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**ON**  
**SOUTH AFRICA**

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August 1991

COMMONWEALTH & OTHER DOCUMENTS ON SOUTH AFRICA

CHOGM DOCUMENTS

1. Southern Africa: The Way Ahead - the Kuala Lumpur Statement (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, October 1989)
2. Presentation by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, October 1989
3. Southern Africa: The Way Ahead: Britain's View (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, October 1989)
4. The Okanagan Statement and Programme of Action (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting - Vancouver, October 1987)
5. Communiqué of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Review Meeting - London, August 1986
6. The Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting - Nassau, October 1985)

CFM COMMUNIQUES

7. Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa Special Session - Concluding Statement, London, 16 February 1991
8. Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa - Consultations - Concluding Statement and Abuja Commitment - Abuja, 17 May 1990
9. Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa - Concluding Statement - Canberra, August 1989 - Apartheid and International Finance
10. Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa - Concluding Statement - Harare, February 1989 - Statement on the Arms Embargo Against South Africa
11. Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa - Concluding Statement - Toronto, August 1988 - Statement on South Africa's Relations with the International Financial System
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### UN AND OAU DECLARATIONS

13. Abuja Declaration on South Africa, OAU Summit, Abuja, June 1991
14. Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa (United Nations Special Session, December 1989)

### SPORT

15. Press Release on the Recognition of the South African National Olympic Committee (Lausanne, July 1991)
16. Canadian Government Policy Regarding Sporting Contacts Between Canada and South Africa (June 1989)
17. The "Gleneagles" Declaration; Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport (June 1977)

### OTHER

18. Canadian Government Guidelines on Official Contacts with South Africa (November 1990)
19. The "Possible Negotiating Concept" of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on Southern Africa (June 1986)

**Belanger, Patrick -AIML**

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## **Southern Africa: the Way Ahead the Kuala Lumpur Statement**

### **South Africa**

1. Heads of Government continued to view the system of apartheid in South Africa as a serious challenge to the values and principles of the Commonwealth and reaffirmed that its total eradication remained their shared responsibility and common goal.
2. Heads of Government reviewed the situation in South Africa against the possibility that significant changes in approach on the part of the South African regime, for which the Commonwealth had striven for so long, may yet prove to be within reach. In recent weeks, the regime had accepted a degree of peaceful political activity by the black majority and on the eve of this Meeting had released from prison eight political leaders.
3. However, they noted that the state of emergency remained in force; the ANC, the PAC and many other organisations remained banned; Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners remained incarcerated; many more continued to be detained without trial; and executions in political cases had not stopped. There had also been no action to indicate that the new South African Government was prepared to dismantle the pillars of apartheid, especially the Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act, the Bantustan 'homelands' policy and the system of separate education.
4. Heads of Government agreed that such encouraging signs as there had been were very much the product of a combination of internal and external pressures. In this context they welcomed the role now being played by the Mass Democratic Movement in its sustained, disciplined and peaceful opposition to apartheid. They attached importance to acceptance of peaceful demonstrations and political manifestations as a test of the sincerity of the new Government and its professed desire for change.
5. In considering the way forward, Heads of Government reiterated their preference for a negotiated and peaceful settlement and in this context reaffirmed the continuing validity of the EPG's 'Possible Negotiating Concept'. Among other measures, that Concept calls for

#### **On the part of the (South African) Government:**

- (a) Removal of the military from the townships, providing for freedom of assembly and discussion and suspension of detention without trial.
- (b) The release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees.

- (c) The unbanning of the ANC and PAC and the permitting of normal political activity.

**On the part of the ANC and others:**

Entering negotiations and suspending violence.

They noted with satisfaction the strong preference for the path of negotiated and peaceful settlement also inherent in the 1989 Harare Declaration of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Organisation of African Unity on Southern Africa endorsed by the Non-Aligned Movement at its Belgrade Summit last month. It is agreed on all sides that the South African Government and the authentic representatives of the majority population should come to the table prepared to negotiate the future of the country and its people in good faith, in an atmosphere free of violence from either side.

6. Heads of Government had recognised in their Nassau Accord that the constitutional system was a matter for all the people of South Africa to decide. They continued to believe that the Commonwealth's role in this regard was essentially to facilitate the opening of negotiations between the South African authorities and authentic black leaders.

7. They agreed that the only justification for sanctions against South Africa was the pressure they created for fundamental political change. Their purpose was not punitive, but to abolish apartheid by bringing Pretoria to the negotiating table and keeping it there until that change was irreversibly secured. In this respect Heads of Government noted that leading personalities in the South African Government had themselves acknowledged the increasing pressures on the South African economy, and that those pressures would not be diminished until fundamental political change had taken place.

8. Heads of Government, other than Britain, also acknowledged that the impact of sanctions had begun to influence the policies of the South African regime. The effectiveness of sanctions in this regard had also been demonstrated by the Report on Sanctions commissioned by the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa and prepared by a group of independent experts which was before the Meeting. They considered that the Report had made a significant contribution towards public understanding of the issues, and that its recommendations would need to be considered in the light of developments in South Africa and the region.

9. In considering what further steps they might take to advance the prospects for negotiations, Heads of Government expressed the view that this was not the time to consider any relaxation of existing sanctions and pressures. That would have to await evidence of clear and irreversible change. In the meantime, they agreed that all existing sanctions and measures should be maintained, and they called upon the wider international community to do likewise.

10. They also agreed, with the exception of Britain, that such measures should be tightened, and decided in this context

- (a) to develop new forms of financial pressure on the Pretoria regime by seeking to intensify and extend financial sanctions, in particular by

- calling on all relevant banks and financial institutions to impose tougher conditions on day-to-day trade financing, specifically through reducing the maximum credit terms to 90 days; and
  - calling on relevant governments to make trade credits harder to get by taking South Africa "off cover" with official government agencies for official trade credit and insurance purposes.
- and agreed that their Chairman should communicate these decisions to the relevant financial institutions and to other governments; and
- (b) to support the initiative developed by the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa to strengthen the arms embargo, and continue to pursue it at the United Nations in the 421 Committee.

11. Heads of Government recognised the importance of South Africa's dealings with the international financial community and therefore, with the exception of Britain, endorsed the establishment of an independent agency to review and report on South Africa's international financial links on a regular basis, and to gather and publicise factual information on financial flows to, and policies towards, South Africa. They welcomed the offer of the Government of Australia to provide substantial initial funding.

12. Heads of Government noted that the longer apartheid remained in South Africa, the greater the challenge that would face a future government in rebuilding the South African economy. In particular, they noted that the resumption of international lending to South Africa would not be automatic and that an international effort to assist in the mobilisation of resources would probably be necessary. They agreed to ask appropriate international financial institutions, and in particular the IMF, to examine now how resources might be mobilised upon evidence of clear and irreversible change.

13. Heads of Government welcomed increasing instances of dialogue among South Africans across the racial divide. They were encouraged by the proposals for negotiations, many elements of which reflected Commonwealth concepts, which had been advanced by leaders of the black majority. In this regard, they agreed to continue, individually and collectively, to take advantage of all opportunities to promote dialogue among South Africans.

14. They agreed that the Commonwealth should continue to provide support to the victims and opponents of apartheid within South Africa. Of importance were educational programmes, including in particular the Nassau Fellowships, legal and humanitarian assistance to detainees and their families, support for the trade union movement, and economic and social development programmes including low-cost housing projects.

15. They attached importance to the work of the newly established Commonwealth network of non-governmental organisations, "Skills for South Africa", to provide high-level training and work experience for victims of apartheid and so contribute both to the process of change in South Africa and the development of the skills required in a post-apartheid society. They undertook to provide support and resources to assist in the implementation and co-ordination of this work.



16. Heads of Government reaffirmed the continuing high priority of the Commonwealth effort to expose the truth about apartheid and to counter South African propaganda and censorship. They welcomed the Commonwealth strategy prepared by the Working Party set up as part of the Okanagan Programme of Action. They noted that a number of countries had already implemented and funded national action plans. They stressed the particular importance of the support being given to the embattled alternative press and other groups in South Africa resisting censorship.

### **Namibia**

17. Heads of Government welcomed the implementing of Resolution 435, and looked forward to the holding of free and fair elections leading to the emergence of a genuinely independent Namibia. They reaffirmed their full support for the United Nations Secretary-General, and the UN's efforts to ensure the integrity of the Settlement Plan. Heads of Government looked forward to welcoming a free Namibia into the Commonwealth.

18. They noted that the Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group on Namibia had identified a number of areas of urgent need if an independent Government emerging from the Resolution 435 process was to be able to govern effectively. They accordingly called for the provision of a special and enlarged multilateral package of assistance in addition to bilateral aid. To this end they requested the Commonwealth Secretary-General to send a small team of experts to Namibia as soon as practicable after the elections to advise on possible Commonwealth assistance.

19. Heads of Government also noted that the Report drew attention to what the Group had viewed as moves by the South African Government to retain a continuing ability to destabilise an independent Namibia, and they were of the view that any steps taken by South Africa to this end would inevitably call into question its declarations of good faith in respect of these and other matters, and particularly its expressed desire now to seek peaceful co-existence with its neighbours.

20. Heads of Government called on all the parties to the Resolution 435 Settlement Plan and all political groups within Namibia to fully meet their respective responsibilities and obligations, including full co-operation with the UN authorities, to conclude the process of bringing into being a free, independent and stable Namibia.

21. Heads of Government expressed their concern that a post-independence Namibia be able fully to realise its economic potential and contribute to the development of the larger Southern Africa region. In this respect, they expressed the hope that the early re-integration of Walvis Bay into Namibia in accordance with Security Council Resolution 432 (1978) would be able to be achieved, noting that compliance with this by South Africa would be a convincing demonstration of its good faith and commitment to the long-term viability of its newly independent neighbour.

### **Other Developments in the Southern African Region**

22. Heads of Government noted that notwithstanding international condemnation, South

Africa's campaign of destabilisation against its neighbours had resulted in untold misery and destruction and was graphically documented in The Destabilisation Report.

23. Despite some welcome improvement in the security situation in the south-west of the African continent, Heads of Government observed that the MNR's murderous activities continued on a major scale in Mozambique and elsewhere; and destabilisation remained a major factor in the region's security crisis. Heads of Government unreservedly condemned South Africa's support for the MNR and other acts of destabilisation. Heads of Government reiterated the view, however, that only the eradication of apartheid in South Africa would enable the region to develop in peace.

24. Special efforts were needed to strengthen and develop the economies of Southern Africa so as to relieve them of South African economic domination. Heads of Government considered that the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), deserved particular support and encouragement. To that end, they mandated the Secretary-General to carry out an Action Plan in consultation with SADCC, the AFRICA Fund, the Preferential Trade Area and the interested states in the region and elsewhere, to promote trade and investment in the Front-Line and neighbouring states. In the provision of assistance to SADCC countries, efforts should also be made, where possible, to purchase capital goods and services from within the region thus stimulating regional production, employment, trade and transportation.

25. Heads of Government identified a continuing need for assistance to the Front-Line States. While there had been significant contributions in this area by a number of Commonwealth and other governments, much remained to be done to meet the security needs identified in the special report by General Olusegun Obasanjo, commissioned by the Vancouver Meeting.

26. Heads of Government welcomed the successful establishment of the Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique, which had augmented bilateral contributions from Commonwealth countries including those of the Front-Line States. Heads of Government recognised the importance of continuing contributions to the Fund in view of Mozambique's key geographical position and its role in Southern Africa.

#### Continuing Review

27. With the exception of Britain, Heads of Government commended the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers established by the Okanagan Statement for its reports, and agreed that it should continue with its work, under the chairmanship of the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs; that the Foreign Minister of Malaysia be added to its members; and that it report again when Heads of Government next meet. They expressed the wish that it reconvene in April, some six months after the new administration in Pretoria took office.

*Putra World Trade Centre, Kuala Lumpur  
22 October 1989*

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NOTES FOR REMARKS BY  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,  
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOE CLARK,  
UPON PRESENTATION OF THE REPORT OF THE  
COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS  
TO THE  
COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING

KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA

October 19, 1989.

Secretary of State  
for  
External Affairs

Secrétaire d'État  
aux  
Affaires extérieures

Canada

Mr. Chairman,

Mr. Secretary-General,

Distinguished Heads of Delegation

At Vancouver, Heads of Government established the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa. I am honoured to submit its Report today. The Chairman earlier listed a number of other documents that were either commissioned by the Committee or originated in proposals first put forward in the Committee.

The Secretariat had also prepared for the Committee's use a document reporting on developments in Southern Africa since the last formal meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers in Canberra in August. My colleagues and I met informally on Monday of this week with the Reverend Alan Boesak and Mr. Thabo Mbeki of the African National Congress to hear their views on the latest events in South Africa.

Because there have been confusing press reports, I should make it clear that, at no time, did Mr. Boesak suggest it would be appropriate to relax Commonwealth pressure on South Africa now. He believes it is essential that pressure be maintained, and that the mere promise of reform should not be rewarded by any relaxation of pressure. He does believe that it would be reasonable to expect the South African Government to demonstrate its commitment to real reform within six months from its inauguration, and that it would be appropriate, at the end of that time, to hold South Africa to account if it had not acted on the programme presented to President de Klerk in his meeting with clerics last week. That is the position Dr. Boesak conveyed to our dinner.

This morning I want to highlight briefly some of the principal points in the Report and offer some observations on the Committee's experience.

The Committee included the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Foreign Minister of Malaysia, as host of this CHOGM, attended the Canberra meeting and we sought to keep other Governments fully briefed. There was a frank and collegial atmosphere. All members attended all sessions, although schedules were often inconvenient. We all learned from the experience, and were able to submit a unanimous report. We were very ably assisted in our work by both the present and the new Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, and by officials of the Secretariat.

This Committee was established with the following principal goals:

- to keep the South Africa issue on the public agenda;
- to give high level impetus to the objectives of the Okanagan declaration; and
- to provide guidance in the fight against apartheid.

The mandate of the Committee covered four areas:

- sanctions;
- the relationship between South Africa and its neighbours;
- a range of activities related to what might be termed "reaching into South Africa"; and
- Namibia.

It was a mandate which reflected the two-track approach towards southern Africa that was agreed to in Vancouver. One track reflected a desire to promote a positive agenda in terms of encouraging dialogue, facilitating negotiations and assisting both the victims of and opponents to apartheid. The second was to maintain pressure on South Africa to reform through the widening and intensifying of sanctions.

The Committee met formally on four occasions: in Lusaka in February of 1988; in Toronto in August of that year; in Harare last January and, most recently, in Canberra in August. One of the most important aspects of those meetings is that they allowed us to meet directly with, and hear directly from, South Africans engaged on the front lines of the fight against apartheid - whether union representatives, church leaders, journalists, officials of the ANC and PAC, or others. I wish all of you could have been present that first night in Lusaka when Frank Chikane and Byers Naude spoke of the fears and the hopes they meet in their daily rounds within South Africa. That exposure to the witnesses of apartheid is compelling.

A number of those persons invited from South Africa to meet with us were prevented by the South African Government from doing so. However, those witnesses with whom we did meet spoke to us eloquently, passionately and graphically of South African oppression within its own borders and of its destabilization activities against its neighbours.

The Committee commissioned a number of important studies related to our mandate. One, an independent study on South Africa's destabilization of its neighbours is a chronicle of deliberate destruction, death and dislocation. You have it before you as "A Candle on Kilimanjaro". The cost to South Africa's neighbours of deliberate destabilization has been staggering in terms of loss of life, human suffering and damage to the economy, the infrastructure, and the society as a whole.

The Committee's study of South Africa's links to the international financial community has highlighted the importance of financial measures as a means of exerting direct and critical pressure on the South African Government's ability to continue to finance apartheid. The South African Government reacted to that report last night and did so on terms that are very costly to their economy. In my judgment it is no coincidence that this announcement occurred on the day this CHOGM began.

A third study, an independent assessment of the application and effectiveness of sanctions, demonstrated that sanctions work, that they have an effect on the attitudes of white South Africans and on the policies of their government. It set forward further actions the Commonwealth can consider.

We have been interested in means to encourage genuine dialogue among South Africans, which I believe is now more possible and more necessary than ever. We have also borne in mind the fundamental importance of the "possible negotiating concept" established by the Eminent Persons Group.

Finally, the Committee had as one of its tasks the pursuit of implementation of Security Council Resolution 435: the question of Namibia. That occupied an increasing amount of our attention as developments in Namibia unfolded. The Committee's role was, first and foremost, to assist the United Nations through the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, and UNTAG in its responsibility to bring about the long overdue independence of Namibia through the implementation of Resolution 435.

We have monitored events in Namibia closely and offered assistance whenever it seemed that the Committee or the Commonwealth at large could make a contribution. Our concern over intimidation by Koevoet led us to have Secretary-General Ramphal encourage Commonwealth countries to supply additional police forces to UNTAG if requested by the UN Secretary-General. Similarly, because we saw serious problems in the proposed electoral law we provided the UN Special Representative with a number of suggestions, reflected in the electoral law finally negotiated, to ensure the integrity of the secret ballot and decentralized counting.

While Resolution 435 vested responsibility for the supervision and control of the election campaign and elections in the UN, there was scope for others to observe and lend weight to the UN operation. Accordingly it was at the Committee's suggestion that a Commonwealth observer group, drawn from 7 countries, travelled to Namibia several weeks ago to report to this meeting on the situation and possible future arrangements. Their Report has been provided to you for consideration at this meeting. It has not been reviewed by the Committee of Foreign Ministers.

The Committee also looked beyond Namibian independence - an independence that could be threatened by South African political and military pressures. As a result the Committee asked the Secretary-General to explore the prospects for significantly expanded aid in the operational, developmental and constitutional fields.

We believe the Committee's very existence, and the publicity of our meetings, themselves became instruments of pressure. But we also learned that when eight countries sit down regularly to campaign against apartheid, we find new pressure points, new instruments of influence.

We identified a number of practical ways in which the Commonwealth can increase pressure upon the South African Government to end apartheid.

One of the most important is to emphasize financial links and establish an independent monitoring mechanism to provide objective information on South Africa's international financial relations.

Another is to confront and counter the efforts of South African censorship and propaganda in each of our countries.

A third is to act together to tighten and extend the mandatory arms embargo of the United Nations, including to prohibit the import of arms from South Africa.

A fourth, which can be pursued more diligently, is to organize joint demarches by Commonwealth countries on individual nations which have not introduced sanctions similar to those of the Commonwealth. We believe pressures of this kind helped encourage Japan to reduce its imports of South African coal.

None of these will work miracles. However, if pursued steadily and broadly, they increase the pressure for change.

So does visible active support for the victims of apartheid, and the opponents of apartheid.



General Obasanjo prepared a report on the security needs of the Front Line States. Professor Cornford and Archbishop Scott have established a network of NGOs to train black South Africans. Governments can help the victims of apartheid. The Secretariat is developing a new strategy on trade and investment in southern Africa.

These all provide opportunities to individual members of the Commonwealth to increase visible, practical help. We hope they, and other measures, will be considered by Heads of Government.

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## SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE WAY AHEAD: BRITAIN'S VIEW

BRITAIN IS FULLY AT ONE WITH THE REST OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN UTTERLY CONDEMNING APARTHEID AND WISHING TO SEE ITS TOTAL ERADICATION SO THAT ALL THE INHABITANTS OF SOUTH AFRICA CAN LIVE IN DIGNITY AND PLAY A FULL PART IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THEIR COUNTRY.

BRITAIN WELCOMES THE RECOGNITION IN THE KUALA LUMPUR STATEMENT:

- THAT CHANGE IS UNDERWAY IN SOUTH AFRICA;
- THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE PUNITIVE AND THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NEED TO RESPOND TO EVIDENCE OF CLEAR AND IRREVERSIBLE CHANGE; AND
- THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN AN ATMOSPHERE FREE OF VIOLENCE FROM EITHER SIDE.

BUT BRITAIN BELIEVES THE COMMONWEALTH CAN HELP A NEW SOUTH AFRICA TO EMERGE IN MUCH MORE POSITIVE WAYS THAN THOSE SET OUT ~~IN THE KUALA LUMPUR STATEMENT.~~

IN BRITAIN'S VIEW THERE HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE THE LAST MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN VANCOUVER. SEVENTY PER CENT OF WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS VOTED FOR CHANGE IN THE RECENT ELECTIONS AND THERE IS NOW A GOVERNMENT FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE CONCEPT OF NEGOTIATIONS. PEACEFUL POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY THE BLACK MAJORITY HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AND EIGHT OF THE POLITICAL PRISONERS WHOSE RELEASE

HAS LONG BEEN A GOAL OF COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN SET FREE.

IN THIS NEW SITUATION, BRITAIN BELIEVES THAT THE COMMONWEALTH SHOULD CONCENTRATE NOW ON ENCOURAGING CHANGE RATHER THAN ON FURTHER PUNISHMENT. WHATEVER THEIR INTENTION, THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONS IS PUNITIVE. ALL THE EVIDENCE IS THAT THEY BEAR HARDEST ON THE POOREST AND WEAKEST MEMBERS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S BLACK POPULATION, DEPRIVING THEM OF THE DIGNITY OF JOBS AND THE ABILITY TO CARE FOR THEIR FAMILIES. SOUTH AFRICA'S POPULATION IS GROWING VERY RAPIDLY AND THE COUNTRY NEEDS ECONOMIC GROWTH TO PROVIDE A DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING FOR ITS PEOPLE. SANCTIONS, IN PARTICULAR FINANCIAL SANCTIONS, HAVE THE EFFECT OF DELIBERATELY DEPRIVING SOUTH AFRICA OF ACCESS TO THE FUNDS WHICH IT NEEDS IN ORDER TO GROW. THEY THUS PUT OUT OF REACH THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING LIVING STANDARDS FOR ALL SOUTH AFRICANS. SANCTIONS CONTRIBUTE TO POVERTY AND MISERY IN SOUTH AFRICA, WHEREAS BRITAIN'S EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED TO HELPING RELIEVE POVERTY AND MISERY THROUGHOUT AFRICA AS A WHOLE.

MOREOVER, VIRTUALLY EVERY OPINION POLL - RECENT EXAMPLES BEING THOSE IN THE INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER AND ON ITN - SHOWS A CLEAR MAJORITY AGAINST SANCTIONS WHEN IT IS MADE CLEAR THEY WOULD INVOLVE LOSS OF JOBS. EVEN THE RECENT BOOK "SANCTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID" SHOWS THAT 78 PER CENT OF THOSE ASKED DID NOT FEEL SANCTIONS WOULD BE WORTHWHILE IF MANY BLACKS WERE TO LOSE THEIR JOBS AS A RESULT.

BRITAIN DOES NOT AGREE THAT SANCTIONS HAVE THE POLITICAL EFFECTS CLAIMED FOR THEM. WHILE THEY CERTAINLY WEAKEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN

ECONOMY, THE POLITICAL EFFECT OF SANCTIONS IS TO INCREASE RESISTANCE TO CHANGE RATHER THAN ENCOURAGE CHANGE. THERE SEEMS TO BE A CLEAR CORRELATION BETWEEN THE IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS BY THE US CONGRESS AND THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE STRENGTH OF EXTREME RIGHT-WING PARTIES IN SOUTH AFRICA UTTERLY OPPOSED TO CHANGE.

BRITAIN BELIEVES IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY FORWARD IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE FIRST STEP IS TO IMPLEMENT THE CONCEPT DEVELOPED BY THE COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP, TO OPEN THE WAY TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS TO START ABOUT THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA. THIS REQUIRES:

- RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA AND ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS;
- LIFTING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY
- UNBANNING OF POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS
- ALL AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE.

SOUTH AFRICA HAS TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS DOWN THIS ROAD AND MUST BE ENCOURAGED BY ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES OF PEACEFUL PERSUASION TO PROCEED FURTHER. AS AND WHEN SOUTH AFRICA DOES TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS THEN IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO LIFT SOME OF THE MEASURES IMPOSED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, SO AS TO REWARD PROGRESS AND ENCOURAGE SOUTH AFRICA TO CONTINUE FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD OF REFORM. THE AIM SHOULD BE TO SECURE POSITIVE INFLUENCE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN ADD TO THE SANCTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN LARGELY FRUITLESS.

AT THE SAME TIME, BRITAIN WILL CONTINUE ITS SUBSTANTIAL PROGRAMME OF POSITIVE HELP FOR BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. THIS INCLUDES EXPENDITURE OF SOME TEN MILLION POUNDS A YEAR ON MEASURES IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF:

- TO FINANCE NEARLY 1000 BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS IN HIGHER EDUCATION
- TO CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY TO A SCHEME TO CREATE MORE LOW-COST HOUSING FOR BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS
- TO SUPPORT NEARLY 300 RURAL PROJECTS
- TO BRING RELIEF TO REFUGEES FROM MOZAMBIQUE,
- AND TO SUPPORT OPERATION HUNGER, WHICH ALREADY PROVIDES FOOD FOR 1.3 MILLION BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS, INCLUDING MANY CHILDREN.

AT THE SAME TIME BRITAIN WILL CONTINUE ITS VERY SUBSTANTIAL PROGRAMME OF ASSISTANCE TO THE FRONT LINE STATES, WHICH ALREADY TOTALS SOME 1.1 BILLION POUNDS SINCE 1980. RATHER THAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE COST OF THE INDEPENDENT AGENCY PROPOSED BY THE REST OF THE COMMONWEALTH TO REVIEW AND REPORT ON SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LINKS, AND OF THE CONTINUING WORK OF THE COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTH AFRICA, BRITAIN WILL CONTRIBUTE AN EQUIVALENT AMOUNT FOR ADDITIONAL HELP TO BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS.

BRITAIN ALSO GIVES ITS UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL IN SECURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED

NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435 IN NAMIBIA. IT WILL BE FOR HIM AND HIS REPRESENTATIVE ALONE TO JUDGE WHETHER THE ELECTIONS ARE FULLY FREE AND FAIR. IT WILL NOT BE FOR ANY OTHER GROUP OR BODY TO PRONOUNCE ON THIS OR ATTEMPT TO QUALIFY OR VARY IN ANY RESPECT THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PLAN. AT THE SAME TIME, BRITAIN IS READY TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA AS WELL AS, IF ASKED, MILITARY TRAINING FOR NAMIBIA'S ARMED FORCES AFTER INDEPENDENCE AS WE HAVE DONE FOR ZIMBABWE, MOZAMBIQUE AND OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

BRITAIN BELIEVES THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA SHOW THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE BY PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION, WHETHER IT BE IN NAMIBIA, IN ANGOLA OR IN MOZAMBIQUE. WHILE THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF MUST BE FOR THE PEOPLE - ALL THE PEOPLE - OF THAT COUNTRY TO DECIDE, BRITAIN WANTS TO SEE THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE RE-DOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO SUPPORT PEACEFUL CHANGE AND ENABLE THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA TO INHERIT A STRONG ECONOMY. THIS WILL MORE LIKELY BE ACHIEVED BY THE POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS SET OUT IN THIS STATEMENT THAN BY TIGHTENING SANCTIONS AND THE IMPOSITION OF NEW PUNITIVE MEASURES AS PROPOSED BY THE REST OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

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## THE OKANAGAN STATEMENT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION

We continue to recognize the situation in Southern Africa as one of the major challenges facing the world community today. We reaffirm our shared international responsibility to work together for the total eradication of apartheid and the brutalities that it continues to inflict on its victims within and in the neighbourhood of South Africa.

2. We consider that the crisis engendered in the region by apartheid has seriously deteriorated since our last meeting in Nassau. Repressive measures resulting in more suffering and loss of life have been intensified within South Africa, and the toll taken by acts of war and destruction directed against South Africa's neighbours in an attempt to sustain and defend apartheid has continued to rise. Southern Africa desperately needs regional peace and stability.

3. It is therefore our collective view that the urgency of international action against the intolerable situation that exists in Southern Africa has heightened and that as Commonwealth members we have the continuing obligation to make an effective contribution towards the ending of apartheid and relieving South Africa's neighbours of the burden of being forced to devote much of their resources to their resolute and determined efforts to defend their security and advance the cause of freedom and independence in their region. We recognize that these states are making intolerable sacrifices in a cause that concerns all countries and peoples.

4. We have reviewed developments in Southern Africa since our Nassau Meeting which produced the Accord on Southern Africa and reaffirmed our shared commitment to its objectives. We also recall the London Review Meeting in August 1986 which considered the Report of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), 'Mission to South Africa', established under the Nassau Accord. The EPG was to initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics, and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.

5. Meeting for the first time in full Session since the publication of the Report, we warmly commend the work of the EPG and agree that the EPG mission offered a real opportunity for the South African Government to initiate a negotiating process between the Government and the true representatives of the black majority, leading ultimately, to a peaceful resolution of the problem of apartheid and to a break in the cycle of violence in the region. Pretoria's rejection of the 'Negotiating Concept', submitted by the EPG, which was underlined by its brutal attacks against Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe on 19 May 1986, was nothing less than a tragedy for the region.

6. At Nassau we appealed to the authorities in Pretoria to take a number of steps in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency if the crisis of apartheid was not to end in even greater tragedy. In spite of the Pretoria regime's increased intransigence since Nassau, we remain convinced that only through negotiations can catastrophe be averted. We are encouraged in this by the obvious yearning for peace with justice which is evident amongst South Africa's peoples of all races as was dramatically highlighted by the recent Daker Meeting. Accordingly, we again call on the South African Government to accept the 'Negotiating Concept' of the EPG which remains as valid today as it was when

the Group put it forward.

#### Commonwealth Response - Sanctions

7. With the exception of Britain we believe that economic and other sanctions have had a significant effect on South Africa and that their wider, tighter, and more intensified application must remain an essential part of the international community's response to apartheid.

8. We realize that if the sanctions and other measures we have adopted are to have maximum effect, they must be part of a wider programme of international action. While mindful of the widespread view within the international community that comprehensive and mandatory sanctions would be the quickest route to bring Pretoria to the negotiating table, we, with the exception of Britain, believe that, pending the acceptance of such a position by the international community as a whole, genuine efforts should be made to secure the universal adoption of the measures now adopted by most Commonwealth and other countries including the United States and the Nordic countries. We commit ourselves to continuing efforts to secure a more concerted application of a global sanctions programme.

9. Further, in the interest of greater effectiveness, we have decided to continue co-ordination by the Secretariat of the implementation of measures as agreed by each member and to identify any efforts to frustrate them.

10. With the exception of Britain, we agree to evaluate on a continuous basis the application of sanctions in order to assess their impact. Moreover, given the significance of South Africa's relationship with the international financial system and the need for a better understanding of developments and possibilities in this sphere, with the exception of Britain we will initiate an expert study, drawing on independent sources, to examine this aspect of the South African economy.

11. Finally, mindful of our commitment at Nassau which we reaffirm here in Vancouver, we agree that we will continue to take further action individually and collectively as deemed appropriate in response to the situation as it evolves until apartheid is dismantled, in the case of all but Britain that includes sanctions.

#### South Africa and its Neighbours

12. In addition to our programme of action addressed directly to apartheid itself, we believe that the desperate plight of South Africa's neighbours calls for a comprehensive response from the international community. Substantial and invaluable help is already being provided by several Commonwealth countries through programmes of development assistance and security. However, the capacity of South Africa's neighbours to resist Pretoria's policy of destabilisation and destruction must be strengthened.

13. South Africa's aims are clear enough. In part, their actions are intended to coerce the Front-Line States into abandoning support for the black majority in South Africa, and to force them into co-existence with apartheid. They are also intended to perpetuate the dependence on South Africa of the majority of these countries whose development efforts are now being undermined by the need to confront Pretoria's aggression. Therefore, if assistance for the region's development is to be effective, the international community must also address the security needs of the Front-Line States.

14. The Commonwealth is well placed to give a lead in this field. The Commonwealth has always considered assistance to the region as an integral part of its support for the struggle against apartheid. But so far, such assistance has been directed mainly to efforts to reduce dependence on South Africa. In the face of a systematic campaign to undermine the economies of these countries, the Commonwealth should itself take - and encourage the wider community to take - a broader view of the region's needs; assistance is needed both to advance disengagement from the South African economy and to provide for its security against South African aggression.

15. Against this background, and while acknowledging the continuing value of the forms of bilateral and multilateral assistance now being provided, we have decided to initiate an enhanced programme of co-ordinated Commonwealth assistance consistent with and complementary to the objectives of SADCC and other agencies collaborating to this end with the region, including the Africa Fund. We see these efforts as directed towards the Front-Line and neighbouring states, particularly Mozambique. We further see these efforts directed to key sectors such as transportation and communications, embracing both their rehabilitation and their physical protection. In this respect we have decided to give priority attention to the Limpopo Line and the Port of Maputo. On a related matter, we propose to examine the question of transit rights of the land-locked states of the region.

16. We see Mozambique in a key geographical position in relation to the Front-Line States. If the region is to cease to be hostage to South Africa, special and urgent attention must be given to the needs of Mozambique. We have therefore decided to establish a special fund to provide technical assistance to Mozambique. We also stand ready, if requested, to embark upon a process of consultations with a view to enabling those of our members in a position to do so to make appropriate contributions to the security needs of Mozambique and the other Front-Line States requiring such help.

#### Reaching into South Africa

17. We are agreed that the Commonwealth should give support to the victims and opponents of apartheid within South Africa.

18. We endorse individual and collective efforts to provide assistance to the victims of apartheid and we resolve to augment those efforts to the fullest extent possible. We recognize the particular value of the Nassau Fellowship Programme in providing educational opportunities to young South Africans, and intend to expand it.

19. In light of the problems created by the state of emergency and other repressive measures in South Africa, we consider the provision of humanitarian and legal assistance to detainees and their families a high priority, and those in a position to do so undertake to increase their individual efforts in this regard.

20. Recognising its growing importance, we shall also increase our support to the trade union movement in South Africa, in particular, to labour education.

21. We plan wherever possible to increase our individual contributions to economic and social development programmes in such fields as education.

22. Despite having to confirm the conclusion of the EPG that Pretoria is not prepared to negotiate fundamental change in South Africa, we believe that we should take advantage of any opportunity to promote real internal dialogue. In the absence of movement by the authorities in Pretoria, we shall increase our contacts with South Africans of differing viewpoints. We shall make an enhanced effort to give support to the opponents of apartheid through such activities as the organisation of conferences on the future of South Africa, the arrangement of visits and the publication of studies related to ending apartheid. We have agreed to consider means by which these activities could be co-ordinated and their importance highlighted.

23. The need for Commonwealth action to counteract South African propaganda and censorship by exposing the truth about apartheid has been made more pressing by the draconian curbs imposed on the press at the beginning of 1987. These amount to an all out attempt to replace independent reporting of events in the country with its own propaganda. Largely as a result of these restrictions, much of what is happening in South Africa no longer reaches the television screens and newspapers of the outside world.

24. In view of what is at stake, we are agreed that the Commonwealth should give high priority to counteracting South African propaganda and censorship.

#### Namibia

25. We are gravely concerned that the impasse in Namibia's progress to independence under the terms of Resolution 435 seems to have assumed the proportions of a permanent stalemate. We again stress the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and we remain unanimously convinced of the view that Resolution 435 provides the only basis for an internationally acceptable settlement of the Namibian question.

26. Linking the withdrawal of Cuban forces to a settlement under Resolution 435 - a linkage which we have unanimously rejected - has, in effect, provided an opening for the South African regime to continue to frustrate any progress towards implementation of the Resolution. The challenge, therefore, is to develop an effective process of negotiation leading to the Resolution's implementation.

27. At Nassau we made it clear that the action which we envisaged in the Accord on Southern Africa should be directed equally towards ensuring South Africa's compliance with the wishes of the international community on the question of Namibia. We also recall that at New Delhi we agreed that if South Africa continued to obstruct the implementation of Resolution 435, the adoption of appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations would have to be considered. These continue to be valid conclusions.

#### The Way Forward

28. The unfolding - but often unseen - tragedy of South Africa impels us to ensure that the world continues to focus its attention on apartheid until we meet again in full session. With the exception of Britain, we see great value as a measure of our continuing concern in establishing a Committee of Foreign Ministers able to meet periodically to provide high level impetus and guidance in

furtherance of the objectives of this statement. The Committee will comprise the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe and will be chaired by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada.

19. We believe that this Statement provides a framework for a significant Commonwealth initiative to assist the region, and is one to which a number of Commonwealth countries, who hitherto have not been in a position to contribute to multilateral efforts, will be enabled to do so. It will require detailed consultations between both donor Commonwealth governments and the countries in question. We are instructing the Secretary-General to initiate these processes as a matter of the highest priority.

Lake Okanagan  
16 October 1987



COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT REVIEW MEETING  
LONDON, 3-5 AUGUST 1986

COMMUNIQUE

As agreed at Nassau last October, our Meeting was held in the special context of the crisis in Southern Africa. At the outset of our discussions we specifically reaffirmed our commitment to the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa which, with our other colleagues, we had concluded at Nassau. We reaffirmed, in particular, the united belief we expressed in the Accord that "apartheid must be dismantled now if a greater tragedy is to be averted, and that concerted pressure must be brought to bear to achieve that end".

2. At our request the Co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (EPG), General Olusegun Obasanjo and Mr. Malcolm Fraser, introduced the Report of the EPG and answered the many questions we put to them. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, who undertook a mission to Southern Africa in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, also briefed us on the results of his mission.

3. The Report of the EPG, Mission to South Africa, was the central document at our discussions. That unanimous Report has commanded attention worldwide as pointing the way forward for South Africa and for the world in relation to South Africa. We warmly commend the Group's work which has made a positive and enduring contribution to the efforts to end apartheid and establish a non-racial and representative government in South Africa. We particularly commend the EPG's 'negotiating concept' and deeply regret its rejection by the South African Government.

4. At Nassau, the Commonwealth unanimously adopted a common programme of action which included a number of economic measures against South Africa. It was our collective hope that those measures and the efforts of the EPG to promote a process of dialogue in South Africa would, within six months, bring about concrete progress towards our objectives of seeing apartheid dismantled and the structures of democracy erected in South Africa.

5. As envisaged in the Accord, we have reviewed the situation. We are profoundly disappointed that the authorities in Pretoria have taken none of the five steps which at Nassau we called on them to take "in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency". Nelson Mandela and other

political leaders remain in prison. A new and more widely repressive emergency has been imposed and political freedom more rigorously curtailed; the ANC and other political parties are still banned. Beyond these, however, it has been a matter of deep concern to us that the EPG after its most patient efforts has been forced to conclude that "at present there is no genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle apartheid and no present prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative government". We had looked at Nassau for the initiation by Pretoria of a process of dialogue in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides. Instead, as the EPG found, the cycle of violence and counter-violence has spiralled.

6. We receive the Group's findings with disappointment, and deplore the conduct of the South African Government whose actions, including the raids on neighbouring countries at a crucial moment of the EPG's work, terminated its efforts for peaceful change. We continue to believe with the EPG that the cycle of violence in South Africa must end. It is clearly established that the situation in South Africa constitutes a serious threat to regional peace and security.

7. It is thus clear to us that since our meeting in Nassau there has not been the adequate concrete progress that we looked for there. Indeed, the situation has deteriorated.

8. Accordingly, in the light of our review and of our agreement at Nassau, we have considered the adoption of further measures against the background of the EPG's conclusion that the absence of effective economic pressure on South Africa and the belief of the South African authorities that it need not be feared are actually deferring change. We acknowledge that the Commonwealth cannot stand by and allow the cycle of violence to spiral, but must take effective concerted action.

9. We are agreed that one element of such action must be the adoption of further measures designed to impress on the authorities in Pretoria the compelling urgency of dismantling apartheid and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa.

10. In doing so, we have looked particularly at the measures listed in para. 7 of the Accord which some of us at Nassau had already indicated a willingness to include in any consideration of further measures. But we have looked as well to other measures under consideration elsewhere. In deciding on the adoption of further measures, we recognise that if they are to have maximum effect they should be part of a wider programme of international action.

11. The British Government's position is set out in paragraph 12. The rest of us have agreed as follows:



- (a) The adoption of further substantial economic measures against South Africa is a moral and political imperative to which a positive response can no longer be deferred.
- (b) We ourselves will therefore adopt the following measures and commend them to the rest of the Commonwealth and the wider international community for urgent adoption and implementation:
  - (i) all the measures listed in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord, namely:
    - a) a ban on air links with South Africa,
    - b) a ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa,
    - c) a ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa,
    - d) the termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa,
    - e) the termination of all government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa,
    - f) a ban on all government procurement in South Africa,
    - g) a ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies, and
    - h) a ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, and
  - (ii) the following additional measures:
    - i) a ban on all new bank loans to South Africa, whether to the public or private sectors,
    - j) a ban on the import of uranium, coal, iron and steel from South Africa, and
    - k) the withdrawal of all consular facilities in South Africa except for our own nationals and nationals of third countries to whom we render consular services.

(c) While expressing both concern and regret that the British Government does not join in our agreement, we note its intention to proceed with the measures mentioned in paragraph 12 below.

(d) We feel, however, that we must do more. We look beyond the Commonwealth to the wider international community. We will, therefore, immediately embark on intensive consultations within the international community with a view to securing concerted international action in the coming months, our emphasis being on those countries that presently sustain a significant level of economic relations with South Africa.

12. The British Government, while taking a different view on the likely impact of economic sanctions, declares that it will:

- (i) put a voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa,
- (ii) put a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, and
- (iii) accept and implement any EEC decision to ban the import of coal, iron, and steel and of gold coins from South Africa.

13. As a further element of our collective commitment to effective action, we have requested the Secretary-General, with assistance from our Governments, to co-ordinate the implementation of the agreed measures and to identify such adjustment as may be necessary in Commonwealth countries affected by them.

14. We renew the call we made at Nassau on the authorities in Pretoria to initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government in a united and non-fragmented South Africa. If Pretoria responds positively to this call and takes the other steps for which we called in paragraph 2 of the Nassau Accord, we stand ready to review the situation and to rescind the measures we have adopted if appropriate; and to contribute, in all ways open to us, to an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and to peace and stability in Southern Africa as a whole.

15. On the other hand, we are equally mindful of our further commitment at Nassau that if in a reasonable time even these further measures have not had the desired effect,

still further effective measures will have to be considered. We trust that the authorities in Pretoria will recognise the seriousness of our resolve. Acts of economic or other aggression against neighbouring states by way of retaliation or otherwise will activate that resolve.

16. Regretting the absence of full agreement but recognising that the potential for united Commonwealth action still exists, we agree that the seven Governments will keep the situation under review with the view to advising whether any further collective Commonwealth action, including a full Heads of Government Meeting, is desirable. We are conscious that the situation in South Africa may evolve rapidly and dangerously. We believe the Commonwealth must retain its capacity to help to advance the objectives of the Nassau Accord and be ready to use all the means at its disposal to do so.

17. Meeting in London at a time of heightened strains within our association, we take the opportunity to renew our own firm commitment to the future of the Commonwealth and to the aims and objectives which have guided it over the years. We are fortified in this renewal by the spirit of frankness in friendship which characterised our discussions and our belief that they have helped to light a common path towards fulfilment of our common purpose, namely, the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial and representative government in South Africa as a matter of compelling urgency.

Marlborough House  
London

4 August 1986



## THE COMMONWEALTH ACCORD ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

1. We consider that South Africa's continuing refusal to dismantle apartheid, its illegal occupation of Namibia, and its aggression against its neighbours constitute a serious challenge to the values and principles of the Commonwealth, a challenge which Commonwealth countries cannot ignore. At New Delhi we expressed the view that "only the eradication of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule on the basis of free and fair exercise of universal adult suffrage by all the people in a united and non-fragmented South Africa can lead to a just and lasting solution of the explosive situation prevailing in Southern Africa." We are united in the belief that reliance on the range of pressures adopted so far has not resulted in the fundamental changes we have sought over many years. The growing crisis and intensified repression in South Africa mean that apartheid must be dismantled now if a greater tragedy is to be averted and that concerted pressure must be brought to bear to achieve that end. We consider that the situation calls for urgent practical steps.

2. We, therefore, call on the authorities in Pretoria for the following steps to be taken in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency:

- (a) Declare that the system of apartheid will be dismantled and specific and meaningful action taken in fulfilment of that intent.
- (b) Terminate the existing state of emergency.
- (c) Release immediately and unconditionally Nelson Mandela and all others imprisoned and detained for their opposition to apartheid.
- (d) Establish political freedom and specifically lift the existing ban on the African National Congress and other political parties.
- (e) Initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.

3. We have agreed on a number of measures which have as their rationale impressing on the authorities in Pretoria the compelling urgency of dismantling apartheid and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa. The latter, in particular, demands a process of dialogue involving the true representatives of the majority black population of South Africa. We believe that we must do all we can to assist that process, while recognising that the forms of political settlement in South Africa are for the people of that country - all the people - to determine.

4. To this end, we have decided to establish a small group of eminent Commonwealth persons to encourage through all practicable ways the evolution of that necessary process of political dialogue. We are not unmindful of the

difficulties such an effort will encounter, including the possibility of initial rejection by the South African authorities, but we believe it to be our duty to leave nothing undone that might contribute to peaceful change in South Africa and avoid the dreadful prospect of violent conflict that looms over South Africa, threatening people of all races in the country, and the peace and stability of the entire Southern Africa region.

5. We are asking the President of Zambia and the Prime Ministers of Australia, The Bahamas, Canada, India, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe to develop with the Secretary-General the modalities of this effort to assist the process of political dialogue in South Africa. We would look to the group of eminent persons to seek to facilitate the processes of dialogue referred to in paragraph 2(e) above and by all practicable means to advance the fulfilment of the objectives of this Accord.

6. For our part, we have as an earnest of our opposition to apartheid reached accord on a programme of common action as follows:

- (i) we declare the Commonwealth's support for the strictest enforcement of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 418 and 558, and commit ourselves to prosecute violators to the fullest extent of the law;
- (ii) we reaffirm the Gleneagles Declaration of 1977, which called upon Commonwealth members to take every practical step to discourage sporting contacts with South Africa;
- (iii) we agree upon, and commend to other governments, the adoption of the following further economic measures against South Africa, which have already been adopted by a number of member countries:
  - (a) a ban on all new government loans to the Government of South Africa and its agencies;
  - (b) a readiness to take unilaterally what action may be possible to preclude the import of Krugerrands;
  - (c) no Government funding for trade missions to South Africa or for participation in exhibitions and trade fairs in South Africa;
  - (d) a ban on the sale and export of computer equipment capable of use by South African military forces, police or security forces;
  - (e) a ban on new contracts for the sale and export of nuclear goods, materials and technology to South Africa;
  - (f) a ban on the sale and export of oil to South Africa;
  - (g) a strict and rigorously controlled embargo on imports of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and paramilitary equipment from South Africa;

- (h) an embargo on all military co-operation with South Africa;  
and
- (i) discouragement of all cultural and scientific events except where these contribute towards the ending of apartheid or have no possible role in promoting it.

7. It is our hope that the process and measures we have agreed upon will help to bring about concrete progress towards the objectives stated above in six months. The Heads of Government mentioned in paragraph 5 above, or their representatives, will then meet to review the situation. If in their opinion adequate progress has not been made within this period, we agree to consider the adoption of further measures. Some of us would, in that event, consider the following steps among others:

- (a) a ban on air links with South Africa;
- (b) a ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa;
- (c) a ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa;
- (d) the termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa;
- (e) the termination of all government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa;
- (f) a ban on all government procurement in South Africa;
- (g) a ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies;
- (h) a ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa.

8. Finally, we agree that should all of the above measures fail to produce the desired results within a reasonable period, further effective measures will have to be considered. Many of us have either taken or are prepared to take measures which go beyond those listed above, and each of us will pursue the objectives of this Accord in all the ways and through all appropriate fora open to us. We believe, however, that in pursuing this programme jointly, we enlarge the prospects of an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and peace and stability in the Southern Africa region as a whole.

Lyford Cay, Nassau  
20 October 1985







# Commonwealth News Release

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## COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Special Session: London, 16 February 1991

### Members of the Committee

The Rt. Hon. Joe Clark (Canada) - Chairman; Senator The Hon. Gareth Evans (Australia); Dr Cedric Grant (Guyana); The Hon. V.C. Shukla (India); The Hon. Dato' Abu Hassan bin Haji Omar (Malaysia); The Hon. Major-General Ike O.S. Nwachukwu (Nigeria); The Hon. Ahmed Hassan Diria (Tanzania); The Hon. Lieutenant-General B.N. Mibenge (Zambia); The Hon. Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira (Zimbabwe).

### CONCLUDING STATEMENT

#### Recent Developments in South Africa

1. The Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa met in a special session in London on 16 February to review recent developments in South Africa.

2. The immediate background to the meeting was President de Klerk's statement of 1 February 1991 to the South African Parliament in which he endorsed the concept of a multi-party conference to advance constitutional negotiations and announced the Government's intention to introduce legislation to repeal

- the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936;
- the Group Areas Act of 1956;
- the Development of Black Communities Act of 1984; and
- the Population Registration Act of 1950.

3. The Committee also took particular note of the "Manifesto for the New South Africa", also published on 1 February 1991, in which the South African Government

committed itself to "the creation of a free and democratic political system" in which

- all the people of South Africa "shall participate fully at all levels of Government, on the basis of universal adult franchise";
- government shall "at all times be based upon the consent of the governed";
- "all people shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy equal rights regardless of race, colour, sex or creed"; and
- "all discrimination between groups of people or between individuals shall be eliminated and discriminatory legislation shall be repealed".

4. The Committee welcomed these latest pronouncements and commitments. They agreed that these developments were a substantial progress on the situation since their last meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 1990 and that when implemented in full, and taken together with the measures introduced by the Government in February 1990, would constitute a major advance towards the ending of apartheid.

#### Commonwealth Response

5. In considering an appropriate response to these developments, the Committee recalled the objective of Commonwealth policy towards South Africa over the years, viz eradication of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule on the basis of free and fair exercise of universal adult suffrage by all the people in a united and non-fragmented South Africa. The Commonwealth had also consistently maintained that the forms of political settlement in South Africa were for the people of that country - all the people - to determine. In this connection the Committee noted that the Groot Schuur Meeting of May 1990 and the Pretoria Meeting the following August between the Government and the African National Congress (ANC) had led to a number of important agreements, relating to the removal of preliminary obstacles to negotiations, which agreements have now been confirmed by the announcement on 15 February of the adoption of the recommendations of the South African Government/ANC Working Group relating to the release of prisoners, the return of exiles and the suspension of the armed struggle.

6. Notwithstanding these welcome developments, Ministers noted that there had as yet been very little change on the ground and that there had been more promises than concrete action by the South African Government. The Committee expressed particular concern over continuing constraints on political freedom. In the Groot Schuur and Pretoria Minutes, the Government undertook to review security legislation, repeal its repressive provisions and present amendments in the present session of Parliament. Despite

assurances that this pledge will be fulfilled, the Government continues to make massive arrests and clings to the most repressive provisions of all, detention without trial and restrictions on public meetings. The Committee stressed that due process of law and the freedoms of assembly and expression are universal human rights, and called on the Government to give effect to them without delay.

#### Support for Negotiations

7. The Committee gave close and extensive consideration to how the Commonwealth could best assist the reform process in all the current circumstances. At Abuja the Committee had affirmed that the Commonwealth stood ready to assist in facilitating the negotiating process and had in this context welcomed initiatives to provide assistance such as constitutional expertise and funding for research, conferences and seminars on issues and options for a post-apartheid South Africa. The Committee reaffirmed this commitment, and the continuing readiness of the Commonwealth to assist the process of negotiations in any other way that might be deemed appropriate by the parties concerned.

#### Sanctions

8. The purpose of sanctions is to end apartheid: Commonwealth leaders have repeatedly made it clear that their purpose is not punitive but to bring the South African Government to the negotiating table and to keep it there until fundamental and irreversible change had been secured. Sanctions have been crucial in bringing about the changes which have occurred to date, and will go on being crucial if the destruction of apartheid is to be ultimately assured. Ministers' firm view, accordingly, was that it was crucial to maintain sanctions pressure through all stages of that process, up to and including the adoption of a new constitution. They also emphasised the importance of the Commonwealth remaining united and purposeful in its application of sanctions, and continuing to play a catalytic role in shaping world opinions in respect of the unfolding events in South Africa.

9. In this context, Ministers agreed that, while it was not yet time to lift sanctions, the most effective way of securing these objectives in the crucial months ahead would be for sanctions pressure to be maintained by a programmed management approach, relating any change in the application of sanctions not to mere statements of intention but to the adoption of real and practical steps in the destruction of apartheid.

10. They agreed that the elements in this programme should be as follows:

- (a) All existing measures should be maintained in their present form until the obstacles to negotiation are

overcome in accordance with the Pretoria Minute of 6 August 1990, and the three legislative pillars of apartheid identified in President de Klerk's speech of 1 February 1991 have been repealed as there promised, i.e. until:

- remaining political prisoners have been released;
- the way has been cleared for exiles to return home;
- repressive security legislation has been reviewed and repealed; and
- the Group Areas Act, Lands Acts, and Population Registration Act have been repealed.

When these conditions have been fulfilled, this Committee will meet again after 30 April 1991, in New Delhi to consider the appropriate response.

- (b) The most important forms of pressure on the South African Government - trade and investment sanctions and, above all else, the financial sanctions, including lending by international financial institutions like the IMF - should not be modified until some further major step has been taken down the path of constitutional reform. This could take the form of the establishment of an interim government; the establishment of a constituent assembly or some other agreed constitution-making process marking the commencement of final negotiations; or any other form agreed by the multi-party conference.
- (c) The arms embargo - applied by the United Nations and supported by a variety of specific Commonwealth measures - should not be lifted until such time as the new constitution is firmly in place: it is not until the new post-apartheid South Africa is firmly established with full democratic control and accountability, that the supply of arms should be countenanced by the international community.

#### **Sporting Contacts with South Africa**

11. The Committee warmly welcomed the steps taken by a number of sports organisations within South Africa. Encouraging progress has been made in several codes towards unifying sport under non-racial administration. The Committee agreed that Commonwealth support and encouragement for the unity talks must be of the highest priority, and noted the importance of assisting disadvantaged South African sports organisations, to which member governments were already providing assistance.

12. The Committee agreed that it was appropriate for those sporting codes which achieve unity to be recognised by the international community. The Committee also agreed that

the Commonwealth should continue to be guided in this respect by the views of representative non-racial sporting organisations.

13. The Committee agreed that it was important that the international community - governments no less than international sports federations - respond collectively and appropriately to developments in South African sport, and in particular to the wishes of the non-racial sports movement whose work to date has been greatly aided by the sports boycott. Taking account of these developments the Committee agreed to present to the Harare Heads of Government Meeting further specific proposals by which the Commonwealth can continue to encourage non-racial sport.

#### Human Resource Development for a Post-Apartheid South Africa

14. The Committee welcomed the Interim Report of the Expert Group and looked forward to the Commonwealth playing as significant a role in the human resource development of a post-apartheid South Africa as it had done in the elimination of apartheid. While the full elaboration of such a programme would have to await the Committee's final report and further political evolution within South Africa, there was an urgent need to take action now if there was to be a smooth transition to the promised non-racial democracy. In this context, and with a view to preparing black South Africans to take senior jobs in government, the Committee endorsed the Expert Group's emphasis on an immediate Commonwealth programme of training and work placements in the following areas:

- central administration including judicial, economic, legal, police and security services;
- local government structures including all essential services;
- technical services including management of educational institutions, transport and communication.

15. While much of the training and work placements would need to be offered outside South Africa, the Committee agreed that, subject to the criteria laid down by the Expert Group, a beginning should also be made to support training and placements within South Africa in the interests of speed and cost-effectiveness. The training and rehabilitation of returning exiles merited particular attention.

16. In endorsing the Expert Group's Report, members of the Committee pledged assistance from their governments in the implementation of its recommendations and were confident that all Commonwealth governments would wish to join in this important endeavour. They requested the Secretary-General to initiate the necessary action to get the programme going as quickly as possible.





# Commonwealth News Release

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COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Fifth Meeting: Abuja, 16-17 May 1990

## Members of the Committee

The Rt. Hon. Joe Clark (Canada) - Chairman; Senator The Hon. Gareth Evans (Australia); The Hon. Rashleigh E. Jackson (Guyana); The Hon. Hari Kishore Singh (India); The Hon. Dato' Abu Hassan bin Haji Omar (Malaysia); The Hon. Alhaji Dr. Rilwanu Lukman (Nigeria); The Hon. Benjamin Mkapa (Tanzania); The Hon. Luke J. Mwananshiku (Zambia) and The Hon. Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira (Zimbabwe).

The Foreign Minister of Namibia, The Hon. Theo-Ben Gurirab, attended the meeting as an Observer at the invitation of the Committee.

## CONSULTATIONS

The Committee greatly valued its special session with Mr. Nelson Mandela, Deputy President of the African National Congress (ANC) and its consultations with Dr. Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, Director of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa and Mr. Ahmed Gora Ebrahim, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)

## CONCLUDING STATEMENT

### Developments in and Prospects for Southern Africa

#### Situation in South Africa

1. The Committee noted that for the first time since its establishment developments in South Africa seemed to offer real opportunity for movement away from the apartheid policy. The unbanning of the ANC, the PAC and other political organisations; the abolition of the media emergency regulations; the rescinding of restrictions on 33 organisations; the release of some political prisoners - most notably the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and the Groote Schuur meeting between the South African Government and the ANC at the beginning of May suggest that the South African Government may be recognising the need to take concrete steps towards breaking the logjam and initiating genuine negotiations with the representatives of the majority population of South Africa.

2. The Committee welcomed these significant developments but stressed that they were still partial and preliminary measures which have not yet met Commonwealth and agreed international objectives of the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial, democratic and non-fragmented South Africa. The Committee recognised that the creation of a climate conducive to negotiations was still to be fully achieved. The prisoners released so far were only a small fraction of South Africa's political prisoners. The Committee further noted that despite the lifting of bans and restrictions on individuals and organisations on 2 February, repression continues. According to the South African Human Rights Commission, 324 people were being held under the State of Emergency as of 9 May, 1990, with a further 74 detained under internal security and other legislation. Hundreds of people have been wounded and over one hundred killed in confrontations with police since 2 February. The Committee condemned these instances of continuing repression which were at variance with the Government's own pronouncements.

3. In the face of all this, the Committee called on the South African Government to implement in full and as a matter of utmost urgency the measures first put forward by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) and more recently amplified and adumbrated in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations Special Session Declarations as agreed international consensus on the way forward. These are to:

- release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from imposing any restrictions on them;



- lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and persons;
- remove all troops from the townships;
- end the state of emergency and repeal all legislation, such as the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity; and
- cease all political trials and executions.

4. In this context, the Committee noted the decision of the Groote Schuur meeting to establish a Working Party to examine the question of the release of political prisoners. It expressed the hope that the efforts of this Working Party will lead to the removal of all the remaining obstacles to negotiations and improvement of the prospect that the other outstanding issues would be addressed, thereby facilitating the commencement of genuine negotiations. This was a point of paramount concern to the Committee.

#### The situation in the region

5. The Committee warmly welcomed Namibia's independence on 21 March, its accession to the Commonwealth the same day, and the participation of Foreign Minister Gurirab at its fifth meeting. Namibia's long-awaited independence and exemplary constitution should be a convincing demonstration to South Africans that fundamental change to a non-racial society can be achieved through a democratic and negotiated process. Ministers observed that the new nation would look to the international community to support its promising start, and urged Commonwealth and other donors to respond generously at the aid conference in New York next month. The Committee also expressed the hope that early reintegration of Walvis Bay into Namibia, as called for in the Security Council Resolution 432(78), could be achieved, and looked forward to the start of productive negotiations on this subject in the near future.

6. The Committee noted that since Kuala Lumpur, the Governments of Angola and Mozambique had continued to seek negotiated solutions to the conflicts in their countries and to this end had taken steps to bring about direct talks with their respective rebel movements. The Committee welcomed President Chissano's announcement of impending talks with the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) and commended President Dos Santos's continuing commitment to the Gbadolite process. But notwithstanding the initiatives of the Government of Mozambique, the MNR had continued to commit acts of murder and destruction in all the provinces of Mozambique but especially in the provinces of Gaza, Sofala and Manica. In Angola,

the search for a negotiated settlement proceeded against a background of continuing hostilities between the Government and UNITA forces exacerbated by external interference. The Committee called for cessation of all such interference as neither the MNR nor UNITA could continue their campaigns of destruction without continuing political and material support from South Africa and other countries. The Committee reiterated its appeal to all governments to contribute to meeting the identified security needs of Angola and Mozambique and again requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to encourage increased security assistance for the Front-Line States, particularly Mozambique.

## Sanctions

7. Having reviewed the current situation in South Africa and the region, Ministers noted the indispensable role that international sanctions and other pressures continue to play in bringing about change in South Africa.

8. As Heads of Government had stated at Kuala Lumpur, the purpose of sanctions was not punitive but to abolish apartheid by bringing Pretoria to the negotiating table and keeping it there until fundamental political change was irreversibly secured. There was growing evidence that the white community in South Africa is coming to terms with the reality that the only way to counter the deteriorating economic and social situation was to end the international isolation through political change. Such recognition underlies the steps that Pretoria has recently taken towards the process of negotiations. The Committee was, therefore, of the view that to relax sanctions now would abort the process towards negotiations that had barely commenced. The Committee called on the international financial community, whose withdrawal of credit and investment from South Africa continues to be a powerful source of pressure on Pretoria, not to relent in applying such pressure; and called on all Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries to maintain existing sanctions and measures until Pretoria was brought to the negotiating table and change was clearly and irreversibly secured. Certainly, it would be wrong to withdraw pressure now.

9. In this context, it attached importance to the considered view of Mr. Mandela that the Committee should seek to impress upon governments that if the trend to relax sanctions is not stopped, all the gains in the first steps towards negotiations will be reversed. The Committee underlined the importance of maintaining the existing consensus on international sanctions. Given the importance of the international community acting in concert and not relaxing sanctions prematurely, the Committee agreed to convey its views to non-Commonwealth governments and, in particular, to the members of the EC and G7 groupings of countries.

10. The Committee noted the establishment of the Independent Centre for the Study of the South African Economy and International Finance at the London School of Economics, as called for by the Commonwealth (other than Britain) at Kuala Lumpur, whose purpose is to study and report on South Africa's international financial relations and their implications for its economy; and to publicise factual information on financial flows to, and policies towards, South Africa. The terms of reference provide that, at the appropriate time, the Centre should examine ways of mobilising resources for post-apartheid South Africa. Ministers expressed the hope that as the pillars of apartheid crumble, the Centre could develop into an agency studying how best to restore economic growth and dynamism into a new, democratic South Africa. Ministers commended Australia and other Commonwealth governments for the financial support provided to the Centre. They looked forward to the Centre's first regular report starting from July.—

#### **The Arms Embargo**

11. The Committee received a report on the work of the United Nations Security Council 421 Committee on the Arms Embargo chaired by Malaysia. Ministers agreed to offer every assistance to the Committee to enable it to fulfil its mandate. Ministers also agreed to continue to press for greater transparency in the operation of the Committee to ensure a more effective application of the Arms Embargo by the international community.

#### **Support for dialogue and negotiations**

12. The Committee commended the common commitment of the ANC and the South African Government to a peaceful process of negotiations. Recalling the historic work of the EPG in the evolution of this process, the Committee affirmed that the Commonwealth stands ready to assist in facilitating the negotiating process. In this context the Committee welcomed initiatives to provide assistance, through, for example, the provision of constitutional expertise and funding for research, conferences and seminars on issues and options for a post-apartheid South Africa.

#### **Aid to victims and opponents of apartheid**

13. The work of the Commonwealth network of non-governmental organisations, Skills for South Africa, established to provide training and work experience for black South Africans has assumed particular importance and relevance. The Committee therefore urged all governments to make more resources available to the network to enable it to meet the expected increase in the demand for its services. The Committee welcomed the proposal to establish an Expert Group on human resource development for a post-apartheid

South Africa to assist the Committee in addressing human resources issues as an integral part of the Commonwealth's efforts to support South Africa's transition to a successful and stable non-racial democracy. The Committee requested the Secretary-General to establish the Expert Group and facilitate its work.

14. The imminent return to South Africa of many thousands of refugees following the unbanning of the political parties will require a substantial infusion of financial resources to meet the cost of resettlement. In the light of this new situation, the Committee called on all Commonwealth governments and the wider international community to use appropriate channels for contributing financially and in kind to the resettlement of the returnees. In this respect the Committee welcomed the announcement by Australia this week that it would respond to ANC requests by making available A\$15 million over the next three years for resettlement, training and related purposes.

#### **Process of Consultation**

15. The Committee noted the uncertainty of future developments and stressed the importance of ensuring that the views of those most directly involved are taken into account in a timely fashion into future Commonwealth responses. The Committee requested the Secretary-General to maintain close contact with all the parties concerned. Ministers also mandated the Chairman to convene a special meeting of this Committee at any point it was deemed necessary and helpful.

#### **Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique**

16. The Committee welcomed the Secretary-General's Report on the Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique and expressed satisfaction that further contributions and pledges from Australia, Britain, Canada, Malaysia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone will permit a build-up of activities in 1990 and 1991. Thereafter additional resources will be required. The Committee urged Commonwealth governments to contribute additional resources to maintain the Fund's activities over a full five years.

#### **Other items**

17. The Committee took note, with appreciation, of the substantial progress that has been made in implementing other elements of the Okanagan Programme of Action; notably the Commonwealth Strategy for Countering South African Propaganda and Censorship and the Plan of Action for the Promotion of Trade and Investment in Southern Africa.

**Next meeting**

18. The Committee gratefully accepted the offer of India to host its next meeting which will again review the evolving situation in South Africa with a particular focus on how the Commonwealth can facilitate progress towards a non-racial future for that country.

19. Ministers expressed their warm appreciation to the Government of Nigeria for its generous hospitality and the excellent arrangements for the meeting of the Committee in the congenial atmosphere of Abuja.

Nicon Noga Hilton Hotel  
Abuja, Nigeria

17 May 1990



# Commonwealth News Release

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## THE ABUJA COMMITMENT

The Committee, in light of its deliberations, agreed upon the following commitment concerning the situation in Southern Africa. They agreed that this consensus should be known as the ABUJA COMMITMENT.

1. The primary objective of Commonwealth action concerning South Africa remains as agreed unanimously by Commonwealth Heads of Government at New Delhi in 1983: "only the eradication of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule on the basis of free and fair exercise of universal adult suffrage by all the people in a united and non-fragmented South Africa can lead to a just and lasting solution to the explosive situation prevailing in Southern Africa."
2. This objective must continue to govern Commonwealth and international action concerning South Africa, including sanctions and the encouragement of dialogue between all parties.
3. Sanctions are working. They have clearly contributed to persuading the South African Government that change has become necessary, thereby beginning a process of dialogue with the majority in South Africa.
4. The recent momentum must be maintained so as to result in the removal of all obstacles to the commencement of negotiations leading to a non-racial, democratic South Africa.
5. The role of sanctions in encouraging negotiations remains valid and indispensable. To relax sanctions now would prejudice seriously the objective of successful negotiations. Sanctions must remain until there is clear evidence of irreversible change.
6. Appropriate international action concerning South Africa must continue to be based on and responsive to the views of the majority. Such international action can best be effected if it is based on the principles of consultation and consensus.
7. The normalization of the situation in South Africa requires removal of all obstacles to negotiation, the dismantling of apartheid, and a process of democratization extending across the spectrum - political, social and economic - if democracy is to be real and enduring.

8. At the political level, democratization must be based on the principle of universal adult suffrage leading to the establishment of non-racial, democratic, non-fragmented South Africa.

9. The international community must focus its current activities on encouraging dialogue and assisting the oppressed majority in South Africa in strengthening their negotiating resources.

10. There is an urgent requirement also to look beyond the negotiating process, and to help prepare for a post-apartheid South Africa which will be both democratic and prosperous.

11. To this end, the international community must increase its emphasis on the encouragement of human resource development in all skills relevant to the successful management of a democratic, modern and prosperous South Africa.

12. The Commonwealth reaffirms its commitment to the struggle against apartheid until its last vestiges have disappeared and the way is paved for South Africa's return to the Commonwealth family - democratic, just and free at last.

Commonwealth Committee of Foreign  
Ministers on Southern Africa

Abuja, Nigeria

17 May 1990







# Commonwealth News Release

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## COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Fourth Meeting: Canberra, 7-9 August 1989

### Members of the Committee

The Rt. Hon. Joe Clark (Canada) - Chairman; Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans (Australia); The Hon. Rashleigh E. Jackson (Guyana); The Hon P.V. Narasimha Rao (India); The Hon. Major-General Iks Nwachukwu (Nigeria); The Hon. Benjamin Mkapa (Tanzania); The Hon. Luke J. Mwananshiku (Zambia) and The Hon. Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira (Zimbabwe)

The Foreign Minister of Malaysia, The Hon. Dato' Abu Hassan bin Haji Omar, representing the host Government of the forthcoming Heads of Government Meeting in Kuala Lumpur attended the meeting as the guest of the Committee. The Foreign Minister of New Zealand, the Hon. Russell Marshall, held discussions with the Committee during its meeting.

### CONCLUDING STATEMENT

1. The Committee's fourth meeting considered developments and progress in the implementation of earlier decisions arising from its mandate from Commonwealth Heads of Government and the Okanagan Statement and Programme of Action. Its conclusions in Canberra included the following.

#### The Situation in South Africa

2. The Committee noted that despite talk about reform the situation in South Africa had not improved since its last meeting in Harare. Apartheid remained in place and the state of emergency had been renewed for the fourth consecutive year. Nelson Mandela and the other political prisoners remained incarcerated. Most of the detainees released at the beginning of the year following the country-wide hunger strike had since been restricted as part of the regime's effort to contain all opposition to the system. The Committee was distressed by the increasing and distorted application of the legal doctrine of "common purpose". Of particular concern was the sentencing to death of the Uppington 14. Equally disturbing were growing instances of informal repression and attacks on anti-apartheid activists. The murder of Dr. David Webster on 1 May followed an all too familiar pattern of assassinations. According to a United States State Department report issued in February, South African "death squads" were said to be operating "completely outside the law inside and outside the country". The South African Government had also continued its pressure against the media on several fronts as part of the wider effort to quell peaceful opposition to apartheid. The ban on political parties remained in force and, notwithstanding the declarations of the new leadership of the ruling National Party, no beginning had been made on negotiations between the Government and the acknowledged representatives of the black majority.

## Namibia

3. The Committee considered recent developments in Namibia as a matter of priority concern. Ministers stressed the importance of 'impartiality' and elimination of 'intimidation' in the implementation of Resolution 435. The presence of former Koevoet personnel had already been the subject of complaint by the United Nations Secretary-General. Pretoria's evident hostility to all opposition and its retention of Koevoet personnel within the South West Africa Police (SWAPOL) constituted a most disturbing indication of intimidation of South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) and other opposition supporters by the authorities, and a clear danger to free and fair elections. There was urgent need for a strict adherence by South Africa to the basic principles of the 435 process.

4. Beyond these matters of a physical nature, there were serious questions that remained unresolved in relation to the proclamation that would govern the conduct of the elections, the operations of the Constituent Assembly and the entire process leading to independence. Fundamental changes appear to be needed to ensure the integrity of the secret ballot. Particular proposals for tightening the proclamations that in our view require very careful consideration include the following:

- (a) voter identification must take place before a voter is issued with a ballot paper and the subsequent use of fingerprint experts, etc., abandoned;
- (b) party agents must be permitted to play their full and proper role in the polling process;
- (c) UNTAG's role must be fully consistent with the requirements of Resolution 435;
- (d) counting must take place at each polling station and the final determination concluded expeditiously;
- (e) the Constituent Assembly must be recognised as the only authentic representative body and as such must exercise its rights in an unfettered manner in both drafting and adopting the Constitution and (should the Assembly so wish) in reconstituting itself as the first parliament under the new Constitution from such date as it should choose as Namibian Independence Day;
- (f) the Administrator-General in the performance of his role until Independence Day should be guided by the wishes of the Assembly.

5. Commonwealth governments had been alerted to these issues. Their several Governments would exert every effort to ensure that the final legislation was in conformity with the expectations of the international community and the requirements of the 435 process; but there was very little time in which to ensure this. Heads of Government would be meeting in Kuala Lumpur three weeks before the elections. It was absolutely essential that the international community as a whole gave maximum support to the United Nations at this moment in ensuring that the basic legislative framework existed under which the electoral process and the Constituent Assembly thereafter did not become a distortion of international expectations for Namibia's independence. The Committee felt that it could not urge too strongly the utmost vigilance in relation to these basic arrangements. The fulfilment of Commonwealth expectations for a free Namibia within the family of the Commonwealth could very well turn on how these questions were resolved.

6. Resolution 435 vested responsibility for the supervision and control of the elections and the election campaign in the United Nations. However, as had already been demonstrated by a considerable number of visits, there was scope for others to observe the process and lend weight to international efforts to buttress the United Nations operation. In this regard, Ministers were of the view that the Commonwealth Secretary-General should explore urgently the possibility of constituting a representative observer group from the Commonwealth which would visit Namibia prior to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in order to report to Heads of Government in Kuala Lumpur on the situation and on possible future arrangements.

7. Ministers noted with approval that the expanded United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) police force would soon reach its authorised target of 1,000 and that several Commonwealth countries were among the contributors. At the same time, they expressed concern at the ongoing problem of SWAPOL and, in particular the continuing presence of Koevoet personnel in SWAPOL, and resolved to draw this concern to the attention of the United Nations Secretary-General. To help the United Nations address the problem, the Committee agreed that the Commonwealth Secretary-General would encourage Commonwealth member countries to be prepared to supply additional police officers if the United Nations Secretary-General requested them. The Commonwealth would make this offer of support to the United Nations Secretary-General to ensure that the United Nations had all the resources needed to resolve the serious problem posed by SWAPOL.

8. In this regard the Committee reiterated its earlier call on member states of the United Nations, including members of the Security Council, to assure the United Nations Secretary-General that the required resources will be provided to enable him to deploy, up the upper limit of 7,500, the full military component judged by him to be necessary for carrying out effectively all the relevant tasks specified in the UNTAG plan.

9. The Committee concluded that the challenge facing Namibia in the post-electoral period both before and after independence would be daunting. Conditions were very uncertain and, even if as was to be hoped, the election process was free and fair, the success of the expression of the people's will could be frustrated by subsequent political and economic pressures from South Africa. In light of these dangers the Namibian people would need assistance in preparing themselves administratively for independence and in effecting rapid economic development. The Commonwealth already provided extensive training and other development assistance. Ministers asked the Secretary-General to explore the possibilities for significantly expanded aid in the operational, development and constitutional fields. In anticipation of these needs and the expectation of increased assistance, the Committee thought that consideration should be given to sending Commonwealth expertise at the appropriate time to provide assistance and advice, while participating in the planning of future activity with the new Government.

#### **Destabilisation**

10. The Committee noted that despite the welcome improvement in the security situation in South Western Africa, South Africa's campaign of destabilisation in other parts of the region continued to exact a high toll both in human life and material loss. According to an independent study on the subject of destabilisation commissioned by the Committee,

the resulting instability in the region in the period since 1980 had caused the death of 1.5 million people, no less than four million made homeless, several thousand disabled, and material damage estimated at some US\$45 billion.

11. The Committee was particularly concerned that Mozambique continued to suffer from the ravages of the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). The Committee applauded the initiative of the Government of Mozambique to achieve peace and national reconciliation and in this connection called upon Pretoria to show by deed that it had truly abandoned its support for the rebel MNR.

12. The Committee denounced South Africa's campaign of destabilisation against its neighbours and saw in that campaign a major contributory factor in the regions' economic problems. In this regard the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), with its objectives of promoting regional self-reliance and economic independence from South Africa, deserved increased support and encouragement.

13. The Committee also welcomed the outcome of the Gbadolite summit of 20 June and pledged its support for the African initiative to help bring about peace and genuine national reconciliation in Angola. The Committee also welcomed a similar initiative being mounted in the case of Mozambique.

### Sanctions

14. Recent developments in South Africa have reaffirmed the Committee's belief that sanctions are having an increasing economic and political impact. It saw evidence of a heightened recognition within the white community that in the absence of fundamental political change, South Africa's relationship with the world was unlikely to improve and that the economy and living standards would continue to deteriorate under the pressure of trade and financial sanctions. If Pretoria did, indeed, turn towards the dismantling of apartheid, sanctions would have contributed to forcing that change. The Committee was united in the belief that sanctions would need to be sustained, and intensified, until progress in that direction became irreversible.

15. In that context, the Committee noted that Pretoria had not taken any of the steps Commonwealth leaders had urged at Nassau in October 1985, namely: to declare that the system of apartheid will be dismantled and specific and meaningful action taken in fulfilment of that intent; terminate the existing state of emergency; release immediately and unconditionally Nelson Mandela and all others imprisoned and detained for their opposition to apartheid; establish political freedom and specifically lift the existing ban on the African National Congress (ANC) and other political parties; and to initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.

16. The Committee reiterated its conviction, confirmed by its further consultations with several black South African leaders, that most black South Africans continued to look principally to sanctions for pressure on Pretoria for peaceful change. Sanctions, in the Committee's view, remained the most effective peaceful path to the ending of apartheid.

## Expert Study on Sanctions

17. In receiving the final report on the Evaluation of the Application and Impact of Sanctions against South Africa, prepared by an independent expert study group, the Committee recalled that at Okanagan, Heads of Government, with the exception of Britain, had agreed that pending the acceptance by the international community as a whole that comprehensive and mandatory sanctions would be the quickest route to bring Pretoria to the negotiating table, a wider, tighter and more intensified application of sanctions must remain an essential part of its response to apartheid.

18. Ministers shared the overall conclusions of the report that existing sanctions - adopted by the Commonwealth, the United States, the Nordic States and other countries - have through their impact on South Africa's economy and policies, confirmed the legitimacy of sanctions as an instrument of policy to induce dismantling of apartheid in South Africa and, in the circumstances, the urgency of even stronger signals to the new Government in South Africa.

19. The Study makes 30 recommendations for action. The Committee believed these recommendations deserved careful consideration by all countries, most of whom now apply sanctions of one kind or another against South Africa. It was therefore making the Study available not only to Commonwealth governments but to the wider international community. Since important questions of timing arise in the consideration and application of further measures, Ministers felt that all governments would wish to examine these recommendations carefully and in the framework of overall strategy. For Commonwealth countries, they have particular significance in relation to the Kuala Lumpur Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government later this year.

20. The Committee also noted the Study's conclusions that the policies of certain countries had continued to undermine the effectiveness of existing sanctions adopted by the Commonwealth and other countries. They noted that, particularly in the light of the publicity fostered by the Committee, some of the countries which have expanded their links with South Africa in recent years have become conscious of the need to curtail them, particularly in certain sectors where Commonwealth sanctions apply. They expressed concern, however, at the unwillingness of those countries with the most leverage to apply pressure on South Africa through more concerted action on sanctions. South Africa should not be encouraged to believe that it may delay indefinitely in responding fully to the legitimate aspirations of the majority of its citizens. There was a critical need for those countries to look again at responding to the urgency of the South African situation and the Committee called on them to demonstrate by concrete actions their commitment to hastening the end of apartheid.

## South Africa's Links with the International Financial System

21. The Committee welcomed the publication of "Apartheid and International Finance" by Keith Ovenden and Tony Cole commissioned by the Australian Government, noting that it was an updated and expanded version of the report of the Intergovernmental Group on South Africa's Relationship with the International Financial System commissioned by the Committee and considered by it in Toronto. It supported the authors' conclusion that financial sanctions applied by the private sector, governments and non-governmental organisations had been, and continue to be, one of the most effective forms of pressure on Pretoria.

22. The Committee reaffirmed its Toronto decisions on widening and tightening financial sanctions. It had an extensive discussion on further action to enhance the effectiveness of financial sanctions against South Africa. It also considered means of further defining the Commonwealth ban on new bank lending to South Africa. As a result, the Committee invited Commonwealth and other governments to take further action, as specified in the Annex to this Statement, which was issued as a press release on 8 August.

#### **Arms Embargo**

23. South Africa's policies of destabilisation and repression highlight the importance of maintaining and strengthening the arms embargo. Ministers received a report from Canada on recent efforts at the United Nations to further the recommendations on tightening the embargo. Ministers also received an updated report on the United Nations arms embargo from the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa (WCMNC). The Committee was encouraged by the recent meetings of the United Nations Security Council's 421 Committee charged with monitoring the embargo. They welcomed efforts to compile a new report on the Committee's work, hold hearings with experts and undertake thorough investigations of recent breaches of the embargo. They agreed to consult at the United Nations with a view to encouraging further progress along these lines.

#### **Demarches**

24. Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to secure a more concerted application of a global sanctions programme and reviewed their efforts through demarches on a wide range of governments to encourage universal adoption of the Commonwealth package of measures, including the actions recommended by the Committee. They made plans to continue their efforts in the months ahead, taking into account the opportunities presented by forthcoming conferences and the United Nations General Assembly for joint activity by Committee members.

#### **Security Needs of the Front-Line States**

25. The Committee reviewed the continuing threat to the security of the Front-Line States and stressed the ongoing need for practical security assistance, especially for Mozambique. While acknowledging the generous contributions in this area by a number of Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries, the Committee stressed that much remained to be done to help meet the security needs identified in the special report by General Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. The Committee asked the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to encourage increased security assistance for the countries of the region, particularly Mozambique.

#### **Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique**

26. The Committee reviewed and commended the Secretary-General's Report on operations in the first 18 months of the Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique, and noted the further strong evidence of successful implementation and of continuing demand for Commonwealth assistance under the programme. The Committee urged all Commonwealth governments, as part of their preparations for the Kuala Lumpur Heads of Government Meeting, to consider pledging generously so that the Fund's momentum is maintained and the promise of Vancouver becomes a reality.

### **Promotion of Trade and Investment in Front-Line and Neighbouring States**

27. In the light of the importance of strengthening their economic independence and disengagement from South Africa, the Committee reviewed the draft strategy paper submitted by Canada on trade and investment promotion in the Front-Line and neighbouring States. The extremely useful efforts already being undertaken in this regard in a number of different fora, including SADCC and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), were recognised. The Committee requested the Secretariat to develop an Action Plan taking into account the views of the Front-Line and neighbouring states, SADCC and the PTA and all Commonwealth countries concerned.

### **Dialogue**

28. In keeping with its mandate from Vancouver, the Committee has continued to place a premium on dialogue between the South African Government and the true representatives of the non-white majority as the only peaceful route to a resolution of the conflict. The Committee welcomed recent growing instances of dialogue among South Africans across racial and political lines. For example, in Lusaka in July more than 100 white South Africans from the "Five Freedoms Forum" met with the ANC. The Committee also took particular note of the meeting between State President P.W. Botha and Nelson Mandela on 5 July in Cape Town. The Committee recalled that in its Report the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) had underlined the centrality of Nelson Mandela in any genuine negotiation to bring about the resolution of the conflict. If the meeting was an indication that at long last the South African Government too was beginning to share this assessment of Nelson Mandela's place in the South African political equation, the next logical step should be his immediate and unconditional release. In this regard, the Committee stressed the continuing validity of the Negotiating Concept elaborated by the EPG as a basis for future negotiations.

### **Countering South African Propaganda and Censorship**

29. The Committee noted that since its last meeting the apartheid regime had taken its campaign against the media further with bannings of newspapers and journalists and the imposition of crippling fines. Against this background the Committee reaffirmed the continuing validity of the Commonwealth effort to expose the truth about apartheid and to combat media censorship. In this connection they warmly welcomed and endorsed the report for Heads of Government from the Working Party established by the Secretary-General to develop a Commonwealth strategy for this purpose. The Committee paid tribute to all the Commonwealth governments which had in various ways contributed to the work of the Working Party and to the wider effort to counteract South African propaganda and censorship.

### **Aid to Victims and Opponents of Apartheid**

30. The Committee continued to emphasise the importance of practical and financial assistance to victims and opponents of apartheid, in particular educational, legal and humanitarian assistance and aid to trade unions. Efforts already being made by Commonwealth and other countries were recognised and the Committee called for further responses from all countries opposed to apartheid.

31. The Committee strongly endorsed the work of the newly-established Commonwealth network of non-governmental organisations, Skills for South Africa, which will provide high level training and work experience for black South Africans and contribute both to the process of change in South Africa and the development of skills required in a post-apartheid society.

32. The Committee noted the support the network had already received from a wide range of governments and institutions, commended it to the Commonwealth, and urged governments to provide appropriate support and resources to assist in the implementation and co-ordination of this work.

#### Sporting Contacts with South Africa

33. The Committee took account of recent developments in relation to sporting contacts with South Africa. Ministers reaffirmed the importance of Commonwealth Governments' stand against such contacts and of the Commonwealth's commitment in relation to them under the Gleneagles Agreement, and unreservedly condemned the efforts by South Africa to induce cricket and rugby players from Britain and other Commonwealth countries to play in South Africa.

34. They expressed extreme disappointment at the action of players who had indicated their willingness to go to South Africa in violation of the Gleneagles Agreement, describing such conduct as unworthy of the highest tradition of Commonwealth sport and gravely detrimental to it, and called on the players in question who had not already done so to decline these invitations. Sporting contact with South Africa could not be justified on the basis of its contribution to the development of non-racial sport within that country: the very structure of South African society and the actions of the white minority Government necessarily confined non-whites to second class participation in sport, as in all other aspects of South African life. Nothing could justify giving comfort to the apartheid regime or undermining the position of other sportsmen and sportswomen who remained faithful to the Gleneagles Agreement.

35. In the case of cricketers who had agreed to go to South Africa, the Committee called for the rigorous enforcement of the penalties agreed earlier this year by the International Cricket Conference. Ministers also called upon other sporting bodies to develop and apply similar rules and penalty structures in respect of the sports they controlled.

36. Ministers called on all Commonwealth Governments to express their own strong opposition to such sporting contacts with South Africa and to use their utmost endeavours through all political and other channels to discourage them. They were mindful of the efforts which had already been made in this respect and were particularly appreciative of the strong stands taken by the Australian and New Zealand Governments. They looked for the furtherance and intensification of all such efforts.

#### Auckland Commonwealth Games

37. The Ministers expressed their strong and unanimous desire that next year's Commonwealth Games in Auckland should be an unqualified success. They recognised that the Games were an important element in the strength of the Commonwealth association and the fraternity of its peoples, particularly the young people of the Commonwealth. They agreed that they would pursue a process of consultation in relation to the Games in the months ahead, and would seek the involvement of all other Commonwealth countries in that consultative process.



38. Ministers welcomed the opportunity afforded by their meeting in Canberra for discussions on the Auckland Games and related matters with the Foreign Minister of New Zealand, the Hon. Russell Marshall. They took the opportunity to express to him the value they placed on the strong support his Government had given to the Gleneagles Agreement and to the wider Commonwealth effort to bring about the dismantling of apartheid.

#### Future Organisation of Commonwealth Games

39. Ministers received with interest a proposal from Canada for placing the Commonwealth Games on a firmer financial footing and for arrangements which would facilitate their being staged in developing Commonwealth countries. They supported the idea of a meeting of Commonwealth representatives to examine these proposals further.

#### Consultations

40. The Committee greatly valued the opportunity for direct consultations with leading personalities from the liberation movements and anti-apartheid organisations from within South Africa. Making presentations before the Committee were Father Smangaliso Mkhathshwa, Director of the Institute of Contextual Theology, Dr Max Coleman, a Commissioner of the Human Rights Commission, Mr Moses Mayekiso, General Secretary of the National Union of Metalworkers, Mr Ahmad Gora Ebrahim, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), and Mr Aziz Pahad, Chief Representative of the ANC to Britain. Their perspectives on the situation in South Africa considerably assisted the Committee's deliberations. Ministers expressed their profound disappointment that the Government of South Africa should have prevented Mr Azhar Cachalia, the Treasurer of the United Democratic Front (UDF), from being present at their meeting.

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTHERN  
AFRICA

APARTHEID AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

At their meeting on Tuesday 8 August 1989, the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa agreed to the following statement:


The financial sanctions already being applied by Commonwealth and other Governments and their respective financial institutions have proved to be among the most effective of all instruments of pressure against South Africa. South Africa's exclusion from world capital markets is placing significant pressure on its balance of payments and, as a consequence, on its capacity for economic growth.

In order to ensure that the pressure from these sources is maintained, the Committee reaffirmed its Toronto decisions on widening and tightening financial sanctions and invited Commonwealth and other Governments, and financial institutions within their respective jurisdictions, to take further action in each of the following areas.

(a) Tightening conditions for debt repayment.

Ministers reaffirmed the key importance of June 1990 in terms of the rescheduling of South African debt, providing the opportunity to exert further pressure on South Africa's debt servicing obligations. They noted that there was some evidence of relaxation in the second rescheduling (1987-90) in that South Africa was required to repay annually less capital under it than under the first rescheduling agreement (1986-87). They called on banks in the context of the 1990 rescheduling negotiations to exert the maximum possible pressure on South Africa consistent with the need to avoid precipitating South African default on its debt and in particular recommended:

- . provision for substantial capital re-payments;
- . the application of the highest possible interest rates to South African debt;



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- . provision for substantial capital re-payments;
- . the application of the highest possible interest rates to South African debt;

the rejection of exit options, including the long term rollover\*.

To this end, Ministers agreed that a delegation of senior officials would seek access to senior executives of the member banks of the coordinating committee presently negotiating the 1990 rescheduling arrangements.

(b) Imposing Further Restrictions on Trade finance

Ministers recognised the advantage that accrued to South Africa in having much of its trade credit business still insured with official export credit agencies. In order to send a clear signal about the need to curtail sources of foreign funds to South Africa and, at the least, to expose that country to the unfettered judgment of the market place in this field, they urged that all countries that had not done so now take South Africa "off cover" with official Government agencies for official trade credit and insurance purposes.

Ministers noted South African claims that trade financing was being used as a balance of payments cushion. They therefore called on all financial institutions in Commonwealth and other countries to impose tougher terms for trade financing including, in particular, reducing the maximum credit term to ninety days.

(c) Monitoring the ban on medium and long-term lending

Recognising the importance of promoting public awareness of South Africa's dealings with the international financial community, Ministers supported in principle the establishment of an independent mechanism to review and report on South Africa's links with the international financial community on a regular basis. It would involve a small, specialist staff with proven research skills in the area of financial markets and be located in one of the world financial centres. The cooperation of finance houses in ensuring the regular

\* Under the 1987 rescheduling agreement, creditors were offered two methods of escaping from the unilateral moratorium that South Africa had placed on commercial loans. One was to convert debt to a long term schedule (the 1997 option) with defined interest and capital repayments. The other was to convert the debt into equities on the local South African share market and then export the funds through the financial Rand exchange system - at a substantial discount. Since 1987 a further exit option has developed in the form of an international secondary market for South African debt. Use of any of these options has the effect of lessening the pressure on South Africa in some degree.

publication of factual information covering the broad field of South Africa's links with international finance would need to be assured.

Ministers agreed that a specific proposal along these lines should be developed for further consideration at Kuala Lumpur in October.

(d) Ban on New Bank Lending

Ministers discussed Commonwealth experience of the application of the existing ban on new bank lending to South Africa in the context of South African controlled international companies operating outside South Africa. They reaffirmed the intent of the lending ban which is to put pressure on South Africa's balance of payments. Ministers noted, in this connection, that loans to South African owned or controlled entities incorporated abroad may in certain circumstances enable South African companies to strengthen their marketing network, improve their access to technology and otherwise enhance their capacity to frustrate sanctions.

They also noted that lending to such entities may, on the other hand, involve in certain circumstances an outflow from South Africa of capital and expertise such as to reinforce the impact of financial sanctions.

As a result Ministers proposed that the following general guidelines be applied by banks and other financial institutions in respective national jurisdictions, as criteria for assessing the acceptability of a proposed loan:

That banks and other financial institutions responding to a loan request from any entity outside South Africa that may possibly be controlled by South African interests should:

(a) require a declaration by the borrower stating the source of control of the entity seeking the loan; and

(b) where South African control is established:

- obtain an assurance that the purpose of the loan is not for activities designed to circumvent sanctions;
- require an assurance that the funds will be used for the stated purpose of the loan and will not be transferred to South Africa;
- be satisfied that the purpose of the investment is not to repatriate profits to South Africa;

- be satisfied that, on balance and in all the circumstances of the individual case, the loan would not result in significant net benefit flowing to economic interests within South Africa, or the South African economy as a whole;

and not grant the loan in question unless so assured and satisfied.

Canberra  
8 August 1989







# Commonwealth News Release

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8 FEBRUARY 1989

## COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Third Meeting: Harare, 6-8 February 1989

### Members of the Committee

The Rt. Hon. Joe Clark (Canada) - Chairman; Senator the Hon Gareth Evans (Australia); The Hon. Rashleigh E. Jackson (Guyana); The Hon. P. V. Narasimha Rao (India); The Hon. Major-General Ike Nwachukwu (Nigeria); The Hon. Benjamin Mkapa (Tanzania); The Hon. Luke J. Mwanashiku (Zambia); The Hon. Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira (Zimbabwe).

### CONCLUDING STATEMENT

1. The Committee's third meeting considered developments and progress in the implementation of its earlier decisions arising from its mandate from Commonwealth Heads of Government under the Okanagan Statement and Programme of Action. As agreed at Toronto, the Committee gave special consideration to the question of destabilisation of its neighbours by South Africa. Some of the Committee's work remained of a non-public character; its conclusions in Harare included the following:

#### The Situation in South Africa

2. The Committee noted that there had been significant developments in South Africa since its last meeting; a few positive; many negative. The hopeful movement towards Namibian independence and the reprieve of the "Sharpeville Six" were among the welcome developments; however, they represented no real change in or impact on the fundamental nature of apartheid. Some of the negative developments, on the other hand, have serious implications. The outcome of the "Delmas Treason Trial", which sent three UDF leaders and one member of the South African Council of Churches to prison for their role in organising opposition to apartheid in 1984 and 1985, has reinforced the message from Pretoria that it will not tolerate even peaceful opposition to apartheid from any quarter within South Africa.

The use of the legal system to harass and suppress legitimate, non-violent opposition to apartheid is particularly disturbing. Such systematic repression was highlighted by a mass hunger strike of detainees in South Africa's prisons coinciding with the Committee's meeting. The Committee also noted that while some older black leaders in poor health had been released from prison, a new generation was being incarcerated under the continuing State of Emergency.

3. The October 26 segregated municipal elections, from which the overwhelming majority of blacks were disenfranchised and which most of the rest simply ignored, had left no doubt that black South Africans would not accept dictation as to who are their leaders. The Committee renewed its commitment to continued international pressure on the South African Government to end apartheid and enter into negotiations with the genuine black leaders towards the establishment of a non-racial, democratic society. Pretoria was presenting to the world the face of a peace-maker; the realities of apartheid within South Africa and of destabilisation within the Southern Africa region were very different. The Committee attached importance to the world community not being deceived.

#### Namibia

4. The Committee recalled that at its meeting in Toronto it had welcomed the consultations between the Governments of Angola, Cuba and South Africa under the mediation of the United States. It noted that those negotiations had since culminated in the Brazzaville Protocol of 13 December and the New York Agreements of 22 December which have opened the way for Namibia's independence under Security Council Resolution 435/78. The Committee welcomed these opportunities and committed its support to their genuine fulfilment. The Committee stressed that Namibia was the sole responsibility of the United Nations and that the Commonwealth looked to that body to bring Namibia to independence through free and fair elections under its effective supervision and control.

5. The Committee recognised that the Commonwealth - which has long waited to welcome Namibia as a member - had a particular interest in safeguarding the integrity of the process for implementing Resolution 435 and the plan for Namibia's freedom. It noted the continuing differences on the implementation of Resolution 435 involving a possible substantial reduction in the military component - as set out in the Secretary General's Report to the Security Council of 23 January, 1989.

6. The Committee hoped that these differences would be resolved bearing in mind that the over-riding consideration must be the ability of the United Nations to carry out its full responsibilities in relation to the implementation of Resolution 435 and the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections held under its supervision and control.

7. To this end, the Committee called on member states of the United Nations, including members of the Security Council, to assure the United Nations Secretary-General that the required resources will be provided to enable him to deploy, up to the upper limit of 7,500, the full military component judged by him to be necessary for carrying out effectively all the relevant tasks specified in the UNTAG plan.

8. In the view of the Committee, the UN Secretary-General's efforts to sustain confidence all round during the transitional period could be assisted by the presence of observers from as many member states as possible. Accordingly, it expressed the hope that Commonwealth members would respond favourably to requests from the Secretary-General for personnel in constituting observer components of UNTAG.

#### Destabilisation

9. Meeting in Harare, the Committee was deeply troubled by the scale of South African destabilisation in the region - the external face of apartheid - and the severity of its implications for all aspects of life. South Africa despite its assertions to the contrary remained the single most destabilising factor in the entire Southern Africa region - and as a matter of conscious policy. Over many years South Africa has been responsible, directly and indirectly, for regional destabilisation on an incredible scale with heavy human, economic, political, social and environmental costs for its neighbours: well over a million killed, several millions disabled and an estimated damage of some US\$35 billion since 1980.

10. The Committee recognised specifically that South Africa was persisting with its destabilisation activities, despite its claims to the contrary, following the tripartite agreement on Angola/Namibia and Pretoria's recent African diplomatic offensive. Indeed, there had been a significant escalation of destabilisation activity in recent months in Mozambique in particular. A chronological list of some 60 incidents between November 1988 and January 1989 was brought to the attention of the Committee during its meeting.

11. The Committee received a preliminary report on destabilisation commissioned at its request by the Secretariat from independent experts. In view of the importance of broadening awareness of the destabilisation issue, with its horrendous impact on the countries of Southern Africa, the Committee agreed the immediate release

of the preliminary report while it continued its review of it. An enlarged and updated version of the report would be prepared for consideration at the next CFMSA meeting.

12. The Committee felt strongly that South Africa simply could not be allowed to pursue with impunity policies of destabilisation of its neighbours, designed as they were to reinforce and protect the system of apartheid inside South Africa. The international community, and the Commonwealth within it, had a duty to exert every effort to put an end to such pernicious aggression and to assist in meeting the resulting security needs of the victim states of the region. Responding to South Africa's destabilisation of the FrontLine States had become an integral part of the response to apartheid itself. The one was as morally compelling as the other.

### Sanctions

13. The Committee agreed that sanctions were having an increasing impact on South Africa, politically and economically. It noted, in particular, that events in the second half of 1988 and current prospects show that sanctions are having a perceptible effect on the South African economy. They were beginning to promote recognition within the white community that in the absence of fundamental political change, it cannot hope to see such externally imposed constraints removed. The Committee was convinced that this perception would be strengthened by an intensification of sanctions. Sanctions in the Committee's view remained the most effective peaceful path to the ending of apartheid.

### South Africa's links with the international financial system

14. The Committee noted that the financial sanctions applied by the private sector and governments against South Africa constituted one of the most powerful sources of pressure and that the measures they agreed at Toronto had contributed to an intensification of an intensification of the pressure. Noting that with the expiration of existing debt standstill, substantial debt repayments by South Africa were due during 1990, the Committee reiterated their call to the international financial community to be unremitting in denying rescheduling arrangements which extend beyond one year at a time, as means of intensifying economic pressure. They also affirmed their call to governments and financial institutions to take steps to restrict trade financing.

15. The Committee welcomed efforts by the Secretariat and Commonwealth countries to disseminate the findings of the report on South Africa's Links with the International Financial Community more widely, particularly within international organisations. It undertook to increase efforts to encourage other countries to adopt the measures recommended at the Committee's last meeting to maintain the financial pressure on South Africa, and agreed to further discuss specific targetted activities in this respect at its next meeting in Australia.

16. The Committee considered the terms of the present ban on "all new bank loans to South Africa whether to the public or private sectors" in the light of the recent Bank of Nova Scotia loan to the South African controlled company MINORCO, based in Luxembourg, in its bid to take over the British mining company CONSOLIDATED GOLDFIELDS. The Committee noted that such a loan may escape the strict terms of the present ban as agreed by Commonwealth countries (excluding Britain) in 1986, and agreed to re-examine the formulation of a ban with a view to ensuring that it covers the true intent of the restriction. Meanwhile, members of the Committee agreed that their countries would be guided by the spirit and intent of the ban in their domestic action, and called on other Commonwealth countries to do likewise.

#### The Expert Study on Sanctions

17.. The Committee was encouraged by the interest with which the international community had received the interim Statistics on Trade with South Africa compiled by the Commonwealth Expert Group, released at the conclusion of its meeting in Toronto. It noted that some of the countries which had expanded their economic links with South Africa in recent years had become conscious of the need to curtailed them. While welcoming this development, the Committee emphasised that further action was needed by these countries to bring their policies in line with the steps taken by the Commonwealth and the United States. Recognising that the effectiveness of existing sanctions would increase greatly when adopted universally and applied vigorously, the Committee reaffirmed its decision to continue selected demarches to further this objective.

18. The Committee received the Progress Report on the Experts Study on the Impact and Application of Sanctions. It welcomed the action already taken by member countries to implement the decision arising out of the Experts' interim report presented in Toronto. It noted that the final report will be available for review at the next meeting of the Committee.

#### Arms Embargo

19. The Committee gave particular attention to the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa, mindful that Pretoria's policies of destabilisation in the region highlighted the seriousness of breaches of the embargo. The Committee was assisted by a further report presented to it by the World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa (WCMNC). Based on proposals submitted by Canada, it called for specific measures to be taken by the UN Security Council and the Council's 421 Committee, as well as by member states to secure the more effective implementation of the arms embargo. In so doing, the Committee issued a separate Statement on the Arms Embargo (Annex).

#### Security of the Front-Line States

20. The Committee stressed the continuing threat to the security of the Front-Line States as a result of South Africa's continuing campaign of destabilisation in the region. Mozambique's security remained of special concern. The Committee noted with appreciation that a number of Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries were contributing in various ways to the security of the Front-Line States; but agreed that much remained to be done in pursuance of the security needs set out in the special report by General Olusegun Obasanjo. It asked the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to encourage a broader response from Commonwealth and other countries.

#### Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique

21. The Committee commended the Secretary-General's Report on the first year of operations of the Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique and agreed that the foundation had been laid for a significant and distinctive Commonwealth contribution to Mozambique's economic development and rehabilitation.

22. The Committee, noting that Front-Line States were making major contributions to the security and rehabilitation of Mozambique, emphasised the need for additional Commonwealth-wide contributions if the Fund's activities were to be sustained. It expressed appreciation at the additional pledge of support by Australia, noted the willingness of others to review the level of their contributions, and urged Commonwealth Governments to provide enhanced support so that the Fund's potential could be realised and the Vancouver Heads of Government Meeting mandate discharged in full.

#### Promotion of Trade and Investment in Front-Line and Neighbouring States

23. In recognition of the necessity to strengthen economic independence and further disengagement from the economy of apartheid South Africa the Committee welcomed the draft strategy paper submitted by Canada on trade and investment promotion in the Front-Line and neighbouring states. The means proposed in the strategy to achieve these goals were two-fold: assistance to develop stronger two-way trade between the region and outside markets; and assistance to provide increased private investment in the region. Noting the considerable efforts already under way to advance disengagement from the South African economy, the Committee agreed that, with the assistance of the Commonwealth Secretariat, and in close consultation with SADCC, PTA and the states involved and other members of the Commonwealth, a Commonwealth strategy on trade and investment promotion in Southern Africa should be further developed for consideration at the next meeting of the Committee in Australia.

#### Dialogue

24. Following references in the Okanagan Statement, the Committee welcomed the growing instances of dialogue between South Africans across racial and political lines. In this context the Committee reiterated the call on Pretoria by Heads of Government in Vancouver to accept the "Negotiating Concept" of the EPG which remains as valid today as it was when the Group put it forward.

## Countering South African Propaganda and Censorship

25. The Committee agreed that the need to counteract South African propaganda had never been more urgent. Since their Toronto meeting last August, Pretoria had intensified its campaign of repression against the media in an attempt to deceive the world about what was happening in South Africa. It continued to ban newspapers and journalists working to expose the truth about apartheid as part of its strategy to silence all opposition. Against this background, the Committee expressed its full support for the anti-apartheid media, in particular the "alternative" media which had borne the brunt of the regime's repression. The Committee noted with appreciation that some Commonwealth countries, including Australia, Canada and Nigeria, were already assisting in the training of South African journalists and hoped that other Commonwealth countries in a position to do so would also assist.

26. The Committee expressed satisfaction with the progress achieved by the Commonwealth Working Party on countering South African propaganda and censorship, at its first meeting. It endorsed the Working Party's decision to focus early efforts on activities designed to support individual journalists and the media in South Africa. The Committee urged all member states of the Commonwealth to support the efforts of the Working Party and to elaborate their own action plans to counter South African propaganda and censorship. The Committee applauded those efforts already underway in a number of Commonwealth countries and received reports on actions taken to date by Australia, Canada, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, among others.

### Reaching Into South Africa: Aid to Victims

27. The Committee emphasised the importance of practical and financial assistance to the victims and opponents of apartheid, in particular assistance to trade unions, and legal, humanitarian and education assistance. It recognised the efforts already being made by Commonwealth and other countries, many of which have substantially increased their assistance since the Committee first met, and called for further responses from all countries opposed to apartheid.

28. The Committee remained deeply concerned with the implications of the Disclosure of Foreign Funding Bill currently being enacted in South Africa, with its threat to assistance to the victims and opponents of apartheid. The Committee stressed the importance of countervailing action by the international community.



## Consultations

29. The Committee valued its direct consultations with several leading anti-apartheid personalities from South Africa. Among them were The Rev. Dr. Allan Boesak; also Mr. Mohamed Valli and Mr. Murphy Morobe, respectively Acting General Secretary and Acting Publicity Secretary of the United Democratic Front who had come to Harare at the invitation of the Committee. Mr. Alfred Nzo, the General Secretary of the African National Congress, Mr. Joe Mwanazi, the Administrative Secretary of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, and a delegation from the Commonwealth Trade Union Council, also appeared before the Committee.

## Next Meeting

30. The Committee accepted the offer of the Australian Government that the next meeting of the Committee be held in Canberra in July/August. As that meeting would be the final meeting before the Kuala Lumpur summit, it would provide the opportunity to draw together the work of the Committee in all areas mandated to it in the Okanagan Statement and Programme of Action agreed by Commonwealth Heads of Government in Canada in 1987.

Annex

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS  
ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

STATEMENT ON THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

At Toronto, the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa invited Commonwealth and other Governments to consider prohibiting technology transfer that is designed to enable South Africa to circumvent existing sanctions, particularly in the areas of arms, oil and computers. The intent of the existing UN and Commonwealth arms embargo is not only to deny South Africa a military capability but also to increase the cost of maintaining apartheid. The World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa report makes clear that the most substantial loopholes in the UN arms embargo derive from differing interpretations of the embargo, more specifically, of what exports should be banned.

2. With a view to tightening the mandatory UN arms embargo against South Africa and in order to ensure that there is no misunderstanding about the Commonwealth ban, or the Commonwealth's interpretation of the UN ban, the Committee commends the following clarifications of what exports should be banned as 'arms and related materiel' by way of supplement to the suggestions made in Security Council Resolution 591.

- (i) Arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war, or any articles deemed capable of being converted thereinto or having a strategic or tactical value or nature. Materials, equipment and technologies which are designed or used for the development, production or utilisation of arms, ammunition or implements of war. Materials and equipment incorporating unique technology, the acquisition of which by South Africa may reasonably be expected to give assistance to the development and production of arms, ammunition and implements of war, of their means of utilisation or delivery, or counter-measures to them. Materials, equipment and technologies of which South Africa has a deficiency, and which may be critical to the production of arms, ammunition or implements of war, or their means of delivery or counter-measures to them.

- (ii) "Strategic or tactical nature or value" to be considered to include goods which assist in the maintenance of repression in South Africa: specifically exports of high technology including aircraft, aircraft engines and parts thereto, data processing equipment and software, electronic and telecommunications equipment; and also exports of four wheel drive vehicles.

The Committee calls for the above provisions, in conjunction with those contained in Resolution 591, to be made mandatory by the Security Council.

3. The Committee also urges that:

- (i) a Monitoring Unit be established at the United Nations in order to assist the UN 421 Committee. The Unit would, inter alia, investigate alleged breaches and publish its findings regularly.

- (ii) measures be considered for preventing foreign technology and expertise from assisting the internal armaments industry of South Africa; and for subsidiaries in South Africa of overseas companies being prohibited from manufacturing or supplying any items having a strategic or tactical value which would enhance the capability of the military and security forces; and

- (iii) the provision in the Resolution 418 (1977) (mandatory arms embargo) relating to licences be strictly applied with a view to all licences being terminated.

4. The Committee further calls for a mandatory embargo on the import of South African arms and military goods to complement the embargo on the export of arms and, in particular, for the Security Council to make its resolution 558 on the import of arms mandatory.

5. The Committee encourages all Commonwealth members to provide the Secretary-General with details about how they have implemented the UN arms embargo as well as the further measures to strengthen that embargo which have been adopted by the Commonwealth.





# Commonwealth News Release

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Second Meeting: Toronto, 2-3 August 1988

## Members of the Committee

The Rt. Hon. Joe Clark (Canada) - Chairman; The Hon. Bill Hayden (Australia); The Hon. Rashleigh E. Jackson (Guyana); The Hon. P.V. Narasimha Rao (India); The Hon. Major-General Ike Nwachukwu (Nigeria); The Hon. Benjamin Mkapa (Tanzania); The Hon. Luke J. Mwananshiku (Zambia); The Hon. Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira (Zimbabwe).

## CONCLUDING STATEMENT

The Committee's second meeting was devoted to substantive consideration of the main areas of its mandate from Commonwealth Heads of Government under the Okanagan Statement and Programme of Action. As agreed at Lusaka, it gave special additional consideration to counteracting South African propaganda and censorship. In the context of the on-going nature of its task and the fact that some aspects of its work remained of a non-public character, the Committee's conclusions in Toronto included the following:

### 1. South African Propaganda and Censorship

Recalling the high priority attached by Heads of Government in Vancouver to counteracting South African propaganda and censorship, the Committee reaffirmed the belief that the Commonwealth must confront the fact that news reporting about the reality of South Africa and the apartheid system is being distorted by the press censorship and media restrictions. Furthermore, governments whose countries are the targets of official South African propaganda are seeing the effects of such disinformation campaigns.

The Committee's deliberations were greatly assisted by a paper from the Government of Canada on 'a Commonwealth Strategy for counteracting South African Propaganda and Censorship', and by the proceedings of a Public Forum on the subject organised by the Government of Canada in conjunction with the meeting.

The Committee welcomed the Canadian initiative and agreed that the proposals made in the paper, and in their discussions on it provided a basis for developing a practical Commonwealth response to the challenges posed by South African propaganda and censorship.

Several Ministers indicated the intention of their governments to proceed with implementation of specific proposals. In the meantime, the Committee invited the Secretary-General to establish a working party drawn from Commonwealth countries, not necessarily confined to members of the Committee, with a view to reviewing national action plans and elaborating an overall Commonwealth programme for counteracting South African Propaganda and Censorship. Meanwhile, the Committee agreed that publication of the Canadian paper would assist on-going consultations.

## 2. Sanctions

The Committee had before it two Reports prepared pursuant to its decisions at Lusaka.

### (a) Impact of Sanctions

The first was an Interim Report on the Evaluation of the Application and Impact of Sanctions against South Africa prepared by an Expert Study Group pursuant to Terms of Reference agreed by the Committee at Lusaka with a view to widening, tightening and intensifying economic and other sanctions. The Committee noted the conclusions of the Interim Report that trade sanctions are having a discernible impact on South Africa, that its economy is coming under pressure and that the impact of sanctions will be enhanced if the sanctions themselves are more widely adopted and their application intensified and tightened. Within this context, the Committee agreed on an action plan of individual and concerted demarches on countries which have so far not adopted Commonwealth measures, or whose trade practices in relation to South Africa are tending to diminish the impact of Commonwealth sanctions.

With a view to intensifying and tightening the application of sanctions already agreed, the Committee invited Commonwealth and other Governments to consider adopting the following measures as recommended in the Interim Report:

- (a) to press other countries to adopt the Commonwealth trade bans priority attention being given to coal;

- (b) to implement procedures for stricter customs scrutiny and give higher priority for investigating sanctions violations;
- (c) to provide, where necessary by legislation, for heavier penalties for those violating sanctions, including publicising of violations and the consequent penalties;
- (d) to prohibit technology transfer that is designed to enable South Africa to circumvent existing sanctions, particularly in the areas of arms, oil and computers;
- (e) to clarify the definition of agricultural products in order to reinforce the scope of the ban of agricultural products from South Africa;
- (f) to undertake to increase publicity and information about companies which continue to trade with South Africa, in violation of agreed sanctions; and
- (g) to permit orderly actions of local authorities, private sector groups and individuals in demonstrating their abhorrence of apartheid;

Additionally, the Committee asked the Secretary-General to publish the statistical tables on South Africa's trade prepared by the Expert Study Group. The Committee looked forward to the early submission of the experts final report in the New Year.

(b) Financial Links

The second Report was that prepared on behalf of the Committee by officials of the Governments of Australia, Canada, and India on South Africa's relationship with the international financial system with a view to exploring the possibilities of effective action against South Africa in this area. The Committee's conclusions on this Report are set out in the Annex to this Statement which was separately released by the Committee during its Meeting. The Committee agreed that in the light of its conclusions it would be desirable to make the Report available to all Commonwealth Governments and to the wider international community.

(c) Propaganda Against Sanctions

The Committee recognised that Pretoria's fear of sanctions was leading to a concerted campaign supported by massive financial resources to convince Western countries that black South Africans were opposed to sanctions. The Committee recognised that this was itself an admission by Pretoria of the effectiveness of sanctions. Its deliberations also confirmed throughout the Committee's view that black South Africans continued to look principally to sanctions as the international community's most necessary form of pressure on Pretoria for peaceful change. The Committee, therefore, believed it to be a paramount need to counteract South African propaganda that sanctions are opposed by blacks because it hurts them. In this regard, it agreed that it was specially important for the authentic voices of black South Africans, particularly of black trade unionists, to reach the outside world.

(d) The Arms Embargo

The Committee welcomed the report on the UN arms embargo submitted by the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa. It called on members of the UN Security Council 421 Committee to take active steps towards fulfilment of its mandate, and agreed to assist the Committee in strengthening the monitoring of the arms embargo. The Committee agreed with the need to continue to review national implementation of the embargo as a matter of priority. The Committee noted that the Commonwealth had already gone beyond the UN Resolutions dealing with the embargo on the export of computer components to the military, police and security forces, nuclear supplies and all military co-operation with South Africa. It agreed to raise particular issues of concern, as required, with other countries. When Governments have had an opportunity to review the report they will address specific recommendations at the next CFM meeting. Further the Committee will ask other Commonwealth countries to provide up-to-date information on the measures they have taken individually to implement the UN arms embargo.



3.

### Security Needs of the Front-Line States

The Committee gave consideration to the special Report prepared by General Olusegun Obasanjo on the Security Needs of the Front-Line States. General Obasanjo's mission was undertaken subsequent to the Committee's meeting in Lusaka on the basis of the recognition by Commonwealth Heads of Government at Vancouver that if the development of the Southern African region is to be effective the international community must also address the security needs of the Front-Line States. The Committee had the benefit of discussing the Report with General Obasanjo.

On the basis of its consideration of the Report, the Committee stressed the continuing threat which apartheid posed to the security and development of the Front-Line States and emphasised the need for Commonwealth and wider international support for these countries. It recognised the special importance of Mozambique in any initiative to enhance regional security, especially in the area of transport and communication, and called upon Commonwealth and other governments to contribute appropriately to the protection of Mozambique's communications network.

Recognising the commitment of all Commonwealth countries at Vancouver to the cause of enhancing the security of the Front-Line States, the Committee welcomed the consideration of the Report by Commonwealth Governments generally. The Committee underlined the need for an urgent practical response to the Report's recommendations - responses that need not be confined to member countries of the Commonwealth. The Committee also welcomed co-ordination by the Secretary-General of a response by Commonwealth Governments to the recommendations of the Obasanjo Report.

4.

### Namibia

Welcoming the consultations currently in train involving the Governments of Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States of America, Ministers underscored the commitment of their Governments to, and support for, Namibian independence on the basis of Security Council Resolution 435.

5. The Situation in Southern Africa

The Committee deplored the continued deterioration of the situation within South Africa and its implications for the region as a whole. A critical aspect of the most recent deterioration was the clear message from Pretoria that it would not tolerate even peaceful opposition to apartheid from any quarter within South Africa. Given the ever-increasing scale of repression under the State of Emergency in South Africa and the persistence of South African aggression against neighbouring countries, the Committee recognised that it was essential for the international community as a whole to pursue the most urgent action by way of effective international sanctions and all other appropriate means to bring the apartheid system to an end and to secure the establishment of a free, non-racial society in South Africa. Ministers renewed the commitments of their Governments to assist this process in all practicable ways.

6. Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique

The Committee welcomed the Secretary-General's Report that the Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique was fully operational and providing technical assistance to Mozambique's economic rehabilitation programme. Noting that Mozambique has expressed its deep appreciation for the Commonwealth's response to its needs, the Committee called for further financial support to ensure that the Fund will be able to continue its operations for a second year.

7. Reaching Into South Africa: Aid to Victims

The Committee emphasised the importance of practical and financial assistance to the victims and opponents of apartheid, both those who remain within South Africa and those who are in exile. Assistance to trade unions, and legal, humanitarian and education assistance were emphasised. Ministers endorsed the possibility of creating a Commonwealth-wide programme and network of non-governmental organisations to conduct advanced education and training of black South Africans.

8. 'Sharpeville Six'

The Committee recalled its appeal at Lusaka for the lives of the 'Sharpeville Six'. It reiterated this

appeal at Toronto and urged that, whatever the outcome of the legal process, their lives should be spared. Ministers called on Pretoria to remit as well current sentences on other prisoners facing execution for their opposition to apartheid.

9. **Consultations**

The Committee consulted directly with prominent opponents of apartheid from within South Africa invited to bear witness to the conditions within South Africa and more specifically the problems posed by South African propaganda and censorship.

10. **Cultural Festival**

Ministers were pleased to participate in the Cultural Festival organised in Toronto to express the hope of all to rekindle the light of freedom in South Africa.

11. **Further Action**

The Committee agreed that its next meeting would be held in Harare in January/February 1989. Meanwhile, work would continue towards the completion by the Expert Study Group of the Report on the evaluation of the application and impact of sanctions against South Africa.

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COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

STATEMENT ON  
SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE  
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM

At its first meeting in Lusaka the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers agreed on the terms of reference for a study on South Africa's relationship with the international financial system with a view to exploring the possibilities of effective action against South Africa in this area. Ministers have now considered the study prepared by officials from Australia, Canada and India and agreed a number of measures designed to increase financial pressure on South Africa and to invite Commonwealth and other governments to consider their adoption and implementation.

The South African economy cannot grow fast enough to prevent unemployment from rising further without strong import growth and a collapse of the current account surpluses necessary to repay foreign debt. It cannot gain sufficient new sources of foreign exchange to break out of this trap because:

- . foreign banks are uninterested in new lending;
- . foreign trade credits provide only a short-term and one-off increase in foreign borrowing;
- . many capital-exporting economies have banned new investment in South Africa;
- . potential foreign investors are discouraged by the political uncertainties caused by apartheid, the associated poor economic outlook, and the economic uncertainties arising from disinvestment pressures and trade and financial sanctions;

- . its key export - gold - faces increasing global supplies and uncertain price prospects; and
- . it has limited opportunities to increase non-gold exports.

This study has arrived at a number of broad conclusions about financial sanctions:

- . the refusal of banks to lend to South Africa has been the most significant sanction in restricting economic growth through forcing large capital account deficits to repay maturing loans, and requiring corresponding current account surpluses;
- . trade sanctions and disinvestment pressures have played a supporting role, making it more difficult for South Africa to maintain the required current account surplus, and discouraging potential new foreign investment;
- . an important consequence of disinvestment has been its contribution to the poor outlook for new direct investment in South Africa;
- . South Africa cannot gain any external account relief from its relations with the Bank for International Settlements or the International Monetary Fund, because the Fund's Board is unlikely to approve a programme for South Africa and the BIS would only lend to bridge to an IMF programme; and, finally

- . The maintenance and extension of financial sanctions would hobble South African economic growth and maintain the economic pressure on the South African Government to abandon apartheid.

### Ministerial Decisions

- (a) Increased Restrictions on New Lending and New Investment

At present, all Commonwealth countries except the UK have imposed a ban (either voluntary or mandatory) on new lending, other than short-term trade credits, and on new investments. This could be extended to include new trade credits. A global ban on trade credits would have a very serious effect on South Africa's external accounts.

Ministers have agreed to ask financial institutions operating in their countries to ensure that there is no expansion in trade financing. South Africa should know that this source of funding can no longer be tapped as a balance of payments cushion.

- (b) Provisioning Requirements

Ministers have agreed to ask national bank regulatory authorities to ensure that their loan loss provisioning requirements are rigorously applied with respect to South African risk. Ministers expect that South African country risk will be treated no more favourably than that of heavily indebted countries.

(c) Existing Loans

Banks whose loans are subject to the South African moratorium and interim rescheduling have no option but to retain their exposure in South Africa or to sell it at a discount to other banks. However, the type of rescheduling accepted by the bank can have a significant effect on the constraints faced by economic policy-makers in South Africa. Ministers agreed to ask banks in their countries to press for rescheduling arrangements which do not extend beyond one year at a time.

(d) Ban on Official Export Credit Insurance

Ministers agreed to press for an international ban on insurance cover by official export credit agencies for loans to South Africa.

(e) Internationalisation of Lending Restrictions

The financial pressures on South Africa would be very much greater if more countries followed the Commonwealth's lead in restricting new lending to South Africa. The Commonwealth has already asked others to adopt its approach with some success to date. These efforts will be further intensified through bilateral contacts and in international fora.

Anti-apartheid and other non-governmental organisations can bring pressure to bear on institutions with which they deal. They are becoming more active in several countries. These groups could learn much from the success of established groups in other countries. Ministers agreed to facilitate the flow of such information.

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COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

First Meeting: Lusaka, 1-2 February 1988

Members of the Committee

The Right Honourable Joe Clark (Canada) - Chairman;  
The Honourable Bill Hayden (Australia);  
The Honourable Rashleigh E. Jackson (Guyana);  
The Honourable K. Natwar Singh (India);  
The Honourable Major-General Ike Nwachukwu (Nigeria);  
The Honourable Benjamin Mkapa (Tanzania);  
The Honourable Luke J. Mwansashiku (Zambia); and  
The Honourable Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira (Zimbabwe).

**CONCLUDING STATEMENT**

The Committee's first meeting was devoted to an initial consideration of the main areas of its mandate from Commonwealth Heads of Government under the Okanagan Statement and Programme of Action.

The Committee recognised at the outset that its task was of an ongoing nature and that some aspects of its work would be of a non-public character.

Its conclusions in Lusaka included the following:

(i) Sanctions

To widen, tighten and intensify economic and other sanctions against South Africa, the Committee has set in train an examination of the application of sanctions, involving their evaluation on a continuing basis, an assessment of their impact and an identification of efforts to frustrate them. It will take account of economic, political and other relevant considerations.

The Committee also agreed on the terms of reference of the expert study identified by Heads of Government in Vancouver on South Africa's relationship with the international financial system with a view to exploring the possibilities of effective action against South Africa in this area. Australia will continue to play a leading role in the preparation of this study. In this context, the Committee issued an urgent call on the international banks concerned not to participate in rescheduling exercises but to maintain maximum pressure on South Africa for early repayment of all due amounts.

The Committee took note of recent indications of significant changes in South Africa's terms of trade and trading patterns. It will undertake a thorough examination of these trade questions. It will also separately develop ways of promoting trade and investment in the Front-Line and neighbouring states as a means to increase their economic independence of South Africa.

While the programme of agreed studies is proceeding, the Committee will pursue all appropriate action for mobilising international support for sanctions with a view to securing a more concerted application of a global sanctions programme.

The Committee paid special attention to the existing mandatory arms embargo and recognised the need for specific action at both the national and international levels to secure their more effective enforcement of the embargo. The Committee will devote particular attention to this matter and pursue it as an issue of urgency.

(ii) South Africa and its neighbours

The Committee gave particular attention to the enlarging needs of the Front-Line States deriving from South Africa's policies of destabilization in the region. They paid particular attention to the effect of these policies on Mozambique and to current South African aggression in Angola. They welcomed the increased assistance to the region's development by the Africa Fund as agreed at the recent SADCC Ministerial Meeting in Arusha but recognised, as Heads of Government had done in Vancouver, that if the region's development is to be effective the international community must also address the security needs of the Front-Line States. They examined ways in which this might be achieved on an urgent and effective basis and set in hand a process of consultation with the governments concerned towards this end.

The Committee welcomed the progress that had been made for the establishment of the Commonwealth Special Fund for Technical Assistance to Mozambique.

(iii) Reaching into South Africa

The Committee held preliminary discussions with representatives of the South African Council of Churches, the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) and the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

In the context of the intensification of repression in South Africa under the State of Emergency, the Committee recognized the importance of maximum exposure of the realities in the country and the need for effective responses to the draconian censorship that has been imposed. It began the exploration of ways in which the truth of what is happening in South Africa can be conveyed to the international community. Within the next few months, Canada will propose to the Committee a detailed strategy to combat South Africa's censorship and propaganda.

As part of the world-wide efforts to promote actions against apartheid, the Committee welcomed the decision to convene a Conference of World Parliamentarians later this year, as conveyed by the Chairman of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid.

On 1 February the Committee conveyed to the South African Foreign Minister its deep concern at the recent confirmation of death sentences on the 'Sharpeville Six'. The Committee expressed the hope that even at this late hour the Government of South Africa would heed their humanitarian appeal.

(iv) Namibia

The Committee reaffirmed its strong support for Namibian independence as called for in Security Council Resolution 435. It rejected once again linkage between Namibia and the developments in Angola. The Committee agreed to increase its efforts to bring the plight of the Namibian people and South African aggression to the attention of the international community.

(v) Further Action

The Committee considered a possible programme of meetings up to the next Meetings of Heads of Government in Kuala Lumpur in 1989. It recognised however that its work may be pursued in a variety of ways including contacts with other governments and facilitating opportunities for focusing world attention on apartheid.

In between meetings, continuity in the work of the Committee will be maintained through liaison in London by a Committee of eight High Commissioners under the chairmanship of Canada's High Commissioner, Mr. Roy McMurtry, in close consultation with the Secretariat.

The Committee agreed that its next formal meeting will be held in Canada in July 1988.

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A STUDY ARISING  
FROM THE OKANAGAN STATEMENT (PARAGRAPHS 7-11)

**Introduction**

With the exception of Britain, Commonwealth Heads of Government at their Vancouver meeting agreed that economic and other sanctions have had a significant impact on South Africa and that their wider, tighter and more intensified application must remain a part of the international community's response to apartheid. In this context, they agreed to evaluate on a continuous basis the application of sanctions in order to assess their impact; and also committed themselves to continuing efforts to secure a more concerted application of a global sanctions programme.

2. In order to assist in the fulfilment of the above decisions of the Heads of Government, the study will review the scope of the existing sanctions by the Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth governments, voluntary bodies and private sector, examine their implementation and evaluate their impact not only in economic terms but also in terms of the morale of the Pretoria regime and the political processes in South Africa.

3. The study will also identify efforts to frustrate sanctions and the manner and the extent to which the impact of sanctions is weakened as a result. In examining what action can be taken to strengthen the impact of sanctions, it will consider the scope for further concerted efforts by the Commonwealth and the wider world.

**Possible Outline of Study**

4. The areas of enquiry for the study may be set out as follows:

**A. Review of Current Sanctions**

Scope and legal status of sanctions adopted by country or group of countries, by major category of sanctions; the status of various United Nations measures (mandatory or non-mandatory) and their implementation; measures by voluntary groups and the private sector; dates of adoption and implementation; monitoring mechanisms and provisions of penalties against offenders.

**B. Efforts to Frustrate Sanctions**

Efforts by South Africa to frustrate sanctions by category of measures; the role of governments, organisations and groups outside South Africa in frustrating sanctions; South Africa's policies towards its neighbours in frustrating sanctions.

**C. Strengthening Existing Measures**

Scope for making existing measures more effective through a wider, tighter and more intensified application:

(i) Economic Impact of Sanctions

Impact on credit and investment flows to South Africa; on the cost and supply of oil; on exports and imports in terms of volume and unit values. Economy wide impact in terms of capital formation; access to technology; employment and growth of GDP; and on the confidence of the business community.

(ii) Impact on Military Capability

Impact on access to security/military related technology and on the availability of armaments; on the military capability of South Africa.

(iii) Political Impact

Impact on the Pretoria regime and its willingness to negotiate, on the political perceptions of the business community and on the White electorate in general. Impact in terms of South Africa's isolation in the international community and its ability to conduct external relations.

**D. Areas of Vulnerability**

Areas, economic or otherwise, in which South Africa is particularly vulnerable to sanctions. Measures that will have a significant impact when applied (a) concertedly or (b) bilaterally. A prioritisation of possible measures

**E. Possible Further Action**

Possible further action given South Africa's vulnerability in particular areas.

**Time-Frame and Modalities**

5. An initial study concluded within a period of, say, not more than six months could be followed up by updating and extending the enquiry to further areas, as the situation evolves, at periodic intervals. The Secretary-General in consultation with the Chairman will arrange for the study to be undertaken in a manner that would inter alia permit the issue of interim reports or segments of the Study to members of the Committee from time to time.

Commonwealth Secretariat  
Mulungushi Conference Hall  
Lusaka

2 February 1988

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AHG/Decl.4 (XXVII)

ABUJA DECLARATION ON SOUTH AFRICA

Adopted at the OAU Twenty-seventh Assembly of Heads of State and Government : Abuja, Nigeria : June 3 - 5, 1991.

1.0. From its foundation, the OAU, acting in support of the People of South Africa, led by their National Liberation Movements, had been engaged in the struggle to end the apartheid crime against humanity.

2.0. As long as apartheid persists, it continues to be a grave affront to all peoples, in particular those of Africa and the black diaspora, who have been victims of slavery, colonialism and racialism.

3.0. It has taken the lives of many people both in South Africa and other countries of Southern Africa, destroyed means of livelihood for millions, dehumanised and degraded entire peoples.

4.0. Because of all this and more, it has posed a challenge to all people of conscience to act in a manner consistent with love of freedom and understanding of the import of the principle that all persons are born equal.

5.0. As we meet in Abuja, we are inspired with renewed confidence that, as a result of struggles that have been waged by the people of South Africa, Africa and the rest of the world, the scourge of apartheid will soon be a thing of the past.

6.0. This outcome, for which millions of people on our continent and the rest of the world have striven, will make a decisive contribution to the universal effort to end racial

oppression and prejudice, wherever they may occur, and to assert the dignity of every human being, regardless of colour, race or gender.

7.0. Coming at this time in the history of Africa, the liquidation of the system of Apartheid will be an important signal of the commitment of our continent to its renewal as a zone of freedom, respect for human and people's rights, justice, prosperity, peace and stability.

8.0. As part of that commitment, we reiterate our long-held preference for the transformation of South Africa into a united democratic and non-racial country by peaceful means.

9.0. We reaffirm our conviction that implementation of the provisions contained in the Harare Declaration and UN General Assembly Declarations on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa adopted at its Sixteenth Special Session in December 1989 would lead to such a peaceful resolution of the South African question.

10.0. The people of South Africa have an urgent need to live together in conditions of justice, peace, prosperity and friendship among themselves. We believe that to achieve this, the steps visualized in these Declarations should be carried out expeditiously.

11.0. The very success of the future process of reconstruction required that South Africa proceeds as quickly as possible, to transform itself into a non-racial democracy.

12.0. This is also imperative for the future of all the countries of the region of Southern Africa to enable them to cooperate among themselves as equals for the upliftment of all their peoples.



13.0. We are also convinced that a liberated South Africa will make an important contribution to the critical efforts of the peoples of Africa to create a political and social order which will guarantee all the peoples of our continent human rights, peace, security, stability and development.

14.0. For all these reasons, it is vital that we, the peoples of Africa, continue to wage a united struggle against apartheid and persist in our support for the South African Liberation Movements until the abhorrent system of racist, white minority domination is totally abolished.

15.0. Accordingly, we reaffirm our support for the constitutional principles contained in the Harare and UN Declarations which provide the basis for the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial democracy and would, once implemented, make for an internationally acceptable solution of the South Africa question.

16.0. We urge the people of South Africa and all their political parties and organizations themselves to accept these principles. Abandoning all notions of racial and ethnic fragmentation of the population, so as to establish the conditions for speedy movement forward towards the adoption of a democratic constitution.

17.0. To create the climate conducive to negotiations, we call on the South African Government to implement all the reconditions stipulated in the Harare and United Nations Consensus Declarations on South Africa and the agreements it has entered into under the Groota Schuur and Pretoria Minutes and desist from any further resort to delaying tactics.

18.0. We are also gravely concerned at the current organised and orchestrated violence which has already claimed the lives of too many black people. This violence has itself emerged as a major obstacle to the process of negotiations.

19.0. We demand that the South African Government act immediately to end this violence and enter into firm public commitments to do everything in its power to protect the lives and property of all the people of South Africa.

20.0. We also urge all political and other public organisations to stop fratricidal conflict which could delay the process towards the elimination of apartheid; to agree to and abide by a code of conduct aimed at ending all violence among their members and supporters.

21.0. We wish to impress on the South African Liberation Movements the strategic importance of the unity of all anti-apartheid forces in the continuing struggle to liberate their country. We commend the decisions and steps that have been taken in this regard and urge them to pursue this objective with all necessary vigour. On our part we stand ready to assist the democratic forces of South Africa to achieve this unity.

22.0. We acknowledge that there have been some positive developments in South Africa. Accordingly, we encourage the South African Government to pursue its efforts and to take further measures to accelerate the process for the elimination apartheid. However, the preconditions set out in the Harare and United Nations Consensus Declarations and the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes have not been fully met. In these circumstances all sanctions must remain in place. We further reaffirm the decisive importance of sanctions in moving South Africa forward towards a non-racial democracy and are convinced that it will be necessary to continue to use this form of pressure until the system of apartheid has been ended.

23.0. Bearing in mind the positive developments made so far inside South Africa and the general international reaction thereto, we mandate the current Chairman of the OAU, in consultation with the Frontline States and the National Liberation Movements, and within the framework of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government on Southern Africa to continue to monitor and review the situation in South Africa, taking into account concrete steps undertaken by South Africa to remove all obstacles to genuine negotiations as stipulated in the Harare and the UN Consensus Declarations, as well as putting an immediate end to the on-going violence.

24.0. Should the South African Government adopt measures which lead to positive, profound and irreversible change towards the abolition of apartheid, we commit ourselves to review the question of sanctions with a view to re-admitting South Africa into the international community.

25.0. We reiterate our support for the South African Liberation Movements and other democratic forces that have been in the forefront of struggle to abolish the system of apartheid.

26.0. Accordingly, we therefore commit ourselves to continue to provide these fighters against apartheid, for a democratic South Africa with the necessary financial and material assistance to enable them to carry out their historic mission of liberating their country.

27.0. Let all the peoples of the world reaffirm their resolve to act in concert to assist the people of South Africa to regain their liberty without further delay. Let all our actions be guided by this noble objective, knowing that our own freedom

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will remain circumscribed as long as the people of South Africa are not free and knowing that our own actions can make a decisive contribution to the speed with which the final liquidation of the system of white minority rule on our continent is achieved. Let all of us walk the last mile together and together arrive at the common destination of the liquidation of the system of apartheid and the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial democracy.

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General Assembly

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2 February 1990

Sixteenth special session  
Agenda item 7

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the  
Sixteenth Special Session (A/S-16/4)]

S-16/1. Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences  
in Southern Africa

The General Assembly

Adopts the Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in  
Southern Africa, annexed to the present resolution.

6th plenary meeting  
14 December 1989

ANNEX

Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in  
Southern Africa

We, the States Members of the United Nations,

Assembled at the sixteenth special session of the General Assembly, a special  
session on apartheid and its destructive consequences in southern Africa, guided by  
the fundamental and universal principles enshrined in the Charter of the United  
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1/ in the context of our  
efforts to establish peace throughout the world by ending all conflicts through

1/ Resolution 217 A (III).

negotiations, and desirous of making serious efforts to bring an end to the unacceptable situation prevailing in southern Africa, which is a result of the policies and practices of apartheid, through negotiations based on the principle of justice and peace for all:

Dec 31 1977

Reaffirming our conviction, which history confirms, that where colonial and racial domination or apartheid exist, there can be neither peace nor justice,

Reiterating, accordingly, that while the apartheid system in South Africa persists, the peoples of Africa as a whole cannot achieve the fundamental objectives of justice, human dignity and peace which are both crucial in themselves and fundamental to the stability and development of the continent,

Recognizing that, with regard to southern Africa, the entire world is vitally interested that the processes in which that region is involved, leading to the genuine national independence of Namibia and peace in Angola and Mozambique, should succeed in the shortest possible time, and equally recognizing that the world is deeply concerned that destabilization by South Africa of the countries of the region, whether through direct aggression, sponsorship of surrogates, economic subversion or other means, is unacceptable in all its forms and must not occur,

Also recognizing the reality that permanent peace and stability in southern Africa can only be achieved when the system of apartheid in South Africa has been eradicated and South Africa has been transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial country, and therefore reiterating that all the necessary measures should be adopted now to bring a speedy end to the apartheid system in the interest of all the people of southern Africa, the continent and the world at large,

Believing that, as a result of the legitimate struggle of the South African people for the elimination of apartheid, and of international pressure against that system, as well as global efforts to resolve regional conflicts, possibilities exist for further movement towards the resolution of the problems facing the people of South Africa,

Reaffirming the right of all peoples, including the people of South Africa, to determine their own destiny and to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live and work together to build a harmonious society, and remaining committed to doing everything possible and necessary to assist the people of South Africa, in such ways as they may, through their genuine representatives, determine to achieve this objective,

Making these commitments because we believe that all people are equal and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, sex or creed, that all men and women have the right and duty to participate in their own government, as equal members of society, and that no individual or group of individuals has any right to govern others without their democratic consent, and reiterating that the apartheid system violates all these fundamental and universal principles,

Affirming that apartheid, characterized as a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind, is responsible for the death of countless numbers of people in South Africa, has sought to dehumanize entire peoples and has imposed a brutal war on the region of southern Africa, which has resulted in untold loss of life, destruction of property and massive displacement of innocent men, women and children and which is a scourge and affront to humanity that must be fought and eradicated in its totality,

Therefore we support and continue to support all those in South Africa who pursue this noble objective. We believe this to be our duty, carried out in the interest of all humanity,

While extending this support to those who strive for a non-racial and democratic society in South Africa, a point on which no compromise is possible, we have repeatedly expressed our objective of a solution arrived at by peaceful means; we note that the people of South Africa, and their liberation movements who felt compelled to take up arms, have also upheld their preference for this position for many decades and continue to do so,

Welcoming the Declaration of the Ad-Hoc Committee of the Organization of African Unity on Southern Africa on the question of South Africa, adopted at Harare on 21 August 1989, 2/ and subsequently endorsed by the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at their Ninth Conference, held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, 3/ as a reaffirmation of readiness to resolve the problems of South Africa through negotiations. The Declaration is consistent with the positions contained in the Lusaka Manifesto 4/ of two decades ago, in particular regarding the preference of the African people for peaceful change, and takes into account the changes that have taken place in southern Africa since then. The Declaration constitutes a new challenge to the Pretoria régime to join in the noble efforts to end the apartheid system, an objective to which the United Nations has always been committed,

Noting with appreciation that the Commonwealth Heads of Government, at their meeting held at Kuala Lumpur from 18 to 24 October 1989, noted with satisfaction the strong preference for the path of negotiated and peaceful settlement inherent in the Declaration adopted at Harare on 21 August 1989, and considered what further steps they might take to advance the prospects for negotiations, 5/

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2/ A/44/697, annex.

3/ See A/44/551-S/20870, annex.

4/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

5/ See A/44/672-S/20914.



Also noting with appreciation that the Third Francophone Conference of Heads of State and Government, held at Dakar from 24 to 26 May 1989, likewise called for negotiations between Pretoria and representatives of the majority of the people with a view to the establishment of a democratic and egalitarian system in South Africa,

Consequently, we shall continue to do everything in our power to increase support for the legitimate struggle of the South African people, including maintaining international pressure against the system of apartheid until that system is ended and South Africa is transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial country, with justice and security for all its citizens,

In keeping with this solemn resolve, and responding directly to the wishes of the majority of the people of South Africa, we publicly pledge ourselves to the positions contained hereunder, convinced that their implementation will lead to a speedy end of the apartheid system and heralding the dawn of a new era of peace for all the peoples of Africa, in a continent finally free from racism, white minority rule and colonial domination,

Declare as follows:

1. A conjuncture of circumstances exists, which, if there is a demonstrable readiness on the part of the South African régime to engage in negotiations genuinely and seriously, given the repeated expression of the majority of the people of South Africa of their long-standing preference to arrive at a political settlement, could create the possibility to end apartheid through negotiations.
2. We would therefore encourage the people of South Africa, as part of their legitimate struggle, to join together to negotiate an end to the apartheid system and agree on all the measures that are necessary to transform their country into a non-racial democracy. We support the position held by the majority of the people of South Africa that these objectives, and not the amendment or reform of the apartheid system, should be the goals of the negotiations.
3. We are at one with the people of South Africa that the outcome of such a process should be a new constitutional order determined by them and based on the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore hold the following fundamental principles to be of importance:
  - (a) South Africa shall become a united, non-racial and democratic State;
  - (b) All its people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and nationality, regardless of race, colour, sex or creed;
  - (c) All its people shall have the right to participate in the government and administration of the country on the basis of universal, equal suffrage, under a non-racial voters' roll, and by secret ballot, in a united and non-fragmented South Africa;

(d) All shall have the right to form and join any political party of their choice, provided that this is not in furtherance of racism;

(e) All shall enjoy universally recognized human rights, freedoms and civil liberties, protected under an entrenched bill of rights;

(f) South Africa shall have a legal system that will guarantee equality of all before the law;

(g) South Africa shall have an independent and non-racial judiciary;

(h) There shall be created an economic order that will promote and advance the well-being of all South Africans;

(i) A democratic South Africa shall respect the rights, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and pursue a policy of peace, friendship and mutually beneficial co-operation with all peoples.

4. We believe that acceptance of these fundamental principles could constitute the basis for an internationally acceptable solution that will enable South Africa to take its rightful place as an equal partner among the world community of nations.

#### A. Climate for negotiations

5. We believe that it is essential that the necessary climate be created for negotiations. There is an urgent need to respond positively to this universally acclaimed demand and thus create this climate.

6. Accordingly, the present South African régime should, at the least:

(a) Release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from imposing any restrictions on them;

(b) Lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organizations and persons;

(c) Remove all troops from the townships;

(d) End the state of emergency and repeal all legislation, such as the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity;

(e) Cease all political trials and political executions.

7. These measures would help create the necessary climate in which free political discussion can take place - an essential condition to ensure that the people themselves participate in the process of remaking their country.

B. Guidelines to the process of negotiations

8. We are of the view that the parties concerned should, in the context of the necessary climate, negotiate the future of their country and its people in good faith and in an atmosphere which, by mutual agreement between the liberation movements and the South African régime, would be free of violence. The process could commence along the following guidelines:

(a) Agreement on the mechanism for the drawing up of a new constitution, based on, among others, the principles enunciated above, and the basis for its adoption;

(b) Agreement on the role to be played by the international community in ensuring a successful transition to a democratic order;

(c) Agreed transitional arrangements and modalities for the process of the drawing up and adoption of a new constitution, and for the transition to a democratic order, including the holding of elections.

C. Programme of action

9. In pursuance of the objectives stated in this Declaration, we hereby decide:

(a) To remain seized of the issue of a political resolution of the South African question;

(b) To step up all-round support for the opponents of apartheid and to campaign internationally in pursuance of this objective;

(c) To use concerted and effective measures, including the full observance by all countries of the mandatory arms embargo, aimed at applying pressure to ensure a speedy end to apartheid;

(d) To ensure that the international community does not relax existing measures aimed at encouraging the South African régime to eradicate apartheid until there is clear evidence of profound and irreversible changes, bearing in mind the objectives of this Declaration;

(e) To render all possible assistance to the front-line and neighbouring States to enable them: to rebuild their economies, which have been adversely affected by South Africa's acts of aggression and destabilization; to withstand any further such acts; and to continue to support the peoples of Namibia and South Africa;

(f) To extend such assistance to the Governments of Angola and Mozambique as they may request in order to secure peace for their peoples, and to encourage and support peace initiatives undertaken by the Governments of Angola and Mozambique aimed at bringing about peace and normalization of life in their countries;

(g) The new South Africa shall, upon adoption of the new constitution, participate fully in relevant organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations.

10. We request the Secretary-General to transmit copies of the present Declaration to the South African Government and the representatives of the oppressed people of South Africa and also request the Secretary-General to prepare a report and submit it to the General Assembly by 1 July 1990 on the progress made in the implementation of the present Declaration.

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PRESS RELEASE  
ON  
THE RECOGNITION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NOC

I Summary of events relating to the matter

- In 1970, the South African Olympic Committee was excluded from the Olympic Movement by the IOC because, in the practice of sport, the said NOC applied the laws of apartheid, thereby violating the Olympic Charter.

- The IOC subsequently chose to give its decision a strong impact in the world of sport, and such decision was largely followed by the various sports bodies.

- In 1988, the IOC's position was firmly reasserted on the occasion of an "African sports summit", following which the "Lausanne Declaration" on apartheid in sport was adopted and an "Apartheid and Olympism" Commission set up with the mandate of gathering facts and informing the various bodies of the IOC with a view to reinforcing the anti-apartheid policy in sport.

- In 1989, following on the one hand President F.W. de Klerk's statement, in which the Head of the South African State proclaimed his determination to eliminate apartheid, and on the other hand the liberation of Mr. Nelson Mandela, then Vice President of the ANC, the IOC finally agreed to a request from the South African sports organizations, who had been asking for several years to be heard. To this effect, it entrusted the Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa (ANOCA), in relation with the other African sports bodies, with the task of organizing meetings with the South African sports organizations.

- These meetings led to the grouping of the various South African organizations claiming national "multi-sport" competence within a sole body entitled Interim National Olympic Committee of South Africa.

- In March 1991, an IOC delegation visited South Africa. As a result of its visit, conditional recognition was granted to INOCSA. The conditions can be summed up as follows:

1. abolition of apartheid;
2. respect of the Olympic Charter;
3. establishment of relations between South African national federations and the International Federations;
4. continued unification of sports on a non-racial basis;
5. normalization of relations with sports organizations in Africa.

Furthermore, observation of the "moratorium" was required and the IOC reserved the right to reconsider its recognition within a period of 180 days.

- In May 1991, an IOC mission visited South Africa to evaluate the needs expressed by INOCSA and take the first steps towards assistance to the least privileged athletes in South Africa.

- In June 1991, the IOC Session delegated to its Executive Board and its President the authority to take, if and as needed, any decision which might be required by events.

## II Recommendation


The "Apartheid and Olympism" Commission,

having met with INOCSA in Lausanne on 9th July 1991 in the presence of ANOCA,

considering that, by virtue of the abolition of the laws of apartheid, INOCSA can from now on respect the Olympic Charter; that it has undertaken to do so; that it has successfully embarked on the unification of sports in South Africa on a non-racial basis as well as on the normalization of its structure in conformity with the usual procedures and the IOC's directions;

1. Notes the effectiveness of the IOC's recognition of INOCSA;
2. Recommends that the IOC President and the Executive Board formally endorse this effectiveness by proclaiming the outright recognition of the National Olympic Committee of South Africa and draw therefrom all legal consequences, subject to review of its implementation in the light of determining events relating to sport in South Africa.

Lausanne, July 9th, 1991



CITIUS · ALTIUS · FORTIUS

COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIQUE

CHÂTEAU DE VIDY, 1007 LAUSANNE, SUISSE

THE PRESIDENT

To :  
Mr Sam Ramsamy

Lausanne, July 9th, 1991  
Ref. No. /91/chm

Re: National Olympic Committee of South Africa

Dear Mr Ramsamy,

This is to advise you that, following the recommendation made on July 9th, 1991 in Lausanne by the "Apartheid & Olympism" Commission, I have decided to proclaim the outright recognition of the National Olympic Committee of South Africa.


The IOC urges you

- 1) to immediately intensify your work towards unification of South African sports on a non racial basis;
- 2) to accelerate the process of normalization of relationships between the maximum possible number of national federations encompassed by your organization and the relevant IFs;
- 3) to pursue the normalisation of your relationships with sports organisations in Africa and in particular with the Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa (ANOCA).
- 4) to seek assurance from the competent authorities and sports organizations that all South African sports facilities in fact be available without any distinction of race;
- 5) to ensure that all national federations and governing bodies take effective and adequate action to develop and train athletes from all races.

I take this opportunity to extend the best wishes and good will of the IOC in this most important task.

I look forward to hearing from you very soon.

Very truly yours,



Juan Antonio SAMARANCH





# Canadian Government Policy Regarding Sporting Contacts Between Canada and South Africa

## Introduction

This statement on sport relations between Canada and the Republic of South Africa is for the guidance of Canadian individual sport persons, Canadian sport organizations, other Canadian organizations involved in international sport, Government departments and the Canadian public at large. It is intended to set out Canada's policy regarding sporting contacts between Canadian and South African sport persons whether in Canada, South Africa or a third country.

## Canada's Policy on South Africa

South Africa is unique in the world. Only South Africa has institutionalized apartheid and denies the majority of its population fundamental human rights on the basis of race.

The Canadian Government is playing a leading role in the sustained and determined international opposition to apartheid. In concert with its Commonwealth partners and other like-minded countries, Canada has adopted strong measures against South Africa in an effort to pressure that country to dismantle its apartheid system. Sanctions remain one of the few ways of peacefully applying such pressure.

To impress upon South Africa the urgency of real progress, Canada has imposed a series of strong measures unilaterally and in cooperation with the Commonwealth and the United Nations. Canada has adopted all the economic and other sanctions agreed to by the Commonwealth. Over 30 measures have been implemented including a ban on new bank loans and new investment in South Africa; a ban on the import of South African agricultural products, uranium, coal, iron and steel; and the termination of all government programs to assist exports to South Africa. The effect has been pronounced. Trade in goods under sanction has been eliminated. The success of these sanctions has required the active support of Canadian individuals and business. At the 1987 Heads of Government Meeting, Canada and its Commonwealth partners agreed that further progress towards peaceful change requires the widening, tightening and intensifying of the existing sanctions against South Africa. Sport is no exception.

## **The International Sport Boycott of South Africa**

Sport is particularly important to South Africa. An end to apartheid would allow all the athletes of that nation to participate fully in international sporting events. The sport boycott is one of the oldest and most effective means of encouraging South Africa to dismantle apartheid. Because of the tremendous interest and pride taken by South Africa in the achievements of its athletes, the sport boycott has proven extremely important in bringing home the extent of international opposition to apartheid. The boycott has in large measure prevented South Africa from using sport as a diplomatic, political and public relations vehicle.

The international sport boycott was launched by governments and by international sport organizations in the 1970s as a means of applying pressure on South Africa. From 1956, when a South African sport association was first expelled from an international sport federation, South Africa's isolation has grown. South Africa has not been allowed to compete in the Olympics since 1960. Today only a handful of sports allow South Africans to participate in international sport events. In 1977, the United Nations issued a Declaration against Apartheid in Sport. Later that year, Commonwealth Governments unanimously endorsed the Gleneagles Agreement, which pledges its signatories to discourage, by all practical means, sporting contacts between their citizens and South Africans. In 1982, the Commonwealth Games Federation adopted a Code of Conduct designed to attach specific sanctions to the general commitment made by Commonwealth Heads of Government at Gleneagles. In June 1988, the International Olympic Committee reaffirmed its longstanding position by issuing a declaration against apartheid in sport which calls on both Olympic and non-Olympic sport organizations to demonstrate their opposition to apartheid by refusing to enter into any contact of a sporting nature, official or otherwise, with official South African organizations or South African sportsmen and women.

### **Canada's Policy on Sporting Contacts**

Canada's position on sporting contacts with South Africa is fully consistent with the governmental and sporting initiatives mentioned above. It will continue to be sensitive to and reflect the evolving situation in South Africa and in international sport. In 1972, the Canadian Government began to deny funding to sporting events in Canada which included representatives of South Africa and to Canadian athletes and teams participating in sport events in South Africa. In 1978 and 1985 the policy was strengthened, resulting in the elimination of the majority of sporting contacts between Canadians and South Africans. In July 1988, the Government announced that individuals travelling on South African passports seeking to enter Canada to participate in a sport event will be denied visas.

## **Text of the Policy**

As of June 28, 1989, Canada's policy on sporting contacts is being extended by:

- applying the policy to individual sports persons, including professionals (as well as nationally-representative sports persons and teams);
- pressing for the adoption of similar measures by other governments and international organizations using diplomatic and intergovernmental channels;
- encouraging and assisting Canadian sport organizations and sports persons to seek the expulsion of South Africa from the international federation to which they are affiliated;
- urging Canadian sport organizations to institute measures which lead to the suspension of athletes and sport officials who participate in sport events in South Africa and to press their international federations to do likewise ;
- applying the policy to sporting contacts in third countries between Canadian and South African individual (including professional) sports persons;
- requesting the support of individual Canadians in implementing this policy.

## **Application of the Policy**

This policy applies to all individual Canadian sport persons, Canadian sport organizations and other Canadian organizations involved in international sport and to all events sanctioned and/or organized by a Canadian sport organization, its affiliates and members. It applies to all South Africans seeking entry into Canada to participate in a sport event. The policy applies to all activities defined as "sport" by the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid.

## **Guidelines Governing Sporting Contacts Between Canada and South Africa**

The following sets out the Government of Canada's policy regarding sporting contacts with South Africa. These guidelines identify the respective roles and responsibilities of the Government and Canadian sports organizations regarding sporting contacts between Canadians and South Africans. For

the purpose of the policy, a sport "event" includes competitions, meetings, gatherings and congresses. Any sport organization or individual sport person who wishes or has information on the sporting contacts issue should contact the Department of External Affairs or Fitness and Amateur Sport.

### 1. Sport Events in Canada

The Government affirms that South African sport persons are not welcome to participate in Canadian sport events or sport-related activities.

The Government will deny entry visas to individuals travelling on a South African passport who wish to enter Canada to participate in a sport event or to pursue their sport careers.

Canadian sport organizations are expected not to issue invitations to South African sport persons to participate in their sport events.

The Government may from time to time make recommendations to sport organizations on South African sport persons whose entitlement to a passport of another country permits them to avoid the restrictions imposed upon South African passport holders.

### 2. Sport Events in South Africa

The Government seeks to discourage, and will deny any support, either financial or moral, to any individual, whether affiliated or non-affiliated with a Canadian sport association, whose purpose is to travel to South Africa for sport events or to pursue his or her sporting career.

Canadian sports organizations are expected to maintain a policy of non-involvement of any kind in sport events in South Africa. They are expected to discourage participation in any sport event held in South Africa by the withholding of permits, approvals, funds and through other effective measures. They are requested to adopt and enforce rules that call for the suspension of athletes and officials who participate in sport events in South Africa. These organizations are expected to take such actions whether or not they are funding the visit or the athletes or officials are travelling to South Africa on their own resources.

Should the association be unsuccessful in deterring its athletes and officials from participating in a sport event in South Africa, the Government expects that association to take immediate and appropriate action, such as suspension and the denial of access to all activities organized or sanctioned by the Canadian national body or its affiliates.

The Government expects Canadian sport organizations to press their international federations to adopt rules which call for the suspension of all athletes and officials who participate in sport events in South Africa.

The Government calls on individual Canadian sport persons, whether affiliated or non-affiliated with a Canadian sport association, to decline invitations to participate in sport events in South Africa. It further asks individuals who have taken part in a sport event in South Africa in the past to pledge not to participate in such events in the future.

### 3. Sport Events in a Third Country

The Government opposes sporting contacts between Canadians and South Africans in events held in third countries. It will therefore not extend any support (either financial or moral) to any organization or individual for the purpose of participating in sport events in third countries in which South Africans are participating.

The Government expects Canadian sport organizations to initiate and to support appropriate measures which seek to ban South Africa from further international involvement in sport. Their support of this policy should include strong and persistent representation to their international counterpart organizations to exclude South Africans from international sport both individually and in common cause with other national organizations. The Government will work with individuals and national sport organizations to assist in securing the expulsion of South Africans from all international sport events until such time as apartheid is dismantled.

The Government reaffirms that nationally-representative Canadian teams are expected not to participate in sport events in third countries involving South Africans. In extension of that policy, Canadian sport organizations are expected to discourage individual members, affiliated clubs or teams from participating in any international events or competitions involving South Africans. These organizations are expected to decline invitations, withdraw from or formally protest South African participation to event organizers and to the international federation on behalf of their members, clubs etc. Canadian sport organizations are also expected to deny funding, approvals and permits to their athletes or officials, affiliated clubs or teams for any international events or competitions involving South Africans.

## An Appeal to All Canadians

The Government seeks the support and cooperation of all Canadians, whether affiliated or non-affiliated with national sport organizations, in excluding South Africa from all international sport events and in implementing the above guidelines.

### Measures supporting policy

In support of this policy, the Government undertakes:

- to apply increased pressure through diplomatic and intergovernmental channels to protest the participation of South Africa in international sport events and to secure the expulsion of South Africa from international sport;
- to assist Canadian sport associations in urging their international sport federations to expel or suspend South Africa;
- to work bilaterally and multilaterally to encourage other countries and international organizations to adopt policies and practices similar to those of Canada;
- to review the performance of Canadian sport organizations in complying with this policy and to take such performance into account in its deliberation on the grants and contributions made to these organizations and their activities.

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## BACKGROUND

### Canada's Policy on Sporting Contacts With South Africa

South Africa is unique in the world. Only South Africa has institutionalized apartheid and denies the majority of its population fundamental human rights on the basis of race. This racism applies to sport just as it does to South African politics, education, business and culture. Indeed, non-whites do not have the same opportunities as whites to develop their sport skills and abilities nor do they have the same access to top quality facilities and equipment.

The boycott on sporting contacts with South Africa was one of the first international sanctions to be put in place. Its purpose is to encourage the peaceful dismantling of the apartheid system by impressing upon the South African Government and citizens the depth of international abhorrence to apartheid. It is also aimed at preventing the South African Government from continuing to use sport as a diplomatic, political or public relations vehicle in support of apartheid.

The international sport boycott was launched by governments and by international sport organizations in the 1970s as a means of applying pressure on South Africa. Since 1956, when a South African sport association was first expelled from an international sport federation, South Africa's isolation has grown. South Africa has not been allowed to compete in the Olympics since 1960. Today only a handful of sports allow South Africans to participate in international sport events. In 1977, the United Nations issued a Declaration Against Apartheid in Sport. Later that year, Commonwealth Governments unanimously endorsed the Gleneagles Agreement, which pledged its signatories to discourage, by all practical means, sporting contacts between their citizens and South Africans. In June 1988, the International Olympic Committee reaffirmed its longstanding position by issuing a declaration against apartheid in sport. This declaration calls on both Olympic and non-Olympic sport organizations to demonstrate their opposition to apartheid by refusing to enter into any sporting contact, official or otherwise, with South African organizations or sportspersons.

Canada's opposition to apartheid in sport is longstanding. As early as 1934, leaders of the Canadian sport community publicly objected to racism in South African sport. The Canadian Government first placed restrictions on Canada-South Africa sport relations in 1972. Canada's policy on sporting contacts, announced in 1978, was based on the Gleneagles Agreement and effectively cut off sport relations between Canadians and South African teams and amateur level athletes. However, some individuals, primarily professional athletes, were not covered by the policy. Over the past decade, the vast majority of sporting contacts between Canadians and South Africans have been eliminated. On July 29, 1988, the Canadian Government moved to further tighten the policy to include all sport persons and began denying visas to individuals using South African passports and seeking to enter Canada to participate in a sport event.





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# news release

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Date

June 28, 1989.

No. 156

For release

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## CANADA TIGHTENS BAN ON SPORTING CONTACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

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Ottawa -- The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, and the Honourable Jean Charest, Minister of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport, today announced a strengthened Government policy on Sporting Contacts between Canada and South Africa.

Effective immediately, the policy is extended to include all sporting contacts between Canadians and South Africans whether they take place in Canada, in South Africa or in a third country. Features of the policy are:

- In addition to amateur representative team and individual sports, the revised policy now applies to individual sport persons, including professionals;

- Henceforth Canadian sport organizations are expected to decline invitations to, withdraw from or protest events in third countries in which South Africans are participating and to discourage their members from participating in such events;

- Canadian sport organizations are requested to suspend athletes and officials under their purview who participate in sport events in South Africa and to press their international federation to take similar action;

- Observance of the Government's policy by Canadian sport organizations will henceforth be taken into account in funding decisions;

- The Canadian Government will take action designed to strengthen and extend the international sport boycott of South Africa by working through diplomatic and intergovernmental channels.

The policy takes the Government as far as it can go within the limits of Canadian and international law. "We are exercising the full extent of our authority," said Mr. Clark.

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"The Government alone cannot bring about a total ban on Canada-South Africa sport contacts. It requires the full co-operation of Canadian sport organizations and individual athletes and officials," said Minister Charest. "The authority to stop athletes from competing with South Africans lies with the sport organizations. Pressure must be increased to achieve an expulsion of South Africa from all international sport organizations."

In addition, Canada is providing financial support for a new two-track approach, initiated by leading international anti-apartheid in sport organizations, which features tightening the ban on sporting contacts with South Africa while seeking ways to encourage the development of non-racial sport in South Africa. "The two-track plan is an important initiative," said Mr. Clark. "While maintaining the sport boycott, we will be working with anti-apartheid organizations as well as like-minded governments to explore ways of helping to promote dialogue and break down racial barriers within South African sport and, by extension, in South Africa as a whole."

The Canadian Government first placed restrictions on Canada-South Africa sport relations in 1972. Since then, the vast majority of sporting contacts between Canadians and South Africans have been eliminated. In July 1988, the Government announced that individuals travelling on South African passports and seeking entry into Canada to participate in a sport event would be denied visas.

"The sport boycott works. It is one of the oldest and most effective sanctions against apartheid," Minister Clark noted.

Canada's policy on sporting contacts with South Africa is one of a series of measures which the Government has introduced to encourage a peaceful end to apartheid.

For further information contact:

Media Relations Office,  
Department of External Affairs, (613) 995-1874

John Scott, International Relations,  
Fitness and Amateur Sport, (613) 996-6555



# Commonwealth statement on apartheid in sport

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The member countries of the Commonwealth, embracing peoples of diverse races, colours, languages and faiths, have long recognised racial prejudice and discrimination as a dangerous sickness and an unmitigated evil and are pledged to use all their efforts to foster human dignity everywhere. At their London Meeting, Heads of Government reaffirmed that apartheid in sport, as in other fields, is an abomination and runs directly counter to the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which they made at Singapore on 22 January 1971.

They were conscious that sport is an important means of developing and fostering understanding between the people, and especially between the young people, of all countries. But, they were also aware that, quite apart from other factors, sporting contacts between their nationals and the nationals of countries practising apartheid in sport tend to encourage the belief (however unwarranted) that they are prepared to condone this abhorrent policy or are less than totally committed to the Principles embodied in their Singapore Declaration. Regretting past misunderstandings and difficulties and recognising that these were partly the result of inadequate inter-governmental consultations, they agreed that they would seek to remedy this situation in the context of the increased level of understanding now achieved.

They reaffirmed their full support for the international campaign against apartheid and welcomed the efforts of the United Nations to reach

universally accepted approaches to the question of sporting contacts within the framework of that campaign.

Mindful of these and other considerations, they accepted it as the urgent duty of each of their Governments vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by withholding any form of support for, and by taking every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organised on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin.

They fully acknowledged that it was for each Government to determine in accordance with its law the methods by which it might best discharge these commitments. But they recognised that the effective fulfilment of their commitments was essential to the harmonious development of Commonwealth sport hereafter.

They acknowledged also that the full realisation of their objectives involved the understanding, support and active participation of the nationals of their countries and of their national sporting organisations and authorities. As they drew a curtain across the past they issued a collective call for that understanding, support and participation with a view to ensuring that in this matter the peoples and Governments of the Commonwealth might help to give a lead to the world.

Heads of Government specially welcomed the belief, unanimously expressed at their Meeting, that in the light of their consultations and accord there were unlikely to be future sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries or their nationals and South Africa while that country continues to pursue the detestable policy of apartheid. On that basis, and having regard to their commitments, they looked forward with satisfaction to the holding of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and to the continued strengthening of Commonwealth sport generally.

*London, 15 June 1977*



**GUIDELINES ON OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA**

The following policy guidelines concern official contacts with South Africa and replace the previous "Guidelines on Official Visits to and from South Africa". They clarify without substantively modifying the latter.

**A. General Guidelines**

1. For the purpose of these guidelines:

official means an employee or agent of the Canadian or South African Governments, or one of their agencies, corporations or parastatal institutions, acting within the scope of his or her responsibilities;

contact means a meeting, conference, seminar, or visit involving contact between South African and Canadian officials.

2. It is the policy of the Government of Canada, in conformity with its international commitments, that there should be minimal official contacts with officials, departments or agencies of the South African Government in the interest of avoiding, either directly or indirectly, support for the enforcement or preservation of apartheid.
3. As a general rule, Canadian officials should not accept, directly or indirectly, travel funds or honoraria from South African sources because the South African Government assists many private organizations in the holding of conferences and meetings.
4. Canada abides by a Commonwealth Heads of Government agreement to discourage all contacts with or activities involving South Africa in the cultural and scientific sphere, except where these contribute towards the ending of apartheid or have no possible role in promoting it. Canadian officials should therefore not participate in cultural or scientific events in Canada or in visits to Canada involving South African officials without prior reference to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.
5. With some specific exceptions listed in Part B below, Canadian officials should not attend meetings, conferences or seminars in Canada, in an official capacity, which are also attended by South African officials. In the case of an international meeting in Canada which South African officials might be expected to attend, in order to comply

with these guidelines, the host must decide either to ensure that potential South African participants are asked not to attend or face the withdrawal of Canadian officials. This sanction does not apply to contacts in similar circumstances outside Canada.

6. Canadian officials are responsible for ensuring that the hosts or organizers of seminars, meetings or conferences in Canada, falling within their area of responsibility, are fully informed of these guidelines sufficiently far in advance to ensure that they are respected.
7. Unless they are travelling to South Africa on authorized government business, Canadian officials are strongly discouraged from visiting that country, particularly when using special or diplomatic passports, except when visiting family or friends at the Embassy.
8. Canadian officials are strongly discouraged from using South African facilities, e.g. South African Airways.
9. In third countries, Canadian officials are expected to maintain correct contacts with South African officials while preserving the spirit of these guidelines. Social contacts are discouraged unless there is a direct Canadian interest involved. In the case of South Africa National Day receptions, the presence of a senior Embassy officer without his/her spouse is acceptable.

B. Exceptions \*

1. Canadian officials posted to the Canadian Embassy in South Africa or travelling on Embassy business.
2. Canadian officials transiting South Africa en route to land-locked countries bordering on South Africa on Canadian Government business.
3. Canadian officials tasked with responsibility for the conduct of official relations with South Africa.
4. South African diplomats accredited to Canada.

5. Attendance by Canadian officials at meetings or conferences held in Canada also attended by South African officials if the meeting or conference is sponsored or organized by an international organization which is treaty-based or which strictly adheres to the principle of universality of membership (e.g. the United Nations).
6. Attendance by Canadian officials at conferences held in Canada also attended by South African officials if the conference is hosted and organized by a non-governmental scientific and professional organization along a scientific and professional theme unrelated to the enforcement of apartheid and where (a) the principle of universal membership is consistently applied by the organization and (b) the federal government has no direct control over the issuing of invitations and/or registration.
7. Official contacts relating to the maintenance and promotion of public health or safety.
8. Official contacts relating to Canadian Government activities in the fields of education, development and constitutional assistance or other Canadian initiatives directed toward redressing racial disparities in South Africa and encouraging negotiations aimed at the dismantling of apartheid.
9. Commercial contacts involving representatives from third countries in addition to officials from Canada and South Africa where these contacts would have no direct bearing on Canada's bilateral relations with South Africa.

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\* No exceptions will be allowed if the South Africans in question are with the military, police or other establishments which have a direct role in repression or the enforcement of apartheid.





## SOUTH AFRICA

### The 'Possible Negotiating Concept' of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on Southern Africa

"The South African Government has declared its commitment to dismantling the system of apartheid, to ending racial discrimination and to broad-based negotiations leading to new constitutional arrangements for power-sharing by all the people of South Africa. In the light of preliminary and as yet incomplete discussions with representatives of various organizations and groups, within and outside South Africa, we believe that in the context of specific and meaningful steps being taken towards ending apartheid, the following additional action might ensure negotiations and a break in the cycle of violence.

On the part of the Government:

- (a) Removal of the military from the townships, providing for freedom of assembly and discussion and suspension of detention without trial.
- (b) The release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees.
- (c) The unbanning of the ANC and PAC and the permitting of normal political activity.

On the part of the ANC and others:

Entering negotiations and suspending violence.

It is our view that simultaneous announcements incorporating these ideas might be negotiated if the Government were to be interested in pursuing this broad approach.

In the light of the Government's indication to us that it:

- (i) is not in principle against the release of Nelson Mandela and similar prisoners;
- (ii) is not opposed in principle to the unbanning of any organizations;
- (iii) is prepared to enter into negotiations with the acknowledged leaders of the people of South Africa;
- (iv) is committed to removal of discrimination, not only from the statute books but also from South African society as a whole;
- (v) is committed to ending of white domination;
- (vi) will not prescribe who may represent black communities in negotiations on a new constitution for South Africa;
- (vii) is prepared to negotiate on an open agenda;

the South African Government may wish to give serious consideration to the approach outlined in this note."

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