence of the George III. map, the over-reaching is more apparent than real, and it is certain that, had the existence of the map been known to the Americans, we would not have got any of the disputed territory without fighting for it.

In Fitzmaurice's "Life of Shelburne," and in Moore's "Treaties and Arbitrations," it is stated that this map is the veritable one used in the negotiations of 1782, with Oswald's first line and the line finally agreed on, marked on it. These erroneous statements are based on the dispatch of Mr. Everett, above referred to. The map in the "Life of Shelburne" also shows "Oswald's first line," and Mr. Everett states that the "George III. map contains the same line, partially erased, from Lake Nipissing to the source of the Mississippi." Both the Shelburne map and the Everett dispatch are in error and have reference to portions of two or more lines, showing (1) the province of Quebec according to the Proclamation of 1763, (2) a line indicating the northern boundary of territory claimed by Great Britain, prior to the cession of Canada, as having been ceded to her by the Iroquois, and (3) the 48th parallel, marked "Northern boundary of New England."

* * *

BRANT AND THE BUTLERS

AT JOHNSON HALL appeared an Indian lad, bright, intelligent and keenly observant, who was known as Joseph Brant. Here he met the best company the colony could afford and heard all the questions of the day discussed by those who were prime movers in the country's politics. This boy made the most of all his advantages, for he was destined to become a faithful supporter of Great Britain and a pillar of strength to his own people.

At thirteen years of age Brant followed Sir William Johnson to the battle of Lake George, where the French were defeated and their leader, Baron Deskieu, was mortally wounded. The boy displayed courage though he said "he was seized with such a tremor when the firing began that he was obliged to take hold of a small sapling to steady himself." He was educated by Sir William Johnson; the influential position occupied by his sister, Mollie Brant, in the Baronet's household placed him high in that gentleman's favour. His tact and discretion rendered him a valuable auxiliary in dealing with his own people. He assisted Dr. Steward in a revision of the Church of England Prayer Book, also in translating a portion of the Acts of the Apostles, a short History of the Bible, and the Church Catechism into the Mohawk tongue.

Though the Americans had systematically despoiled and oppressed the natives during the American Revolution, every effort was made to gain the allegiance of the Six Nations. The Oneidas were the only tribe inclined to side with the Colonists, the others remained intensely British in sentiment. Brant declared that they were "steady, not changeable as the wind," that they were in covenant with the King, as their

forefathers had been, adding "The love we have for the memory of Sir William Johnson and the obligations which the Six Nations are under to him must make us guard and protect every member of his family."

Brant (1775) visited England, where his appearance in Indian costume rendered him "an object of much curiosity." Apparently he was able to hold his own with the best in the land. At the Earl of Warwick's request he sat to Romney for a portrait, he contracted an intimacy with James Boswell, and was presented to the King. Promising to bring 3,000 warriors into the field, he received the commission of captain in the British Army. For some time he served as assistant to the Indian agent, Colonel Guy Johnson. When Sir John Johnson and his adherents fled to Canada they were accompanied by Brant and his Mohawks. A story is told which illustrates Brant's shrewdness and dry, sarcastic humour. His former teacher, Dr. Wheelock, wrote endeavouring to secure his aid for the Colonists. In reply Brant referred pleasantly to the happy hours he had passed beneath the Doctor's roof, saying that none had been more blessed than the family devotions, one petition had left an indelible impression: "That they might be able to live as good subjects, to fear God and honour the King." He once visited a certain Jemina Wilkinson, who claimed to re-incarnate in her own person the Saviour of the world. He addressed her in three Indian dialects, all of which she failed to comprehend. "Then, madame," he insisted, "you are not what you profess to be, the Lord understands one language as well as another."

In June, 1777, Brant, who had been elected principal war chief of the Six Nations, with about eighty warriors, ascended the Susquehanna from Oghkwaga to Unadilla. General Herkimer, of the Colonial Militia, with a large force, met him ostensibly to treat on terms of perfect equality. The leaders had been intimate friends, yet Herkimer had planned to have Brant and three of his chiefs murdered. The Indian's sagacity frustrated the plot. Herkimer insisted that he had come on a friendly visit.

"I have five hundred warriors with me, armed and ready for battle," replied Brant. "You are in my power, but we have been friends and neighbours, I will not take advantage of you."

The American writer, Brownell, observes: "We are sorry to record an instance of such unpardonable treachery as Herkimer is said to have planned at this juncture." The border States were perpetually harassed by flying parties of Loyalists and Indians, but the first barbarous deed was committed by the Americans in the murder of the Sachem, Peter Neakes, who had been guilty of no act of positive hostility. The massacre of Cornstalk, his son, Ellenipsico, and a young Delaware chief, still further inflamed the Indian's resentment. During the summer of 1777, when Bourgoyne advanced, Brant and his Mohawks rendered important services, they also took part in a raid on Fort Stanwix. In 1778 Brant's first movement was upon Springfield, a small town at the head of Otsego lake. Most of the men escaped, the place was burnt, with the exception of one house where the Indian chief collected all the women and children, where they remained unharmed.

In an attempt to secure the Indians' neutrality a council was held March, 1778, at Johnstown. The Senecas sent a message expressing their surprise that, "while our tomahawks are sticking in their heads, their wounds bleeding, and their eyes streaming with tears for the loss of their friends at Oriskany, the Commissioners should think of inviting us." The negotiations had no result.

Among the Mohawks falsehood was punished by death, and when they found they could not depend upon the word of their antagonists their contempt for the frontiersmen was extreme.

During this season took place at Wyoming the affair which has been so absurdly misrepresented by poets and romancers. Drake's "Book of the Indians" and Thatcher's "Military Journal" contain distorted accounts of this occurrence which have served as a foundation for ignorant and

unscrupulous writers. "No two accounts seem to agree, and historians have striven to outdo each other in the violence of their expressions of indignation at cruelties and horrors which existed only in their own imaginations," says Brownell, while Stone remarks candidly, "The writer has encountered so much that is false recorded in history as sober verity that he has at times been disposed almost to unequivocal scepticism in regard to uninspired narrative."

Far from being a scene of rustic peace, Wyoming had long been a centre of crime and bloodshed. Bitter hostility existed between the settlers under the Connecticut grant and those from Pennsylvania; during their disputes the colony had been three times virtually destroyed. In this spot the Loyalists had been treated with extreme cruelty. An expedition was being prepared at Wyoming to storm Niagara, and to the British defeat at Niagara meant loss of the West. It is impossible to make war in kid gloves. Prisoners taken by Congress troops were treated with great barbarity, it was natural the Loyalists should retaliate. Nor can we blame the savages—why should these children of nature be expected to rise superior in magnanimity to their civilized brethren? Ten years after the Revolutionary War had ended, Wyoming was still noted for the lawlessness of its inhabitants. The attacking party consisted of 300 British regulars and refugees, and 500 Indians commanded by Colonel John Butler. It has been proved that Brant was not present. "The atrocities may likely have been committed by our own people, the partisans of the Pennite cause certainly afforded Butler active assistance," writes the author of "The Old New York Frontier."

Brownell assures us, "There is many an instance recorded of Brant's interference, even in the heat of conflict, to stay the hand uplifted against the feeble and helpless." He once sent an Indian runner a long distance to restore a baby that had been separated from its mother. At Schoharie he took prisoner a man named Harper who had been an old school-mate, treated him with kindly consideration which Harper

rewarded by meanest treachery. Alexander Harper, a prisoner at Niagara, wrote to his wife, "Brant uses me, and all those taken along with me, exceedingly well." General Haldimand writing to Sir George Germain declared: "The reports assiduously published on all occasions by the enemy of cruelties committed by the Indians are notoriously false, and propagated merely to exasperate the ignorant and deluded people. In this last instance Major Carleton informs me they behaved with the greatest moderation, and did not strip, or in any way ill-use the prisoners." Gansevoort, Colonel of the Third New York Regiment, wrote: "It is a justice due to General Carleton and his successors to declare that from all accounts the prisoners in their power have been treated with much leniency." From the Delaware, April 10th, 1779, Brant wrote: "That your Bostonais may be certified of my conduct towards all those I have captured in these parts, know that I have taken off with me but a small number. Many have I released. Neither were the weak subjected to death, for it is a shame to destroy those who are defenceless. This has been uniformly my conduct throughout the war. These being my sentiments ye have exceedingly angered me by threatening or destroying those who may be considered prisoners, ye are (or once were) brave men. I shall certainly destroy, without distinction, does the like conduct take place in future."

Colonel William Butler, with a regiment of Pennsylvains and a party of Oneidas, burned the Indian towns of Unadilla. In retaliation, Walter Butler led 700 men against the fort in Cherry Valley, commanded by Ichabod Allan. Brant, with his Indians, accompanied the expedition. The savages became uncontrollable and murdered about fifty men, women and children. Later American writers admit that both leaders endeavoured to restrain the infuriated Indians. The women and children taken captive, with the exception of a few retained as hostages, were speedily returned to their friends. Walter Butler wrote to General Schuyler: "I have done everything in my power to restrain the fury of the

Indians from hurting women and children who fell in our hands, or from killing the prisoners, and would have more effectually prevented them, but that they were much incensed by the late destruction of their villages by your people. I shall always continue to act in the same manner. I look on it as beneath the character of a soldier to make war upon women and children."

The Americans endeavoured to make capital out of the murder of the ill-fated Jane McCrea. The youth, beauty and virtues of the victim excited universal sympathy. Burke's eloquence thrilled the House of Commons with the mournful tale, but the facts as exposed in "The Field Book of Sports" by Lossing, who minutely examined all the evidence and who claims to have talked with Miss McCrea's friend, Mrs. McNeil, do not at all agree with the wild assertions made on the subject.

Jane McCrea, the orphan daughter of a Presbyterian minister, was residing with a brother near Fort Edward. She was engaged to a Loyalist named David Jones, who had joined Bourgoyne's army and at the time of the sad occurrence was with General Fraser at Sandy Hill. McCrea was a Whig, and hearing that the British were about to make a descent upon Fort Edward left his home, though his sister refused to accompany him, and remained with a friend, Mrs. McNeil. Knowing that her lover was in the vicinity she may have lingered in hope of seeing him. A party of Indians carried away both guest and hostess. Mrs. McNeil was taken to General Fraser, whose relative she was, and by whom she was hospitably entertained. The following day Indians arrived with a number of scalps; one with dark, luxuriant tresses Mrs. McNeil insisted could only belong to Jane McCrea. Bourgoyne demanded that the supposed murderer should be given up, but as there was no evidence against him he was discharged. The Americans declared that David Jones had sent the Indians for his sweetheart, that they had quarrelled over the reward, and murdered her, and that Bourgoyne was responsible for the barbarity of his allies. David Jones

solemnly denied that he had ever sent for Miss McCrea. Lossing claims that she was killed by a chance shot from some Americans who were pursuing the Indians. Mrs. McNeil, who was familiar with all the circumstances, believed this Bourgoyne was as humane as he could be: he refused to give bounties for scalps, and offered rewards for prisoners for the express purpose of checking the practice of scalping. Jane McCrea's tragic fate was simply a regrettable incident of war.


For the express purpose of exciting hostility against the British, the American leaders not only distorted but also invented facts. Deliberate fictions for political purposes were given as truths. The well-known scalp story of Dr. Franklyn was long believed; recently it has been revived, and included in several books as authentic. Stone tells us: "Among cases of furs at Albany were found eight large packing cases containing scalps taken in the last three years from the inhabitants of New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, cured, dried, hooped and painted with all the Indian triumphant marks, intended to be forwarded to the King of England. They were accompanied by an artfully compiled invoice describing scalps of Congress soldiers, farmers, mothers, 211 girls' scalps, a box of birch bark containing 29 little infants' scalps of various sizes." One would suppose that the vulgarity and penny dreadfulness of tone would at once prove this a hoax, but the fabrication was accepted seriously, and has often been accepted as history until Stone proclaimed that it had been invented by Benjamin Franklyn for "political purposes," to inflame the Colonists against the Loyalists.

In April 1779 Colonel Van Shaiek made an expedition against the Indians, the same year the cruel Sullivan destroyed forty Indian towns. Brant, with Sir John Johnson and the Butlers made a determined resistance on the banks of the Chemung, but were overpowered by the superior force. In the spring of 1781 the Coshocton campaign against the unfriendly Delawares took place. The whites scalped the Indians; an Indian envoy sent to make peace was murdered;

prisoners were butchered in cold blood. The massacre, by the infamous Williams, of Christian Moravian Indians is a dark blot on the history of the United States. The victims numbered ninety, a third of them were women, there were thirty-four children; they were unarmed and died praying for their executioners. The murderers seized a quantity of plunder, furs, horses, etc., and returned to the Ohio without the loss of a man. Two months later the Wyandots won a brilliant victory. An American historian mildly remarks: "The Americans, indeed, had not acquitted themselves like soldiers during the engagement of the previous afternoon, and they availed themselves of the darkness to escape, greatly to the mortification of the Indians and their daring leader, Captain Pipe."

The disaffected people formed a formidable party in the border States. Brant made constant raids on the Mohawk Valley. Their chief object was to seize influential inhabitants and carry them to Canada, where they could be held as hostages, or exchanged for Tory prisoners. General Gordon was taken from his bed at Battletown, several were carried away from Coxsackie, a number from north of Albany, and a bold attempt was made to seize General Schuyler.

Sir John Johnson with his Royal Greens, Butler's Rangers led by Major Walter Butler, and two hundred Indians invaded the Mohawk Valley, 1781. Willett's soldiers fled in a panic, leaving their only field piece to fall into the enemy's hands. Next day a brisk engagement took place at Canada Creek. The Tories were starved and exhausted, having for four days subsisted on half a pound of horseflesh per man. From the contradictory accounts given it is difficult to tell with which side the advantage rested. In this skirmish Walter Butler passed out of the strife into the silence. One account says he was shot dead. Campbell represents him as begging for mercy, which is little in accordance with what is known of the young man's character. Willett, while loudly vaunting his own exploits, thus unfeelingly alludes to his enemy's death:



“Not even the fall of their favourite, Butler, could attract their attention so much as to induce them to take the money, or anything else, out of his pocket, although he was not dead when found by one of our Indians, *who finished his business for him*, and got a considerable bounty.”

The loss of Walter Butler was a heavy blow to the Loyalist cause. With a spirit as dauntless as has ever been celebrated in tale or ballad, he had grudged no sacrifice on behalf of his principles. It was long the fashion to vilify the Butlers; the vindictive clamour of their enemies against them rose so high and shrill that even those for whom they had given all never ventured to raise a voice in their favour, and it is only of recent years that anyone has questioned the truth of accusations brought against them. As the “monster Brant” has been proved quite as humane and magnanimous as his white contemporaries, so the “brutal Butlers” were brave and loyal gentlemen viewed through a dark mist of prejudice. The attitude of the Tories was much the same as that of the Legitimist nobles during the French Revolution. They fought for king and country, in defence of their own homes and possessions; giving up all for loyalty, they wandered forth beggars on the face of the earth.

The Butlers were men of education and position. Colonel John Butler's estate lay in the Mohawk Valley, north of Butternut Creek and reached westwards to the Unadilla River. He had been Deputy Indian Agent under Sir William Johnson and had distinguished himself at the battle of Lake George (Sept. 8, 1755), also at the siege of Niagara. He raised a body of irregular troops, Butler's Rangers, which played a conspicuous part in the Border War. In 1778 barracks were erected for them at Niagara-on-the-Lake; the remains of their guard house still stands; on the common near it is now proposed to erect a monument to the memory of these devoted patriots.

Those who knew Colonel Butler best claim that his conduct was uniformly characterized by humanity. When the Wells family were killed at Cherry Valley he exclaimed: “I

would have gone miles on my hands and knees to save them." Mollie Brant had determined on the destruction of Colonel Stacey, then prisoner at Niagara. She informed Colonel Butler that in a dream she had seen the Indians kicking the prisoner's head about the Fort. Butler temporized by giving her a small keg of rum on which Stacy's face had been painted. This did not satisfy the copper-coloured Herodias, who declared she had been visited by another vision in which the Indians were using the Yankee's head, with the hat on, as a football. Another keg of rum was supplied, but the Colonel assured her definitely that the prisoner would never be surrendered to the savages. The British Government gave Colonel Butler for his services a pension of \$3,500 per annum and 5,000 acres of land on the Niagara River. The tablet raised to his memory, in St. Mark's Church, at Niagara-on-the-Lake, proves the estimation in which he was held by his own people.

When Walter Butler was a popular young law student at Albany no voice was raised against him. In 1777 he was arrested and condemned to death as a spy; being reprieved he spent nearly a year in gaol at Albany. His friends aided him to escape, though his mother and the younger members of the family were detained as hostages. Cast adrift on the world, driven desperate by wrong and injustice, the indignation burning his heart expressed itself in fiery action, but there is no reliable evidence that Walter Butler transgressed the rules of civilized warfare. Malice painted him in the blackest colours, but present day American writers, examining facts with more impartial judgement, are beginning to assume a different position. "His barbarities were greatly exaggerated by reports embodied in history and poetry," admits Hildreth, while Lossing, a most prejudiced writer, frankly acknowledges, "His personal deeds at Wyoming were not so heinous as common report has made them." In his defence we may quote a manly and straightforward letter dated Feb. 1779, and addressed to General Clinton by Major Butler:—

"We deny any cruelties to have been committed at Wyoming either by whites or Indians; so far to the contrary

that neither man, woman or child was hurt after the capitulation, or woman or child before it. Though, should you call it inhumanity, the killing men, in arms, on the field, we plead guilty. The inhabitants killed at Cherry Valley does not lie at my door, my conscience acquits. If any are guilty (as accessories) it is yourselves, at least in the conduct of some of your officers. First Colonel Hartley, of your force, sent to the Indians the enclosed, being a copy of a letter, charging them with crimes they never committed, and threatening them and their villages with fire and sword and no quarter. The burning of one of your villages then habited only by a few families—your friends—who imagined they might remain in peace and friendship with you till assured a few hours before the arrival of your troops that they should not even receive quarter, took to the woods, and to complete the matter, Colonel Denison and his people appeared again in arms after a solemn capitulation and engagement not to bear arms during the war, and Colonel Denison not performing a promise to release a number of soldiers belonging to Colonel Butler's corps of Rangers, then prisoners among you, were reasons assigned by the Indians to me after the destruction at Cherry Valley for not acting in the same manner as at Wyoming. The prisoners now sent back by me, or any in our, or the Indians' hands, must declare I did all in my power to prevent the Indians killing prisoners, or taking women or children prisoners. Colonel Stacy and several officers of yours will acquit me, and must further declare that they have received every assistance before and since their arrival at this post (Niagara) that could be got to relieve their wants. I must, however, beg leave to observe, that I experienced no humanity, or even common justice during my imprisonment among you."

At the cessation of hostilities, 1782, the ancient country of the Six Nations was within the boundary granted to the Americans. The Senecas offered them land in the Genesee Valley, but they were unwilling to remain in the United States. Finally the English Government settled some of them on the

Bay of Quinté and others near the present city of Brantford. The Mohawks have lived in comfort in this fertile country, learning the gentle arts of peace and becoming law-abiding subjects.

Brant, in 1785, visited England for the purpose of adjusting the Mohawks' claims. "The Great Captain of the Six Nations" was fêted and flattered; among his friends he numbered the Bishop of London, Lord Sidney, Lord Percy, the Earl of Warwick and Earl Moira. Charles Fox presented him with a silver snuff box. He dined with the Prince of Wales and was presented to the King and Queen. Brant appeared at a masquerade clad in all the pomp of Indian finery. A stately Turkish diplomatist was attracted by this picturesque figure. Mistaking Brant's dark skin for a mask, he touched the nose to see what it was made of. Swinging his tomahawk the chief uttered a resounding war whoop. The Indian apparently enjoyed the jest better than the Turk. During this visit the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel brought out, under the King's patronage, a superior edition of Brant's translation of the Gospel of St. Mark into Mohawk, also Indian Psalm and Prayer Books.

In September 1791 Brant and his people won a victory over General St. Claire who had attacked the Miami's villages. The routed forces fled in the wildest confusion, and the Indians seized a number of field pieces, all baggage and field equipage with 400 horses. The enemy's loss was very great.

The Americans now desired peace, and strenuous efforts were made to win this guiding spirit over to their interests. Brant was addressed in flattering, almost servile, terms and finally consented to meet the President. A clever diplomatist he accepted their compliments, listened courteously to the politician's statements concerning their "humane intentions," kept his own counsel and likely smiled in his sleeve. He wrote to the Count de Puisaye: "I was offered a thousand guineas down, and to have full pay and the pension I now receive doubled merely on condition I use my influence to bring about a peace. Afterwards I was offered the pre-

emption right to lands to the amount of £2,000 currency and \$1,500 per annum. This I considered as inconsistent with the principles of honour to receive, as by accepting any of these offers they might expect me to act contrary to His Majesty's interests and the honour of our own nation." The Americans advocated schemes that were profitable to themselves and were shocked that others refused to view matters in the same light. It was astonishing that the natives refused to be plundered of their lands. The British were accused of "tampering with the Indians," and Governor Simcoe was guilty of the enormity of advising these unfortunate people not to listen to any terms which did not secure their long contested boundary. With an effrontery almost bordering on the sublime the President wrote to Mr. Jay, then Minister to England:

"There does not remain a doubt in the mind of any well informed person in this country, not shut against conviction, that all the difficulties we have encountered with the Indians—their hostilities, murders of helpless women and innocent children along our frontiers result from the agents of Great Britain in this country."

But never a word is breathed of the long course of fraud, cruelty, rapacity and treachery which had driven the natives desperate.

The Indian war ended in 1795. In his efforts for the moral and social improvement of his people, Brant displayed both astuteness and breadth of view. The Americans abused him because he refused to second their selfish designs. Though he had been a loyal supporter to the British they sometimes doubted his good faith. The truth seems to have been that he was a pure patriot determined to maintain the existence of the Indians as an independent people. His experience taught him that they had nothing to expect from the Americans, with the British he perceived a chance of justice; then his natural shrewdness convinced him that unswerving fidelity was the best policy. Addressing Generals Clinton and Butler at Miamis he said:

“Brothers,—We are of the same opinion as the people of the United States; you consider yourselves an independent people; we are the original inhabitants of this country and sovereigns of the soil, and look upon ourselves as equally independent and free as other nations. This country was given us by the Great Spirit above and we wish to enjoy it.”

With sleepless vigilance Brant watched over his people's interests, yet he was annoyed by many jealousies and animosities. The Mohawks were in a transition stage, being no longer hunters or warriors; nor had they yet entirely settled to agriculture. Ignorant and superstitious they expected a great deal without actually knowing what. “My only crime is,” the chief declared, “that I want to make you a happy people, and for you to be able to call your land your own for ever, and not leaving it doubtful whether it is your own or not.”

Brant lived in the English mode at Burlington, Ontario; his home was the abode of the widest hospitality. His conduct in all the domestic relations seems to have been most exemplary, though his latter years were darkened by family misfortunes. He had proposed writing a history of his own people and commenced to study Greek in order to make a more perfect translation of the Scriptures into Mohawk. Joseph Brant died November 7th, 1807. His last words to his nephew, Togoninhokâreeva, were:

“Have pity on the poor Indians; if you can have any influence with the great, endeavour to do them all the good you can.”

John Brant, determined to vindicate his father's memory, urged the poet, Campbell, to rectify the impression he had given in “Gertrude, of Wyoming.” A contradiction was promised in his next edition, then soon to be published. This was not made, as it should have been, in the text, but in a note. It reads:

“I took the character of Brant in the poem of “Gertrude” from common histories of England, all of which represented him a bloody and bad man (even among savages)

and chief agent in the horrible desolation of Wyoming. Some years after this poem appeared, the son of Brant, a most interesting and intelligent youth, came to England and I formed an acquaintance with him on which I still look back with pleasure. .

“He appealed to my sense of honour and justice on his own part, and that of his sister, to retract the unfair assertion, which, unconscious of its unfairness, I had cast on his father's memory. He then referred to documents which completely satisfied me that the common accounts of Brant's cruelties which I had found in books of travel, in Adolphus and similar histories of England were gross errors, and that, in point of fact, Brant was not even present at that scene of desolation. I ascertained also that he often strove to mitigate the cruelty of Indian warfare. The name of Brant, therefore, remains in my poem, a pure and declared character of fiction.”

Among his authorities, Campbell quotes the Annual Registrar for 1779, uncontradicted for thirty years; also Gordon Massey, Weld, Marshall, and Belsham, all of whom seem to have relied on imagination rather than fact. The poet defends himself by saying: “I took the liberty of a versifier to run away from fact into fancy, like a school boy who never dreams that he is a truant when he rambles on a holiday from school.” Verily, this is an airy and somewhat cruel method of blackening a man's reputation.

BLANCHE LUCILLE MACDONNELL

EVENING

When the white iris folds the drowsing bee,
When the first cricket wakes
The fairy hosts of his enchanted brakes,
When the dark moth has sought the lilac tree
And the young stars, like jasmine of the skies,
Are opening on the silence, Lord, there lies
Dew on Thy rose and dream upon mine eyes.

Lovely the day, when life is robed in splendour,
Walking the ways of God and strong with wine.
But the pale eve is wonderful and tender
And night is more divine.
Fold my faint olives from their shimmering plain,
O shadow of sweet darkness fringed with rain.
Give me tonight again.

Give me today no more. I have bethought me
Silence is more than laughter, sleep than tears.
Sleep like a lover faithfully hath sought me
Down the enduring years.
Where stray the first white fatlings of the fold,
Where the Lent lily droops her earlier gold,
Sleep waits me as of old.

Grant me sweet sleep, for light is unavailing
When patient eyes grow weary of the day.
Young lambs creep close and tender wings are failing,
And I grow tired as they.
Light as the long wave leaves the lonely shore
Our boughs have lost the bloom that morning bore.
Give me today no more.

MARJORIE L. C. PICKTHALL

THE SEARCH FOR THE ULTIMATE

I WAS present recently at a little dinner-party of thoughtful men—the majority of them specialists, some of them teachers of science. The talk turned on that fascinating of fascinating subjects, the ultimate constituents of the cosmos. A professor of chemistry expatiated on a well-worn theme, and showed how complete a system was the atomic theory, and how perfectly it accorded with all and every of the known laws of matter. A professor of physics followed, and showed equally lucidly that science was now able to probe a little farther into the mystery of matter; that the atom was not now the indivisible thing it once was wont to be deemed; and that the theory of ions or electrons was preferable to the theory of atoms. That the ion or the electron was ultimate, however, the speaker seemed loath to admit; and, pressed perhaps by a question or two, he bade us non-specialist interrogators take refuge in a universe of “ether” in which spun an infinity of Kelvinian “vortex rings.” So far well: the atom was good; the ion was better; the vortex ring was best. These were curious, yet perhaps not wholly satisfactory, speculations.

A few days afterwards my curiosity was deepened. In an article by a professor of psychology upon which I alighted, the writer, an eminent authority, asked, “Can the elements at which physical and chemical analysis arrive, ever be final and yet be regarded as something objective, something independent of the conceiving mind? I think not..... Since we can know of nothing unless it has a part in our consciousness, *final* elements must always be as states of consciousness. Atoms, ions, forces, energies, can

never figure as last elements in 'knowledge.'"¹ This gave me pause. The discussion was suddenly and definitely taken out of the region of physics and transferred to the region of psychics.

I puzzled long over that phrase "states of consciousness." And curiously enough, I found, not only that it puzzled, but that it was objected to by, a metaphysician pure and simple. "Consciousness," says Professor Andrew Seth, "as the form of the word proclaims, is an abstraction; it is the quality or characteristic of a subject or conscious being. States are states of the conscious being, then, not states of consciousness."² Evidently the physicist had turned the flank of the chemist; the psychologist that of the physicist; and the metaphysician that of the psychologist.—Little wonder that a humble and questioning non-specialist was by this time in a quandary.

For help now I looked to the philosophers. What did I find? Each philosopher spake in a tone that led one to think that he believed his particular theory really explained the ultimate. But each philosopher seemed to have a theory different from that of every other. Leibniz talked of his "monads"; Spinoza of his "substance"; Fichte of his "ego"; Kant, in addition to his *a priori* notions of space and time, seemed really to believe in his *ding-an-sich*, his *noumena*, his things-in-themselves; Hegel, with greater insight than anybody else, seeing that of the real ultimate we can predicate nothing at all (for to predicate anything of the ultimate would be to split it up into infra or sub-ultimates), Hegel fell back boldly on "non-being"; and Hegel's numerous followers, fearful apparently (in spite of Mr. James Hutchison Stirling, greatly daring) of Hegel's "non-being," fell back, less boldly, on an old-fashioned ultimate, by name "the absolute"—usually spelled, I

¹ August Kirschmann. "Transmutation of the Elements, and the Interior of the Earth." Reprinted from the "Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society of Canada," November, December, 1907, pp. 343, 344.

² Andrew Seth. "The 'New' Psychology and Automatism," in an address to the Edinburgh University Philosophical Society, November 9, 1892. See his "Man's Place in the Cosmos and other Essays." Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1897, pp. 100, 101.

believe, with a capital A. Farther than this, it seems, even philosophy durst not go. For, if I am not mistaken, even Mr. Bradley, the most modern of our philosophers, scrutinize as he does every cranny of philosophical speculation, can offer us, as his explanation of the ultimate, only his explanation of the absolute, and this he calls "Reality."

Towards Mr. Bradley's "Reality" I confess to feeling singularly attracted; though I could wish that he too would fight shy of that word "Absolute." Indeed Professor Seth calls Mr. Bradley's metaphysics "A new Theory of the Absolute."¹ Every time I see that word "Absolute" I think of Mr. Frederic Harrison. Mr. Harrison, agreeing with, and citing, Sir W. Hamilton and Mansel, maintains that the absolute is a "wholly negative conception." "What is the meaning," he asks, "of The Absolute? Absolute is an adjective denoting absence of relations, just as empty denotes absence of contents. Why The Absolute any more than The Empty? The Equal? The Red? The Unmeaning?"² As it happens, Mr. Bradley puts a great deal of meaning into his Absolute or Reality. He attributes to it "sentience." Almost he attributes to it "personality." He actually discusses whether it "consists of souls." And what are we to make of this: "Every flame of passion, chaste or carnal, would still burn in the Absolute unquenched and unabridged, a note absorbed in the harmony of its higher bliss"³? It must be a highly human Absolute, that!

Yet in all these speculations the language of the propounders was such as to lead one to think that they were seeking—indeed had found—not a mere working hypothesis, but the real and ultimate basis of all that is. Professor Seth himself categorically says, "Philosophy, therefore, stands or falls with the possibility of discovering a reasonable meaning or end in the universe."⁴ I presume that by "the universe" he means *the* universe, not merely the little universe

¹ Op. cit., p. 129.

² "The Philosophy of Common Sense," pages 128, 129.

³ "Appearance and Reality," page 172.

⁴ Op. cit., p. 59.

cognoscible by man. Listen, too, to Sir Oliver Lodge, "I look forward to the time when ether in motion will be re-recognized as the fundamental and unique thing in the universe."¹ Which universe has Sir Oliver Lodge in his mind? *the* universe, the sum-total of all that is, and was, or is to be, including in it man himself; or the universe discernible by a few human senses and a human mind?

Is it possible for this human mind to find the ultimate? Can it say of what the whole is fundamentally made up? Is it within its power to determine the unique basis of all that is? Professor Seth, with an audacity that compels our admiration, entitles his latest work "Man's Place in the Cosmos," an entitulation which presupposes the possibility of knowing (i) what man is, and (ii) what the cosmos is.

(i) What, then, is man? If there is any truth at all in any aspect whatsoever of the theory of evolution, man is an integral part of the cosmos, was developed out of the cosmos. Surely there is nothing in man that was not afore-time in cosmos. Man occupies in cosmos a place not very dissimilar to that occupied by tadpole or amoeba. If so, man's consciousness cannot be wholly dissimilar from that of tadpole or amoeba. We are impaled on one or other horn of a simple dilemma. (a) Either a reason capable of comprehending the sum total of all things has been somehow infused into the human organism; or (b) the human organism is but a part of the all, and therefore incapable of comprehending that all. With those who accept the first hypothesis, there is no arguing. They fall back on Faith—perhaps a far more rational and logical proceeding (a "pragmatical" proceeding I suppose it would now be fashionable to call it) than is commonly supposed. With those who accept the second hypothesis, the only argument surely is, How can an organism still in process of development understand the all in which and out of which it is being developed?

(ii) What is this "universe" of which Sir Oliver Lodge and Professor Seth think we can get and ought to get definite

¹ Lecture before the Royal Institution. Reported in *The Times* (weekly edition) of Feb. 28, 1908.

ideas? Well, the "reason" by means of which we get ideas is assuredly limited in its action and range by what is given to it by the senses. And of senses, up to the present, man possesses very few—some nine or ten at most I am told. Mind, consciousness, the intellect, reason, has nothing to work on save what is given it by these nine or ten senses. Accordingly, the universe about which man's reason is able to affirm anything at all is merely that minute portion of the all which is revealed to it by these few avenues of knowledge: it consists wholly of things visible, tangible, audible, olfactable, sapid, ponderable, painful, pleasurable, hot, cold, and so forth; and of the relationships between these which the perceiving and thinking mind creates. Now, it is well to remember that these senses have been developed, have been evolved. Lower down in the scale of life the senses are fewer in number and cruder in character. But if organisms lower than man have fewer or less developed senses, is it not probable that there may be organisms higher than man which have more and more highly developed senses? There is no reason to suppose that, in process of time, if not upon this sphere yet upon some other, many more avenues of knowledge may not be developed. If so, the cosmos of which a being so endowed would be cognizant would surely be a vastly different affair from the cosmos cognoscible by us. Not only so, but the relationships between the contents of such cosmos would also be vastly different, because the reason that was fed by, say n senses, would be very different from the reason that was fed by nine. Does not, in short, the world or universe which we think that we perceive depend entirely upon the apparatus by which we think and perceive?¹

To speak of n senses is, I hope, not irrational. Apparently the senses have been developed by the impingement of external forces upon sensitive protoplasm. Up to the present, only a few external forces have as yet pierced for themselves avenues of entrance—avenues of entrance, at all

¹ To a mind gifted with n senses, the word "limit" would be meaningless, for it connotes something having to do with number or magnitude, that is with time or space.

events, gross enough to be dissected by scalpel and forceps—light-waves, heat-waves, sound-waves, and so forth. What if the goal of evolution were the entrance of all external forces ; what if the goal of evolution were the development of the organism to such a pitch that the physiological wall of demarcation between internal and external, between subject and object, between ego and cosmos, were thrown down, and some incomprehensible process of intussusception or involution prove to be proceeding *pari passu* with the process of evolution ? We see intussusception going on in crude form before our eyes. The animal ingests and assimilates what we call “non-living” matter and transforms it into living protoplasm : carbon and oxygen and nitrogen and phosphorus are transmuted into sentient nerves and reasoning mind. I see no escape from this. To those who would say that “life” is a thing outside matter, a thing which manipulates matter (as Sir Edward Fry so persuasively argues¹), I would propound the following query : Is there in the last-born living organism an integral portion of the actual corporeal structure of the first ? They cannot say “Yes,” because an organism can multiply to infinity. If they say “No,” my position is ceded ; because, then, “life” is not a thing, pieces of which have been handed on ; there is nothing in *Z* that was in *A* ; *Z* consists wholly of pieces of the outside world which have taken on the powers possessed by *A*. The outside world actually becomes the inside world ! The things we see and think about actually become in their turn seers and thinkers ! Percipient and perceived move towards some inconceivable identity.

That an addition to our senses would upset our present conception of the universe we may safely conjecture. For example, suppose two individual consciousnesses, two minds, could coalesce without the intervention of physiological or material media, what would happen ? Would not the relationship between ideas which we call Time have two dimensions, not only one ? The united minds would have

¹ *Contemporary Review*, February, 1906. :

synchronous yet parallel ideas, and between these ideas the relationship would be, not linear, but planar. A coalescence of innumerable minds, were such a thing conceivable, would result in time-relations on a boundless plane. Time, at bottom, is physiological, is, as Saint Augustine long ago hinted, the function of memory. If we had no remembrance of *A* when we were attending to *Z*, *Z* would have no temporal relationship to *A*; all we should know would be *Z*. To a "coalized" mind, a mind that could attend to both *A* and *Z* together, *A* and *Z* would not be temporarily separated. That is to say, to an all-embracing mind, Time would be an all-embracing present. That is to say, there would be no Time.

To speak of such mental coalescence is surely not wholly irrational. Do not those mysteries called "telepathy" and "suggestion" point to some such goal? Who shall put limits to the way mind can act upon mind? That mental "matter," even within the minutest compass, can achieve some astounding miracles, the brain of the bee teaches us.

And as with Time, so with Space. Could two bodies occupy the same space, our conception of the relationship of things material would materially change, and perhaps space itself be found to have not three, but four (or perhaps *n*) dimensions. Space relations are purely physiological, the result of the co-ordination of visual, tactual, muscular (probably also of visceral and aural) and other sensations.

Nor is this conjecture wholly irrational. Monsieur Poincaré, I am told, has mathematically proved that the ion has no "mass,"—mass, that last and supposedly quintessential attribute of matter. If the ion has no mass, which virtually means no materiality, what prevents the coalescence of ions? And ions are supposed to be the substrate of atoms, and atoms the substrate of molecules, and molecules the substrate of things material.

Also (though this may be a hard saying) to what extraordinary, yet cosmic, goal does that mystery of mysteries "sex" point? By themselves, so it seems, the reproductive

cells are neither self-conscious nor able to take-in and build up external matter ; conjoined they become in process of time a being able to ask itself what it itself is ! A portion of the cosmos interrogates itself ! Is the cosmos as a whole in process of becoming a self-conscious entity ? Again, the lower the organism, the simpler this reproductive process ; but how far could the differentiation of sex go, and to what does that differentiation point ? Does it point to a complete and infinite intussusception of the non-ego by the ego, that is of the cosmos by the individual ? If so, our conceptions of the cosmos, that is of " the universe " of which our scientific and philosophical friends talk so glibly, must undergo not a little scientific and philosophical change !

By this time atoms and ions and vortex rings and ether seem to have been left very far behind indeed. To explain the universe by means of these seems to take one back to the days when everything was explained by " earth, air, fire and water."

To an individual with n senses, not only would space and time vanish, would vanish also our puny conceptions of number and magnitude. When we speak of " greatness " or " smallness " we speak only of spatial relationships. Were there no space, there would be no size. So with multiplicity or number. We distinguish A from B because memory recalls A when we perceive or attend to B . Were the sum-total of all things perceptible at once, the Many would dissolve into the One. Does this seem irrationally transcendental ? Then turn the argument the other way. Had we no memory, perceptions would be a series of puncta : we could not recall A when we perceived or attended to B . We could not be cognizant of a " many ". At any given moment, we should only be cognizant of a " one." So also would vanish our present conception of " motion," for motion is but changes in space in periods of time. The conception of motion, is also derived from purely physiological sources. Change the physiology, and you change the conception. Change the machinery and the consciousness is changed.

Is the only consciousness, or is the highest consciousness, in the cosmos that of man, of pigmy man penned to the periphery of a petty planet, itself an insignificant member of an insignificant system, and that system but one of unnumbered hosts thridding an untrodden path through. . . . through How shall we name that from which we are doing our utmost to abstract the limiting conceptions of Space and Time ?

The universe as cognoscible by man is a universe perceived by human senses and conceived by a human mind. For after all, do any of the highly abstract terms utilized by metaphysicians really carry us out of the world of the senses ? What is our widest generalization but an assertion about things of sense ? If we try to abstract or draw away everything given us by the senses, there is nothing left to conceive. Who was ever able to picture to himself "pure being," being or existence deprived of every vestige of those qualities which we attribute to things as they exist for us ? We can no more think of pure Nothing—as apparently Hegel wanted us to, than we can think of pure Everything—as apparently Mr. Bradley wants us to. Each is a mere word, a *flatus vocis*. But out of mere words, no (or rather it seems that any) system of philosophy may be built up.

To this perhaps somebody will answer, "There can not be words without concepts." Indeed ! can there not ? What concept attaches to the word "Infinity" ? None whatsoever. It merely means "lacking limit." It seems to me that there has been a great deal of nonsense written about this word "infinity." What, for example, can we make of such an assertion as that "Every assemblage that has a part 'equivalent' to the whole, is infinite in the Bolzano sense of the term" ?¹ Professor Keyser, the quoter, is sensible. He says flatly, "Do the stars constitute an infinite multitude ? No one knows."² And what is true

¹ Quoted by Cassius Jackson Keyser on "The Axiom of Infinity: A New Presupposition of Thought." "Hibbert Journal," vol. 11, No. 3, p. 542.

² "Hibbert Journal," cit. supra, p. 552.

of the stars is of course true of every other thing conceivable by the human mind. To the oyster at the bottom of his watery world, is the ocean finite or infinite? He does not know. The oyster's world is a moluscan one. Well, man's world is a human one; and, for all that man knows, there may be as much above it and beyond it as there is above and beyond the oyster's.

The ultimate, then, it seems to me, a non-specialist, is undiscoverable, is inconceivable. The very word "ultimate" seems to carry within itself the elements for its own stultification. The moment you posit an ultimate, that moment the mind passes beyond it and asks, "Whence came it?" (A child once asked me, "Who made God?"!) If I am right, then the ultimates which have been chosen by philosophers and specialists will prove themselves to be untenable. The atom is already discarded. If the ion has no mass, what on earth is it? To call it a "force" is to fall back on a *flatus vocis*. I have really no clearer conception of the word "force" than I have of the word "figment." Besides, I cannot imagine a force having no origin and acting upon nothing. The vortex ring presupposes an ether, but what "ether" is, who knows? If it, too, is not a mere *flatus vocis*, it is conceived of—at all events by us simple non-specialists—as a thin, impalpable, structureless sort of smoke or gas in which even flimsy comets can rush without friction. Yet Sir Oliver Lodge tells us that ether has a density fifty-thousand million times that of platinum, and that in a cubic millimetre of it there is an energy equal to that of a million horses working hard for thirty million years. To be able thus to put the ultimate into scales and measure it by horse-power seems seems strange. Strange, indeed, it would seem to beings who could transcend our puny conceptions of magnitude and number. Sir Oliver speaks of "strains" in the ether—so, I believe, does Haeckel. What on earth is a "strain"? It sounds very much like a pull that does not succeed in pulling. What pulls? What does it pull? What prevents it from pulling? As an ultimate, I confess

I cannot pin my faith to an ineffectual pull. "States of consciousness," too, as we have seen, falls to the ground, because beneath the consciousness there must be an entity that is conscious, proving that the "state" cannot be "ultimate." And what shall we say of Leibniz, his "monads," and of Spinoza's "substance," of Fichte's "ego," of Hegel's "non-being," of Spencer's "unknowable," of Schopenhauer's "will" and "idea"; of Mr. Bradley's "reality"? Are they not one and all mere *flatus vocis*, words to which to try to attach a definite meaning is an attempt futile even by those who coin them? Thales and Anaximander and Anaximenes came as near the mark as these. The ultimate that each succeeding age selects as the final explanation of all that is, is governed by the trend and limited by the scope of the knowledge of that age. At best they are but working hypotheses, designed to meet the exigencies of the few laws which seem to govern this little human habitat: a habitat which to beings more evolved than ourselves (and of such somewhere there may be unnumbered hosts) probably seems as exiguous and as gross as do to us the mud and water of the tadpole's pond.

I suppose Mr. Bradley would argue that, just because I recognize limits to human consciousness, by that very fact I posit something beyond human consciousness. Of course I do. But what I decline to do is to give a name to that "something beyond," or to imagine that I can say anything whatsoever about it. A limited mind may be cognizant of its limitations; but can it posit anything whatsoever about anything lying beyond those limitations? That, surely, is the question in a nut-shell. Professor Seth frankly says that philosophy must be "humanistic." We should smile if a frog declared that philosophy must be batrachianistic. Of course a frog's philosophy would be batrachianistic,—and that surely would be its fatal defect. So, surely, the humanisticism of Professor Seth's philosophy is its fatal defect. If Professor Seth replies that we can trust human reason, for that (by my own admission) it is a part of the all, is being

developed in and out of the all, I answer, Yes, so far as it goes ; but it goes scarce any distance. Self-consciousness seems only on the threshold of its emergence—at all events upon this earth. And in the mighty material universe spread out to our gaze, how lowly a position is that occupied by this earth ! After all, too, this mighty and marvellous “universe” of which we prate, what is it ? Just that which comes in at our pupils, our ear-holes, our nostrils, our palate, our finger tips. To us it seems enormous. So does the pond to the frog. Astronomers tell us their most powerful glasses only reveal more worlds, biologists think they have detected ultra-microscopical organisms. Above us and beneath are “universes.” There are universes of stellar systems ; there are universes of microbes ; there are universes of things in which microbes stalk as gigantic monsters. There are universes within universes, interacting, preying upon one another, eating each other up, and all of them apparently in a state of the most frightful commotion,—and all of them, for aught we know, mere phantasms of the mind. Shall man, this “hair-crowned bubble of the dust,” this carbon-compound man, sit down and write out in words a true and succinct account of this All ?

But, I shall be told, he can and does try. Ah ! that is the mystery of mysteries. That this tiny little piece of cosmic “matter” which we call “man” can, as it were, get out of himself, look round upon himself, and himself ask himself “What is this thing called ‘I,’ and what this universe in which I find myself ?” What stupendous questions ! To what does the ability to ask them point ? I do not know. But I do not think it points to an ability to determine either what is the fundamental and unique thing in the universe or what is the reasonable meaning or end of the universe. “Faith” may provide an answer, so may Imagination ;¹ but it will be an answer incapable of

¹ See a remarkably suggestive article on “Knowledge and Faith,” by G. Lowes Dickinson, in the “Hibbert Journal” of April, 1908.

proof. And both Science and Philosophy, apparently, scoff at answers incapable of proof.

. . . But I may be all wrong. I am not a metaphysician. Perhaps a non-specialist should not venture into misty regions like these. If there is any outlet to my *cul de sac* of scientific and philosophical nescience, I shall be glad to hear of it, and, if I can, to crawl through it. There must be many who, though they are neither metaphysicians nor men of science, think upon these things.

ARNOLD HAULTAIN

LAKE MEMPHREMAGOG

O Memphremagog, sea diminutive !

The beauty of the Trosachs bides with thee,

Although not thine the Highland wizardry.

Nor doth the dweller by thy shores receive

The solemn thrill Gennesaret doth give ;

Nor yet the subtle charm that ever breaks

From the old glory of Italian lakes ;

Or Windermere, where Wordsworth still doth live.

But thou a spell for peace hast, of thine own.

Long time ago, the untamed Iroquois,

Mounting Owl's Head or Elephantis, saw

Thy shining beauty in the distance lone.

His heart stirred strangely as, entranced, he stood ;

Grew soft awhile,—forgot its thirst for blood.

ROBERT STANLEY WEIR

REALISM

ARCHDEACON FRENCH has remarked that there are some words which, by their debasement, prove the wickedness of the world. They are like begrimed coins, so marred and tarnished by unclean hands that we no longer see that they are silver and stamped with the image of the King.

There are also current phrases which bespeak the sorrows of the world, and betray that most of us are pessimists at heart. It is "too lovely to last" we say, "too beautiful to be real", "too good to be true". And the same feeling towards life finds expression in the popular use of that much misused word "realism".

Realism is defined as, "the representation of what is real in fact". One might therefore expect the literary realist to exploit and picture that which is pre-eminently real, either because it is normal and typical or because it is enduring. But in these latter days realism too often means a detailed description of the body, which is perishable, or of the things of the body which are more perishable still.

The "realist", so called, analyzes physical passions which the soul will put aside, we hope with the body, when it passes on to the eternities. He diagnoses states of mind and soul which are neurotic and abnormal, and he dwells upon things which are ephemeral, trivial, or unclean, to the neglect of eternal verities.

It is his insistence upon these eternal verities which makes Tolstoi a realist indeed. He can and does describe the bloating and discoloration of a drowned man's body. But that is an episode. The authors of "Gil Blas" and of "Humphry Clinker" can do the like and even worse. But

neither Le Sage nor Smollet could even aspire to do what Tolstoi does in "Resurrection," wherein he describes a moral awakening which is no less than the re-birth of a soul.

In the world's history such a spiritual change has been realized many thousand times. Men and women wide apart in space and time, in temperament and circumstances, have had this great experience in common. This change is brought about by a power no less than the spirit of God which works through all history, and whose power endures through all eternity. Here indeed is realism!—the account of an experience as widespread as humanity, and as lasting as the soul itself.

Thomas Hardy is another realist, indeed, though in latter days he has lost the heavenly vision. Some of his realities, like some of Tolstoi's, are of the earth, earthy, but, like Tolstoi, he portrays also things that are lowly and of good report. "His peasants," says one of his critics, "smell of perspiration." Well! What would one have?—A party of opera peasants, elaborately rouged and curled, forever commenting musically on what is going forward, and leaving whosoever will to look after the babies, the chickens, the cows, and the potatoes?

Giles in the "Woodlanders" may "smell of perspiration," though Hardy, I think, takes that for granted. We are told that his feet are heavy with the mire of the lanes, his clothes stained with the juice of the cider press, and his skin browned with the autumn sun. But when love stirs his soul he shows a self-effacing devotion, a delicate and perfect courtesy which were never excelled by any knight of Arthur's court. The muddy boots and the apple stains are real to be sure. But are the spiritual qualities which outlast the body, let alone its outward conditions, any less real? Our affliction is that literary shrimps and minnows who expend their energies upon descriptions of mire and apple stains, and who ignore aught else, get a name far too good for them and are dubbed realists.

The writer once had the happiness to spend three months in a well-known social settlement. A wide, squalid thoroughfare stretched before the door, and along this, daily, ebbed and flowed a human tide of wage earners. Rickety tenements were behind us. On one side was a rag-and-bone yard; on the other a livery stable which furnished most of the funerals of the neighbourhood. All around us were saloons, pawn-brokers' shops, and sweat shops. Surely, then if ever, we were behind the foot-lights of life's theatre, with opportunities to learn that the cloud-capped towers and gorgeous palaces were merely boards, paint, and dirty canvas.

Did we come to believe that the world was hollow, and all the dolls stuffed with sawdust? The sins of the great city were revealed, but so were the virtues which smell sweet and blossom in the dust. There was found among the poorest Jews the fidelity to revered law which would bear racking hunger, rather than eat the forbidden things. There was the neighborliness which shared the last loaf. One humble friend, a Russian Jewess just helped out of uttermost poverty, opened her tenement rooms and her heart to four still more destitute compatriots, "till he find a shob." These refugees from starvation, having nothing, paid nothing to their hostess, and were welcomed to whatever she had. But later when they were about to receive charity on false pretences this same hostess, at much inconvenience to herself, thought it right to inform those intending to bestow a gift that their money, though asked for one purpose, would be applied to quite another. Her generosity towards compatriots in distress had left no room in her heart for thoughts of self; neither did her love for truth, nor her solicitude in behalf of a benevolent association about to be cheated.

One of the features of settlement life was a weekly debate on industrial and social questions in which workmen, employers, and sometimes clergymen and University professors took part, and among the workmen who spoke most earnestly and often there was one who emphatically maintained against all comers the thesis that "the main-spring of all human

action is selfishness." Yet this very man was twice detected in beautifully unselfish actions, and having done good by stealth he blushed to find it fame. The modern mis-called realist would describe this man's stubbed fingers, his dirty nails, the aroma of tobacco which encompassed him,—ignoring the fine generosity which, though having all these things, he was capable.

Such qualities as he betrayed are shown every day, else were we most miserable. When the mine caves in, or the fire gains headway, or the ship is battering against the rocks, there is always the man ready to risk his life in the effort to save his mates. He emerges from the obscure, human swarm where he would have remained forever unnoticed but for this difficult and perilous occasion—a plain wage-earner, one of the proletariat; perchance, like Jim Bludso, too fond of whiskey, or even, perhaps, "smelling of perspiration."

He comes forward bravely, despite the fact that self-preservation is the first law of nature, and despite his knowledge that he is going to almost certain death. And we wonder how many there are whom no stress of danger has ever called but who also have this seed of Godhood in them. And in life's more trodden ways there is always the Divine compulsion that makes men and women, without clear faith or definite hope of any reward in any world, go on doing the difficult or uninteresting, or perhaps, unpopular right, though with depression or rebellion in their hearts. It is quite as real as the allurements of Evil, and often able to overpower them.

The whole judicial system of civilized communities rests upon the axiom that, in most cases, men tell the truth. Why interrogate witnesses else, or ask the jury what it really thinks? The commercial system is founded upon the assumption that people as a rule keep their promises and pay their debts. Unless rectitude were the rule, lying and sharp practice the exception, civilized society would disintegrate. And the common round of life among the plain people shows many other beautiful realities.

There is the delight of the tenement family over the baby whose arrival means so much less of comfort to every one of them, the faithful fondness of the husband towards the wife from whom every charm has fled, the tender pride of the gray-haired father in the tall daughters whose rearing has cost him so much self-sacrifice. So real indeed is this paternal love that society has invented a device like insurance, enabling the father to, in a measure, defy natural law, and continue to care for his brood even after he has passed through the dark gates of death. It is this strong primal emotion which gives majesty to the squalid death-bed of Père Goriot.

Parental solicitude, though instinctive, is reinforced by reason, conscience, and pressure of public opinion. But there is nothing else but instinct in the confidence with which a baby, hungry, frightened, or in pain, turns to the succouring love that encompasses him. The little creature has accumulated no experience, and has no ability to reason from experience even had he acquired any. This appeal is purely instinctive and means what?—That for uncounted generations, almost unthinkable in number, the little one's helplessness has moved the parent to help and cherish. The confidence with which the baby clings is proof of the parental love of the cave-woman and the cave-man.

Why, therefore, call a book "realistic" because it describes that exceptional case, the desertion of her child by a hysterical woman whose normal instincts have been burned out of her by an unlawful and unholy passion?

Our contention is that the great realists, who are realists indeed, pourtray the holier as well as the baser impulses and emotions. For then the "wheel of life turns high" as well as low. And so they can justly pourtray man, whose feet are defiled with the earth whence he was taken, but whose head is already brightened with the glory of Heaven towards which, ages ago, his face was set.

E. M. HARDINGE

ROMAN LAW

THE object of the present article is to discuss the question how far it is worth while to study the history and the completed system of Roman law; and, as preliminary thereto, it behoves us to consider briefly what law really is. Now if anyone who had not previously considered the question were asked what he understood by law, the probability is that he would first of all think of statute law; he would think of acts of the legislature; but, in fact, statute law forms a very small and even now an almost insignificant part of the whole law. The activity of legislatures is a modern phenomenon, and statute law is but a small part of the law of Rome. The law is a general term to express the infinite number of rules and principles which the courts apply to the various relations and transactions into which people enter. These innumerable rules and principles come from several different sources, but very few of them come from statutes.

Now, in studying the history of Roman law as ordinarily understood, we have to deal with a period of about a thousand years, during which such a system of law was built up and developed. The history of Roman law for our purposes may be said to extend from the year B.C. 451, when what are known as the Twelve Tables are supposed to have been drawn up, to the middle of the sixth century of our era, when Justinian compiled the Digest, the Code, and the Institutes, which have been long known as the Corpus Juris. During that period the law of Rome developed from the mere customs and usages of a small community living in a very small territory on the banks of the Tiber,—a territory not more than about thirty

miles long by about twelve miles broad at the broadest part,—into a system of law fitted to be, and which in fact was, for a time, the law of the whole of the civilized world. For the Roman Empire did in its day comprise the whole of the civilized world.

Edmund Burke in his "Abridgement of English History" says: "What can be more instructive than to search out the first obscure and scanty fountains of that jurisprudence which now waters and enriches whole nations with so abundant and copious a flood; to observe the first principles of right springing up, involved in superstition and polluted by violence, until by length of time and favourable circumstances it has worked itself into clearness."

He is referring to English Law, but what he says is equally applicable to the history of the law of Rome; and more than that, in studying the history of Roman law we are engaged in studying a very important chapter in the history of civilization. The Romans were in truth the first people who ever evolved an adequate conception of the true nature of private law, by private law being meant the law regulating the relations and transactions between private individuals, as distinguished from the law regulating the relations between the State and individuals in the State.

Now, if we look at primitive systems of law, other than the Roman,—systems which have never been influenced by the work done by Rome,—we find that they consist either of customs and usages much intermixed with, and affected by, religious ideas and superstitions, or else of rules imposed by the law-maker mainly for the purpose of restraining acts of violence and wrong. The Romans rose at last to a different conception of what law should be, namely, that it should be an intellectual fabric of rules and principles based on an analysis of the relations and transactions into which men enter in the business of life in their juridical aspect: that is to say, with a view to discovering the rights and obligations expressed or implied in them, which are to be arrived at by a process of reasoning, in the light of justice, common-sense,

expediency, and public policy. In other words, private law is a thing which has to be rather discovered than imposed by the legislature. Such a conception of law, and the working of it out into a completed system, was Rome's great contribution to the intellectual life of the world, and so in the study of her law we are studying one of the main manifestations of the national life and character of that great people, and it goes without saying, therefore, that the study of Roman law will throw a light upon her history.

Now, if we turn to consider the legal system of Rome as ultimately developed, we find that it has to begin with, great intrinsic merits. This, in truth, is only what might be expected. Let us consider for a moment how keen in modern days is the competition among rival careers for the talent and intellect of each generation. Many of our cleverest men we find immersed in commerce, or presiding over the great financial institutions by and through which the extreme commercial development of modern times is carried on. Others devote themselves to literature and the arts. Others again devote themselves to the political life of the age, which has arisen from the development of democratic institutions, and which had no parallel at Rome. During the greater part of Roman history there were but two careers which offered any great inducement to a well-born Roman of high talents. The one was the military career and the other was the pursuit of the law. It is true that during a short period at the commencement of the Empire—during what is known as the Augustan era—there was a great efflorescence of literature, but the Augustan era soon came to an end, and what had been true before was even more true during the latter part of the first century of the Empire, and the whole of the second century, which constitute what is called the classical period of Roman law, the period during which the most distinguished of her jurists lived and worked. During the Imperial period a man of talent, says Sir Henry Maine, "might become a teacher of rhetoric, a commander of frontier posts, or a professional writer of panegyrics. The

only other walk of active life which was open to him was the practice of the law. Through that lay the approach to wealth, to fame, to office, to the council chamber of the monarch—it might be to the very throne itself.” And again Sir Henry Maine says: “The English law has always enjoyed even more than its fair share of the disposable ability of the country; but what would it have been if besides Coke, Somers, Hardwicke, and Mansfield it could have counted Locke, Newton, and the whole strength of Bacon—nay even Milton and Dryden among its chief luminaries,”—the implication being, of course, that such a state of things as he here suggests would in truth have been the case at Rome.

And the respect with which, as might be expected, the Romans regarded their law was itself conducive to the attainment of a high standard. “I consider this little Code,” says Cicero, referring to the Twelve Tables, “worth all the libraries of the philosophers.” And in the definitions at the commencement of Justinian’s Institutes we find Ulpian, one of the greatest of the jurists, defining jurisprudence as, “the knowledge of things human and divine, the science of the just and the unjust”;—a definition, indeed, which has no scientific value because it confuses religion and morality with law properly so called, but which nevertheless indicates the high plane upon which Ulpian placed the law. And we are told that the Grand Pontiff Scaevola rebuked Servius Sulpicius, the rival and friend of Cicero, when he expressed himself at a loss for the proper solution of some legal question, by saying: “It is shameful for a patrician and a noble to be ignorant of the law which governs him.”

And so it is that we find Roman law spoken of in the highest terms of eulogy by those who have been most competent to pronounce upon its merits. Thus, Sir Matthew Hale, the great Chief Justice of the first half of the seventeenth century, it is recorded, often said that the true grounds and reasons of law were so well delivered in the Digest, that a man could never understand law as a science so well as by seeking it there. And Sir Henry Maine, speaking of the

great Roman jurists, refers to their force and elegance of expression, their rectitude of moral view, their immunity from prejudice, their sound and masculine sense and their sensibility to analogies. Rivier, a famous Belgian professor, says that, "It is the union of logic and subtlety which make Roman law the model law." Maine again tells us that: "The Roman jurisprudence throws into definite and concise form of words a variety of legal conceptions which are necessarily realized by English lawyers, but which at present are expressed differently by different authorities and always in vague and general language." Austin, who flourished and lectured in the middle of the last century, declares that: "Turning from the study of the English to the study of Roman law you escape from the empire of chaos and darkness to a world which seems by comparison the region of order and light:" words which, happily, owing largely to the work of Austin himself, are by no means so just and true, so far as English law is concerned, as they were when they were written. English law of that day might well be described as "chaos tempered by Fisher's Digest."

Lastly, to mention one with whose name all lawyers are familiar, and who is certainly up to date, Sir Frederick Pollock writes that: "The original authorities of the Roman system are, compared with our own, compendious, and a moderate amount of systematic application under proper guidance will give a man a range of legal ideas more complete in itself and more conducive to orderly thinking than he is likely to get from any other form of legal study at present practicable."

But there is another and quite different point of view from which the study of Roman law may be commended, and one which may appeal to many minds more strongly than anything already advanced. In one of the Preliminary Constitutions, as they are called, to his compilations, which is called the Constitution 'Tanta,' Justinian, who is never over modest, says: "The whole frame of Roman law being thus set forth and completed in three divisions, namely, one of

the Institutions, one of the Digest or Pandects, and, lastly, one of the Constitutions. . . . we offer this work with dutiful intent to God Almighty for the preservation of mankind." Little could Justinian, or his great lieutenant Tribonian, have known when those words were penned how well future ages would justify the claim which they were making. It has been truly said that with the exception of the Bible, there has been no book which has so profoundly affected Western Civilization as the Corpus Juris of Justinian.

The whole of the civilized world, or at least the whole of the progressive nations of the western world, have one of two systems as the basis of their law: they have either the common law of England or the Civil Law, which is derived directly from the Roman law. In studying the Roman we are studying the basal law of Europe, more or less modified, indeed, by national or local family customs or land customs, or by modern legislation. When the Germanic invaders overran the Western Roman Empire at the end of the fourth century of our era, they by no means desired to impose their German customs upon their Gallo-Roman subjects, or to expel the law under which the latter were living. Such a policy would have been contrary to the ideas of the age. In those times law was looked upon as personal, not as territorial. In these days we look upon law as territorial, that is to say, we look upon law as a system to which every one living in a given country is subject. But in the period of which I am now speaking people looked upon law as something which a man, as it were, carried about with him. Everybody, when brought before a magistrate, had a right to appeal to his own law. Consequently the Germanic conquerors of the Western Empire not only recognized the right of the subject people to live under their own laws but actually had codes of Roman law prepared for their benefit, of which the most famous was the Code of Alaric, King of the Visigoths, which was compiled about the year A.D. 506 and which is the most famous

of all such codes because of its extent and because of the great influence which it had in succeeding ages.

Now this personal view of the law we find existing up to the tenth century. Up to that time we find the accused claiming from the magistrate that he should be judged according to his own law. After the tenth century this idea passed away. People have become fused together, law has become territorial, and the juridical aspect of what had previously been the Roman province of Gaul is this, that in the south Roman law prevails, while in the north Germanic custom prevails, but even in the most Germanized regions there is an admixture of Roman principles. In the twelfth century took place what has been called a great legal renaissance. Famous schools of law were established at Bologna and Pavia and other places. The compilations of Justinian were submitted to the most careful study. More and more an idea developed and spread that Roman law must be regarded as the common law everywhere, and that its principles should be recognized as everywhere binding. We must remember that when in the beginning of the ninth century Germany's Emperor was crowned by the Pope he claimed to be the successor of Augustus; and the Holy Roman Empire, which has been described as "that majestic fiction which dominated the middle ages," claimed to be a new Rome. The natural corollary, therefore, was that the law of old Rome must also be the law of new Rome. In the country which is now known as Germany, indeed, all traces of Roman civilization was at first extirpated. But in the middle ages there came about a very striking event in the history of law, namely: the reception of Roman law en bloc by Germany, a reception which culminated in 1495 by a decree of the Emperor, when founding the great tribunal of the Imperial Chamber, by which he enjoined the judges and assessors to make the Roman law one of the principal sources of their decisions. In Italy the law of Theodosius at first, and the law of Justinian subsequently, were continuously taught and applied.

Then again it must be remembered that Roman law was the law of the Church, and all affairs of which she had the administration were regulated by what came to be called the Canon Law, which was Roman law modified in accordance with the spirit of Christianity and of the Church.

The result is found to be that at the basis of the legal systems, not only of Germany, but of all the countries of Western Europe, which arose out of what had once been the Roman Empire, is found the civil law. Not only is the civil law, or Roman law, the basis of the legal system of Italy, of Greece and of the rest of South-Eastern Europe so far as it is Christian, of Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, France, Germany, and the German and Slavonic parts of Austria, the Hungarian Monarchy, and all Belgium and Holland,—but the leading principles of Roman law prevail also in the adjoining countries of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Russia and Hungary.

Strange to say the only exception to this condition of things in Western Europe is England. It may well seem strange that it should be so, for England was under Roman occupation for a period of nearly four hundred years, ending with A.D. 410. And moreover as to the great revival of the study of Roman law of which I have spoken, the study of it in England dates from a much earlier time than in any Continental country except Italy. Vacarius, the Lombard, a great jurist, was we are told brought over to England by Archbishop Theobald and taught law at Oxford about the year 1150. Roman law was, in fact, received as authoritative in England, as it was in the rest of Europe, up to the time of Bracton, the greatest of the early text writers of English law, at the end of the thirteenth century. After that, however, owing to the growing jealousy of foreign influence, and especially of the influence of the Pope and of the Emperor, the opinion of the courts and lawyers in England turned against the Roman law. Judges even denied the authority of Bracton on account of the great intermixture of Roman law to be found in his book. In after ages a certain

introduction of the principles of Roman law into English law took place in the earlier decisions of the Court of Chancery; and also in commercial law, under the influence largely of Lord Mansfield, who presided over the Court of Queen's Bench in the middle of the eighteenth century, and whose name will always be associated with the development of commercial law in England. But in the main England was destined in the development of her legal system to show the same extraordinary individuality and originality which she has shown in many other directions; and for the most part what there is of Roman law in English law was received before the time of Bracton, or else relates to the law of personal property, marriage and divorce, legacies and wills of personal property generally, and the law of intestacy of personal property. It is to be found in these last owing to the fact that jurisdiction over such matters rested in the hands of the ecclesiastical courts, until their jurisdiction was, at the time of the creation of the Court of Probate in the year 1857, transferred to secular courts. Now the ecclesiastical courts of course administered the canon law, and the canon law, as already explained, was derived from the civil law. Only two courts in England to-day, and those of very limited jurisdiction, admit the authority of the Digest, namely: the Ecclesiastical Courts and the Court of Admiralty. It is otherwise indeed in Scotland, and there, at least after the establishment of the Court of Session by King James the Fifth in 1532, the civil law was definitely received.

Thus we see that Gibbon, in the celebrated 44th Chapter of his "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," was fully justified in writing in his somewhat gorgeous style: "The vain titles of the victories of Justinian are crumbled into dust, but the name of the legislator is inscribed on a fair and everlasting monument. Under his reign and by his care, the civil jurisprudence was digested in the immortal works of the Code, the Pandects, and the Institutes. The public reason of the Romans has been silently or studiously transfused into the domestic institutions of Europe; and the laws of

Justinian still command the respect and obedience of independent nations." As was said by Portalis, one of the great French jurists who were concerned in the drawing up of the Code Napoleon, "Rome subjected Europe by her arms, she civilized it by her laws." Or again, as has been epigrammatically expressed, even after her fall Rome continued to rule not *ratione imperii*—by reason of imperial power—but *imperio rationis*—by virtue of the imperial power of reason.

But we may come nearer home, and we shall find that in all the non-European colonies which at one time belonged to France or Holland, such as the State of Louisiana, and such as Ceylon and British Guiana, the civil law, or what is known as Roman-Dutch law, is to be found. The same is true of the regions which formerly obeyed Spain or Portugal, namely Mexico, Central America, South America, Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands.

Lastly, in our own Quebec we find the civil law. The law of Quebec is for the most part to be found in her Civil Code. Two thirds of that code is a recension of the Code Napoleon, all, in fact, except the part relating to commercial law. The commercial law of Quebec is derived partly from French and partly from English law. It is, so to speak, an eclectic system, and so far as derived from French law it runs back, as already shown, to the civil law. The rest of her Civil Code is virtually the Code Napoleon, and the Code Napoleon, Sir Henry Maine tells us, "may be described without inaccuracy as a compendium of the rules of Roman law then practised in France, cleared of all feudal admixture, such rules, however, being in all cases taken with the extensions given to them and the interpretations put upon them by one or two eminent French jurists and particularly by Pothier." And to-day the writings of Pothier and Dumoulin are great authorities in the Quebec Courts.

Lastly, in Roman law we are studying the principles of that great system, which is daily rising more and more into importance and recognition, known as international law. When in 1625 Grotius laid the foundation of modern inter-

national law in his great work "De Bello et Pace" he looked to those principles of law which the Roman jurists derived from what they called the law of nature, to find principles which might be advanced to govern the relations of independent nations. So Sir Henry Maine tells us: "If International law be not studied historically, if we fail to comprehend, first, the influence of certain theories of the Roman juriconsults on the mind of Hugo Grotius, and next the influence of the great book of Grotius on international jurisprudence, we lose at once all chance of comprehending that body of rules which alone protects the European Commonwealth from permanent anarchy, we blind ourselves to the principles by conforming to which it coheres, we can understand neither its strength nor its weakness, nor can we separate those arrangements which can safely be modified from those which cannot be touched without shaking the whole fabric to pieces."

For these reasons we may firmly maintain that time and attention devoted to the study of the history of Roman law, and of its completed system as set out in its elements in Justinian's Institutes, will not be wasted. The Institutes were intended, as Justinian himself says, for the youth eager for instruction in law. But at the same time he gave the book the force of statute, thereby placing it on a higher level than any ordinary text book can occupy. The student will probably be surprised when he finds how little there is that can be called archaic, much less barbaric, in it. It is in truth a fabric of pure reason, and its principles are for the most part as applicable to the legal problems of to-day as they were when they were formulated.

A. H. F. LEFROY

THE TREATMENT OF CRIMINALS

IN a recent discussion in England, chiefly in the pages of the "Nineteenth Century," on Crime and Criminals, the subject was considered from three points of view. Sir Alfred Wills, an eminent ex-judge of the High Court, argued in favour of prolonged imprisonment, not so much as punishment as for protection to society; Sir Robert Anderson, a well-known penologist, and late assistant-commissioner of the Metropolitan police, also urged long terms of imprisonment, during which there should be corrective and educative treatment; and a convict of literary ability wrote trenchantly in advocacy of incisive punishments of short duration.

The question as a general one forces itself into prominence once in every twenty-five years, and occasionally there is a spasmodic flare in a particular direction, whenever there has been a notorious miscarriage of justice or exceptionally severe treatment of an innocent person. A noteworthy feature of the present discussion, however, is its prevalence. The articles in the "Nineteenth Century" were soon followed by debates from six aspects at the Convention of the Municipalities of Canada, held in Montreal, July, 1908. In the United States, in Australia, in France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and in other countries the matter is under discussion. This consideration is a hopeful sign, for it must be recognized that hitherto the discussions have had few results beyond the preparation of the ground for still further debate. Now, however, it looks as if something will be done. The different countries are realizing that none of them has a monopoly of improvements and developments in the methods of treating persons imprisoned for crime.

All the English-speaking peoples have much the same sort of punitive plans. It is when details are examined that differences are found, and eclecticism may yet secure a solution of the question. Canada is well to the front. Twenty years ago Major Arthur Griffiths, Inspector of British prisons, writing on prison discipline in every civilized country, declared that the prison system of Canada was advanced and enlightened and was doing good work, a tribute he did not pay to any other country. Since then Canada has not gone backward, and the tribute is as well merited to-day as when it was written. Quite recently, too, there was the important announcement that General Booth is to be permitted to conduct a Canadian jail on the reclamation methods associated with his name.

Apart from all this the question has an importance and interest for Canada, or ought to have, from the fact that according to the latest official statistics for the year 1905, the total number of persons convicted in Canada in that year was 62,559. Of these 7,624 were for indictable offences, the others being summary convictions. More than four-fifths of the indictable offenders were convicted for the first time, 11.32 per cent. for the second time, and nine per cent. were habitual criminals. That is to say, in over 20 per cent. of indictable offenders the punishments inflicted were wasted so far as respects curative or deterrent effect. The report on penitentiaries emphasizes this condition of things. In 1906-7 there were 1,368 convicts in the Canadian penitentiaries. Of these 265 had been re-committed more than once—a waste of nearly twenty per cent. of those punishments that are supposed especially to reform.

Two initial difficulties face the enquirer. First, there is not a clear conception or admitted basis of "the object and aim of punishment"; secondly, with such hazy views on the subject as there are, no general or consistent rules for their application to practical purposes have been agreed upon by penologists. As regards the first difficulty reformers are still hampered by the fourfold object of punishment indicated

by Beccaria in the middle of the eighteenth century: (1) retributive punishment; (2) satisfaction of justice; (3) example or warning to society; (4) reformation of the criminal. Even a cursory consideration of this fourfold object shows that as regards the first three features penologists are indeed in a cloud. Retributive punishment is after all but another name for vengeance. "The sentiment of justice," wrote J. S. Mill, "in that one of its elements which consists of the "desire to punish, is, I conceive, the natural feeling of re-taliation or vengeance, rendered by intellect and sympathy "applicable to those injuries, that is, to those hurts, which "wound us through, or in common with, society at large." Retribution ought not to have any influence in punishing a criminal. The *lex talionis* was abolished a long time ago by the highest authority. And yet every day, and in all places, it is found to be almost a guiding principle in sentencing a man to imprisonment. An English judge once said: "It is no use talking to a man who can behave so ill to his mother. You must go to prison for twenty years." Whatever enormity the wretch had committed, that was not the *animus* which should have influenced a sentence with reformation for its aim and object, though it was quite consistent with the view of ex-judge Wills that, in the interests of society, brutes should be locked up for life. On the reformatory and deterring principle, however, surely in the twentieth century it is time to adjudicate on the do-him-good principle, not the serve-him-right system.

The second object of punishment, the satisfaction of justice, succumbs to similar analysis. Ethics is at a low ebb if Justice demands suffering for its satisfaction. Such assertion smells of the musty bond held by Shylock. Perhaps, however, by "satisfaction of justice" is meant satisfaction of, or restitution to, the injured. But surely it is only the degraded that demand suffering for satisfaction of a personal wrong, a sentiment that should not be encouraged; while material restitution is in most cases impossible. Do not trouble much about redeeming the stolen goods; redeem the

culprit. This feature, too, is a matter that has little to do with the aim and object of punishment. As to the force of example or warning, there is no trace in the history of crime that the display of punishment has had a beneficial effect. The truth is contrariwise. It is too late in the day to urge the argument seriously, seeing that gibbeting, public executions, and even the pillory and the stocks have long ago been abolished. If example be good for anything, the reading of the police cases in the newspapers by those of the criminal and quasi-criminal classes that can read might be the best means of enforcing example. Unfortunately police cases are not reported in our newspapers in a way to warn, nor with the object of deterring.

The futility of allowing the three motives indicated to influence the sentence of a culprit is shown as clearly in their practical application as in abstract consideration. With such principles operative there can be no equality of treatment. A magistrate or judge may consider one month's imprisonment adequate punishment for a particular crime, while another magistrate or judge treats a prisoner whose criminality is equal to, or even less than, that of the other to a term of six months in jail.

The idiosyncrasies of the presiding officer predominate, and he is just as likely to err in leniency as in severity. Particularly does this argument apply to sentences inflicted by Justices of the Peace. One of the penalties we pay for an untrained and unpaid magistracy is that their conduct of a Court is by rule-of-thumb. Local associations, personal acquaintance, and all sorts of outside influences determine the fate of a person charged with an offence. Sir Robert Anderson well expresses the position when he says : " A poor wretch who is deserving of pity often receives the same sentence and is always subjected to the same penal discipline as the scoundrel who deserves hanging." Recently a justice of the peace of far more than average ability and education said, " The man may be innocent, but do you think I was going to decide in favour of a Jew peddler against a respectable farmer ? "

and another justice of the peace was hooted in the street for giving a decision in favour of a German in an action brought by the City Council. A magistrate's duty, it was said, was "to stay with the city." To such an extent is the evil recognized that a suggestion has been seriously advanced by a competent authority, Dr. Gilhouse, warden of the Central Prison, that there should be a "convention of magistrates" to formulate consistent rules of treatment.

There remains the fourth of the fourfold object of punishment above set out, the reformation of the culprit. Until recent years this was seldom thought of, and yet it is the utility of the punishment. "Let him that stole steal no more; but rather let him labour, working with his hands the thing that is good." Horace says that "utility is the mother of right and equity," and so it is. There should be no abstract idea of justice to proceed upon, no cherished notions of satisfaction, no demand for the expiation of the offence. Indeed it seems to the present writer that the reformation of the convicted is all-embracing and includes the other three objects that have been set forth. If the man, by means of his castigation, sin no more, surely justice is satisfied; society is benefited; the best of examples is given; and the injured has at least ethical restitution. A man saved ought to be recompense for a wrong inflicted. The mere act of torturing an ignorant man for what he has done and cannot undo, can hardly give pleasure to a right-minded man. Any castigation that stands aloof from reformation, or is in excess of it, that punishes without benefiting, is objectless and vindictive. To the enlightened conscience of an intelligent people the issue of a punishment should be the greatest possible beneficial effect with the least possible pain, at any rate for first offences. The prevention of a repetition of the crime, not a terrifying example to society or a demand for retribution, ought to be a check upon that profusion of punishment which never yet did good. Punishment should reform, not ruin. Reformation is the best deterrent. Sir Robert Anderson says, "the punishment-of-crime system is giving way;" and further,

"I denounce it as both false and mischievous." These are weighty words, coming from so high an authority.

How inadequate is the present treatment of criminals as a curative process is evident from the statistics already quoted. A glance at the way criminals are handled explains the fact. Even those apprehended on suspicion are treated with the same rigorous deportment as that exhibited towards the convicted, so that to a person falsely charged the doctrine that the laws of his country hold a man innocent until proven guilty appears farcical. Hurried from the magistrate's presence, the innocent and guilty are allowed freely to associate, are often shackled together, shoved into the same van, and driven to the jail, *en route* to which the criminals *in posse* are regaled by the criminals *in esse* with pressing invitations to join their "ken" when they "come out," and are perhaps introduced to a good "fence" or a clever thief. Within the gloomy walls everything seems ordered to strengthen the impressions already received and to introduce the novice, probably a young one, to the expert and experienced in crime. He bathes—a thief attends him with a towel; he dons the prison dress—it is brought him by a swindler; he takes exercise alongside a receiver of stolen goods; he walks to chapel in the midst of all sorts and conditions of criminals. At every touch and turn "useful" information is offered him. Even the stillness of his cell is broken by the whispers of degraded manhood through the spy-hole of his cell door, and thus stolen conversations add to his already dangerous store of recently acquired knowledge.

The chief difference in the treatment of the innocent and the treatment of the guilty is that the jail-life of the latter is relieved by moderate work or hard labour, while the former is doomed to the prolonged horrors of solitary confinement, the terrible nature of which is abundantly testified by the statutes passed to mitigate its severity; and by the fact that prisoners whose sentences do not include hard labour frequently ask to be so distinguished, preferring work to enforced solitude.

The above picture may be thought highly coloured, and indeed some of the statements are traversed. The contradictions, however, go no further than to show that such a state of affairs does not obtain in every jail. Michael Davitt's "Leaves from a Prison Diary" shows very clearly that inter-communication between prisoners in jails is much more close and frequent than is generally supposed. As for this country, the following excerpt from the last presentment of the Grand Jury of Manitoba comprises all that needs to be said on the subject: "At the present time prisoners awaiting trial and those convicted of crimes are confined in the one set of cells and are herded together indiscriminately regardless of their offences or supposed offences. Some are serving terms up to twenty-three months; some are awaiting trial on technical or minor charges, having been unable to find bail." It is difficult to imagine a more distressing or disgraceful state of affairs.

Such being the condition of things in the past and present, let us next enquire what is being done to improve matters. The first attempt known to the writer is that of Sir Walter Crofton, about forty years ago. Of the system of this eminent penologist so shrewd a thinker as Count Cavour said: "It is the only efficacious means of discountenancing vice and checking crime, by encouraging through means purely philanthropic the reformation of the criminal, without, however, withholding from him his punishment." This half-imprisonment half-freedom system kept in view three things: that punishing a man does in itself place him in hostility to us; that he is to be cured of his wickedness; and that he must be trained to do something good after he is liberated. To these ends, therefore, we must provide for separation, to prevent the spread of mutinous conduct, with low diet, uninteresting and monotonous work and plenty of it, for a short duration (ten days to a month for a first offence); progressive work on the mark system; that is to say not only probation, but approbation; more liberty, kindness, instruction, and interesting work.

For proof of the efficacy of this system there is higher authority than even Count Cavour, the fact that of the criminals thus treated not six per cent. returned to their evil pursuits. This was at a time when 46.1 per cent. returned to crime under the national system; and when there were no other reformatory influences in operation, as there have been since, notably the education of every child in the country, now in operation for thirty-four years with marvelous results in the desired direction.

Sir Walter Crofton's excellent scheme is now supplanted in England by an improvement upon it, known as the Bostol system, from the place where it has been carried on since 1902 under the supervision of Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brice, and which already shows indications of being a successful method of reformation and reclamation. In 1883 there was the proposal of Sir Howard Vincent, ex-director of criminal investigation, which culminated after many years persistent effort in the Probation of Offenders Act; which has since been amended (in 1907) by an Act that has been in operation but a few months, showing that it took a quarter of a century to open the eyes of legislators to what was so clear to penologists and social reformers. The idea of this high authority was that a first offender, in certain circumstances and on specified conditions, might be released on probation instead of being sent to prison. The treatment is with a view solely to the reclamation of the culprit and from the first had the high approval of Lord Chief Justice Coleridge.

The results, so far, have been beneficial. About the same time that Sir Howard Vincent was agitating the reform, a plan that obtained in New York (and still obtains there and now in many other places) attracted attention. It was commended by Lord Coleridge after a visit to the institution. The Lord Chief Justice, after pointing out that all the inmates were taught some trade, said: "They are sent there, not as a punishment, but they are allowed to be sent there by the laws of New York for minor offences, offences which would condemn many a poor fellow in England to be

a felon for life. They are sent to this institution, where their names are concealed, and where they are not treated as under punishment, but as Christian boys and girls, and taught, as far as they can be taught, to get on in life." Indeed the United States is to be congratulated and commended for its successful treatment of criminals, especially young ones. Its rulers have discovered that surer convictions and lighter sentences mark the progress of penal reform. No cruel or degrading punishments are employed at these institutions and no distinctive dress is worn. The prison library is much used. In the Massachusetts State Prison the convicts established among themselves a society for mutual debate and improvement. Above all, the youthful culprit is not confined with the mature criminal. A few months ago the management of Belgian prisons began to permit smoking as a reward for good conduct.

The next and last step in punitive reform is the parole plan that has now reached Canada, the United States, and England. This has hardly been in operation a long enough time for general conclusions to be decisively drawn. It seems, however, to be successful and effective. In Canada there were 285 paroles granted in 1906-7. Of these one license only has so far been forfeited by a subsequent conviction. Taking a longer period, embracing the parole system from the year of its inception in Canada (1899-1900) to 31st March, 1907, the number of parole licenses granted was 1645, of which 33 only were forfeited by subsequent convictions. This is less than two per cent. and compares favourably with the twenty per cent. that return to crime under different treatment, as already shown. Even this small percentage might be reduced if the hint given by the Dominion Parole Officer were taken: "that no one is left standing outside of a Canadian penal institution on the day of his release, without a friend to aid or the opportunity to follow up the good impressions often made upon the prisoners while under authority." This, however, is a phase of the question beyond the scope of this article.

From this, indications may be seen of the direction reformation and reclamation ought to take. The initial difficulties already mentioned confront the penologist here in full force. To apply a homely western phrase, "Men are not all built alike;" or as Major Arthur Griffiths expressed it long ago, "Some men are born criminals, some achieve crime, others have crime thrust upon them." Each of these classes needs different treatment. There should be a velvet paw of tenderest benevolence for those who will accept help; but beneath it a claw, sharp as steel for the refractory and rebellious. It seems to the writer that the best way to meet the difficulty is to further extend the principle of "The Probation of Offenders Act" and of the parole system. The method of indeterminate sentences, also, must not be forgotten, that is incarcerating a man for no definite period, and liberating him when there is a reasonable probability that he will behave himself. Persons sent to prison and even to penal servitude are at present released on certain specified conditions, before the expiration of their sentences. If this be done with experts in crime, surely something in the same direction may be attempted as with novices.

Further, it is quite common for judges and magistrates to discharge a guilty person "to come up for judgement when called upon," known as "suspended sentence." Both judges and magistrates can testify how seldom prisoners so discharged are again heard of in the criminal world. Why not take the final step and make the practice general? Why not allow all first offenders against property, or at any rate the ordinary run of such offenders, to be at large on suspended sentence without suffering imprisonment so long as they properly conduct themselves and show an earnest desire to reform? Let us get rid of the prison. In the only case brought before the Great Master, the judgement was, "Go, sin no more." Is it not time His followers obeyed the lesson so divinely taught? It can hardly be expected that judges or magistrates will oppose the plan. There is often a reluctance on the part of both bench and jury to

convict on account of the severity of the sentence which it is known must follow a conviction. In the words of the Lord Chief Justice already mentioned: "Judges have too often to punish men for being what society has made them, and we have to act as engines of a system which sometimes crushes with pitiless severity the very creatures it has produced." He believed that many of the sentences inflicted were, "an unmixed harm, productive of unmixed evil, increasing crime instead of diminishing it;" and he asks that, above all things, persons should be prevented from "growing into criminals."

Although a plan is suggested in the preceding paragraph it is not advanced as a rigid rule. There are offences to which the proposed method is not applicable and to which none of the arguments in this article applies. Indeed the writer does not here treat of crimes against the person, the sacred person, of the citizen; based, as such crimes usually are, on revolting brutality, virulence, and passion. Such crimes are beyond the scope of ordinary punitive treatment, and much is to be said in favour of the proposal in Sir Alfred Wills' "Nineteenth Century" article, to keep such confirmed criminals permanently behind the prison bars, not so much as a punishment as protection to society. Let it be again repeated, the great object is reformation, and the means should be adapted to that end. If washing the culprit with rose water shall cure him, let that be the treatment; if whipping with the cat-o'-nine tails be more effective, lay it on heavily. Whichever or whatever be done, let it reform. Hitherto it has been believed that severe punishment ("a sign of inhumanity," says Beccaria) would do it. This has failed, and our jails, instead of being Houses of Correction, are huge criminal manufactories, wholesale, retail, and for exportation, turning out annually a large army of experts to prey on society. This is because a severe punishment, if prolonged, becomes hardening. The probability is that of prisoners convicted more than once the greatest number are of those whose first imprisonments were of longest duration.

There are no statistics available to prove this, and to collect the information would probably lead to too extended and minute an enquiry, if it should be possible to obtain it all. Some years ago a painstaking penologist, Mr. T. B. LeBaker, estimated that of those convicted once, not quite one in five relapse once, but of these nearly one half relapse a second time; of these again more than one half relapse a third time. and of these more than three-quarters relapse a fourth time. In these cases punishment has obviously been inflicted at the wrong end, and it is high time the plans of reformation advocated in this article be given a trial. Prison life should be short and sharp, not long and stupid, says the convict writer in the "Nineteenth Century." Add the good influences that should be brought to bear on those in prison.

All who have made enquiry into prison discipline know that there are many instances of persons, with hearts ripe for soothing into goodness, who were driven into criminal mindedness even before their trials by the severity of prison discipline, at a time when no other safeguard was needed than to prevent escape and their hiding proofs of guilt. This state of things ought to be reversed. No man is wholly bad, and whatever good feelings a bad man may have, his life in prison affords the best opportunity for refining and strengthening them. Hence it is that the experiment in Canada by the Chief of the Salvation Army must be watched with interest. As in the melodies of some of the great masters, discords are occasionally introduced to relieve the ear and beautify and temper the piece; so in the careers of some men frightful disturbances arise which it rests with superior influences to turn to good and great ends; to so use the discord that has ruffled the harmony of a weak one's career, that he may live to bless the day he was subjected to the corrective influence of prison life. This is how it is in a few cases, how it may be in a great many, how it should be in all.

A few words are all that can be devoted here to juvenile criminals. If we are to arrest crime we must begin with the young. As the twig is bent, the tree is inclined; see that

the twig does not become a stalwart branch before it is pointed in the proper direction. The principles of punishment are nearly the same in regard to juveniles and adults; but there is this important distinction between the two classes of criminals: juveniles are more strongly affected by environment than the others. Children may be roughly divided into two classes: parlour children and street children. The former have the advantages of a home, of parental training, and supervision: the latter have no advantages whatever and a heap of disadvantages "huge as high Olympus"—sin and sorrow around them, bad example, over-crowded and miserable homes, parental influences they would be better without. Both these classes of youngsters have the same childish instincts, and commit the same peccadilloes. But how different the treatment for the offence; and this is the crucial point.

Master Alfonse purloins a forbidden orange from his mother's fruit dish. As a result he has no sugar in his tea and is sent to bed; where, repentant and remorseful, he cries himself to sleep. He steals no more oranges, becomes a respectable member of society, mayor of his city and justice of the peace. In the last named capacity Jim the Joker, the pride of his fellow street-waifs, is brought before him charged with stealing—not purloining—an orange from an old woman's barrow. The little wretch is sent to prison for fourteen days and in a short time Jim the Joker is manufactured into a full-fledged criminal, to the admiration of his companions. In the first case the punishment was effective and efficacious: in the latter it was a failure. One punishment reformed, the other degraded.

A very excellent suggestion was made many years ago in a book entitled "The Gaol Cradle, Who Rocks It?" by the Rev. Benjamin Waugh. It is that the treatment of juvenile criminals should be removed altogether from the police, the magistrates, and the jails. There ought to be a separate *modus operandi*. Perhaps the work could be entrusted to school trustees. The similar institutions in England already

deal with truants, though needlessly the magistrate is called in to help them. Truancy is a fruitful source of juvenile crime, and those that are competent to deal with the one, are surely competent to deal with the other. Parents and the public generally could hardly object to the arrangement, for obviously they would prefer such cases being dealt with by a body in whose election they have had a voice, rather than by magistrates not in any way responsible to them. Such a body, too, would have the additional and important advantage of being able to ascertain how far the parents of the young Arabs were responsible for their offences. It is important that parents should not be allowed to shirk their responsibilities. In dealing with juvenile criminals their surroundings should be enquired into (and magistrates and police officers cannot be expected to do this) so as to separate the good parents from the bad, to chastise these and to assist those. School trustees may not be the best organization to achieve the object. Legislatures may perhaps be able to devise a better. The Juvenile Court at Denver deals very successfully with parents, on the lines here indicated. Recent Dominion statutes, in establishing courts for juveniles, and a statute passed at the last session of the Saskatchewan legislature (copying Manitoba) authorizing the establishment of associations to deal with juvenile criminals are steps in the right direction, but they are only steps, and halting ones.

The suggestions of the Rev. B. Waugh, above referred to, fell on stony ground in England. Thanks to women in the United States more congenial soil was found, and to-day the best system in so desirable a direction is that which obtains in many cities in the great Republic; notably at Denver, where through the humane, prudent, and energetic influence of Judge B. B. Lindsay, there is a Juvenile Court (private, in a parlour) with its judge, clerk, probation officers, etc., and in connexion therewith a detention school, with its staff of officers. Of the juveniles treated at Denver, ninety-five per cent. do not return to crime. Last session the Parliament of Canada passed a Juvenile Delinquents' Act, similar

to the American one. It is, however, too permissive, relying too little on the public exchequer and too much on philanthropy. Why should the Act not be as compulsive as the legislation that deals with adults? If it be proper for the State to support criminal courts, jails, and penitentiaries for adult reprobates; it is certainly equally proper, nay much more proper, to provide for juvenile sinners, who are being enticed from before and pushed from behind, to the ranks of those adults upon whom is spent so much for punishment, so little for reclamation.

"A prison is the worst place to send anybody," said a jail governor to the writer; and a warder added, "No child ought ever to see the inside of a jail." Sound reasoning goes further and declares that no child ought ever to see the inside of a police court. The effect upon a bad child and a merely weak child is different, but in both cases the result is disastrous. What takes place? A juvenile criminal is taken to the lock-up, where he perhaps meets hardened rascals; he is put into a cell where he is kept all night, perhaps without food. He already feels himself "in prison." In the morning he is taken before a magistrate, who is perhaps gorgeously robed. He is asked to plead, to cross-examine witnesses and to say what he has to say. This asking a pale-faced and trembling youngster, with his heart full of trouble and his eyes full of tears, to cross-examine witnesses and to make a speech in full court with eyes upon him from every side, would be ludicrous were it not so sad. The lad mutters something; perhaps he is saying he is sorry and will not do it again. Broken-hearted he is sent to jail, where the surroundings harden his heart, and to him State correction means disaster. Perhaps, however, the culprit is not a pale-faced, trembling child; but a defiant, incorrigible little rascal. To him the paraphernalia of the Court are a glory. He is a sort of Dick Turpin, Paul Clifford, or Bill Miner. He is a hero in his own eyes, and, what is still worse, in the eyes of his companions. The jail has no terrors for him. What is needed to take the glory out of him is the degrading

influence of a sound whipping with a birch rod or cane. This is enforced by the law in England, and although not so in Canada, yet judges and magistrates by methods pardonably oblique impose the punishment, and with beneficial results. It would be much better if this were done by the probation officer of a juvenile court, than by an uniformed constable in the cell of a prison.

Such legislation is generally initiated or at any rate stimulated by women. No one will deny that the reclamation of juveniles is a work for which women are specially adapted. Their sympathetic nature cannot but be a strong influence in directing the young to the paths of righteousness. The only danger is that they are often too sympathetic and assert proposals that are mawkish and mischievous. Ladies' organizations are too prone to regard street Arabs as "dear little saints" that only require kind watchfulness to keep them from falling. It is necessary to realize that many of the lads and lasses are not dear little saints but horrible little rascals, and perhaps the harsher material of men is necessary to somewhat guide the too tender sympathies of women. The work to be done is a noble work. If the State assert the right to punish for wrong-doing, it is the duty of the State to teach its subjects to discriminate between right and wrong. As regards juveniles this has not yet been achieved. If the State demand allegiance to the law it should remember its own obligation to inculcate obedience to the law. "Where there is darkness," says Victor Hugo, "there is sin, and those who commit the sin are not so much to blame as those who permit the darkness." The majority of the criminal classes grow up with ideas of right and wrong not so much perverted as non-existent. Juvenility is the period in which to correct this. The noble work before women is to see that children who under the present system are driven into criminality by our jails, should instead thereof be rescued therefrom. The child should not, at the very threshold of its life, be polluted with the prison taint. What is necessary is to direct the child where to go. The women have realized this.

The following seem legitimate conclusions from the premises: (1) There should be no intercommunication between prisoners without supervision; (2) During the period between commitment and trial a prisoner ought not to be subjected to further restraint than to prevent escape or the hiding the proofs of guilt; (3) Sentences inflicted should be with a view to reformation. To this end: suspended sentences under proper safeguards for first offences of the ordinary or common kind; for offences other than the first—indeterminate sentences, or probation, or the parole system, or something in the nature of all three combined. (4) The safety of society demands that those addicted to revolting crimes of a brutal nature should be kept in close confinement for life. (5) No juvenile ought to be sent to jail, or to appear in a criminal court or be handled by the police.

After all, these considerations touch only the fringe of the question. What is alone surprising is that so much money is spent in the punishment of crime and yet so little is done to prevent it. We have an abundance of "detectives": let us have a few "preventives". Why not go to the *fons et origo*, the producers of criminals, the immoral and degraded parents? This is a question for physiologists and psychologists and is beyond the scope of this article. The following statement by Hugo Münsterberg indicates what ought to be done: "When a school for criminal boys and girls was carefully examined (in the United States) it was found that of the 200 boys, 127 were deficient in their general make-up, either in the direction of feeble-mindedness, or in the direction of hysterical emotion and epileptic disturbance; in 85 cases the father or the mother, or both, were drunkards; in 24 cases the parents were insane; in 26 cases epileptic; and in 26 further cases, suffering from other nervous diseases." Surely there is much to be said in favour of the proposal by Sir Alfred Wills, to detain professional, habitual, or brutal prisoners long enough to make the chance small of their becoming the parents of criminals. WM. TRANT

PLAY FOR THE PEOPLE

NOW that the question of playgrounds for children in our large cities has begun to occupy public attention in Canada, it might be useful to consider the progress of the movement in the United States, where it has taken a remarkable and rapid development.

The first annual convention of the Playgrounds Association of America met in Chicago in June 1907, and the second met in New York in September last, at which 400 members represented 29 states and 185 cities with organized playgrounds, instead of the 66 of the previous year. The Chicago meeting was a great festival, a kind of thanksgiving with joy and gladness, as the veterans of the cause of Play for the People met and celebrated the victory of the idea, and its acceptance by public opinion as one of the things that had to be provided for in the national housekeeping. There was great playing in the magnificent recreation centres on which Chicago has spent eleven million dollars of capital, with a yearly maintenance of \$30,000 for each centre. Yet the playground movement in Chicago only dates from the nineties, when a beginning was made with a few vacant lots and school yards, the equipment being barely more than a pile of paving blocks.

It must have been a wonderful sight at this play festival to see the great gathering of children and adults of both sexes and all ages, each contributing their share to the display of varied play, both in large field games, in small playground games, in athletic sports and gymnastic work, and finally in the national dances, with their natural accompaniment of music, for which Chicago, with its motley of peoples, could supply efficient performers of many nations. The only form

of recreation unrepresented seems to have been the dramatic. It was a great display and showed all that was possible to attain with what are almost ideal conditions.

This year's meeting at New York was of a different kind. It was a business consultation on the part of the people who had to work out the idea, whose festival had been so gloriously acclaimed at Chicago; and it is an impressive thing to see the American people applying their great business aptitude to the cause of the public weal. Over two-thirds of those who attended came from outside New York, and they came from as far as Florida and Seattle. Not only playground commissioners, directors, and supervisors, and those identified with the voluntary playground associations, but members of school and park boards, mayors of cities, aldermen, school principals and teachers, business men, ministers, social settlement folk, and Young Men's Christian Association representatives—in fact all who were interested and believed in the play movement. They met and talked over the results of the year; experts discussed; there were conferences and open discussions between the workers; the difficult problems of control, and the relations between official bodies and voluntary playground associations were discussed in an intimate way.

Let us detach from these great gatherings the main principles that emerge as settled, and then consider some of the details that still remain to be worked out. It seems as if the national life has gone through somewhat the same stages as our individual life. There is the first fierce struggle to win bread,—to “make a living”; and when that is accomplished we begin to ask what we are living for, to crave for the graces of life, art, music, and some wider understanding of the world in which we live. So in our national life we have been absorbed in developing industries,—making the most possible out of the resources of nature for mere existence, but now we are discovering that we want something more; we do not want merely a nation of workers, but of fully developed men and women, whose lives shall hold joy and leisure. Weary with the heavy burden of repression and care; with costly

gaols, workhouses, and reformatories, and ever-enlarging hospitals, we have become aware that we have brought these things about by our lack of prevision and provision, but that it is not too late to mend.

We have not only awakened to the realization of these wider needs, but we are beginning to cease to pray for special blessings for ourselves, and to find budding within us a kind of corporate conscience, a sense of our interdependence, and the need to suit our lives to the needs of the whole, instead of pitting our individual forces against the whole world.

These two great principles emerge then: a wider life for all; the same needs for all; something beyond mere bread-winning—well expressed in Carroll Wright's phrase—"a spiritual margin;" and satisfaction for these needs for *all*.

Among these needs, that of recreation looms large. It is Chicago that suggests that our very inclusive term, public playground, stands primarily for public recreation, a recreation that has at one end the play of children and at the other end the relaxation of young men, young women, and adults.

We are beginning to recognize this in the case of the young: and it is largely through our efforts to minimize the dangers for them and to give some reasonable outlet for their insatiable love of amusement and diversion, that we are at last approaching the subject of public recreation in its relation to social morality, and realizing with shame and confusion that we are spending a hundredfold more money in juvenile reform than is spent in providing means for public recreation. It is good to note that Washington State has recently passed a law whereby, when any fresh plots of land are added to any city area, one-tenth of it must be set aside for park and playground use.

Bearing in mind those large principles, we shall now consider details. We have to remember the three elements in recreation; that of pure amusement and relaxation, that of skill—of bodily development—and last, but not least, that of moral training. It is hard to separate pleasure and morality, and it is perhaps our great modern revelation to discover

that Nature has joined these two in bonds not to be sundered without paying the penalties. That her great theme of pure pleasure has also its serious side is well illustrated by that charming story of R. L. Stevenson's wanderings in a canoe on the riverways of Belgium, where he one night received hospitality from a boating club, who welcomed him as a friend and brother. Anxious to make clear their point of view, they explained that, as they were mostly clerks, they were all employed in commerce during the day, *but* in the evening "voyez vous, nous sommes serieux."

Now, what happens as the result of our city life? As Jane Addams well puts it, "at the very time that the city has become distinctly industrial, and daily labour continually more monotonous and subdivided, we seem to have decided that no provision for public recreation is necessary. It would be interesting to trace how far this thoughtless condition is responsible for the vicious excitement and trivial amusements which in a modern city so largely take the place formerly supplied by public recreation and manly sports. It would be illuminating to know the legitimate connection between lack of public facilities for decent pleasures and our present social immoralities."

We look back on the picture of the past,—and it was only last summer that Canada had presented in bodily form before her eyes one of the most vivid and moving pictures of this vanished life that has ever been seen in any land, and for which with its stirring of common memories, its awakening realization of our glorious and romantic past, from which the bitterness has faded, leaving only the splendid inheritance of heroism and patriotism, we must be ever thankful to the Governor-General, without whose firm purpose and insight this stimulus to our national life could never have been given.

We look back even further, to the great days of Greece, with her theatre, which was the national training in morals, to Rome with its great scenic spectacles, to the squares of Italy where the little town gathers for its pleasant gossip under the trees in the intervals of work, to the open spaces by

the churches of northern Spain where the great national game of ball is the chief interest of the people. We think of the innumerable village greens, the *Waldspielplatz* of Germany, that ideal, grassy ground surrounded by a wood, where no noise disturbs the players, and no noise of play disturbs the world, and we recall the English village commons, now returning to their old uses, where dance, and song, and games punctuate each recurring season.

In banishing one by one these wholesome pleasures, where characters reveal themselves naturally, and old and young are brought together, what have we given to the people? We cannot avoid the charge that we have caused to be given to them the saloon, the dime museum, the cheap theatre, the common dancing halls, where a garish and often vicious excitement satisfies, while it demoralizes a natural taste.

As to the physical training of properly directed playgrounds, we look to them to furnish us with a youth possessing disease-resisting bodies. It is not enough to protect children from harm, we need to make them sturdy, and if they cannot live in the country, which is the only proper place to bring up children in, we have to provide for them some form of exercise and play in the open air.

The New York Conference spoke strongly through the medium of Dr. Woods Hutchison, whose words are worth quoting: "The boasted organization of our civilization is an organization for 'grown-ups' and has left the child out of its calculations. Half a century ago our social and industrial organization was so loose that there was plenty of room for the child to grow up in the gaps and interspaces. Now it is so compact that he scarcely has breathing room and no play room. We have gone far to civilize the business of play out of existence. The modern city child has lost his most precious birthright, the back yard. At the same time we have made the streets more impossible as playgrounds than ever. With street car tracks down the middle, delivery wagons along both curbs, and automobiles

all over the roadway they are about as suitable for play as the track of a trunk line railway.

“The small shop where he saw things made, and work accomplished on every side of him, where he could pick up the remnants and imitate the performance, is lost as well. The work that was done by the local carpenter, the blacksmith, the tinsmith, the wagon builder, the weaver at his home loom, the boat builder, is now taken over by the huge factory, where the child is neither admitted nor wanted, except as a stunted and over-worked labourer before his time.

“We have not improved matters much by substituting the school. Because the child is deprived of the proper opportunity to develop his body, we build beautiful palaces for his incarceration during the hours of daylight, so that we may over-develop his brain. If this were not so stupid it would be criminal. The real business of the child is not to pass examinations, but to grow up.

“The schoolroom must relinquish at least one half of its claims upon the time and strength of our children. Our schoolrooms should be relieved of the mere necessary duty of keeping children out of harm and of mischief, with which they are now loaded, and the playground should be organized, supervised and recognized as a vital and co-ordinate branch of our scheme of education. One of the most valuable influences of the school is the effect of the children upon one another. But this can be obtained in its perfection only upon the playground. Cut down the school hours one half, and double the playground hours and you will have done more for the physical, mental, and moral health of young America than by any other possible step. Better a playground without a school house, than a school house without a playground.”

It is to the last value of recreation, that of the training in morals, that we find the New York Conference giving its serious attention. Here is a brief quotation from one of the most eloquent addresses of the convention by Mrs. Harriet Heller, of Omaha. She was speaking of the delinquent boy

and how he becomes so. "Give the whole boy, not just the boy-intellectual, a normal experience, and you will have a normal boy. Very few delinquents have that normal experience. What does it consist of?—Enough nourishing food, sufficient clean air and water, a place to play, a little appreciated service to be rendered, a chance at learning, and if something must be pinched off a little short, the boy can spare the formal *learning* for he is being educated every minute. I would plead for an adjustment *based upon the needs and ability of the child, rather than the extent of modern knowledge*. Over-pressure to force intellectual expression is a telling factor in producing delinquency. The playground comes to the rescue of the whole boy."

Shall we sum up briefly the training for life given the child in the playground? First, he learns to give and take, he learns to be a good loser, a very fundamental preparation for life. He learns fair play and no cheating. He learns to be loyal, and that not only to his side; but in learning the value of loyalty he learns to appreciate it in others, his opponents; and in this miniature field of life, he gets his first lessons in practical standards and values; he learns the first lessons of co-operation and government, and of leadership; most valuable of all he learns the true meaning of sport whose object is skill and not success, pride in your own skill, pleasure in that of your opponents. If this idea were once fundamentally rooted in a child, he would scorn in after life to conform his life work to any other law, and skill would be once more installed in its place of honour, each worker vying with another to do the best work, and the best work receiving always its due reward.

And in the modern playground there should be a place for the training of the imagination. In the story telling which is so popular a part of the children's corner, there is scope for all flights and shaping of the imagination, and in the clubs which are the winter continuation school of the playgrounds, there has been in some places a wonderful development of the dramatic sense. A most interesting

paper by Mr. Peixotto of the Columbia Park Boys' Club in San Francisco describes the evolution of really excellent playlets, starting with simple acting charades, and in course of six years developing into talking charades, and finally into little plays, all devised by the children in consultation with the workers. He considers it one of the most potent forces in his hard competition against the city's evil influences, so attractive are the plays, and so positive in their effect on the character of the children.

It is worth while describing the plan: "The workers and boys, standing in the game room, construct the coming play. They discuss its beginning, how it shall develop; they illustrate the climaxes and decide on the ending. Bits of the conversation that particularly emphasize the plot are given to the participants, but it is, up to this point, entirely a case of, 'You do this, and I will do that.' After all this has been understood, the boys repair to the dressing room, and there preparations are made for rendering the play. There has been a marvelous development. In the early years the boys displayed crude and coarse tendencies, appealing distinctly, however, to boys' life. Now the acts have become, through years of progress, delightful and fascinating little comedies.

"As to the character of the plays, they have covered every-day life as we all see it. They have represented farmers coming to town, and boys going to the country, officers in down-town businesses seeking new employees, hospital scenes, storekeepers of the neighbourhood, school in all its phases, good and bad, tramps of every variety, phases of life as seen in the West, melodramatic scenes, in short everything that makes up the bustling life of the city of to-day. While much of it is inconsequential and soon forgotten, some of the plays are so good that they linger in the minds of the spectators and are enrolled as club classics. The whole is a wonderful illustration of the capacity of children to observe, and an object lesson in the value of natural acting in cultivating the boy."

In concluding my list of the practical training for life that we may hope to find in a well managed playground I have finished with this short account of dramatic effort in order to connect it once more with the recreation of adult life, and to speak of the great importance attached by the New York Conference to the Field House or Club House which forms the centre of the playground activities, and of which there are such magnificent examples in the great South Park recreation centres of Chicago. It is a recognition of the fact that both children and adults need a common social meeting place—a hall big enough for games and parties—with rooms where clubs can meet away from the influences of the saloon—their ordinary meeting place—the whole under the management of a director who shall be the playgrounds equivalent of a head master, who has the character and social ability to ensure that use of the Club House which will make it an educational force in the community.

There are some who think that the school house should be a social as well as an educational centre for its neighbourhood, and who look forward to a continuous use, day and evening, the year around, of the entire educational plant of the city, the play and the work blending with each other and changing in character with the seasons. New York has gone far in this direction, with its vacation schools and playgrounds, its evening recreation centres for adults and afternoon recreational work with children.

And here we approach the final matter of debate at the conference, the question to what management this important new department of the national life shall be entrusted. Last year there seemed to be almost unanimity that it should be in the hands of the school boards, and Boston was the first city to rejoice in having all its playgrounds entrusted to its school committee, with a yearly grant of \$50,000 to manage them with. Yet this year the superintendent of schools has received a report favouring control by the school authorities of only such playgrounds as are essential to the school work, and suggesting a joint control for the park playgrounds.

It would seem as if the size of the work and its extension to all ages, pointed to its being put under the care of a special body, on which experts in education should be represented.

It is clear in any case that Canada must not be behind in recognizing the claim of the playgrounds to the support of the State, and we must look forward confidently to appropriations from our city councils to support and extend our modest beginnings.

Perhaps the day may not be far distant when we may even hope to copy the plan which has just been adopted for Washington, which provides for 30 square feet of playground for each child connected with the school, an outdoor playground of not less than two acres for each school district, and an athletic field for each of the four sections of the city.

But in all our planning for cities do not let us forget the pure country with its woods, and hills, and rivers, the true heritage of the child, and let us try to preserve tracts of special beauty lying within reach of our cities, in the wise way of Massachusetts. Canada must remember that she has not yet, like the United States and most European countries, a society for the preservation of places of historical interest and natural beauty.

And so, to remind ourselves of that world of beauty whose faint image we try to embody in our city playgrounds, we may fitly recite the quaint testament of Charles Lounsbury, who, having nothing to leave, executed a somewhat elaborate will, bequeathing the world to those who came after him, concluding thus:

“Item, I leave to children inclusively, but only for the term of their childhood, all and every the flowers of the fields, and the blossoms of the woods, with the right to play among them freely, according to the customs of children, warning them at the same time against thistles and thorns. And I devise to children the banks of the brooks and the golden sands beneath the waters thereof, and the odours of the willows that dip therein, and the white clouds that float high over the giant trees. And I leave the children the long,

long days to be merry in, in a thousand ways, and the night, and the moon, and the train of the milky way to wonder at, but subject nevertheless to the rights hereinafter given to lovers. Item, I devise to boys jointly all the useful, idle fields and commons where ball may be played, all pleasant waters where one may swim, all snowclad hills where one may coast, and all streams and ponds where one may fish, or where, when grim winter comes, one may skate, to have and to hold the same for the period of their boyhood: and all meadows with the clover blossoms and butterflies thereof, the woods and their appurtenances, the squirrels and birds, and echoes and strange noises, and all distant places which may be visited, together with the adventures there found. And I give to said boys each his own place at the fireside at night, with all pictures which may be seen in the burning wood, to enjoy without let or hindrance and without any encumbrance of care."

CAROLINE O. COX

THE UNIVERSITY MOSQUE OF EL-AZHAR

CAIRO is a name that evokes many thoughts in the western mind, be they visions of the Arabian Nights or even vague reminiscences of geography once learned in school and long since forgotten. To the winter visitor to Egypt it is a name that recalls a medley of strange sights and voluble Arabs, and perhaps among the memories of oriental days there may be the recollection of a fleeting visit to the famous University Mosque of El-Azhar, the most famous of the many schools of Cairo.

For Cairo, the *Masr el-Kahireh* of the Arabs, named after *Kahir*, or Mars "the victorious," has been celebrated for its teaching ever since the early days of the Mohammedan supremacy. A medieval traveler, speaking of the schools of Cairo, says that no one knows the number of them, so great is it; and Ibn Khaldoun, a writer of the thirteenth century, mentions the University Mosque of El-Azhar as flourishing long after the fame of Bagdad and of Cordova had begun to wane. To-day it can still boast as many students as our largest Western universities. More than six centuries before the earliest university was founded in America, more than four centuries before the first book was printed in Europe, more than two centuries before the beginnings of Cambridge or of Oxford, and more than a hundred years before Abelard made Paris famous, El-Azhar at Cairo had thirty-five professors. Including its four smaller affiliated universities in Lower Egypt, El-Azhar had in 1902 a combined staff of 395 professors and a total of 15,760 students.

The University is situated at the centre of modern Egyptian life, in the heart of the crowded native quarter of Cairo. It is hidden away in a maze of narrow twisting streets, which makes it almost hopeless for the foreigner to

attempt to find it unaided. To the average traveller Cairo is very much like the Garden of Live Flowers in "Alice through the Looking Glass." One can see the minarets of a mosque in the distance and the street in front seems to lead directly to it; but soon, like Alice, one finds that the road is remarkably "more like a corkscrew than like a path" and that he is back again where he started. But, really, getting lost in the streets of Cairo is just as interesting and as profitable as getting anywhere. Nowhere has loss of time so great compensations, and nowhere does time seem of so little value. When one sees a merchant consume a whole morning in selling a coffee-set or a shawl, one begins to understand how the student can afford to grow gray-headed in idle disputation in the pleasant courts of his Alma Mater.

There must be something in the atmosphere that makes the people easy-going. At first sight there seems to be an air of business in the crowded streets. There are many people and there is a very great din of shouting and talking. But it is an illusion. The people are talking, not to make money, but because they enjoy talking. They look busy because they are crowded together, but the rate at which their life moves is relative. Perhaps for the East this is the movement of rapid business.

High overhead tower the projecting windows of the houses with their wooden screens of beautiful "mushrebiyeh" work. Over the doorways and the shops are stretched tattered awnings. The narrow road is crowded with people on foot, with men carrying enormous loads or pushing small carts, with the occasional carriage of a curious European.

The confusion that meets the eye is rivalled only by the Babel of noises that assail the ear. Pedlars call strange names in loud sing-song tones; the passer-by chatters and shouts in his oriental earnestness; whips crack like pistol-shots in the air to warn the people on foot that a carriage is coming, and the Arab drivers keep up a continual cry of "Mind your foot, sir; take care of your left side," interspersed with a flood of pious exhortations whose equal for picturesque-

ness and force it would be difficult to find. The water-seller passes by with his dripping goat skin full of Nile water; the native woman glides along graceful and erect, with a bundle or a basket balanced on her head; and an old man clad in tattered garments passes slowly by selling incense and leaving behind him an aromatic trail which soon disappears in the strange medley of smells for which Cairo is notorious. Nor is it without cause that the city has a reputation in this respect. At the Pyramids, nine miles away, one can distinctly smell Cairo when the wind is in the right direction.

To get to the University Mosque of El-Azhar one generally passes through the street that leads to the bazaars where the Arab merchant-spider lies patiently in wait for the tourist-fly, and spreads forth his tempting array of strange wares to serve as an only too effective snare.

The Mousky, or street of the bazaar, is itself so interesting that one almost forgets the real object of the drive. Surely never was temptation stronger to loiter by the roadside and bargain for the mere sake of bargaining, and seldom does one find a more bewildering chaos of merchandise. Tawdry and cheap "goods" of the West are displayed along with the strange unfamiliar products of oriental skill, each and all worth only the price which is the resultant of a long and exciting process of aggressive bargaining.

It is with regret that one leaves behind these tiny shops with their squatting merchants, and turns down Sharia Halwagi, one step further in the complicated progress towards the Arab university. Here the miscellaneous profusion of the former booths gives place to a wilderness of footwear, for this is the street of the shoemakers. The small shops are hung with festoons of yellow and red slippers, which hang in gaudy bunches as far as the eye can reach into the gloom that shrouds the back of the little dark dens, while dozens upon dozens of red slippers with pointed toes and of bright yellow ones with rounded toes seem to burst out into the already crowded street.

A little further on, one comes to the equally small and crowded shops of the tent-makers, who sew busily—some of them on modern sewing-machines—at the striking designs of red, blue, yellow and brown *appliqué* upon canvas with which they decorate the interiors of their tents. As one drives along, these smiling Arabs squatting in their gaudy door-ways seek by a sort of whistling hiss to attract the attention of the passer-by to the goods which decorate the walls and ceilings of their tiny shops.

It is out of this profusion of richly contrasting colour that one suddenly emerges as he turns a sharp corner in the narrow street, and finds himself face to face with the chief entrance to the University Mosque of El-Azhar. Its lofty stone gateway, whose delicate lines have recently been restored with much care, conceals a scene as different as can be from the garrulous and slow-going commerce of the street, and yet one that is equally characteristic of the life of the Arab.

The Mosque, whose Arab name when rendered into English means "the blooming" or "the flourishing," has roots that go back to the tenth century, for the first lesson was given in A.D. 975, in the time of the Calif El Aziz. He may be considered the real founder of the University, for he added to the Mosque its library, maintained its teachers, and encouraged its growth in many ways. Since that time teaching has gone on with very little intermission, though the Mosque has been the scene of riots, the birthplace of plots, and has suffered severely from a fourteenth century earthquake, and from an eighteenth century bombardment. Other colleges in other towns had histories, too, but those that still exist at Tantah, Damietta, Dessouk, and Alexandria have passed through many vicissitudes and in process of time have lost their individuality, so that these *medressehs* have in reality become branches of El-Azhar.

Even in Cairo itself, in earlier days, this central school of the Mohammedan world was not without its rivals. One of the most famous of these was founded at the beginning of the eleventh century by the Fatimite Caliph Hakim biamr

Allah, son of the El Aziz who did so much for El-Azhar, and notorious as one of the fanatical founders of the sect of the Druses, who still expect his return upon earth. Both the Caliph and his "House of Science or Wisdom" had a romantic history, and at the downfall of the Fatimites in 1171, the school was absorbed by El-Azhar, "the blooming," which then attained that pre-eminence which it has held throughout all the subsequent vicissitudes of Cairene history.

The entrance to El-Azhar is known as *Bab el-Muzeynin*, or "The Gate of the Barber," because in days gone by it was here that the students were accustomed to have their heads shaved. In addition to its lofty decorated portal, the gateway includes a small entrance court, which opens on the right into a small mosque, the *Mesgid Taibarsiyeh*, which has a very beautiful prayer recess dating from the fourteenth century. On the left of this tiny court are the steward's office and the library beyond, containing some thirteen thousand volumes.

Opposite this gate, on the eastern side of the Mosque there is the *Bab esh-Shurba*, or the Soup Gate; on the west there is the *Bab el-Gohargiyeh*, or Gate of the Jewellers; while on the south there are three other gates, bearing the names of different parts of Egypt. It is, however, at the Gate of the Barber that the visitor enters the precincts of the Mosque.

Being unbelievers and therefore theoretically unclean, we cannot profane the sacred ground in the mosque enclosure by placing western leather upon its dusty tiles or its dirty mats. Two attendants stand at the gates, and before they allow each visitor to step over the six inch barrier of wood which marks the boundary between the mosque and the street, these slow-going Arabs clumsily tie over each shoe an enormous yellow slipper, so large that both feet could easily go into one. The result is that one's progress is a combination of a snow-shoe walk and an oriental shuffle, and the process seriously interferes at first with one's observation. Ladies, too, seeing none of the proverbial juxtaposition of cleanliness to godliness, are for the most part more than usually solicitous about their feet.

While one is having these huge flapping yellow slippers adjusted and is still standing without the pale, his ears gradually become conscious that the air is filled with the steady resonant murmur of many voices, as if one were listening at the entrance of an enormous Brobdingnagian beehive. It is a sound quite different from the Babel of noises that assaults the ear in the streets nearby, where one can distinguish the monotonous song of the water-seller, the crack of the driver's whip, and the stream of voluble Arab invocations above the ebb and flow of noisy chatter that never ceases. The steady murmur which drifts out through the mosque gates is lower in tone, but it carries with it an impression of inexhaustible volume. It is the sound of many voices, but of many voices that seem to be inspired with the same idea. There is none of the individuality, of the give and take, of the little waves of noise that one can distinguish in the street sounds. Here there is unanimity, superficial it may be, but still producing a full note, an insistent rumbling buzz, which conveys an impression of steady labour, of busy business, of a society at work.

But the eye is as yet too occupied with the unwonted sights to allow the ear its due share in the flock of new impressions that crowd themselves upon the mind. And truly all is strange; a few flip-flap loose slippered steps and one has crossed the threshold, leaving behind the Arab at his trading, and has entered the realm of the Arab at his studies.

No longer do we have the narrow streets flanked with Lilliputian shops; no longer the kaleidoscopic change of faces and street-sights; no longer the narrow irregular strip of blue intermittently diminished by tattered awning or projecting window-lattice. Now the blue is generously visible above an open court, and one's first impression is one of the sharp contrast of sunlight and shadow. Then with this impression there gradually merges the realization that this is no empty rectangle, but that it is crowded with human beings, whose thousand turbans catch the sunlight and weave it into odd patterns as they squat in irregular groups here and there on

the square-tiled floor of the court or under its arched colonnade. Sunlight, shadow, and a thousand men and boys: that much is snapshot upon one's mind as an instantaneous impression. Then the senses begin to work, and the eye and the ear take in by slow degrees the varied detail of a scene that has not its equal in the educational world.

As early as the thirteenth century Ibn Khaldoun poetically speaks of the halls of wisdom being thronged and the oceans of knowledge full to overflowing. To-day, even, he can scarcely be accused of hyperbole, for seated in groups of from half a dozen to a dozen and a half are hundreds of students of all ages from tiny boys of six years whose faces have "not yet lost all their original brightness," up to bearded men old enough to be their grandfathers. Most of them are studying, and are either engaged in repeating aloud passages from the Koran or else are busily occupied in writing with ink upon polished pieces of tin which serve the younger ones in place of slates. Others are stretched out on the coarse grass matting sound asleep in the full glare of the sun and blissfully unconscious of their surroundings. Still others are eating native cakes or chewing at long sticks of sugar-cane. Such is the life of the Arab student as it runs its smooth course in this huge open-air court-yard of the Mosque.

If we thread our way through these groups of students studying, sleeping or eating, to the opposite side from the entrance we come upon another aspect of this Arab university. A number of doorways give access to a huge hall, called *Liwan el-Gamia*, whose arched roof is supported by 140 marble columns. There is scarcely a square yard of the some 3,500 of the floor space that is not occupied by squatting students, and in making one's way from one part of it to another one is obliged to step over students and to thread one's way among their books and provisions. The hall itself is but faintly lit, and in the dim religious light the groups of students melt into the gloom that shrouds the distant pillars. Black robes, blue robes, yellow robes, green robes, striped robes,

red turbouches, yellow turbans, green turbans, white turbans, and turbans that once were white, mingle together in this sea of human beings intent on their work. Upon closer examination, this mass of humanity divides itself into irregular groups and each group has for its centre a dignified Arab who is lecturing. Generally he is seated on a kind of square stool placed with its back against one of the marble columns, while around him squat on the floor in a compact group the students who form his class. As the columns are not very far apart and there are no partitions to separate the classes, the result is very much that which obtains among some Sunday Schools of western Christendom. In order that the farthest student in the class may hear all that is said the teacher is obliged to shout at the top of his voice, and as each other professor is equally desirous that none of the words of wisdom shall be lost, the result is indescribable. Woe to the student who sits on the farthest verge and whose ears are assailed at the same time by the cogent arguments and reasoning of two professors not ten yards apart, for professors are famous for their unanimity.

Many of these Mohammedans who come from distant parts have special rooms allotted to them opening off the large court; and here one may see in their own rooms, often with their beds rolled up in a corner or on a kind of gallery, Syrians, Turks, and Hanafites, natives of India and Afghanistan, people from Mecca, from Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli, from the Soudan, and East African students from the Somali coast. There is even a special room known as the *Zawiyet el-'Omyan* for blind students taught by a blind professor, so that practically every class is provided for. Many of these study rooms, or *riwaks*, are outside the Mosque, and many have libraries amounting together to more than eighteen thousand volumes in addition to the central library.

The life of a student in this Arab university has naturally peculiarities which distinguish it from that of western students, though, if you stand far enough off, students are the same the world over. They generally live in dormitories, they hear

innumerable lectures which they will not remember when once the examination is passed, they have holidays, and eventually they leave the halls of their Alma Mater and live happily ever after.

The Cairene student cannot be considered as a member of the University till he is fifteen years old, though he may attend the elementary school within its walls up to that age. After he has gone through this preliminary process of learning to read, write, and commit to memory, he is admitted to the University if he can pass an examination showing his ability to study and to recite half the Koran by heart. If he is blind he must substitute the other half of the Koran for ability to read and write. He then enrolls himself in some *riwak* or dormitory and decides upon the professors whose lectures he will follow. Many of these *riwaks* are foundations whose income is distributed among the resident students, and the quantity of bread or the amount of money that a student receives depends upon the time he has been in residence, which really means upon the number of classical books he has studied. Here perhaps lies a solution to the difficult problem of getting students to study the classics to-day. Surely we can strain the proverbial saying a few inches and believe that the way to a man's mind, too, is through his stomach. Surely there is nothing new under the sun. The Greeks many centuries ago discovered this, and they had none of the troubles of the modern college president.

Thursday is a holiday, and the student is free to go on expeditions into the neighbouring country. In their white turbans and striped robes they wander along, sometimes dreamily and hand in hand, sometimes discussing in animated fashion some trifle of the law as insignificant as those that so exercised the schoolmen of old. Or they betake themselves to some village nearby where there is the sound of merry-making, and chew away at two feet of sugar cane while native music beguiles their ears.

Friday, too, is free and is often occupied in visiting friends. Besides these two holidays every week, there are

the longer vacations, one in midsummer lasting six weeks and the other varying according as the feast of Ramadan comes early or late.

Perhaps the most interesting fact about the professors is their salary. Their western confrères will sympathize with them. The president of El-Azhar, or the *Sheik el ulema*, is the only one who is at all decently remunerated, to use our occidental euphemism. He is paid a monthly salary of \$355, and receives also the revenue of four hundred acres of land, and seventy-five loaves daily. He gives the bread he cannot eat to the poor, and it must be a great comfort to know that he is daily blessed and remembered in the prayers of some threescore and ten persons. The professors, however, unfortunately cannot indulge even in this cheap wholesale charity. They receive from \$3.75 to \$15 a month with some few other benefits, chiefly clothing from the Khedive. Others get nothing, but hang on until there is a vacancy. At Tantah, Dessouk, and Damietta, the monthly salary varies from \$2.25 to \$1.25. As a consequence, many professors are obliged to make a living by reading in mosques and in private houses of the devout, to teach in a government school, or even to pursue a trade, more or less incognito. Still, we have professors who are also practising physicians, authors, architects, engineers, or ministers—why not professors who are also good bookbinders and grocers? Such are not unknown in Cairo.

But then Cairo is a strange place. It casts a glamour that is also a spell over all things, so that one takes even the most unusual experiences and the most unwonted sights as a matter of course. As in a dream our judgement seems to be on a holiday and nothing surprises us; so that it appears a perfectly natural thing for people to do to spend half their lives learning the rather inconsequent contents of the Koran by heart and loading down their memories with the thousand and one interpretations that have gradually grown up until they constitute a formidable body of Islamic tradition. We

think of the schoolmen and of their endless disputations; we remember weary hours spent in fruitless labour over the pros and cons of different readings of Homeric texts; and even the vision of some theological college may flash across our minds. Then, as through a series of dissolving views, we are back again at El-Azhar with its hundreds of students working away, firm in their belief that they are laying up for themselves treasures in the Mohammedan Paradise.

Who is anyone that he should set himself up to judge? Why should the western university with all its elaborate paraphernalia of scientific laboratories look down upon its oriental precursor because El-Azhar happens to regard with apparently equal veneration a beautifully illuminated Koran—the gift of some prince—and a small old-fashioned telescope which is kept shut up in a glass case? Is El-Azhar to be looked at askance because the foundation and centre of its curriculum and of its teaching is the sacred book of the Mohammedans, and that too by centres of learning which in their lectures scarcely mention their Bible even for its literary merit?

The point of view is a wonderful magician. After all, there is not much difference between the pot and the kettle and we can get along very well with both. It is perhaps unfair to compare El-Azhar with representatives of western university life, for they have little in common either in aims or in methods at first sight. Differences, however, are always emphasized when anything is new to one, and it would be therefore obviously unfair for us, armed with western criteria, to seek out the East and estimate it merely by alien standards. Our judgement would be as lacking in essentials as a Mohammedan valuation of one of our own universities.

At El-Azhar there is none of the diversity of interest nor of that complexity of administration that come to life in an institution which seeks to cover the whole range of human knowledge, to satisfy the different needs of individual students and to give scope to the originality of its professors,

as well as at the same time to foster those ideals of efficiency and of service for which as a social institution it necessarily stands.

El-Azhar stands for Mohammedanism. Its professors teach Mohammed's book, the Koran; its students all learn the Koran and are examined upon it. The Koran has been the life of El-Azhar for nearly a thousand years. Only within the last decade or so has the first ray of modern science been able to penetrate the outer courts of this stronghold of Islam. Its renascence is yet to come. With oriental tenacity to what is established by the will of heaven, El-Azhar has clung to its traditions. It has still to go through the periods of unrest and of spiritual readjustment that have always followed upon the entrance of science into a university. Though older than all the European institutions, it has been the last to realize that knowledge must be unfettered by the conservatism of theological prejudice and unconfined by the bonds of tradition before it can grow to wisdom.

Judged by the criteria of a purely scientific age, the limitations of such a university as El-Azhar are obvious, but it makes no pretence to cater to twentieth century needs. The East is essentially conservative and El-Azhar fulfills satisfactorily the purpose for which it was created. Its popularity and the devotion with which it is attended are proof enough of its success in that direction. As there is but one God, Allah, so there is but one book to be studied and that book is the Koran; in it is to be found all that the Faithful need both for instruction and for edification.

GERHARD RICHARD LOMER

SOME ASPECTS OF GRAMMAR

THE average schoolboy regards Grammar as a hateful bundle of interminable rules and exceptions that reminds him of the instrument of castigation which hangs over him like the sword of Damocles. Perhaps more than any other subject grammar seems to him cut off from all living experience, a veritable Dead Sea of routine work, unrelieved by any landmark of human interest.

But this is not the fault either of the boy or of the grammar; it is the fault of the way in which the grammar is taught. Words are the expressions of human thoughts and emotions, and the different combinations of words and the relations between them should therefore rouse as much interest as the latest work of romance. But it has unfortunately been too often forgotten that men only speak in a certain way because they think in a certain way, and that language is only the garment of ideas. A similar defect has marred for some time the study of foreign languages, especially the ancient classics when they were taught in a mere academic manner, divorced from the historical and social interests of the times. But now even this study has been reformed by teaching the words in connexion with the real things and persons that they present. A similar treatment should be possible in dealing with laws of grammar. By showing the close connexion between thought and speech the laws of grammar will seem to be what they really are, not a bundle of dry rules to be committed to memory, but the expression of the most interesting operations of the human mind.

All the different thoughts that could possibly present themselves to the mind may be divided into three great classes. First, things subsistent; secondly, the quality of things; thirdly, the relations that exist between them.

First, there are things which the mind conceives as subsisting or having the possibility of subsistence. To this class the grammarian gives the name of substantives. This name expresses clearly the relative importance of the things denoted. Substantive means standing under or supporting. Unless there be some being or possible being present before the mind, it is evident that no human thought is possible. Whereas, when an object, either ideal or real, is present before the mind, it at once becomes the foundation of all the mental operations concerning it.

Secondly, these different substantive beings have certain attributes, or qualities, or states, which are named adjectives, verbs, and adverbs. These when considered in relation to the substantive are what the accidents are to the substance. They exist only in and by the substantive and assume their peculiar nature from the substantive thing from which they originate. Indeed the grammatical distinction between substantives and their qualitatives is merely the expression of the philosophical distinction between the substantial and the accidental.

The third class consists of words that connect thoughts, such as the prepositions and conjunctions. These fulfill the function of arranging and grouping together in various ways the things and their qualities that are present before the mind.

If we now consider more closely some other parts of speech we shall find that their classification and subdivisions are anything but arbitrary, and that they owe their origin to some of the most interesting processes of the mind. We have already said that substantives form the basis of all language, for we cannot think unless we think of something. And grammarians furthermore divide these objects of the mind into certain classes labeled respectively common, proper, and abstract nouns. Now it is an interesting fact that the mind by its own nature tends to make all things common nouns, or to put this into philosophical language, the mind tends to universalize. When the mind perceives any sub-

stantive object, the mind also conceives that the same kind of object may exist over and over again in an indefinite number of places. A certain type seems to be formed in the mind, and by means of this type the mind is ready to compare and to judge of other objects that are like this type. Children show this tendency in their earliest years. They call everybody papa and mamma, and these terms of endearment are evidently in their common case nouns. It is only later on that the child succeeds in narrowing its attention to the individual object and begins to make use of the proper noun.

There is another class of nouns that go by the name of abstract nouns. Scarcely two writers of grammar entirely agree in their definition of an abstract noun, and the reason is that abstract nouns correspond with one of the most subtle and delicate operations of the human mind. There are certain entities that have no independent existence of their own. They exist only in or on account of something else from which they cannot be separated in reality without vanishing altogether. But the human mind can, by an act of abstraction, conceive these entities quite apart from the thing to which they belong, and can attribute to them an abstract existence. The colour white, for example, cannot exist by itself. It is essentially a quality of something else, for example, of the piece of paper on which the pen is writing. Now the mind, by a peculiar process of its own, can separate the whiteness from the paper and make it the exclusive object of its mental gaze. Then again, the moral qualities like truthfulness, courage, cannot exist without the persons who possess these qualities ; yet to these qualities also the mind can give a separate and abstract existence.

It would be quite an error to say that the entities corresponding with abstract nouns have no real existence whatever. Some grammarians, however, have fallen into this error by defining abstract nouns as names of things that have no real existence, whereas whiteness, truthfulness and other such entities have a real existence, but one that is dependent

upon something else. The abstract noun might be more correctly defined as the name of some quality or some relation between things that only have a real existence in and through these things.

One might here point out a difference between abstract nouns and verbs. Both one and the other are names of qualities of things, qualities that may be active or passive, but in the case of abstract nouns the quality is conceived quite apart from the object which the verb expresses, whereas in the verb the quality is considered as still inherent in the object.

In the rules regarding the singular and plural members of nouns we shall find intense significance. It is recognized that certain nouns and proper nouns have no plural number, unless they are used as common nouns, and, furthermore, unless they are used as class nouns. All this is the consequence of one of the mysterious laws of numbers by which we cannot think a plural number of things unless we think them as belonging to the same class, or in other words, as forming some unity. If, for example, we wish to use a plural noun indicating a dog, a cat, and a mouse taken together, we must use some such word as animals, indicating that they are conceived as belonging to the same class. In other words plurality requires for its conception unity.

It is, however, when we come to the verbs that we find most interesting relations between words and thoughts that they express. There is one verb which either explicitly or implicitly enters into the formation of all other verbs, and that is the verb "to be." We may analyze any verb we please, and we shall find that in using it we attribute or deny being or existence to some quality or thing. We may express this perhaps the most clearly by saying that every verb consists of a noun or an adjective together with some form of the verb "to be" either directly expressed or understood. It is a consequence of having seen, though perhaps unconsciously, the truth of this definition that some grammarians have been wont to call the verb "to be" a substantive verb.

For it is the substance of and underlies the nature of every verb.

It is the knowledge of existence or being in general which we predicate of every object before our mind that constitutes the light of reason. If we analyze any thought whatever we shall find that it always implies existence whether actual or possible. Directly we take away from any mental object its existence, either real or possible, then the whole thought vanishes from our mind. When, however, existence is expressed by means of a verb, then this verb implies more than that thing or quality may possibly exist. It makes a judgement affirming or denying existence of that particular thing or quality.

Besides the verb "to be" there are other categories of verbs that stand apart by themselves, having a distinct nature of their own. These are the so-called auxiliary verbs "may," "must." These verbs have a nature entirely and distinctively their own. Indeed, if we carefully analyze the meaning of these auxiliary verbs we shall find that they denote the obligatory or moral relation between man and the things that surround him. They express the "ought to be" which belongs to quite a different category from the verb "to be." We might put this in exact philosophical language by saying that the verb "to be" expresses the ontological order of the universe and "ought to be" expresses the deontological order of the universe. The child in learning the use of language at first understands the verb "to be" with its modifications, and only in later years it is able to use the verbs "must" and "may" with the full sense of the moral obligation attached to them.

I might show how all the different voices and modes arise from the different applications that we make of the verb "to be." But as it is the purpose of this article merely to suggest a few distinct and separate points of the philosophical construction of grammar, I shall say only a few words on the formation of the tenses.

Tense is that form of the verb that expresses the time in which its action takes place. Time is the relation between duration and succession. Everything that has existed or exists or will exist has a beginning ; it passes from the stage of non-existence to the stage of existence and then must last for some period, however short. Duration enters as an essential element into the notion of time because it is an inexpressible quality of the verb "to be," that, as we have already seen, is found either expressed or implied in all verbs. Such is the peculiar nature of this thought of existence that we cannot think of any action except as having a duration of some kind, however short. If we admit that an action has absolutely no duration then we immediately annihilate the thought of that action.—But duration alone is not time, it is eternity. Succession is the second element that necessarily enters into the idea of time, and this succession is supplied to us by the quality, active or passive, of which existence is affirmed. The following sentence will furnish us with a luminous example of this rather difficult doctrine : "The man was running." Here the past tense "was" of the verb "to be" supplies the element of duration, the action of running supplies us with a notion of succession; and it is the union of these two elements that furnishes us with the knowledge of time.

Since every verb consists, as I have said, of some quality and of existence predicated of that quality by means of the verb "to be," it follows that in every verb there must be some form or other of time ; in other words, there must be some tense.

The principal tenses are the present, past, and future, and these express nothing but different phases of succession, phases that alone are responsible for the diversity of time or tense. The past tense expresses the comparison between events already taken place with what now already exists, a relation that may be summed up by the word *before*; the future tense expresses the comparison with what will be, a relation that may be summed up in the word *after*. That these

tenses are mere mental comparisons is shown by the fact that what is past to one man may be future to those who went before him. The ever fluctuating present tense is always taken as the standpoint of comparison and judgement. Each of these tenses again may be further divided according as the element of duration is more particularly emphasized.

The present tense is subdivided into : (a) The present indefinite, as "has been." This refers more exclusively to the element of succession furnished by the act of speaking. (b) Present imperfect, as "I am speaking." This refers more especially to the element of duration given by the verb "to be," and (c) Present perfect, as "I have spoken," expresses succession, but succession considered in its terminating act.

The remarks I have made so far regard the two most important parts of speech, but it is easy to see that the others might be treated also in the same philosophical manner, and that the student might thus be enabled to see more clearly the interesting reasonableness and importance of grammar. Hitherto we have been treating of words, but now we have to deal with groups of these words, each of which groups has one distinct meaning of its own. This does not mean that in a sentence the meaning of a single word is lost sight of, for the meaning of every word is necessary and must be taken in by the mind in order that the meaning of the whole sentence may be fully grasped. The only difference is that the individual word is no longer the term or finishing point of the reader's attention. The mind regards the separate word meanings as instruments by which to arrive at a more complete knowledge of the sentence which they form. In the sentence, for example, "The man is building a large house," the person who understands the sentence must also understand the meaning of each word composing it, but he does not rest there, he uses these separate meanings as helps to render the whole meaning of the sentence more luminous.

Conversely, when once the meaning of the whole sentence is grasped, then this meaning sheds further light upon the

partial meaning and sense of each separate word. Hence in some phrases we often speak of trying to understand a word by means of the general context. But up till now both grammar and rhetoric have been too much cut off from that human element that can alone give them interest. The boy of seven or eight may, indeed, be in a condition only to learn by rote a certain number of disconnected rules. But boys of more mature age revolt from that kind of knowledge that deals with what is only a part of something else, and is only a mere accident. Let the boy be made to see in clear and simple language the relation between grammar and human thought, and he will then begin to take an interest in what he sees to be the expression of the most interesting workings of his own personality.

J. A. DEWE

THE PLACE OF THE CHURCH IN MODERN LIFE

THE WRITER of the following reflections is by no means blind to the unduly pretentious character of the title under which they appear. There is a sense, however, in which the word Church may be taken, and also a way of interpreting the expression Modern Life that rob this title at once of any air of authoritativeness, or omniscience, or supreme practical wisdom. By the Church, of course, we are quite willing to understand the Christian Church of our Western Civilization, and ultimately—to be practical and direct—the Christian Church in Canada; but we would rather begin by assuming it to be simply the religious organization of mankind, or an organization that exists for the perfection of the moral and spiritual life of mankind. This may seem to many an exceedingly broad and altogether non-committal, or even an agnostical or secular description; and if so we can only ask for the patience of the reader until he sees the use to which we are inclined to put it. And as for the expression Modern Life, this we desire to construe in the most superficial sense possible, in the sense in which modern life is generally regarded to be, in respect of some of its more external characteristics or conditions different, say, from the life of the Eighteenth Century, or, of the Middle Ages, or the time of the Greeks and Romans.

Many people who condemn the church to-day forget that religious organization or the religious organization of society has always existed among civilized or semi-civilized men. Indeed the early organization of human society is often almost entirely religious in its nature. And as for to-day, if all or nearly all of the present churches of Europe

and America were destroyed others would certainly arise to take their place to-morrow. To this extent the writer is at least in partial agreement with those defenders of the church—some of them merely statesmen or men of affairs with practical ends in view, and some of them the humblest of earth's toilers and sufferers—who see in the beneficial social activity and power of the church an argument for the fundamental soundness of the views it takes of the nature of man. On the other hand, it would be a poor way to defend the Christian church, or any form of a Christian church, to forget that religious systems, other than Christianity, have had, and still have, forms of religious organization which for all practical purposes may be regarded as churches.

The great fact then upon which the church as a whole, that is the visible and the invisible church, may be said to rest is the religious instinct of mankind, the tendency and the faith recognized, for example, by a philosopher like Kant and a contemporary man of science like Sir Oliver Lodge to regard our present temporal life as only a part or phase of something very much greater, of an invisible order or kingdom of which our present social system is but an imperfect reflection. All religious organizations of all ages have endeavoured to bring their members into personal relation with a larger and a more enduring life than that of the days of a man or a generation, and so far from this idea being alien to modern thought, it is essentially bound up with the modern idea of the universe as the embodiment of law or with the equally modern idea of the perfected society of the future when, in the phraseology of Herbert Spencer, the ideal man shall exist in the ideal state. The only difference, of course, between religion, or the faith of the church, and the speculations of science about the abstractions that it calls laws and the tendencies of future society, is that in the church or the religious life men are already partly conscious of that divine life of love which from the standpoint of science remains the merest hypothesis.

In this sense it seems to me that, while we may sympathize—as indeed we must—with many of the protests of the liberal theology and the social theology of the day against the excessive “other worldliness” of the church and the theology of the past, of its tendency to dwarf unduly and to minimize the meaning of the life that now is, and against, too, the undue individualism of our Protestant theology of the past, we must never allow ourselves—as do some of the representatives of the newer theology of the day—to go so far as to maintain that the chief business of religion is merely a better adjustment of the social conditions of our present life. “I maintain,” says the Rev. R. J. Campbell, of London, in a recent book, “that the church has nothing whatever to do with preparing men for a world to come. The best way to prepare a man for the world beyond is to get him to live well and truly in this one.” Now this, of course, is an extreme statement, valid merely as a counter-statement against the one-sidedness of the attitude of making everything of a life somewhere else than here and now. Against it we might justifiably place the contention once expressed by the late Arnold Toynbee—at least as modern a man as Mr. Campbell of the London City Temple—that the man who has not realized his immortality has not begun to live even in this life. *Sentimus experimurque nos aeternos esse*: we feel and know by experience that we are eternal, as the great Spinoza puts it. And it is precisely this feeling of the inadequacy of our present earthly life to the demands of the spirit or soul that dwells within us that would make the typical man or woman divinely discontented in the most socialistically arranged state possible,—discontented, if you will, in any Eden or earthly paradise whatsoever.

And now for some of the many things that tend to obscure in the minds of many people to-day this deeper or higher consciousness of the work of the church in relation to the work of the world. One of these is undoubtedly the persistence of popular or belated misconceptions in

respect of the so-called dogmatic teaching of the church, and of the relation of its dogmas and creeds to the science and the criticism of the day. A few years ago—happily now a good many years ago—about the time say, of the so-called scientific materialism of the sixties in Germany and England, the church had to fear what was called the broad question of religion as opposed to science, that is to say, a supposedly absolute or hopeless antagonism between the religious and the scientific ways of regarding the world. Thanks, however, to such things as the freedom of scientific research, thanks indeed chiefly to the fact that the study of religion has itself become matter of science, that is of exact or relatively exact investigation, this antagonism is now altogether a thing of the past. The slightest science and the slightest philosophy make it, as it were, apparent that the so-called personal or “subjective” aspects of this universe of ours are as real as the supposed impersonal and “objective.” And our German friends, by the way, have never limited the word science as we have done to studies like physics and chemistry.

The rock of offence to which we would rather refer here is really an ignorance on the part of many people in the churches, and of many people outside the churches, of the distinction between the theology, and the creeds, and the descriptions, through which the churches have from time to time for various reasons sought to describe their positions in relation to the thought and the tendencies of a time, and the inward religion, or the inward life and realities, of which these theologies, and creeds, and descriptions are but a partial and an imperfect expression. In regard to this cause of offence, or stumbling block, both the church and the masses are distinctly blameworthy. Indeed it is often very hard to judge which of the two is the more blameworthy, the churches with their insistence upon things like apostolical succession, and Papal, or Biblical, infallibility, or predestination, or some particular kind of conversion and conviction of sin, or some particular method of church

government or church discipline; for the world and the masses with their absorption in pleasure, and money-getting, and material power that renders them, apart altogether from the matters of the intellectual difficulties of the creeds, almost totally blind to the internal and the personal realities that are the dynamic forces, the things of importance, in any religious system in the world.

It is here quite unnecessary to attempt to indicate how, through Greek philosophy, and Neo-Platonism, and St. Augustine, and the scholastic Renaissance the original spiritual message of Christianity,—that access to the supremely real is by an attitude of personal faith, and love, and experience that is continually working out its own verification,—became converted into a theory, or a theology, or a formulation, or a system to be accepted in a spirit of blind submission or unquestioning obedience. It is rather, we might say, one of the great needs of the hour that the churches should do everything in their power to make clear to themselves and the world that the realities for which they stand are not those of the conceptions and formulas of by-gone ages, or the creeds that have divided Christians in the past, but the living realities of the same transforming life and spirit that have made Christianity a world-force from the beginning, and that still make it the greatest world-force of the day. It is, however, by the way, of the utmost importance that this work of enlightenment should be accomplished without fostering or creating the impression that all theory and theology whatsoever, all "development of Christian doctrine," as it is called, should at once be thrown aside as so much useless lumber or dead wood. Everything that the best thought and the best experience of different ages and epochs of history has brought out of Christianity can still profitably be used in the way of getting at its meaning for the world. And the talk of many otherwise well-informed and well-meaning people about "getting back" to what Christ and Christianity were before they were interpreted by Christian scholars and Christian con-

verts who approached them from different points of view, is just about as absurd as was the talk of the followers of Rousseau a hundred years ago of our all returning to a state of Nature and natural living supposed to exist before civilization began.

Putting aside therefore as essentially superficial and antiquated this entire matter of a supposed opposition between religion, on the one hand, and science, on the other, and putting aside too the somewhat vain attempt to consider Christianity apart altogether from the interpretations put upon it by its devotees and followers from the first and second to the nineteenth century with its great emphasis upon what it regards as the "social" side of Christ's teaching, let us turn to a somewhat more serious charge against the church. We often hear it said to-day that the church is out of touch with modern life, that her interests are no longer those of the men and women of to-day,—a charge that the observant reader of the world's news would probably claim to be substantiated by the character of the recent protests of the present Pope against what he has the courage to call Modernism in nearly all its forms.

Now there is just as much caution necessary in dealing with this charge as in dealing with the supposition of a hopeless antagonism between the interests of religion and those of science. If modern life were really entirely materialistic and secular, then the church might well be out of sympathy or out of touch with it. It would, as it were, be only so much the worse for modern life, not for the church. Despite, however, many appearances in this direction, appearances through which we often allow ourselves to be impressed and to be deceived, modern life is not entirely materialistic and not entirely secular. This is a point, of course, to which many pages might well be devoted, and I desire to pass over it as resting in the main upon a misunderstanding or a misapprehension of fact,—upon an irrelevancy. There is, at least, just as much poetry, and pathos, and sentiment,

and idealism in modern life as a whole as there was in life in the ancient world or in the Middle Ages,—with perhaps far less ignorance and superstition, and very much more personal independence and a far higher standard of general comfort. The human heart still lives by “its joys, its tenderness, its fears,” and its hopes, and the human mind is just as speculative to-day as it ever was. The speculations of our scientific men about the nature of matter, and life, and the soul would fill many sections in many libraries. Occultism, and spiritualism, and theosophy are still rampant despite all our science. And the speculations of many of our educators, and socialists, and social reformers,—aye and of our millionaires who build up industrial villages, and institutions, and schemes of one kind or another,—are not so far away from those of Plato, and More, and Godwin, and Shelley, and Carlyle, and the Apocalypse as they often appear to be. Man never is but always “to be” blest.

It is not modern life with its real needs and interests that has grown beyond the church, it is only some or many of the conditions of modern life that have outstripped the church of the Middle Ages or the church of the days of our grandfathers. Such conditions are, for example, the modern city with its contrasts and its submerged and unknown hordes of human beings, the modern immigration movement with the problems it develops in town and country, the fact that the semi-feudalism of the organization and arrangements of the parish churches of the Old World has very little meaning for our democracy of to-day. Men simply do not believe, and it is not true, that the parish priest and the parish church of to-day are still the focus or the centre of illumination, or civilization, or inspiration that they used to be. Education is no longer the possession or the privilege of the clergy, and the slightest travel in the old or the new world, or the mere opening of a newspaper, reveals the fact that other religions than the Christian have their priests, and their ritual, and their beliefs, and

their social systems that, to begin with, are as indifferent or as antagonistic to Christianity as is church Christianity to them. In nearly every Western city on this continent, for example, the Christian child can see on the streets the yellow man, or the black man, or the Hebrew, or the Russian Christian with forms of belief different not only from his but from those of each other. It may safely be said that the average child or young person in this modernized America or British Empire is—like the average working man who reads Darwin, or Herbert Spencer, or Carl Marx (often just because he knows them to be against the traditional theology of the churches)—against any form of Christianity that does not take an active recognition of the different religions of the different people and of the God-given freedom of the individual to try all things and hold fast that which is good. And it may also be safely said that the average Christian minister or priest of the past hundred years has not shown either the ability, or the open-mindedness, or the freedom to deal in his presentation of religious truth with all these conditions and all these facts.

What then is the church going to do about it all? The first and most obvious duty of the church, or of any section of the church, with a view to finding out its real place in modern life is the duty of obtaining information as to the facts and the actual development of the modern world, in relation, of course, to the past and more particularly perhaps to the great transformation of the last century and those of the opening decades of this twentieth century. This century has already witnessed the emergence of the new world-powers upon the political and social horizon, and will in all probability witness before its close a contact or a conflict of the civilization of the Western World with that of the Great East that will be as remarkable as anything known to history since the Crusades or the Mohammedan conquest of Western Europe.

The information to which we refer will mean, to begin with, in Canada, and particularly in Western Canada, a

continued and resolute belief in our common school system and the absolute freedom of so many hours per day for so-called secular education without the interference of any denominational or clerical influence whatever. It means too for the church—for it is dealing with religion as the highest product of the mind of man, or of the operation of the Divine Spirit in the life of man—an equally resolute belief in the non-sectarian character of the universities and the highest teaching agencies of the land. Whatever may have been the history of denominational colleges and institutions in the past, and it has been in the main an honourable one although tarnished now and then by deeds of intolerance, and bigotry, and blindness, the day of denominational universities and schools is past. No denomination is rich enough or powerful enough to sustain the modern university with its unparalleled expenses for the teaching of science or for investigation, and research, and exploration, and field instruction.

Let us continue then the policy of our most enlightened churches of placing our seminaries of theology near the great universities where the clergy of the future will be brought into the most active contact with knowledge new and old, and with men who are going into all kinds of calling in the modern world, and let the sifting process go on there so that only the best, and the strongest, and the best educated will select, and be selected for the profession of the Christian ministry. Let us remember, those of us who are induced to believe that the heart is the only qualification for a minister of the gospel, that enthusiastic men anywhere are dangerous just in proportion to their lack of knowledge, and that a Christian minister—however excellent his heart and his natural gifts and endowments—who is allowed to talk in the name of the church against science, for example, or for socialism, or for temperance when he means prohibition and abstinence, merely because he feels certain things very strongly, is apt to do great harm to the church and the

society to which he belongs, and to render more unlikely than ever any proper understanding of the one by the other.

The grave difficulty of course that stands in the way of this very desideratum of an educated clergy who will have an increasing influence on the future policy of the church, is that for various reasons it is becoming increasingly difficult for her to retain or obtain the services or the enthusiasm of the best or the strongest men in our schools, and colleges, and families. Students and teachers in the universities in both Europe and America have long been aware of the state of matters, and it is indeed one altogether different from that which prevailed two or three generations ago. Many things may be urged by way of explanation. There is the practical mood of mind of the country and the age in which we live, the absolutely unlimited and untrammelled field for enterprise and ability in so many different directions, the comparatively inadequate remuneration of the clergy in comparison with men in other professions and callings, and the intellectual difficulties of the age to which partial reference has already been made. I have, however, enough faith in youth and its idealism and its generous enthusiasms to believe that by far the greatest deterrent to the acceptance of the career of the ministry of the church on the part of many of our ablest all-round men in the schools, and colleges, and elsewhere is not the matter of the small stipend but the uncertainty of mind brought about by the comparative absence of freedom—of freedom of thought and investigation, of freedom of speech and freedom of action, that seems to be the lot of the average minister who is tied hand and foot by the traditions, and the conventions, and the conservatism of some particular religious body. How many men in the average club or place of business to-day, how many men in the street have not the feeling that however great and sincere may be the respect and the affection they feel and ought to feel for scores of the clergy whom as men they love and admire, they do not altogether understand how clergymen as a class can put up with the

comparative lack of freedom they enjoy in the matter of an expression of their opinions about the articles, and creeds, and policies of the church.

Now it would be exceedingly rash and presumptuous for any one individual to suggest different things that the churches might do in respect of the questions still put to ministers, and elders, and deacons, and candidates for membership; and yet the time has undoubtedly arrived when in the interests of common honesty and of a clear conscience on the part of church officers and church members, and of a wiser policy of the church as a whole before the world, some changes ought to be made either in the wording of the questions and articles of subscription, or in the matter of a recognized and formulated understanding of the meaning of subscription or assent to the past teaching of the church. Few people of any intelligence would, I suppose, be so foolish as to advocate any changing of the great creeds of Christendom, such as the Apostles Creed, or the Nicene Creed, or the Westminster Confession, in view of supposed modern needs and requirements. All that should, however, be required of the members or office-bearers of any church is an expression of belief in many or all of these great creeds and documents in so far as they are, or were believed to be, consistent with the entire word of God in Nature and in Revelation,—with a clear indication that it is the latter rather than the former that is conscientiously believed. This is practically secured in Scotland by a declaratory act setting forth the meaning of subscription, or assent, or consent to the word of God and the articles of the church, so as to leave the door open to the fact of the necessarily partial apprehension of all old truth and the no less necessarily partial apprehension of new truth. It is also secured—only by way of suggestion of course—in the preliminary words upon doctrines in the report of the “Joint Committee of the Presbyterian, Methodist and Congregational Churches of Canada on Church Union;” and no doubt, if ever a working

union of the churches in Canada in regard to such things as the education of their young men for the ministry, and social work in cities, and foreign mission work were to be effected, there would require to be a more or less distinct recognition by the co-operating churches of the sense or senses in which they had come to understand or interpret their hitherto different and differentiating statements of religious truth. Some people at present, therefore, in the churches may be inclined to wait for what further conferences on the matter of Church Union may bring about; but, on the other hand, if each of the greater Canadian churches were now, or soon in the future, to come before the world with a more or less open and honest statement of the sense in which its adherents accepted Christian teaching of the past and the present, these conferences themselves on Union would be helped very materially, in the sense that much of their educational work would be already anticipated.

Two reflections, it seems to me, are fairly relevant to this stage of the argument. The first is that, if the church in Canada is not determined to support by the weight of her authority and her influence the great educational movement represented by the schools and universities of the land; if she does not constantly seek to create the impression that her entire policy regarding the truth she professes, regarding her social conduct and aim as an institution, is one that is not only open to the light of day but one that is constantly seeking for as much of that light as possible, she is certainly doomed so far as any influence on the future citizens of the country is concerned. It is not merely that the time has now arrived when, as in the United States, education, the attainment of the best light and information upon all subjects whatsoever, has itself become a religion or a part of religion, but that the Christian religion everywhere in the world is in conflict with other religions that also profess to be founded on revelations and sacred traditions. How can a church or a religion hope to subsist in this country without

being able to show its relations to all that purports to be light and inspiration from all possible quarters? And how can the Christianity of the present and the future expect to realize the divine command to go into all the world and "teach" all nations, without courting the light and the leading that will bring to it the lovers of light and the seekers of truth everywhere?

The second reflection is that, if what is called Union could do anything in this educational connexion, in the matter of making evident to the world what it is, and what it is not, that membership in the church or a section of it really means, and also in the matter of a broad policy that would bring only educated and efficient men,—men, of course, who should firstly, if you will, be good men, men whose affections are set on the spiritual rather than the material side of life,—into the Christian ministry, it would do the greatest conceivable kind of good to the church and the community. And, as a matter of fact, it is only with the unification of many of the smaller, struggling educational agencies of the churches and the connecting of them with each other and with the greater schools and universities of the land, and with the unification of the city and the foreign missions of the churches that union can begin,—only, in other words, with a practical and a working, rather than a theoretical, union or an Utopian fusion of all church properties, and men, and interests.

Think of the elevation alone that would come about in the status of the ministry in this country if the churches would unite to the extent of agreeing to plant no more independent, competing, denominational agencies in the Northwest, but rather, single, united, Christian churches suggestive of a unification of the religious efforts of the country; and if, too, the machinery existed for the transfer of any successful minister of any church to any other church where he might be useful. And there is really nothing Utopian or nothing impossible in this,—simply a common

agreement about the economical expenditure of funds and resources such as any well-meaning and intelligent business man could appreciate.

With the new information and the new attitude of the church that we are attempting to describe there would come, too, many important specific consequences other than the desirable general consequence of an educated ministry. One of the first of these, I think, would be a great consequence indeed—far less uncertainty than exists to-day about the distinctive message of the church. My meaning, of course, is that with a better educated ministry, with a body of men able to see the spiritual message of the Christian religion as distinct from, and yet related to, that of all the other great religions and to the different phases or stages of social evolution, will there come again from our pulpits the words of men who are really conscious of having a definite message to give the world from some definite point of view and standing ground, of which they are as much masters as are investigators in the natural sciences, when they in their turn keep upon their own proper ground. Fortunately I can call to my help for the purpose both of illustration and information the words of a distinguished professor of theology, Professor Peabody of Harvard, in the "Harvard Theological Quarterly," which evidently desires to come before the world with the impression that theology is a real science instead of a collection of speculative and controversial opinions upon all subjects and problems of the world whatsoever. Professor Peabody here complains, "that the education for the ministry has for the most part remained unadjusted to the new world of learning, and that the clergy have been of late inclined to lay down theology as a record of extinct controversies",—the point to which I referred earlier under the idea of the revolutionary attitude assumed by some zealous but unwise present-day friends and defenders of "simple" or "primitive" Christianity. "They (that is the clergy) have acquired, many of them, a habit of mind quite other than that which distinguishes a learned

calling. They have become meddlers in many subjects and in many things, administrators, organizers, philanthropists, semi-scientists and what not,—pastors but not theologians. Feeling and action, as it were, have crowded out thought, and the passion for service has supplanted the passion for truth, and the dilemma that confronts the church is that it either must retreat frankly from the pretense of leadership under the conditions of the present age, or that it must become a more efficient organ of rational and candid thought." When the clergy then again have the power to translate the eternal truth of religion into the language and thought of the present day, they will again have the power that belongs to the consciousness of having a certain, instead of an uncertain, message to deliver.

Then again there might be the important consequence of the discovery and proclamation of new truth on the part of the church. Long ago the true Christian teacher was described as a man who bringeth forth out of his treasury things new and old, well aware of the caution that it is useless to pour new wine into old bottles: and if the Christian church has to-day no definite provision for the discovery and the proclamation of new truth, it is not only false to this old idea of the spiritual teacher but it is behind any other modern teaching agency. Just the moment that a university or a theological college ceases to discover to its pupils and the public generally new truth, just at that very moment does it forfeit not only its right to the public confidence but also its own birthright. I could illustrate what I mean by taking up some of the truths of modern philanthropy, say the discovery of the charity organization people, that the very worst way to cure poverty is to "relieve" the poor, thinking—as did the charity of the Middle Ages—merely of the feeling or the duty of the giver rather than of the real needs of the receiver. And I am quite sure that the Christian teacher of the future will see much better than do some of the clergy of the present through such things as "Christian" socialism, "Christian"

temperance (a different thing, as we have already noticed, from "prohibition"), "Christian" healing, "Christian" science, the conversion of the "heathen" and so on. But there are other matters and other directions in which the church can continually appeal either to new truth or at least to new aspects of old truth.

One of the questions, for example, that used to trouble many of the deeper minds of the nineteenth century, like those of Darwin and John Stuart Mill, was the apparent helplessness—it may be said in all reverence—of the Deity himself to bring to an end much of the suffering in the animal and the human world, much of the apparently inevitable and undeserved suffering of the weak, and the ignorant, and the helpless. Mill indeed thought that the only possible way in which the belief in God could be reconciled with our painful experience of the world was by assuming that the Deity is good but not all-powerful, that the "omnipotence" of God, in short, must somehow be sacrificed to the idea of, or the belief in, His "goodness." Now I do not say that his conclusion is either right or sound, but I do say that the Christian teacher must continually seek to enlighten men as to the relation of popular ideas about the "sovereignty" of God with the deeper teaching of Christianity about sin, and suffering, and redemption, just as the so-called constructive "higher" critic of to-day has very much to teach the world about the actual historical conditions under which Jewish and Christian truth was revealed or made known to the world. The present British Minister of War, who is also a philosophical scholar of no mean order, said, for example, recently in the enigmatic manner of nearly all the English Neo-Hegelian philosophers, that the British soldier might perhaps be cured of a good deal of his intemperance if he could only be brought to realize that he—the poor Tommy Atkins that he is—is really as "necessary" to God as God is to him. Now while this again may sound almost irreverent to some ears there is something in it suggestive of the idea of the real

dignity of human nature, which no teaching about original sin ought to be allowed to obscure, and which is contained in that idea which all Christians profess to accept, of the humblest Christian being somehow a worker with God or Christ.

With the suggestion of a few more corollaries and conclusions this paper may well be brought to a termination. In view of the general and the particular considerations we have ventured to bring forward in respect of the attitude of the church to modern life it is surely incumbent upon the church as a whole to proclaim herself in thorough sympathy with all the accredited, positive, ameliorative, and educative influences of the day. By this we mean not only the newer knowledge and its agencies but such practical agencies as social settlements, the charity organization societies, prison and criminal reform, the Gothenburg methods of dealing with the liquor traffic, the trades union movement, the Salvation Army, the reform clubs of our cities, the movement for church unity already referred to, and so on. Nor in doing this need the church fear that any secular agency or any set of secular agencies,—with time the distinction between the secular and the sacred will gradually disappear,—will ever become important enough to render her functions no longer a necessity, for if there is one thing upon which the church may securely build, it is the necessary imperfection of all merely human associations,—the state, and the school, and the family, and the workshop.

There will, in other words, always be a place in society for an institution or an agency that takes into account what is called the relative "failure" of all life (institutional and personal) and that ministers to the need felt by the individual of a communion and an interest that transcends the limits of a single lifetime or of a single age or generation, or of a single country, or even of civilization itself:

“Gone for ever! Ever? No, for since our dying race began,
Ever, ever, and for ever was the leading light of man.
Those that in barbarian burials killed the slave and slew the wife
Felt within themselves the sacred passion of the second life.
Truth for truth, and good for good! The Good, the True, the Pure,
the Just,
Take the charm ‘for ever’ from them and they crumble into dust.”

The time has surely come, it would seem, when it is the positive duty of every church member, of every ideal citizen (in the invisible church they are both one) to master thoroughly the workings of some one positive or ameliorative social agency of modern times. What that one agency may happen to be matters very little, provided it is an agency outside of, or other than, the workshop or the calling that brings him his bread and butter. Just think of the immense benefit to any church of having associated with it men who really know the truth about such things as the labour question, foreign missions, the education of the clergy and so on, men of course who should have the power or the means of getting so-called religious people together for rational, sensible action in view of the facts and the needs they could point out! Think even of the value to anyone of the great sections of the church of a body of men, the half of whom should be laymen, who should know as thoroughly the ultimate disposition of the funds and moneys at their disposal as they do about every cent spent in pushing and sustaining the interests of a business concern. Think lastly of the benefit to Canada of a number of men from all the different churches who would bring to an end in the near future the waste of public money and resources that exists to-day simply and solely because, in many villages and hamlets of this country, two or three religious bodies are studiously trying to do imperfectly what would be much better done by one unsectarian agency.

As for the attitude of men like Nietzsche and others that the world has on the whole outgrown Christianity, and that there can consequently be in it very little place

for the church, it may, I think, be safely maintained that the world is not on the whole likely to give up believing in a practical way in such elements or deeper truths in the modern spirit as are to be distinctly traced to Christian influence. From Christianity the world has undoubtedly learned such lessons or convictions as the following: 1, a belief in the infinite significance of human life; 2, a belief that "sin, and suffering, and guilt" are essential phases of human life; and 3, a belief that the world lives by the "vicarious" death of the just and the innocent. There will always, therefore, it seems to me, be room for the church if she can continue to present to the world such a living embodiment of these great truths as is afforded in the most unique manner in the life and the person of Jesus Christ. As the Berlin philosopher, who died this last summer, Professor Friederich Paulsen puts it: "It is impossible for us to accept evil as complacently as did the Greeks, to contemplate our lives with such self-satisfaction as was possible to the Greeks and Romans. Occasionally at some Neo-Humanistic funeral, the Horatian, *Integer vitæ scelerisque purus* is sung. I am inclined to believe that the song would sound oppressive to the dead man if he could hear it; perhaps it would remind him of the beginning of the prayer of the Pharisee: 'God, I thank thee that I am not as other men are, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, or even as this publican.' The proud words of the dying Julian, 'I die without remorse, as I have lived without sin,' we too might utter before an earthly tribune; but can not utter them before the tribunal of our conscience, before the tribunal of God?" These words of Paulsen's recall to my mind the prayer written for possible use after his death by an equally typical, modern student of philosophy, the late Professor Henry Sidgwick of Cambridge University, who for the greater part of his life had serious conscientious objections to established or orthodox Christianity, and who had therefore always been unable to take an active part in Christian public worship: "Let us commend to the

love of God with silent prayer the soul of a sinful man who partly tried to do his duty." These were the words that seemed to Sidgwick to express best his own attitude towards his life as a whole, as that of a seeker after a foundation for the moral and spiritual life of man. I only quote them as showing, with those of Paulsen and many other possible men, how deeply the Christian conception of life has affected our modern world, whether we will have it so or not. In reply then to Strauss' well-known question, which he himself answered in an emphatic negative—"Are we still Christians?" Christians, that is, after history and criticism have done their work upon the original sources of Christianity, and after all the truth and all the progress of "Modernism"? it seems to me that we may reply, "Yes," if the question is put in the fullest possible sense, but "No," if we mean by Christianity any one of the limited systems of the past.

The history of Christianity is conserved for the modern world not merely in the doctrines, and systems, and politics that theological students have to master as part of their mental equipment, but also in the hymnal, and the devotional, and the liturgical literature of the entire church, Catholic and Protestant. It is still possible, therefore, for those who have an interest in what they regard as the continuity of Christian teaching or Christian experience to supplement the broadest possible preaching and instruction by the judicious and the "free" use of the higher devotional literature of the past and the present. And the possibility of doing this in their services is one of the great advantages enjoyed by all the great historic churches and communions. It is an advantage too that the educated man of to-day can enjoy in any section of the Christian church—whether Greek, or Catholic, or Protestant. For, in the language of Carlyle: "In spite of temporary, spiritual hebetude and cecity, man and his universe are essentially Divine, and no past nobleness or revelation of the Divine can or ever will be lost to him."

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