


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DOCS

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

# CHEMICAL WEAPONS – FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1991 SESSION



**PV**

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ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA  
OTTAWA, CANADA

JANUARY 1992

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
# CHEMICAL WEAPONS – FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1991 SESSION

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OTTAWA, CANADA

JANUARY 1992



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INTRODUCTION

Volume 1 of the final records (FV) of the Conference on Disarmament during the 1991 session relating to Chemical Weapons. It has been compiled and edited to facilitate distribution.

This volume is a compilation of the final records (FV) of the Conference on Disarmament during the 1991 session relating to Chemical Weapons. It has been compiled and edited to facilitate distribution.

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(The President)

... "The Conference on Disarmament has an important role to play in strengthening the United Nations' ability to deal with the multifaceted challenges we will face as we move into the twenty-first century. Your agenda remains relevant and rich in potential. I am optimistic that your collective wisdom and the momentum generated by recent positive developments in the world at large will enable the Conference to produce genuine and viable agreements. There is a wealth of experience and expertise that can be put to use. The successful conclusion of your negotiations aimed at a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons would be a particularly notable achievement. We in Sri Lanka eagerly await the realization of such a convention.

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(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

... "Another priority is the completion of negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. The urgency of finalizing this work was emphasized once again by the international community at the last session of the General Assembly, and has been underlined further by events in the Gulf region. Universal adherence to an effective ban could best be ensured through a global, comprehensive and non-discriminatory convention. I strongly believe that all necessary conditions have been met to achieve a balanced compromise. There is incalculable danger in allowing the existing political momentum to lapse through tardy action. Every effort must be made to step up negotiations and constructively address the fundamental political issues which stand in the way of

CD/PV.577

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(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations)

success. The time has come, in my opinion, to give a decisive impetus to the Conference's work on the convention through a meeting at the ministerial level with a view to settling all the remaining points of concern.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

... A lesson to be learned from the military build-up in the region is that the international arms trade has to be limited. International control of all arms trade is urgently called for. All States, both arms exporters and importers, must comply with such control. Another lesson to be learned from the acute menace of chemical warfare is that chemical weapons must be destroyed once and for all and that a total ban on chemical weapons must be concluded urgently. Considerable progress has been made in the past year. However, the political breakthrough continues to elude us. It must come now. The world cannot wait any longer.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish):

... During last year the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban was examined in detail by the international community. Here, it was at last possible to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on this priority item and in the General Assembly there were extensive consultations aimed at merging the two texts that have been adopted year after year. Moreover, at the fourth NPT review conference the item was the subject of intense discussions and over the past two weeks the Moscow Treaty Amendment Conference examined in detail several aspects of the question, including that of the verification of a comprehensive test ban. On the other hand, in 1990 it was not possible to advance substantially towards the conclusion of a convention on the elimination of chemical weapons, notwithstanding continual meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on the matter and the persevering efforts of its Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

... Let us hope that this Conference will at last make the contribution which everyone expects from it. It is not a matter of finding a way to "get through another year", or seeing whether or not we can conclude the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons this year, while we pass the time discussing other items knowing full well that in August we shall not have achieved much. Let us re-establish the ad hoc committees on all our agenda items at once, avoiding an unnecessary waste of time. And let us give clear proof of political will by giving them negotiating mandates. That is why this body was created and that is why we are here.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

... First of all, it is easy to perceive the growing lack of correspondence between the items on its agenda and certain regional priorities. It is not that the agenda has become obsolete, but there has clearly been a weakening in the original political will that inspired its members to negotiate disarmament measures under the eight main items. This accounts for the recurrent paralysis of the Conference in dealing with most of its items, as well as the unforeseeable complication of negotiating on such an urgent issue as the total banning and destruction of chemical weapons.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

... The foreseeable results of the PTBT Amendment Conference constitute another factor that should prompt us to moderation. And negotiation and co-ordination between States call for a will and an effort that go beyond mere good intentions. New political conditions must be created that will make it possible for a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear tests once and for all to be negotiated as rapidly as possible. But this should be viewed as a process to be pursued in parallel with and not in conflict with the question of the extension of the NPT, bearing in mind that the fate of the NPT beyond 1995 will depend on how all its provisions have been respected. It is this constructive spirit and quest for consensus that should inspire the Conference on Disarmament to include in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons the prohibition of use of all forms of these weapons of mass destruction. From the time that the prohibition of the use of force was enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, there has been no place in

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

international law for the right to reprisals. The only exception to this principle is self-defence, which is provided for in Article 51 of the Charter, on the terms that are stated therein. It is to be hoped that this year the scope of the future convention will be defined on the basis of the norms laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.

It is my hope that this year the Conference on Disarmament can provide the international community with specific results from its negotiations. The Gulf war places us under an obligation to achieve the virtual finalization of the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons. In this context I wish Ambassador Batsanov, who is to assume the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee, every success, and I offer him the full co-operation of my delegation.

The PRESIDENT:

... I now wish to turn to our business for today. I should like to inform you that the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, covering its inter-sessional work, will be available as document CD/1046 for our next plenary meeting on Thursday. On that occasion, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, will introduce it. At the following plenary meeting of the Conference, to be held on 7 February, I shall invite the Conference to adopt the report contained in document CD/1046. In connection with the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee, which was recommended to us as a priority matter in its report on the 1990 session, I am continuing my consultations on its future mandate. I do hope that it will be possible for us to agree soon on the re-establishment of this subsidiary body, so that negotiations on the "rolling text" can proceed without delay.

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Mr. HYLTIENIUS (Sweden): I have the honour today to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons (CD/1046).

As you will recall, the Conference decided at the last meeting of the summer part of its session that the Ad Hoc Committee should hold open-ended consultations from 26 November to 21 December 1990, followed by a session of limited duration during the period 8 to 18 January 1991. As a result of this inter-sessional work the earlier report submitted to the Conference in August last year (contained in document CD/1033) has been considerably amended. Several new documents have been drafted, and parts of the earlier text have been moved from appendix II to appendix I and thus now form part of the so-called "rolling text". Moreover, the part of the "rolling text" containing the articles of the convention has been edited to make it more consistent and readable.

In 1990 the political issues involved in the drafting of the future convention were addressed to a much greater extent than before. This was done in a number of ways. The most comprehensive effort took place in the open-ended consultations on undiminished security and universal adherence. A convention of this magnitude cannot be dealt with only on a piecemeal basis. It is necessary also to have an overview of the political context and the component parts in their interrelationship. It became clear from the consultations that the convention must be effective and non-discriminatory in order to be sufficiently attractive. It must be considered an advantage to become a party to the convention. Correspondingly, it must be unattractive to stay outside. I believe that the open-ended consultations on these matters have increased understanding of the issues involved and thereby prepared the ground for final agreement on them. It has also opened a discussion on what can be done at this stage to promote widest possible adherence to the convention by means of declarations of intent, regional initiatives, etc.

My summary of the open-ended consultations on undiminished security and universal adherence is contained in appendix II to the Committee's report. In this context I note with particular satisfaction the increased number of

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

non-members of the Conference on Disarmament which are participating in the negotiations. This bodes well for the prospects of future adherence to the convention. The regional initiatives undertaken and planned are other examples of constructive contributions to these endeavours.

In this past year we have also worked very actively on verification issues. Apart from the active consideration of these issues in one of the Working Groups, which led to some important concrete results and to which I shall revert in a minute, a determined effort was made to come to grips with the problem of challenge verification, or - as I would prefer to name it - inspection on request. I presented a draft article IX, which was welcomed by a large number of delegations and extensively and intensively discussed. It did not prove possible, however, to agree on the article. It would, of course, have been a great achievement to settle this long-standing political problem relating to a cornerstone of the convention, but in my view there is no reason to be too discouraged by this situation. The remaining problems are now better known and understood by all delegations. This is a stage we must go through in order to achieve the convention.

In this connection it is interesting to note the efforts made in trial inspections on request to illustrate the problems encountered and find solutions to them. The Committee will in fact be in a better position than before to resolve this issue when it comes under renewed consideration.

The open-ended consultations on the Executive Council seemed by and large to confirm the viability of the existing provisions in appendix I, whereas it appeared that the issues of the composition and decision-making procedures of the Council were not yet ripe for solution.

Besides the complete treatment of major political hard-core issues that I have just outlined, considerable progress has been made on various issues which are now reflected in the new "rolling text". The disappointment over the lack of agreement on a few key issues must not obscure the considerable and concrete achievements made in the three Working Groups and by the Friends of the Chair.

From Working Group A we have received a new and final text on investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons, which is harmonized with the procedures available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and is now included in the protocol on inspection procedures. In addition, painstaking work has been done in Working Group A, which has resulted in readable and, most importantly, implementable verification provisions in the annexes to articles IV and V. These provisions and similar provisions in the annexes to article VI have, furthermore, been harmonized with provisions in the protocol on inspection procedures. I wish to thank Mr. Sahbaz for his contributions to these important results. ..

Working Group B has been able to incorporate into the "rolling text" a complete order of destruction for chemical weapons as well as for chemical weapons production facilities. I would like to recall that before the 1990 session this was considered by representatives from all groups as one of the

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

main outstanding hurdles. It has now been overcome, and I especially thank Mr. Meerburg for his inventiveness and a good job done. Working Group B has also been able to elaborate further the schedules in the annex on chemicals, and to finalize the modalities for revision of schedules and guidelines. Moreover, considerable progress has been made on the issue of thresholds. Extremely useful material on low concentrations and on the "captive use" of listed chemicals has also been incorporated into appendix II.

Working Group C has made much headway on issues that were considered by most of us as major outstanding problems. We are particularly indebted to Dr. Krutzsch for his perseverance and enthusiasm. While the solutions to the issues of amendments, settlement of disputes and measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions now incorporated into appendix I have not been finally elaborated, each of them constitutes a breakthrough not only technically but also politically. Finally, the material on "Financial aspects of the Organization" now in appendix II constitutes a valuable new basis for further work on an issue that is of major concern.

The open-ended consultations on article X (Assistance and protection against chemical weapons) continued during the inter-sessional period. Further progress was made, and it is my opinion that agreement is within reach on this important article. A Chairman's paper (CD/CW/WP.324) was issued as a basis for continued work. I am very grateful indeed to Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina and his deputy, Mr. Parini, for the very constructive and promising work undertaken on this issue.

Article XI is in my opinion another important part of the convention. I have conducted private consultations on this article during the whole year, and during the inter-sessional period I also held open-ended consultations on the matter. There is still no agreement on this, but the number of delegations which have reservations about including the draft text on the article in appendix I have diminished considerably.

The problem of old chemical weapons is now better analysed than before, but its solution still eludes us. I have the impression that further contacts on a bilateral basis between some of the countries particularly concerned will be necessary before it is possible to find an appropriate and generally acceptable solution in the multilateral context. I am most grateful to Ambassador Morel for his efforts and contributions as a Friend of the Chair in this difficult field. The outcome of the work on this matter is reflected in appendix II.

I am pleased to report that the problem of jurisdiction and control has been brought much closer to solution this year. A new text on "General undertakings" in article VII has been included in appendix I. A few references to this concept remain in the "rolling text", but I am convinced that they can be addressed without too much difficulty now that the general undertakings have been agreed. This is due to the energetic work done by Ambassador Reese and Mr. Morris of Australia, who conducted consultations on this issue on my behalf. I wish to express my warm thanks for their successful endeavours.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

Although great emphasis has been put on the efforts this year to address the political issues, this does not mean that the technical questions have been neglected. I have already reported on the work and the important results achieved in Working Group B. In addition, several technical problems have been dealt with in the Technical Group on Instrumentation under the able Chairmanship of Dr. Rautio, and I should like to take this opportunity to thank her once more for her important contributions to this year's work.

The draft convention has been meticulously elaborated over several years by different negotiators and experts. It has gradually become rather difficult to read because of inconsistencies in nomenclature, numbering, punctuation etc. It was therefore felt that the present text had to be edited. An open-ended group led by Dr. Santesson of my delegation embarked upon that work during the inter-sessional period, and the part of the "rolling text" containing the articles of the convention has now been edited. In addition, guidelines for future editing as well as a list of some outstanding editing issues have been circulated in a working paper (CD/CW/WP.323).

As the implementation of the future convention will also depend on co-operation with chemical industry, contacts with industry representatives are of particular importance. The Ad Hoc Committee's meetings with industry representatives provided the framework for in-depth discussions of some topical verification and technical issues. Diplomats and industrialists seem to have gained a better understanding of each other's perceptions and concerns than was the case in earlier years.

It is not possible to conduct a negotiation of this complex nature without the support of a very competent and efficient secretariat. The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is fortunate enough to have such support. I am particularly indebted to Mr. Bensmail, the long-standing Secretary of the Committee, whose contributions to our work in the last year and over a number of previous years can hardly be overestimated. He has been very ably assisted by Ms. Marcaillou, Ms. Darby and Mrs. Roux, and I wish to extend my warm thanks also to them. Other members of the secretariat too have contributed in an important manner. I am thinking especially of the interpreters and the translators. I am very grateful to all of them for their work and their understanding and co-operation in our common endeavour.

My own delegation has worked very hard indeed to contribute to the efforts which go into a chairmanship of this kind. I have many competent collaborators who have prepared the basis for much of the material which I have presented in the Committee - Mr. Molander, Dr. Santesson, Dr. Lau, Mr. Gierow, Dr. Runn and Mr. Grenstad. My gratitude also goes to the secretaries in my mission, who have borne much of the burden of producing the material.

I referred at the outset to the political framework of this negotiation. Let me conclude by reverting to this aspect. We can do much within this Conference to take political aspects into account in drafting the convention in such a manner that it becomes attractive enough to achieve wide, perhaps even universal, adherence. But in searching for ideal and well-elaborated

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

solutions let us not lose track of current events. The war in the Gulf reminds us that the problem of chemical warfare is an awesome possibility, and that every effort must now be made to bring our work to an early conclusion. It is more important and urgent than ever.

I wish the incoming Chairman, Ambassador Serguei Batsanov, every success. He had the competence, vision and determination required for the responsible task of guiding these negotiations.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Allow me, Mr. President, to congratulate you on behalf of my delegation on taking up the high office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. We are sure that under your competent and dynamic leadership the CD's activities for this year will get under way smoothly and efficiently. Let me assure you that the Netherlands delegation will make every effort to assist you in making your present stewardship effective and stimulating.

Most of our thoughts are directed nowadays towards the war in the Gulf, and rightly so. The Netherlands is taking an active share in the task of ensuring compliance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. As we are all aware, a dramatic dimension is looming over this war. I refer to the implicit and explicit threats which we have heard to use chemical weapons in that conflict. Needless to say, such threats cannot but compel us to achieve the most important objective on our agenda: an effective convention banning all chemical weapons once and for all. A convention worthy of our confidence to ensure that the scourge of chemical warfare is effectively removed from every region in the world. A convention of which we can be sure that it will be faithfully implemented and complied with everywhere, and which will not be considered by some as just another scrap of paper to be ignored. One of the tools which should give rise to confidence in complete implementation of the convention is a régime to trigger international inspections on request any time, anywhere, based on effective procedures to identify serious violations. Only such a régime will deter potential violators. We have already worked out some procedures for such inspections. We must test them in practice. And we must improve and complete them.

(continued)

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

In this connection, I take pleasure in introducing today on behalf of both Canada and the Netherlands a report on a joint Canada/Netherlands chemical weapons trial challenge inspection of a military facility. This report is being circulated as document CD/1052, and also bears the number CD/CW/WP.327.

The inspection, which took place from 26 to 28 November 1990 at an operational military airfield containing garrisoned land forces, was the first bilateral trial inspection in the chemical weapons field for both participating countries. I may remark that the Netherlands has also been involved in a number of bilateral trial inspections in the field of conventional arms control. Last year, two joint inspection exercises took place with Poland to provide practical experience for the negotiations on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in Paris on 19 November 1990. As a further training effort for the implementation of this Treaty, a joint Canada/Netherlands trial inspection was held this week in the Netherlands. Observers from our partners in the Western European Union were invited to take part on that occasion.

I come back now to our Joint Canada/Netherlands chemical weapons trial inspection. Building on the experience of earlier national trial inspections, the aims of the inspection were firstly, to further test the inspection procedures laid down in the "rolling text"; secondly, to ascertain that compliance with a chemical weapons convention could be demonstrated without sensitive information being divulged; and, finally, to continue the training of the participants in organizing, carrying out and escorting such an inspection.

The inspection, carried out by Netherlands as well as Canadian inspectors, demonstrated the utility of conducting multinational exercises. It also demonstrated that reliable conclusions could be drawn under circumstances of managed access at an operational military facility. Furthermore, the exercise yielded a number of useful conclusions on problems still under discussion in the CD and pointed to some areas that still need to be addressed in our negotiations, and, perhaps, in the protocol on inspection procedures in the draft convention. These conclusions and recommendations are laid out in the report. Allow me, Mr. President, to dwell on a few of them.

With regard to the notification of the inspection site and the arrival of the inspection team, Canada and the Netherlands opted for the procedure whereby the site is notified by the requesting State after arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, rather than simultaneously with the notification of the inspection request to the inspected State. In real life this would have enhanced the element of surprise. It was concluded, however, that the "rolling text" leaves many ambiguities as to the precise procedures that should be followed up to the actual beginning of the inspection. The exact time of the start of the inspection, for instance, about which the "rolling text" says little, leaves considerable opportunity for dispute. At the same time, the Technical Secretariat would encounter quite a number of problems in forming an inspection team if it was unaware, at that time, of the type and size of the site to be inspected.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

During the exercise, the observer from the requesting State was given a considerable amount of leeway in observing the pre-inspection briefing, the debriefing and the activities of the inspection team and its subteams. It was felt afterwards that the observer would have been in a very good position to advise his national authorities on the efficacy of the conduct of the inspection and on its findings, without interfering with the inspection or obtaining sensitive information.

On the whole, the exercise showed that under circumstances of managed access, sensitive information could be adequately protected at this military site, while at the same time the inspection team was provided with enough information to draw reliable conclusions with regard to the presence of CW. One related problem was the inability of the inspection team to inspect medical records owing to Canadian laws that protect the privacy of the patient. It was felt that this issue should be carefully considered in the CD.

Canada and the Netherlands agreed that all samples would be analysed off-site at the TNO laboratories in the Netherlands. Although analysis at a fully equipped modern laboratory had the advantage of producing very reliable test results and, at the same time, reducing the size of the inspection team and the quantity of its equipment, off-site inspection posed the problem of maintaining the chain of custody during storage, transportation and analysis of the samples. As our experts are already aware, further consideration will need to be given to this matter.

On the whole the joint Canada/Netherlands trial challenge inspection amounted to a rather satisfactory and useful experience. It showed once more that the procedures laid down in the "rolling text" so far, although not yet perfect, do in principle provide an excellent framework for the carrying out of such inspections. It contains the instruments required to ascertain that the provisions of the future chemical weapons convention are complied with. I might therefore encourage all potential States parties to the future convention to participate in trial challenge inspections, in order to help us further fine-tune this aspect of the CW verification régime.

Some of the issues we have identified in our report on the trial challenge inspection could possibly be addressed in the Ad Hoc Committee and its subgroups, while other issues might not need to be addressed until a later stage. This is a matter for discussion by our technical and legal experts.

I should not let this opportunity go by without thanking the Canadian authorities, both military and civilian, for their splendid co-operation. As the inspection took place in Germany, our appreciation also goes, of course, to the German authorities.

Finally, we look forward to and count on the completion of our negotiations this year. We believe therefore that the new Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should be set up without delay. The new "rolling text" just introduced by the former Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons provides an excellent basis for continuing, if not redoubling, our efforts.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherland)

My delegation wishes to avail itself of this opportunity to express our appreciation and respect to Ambassador Hyltenius and his team for the invaluable services they have rendered to the CWC negotiating process. We are confident that Ambassador Batsanov will push on in the same vein.

CD/PV.580

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Mr. SHANNON (Canada): May I, at the outset, Mr. President, offer you my congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference and wish you every success, and may I also welcome our new ambassadorial colleagues among our ranks?

The report we are presenting today on the joint Canada/Netherlands trial CW challenge inspection comes at a time of great international crisis. World attention is focused on the conflict in the Persian Gulf and on the danger that chemical weapons might yet again be used, in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The spectre of possible chemical weapons use in the Gulf highlights the importance of our work, as we seek to rid the world of these weapons of senseless mass destruction. We must respond to this challenge with redoubled effort.

Last year Canada welcomed the Netherlands proposal to conduct a joint inspection and, in fact, to create a binational inspection team. We felt that this would exemplify many of the characteristics of an international team dispatched by the Director-General of the Proposed Technical Secretariat. Our first collaboration with the Netherlands in a CW trial inspection capacity took place in June 1990, and was reported in CD/1030/Rev.1. In this first endeavour, Canadian officials conducted a practice "routine" inspection at a Canadian pharmaceutical facility. An observer from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended. However, the full integration of officials from both countries in carrying out the joint Canada/Netherlands trial challenge inspection at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Lahr in Germany went further, in a multinational sense, than our earlier national practice inspection. And, as the trial inspection took place on German territory, we had an additional multinational feature: the presence of German observers throughout the inspection.

I would like to draw attention to another aspect of this inspection and its procedures. The Canadian in-country escort team had been trained to receive inspections in relation to quite a different set of treaty obligations, namely, those of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. We found that the escort team's operating procedures, we well as those of the personnel of the inspected site, could be modified without great difficulty to meet many of the needs of the CW challenge inspection. In a similar vein, I would like to suggest that certain of the considerations taken into account and finding expression in the Protocol on Inspection of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe might be of interest to our experts as we refine and conclude the protocol on inspection procedures in the "rolling text" of the CW convention. What I am referring to is a cross-fertilization of ideas as we try to devise a set of procedures that will work in practice, not just look good on paper.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

My Netherlands colleague has already touched on the "managed access" element of the joint trial challenge inspection of CFB Lahr. I would like to add a point of reinforcement from the perspective of the inspected State. Even though normal security sensitivities applied to CFB Lahr as an operational military airfield and a garrison for land forces, the "managed access" approach to particular facilities and equipment was able both to meet the needs of the inspection team and to satisfy the security concerns of the inspected State.

As an aside, I want to express here to my Netherlands colleague our deep pleasure and appreciation for the opportunity afforded us to work so closely with our Dutch colleagues and to remark upon the professionalism which both the Netherlands Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence displayed throughout this exercise.

Mr. President, my delegation offers to you, at the beginning of substantive work of this CD session, our full support as we strive to conclude, as soon as possible, a CW convention that will result in the complete destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and remove for ever the fear that such horrible weapons might again be used. This year has seen the threat of CW use raised again; our task is to ensure the year does not end with the question of the control of CW still unresolved.

I take this opportunity to add that, as in previous years, my delegation will be distributing, through the secretariat, copies of the latest compendiums of CW-related documents and statements delivered during the 1990 session.

The PRESIDENT:

... Our negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons have shown encouraging progress. This is all the more timely since we have witnessed in the recent past how much suffering chemical weapons may cause. May I therefore remind all delegations, those of member States as well as those of States wishing to accede to the status of participating non-members, that all States participating in the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons made the following call in its Final Declaration: "In addition, in order to achieve as soon as possible the indispensable universal character of the convention, they call upon all States to become parties thereto as soon as it is concluded." In this context I wish to note that all 34 States non-members that have addressed communications to us have indicated their wish to be invited to participate in our negotiations on the banning of chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 581st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As announced at our last plenary meeting, I will put before the Conference today for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, contained in document CD/1046. We shall first listen to the statements scheduled for today and then proceed immediately afterwards to take that action.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): This morning, I wish to read out a statement on behalf of the Group of 21 concerning the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

(continued in English)

As in previous years, the Group of 21 would like to emphasize once again that the goal of the negotiations under way in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is to conclude a comprehensive and non-discriminatory multilateral convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

On 4 December 1990, the forty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 45/57 A, which refers, inter alia, to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In this resolution the General Assembly stressed once again its conviction of the "necessity that every effort be exerted for the successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction". The General Assembly also expressed "its regret and concern that a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been concluded". Furthermore, it strongly urged the Conference on Disarmament, "as a matter of highest priority, to intensify during its 1991 session its efforts to resolve outstanding issues, and to conclude its negotiations on a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for that purpose".

This year the urgency of concluding a chemical weapons convention is reinforced by the present circumstances in the international arena, which are detrimental to peace and security. The Group of 21 continues to believe that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should include a reference to the total prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in order to be consistent with the General Assembly resolutions successively adopted in previous years since, in its view, this undertaking is already provided for in article I, paragraph 3 of the draft Convention. This element is of paramount importance to the Group as well as to the vast majority of all members of the Conference.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

As stated repeatedly by the Group of 21, the goal of concluding a comprehensive convention compels the Conference on Disarmament to seek a total ban on the use of chemical weapons so as to free the world from the scourge of these weapons of mass destruction. The Group would like to emphasize the importance it attaches to all aspects of the mandate, and expresses its willingness to ensure the prompt resumption of the important work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

CD/PV.581

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Mr. von WAGNER (Germany):

... We have listened very carefully to the declaration just read out by the representative of Peru on behalf of the Group of 21. As co-ordinator for chemical weapons of the Western Group, on behalf of Western delegations, may I express the opinion of Western delegations that we agree completely with the declaration of the Group of 21 as far as it pronounces the need for the early establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee for Chemical Weapons? We have, at an early date of the new round of negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament, pointed to the fact that Western delegations are prepared to re-establish that Committee without any delay, and in order to be able to do so, we have said that the best way to do it is on the basis of the mandate which we had last year. That this mandate is sufficient is proven by the "rolling text" which has been elaborated during the past years on this and similar mandates, and which now contains more than 200 pages, most of them consensus language. So, as it was sufficient to establish that kind of consensus and that text, there is no reason to believe that it would not be sufficient to continue this very valuable task during the coming year. On that ground, we urge the Conference on Disarmament to agree as early as possible on the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

CD/PV.581

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Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I would like to mention that we have with us today, as a guest of my delegation, Congressman Wayne Owens, a member of the United States House of Representatives, from the State of Utah. Congressman Owens is one of four Congressmen appointed by the Speaker of the House, Mr. Thomas Foley, as a special observer for the chemical weapons negotiations. He is in Geneva to familiarize himself with the CW negotiations.

(The President)

We shall now take action on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on its intersessional work, as contained in document CD/1046. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

... The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region and the indiscriminate use of chemical weapons in the past decade are now coupled with the spectre of their possible use in the Persian Gulf war. Any such use will undoubtedly bring about unpredictable consequences whose implications could be catastrophic for all. Even talk here and there by officials of the warring parties is dangerous.

It is even more alarming that not only threats exist of the possible use of chemical weapons, but there is even reference to a possible resort to nuclear arms. Aside from an immediate need to prevent such a disastrous situation in this conflict, one is now more inclined to insist, for the long term, that any commitment regarding weapons of mass destruction ought to be comprehensive and include chemical weapons and nuclear weapons as well as sophisticated conventional weaponry. With regard to nuclear weapons, one could now conclude that accession to the non-proliferation Treaty by all States seems a necessary requirement.

The draft convention on chemical weapons should also be freed of any discriminatory provisions. It should enhance the security of all nations. Ideas such as the retention of chemical weapon stocks, whatever the pretext, will give the impression of the military utility of such weapons and will be detrimental to our common cause.

Furthermore, universality is the keyword for our work in this regard. The incentives for joining the convention and disincentives for those who remain outside will play a determining role in this respect. Since underdevelopment poses a threat to the security of developing countries, any provision which may harm the legitimate development of civil chemical industry should be prevented.

But still, the most significant task to be tackled in order to ensure universality and prepare suitable ground whereby States would find it safe and secure to join the convention is to maintain a balance at the global, and more importantly at the regional level for the security of States. The fact that the chemical weapons convention would generally enhance the security of States remains valid, but this cannot be sufficient when one comes to the actual point of making a decision to join this convention. For each country, national security reigns supreme. Every State will wish to have enough assurances that its security will not be diminished through joining the convention. I must add that this is particularly relevant in regions which are hotbeds of tension and where chemical weapons have already been used.

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(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Let me conclude by reiterating that the effects of the current crisis in the Persian Gulf will go beyond the region, although its consequences for future stability and security in the region itself will be immense and long-lasting. In reality, this crisis will determine whether political or military solutions will prevail in international affairs. One way or another, both parties have chosen the military option, which in fact will only be a lost game. Our individual and joint efforts should all be directed at reversing this trend and generating the necessary political will to prevent the catastrophe from gaining further momentum. My country will spare no effort in this regard.

Mr. HYLTIENIUS (Sweden): I have listened with great interest to the important statement just made by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I am sure that it will be read with great interest in many capitals, including my own.

My delegation today wishes to introduce document CD/1053 on "Verification of the chemical industry within the general pattern of verification of a chemical weapons convention".

The proposal contained in CD/1053 is already well known to all delegations. A first version was circulated for consultations to all groups and China in November. My delegation made a special presentation in the Group of 21, and was gratified also to be invited to the Group of Western States for a detailed discussion. Delegations from all groups and several observer delegations approached us during the inter-sessional period to obtain clarifications and share their preliminary views. By and large my delegation has been encouraged to proceed and to develop the ideas contained in the consultation paper.

In elaborating the new document, which is now before you, we have thus been able to draw on a considerable amount of comments from a large number of delegations. I would like to take this opportunity to thank those delegations that have spent time studying our proposal and conveying their views and questions to us. The amendments and additions that have been made to the paper are mainly aimed at clarifying a number of points, but a few substantive additions have also been made. The fact that the basic approach of the paper has not been questioned by any delegation that has studied it in detail gives us good hope that the paper will be given serious consideration in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

Against this background any further introduction may be superfluous. Still, I would like to make some general comments. First, I would like to state what this paper is not. It is not a tactical proposal for the purpose of unlocking the apparent stalemate in discussions on verification in the chemical industry. My delegation has for a long time had doubts regarding the cost-effectiveness of schedule 2 verification as provided for in the draft convention. These doubts have matured over the years. The intense

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

involvement of my delegation in the evaluation of the many national trial inspections has given us ample opportunity to take a close look at the provisions of annex II to article VI.

The NTI exercise taught us a limited lesson, namely that the inspections envisaged in annex II to article VI in the draft convention could technically be implemented. The Committee chose to stop at that conclusion. The national trial inspections as designed, however, could not serve to demonstrate that such inspections were effective in terms of an overall verification objective. Only a few delegations commented openly on the apparent futility of "crawling around one single reactor or production line" for a day when a number of similar reactors on the premises were undeclared and not even available for any kind of verification except on challenge. The doubts, which everyone that carried out an NTI must have felt, were however expressed by some through proposals for additions to the system in the shape of ad hoc inspections.

While discussing these proposals my delegation gradually came to the conclusion that an imperfect system would hardly get any better by adding to it. Instead, we started to look for ways and means to amend the present system in such a way that a comprehensive and unified approach could be taken to the chemical industry in its entirety. In doing so we had to depart from an imperfect material-balance verification of a narrow segment of the relevant industry to follow a verification concept that creates transparency in the entire industry concerned, combined with selective on-site verification efforts, either directed or at random. The outline given in CD/1053 is thus a proposal in its own right, which should be discussed and judged on its own merits and not in the light of provisions in the "rolling text" or other proposals under discussion.

The second thing this proposal is not is an unravelling of the "rolling text", an undoing of work done. This new approach is, rather, a redirection within a given framework. It builds on what has been already achieved or discussed, including experience from national trial inspections. Furthermore, the proposal in CD/1053 can contribute to solving some difficult outstanding issues. Thus the present schedule 2 verification in the "rolling text" cannot be said to be really agreed until the issues of modalities for determining the frequency of inspections and the actual contents of schedule 2 have been resolved. And those are major and difficult tasks. The approach in CD/1053 would resolve the issue of frequency and would permit a quick and easy compromise on the contents of the schedules. Finally, in the view of my delegation, the incorporation of CD/1053 into the "rolling text" would not require any major effort.

Far from re-opening a closed chapter, the outline in CD/1053 would permit the Conference to conclude one of the most difficult unresolved parts of the chemical weapons negotiations, namely how to create a sufficient degree of confidence that capabilities in the chemical industry are not misused for purposes prohibited by the convention, without undue intrusiveness and interference in perfectly legitimate industrial activities, and without causing unacceptable costs to the States parties.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

As I have stated, CD/1053 is in the first place an outline in which the details are to be developed. Discussion of it should therefore first focus on its basic concepts. Among its basic concepts I would like to underline the obligation to declare all CW-capable plant sites, whether or not they actually produce listed chemicals, and thereby the undertaking to accept short-notice on-site inspections at any of these. Such inspections should be streamlined and aimed primarily at verifying declarations on planned activities and the absence of activities that should have been declared. It is of particular importance to note that such inspections, according to the proposal, would focus on ongoing activities instead of trying to verify past activities. This helps to avoid unnecessary anomalies and ambiguities.

Hence we have on the one hand, broader openness and transparency than hitherto contemplated, and on the other hand less intrusiveness and interference in those cases where an actual inspection is carried out. My delegation proposes to identify CW-capable facilities through the use of certain chemical conversion processes. It might not be possible to use this classification absolutely unambiguously for each and every plant site. It is the view of my delegation, however, that a list of chemical conversion processes would be sufficiently clear to implement obligations under the convention. The responsibility to define exactly how the obligation to declare should be implemented in each State party could be entrusted to national legislation. Certainly, guidelines could be recommended through consultative multilateral work in the preparatory commission.

The negative verification approach, coupled with the absence of facility agreements in CD/1053, goes a long way towards streamlining the actual inspections and responding to legitimate concerns regarding confidentiality in industry. In fact, Sweden has carried out a national trial inspection on the basis of the approach taken in CD/1053. The result was encouraging. The inspectors were satisfied with the verification result - the absence of any production of listed chemicals - and the facility was particularly satisfied at the absence of a facility agreement, the elaboration of which would have required the facility to provide sensitive process information in written form.

Many delegations have asked questions regarding the selection of facilities for inspection. In the view of my delegation this problem is not of major importance. The overall approach, including the declaration régime, the concentration on production, the definition of CW-capable industry and the similar treatment of schedules 2 and 3, should be discussed first. Were those elements to be accepted, the selection principles could certainly be negotiated without too much difficulty.

It has been natural for my delegation to build on the present annex II in providing for obligatory inspections in those facilities that actually produce schedule 2 and schedule 3 chemicals. In addition, it is proposed that inspections should take place in these as well as in other CW-capable facilities through a system which blends directed efforts with random selection. We think all of these elements may be necessary. How actually to combine them - a higher or lesser degree of random selection - can certainly be discussed. But again, in the view of my delegation, this is a practical detail rather than a matter of principle in our proposal.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

CD/1053 is largely self-explanatory. I have therefore only tried briefly to comment further on some of the salient points and to dissipate any possible misunderstanding of the paper, its contents and objectives. It is now in the hands of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We look forward to more formal discussion of it.

CD/PV.582

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Mr. KRALIK (Czechoslovakia):

... Mr. President, you have invited us to avoid topics not belonging to this forum. It is a justified appeal, justified because it gives us the chance to devote more attention to the subjects really pertaining to disarmament. No doubt, the Conference cannot remain indifferent to the fact that there are growing apprehensions of the use of chemical and other non-conventional weapons. And this, above all, in those countries where the renowned nuclear mushroom has not appeared yet, but where an equally terrifying ecological bomb with boundless consequences for the flora and fauna of a region compared at one time to the biblical Eden has already exploded.

The assurance of some experts that the potential aggressor is not sufficiently technically prepared to use chemical weapons is, doubtless, a very meagre consolation. History teaches us the very opposite, and that is why I would like to mention in this connection the far-sighted message of Winston Churchill. With prophetic words this great statesman addressed humanity soon after Hitler's ruthless annexation of Austria and his brutal violation of Czechoslovakia, and before his preparations to attack Poland.

"Is he going to try to blow up the world or not? The world is a very heavy thing to blow up! An extraordinary man at a pinnacle of power may create a great explosion, and yet the civilized world may remain unshaken. The enormous fragments and splinters may clatter down upon his own head and destroy him ... but the world will go on".

And the world went on. But at what a price! We recall it bitterly - in Europe as well as in the other continents. That is the reason why the new blows of destruction are not only a matter of apprehension for the Middle East nations. The best remedy against fear is positive behaviour. Therefore, I believe that this Conference should also take a positive step. Following the example of the group of 11 Latin American countries, and developing the ideas of President Mitterrand and other statesmen, we could, for example, renew the

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(Mr. Králík Czechoslovakia)

initiative we were talking about last year. As an example, the Conference could possibly initiate a joint declaration by the member States of the Conference on Disarmament and those having observer status, undertaking not to be the first to use chemical weapons during the period of negotiations on the CWC.

I would like to devote my statement today to questions concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons (CW) and the finalization of the chemical weapons convention (CWC). In recent years, the Ad Hoc Committee on CW has moved toward completion of the CWC. However, there are certain open questions to be solved, some of them of a technical nature and some of a political character. In respect of both - political and technical - different working papers have been distributed dealing with various aspects of the future CWC. In the interests of openness and - if possible - obtaining more information from the States parties to the future CWC, the majority of delegations, including Czechoslovakia (in document CD/949) have presented working papers about their chemical potential. However, with a view to the future development of the "rolling text", a more detailed assessment of the needs of inspectors and financial aspects, and clarification of some technical questions, in my last statement in August 1990 our delegation announced a new document. The document contains very detailed data on Czechoslovakia's chemical potential, including not only qualitative but also quantitative data on the production, processing, consumption, export and import of chemicals falling under the scope of the future CWC. This document, numbered CD/1048, has just been distributed.

Let me say a few words about the philosophy of our approach. As stated in the past, and I can repeat it once again, Czechoslovakia has no CW. Our country also intends, and this is well known, to be an original party to the CWC. That is why we approach the CWC very seriously. Today I wish to inform you that we synthesize compounds on schedule 1, as you can see from the document distributed, of course in much smaller quantities than those permitted by the proposals contained in the present "rolling text".

In a spirit of good will and on a voluntary basis, we also declare and specify the facilities, including their owners and locations. We believe that after this declaration there will be a clearer picture of the verification requirements of the future CWC in one country. We hope for similar openness from other States because these data, taken together, are connected with personnel, equipment and other needs for implementation of the CWC. Let me inform distinguished delegations that these data can also be verified in a very simple way. Last year, bilateral talks were held between the United States Embassy in Prague and our Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and on 17 December 1990 - on the basis of an agreement - United States specialists visited a Czechoslovak military facility in Slovakia used for synthesis of super-toxic lethal chemicals. As a result of this visit it was confirmed that the schedule 1 chemicals produced cannot be considered to be CW. For the same purpose, the commander of the facility authorized the use of a computerized data base to review the production of chemicals in a year selected at random from a 10-year period. The professionalism of the facility and its workers were appreciated. This high level of professionalism of Czechoslovak scientists can be documented now on the basis of the activities of a small but qualified group of military specialists in the Gulf.

(Mr. Králik, Czechoslovakia)

All these data serve as evidence of Czechoslovakia's interest in finalizing the CWC as soon as possible. More evidence of our real concern for chemical disarmament is provided by the withdrawal of our reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, announced by Foreign Minister Dienstbier of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic at the forty-fifth United Nations General Assembly.

To illustrate further our efforts in preparation for the CWC, I also wish to inform you of the establishment of a working group for preparatory work on a national committee for the future CWC. We are now in the process of forming this committee, and following its initial activities we shall inform the CD of the practical results.

As far as practical verification is concerned, I would also like to point out that we are willing to invite interested delegations, on a bilateral basis, to visit the facility presented in document CD/1048, and we are able to extend the spectrum of facilities which can be visited at other Czechoslovak establishments dealing with CW-related topics.

My delegation looks forward to and counts on the completion of our CW negotiations as soon as possible, probably this year. The revised "rolling text" provides a unique basis for redoubling our common efforts. The regrettable consequences of the events taking place in the Gulf are pushing us towards the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. I would like to assure the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Serguei Batsanov, the new Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, of my delegation's full support and co-operation in its further deliberations and in his very important task. At the same time I would like to express appreciation and respect to Ambassador Hyltenius and his colleagues on the Swedish delegation for the excellent work they have done during the last year. In full awareness of the importance of the words of Albert Camus - "La vraie générosité envers l'avenir, consiste à tout donner au présent" - I wish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons much success in its future activities.

CD/PV.582

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Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): Mr. President, I am pleased to take the floor for the first time at this Conference under your presidency, in particular because of the friendly ties that have existed for so long between our two countries.

This is a sombre period in which to be assuming duties as Ambassador for Disarmament. But it is also a time when the opportunities and the necessity for disarmament and restraints on arms transfers are more apparent than ever. The war in the Gulf is a tragic reminder that the enormous improvement in the international environment which emerged in 1989 does not necessarily or inevitably lead to greater peace and stability in every region. On the contrary, one of the ironic effects of the ending of the cold war is that in regions outside Europe the security environment may well have become more complex and more difficult to calculate. The emerging world, one commentator

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

has said, "is likely to lack the clarity and stability of the cold war, and to be a more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities". This will be particularly so if pressures from regional arms races result in the further proliferation of conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the spread of missile technology. With the experience of recent weeks, the international community will expect these questions to be addressed with renewed vigour.

Under these circumstances, the relevance and salience of the work of this Conference has increased. The threat of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war makes the achievement of a complete ban of chemical weapons for all times and in all environments even more urgently required. I will therefore address chemical weapons issues principally in this statement today.

The Australian Government is fully committed to a ban which would make chemical weapons illegal and which would prohibit their use. We believe our security and that of our neighbours would be enhanced by a binding multilateral commitment which assured us all that we would not face the threat of these horrible weapons. We believe that the international political conditions exist to bring such a ban into effect by concluding these negotiations. We hope in this final stage of the convention negotiations that we will recapture in 1991 the spirit that was evident two years ago at the Paris Conference and 18 months ago at the Canberra Conference, when Governments and the chemical industry committed themselves to that same objective.

We recognize however that there is a limit what officials here in Geneva may be able to achieve through the processes of negotiation and that higher-level involvement may be necessary to provide the political direction to break through the remaining problems. We therefore support calls for a meeting at ministerial level.

As we see it, the purpose of such a meeting would be to overcome political impasses in the negotiations and to give final instructions to permit the conclusion of a balanced treaty package. This requires careful preparation of the elements of such a package. It could be that we will need to prepare options so that ministers would be able to assess which proposals are both feasible in their impact on industry and credible in their contribution to collective security. A second reason for suggesting and supporting a ministerial-level meeting would be to help promote universal adherence to it. As a newcomer to this Conference I observe that there is a considerable part of the world which is not represented here. Even amongst Governments which are here represented there are different constituencies in different countries which will need to be educated about the treaty. This means there is a significant "selling job" ahead of us to have a treaty supported as widely as possible amongst Governments and as broadly as possible within Governments.

Of course participation in the deliberations of this Conference is not limited to its 39 member States. We were pleased to see the Conference approve, on 31 January, the application for observer status of 34 nations. We would have been even happier if that number had been larger, particularly as we approach the final phase, of the negotiations of a multilateral chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

Clearly one of the most efficient and productive ways to understand the objectives and the political, legal and practical implications of a future CWC is through active participation in the negotiations themselves. In practice, this opportunity has been realized by a number of observer delegations, and especially in our CWC negotiations. Observer States can and do participate both through the submission of working papers and orally in the proceedings of the CWC Ad Hoc Committee and its working groups. During the course of the negotiations in 1991 we would encourage non-member States to make known their views on specific aspects of the "rolling text" of concern to them so that they can be considered fully.

Another approach to promoting universality that has made sense to Australia has been to engage in a serious dialogue with our neighbours in the Asia/Pacific areas about this treaty and what it would imply for them. I had the privilege of being present in Brisbane in November 1990 at the second regional seminar against chemical weapons hosted by the Australian Government. There were 23 regional States present of whom only three are colleagues here in the CD; that is Indonesia, Burma and ourselves. It was apparent that there is a big gap in understanding this far-reaching and complex treaty between those of us who sit in this room and who are familiar in detail with its concepts and its specific provisions, and those busy government officials in other countries who are not here but who nevertheless will be required to undertake the considerable administrative and commercial requirements that the convention will impose.

In asking Governments to accept those requirements we need to be clear that we are delivering tangible security benefits in return. This means to our minds that the concepts and working arrangements that are embodied in the treaty particularly in the area of verification must not be designed to be so elaborate or to be required to cover such highly theoretical possibilities that they put at risk those benefits. Ultimately the treaty like all treaties can only bind with ropes of paper. If there is not the political willingness to abide by its provisions then its internal mechanisms cannot force proper behaviour on States. But on the other hand, a well-balanced, sensible, clear treaty can establish norms and give confidence to all its adherents that its benefits of enhanced security and equal commercial impact will be realized.

In order to achieve that equal commercial impact, the Australian Government has actively sought collaboration with the international chemical industry not as a partner with us here in the negotiations but as an interested and knowledgeable resource on whom much of the impact of this convention will fall. A recent example of productive Government-industry exchanges was the meeting in January 1991 in Bangkok of the ASEAN Chemical Industries Club at which a colleague from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was able to give a presentation on the state of our negotiations here. It is also pleasing that this Conference has had further involvement with industry over the past year. And may I say that we welcome very much the ideas put forward by Sweden this morning in document CD/1053? We will examine them sympathetically and closely.

For our part, the Australian Government and the Australian chemical industry will continue to look for opportunities to continue this dialogue with our regional neighbours so that all States in our region will be well

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

prepared to become adherents to the completed convention. In this context, the Australian Government intends to host a workshop for regional chemists in Melbourne in the middle of this year with the aim of providing the necessary background and training to those technical advisers to Governments who will be required to complete declarations and assemble technical data. We are indebted to our Finnish colleagues for the model they have established and without shame we have adapted their work for our own region. May I add here that we admire the work that Dr. Rautio and her experts continue to produce? Associated with the workshop in Melbourne for regional chemists we plan to hold a multilateral trial inspection of a chemical plant there. We welcome the intention of the Governments of Venezuela and Nigeria to engage in similar exercises aimed at raising consciousness of the benefits and the requirements of the convention, and would encourage other members of this Conference to undertake similar exercises in their regions as tangible ways of soliciting support and promoting universal adherence to the concluded convention.

Australia has also been putting into place the administrative structure that will be needed once the convention comes into effect. We have found this to be no simple matter with a federal constitution and varying State and local government regulations. In the hope that our experiences may be of use to other nations, I have asked the secretariat to distribute today as a Conference document CD/1055, a strategy paper outlining how we have approached the establishment of our national chemical weapons convention secretariat, and we will look forward to the document that our Czechoslovak colleague has foreshadowed earlier this morning giving us details of Czechoslovakia's experiences in the same area.

During 1990 under the able leadership of Ambassador Hyltenius, good progress was made in cleaning up the "rolling text" in a way which makes it internally more consistent, concise and readable. One major impediment to the cleaning-up process and to substantive progress in the negotiations has been a large number of unattributed footnotes, in many cases their authorship now unknown and *raison d'être* forgotten as the years of negotiating have rolled on. In the past the CD tradition, as I understand it, was not to attribute footnotes. The state of the negotiations is now, I believe, such that it would be useful to be able to identify the originators of footnotes in order to facilitate their removal if there is no reason for them to remain, or to help us understand more fully the authors' thinking in order to find a solution as these negotiations conclude. In brief, we propose that all delegations use the first session of this year's work in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to identify footnotes they have inserted in the "rolling text" and to transmit these to the secretariat for compilation and distribution to all the participants. The secretariat could also assist if it is able to identify old footnotes to the extent that its records permit it do so. Any footnotes not so "claimed" should simply be deleted. Once this process has been completed, we would be in a much better position to tackle in a more purposeful way the substance of the remaining attributed footnotes.

Another matter which is of great concern to the Australian Government is that the provisions of the treaty relating to the destruction of existing chemical weapons should ensure there is a clear commitment to environmentally safe procedures. Our view is that the provisions of the convention should be developed on this point. This is a particular concern to Australia and to

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

nations of the Pacific because of the operation of the CW destruction facility at Johnston Atoll. Australia supports that facility's operations on the basis that its scope is limited to the destruction of the stockpiles currently there and that its operation continues in a manner which is fully compatible with environmental safety. This is a matter on which the Australian Prime Minister has taken a direct interest and to which he is personally deeply committed.

Stepping back from the actual provisions of the "rolling text" and ways to bring these negotiations to an early conclusion Australia believes the threat posed by the spread of chemical weapons is regrettably growing and not just in the Middle East. This concern underlines the urgency of the task before us and gives particular point to our security concerns which can only be met by a multilateral, verifiable, broadly supported convention. I am pleased to advise today that Australia will be an original signatory to such a convention.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany): A number of countries have reported to the Conference on Disarmament the outcome of national chemical weapons practice challenge inspections, including the Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany. All these exercises were intended to test the procedures that we have already worked out in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, in order to draw lessons from practical experience and thus contribute to the completion of an effective challenge inspection régime by providing a better understanding of the problems involved. Most recently Canada and the Netherlands introduced in CD/1052 the report on their joint trial challenge inspection at a military base in Germany. Today I would like to introduce, on behalf of both the United Kingdom and Germany, a report on two joint CW practice challenge inspections carried out in military facilities. The detailed report on the outcome of these exercises is tabled as document CD/1056 - working paper CD/CW/WP.330.

In view of the extensive experience both countries had already gained in the course of their previous national practice challenge inspections (PCIs), the two joint exercises, one in each country, were intended to give added realism to the PCI concept, to re-examine once more the conclusions they had reached so far, and to see what further lessons could be learned. The first exercise was held in the Federal Republic of Germany from 21 to 23 May 1990 at an air force base. The exercise was conducted under joint Anglo-German control, with the United Kingdom providing the inspection team and challenging State observer, and the Federal Republic the home team. The second exercise was held in the United Kingdom from 18 to 21 June 1990 at an ammunition storage facility. This exercise was also held under joint control, but with the roles reversed. Both countries concluded that the exercises had been conducted in a very positive and co-operative spirit, and that a number of lessons had been learned, both in confirming the conclusions that had been reached in their respective national PCIs, and in providing new insights and perspectives on the issue of challenge inspection.

Of the multitude of lessons learned, which include further practical experience in sample-taking and the use of instrumentation, like X-ray and mobile analytical equipment, and which are reported and discussed in detail in the report, let me highlight here only two of the principal conclusions drawn. Firstly, the two joint exercises have confirmed for both countries the key importance of the concept of challenge inspections, based on short notice as well as access to any challenged site, as an effective means for deterring circumvention of, as well as ensuring compliance with, the chemical weapons convention. Secondly, the joint exercises have demonstrated once more that, using managed access techniques in an intelligent and inventive way, inspectors are able to obtain the relevant information they seek, while sensitive information unrelated to chemical weapons remains protected. This has proved to be particularly true in applying the random selective access proposals elaborated in the United Kingdom paper, CD/1012.

(Mr. von Wagner, Germany)

The series of national PCIs in Germany will soon be continued in a chemical plant site, from which we expect to gain a better understanding of the problems related to the application of challenge inspections in chemical industry.

Finally, let me use this opportunity to express my gratitude to all military and civilian authorities of the United Kingdom involved in the two joint practice challenge inspections for their outstanding co-operation and support in the preparation and conduct of these exercises.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): As this is the first time I take the floor under your presidency, may I begin by congratulating you on your accession to the Chair of our Conference? We are all benefiting from the wise leadership you are giving us.

The distinguished Ambassador of Germany has just introduced a report on two joint chemical weapons trial challenge inspections held by Germany and the United Kingdom (CD/1056). Ambassador von Wagner has already described this collaborative work in some detail. I would only make two comments.

First I would emphasize the excellent co-operation between the officials, German and British, who carried out the two joint trials. We for our part found working together with our German colleagues gave a most valuable additional dimension to both trials.

You may recall that prior to these two joint trials, the United Kingdom had undertaken six national trial challenge inspections, and we reported on these in CD/1012. My authorities found that the experience gained in the joint German/United Kingdom trials confirmed the earlier conclusions from our own national trials as regards both the high value of challenge inspection as part of the verification process and the efficacy of managed access techniques. Ambassador von Wagner has rightly emphasized this aspect, and I endorse what he has said. Our experience in this respect seems to have been similar both to that of our German partners and to that described in the report on the joint trial challenge inspection held by Canada and the Netherlands which was tabled by the distinguished Ambassadors of those two countries on 31 January.

(Mr. Ngoubeyou, Cameroon)

... Turning to chemical weapons, I should point out that the report presented by Ambassador Hyltenius, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, shows the substantial progress that has been achieved in the elaboration of the draft convention on chemical weapons. Here we would like to congratulate Ambassador Hyltenius for his tremendous contribution. The importance of such a legal instrument in formalizing the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, particularly in the light of events in the Gulf, needs no further demonstration. That is why we hope that under the enlightened guidance of Ambassador Batsanov, the Ad Hoc Committee will make every effort to settle the highly complex political and technical questions that have still to be resolved and reach agreement on the substance of this international convention which we have awaited with such impatience. The Cameroonian delegation, which will again be participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee this year, will make its modest contribution to the search for compromise solutions.

Here it is appropriate to stress the value of CW trial inspections such as those carried out jointly at the Canadian military base at Lahr in Germany by the Netherlands and Canada. Such trials make it possible to verify the applicability of the provisions of the protocol on inspection procedures, to initiate participants into techniques for implementing the future convention and to promote understanding among States. We hope that the Conference will be in a position to achieve concrete progress in finalizing the text of the convention on chemical weapons. Likewise, since there is no fundamental objection in the Conference to the idea of an international convention aimed at providing non-nuclear-weapon States with assurances against the use or threat of use of such weapons, even if the difficulties involved in developing a common approach are still great, Cameroon hopes that the members of the Conference will redouble their efforts to study further the different approaches that have been envisaged in order to overcome the difficulties, reach an agreement as soon as possible and conclude effective international arrangements relating to the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

... Referring to item 4 of our agenda, let me begin by saying that my delegation's basic position was well reflected in the statement of the distinguished delegate of Peru on behalf of the Group of 21 a few days ago. The future convention, while safeguarding civilian chemical industry and promoting international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of chemicals, must in the first place be designed to achieve the total destruction of existing arsenals and outlaw the use of these abhorrent weapons. Given the long-standing loathing of these weapons by the world community, which is now increased by the threat of the possible use of these

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

weapons on the battlefield during the present war, the Conference now faces the critical historic task of bringing about a treaty banning the use, possession, production and development of these weapons.

There are some issues left to be solved in order to conclude the convention. The main task at the current session of the Conference, as far as chemical weapons are concerned, is that of finding solutions in principle to those few issues where there is as yet no agreement, mainly the question of universal adherence. For this purpose the future convention must provide for systematic and total destruction of all chemical weapons within a specific period. The legitimate concern for the security of non-possessor States should be addressed in a way which ensures that the implementation of the convention will not create any new imbalance which might undermine their security concerns. Those States which do not possess or intend to possess chemical weapons for their military and defence purposes, which I believe comprises the majority of States in the globe, should not be in the position of being caught off guard and finding that, at the end of the destruction period, certain States parties are allowed to retain their chemical weapons stocks. My delegation will find it difficult to support a draft convention which permits the existence of these weapons. The political cost of protesting at a later stage will be too high for a country like mine, which has so far scrupulously observed its obligations under any treaty relating to disarmament.

Indonesia has consistently supported the role played by the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security at regional as well as global levels. For that reason, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia hosted the United Nations Regional Disarmament Workshop for Asia and the Pacific in Bandung from 28 January to 1 February 1991. The convening of the workshop, in co-operation with the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, took place under the mandate of United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/151 H. The programme for this workshop covered a wide range of issues which are of deep concern to the entire world. These include peace and security in Asia and the Pacific, global disarmament to strengthen the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the chemical weapons convention, regional disarmament efforts and a proposal to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and conflict resolution in the Asia-Pacific region. I am hopeful that the results of these deliberations will contribute substantially to the region's comprehension of these issues, and more specifically that it will also contribute to the implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/151 H concerning the promotion of regional disarmament training and advisory services.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

... There is no valid reason to justify the indefinite postponement of the start of negotiations. Nor are member States of the Conference on Disarmament in a position to sacrifice deep-seated positions of principle, based on democratic sentiments of their peoples, while awaiting the bon vouloir of one or two delegations. Starting negotiations on a CTBT does not necessarily oblige member States of the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a treaty in six months or a year. As in the area of chemical weapons, where nobody doubts the good faith of the States that are represented here, negotiations on a CTBT could very well take a few years to reconcile positions that are still divergent as regards the structure and scope of the future CTBT. Nevertheless, my delegation is concerned that a degree of intolerance and inflexibility persists with regard to a matter that would in no way tie the hands of member States, but does definitely jeopardize the realization of an aspiration that is based on international law and the demands of the peoples of other countries and the obligations incumbent on members of the Conference on Disarmament.

(The President)

I should like now to turn to agenda item 4. The secretariat has also circulated today a draft decision which is contained in document CD/WP.401, concerning the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I now put document CD/WP.401 before the Conference for decision. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now turn to the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee. I understand that there is consensus on the appointment of Minister Serguei Batsanov of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. I invite you to formalize that decision.

It was do decided.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to extend congratulations to Minister Batsanov on behalf of the Conference on his appointment to the chairmanship of that subsidiary body. I further wish him a successful tenure of office in the negotiations on one of the priority items on our agenda.

I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, as Co-ordinator for the Group of 21 on item 4.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): On behalf of the Group of 21, I would like to make the following statement with regard to the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. With your permission, Mr. President, I shall read out the statement in English.

(continued in English)

"On 7 February 1991 the Group of 21 made a statement with regard to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It set forth its position in relation to the necessity of including the question of the total prohibition of use of chemical weapons in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons that we have just re-established. The Group of 21 has joined the consensus this morning on the draft mandate proposed in order to ensure the prompt resumption of the important work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. However, we deeply regret that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons does not include specific reference to the prohibition of use of chemical weapons. The Group of 21 continues to believe that, as the draft convention covers the issue of the prohibition of use, this should also be clearly reflected in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee."

(Mr. Antyukhin, USSR)

... In connection with the decision just adopted by the Conference, to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and appoint the head of the Soviet delegation, S.B. Batsanov, as Chairman of the Committee for the coming year, the Soviet delegation would like to express its deepest gratitude to all delegations for the great confidence that they have placed in us.

S.B. Batsanov has asked me to convey to you that he regards this appointment first and foremost as a recognition of the role which the Soviet Union is playing both in the talks aimed at the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and in the efforts being made by the international community in other fields of arms limitation and disarmament. He has asked me to assure all the distinguished representatives that he will make every effort to ensure that 1991 is a year of substantial progress towards a decision on what we view as one of the most urgent items on the agenda of the Conference - saving mankind from the threat of chemical warfare. The urgency of this task is confirmed by the dramatic events which are now occurring in the Persian Gulf region. The delegation of the USSR listened carefully to the substantive statement made by the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati. It contains a number of points which all of us should give serious thought to. Furthermore, the war in the Gulf, as we see it, clearly demonstrates that we are seriously behind schedule in drafting a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In these circumstances it is obvious that all of us should once again take a critical look at our fundamental attitude to the convention and take the necessary political decisions to ensure full and unreserved support for the future convention on the part of all participants in the negotiations. This is the guarantee of success.

Unfortunately, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, S.B. Batsanov, will be away from Geneva until Monday for previously planned consultations. He asked me to say on his behalf that in order to perform effectively the functions of Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, he intends to co-operate extensively with all interested delegations participating in the talks both as members of the Conference and as non-members. The goal of such co-operation, as he sees it, is to try to lay the foundations which on the one hand will contribute to the achievement of a generally acceptable compromise on outstanding issues connected with the draft convention, reflecting a balance between the interests of the different parties in the negotiations, and on the other hand will guarantee the effectiveness and universality of the future convention.

(continued)

(Mr. Antyukhin, USSR)

We feel bound to point out that the circumstances which helped to bring the negotiations to the very significant stage they have now reached did not come about by accident. A considerable personal contribution was made here by the distinguished representatives of States who have served as previous chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In this connection, I would like to refer in particular to the last Chairman, the Ambassador of Sweden, Ambassador C.-M. Hyltenius, whose pragmatism, openness, intuition and, when necessary, stubbornness, played a substantial role during the 1990 session of the Ad Hoc Committee in the achievement of important results on the basis of which we now have to make the last breakthrough to the signing of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

I would also like to inform you that the representative of the USSR to the Conference on Disarmament has received instructions from his Government to the effect that, if elected Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, he should actively promote negotiations, devoting special attention to finding solutions on key political issues leading to the completion of work on the multilateral convention.

In conclusion, S.B. Batsanov has asked me to inform the distinguished delegates that with the agreement of the secretariat of the Conference, the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will be held next Tuesday, 19 February at 3 p.m. in room V.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese):

... Under your able guidance, Mr. President, steady new progress has been made in the work of the Conference. In addition to other ad hoc committees, the ad hoc committees on an NTB, chemical weapons and outer space have been re-established today. New decisions have been taken on important agenda items such as nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. In this connection, I wish to extend our congratulations to you as well as to the Conference. Our felicitations also go to Ambassador Chadha of India, Mr. Batsanov, head of the Soviet delegation, and Ambassador Moritán of Argentina on their appointment as chairmen of the three committees. We are convinced that with their outstanding skills and rich experience, they will guide the committees to new achievements. Here I would like to offer them as well as the officers of the Conference the close co-operation of the Chinese delegation. At the same time I would like to express once again our thanks to Ambassador Donowaki, Ambassador Hyltenius and Ambassador Shannon, the chairmen of the three ad hoc committees in 1990, and their officers, for their outstanding work and contributions.

The principled stands of the Chinese delegation on the nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the prevention of nuclear war, chemical weapons and outer space, including our position on the mandate of

(Mr. Hou, China)

those ad hoc committees, are consistent and well known to everyone, and therefore I will not elaborate. I would like to emphasize here that it has been the common objective cherished and pursued by people all over the world to free the world from chemical weapons. The conclusion of the negotiations on a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons is an important task entrusted to the Conference on Disarmament by the international community. The current developments in the international situation have further proved the importance and urgency of accomplishing this historic task at an early date. The Chinese delegation would like to reiterate that the key to the success of our negotiations on a chemical weapons convention lies in firm adherence to the fundamental objective, namely the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. It is a matter of course that an unconditional ban on the use of chemical weapons and the thorough destruction of all chemical weapons should be included. This is the common ground for the whole negotiation process. We are convinced that so long as all parties to the negotiations adhere to this commitment by conducting earnest and pragmatic negotiations and fully demonstrate their political will, we will surely attain our goal.

It is the set objective of China to work actively for the early conclusion of such a convention. The Chinese delegation will, as always, continue to co-operate with other delegations in a constructive and earnest manner in our joint efforts to achieve the early conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons.

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(The President)

... The decision we have just taken on agenda item 4 once again signifies the spirit of compromise displayed by all groups and delegations. I do hope that, as the President of Sri Lanka stated in his message to the Conference, the demonstrated willingness to get on with the work of conclusively negotiating a treaty on this subject will augur well for the early realization of the convention. The meticulous care and skill with which the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Batsanov, has embarked upon his onerous duties make us confident that the Committee will make decisive progress this year.

(The President)

... It is my view that the conclusion of the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention is within reach. The Ad Hoc Committee will resume its work today. The current conflict in the Middle East has once again illustrated the importance and urgency of these negotiations.

(Mr. Jeszenszky, Hungary)

... With remarkable intensity the Conference on Disarmament is performing its task of elaborating a multilateral convention on the comprehensive and total prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles. The problem of chemical weapons is, of course, only one of several items on the agenda of the Conference. There are other items, many of them highly important, on which subsidiary bodies are now functioning but where no major breakthrough has been achieved over a prolonged period of time. On some other items, even getting down to substantial work has for years been impossible.

The "Decalogue" of the Conference was created to be a wide and flexible framework, covering practically all aspects of disarmament. The present agenda, built on the basis of this Decalogue, concentrates the efforts of the Conference on weapons of mass destruction. Given the enormous destructive power of such weaponry, no reasoning is needed to justify that special attention. Nevertheless, we cannot forget that the nuclear and chemical threats are not the only dangers facing mankind. The Decalogue provides us with a very useful umbrella, and it might be opportune to start thinking whether the present agenda could be developed through a gradual and realistic adjustment in order to face the realities of the world.

(Mr. Jeszenszky, Hungary)

... Most of the security challenges the world has to face today have manifested themselves strikingly in the Gulf war. These include the menace resulting from nuclear and missile proliferation, the possible use of chemical and biological weapons and the introduction of the ecological weapon.

... I am convinced that the persistent threat of chemical weapons represents one of the major dangers with respect to human suffering. I suppose that many of us here were shocked by the pictures showing the frightening skills children acquired in using gas masks. Surely, none of us would like to create a future where such abilities are a prerequisite of human existence and where mankind has to learn to live under the perilous shadow of chemical weapons.

After more than 20 years of negotiations we need no additional arguments in favour of the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. We need action now, decisive and urgent action. This item of the agenda will have to be solved in the near future, despite the obvious fact that answers to major political and technical questions have yet to be found.

For any multilateral disarmament agreement to be viable the widest possible adherence is of crucial importance. In the case of the chemical weapons convention this means the involvement of all States that have declared the possession of chemical weapons and all States that have the technological capability of producing such weapons. In order to achieve the aim of universality the future convention must be attractive in the broadest sense and in no way discriminatory for potential States parties.

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(Mr. Jeszenszky, Hungary)

The future multilateral legal instrument should be equitable in terms of rights and obligations of States parties. In the context of the convention, this entails an unconditional rejection of the use of chemical weapons connected to the obligation to destroy existing chemical weapon stockpiles totally.

I would like at this forum to reiterate once again our commitment to the total prohibition of chemical weapons. Hungary is among the States that have declared their intention to become original parties to the chemical weapons convention. My country declared in 1989 its intention to be in full conformity with the main provisions of the convention still being negotiated. In February 1990, as a measure of openness, we provided detailed data on the activities of our chemical industry as required by the draft provisions of the convention. I am pleased to announce that in document CD/1061 we are repeating this declaration and putting forward all the information required under the future convention. We are convinced that this step will contribute to the cause of negotiations, and we would welcome similar confidence-building measures on the part of other negotiating parties as well.

In my understanding current negotiating efforts are aimed at preparing possible solutions for a number of outstanding political issues related to the future chemical weapons convention. This set of solutions in turn could be formalized by the foreign ministers of States represented in the Conference on Disarmament, with the aim of giving a final push towards the successful conclusion of negotiations. I personally would be pleased to come back to the Conference for a ministerial meeting and share the common satisfaction of contributing to the efforts aimed at finalizing the draft convention.

In considering ways and means to preserve the vitality of the Conference on Disarmament, we could perhaps ponder what other issues are to be taken up after the successful termination of negotiations on chemical weapons. It might be deemed timely to initiate informal contacts amongst members of the Conference to probe different ideas. These informal contacts could and should, in due time, lead to wide agreement on relevant and politically feasible measures, however partial they might initially be.

The ideas presented in my statement are not an endeavour to pre-empt too precipitately such a process, but an effort to promote its timely launching. These ideas are not in the least intended to undermine the very important substantive work currently being conducted in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. Rather, they are meant to highlight the need to preserve the authority of this body by enabling it to face new challenges and helping it to enter into a new phase of its existence. Nature has provided numerous examples proving that inability to adapt to the changing environment is not an advantage in the race for survival, called evolution.

(Mr. Gros-Espiell, Uruguay)

In the statement I delivered to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 4 October 1990 entitled "The vulnerability of peace without disarmament", I said one or two words that with your permission I would like to repeat again:

"The international community must avoid the occurrence of similar dangerous situations in the future. That will be possible only if we accelerate the disarmament process. Uruguay understands that the immediate task is to concentrate on further advancing the regulation and limitation of armaments, whether conventional, nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, radiological or space weapons."

... First of all, therefore, allow me to say a few words on the question of chemical weapons, as it stands today in the view of my Government. We know that from the legal standpoint the present situation on the chemical weapons issue is determined by the existence and applicability of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, a protocol that was supplemented many years later, because this Protocol had emerged from the work of the League of Nations, by the 1972 Convention, drafted within the United Nations and devoted to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their destruction. But it is clear that these two international instruments, which are manifestly important and necessarily applicable, do not by any means exhaust the international agenda on the subject of chemical weapons. For that reason the Paris Conference of 1989 on the prohibition of chemical weapons analysed the problem in the light of the present situation, and concluded that it was necessary to expedite this process in order to complete the legal framework of the total ban on all the aspects of the chemical weapons issue.

CD/PV.584

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(Mr. Gros-Espiell, Uruguay)

In this context, the work of the Conference on Disarmament is obviously of great importance, and today is of a topicality and urgency that cannot be ignored by anyone. The Paris Conference, in the year 1989, on the one hand, recognized the importance and continuing validity of the 1925 Protocol, and at it the States parties to that Protocol solemnly reaffirmed the prohibition as established in it and called upon States that have not yet acceded to it to do so, but underscored, and this is what is important, what I wish to emphasize today, the necessity of concluding, at an early date a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. This is the major challenge we face as far as chemical weapons are concerned at the present time, one that in the light of the current situation it is necessary to expedite with renewed efforts and with sure hopes of arriving as soon as possible at an acceptable solution for the entire international community which will be implemented immediately without fail. In this regard, I wish to refer to the statement by the Group of 21 which was made very recently on 7 February 1991 in the form of an exposé by Peru on behalf of the Group. On this basis, on this awareness of the urgency, the importance, the topicality and this Conference's inescapable commitment to the international community with regard to the chemical weapons issue, my Government hopes that in a short time it will be possible to present this convention that is being so eagerly awaited.

Mr. HANNAH (New Zealand):

... My statement this morning is devoted entirely to the subject of chemical weapons. Specifically, I wish to place before the CD the report of New Zealand's national trial inspection, contained in document CD/1057. Before doing so, however, I would like to make a few general comments on the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention - at this moment the prime focus of the work of this Conference.

New Zealand does not have, and has never had chemical weapons. We do not allow chemical weapons to be stationed on our territory. We are party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and in 1989 we withdrew our reservation to that Protocol which permitted the use of chemical weapons under certain circumstances. We took that step because the New Zealand Government does not now see any circumstances where the use of chemical weapons would be tolerable.

(continued)

(Mr. Hannah, New Zealand)

The possibility that chemical weapons might be used in the Gulf war is of immediate concern. That threat confirms our belief in the need for a convention going far beyond the Geneva Protocol, one which effectively prohibits the development, production, stockpiling as well as the use of chemical weapons. That threat should strengthen the resolve of all of us to conclude such a convention as soon as possible.

It is against such a background that New Zealand's support for a chemical weapons convention should be seen. New Zealand is not a key participant in the negotiations. We have only a fledgling chemical industry and are unable to muster the technical expertise shared by so many here in this room. But we are following the negotiations closely. Our aim is that, once the chemical weapons convention is concluded, New Zealand will have the necessary legislation in place to become an original party. Others have already expressed a similar aim, and we hope many more will do likewise as the negotiations enter their concluding phase.

New Zealand is under no illusions that there still remain crucial political obstacles to be overcome before a chemical weapons convention becomes a reality. We accept that some of those may be beyond the scope of this body. That is why we support the idea of a ministerial conference, later this year, where the necessary political decisions might be taken. It goes without saying that such a conference should be open to all - CD members and non-members alike - who share our common interest in a chemical weapons convention. It is only through universal adherence that the chemical weapons convention will achieve its objective of ensuring that such weapons will never again be used anywhere on this Earth.

My Government's support for the conclusion of a comprehensive, effective, and verifiable chemical weapons convention is shared by the New Zealand chemical industry. As a measure of this support, Government and industry worked together to undertake a national trial inspection in November 1990.

As I have noted, New Zealand has only a small chemical industry, and limited technical resources at its disposal. We are not alone in that. Through discussion at regional meetings we are aware of the burden other small countries believe they will face in implementing the chemical weapons convention. One objective of our trial inspection was therefore to determine how the lessons learned from earlier inspections were applicable to those with more modest chemical industries. Bearing in mind our limited technical resources, a second objective was to examine the auditing aspect of an inspection, both as an independent measure of verification, and in its relationship to scientific monitoring.

The inspection we undertook was conducted at a multi-purpose complex of an agricultural chemical company that produces mainly herbicides. It is the largest of only a few chemical manufacturers in New Zealand. It does not produce any chemicals currently listed under schedule 2 of the "rolling text". For the purposes of the inspection, therefore, para-chloro-ortho-cresol (PCOC) was treated as a schedule 2 chemical. The declared activity at the plant during the inspection was the production of the herbicide sodium 4-chloro-2-methyl phenoxybutyrate (MCPB).

(Mr. Hannah, New Zealand)

The report of the trial inspection is contained in CD/1057. I will restrict my comments today to the two specific objectives mentioned earlier. The inspection demonstrated that commercial practices in today's chemical industry give rise to a myriad of overlapping records that can be audited as a means of verifying legitimate chemical production. The trial inspection clearly showed the effectiveness as a verification tool of a detailed financial and production records audit.

An audit of financial records was undertaken in addition to a production records audit to verify declared activities over an extended period of time (which a site inspection may not be certain to identify). The financial records audit also provided a thorough cross-check of production records in the event of a fraudulent dual accounting system (which we thought would most likely occur in the production domain). The independence of both recording systems provides extensive opportunity for the detection of undeclared activity, and should not be underplayed.

Although relatively straightforward, the records and production audit proved to be the most time-consuming aspect of the trial inspection. In undertaking the audit, a five-point strategy was adopted: (i) preliminary evaluation; (ii) production analysis and evaluation; (iii) financial substantive testing evaluation; (iv) internal control (compliance testing) evaluation; and (v) analytical review evaluation. This strategy, together with a list of documentation required for a production and financial records audit, is detailed in the annex to the report.

It was found that to undertake a records audit an inspector needed experience in both commercial auditing and management/cost accounting from a manufacturing background. A minimum of six to nine working days (depending on the complexities of the operation and number of independent processes) was necessary to complete an audit.

Looking more generally at the resource implications, the trial inspection reinforced for us the lesson that even for a modest chemical industrial facility subject to routine inspection procedures, a high degree of technical instrumentation and a wide variety of skills are needed to properly verify legitimate chemical industry activity. Physical inspection, financial and production records audit, and sample analysis are all essential ingredients of an effective inspection régime.

In undertaking such an exercise New Zealand used the full extent of its technical and scientific capability. It is our view that the resources required to attain such a capability are beyond the scope of many countries and that, accordingly, such countries are likely to face difficulties in meeting chemical weapons convention obligations. Granted the burden of routine and challenge inspections will fall not upon individual Governments, but upon the technical secretariat. But even so, the requirement to establish national authorities with the kind of capabilities I have just listed will not be easy for many.

In its conclusion, the New Zealand report identifies two possible ways to help overcome such difficulties. Firstly, countries need to review the technical/legal/scientific resources their regions possess, and the potential for regional co-operation in implementing the convention. Secondly,

(Mr. Hannah, New Zealand)

development at an early stage of a flexible but standardized methodology of key audit and inspection approaches would be desirable. This would ensure compatibility of inspection treatments, streamlined and effective techniques, and prior determination and preparation of the human resources and equipment required.

Since our inspection report was prepared, we have had the opportunity to study your own delegation's paper, CD/1053, which proposes ways of streamlining schedule 2 inspections. When you introduced that paper at last week's meeting, you expressed some doubts about the cost-effectiveness of schedule 2 verification in the draft convention. We share those concerns and, on the basis of our own experience, are particularly aware of the potential for a verification régime to overburden the national authorities of smaller would-be States parties. We look forward to the proposals in CD/1053 being closely examined by the Ad Hoc Committee.

Unless individual States are confident of their own ability to implement relevant aspects of the chemical weapons convention, there cannot be the necessary international confidence in the convention as a whole. The New Zealand experience is that, for many countries, there will be practical constraints quite different in nature from those facing the major players in the negotiations. We all need to keep these constraints in mind as we begin what all hope will be the year in which a chemical weapons convention is concluded.

I thank the members of the Conference and yourself, Mr. President, for hearing out a rather technical intervention, and I hope it is of assistance to the deliberations on the chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Tomic, Chile)

... I would not wish to conclude this statement without referring briefly to the topics at the centre of the Conference's attention at its present session. I refer to chemical weapons, nuclear testing and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As far as chemical weapons are concerned, my country has repeatedly advocated the prompt signature of a convention expressly prohibiting the production, stockpiling and use of this type of weapons, as well as the complete destruction of those that already exist. We said so in this forum in 1989, and also mentioned the fact at the ministerial conference in Paris. Unfortunately, the political drive that was generated at this latter important meeting has disappeared. My country considers that in order to attain the objective of banning these deadly weapons once and for all, the support of all nations or the great majority of them is necessary.

(Mr. Tomic, Chile)

Universality is an essential prerequisite. Destruction should be complete and immediate, and effective and transparent verification machinery must also be set up. Last December, in keeping with Chile's interest in contributing to the creation of the required climate of international confidence, my delegation circulated, document CD/1042, which constituted a response to the suggested outline for the multilateral exchange of basic data proposed by Germany. With regard to the destruction of stockpiles and its possible negative repercussions on the environment, we are interested in and support Peru's initiative for the inclusion in the draft convention of a chapter on the preservation and cleaning up of the environment. In fact, for several months certain delegations have been proposing a ministerial conference to be held in the near future to define the necessary political guidelines for the finalization of the negotiations. While supporting this idea, we would like to say that invitations to this Conference should in our view be addressed not only to the member States of the Conference on Disarmament, but also to observer States as well as those that are not in either of the two above categories, in order to try to make the convention truly universal.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The statement addressed to the members of the Conference on Disarmament by the participants in the women's conference on the relationship between arms and the environment reads as follows:

... "The Gulf war has underscored the importance for progress on the critical issues before this Conference. We wish to refer specifically to the need for the speedy conclusion of the convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and for their destruction, to the need for further progress in nuclear disarmament, and for the conclusion of a binding international instrument prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities as potential radiological weapons.

CD/PV.586

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Mr. BESANCENOT (France) (translated from French):

... In other areas of arms control too, 1990 saw progress which we hope will rapidly lead to agreements: as regards START, concerning the nuclear weapons of the two major Powers; and as regards the chemical weapons negotiations, which are taking up the bulk of the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Gulf crisis, which involved a serious threat that chemical weapons would be used, showed us, if we needed to be shown, that there was an urgent need to achieve a universal ban on such arms. The Conference on Disarmament must therefore redouble its efforts to devise imaginative wording whereby the final very complex problems involved in such an agreement can be resolved. We are confident that with good will on all sides, it will be possible to finalize this convention in the near future, so as to strengthen security for all.

(Mr. Calovski, Yugoslavia)

... As regards the other priority of this Conference - chemical weapons - Yugoslavia's interest and, we can say, that of the entire Non-Aligned Movement, is to have a decisive step forward taken towards the adoption of a global and comprehensive convention. We are aware that a number of primarily political problems should be solved as soon as possible, since any fundamental advance in the negotiations on the convention depends on them. We would like to have these issues examined and decided upon at a special session of this Conference at ministerial level whenever it is considered that such a session could contribute to the adoption of the convention. We trust we all agree that a universal approach to the convention should be achieved - if possible before the entry into force of the convention. This is the main aim of the proposal Yugoslavia submitted at the last special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, namely that immediately after agreement is reached on the convention a special conference should be convened under the auspices of the United Nations to enable all the member States of the United Nations to adopt and sign the convention.

It is very important that the convention should be an important and attractive enough instrument offering more security to all the signatories. I believe I share the opinion of all of you when I say that, when the convention enters into force, a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, including the prohibition of use, should also enter into force. I hope it

(Mr. Calovski, Yugoslavia)

will not be an exaggeration if I say that in a political sense the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons was adopted two years ago in the Paris Declaration, which is one more reason why the prohibition in the convention should be formulated in such a manner as to eliminate chemical weapons once and for all, and why they should never, under any condition, be legalized again.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

Turning then to the substance of the theme for this week "Arms and the environment" I would like to make several observations which relate to the work we are engaged on here in the Conference. As you will recall, when I spoke to the Plenary on 14 February I said that in Australia's view, the destruction of existing chemical weapons should be carried out in a way that is environmentally safe and that the provisions of the convention should be developed to make clear our collective commitment to such environmentally safe procedures.

The destruction of chemical weapons is not just a political and security objective; it is also an environmental objective. Existing chemical weapons are highly toxic and corrosive and over time threaten to leak from even the most robust containment. There are numerous stories of the leaking of stored chemical weapons or of chemical weapons remaining from previous conflicts which had been dumped or disposed of without being effectively or safely destroyed. Thus the chemical weapons convention when it comes into force will provide positive environmental benefits by ensuring that the world will not face in future environmental hazards from the use or from the merely accidental or inadvertent release of chemical weapons. The Australian Government supports proposals developed by the United States for the safe destruction of its existing chemical weapons stockpiles. We also support the efforts of the Soviet Union to undertake similar activities. We welcome the provisions of their bilateral agreement and look forward to having the same commitment available for multilateral subscription through the completed convention.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

It is my delegation's view that there is undoubtedly a direct link between the arms race and threats to the ecological integrity of the planet. This is the reason that prompted Peru in August last year to propose the inclusion in the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction of a set of specific provisions regarding the protection and cleaning up of the environment, in particular during the process of destruction of the large CW arsenals. This proposal by Peru is contained in document CD/1024, which is before the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

... Let us take a look at the results. In the 12 years' existence of this negotiating forum in its new shape, it has not to date been capable of concluding a single disarmament treaty or agreement on any of the eight items on its agenda. We are negotiating only on the item relating to the chemical weapons ban. And four other items are being discussed in subsidiary bodies, while there is no consensus even to discuss the three remaining items relating to no lesser matters than nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and the comprehensive programme of disarmament. And in the only negotiations under way, we observe the difficulties involved in reaching unanimity, even on issues of minor importance for the future of the convention.

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Mr. CESKA (Austria):

... This is not only a crucial time for international politics, but also for the work of this Conference. In a world where military confrontation still seems to play a continuing and most regrettable role, reductions in military capabilities are of the highest priority. This holds especially true for regions where existing tensions have created a large potential for military conflicts. Therefore, the Conference on Disarmament is called upon to seek rapid and at the same time effective solutions for the items on its agenda. In particular, the early conclusion of work on a global convention banning all chemical weapons is of great importance. The knowledge of the existence of such arsenals and of their terrifying effectiveness was tragically refreshed during the Iraq-Iran war. Most recently, seven weeks of uncertainty about the imminent use of chemical weapons in the Gulf stressed most expressively the seriousness of the threat. Given this experience, an effective, comprehensive, non-discriminatory and universally adhered-to convention as a guarantee for avoiding such situations in the future is in our view a pressing need.

Let me now turn to the actual negotiations on a CW convention and to key issues not resolved thus far. In this context, the work programme which has been proposed for the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons seems to us a very

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(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

constructive approach in as much as it deals with all related questions. It provides for detailed consideration under the three headings of security, verification and organization, and at the same time takes account of their close interrelationship. Therefore, in my remarks, I will follow this working agenda.

The future convention will only be considered successful if it is able to guarantee the security of all States parties. In this regard, the security perceptions of quite different international actors have to be taken into account. Regional security interests demand particular attention under the convention. This seems especially true when considering ways and means of ensuring signature and ratification by all States of a given region. Only if full participation at the regional level is ensured, can universal commitment to the convention be expected. Therefore, particular importance has to be attributed to early involvement by all States in the elaboration of the convention. In this context, it is encouraging to note that an increasing number of non-member States are participating in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The presence of an even greater number of States would create still more confidence and ensure the necessary global attention.

An important aspect of security relates to the question of the total destruction of all chemical weapons. In our view, adequate steps have to be undertaken to guarantee the feasibility of destruction of all chemical weapons within the envisaged time frame. To this end, transfer of necessary technology as well as regional arrangements for co-operation might be envisaged. Any such activities should take place under strict international surveillance. Furthermore, all States should start to redefine their military doctrines in a way that leaves no place for the use of chemical weapons.

As to security concerns, the question of assistance in cases of the use or the threat of the use of chemical weapons is relevant. Adequate provisions should, on the one hand, guarantee rapid assistance in cases where there is an immediate need and, on the other hand, also ensure some form of political guidance for such circumstances.

The second "basket" deals with matters related to verification, which can be considered as the cornerstone of the future convention. Actually, a comprehensive discussion is focusing on solutions elaborated so far and on necessary changes. In our view, the future verification régime has to guarantee the necessary confidence in the convention by adequate and strict surveillance of compliance with the convention by all States. At the same time, the régime should be practical and flexible enough to deal with future developments such as production changes or new scientific knowledge. In this regard, we welcome the current efforts to streamline the overall verification régime while keeping the most important principle intact, i.e. verification of any relevant site anywhere at any time.

As a concrete contribution to these efforts, Austria has submitted working paper CD/1062 (CD/CW/WP.334) dated 21 February 1991, containing three studies related to the verification of non-production of chemical weapons. One study deals with materials monitoring in chemical production facilities, comparing relevant solutions in the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances with the actual approach of the

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

"rolling text". The other two studies deal with the development of a computer program for accounts auditing during inspections of facilities, one giving the theoretical background, the other describing the details of a computer program elaborated for that purpose. My delegation would be interested in any comments, and stands ready to offer any further information.

Turning to the third area, entitled "organization", let me start by elaborating on the question of participation and decision-making within the Executive Council of the future control organization. In our view, adequate geographical distribution of membership should be ensured, while at the same time it might be envisaged that some countries may seek more frequent representation in this organ than others, taking into account their specific interests and responsibilities. The question needs to be considered of whether consensus requirements or veto rights have a place in such an organ.

In the light of the progress achieved in the current negotiations, which will hopefully make it possible to finalize the CW convention in the near future, let me reiterate the readiness of Austria to host the future organization.

The financing of the activities of the future organization will have to strike a balance between political aspects and the technical needs of the organization. In other words, contributions to a general budget encompassing the current costs of activities should be borne by all States parties; contributions to a specific budget for verification activities should be based upon special criteria while still ensuring some form of cost-sharing as an expression of a global commitment to verification.

(The President)

... In connection with the fact that the Soviet representative is performing the duties of President of the Conference from this week onwards, the Foreign Minister of the USSR, A.A. Bessmertnykh, has requested me to convey to the Conference on Disarmament and all the delegations taking part in its proceedings, as well as the Secretary-General of the Conference, his wishes for success in resolving the tasks of the utmost importance which are on the agenda of this forum. He also instructed me to underline the unchanging nature of the Soviet Union's consistent course towards lower levels of military confrontation, and towards real disarmament. As regards the Conference on Disarmament, Minister Bessmertnykh asked me to note that this involves first of all the earliest possible completion of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, ensuring a qualitative shift in considering the problems of the complete prohibition of nuclear tests and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and a constructive search for mutually acceptable solutions on other agenda items of this unique multilateral negotiating forum.

(Mr. Garvalov, Bulgaria)

... Among the concrete items on the agenda my delegation attaches prime importance to the priority of the negotiations to conclude a chemical weapons convention. Bulgaria has declared that it does not possess chemical weapons, that it has no intention whatsoever of acquiring such weapons and that it is ready to sign the future convention immediately. My country has initiated the procedure whereby it will drop its reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. While it is true in principle that negotiations are a give-and-take process, in this particular case Bulgaria is not giving up anything by joining such a convention. From the point of view of its national security Bulgaria can only gain from a convention which will eliminate all existing stocks of chemical weapons, prevent future production of chemical weapons and contain reliable guarantees that it will be strictly complied with, and may earn the widest possible adherence. For us this convention will be even more acceptable should it succeed in solving in the best possible and just way such issues as assistance, economic and technical cooperation in the field of civil chemical industry, and financial and organizational aspects.

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(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

... The spectre of the use of chemical weapons during the Gulf war has dramatically brought to the fore once again the need for the urgent conclusion of a convention on the comprehensive and total prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation shares the concern within the CD and the rest of the international community over the delay in concluding the negotiations. The very high expectations that were generated by the Paris Conference on chemical weapons in January 1989 have yet to be realized. Our negotiations have reached a critical stage where the issues are now being addressed more purposefully than ever before. While my delegation appreciates and indeed respects the concerns of some delegations on a number of decisive issues under negotiation, our overriding consideration should be to ensure that we have a convention that members of the international community will be willing to adhere to and ratify. We therefore welcome the increasing attention paid in the Ad Hoc Committee to the question of universality. Similarly, it is

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(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

important for intensive consultations to be conducted regularly with non-members of the Conference on Disarmament, who do not have the opportunity to examine the provisions of the draft convention thoroughly and its effects on their national security.

My delegation is of the view that when the convention is finally concluded, it is essential to provide a genuine and credible guarantee to parties who do not produce or store chemical weapons in a way that will enhance rather than diminish the security of all States parties. These weapons of mass and indiscriminate destruction are morally reprehensible because their targets are not military installations or physical structures essential to military endeavour. They are always directed against innocent civilians and their environment. In practical terms, it means a convention that includes a very effective verification régime that will instil in States parties the confidence that its provisions are being complied with, or, where this is not so, that violations will be properly detected; a convention that will ensure that, where violations are detected, they will be decisively dealt with; a convention that will in particular be non-discriminatory among the States parties; a convention that will also foster cooperation among States parties, in the chemical industry. Similarly there is a need for genuine safeguards so that the principle of prohibition does not adversely affect chemical industries in the developing countries. My delegation is satisfied that the Ad Hoc Committee has got off to a good start this session under your able guidance. We expect the Committee to intensify its efforts to conclude outstanding work on the convention. The spirit of mutual concession and of mature compromise is required at this stage to overcome the outstanding differences.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

... The optimistic view about the work of the CD that I have just described can be substantiated by taking a careful look at the status of the chemical weapons convention negotiations. It was in 1984, when the United States introduced a draft convention in CD/500, that the concept of mandatory inspections or inspections on request took firm hold as an important mechanism for ensuring the reliability and effectiveness of the CWC. In 1987, as a result of President Gorbachev's "new thinking" diplomacy, the Soviet Union came to support the concept of mandatory inspections. This was already the beginning of the end of the cold war, from which the CWC negotiations received a tremendous boost. Two years later, when the CD still had no CWC and the Iran-Iraq war produced unfortunate instances of the use of chemical weapons, the Paris Conference was convened in January 1989, and then the Canberra Conference later in the same year, in order to encourage the early conclusion of the CWC. The year 1990 was regarded as a critical year for the negotiations. The signing in June of that year of the bilateral United States-Soviet agreement to cease production of CW and to destroy most of their CW stockpiles was indeed a historic step forward, immensely facilitating the CWC negotiations. On the other hand, one has to admit the enormous impact the new concept of inspection on request had in store, because it was to be applied globally, in contrast to the CFE Treaty, which applied only to Europe, and also because it was meant to involve not only military but also civilian industrial facilities. The complexity and sensitivity of the issue was clearly demonstrated when the United States and the Soviet Union failed to agree on the protocol on inspection procedures at the end of last year, in spite of their commitment to do so. Thus it becomes clear that the CD cannot be criticized for its incompetence, or for its failure to take advantage of the ending of the cold war.

Another important factor delaying the negotiations last year was the debate on the question of the universality of the future CWC. In last year's United States-Soviet bilateral agreement, it was agreed that the concept of a residual security stock would be introduced into the draft CWC in order to ensure universal adherence to the future convention. However, the proposal, which amounted to the creation of unequal status for States parties to the future convention between CW haves and have-nots, was bound to be met with strong opposition and resentment from a number of States participating in the negotiations.

I took up the issue of inspections upon request and the issue of universality as the most important issues on which the CWC negotiations were stalled during the course of last year. However, I did not do so out of despair. On the contrary, my delegation was encouraged by the fact that the most crucial issues finally came to be seriously and constructively discussed

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(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

during the course of last year under the able chairmanship of your predecessor, Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius. Similarly, some other remaining issues of importance were tackled energetically and considerable progress was achieved during the course of last year. This year my delegation is pleased to note the prevailing sense among delegations that we are nearing our final goal. The crucial issues of inspection upon request and universal adherence, as well as other similarly important remaining issues, are now being actively pursued under your dedicated and skilful chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee. Working group chairmen and friends of the chair selected by you are also demonstrating devotion and competence. In addition, group co-ordinators are working harder than ever. All these indications show that the momentum is rising. Formal and informal consultations, as well as group and bilateral consultations, are fully geared up to the early achievement of our common goal. Therefore, my delegation does not find it necessary to dwell upon any specific issues in today's plenary statement, except to reaffirm its strong commitment to work, under your able guidance, for the early conclusion of the CWC. I also wish to take this opportunity to remind the Conference that Japan, like the CSCE member States, declared its intention to become one of the original signatory States of the CWC last October during the session of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

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(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

... When we think about the role of the CD in the emerging post-cold-war era, we are all aware that the end of East-West confrontation does not necessarily lead us to a more peaceful and stable world. The unfortunate experience of the Gulf war reminded us of the danger of even more frequent and disastrous regional conflicts. Therefore, the greatest concern of our times is the question of whether and how we can prevent a second and third incident similar to the one Iraq unlawfully started. In this connection, the question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the question of the abnormal build-up of conventional weapons in particular regions, are likely to be focused upon with great attention at every possible opportunity in our international dealings. The relevance of the CD as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament matters will certainly be judged by its ability to meet the concerns of our times as described above. As far as the prevention of weapons of mass destruction is concerned, the early conclusion of the CWC will no doubt become the single most important contribution by the CD for the time being, while any much longer delay in delivering the CWC will cast serious doubt on the competence of the CD. As to biological weapons, a number of delegations appear to take the view that the updating of the BWC by incorporating a workable and reliable verification mechanism would be a natural and urgent task for the CD after the conclusion of the CWC. As for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we have in place the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and the strengthening of the Treaty régime, we have to admit, is not under the responsibility of the CD alone. As to the question of the abnormal build-up of conventional arms in particular regions, the dangers of which we have been reminded of by the latest events in the Gulf, Japan, as a nation that has long enforced a policy of strict control on arms exports, may be in a good position to urge other major suppliers of arms to exercise restraint. However, arms export control is a well-known complex problem. Denial of arms supplies might have a destabilizing effect on those regions where the existing imbalance of forces poses a real threat to the security of some nations in the region. Furthermore, mere restraint in arms transfer naturally works in favour of nations with an arms production capability. In any case, it remains to be seen whether the question of international arms transfers can best be addressed at the CD. On the other hand, we may be able to make a modest step forward by enhancing transparency and openness in international arms transfers. This is one of the so-called confidence-building measures. It has to be applied globally, and still it has great relevance to regional security problems. Furthermore, a study on the question of transparency in international arms transfers now being conducted by a group of experts under the auspices of the United Nations is scheduled to be completed this summer. Although confidence-building measures are not disarmament *per se*, there is no doubt about their usefulness in preventing an arms race, and the CD must be the right forum for looking into the matter with a view to working out appropriate international undertakings. In this way the CD may become more attuned to the requirements of our times.

(continued)

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

When we take a look at our agenda in the CD as adopted (CD/1049), we realize that as many as three items are nuclear-related and that pertinent issues including the BWC are not given any place. Of course, my delegation recognizes the importance of a nuclear test ban, and will continue to work hard for its early realization. None the less, there is no denying that the idea of giving this agenda item such high priority was a by-product of the culmination of the cold war era. Some 10 years ago when there was no realistic possibility of a reduction in nuclear arms, a nuclear test ban, however unachievable it might actually have been, might have had its own appeal as the most important step forward in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Today we find ourselves, let us hope, in a vastly different world. My delegation is aware that the agenda of the CD has its own history. Often it is explained that our agenda is based on the famous "Decalogue", which in turn is said to have taken into account the relevant provisions of the documents of SSOD I and II. Then the question may arise: How come the Decalogue appears to be more flexible, allowing more room for the inclusion of the urgent subjects of our times, including the BWC, as agenda items of the CD? It is against this background that my delegation was pleased to see the resumption of the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the CD under the chairmanship of our esteemed colleague, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan. In this fast-changing world, the CD must certainly work hard to meet the requirements of our times by concluding, as early as possible, the long-standing CWC negotiations, and by placing on its agenda the most appropriate and urgently required items of our times.

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

... Among the items included in its agenda, there is one on which the Conference on Disarmament has made progress in fulfilling its role as a multilateral negotiating body. Let us say that this is the only one on which we have made progress - the issue of chemical weapons. The process of negotiation on the draft convention has been arduous. Many persistent obstacles in the past negotiations have been overcome. Proof of this is the current content of appendices I and II to the "rolling text" of the draft convention. The draft convention sets forth the commitment of all States parties not to use, develop, produce, acquire, stock-pile, retain or transfer chemical weapons, as well as the commitment to their destruction. The scope of the convention is quite clear: the total and complete destruction of chemical weapons. Bearing in mind that there is a prohibition of use contained in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 - a question that has been incorporated in the scope of the future convention - we are concerned that this reference has not yet been included in the mandate of the Committee. Also included is a clear commitment to the total destruction of chemical weapons over a 10-year period. Recognizing this commitment and the scope of the Convention, which is that of total prohibition and destruction, provisions which ensure the maintenance of certain CW arsenals at the end of the destruction period would be unacceptable at this stage of the negotiations. In that context, we reiterate that the fundamental element which must characterize this instrument is that of universality, and to achieve this the scope set by the convention should be that of total and complete prohibition and destruction, establishing no rights for chemical-weapon States to maintain certain arsenals, nor any postponement of the obligation to destroy all chemical weapons as well as CW production facilities. An issue requiring consideration by the Committee relates to the financing of the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Last year Working Group C held consultations on this issue, the results of which are currently attached in appendix 2 of the "rolling text". The inclusion of a reference on this item in the draft convention is an important

(continued)

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

step which will make the future work of the Committee easier. The negotiation of a Convention to establish a total ban on chemical weapons, which has involved the consideration of a number of political and technical issues of extreme complexity, and major efforts and sacrifices on the part of the negotiators, has proved that the Conference can make progress in multilateral negotiations when there is political will to do so. The time would be right if we take into account the proposal for the holding of a ministerial session of the Conference on Disarmament devoted to the chemical weapons issue. Presumably this conference would be designed to overcome the obstacles affecting the negotiations on the convention. However, at the same time we believe that we cannot come to this session with the same problems as those which exist now, and hence we have to focus our efforts on overcoming them and to hold the conference at the time deemed most appropriate. A modest contribution by Venezuela to the efforts designed to achieve the complete prohibition of chemical weapons is the holding in Caracas of a regional seminar which will basically revolve around the question of chemical weapons. This seminar will be held from 1 to 5 July of the current year. The seminar, as we have previously stated, will be designed to acquaint all Latin American and Caribbean States with the scope, the purposes and goals of the convention, the verification machinery that is to be set up, and generally speaking all the legal and technical aspects of the future convention on chemical weapons in order to facilitate the internal administrative and legislative process that is to be followed for the early ratification, entry into force and implementation of this instrument. It is hoped that the participating Governments will give preference to designating officials from their foreign ministries or other governmental bodies who in one way or another would participate in decision-making relating to the adoption and setting in motion of the convention.

(Mr. Mantuba, Zaire)

... In my humble opinion the Conference has neither reflected nor paused to see to what extent the changes that have occurred could reorient our Organization. Just recently, the regret expressed by the august representative of Peru, Dr. Calderón, on the Conference's inability, over a period of nearly 12 years, to conclude even a treaty on one of the items on the agenda, shows sufficiently well the seriousness of the illness from which our Conference is suffering. But if we really cannot perform the main function for which this organ was created, what can be its justification? Unless we are careful, the Conference on Disarmament runs the risk of becoming a debating society for plenipotentiaries whose main purpose is merely to set forth and highlight their different points of view. How could you explain that to this day we are still in the midst of doubts and hesitations and consultations to find a decisive solution concerning the expansion of the membership of the Conference? It is, moreover, surprising to find that certain States are opposed to increasing the number of members from 39 to 44. It is high time for the Conference to be flexible on this subject; because our common aim is to bring about a new network of international security relationships where each State, big or small, must make its modest contribution. Whether members, observers or others, every time world peace is threatened, all world States experience a lack of security and all have the same concern - peace. It is true that the Conference's overall record is not totally negative; for it is agreeable to acknowledge the establishment of certain ad hoc committees on a few items on the agenda. But what course will they take, and what will their aim be? For instance, taking agenda item 1 on nuclear testing, the eminent Ambassador of Morocco, Mr. Benhima, was among the outstanding speakers last year who deplored the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban did not have a negotiating mandate. I am afraid that this year the situation will be almost identical. Nothing will surprise us when we bear in mind that the interests of these five major nuclear-weapon Powers are closely connected. As regards chemical weapons, as everybody knows, their history is the longest

(Mr. Mantuba, Zaire)

in all multilateral negotiations on disarmament. Sixty-five years after the adoption of the Geneva Protocol in 1925, the international community still has no convention banning all chemical weapons. What has become of the enthusiasm generated by the 1989 Paris Conference on the convention banning the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons? As time passes, all the speeches, promises and initiatives seem today to have evaporated into the clouds, and the threat of their use remains. Where is the political resolve of the international community?

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian):

... Now, with your permission, I would like to take the floor myself as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to make a brief announcement. At the last meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons we agreed that the documents submitted by the chairmen of the working groups and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee would be compiled by the secretariat, naturally without their being given any official status or document number. I would now like to inform delegations that this compilation will be put in the delegations' pigeon-holes on Tuesday, 2 April. In that way everyone will be able to obtain those documents there at that time.

CD/PV.591

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian):

... The beginning of the second part of the Conference's session coincides with events which offer good omens for success in our work, particularly in the field of chemical weapons. I am sure that today we will hear more detailed statements concerning these events. I should like to take this opportunity to assure you that my delegation, and I personally as President of the Conference, stand ready to cooperate so that everything possible is done to advance our work on this matter, and also on other matters before the Conference, in order to resolve them successfully.

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Mr. SCHAFER (Germany): It is a great honour and privilege for me today to be able to address the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the body which deals with central aspects of arms control and disarmament on behalf of the international community. You, Mr. President, have this year become Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for negotiations on chemical weapons. Your responsible task is looked at by people throughout the world with the greatest interest and high hopes: the earliest possible, universal, comprehensive and effectively verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany has strongly supported this goal from the very start and hopes that it will soon be attained. My Government, therefore, very much welcomes and fully supports the new proposals of President Bush which will be presented here this morning, as far as I would told, which aim at achieving the comprehensive and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons within the next 12 months.

(Mr. Schäfer, Germany)

... Limiting the proliferation of conventional weapons is an urgent problem whose significance in relation to nuclear, biological or chemical arms control - the theme of this Conference - should not be underrated. As is well known, the renunciation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons has always, and from the very beginning, been a corner-stone of the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany; the German Government reaffirmed this renunciation on behalf of Germany as a whole at the fourth conference to review the non-proliferation Treaty. Germany is also participating actively in the current multilateral efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation régime. Above all it has advocated that full-scope safeguards be agreed as the pre-condition for nuclear supplies to non-NPT countries. To be credible, the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction and the commitment to their non-proliferation must also include missile technology. Particularly in this respect, the experience of the Gulf war has sent dramatic signals. The German Government therefore supports the ongoing efforts to enhance and supplement the régime. The reforms agreed or envisaged are intended to ensure that in future the missile technology control régime supplements to a greater extent the global non-proliferation régime.

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Mr. KARHILO (Finland):

... The war in the Persian Gulf emphasized once more the urgent need to complete the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. But the war also profoundly changed the perceptions of the role of chemical weapons and their usability in modern warfare based on high technology.

For a considerable time, the chemical weapons negotiations have been in a dilemma: the text of the draft convention has been refined and improved every year, but the successful conclusion of the negotiations has eluded us. The core issues that remain open are well known. It is also realistic to state that some of those issues remain open only in waiting for the end-game to begin. It should begin now. The statement of President George Bush last Monday should form a good prelude for it. We welcome the readiness of the United States to resolve for its part some important open issues such as the questions regarding a total prohibition of use and an unconditional commitment to destroy all chemical weapons within 10 years of the convention's taking effect. We hope that this new development will accelerate the pace in all issues under negotiation.

The package approach is a helpful illustration of the interrelationship of the issues. However, expectations of a package should not mislead us into assuming that all the pieces of the puzzle can be left to fall in place at one go and at the last minute. The same is true of a ministerial meeting.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

It cannot be expected that the ministers could somehow in a day or two solve the questions that the negotiators have not been able to settle. The task that we can see for a ministerial meeting is to confirm the solution of the main political issues. Thereafter the text could be polished by the negotiators at a rapid pace. Another important aspect of a ministerial meeting is attendance. We are all striving for a universal convention. The signals sent to the international community as a whole have to be carefully considered. One of the main features of the chemical weapons convention will be its non-discriminatory nature. Restricting full participation in an essentially political meeting to anything less than all the countries that have shown interest in the negotiations may result in adverse interpretations of the objective of the whole process.

Confidence-building measures, openness and transparency are proven pace-setters for disarmament measures. They could also serve as pace-setters for the CWC even during the negotiating process. There are measures that have already been suggested and taken in connection with these negotiations - for example, visits to CW-related facilities, declarations concerning the possession or non-possession of chemical weapons, the production of scheduled chemicals and intention to become an original signatory of the convention. Several other possible measures have been identified during the first session of the CD in Working Group A of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. All these voluntary measures are suitable for unilateral, bilateral or multilateral application. Finland would like to see more countries consider making use of them.

It has been disappointing to see that the advances in the solution of the pending political issues have hitherto been limited. Still, we recognize the fact that a good deal of useful work has been done in the other parts of the "rolling text". In particular, I would like to mention the discussion on the streamlining of the verification system for the chemical industry, based on the Swedish proposal contained in document CD/1053. We are confident that on the basis of an integrated approach, a feasible, practical and cost-effective system for verification will emerge. The most important features of such a system, in our opinion, are the enlargement of the number of facilities open to possible inspections and, at the same time, the concentration of verification activities on the facilities which are the most relevant.

The main contribution of Finland to the chemical weapons negotiations is in the technical field. Within the Finnish Research Project on the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, scientific research has been conducted for some 20 years. The results of these research activities have been published in the so-called "blue book" series and presented annually to the CD. This exclusively verification-oriented research activity is no longer as unique in the world as it was only a few years ago. We welcome the fact that an increasing number of countries are involved in this type of research activity.

Serious discussion based on technical research can only speed up the negotiating process. A wider understanding of technical problems connected with verification and the pursuit of adequate solutions to them contribute to confidence both within and among the participating countries. They have to be fully confident that the means to achieve the aims set forth in the process

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

are both practical and feasible. This confidence-building feature was and continues to be, in our opinion, the wider perspective for the work of the Technical Group on Instrumentation and its successor, the Technical Group on Analytical Database and Laboratories.

In 1989 Finland coordinated the first inter-laboratory comparison test, the so-called round-robin test. The results of that test were reported to the CD last summer. A second, similar test was arranged in November-December last year. The results of that second test will be reported to the CD before the end of this year's last session. Fifteen laboratories participated in this second round-robin test; that is, five more than in the first one. On the whole all laboratories regarded the experiment as useful. This is perhaps best shown by the fact that a third test is being prepared for the coming autumn.

Another concrete activity that Finland has been engaged in during the past year is the training programme on verification analysis required by the future convention. This programme is offered to analytical chemists from developing countries which are members of the Group of 21. The third training course is now approaching its conclusion. We have been pleased to see that this programme has been well received by the countries concerned. During this year chemists from Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia will participate in the programme.

It is our intention to continue the programme and to develop it in substance. In the first phase this means adding some verification techniques not presently covered. It also means penetrating deeper into some existing areas of the programme. We would like to thank the Government of Germany for its support for our efforts. This makes it possible for us to add important new features to the programme. In the second phase we are planning a follow-up course for those who have already participated in the basic course. During the next 12 months we hope to be able to improve the capabilities of the project laboratory in such a way that steps towards the follow-up course could be started.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

As we open the second part of our 1991 session, it gives me great pleasure to read to you, and to our colleagues, a message to the Conference on Disarmament from the President of the United States. The message is as follows:

"The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf has brought into play once again the terrible spectre of the use of chemical weapons against innocent populations. It underscores the urgency of ridding the world of these weapons of terror. I believe that the best hope for eliminating the scourge of chemical weapons is the total ban contained in the chemical weapons convention under negotiation in this Conference. The United States is committed to the early, successful completion of this convention and to its effective implementation. To this end, I have announced a number of steps the United States will take to accelerate the negotiations, and have instructed Ambassador Ledogar to implement my decision at this session. I hope this initiative will also spur other nations to commit themselves equally to the critical objectives of the convention, and I urge all nations to join us in achieving an effective chemical weapons ban as soon as possible. I especially call upon the participants in this Conference to exert every effort toward this end and to set themselves the goal of resolving all major outstanding issues by the end of 1991 and of completing the chemical weapons convention within the next 12 months. To achieve this timetable, I urge that the chemical weapons Ad Hoc Committee stay in continuous session in Geneva. I wish you all speedy success."

President Bush's message sets forth the basic approach the United States wishes to take in concluding our work on a chemical weapons ban. He has long maintained that the best hope for eliminating chemical weapons is the total ban which we are presently negotiating in this forum. Given the urgency of ridding the world of these weapons of terror, we cannot afford to continue "business as usual" in our negotiations.

At the beginning of this week, the President announced that the United States is prepared to take a number of innovative steps to strengthen the prospects for successful conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. Permit me to outline these steps for you at this time.

To instil a sense of urgency in the CD's work, the United States proposes that a time frame be established for completion of the negotiations. We propose that the goal be to resolve all major outstanding issues in the negotiations by the end of 1991, and to complete the convention within 12 months.

To help reach these goals, the United States proposes that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons stay in continuous session from now until the convention is completed; negotiations would continue during the previously scheduled breaks in July and in the fall. This will help ensure that no time is lost and no opportunity is wasted. Under our proposal, the United States is prepared to keep me and my delegation in Geneva and to reinforce the delegation as necessary to support this schedule. We call on other nations to share the same commitment.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

To facilitate completion of a chemical weapons ban within a year, the United States has decided to take steps to resolve two key issues that have become obstacles in the negotiations. In taking these steps we hope to demonstrate that the only way to achieve a treaty is through flexibility. We urge others to show similar flexibility. Specifically, the United States will drop its insistence on retaining a right of retaliation with chemical weapons. The United States will formally forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation in kind, against any State, effective when the convention enters into force. We will also propose a provision for the convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances.

Further, the United States will drop its position that we and certain others must be allowed to keep 2 per cent of our chemical weapons stockpile until all CW-capable States have joined the convention. The United States will unconditionally commit itself to the destruction of all of its chemical weapons stocks and former chemical weapons production facilities within 10 years of the entry into force of the convention. We call upon all States to declare their stocks of chemical weapons and to follow our lead by beginning to destroy their stocks and production facilities. We will propose provisions for the convention that require all parties, unconditionally, to begin the destruction of their chemical weapons stocks and production facilities as soon as the convention enters into force and to complete the elimination within 10 years.

Verification is one of the key unfinished areas of the convention. While substantial progress has been made in developing the verification system for the convention, important issues remain. The United States reaffirms its commitment to a strong and forthright verification régime. We will soon offer additional concrete proposals to address the central issue of challenge inspection.

Another key unresolved issue is how to achieve the broad participation that is essential for an effective ban. We believe, of course, that significant intrinsic benefits will flow to all parties from a total ban on chemical weapons. We also believe there should be tangible benefits for those States that join the convention - and specific penalties for those who do not. Therefore, the United States will propose provisions for the convention that will require parties to refuse to trade in CW-related materials with States that do not become parties within a reasonable period of time after entry into force.

Many States will be required to destroy chemical weapons under the convention. This is a very complex and technically demanding task. To facilitate the worldwide elimination of chemical weapons, the United States will offer practical and effective help to other States to assist in the speedy, safe, and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons, wherever they may be found. We are creating a task force comprised of United States Government and private industry representatives to develop proposals on how the United States can advise and assist States in chemical weapons destruction. We will provide technical destruction assistance to parties that have chemical weapons located on their territory. This could

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

include visits to our destruction facilities, blueprints, and technical advice. As a forum for practical cooperation, we propose the creation of a technical working group on destruction under the aegis of the CD.

The United States reaffirms its position that there should be sanctions against those States that violate the convention and especially severe sanctions against any State that initiates the use of chemical weapons. The United States declares that it will consider violations of the convention, especially the initiation of the use of chemical weapons, as extremely grave breaches of international law and the United States will impose all appropriate sanctions.

Through the process of negotiation, the participants in the CD are endeavouring to ensure that the chemical weapons convention accommodates the concerns and interests of all participants. Compromises are frequently necessary to achieve this accommodation. We believe therefore that the States participating in the negotiations have a responsibility to support the resulting text. The United States formally declares its intention to become an original party to the chemical weapons convention. We call upon all States to commit publicly to becoming original parties. We also call upon all States to declare their chemical weapons stocks, and to forswear the use of CW for any reason when the CWC enters into force.

Until a total ban is effected, the United States believes it is important to prevent chemical weapons from spreading further. To this end the United States is prepared to provide extensive information on our export controls on CW-related materials and technologies - and on our domestic legislation to enforce them - to all other participants in the negotiations. We recommend that all States enact similar controls, thereby curbing the spread of chemical weapons as we all work toward a complete and formal ban.

Completing the convention in the next year will require considerable effort, dedication, and flexibility from all of us. The status quo will not suffice. It will require all of us to work together if we are to achieve our common objective of a global ban on the production, storage and use of chemical weapons. To achieve universal adherence, the United States is ready to do what is necessary to make a chemical weapons convention a reality. We urge others to show flexibility in their positions and to make the same commitment toward accomplishing our common objectives.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on behalf of the Netherlands delegation on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We are confident that under your inspiring leadership our expectations of considerable progress will be fulfilled. Indeed, we do aspire that in your concurrent capacity as Chairman of the 1991 Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, you will achieve the long-desired CW convention. Do it, Mr. President. You can be sure of the full support of my delegation.

Today I wish to address three subjects: first, the chemical weapons convention in statu nascendi; second, a nuclear test ban, notably its scope and verification; and third, "track B" of the radiological weapons file, on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. Lastly, I should like to introduce document CD/1064, which contains the text of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in Paris on 19 November 1990.

We are extremely happy that the United States of America last week reconsidered its position on a number of delicate issues concerning the draft chemical weapons convention: the issues of security stocks and the use of chemical weapons in retaliation or otherwise. We know that the American decisions were difficult to take, and we are therefore all the more satisfied and grateful that they were taken. I trust them to provide an important political impulse to engage us in the final phase of the negotiations.

It is indeed now high time for all delegations present here to get our act together. Let us establish a realistic deadline and let us start a major effort within the Conference on Disarmament, in conjunction with interested observers, to finalize the convention before the deadline expires. We must reorganize ourselves somewhat to be able to tackle the major remaining issues. And in order not to lose precious time, it will be necessary to continue our negotiations during the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly. Two major problem areas require much further consideration. These are challenge inspections and the verification of non-production in the chemical industry. Of course, much other nitty-gritty work still needs to be done, but right now it seems important to concentrate on solving the two major verification problems. These are complex matters which are vital to an effective treaty and which touch upon important national security and industrial interests. These will therefore take time to solve. Some other difficult issues, such as the composition of the Executive Council, may be tackled somewhat later.

For handling the major question of verification of non-production in the chemical industry, excellent work has been done in Working Group B. This work should be continued as a matter of high priority. Indeed, a régime is coming into being which has good deterrence features with respect to potential violators of the convention and is at the same time cost-effective. Openness of the chemical industry will create the confidence that all parties are faithfully complying with the treaty.

No formal structure exists as yet to tackle the other major issue - i.e. challenge inspections. For the time being we could leave it to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to organize private and open-ended consultations. Somewhat later in the year we may need a more organized

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

structure to handle this complex matter. Many ideas are floating around, while trial challenge inspections have been carried out and are being organized in order to study particular aspects of such inspections and build up experience. We now reach a stage in which concrete and tested ideas are brought into the discussions which must be translated into treaty language. The time is ripe for a major effort in this field.

Most other matters, the nitty-gritty of the convention, could be handled in the existing working groups. However, clear priorities will have to be established. The extended bureau could play a more active role in steering the work that takes place in the different forums.

At this point in time, it does not seem useful to dwell extensively on the various remaining problems. One particular aspect I would like to mention, however, is the question of amendments. Last year we agreed on two types of amendment procedure, a heavy one and a so-called simplified one. The qualification "simplified" is wrong because it gives a wrong impression: the procedure is not simple at all. For any proposed change under this procedure, one or more qualified majorities must be found among States parties, first in the Executive Council and subsequently, if the decision is still contested, in the Conference of all States parties. Since the procedure is quite difficult, we must not be afraid to submit all the annexes of the convention to this procedure. In the main treaty we already have, or we still shall, put all the major obligations which virtually cannot be changed under the "heavy" amendment procedure. The annexes contain the details which could then be changed if really needed, taking into account relevant experience on the part of the Technical Secretariat and the States parties as well as new technological developments. This would be a logical structure for the convention. By adopting an early decision on this matter, all working groups would then also have guidance how to structure the articles of the convention and their annexes.

Finally, we need not be afraid to leave certain details to the Preparatory Commission and the Technical Secretariat to be worked out under the guidance of the Executive Council. There has been a tendency in the past to stipulate all future procedures in detail. This is not our task: our present task is to work out a treaty in which we all have confidence and which includes all major obligations in detail sufficient for us not to find ourselves confronted with unpleasant surprises once the treaty enters into force. Consequently, parts of the "rolling text" can be transferred to the PrepCom for further consideration and we need not devote too much attention to them any more. The extended bureau could also develop proposals on these matters for submission to the Ad Hoc Committee.

I realize that on the chemical weapons convention I have been raising mainly procedural matters, and in doing so, I omitted an organizational decision which is, as you can understand, somewhat dear to us, i.e. on the establishment of the CW treaty organization. I will not dwell on that now. Let me simply stress that these procedural matters are relevant, if we are to get our job done before the summer session of 1992, before our well-earned annual holiday: that should be the ultimate deadline.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish):

... As I am taking the floor for the first time in plenary under your presidency, Sir, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation for the skilful way in which you have been performing your responsible functions - congratulations which also extend to your wise leadership of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with the task of negotiating the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. Secondly, I would like to bid a cordial farewell from my delegation to the distinguished ambassadors Loéis of Indonesia and U Aung Thant of Myanmar, and at the same time to welcome very warmly the new representative of the latter country, Ambassador U Tin Kyaw Hlaing, whom we wish every success.

My delegation listened with great satisfaction to the interesting proposals put forward last Thursday, 16 May, on behalf of his country, by Ambassador Stephen Ledogar. With a commendable step that does it credit, the United States has corrected its position on two issues of the greatest importance, with the result that the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons have now gained renewed impetus, to the extent that this time it seems reasonable to believe that the convention on the total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons can be finalized next year. This change in the position of the United States has occurred at the very moment when the international community has become deeply aware that chemical weapons are of little or no military use in guaranteeing the security of the States that possess them. We applaud this long-awaited gesture by the United States and all that remains ahead of us is to use the same intelligence and urgency to deal with the still outstanding issues. We agree with the United States delegation that there is no longer any place for "business as usual".

My delegation considers that the United States has taken a very positive step by dropping its insistence on the "right to retaliation". This new position, which goes far beyond its obligations with regard to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, offers the advantage, in my view, of excluding "second use" for whatever reason and against any State whatsoever as soon as the Convention comes into effect. And should there be any doubt remaining, it is also proposed to ban the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances.

We also welcome the unconditional commitment made by the United States to abide by the time-limit of 10 years for the destruction of all chemical weapon stocks possessed by the States parties, as well as the facilities for the production of these weapons of mass destruction. The abandonment of the contentious position of maintaining 2 per cent as a safety valve in order

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(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

to guarantee the universality of the convention could not have been more appropriate, and to do so unconditionally could not have been more significant. My delegation also shares the view that intrinsic benefits should be built into the convention in order to encourage the widest possible accession by States. We are also in favour of including sufficient restrictions and obstacles for those who, after a reasonable period, choose to remain outside the convention. For the same reasons the proposal made to us by the United States for cooperation with the States parties in the destruction of their chemical weapon stocks is highly thought-provoking. This initiative is particularly interesting when applied to the case of States parties that have chemical weapons which were abandoned on their territory.

The distinguished representative of the United States also made a proposal of a procedural nature. In concrete terms, the Ad Hoc Committee would be authorized to remain in continuous session over the next 12 months until negotiations are concluded. In view of the fact that my delegation has always demanded that negotiations be speeded up we very warmly welcome this proposal, on the understanding, of course, that there would be certain breaks to permit consultations with our capitals. We fully support the 12-month work schedule together with the increased effort that will have to be made until the end of this year in order to have the convention practically ready. And in order to clear up any doubts, perhaps it would be advisable to amend the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee to ensure that it reflects the new atmosphere prevailing in the Conference. It is this convergence of opinions on procedural matters that prompts me to contemplate the possibility of examining to what extent it would be desirable to keep the same bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee, under your chairmanship, Ambassador Batsanov, until the negotiations are concluded. The need to preserve proper consistency during the final stages of the negotiations could be one of the reasons; but we could also argue the need to keep the same structure in the organization of the Committee's work. In any event, my delegation is perfectly aware of the fact that this is a matter which requires consensus among the regional groups and, above all, the consent of the group that would be expected to nominate a candidate for the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1992.

On the instructions of my Government I am very pleased to inform this Conference this morning that the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is already taking steps leading in due course to the establishment of a national authority under article VII of the future convention. A multisectoral committee will carry out the preparatory work for this purpose. The Peruvian Government is aware of the great importance for mankind of the convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, and therefore wishes through me to state its intention as of now to become an original signatory of the convention.

In the field of arms regulation and disarmament, verification is an effective mechanism for confidence-building and a guarantee to safeguard existing levels of security. Verification is not a philosophical or moral exercise. Above all it serves to confirm eminently technical facts on the basis of observation, supported as the case may be by the use of high-precision instruments. For this reason verification, like any other human endeavour is not and cannot be 100 per cent exact or certain.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

And actually it does not need to be. It is the product of what might be called "political engineering", a half abstract and half exact science which we diplomats seem to practise compulsively, and which makes it possible to say how far one has to move if one really wants to attain one's objective. In each case there is a ruling principle which will ensure the best possible result through an equation in which political good will, together with the technical and juridical resources available, are applied in the light of the "opportunity cost", that basic principle of economic reasoning which, applied to the current negotiations, will demonstrate that there is a lower cost and a greater benefit if we succeed in identifying the right moment at which the convention should be concluded, thus preventing us from choosing the wrong moment when the marginal cost would in all respects be greater than the benefit obtained.

The convention that we have been negotiating for several years now includes in its present form the outline of a revolutionary system of verification. It is not for nothing that provisions related or linked to verification take up more than 70 per cent of the whole. And this is to be expected. However, there is still a considerable amount of work ahead to finalize it. At present it is not possible to rule out, *inter alia*, a credible set of complementary sanctions, precisely in order to simplify it and avoid having a system burdened with sophisticated contrivances.

In the view of my delegation the future convention will have two main objectives that will form the basis of the international system of verification. We refer to chemical disarmament, which means the total elimination of chemical weapon stocks and of production facilities for such weapons in all States parties; and the peaceful use of the chemical industry, including prevention of the development of capabilities to produce chemical weapons. The first objective is clear and in addition will have to be achieved within 10 years. As a result I do not foresee any major legal problems in achieving it. The second objective, however, calls for discussion. For a start, there is a tendency to set aside the notion of peaceful uses in favour of "purposes not prohibited by the convention". It appears that this distinction would cause no particular problems. However, there is a risk that this concept could provide a cover for the development of an extensive sector of the chemical industry for military purposes not covered by the prohibitions of the convention. The problem would then be to know to what extent this would be compatible with the precept laid down in the preamble that advances in chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind. The verification system which is being developed provides a systematic and coherent set of provisions directed towards ensuring the fulfilment of obligations with regard to these two objectives. This will certainly need to be refined, particularly with regard to article VI. But what must be highlighted here is its comprehensive nature in which challenge inspections or inspections on request constitute one of the key elements.

In this way I come to the central point of my statement this morning. In accordance with instructions from my Government, I have pleasure in submitting to this Conference a proposal on challenge inspections or inspections on request contained in document CD/1075 (or CD/CW/WP.337), which was circulated this morning by the secretariat in all official languages of the Conference.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

In submitting this proposal, Peru is convinced that it can help promote understanding on this issue. The proposals we are submitting today naturally take into account the comments made by several delegations. We have no doubt that the promising atmosphere in Geneva now with regard to the possibility of the early conclusion of the convention will do much to help resolve this thorny issue. The key point of our proposal is that challenge inspections or inspections on request should be viewed as consisting of two clearly differentiated stages. The first, of a strictly confidential nature and eminently technically oriented, within the competence of the Director-General of the Organization. And the second in which the Executive Council would play a leading role, basically of a political nature, in which inspection teams could be authorized wider access within the scope of the request made. The aim of dividing inspections on request into two stages is based on two guiding principles which, in the view of my delegation, should be unshakeable. The first principle assumes that all States parties act in good faith. In other words, there should be no room for doubting a priori, the intention of the States parties to act correctly in accordance with the commitments undertaken. And, by virtue of the second principle, there can be no discriminatory treatment among States parties. Consequently, both the State making the request and the State that has to accept the visit by the inspection team are on an equal footing until proved otherwise.

In the first stage, the request would be made known to the State in question and the Executive Council within 24 hours. The following day the Director-General would designate an inspection team which would travel immediately to the territory of the requested State to inspect the "relevant facilities" in accordance with the request made. When my delegation refers to "relevant facilities" - I wish to make a digression here - it is thinking of the English word "relevant" in its first meaning given in the second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary. At this stage the principles of non-discrimination and good faith would not allow for inspection "anywhere without delay", since that would amount to giving excessive credence to the request and considering the requested State a priori guilty. However, if the inspection team did not succeed in clarifying the doubts or concerns expressed in the inspection request, then the way would be open for a second stage, basically political in nature, where the Executive Council could decide to extend the mandate of the inspection team to enable it to inspect "anywhere without delay", but still within the context of the request made, in order to determine whether or not the convention had been breached. This second stage, which gives greater discretion to the inspection team in the territory of the visited country, would therefore be a measure of last resort, which could be followed by the appropriate sanction should non-compliance be proved. The principles of non-discrimination and good faith should also govern provisions to avoid any abuse of the right to inspections on request. These could include sanctions as a means of discouraging the devaluation of this valuable mechanism through abuse. We cannot imagine that, if this right was repeatedly abused, the perpetrator would be left unpunished in full knowledge of the fact that there would be a cost that would have to be paid by someone.

As I have already pointed out, an international system of verification, being a human invention, would always be limited. In principle, concealed intentions or decisions cannot be detected as long as they do not become a manifestation of a will that has not yet been implemented. Consequently, the

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

reliability of the system will suffer from the weaknesses of what is humanly possible. However, this should not be an obstacle to our finding the highest common denominator and concluding within the proposed 12 months, with legitimate satisfaction, the convention which will ban chemical weapons from this planet for ever.

The draft convention already contains general provisions on cooperation among States in the destruction of chemical weapons. The declared intention of the United States is to provide practical technical help to other States in the same manner as it has done in the past. It is also possible to be specific in providing technical and financial assistance to States which are unable to carry out the destruction of their chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the distinguished representative of Peru, Dr. Calderón, for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. If at this stage there are no delegations wishing to take the floor, I would like to make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union. I see none, and so I shall now turn to the statement.

The beginning of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament has been marked by an important event. On 16 May the United States delegation officially presented to the Conference on Disarmament new proposals based on the statement made by President Bush on 13 May on the prohibition of chemical weapons. President Bush's message to the Conference on Disarmament contained a commitment on the part of the United States to the early completion of work on the convention on the banning of chemical weapons. This is, of course, in line with the Soviet Union's approach to chemical disarmament. There is every justification for including elimination of the chemical weapons threat among the priority tasks facing the international community. Recent events in the Persian Gulf offered a grim reminder of this. We are deeply convinced that this weapon of mass destruction should have no place on Earth, neither in the West nor in the East, neither in the North nor in the South.

The USSR delegation welcomes the new United States initiatives in the field of banning chemical weapons as a necessary contribution to the process of preparation of a convention in this area. They contain a great potential for progress towards agreement on a number of still outstanding issues. This concerns primarily the United States' declared readiness to assume obligations under the convention to forswear the use of chemical weapons in any circumstances, including retaliation, and to destroy completely all stocks of chemical weapons and production facilities within the first 10 years after the convention enters into force. This makes it possible to believe that we will at last manage to solve two of the most important outstanding issues.

The overwhelming majority of participants in the negotiations, including the Soviet Union, have been firm proponents of the need for the unconditional and absolute prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. This is a major contribution that the convention would make to strengthening international security. Such a ban would have a solid moral component as well. We welcome the new position of the United States on this issue, which opens up the path towards early agreement on one of the fundamental obligations of States under the future convention.

It is no secret that the participants in the negotiations gave a critical reception to the proposals which in one way or another allowed for the possibility that not all chemical weapon stocks would be destroyed. Many saw in them an element of discrimination, an attempt to perpetuate differences in the status of States with respect to chemical weapons and even a justification for acquiring chemical weapons. In spite of the fact that the well-known idea

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(The President)

of maintaining 2 per cent of chemical weapon stocks until all CW-capable States become parties to the convention was motivated by the aim of ensuring the universality of the convention, it met with similar criticism. Last year the issue of universality was discussed in detail from various points of view and was recognized as a key issue for the effectiveness of the future convention. Quite a few useful alternative proposals were put forward concerning steps that could be taken as of now to facilitate accession to the convention by as many States as possible. Taking into account all the circumstances at the negotiations, the Soviet Union will of course not object to the removal from the draft convention of any reference to the Soviet-American proposal on ensuring the universality of the convention, which was based on the idea of maintaining 2 per cent of chemical weapon stocks.

The discussion of the issues related to the convention's universality has shown that declarations by States of their intention to become original parties or original signatories of the agreement now being drafted are among the major means of strengthening confidence and improving the atmosphere at the negotiations. The Soviet Union is pleased to note that in the course of today's plenary meeting we have heard further statements to that effect. The Soviet Union, initially unilaterally in 1989, then in 1990 jointly with the United States, and also jointly with the participants in the CSCE process, has officially declared its intention to sign the future convention as an original party. We consider it important that other States should follow these good examples, especially now, when the negotiations are in need of a strong and universal political support. Regional initiatives in support of the convention by relevant States are also useful.

Joining the convention does not imply only obligations, but should be naturally related to the actual benefits which would accrue to parties renouncing chemical weapons under effective international control. In this regard we consider that the inclusion in the convention of the provisions now practically agreed upon on economic cooperation and development is a useful step. The same applies to the provisions on assistance in the event of a CW attack or the threat of such an attack. The convention should encourage States to rely on international assistance, which might be provided through the organization under the convention in the event of the use of chemical weapons, which of course would be a gross violation of international law. The USSR delegation supports the setting up under the organization of a special voluntary fund for international assistance, which might take the form of both means of protection against chemical weapons and means of humanitarian assistance to victims of the use of chemical weapons. As for encouraging States to join the convention, the United States' idea that the parties should refuse to trade in CW-related materials with countries that do not join the convention within a reasonable time after its entry into force is also an interesting one. This is a relatively new issue in the negotiations, and its technical and legal aspects will of course need to be looked into further.

The draft convention already contains general provisions on cooperation among States in the destruction of chemical weapons. The declared readiness of the United States to provide practical technical help to other States in the safe and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons can be welcomed as a specific means of putting this provision into effect.

(The President)

The Soviet Union has a certain amount of useful experience in examining, together with the United States, issues related to cooperation in the area of destruction. The USSR delegation will be prepared to take part in the exchange of views on the United States proposal that issues of cooperation in the destruction of chemical weapons should be discussed already at the negotiating stage.

The ban on chemical weapons would be made more effective by a mechanism of sanctions against violators. Last year material on this topic was prepared for the first time for inclusion in the draft convention. We support the basic principle of this document, that every violation of the convention should give rise to an adequate reaction on the part of the international community and that measures should be taken to redress situations related to violations of the convention. A role in this area could be played both by bodies within the future organization to be set up under the convention and - where there is a threat to international peace and security - United Nations machinery, in particular the Security Council and measures under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. The idea of collective measures in response to violations of the convention, which would demonstrate the unity of the States parties to it, is also well founded. The United States' declaration in favour of strengthening sanctions against those who violate the convention, particularly where chemical weapons are used, corresponds to our approach and, as we see it, is in keeping with the prevailing views at the negotiations. Here too there is a possibility for resolving another of the issues which have not yet been fully agreed.

The ban on chemical weapons must of course be supported by the most highly effective international control. We expect nothing less from the future convention. In this context we note with satisfaction the United States' declaration of its commitment to a strong and firm verification régime. The time has come for early agreement on mandatory challenge inspections, an important element of verification. The major task here as we see it is to strike a balance between the need to ensure, on the one hand, strict compliance with the convention and confidence among all the parties that it is being complied with and, on the other, protection of sensitive information in areas not related to the purposes of the convention. In the view of the USSR delegation, this goal can be reached through a combination of the principle of mandatory challenge inspections anywhere with the idea of "managed access" advanced by Great Britain and tested in a number of trial inspections. We hope that the promised new United States proposals on inspections of undeclared facilities will be a contribution to the joint efforts of the negotiators.

It is hardly necessary to demonstrate the importance of greater openness, especially in the concluding stage of the negotiations. Appeals on that score are also contained in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. Data exchange should facilitate the elaboration of the convention's provisions, including those dealing with the chemical industry. Some time ago the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany introduced a proposal (CD/828 of 12 April 1988) relating to the format of such an exchange of data on a multilateral basis during the negotiations, which comprises both a statement on the presence or absence of chemical weapons and sections related to facilities to be subject to verification. In keeping with this proposal

(The President)

most European States as well as Australia, Chile and Japan have provided information. We call on all States that have not yet provided data in keeping with the format proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany to do so in the near future.

The Soviet Union supports the idea of intensifying the negotiating process with a view to resolving all the major outstanding problems before the end of 1991. The proposal for a package solution of these problems taking into account the whole range of States' interests is also directed towards the early conclusion of the convention. Also worthy of support is the idea of setting a deadline for completing the preparation of the convention which is acceptable to all participants in the negotiations. A special meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament could provide a strong additional impetus for moving towards final agreement. The usefulness of such a meeting, if thoroughly prepared, appears to be acknowledged by virtually everyone, and we believe we should now move on to the practical organization of this important meeting, so that its results match its original intentions.

The elements are now truly falling into place for a breakthrough towards the final goal - the convention on the complete prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks. The new United States proposals will undoubtedly help to broaden areas of agreement between the negotiators. The Soviet Union is ready to cooperate constructively with all States with a view to the speediest possible advance towards a world free of chemical weapons.

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian):

... Substantial changes for the better in the chemical weapons negotiations have opened up new prospects before the whole of the Conference. I think that bearing this in mind we must take a fresh look at the organization of our work and think how best to adapt it to the changed circumstances. I shall continue consultations on this issue as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and I shall act here in close contact with Ambassador Solesby, who from next week on will be in the place I am occupying now.

The PRESIDENT:

... My turn in this Chair has come in the middle of our spring session. Thanks to the efficiency of my predecessors, Ambassador Batsanov and those who went before him, the structure of the Conference's work is already well in place. The ad hoc committees on the nuclear test ban, on chemical weapons, on prevention of an arms race in outer space, on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and on radiological weapons are all functioning smoothly. Informal plenary discussions on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and on prevention of nuclear war are being held on a regular basis. Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico has been undertaking consultations as Special Coordinator on the comprehensive programme of disarmament and I shall ask him to continue to do that. Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan has already held two open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning and has announced plans for further such meetings. I myself shall continue the practice of my predecessors in holding consultations on proposals for expanding the membership of the Conference. In other words, this Conference is on automatic control and it is left to the pilot to make only small adjustments should any become necessary.

It is a time of particularly high expectations for the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Important developments have recently taken place which hold out the hope of accelerated progress. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has already begun consultations on possible changes to the organization of work in order to respond fully to these new opportunities. I intend to support Ambassador Batsanov in this task in the hope of reaching agreement among us all in the very near future. We are fortunate in having such a dynamic Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I should like to pay a tribute to the leadership he has given during the past month in the presidency of the Conference as a whole. It provided further proof that leadership of our important chemical weapons negotiations is in excellent hands.

Mr. SENE (Senegal) (translated from French):

... In the more than 10 years that this negotiating forum has existed in its present form, the Conference on Disarmament has experienced difficulties thus far in concluding a treaty or an agreement in any of the eight fields with which it deals, and the only negotiations under way relate to the prohibition of chemical weapons, bearing in mind that significant progress is being made in other forums, a fact which is sure to give impetus to the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. This appears all the more paradoxical in that, for the first time since the Second World War, definite optimism seems to prevail as a result of the rapprochement between the two world super-Powers and the end of the certainties of the Cold War. Unfortunately, the end of the East-West confrontation has not resulted in the strengthening of stability and peace in the world as we had hoped, and the tragic example of the Gulf war in the wake of the aggression against Kuwait reminds us that the rest of the world is not free of regional conflicts and strategic imbalances, and Africa in that respect is also a theatre to which we can turn our attention in order to reflect on these facts.

At any rate the question of chemical weapons, which will be the main subject of my statement, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction more generally, the abnormal build-up of conventional weapons in certain regions of the world as well as poverty and hunger, the destruction or degradation of our environment, all these today are subjects of great concern and these issues represent the most serious threats currently facing mankind. As the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament will be judged above all on the basis of its ability and capacity to respond positively to these concerns. As regards the problem of chemical weapons, which will be the subject of my statement, the threat of the use of such weapons during the Gulf war highlighted once again, and in a dramatic manner, the urgent need to conclude a convention completely and totally banning chemical weapons. My country, Senegal, shares the concern of the international community at the delay in concluding the negotiations. The

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(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

hopes raised by the Paris Conference which was a success on the subject of chemical weapons were clearly very quickly dashed, as was the euphoria prompted by the signing in June 1990 by the United States of America and the Soviet Union of a bilateral agreement on the cessation of the manufacture of chemical weapons and the destruction of the major part of their chemical weapon stockpiles.

The Government of the Republic of Senegal has made an unreserved commitment to a ban which would make chemical weapons illegal and ban their use. International security would be strengthened by a binding multilateral commitment which would guarantee all parties that they will not be threatened by these terrible weapons. The future convention, while protecting civilian chemical industry and encouraging international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemicals, should in the first place provide primarily for the complete destruction of existing arsenals and prohibit the use of these weapons. To do that it will have to be universal and non-discriminatory.

Our negotiations have reached a critical phase in which issues are now approached in a spirit that is more constructive than ever before. Thus we listened very carefully to the statement delivered on 16 May by Ambassador Stephen Ledogar of the United States on the proposals made by President Bush. I should like to take this opportunity to state my delegation's appreciation of this welcome initiative on the part of the United States and its President. This initiative marks very important progress which will very definitely give a beneficial boost to our negotiations. We are certain that this new development will contribute to stepping up our work on all items currently under negotiation. The change that has been noted in the American position has taken place at the very time when it has been proved that chemical weapons are not able to guarantee the security of the States that possess them. We therefore welcome very positively the decision of the United States to drop its insistence on the "right of retaliation". This decision, which goes beyond the obligations set forth in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, offers us the advantage of putting an end to the debate on the need for States to have an adequate chemical weapons stockpile for measures of reprisals. The use of these weapons can therefore no longer be justified by mitigating circumstances. The fact that this proposal includes severe measures to be taken against those who have not, after a reasonable period of time, signed the convention after its entry into force is also a new and positive element which must be taken into account. My delegation, moreover, fully subscribes to the procedural proposal made by the United States that the session should be held without interruption so that the convention can be finalized by the end of this year.

My delegation is particularly optimistic that the convention will be completed very quickly since very interesting proposals have been submitted by a number of delegations. Thus in his statement delivered on 16 May 1991, the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius, whom we have always appreciated for his work and his positive contributions throughout the length of our Conference, submitted a proposal on the expansion of the membership of the Conference. We hope that this proposal will help us

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

to settle this issue, which has been pending for a long time. Another proposal that should earn the Conference's full attention is the proposal presented on 23 May 1991 by the distinguished representative of Peru in the form of a working paper on challenge inspections or inspections on request (CD/CW/WP.337).

Today, the delegation of Senegal is very pleased to note that the vast majority of delegations feel we are approaching the final objective - the prompt conclusion of a universal and non-discriminatory convention on chemical weapons. Under your skilful and devoted guidance, Madam President, we are sure that we will find positive solutions to the major issues of inspections on request and universal accession to the convention, as well as other equally important outstanding issues such as the protection and decontamination of the environment, particularly during the process of destruction of the major CW arsenals. At the global level the principled proposals of the delegation of Senegal on the nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of nuclear war, including the mandates of the ad hoc committees dealing with these issues, have remained unchanged and are well known to all and reflect the positions that have been upheld by the Group of 21.

In conclusion, let me say that the peoples of the entire world today jointly aspire to rid mankind of weapons of mass destruction. To that end, the conclusion of the negotiations on a convention for the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons in so far as the way is now open is a major undertaking which the international community has entrusted to the Conference on Disarmament. The current evolution of the international situation provides new proof of the importance and urgency of discharging this responsibility without delay. The delegation of Senegal would like to reiterate that the key to the success of our negotiations lies in firm commitment to the fundamental objective of the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons. It goes without saying that this objective includes the unconditional prohibition of the use of these weapons, and their total destruction. We are convinced that we will achieve this objective if all parties to the negotiations uphold this commitment by engaging in serious and pragmatic talks and fully demonstrating their political will. The Conference on Disarmament needs to achieve decisive progress to maintain its prestige as a negotiating forum. This session should be action-oriented so as to achieve concrete results.

In conclusion, let me say that Senegal has set itself the objective of working actively for the rapid conclusion of such a convention on chemical weapons. My delegation will continue as in the past to cooperate with other delegations in a constructive and serious spirit for this purpose, to share the concept of general and monitored disarmament so as to strengthen collective security and peace in the world.

Mr. HOGG (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): As the United Kingdom has the honour of holding the Presidency of this Conference, it is for me a very particular pleasure to speak here today. As you have said, Madam President, all the work of this Conference has our whole-hearted support but we do attach particular importance to the achievement of a chemical weapons ban - the urgency of which has been impressed on all our minds by the circumstances of the Gulf war. I shall refer to this later in the course of this statement.

... I have of course referred to success in Europe, but that is in stark contrast to the rising threat elsewhere. The Gulf war should have punctured any euphoria which might have been created by the easing of East/West tensions. The military policies of Iraq have highlighted the dangers of proliferation: the proliferation of chemical weapons, the proliferation of biological weapons, the spread of nuclear weapons and of ballistic missiles and the related question of arms transfers and the arms trade. Of course the fundamental answer lies in finding political solutions to the underlying problems but at the same time we must recognize the importance of arms control accords which by creating conditions of greater confidence, help to bring about the necessary long-term political agreements.

(Mr. Hogg, United Kingdom)

... We must take all possible measures to reduce and, if possible, eliminate the risks posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and by the ballistic missile systems which can deliver them. Export controls can play an important part in slowing down the rate of proliferation because, if effectively enforced, they can make it more difficult for countries to obtain the equipment and technology with which to develop these weapons.

Some countries are already making efforts to improve and harmonize their national export controls. The Nuclear Suppliers Group met in March to discuss the implementation of its guidelines. The membership of the Missile Technology Control Régime has recently been expanded by the accession of new States parties. The Australia Group is working to increase the effectiveness of its controls on chemical and biological materials. In December last year the United Kingdom held a seminar in London on chemical-weapons-related export controls.

But two important provisos: first we must not jeopardize developing civil, especially chemical industries in the third world; secondly, in supplier countries, industries need to be assured that they can conduct their trade with other countries under fair and equal conditions there.

(Mr. Hogg, United Kingdom)

... The area in which the Conference on Disarmament can make the most significant contribution to global arms control at the present time is the negotiation of a chemical weapons convention. The most effective long-term answer to preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons will be the agreement of an effective global ban. The very real threat of the large-scale use of chemical weapons during the Gulf war should now spur us on to complete the task as soon as may be. We support the proposal by President Bush that we should all aim to resolve the major outstanding issues by the end of this year and complete the convention ready for signature by the middle of 1992. We recognize that this is a very ambitious target. However, it is also a very important and valuable one for it would rid the world of a particularly repugnant weapon; it will serve to reaffirm the positive benefits of international cooperation in matters of global security and therefore we will play a full part in the achievement of these objectives.

One of the key issues yet to be resolved in the negotiations for the chemical weapons convention is that of verification. In 1990, my predecessor, William Waldegrave, presented the results of a series of practice challenge inspection exercises we had carried out at government facilities in the United Kingdom. Our main conclusion, one that we commend to all parties, was that there is no site so sensitive that we could not allow some form of access within it. We found that it was possible to reconcile the degree of intrusiveness necessary for effective verification with the protection of necessary legitimate security interests. However we had not, then, included an inspection of a civil chemical site in such practical exercises: here there is a real problem of commercial confidentiality. We therefore decided to carry out such an inspection in order to check whether managed access techniques were applicable and I have the honour today to table a paper, CD/1080, which describes the main lessons from the work we undertook.

We came to the following conclusions: First, that although a breach of the convention would be more difficult to detect at a civil site than at a military site, a wide-ranging inspection would present a significant risk of discovery to an evader. Second, the need to present legitimate commercial confidentiality can be reconciled with the requirements for extensive access. Third, the system of managed access previously developed at sensitive government facilities worked well, with suitable adaptation, in the industrial context. These conclusions have reinforced our view that a system of challenge inspection for both civil and military sites, intrusive enough to represent a real deterrent to evasion, is practical and achievable. Our conclusion remains that effective verification is crucial for the convention and that challenge inspection is the key to effective verification. Without a rapid and intrusive inspection system, the convention would lack the instruments necessary to make it an effective arms control measure.

(Mr. Hogg, United Kingdom)

Although challenge inspection is the key, it is not the only method of verification being developed, and we welcome the new proposals put forward by Sweden for an integrated approach to the routine verification of the chemical industry. We believe these proposals are a step in the direction of a more practical, economic and better-focused régime. Much work still needs to be done on this issue, but the integrated system does offer a positive way forward.

Some other important issues must also be tackled rapidly and imaginatively if a convention is to be ready for signature in 12 months' time. The organization of the convention must be cost-effective and must be funded by a clear and equitable system of contributions. An effective decision-making procedure must be created to oversee its efficient implementation. The benefits of joining, flowing from enhanced security, must outweigh those of staying out - this to encourage wide adherence. A procedure for penalizing States parties in breach of the convention, especially those which use chemical weapons, needs to be developed and parties must act together to prevent non-members from acquiring the means to make chemical weapons.

So, to sum up, we want an effective convention that will not only ban chemical weapons, but deter even the most unscrupulous régime from ignoring that ban in future. Such a convention is now within our grasp. Let us together ensure that we complete it.

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

... During the last couple of years many of us have nourished the hope that the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention would soon be brought to a successful conclusion. Successive chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons have spared no effort in trying to reach the final stage of the work of the Conference on Disarmament towards a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. But despite progress on more technical issues and considerable improvement of the draft text of the convention, this final stage has so far seemed out of reach.

Norway therefore wholeheartedly welcomes President Bush's chemical weapons initiative of 13 May which we hope will bring the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention to an early and successful conclusion. The decision by the United States Government to accept unconditional prohibition of use and total destruction of all its chemical weapons within the first 10 years of the convention is indeed of great importance. We are confident that the negotiations will make full use of the new United States positions to regain the momentum necessary to conclude the convention within a reasonable period of time.

We also support the process of a package approach started by the present chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet Union, which demonstrates the interrelationship between problems related to security, verification and organizational issues, in our view the most important ones remaining in the negotiations.

We are fully aware, however, that important and complex issues still remain unresolved. The issue of verification of non-production is one such issue. Again, with the necessary flexibility on the part of all parties, progress should be possible on the basis of recent proposals, inter alia by the Swedish delegation. In this context we support the proposal for a ministerial meeting convened at an appropriate time to solve the outstanding political issues. Such a meeting would have to be well prepared and open for participation by countries other than the present 30 members.

Let me also underline the importance attached by my Government to the need for openness and transparency with regard to chemical weapons. All chemical-weapon States should provide information about the location, composition and size of their stocks. Similarly, all countries not in possession of chemical weapons should make declarations to that effect.

Norway will continue her research programme on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. This programme was initiated in 1981 and is carried out by experts at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. This year's report is the tenth in the annual series of research publications in this field. A working paper giving a summary of this year's report is being issued

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

as document CD/1078, and each delegation will receive a copy of the report itself in the near future.

Within the framework of the present research programme, the Norwegian Government has decided to invite scientists and scholars from developing countries for training in methods of verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. We feel it is important to draw as many countries as possible into this cooperation.

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Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden):

... What can be learnt from this war? One lesson to be learned from the military build-up in the region, as I said in my statement here in January, is that the international arms trade has to be limited. International control of all arms trade is urgently called for. It must apply to all States, both arms exporters and importers. Another lesson to be learned from the acute menace of chemical warfare is that chemical weapons must be destroyed once and for all and that a total ban on chemical weapons must be concluded urgently.

(continued)

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

... There is now widespread agreement that we must intensify the negotiations here in Geneva to completely ban chemical weapons. Who stands to lose by their elimination? Nobody. All countries and all peoples would gain in security if a total ban were achieved. My Government welcomes President Bush's announcement of a shift in United States chemical weapons policy. Acceptance by the United States of both a total ban on the use of chemical weapons and the total and unconditional destruction of existing stocks of chemical arms constitutes a long-awaited breakthrough in the negotiations.

No delegation claims any more that the right of retaliation in kind should be part of a future chemical weapons convention. Throughout the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, the Swedish Government has consistently advocated a total and unconditional prohibition of use, valid under all circumstances. No delegation insists any longer on the option of retaining certain quantities of chemical weapons after the destruction period - a policy my delegation has viewed with profound concern, as have many others.

I am confident that the removal of these well-known obstacles implies a fundamental change in the negotiating process. I am confident that it will contribute to added momentum in the negotiations and the speedy conclusion of the chemical weapons treaty.

Let us be clear, nonetheless, that there is still a heavy workload ahead of us. Essential issues of a highly political character remain unresolved. Verification is one of them. Constructive proposals for the conduct of inspections on request are needed. The crux of the matter is to strike a balance between the legitimate security concerns of States parties and the necessity of having an efficient verification régime which inspires confidence that the convention is being complied with.

As far as the verification of the chemical industry is concerned, constructive work has been carried out in Working Group B of the Ad Hoc Committee. The unified, cost-effective verification régime that has been suggested, which also covers chemical-weapons-capable facilities, seems to contain several elements that could lead to a final settlement. An expanded obligation to declare industrial facilities should be seen as a measure for creating greater confidence among States parties.

In this phase of intensified work and reconciled divergencies, a final settlement of the issues of technological cooperation and of protection and assistance should be within reach. It would be a mistake for any delegation to wait until the very last moment to actively seek a solution of these

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

outstanding issues. Quite the contrary. We should now press ahead. At this promising juncture, an intensification of the work of the Committee is the correct prescription. Without further delay, capitals must supply delegations with instructions flexible enough to permit us to achieve a complete draft treaty text ready for signature within a year.

Chemical weapons were not actually used in the Gulf war. On the other hand, the perceived threat of the use of chemical weapons was real. In order to eliminate the chemical weapons menace, all chemical weapons should be banned and destroyed - everywhere. Sweden strongly supports the United Nations Special Commission set up in accordance with Security Council resolution 687. In this connection, my Government puts special emphasis on paragraph 14 of resolution 687, which states that its implementation represents "steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons".

The establishment of the Special Commission is entirely in line with the central role of the United Nations in safeguarding international peace and security accorded to the world organization in the Charter. My delegation hopes that the practical experience of the Special Commission with the physical destruction of chemical weapons, and the international coordination of this vast undertaking, will have a favourable impact on the negotiations here in Geneva.

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(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

... All States, whether predominantly military exporters or importers, should cooperate with this international régime under the auspices of the United Nations. Such a régime must be supported by appropriate verification provisions and mechanisms. To outline, and reach agreement on, such arrangements is a major undertaking which can be expected to take quite some time to achieve. Yet we do not have to start from scratch. A great deal may be learnt from recent agreements on reducing and destroying conventional and nuclear weapons, and from the experience gained in the negotiations on the verification of a total ban on chemical weapons. In order to be feasible in the short term, a régime should proceed gradually. As a first step, the United Nations should establish a clearing-house for information on military production, exports and imports. All Governments should supply the United Nations with comprehensive statements of their military production, exports and imports. The United Nations should compile and keep a register of these reports, and regularly make this register available to all its Members.

In terms of armed hostilities, the war in the Gulf is over. Nevertheless, the Gulf war continues to present the world community with new challenges. I have sought to outline a threefold challenge, amplified - though not created - by this war: the need for international limitation of the transfer of conventional armaments; the need for a speedy conclusion of a total ban on all chemical weapons; and the need for disarmament, peace and security in Iraq and the entire region.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French):

... Hence our aims are clear. Chemical weapons must be eliminated. Bacteriological weapons must not be produced. Existing nuclear arsenals must be reduced to the lowest level consistent with the maintenance of deterrence. The non-dissemination of nuclear weapons remains an imperative, whereas the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is justified. The dissemination of ballistic technologies must be strictly controlled in so far as they may be used for aggressive aims. On the other hand, there is no reason to prevent cooperation in space for civilian and scientific purposes.

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(Mr. Errera, France)

... As regards the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons: the entire international community, meeting at the Paris Conference in January 1989, acknowledged the need to complete as soon as possible the convention banning chemical weapons which has been negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament. France proposed convening the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in Geneva at ministerial level to conclude the negotiations before the end of the year. It will spare no effort to reach that objective. It calls on all States to become parties to the convention from the outset.

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(Mr. Errera, France)

... There is a need for the strict regional application of the category régimes laid down for nuclear, bacteriological and chemical (NBC) weapons as well as ballistic missiles. That is why, at the initiative of France, United Nations Security Council resolution 687 on the cease-fire in the Gulf conflict noted that the specific constraints imposed on Iraq as regards nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic missiles, represented steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles, along with a global ban on chemical weapons. That goal should be pursued in other regions of the world.

(Mr. Nakayama, Japan)

... Other serious issues requiring solution have also emerged in connection with the implementation of disarmament measures. For example, what should be done about the question of the transfer of arms from one region to another as a result of disarmament arrangements in the former region? What are the security implications of such a transfer to the latter region? What about the ecological problems resulting from the destruction of chemical weapons?

... Here in Geneva, one may recall the fact that the Conference on Disarmament, in contrast to its productive years in the 1960s and 1970s, has failed to produce a single disarmament treaty in recent years. On the other hand, it is also a fact that in these same years an epoch-making endeavour has been made assiduously in order to draw up a chemical weapons prohibition convention. This endeavour is truly epoch-making as the convention is to be equipped with a strict and complex verification régime and the negotiations are in fact approaching the final stage. Now that the cold war, which could have delayed the negotiations, is becoming a thing of the past, the time is ripe for new achievements. The goal must be achievable and should be achieved. If and when we succeed in concluding a multilateral disarmament convention with the active participation of developing States, the accomplishment will have no less significance than the recently concluded bilateral and regional disarmament agreements. This accomplishment would also be a significant instrument in bridging the perception gap between developed and developing nations with regard to the approach and the progress of the disarmament process. In this sense, the Conference on Disarmament is now being challenged to prove its raison d'être.

I should now like to take up the question of weapons of mass destruction, with which the work of the Conference on Disarmament is closely linked. Considering the time and the place, it would be only natural to begin with the problems of chemical weapons, upon which I have already touched.

(continued)

(Mr. Nakayama, Japan)

More than 60 years have passed since the use of chemical weapons was banned by the Geneva Protocol, and more than 20 years since chemical weapons became a subject of this forum. Precisely when the negotiations to eliminate these inhumane weapons appeared to be approaching the final stage, the Gulf crisis broke out. The threat of the use of these very weapons by Iraq heightened the desire of the international community for the early conclusion of the convention to a level never reached before. It is now imperative to conclude the long-standing negotiations as early as possible, without losing the momentum created by the Gulf crisis. I sincerely hope that all the delegates here will make all-out efforts for this purpose.

In this connection, the latest position of the United States announced by President Bush represented a courageous undertaking aimed at global elimination of chemical weapons. Japan heartily welcomes this initiative.

I am aware that there are some proposals for the Conference on Disarmament to be convened at the ministerial level in order to give political impetus to the negotiations. Basically, I am in agreement with the idea, because this may be the way to achieve a breakthrough in some of the pending important issues and to expedite the negotiations. However, such a ministerial conference would not be able to achieve its expected objectives unless issues requiring political solutions are sufficiently narrowed down and crystallized, paving the way for appropriate political settlements. As for myself, I will be willing to attend such a ministerial conference and do my best, if all the delegates here, who are top disarmament negotiators of the respective nations, prepare the ground with the utmost care and if they ask for such a ministerial-level exercise by consensus.

With regard to this, I should like to make a proposal. Perhaps we should consider convening a meeting in Geneva at the level of high officials from nations' capitals. This may become appropriate at a certain advanced stage of the negotiating efforts. Such a meeting at the level of high officials, possibly before the end of this year, may help in moving the negotiations a step further and help in the planning of a ministerial conference.

Of course, whatever the level of a meeting or a conference may be, it would be difficult or even unrealistic to try to draw up a convention that would be 100 per cent satisfactory to all the States parties. Therefore, in putting forward my proposal I should like to urge all States to demonstrate a spirit of compromise to the maximum extent, fully realizing the ultimate goals of the convention. This would be indispensable for the early conclusion of the negotiations.

In conjunction with the new moves I have just mentioned, which are meant to facilitate breakthroughs in the negotiations, it would be important for the Governments of States parties to the negotiations to seek understanding and cooperation from their nationals concerning this convention. Only in this way can nations ensure the smooth implementation of the convention in their territories, including the effective and reasonable implementation of verification and inspection measures. For this purpose, it would also be

(Mr. Nakayama, Japan)

important for Governments to study and carry out practicability exercises. From this viewpoint, my Government is planning for the second time to carry out a trial inspection of facilities dealing with chemicals to be limited by the convention during the current fiscal year. Through the experience and insight to be acquired in this trial inspection, we should like to make a contribution to the establishment of a reliable verification and inspection system.

I should also like to touch upon the question of the universality of the convention. Unfortunately, there is no panacea that would ensure universal adherence to the convention. Each nation will have to accede to the convention on the basis of its political commitment to eliminate chemical weapons from the surface of the Earth. In this sense, it would be important to prepare a convention that would convince all nations that their security would be enhanced by acceding to it. With respect to those nations which still refuse to accede to the convention, it would be important to continue diplomatic efforts of persuasion and to make them realize the high costs they would have to pay by remaining outside the convention. With all the wisdom we have gathered and will gather, we must come up with a formula that will meet these requirements.

As I have been explaining, Japan is for the early conclusion of the convention, and, as was announced during the last session of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, Japan will become one of the original signatory States of the convention. On this occasion, I wish to express the hope that all those States that have not done so will make similar announcements, and that all the States possessing chemical weapons will make announcements admitting the fact. By doing this, we can give the convention firm ground on which to stand and build confidence in the idea of the elimination of chemical weapons.

In this connection, the task of the elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons now being carried out by the United Nations Special Commission, consisting of experts from various nations, of which Japan is one, is indeed a momentous task. It will serve, let us hope, as a valuable experiment upon which the future elimination of chemical weapons under the convention may be modelled. The task of the Special Commission will be full of difficult technical and financial problems, including the question of the prevention of harmful environmental effects. Japan is willing to contribute in an appropriate manner to the carrying out of the task of the Special Commission.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan for his important statement and also for the kind words which he addressed to me.

As you know, the Prime Minister of Australia, His Excellency the Honourable Robert J.L. Hawke, AC MP, was inscribed to address the Conference today. Unfortunately, he had to cancel his visit for reasons relating to his high responsibilities. However, the Prime Minister has addressed a message to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina, and I would like to invite Ambassador Komatina to read this message.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The message addressed by the Honourable Robert James Lee Hawke, Prime Minister of Australia, reads as follows:

"I write to advise you that I will not be able to visit Geneva to deliver my address to the Conference on Disarmament on 6 June.

"I had been very much looking forward to putting my vision both of the challenge that now lies before the Conference and of the achievements which, I believe, are within its reach. Most importantly, I wanted to urge the members of the Conference to move quickly to conclude a convention that will rid the world of chemical weapons. I regret that I will not now have this opportunity.

"I believe that I have a duty to stay in Australia to oversee a number of matters which must be dealt with after the political events here over the past few days.

"I am sorry that it has become necessary to cancel my visit at this late stage. I apologize for any inconvenience this may cause.

"I wish you well in your important deliberations."

Here ends the message, and I would like to use this opportunity to thank the Prime Minister for his message through the Ambassador of Australia.

The PRESIDENT: I wish also to draw your attention to a draft letter to be addressed to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of States non-members which are not participating at present in our work on chemical weapons. As indicated in the draft, that letter will be signed by myself, as President of the Conference, and by Ambassador Batsanov, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I discussed the draft letter at the presidential consultations held yesterday and found that there was agreement to despatch the text as drafted. I have to add that, since then, we have noticed a very small editorial mistake in the first paragraph. Since this was drafted, the number of non-member States participating in our work has happily increased and the number should now read 35 instead of 34, so we will make that change if we may. If I hear no objection, I shall proceed as I have just described.

It was so decided.

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(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

... The area where we look for the most immediate results is chemical weapons. The urgent need for a global convention has been demonstrated yet again, this time by the Gulf War. Like others, New Zealand units with the multinational force faced exposure to possible chemical attack. Threats to use chemical weapons against civilians were particularly barbaric, and are a reminder to us all of the need to outlaw these dreadful weapons for all time. New Zealand is firmly committed to the conclusion of a comprehensive convention prohibiting chemical weapons. We are pleased to note the progress being made on a number of important issues, including the drafting of an appropriate definition of chemical weapons and the order of destruction of stockpiles.

It has been clear for some time that greater momentum needs to be given to the negotiations. We welcome President Bush's announcement that the United States will drop its right of retaliation and destroy all its chemical weapon stocks within 10 years of the convention coming into force. We hope that this will provide some of the necessary impetus for the early conclusion of the negotiations. We believe that further impetus may well be provided by a meeting at ministerial level of the CD at an appropriate time.

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(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

Drafting the convention is not, of course, an end in itself. For the convention to work it must attract the widest possible international support. It is therefore essential that the convention should not impose a burden, that for practical reasons, would tend to discourage smaller countries from acceding. This has implications in a number of areas, not least regarding the costs and complexity of the controls being established. There is no area in which this is more relevant than verification, particularly challenge inspections and the verification of legitimate chemical activity. Here we must find an appropriate balance between verification which is sufficient to provide confidence in the régime, but which does not place an undue burden on the States and industries concerned. I suggest that we should not be looking for - and cannot afford the burden of - a perfect régime. We need a sufficient régime - one that is sufficient to deter a would-be violator because there would be a real prospect of being detected. I know these concerns are shared by others.

It was consistent with these concerns that New Zealand's trial inspection, the results of which were tabled earlier this year, looked at means by which small countries with modest chemical industries could comply with the convention. It remains inevitable, however, that there will be substantial costs in implementing this convention. It will be necessary - but may not be easy - to come up with a wholly equitable formula to determine where they fall. It is true that countries will benefit from the enhanced security offered by the convention. However, in the IAEA context New Zealand, which has no nuclear industry at all, pays a safeguards contribution equivalent to that paid by six shielded countries, all of them larger than us, which operate 29 nuclear power plants between them. I do not believe that the present inequitable IAEA funding system is sustainable in the long run, and we must not sow the seeds for similar inequities in the chemical weapons convention.

The destruction of all chemical weapons is our ultimate objective. That is a huge and costly task, not the least because of the absolute necessity to protect the environment in the process. In our view these weapons ought to be destroyed in situ and subject to proper controls. In this respect we accept that the United States has acted openly and responsibly in endeavouring to alleviate concern about the destruction of chemical weapons at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. Provided that the process continues to operate in an environmentally safe manner, we also accept that the chemical weapons stocks on the atoll should be destroyed there. Of fundamental importance to us, however, is the United States' assurance that there is no prospect of further stocks being brought into the region for destruction at Johnston Atoll.

Controlling the transfer of technology and components intended for chemical weapons production is one way of limiting the spread of the weapons themselves. We have recently expanded the list of chemical weapons precursors subject to export controls in New Zealand. New Zealand believes it is essential for Governments to work hand in hand with the private sector on these questions. In the chemical area, the New Zealand Government maintains close contact with the New Zealand Chemical Industry Council. We are pleased that the Council has recently taken self-regulatory steps in adopting a

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

programme of "responsible care" similar to that in other countries. We also welcome initiatives by the United States and others to tighten controls on exports which contribute to the production of weapons of mass destruction. New Zealand already maintains controls on the export of strategic goods and is a participant in the Missile Technology Control Régime.

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(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

... The accumulation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in certain regions such as the Middle East, creates a destabilizing environment that endangers international peace and security. The spectre of the use of weapons of mass destruction impels us to redouble our efforts for the early conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons convention and to address all other weapons of mass destruction. This should be done without delay in order to make our world a safer place to live in.

Egypt proposed on 8 April 1990, the declaration of the Middle East as a region free of all weapons of mass destruction. On 24 April 1990, I was instructed to introduce our proposal in the CD, and I stated on that occasion the following:

"The rationale of the proposal is to spare a region fraught with tension from the scourge of a possible recourse to any type of weapon of mass destruction".

I went on to state in that same intervention:

"It is the considered opinion of the Government of Egypt that the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East merits urgent attention and serious examination. ... I believe a careful perusal of its contents will contribute to a better and more profound appreciation of our proposal. It is our earnest hope that this proposed comprehensive approach will command the active support of all ... States".

As of late, proposals have been announced by the United States and France which we hope will contribute to the attainment of this important objective. The Security Council has also adopted resolution 687, which recognized in paragraph 14 the necessity to establish such a zone. Paragraph 14 reads:

"Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons".

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Egypt considers the Security Council's reference to the proposal on weapons of mass destruction to be an acknowledgement of the merit of the Egyptian proposal. As a follow-up my delegation hopes that adequate machinery, as well as specific measures, under the supervision of the Security Council, will be soon undertaken. The Council may even discuss such measures during its upcoming meeting to review the steps taken by Iraq in the field of disarmament.

One further integral element that would facilitate the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and ensure regional collective accession to it could be the encouragement of all States in the region to adhere to the international legal instruments that comprise the juridical régimes regulating weapons of mass destruction. These legal instruments are the non-proliferation Treaty, the biological weapons Convention of 1972 and the chemical weapons convention which is under preparation now at the CD. The successful employment of confidence-building measures in the Middle East will undoubtedly be augmented through the adherence of all parties in the region to these important legal instruments.

Last year a highly qualified group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General finalized and presented a study on effective and verifiable measures which could facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The study noted in paragraph 110 that

"there is broad agreement that an effective zone would be a great improvement over the present situation. The problem is how to create the conditions in which a zone becomes a realistic development".

This represents the basic challenge for the implementation of a stream of General Assembly resolutions that date back to 1974, when Egypt and Iran presented this proposal for the first time to the General Assembly and have been adopted by consensus at every General Assembly session since 1980.

Mr. CESKA (Austria):

... May I start by expressing the deep satisfaction of my Government with regard to the recent initiative taken by President Bush in the field of chemical weapons? The unconditional renouncement of any use of chemical weapons upon entry into force of the chemical weapons convention expressed therein represents an important step towards the global abolition of this category of weapons. In this context, we are also aware of the importance of cooperation for the destruction of chemical weapons as requested by the United States initiative. At the same time, we are in favour of intensifying the negotiations - in their quantitative as well as qualitative aspects - with a view to finalizing the draft convention within the coming 12 months.

Besides the above-mentioned questions, there are still a number of other issues under discussion which also require political settlement apart from technical solutions. In particular, I am referring to the questions of verification and decision-making. The essential problem we are facing in the field of verification relates to the identification of objective criteria to allow for inclusion of the most relevant facilities and installations into the control régime. In this context, we support the concept of "capability" as an essential criterion, while, at the same time, we agree with those who argue in favour of restricting this concept to the most relevant facilities and

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(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

installations capable of producing schedule 1, 2 and 3 chemicals. This should satisfy both the political and technical needs with regard to the scope of verification. Politically speaking, this would help to overcome reluctance displayed by industry representatives as well as by countries hosting a large number of chemical facilities and installations. Furthermore, financial implications could be kept to an acceptable level. From the technical point of view, such a further selection would help "separate the wheat from the chaff".

Concerning the decision-making mechanism to be adopted under the future convention, let me refer to three principles which seem the most crucial. They relate to the questions of geographical distribution of seats, transparency and flexibility. In the light of the regional as well as global interests of all States, all regions of the world should be adequately represented in the pattern of decision-making. In this regard, the number of seats in the executive organ of the control organization could be limited to 20, using a commonly acceptable mechanism for the selection of candidates. Such a system could, however, comprise some additional criteria in order to allow for more frequent representation of highly concerned States.

In order to ensure comprehensive confidence in the work of the organization, maximum transparency in the decision-making process would be required. This has also to be guaranteed in all other areas of work of the future organization, taking into account, however, information restrictions due to commercial secrecy requirements and security interests involved.

The necessity for flexibility relates to the need for swift political and organizational reaction. A changing international environment as well as rapid advances in science and technology necessitate the flexible application as well as interpretation of the convention. In view of the security interests involved, the administrative side of the organization should also be handled in a flexible manner, ensuring comprehensive satisfaction of particular security concerns. Consequently, in order to meet these requirements, the future control organization should dispose of adequate information and evaluation machinery.

Let me welcome the important initiative recently taken by President Mitterrand of France which contains proposals relating to weapons of mass destruction as well as other categories of weapons. In particular the proposed acceleration of the CW negotiations and their possible conclusion, still in 1991, by a ministerial meeting are aimed at intensifying the negotiations in order to bring them to an early end. We likewise welcome the decision of the French Government to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, thereby strengthening it decisively.

Let me reiterate once more that my country attaches the utmost importance to the achievement of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. It is with this understanding that Austria has intensified its commitment to the negotiating process and continues to offer to serve as host country for the

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

future control organization. In this context, let me give more details of our understanding of the role of the future control organization as well as our offer.

The future control organization will have to exercise a number of different functions in order to allow for comprehensive and forward-looking implementation of the convention. One of these functions relates to verification activities in the large sense, including periodic updating of verification means and related methodology. In this regard, the establishment of a special unit dealing with science-and-technology-related issues would seem appropriate. Another area of activity would cover peaceful cooperation in the field of chemistry, which would largely constitute a clearing-house function. Furthermore, education programmes for inspectors as well as students and the broad public could be envisaged.

Let me mention one more idea, which relates to the question of environmental protection. As is often pointed out in the context of destruction of chemical weapons, minimum environmental standards will have to be observed. As the future day-to-day work of the organization will allow for collection of comprehensive environmental knowledge also in other areas, a specific environmental unit might be created. This unit could help foster international cooperation programmes in the specific environmental context of highly toxic chemicals, drawing also on existing knowledge within WHO.

Thus, in our view the future control organization should be a comprehensive and easily accessible servicing body of the international community of States. For this purpose, its location should allow for optimum cooperation and coordination with other relevant international bodies and the international community as a whole. Excellent working conditions including generous privileges and immunities should render this task as easy as possible. Austria is prepared to offer such conditions, comprising equivalent treatment for the staff of the organization as well as for the permanent missions accredited to the organization equivalent to those of bilateral missions, as a contribution to the future success of the work of the organization.

Turning now to the forthcoming third review conference of the biological weapons Convention taking place in Geneva in September this year, let me start with some general remarks. In our understanding, the biological weapons régime as contained in the Convention has proved satisfactory. At the second review conference in 1986, the time was not felt to be ripe to take action on institutional as well as other questions in the light of the then expected conclusion of the chemical weapons convention negotiations. In the mean time the then prevailing expectation concerning the possibility of simply merging the chemical weapons convention and the biological weapons Convention implementation institutions has proven unfeasible, as at least a specialized unit dealing with biological-weapons-related issues seems needed. Consequently, precise proposals could now be foreseen in order to allow for enhanced implementation of the biological weapons Convention while at the same time not excluding the possibility of integrating such a specialized unit into the future chemical weapons control organization.

Mr. DITCHEV (Bulgaria):

... Recently, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a declaration of support for the latest initiative of President Bush concerning the Middle East. The declaration expresses, *inter alia*, the belief that this initiative could have a much broader impact on efforts aimed at strengthening peace and security on a global scale. I also wish to inform you in this connection that steps are currently being undertaken in Bulgaria to introduce a comprehensive national system of export control. We are seeking to use the experience acquired by other countries in this field. The aim is to contribute to the viability of the existing internationally agreed guidelines trying to curb the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and missile technologies. Speaking about non-proliferation, I would also like to welcome the decision of France to accede to the NPT. We regard this development as a major contribution to the viability of the treaty and to international security as a whole. My delegation listened with great attention to the statement of the distinguished Ambassador of France, Ambassador Errera, introducing the arms control and disarmament plan put forward some days ago by President Mitterrand. We find that this plan contains a number of valuable ideas which will be thoroughly examined, no doubt in positive terms.

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(Mr. Ditchev, Bulgaria)

Today I wish to address the agenda item dealing with chemical weapons. I shall start by saying that Bulgaria is much interested in the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. It is in this context that we consider positively the recent initiative of President Bush. Bulgaria cannot but welcome this initiative, as we have always favoured the idea of speeding up the work on the CW convention, including through continuous negotiations. In the view of the Bulgarian delegation, it is entirely within reach to have all outstanding issues resolved by the end of 1991 and the convention completed within 12 months.

Unilaterally at the 1989 Paris CW conference, and together with the other CSCE countries at the 1990 Paris summit meeting, Bulgaria has declared its intention to become an original party to the chemical weapons convention. We therefore support the United States call upon all States to do likewise and to declare their chemical weapons stockpiles. My country has entered a process of intensive national preparations to meet well in time its future obligations. A proposal has been tabled in the Bulgarian Council of Ministers for setting up a national commission to prepare for accession of the country to the convention. This commission may well turn later on into a national authority as provided for under article VII of the chemical weapons convention.

The formal renunciation by the United States of America of the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, conforms with the will of all other States participating in the negotiations, Bulgaria included. We have always insisted that article I of the future convention should contain the obligation not to use chemical weapons under any circumstances. Accordingly, our Government is in a process of withdrawal of the reservation of Bulgaria to the 1925 Geneva Protocol made a long time ago. We welcome also the new unconditional United States commitment to destroy all of its chemical weapon stocks and production facilities within 10 years of entry into force of the convention. Inclusion of such provisions seems to hold the highest promise of speeding up the finalization of the convention. The United States' expressed readiness to provide assistance to other States in the speedy, safe and environmentally sound destruction of all existing stockpiles of chemical weapons is another positive step which may facilitate the successful completion of this process within the envisaged 10 years.

My delegation believes that the proposal to forswear the trade in CW-related materials with States with which are not parties to the convention may need some further clarification. The "rolling text" already contains the provision that transfer of schedule 1 chemicals may be done only between States parties to the convention. As of now, this provision does not apply to the chemicals under the remaining two schedules. A closer look at the draft text of article XI may also be needed. It is clear, however, that inclusion of a consensus provision of this kind in the convention would encourage more States to join the convention, and would therefore contribute to achieving its universality.

(Mr. Ditchev, Bulgaria)

Bulgaria will support inclusion of provisions for sanctions against those States which violate the convention, and especially for severe sanctions against any State that initiates the use of chemical weapons. We are also committed to a strong verification régime, with challenge inspection being one of its main elements. Once the promised new proposals by the United States are made we shall define our position on the matter.

Finally, the delegation of Bulgaria has been happy to note the prompt and positive reaction of the Soviet Union to the United States proposals, as expressed in the plenary statement of the Soviet delegation on 23 May. This is yet another evidence that the necessary prerequisites for early conclusion of the CW convention are being created. We are confident that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will be in a position, under the able guidance of its chairman, Ambassador Serguei Batsanov, to accomplish this task.

My delegation will take an active stand in the negotiations on these and all other remaining issues. In the present new context of the negotiations, we appreciate even more the idea of calling a CW meeting at the level of foreign ministers in Geneva to help finally solve all the pending political issues of the CW convention.

In conclusion, I should like to stress the following. You, Madam President, are guiding the work of the Conference on Disarmament at a time when the negotiations on CW have entered probably the most difficult and also the most rewarding stage. An early and successful outcome of these negotiations is to add to the credibility of this forum and demonstrate again that it is able to deal with and resolve in an effective way most complex and sensitive issues related to security. It is a time of unprecedented opportunities which we all should use to the maximum of our abilities.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): You have called upon me, Madam President, in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. However, first of all, as the head of the Soviet delegation, I should like to sincerely congratulate you on taking up the post of President and to express our great appreciation of the very effective manner in which you are directing the work of the Conference. I also consider it necessary to state that your leadership, among other things, has had a positive impact on the resolution of several issues now before the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Actually, it is in connection with one such issue that I have asked to take the floor. I should like to present to the Conference a recommendation which was adopted yesterday by consensus in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and which has been distributed here today as document CD/CW/WP.343. This is an Ad Hoc Committee document dated 12 June. It calls for the Ad Hoc Committee to hold an additional regular session during the period from 8 to 19 July, that is, right

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

up to the beginning of the third part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament. The necessity for this additional session arises out of the fact that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee has entered a new stage, which requires the significant intensification of negotiations in order to achieve progress towards the early completion of the convention on chemical weapons. This recommendation adopted yesterday by the Ad Hoc Committee should not, in the view of the participants in the CW negotiations, pre-judge any possible further decisions regarding work during the period following the conclusion of the third part of the Conference on Disarmament, which is scheduled for the beginning of September. Consultations are still under way on this question. I should like to express the hope that the Conference on Disarmament will adopt our recommendation, which would then provide the "legal basis" required to continue negotiations on chemical weapons during the second and third weeks of July.

Mr. CHADHA (India):

... I have asked for the floor only to make a very brief statement on some recent positive developments which we believe would give an impetus to the negotiations which are now under way on chemical weapons at the Conference on Disarmament. I am referring to the statement made by President Bush on 13 May 1991 formally forswearing the use of chemical weapons for any reason against any State and unconditionally committing the United States to the destruction of its chemical weapons stocks within 10 years of the entry into force of a chemical weapons convention. The Government of India has already welcomed this statement, which, we believe, will make a crucial and important contribution to the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. India is strongly opposed to chemical weapons and has a long-standing commitment to the total worldwide elimination of chemical weapons and to outlawing their use unconditionally. To this end, India fully supports the call made by President Bush for an intensification of our negotiations here at Geneva in order to resolve all outstanding issues by the end of this year and to complete this convention by mid-1992. India will contribute in every possible manner to achieve the objectives of the total renunciation of chemical weapons, the commitment not to use chemical weapons under any circumstances

(continued)

(Mr. Chadha, India)

and the destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles. We will support the efforts of all like-minded delegations in the CD to these ends.

As my delegation has had occasion to state on many occasions in the past, a convention that can enjoy universal adherence must be non-discriminatory and must provide for equal rights and obligations of all States, whether or not they possess chemical weapons. It must contain an effective system of verification that reassures all States parties about compliance. The convention should ensure the unimpeded right of the States parties to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes and not hinder or impede international cooperation in peaceful areas of chemical industry development. The ideal way to ensure universal adherence to this convention is to make it attractive for those who join it. To this end, the interests of those who possess chemical weapons must be matched by the interests of those who do not and who will accept curbs on their chemical industry, which plays an important role in their development in the hope of achieving enhanced security. The routine verification system which will be developed must therefore ensure that the need for compliance is centred around the chemical industry itself, is focused, is easily implementable and is affordable. The issue of challenge inspection in the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention has now been discussed for a number of years. We believe that once a request for challenge inspection is received, the area of interest is enlarged and becomes the concern of all States parties, who are then legitimately involved in seeking reassurance that the convention is not being violated. The multilateral character of challenge inspection therefore needs to be ensured. The interests of security in the chemical weapons convention will have to be matched with the objectives of development. I am sure that all delegations negotiating on this issue in the CD share our sense of urgency and realize that the chemical weapons negotiations are at a critical stage. All efforts should be made to achieve our goal and India will fully support and complement endeavours towards this end.

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The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and also for his kind words, and perhaps now we can return to the document CD/CW/WP.343, the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons concerning the holding of an additional regular session, of limited duration, of the Ad Hoc Committee during the period 8 to 19 July. I propose that we now take action on that recommendation. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

... The Conference is energetically renewing its efforts to find political common ground which will result in a convention on chemical weapons within a reasonable time-frame. At the present stage, sustained commitment would go a long way towards overcoming outstanding problems. The decision of the United States to forswear all recourse to chemical weapons in any circumstances, including reprisals, as well as the decision to destroy all stock-piles and all production facilities completely within 10 years after the convention enters into force, will doubtless - this is our hope - have a positive impact on the ongoing negotiations.

Ever since the idea was suggested, the convening of a conference at ministerial level has continued to arouse interest, even if views are divided as to the role that should be entrusted to it and the scope of its decisions at this phase of the negotiations. We support the proposal but consider that, in view of what is at stake, such a conference should be carefully prepared for so as to ensure the best possible conditions for success, notably through the reduction of the remaining differences on major issues or fundamental principles governing the rights and duties of all parties.

The system of verification stemming from the provisions of the convention should be based on mutual trust. We are of the view that verification is

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

necessary and indispensable given the relative ease with which such weapons spread. However, this should not lead us to create an over-intrusive system that will prove to be a disincentive by being too demanding. Verification should be based on scrupulous and efficient measures, but without turning into a sort of unbridled intrusion in the inspected area, or simply involving prohibitive costs which would impair the ability of the ad hoc body to carry out its mandate satisfactorily. In this connection, the institution entrusted with monitoring the application of the convention should be fully representative of that universality we seek so that it can perform its task with all due impartiality. The developing countries should have an assurance that they will benefit from chemical technologies that are destined for civilian use.

Before concluding this chapter, I should like to commend the intensive work undertaken by the Committee on Chemical Weapons during the previous session under the active and skilled leadership of Ambassador Hyltenius, whom we thank for the efforts made in the elaboration of the convention. Ambassador Batsanov, who is pursuing that task with devotion and intelligence, also deserves our tribute.

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

... The current session of the CD has been marked by important events such as the United States initiative on chemical weapons. The announcement by President Bush last month that the United States will drop its right of retaliation and destroy all its chemical weapon stocks within 10 years of the convention coming into force constitutes a breakthrough in the negotiations. We hope that this initiative will lead to positive developments. Another notable feature of this session is the increasing participation of non-member States. This trend is indicative of the growing awareness of and interest in the substantive work being done at the Conference.

(continued)

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

... The threat of the use of chemical weapons was heightened during the recent Gulf war. The war has once again reminded us of the need for urgent conclusion of a convention completely and totally banning chemical weapons. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons two years ago stressed the necessity of concluding at an early date a convention on chemical weapons and called on the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts as a matter of urgency to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date. It is, therefore, most encouraging to note that considerable progress has been made on various issues which are now reflected in the new "rolling text", though a few key issues still remain to be resolved.

For the effective implementation of the chemical weapons convention universal adherence is of the utmost importance. I fully agree with Ambassador Hyltenius, when in introducing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons (CD/1046), he stated that the convention must be effective and non-discriminatory in order to be sufficiently attractive and that it must be unattractive to stay outside. It is gratifying to note that increasing numbers of non-members of the Conference on Disarmament are now participating in the negotiations, which augurs well for the prospects of universal adherence to the convention. Regarding the verification system, while substantial progress has been made, important issues still remain.

The future convention must provide for the legitimate concerns of the security of non-possessor States. It is also essential to provide genuine and credible guarantees to States which do not produce or store chemical weapons in a way that will enhance rather than diminish their security. The security of all countries can be best strengthened through the early conclusion and entry into force of the convention. Bringing about an effective, verifiable and truly global convention banning chemical weapons at the earliest date is a political priority.

The Union of Myanmar, which is unequivocally committed to the achievement of the total and comprehensive banning of chemical weapons, possesses no such weapons, nor has the means of producing them, nor the intention of acquiring them. Our country's stand in international forums has always been that of the total banning of all kinds of chemical weapons without exception. We have consistently voted for resolutions which would help ban forever chemical weapons.

I should be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to pay a well-deserved tribute to Ambassador Hyltenius for the valuable contribution he has made through untiring efforts. We are also convinced that under the experienced stewardship of Ambassador Batsanov, further progress can be

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

achieved. The Ad Hoc Committee has got off to a good start this year. The recent decision to hold an additional regular session of limited duration during the period 8 to 19 July 1991 would enable the Committee to further intensify its efforts to resolve the remaining issues.

Ms. BALJINNYAM (Mongolia):

... The dawn of the post-cold-war era offers both uncertainty and daunting possibility. The sweeping positive political changes in international relations at times bring forward acute internal problems laden with far-reaching implications. Unresolved problems piled during the past, cry for solutions in the new context in a manner consistent with the spirit of our time. The horizon of world peace that looked so bright and promising last year was darkened by the clouds of war in the Persian Gulf. A lesson to learn from this war is an obvious one. That is the accumulation of weapons of modern conventional types, not speaking of weapons of mass destruction, is fraught with the danger of destabilization and war. The Gulf crisis highlighted the urgent need to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Problems connected with arms transfer and the destruction of chemical and bacteriological weapons have been put higher on the international political agenda. A number of important initiatives to limit the arms race in the Middle East have been put forward. In this context the relevance and importance of the Conference on Disarmament has become more prominent than ever. Finally, East-West rivalry is being replaced by cooperation. The conclusion of the CFE Treaty heralds the beginning of a new era of inter-State relations in Europe. The example of Europe in reducing tensions and increasing stability is an extremely valuable lesson to other regions and provides important ideas of enhancing a regional approach to disarmament and arms control. My delegation fully shares the view that regional arms control measures constitute central elements of international stability.

During the last couple of years we have been living under the expectations of completing the drafting of a universal, comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention on the total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. A task which proved to be rather elusive to achieve. However, in the light of the latest developments, in particular the timely initiative of the United States, a breakthrough in the negotiations has become a reality.

My delegation welcomes the United States initiatives, its readiness to forswear the use of chemical weapons and its commitment to destroy its chemical weapon stocks. The new constructive United States stand opens the way to solve two of the most central issues of the future convention. Mongolia fully supports the call made by President Bush to resolve major outstanding issues by the end of 1991 and complete the convention within the next 12 months. We are in favour of intensifying the negotiations and support the proposal for a package solution taking into account the interests of States participating in the negotiations, initiated by the Chairman of the

(Ms. Baljinnyam, Mongolia)

Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Serguei Batsanov. We see the advantage of this approach in the fact that it provides the opportunity to examine the important problems connected with security, verification and organization in their close interrelationship.

There are a number of complex issues the settlement of which will require not only technical solutions but political decisions. I have in mind the questions of verification, decision-making and financial obligations of States parties, as well as economic cooperation and development. My delegation fully shares the view that the negotiations on banning chemical weapons are at a critical stage, and in need of strong political support from every quarter. At the same time we consider that with the necessary flexibility and willingness of all parties to compromise, progress towards finalization of the convention should be within reach. In this context Mongolia supports the convening of a well-prepared ministerial meeting, which would not only give a strong impetus to the negotiations but solve the last remaining issues. For the sake of the universality of the future convention on chemical weapons such a meeting could be open for participation to all interested States.

My delegation sees in the successful conclusion of the consultations on the new mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons the reaffirmation of the commitment of the CD members to conclude the convention as swiftly as possible. Given the consensus of all regional groups to ensure consistency during the final stages of the negotiations my delegation is ready to support Peru's idea of keeping the same bureau under Ambassador Batsanov's chairmanship.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

... The negotiations on the chemical weapons convention have finally acquired the pace and the prospect of an early conclusion. It is particularly encouraging to see how a flexible and constructive approach has given a fresh impulse to a negotiating process whose lack of progress was at odds with a definitely positive international climate. Hence we welcome the fact that this determination has finally reached our negotiating table. It is unnecessary to reiterate our commitment and our fullest possible political will to finalize the instrument as soon as possible, so that 1992 is definitely the year in which the Conference on Disarmament will be able to submit to the United Nations General Assembly its first multilateral disarmament agreement. Time is short, but if a positive consequence may be drawn from our protracted deliberations for almost a decade, it is that we all know perfectly well which are the concrete areas where we will have to concentrate our greatest efforts in this final phase in order to achieve a balanced and effective text.

My country does not possess and has never possessed or used chemical weapons. Like many others participating in these negotiations, our interest has always been focused on achieving a coherent agreement from the viewpoint of national security, but at the same time above all one that guarantees that enthusiasm in tackling the military aspects of science and the chemical industry will not hamper the unrestricted development of this sector in its real, i.e. civil dimension. That is why, in embarking on this stage of the negotiations we focus special attention, inter alia, on two very specific aspects thereof - firstly, the economic and commercial consequences of the convention, and secondly the characteristics of the verification system which will ultimately be agreed.

In respect of the first question, I think that in this field it should be possible for us as negotiators to find points of convergence. No one, I feel - in particular those among us who will have to justify decisions taken here before our parliaments - favours an agreement that imposes undue controls or restrictions upon the chemical industry. My country, whose chemical industry is a significant contributor to the gross national product, is among those that consider this sector to display one of the highest levels of dynamism and growth potential in the economy. It is logical to conclude that it is in our interests to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement that will not be perceived by our chemical industry as an obstacle to its activities, which, as in most countries active in this area, are already subject to detailed health and environmental regulations. In this context, it seems important to stress that in order to be a balanced and fair instrument, the convention on chemical weapons that we are about to conclude will have to be economically and commercially neutral - in other words its provisions should not result in competitive imbalances or industrial or commercial advantages to the benefit or detriment of any of its States parties. This is something that we will have to bear especially in mind in the context of the institutional machinery to be set up under article VIII of the convention.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

At the same time, we must strive to make sure that once the convention has been concluded, it constitutes the sole operational standard in force regarding controls over exports and transfers of chemicals and equipment related to the chemical industry. Once the treaty enters into force nothing should prevent extensive cooperation and exchange of chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the treaty. Once the convention enters into force, each State party should, in conformity with its provisions, ensure through national legislation the proper fulfilment of the provisions of the treaty to which it has just acceded. The continued existence of additional controls would result in a dual legal regime applicable to chemical activities which would undoubtedly overlap with the convention, thus in our view creating the dangerous situation of parallel legal frameworks, leading to ambiguous situations and penalizing the private sector. The existence of parallel or restricted groups, whose purpose has hitherto been to limit the transfer of certain chemicals in the absence of a binding multilateral rule, would no longer make any sense. Unless, as we pointed out, the same States that drafted the treaty felt so dissatisfied with the result of our efforts that they did not hesitate to send a signal which was both politically transparent and negative from the viewpoint of confidence-building, acknowledging that the convention so painstakingly elaborated is inadequate to eliminate the menace of chemical weapons in a credible manner. The proposed conference at the ministerial level that has been suggested as a political alternative to provide a final political boost to our negotiations might perhaps offer a good occasion for those countries that have so far relied on this type of unilateral measure to announce that, as from the entry into force of the convention, they will recognize the due primacy of this instrument and cease to apply controls of this type to the States parties.

Closely connected with this problem is that of the protection of information of scientific or commercial value. The question has been the subject of consideration in the "rolling text", and will undoubtedly deserve more attention from the technical secretariat, which in discharging its responsibilities will necessarily have access to a wealth of information on production volumes as well as the present planned activities of a good part of the world's chemical industry. I think it is useful for us to bear in mind in thinking about this problem that the future organization to be established will have to devote itself to ensuring the application of the provisions of the convention, facilitating activities relating to verification of compliance and providing a forum for consultation and cooperation among States parties. Verification activities will require great zeal on the part of the technical secretariat, which will be in possession of data which are intrinsically of incontestable scientific and commercial value.

The chapter of this convention on verification will, as we all know, have two main components. The first, in accordance with the provisions of article IX, will, through challenge inspections, deal with individual situations that may be considered potentially harmful for the convention as they point to possible violations of the provisions of the very heart of the agreement - relating to the possible production of chemical weapons in open breach of the spirit and the letter of the agreement. Consequently, in our view, our efforts should be aimed at creating a system as complete and

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

reassuring as possible. My delegation will revert to the important problem of inspections on request in the near future, however, today we should like to share with the delegations some ideas on verification of activities not prohibited by the convention, under article VI of the instrument. This component of verification refers to activities not prohibited by the convention, and for that very reason it is different in implications and scope from those related to inspections on request. Here, verification measures are designed to preserve the instrument through systematic periodic monitoring of certain facilities which are regarded as being of importance and are engaged in perfectly legitimate activities. It will come as no surprise that for a country like mine, which does not possess and has never possessed chemical weapons, this is the area of verification that attracts the greatest attention, since this is the machinery which will apply to a sizeable extent to civil industry.

From the resumption of our negotiations at the beginning of this year, the debate took on a new dimension in the wake of the introduction of concepts such as the "integrated approach" proposed by the delegation of Sweden. We understand that this turn in the debate, regardless of the final shape of the verification system, is a positive factor in itself, in so far as it can be said to have alerted us all to the direction our deliberations were taking. It became increasingly evident that the verification arrangements as they appeared in the "rolling text", in addition to being tremendously costly, would not necessarily be appropriate for the objective they were supposed to pursue. A simple statistical survey of facilities throughout the world which would be subject to inspections revealed the practical limitations of the system. From the moment when we negotiators accepted this premise and took on the task of refocusing our efforts on the search for a more appropriate and manageable system, we have seen with some disappointment that, as if obeying the logic of an irresistible attraction, the discussions appear to be giving way once again to the reiteration of ideas, that take us back to schemes for the delimitation of "capable" chemical industry of such theoretical breadth that we might well wonder what the point of the simplification exercise is if ultimately - this time with different arguments - we will arrive at verification schemes which are unnecessarily ambitious.

In the view of my delegation, a possible means of proceeding could be based on the integrated approach, duly moderated and modified through the inclusion of other definition criteria, for example, the selection of major chemical industry categories, in order to avoid from the outset the possibility of affecting the normal operation of industries and sectors that are unlikely to embark on the production or processing of certain chemicals included, for instance, in schedule 2. In this respect, it might be necessary to work towards a definition of industrial categories on the basis of specific criteria and not necessarily using existing rules which, while they may serve as a useful basis for the final definition, have been conceived on purely commercial grounds and thus do not necessarily reflect the political perspective relating to security that might be developed here. The delimitation can also benefit from the definition of certain chemical processes, as proposed in the integrated approach, although here we should perhaps move forward on greater precision and greater detail so as to avoid,

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

here too, an excessively broad framework which would once again produce arrangements that were unworkable in practice. The general criterion, which in our view should offer basic orientation, provides that verification of such a huge and complex sector as the chemical industry should be kept within reasonable limits - all the more so if we recognize that even a system providing for thousands of inspections per year would not be sufficient to guarantee that the convention was not being breached in one way or another in a dozen small facilities located in different points of the globe.

Let me refer to an issue that has a close relationship with the preceding reflections on verification under article VI, and one which in my delegation's view deserves particular attention. One of the effects of the new debate on the type of verification applicable to the chemical industry has been to focus our efforts on the work being done under the guidance of France as a Friend of the Chair for technical matters to delimit what is normally called "capable" chemical industry. My delegation would like us in this important exercise to try to stop referring to "capable" chemical industry - for a number of reasons. An inexperienced observer following our negotiations, on observing our attempts to define "capable" chemical industry, might well wonder what capability we are speaking of. For those of us who are participating in this exercise, the specialists and those who, overcoming boredom, are following our efforts, there is no doubt that we are referring to chemical industry which has the capability to produce chemicals that because of their toxicity and incapacitating nature are deemed subject to inclusion in schedules 1 and 2, but which are not at present engaged in producing, consuming or processing them. No one can ignore the fact that the idea, the concept of capabilities or capability in the context of security and disarmament matters has had a very clear meaning, as it brings to mind precisely the capability for aggressive applications, often on the margins of, or behind the back of, the international community. I think that in a field like that of the chemical industry, where what we are trying to do in seeking an integrated approach is to delimit facilities which are important in terms of the application of this convention, but nevertheless do not constitute a danger for its purposes and objectives, we should avoid a semantic formula that conveys an idea contrary to the objectives underlying it.

Just over a year ago, when the international climate allowed us to turn down the volume of our polemic on inspections under article IX, it was considered appropriate to stop referring to challenge inspections. The concepts of inspection on demand or on request modified the terminology in view of the fact that the very point at stake was the correct designation of what will be one of the key provisions of the convention. In this connection we believe a fortiori that when speaking of the civil chemical industry it would be advisable to drop the term "capable" and replace it by a more appropriate expression. I am convinced that behind the appearance of a semantic question in this matter lies an entire attitude and a disposition, an animus, in the Latin tradition, which should be guided by an attitude of respect and self-restraint vis-à-vis the world's chemical industry, without whose cooperation the best machinery we could devise will be a dead letter.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

It has been said that the illusion of security is worse than the absence of security. A verification system more concerned about monitoring civil activities than about setting up a solid and comprehensive system of challenge inspections may in our view lead to an unhappy combination of high costs and an illusion of security.

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The PRESIDENT:

... I would like now to turn to document CD/WP.407, containing a draft decision on the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and to take it up for action. If there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference is ready to adopt the draft decision.

It was so decided.

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Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish):

... As regards document CD/WP.407, I should simply like to point out that the expression "antes de 1992 [before 1992]" in the eighth line of the Spanish translation should be replaced by "en 1992 [by 1992]".

The PRESIDENT:

... As part of the negotiations for a chemical weapons convention, three decisions have been taken by the Conference. A letter to non-member States not participating in the Conference was approved for transmission by myself as President and Ambassador Batsanov as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. That letter is being transmitted today. The Conference endorsed a recommendation by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons that inter-sessional work should continue from 8 to 19 July, and we have just agreed important additions to the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate.

I confess I had hoped that decisions would be reached under my presidency on the timetable for additional inter-sessional work during the rest of the year. It has as you know, proved possible to reach an informal understanding (not yet discussed and endorsed formally by the Conference) on inter-sessional work from 30 September to 11 October and 18 November to 20 December as well as from 6 to 18 January. Unfortunately it has not yet been possible to reach agreement concerning the three weeks during the biological weapons Convention review conference and the five weeks during the United Nations General Assembly First Committee. This is a matter which will have to be returned to later. There are a number of considerations which have to be taken into account, and it is certainly not for the President to take sides in

(The President)

the debate. But I would like to make one point. We have just about reached halfway in the time so far made available for chemical weapons negotiations during 1991. Think how much has been achieved during the first half, and then compare it with how much still remains to be settled before we can achieve our common goal of an early convention. It is a sobering thought. We surely should not dismiss lightly the possibility of according yet more of the available time to our chemical weapons negotiations.

The PRESIDENT:

... I'm not partial to long introductory statements by new CD Presidents. I will allow myself just a few personal words on this occasion. The Conference on Disarmament is comprised of a group of States from all over the world whose representatives come together to consider issues and to negotiate agreements. It is the only negotiating forum where, on the basis of equality in voice, such a group of States, regardless of their military potential, their economic prowess, or their geographical size meet to come to grips with urgent security problems of our times. Each and every State can make a significant contribution to the efforts to achieve arms control and disarmament. We seek to serve the objectives of international peace and security. We do so in a world which, thankfully, has been spared the agony of a global conflict for nearly a half-century. Yet our world has, sadly enough, witnessed a

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(The President)

continuation of suffering, destruction and death in numerous violent regional and internal conflicts during this period. It is a matter of great importance, therefore, that this Conference address the urgent issues on its agenda. As numerous speakers before me have already recalled, of utmost urgency is a total ban on chemical weapons.

As you know, at the beginning of this session the United States set forth some new elements in the approach it wishes to take in pursuit of a chemical weapons ban. In the process we reversed two major, long-held United States positions which most of you had identified as obstacles to progress. We didn't bargain for their removal; President Bush swept them away unconditionally. His purpose was to strengthen the prospects for a successful and speedy conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. In the weeks that followed I've sensed a new spirit of optimism and challenge in this body. We do have a very large task ahead of us, but with the will to succeed we will succeed. The chemical weapons convention will be concluded in 1992 and we will proceed to destroy these terrible weapons which threaten all mankind.

Mr. PEREZ-VILLANUEVA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): It is a real honour and a pleasure for me to meet Ambassador Ledogar once again as President of this Conference after having had an opportunity personally to witness his professional skill and negotiating ability in Vienna some time ago when he and I participated in the conventional disarmament talks that were then just beginning and would later, as you all know, become crystallized in the agreement on conventional forces in Europe. Allow me therefore, as I begin my statement, to congratulate you and offer you my delegation's best wishes at the beginning of your term in the very important post it falls to you to occupy at a particularly interesting and intensely active time in the life of the Conference on Disarmament. I am sure that during your term as President, benefiting from your drive and guidance, pursuing the path taken by your immediate and illustrious predecessors, Ambassador Solesby and Ambassador Batsanov, this forum will make definite progress on the many outstanding questions in each of the committees, and especially the committee dealing with chemical weapons. I followed with great attention your very interesting statements on the inauguration of your presidency, and I think

(continued)

(Mr. Pérez-Villanueva, Spain)

that your remarks on beginning your term are highly appropriate for tackling the problem of expanding the membership of the Conference. I will refer to them later. Thank you, therefore, to you and Ambassador Kamal.

We were talking about a particularly interesting period in the Conference on Disarmament and in the international context in which we are operating. There are events, and changes, taking place in the international scene today that for most part give us hope and in any event are of great interest. On 29 May of this year, the President of the United States announced a series of proposals for controlling the spread of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons in the Middle East, proposals that you yourself, Mr. President, presented in this room. The initiative seeks to curb the proliferation of missiles and the destabilizing conventional arms race in that region of the world. Spain welcomes this United States initiative, through which an attempt might be made to bring military arsenals into line with the real defensive requirements of States in a particularly sensitive region. More recently, the President of France also proposed a global arms control plan while announcing his country's decision of principle to accede to the NPT. Spain applauds this decision, which will most certainly help to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and will undoubtedly set an example for other countries that have yet to join. The measures proposed by France and presented to this Conference recently by Ambassador Errera are very much in line with the Spanish position, especially in so far as their underlying philosophy is concerned (the need to promote regional and global stability through arms control and non-proliferation) as well as the instruments it suggests (universalization of the NPT and the MTCR, speeding up of the CW negotiations in Geneva, etc.). Spain believes, Mr. President, that your country's initiative as well as that of France are particularly timely as the Gulf crisis has dramatically highlighted the consequences of excessive arms accumulation in an especially unstable region. Specifically with regard to the expectations surrounding the Conference on Disarmament, we welcome with special satisfaction the initiative you recently presented on behalf of President Bush substantially modifying the United States position on certain outstanding obstacles in the chemical weapons Committee. This change in your country's negotiating position is most gratifying and will undoubtedly give a substantial stimulus to the negotiating process towards a convention.

The situation in the Conference on Disarmament in the short and medium term gives urgency to the task of reflecting on its immediate future - a task that has already been tackled by some delegations in this plenary, and one in which my delegation would now like to join, thus playing a part in harnessing the momentum given to this forum by the expected conclusion within the next 12 months of a convention eliminating an entire category of weapons. That success, which will certainly be achieved, should pave the way towards a greater and better use of the resources of this Conference and the institution in itself as the international community's sole forum for disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Pérez-Villanueva, Spain)

... For several years now the participating countries, be they full members or observers in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, have been staging trials applying the rules that the chemical weapons convention will soon lay down for the different types of inspection it is likely to establish. The carrying out of trial inspections has become a praiseworthy and particularly intensive tradition in the last few years. These national trial inspections have several aims, generally seeking to check the feasibility of the inspection provisions in the draft text of the convention, and at the same time to determine the degree of preparedness and awareness of governments as well as private chemical industry and the armed forces with regard to the forthcoming application of the convention on the total prohibition of the production, development, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Spain, wishing, in keeping with government policy in this area, to contribute actively to the attainment of an effective and verifiable convention, has carried out a national trial inspection, in the form of a routine inspection, the results of which appear in the report that I am pleased to present today to this Conference (CD/1082). The carrying out of the national trial inspection had a dual purpose: the immediate purpose of making a direct contribution on the part of my country to the negotiations being held in Geneva, and indirectly but no less importantly, to set in motion a mechanism for raising awareness in the public and private sector in Spain about the implications for either side that will undoubtedly stem from the entry into force of the convention.

Systematic contacts were held among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federation of Spanish Chemical Industries and some companies of special importance in the Spanish chemical industry before the trial inspection was carried out. The task in the first stage was to up-date information on the Spanish chemical sector and at the same time lay the foundations of what will shortly become the national authority under the convention. These initial contacts proved very useful, firstly in identifying the general features of the company to be chosen for the trial inspections, and secondly in establishing smoother relations between the authorities and the private sector in this field. In subsequent meetings the specific programme of activities was prepared and tasks were allotted to all the agencies and experts directly or indirectly involved in the operation.

(continued)

(Mr. Pérez-Villanueva, Spain)

My country obtained important information as a direct result of the inspection, particularly with regard to its limits and the benefits of the inspection system. First of all, on-site inspection is an essential element for verification of a chemical weapons convention. Moreover, in this instance inspection is feasible, for as our experience has shown, it is possible to find a way to respect the company's confidentiality concerns without diminishing the effectiveness of the inspectors' task. Cooperation between the company and the inspection team is also extremely important. And lastly, it is very useful to schedule the "field" inspection in the industrial plant itself simultaneously with the inspection of the administrative and commercial machinery, which, as has been shown by experience in many other countries, in addition to Spanish experience, will be longer and more complex than the former, in most cases. Through this exercise Spain reaffirmed its belief that inspection in its different forms, as a right and as a duty, is the only element which can fully guarantee the security of the countries that are parties to the future convention. In this instance, Spain tested the system established for routine inspection of a large industrial chemical plant. My Government also plans to stage a trial inspection on request, if time allows, jointly with another country participating in this Conference. And this is my Government's intention because, considering the experience acquired through the trial routine inspection, the importance of including inspection on request or challenge inspection in our future convention with no restrictions other than purely technical ones has become even more evident. An inspection of this kind, for which there is no substitute in terms of political value, should be accepted without preconceived restrictions, conditions or limitations on the understanding that it is possible to strike a balance between the company's legitimate concerns, the unrenounceable right to secrecy in defence matters and the aim of the inspection itself, whose benefits are well worth a major effort.

I am pleased to be able to announce to you today that, as regards chemical weapons, and more specifically the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, my Government is undertaking a detailed study on the possibility of the early withdrawal of the reservations made by my country to the text of the Protocol, to which it acceded in the summer of 1929. Spain would thus renounce the use of chemical weapons erga omnes and therefore also the right of reprisals in kind. I hope to make an official statement on this matter very soon.

(continued)

(Mr. Pérez-Villanueva, Spain)

... In his statement to this assembly last year, the Foreign Minister also said he was convinced that a step towards the expansion of the Conference would give a vital boost to the disarmament negotiations and help to ensure universal endorsement of any disarmament agreements that might be adopted within the Conference, that being a problem which would sooner or later have to be faced by a Conference on Disarmament restricted, as currently, to a limited number of members. As can be inferred from these words, the longed-for universal accession to these legal instruments that are taking shape in this field is a thought-provoking subject in relation to the membership of the Conference and access to it. According to all indications, and as evidenced by the wishes expressed by many delegations in this very plenary and by the progress in the negotiations, we are on the verge of reaping the fruit of a long and difficult task in concluding a chemical weapons convention, thus taking a truly historic step in the recent arms control and disarmament processes.

One of the basic components of a convention of this kind is of course accession by the widest possible number of parties, which will satisfactorily guarantee the security of all and compensate for the sacrifices made by the signatories. Therefore, it seems somewhat contradictory to wish for the widest accession to the chemical weapons convention, as is indeed logical, while at the same time limiting access to the forum in which it is negotiated. Spain has repeatedly declared its firm resolve to sign the chemical weapons convention as soon as it is open for signature, but on the other hand somewhat regrets that this is the only course fully consistent with its status as a sovereign country that my country can follow in the immediate foreseeable future since, as has been stated, its participation in the negotiating process is limited. The fact that Spain is not yet a member of the Conference on Disarmament, despite its reiterated interest over the years, does not alter the basic political decision on the chemical weapons convention or any other that may be negotiated in this field and is in keeping with Spain's security interests and those of its friends and allies. There remains, however, the possibility that this contradiction to which we referred earlier may become a deep rift in the normative system which the Conference on Disarmament intends to present to the international community, and this rift, which will never be

(Mr. Pérez-Villanueva, Spain)

exploited by Spain, will certainly be exploited by those that are already looking for its weaknesses and the means to evade the objectives of a future chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

... I will in due course speak to a number of subjects that relate directly to our work here at the CD. But before doing so there are some more general remarks that I wish to make, relating in particular to Canada's heightened interest in non-proliferation issues. The area of arms control is one where the lessons of the recent war in the Persian Gulf are most relevant. The aggression perpetrated against Kuwait by Iraq clearly demonstrated to all of us the dangers to the maintenance of international peace and security posed by excessive accumulations of conventional weapons. Moreover, Iraq's threats to resort to the use of chemical weapons highlighted the urgent need for the international community to mobilize political will to address the proliferation both of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery systems.

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(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

The early conclusion of a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention is another very high-priority Canadian arms control and disarmament objective. We believe that this objective is possible and realistic, and that some time not too late in 1992 we can together achieve it. We will spare no effort to meet that goal.

(continued)

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

Now let me turn briefly to some of the subjects on the current CD agenda. I have already referred briefly to the ongoing negotiations on chemical weapons. Although the task of assessing the results of this second part of the 1991 session on chemical weapons is one that must await the reports of the Ad Hoc Committee Chairman and his colleagues, it is already apparent that our work has benefited enormously from the important policy statement by President Bush last month. Canada both welcomed and applauded that statement - not only did it demonstrate a welcomed flexibility on two of the major issues before us, but, through its commitment to resolve the remaining outstanding issues and complete the convention within the next year, it provided a much-needed impetus to our negotiations.

As a direct result of that statement, major progress has been achieved in Working Group A, under Mr. Mashhadi's able guidance, in resolving uncertainties over the question of CW use. The text emerging from that Group's discussions on article I - the article that sets forth the fundamental principles of this convention - now more clearly bans the use of CW by States parties in any circumstances whatsoever, including retaliatory use, use against a non-State party, or use against any persons or places anywhere. This is a major achievement, one that we hope will serve to encourage universal adherence to the convention. In light of this, I should like to reaffirm the undertaking made by a predecessor of mine several years ago that Canada will re-examine its reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol with a view to withdrawing these reservations once the CW convention has come into effect. We call upon all other States that have not yet done so to make a similar commitment, and I welcome in that respect the important statement made this morning by the Ambassador of Spain.

Mr. President, your Government's reaffirmed commitment to the total destruction of its CW stockpile under the convention, has, we think, successfully laid to rest concerns felt by many here about the implications of the proposals contained in CD/CW/WP.303. As such, we consider that the clear and unequivocal commitment of States parties to destroy their CW stockpiles will serve as a powerful incentive for those of us who do not possess CW to adhere to the convention.

These of course are not the only areas of our work in which there have been important developments. Rather than catalogue these, however, I should like to focus on the area that we consider most vital for ensuring an effective convention, and that is the question of verification. We and others have long argued that effective verification is essential to persuading States - both CW-possessors and non-possessors - that their security concerns regarding CW can best be addressed through this convention. And in the course of these negotiations, we have been persuaded that effective verification requires two fundamental elements: a comprehensive routine system that allows on-site inspection of any facility that might have direct relevance to the convention, backed up by a strong and meaningful challenge inspection - or "inspection on request" - procedure that ensures that any doubts that one State party might harbour about the compliance of another State party can be ultimately resolved. The two are not mutually exclusive but they are mutually reinforcing. And both will be most effective if both are developed to their optimum potential.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

We therefore find it very encouraging that the discussions this session on a comprehensive, integrated verification system under article VI have been so constructive. In large measure, this has been due to the sensitive leadership shown by Mr. Gizowski, but all participants in the Working Group deserve credit for their willingness to explore seriously the best means of achieving an effective régime for article VI. We have every confidence that if we continue this approach we will ultimately succeed in devising a system that is of maximum effectiveness at optimum cost-effectiveness. Similarly, we hope that our future discussions on article XI verification will be equally constructive and positive.

I said that I did not want to catalogue the achievements of this second part of the 1991 session and I shall not. But I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the achievements being made in Working Group C, under the leadership of Mr. Perugini, ably assisted by his amicus curiae, Professor Ronzitti, on a number of difficult legal and institutional issues. Canada particularly appreciates the progress achieved to date in resolving an issue of considerable importance to us, and that is "jurisdiction and control". If this issue can ultimately be settled along the lines of the present discussions, then Canada will have markedly greater confidence in its ability to honour fully all of its obligations under the convention.

Some observers not participating in our negotiations might wonder why we are paying such close attention to issues such as "jurisdiction and control", but we here are all aware that the details can be devilishly difficult. None more so, perhaps, than those confronting our two "Friends of the Chair" on technical issues, Messrs. Meerburg and Canonne. May I thus take this opportunity to thank them both for their patient efforts to lead us through the technical thickets of the schedules and guidelines and the problem of how to define "capability"?

I need not remind you that a further major element in President Bush's statement last month was the call to engage in continuous negotiations here until the outstanding issues have been resolved. Canada supports this call, we welcome the CD's decision to radically reduce the July break, and we are prepared to endorse further radical adjustments in our schedule in the forthcoming months to realize our goal. We have some tough decisions still ahead of us on verification but an effective CW convention now is within our grasp. With a relatively modest additional sacrifice of our time and energy, we should be able to complete our negotiations in the next few months.

Mr. GIZOWSKI (Poland):

As we approach the end of the second part of the 1991 session of the Conference, I should like to devote my statement today almost exclusively to the question of chemical weapons. This not only reflects the very high priority attached by my country to the earliest possible conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, but also stems from a qualitatively new situation which has emerged in this regard in the last few weeks.

Year after year the delegations, including my own, repeated in their plenary statements that the CW convention was within our reach. At that time it proved to be more an expression of hope than of a reality. Today we are facing the possibility of a genuine breakthrough in our prolonged negotiations. This is due, first of all, to the initiative undertaken by the President of the United States, which was introduced by you, Mr. President, at this forum on 16 May. My Government wholeheartedly welcomes President Bush's announcement forswearing the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any State. Together with the commitment of the United States to destroy unconditionally all their stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of the entry into force of the convention, it opens new promising possibilities of solving outstanding issues expeditiously and accelerating further negotiations on the convention. We highly appreciate the offer of technical assistance on safe and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons, which could greatly facilitate the smooth implementation of the convention. Altogether it provides fresh momentum towards the attainment of our ultimate goal of a world free of chemical weapons.

The positive reaction of other delegations to this initiative enabled us to reach a consensus on the necessity to accelerate the work with a view of completing the chemical weapons convention by 1992. We believe that it is the responsibility of the whole Conference on Disarmament, and not only the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to ensure that the elaboration of the convention receives the highest priority, particularly in cases when due to limited resources in terms of availability of time or conference services there might be a need to make the necessary adjustment in consideration of various issues.

(continued)

(Mr. Gizowski, Poland)

This does not mean of course that my delegation seeks to belittle the significance of other items on the agenda of the Conference. Some of those items are indeed of vital importance and should certainly stay also in the future as priority topics for negotiations in this forum. Some others, no less important from the substantive point of view, but not yet ripe as subjects for negotiating international conventions or agreements, are perhaps better suited for future discussions in other forums, such as the United Nations Disarmament Commission. But in any case, as far as the present moment is concerned, I am convinced that it is in the deepest interest of the Governments represented in this hall and the whole international community to concentrate efforts on elaborating the chemical weapons convention. Prompt, successful conclusion of the convention would add immensely to the credibility of this Conference as the unique multilateral body in the field of disarmament. And what is even more important, the conclusion of the convention, after the INF and CFE agreements and hopefully also after a START agreement, would become a step of enormous significance in building a safer world, in constructing a new infrastructure of security based not on military might but on cooperation among States.

I shall come back to the question of the chemical weapons convention later in my statement today. Now I wish to emphasize that we did notice and consider of great importance other initiatives, proposals and ideas which have been put forward in the last few months in this forum or which are directly connected with the work of the Conference on Disarmament. I have in mind first and foremost the plan for arms control and disarmament submitted by the President of France on 3 June this year. We welcome, in particular, the decision of France in principle to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and we remain convinced that it will give a strong stimulus to the process of further universalization of the Treaty.

The Conference has been addressed this year by eminent personalities from a number of countries. The statements by our distinguished guests, as well as numerous interventions by heads of delegations, have given the Conference abundant material for thinking and analysing. Several ideas have been put forward with regard to the future activities of the Conference, after the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. Particular emphasis has been placed on the question of limitation of international arms transfers. All those ideas merit careful consideration. The Polish delegation has taken note of them and will present its position in due course. As of now we can say that we regard some of the suggestions as extremely interesting and worthy of full support.

Reverting to the question of the chemical weapons convention, I cannot but fully agree with what you, Mr. President, in your capacity as the head of the United States delegation, stated when introducing President Bush's message to the Conference, namely that we cannot afford to continue with "business as usual" in our negotiations. My delegation is gratified at the fact that recently the Conference adopted several decisions conducive to the intensification and speedy conclusion of the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, including the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee and allocation of

(Mr. Gizowski, Poland)

additional time for negotiations. We are prepared to go along with any further suggestions in terms of time and effort needed to accelerate negotiations.

We believe, however, that the question of intensification is not only a problem of time but also, and perhaps in the first place, a problem of will to compromise on the part of all the participants and the necessity to give a fresh look to those issues which are blocking us from achieving the final agreement. It is our firm belief that with a real will to work intensely and to "give and take", we should be able to resolve all key outstanding issues before the end of this year.

One of these issues is undoubtedly verification. The discussion conducted on this issue so far has confirmed once again that the future verification regime should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and assurance that the convention is being observed by all parties. An effective verification system will promote the implementation of the convention by building confidence and deterring any possible violations. We all agree at least on one point - that a 100 per cent infallible verification system is just not feasible. But this does not mean that a reasonable level of assurance to the States parties that the convention is being complied with is not achievable. In principle, the basic outlines of such a system have already been written into the present "rolling text". Verification provisions dealing with chemical weapons stocks and production facilities are well elaborated and, with some refinement, they could serve properly for the effective implementation of chemical disarmament. The same is true about verifying schedule 1 facilities. There are still two major outstanding issues in the area of verification on which a solution should be found, namely the remaining part of article VI on activities not prohibited under the convention and article IX, in particular the question of inspection on request.

There is a substantial distinction between the two types of inspection. At the same time, however, both of them embody two concepts: confidence and deterrence, although the proportion among these two factors is different. While in inspection on request the deterrence factor prevails, in the case of verification activities under article VI confidence plays a leading role. This proportion is, in our opinion, quite natural. Any verification system conceived under article VI should be based on declared activities and should serve mainly as a confidence-building measure. Still, a certain degree of deterrence should be preserved. From this point of view we welcome the broadening of the scope of verification under this article. We share the opinion that it will be quite difficult to sift relevant facilities from irrelevant ones. That is why we prefer a broader approach, even risking sometimes the inclusion into the scope of declarations of facilities which are not posing a particular risk to the objectives of the convention. One might question whether any State would choose to use a declared facility for illicit weapons manufacture in the first place. The very fact that on-site inspections can take place is a significant deterrent. When making this assumption in combination with a broad scope of facilities which could be included into the declarations we are already increasing confidence substantially. Here we come

(Mr. Gizowski, Poland)

to grips with the question of how to provide adequate resources to verify treaty compliance effectively. We should be careful not to overburden the future technical secretariat with the enormous task of verifying the obvious cases and spending on this a huge amount of the Organization's budget. We were quite concerned about constantly increasing tasks of the future Organization, especially in the verification area, without being confident that this was adding to the efficiency of the implementation process. Taking this into account, certain elements in the Swedish proposal for an "integrated approach" are quite attractive to us. The crux of the matter is in the selection process. To be effective, it should combine, in our opinion, the involvement of the States parties as well as that of the technical secretariat. Our experience with the implementation of confidence-building measures in the context of the Stockholm agreement - although I am aware of differences between these two concepts - shows that when the request is treated as something normal and routine the confrontational character can be easily avoided.

The key issue in the overall verification system under the chemical weapons convention remains, however, inspection on request. We know that in spite of the fact that it is not now directly on the table this issue is not dormant. We do hope that in the rather near future it will reappear on the negotiating table. We consider inspection on request as a prerequisite for confidence that the convention is being complied with. This was one of the reasons why we undertook a trial inspection on request of Soviet military facilities located on Polish territory, a report on which will soon be presented to the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, as this is the first time I have taken the floor in this forum, on behalf of my delegation and myself I wish to extend to you our warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to wish you every success in discharging your important responsibility. The determination that you demonstrated in your opening statement the day before yesterday to conclude the chemical-weapons-ban treaty by 1992 is a good indication of the firm leadership with which you are going to lead us to productive results of our debate on disarmament. I would also like to express our sincere appreciation to the preceding Presidents, Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Batsanov of the USSR and Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom, for the excellent manner in which they presided over the Conference. I also would like to take this opportunity to extend my high regards to Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, and his staff for their invaluable assistance in making the necessary arrangements and preparations for this Conference.

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

... The draft convention on the chemical weapons ban is one of the most crucial and promising items on the Conference's agenda and has raised hopes and expectations for the early conclusion of the convention. In our view, the key to the success of the convention on chemical weapons lies in assuring universal adherence to the convention. We share the view of other delegations that universal adherence could best be ensured by making the convention effective, non-discriminatory and verifiable. To this end, we wish to underline the importance of ironing out the remaining differences for the establishment of an effective verification regime. Such a regime would enhance confidence in the convention by assuring each State party that other States parties remain in full compliance.

President Bush of the United States made an announcement on 13 May on the United States unconditional commitment to the destruction of all of its stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of the convention coming into force. President Bush's new arms control initiative is most welcome and represents a positive and far-sighted step toward achieving universal adherence to the chemical weapons convention.

The outbreak of chemical warfare was an ominous possibility during the Gulf war, and the world was alerted to its potentially catastrophic consequences. Despite progress made in disarmament negotiations between the two super Powers and in Europe, and the recent conclusion of the Gulf war, the danger of chemical weapons use has not completely disappeared. The time is

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

ripe to take advantage of every possible opportunity to broaden support for the early and successful conclusion of the convention, in the same way that momentum was created by the Paris Ministerial Conference and the Canberra Government-Industry Conference in 1989.

The convention on banning chemical weapons and the Convention prohibiting biological weapons are twin branches of the same tree. The third review conference of the biological weapons Convention will be held in September in Geneva. The Republic of Korea has always supported international efforts to eradicate weapons of mass destruction. My country, as a party to the Convention since 1987, will be represented at the review conference and will make an active contribution to making the Convention effective and lasting.

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

... As a responsible member of the international community, the Republic of Korea will spare no effort to help facilitate the implementation of the noble task of this Conference. Finally, in concluding, allow me to express the fervent wish of the Korean Government that the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, will make a positive contribution to the promotion of world peace and security by successfully concluding the chemical weapons convention as early as possible, and that a breakthrough on other major issues of the CD, such as the nuclear test ban, will be made in the near future.

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

In our statement at the last session of the CD we expressed optimism that a comprehensive and global ban on chemical weapons was within reach. Recent developments have enhanced this optimism. We indeed believe that the CW negotiations have now entered a decisive, and hopefully, the terminal phase. We also stated then that the bulk of the "technical infrastructure" of the convention was in place and that remaining issues should be addressed in a political perspective with a view to taking decisions through compromises. We now feel that the negotiations are poised to move in that direction.

We welcome in this context the initiative by the President of the United States in announcing a most constructive change of position facilitating a consensus on the main prohibition of the convention covering the entire chemical weapons cycle including the unconditional destruction of CW stocks within the specified time-frame. We take satisfaction at the fact that this development has already led to the emergence of a consensus on article I of the Convention. The comprehensive character of the main prohibition that we now have, which is applicable in any circumstances whatsoever, will augur well for achieving the desired objective of universality. We hope that somewhat related issue of article XII will be resolved expeditiously. As my delegation sees it, the remaining issue relating to article XII involves both legal and political questions. Given the comprehensive and multilateral nature of the convention that we all hope for, it is important that we adopt innovative solutions to such problems. In this regard, the interesting idea put forward by the distinguished Ambassador of Austria is worthy of serious consideration by countries which have entered reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The possibility of a collective withdrawal of reservations would be an expression of greater political support for the kind of comprehensive regime envisaged under the convention. It would also amount to an important confidence-building measure, commensurate with the unconditional prohibition which we have already secured collectively.

A consensus having been reached in the Conference for an intensified work programme, for which we would like to thank Ambassador Batsanov, it is now important for the Committee to maintain the momentum of its work. We therefore hope that new substantive proposals aiming at developing a consensus acceptable to all delegations will be forthcoming on remaining major issues such as inspection on request. My delegation shares the view that the procedure for inspections on request is an important part of the verification regime to maintain the confidence of all countries, large and small, developed and developing. We also believe that in order to achieve this desired objective, the concept itself should retain its multilateral character and be depoliticized. Its intrusiveness and use should be managed in a way consistent with the objectives and the scope of the Convention. The new inputs expected, we hope, will address these aspects and lead to consensus.

In our statement to the CD on 22 March last year, my delegation referred to two aspects of a possible framework to facilitate solutions to remaining political questions. One was the desirability of a time-frame to conclude our negotiations and the other was the question whether we should look at a package format to handle remaining issues in the terminal phase of our negotiations. My delegation stated then:

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

"We are inclined to believe that a time-frame for the conclusion of the convention could now be considered as a via media for seeking solutions to remaining issues. The questions relating to scope, the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council, challenge inspection, assistance, the order of destruction, economic and technological development and the Convention's relationship to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are issues which require political decisions in a spirit of compromise, bearing in mind the realities of desired universality. One could argue that these issues are politically interrelated in a manner that perhaps requires solutions in a package form during the terminal phase of negotiations."

We therefore take satisfaction at the fact that a consensus was achieved to infuse a sense of timing into the mandate of the Committee. In order to use the other aspect of a package framework we encourage the Chairman of the Committee to pursue his own consultations.

All are agreed that universality is the desired objective with regard to the implementation of the Convention. As has been pointed out by the Group of 21, a key to achieve this objective would be the internal consistency of the convention in maintaining the non-discriminatory and multilateral character of the treaty which now embodies a comprehensive and unconditional ban on the entire chemical weapons cycle. Consistency of these two principles should be equally applicable to the composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council.

Long-drawn-out efforts, both bilateral and multilateral, have contributed to developing the "rolling text" as it stands today. The authority of the consensus flowing from the Paris Conference and recent developments facilitating a consensus on the main prohibition augur well for the Committee to come to grips with other political issues, while parallel technical work should continue in working groups. Sri Lanka remains committed to the conclusion of the convention at the earliest possible date. I have been instructed by my Government to state that it is actively considering becoming an original signatory to the convention, when it is ready for signature upon conclusion.

The chemical weapons convention will be a unique instrument in terms of both its intrusiveness and its coverage of civilian industrial activity. It could also be the first international instrument which envisages, in one way or another, the concept of universality even before the conclusion of negotiations. While extra-convention means will always be available to promote universality, the most effective way of ensuring the widest possible participation would be to promote universality from within the text of the convention. The majority of the potential States parties will be countries which have never had chemical weapons and have no intention of acquiring them. It is therefore important that the convention does not entail undue and disproportionate institutional and financial burdens on such countries under the verification regime envisaged. As was pointed out by the distinguished Minister of New Zealand, it will be essential that the verification burdens of the convention should not discourage smaller countries from acceding. One

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

cannot argue that the accession of militarily insignificant countries, which would in any case not pose a threat to the convention, is of less significance than a "capable" country remaining outside the convention.

It is in this context that my delegation would like to commend for serious consideration the pertinent observations of the delegation of Argentina concerning the need for the verification regime to remain commercially neutral and the importance of avoiding a dual regime for civil chemical trade once the convention enters into force. Developing countries which seek to develop their, as yet, elementary civilian chemical industry will have to weigh the security benefits of the convention against the costs and burdens not only of national implementation measures and international verification measures but also of the economic implications of possible dual regimes. The justified motives of devising an adequately comprehensive verification regime should not take us to the extreme of legislating for every eventuality. This would overburden the convention with an expensive verification regime that could go beyond the scope of the convention. Financing of such a regime can entail considerable financial obligations for developing countries. It will therefore be of importance to agree on a viable balance of verification burdens, bearing in mind that letter-perfect verification is neither feasible nor needed.

We feel that the opportunity now exists for the CD to strive towards firming up what could be the Conference's first conclusive output, since its inception over a decade ago. The consensus that was recently achieved on article I was the culmination of a long process. It also demonstrated the dynamism of multilateral negotiations and the fact that debilitating attributes sometimes conferred upon multilateral bodies are not justified. In fact the consensus on article I proved the contrary. The initial draft text of a CW convention submitted to the CD some years ago was enriched and developed in a dynamic way by multilateral participation. The very basis of the new consensus, namely, the idea of including the use of CW in the main prohibition, did not figure in the initial proposal but was conceived and developed by this multilateral body. The CD has therefore proved that it can negotiate, even on issues concerning weapons of mass destruction, if and when it is enabled to do so. Among the many tragedies and ironies of the Gulf war, some would perceive a realization that the threat of mass destruction deriving from chemical weapons neither deterred war nor influenced the outcome of that war. If this is to be one among many lessons to be drawn from that tragic event, it is perhaps time for the CD to pay more focused attention to other priority items on our agenda dealing with a host of disarmament questions including the priority nuclear issues which have remained in a state of paralysis due to similar doctrinal considerations. Irrespective of the moral of the Gulf conflict experience, if it has presented us with an opportunity to eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass destruction, the CD has to seize that opportunity.

Mr. RAHARDJO (Indonesia):

My association with the Conference on Disarmament is at a time when the echo of the ongoing dynamic and fundamental changes in the global political climate seems to be having an effect on its work. The observations made on the progress of the negotiations on item 4 have made it clear to us all that tangible results could be realized in the near future, due to the conciliatory positions of the major parties, which will eventually pave the way for the speedy conclusion of the draft convention.

It is my delegation's view that a decision made by the major possessors of chemical weapons to abandon these weapons options and to totally eliminate them from their military arsenals would encourage others to do the same. Recent events in the Gulf have clearly demonstrated that the military value of these weapons is limited when in contest with other systems of sophisticated weaponry owned by a handful of the collective military Powers. The political costs of maintaining these abhorrent weapons for defence and military purposes in the future will be too high for any country to afford.

The change of position of the Government of the United States on the question of the use of chemical weapons has provided new impetus to the course of negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The new approach of the Governments of the United States and the USSR to the question of universal adherence has brought about a fresh resolve and has resulted in the emergence of a common will to achieve a final agreement as soon as possible on the establishment of a treaty on the total prohibition of these abhorrent weapons. My delegation welcomes this development and hopes that the future convention on chemical weapons will be a faithful reflection of the legitimate interests of the international community as a whole.

For a country like Indonesia, which has never possessed or developed such abhorrent weapons, the total prohibition of their use has always been regarded as a crucial element in the convention. We believe that the real danger of

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chemical weapons lies in the possible use or threat of use of these weapons, rather than the development or stockpiling of these weapons. In this context, the importance of provisions regulating assistance and protection in case of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons could well be emphasized in order to create a deterrent and thus lessen the chance of countries choosing chemical weapons for aggressive military purposes. My delegation also attaches particular importance to the provision governing the future possibility of the use or threat of use of such weapons by States which are not party to the convention. A provision which assures prompt assistance and protection to a State party which might be threatened or attacked by any State using chemical weapons may attract States to become party to the convention.

In the course of the negotiations of the last few years, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has not been able to reach agreement on the above question, which is due among other reasons to the thorny question of the threat of use of chemical weapons. Moreover, the question of the function of the future technical secretariat in providing assistance to States parties in need of assistance in case of the threat of use or use of chemical weapons has remained unresolved. If these pending questions are to be resolved, a new approach has to be developed. Any State or States parties to the convention which renounce chemical weapons options for their defence purposes and become parties to the convention should be entitled to receive assistance or protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, with a view to preventing the real use of such weapons against this particular State or States parties. My delegation hopes that those which are in a position to do so will make a contribution either in cash, or in kind, through the assistance mechanism to be created under the auspices of the technical secretariat. At the same time efforts should also be pursued to make the technical secretariat function effectively so as to enable it to give prompt assistance to countries in need.

With regard to the interrelationship between the future chemical weapons convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, my delegation would like to emphasize that the provision governing such a relationship should be carefully and properly drafted so as to fully reflect the concerns and aspirations of the States parties to the convention. The future chemical weapons convention should avoid any possible confusion or loopholes which may lead to abuse by any State which is party to both the future convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

While it is encouraging to note the wealth of ideas which have been put forward during the course of the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons, my delegation considers it necessary to mention a number of points which are of relevance to us. With reference to the verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry, we are all aware that a new concept based on an integrated approach has been introduced. This has altered the perceived concept of verification as envisaged in the "rolling text" of the last session of the Conference on Disarmament; among others the range of the target to be verified has been widened. The concept of "capable" facilities allows on-site inspection not only in those facilities which produce but also those which are able to produce or process scheduled

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chemicals. In this connection we would like to underline that the question of verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry should be approached cautiously with a view to avoiding an unnecessary burden upon the developing countries which are still in the process of developing their chemical industry.

With reference to the effective functioning of the verification system of the convention, the Indonesian delegation welcomes the conduct of the meeting of the Technical Group on Instrumentation. Based on the experience gained from our participation in the meeting, it was learnt that the existing laboratories and research institutes in Indonesia are operating the same instrumentation as conceived to be used in the future verification system. As for the need to furnish inspectors for the future implementation of the verification system of the convention, I wish to express the appreciation of the Indonesian Government to the Government of Finland for granting the opportunity for Indonesian officials to participate in the training course for such inspectors. We earnestly hope that this initiative will be followed by other countries which are in a position to do so, with a view to improving the technical skills of the personnel for the smooth implementation of the convention.

While recognizing the importance of the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons, we should not lose sight of the need to pursue the efforts towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, which is long overdue. It has been noted that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has resumed its work. We recognize that the progress of the work in the Committee in stemming further qualitative improvements of nuclear weaponry falls far short of expectations. There is still a tremendous amount of work ahead of us in order to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban regime which will be universally adhered to. The resumption of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee is expected to be a good beginning. We hope that its endeavours will be instrumental in the overall effort to establish a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

... Consequently, I am pleased to inform the Conference on Disarmament that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru has communicated to the ambassadors in Lima of the member countries of the Rio Group - Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela - a proposal for the holding in Lima next November, on dates to be decided, of a special meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Rio Group, firstly, to agree expressly on a joint renunciation of all types of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and secondly, to reach agreement on banning the acquisition, production or transfer in the future of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles for warlike purposes in Latin America, as well as the new generations of advanced systems of conventional weapons - I refer principally to fuel-air bombs with a massive explosive and destructive effect, laser-guided bombs and munitions, long-range extremely destructive multistage rocket systems, anti-radar and "stealth" technology. Also a ban on the introduction of nuclear propulsion in the attack submarines of Latin American countries. The third objective of the Lima meeting would be to devote itself to measures to build security, confidence and transparency among the democracies of the Rio Group, such as intensification of contacts between military high commands, cuts in troops and offensive weapons in border areas, mutual notification of military manoeuvres, invitations to attend them, visits to military facilities and the creation of a centre to register the transfer and production of weapons in our countries.

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Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): I have asked for the floor to introduce the latest "blue book", which has been circulated as a CD document (CD/1090). Like last year's report, the 1991 "blue book" is a joint report of countries which participated in the second round-robin test. A brief description of the

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test has also been circulated as a working paper (CD/CW/WP.350) by Australia, Canada, China, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Finland, France, Germany, India, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. That working paper was introduced in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons yesterday. In my presentation today, I will mainly deal with the conclusions of the test that are of more general interest than the analytical details as such.

In order that the exercise should follow a likely CWC scenario it was agreed that the samples for the second round-robin test should simulate an inspection of the chemical industry by including appropriate background chemicals. The laboratory that volunteered to prepare the samples chose to use charcoal, Tenax, XAD-2 and cotton buds as sample matrices in addition to aqueous samples. Some of the samples were spiked with octyl methylphosphonofluoridate, which, although a schedule 1 chemical, is not (within public knowledge) a CW agent. This meant that many laboratories did not have the necessary reference material (authentic reference substance or database information) to make a positive identification of the principal spiking substance. In the absence of a readily identifiable CW agent upon which to focus, the participating laboratories applied varying degrees of effort in identifying as many compounds as possible to allow judgement whether they were scheduled compounds.

Accordingly, to maximize the value of this second round-robin test, the objective of the test was changed from analysis of samples for CW agents and their degradation products to their content of any scheduled chemicals.

In the event the laboratories reported 17 scheduled chemicals, 31 other phosphorus-containing chemicals and 89 non-phosphorus chemicals. All laboratories identified the chemicals used as starting materials in the synthesis of the planned end-product, the pesticide dichlorvos. Only two laboratories reported chemicals belonging to schedule 1, the mixture of isomeric octyl methylphosphonofluoridates. All laboratories except one identified dimethyl methylphosphonate, which is a schedule 2 compound and appeared as an impurity of feedstock material. Six laboratories identified the mixture of isomeric dioctyl methylphosphonates which are also schedule 2 compounds and primary degradation products of the principal spiking compound. Three laboratories identified the mixture of methyl octyl methylphosphonates. Two laboratories reported detection of alkyl alkyl methylphosphonates but were not able to identify the actual alkyl groups. In addition to the octyl derivatives, four additional methyl phosphonates and methylphosphonic acid were reported.

All the participating laboratories considered the second round-robin test very useful, even though the original plan of the test did not materialize. The results obtained from the analysis of samples according to the revised objective probably raised many more questions than the original plan would have done.

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The need for background information on samples was discussed by the scientists of the participating laboratories. They considered it desirable to know whether the samples had been collected in an area of alleged use or in an industrial site. The participants also considered the analysis request, be it confirmation of preliminary identifications, identifying scheduled chemicals or structure elucidation of unknown chemicals, to be more important for the off-site laboratories than to know whether the inspection had been a routine or challenge inspection.

In the present test the laboratories were informed that the samples did not contain CW agents. This information caused some confusion, however, because not all laboratories were aware of the difference between a CW agent and a schedule 1 chemical and, accordingly, some did not look for members of the nerve agent families.

Information on the particular sampling points in the facility helped in understanding the production process. However, such information might be considered highly confidential by the facility, the kind of information that should not be revealed to a laboratory capable of doing in-depth analysis of all chemicals in the samples. This type of information is, naturally, available to the inspectors on-site, but this confidential information can be protected by the use of "blinded" instruments, i.e. those having only scheduled and related chemicals in their databases.

As shown by the test, a large number of chemicals can be tentatively identified with a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GC/MS), the instrumentation planned for on-site analysis, if reference spectra are available in the computer of the instrument.

The second round-robin test showed that if the analytical request is to identify any scheduled chemicals, the methods should be such as to allow detection of all individual compounds on the schedules. As long as the databases remain incomplete, samples should be monitored by techniques allowing detection of family members. Easily volatile chemicals such as phosgene and hydrogen cyanide require slightly different procedures than those optimized for nerve agents and mustards.

The scientists discussed the criteria and need to report chemicals other than scheduled ones to the future technical secretariat. This question was felt important since the number of chemicals that can be identified in off-site laboratories is greater than during on-site analysis. In this test the laboratories reported non-scheduled feedstock chemicals and the product of ongoing synthesis, plus their impurities and a large number of unrelated chemicals. It was pointed out that the identification of non-scheduled chemicals could be used to identify industrial processes and could corroborate the stated purpose of the process and be used as evidence of compliance. However, this would not necessarily be an indication of compliance all of the time. In the present test, toluene and trichloroacetaldehyde confirmed that during the inspection the facility was producing dichlorvos.

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Some laboratories identified and reported sodium fluoride and octyl alcohols, which do not belong to the schedules either, but which could indicate earlier production of octyl methylphosphonofluoridates.

The need to identify and report non-scheduled chemicals is determined by the goal of the verification, whether it is to confirm the absence of non-declared scheduled chemicals or also to confirm that the current production of the facility is in line with the declaration. If the goal is to confirm the absence of non-declared scheduled compounds, the goal can be achieved on-site with "blinded" instruments. In this case, chemicals such as sodium fluoride and octyl alcohols would remain undetected unless they were included in the database as additional chemicals.

If the goal is to confirm a declaration, on-site analysis would require that the databases for the instruments contain data on the chemical products and their feedstock chemicals instead of data on scheduled chemicals. In this case, in addition to undeclared non-restricted production, undeclared scheduled chemicals would go undetected.

If both current production and the absence of scheduled chemicals are to be verified, the number of chemicals in the databases increases substantially. At present negative assurance seems to be the preferred objective. For the future tests, the group agreed that only scheduled chemicals should be reported.

The present test strongly emphasized the need for identification criteria in verification analyses. Some laboratories did not list any chemicals for which no reference material was available, and the identification of which would have had to be based on structure elucidation only. Some laboratories listed chemicals solely on the basis of electron ionization spectra after comparison of the recorded spectra with those in commercial libraries.

The scientists discussed the degree of certainty required before a scheduled chemical is reported to the technical secretariat as present in the samples collected during an inspection of a chemical facility. The results of on-site and off-site analyses have to be considered separately.

The goal of on-site analysis is to support the verification of compliance with the treaty, i.e. to find out if there are any samples that need to be sent to two off-site laboratories for confirmatory analysis. Unambiguous identification is not required on-site, just an indication that scheduled chemicals might be present. On the other hand, the goal of off-site analysis is to obtain unambiguous confirmation of the analytical results obtained on-site. The scientists discussed whether unambiguous results are the only ones that should be reported by laboratories to the technical secretariat or whether tentative assignments, clearly marked as tentative, should also be released, to allow the secretariat to make the final identification. The group considered it imperative that the laboratories do the final identification themselves and report only those chemicals for which they have an unambiguous identification, i.e. a simple yes/no answer. In cases when the results from the two laboratories differ, the technical secretariat should

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send the samples for final evaluation to a third laboratory together with the analytical data from the two laboratories. The experts from the three laboratories together could then resolve the discrepancies.

The criteria for unambiguous identification were discussed at some length. There was consensus that two independent spectrometric techniques giving identical results are required. If the concentration of the sample is high enough, two different techniques such as mass spectrometry and infrared spectrometry or mass spectrometry and nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry are to be preferred over two similar techniques, such as two kinds of mass spectrometry.

In all the spectrometric methods, unambiguous identification requires that the analytical results be compared with reference data in a database or with data recorded from an authentic compound using the same individual instrument. The latter procedure involving authentic compounds was considered more reliable because the recorded and database spectra are likely to have been recorded under different conditions.

The present test highlighted the difficulties in identifying chemicals for which there are no earlier data or authentic compounds available. Preliminary identification has to be based on the interpretation of different types of spectra and final confirmation is obtained only after synthesis of the proposed chemical and recording of the identification data for purposes of comparison. In future, such a requirement for synthesis might delay the reporting of analytical results to the technical secretariat and, accordingly, underlines the need for as complete a database as possible at the earliest date after the convention has entered into force.

Unambiguous identification requires that the arrangement of atoms in the molecule be exactly known. The large number of isomeric chemicals in the octyl families made it impossible to determine the exact configuration of the octyl side chain. For purposes of verification, the scientists considered it sufficient to be able to report that octyl methylphosphonofluoridates were identified, without the need to report each of the fluoridates separately. Scientifically speaking this means that identifications were not unambiguous but that they were sufficient for the purpose, especially as the draft convention requires identification of alkyl methylphosphonofluoridates, not the exact structure of the alkyl moiety.

The results of the present test need to be evaluated in terms of success in identifying those samples that would have warranted transport to verification laboratories for more detailed analysis. The most important samples were those containing schedule 1 compounds and those containing methylphosphonates, especially the octyl derivatives. The only schedule 1 chemicals, the mixture of isomeric octyl methylphosphonofluoridates, were reported by only two laboratories, despite the availability of sophisticated in-house equipment. This was partly due to the degradation of the fluoridates during transport of the samples and partly due to the lack of reference data for these compounds. The degradation would of course have been avoided if the analysis had been performed on-site. Both the fluoridates and the

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methylphosphonates have specific ions in their mass spectra, most probably common to almost all members of the respective families, so they too would have been detected on-site.

The scientists considered the recommended operating procedures important for both on-site and off-site analyses and accordingly compiled procedures for the new sample matrices and analytical techniques. The need continuously to improve procedures, to meet the challenges of new developments in the analytical field, raised the idea of a "rolling text" for the recommended operating procedures.

The second round-robin test demonstrated the need to solve the problems associated with the transportation of samples. At present, the laboratory responsible for the preparation of samples is the only one that can give information on the toxicity of the samples with a view to finding the appropriate means of transportation. Rules acceptable for every Government should, therefore, be found for the transportation of test samples in order to facilitate the work of the future convention.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

... It is undeniable that important progress has been achieved in efforts to halt the arms race, reduce armaments and control the armaments drive, and that new and important agreements can be concluded in the field of disarmament. We highly praise in this respect the contributions of your great country, Mr. President, the United States of America, which open new vistas for our endeavours. With you chairing this Conference, we stand confident that we can succeed in attaining further progress in our work, first of all in putting the final touch on the chemical weapons convention.

The recent initiative of your country, presented personally by President George Bush, is unanimously appreciated as a real breakthrough for the solution of the remaining problems. This has already led to the emergence of a consensus on article I of the "rolling text", providing a more comprehensive character of the prohibition, which is applicable in any circumstances whatsoever.

Among the major remaining issues to be solved, verification is, of course, the most important. We share fully the view that verification is vital for assuring the efficiency of the convention. In such a way, States will be more assured that their security concerns are covered. Romania is ready to submit herself to any verification that meets with the agreement of the other States. Meantime, we understand the tremendous objective difficulties lying before us, and first of all before the experts who deal directly with this problem. Among other things, as has rightly been stressed during the debates, it is necessary to find an equilibrium between the necessity to prevent any violations of the undertaken obligations and the legitimate preoccupation to protect certain installations from improper intrusions that do not have any relation with the objective of the convention. We ourselves have such problems and are interested in balanced and efficient control.

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(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

My country, which is unequivocally committed to the achievement of a total and comprehensive banning of chemical weapons, repeatedly declared in the last year and a half that it possessed no chemical weapons or had the means of producing them, nor the intention to acquire them. The Romanian Government wants to become an original party to the chemical weapons convention.

I am pleased to announce here today that as far as chemical weapons are concerned, and more specifically the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, the Romanian Parliament adopted last month a law on the withdrawal of the reservations made to the text of the Protocol a long time ago. This month, Romania officially notified France, as the depositary country, about the withdrawal of these reservations.

We support the proposal made by our Austrian colleague that countries which still have such reservations should withdraw them collectively and, in order to come to such an arrangement, a special meeting of the concerned countries be convened. We also share the view that this could be done during the envisaged ministerial meeting on chemical weapons.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

... The war in the Gulf has also demonstrated the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, the spread of nuclear weapons and of ballistic missiles, the related question of arms transfers and the arms trade. Constraining the supply and availability of weapons of mass destruction, and of the materials needed for their manufacture, should be a priority task. Such constraints would undoubtedly reduce the risks posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the ballistic missile systems that can deliver them. It is our belief that the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction and the commitment to their non-proliferation should also include missile technology.

Romania has been actively participating since the beginning of last year in the current multilateral efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. To this end, my Government expressed its readiness to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group and, as a result, last spring Romania was invited to take part in the work of this forum as a full member. In the same spirit my country decided to accept the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and to accede to this Group next autumn. We have close relations with the members of the Australia Group, working to increase the effectiveness of its control on chemical and biological materials.

Mr. CHADHA (India):

... I wish to express my deep appreciation for the kind words that you have just addressed to me. It was indeed an enriching experience for me to be present during the work of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva at a time when new opportunities have been created in the field of disarmament by the far-reaching changes in East-West relations, the signature of the CFE Treaty in Europe and the announcement that the START Treaty between the United States and the USSR will be signed in the near future. We also saw a new momentum in the chemical weapons negotiations at Geneva, which may indeed lead to the completion of these negotiations in the near future.

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(Mr. Chadha, India)

... The present international situation offers adequate opportunities for the Conference on Disarmament to live up to its reputation as the single multilateral negotiating forum. The conclusion of a chemical weapons

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(Mr. Chadha, India)

convention in the near future would certainly be a shot in the arm for this body. Although I have some regrets that I will not be here when this convention is finalized, I can assure you that the Indian delegation will continue to cooperate fully with other delegations at the CD in order to fulfil our important task. I wish to thank all delegations once again for their cooperation. I am also grateful to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and his able deputy, Ambassador Berasategui, with whom I have had a long association, the other members of the secretariat for their support and encouragement, and finally wish the Conference on Disarmament well in the accomplishment of its tasks.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement, and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

If there is no other delegation wishing to take the floor, I shall proceed to other business. I see none.

The Conference has before it working paper CD/WP.408, relating to a request from Malta to participate in the work of the Conference at plenary meetings and in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I gained the impression at presidential consultations yesterday that there was no objection to that request. This being the case, I would think there is no need to hold an informal meeting to consider it, on the understanding that this does not set a precedent for the consideration of other requests. Shall I take it that the Conference agrees to the draft decision?

It was so decided.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): In my statement today I propose to address some aspects of the future chemical weapons convention, an important subject to which the Conference on Disarmament continues to devote by far the greatest amount of its time.

Allow me to reiterate, at the very outset, our perception of what the chemical weapons convention should encompass. We support a comprehensive, effective and equitable treaty which prohibits the development, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and which provides for the total destruction of existing stockpiles, production facilities and delivery systems of chemical weapons. A convention which contains anything less than these fundamental provisions would not enjoy universal support, and this would undermine the basic concept of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Let me also state once again for the record that Pakistan neither possesses chemical weapons nor desires to acquire them, and that it will continue to actively and positively contribute towards the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

The impetus that has been provided to our negotiations by the recent change in the United States position is timely, and we welcome it. In fact, it has made it possible for us to refine article I, which for the first time now clearly spells out the prohibition of use in a straight-forward manner. If we continue our work in the same spirit in the coming months, and show due regard for the views of all negotiating partners, there is no reason why a convention cannot be concluded by the end of 1992 as has already been resolved by us.

Confidence in compliance with the future chemical weapons convention lies at the heart of our negotiations. It would be too simplistic to build a vitally important disarmament convention only on the premise that States parties would adhere to it in good faith, and with the intention of abiding by its provisions. Provisions relating to verification and compliance will consequently have to establish a system which ensures that treaty obligations are being strictly observed. While 100 per cent effective compliance machinery does not appear within the realm of the possible, our endeavour is to create an equitable and efficacious verification system which maximizes confidence in the treaty provisions. It is obvious that the type and intrusiveness of verification to which an activity would be subjected should be determined by the element of risk which that particular activity poses for the convention.

The verification regime which we have been developing for the convention consists of two main elements, namely routine inspection under article VI and challenge inspection under article IX. I shall address these articles separately.

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(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

The importance of verification under article VI is undeniable. Unlike the provisions in the convention concerning destruction, which will apply only to chemical-weapon States, and which will hopefully become obsolete after the 10-year destruction period during which stocks and production facilities would be eliminated, the monitoring regime for activities not prohibited under the convention will be of unlimited duration and of direct interest to a considerably larger number of States. In this context we have addressed the question of clandestine production in facilities which are normally devoted to peaceful purposes but which could be converted to the production of chemicals posing a risk to the objectives of the convention. In developing a regime to address these concerns we must ensure that it is as non-intrusive as possible, while at the same time being as cost-effective as possible. We are not in favour of a system which places unnecessary hindrances on the civilian chemical industry, and in which certain elements of the challenge inspection procedure are sought to be injected. Continued insistence on the inclusion of such concepts are liable to result in the unnecessary politicization of an activity which is intrinsically routine in nature.

The provisions of article IX on challenge inspection will have a central place in the proposed convention, both as a means of providing confidence in its implementation and in order to deter potential violations. To be effective these procedures will have to be expeditious, non-discriminatory and mandatory. Although these principles now seem to be generally accepted, the task of translating them into agreed procedures has not been easy. Numerous proposals have been put forward, but success has eluded us so far. The working paper introduced by four delegations recently is a brave and positive attempt to break the deadlock on this issue, and we have noted that in its effort to accommodate many of the concerns that have been expressed in the Ad hoc Committee by various delegations, it has departed from some concepts which until now had been considered as sacrosanct and non-negotiable.

On this subject of challenge inspection, I would like to state once again some of the ideas which my delegation has expressed in the past, and continues to favour. Critically important among these is the imperative need for including clear conditions which prevent abuse of challenge inspection procedures, and which ensure the legitimate right of States, and particularly smaller States, to protect and safeguard sensitive information and installations which are not relevant to the convention. Additionally, once a challenge inspection is launched, it becomes a subject of concern to the States parties, and can no longer be treated as a bilateral affair between the challenging State and the challenged State: the primary responsibility of carrying out the inspection is that of the technical secretariat. The role of the observer still needs to be clearly defined, taking care not to make him into an "inspector of inspectors". And finally, irrespective of the subjective assessments of the parties concerned, once an inspection is completed, a clear determination on compliance or otherwise should be arrived at by the executive council. Failure to include such a provision in the convention would perpetuate a climate of distrust, and undermine confidence in the verification procedures.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

Articles X and XI of the convention are of special importance for the developing countries. My delegation has taken a particular interest in the development of the provisions for these articles, and we are happy to see that agreement has finally been reached in the Ad Hoc Committee to enhance their status by placing them in appendix I. This is indeed an important and overdue breakthrough, though some additional work is required yet to further refine their provisions. The viability and universality of the convention will depend, to a great extent, on the final shape these articles acquire before negotiations are concluded.

Even though the text of article X is fairly well developed, our perception of what it should encompass bears repetition. Firstly, an article which does not assure mandatory assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons will lead to an unbalanced convention. Secondly, the system that is established under this article for the provision of assistance should have an automaticity and predictability about it, of the type of automaticity and predictability that is being sought for the verification mechanisms, for the two directly complement each other. Thirdly and finally, a system of assistance and protection will have no meaning without the actual availability of adequate resources with the Director General, which enable him to provide assistance and protection in case of need, and most particularly in cases requiring emergency assistance.

The language of article XI was developed some years ago and will have to be refined to reflect existing realities. In our view, the provisions of this article should incorporate the obligation of States parties not to impede international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemical science and technology, and an undertaking that existing discriminatory mechanisms will be dismantled once the convention comes into force. As in the case of the suggestion that has been repeatedly heard in this forum, calling on all States to declare their intention to adhere to a future convention even while its text is still under negotiation, perhaps member States who, individually or collectively, apply export controls and restrictions on the transfer of certain chemicals may consider declaring their intention to dismantle these measures for the States who signed the future chemical weapons convention. Simultaneously, as suggested by Austria and supported by other States, member States who have entered reservations to the Geneva Protocol might also consider announcing their intention to withdraw their reservations once the convention comes into force. Such gestures would promote confidence in the convention, and contribute to the objective of its universality, to which we are all committed.

The composition, powers and functions of the executive council are outstanding and thorny issues, and we hope that they will be addressed in an appropriate setting during the current session of the Ad Hoc Committee. Our past discussions have helped us to identify most of the issues and options already. What is now required is the will to strike a compromise which should be realistic and equitable.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

We share the view expressed by a majority of delegations that the executive council should consist of between about 25 and 30 members. At the same time we also believe that the convention should contain provision for the expansion of the executive council in the future, if the situation so warrants.

While choosing a system for the allocation of seats, a balance has to be struck between the undeniable interests of those States which have substantial chemical industries many of which will either be directly concerned by the convention or whose cooperation will be essential, the equally undeniable interests of those States which are situated in particularly sensitive regions or who have specific threat perceptions, and the overall and overriding need for a democratic and regionally representative membership. However, some flexibility will be necessary so that no one of these three legitimacies overwhelms the other two, and so that the membership of this vital organ does not take on a colour that prejudices its decisions. We think a formula can be found, provided there is general agreement on the need for compromise and adjustment between these three types of interest.

We are now in a stage of intense and intensified work, when many factors lead us to believe that meaningful results can be achieved in negotiating and drafting a convention which will be comprehensive and fair, and which will then draw the type of universal adherence which we all seek. Let none of us be found wanting in far-sighted statesmanship now when the glimmer of success is in sight, and when we all see the positive and early possibility of outlawing an entire type of abhorrent weapon from our global community.

Mr. PRZYGODZKI (Poland):

I wish to express the deep satisfaction of my Government with the signing last week by President George Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev of the strategic arms reduction Treaty. I should like to convey to you, Mr. President, as the representative of the United States, as well as to the representative of the USSR, our warmest congratulations on this historic event. We highly appreciate the efforts which have been made both by your country, Mr. President, and by the Soviet Union in overcoming all the difficulties and obstacles on the road to concluding the START Treaty. This is indeed good news for the whole of mankind, and also for this body, which has the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament high on its agenda. The START Treaty, being the first commitment of both States to cut significantly the arsenals of long-range nuclear weapons, including, in particular, the most destabilizing systems of such weapons, will undoubtedly stand as a milestone on the way towards a more secure world. I do hope that in a near future we negotiators in Geneva will be able to make our own contribution to disarmament efforts by successfully completing negotiations on the chemical weapons convention.

In our last statement at the Conference on Disarmament my delegation promised to present a report on a trial inspection on request conducted at some Soviet military facilities on Polish territory. Poland initiated preparations for such an inspection at the beginning of this year. However, at that time our initiative did not materialize. Today I would like to introduce a joint report on behalf of the Republic of Poland and the USSR on the trial inspection on request conducted by Poland at two Soviet military facilities located on the territory of my country on 17 and 18 April 1991. The detailed report on the conduct of this inspection and its results is tabled as document CD/1093 (working paper CD/CW/WP.354).

The principal aims of this inspection were, first, to confirm, in so far as Poland's territory is concerned, the USSR declaration on non-possession of chemical weapons outside its territory; and second, to test relevant procedures of the "rolling text" in practice and to train inspectors in carrying out such inspections. In view of the twofold character of this inspection certain procedural elements were properly adjusted without

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(Mr. Przygodzki, Poland)

prejudice to relevant provisions under the convention. At the same time activities of inspectors were carried out pursuant to a bilateral protocol agreed between Poland and the USSR based on the preceding version of the "rolling text" (CD/1033).

The facilities inspected during this inspection on request were selected by the Polish side. The first was a central artillery depot of the Soviet troops, the second a central chemical depot, both located on the territory of Poland. The different nature of each of these facilities required different approaches to the conduct of the inspection. In the latter case the inspection team inspected the entire depot, while at the first facility it was possible to limit the inspection to just a part of it. In both cases conclusions were identical: no chemical weapons or their traces were discovered.

I would like to note with appreciation the full cooperation of the Soviet authorities and the management of the inspected facilities at all stages of the inspection. The inspection team had full access to all places selected by it, as well as to all documentation. This played an important role as a confidence-building measure at a time when relations between Poland and the USSR are being developed on a qualitatively new basis.

The experience gained during the exercise confirmed that inspection on request constitutes an indispensable element of the effective verification of compliance with the convention. The extent of cooperation by the inspected State with the inspection team will play a great role in dispelling concern about treaty compliance and terminating an inspection at an earlier stage when sufficient evidence is obtained that doubts or suspicion giving rise to the request were unwarranted. A request for inspection should, to the extent possible, clearly identify the nature of suspicion. This would considerably facilitate the task of the technical secretariat to select inspectors with appropriate qualifications and suitable equipment to fulfil the aims of the inspection.

In view of the importance of inspections on request in the verification system of the future chemical weapons convention, my delegation welcomes all efforts to find a final solution to this very important issue in our negotiations. Working paper CD/CW/WP.352 constitutes, in our view, a good basis for further work on article IX. We do believe that an agreement on the final shape of inspection on request will enable us to make progress on all other outstanding issues, thus contributing to the attainment of our common goal - completing negotiations on the chemical weapons convention by 1992. My delegation is ready to contribute its share in this endeavour.

Mr. IOSSIFOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): On behalf of the Soviet delegation I too wish to express our

... Today the Soviet delegation jointly with the delegation of the Republic of Poland is introducing for consideration by the participants in the negotiations a document entitled "Joint report on a trial inspection on request", which is being circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament numbered CD/1093 and dated 6 August 1991, and at the same time as a working paper of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under number CD/CW/WP.354. In terms of timing the introduction of this document has coincided with the stepping up of the discussion on inspections on request in the negotiations, and we hope that the submitted material will facilitate the search for a mutually acceptable solution to this problem.

As the participants in the negotiations are aware, the Soviet Union has officially declared that it has no chemical weapons on the territory of other States (CD/CW/WP.264). The Republic of Poland, which has also submitted data related to chemical weapons to the Conference on Disarmament, has declared, inter alia, that it does not possess chemical weapons (CD/985). With a view to strengthening mutual understanding and trust between the two sides, the Soviet Union and Poland agreed to carry out a trial inspection on request. The trial inspection had the following aims: to confirm, in so far as Poland's territory is concerned, the USSR declaration on non-possession of chemical weapons outside its territory; to test in practice the relevant procedures of the protocol on inspection procedures contained in the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons to be used in checking the suspected storage of chemical weapons; to determine the necessary scope of activities which should be carried out by the inspection team during an inspection on request at military facilities; and lastly to train inspectors in carrying out such inspections.

The trial inspection was carried out during the period from 17 to 18 April 1991 at two Soviet military facilities located on Polish territory. The facilities to be inspected were selected by the Polish side. The inspection was carried out at the central artillery depot, where different types of artillery munitions are stored, and at the central chemical depot, where gear for protection against weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, are stored. On the basis of the results of the inspection it was concluded that no chemical weapons or traces of such weapons are present at the inspected facilities. Overall the experiment demonstrated that it is important and essential to include a concept of inspections on request in the verification mechanism under the future convention as a basic element for ensuring compliance with the provisions of the convention and dispelling possible concerns on the part of the future States parties with regard to such compliance.

(Mr. Iossifov, USSR)

Allow me now to dwell in a little more detail on certain aspects of the trial inspection which are of direct relevance to the issues in the context of inspections on request currently under discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. First, it should be noted, in our view, that the inspection team was granted access to any place within the inspected facilities. During the inspection there were no cases of refusal to grant any requests for access. Another aspect is related to the time elapsing between the submission of the request for the inspection and the granting of access to the facilities indicated in the request. The request was submitted 16 hours prior to the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry. Access to the first facility was provided within two hours after arrival at the point of entry. The notification of the second facility to be inspected was presented 15 hours prior to the arrival of the inspection team at the facility. During the inspection agreed equipment was used.

Naturally, the results of this inspection on request do not claim to be regarded as universal, but we hope that their joint presentation by the Soviet and Polish delegations will help the participants in the negotiations to finalize their approach to this form of verification.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt):

I shall at the outset address the chemical weapons convention. I begin by paying tribute to the efforts of Ambassador Serguei Batsanov of the Soviet Union, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and the three chairmen of the working groups entrusted with the preparation of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as the Friends of the Chair. My delegation's gratitude also goes to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail and his able assistants for their meticulous work.

The spectre of the production and use of chemical weapons has caused universal concern. There is no doubt that a comprehensive treaty banning chemical weapons is the appropriate framework to deal with the question. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons established by the Conference on Disarmament is closely followed now by the international community as a whole. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is at present

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(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

undertaking consultations on an extensive programme of work for the remainder of 1991 and the beginning of 1992. Whatever the outcome of his consultations, I wish to state that my delegation is prepared to work on a full-scale schedule should the Conference on Disarmament so decide.

Last year the President of the United States made an important and timely initiative on chemical weapons. My delegation is grateful that it took two stumbling-blocks out of our way. But what is more significant is that it reaffirmed the commitment on the highest level in the United States to the conclusion of a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, and that there is no place on board for non-proliferation; a position that Egypt has always maintained.

Egypt is of the view that universal adherence to the chemical weapons convention is imperative. To attain universal adherence all the Members of the United Nations should be involved, as appropriate, in the actual preparation of the convention. An open-ended preparatory commission to precede or follow a ministerial conference, or, as the Foreign Minister of Japan suggested when he addressed us on 6 June 1991, that "we should consider convening a meeting in Geneva at the level of high officials", could positively contribute towards the universality that we aspire to attain and could serve as a useful tool in our quest to encourage universal adherence. For this reason we appreciate the constructive step that the Conference on Disarmament took when it considered sending letters to States which are neither members of nor observers at our Conference, bringing to their attention the most recent report of the Ad Hoc Committee so that they could benefit from following the work in this important phase. By doing this, I believe that we would achieve two objectives. The first is to have more participation in our work by observers in the Conference, and the second is to embark on the open-ended preparatory phase we have been considering for a long time now.

In this connection, I would like to refer to the proposal to convene a ministerial meeting as one method of finalizing our work and ensuring universality. Since the proposed ministerial meeting is directly related to the package approach, the decision to convene it is anchored on what we will be able to accomplish in elaborating the package. The more concise the package is, the more easy it becomes to invite the ministers to accelerate the conclusion of the CW convention. On the other hand, if the package is not based on a comprehensive approach the preparation of the ministerial meeting becomes insufficient, and would have negative effects because we will only be left with incoherent positions at the highest level of decision-making, which could backfire.

It is good news that the members of the Conference have agreed to add a reference to the prohibition of use to the mandate. This, however, just brings the wording of the mandate into line with the unambiguous absolute prohibition against the use of chemical weapons that already exists in article I of the draft convention. Our aim is to conclude a convention which will be universally adhered to. But universal adherence in itself is subject

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

to the question of undiminished security - an issue which imposes itself in almost every aspect and provision of our draft convention. A legal question which is very relevant to the issue of undiminished security is the relation of the chemical weapons convention to other relevant international agreements. This provision is the cover under which unilaterally declared "rights" under the 1925 Geneva Protocol are to be transferred to and thereby eternalized in the chemical weapons convention. Some maintain the position that retaliatory use of chemical weapons in conformity with the reservations attached to the 1925 Protocol must remain permissible as long as chemical weapons exist. Any such attempts aiming at creating a situation of legal uncertainty about the scope of the prohibition and the implementation of the convention should be resisted, for it would undermine the integrity of the whole edifice of the convention. The convention should be the sole international contractual legal instrument that governs chemical weapons; otherwise we will be creating a dual legal regime. Furthermore, the legal uncertainty concerning the scope of the prohibition and the implementation of the convention will continue to plague the international community. The comprehensive undertaking not to use chemical weapons, which is already provided for in article I, paragraph 3 of the draft convention, is incompatible with any claim that a reservation to the 1925 Protocol can be carried through in the future. The chemical weapons convention should, therefore, provide that all States with retaliatory rights under the 1925 Protocol should renounce their reservations at the time they sign the convention.

Another important issue that falls directly under the broad concept of undiminished security is that of sanctions. In the absence of effective international control, comprising credible assurances as well as viable monitoring arrangements, the threat to both national and international security persists. This is why the international community should not limit itself to negative assurances in the manner followed with respect to the non-proliferation Treaty. What is needed is positive and credible assurances which would be applied through a mechanism elaborated by the convention and in conformity with the rules of international law. Sanctions, in my view, are guarantees to ensure ultimate compliance. In order to sustain the credibility of these sanctions, they will have to be monitored by the executive council acting under the appropriate supervision of the Security Council. In some cases non-compliance with the convention may constitute a threat to international peace and security. This is why I suggest that a clear relation be established between the functions and competence of the executive council and the Charter-prescribed responsibilities of the Security Council. The executive council should consider the questions of non-compliance and convey its conclusions and recommendations to the Security Council. My delegation welcomes the decision taken by the Ad Hoc Committee to incorporate a new article under the title "Measures to redress a situation and ensure compliance, including sanctions". My delegation has been advocating the inclusion of such an article since 1989. We do, however, realize that further work on this article and related provisions in other parts of the draft convention is still required.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Another pending issue is that of settlement of disputes. There is no provision in the "rolling text" at present on this subject. Certain references, however, exist, though scattered among some articles which specify one method, namely negotiations. What happens, for example, if a solution is not reached through negotiation? All such measures and methods of dispute settlement should be incorporated in the text. Provisions dealing with settlement of disputes should be assembled under a single article, and it should be expected that certain disputes may arise out of the application or the interpretation of the convention. We must, therefore, provide adequate means for the resolution of such disputes. It is reassuring that the Ad Hoc Committee has embarked on the consideration of this subject. A new and comprehensive article on this subject in the "rolling text" will no doubt be a stimulus for further work.

The chemical weapons convention is a functional agreement. Thus the organizational aspects of the convention acquire great relevance. The executive council will be the principal political organ of the organization to be established for the purpose of implementing the convention. The composition of the executive council and its decision-making mechanism should be determined on the basis of the functional requirements - that is to say rapidity in convening meetings and the ability to take timely decisions. A flexible non-discriminatory appointment regime should be adopted to safeguard the right of every State to serve on the council without any special rights or discrimination. The functions of the executive council are just as important. The council should be expected to supervise all the activities emanating from the convention. It should consider the questions of non-compliance and convey its conclusions and recommendations to the Security Council, as I have already stated.

I now turn to the question of verification. The credibility of the verification regime to be established by the convention will be one of the major factors governing its life course. A watertight verification regime is imperative in order to allow the convention to pursue its objectives. The draft convention envisages a number of verification measures. What is revolutionary about this convention is the idea that States parties to the convention are asked to accept, beforehand, the fact that the organization, through its appropriate organs, could at any time inspect any site on their respective territories. This innovation is a bold challenge to the concept of sovereignty. If such provisions are to be enshrined in the chemical weapons convention, as we all hope, they will open a new phase in international relations built on total transparency in all disarmament agreements.

The Ad Hoc Committee has been active on the issue of challenge inspections during the past few weeks. There are several proposals on this question, the most recent of which is the proposal presented by four States and contained in document CD/CW/WP.352. The purpose of any provision on challenge inspection should be to clarify and resolve questions of compliance with the convention. Requests for inspections must only be within the scope of the convention, which is the total prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The executive council should be informed of any request immediately, and should be able to convene right away to follow the course of the investigation so that timely decisions may be taken in order to facilitate the task of the inspectors and to control the situation. Although such inspections should be effective and timely, they should be executed in the least intrusive manner. The challenged State should have the right to protect its national security and industrial secrets. However, in order to ensure compliance by the challenged State, the chemical weapons convention should provide clear-cut procedures in order to strike a balance between these legitimate rights of States and the success of this regime. The report of the inspection operation has to be passed to the parties as well as to the executive council. This report should contain a statement of the factual findings of the inspectors, as well as a conclusion which would help the executive council in deciding whether the challenged party was in compliance with the convention or violating it. Furthermore, the executive council should be able to convene immediately to consider ways and means to remedy the situation and to ensure compliance. This would involve bringing the matter to the attention of the Security Council. A provision to ensure that the right to request challenge inspections will not be abused also has to be included in the text.

The convention should provide a protective umbrella for the States parties, in the form of assistance provided by the other States parties to limit the effect of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. This system should cover a whole range of measures from prevention to treatment. In addition to the question of automaticity required in implementing this provision, the convention must trigger a mechanism in a well-defined time-frame. It is a major achievement that the Ad Hoc Committee was able to move article X from appendix II to appendix I. However, transferring it to appendix I does not mean that article X cannot be improved. The work undertaken in Working Group A aims at attaining such improvement.

Another major step that the Ad Hoc Committee was able to achieve during the inter-sessional period was that of taking article XI off the shelf, where it has been for several years, and putting it in its proper place in appendix I. Article XI is a key provision for universal adherence to the convention. To a large extent, adherence to it will depend, *inter alia*, on the nature and scope of the provisions that will provide for international cooperation to develop the peaceful uses of chemical industries; a convention that does not, however, impede peaceful chemical activities. I wish to emphasize the interest of all States in ensuring that the economic and technological development of their chemical industry are not hampered. In this context, a technical assistance programme to help parties in organizing a system for monitoring their chemical industry should be devised. It is also imperative that the flow of chemicals, instruments and data be maintained. These concepts should be scrutinized so as to clearly reflect the rights and obligations within the context of a well-justified balance.

The Ad Hoc Committee is divided on the question of environment. We believe it is important to introduce provisions on environment in relation with the destruction of CW and any other activity prohibited by the convention.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

I now wish to address the issue of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Egypt has consistently striven to spare this region fraught with tension from the scourge of a possible recourse to any type of weapon of mass destruction. The accumulation of such weapons in the Middle East creates a destabilizing environment that endangers international peace and security.

Egypt has, since 1974, annually presented to the United Nations General Assembly a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Since 1980 that resolution has been adopted by the General Assembly by consensus. Last year a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General submitted a study. It is relevant to recall the conclusion contained in paragraph 110 of that study that "an effective zone would be a great improvement over the present situation. The problem is how to create the conditions in which a zone becomes a realistic development."

On 8 April 1990, President Hosni Mubarak proposed the establishment of a "zone free from weapons of mass destruction" in the Middle East. The three components of President Mubarak's proposal are the following: First, that all weapons of mass destruction without exception should be prohibited in the Middle East, nuclear, chemical or biological; second, that all States of the region without exception make an equal and reciprocal commitment in this regard; third, that verification measures and modalities be established to ascertain full compliance by all States in the region with the full scope of that prohibition without exception.

This initiative provides the appropriate framework for engaging States in the region in a process that would ultimately facilitate the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, and ensure regional collective accession through the encouragement of all States in the region to adhere to the international legal instruments that comprise the juridical regimes regulating weapons of mass destruction. These legal instruments are the non-proliferation Treaty, the biological weapons Convention of 1972 and the chemical weapons convention which is under preparation now at the CD. The successful employment of confidence-building measures in the Middle East will undoubtedly be augmented through the adherence of all parties in the region to these three important legal instruments.

Proposals on chemical and biological weapons relating to the region should be considered by these States within this framework. Egypt would like to reaffirm that disarmament measures relating to the different weapons of mass destruction cannot be taken in isolation, and that all the States of the region should be legally bound by the same obligations without any exception.

At this juncture, I am pleased to invite the attention of the CD to a letter dated 21 July 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, concerning the recent proposals on arms limitation and disarmament in the Middle East. This letter was reproduced on 30 July 1991 as an official document of the General Assembly (A/46/329) and the Security Council (S/22855). May I request the circulation of this document as an official document of the CD?

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

With your permission, Mr. President, I would like to conclude on a personal note. I had the honour to serve in the Egyptian delegation to the CCD in the mid-1970s, as you rightly pointed out. I was away from Geneva for 11 years. When I came back, four years ago, a glance at the Conference on Disarmament files and proceedings was sufficient to reveal that no progress whatsoever had been achieved in a whole decade. No doubt, all the members of the CD realized this fact, and there was an atmosphere of general disappointment. I am happy to state that today, when I am in the process of relinquishing my post in Geneva, I leave with feelings of hope and great expectations for the work of the Conference on Disarmament and for the efforts exerted to achieve disarmament in general. Several important developments have transformed our contemporary world in recent years. Suffice it to mention the general relaxation between the super-Powers and the oft-referred-to attempts to revise the Charter of the United Nations and to make a genuine attempt to resuscitate its provisions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, several important agreements in the nuclear field have been concluded, and when it comes to the chemical weapons convention, there is a general agreement that the light at the end of the tunnel is now glowing brighter. Here I must confess that I envy you, distinguished members of the Conference on Disarmament, for you will soon witness the fruition of these long and arduous negotiations. I take leave of you, Mr. President, and look forward to seeing all of you next October in New York and to cooperating once more with you, in our joint endeavours to create a better world for future generations.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

... As the formal session for 1991 draws to a close, the negotiations in the chemical weapons Committee are becoming more concrete in keeping with the time-frames and objectives we have set, in particular as the change in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, following the new impetus given to the negotiations as a result of President Bush's initiative, stipulated that next year we should conclude our already excessively prolonged work. Deadlines are approaching, and inevitably we have to tackle the most difficult questions, those which in the final analysis reflect our interest in the instrument designed to ban chemical weapons for ever. Now that the problem of the destruction of existing stockpiles has been resolved, and the issue of a ban on use has been directly and unequivocally included in the text of the convention, some questions of major importance still remain to be solved. This morning I will refer to some of them.

Allow me briefly to recall that in a previous statement, my delegation had occasion to express one or two ideas concerning the verification system for the chemical industry under article VI. At that time we tried to draw attention to the need for negotiating efforts to be directed towards a simpler formulation of the verification mechanism which at the same time would provide a credible guarantee that the provisions of the convention with respect to non-military activities in the chemical field would be duly complied with. We believe that the exercise that has been going on both in Group B as well as in the consultations led by France as a Friend of the Chair have to a large extent followed this thrust. But we think that further efforts could certainly be made to simplify the verification system under article VI, which should be focused on actual production of chemicals and production capacity, and not on the material flow or balance of chemicals, which, as much experience - including not a few national trial inspections - has shown, is not sufficiently accurate to support the conclusion that the convention is not being breached through the transfer of chemicals.

This brief initial digression serves to remind you of what, in the view of my delegation, should be the dominant guiding principle regarding inspections under article VI. On this same issue of verification of the chemical industry I think it is important to point out that the recent meeting at which representatives of the world chemical industry exchanged views with the members of the Committee confirmed the impression shared by many delegations involved in the negotiations that the verification system must be open and simple and must take account in a very special way of the principle

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that the normal operations of the chemical industry must not be affected. In view of a recurrent tendency that has been observed in the negotiations in the Committee to insist on complex and indeed costly formulations, I will not hesitate to repeat today that this article deals with activities not prohibited by the convention, in other words, perfectly legitimate activities.

Advocates of these sophisticated verification systems have argued that the risk that certain facilities could pose for the convention should not be side-stepped. Risk, as everyone knows, is a category that pertains to the realm of perception. There is nothing less uniform in the field of disarmament than the security perceptions of the negotiating States. Hence what some might consider of paramount importance as a risk assessment parameter - production capacity, multi-purpose capability of a facility - could be perceived by others as less important than, for instance, its location. In other words, the fact that a plant might be located in an isolated place or might possess power sources indicating a high level of activity or one that would be difficult to justify under normal circumstances. Above all there is the political assessment of those involved, both that of the party assessing the risk and that of the potential transgressor. I sincerely believe that at this stage of our negotiations any risk assessment exercise which aspired to unanimity would be doomed to failure. This is why, as far as the Argentine Republic is concerned, an appropriate verification regime within the framework of article VI must be open, but at the same time realistic and circumscribed by parameters which are attainable and manageable both from the political and from the financial point of view.

The chemical weapons convention, as has been repeatedly stated, is a security treaty. This is its logical nerve-centre and the indisputable focal point of its content must be the provisions designed to secure the elimination and prevent the reappearance of chemical weapons. Therefore, for Argentina the chemical weapons convention must be equipped with a verification system which is sound and coherent from the viewpoint of security, and able to play effectively the deterrent role that any verification mechanism must play in order to discourage, or attach a very high political cost to, any breach of its provisions. That is why in our opinion the verification system under article IX is par excellence the most important element within the treaty's verification system if the treaty is to become a really successful agreement with universal adherence. I would therefore like to raise one or two ideas relating to the negotiations on article IX, and in particular challenge inspections, which we are concentrating on at the moment. Our thinking draws on consideration at the national level of what would be the implications and the scope of the system of challenge inspections, measured against the objectives of the convention and the legitimate security concerns that all the future States parties have to different degrees in this process.

At the same time, in voicing these ideas we have borne in mind the experience gained thanks to the positive and timely initiative of the delegation of Germany that enabled us to participate in the multilateral trial challenge inspection exercise held in an air base in the Frankfurt-Cologne

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area between 22 and 24 May this year. This was a very positive experience, and in that context our gratitude and appreciation go to the German authorities, through Ambassador von Wagner and his delegation, for the excellent arrangements and the highly professional way in which they conducted this complex joint exercise.

In our view, the inspection, details of which will undoubtedly be presented with greater authority by the organizing delegation, succeeded in demonstrating that a challenge inspection is a highly intrusive exercise, but that it can nevertheless be made compatible with the necessary confidentiality that must protect certain military facilities or others with a high commercial or scientific value. The concept of managed access, duly developed on an ad hoc basis - that is, taking into account the characteristics of the site to be inspected - should allow physical access by the organization's inspectors to any site located in a State party whenever a properly justified request is made for challenge inspection.

The exercise at Pferdersfeld made it clear that there are areas - the role of observers, the relationship between the inspection team and the receiving State, the closure (securing) of the site, the availability of reliable means of communication for the inspection team, the need to draw up a fully agreed glossary of important terms for the convention in the five official languages of the United Nations, all issues on which considerable work still has to be done with a view to improvement. The conclusion, however, is encouraging in indicating that it is possible to aim for a strong system of challenge inspections without unduly affecting the security of the receiving State.

Very recently the Ad Hoc Committee received with keen interest a new proposal on challenge inspections put forward by your delegation, Mr. President, along with the delegations of Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom. It joins the existing proposals and will undoubtedly constitute a major contribution to our deliberations. We believe that a number of the elements we identified when referring to the inspection carried out in Germany in May have been taken into account by the authors of this initiative, and we welcome this fact as an encouraging element. At the same time, we think it useful to point out a few basic points that the final blueprint of verification under the convention should in our view include in its final form.

First of all, any system of challenge inspections agreed upon should guarantee the inspection team rapid, not to say immediate, access to the agreed site. Otherwise the challenge would turn into a phased warning, which we do not think would be in anyone's interest, not to mention the fact that any delay, be it at the moment of initiation or later on, would in our view contradict the very principle and the definition of challenge inspections. Secondly, access for the inspectors should be understood primarily as physical access, with the appropriate limitations arising out of the concept of managed access, carried out on an ad hoc basis in the light of the necessarily differing importance of the requested site from the viewpoint of practical

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factors (geographical, access, and so on), as well as its significance from the point of view of the various aspects of confidentiality, whether scientific, commercial or military. The use of alternative forms and/or concepts of access should be elaborated in detail in order to avoid any counter-productive effect. We hope that the current negotiations will lead to progress on this point.

Without seeking to carry the analogy with the activities carried out by the special United Nations commission appointed to monitor compliance with Security Council resolution 687 further than prudence dictates in these cases, we believe that there are important lessons which must be drawn from this continuing exercise, in particular with regard to physical access for inspectors and securing of inspected sites. We believe that if all these considerations are taken into account, they will help to lead to agreement on a challenge inspection system which, in our opinion is worthy of the name.

As our negotiations proceed in various forums, it is common and refreshing to observe that when, perhaps on account of the fatigue and excessive emphasis on details that inevitably go hand in hand with any negotiating process as intense as ours, we get unnecessarily side-tracked in the negotiations, a delegation reminds us of the direction and aim of the exercise. Consequently, we must remember that we are actually negotiating a security agreement, an agreement that has clear and precise objectives and does not try to impose restrictions on the chemical industry, an agreement that in fact seeks to offer sufficient guarantees so that in signing it, States will gain an additional degree of security. This morning, while considering the verification system under article IX, my delegation, without seeking to correct anyone's course, would merely like to remind the Conference of the nature of our negotiations. I am sure that we shall not forget this basic premise in the forthcoming months, which will undoubtedly be the final months.

By way of conclusion, allow me to indicate that as representative of a State that ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925 without any reservations, we think that the time has come - the time can no longer be delayed - for those who ratified it with reservations to withdraw them so as to begin the 1992 session, during which the convention will be concluded, with a renewed spirit and commitment.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

... The delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco concurs with the other members of the Conference in their wish to see the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons finalized within the planned time-frame. The conclusion of such a convention, in our opinion, is a very important disarmament measure. The substantial progress achieved has warranted our hope that the finalization of a text acceptable to all is near at hand. We do not, however, overlook the serious difficulties which remain.

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The PRESIDENT:

As I mentioned at the beginning of my presidency, I asked Ambassador Kamal to assist me in private, informal consultations concerning the possibilities for expansion of the CD's membership. All of you are aware that he has pursued this task energetically and with tact. After extensive consultations, however, we compared results and reluctantly concluded that agreement on an

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(The President)

expansion plan acceptable to all is still elusive. Moreover, we found an increasing number of delegations who feel the expansion issue might better be left for a later time because they fear the politicization of the CD expansion question while we are making a major effort to achieve a CW convention.

The signing of the START Treaty in Moscow last week is a major arms control event which contributes significantly to strategic stability and security in the world. I would hope we can draw inspiration from this signal accomplishment to reinvigorate our own efforts in the CD to complete a chemical weapons convention by next year, a goal we set for ourselves in the revised mandate we recently approved for the CW Ad Hoc Committee.

Many issues remain, but we cannot for a moment slacken our efforts to resolve them if we are to achieve a CW convention in the time that is left to us. Specifically, we must make the maximum possible use of the inter-sessional time between our formal CD meetings, as our CW Ad Hoc Committee Chairman, Ambassador Batsanov, seeks to do. Our Governments and peoples will expect us to produce results in the time-frame we announced. The credibility and even the future of our Conference could be at stake. I therefore urge that we capitalize on the momentum we have recently created for ourselves, reinforced by the historic moment created by signature of the START Treaty, to finish the negotiations on the single most important multilateral arms control treaty in many years. Its time has come.

(The President)

... It is always hoped that the message forwarded to the United Nations General Assembly by the Conference on Disarmament in its annual report will record progress in the negotiations carried out under its auspices. On this occasion it is striking that genuine progress has been made in dealing with the subject of chemical weapons. Of clear importance in these negotiations is the inclusion of the reference to the prohibition of use in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, as well as in relevant parts of the draft convention, and provisions on the total destruction of chemical weapons. We recognize the encouraging turn taken by these negotiations as a result of the decision of the United States Administration not to use chemical weapons against any country, in any circumstances, and to destroy all its arsenals of such weapons. As stipulated in its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is to intensify its work with the aim of achieving final agreement on the convention by 1992. I should like to encourage all delegations to continue their efforts to that end.

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Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America):

... Secondly, I would like to introduce a United States paper that deals with a national trial challenge inspection at a United States commercial chemical production facility last year. This inspection represents one of a series of such exercises that the United States Government is carrying out at commercial and government facilities. Rather than go into the details at this time of the lessons learned during this productive experience, I will simply note that the paper has been turned over to the secretariat for circulation as an official Conference document. It should be available to you shortly.

(continued)

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The third and fourth elements of my remarks today deal with chemical weapons, and with the report writing process in which the CD is now engaged. Although the latter item is more immediate in terms of the time pressures we face, I wish to make my principal remarks first on the far more important and central goal of our Conference at this moment: completion of a chemical weapons convention by 1992. Since President Bush announced his chemical weapons initiative last 13 May, the CW Ad Hoc Committee has made significant progress. Article I of the draft convention now explicitly bans use of chemical weapons, against anyone, under any circumstances. In article IV there is now no question about the obligation to complete the destruction of chemical weapons during the 10 years after the convention enters into force. Agreement seems near to place articles X and XI in appendix I of the "rolling text", and we should be able to take the same step with an improved article VI as well. We are now in the midst of serious exploration of challenge inspection, perhaps the thorniest issue in our convention. And we also believe that progress in a number of other areas such as jurisdiction and control will be reflected in the "rolling text".

Bearing in mind our goal, I submit to you that we must now make a conscious decision to direct our energies more closely on the major issues for the remainder of 1991. In my view there are currently four such issues at this stage: challenge inspection, verification in the chemical industry, the composition and decision-making process of the executive council, and universality. I will address each of these issues in turn.

On challenge inspection, as you know, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia presented a new approach last month designed to move the Conference at last toward resolution of this key issue. The four delegations sought to strike the right balance between access necessary for effective verification, and the need to protect sensitive activities that are not related to chemical weapons and avoid potential abuse of challenge inspection provisions. The regime we propose balances all of the security interests of States parties. It will enhance prospects for universal compliance and, when it enters into force, will give the international inspectorate the ability to discover the facts. It will deter would-be violators, and at the same time provide States parties with reasonable protection of their legitimate activities.

No text is perfect. We have taken due note of the views expressed on the proposal in the Ad Hoc Committee. We are encouraged by the general support shown in discussions so far for the concept of graduated, managed access to challenged sites. We are aware that some delegations would prefer more mandatory access, and that others would like to see stronger mechanisms for protecting sensitive sites. We are also pleased that our proposal has generated useful conceptual discussion of the role of the executive council. Much remains to be thrashed out, but we are confident that we can reach consensus on this critical question.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

With respect to monitoring the chemical industry, the proposal made by eight non-aligned delegations in July was a major advance. It preserves key features of the regime that is currently set forth in article VI of the "rolling text", but closes an important loophole that would have allowed many relevant facilities to escape inspection. As a result of the eight-delegation proposal the Ad Hoc Committee has almost reached consensus to extend the monitoring provisions in Article VI to all CW-capable facilities. Work remains to delimit the industry and exclude those not posing a risk and to work out the inspection regime, but we believe that the general support for coverage of such facilities should be reflected in appendix I of the "rolling text".

Much discussion has taken place on the selection process for facilities to be inspected. We, and many others, believe that the selection process must reflect security interests. Given the many thousands of relevant facilities, States parties must play a role in designating facilities for inspection. This approach is not challenge inspection in disguise. These inspections are routine, and will be conducted accordingly. We recognize the concerns of others about abuse through national selection and believe that safeguards must be incorporated, for instance agreed limits on the annual number of inspections in a given State. We are grateful for the work of the Chairman of Group B on this issue, and will give his proposed approach careful study.

Some have argued that the composition and decision-making process of the executive council can be settled only at the end of these negotiations. We believe, on the contrary, that broad consensus is developing in the Committee, and that agreement on the structure and operations of this vital executive body will help us settle other, more substantive, issues. We believe there is broad support for an executive council of approximately 20 to 25 members. Selection would be based on a combination of geographical and industrial criteria. Decision-making on substantive issues would be by a qualified majority. Several delegations have already expressed views on the executive council and we hope that Working Group C can take this up immediately.

The fourth major issue that I want to discuss is universality. How can the Conference structure the convention to encourage all States to join? I want to express my agreement with my distinguished Argentine colleague, Ambassador García Moritán, who noted last week that a chemical weapons convention is primarily a security agreement. Other delegations have pointed out the need to include restrictions and disincentives for countries who, after a reasonable period of time, choose to remain outside. We strongly agree. We have proposed that, after a suitable transition period, arrangements for trade in CW-related chemicals should discriminate against non-parties. Our proposal will require parties to refuse to trade in CW-related materials with all States that do not become parties to the CW convention within a reasonable period of time. These provisions relate directly to the central purpose of the convention, and to the security of future States parties. We will ask for your support on these grounds.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

There is one more issue that I would like to discuss today, namely longstanding problems of "old" or "abandoned" chemical weapons. This issue is not now a major obstacle to completing the convention. If it can be resolved promptly it will not become one. However, we must come to grips with it. We recognize that this issue reflects a number of different problems, all of them politically sensitive. Concern has been expressed, for example, about negative public reaction to labelling such "chemical weapons" in the convention. The term "chemical weapons" has a powerful emotional and political impact and there is a risk of public misunderstanding. For this reason, we believe it would be useful to explore the possibility of a differentiated approach to the required declarations. This would ensure that the differing situations are not lumped together under the single heading of "chemical weapons".

Another concern is over the responsibility for destruction when chemical weapons produced by one State are found on the territory of another State. It would be best for such matters to be settled between the two States involved. In any case, we cannot afford to have a loophole allowing a State party to retain chemical weapons on its territory if not removed or destroyed by the State owning them.

Unfortunately, much of the discussion on these issues has taken place without adequate information. I propose to you that the Conference can no longer work on the basis of rumours and corridor conversations. We urge the Governments that have problems with old and abandoned chemical weapons to provide technical information on the nature of the problems that exist. This could be done, for example, during the meeting of destruction experts that will be held this fall. We believe that such information would not only help to clarify the situation, but also would facilitate cooperative efforts to ensure that the weapons are disposed of safely. In this connection, I would like to recall the offer of the United States to provide technical assistance for destruction of chemical weapons to any State faced with this problem.

On the subject of adequate information, a number of participants in the negotiations have not yet indicated whether or not they possess chemical weapons. We call on them to do so, in order that members of the conference can make an accurate assessment of the dimensions of the chemical weapons problem.

I would now like to review where we are at this stage in the CW negotiations. As I mentioned earlier, many of the issues on which we have made progress this summer were reflected in the CW Ad Hoc Committee Chairman's paper last spring as the key issues requiring political attention and which might ultimately be elements of a possible package. Earlier this summer the United States made substantial moves on many of these key issues, particularly on the questions of right of retaliation, and on our two per cent proposal to achieve universality, and also on articles X and XI. Additionally we have introduced provisions for challenge inspection and we stand ready to discuss the executive council and the issue of costs. In light of these steps, I

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

confess to some disappointment in recent days on both substantive and procedural grounds. We have heard threats by individual delegations that unless they get what they want in one article, they will hold up another article. Such tactical linkage which is devoid of substantive rationale only invites retaliation in kind.

At this stage in the negotiations, if we are to have a CW convention in 1992, we believe that all serious proposals, and especially proposals receiving broad support, should be reflected in appendix I of the "rolling text", if necessary with footnotes and/or brackets. The time has come to cease unfocused general discussions. If we are to find solutions to the issues, the best basis is actual language proposed for the convention. Let us cease arguing over the placement of papers in other appendices. Then we can focus our efforts on the proposed treaty text itself, seek compromises where possible and where not, clearly identify alternatives for political solution.

Let me add that we are disappointed that a small number of delegations are blocking agreement on a work programme to carry the CW Committee through till next January. My Government finds this difficult to understand, in view of the opportunity to wrap these negotiations up and achieve a convention next year. My delegation does not consider this matter closed, and will continue to press for CW work during the eight weeks of the BWC Review Conference and the disarmament portion of the First Committee. To that end we call on capitals represented here to augment their delegations as necessary.

In my statement today I have outlined the areas of which I believe work should focus, and the approach we should take. Let me leave the subject of chemical weapons with a cautionary note. I have heard it said that some in this chamber believe that following the Gulf War and operation "Desert Storm", the United States has less interest in a CW convention. This argument holds that we have demonstrated that for ourselves, chemical weapons capability on the part of an aggressor can be handled with weapons in our conventional inventory, and that we and the Soviet Union have taken care of the problem of our own large CW stocks and security requirements with our bilateral arrangements.

This line of argument is mistaken. United States security will be enhanced by the convention. Furthermore, the United States has allies and friends around the world whose security, including security from chemical attack, is vital to us. The United States-Soviet bilateral agreement signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev 1 June last year is integrally linked with achievement of a CW convention. So we will continue to work as hard as ever for agreement here. It would, however, be equally mistaken to believe that the United States and its allies are more interested in achieving a CW convention than other members of our Conference, and accordingly that an increasing number of provisions unrelated to chemical weapons can be added to the Treaty in the expectation we will continue to make concessions. We are not les demandeurs in this negotiation. Conclusion of a CW convention will enhance the security of each and every State that becomes a party. This is important, a worthy goal: Let's keep it in sight.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

Let me turn now to an area where our performance has been less than outstanding - the Conference's annual report-writing process. This process threatens to get out of control. I submit that we spend too much time (approximately 3 of our 24 working weeks) and too much money (well more than \$US 1,000 a page) on report-writing. The time has come for reform.

During my recent CD presidency I made a serious attempt to reduce the CD report-writing effort in order to allocate more time to our CW negotiations. I suggested preparing a relatively brief report, based on the requirements of rule 45. This would have meant dropping the compilation of groups' political views on each agenda item - the most time-consuming, contentious and wasteful part of the report-writing effort. It replicates information available elsewhere, and it generates large quantities of political smoke and fire more appropriate to the General Assembly than to the more practical negotiating body we work in. Furthermore, the CD secretariat asked that the CW portion of the report be shortened by dropping appendix II, thereby saving a significant amount of money.

While these objectives had broad support, some participants insisted there could be no changes in cherished routines. Only in the case of the radiological weapons and outer space ad hoc committee reports have we thus far seen efforts made to shorten reports or eliminate political wrangling. Everywhere else we see business as usual - or worse. The NSA and NTB committee draft reports are already heavily politicized, in some cases with rhetoric reminiscent of the height of the cold war. In the NTB draft report one regional group has taken a verbatim transcript approach and is attempting to drive in more than eight full pages of text advertising or supporting its views. They have resorted to distortion of fact and misrepresentation of the views of others. The West was left with few options to achieve the necessary accuracy and balance, other than to draft eight pages of its own if it wished to propose them for bitter negotiation. So much for the effort to reduce the CD report-writing chore so as to devote more time to CW!

While I held your seat, Mr. President, my position required me to act evenhandedly and to take the views of all CD members and groups into account in conducting our business. To some extent I had to put my national role and objectives on the shelf during that period. That is no longer the case. While it may be too late for wholesale changes in the report-writing process, I propose that we try now to begin a less politicized and more cost-effective effort. Specifically, I would urge the negative security assurances and nuclear test ban ad hoc committee chairmen to try to limit political position statements by each group to no more than one or two pages each. This limit should also apply to the reports on CESNAR, PNW and CPD. My delegation is prepared to withhold consensus on those substantive sections of the CD report which are polemical, imbalanced, and unfactual.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

These are drastic steps. At a time when we are trying to negotiate an important global treaty, however, I believe they are absolutely essential. By consensus we set a deadline for ourselves of achieving a CW convention by 1992. We enshrined this goal in a revised mandate for the CW Ad Hoc Committee. Yet we are letting "business as usual" entangle us in sterile report-writing debates reminiscent of a time gone by.

Thus, I hereby request that the problematic committee contributions of this year be compressed and limited to each group's views and that the issue of CD report-writing be placed on the agenda of next year's open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning. We must provide for a much briefer, cheaper and more useful report, which people might actually read. The current product meets almost none of these criteria.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

The Western Group of States have worked for many years to advance progress in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament on a regional and global basis. The Gulf crisis demonstrated that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and of systems capable of delivering them, as well as excessive build-up of conventional arms, undermine international security and increase the risk of armed conflict throughout the world. To meet this challenge, we have renewed our commitment to the earliest possible achievement of advances in the international forums dealing with specific proliferation issues.

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

... Some of the main and most important possessors of chemical and nuclear weapons are urging the immediate and rapid conclusion of the convention on chemical weapons. Yet it is surprising that they are not as passionate in clamouring for the rapid elimination of nuclear armaments and new armaments technologies which constitute the most serious threat for mankind. My Government considers that all our efforts must be channelled towards effective treaties to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. In that context, aware that any agreement eliminating any category of weapons will contribute to international peace and security, it believes that the early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons, even though it might be a partial achievement within the context of the more complex problem of general and complete disarmament, is a step forward in the elimination of one of the categories of weapons threatening mankind. It is for that reason that the outcome of our work is a matter for constant attention in the bodies created to this end by our national authorities, which, drawing on the objectives we must reach, have taken a number of initiatives such as the dismantling of Cuban facilities that consume chemicals which will fall under the convention and a complete study of the levels of consumption and import of these chemicals.

Before expressing specific views on the "rolling text", I should like to make some general comments. We should not forget that for many years there were obstacles which delayed our negotiations for the conclusion of the convention, among them the insistence on the right to retaliation and on the retention of 2 per cent of chemical arsenals. We feel satisfied that these obstacles have now disappeared, and we would be even more satisfied if this had been the result of the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and not the outcome of bilateral agreements which we must now welcome and acknowledge, since this undoubtedly constitutes a step forward towards the conclusion of the convention. Even though we deem it important to take advantage of this situation to achieve the early conclusion of the convention, to the benefit of the security of all our peoples, we cannot accept demands that we should sacrifice the time available to us for other negotiations in the field of disarmament.

(continued)

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

For Cuba, a country which does not possess chemical weapons, the conclusion of a non-discriminatory convention which prohibits the development, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons and makes the necessary provision for the destruction of existing stockpiles, production facilities and launching systems, is not only of crucial importance but is an essential guarantee in its perception of security. This should be a convention embracing all States which possess chemical weapons. In it all States must have equal duties and rights, whether or not they possess chemical weapons, even though, as a simple reflection of reality, those that possess them will bear certain additional obligations.

We have always held the view that we are not negotiating a treaty for horizontal non-proliferation in the field of chemical weapons, but rather a comprehensive CW disarmament treaty, and hence the text we agree should not contain any article enabling any State party, after the end of the scheduled destruction period, to have this type of weapon in its arsenals or maintain its capacity to produce them. The convention should encompass all currently existing chemical weapons, including binary and multicomponent weapons, regardless of their structure and composition, and should extend to all facilities for producing and stockpiling such weapons. The future convention should not contain any provisions that could limit or restrict international trade in chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the convention; on the contrary, it should provide certain guarantees that it will not offer a screen for discriminatory practices based on criteria foreign to its letter and spirit. Cuba shares the views already expressed in this room that, once the convention is concluded, there should not be any additional verification machinery that could in practice establish a dual legal regime to monitor trade in chemicals for purposes permitted by the convention. Along with 18 other members of this Conference, we have sponsored the proposed amendment to paragraph 2 of article XI concerning the elimination of all current discriminatory restrictions against States parties as soon as the future convention enters into force for them.

The economic and technological development of States parties should not be adversely affected under any circumstances. Likewise, the parties to the convention should have access to assistance in the eventuality that chemical weapons are used against them or in the case of the threat of the use of such weapons. We also believe that the convention should be adopted unreservedly, as this would effectively contribute to strengthening its provisions and its moral authority.

As for the essential problem of verification, which continues to be the subject of debate, we believe that the best system of verification which can be devised cannot be perfect, and hence moderation and awareness of the context within which the system agreed is to be applied must guide our deliberations in the matter. It will be necessary to strike an appropriate balance between what is required for a reliable and effective system and what can be viable without creating a financial burden which is unnecessary, costly and may even discourage universal adherence to the convention.

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

The different types of inspection to be devised will have to be complementary in nature; they will have to be as minimal and as non-intrusive as possible without affecting the legitimate interests of States in the field of industry. Routine inspections will have to keep to the nature of the purpose for which they were conceived and, in our view, do not require elements that might be called for by challenge inspections.

We have carefully studied all proposals submitted so far to tackle the problems connected with article IX. The team of inspectors participating in the verification system will have to be as broadly representative of the States parties as possible and on each occasion be approved by the States affected. In no case should challenge inspections be used in an indiscriminate manner by any State and they should be kept free of all political or other considerations. This is why we attach importance to the concern raised in respect of the existing possibility of abusing this type of procedure, and we believe that in one way or another this concern can and must find room in the text we agree.

In respect of the composition, functions and role to be played by the executive council, we believe that this organ will have to guarantee proper geographical representation. Its size should be representative of the membership of the convention, it should not have permanent members and all States that wish to be part of it should be elected by the Conference whilst respecting the principle of re-election of all members of the council. All countries should have a vote and their financial contribution could be apportioned on the basis of the scale of assessments established by the United Nations for its regular budget. We believe that the technical secretariat should be representative of the various countries that will or might be parties to the convention and all its posts will be open to citizens of any State party. As for the financing of the future organization, we believe that this is a very important aspect. It is our impression that delegations have a clearer idea of what the system of financing should not be than what it should be. Our delegation has identified some principles that could provide the basis for future consideration of this matter which we will be setting out in the course of these negotiations. The financing of the costs incurred as a result of routine and challenge inspections could require additional provisions, and hence the alternative solutions require further study and consideration.

We believe that in the last few months we have achieved substantial progress in negotiations on the current "rolling text" of the future convention on chemical weapons. We must recall that this negotiating process has been and is the result of negotiations among the members of the Conference on Disarmament and that most countries - which we hope will sign the convention so that it enjoys universal participation - are not aware of this text. Hence we supported the letter sent by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the President of the Conference on Disarmament to the Member States of the United Nations, drawing their

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

attention to the forthcoming conclusion of the negotiating process on the convention, and we promoted the idea of informing the permanent representatives of our region which are not members of the Conference of the specific features of the evolving text. However, we consider that this is not enough given the imminence of the early conclusion of the convention and our interest in its gaining maximum participation. We suggest that the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament should immediately initiate a wide-ranging process of information and clarification for the benefit of permanent representatives of Governments which are non-members of the Conference on Disarmament on the "rolling text" of the convention so as to enable them to sign the convention immediately once it is concluded.

Allow me in conclusion to reiterate that it is our most heartfelt desire that the impetus currently enjoyed by the negotiations on chemical weapons, after long years of stagnation, should not only be crowned by success as soon as possible, but also that it should extend sooner rather than later to all the other items on the agenda of the Conference.

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Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria):

... As this year's session draws to a close, it is only natural that we take stock of our efforts and relate them to the anticipation with which it began. The first part of my statement this morning will be devoted to chemical weapons. We find most encouraging the positive spirit of cooperation that has generally prevailed in the negotiations. Already, both the United States and the Soviet Union had last year reached an agreement to stop the production of chemical weapons. My delegation welcomes the timely initiative of the United States in resolving the two key issues that had created obstacles to our negotiations in the past. We note with satisfaction their unconditional commitment to the destruction of all their chemical weapons stocks and facilities within 10 years of entry into force of the convention. We believe that this willingness to accommodate differing views is a hopeful sign towards resolving other thorny issues in the "rolling text".

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(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

The endeavour to complete our work should, however, not blind us to present-day realities. The final phase of our work will require careful and coordinated efforts by all delegations to ensure its consolidation through agreement on the few outstanding issues. We must demonstrate the vision and tenacity that the opportunity requires and identify practical, forward-looking ways towards an early conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention on the complete prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction.

Despite apparent repetition, we find it essential to emphasize that Nigeria does not possess chemical weapons, nor does it intend to acquire them. Notwithstanding that our chemical industry is still in its infancy, my Government earlier last month held a national seminar on the future of chemical weapons. The importance that my country attaches to the convention is motivated by our desire to achieve an agreement consistent with global security concerns, but at the same time guarantees that the development of our chemical industry will not be unduly impeded. In short, the convention must be economically neutral.

Our principal concern still remains that the proposed ban and restrictions would seriously affect a wide range of industries in the chemical field, because of their heavy dependence on the importation of raw materials, including chemical agents. Indeed, it could result in supplies being hampered, protracted delays and escalation in their prices. Related equipment could be similarly affected. These are very real concerns, and I believe that we are not negotiating a convention that would paralyse the chemical industry of States parties, especially from the developing countries. Such a perception would have dire consequences for universality. Hence we believe that all existing export control measures in the chemical industry must be abolished when the convention enters into force. Obviously, steps must be taken to allay such fears.

We welcome the agreement reached during the inter-sessional meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee to include the articles on assistance and protection, and on economic and technological development, as well as a new article on sanctions, in the "rolling text". This augurs well for the early conclusion of the convention. The importance that we attach to these articles arises from our belief that the convention should help to foster friendly relations among its adherence through cooperation in chemical industry. It should also provide a framework, in addition to other international mechanisms, to develop close ties through the demonstration of solidarity among States parties in times of crisis. Articles X and XI, and that on sanctions, have these potentialities and their provisions must be positively elaborated so that the potentialities can be fully realized.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Specifically on the issue of sanctions, my delegation last year advocated the provision of penalties for the violation of the convention. Notwithstanding the fact that the record of imposition of sanctions is mixed at best, its inclusion in the convention could enhance universal adherence. For a developing country like Nigeria, the creation of awareness that the use of chemical weapons would not be cost-free, through a commitment to sanctions by the States parties, would deter aggression by non-States parties.

The burden of creating a credible sanctions policy as a reprisal against the use of chemical weapons will no doubt fall on the executive council acting under appropriate supervision of the Security Council as outlined by Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt in his plenary statement on 8 August. My delegation is mindful of the difficult legal problem of trying to legitimize sanctions against non-States parties to the future convention. However, we regard them as measures that are indispensable for the undiminished security of States parties.

It would be exceedingly myopic to believe or think that the benefits of these articles will flow only to the States parties from the developing countries. As we are living in an interdependent world, all efforts must be made to ensure that the convention is as attractive as possible in order to attain the widest possible adherence.

Another unresolved key issue is verification, both routine and challenge, which remains very difficult. We must continue to address it very constructively, and with perseverance. We regard routine inspection as a purely technical exercise which should be left to the technical secretariat to conduct. Only this approach can guarantee a fair, equitable and non-discriminatory system. Challenge inspection is qualitatively different. Firstly, it is initiated by a State party. Secondly, it is intended to address some specific doubts and concerns. This aspect of the inspection, together with the special interest it is bound to generate among States parties, gives it a specifically political and therefore very sensitive character. It bears repeating that the image of a State party, the challenged State, will be at stake. Thus it can only be expected that after the organization has completed its inspection of the State party's facility, the same organization should make a categorical pronouncement on the State party's compliance or not, on the basis of the inspection report. It should be a collective exercise, from the beginning to the end, especially in view of its political nature. We trust that this important aspect of the issue and of course the level of intrusiveness or the role of the observer will continue to receive careful consideration.

History has repeatedly demonstrated the fact that we cannot really enforce or legislate morality. We all know that good intention is one thing and honest implementation is quite another irrespective of whether the selection of facilities for inspection is done by the technical secretariat or States parties.

Mr. TOTH (Hungary):

Other events of this year so far had a complex impact on our proceedings. Perhaps the most significant influence can be attributed to the Gulf conflict, to the lingering threat of the use of chemical weapons in the war. Expectations concerning the outcome of the conflict and the possible terms of its settlement had a discernible effect on the negotiations on the total prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles, leading to meaningful work on pending issues of the future chemical weapons convention.

No less importance can be attached to the arms control and disarmament initiatives that were launched following the ending of the Gulf crisis. The chemical weapons initiative of the United States President, the new arms control and disarmament plan put forward by the President of France are major developments. Important steps were also made towards achieving the universality of the NPT, including the announcement of the decision in principle of two nuclear-weapon States, France and China, to sign the non-proliferation Treaty.

The re-evaluation by the United States of security policy related to chemical weapons has had an immense effect on the CW negotiations. We certainly add our voice to the numerous appraisals expressed in this hall regarding the decision announced by President Bush a couple of months ago to move away from a position previously held concerning the conditional destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and the right of retaliatory use of chemical weapons. That initiative marked a genuine intent to conclude a

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chemical weapons convention as early as possible, and led to the creation of the favourable atmosphere in which the negotiations are now progressing. The Hungarian delegation cannot but welcome the plans to intensify the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, allocating as much time as possible for substantive work in order to meet the objective adopted in the new mandate of the Committee. We appreciate the efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Batsanov, seeking to find additional time for negotiations without the intention of interfering with other no less important events of multilateral disarmament. We do believe that some kind of activity, apart from a full session of the Committee, is possible even during periods coinciding with the work of other disarmament forums. In this regard, consideration might also be given to making good use of the presence at the United Nations General Assembly of high-level political decision makers. Their gathering in New York could be exploited for giving additional political support or impetus to the CW negotiations.

The report of the Conference on Disarmament to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly later this fall will reflect the results achieved so far in the CW negotiations. The achievements will duly represent the current state of affairs in the negotiations and will - in a way - also indicate the fields requiring further work for concluding the CW convention. One such field is of course verification which, by nature, is one of the crucial elements of any arms control or disarmament agreement. During this year's session important new approaches have been injected into the work on the verification regime to be applied to activities not prohibited under the convention. We attach equal importance to the fact that after a period of stalling, substantive discussion in the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee was resumed on the other element of the future verification system, namely, challenge inspection. The latter was substantiated not least by new ideas presented by a number of delegations giving ample material to work on with the aim of resolving the issue. The intensification of work on the verification system to be created under article VI of the draft convention was a result of the common recognition that existing provisions on the verification of activities not prohibited under the convention are far from satisfactory. We welcome the new approaches aiming to integrate the major and most relevant part of the international chemical industry in a more comprehensive system of verification. They all appear to seek some sort of solution to eliminate existing loopholes. It is also encouraging that the chemical industry is ready to provide access to all of its facilities for the main purposes of verification.

When we attempt to patch up the holes of the safety net identified with the verification system we should not overlook the imperfections that exist elsewhere. I would like to refer to the schedules of chemicals that are to play a fundamental part in conducting inspections. It is obvious that the contents of the schedules will determine to a large extent the scope of any inspection to be carried out in the future. Now, for example, as we look at schedule 1, listing chemicals known to be chemical weapons, we may have to

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face the fact that certain chemicals publicly described as possible agents for warfare are missing from our list. Also, there is good reason to presume that declared chemical-weapon States and other States known to have displayed "interest" towards this means of warfare might be in the possession of CW formulas that have not been made public so far. Thus, the danger of circumvention is inherent. Of course, it is hard to imagine any method to deal with the latter phenomenon. Yet we must be aware of certain facts of life if we are to maintain our clear-sightedness.

While there is an unquestionable need to have an adequate regime to make sure that chemical industries of future States parties are really engaged only in activities not prohibited under the convention, we should be realistic in our final objectives. It should have become obvious by now that a truly foolproof verification regime of the chemical weapons convention would entail financial and other burdens that most future parties would be reluctant to bear. However, a trade-off between possibilities and the safeguarding of implementation is indispensable. In our view, the verification system can be considerably strengthened by an enhanced challenge regime providing increased effectiveness relating, in particular, to facilities declared under article VI of the future convention.

It has often been said that one of the main purposes of verification is to detect non-compliance and through this, to deter potential violators. At the same time, realizing the limitations of any workable and feasible verification system for the chemical weapons convention, we might look at other ways as well to enhance the deterrence against possible violators. It is obvious that verification has the best chance to reveal a violation arising from the actual use of chemical weapons. This form of violation was also considered by the initiative put forward by President Bush as a grave breach of international law, and I do not believe that anybody in this hall thinks otherwise. Accepting this as a premise, the international community should have the resolve to take appropriate and determined action against any State that initiates the use of chemical weapons. This action, of course, would mean sanctions in the first place. The terms of the cease-fire putting an end to the Gulf conflict as reflected in United Nations Security Council resolution 687 established stringent rules and conditions for the vanquished and have provided an important precedent. Such terms in themselves could also become a form of dissuasion to any future aggressor or violator. It could also effectively complement the deterrent potential of verification expected to detect non-compliance. Thus, it might be advisable to take another look at provisions on "measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions" that have recently been introduced into the draft convention.

There is one more issue that cannot be avoided when discussing the prohibition of use of chemical weapons, and that surely is the relation of the chemical weapons convention to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We regard the CWC as replacing totally, for States parties, the obligations and rights assumed

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under the Geneva Protocol. In accepting the spirit and the substance of the CWC, there remains no sound reason to maintain reservations attached by certain States to the Protocol. We certainly endorse the call to withdraw all reservations to the Geneva Protocol upon signature of the CW convention, at the latest. We welcome the decision by a number of States parties to the Geneva Protocol to withdraw their reservations.

Hungary has, on earlier occasions, stated that States parties to the CW convention, while assuming significant obligations, cannot be entitled to merely the same rights that non-States parties without obligations might enjoy. In this regard, the CW convention really needs to be positively discriminatory vis-à-vis States parties. Discrimination that might arise from the future CWC is to be exercised towards States failing to join the convention. If universal adherence to the future convention is a desired objective, this certainly must be kept in mind. We are, of course, aware of the existence of certain arrangements aiming to curb the actual threat of CW proliferation. Such arrangements have indeed contributed to non-proliferation efforts. However, with the achievement of the total and comprehensive ban of chemical weapons through the CW convention, these measures - being a product of a totally different situation - need to be re-examined and should be harmonized with the purposes of the convention.

The recent progress in the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, and the expected completion of these negotiations by 1992, will also affect the third review conference of the biological weapons Convention. May I just recall the often heard expectation that a well-founded CWC might pave the way for the more effective functioning of the biological weapons Convention? This is not the first occasion during the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament when the topic of biological weapons appears in a statement. In the framework of our informal consultations on the future of the CD, several delegations raised the possibility of conducting meaningful negotiations to establish a verification mechanism in this field. The arms control and disarmament plan introduced by the distinguished Ambassador of France on 3 June also contained a concrete proposal on the verification of the 1972 biological weapons Convention.

In our view, the question of an ensured prohibition of biological weapons is gathering increasing importance. The recent findings of the United Nations inspection teams in Iraq have caused a frightening alarm that the grave danger of biological warfare has not yet disappeared. It is our firm belief that the BWC is of crucial significance, making an undeniable and relevant contribution to international security. The system of confidence-building measures adopted at the 1987 follow-up technical meeting also played a useful role in strengthening the Convention. These positive facts, however, should not tempt us to sit back comfortably and enjoy a false feeling of satisfaction.

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It might also be advisable to assess the present approach to the confidence-building measures and reaffirm the political commitment undertaken for participating in these measures. Another important responsibility of the review conference lies in strengthening the character of the convention as an instrument of non-proliferation, without of course changing the basic principles regarding commercial relations and scientific cooperation.

In the light of the fresh evidence that one of the signatories to the BWC conducted a biological warfare programme, the question of verification cannot be considered any more as only a theoretical one. On the contrary, this problem seems to be more topical than ever before. One of the most important and probably most difficult tasks ahead of the third review conference is to lay the groundwork for the further consideration of the establishment of a future verification system of the BWC.

Naturally, a relatively short conference cannot cover the whole problem of verification in its entirety and complexity. One possible solution is to concentrate our efforts on questions of principle and leave the practical details to a new follow-up process. It is evident that any kind of follow-up will have to face a laborious task, where a great deal of detailed technical work is to be accomplished. In the light of this, we think that such a process should not necessarily be tied to a rigid time frame. The primary nature of such a follow-up will probably have to be an exploratory one. We must not forget that verification of the BWC constitutes a very specific task, and it may easily turn out to be even more difficult than that of the CWC. As an introductory measure to further negotiations, possible approaches have to be defined and examined from the points of view of practicability, effectiveness and costs.

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The Gulf conflict and its aftermath have consequences that go far beyond ongoing multilateral disarmament efforts. The activities carried out and the findings made by the United Nations Special Commission established to implement the relevant paragraphs of Security Council resolution 687 have a clear message to convey to the international community as a whole. Clandestine and overt attempts at proliferation, excessive conventional arms build-up having nothing to do with the needs of legitimate self-defense, have displayed vividly their extremely destabilizing effects for international security. There appear to be discrepancies between the existing, but by no means comprehensive multilateral disarmament machinery, including its legal instruments on the one hand and the revealed facts of reality on the other. Unfortunately, the problems have surfaced in areas where there was an apparent feeling of security. Uncertainties have arisen regarding the effectiveness of multilateral arms control and disarmament regimes established in the field of weapons of mass destruction. This realization might call for reflection on the effectiveness of some of the relevant aspects of existing security and disarmament treaties and other corresponding arrangements.

There is currently an important and welcome political driving force to finalize the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles. Such an influence is indispensable for the conclusion of any disarmament agreement. However, we must not forget the lessons of the Gulf conflict I have just referred to, namely that some uncertainties have arisen regarding existing multilateral disarmament agreements. It surely cannot be denied that those agreements were concluded on the basis of what could then be politically achieved, yet practice appears to have defied some of the objectives. This, in our view, needs to be taken into account while working on new agreements in order to avoid future "disappointments" in matters related to international security.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany)

Before introducing the reports on two trial challenge inspections conducted in Germany earlier this year, I would like to start with some observations on this issue in general. In the past our work on the CW convention has been criticized repeatedly from outside the CD, pointing to

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our distance from reality in our negotiations at the detached conference table. Although critics might not be wrong in some respects, it is not true as to verification exercises. Up to now, we have a record of approximately 50 trial routine and trial challenge inspections, carried out by various CD members and observer countries in the past few years. This gives evidence of a solid, still growing practical basis and a wealth of operational experience available to us in concluding, at last, our work on the CW convention.

Some countries, including my own, have also reported on bilateral trial challenge inspections, which not only added further elements of realism to a learning process in very practical terms, but at the same time served in building confidence between the countries involved. In this context, my delegation wishes to express its particular appreciation of the interesting joint report tabled recently by the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Union in document CD/1093.

Within the framework of a series of German trial challenge inspections, such an inspection was conducted for the first time at a large chemical complex at the end of February 1991. Another trial challenge inspection was conducted with participants from five other CD countries at a German air force base in May 1991. I have pleasure in introducing today the reports on these two trial challenge inspections, which are tabled as documents CD/1101 and CD/1102 (working papers CD/CW/WP.360 and CD/CW/WP.361).

In order to gain, for the first time, experience in the inspection of a large production site typical of the German chemical industry, a plant site located in Frankfurt-Hoechst was selected, comprising approximately 800 buildings and 100 individual production facilities, covering an area of over 4 square kilometres. Document CD/1101 describes in detail the scenario, the conduct of the inspection and the lessons learned. Above all, this trial inspection showed that a suspected violation of article I of the convention can be investigated successfully even in the case of a very large chemical plant site. Nevertheless, the suspicion needs to be sufficiently concrete and specified in the request. In this case, the suspected production of the schedule 1 precursor chemical DF was investigated. Another important lesson learned refers to the requirement of inspectors to be specially trained to perform such a difficult inspection task in the chemical industry. Expertise not only in chemical processes, including processes possibly used in CW production, but also in chemical engineering and plant construction, was found to be absolutely crucial. This similarly applies to the members of the escort team of the national authority.

As regards the size of the inspection team, 11 inspectors split up into four subteams were able to inspect less than a third of the facilities within the two days of trial inspection. To facilitate their task, a number of inspection assistants were found to be needed. These assistants should be assigned to each subteam to carry out, for example, sample-taking and analytical screening.

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The inspection excluded the aspect of securing the site. Since securing a site of this size in a meaningful manner poses major problems, it had been decided not to overload the scenario of this first trial challenge inspection of such a site.

Basically, the trial inspection caused no problems regarding commercial confidentiality. However, it was felt that this aspect could not be enacted in a sufficiently realistic manner, given the artificial absence of real distrust in the case of this exercise. Nevertheless, the area of applied research, which represents the stage between research and production, was identified to be a particularly sensitive one: the information that could have been collected here is of extraordinary commercial value to the owner and, therefore, requires special protection. With regard to the observer, there was no indication that his role would differ from that at military facilities. In both cases he should be kept informed on how the inspection was proceeding by the chief inspector only, while it should be at the discretion of the challenged State to determine the extent of access granted to him. The observer's rights need to be clearly delimited further.

Finally, sampling and analysis proved to be particularly difficult tasks. The necessity of further development of methods and instrumentation, identified previously by the technical groups chaired by Dr. Rautio, was confirmed during this exercise. Both the number of samples and the time required for analysis need to be reduced drastically. Methods to be developed should include simple pre-screening means backed up by more sophisticated screening methods, such as recently proposed by Australia in CD/CW/WP.353. Thus, more intrusive and time-consuming in-depth analyses of samples on the site would be minimized. The use of analytical instruments of the central laboratory at the site proved to be problematic, since they took considerable time to be adapted to the needs of the inspection.

Some of the experiences I have mentioned were confirmed during the first trial challenge inspection with multinational participation and are described in detail in document CD/1102. The inspection at the Bad Kreuznach military air base, consisting of two distant areas, proceeded from the suspicion of chemical weapons being stored and personnel being trained in the use of these weapons. One of the aims in this trial inspection was to gain practical experience with an international inspection team typical of those that will be dispatched by the future technical secretariat. The inspectors, who came from Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and Germany, worked extremely well together. From time to time, the course of the inspection was interrupted to discuss questions raised by team members participating in a CW-related inspection for the first time. These discussions turned out to be of great value to all participants. The need for the inspectors appointed by the technical secretariat to be thoroughly prepared and well trained again became clear.

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The observer in this trial inspection, whose role was assumed by the United Kingdom, was accorded a high degree of openness, although, like the observer in previous German trial challenge inspections, he was constantly escorted. In some cases, at the request of the representative of the inspection site, he was kept at a safe distance from the inspected sensitive object.

Finally, returning to the point of the criticism of the work done in the CD, namely to be lacking the necessary sense of reality, let me add one practical proposal that builds on practical experience: in order to narrow down, in the future, the unavoidable gap between inspection exercises and real inspections, CW dummies could be hidden at the inspection site, with the task for the site management not to disclose their existence and to attempt to evacuate them in spite of the site being secured.

All in all, apart from many other lessons learned, it can be concluded from this first multinational trial challenge inspection that the challenge inspection regime envisaged can fully meet the requirements as an important verification instrument of the CW convention. It can be handled in such a way as to ensure the necessary degree of openness, while taking into account the national security interests of the inspected State.

Mr. HYLTIENIUS (Sweden):

The negotiations on the chemical weapons convention now seem to be entering into their final and decisive phase. They have continued to advance under the skilful leadership of Ambassador Batsanov, the chairmen of the working groups and the friends of the Chair. Provided that the necessary flexibility and determination is shown by all participants, there is every reason to expect that our efforts will be crowned with success in the course of the coming year. The convention would be a historical achievement and make the world a better place both for ourselves and for generations to come.

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Article I constitutes the backbone of the draft convention. One of the major hurdles for the convention has recently been eliminated, through the inclusion of a provision on the total prohibition of use of chemical weapons in the scope of the convention. This was absolutely necessary and has considerably increased the prospects of progress on other remaining issues. A few remaining problems pertaining to articles I and II have not been actively discussed for several years. They must now be addressed and resolved. One of them is the question of prohibiting military preparations for use of chemical weapons. It was introduced in the negotiations long ago under circumstances that differ considerably from the present state of affairs. Today we have an unconditional prohibition of use in article I, and the need for a specific prohibition of military preparations does not, therefore, appear to be of the same importance as before. Thus, my delegation considers that paragraph 4 in article I is no longer needed.

The question of herbicides is another unresolved issue related to article I. It is the long-standing position of my delegation that the future convention should encompass a prohibition to use herbicides as a method of warfare. When the matter was discussed previously concerns were expressed that prohibiting the military use of herbicides could be interpreted as also prohibiting a State party from using herbicides, for example, to clear its own air bases, an activity which may be instrumental in supporting its war efforts. However, the formulation "as a method of warfare" makes it clear that such interpretations would not be possible. My delegation favours the inclusion in article I of a prohibition against the use of herbicides as a method of warfare, as contained in footnote 1 to the article. In view of tragic experiences in this field the chemical weapons convention could not simply ignore this problem. It is obvious that such an extension of the scope could not be coupled with verification mechanisms of the kind envisaged for chemical warfare agents. In the view of my delegation the only feasible verification would be the investigation of alleged use.

The difficult problem of "old chemical weapons", abandoned as stockpiles on the territories of other countries or found as remnants on the battlefield, will also have to be resolved. There are several problems connected with this issue, the most difficult being the question of responsibility for such weapons. There must also probably be some time limit for weapons to be included in this category. It seems to me that the problem of old chemical weapons will primarily have to be resolved bilaterally between the countries concerned, and that the multilateral convention should only refer to it in general terms.

A major breakthrough has been made over the past two years in finalizing the order of destruction in articles IV and V and their annexes. With the withdrawal of the "2% proposal" we now have an agreed text with agreed time-frames for the destruction of chemical weapons and an unambiguous obligation to destroy chemical weapons production facilities.

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This year new ideas have been introduced concerning the verification of the chemical industry. I note with great satisfaction the converging positions on the inclusion of "capable facilities" under article VI and appreciate that delegations do not reject the exploration of new ideas.

My delegation welcomes the fact that a substantial part of the chemical industry seems to be prepared to provide free access for international inspectors. Such an approach would considerably facilitate the definition of "capability". If a somewhat narrower concept is considered desirable however, my delegation believes that the exemption of certain kinds of production is the least complicated way to go.

A verification regime building upon an extended scope of declarations and nominations by States parties would constitute an important confidence-building measure, which would provide a possibility to demonstrate compliance with the convention. In the view of my delegation, declarations should be linked to production, present or planned.

The inspection site should in our view correspond to an entire plant site. From this follows that an inspection could include a variety of procedures depending on the nature of the site. The aim of an inspection should be to verify the declaration. A relatively simple inspection procedure should be the basis, with the possibility of increasing the intrusiveness, if the inspectors deem it necessary. The number of inspections possible within a given budget would then be significantly higher compared with the system currently outlined in the "rolling text".

The selection of facilities for inspection under article VI must be performed in such a way that the security concerns of States parties are taken into account. We do not, however, understand the reasoning behind a pre-determined concentration on inspections of schedule 2 facilities. In fact, my delegation does not believe that a risk assessment can be based on simple technical criteria. Thus, a selection by the technical secretariat based on such criteria would not be sufficient for singling out the most relevant facilities. A State party should take its own decision as to which facility it considers should be inspected. This must be the basis. It is conceivable, however, that inspections proposed by States parties could be complemented by inspections initiated by the technical secretariat according to agreed guidelines.

There has been much discussion about anonymous nominations. The preference for such nominations for inspections builds upon two different presumptions: first, that anonymity would avoid creating bilateral political problems and, second, that it would not be correct to single out one State party among several having made the same nomination. The list of nominated plant sites could be included in the annual report of the technical secretariat with an indication of the number of nominations for each of them.

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While very little work remains on article VII, much more should be done to start preparations for its implementation as the convention now approaches its completion. Regional efforts to publicize the forthcoming convention and its implications for the States parties on the national level play a very constructive role in this context. I should therefore like to take this opportunity to express the appreciation of my Government of the initiative that led to the regional workshop recently held in Mexico City under the auspices of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

The "rolling text" with regard to article VIII has been cleaned up considerably. The core issues that remain to be solved are the composition, functions and decision-making of the executive council. How can we strike the right balance between representativity and efficiency of the executive council? It goes without saying that all States parties must be eligible for the executive council. This is not enough, however. The number of members of the council and the length of their term of office should also guarantee all States parties the possibility of serving on the council at reasonable intervals. This would undoubtedly be one important factor contributing to the universal adherence that we are all striving for. At the same time we must ensure that the efficiency of the council is not hampered. Therefore, my delegation suggests that 25-30 States parties be elected by the conference of the States parties for a two-year term. Furthermore, we suggest that provision be made for the possibility of enlarging the council at a later stage, if and when it is deemed appropriate.

The basis for the allocation of seats should be the need to ensure balanced geographical representation. However, other interests must also be reflected when composing the structure of the executive council. Political factors and the size of national chemical industries are also relevant. These interests should, at least to some extent, be taken into account within each regional group as it considers its internal allocation of seats.

It is necessary to apply a nuanced approach to the problem of inspections under article IX. This article should cover a whole spectrum, from consultations and requests for clarification on matters of compliance with the convention to requests for on-site inspections, which may be either undramatic or more or less confrontational. That is why my delegation has proposed using the term "inspections on request". It is evident from the discussion that a deliberate choice to make on-site inspections under article IX confrontational - as the term "challenge" implies - also inevitably puts more emphasis on the question of abuse.

It has been argued that if a violation cannot be proven the request should be considered an abuse of the convention. This is, of course, a grossly oversimplified view, but it may serve to deter any State party from requesting on-site inspections under this article unless it is practically 100 per cent sure that a suspected violation can be proven. Such an outcome

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would jeopardize the whole effort to achieve an effective verification regime. Its purpose must be to deter violations of the convention rather than requests for inspections.

The terminology is of course less important than the substance of the matter under negotiation. The Swedish delegation will therefore not insist on the term "inspections on request", if this would hamper further progress on this article.

Sweden welcomes the fact that the presentation of CD/CW/WP.352 has now again brought article IX to the negotiating table. We particularly welcome the amendments proposed by the delegation of France. Together with previous documents, including CD/CW/WP.316, these contributions form a good basis for the work on article IX. The conclusion of that work is, in the view of my delegation, the most urgent task of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The trend in the field of disarmament during the last few years has been to work towards greater transparency and openness as well as greater intrusiveness in terms of verification regimes and clarification of doubts about compliance. This is an important trend that inspires confidence and thereby promotes the security of States. It is on the basis of this trend, as well as of the need to create an effective "safety net" in the verification regime, that my delegation has approached article IX of the draft convention.

It is important to keep in mind that the work on a verification regime containing, among other important parts, inspections on request does not have a bearing on the chemical weapons convention only. It will also form the framework for the elaboration of verification regimes in other future multilateral treaties on arms limitation and disarmament.

In the opinion of my delegation it is of the utmost importance that a request for an inspection be complied with by the technical secretariat automatically and without delay. Time is of the essence. A phased approach might be a way to take care, at least to a degree, of both the demand for automaticity and the concern regarding possible abuse. A time-consuming process, hampering the start of the inspection, could erode the credibility of the convention. Besides, it is likely that the executive council will closely follow the entire process of an inspection on request and thus play a significant role in deterring abuse of the convention.

Most countries have military installations which are of the highest importance to their national security. Sweden therefore favours a procedure which makes it possible for a State party to protect its national security without giving it the right of denying access to the facility in question. Managed access offers an acceptable way of dealing with these problems. In the view of my delegation, the more restricted access approach contained in CD/CW/WP.352 gives too much freedom to the inspected State party. It may be added that the need for a strict verification regime seems vindicated by recent events.

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It would be wrong to prescribe in advance what the executive council should do once the inspection report has been submitted. There is in fact a wide range of possibilities depending on the nature of the report: the report may provide compelling evidence of a violation, it may show that there was no evidence of a breach of the convention, or it may be inconclusive. The executive council should be free to draw its own conclusions and decide on measures it deems appropriate. It is not possible to cover in the text of the convention every conceivable case, nor is it desirable even to attempt such a futile exercise.

What is essential, nay necessary, is to have a convention that deters potential violators and inspires confidence in the effectiveness of its verification and complaints procedures. This also goes for the problem of possible abuses of its provisions. Article IX must not become a paper tiger. It must have real teeth.

It is of vital importance to ensure the multilateral character of the convention. It has been proposed that the requesting State party should have the right to send a representative to observe the conduct of the inspection. As I have stated before, my delegation has reservations against such an arrangement for two reasons. Firstly, it implies that the international team of inspectors cannot be trusted and therefore has to be checked by the requesting State party. This is not acceptable as a matter of principle and would create a very bad precedent for other international treaties. Secondly, it is questionable whether such a clause would be politically realistic. It is hardly conceivable that certain States would allow representatives of certain other States to be present at installations which they regard as sensitive. However, if some States parties would like to make bilateral or regional arrangements for the presence of observers at inspections on request they should be free to do so. But it should not be obligatory under the convention to allow the presence of observers from the requesting State. Such a clause might seriously undermine the convention's chances of obtaining universal adherence.

Sweden welcomes the agreement in the Ad Hoc Committee to include the draft texts of articles X and XI in appendix I. The agreed formulations in article X will make it easier for States parties to mobilize assistance in cases of the use or the threat of the use of chemical weapons by giving this provision the intended operational character. The settlement of this issue represents an important step forward in the negotiations.

For several years Sweden has argued for the inclusion of the text on article XI regarding economic and technological development in appendix I. No delegation had or has, in the view of my delegation, anything to gain by holding up this important issue.

Another result of the fruitful work that has recently taken place is the agreement on the article regarding the relationship between the future convention and other international agreements. Concerns that a future

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convention might affect obligations under the Geneva Protocol are now dispersed. The Swedish delegation is satisfied with the present wording of this article, which follows closely the pattern set out in other disarmament treaties.

Tangible results have been obtained in the negotiations on the organization, measures to redress a situation and ensure compliance, including sanctions, amendments, settlement of disputes, and jurisdiction and control. The constructive attitude taken by delegations augurs well for the inter-sessional work in the area of legal and institutional matters.

Over the many years that the work on a chemical weapons convention has been going on progress has been slow, not because sufficient time has not been allocated but because of the lack of a genuine will in some quarters to engage in serious negotiations. It is above all a question of the will to engage in a process of give and take. This must be our focus. We now stand a better chance than ever to conclude these negotiations. Let us not miss this opportunity.

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

... Turning to agenda item 4 on chemical weapons, my delegation would firstly like to make some observations on an issue that has attracted considerable attention, namely the verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry, under article VI of the draft convention. We firmly believe that the regime should be formulated to accommodate the legitimate interests of the chemical industries, especially those in the developing countries. It should be conceived in such a way as to safeguard the objective comparative advantages of particular industries against possible abuse motivated by commercial interests. In this regard it is important to ensure that the burden of compliance with the convention will not fall disproportionately on the emerging industries in developing countries. Hence there is a need to strike an appropriate balance between justified security considerations and legitimate economic interests. The formulation of provisions governing the implementation of this article should therefore be given priority by the Committee before finalizing the article itself. Given the fact that the implementation of the convention will affect thousands of facilities located in both developed and developing countries, the formulation of such provisions should also take into account the different levels of development of the States parties to the convention. We also share the view that the States parties should play a role in the selection process of facilities to be inspected. It is in this context that the Indonesian delegation stands ready to explore every possible avenue, together with other delegations participating in the negotiation, in order to establish a monitoring regime of the convention under article VI.

Article XI, which deals with economic and technological development, has also been intensively discussed during this year's sessions of the Committee. Like many other delegations, we consider this article to be a strong incentive for States to join the convention. We would go even further by suggesting that this article would give even greater motivation if it is to promote cooperation among States parties in activities which are not prohibited by the convention.

The agreement on the inclusion of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, and the basic undertaking on the total destruction of chemical weapons stocks as well as their production facilities, has indeed

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(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

removed the stumbling-block in the negotiation on article I. There are still, however, crucial issues which need to be resolved, such as the question on how to put into practical terms this basic undertaking on the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and their production facilities. We see that the political will which has emerged recently has provided us with an opportunity to begin the elaboration of practical measures regarding the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and their production facilities. In this connection, a new cooperative approach in order to find a practical solution to this question may be initiated among possessors of these weapons. Some States have given indications of their possession of chemical weapons and their production facilities. The information supplied by these States, and any future information given by other possessor States, would serve as the basic modality for the initiation of the new cooperative approach which I have just mentioned in this respect. Being a State party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol without reservation which has never possessed nor produced chemical weapons we are very keen to see the total elimination of these weapons.

On the question of the composition and decision-making process of the executive council, my delegation wishes to recall the points it raised before the Committee during the discussions on this matter last year. We continue to believe that the representation of States parties to this body should reflect a balance in the political reality and geographical equitability of the States parties. In this regard, we preliminarily envisage the figure of 35 States as members of the executive council with the possibility of expanding the membership as the number of States parties increases. The example of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency might serve as a point of reference in the establishment of such a body.

(Mr. Errera, France)

... Nuclear deterrence is the child of both the Second World War and East-West confrontation. The fact is that the fear and horror of nuclear war have made it possible to maintain peace for 40 years in Europe despite extreme tension and a one-sided build-up of gigantic conventional arsenals on our continent. Such a situation obviously cannot be changed overnight. Continuous

(Mr. Errera, France)

and parallel efforts are required in the political sphere and the military sphere. The year 1990, with the end of the division of Germany and of Europe, the agreement on conventional disarmament and the CSCE summit, marked a historic turning-point. Even though uncertainties may remain - as current events have reminded us - 1991 has recorded further decisive progress with the START I agreement. Agreement on a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons is in sight. But the task remains considerable, and we must spare other regions of the world the conflicts and dangers that Europe has experienced. That is why my Government is extremely alert to the problems of non-proliferation in the nuclear sphere, as in the sphere of chemical and biological weapons, and that of ballistic missiles.

With specific reference to the subject of regulating conventional arms transfers and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, my delegation, on instructions from my Government and in agreement with the other parties concerned, has just submitted as an official document of the Conference (under the symbol CD/1103) the communique of the meeting that the representatives of the five countries held in Paris on 8 and 9 July last. I think that we can all agree on the unprecedented nature of such a meeting and the importance of the discussions and the decisions that were reached. Without entering into the details of the communique, I should like to draw the Conference's attention to the following elements. The Five confirmed that they would not transfer conventional weapons when, in the light of the circumstances, such transfers would be likely to jeopardize stability. They agreed to support continued work to establish, under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary-General, a register of arms transfers, drawn up on a non-discriminatory basis, as a step towards increased transparency on arms transfers and in general in military matters. They also strongly supported the objective of establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East, through the full implementation of Security Council resolution 687 and the adoption by all the countries in the region of a comprehensive programme of arms control. Lastly, they expressed their intention to continue their discussions on these subjects, *inter alia* with a view to establishing guidelines to ensure the observance of rules of restraint as regards arms transfers.

My delegation considers it a matter of the utmost importance for the Conference on Disarmament to be kept informed of the work of the Five in these areas, work which complements the efforts of other States or groups of States. For its part it will do its best to contribute to those efforts.

I should now like to say the following in my personal capacity. I know that it is not customary in this forum to comment on an event or to express feelings, still less emotions. But there are times when morality and politics converge. There are times when, through its force, through its intensity, an event takes on universal significance. There are times when what is generally called progress takes on its full meaning. So when a country - and not just any country - succeeds in avoiding a hazardous enterprise, when a people expresses its will to resist and says no - no to threats, no to intimidation,

(Mr. Errera, France)

Simply in order to live freely, and when men through their inspiration and their courage open the way to the noblest of all victories, the victory of freedom, we must be glad and we must say so. We must be glad for those who, because they wished it, succeeded in preserving their liberty; we must be glad at the triumph of the principles, values and ideals which we all espouse, that is to say the democratic principle, respect for the law; and lastly we must be glad too that the process of disarmament will continue, because - let us make no mistake - if disarmament agreements have been concluded in the recent past - the agreement on intermediate nuclear forces in 1987, the agreement on conventional forces in Europe in 1989, the START agreement last month, which I have just referred to - if the conclusion of a global convention banning chemical weapons is within reach today, this is indeed because, in part at least, a process of reform and democratization was undertaken in the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt that the interruption of that process, a reversal of the trend in the Soviet Union, would have had particularly adverse effects for disarmament efforts and hence for our Conference. For that reason too we must be glad.

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(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

I take this opportunity to draw attention to President Hosni Mubarak's initiative in which he proposed that all weapons of mass destruction, without exception, should be removed from the Middle Eastern region, on the understanding that this would apply equally to all States of the region without distinction or discrimination. This initiative forms part of Egypt's endeavours to achieve the goals and objectives of full and general disarmament and to use the savings resulting therefrom to further the development endeavours of the developing countries. In this connection, we welcome the statement issued at the meeting of experts of the five permanent members of the Security Council, held at Paris on 8 and 9 July of this year, in which they referred to the importance of turning the Middle East into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

I also wish to express my gratitude to the Ambassador of the Netherlands for the kind invitation that he extended to me, at the beginning of my assignment to this Conference, to visit The Hague on 23 and 24 August to inspect the facilities that his friendly Government is offering to accommodate the organization that we intend to establish within the context of the negotiations for the drafting of a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons. The visit will undoubtedly be of benefit in our deliberations on this subject.

(Mr. Negretto Cambiaso, Italy)

... The new impetus to the chemical weapons negotiations is the result of a tragic event, as a war always is, from which an innumerable set of lessons were drawn; and I would like to refrain from adding any further to it. We are now facing a new reality. It is encouraging to see that many former obstacles have been swept away. What is most important is the positive reality that has emerged from the tragedy of the war, resulting in a renewed role for the international community, not merely of a declaratory nature, to reaffirm legality against violence. We are faced now with an extraordinary opportunity to consolidate this yet fragile new dimension for the role of the international community. We should secure all its implications, as it not only represents the very foundation of the convention and of its future organization; but also because of the urgency, on a more general outlook, to provide credible and acceptable frameworks to ensure stability, while former strategic balances are breaking down.

Our debate on article IX is important in itself as well as for some of its implications of a more general nature. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, to whom I would like to convey the sympathy and appreciation of the Italian delegation, has therefore been right in devoting prior attention to the issue, against the backdrop of the ongoing events of the Gulf War aftermath. The problems yet to be solved on challenge inspection are basically turning around the critical question of striking the right balance between the protection of the legitimate interests of a State (security and confidentiality) and the need to consolidate the ever-increasing role of the international community through its organs, represented, in the specific case of article IX, by the executive council, the technical secretariat and by the inspection team.

In our view, it is possible to reach a compromise between these requirements, without undermining the prominence of the role of the future organization in fulfilling the main duties it has been entrusted by the convention. The availability of a neutral instrument above parties is useful to ensure and verify compliance but it also represents a guarantee against possible distortions of controls to the detriment of State parties' interests. It would not otherwise make sense to set up a new, costly and complex international organization if controls of the kind foreseen by article IX could be implemented through inter-State mechanisms, such as those existing in the INF, Stockholm and CFE agreements.

Allow me to cite some concrete examples, with regard to the role of the above-mentioned three organs, beginning with the director-general of the technical secretariat. He seems already implicitly empowered to check whether the elements of the request are assembled according to the basic procedural requirements listed in part III of the protocol on inspection procedures as annexed to document CD/CW/WP.352, as well as in the relevant section of the "rolling text". Upon notification, the requirement is in fact spelled out that the request should contain, inter alia, "the concern regarding compliance

(Mr. Negretto Cambiaso, Italy)

with the convention, including a specification of the relevant provision of the convention about which concerns have arisen, and the nature and circumstances of the suspected non-compliance", failing which one could envisage the return of the incomplete request to the challenging State, with an invitation to insert any missing elements. It would not be a substantive "filter", irreconcilable with the need for tight time-frames, but, rather, a procedural one, which the director-general of the technical secretariat would be called upon to fulfil through a formal evaluation of the admissibility of the request.

Furthermore, another element would seem relevant to the purpose of preventing negative consequences for the inspected State arising from requests not consistent with the scope of the convention: I am referring to the role of the inspection team and to the possibility that, during the conduct of the inspection, or even when drafting the inspection plan, a certain leeway and flexibility may be recognized in implementing the degree or the extension of the intrusiveness of the inspection, whenever it came across manifestly unfounded requests. In such circumstances it could even, in extreme situations, assume the responsibility of suspending or interrupting the inspection, thereby declaring it null and void. We therefore share the views of those who consider that the mandate should be flexible enough for the inspection team to tailor the inspection to the conditions they meet on the site.

The material conduct of the inspection can also provide us with some of the answers for the central dilemma of this system of verification, consisting in the search for the all too famous best balance between protection of confidentiality and the required intrusiveness of the controls. We are of the opinion that it may be possible to include more stringent provisions in the useful approach reflected by the four Western delegations, as far as inspections of undeclared sites are concerned, irrespective of the need to ensure in any case greater intrusiveness for the verification system of declared facilities.

We acknowledge the legitimate concerns of countries that, more than others, may find themselves potentially exposed and at a greater risk of disclosing national-security-related information not relevant to the convention. Concerns of such a nature, according to recent experience with national trial inspections (and as indicated also in the above-mentioned document), may be taken into account, in certain specific and sensitive circumstances, by giving exceptionally only individual inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection site, binding these inspectors with specific commitments about non-disclosure of unrelated confidential information. Furthermore, with regard to the need to secure the site in advance, in order to protect it from tampering of any kind, further thought should be given to the various possibilities of giving the inspection team discretion in checking incoming and outgoing traffic, by means of randomized controls, especially when inspecting large sites, or adopting some criteria in terms of quantitative thresholds (such as the tonnage of vehicles). We are of the view, in other words, that there is still further negotiating "room for manoeuvre" in order to reconcile positions and requirements which we believe will be less constraining in reality than in theory.

(Mr. Negretto Cambiaso, Italy)

Many delegations are also questioning the compatibility of the role of the observer, or his mere presence, with the neutral and super parties nature of the inspection team. We believe, like others, that the role of the observers should be a subsidiary one as opposed to the primary role of the team. But, at the same time, we are of the view that the observer could represent a useful instrument for the good conduct of the inspection, as he will be the conveyor of any information at the disposal of the requesting State that might be usefully disclosed to integrate the initial input by the latter. It would otherwise be difficult for a State party to entrust the organization with the task of verifying the well-foundedness of its own concern without feeling obliged at the same time and in its own interest to allow the organization to avail itself of all relevant information at the disposal of the State party itself.

I would at this stage also like to express a few considerations on the role of the executive council in the final stage of the challenge inspection. In the opinion of the Italian delegation, it should not be necessary to provide for an automatic convening at the end of the inspection, if only for practical and financial reasons, on the condition, however, that a single State be allowed to request such a meeting. Where the executive council is convened, two main procedural scenarios are set: in the first, an initial debate would take place on the substance of the final report, with no consequences in terms of possible recourse to measures to redress the situation. It would at that stage be simply a question of "reviewing" the situation and each member of the council, as well as each of the two concerned States, will be entitled to express its views on the conclusions of the report. It would not be necessary, at this juncture, to have any specific voting requirements by the executive council, as it would add nothing to a debate which would per se clearly indicate what the prevailing views are.

If, however, the executive council were to deem it necessary to have a follow-up to the review of the situation, in terms of promoting "any appropriate further action" - to quote the exact wording in the "rolling text" as well as in other relevant documents - in that case a decision by the executive council might prove necessary through recourse to the voting procedures agreed in the convention. We reserve the possibility of introducing a more precise textual proposal on this specific point.

In concluding on article IX, on which I have perhaps dwelt too extensively because of its symbolic character, I would state our readiness to agree on an inspection instrument that should be both effective and devoid of the possible arbitrary uses that some States, in good or bad faith, might make of it. An inspection system, in other words, entrusted to the superior responsibility of a multilateral and international organization going beyond the States themselves.

Consistently with such a general political approach, Italy is accurately assessing the possibility of carrying out a series of trial inspections, of multilateral and bilateral character, with countries belonging to the Mediterranean and middle eastern areas, which are particularly close to us and with which we share close ties of cooperation.

(Mr. Negretto Cambiaso, Italy)

Please allow me to briefly touch upon another specific but still important point. In our view, the possibility of the continued existence of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 beyond the entry into force of the convention could well be discussed, especially as a means to safeguard the international community from future withdrawal of States from the convention. However, the question of whether reservations to the Geneva Protocol should be allowed to continue to exist is a different issue and should be considered separately. Such reservations, on the entry into force of the convention, would no longer be compatible with the new version of article I, which provides for an unconditional prohibition of use. It would seem contradictory to allow a State to commit itself to such a new and far-reaching prohibition, while maintaining at the same time reservations safeguarding its right to retaliate "in kind".

Gaps to be filled up are always to be found, when a historical phase is over and a new one appears, charged with great promise but also with unknown factors, casting implications not always easily foreseeable. The stability of the world belonging to the recent past was, to say the least, the result of a negative factor: the fear of a nuclear holocaust in case of a military conflict of vast proportions with neither winners nor losers.

With the end of East-West confrontations, reliance on nuclear weapons is bound to face drastic reductions. This is Italy's persuasion and I am glad to associate myself with the worldwide appreciation for the signature of the START Treaty in Moscow, that we consider a first important step towards greater and more ambitious goals. Other positive forces are taking shape today, first and foremost those represented by public opinion and the consent of the people. We have seen in recent days the extent of their effectiveness. There is a need for such emerging consensus to rest on updated international structures, on a global or regional basis.

The convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons contains a number of important innovations, to be connected with a growing role of the organs of the international community, above States parties. Other opportunities are ahead of us in the field of multilateral disarmament, and I would like to confirm that my country has trust in the future role of this negotiating body, worthy of being strengthened and updated at the appropriate time, in terms both of its composition and future competences. In the meanwhile it would be useful to devote the efforts we usually make to putting forward our own views also to the understanding of everyone else's positions. This could help us in avoiding unnecessary and time-consuming procedural wrestling. We are willing to cooperate in this direction, and we are confident in the success of our future endeavours.

Mr. RI (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (translated from French): Allow me first of all, Mr. President, to congratulate you warmly on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this important stage and to wish you every success in your responsible task. This session of the Conference on Disarmament is about to complete its work in a very different climate from those that preceded it in recent years. Internationally, where tensions are diminishing and confrontation is giving way to reconciliation and cooperation, the peoples of the world no longer wish to return to the cold war, but ardently desire real disarmament being brought about as quickly as possible in order to maintain security and lasting peace. Most particularly, having witnessed the development of the situation that arose before and during the Gulf war, which took place under the threat of the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, they aspire to seeing the day come soon when our planet will be free for ever from power politics and sophisticated war matériel, which have caused immeasurable misfortune and suffering to a great many innocent inhabitants of that region.

In order to establish lasting peace and security around the world and to bring about development, there must be an end to the source of the factor of disturbance. At the present stage disarmament or arms control is not for most developing countries an immediate priority because they do not have an immense quantity of weapons to reduce, nor are they able to take part in the arms race, as the great Powers are. However, international relations today oblige them to attach great importance to disarmament. This is because comprehensive and global disarmament is vital for them, given the history of colonization by armed forces, the two major world wars that covered the globe, several hundreds of clashes and violent postwar conflicts - here I would like to stress that almost 170 armed conflicts, large and small, which have followed more than four decades of the postwar period, have broken out, all of them in the developing countries - and the current state of affairs under the permanent threat of nuclear weapons. The latter do not need the circumstances in which they will be obliged to spend considerable sums on importing weapons from the developed countries, but a climate of peace in which they can devote those sums to economic recovery. In other words, they need relations of international cooperation for their prosperity, but not a military threat from which they must suffer directly or indirectly. In short, this is tantamount to saying that it is incumbent upon the developed countries in general and the nuclear-weapon States in particular, beginning with the super-Powers, to be in a position, indeed to have the duty, to establish in the sphere of disarmament such an international climate of peace for humanity. With this in view, we welcome the agreement on the complete destruction of chemical weapons arrived at by the Americano-Soviet super-Powers, and the signing of the Treaty on intermediate nuclear forces and the START Treaty, and we also appreciate the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. As everyone is aware, such occurrences did not come about because of the talent of a few individuals, but were the result of a policy following the political will of the authorities. Consequently, we are persuaded that it is only when not only their political promise, whether in the case of a treaty, a convention or an agreement, has been implemented as quickly as possible, but also when it has been extended to a great many other sectors and regions, that the multilateral negotiations on disarmament will easily attain their final objective.

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

... For more than 10 years the Conference on Disarmament has engaged in an effort to eliminate chemical weapons, one of the weapons of mass destruction, from the Earth once and for all. It has taken various steps, particularly this year, to draw the attention of many countries to the importance of the issue of chemical weapons, while intensifying negotiations for the preparation of the convention. As a result of these endeavours, we have seen some successes: the number of participants in the session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has risen among non-member States; a breach has opened in the negotiations and agreement has been reached on many provisions. This gives hope for the adoption of the convention by the end of 1992 at the latest. We feel that problems such as the verification system, the executive council and others can be resolved if the negotiations are directed towards taking sufficient account of the concern of non-chemical-weapon countries, particularly developing countries. Clear experience has also been acquired this year to enhance the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament. This is, we may say, a forum for the adoption of general disarmament measures to ensure peace and security throughout the world. For that reason participation in the Conference on Disarmament should be enhanced on a large scale, so that the problems of the widest possible variety of regions and categories are fully reflected and dealt with. We consider that the number of member States should be increased and in the immediate future the participation of non-member

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(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

States in the Conference made much easier. In this regard my delegation would like to propose that we consider changing the procedure so that, if non-member States submit an application to participate in sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, their participation can be renewed by tacit agreement every year unless any objection is raised.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish):

... The subsidiary bodies have concluded their work and their reports are being prepared in all the official languages. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will be ready later than the others, as this Committee concluded its work at the eleventh hour on Tuesday. The English text will be available on Tuesday the 3rd in the morning and the remaining languages first thing on Wednesday the 4th. Owing to the size of the report and the fact that the Committee was not able to conclude its work last Monday as planned, it has not been possible to have it available earlier.

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(The President)

The timetable for next week circulated today by the secretariat takes into account the observations I made on the annual report. Also, in accordance with the understanding arrived at in the President's consultations with the coordinators, to which I referred at the last plenary meeting, the services assigned to subsidiary bodies that have concluded their work have been put at the disposal of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I suggest then that we adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

... In the same spirit, I am very pleased to announce that a joint declaration on the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons will be signed tomorrow in Mendoza, Argentina, by the Ministers of External Relations of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The Government of Uruguay will also adhere to this instrument. This very important declaration will reaffirm our formal engagement not to develop, produce, acquire or use those inhumane means of warfare and will also address the question of exports of chemical substances that can be used as precursors for chemical weapons, pending the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. This important collective step in the field of regional security and confidence-building constitutes also a very relevant contribution to international efforts to prevent the spread of chemical weapons. It demonstrates the readiness of our countries to make all efforts to avoid the introduction of weapons of mass destruction in the region while at the same time preserving the whole gamut of peaceful uses of science and technology for our economic development and the welfare of our peoples. I am quite sure, incidentally, that Ambassador García Robles would be delighted to hear this announcement were he still in our midst.

As you are aware, Argentina and Brazil presented recently to the UNDC a proposal for the multilateral consideration of criteria related to the transfer of "sensitive" technologies. We are jointly taking the initiative of promoting the discussion of that subject in the next session of the General Assembly. We would be very interested that many more delegations could react to the document presented to the UNDC, as some representatives of industrialized countries already did, such as Ambassador Gérard Errera, of France.

The recent events in our fast-changing world demonstrated that improved mechanisms are needed to prevent threats to international security. In the perspective of countries like Brazil, such mechanisms, stringent as they may be, should not impose additional barriers to technology access, which is essential for our development. In other words, many difficulties are faced because of the lack of predictable, clear and universally applicable rules for the transfer of dual-use technology.

About two years ago, when I was the representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament, I stated that - and I am quoting myself - "verification will undoubtedly be the crucial subject of disarmament negotiations, multilateral or bilateral, from now to the end of this century". I am very glad to see today that many countries seem to share those views. Proposals were presented aiming at the establishment of a verification regime for a nuclear test ban; measures to strengthen the biological weapons Convention may also be examined at the forthcoming review conference of that Convention, to take place over the next weeks in Geneva. Another evidence of the importance of this subject is the careful attention it received in this year's session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

With regard to the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention, the delegation of Brazil is instructed to contribute, as effectively as possible, to the achievement of the objective of concluding the draft next year. As to the verification regime of the convention, it is our hope that an efficient mechanism is established so that we avoid the creation of a cumbersome and costly organization. Likewise, it seems convenient to avoid unnecessary interference with the civilian industrial activities in our countries. In this sense, we considered as a positive step the offer made by the industry representatives, when they met in Geneva last June, that they would be prepared to accept inspections any time anywhere. Serious consideration should be given to that offer, for it could enable the adoption of random inspections in civil chemical facilities, thus allowing for a simple and less costly mechanism that could, at the same time, serve the verification purposes of the convention.

I also think that an appropriate regime of inspections on request could contribute to our aim. More transparency could be obtained if all countries would accept the concept of inspections on request to their chemical facilities, without the right to refusal. I could not envisage a more transparent and non-discriminatory regime, which could at the same time reduce the number of routine inspections and the costs of the future organization.

Negotiations are starting, I understand, in connection with the composition and functions of the executive council of the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is of utmost interest to my country that an acceptable agreement is reached that allows for balanced representation of regions, political groups and countries, also taking into account the importance of the chemical industry in the overall context.

It seems to me that after a chemical weapons convention is in force with its verification regime in operation, countries applying other controls and restrictions to international transfers of dual-use chemicals and facilities should suspend them. On the other hand, it would enhance the convention regime and promote universal adherence if reservations to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 could be formally withdrawn when the convention comes into force.

We would receive with great appreciation a formal renunciation by all Latin American countries of all weapons of mass destruction. In our region, more precisely in South America, which is recognized to be the least armed region in the world, economic and social problems are an essential part of collective security. That is why we have to tackle poverty-related questions and request international cooperation to improve our economies and ensure the necessary technology transfers.

At this moment, we are negotiating the chemical weapons convention with renewed enthusiasm, thanks to the positive evolution in the positions of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which permitted the adoption of an unconditional prohibition of chemical weapons in article I of the draft convention. But besides chemical weapons we continued to debate on important items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. In this connection, I would like to note the new dimension given to the consideration of item 1, Nuclear test ban.

(Mr. González, Chile)

... First of all we must note the renewed impetus of the negotiations for the conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons once and for all, to the extent that it is no longer illusory to think that the work on this matter can be finalized during the course of next year. The extension of the negotiating mandate, the progress made on vital articles such as articles I and II and the intensive discussions on verification and challenge inspection are tangible examples of this. This is solely the result of the flexibility shown by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union in withdrawing their proposals on maintaining a percentage of their stockpiles and on the right to retaliate. We are therefore witnessing a clear case where bilateral initiatives, far from replacing multilateralism, strengthen it in a constructive fashion, so that the Conference on Disarmament, the sole negotiating body in the United Nations system, can attain its important goals.

Chile, like the entire international community, is convinced of the imperative need to conclude as soon as possible an agreement banning the manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. In previous statements and in its response to the outline for the exchange of basic data proposed by Germany, it has clearly reiterated that it does not produce nor does it intend to produce this type of weapon, as I wish to reaffirm on this occasion. In that respect, and in order to show the determination guiding us in these areas, I am pleased to announce in this Conference that my country has initiated domestic legislative procedures for the withdrawal of the reservations entered by Chile when it ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

The step that we have taken in this field is, as we see it, a sign of our faith in the results achieved in the negotiations to which I have referred, and also a measure aimed at increasing international and regional trust. We are encouraged to note that several States that had entered similar reservations are prepared to adopt similar measures and we appeal to those that have not yet done so to do likewise so that at the signing of the convention on chemical weapons there will be no reservations to the Geneva Protocol. It is also a particular pleasure for my Government to announce that, as the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil has already said, tomorrow, 5 September, in the city of Mendoza, together with Argentina and Brazil, a joint declaration will be signed on the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, which is clear evidence of the political will which spurs our countries on in our efforts to create real conditions for peace and international stability. At the same time, we particularly welcome the fact that the Government of Uruguay will be joining in that commitment and

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(Mr. González, Chile)

we hope that many other countries will do the same. In this respect the Mendoza agreement, in addition to reaffirming the various unilateral declarations on the non-possession of chemical weapons, refers to the decision to cooperate closely to expedite the conclusion of the convention and to sign it simultaneously as original parties, as well as the intention to institute appropriate measures to monitor substances defined as precursors of chemical warfare agents and the study of mechanisms necessary to ensure compliance with the commitment entered into, until such time as the future convention comes into force. In a similar area, readiness is expressed to look into systems that would help to strengthen the verification machinery under the convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons. Finally, the hope is expressed that other States of the region will endorse the content of this declaration.

It is clear that in various bodies and forums, Latin America is taking major, effective steps forward as regards disarmament problems, arms control and the creation of a climate of mutual trust as expressed in agreements such as the Mendoza agreement, which contribute indirectly but in a meaningful way to strengthening true security based on the elimination of conflict scenarios and their replacement by the promotion of democracy and human rights in the region. In this connection, Chile attaches great importance to regional confidence-building measures, and in this respect has noted with interest the initiative launched by the President of Peru for the holding in Lima next November of a meeting of the foreign ministers of the member countries of the Rio Group aimed at beginning studies and exchanges of views for the purpose of reaching agreement on limiting conventional military arsenals involving high-technology weapons, as well as other matters deemed to be of interest.

As this Conference prepares to adopt a new report to be submitted to the General Assembly containing a summary of the debates and progress made in its subsidiary bodies during this period, allow me to refer to the statement made in this very room on 8 February 1990 by the then representative of Brazil, who, happily, is with us today, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, who is now Secretary-General in the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With great vision he said:

"Unless we effectively broaden our working agenda, this Conference could shrink to no more than a de facto preparatory committee for the future convention on chemical weapons, and only later seek new missions to accomplish. This is a minimalist approach and one that falls far short of the expectations of the international community, one that would make a mockery of our many declarations and resolutions and one fraught with the danger of the long agony of a progressively more enfeebled negotiating body."

He went on to add that "the time has come for aggressively creative new thinking, and ... we have 'in-house' the ability and the experience to suggest ways and means for our renewal and for enduring perhaps even greater usefulness in a dramatically altered international political environment."

(Mr. González, Chile)

These words, uttered at the beginning of the 1990 session, are equally relevant as this session ends, and we consider that they can offer food for lengthy reflection by the delegations present here with next year's session in mind. In fact if we analyse the results achieved by the ad hoc committees in the past few months, we can easily reach the conclusion that apart from matters relating to chemical weapons, the remaining topics on the agenda, despite the efforts of many of their chairmen, were considered superficially and therefore progress has not been substantial, as this mandate of a negotiating body entitled us to expect. This is simply the logical outcome of the existence of working groups that do not have the essential negotiating mandate and therefore have to confine themselves to compiling statements and a variety of background material.

My delegation is very much aware of the need to give priority to work on chemical weapons and supports that decision, but it cannot go along with the idea of postponing all the other items in such a way as to convert this Conference into a preparatory conference for the chemical weapons convention. That is why we recognize the great value of the initiative recently submitted by Sweden in document CD/1089, containing a revised version of its own draft treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which had been submitted in 1983. We believe that that initiative is a useful and timely contribution which has come at a time when the Committee in question, like several others, is stagnating because of a lack of political will to deal with substantive matters. We would therefore venture to propose that among the measures studied annually by the Conference for improving its functioning, we should include next year the permanent establishment of the ad hoc committees with clear-cut and well-defined mandates, so that it is not necessary to devote long weeks each year to discussing how they should be re-established.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Sir. You have given me the floor in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

Now, if I may, I will move on to introducing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which is contained in document CD/1108. It was adopted by our Committee on 27 August. As in previous years, the report consists of three parts: the technical part, appendix I, containing the text of the draft convention, and appendix II, containing material for further work. It can be said without exaggeration that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1991 has taken on a completely new character. The stage has been passed where many doubted it was possible to rapidly conclude the negotiations on the convention banning chemical weapons. The negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee have now entered a new, more advanced stage. This is reflected, inter alia, in the change in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

On 20 June, further to its decision of 14 February to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the Conference on Disarmament added to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. The scope of the future convention was expanded to include a fundamental obligation, that of prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Furthermore, the Committee was instructed to intensify the negotiations "with a view to striving to achieve a final agreement on the convention by 1992". In pursuance of this decision the Ad Hoc Committee has already conducted an additional session of limited duration from 8 to 19 July 1991, and I must add that this was a rather productive session. In this context, I would like to draw the attention of delegates to the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation that it should continue work on the draft convention until the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons by the 1992 session of the Conference on Disarmament, except for three periods: 9 to 27 September; 14 October to 15 November; and 23 December to 3 January 1992. However, even during those periods, in the view of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Chairman and the members of the bureau should hold active private consultations to prepare the ground for the work of the Committee. There will also be a meeting of experts on technical aspects of the destruction of chemical weapons from 7 to 11 October.

(continued)

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

I would now like to dwell briefly on the principal results of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee over the past year. Even a cursory glance at the text of the draft convention introduced today will indicate the substantial body of new material which has been included in the draft convention as a result of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee this year. Once again we have a very large document, 225 pages long, at least in the Russian version, but that is not the point; the point is that we have quite a few really new provisions in the draft convention, new important provisions. I am referring first and foremost to the provisions forming the core of the future convention on the prevention of chemical weapons, on which we were unable to arrive at a solution over a long period. I am talking about the issues included in the "security basket". On the basis of the results of work this year, article I of the draft convention now contains an obligation for States parties "never under any circumstances to use chemical weapons". The issue of the mandatory 10-year period for the destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities has also been finally resolved. Article X on assistance and protection against chemical weapons and article XIII on "Relation to other international agreements" have also been included in the draft. And I would particularly like to stress that in these articles there are no unagreed provisions at all. Also included in the draft convention are article XI on economic and technological development, article XII on measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions, and article XVI on settlement of disputes. Efforts to finalize the text of these three articles will of course be continued.

The Ad Hoc Committee had at the centre of its attention issues related to machinery for verifying compliance with the provisions of the convention. This relates to both verification under article VI, "Activities not prohibited under the Convention", as well as challenge inspections, that is to say, inspections under article IX. The results of the work done on article VI are reflected in the document submitted today. Although there are certain conceptual differences of view concerning the scope of verification in civil commercial industry, the work that has been done makes it possible to state that there are realistic prospects for a compromise solution. Many interesting proposals and suggestions have been put forward on the problem of solving the issue of challenge inspections. Intensive consultations on this subject have been conducted by the Ad Hoc Committee Chairman. Here again we should note a desire on the part of all participants in the negotiations to work seriously in order to find a mutually acceptable compromise. After intensive consultations during our work this year it has also been possible to make distinct progress on the important issue of the use of terms "jurisdiction and control" in the text of the convention. New provisions in this regard are reflected in articles I, III, IV, V and VI. In addition, extensive work has been done in all the groups to "clean up" a large number of articles in the draft convention.

At the end of the summer session, or rather the third part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament, as it is now known, the Ad Hoc Committee began discussions on the issue of the composition of and decision-making procedure in the executive council to be established under the convention. There is no need to stress how important the settlement of this issue is. Of

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

course, serious work will be needed here, and we will need to do our utmost to reduce our differences on this subject. It would not seem to be a wise idea to postpone a final decision on the whole complex of problems concerning the executive council until the very end of work on the draft convention. Important issues which we still have to deal with in the near future are questions relating to the financing of the future organization and its structure. The recent specific proposals which have been put forward on this subject are of interest and deserve in-depth study.

The considerable progress achieved on the multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction was made possible thanks to the efforts made by all participants in the negotiations, including the 37 States that are not members of the Conference on Disarmament, and their desire to seek mutually acceptable compromise solutions, their readiness to devote maximum attention, regardless of the time required, to moving work on the Convention forward as fast as possible. I can safely state that the groundwork for the present progress was largely laid by my predecessors as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and by all the many years of painstaking work on the draft convention. Of course, we still have much to do in order to complete the work on the convention next year.

In submitting the report I must express my warmest thanks to the chairmen of the three working groups, Mr. Mashhadi from Iran, Mr. Gizowsky from Poland and Mr. Perugini from Italy. I was also helped in my work by the friends of the Chair, Ambassadors Loeis and Brotodiningrat from Indonesia, Mr. Meerburg, the Netherlands and Mr. Canonne, France. The members of the bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons did all they could to help move ahead with work on the draft convention. Enormous work was also done by Mrs. Rautio, Finland, in the Group on Analytical Database and Laboratories. We may rightly consider this work as practical preparation for the operation of the future organization. On behalf of the participants in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons I would also like to take this opportunity to extend our gratitude to the Government of the Netherlands for organizing the visit to The Hague, where the Government of the Netherlands proposes to locate the headquarters of the future organization under the convention. Allow me also to thank the Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee, Mr. Bensmail, his deputy, Ms. Hoppe, and their assistants, Ms. Darby and Ms. Roux, and to note their great professionalism and invaluable assistance in our work. I would also like to extend our appreciation to the interpreters and translators as well as all the technical personnel who contributed to the effectiveness and proper organization of our work.

As I have already said, in approving its report to the Conference on Disarmament, our Ad Hoc Committee is not in any way preparing to wind down its work. Quite the contrary - this year the "inter-sessional period" promises to be especially busy. So please do not be surprised at my next statement: if the Conference agrees with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Committee's next meeting will be held on Monday, 30 September, at 3 p.m. in room V, so please note that down.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

And the final point: in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee there is no reference to anybody being recommended for the post of Chairman for the next yearly cycle of the Conference on Disarmament. In fact, I don't know, maybe a shorter term of office than mine awaits the future Chairman. At all events, there is no such recommendation, and that is because when we adopted the report last week in the Ad Hoc Committee, we did not yet have a candidate we could include in the report. However, I am now delighted to inform you and officially report that we have consensus to the effect that Dr. Adolf Ritter von Wagner, Ambassador and representative of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, is recommended as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for the next yearly cycle of the Conference on Disarmament. I am convinced, and I am expressing the shared view of all the participants in the CW negotiations, that this is a fine choice. We know the distinguished Ambassador von Wagner as an experienced CW negotiator. This year he had a heavy burden on his shoulders as the Western Group's coordinator on chemical weapons, and I think we can be certain that he will be a fine Chairman for next year. Therefore, on my own behalf, and on behalf of the other members of the Ad Hoc Committee, I would like to congratulate Ambassador von Wagner, so to speak, on his forthcoming designation as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, in January, of course. On the basis of my own experience, I could at the same time express some commiseration with him. But that is what his destiny is now going to be. Yet again I congratulate him and express the hope that the Conference on Disarmament will endorse our report, the report of our Ad Hoc Committee.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We are now to adopt document CD/1108, containing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. If there are no objections, we will adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador von Wagner, and I take this opportunity to congratulate him on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for next year.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany): I take the floor on behalf of the Western Group as their CW Coordinator to express our gratitude through you, Mr. President, to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Serguei Batsanov. He has guided the Ad Hoc Committee with great wisdom, sensitivity and patience, as witnessed by the report we have just adopted.

With the exception of the "challenge" part of article IX, for the first time in CW negotiating history, all the elements of a complete draft convention are on the table in the Ad Hoc Committee. This has become possible due to important progress achieved during the past 24 negotiation weeks plus two inter-sessional weeks. I shall abstain from repeating the different points which I had originally listed in my manuscript since Ambassador Batsanov has just alluded to them so eloquently. Remaining problems, however, must be mentioned and should not be underestimated. Although there seems to be general support for a graduated "managed access" approach, the discussion on challenge inspections so far hints at major negotiation difficulties concerning the role of the executive council as well as other issues. On the question of verification of chemical industry we need to find a cost-effective and practicable system, balancing breadth of coverage with protection of legitimate industrial activity. Provisions concerning trade with CW-related chemicals for peaceful purposes will not be an easy problem to solve. Against that, the composition and the functions of the executive council seem to be questions which - once political decisions are taken - could be solved rather quickly. Destruction of old and abandoned chemical weapons urgently needs in-depth consideration. Lastly, on the issue of universal adherence to the chemical weapons convention, important proposals are still on the agenda.

All these problems are solvable. The groundwork has been laid. The details - in which, according to a well-known proverb, the devil sits - can be worked out. What the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee need is the determination of delegations to do so. Governments and delegations must be aware of the enormous gain in security which could be registered for all States through a well-verified and reliable chemical weapons convention. If delegations have forgotten the risk which otherwise would exist, they should remember the war between Iraq and Iran as well as the recent Gulf war - wars which are almost unimaginable in some other regions of the world.

Each international legal instrument involves the acceptance of certain obligations and restrictions. In the case of the chemical weapons convention the price of such acceptance is made worthwhile not only by security gains but also by the creation of a climate of confidence in which international cooperation and peaceful trade in chemicals can prosper. Let's be realistic: the overall balance is extremely positive. Let's draw the right conclusions from this assessment and establish the CW convention by May 1992.

(continued)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I will now make my closing statement as President of the Conference.

... When I began my term of office as President of the Conference on Disarmament, I highlighted the progress made in the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention. Today, Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet Union, who is chairing the work of that Committee with great skill, submitted the report on its work, which is a clear reflection of the progress achieved. Mention should be made of the improvements in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee as well as in various relevant articles, through the inclusion of specific provisions on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and guarantees with respect to their total destruction, as well as the decision to include various articles in the text of the draft convention. Article X, on assistance and protection against the use of chemical weapons, is particularly important, as well as article XI on economic and technological development. The Ad Hoc Committee will continue to work during the inter-sessional period, so as to give impetus to the negotiations with a view to final agreement on the convention in 1992. I also wish to express our gratitude to the Government of the Netherlands for their invitation to visit The Hague. We are giving very serious consideration to the offer of the Government of that country to host the headquarters of the future chemical weapons organization.



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