doc CA1 EA 90C41 ENG

DOCS CA1 EA 90C41 ENG Clark announces meeting with Nelsd Mandela and leaders of the front line states in Lusaka and visit to Namibia. --43255720

,62303310E)

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

- CLARK ANNOUNCES MEETING WITH NELSON MANDELA AND LEADERS OF THE FRONT LINE STATES IN LUSAKA AND VISIT TO NAMIBIA.
- PRESS RELEASE THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO NELSON MANDELA.
- THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON THE RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA.
- CLARK APPLAUDS SOUTH AFRICAN PRESIDENT'S SPEECH (STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2, 1990).
- NOTES FOR A SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOE CLARK, ON SOUTH AFRICA.
- CANADA AND THE COMMONWEALTH RESPONSE TO APARTHEID.

- CANADIAN ASSISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA.
- CANADIAN SUPPORT FOR THE PROMOTION OF DIALOGUE ABOUT A NON-RACIAL SOUTH AFRICA AND EFFORTS TO COUNTER PROPAGANDA AND CENSORSHIP.
- NAMIBIA.
- CANADIAN ASSISTANCE TO MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE (SADCC).
- 43255-720 CANADIAN ACTION ON SOUTH AFRICA: CHRONOLOGY.
  - CANADIAN ACTION ON SOUTH AFRICA: CHART.
  - SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE WAY AHEAD THE KUALA LUMPUR STATEMENT (COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING, KUALA LUMPUR, Остовег 1989).
    - BROCHURE CIDA PROGRAM UPDATE.

NON - CIRCULATING 7 CONSULTER SUR PLACE

Dept. of External Affairs Min. des Affaires extérieures

> **3** 1990 APR

RETURN TO DEPARTMENTAL LIBRARY RETOURNER A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE DU MINISTERE

## News Release

Secretary of

State for External Affairs

# Communiqué

Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

No. 039

February 22, 1990.

## CLARK ANNOUNCES MEETING WITH NELSON MANDELA AND LEADERS OF THE FRONT LINE STATES IN LUSAKA

### AND VISIT TO NAMIBIA

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, today announced plans to visit Lusaka, Zambia, February 26-28, 1990, to meet with Nelson Mandela. The trip is in response to an invitation from Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda to hold discussions with Mr. Mandela and leaders of the Front Line States (FLS) on developments now unfolding in South Africa.

Mr. Clark will then travel to Windhoek, Namibia, on March 1, 1990, where he will have talks with President-elect Sam Nujoma and other officials on the eve of Namibian independence on March 21.

"I welcome most heartily this early opportunity for my first meeting with Nelson Mandela", stated the Minister. "It is clear that Mr. Mandela is not only a symbol of hope for his people, but also a person possessing remarkable qualities of statesmanship, vision and fortitude - qualities which will be crucial in the challenging days ahead." This will be Mr. Mandela's first trip outside of South Africa since his release from prison on February 11 of this year.

While in Lusaka, Mr. Clark will also meet with leaders of the FLS and the African National Congress (ANC). "I am looking forward to speaking with these key actors about the important changes which are finally beginning to take place in South Africa", he noted.

"As Chairman of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, I believe that next week's meetings with Mr. Mandela, the ANC, and the FLS can only assist the Commonwealth in pursuing its leadership role in trying to end apartheid in South Africa."

In Namibia on March 1, Mr. Clark will meet with the President-elect and several ministers-designate to discuss various aspects of the Canada-Namibia relationship including our sincere wish to welcome an independent Namibia to the Commonwealth before too long. Canada played a leading role in negotiating and implementing Namibia's independence process, both directly and through the United Nations. "Namibia's experience stands as a persuasive demonstration to South Africans of how fundamental political change can be achieved through a peaceful, negotiated and democratic process", stated Mr. Clark.

To assist the independence process, during the past year, Canada provided over 250 military and police personnel to the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), over 60 election supervisors and technical experts as well as 4,000 ballot boxes to support the election of the Constituent Assembly and over Cdn \$3.5 million in aid for development and refugee repatriation. Namibia's Constituent Assembly recently adopted an exemplary constitution which provides for effective human rights guarantees and a multi-party democracy.

- 30 -

FILL FRESS FUZ



Cabinet du Premier ministre

ANAD

# Release

Date:

February 11, 1990

For release.

Immediate

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney sent today the following letter to Nelson Mandela.

"It is with tremendous joy that I extend to you on behalf of the people of Canada our warmest greetings and best wishes on your day of freedom.

We rejoice in the knowledge that you are now reunited with your family after so many long years apart. We share in the jubilation of the South African people, whose bond with you and your ideals has never wavered throughout these dark years. We celebrate with the world that your freedom from prison today may soon lead to the freedom of all South Africans from the injustice of apartheid.

Your freedom has unleashed great hopes and expectations. These will add to the heavy load you and other leaders must shoulder on the road to a new South Africa. Please know that Canada shares your commitment and that of all South Africans to the peaceful dismantling of apartheid and the creation of a nonracial democracy in South Africa. We stand ready to assist whenever and however needed.

I look forward to being able to meet with you soon. On behalf of the Canadian Government and people, I would like to invite you to visit Canada at your earliest opportunity.

I wish you strength and Godspeed in the important task ahead."

Office of the Prime Minister



Cabinet du Premier ministre

# Release

Date: February 10, 1990

Immediate

For release:

#### PRIME MINISTER BRIAN MULRONEY WELCOMES ANNOUNCED RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney today expressed his profound pleasure at the announcement that Nelson Mandela would be released unconditionally tomorrow.

"This is a time of tremendous joy for the people of South Africa, the people of Canada and for people all around the world who have worked so long and so hard for his release. We rejoice in the knowledge that Nelson Mandela will at last be reunited with his family and with his people, whose bond with him and his ideals has remained steadfast over so many years".

The Prime Minister noted that Canada had consistently called for, and joined with others in exerting pressure in order to seek, the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela. He commended President de Klerk for making this possible. But he said the process of freeing Nelson Mandela from jail and freeing South Africa from apartheid cannot be separated. He said that it was a tribute to Nelson Mandela that the unbanning of African National Congress and the removal of a number of other obstacles to a negotiated settlement preceded his release. He said that we now hope for the quick removal of the remaining obstacles, notably the complete lifting of the State of Emergency, so that negotiations can begin. The Prime Minister said that negotiations represent the only path to justice and peace for all South Africans. "I believe Nelson Mandela will meet the enormous challenge that lies ahead. A just settlement will require all of the talent, vision and moderation that he and other South African leaders, black and white, can muster. We very much look forward to an opportunity to hearing at last from Mr. Mandela on his vision for a new South Africa."

The Prime Minister reiterated that the commitment of the Canadian Government and people does not end with Nelson Mandela's release. We will continue to try to find the most effective means of exerting our influence on the situation. The Prime Minister indicated that we stand ready to assist, in any way, the process of negotiations.

"I know the people of Canada would wish to join me in extending greetings to a free Nelson Mandela and wishing him and other South African leaders strength, wisdom and courage in the important task of building a new, just order in South Africa".

- 30 -

## Statement

Secretary of State for External Affairs



# Déclaration

Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

No. 021

February 2, 1990.

### CLARK APPLAUDS SOUTH AFRICAN PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, applauded the positive steps towards fundamental change and negotiations announced by South African President F.W. de Klerk in his opening speech to Parliament today. He described the speech as an encouraging beginning and said Canada will maintain its activities, urging further concrete movement to end apartheid.

"Today is a good day for South Africa. President de Klerk has removed many of the significant obstacles to meaningful negotiations towards a non-racial democracy. We also look forward to welcoming soon the release of Nelson Mandela. It is particularly important that he will be released into a situation in which bans have been lifted on the African National Congress and other political organizations. The easing of other restrictions, including on the press, also enhances the prospects for freer political debate, dialogue and negotiations. We commend President de Klerk for taking these initiatives. We also congratulate all those whose tireless efforts to bring about an end to apartheid are beginning to bear fruit".

"When Prime Minister Mulroney embarked on a policy of seeking to bring effective international pressure to bear on the Government of South Africa, he knew it would not be instantly successful. But he also knew that eventually this pressure, coupled with measures to assist victims and opponents of apartheid, and enhance dialogue across the racial divide, would bring positive results. Canada is proud to have contributed to the changes that have taken place. We intend to maintain pressure until those changes are irreversible, and at the same time remain ready to assist the process of negotiations in any way."

.../2

"While today's announcements do not denote in any way an end to apartheid, they have significantly improved the prospects for negotiations towards this goal. We urge the South African Government to continue to move forward on this path and end the State of Emergency and other remaining restrictions. We urge all parties to enter negotiations in a spirit of reconciliation and with the clear goal of creating a new nonracial democracy in South Africa."

"President de Klerk's speech deserves and will receive from Canada careful consideration. We will closely monitor the implementation of these measures and other developments in the coming weeks."

In his speech, President de Klerk announced, among other measures, that Nelson Mandela would be freed soon, the African National Congress, Pan-Africanist Congress and South African Communist Party were unbanned, that certain political prisoners would be released, restrictions had been lifted on 33 organizations and 374 individuals, media emergency regulations were abolished except for new security regulations that will control TV and film coverage of unrest incidents, and a moratorium on hangings.

- 30 -

# Statement

90/02

Secretary of State for External Affairs



# Déclaration

Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

NOTES FOR A SPEECH

BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOE CLARK,

ON SOUTH AFRICA

CONFERENCE CENTRE OTTAWA January 15, 1990.



Archbishop Scott,

Distinguished Guests,

The events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union mark a profound change in world history - a change made more dramatic because it is sudden, surprising, spontaneous. Those changes are far from over; indeed, the next steps - of securing lasting reform and freedom - will be even more difficult. And is is both natural and right that the world should turn its attention urgently to how we help the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

But it is equally important that we maintain policies and priorities that are leading to evident progress in other parts of the world. The Berlin Wall is a vicious symbol, and there is joy everywhere that it is coming down. But there are other walls - walls of ignorance and poverty, that programs of Official Development Assistance are helping to bring down; walls of resolute prejudice that will be broken only by the kind of campaign that we have waged together against apartheid.

I particularly welcome the occasion you provide me today to reiterate the high priority we attach to bringing down those other walls, in Africa and elsewhere, and to offer some reflections on developments in South Africa.

The fight against apartheid is a central element of the foreign policy of this Government, both because the cause is so compelling, and because we believe this is so clearly one of those international issues where Canada can make a difference.

That is because Canada enjoys a good and strong relationhip with South Africa's black neighbours. We do not carry the colonial baggage of some other Western countries. We are active members of the Commonwealth, La Francophonie and the G-7 - indeed, the only country to belong to all of these groups. That is important where co-operative action is the most effective force for change.

The Commonwealth has been in the vanguard of the fight against apartheid, as it was in setting the framework for the evolution of Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. From the Nassau Conference onward, Canada has played a leading role in that Commonwealth campaign, whether in meetings of the Heads of Government, or in the Eminent Persons Group, or in the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa.

Looking back just two years ago, to the early days of the South Africa Education Trust Fund, it is worth recalling that hope had all but disappeared for peaceful and fundamental change in South Africa. Apartheid's cruel face had not flinched in reaction to the popular uprisings of 1985 and 1986, and in February 1988, additional draconian measures were imposed. Virtually all of the extra-Parliamentary groups were restricted, along with many individuals. Thousands remained detained without trial under a continued State of Emergency. Censorship was intensified and, ironically, was particularly effective outside South Africa, in taking apartheid out of the spotlight.

But South Africans did not give up. Neither did Canada.

There were periods of intense frustration, when some Canadians believed we should close our Embassy and cut our ties. We made it clear that, if other measures failed, we were prepared to take those final steps. But we knew that the price would be to drastically diminish our influence. So we chose not to walk away, but instead to increase our help to apartheid's foes within South Africa, to step up our involvement in events within that country, and increase our work with our friends outside to mount and maintain international pressure.

And now there are signs that we may be at a watershed in South Africa. Both the Government and the black majority recognize the need to move forward. Both are willing to contemplate peaceful change. The atmosphere is better than it has been for decades.

But there should be no illusions: apartheid is still very much with us. Optimism about what <u>may</u> happen must not cloud our understanding of what still exists. The pillars of apartheid - the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act, the Land Act, segregated education and health care, the homelands system, and above all, the denial of the vote to the black majority -those pillars still stand, cemented in law.

Repression is less intense but it has not stopped. The State of Emergency remains in force. Political trials and detentions have not ended. Although "whites-only" signs have been removed from the beaches, life remains essentially unchanged in the townships, squatter camps, rural farms and the homelands. The lives of ordinary blacks remain constrained and constricted by an unacceptable web of discriminatory regulations covering virtually every aspect of their lives.

Still there is reason to hope. Speculation has intensified concerning the imminent release of Nelson Mandela, with whom President de Klerk recently met. Mr. De Klerk has deliberately created expectations that he will announce significant political changes when Parliament meets at the beginning of February. He has said he is prepared to undertake fundamental change through genuine negotiations with representative leaders. He has warned fellow Afrikaners that only through such a process can they move to a secure future. The release of Walter Sisulu and other political prisoners is welcome, as is the decision to allow peaceful political marches, rallies and the recent Conference for a Democratic Future.

Most of the changes Mr. de Klerk has introduced have been symbolic rather than substantive. They change selectively the <u>application</u> of regulations rather than the regulations themselves. But the first steps have been encouraging.

Other changes are more significant. Notice has been given that the Separate Amenities Act will be scrapped. Of great long-term importance is the imposition of substantial curbs on the pernicious state security system.

The opposition outside Parliament is working out its own concept of how to construct a non-racial democracy. At every opportunity it reminds the de Klerk government, clearly and forcefully, that apartheid cannot be reformed; it must be abolished. Three million South Africans protested the exclusion of blacks from the September elections by staying away from work. Throughout the autumn, the Mass Democratic Movement organized peaceful and orderly mass protest marches. In December, the Conference for a Democratic Future demonstrated an encouraging degree of unity of purpose among the two thousand organizations represented.

Negotiations will not be easy. Nor will they be short. But they must begin, and the preliminary stages must not be prolonged. It is clear that meaningful negotiations cannot take place as long as legitimate parties to this dialogue are jailed, banned, or otherwise prevented from consulting with their constituencies.

The "Possible Negotiating Concept", drawn up by Archbishop Scott and the other Commonwealth Eminent Persons, called on Pretoria to remove the military from the townships; provide for freedom of assembly and discussion and suspend detention without trial; release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees; unban the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress, and permit normal political activity. It called on the ANC and others to enter into negotiations and suspend violence. That concept remains as valid today as when it was first put forward, and has found resonance in subsequent proposals aimed at creating the necessary climate for negotiations.

For its part, the ANC has indicated, in the 1989 Harare Declaration, its clear preference for a peaceful, negotiated settlement. In the several meetings I have had with ANC leaders, they have confirmed that to me directly. The imperative of a peaceful solution was also recognized by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in our recent discussions in Moscow.

Canada believes it is particularly significant that, last month, a unanimous resolution was adopted at the United Nations Special Session on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa.

The entire world community joined together in unprecedented fashion to urge that a climate be created in South Africa for genuine negotiations towards a non-racial democratic society, a society based on essential fundamental principles and human rights.

With that consensus declaration, the South African Government can be in no doubt that the world stands united in demanding that negotiations begin with genuine representatives of all the people, unfettered by restrictions, bannings or imprisonment. It must understand that the release of Nelson Mandela must be accompanied by these other measures, in order that it may lead to genuine negotiations. It should also know that, when that occurs, the international community will be there to provide the assistance required to speed the peaceful transition to a truly non-racial democracy.

The pre-requisite for progress in South Africa has always been the acceptance of the necessity and inevitability of serious and meaningful negotiations. We may now be at this historic juncture.

How do we move the process forward?

Two requirements seem clear.

First, we must maintain international pressure, including sanctions, until there is clear evidence of irreversible change.

The sanctions imposed by Canada and the Commonwealth in 1985 and 1986 marked a turning point. There were closely followed by similar American and European sanctions.

Canadian measures were designed to hit major export sectors of the South African economy, particularly those sectors conducive to joint international action, and Canadian exports of sensitive goods. From the introduction of Canadian sanctions in 1986, until now, Canadian two-way trade with South Africa has dropped by almost a third.

Sanctions have worked. That has been well-documented and acknowledged by South African government and business leaders alike. Hit in their pocket books, South Africans increasingly recognize that change is vital. But until that recognition leads to action, pressure should not be lifted. There should not even be discussion of dismantling sanctions until we see evidence of clear and irreversible change. Indeed, it must be clear that new measures will be introduced if there is no change.

The second requirement is to recognize that, while sanctions are necessary, they are not sufficient. The ultimate goal is negotiation leading to change. It is appropriate, in present circumstances, to give relatively more priority to assisting the victims and opponents of apartheid, and to promoting dialogue among South Africans across the racial divide about a non-racial future.

Education is a major focus. In 1985 we launched the first phase of the Canadian Education Program for South Africa. This \$8 million initiative is comprised of four components: internal scholarships; initiatives in areas such as adult education and alternative schooling; labour education; and the in-Canada scholarship program. That latter program is implemented by the South Africa Education Trust Fund. The Trust Fund plays an invaluable role. Promoting education and skills development among black South Africans is crucial to a successful, post-apartheid South Africa. But it also helps the process of change itself. In Canada, all levels of government, trade unions, business, universities and other institutions have risen to the challenge and offered, through the Trust Fund, work experience and educational opportunities to black South Africans.

Starting this year Canada will provide about \$15 million for an expanded second phase of the Canadian Education Program. These funds could not be better spent. The crisis in black education has never been as acute as it is now. Figures released this month show that only forty-two per cent of black students passed matriculation in 1989. The pass rate for whites was ninety-seven per cent. That is the legacy of separate education - which for blacks has meant a lack of facilities, a lack of qualified teachers and a lack of funding which has crippled black schools.

It is one thing to say that the future of all South Africans rests in the hands - and hearts and minds - of those students. But the more compelling reality is that those hands and hearts and minds must be prepared to meet the challenges of exercising power.

One challenge is to learn the technical skills of a modern economy. An equal challenge, perhaps even more important, is to encourage the attitudes of tolerance and co-operation which will be so essential in a post-apartheid South Africa.

Apartheid does what it says. It keeps people apart, and helps them fear one another, perhaps hate one another. Those walls of fear and hatred must be brought down.

Dialogue among South Africans of different races and backgrounds, on a common future, is vital to the creation of a non-racial society. Canada has supported scores of projects to this end through the innovative \$1.6 million Dialogue Fund.

Our contacts within South Africa have focussed almost exclusively on a majority that is out of power. We have sought to demonstrate our solidarity and support in practical and constructive ways, and we will continue and expand those activities.

It may now be time for us also to seek more contacts with white South Africans to encourage them to approach negotiations with generosity, without fear. Those in the white community who are embracing real reform need to know how much we respect and encourage them. Those who fear change should be reassured.

One activity which Canada intends to continue to pursue vigorously is the encouragement of the media in South Africa. We support virtually all of the alternative press in one form or another, as well as being the principal funder of both the Anti-Censorship Action Group and the Media Defense Trust Fund. Our efforts have made a difference. <u>Vrye Weekblad</u>, the outspoken Afrikaanslanguage weekly, which recently broke the story on the operation of death squads, would not be in existence today were it not for Canadian Government support. On Christmas eve, 1988, the moving men were in <u>Vrye Weekblad</u>'s offices to repossess their rented computers. The Canadian Embassy stepped in and bought the computers on the spot so that publication could continue. That newspaper has since become a crucial catalyst for change in the Afrikaner community

Canada has also been effective in supporting newspapers which are key vehicles for the black community in South Africa. Our provision of training, and the purchase of equipment, for the <u>New Nation</u> and <u>Saamstaan</u> has been a concrete expression of our support for the embattled opposition press.

The fight against apartheid is not a quixotic exercise in moral diplomacy. It reflects a sober analysis of the economic potential of the southern Africa region, a potential which has been sadly stunted by apartheid.

Apartheid has imposed enormous social and political costs on South Africa. Segregating the social services under apartheid -apart from being abhorrent - is grossly inefficient. The massive security structure has come at great financial cost. And as we have seen in the current education crisis, apartheid is also tragically expensive in blighted lives and wasted human resources.

Apartheid has also been an enormous drag on the economic potential of South Africa's neighbours. But a southern Africa freed of apartheid would be a southern Africa open to business. South Africa could be a more important engine of growth. Indeed, the abolition of apartheid could trigger the long-sought economic development of the entire, impoverished African continent.

But there is another important point to be made here. The fight against apartheid is also important for the future of relations between the developed and developing world. To a degree which must not be underestimated, the Third World regards Western attitudes towards apartheid as a crucial test of our commitment to the values we profess.

A new political atmosphere appears to have taken root in South Africa - one that recognizes that only a negotiated political settlement can turn that country around. A golden final opportunity exists, but it must be grasped now and grasped firmly. If the dosages are too small, political change will lose momentum, and the moderation generated thus far will evaporate.

The world - including Canada - has been prepared to pause these past few months; willing to give Mr. de Klerk a chance to prove his declared intentions; willing to give rhetoric a chance to become reality.

On February 2, Parliament will reconvene in South Africa. In early May, the CFM, which I chair, will meet in Nigeria to discuss developments since Kuala Lumpur. These two dates bracket a period of immense significance for us all.

For during this period that Mr. de Klerk must prove he is not offering another "false spring". It is during this period that the majority in South Africa expects concrete progress towards real change. It is reasonable that, in the six months since his election, Mr. de Klerk has been preparing his hand. Now he must begin to show it.

We are entering a period when Mr. de Klerk's courage and imagination will be tested. And we are entering a period where flexibility and moderation will be required on all sides.

Canada, along with the majority in South Africa, expects a true Spring, not a false one.

#### CANADA AND THE COMMONWEALTH RESPONSE TO APARTHEID

Canada has played a prominent role during the past five years in strengthening the position of the Commonwealth and the West against apartheid. Few Western countries have moved as far on sanctions. Equally, few countries offer as high a level of aid to the victims and opponents of apartheid. Our list of voluntary as well as mandatory sanctions, numbering over 30, touches on all aspects of our relations with South Africa. They have formed the genesis for many, if not most, of the Commonwealth and UN sanctions. With the exception of the Nordic countries, the Commonwealth sanctions represent the most extensive and meaningful package of measures instituted by any country, institution or geographical region.

Prompted by Canada, the Commonwealth introduced a program to counter apartheid in 1985 at the Nassau Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). Commonwealth Heads, excepting Britain, expressed the belief that economic and other sanctions are an effective means of pressuring South Africa to change and must remain an essential part of the international community's response to apartheid. As described below, the Commonwealth, during the subsequent five years, added greatly to the 1985 sanctions.

#### NASSAU, OCTOBER 1985

Against the backdrop of political violence in South Africa, concerted Commonwealth action was first taken during the Nassau CHOGM. The Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa, which the CHOGM adopted, introduced the first Commonwealth sanctions, including a tightening of the arms embargo, an end to government support for trade activities, a voluntary ban on the sale of Krugerrands and a voluntary ban on new loans to the Government of South Africa and its agencies. The Nassau Accord also provided for the establishment of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (EPG).

#### Canadian Response:

In addition to these sanctions, Canada also launched a significant program of bilateral assistance for victims and opponents of apartheid. Additional Canadian sanctions, introduced in July 1985, included a ban on air links, and restrictions on official contacts with South African Government officials.

#### LONDON, AUGUST 1986

Nassau was followed by a mini-CHOGM held in London. At this meeting, with the exception of the United Kingdom, all governments present (Canada, Australia, Bahamas, India, Zambia

and Zimbabwe) agreed to a further list of measures. These included bans on: new investment in South Africa; promotion of tourism to South Africa; and the import of agricultural products, uranium, coal, iron and steel from South Africa.

#### Canadian Response:

Canada went even further, announcing that: no government contracts would henceforth be entered into with majority-owned South African companies; the voluntary ban on new bank loans to South Africa would be extended to the private as well as the public sector; and consular facilities in South Africa would be withdrawn.

#### VANCOUVER, OCTOBER 1987

The year between the London mini-CHOGM and the Vancouver Summit was marked by increased repression in South Africa under a State of Emergency. Internationally, action was taken across a wide front: the US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was enacted in October 1986; EEC sanctions were announced in September 1986; and the Nordic countries brought in a near total boycott in December.

The Commonwealth Heads meeting in Vancouver resulted in the Okanagan Statement and Programme of Action on Southern Africa. It reaffirmed the Commonwealth's determination that apartheid must be dismantled if even greater human tragedy was to be averted. Heads of Government did not propose new sanctions but, with the exception of Britain, agreed that the "wider, tighter and more intensified application" of sanctions must remain an essential part of the international community's response to apartheid. The CHOGM also initiated the Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CFM), composed of the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Australia, Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and chaired by Mr. Clark.

#### Canadian Response:

The Okanagan Statement as well as the CFM sprang from Canadian initiatives.

#### KUALA LUMPUR, OCTOBER 1989

The Commonwealth Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur at a time of increasing change in South Africa. President de Klerk campaigned for the September 1989 elections on a reform platform and subsequently acclaimed his victory, albeit with a reduced majority, as a mandate for "orderly" reform. He pledged that the "door to a new South Africa is open".

Just prior to the Kuala Lumpur meeting, President de Klerk freed eight senior political prisoners, including Walter Sisulu, applied a new and welcome tolerance to peaceful political protest, and spoke in more concrete terms about the requirement for fundamental reform.

In this more hopeful situation, the Commonwealth agreed to give President de Klerk "running room" of approximately six months to demonstrate, in substantive ways, his stated goal of dismantling apartheid.

In its statement entitled "South Africa: The Way Ahead", the Commonwealth agreed that where there had been movement in South Africa, more was required. It determined that existing sanctions would be maintained and (with the exception of the United Kingdom), pressure increased by way of: urging banks and financial institutions to reduce export credit terms to 90 days; calling on governments to take South Africa "off cover" for official trade credit and insurance purposes; and encouraging the UN to strengthen the arms embargo. Commonwealth heads of government also endorsed the establishment of an independent agency to review and report on South Africa's international financial links.

#### Canadian Response:

Canada instituted the sanctions agreed to at Kuala Lumpur prior to September 1989. In addition, we extended the ban on high technology items and tightened our policy on sports contacts and on contracts with majority South African-owned companies. Canada also pledged to provide funding to the Independent Agency.

#### Canadian Assistance in South Africa

Canada's concerns for the disadvantaged population in South Africa are both developmental and humanitarian. Canada has for several years maintained a program of development assistance aimed at providing educational and training opportunities to black South Africans that might not otherwise be available.

Canadian assistance is provided multilaterally and through programs that involve non-governmental organizations and institutions. More than \$8.96 million Canadian Official Development Assistance was disbursed for these programs in 1988/89 through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). In 1989/90, total disbursements are expected to be approximately \$7.56 million. None of the monies provided through CIDA is received by the South African government.

#### Canadian Education Program for South Africa (CEPSA)

Canada instituted a program of educational assistance in South Africa in 1985. As a result of an evaluation early in 1989, a second phase of this program was approved with a budget of \$14.7 million. The CEPSA program is made up of four major components: (i) internal scholarships; (ii) the Canadian Education Fund; (iii) labour education; and (iv) in-Canada education and training.

(i) Internal Scholarships:

CIDA currently supports two separate internal scholarship programs for black students in South Africa. Under the first program, administered by the Canadian Embassy in Pretoria, a total of \$1.3 million is being channelled through the Educational Opportunities Council (EOC) to assist undergraduate study and academic-bridging support programs which are designed to bring the academic standards of disadvantaged students up to university requirements. The second component is a \$1.5 million scholarship program, known as the Educational Program for South Africa (EPSA) administered by World University Service of Canada (WUSC).

(ii) The Canadian Education Fund:

The Canadian Education Fund is a special fund administered by the Canadian Embassy in Pretoria. It supports smallscale initiatives in adult education, alternative schooling, teacher upgrading, literacy, bridging, student support services and leadership training.

#### (iii) Labour Education:

Funds are being provided to the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), the Canadian Teachers' Federation and the Confedération des Syndicats Nationaux (CSN) to contribute to training programs for South African labour organizations such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU).

#### (iv) In-Canada Education and Training:

Under this initiative, a consortium of individuals representing NGOs, universities, community colleges and the private sector formed the South Africa Education Trust Fund (SAETF). Chaired by Archbishop Scott, SAETF provides assistance to black South Africans for both long and shortterm training in Canada. A total of \$6.8 million is being provided to SAETF by CIDA.

#### Canada Fund for Local Initiatives

In addition to these four main components, the Canadian Embassy in Pretoria also helps fund local projects through the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives. The emphasis here is on community development and self-help projects organized and implemented by South African communities and organizations.

#### Special Programs

Support to disadvantaged groups in South Africa is also provided through CIDA's Special Programs Branch (SPB). In 1986, a special fund was created to help Canadian NGOs provide legal and humanitarian assistance to black South Africans. SPB's NGO and Institutional Cooperation and Development Services (ICDS) Divisions also support projects in education, community development, small-scale agriculture, water and health care.

#### Multilateral Programs

CIDA's Multilateral Programs Branch contributes funds to support three initiatives: the Nassau Fellowship Program of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC); "Scholarships for Victims of Apartheid" of La Francophonie's Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (ACCT); and a program for the education of blacks outside South Africa managed by the United Nations Education and Training Program for South Africans (UNETPSA).

#### Business Cooperation Branch

The Industrial Cooperation Division of the Business Cooperation Branch provides funding to the Canadian Exporters' Association to run a project entitled "Canadian Assistance to Black Business in South Africa" (CABBSA). Using a budget of \$1.1 million, this project makes South African business consultants available to assist black entrepreneurs in improving various aspects of their business operations.

## CIDA Disbursements for Projects in South Africa

٠

ŝ

|   | 1988-89<br>(Actual)                   | 1989-90<br>(Estimated)                |
|---|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Canadian Education Program<br>for South Africa (CEPSA):<br>Internal Scholarships<br>Canadian Education Fund<br>Labour Education | \$245,720<br>\$1,658,266<br>\$404,990 | \$270,000<br>\$1,672,500<br>\$366,500 |
| South African Education<br>Trust Fund (SAETF)<br>Administration   | \$425,539<br>\$133,778                | \$609,643<br>\$63,469                 |
| CEPSA TOTAL   | \$2,868,293                           | \$2,982,112                           |
| Canada Fund   | \$550,929                             | \$417,500                             |
| <u>Special Programs Branch</u><br>NGO Division:<br>Humanitarian & Legal<br>Assistance Fund<br>Responsive Program                | \$2,265,400<br><u>\$518,502</u>       | \$2,246,100<br>\$237,875              |
| Sub total (NGO)   | \$2,783,902                           | \$2,483,975                           |
| ICDS Division:<br>Humanitarian & Legal<br>Assistance Fund<br>Responsive Program   | \$700,000<br><u>\$631,883</u>         | \$495,000<br>\$638,160                |
| Sub total (ICDS)  | \$1,331,883                           | \$1,133,160                           |
| SPECIAL PROGRAMS TOTAL  | \$4,115,785                           | \$3,617,135                           |
| Multilateral Programs Branch  |                                       |                                       |
| CFTC Nassau Fellowships<br>ACCT Bourses en faveur des   | \$500,000                             | \$450,000                             |
| victimes d'apartheid<br>UNETPSA   | \$175,000<br><u>\$350,000</u>         | \$175,000<br>\$300,000                |
| MULTILATERAL TOTAL  | \$1,025,000                           | \$925,000                             |

## **Business Cooperation Branch**

| Canadian Assistance to Black |           |           |
|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Business in South Africa     | \$396,000 | \$378,000 |

SOUTH AFRICA TOTAL

\$8,956,007 \$8,319,747

February 1990

#### CANADIAN SUPPORT FOR THE PROMOTION OF DIALOGUE ABOUT A NON-RACIAL SOUTH AFRICA AND EFFORTS TO COUNTER PROPAGANDA AND CENSORSHIP

The key objective of Canadian policy with regard to South Africa is to encourage negotiations that will lead to a non-racial democracy. Canadian efforts are two-pronged. Economic and other sanctions are designed to pressure the South African Government to take steps that will result in irreversible change. At the same time Canada has a number of programs designed to assist victims of apartheid, promote dialogue about a non-racial future and counter South African propaganda and censorship.

Canada is trying through specific projects to promote dialogue about a non-racial future among South Africans from all walks of life. In their October 1987 Okanagan Statement, Commonwealth Heads of Government declared: "we believe that we should take advantage of any opportunity to promote real internal dialogue." Following the August 1988 meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CFM), Canada launched a \$1.6 million fund to promote dialogue among South Africans. The projects are designed by and for South Africans. Projects include assisting the alternative press, funding events bringing together South Africans of different races, support for human rights and professional organizations trying to break down the barriers of apartheid, promotion of the idea of a non-racial future through the arts and popular culture and assistance for discussions between the ANC and primarily white South Africans.

Commonwealth Heads of Government also noted in Vancouver the need to expose the truth about apartheid and declared that the Commonwealth should give high priority to counteracting South African propaganda and censorship. Canada prepared a strategy on that subject and presented it to the CFM in Toronto in August 1988. At that time Canada also announced the establishment of the \$1 million Canadian Action Plan to counter South African propaganda and censorship. Some of the activities under this plan are carried out under the Dialogue Fund since censorship remains a serious impediment to dialogue, and a free press plays a key role in promoting dialogue.

The objectives of the plan are to counter the effects of South African propaganda and censorship through activities designed to raise the awareness of the real situation in South Africa. Activities include assistance to the alternative press in South and Southern Africa, the establishment of a special initiatives program at our Embassy in Pretoria, the establishment of a Visits and Speakers Program in Canada and assistance to NGOs to undertake projects to inform and educate Canadians about the realities of apartheid.

#### NAMIBIA

Canada, with France, FRG, UK and USA, sponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 in 1978, providing for UN-supervised elections and Namibia's transition to independence from illegal South African occupation. However, it took another ten years and a series of "parallel accords", before the final obstacles to implementation were overcome in December 1988 through a USA-mediated regional settlement including Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. The United Nations then prepared to launch the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), the largest operation since the Congo a generation ago.

Namibia's transition began tragically last April, with a final flare-up of the long bush war between nationalist guerrillas and South African-controlled forces, when UNTAG had only begun to deploy. However, completion of the prescribed military withdrawals and demobilizations on schedule stabilized the situation. A general amnesty and repeal of apartheid laws were followed by the release of political detainees, the return of 42,000 refugees and exiles, and the registration of some 701,000 voters. UNTAG expanded to 4650 military, 1500 police and 1400 civilians, and played a crucial role in creating conditions for free and fair elections, notably by demanding changes to electoral laws and the disbandment of the Koevoet counterinsurgency force responsible for much police intimidation.

The elections in November, with an impressive 97 per cent turnout, produced a 57 per cent majority for SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization). All parties in the Constituent Assembly demonstrated a strong commitment to reconciliation, making possible the unanimous adoption of a constitution fully in accord with UN principles. The constitution is exemplary in providing for entrenched human rights, an independent judiciary, regular multi-party elections and the absence of preventive detention and the death penalty.

As Namibia approaches independence March 21, its new government under President-elect Sam Nujoma is preparing to take over, while UNTAG is preparing to leave with its mission accomplished on time and within budget. Namibia's experience stands as a persuasive demonstration to South Africans of the feasibility of fundamental change through a peaceful, democratic and negotiated process.

#### Canadian Action

Canada has contributed in all practical ways to Namibia's independence based on the plan it helped to produce:

- Canada advanced 80 per cent of its \$15 million UNTAG assessment before any other country.
- Canada provided over 250 logistics troops for UNTAG from the beginning (rotated after five months), and 100 RCMP officers for the expansion of UNTAG police.
- Canada provided 50 experienced election supervisors for UNTAG, as well as 10 fingerprint experts, two computer experts and some 4000 ballot boxes for the elections.
- Canada had a diplomatic observer mission in Windhoek throughout the process, with six Canadian staff.
- Canada sent four Parliamentary observers, named one member of the Commonwealth observer group and provided financial and other assistance for the travel of NGO observers and the dissemination of their findings.
- Canada was active in the search for solutions through four rounds of intensive Security Council discussions, and also initiated joint lobbying with other countries for the release of Namibian political detainees wherever held.
- Canada furnished \$2 million in aid for refugee repatriation through the UN, provided over \$1 million in development assistance through non-governmental and multilateral channels in 1989/90, and pledged \$2 million through the Commonwealth over 1990 and 1991.

#### CANADIAN ASSISTANCE TO MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE (SADCC)

#### Angola

Canada does not have a formal bilateral aid program with Angola, but approximately \$6.1 million in bilateral assistance was disbursed in FY 1988/89, chiefly in food aid. Another \$7 million has been allocated for food aid to Angola in FY 1989/90, \$4 million of which will be used by the World Food Program in its emergency feeding program and \$3 million will be used by a consortium of Canadian NGOs for emergency food relief to drought victims, mainly in the south. An additional \$50,000 has been allocated to the Canada Fund administered by the Canadian mission in the country to support local initiatives, and \$75,000 is being spent to distribute three million pamphlets on AIDS as part of a government education program.

CIDA provides funds on a matching grant basis to a number of NGOs that implement development and relief projects in Angola. The amount varies from year to year. Through Partnership Africa-Canada (PAC), CIDA's Africa 2000 program is contributing \$583,000 to a large community development program to assist displaced persons in the shanty-towns of Luanda. PAC also has approved a contribution of \$6.8 million over several years for "Program Angola", an integrated rural development and health project being undertaken by a consortium of 18 Canadian NGOs under the umbrella of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC).

In 1988/89 CIDA committed more than \$2 million for emergency relief operations in Angola carried out by such organizations as UNICEF and the League of Red Cross Societies. As a member of SADCC (the Southern African Development Coordination Conference) Angola also benefits from a number of SADCC projects, notably in the energy sector.

#### Botswana

Canadian bilateral development assistance to Botswana is expected to be in the neighborhood of \$25 million over the next five years. Canadian assistance in 1988/89 totalled \$11.88 million, some \$8.11 million of it on bilateral programs chiefly offering technical assistance in the areas of transportation, mining, education and water resources. CIDA contributed about \$280,000 towards NGO projects in Botswana in the same fiscal year.

#### <u>Lesotho</u>

Bilateral aid in recent years has been around \$3 million annually with additional CIDA funding through Canadian NGOs and multilateral agencies. The program focuses on the University of Lesotho, small business development, low-income housing, forestry and a dairy processing project which has substantially encouraged private production. As with some other countries, Lesotho will receive less Canadian aid as a result of the CIDA budget cuts. Spending is approximately \$2 million a year. Lesotho is lobbying vigorously for more aid on the basis of its support for the sanctions against South Africa and the need for infrastructure projects.

#### Malawi

CIDA has undertaken a variety of bilateral projects in human resources, transportation, health and agriculture, and contributed to the work of Canadian NGOs. Bilateral assistance in 1988/89 was \$8.79 million and support for NGOs was \$792,000. Canada also contributed \$3 million worth of food aid and \$1.42 million in humanitarian assistance to help refugees from Mozambique.

#### Mozambique

Development assistance represents Canada's chief activity in Mozambique. Total Canadian aid for 1988/89 was estimated at \$34 million, making it one of the largest recipients in Africa. This included \$8.44 million in bilateral projects and \$20.71 million in food aid. Cooperation Canada Mozambique (COCAMO), a consortium of 20 Canadian NGOs under the auspices of CCIC, is funding a large emergency relief and development project in Mozambique's northern Nampula province.

#### Swaziland

Bilateral aid in recent years has been about \$2 million annually with additional CIDA funding through NGOs and multilateral agencies. The program focuses on rural water supply the University of Swaziland, technical and vocational education and dairy development. Swaziland faces reduced Canadian aid spending as a result of the CIDA budget cuts but is better able than most countries to absorb them as a result of its new-found relative prosperity.

#### <u>Tanzania</u>

Tanzania is one of the largest recipients of Canadian aid in Africa. To date this has exceeded \$445 million, including \$40 million in 1988/89. Major projects have been in the energy, agriculture and transportation (railways) sectors, and balanceof-payments support. Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation (PCIAC) is also active in Tanzania. The CIDA program in Tanzania is one of the nine major programs that have been decentralized to the field.

#### <u>Zambia</u>

Canada has traditionally maintained a substantial bilateral development assistance program in Zambia. Traditional disbursements have been in the order of \$15 to \$18 million. Bilateral aid was initially directed towards Zambia's transportation and training needs, but as the country's economic problems worsened, the emphasis shifted to capital projects and lines of credit designed to ease the difficult balance-ofpayments situation. Following Zambia's 1987 break with the IMF and the World Bank, Canada met existing aid commitments, but did not initiate new projects pending an internationally agreed structural adjustment program. Consequently, bilateral assistance in the current fiscal year declined to about \$7 million, which is less than half the traditional level.

#### Zimbabwe

Canada's development assistance to Zimbabwe dates back to a \$50 million pledge made at the 1981 conference on reconstruction and development (ZIMCORD). Aid disbursements to Zimbabwe from Canada in 1988/89 were \$42.9 million, with direct aid flows under the SADCC program accounting for approximately \$26 million of that. Extensive use is made of lines of credit which ease foreign currency pressures in Zimbabwe, support Canadian private sector activities and generate local funds for further programming. Major activities in rural and human resource development are being executed by Canadian NGOs which received approximately \$2.9 million from CIDA in 1989/90. Plans are well advanced also for a Natural Resources Management Program which will include environmental policy and regulatory assistance.

#####



Affaires extérieures et Commerce extérieur Canada

#### CANADIAN ACTION ON SOUTH AFRICA

July 1985

+

External Affairs and International Trade Canada

7

- The Canadian Government adopted the following measures to demonstrate opposition to apartheid and to pressure the South African Government to bring about fundamental change and enter into genuine negotiations with black leaders towards the establishment of non-racial, representative government:

- strengthened the voluntary "Code of Conduct Concerning the Employment Practices of Canadian Companies Operating in South Africa";
- tightened the Canadian application of the UN Arms Embargo to include sales of sensitive technology to the Government of South Africa and its agencies;
- applied the voluntary UN embargo on imports of South African arms;
  - abrogated the Canada-South Africa Double Taxation Agreement;
    - terminated the use of the Programme for Export Market Development (PEMD) for the South African market;
    - terminated insurance to Canadian exporters to South Africa provided by the Export Development Corporation;
    - issued public guidelines severely limiting sporting contacts between Canada and South Africa;
    - announced the termination of toll-processing of Namibian uranium;
- introduced a voluntary ban on the sale of Krugerrands and other South African gold coins;

Subsequently adopted by the Commonwealth Heads of Government Review Meeting, August, 1986.

Subsequently adopted by the Commonwealth at Nassau, in October 1985.

monitored and severely restricted official contacts, especially in sensitive sectors.

September 1985

+

3

- The Government adopted the following further measures:
- introduced a voluntary ban on new loans to the Government of South Africa and its agencies;
- introduced a voluntary ban on the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa;
- applied an embargo on air transport (cargo and passenger flights) between Canada and South Africa and subsequently banned all air links;
  - established a National Register of Anti-Apartheid Measures to record voluntary actions taken by individual Canadians, private organizations and other levels of government to demonstrate their opposition to apartheid.

September

1985

 The Canadian Government established a special fund of \$1 million to provide support to South African political detainees and their families. In each subsequent year the allocation has grown by \$500,000.

October 1985

- Commonwealth Heads of Government issued the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa at Nassau providing for the specific measures already taken by Canada and establishing the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (EPG) to seek ways of "dismantling apartheid and erecting the structure of democracy in South Africa";
  - Archbishop Edward Scott agreed to participate in the EPG.

February 1986

 A declaration of the Francophone Summit on Southern Africa was presented by Canada and adopted unanimously.

| May<br>1986    | <ul> <li>A \$7 million bilateral education assistance<br/>programme for black South Africans was launched,<br/>with components in both Canada and South Africa.</li> </ul>   |
|----------------|--|
| June<br>1986   | <ul> <li>The Prime Minister asked Bernard Wood, Director<br/>of the North-South Institute, to visit a number<br/>of Commonwealth countries to prepare for the<br/>next Commonwealth meeting;</li> </ul>  |
| June<br>1986   | <ul> <li>In response to the South African Government's<br/>attacks on neighbouring states, which<br/>effectively ended the EPG initiative, the<br/>Canadian Government adopted the following<br/>measures;</li> </ul>  |
|                | <ul> <li>appointed an additional officer at the Canadian<br/>Embassy in South Africa to facilitate<br/>cooperation in the labour sector;</li> </ul>  |
| +              | <ul> <li>ended Canadian Government procurement of all<br/>South African goods and services and invited<br/>provincial governments to follow suit in areas<br/>under their jurisdiction;</li> </ul>   |
| +              | <ul> <li>introduced a ban on the promotion in Canada of<br/>tourism to South Africa;</li> </ul>  |
|                | <ul> <li>cancelled non-resident accreditation to Canada<br/>of the four Washington-based South African<br/>attachés (Science, Labour, Mining and<br/>Agriculture).</li> </ul>  |
| August<br>1986 | Commonwealth Heads of Government held a Review<br>Meeting in London to consider the EPG report.<br>Canada joined with others to ban new investment<br>in South Africa and the import of agricultural<br>products, uranium, coal, iron and steel from<br>South Africa. Canada announced that no<br>government contracts would be entered into with<br>majority-owned South African companies; extended<br>the voluntary ban on a new loans to South Africa<br>to the private as well as the public sector; and<br>withdrew consular facilities in South Africa<br>except for those services provided to our own<br>nationals and nationals of third countries to<br>whom we render consular services. |

- 3 -

33

| January<br>1987   | <ul> <li>The Prime Minister visited Zimbabwe and met with<br/>a number of leaders of the Front Line States at<br/>Victoria Falls.</li> </ul>  |
|-------------------|---|
| April<br>1987     | <ul> <li>The Canadian Government provided more than</li> <li>\$5.8 million during the fiscal year (1987/88) to</li> <li>victims of apartheid in South Africa.</li> </ul>  |
| August<br>1987    | <ul> <li>The Secretary of State for External Affairs<br/>visited Zambia, Mozambique and South Africa.</li> <li>Mr. Clark held talks with Foreign Minister Botha<br/>on South Africa's intentions to initiate<br/>fundamental change and enter into dialogue with<br/>black leaders;</li> </ul>  |
|                   | <ul> <li>The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State<br/>for External Affairs met with Oliver Tambo,<br/>President of the ANC, in Ottawa.</li> </ul>  |
| September<br>1987 | <ul> <li>The Francophone Summit at Quebec issued a<br/>resolution on South Africa. Canada pledged<br/>\$350,000 towards the scholarship fund for South<br/>Africans set up by the Francophonie;</li> </ul>  |
|                   | <ul> <li>As a result of the success of the \$7 million<br/>Canadian education programme to date and the<br/>high demands placed on it by South Africans and<br/>Canadian, an additional \$1.2 million was<br/>approved, including \$500,000 for labour<br/>education.</li> </ul>  |
| October<br>1987   | <ul> <li>At Vancouver, under the chairmanship of Prime<br/>Minister Mulroney, Commonwealth Heads of<br/>Government issued the Okanagan Programme of<br/>Action on Southern Africa which, <u>inter alia</u>,<br/>established the Commonwealth Committee of<br/>Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa for the<br/>purpose of furthering Commonwealth objectives o<br/>combatting apartheid. It is chaired by the<br/>Secretary of State for External Affairs of<br/>Canada;</li> </ul> |

- \$500,000 was provided to the newly created Commonwealth Nassau Fellowship Programme for black South Africans who qualify for university or technical college education but lack the necessary funds.

- 4 -

37

February 1988

- The first meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers (CFM) took place in Lusaka, Zambia. A work programme was approved, including a mission on security needs of the Front Line States, two economic studies related to sanctions, and the development by Canada of a strategy to counter South African censorship and propaganda.

April 1988

- Assistance to victims of apartheid substantially increased during this fiscal year to approximately \$7.8 million.
  - Over \$30 million was committed to the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) for the fiscal year, as well as another \$100 million in bilateral aid to the individual countries of the region to help counter destabilization.
  - Canada tightened its policy on sports contacts by refusing visas to individuals travelling on South African passports and seeking entry into Canada to participate in sports events or activities.

August

1988

July 1988

- The second meeting of the CFM took place in Toronto. The Committee reviewed an interim report on the impact of sanctions, studies on South Africa's international financial links and security requirements of the Front Line States, as well as a Canadian strategy to counter South African propaganda and censorship.
- The Committee put forward practical proposals to widen, tighten and intensify the application of existing sanctions, including in the financial sector.
- The CFM agreed that the proposals in the Canadian strategy to counteract South African propaganda and censorship would be the basis for a practical Commonwealth response to the challenge. Canada committed \$1 million to a Canadian action plan to this end.
- At Toronto, Canada organized an anti-apartheid cultural festival as well as a public forum on censorship and propaganda.

September 1988

- The Government announced the following actions to widen, tighten and intensify the application of Canadian sanctions:
  - tightened the ban on Government contracts with majority South African-owned companies to apply to: grants, contributions and sales; sales to all clients in South Africa, except to serve our objective of reaching into South Africa; and Crown Corporations.
  - the Secretary of State for External Affairs met with representatives of Canadian banks who agreed not to increase trade credits to South Africa and agreed to raise with other foreign bankers directly involved, the Canadian preference for the shortest possible loan rescheduling terms.
  - extended the ban on sales of high technology items on the Export Control List to private sector end-users in South Africa.
- The Government announced it would spend \$1.6 million over two years to promote dialogue among South Africans through grants to organizations. A portion of these funds are committed to projects outlined in the Canadian Action Plan on countering South African propaganda and censorship, since censorship remains a serious impediment to dialogue, and a free press plays a key role in promoting dialogue.
- Dialogue projects funded to date have fallen within five categories: assistance to the alternative press and anti-censorship activities; workshops, conferences and events bringing together South Africans of different races; support for human rights and profession organizations trying to break down the barriers of apartheid; promotion of the idea of a non-racial future through the arts and popular culture; talks between the ANC and white South Africans.

- The Government also announced in September that Canada would provide assistance to help rebuild the bombed-out headquarters of the South African Council of Churches and other human rights groups. Since then the Government has provided \$100,000 to this end.
- The Government announced it had agreed to respond to requests for assistance towards the protection of infrastructure projects in southern Africa, which may include, for example, clothes fuel, spares parts, communications equipment, food and balance of payments support. To date \$2 million have been committed for security assistance on the Nacala railway rehabilitation project and another \$2 million for the Limpopo railway rehabilitation project.

December 1988

The Government announced that it would help implement the UN Plan for Namibian independence in all aspects and would assist in the development of independent Namibia.

January 1989

 The Government provided \$10,000 to the Special Research Bureau in The Hague to help finance its monitoring of the UN oil embargo.

February

- 1989
- The third meeting of the CFM took place in Harare. The Committee agreed that sanctions were having an increasing political and economic impact on South Africa. In the Committee's view, sanctions remained the most effective, peaceful path to the ending of apartheid and thus it renewed the commitment to continued international pressure on the South African Government to end apartheid.
- The Committee, noting that financial sanctions constituted one of the most powerful sources of pressure, reiterated their call to the international financial community to toughen the conditions for rescheduling.
- The Committee gave special consideration to the question of destabilization, receiving a preliminary report commissioned at its request by the Commonwealth Secretariat from independent experts, and agreed to its immediate

release. The Committee also welcomed the draft strategy paper submitted by Canada on trade and investment promotion in the Front Line States.

- The CFM stressed that Namibia was the sole responsibility of the United Nations and that the Commonwealth looked to that body to bring Namibia to independence through free and fair elections under its effective supervision and control.
- The Committee gave particular attention to the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa and, based on proposals submitted by Canada, called for specific measures to be taken by the UN Security Council and the 421 Committee.
- The Government announced that it would provide nearby \$1 million to assist refugees and displaced persons in Southern Africa.
- The Government also announced the contribution of \$1 million for the Namibian Repatriation Program to help Namibian refugees return home in time for the UN supervised pre-independence elections.
- March 1989
- The Canadian Government announced that South Africa would be added to the Area Control List and specified that the control on exports included all high technology products, computers, software, telecommunications equipment, aircraft, helicopters, and four-wheel-drive vehicles. This action was consistent with agreements reached at Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' meetings.
- The Government announced that Canada would participate in the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) created to supervise Namibia's one-year transition to independence. External Affairs had already presented a check for \$11.9 million, in late February, as early payment for the bulk of Canada's assessed share.
- Later in March, the Government announced it would open its own Observer Mission in Namibia, distinct from UNTAG.

- With Government sponsorship, the University of Regina was host to an international conference on South African propaganda and censorship and the risks and challenges it poses to the
- During the 1988-89 fiscal year ending March 31, the Government spent over \$600,000 on projects designed to promote dialogue between all races in South Africa encouraging progress towards a non-racial future. The Government spent another \$1 million for the 1989-90 fiscal year in dialogue-related projects. A portion of these funds was committed to projects outlined in the Canadian Action Plan on countering South African propaganda and censorship.

June 1989

- Canada tightened the ban on sporting contacts with South Africa; the policy was extended to include all sporting contacts between Canadians and South Africans whether they take place in Canada, in South Africa or in a third country. In addition to amateur representative team and individual sports, the revised policy now applies to individual sports persons, including professionals.
- While maintaining the sport boycott, the Canadian Government, with anti-apartheid organizations and like-minded governments, agreed to explore ways of helping to promote dialogue and break down racial barriers within South African sport and, by extension, in South Africa as a whole.
- Elections Canada donated 4,000 metal ballot boxes worth over \$100,000 for the Namibian elections in early November. Also, the UN selected a Canadian, Harry Neufeld, to be its senior electoral computer expert.

August 1989

The fourth meeting of the CFM took place in Canberra. The Committee reaffirmed that financial sanctions applied by the private sector were among the most effective forms of pressure.

domestic and international media.

- They called on international lending institutions to exert the "maximum possible pressure" on South Africe in the rescheduling of its debt. The CFM ministers agreed to dispatch a delegation of senior officials to convey this sentiment to member banks of the committee negotiating the 1990 rescheduling arrangements.
- Ministers noted that South Africa was using trade financing as a balance of payments cushion. They therefore appealed to all financial institutions to impose tougher terms for trade financing, including the reducing of credit to ninety days. They also called on banks to ensure that loans (or profits from) to firms under South African control not be transferred to South Africa.
- The CFM also agreed to communicate with the UN on the need to strengthen the arms embargo.

October

- 1989
- Minister Clark wrote to all major Canadian commercial banks, requesting their cooperation in instituting all of the financial bans agreed to in Canberra. He also requested they convey to their international banking counterparts the decisions of the CFM.

October

1989

 A Canadian official participated in the CFM officials mission to principal European and American banks which urged their compliance with CFM measures.

October 1989

- The Commonwealth Heads of Government met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. They issued the Kuala Lumpur Statement which agreed to a call for the wider international application of all financial measures agreed to in Canberra. It also endorsed the establishment of an independent agency to monitor South Africa's links with the international financial community. Finally, the Commonwealth heads of government determined that upon evidence of "clear and irreversible" change in South Africa, they would consult with international financial institutions to examine how resources could be mobilized to rebuild the South African economy.

# CANADIAN ACTION ON SOUTH AFRICA

August 1989

| TRADE RELATED   | FINANCIAL / INVESTMENT  | SPORTING CONTACTS  | OTHER ACTIONS  |
|---|---|--|--|
| No Canadian government promo-<br>tion of trade with South Africa.   | I — Abrogated Double Taxa-<br>tion Agreement.   | <ol> <li>Canada's policy governs<br/>all sporting contacts be-<br/>tween Canada and</li> </ol>   | I — Provision of assistance to the<br>victims of apartheid in South<br>Africa (\$7.8 million in<br>1988/89). Major areas include:  |
| <ul> <li>II — IMPORTS</li> <li>Mandatory Bans on: <ul> <li>a) all agricultural products</li> <li>b) uranium</li> <li>c) coal</li> <li>d) iron products</li> <li>e) steel products</li> <li>f) arms from South Africa</li> </ul> </li> </ul> | <ul> <li>II — Ban on new corporate investment in South Africa.</li> <li>III — Voluntary ban on new bank loans (both public and private sectors) to South Africa.</li> </ul> | South Africa. This ap-<br>plies to sport contacts<br>between Canadians and<br>South Africans at<br>professional and<br>amateur levels and in<br>individual and team<br>sports no matter where<br>these contacts might<br>occur, i.e. in Canada, in<br>South Africa or in a<br>third country. | Education and skills training for<br>disadvantaged South Africans in<br>their own country or Canada;<br>Legal and humanitarian aid to<br>political detainees and their<br>families; Assistance for small<br>scale community projects in-<br>volving Canadian and local<br>NGOs; Labour education; and<br>Assistance to refugees in<br>neighbouring countries through<br>multilateral agencies. |
| <ul> <li>III — EXPORTS</li> <li>Mandatory Bans on:         <ul> <li>a) all arms and munitions of war</li> </ul> </li> </ul>   | IV — Capped trade credits to<br>South Africa, and re-<br>quested Canadian banks<br>to make loan resched-<br>uling terms as short as   | II — Visas denied to individ-<br>uals travelling on South<br>African passports seek-   | <ul> <li>II — A \$1 million Canadian Action Plan<br/>to Counteract South African<br/>Propaganda and Censorship.</li> <li>III — A \$1.6 million Dialogue Fund to<br/>promote dialogue among South</li> </ul>  |
| <ul> <li>b) all high technology and<br/>other sensitive equipment<br/>such as computers, to any<br/>end-user</li> <li>c) aircraft and aircraft parts</li> <li>d) four-wheel drive vehicles</li> <li>— Voluntary Ban on:</li> </ul>          | V — Established a Code of<br>Conduct for Canadian<br>companies in South<br>Africa.  | <ul> <li>ing to enter Canada to participaté in a sport event or activity.</li> <li>III — Sport associations required to suspend members who participate in</li> </ul>  | Africans about a non-racial<br>future. (A portion of these<br>funds is committed to projects<br>outlined in the Canadian Action<br>Plan since censorship remains<br>a serious impediment to dia-<br>logue, and a free press plays a<br>key role in promoting dialogue.)  |
| <ul> <li>a) petroleum and petroleum products</li> <li>IV OTHER</li> <li>a) voluntary ban on sales of</li> </ul>   |   | sport events in South<br>Africa.<br>IV — Sport associations re-<br>quired to deny invita-<br>tions, to protest or with-  | IV — Provision of security assistance<br>to the Front Line States<br>towards the protection of<br>infrastructure projects (i.e. fuel,<br>clothes, spare parts, communi-<br>cations equipment, food and<br>balances of payments support).<br>(Over \$4 million committed to   |
| Krugerrands<br>b) ban on all air links with<br>South Africa<br>c) discontinued Export Market<br>Development grants for<br>South African market  |   | draw from competitions<br>in third countries involv-<br>ing South African.   | date.)<br>V — A trebling of funding for Canada's<br>global Military Training As-<br>sistance Program between<br>1988 and 1990, a substantial<br>proportion of which will go  |
| d) discontinued insurance to<br>Canadian exporters to<br>South Africa (provided by<br>the Export Development<br>Corporation)  |   | <ul> <li>V — Sport associations re-<br/>quired to pressure their<br/>international federation<br/>to suspend members<br/>who participate in sport<br/>events in South Africa.</li> </ul>   | towards training of military<br>personnel from the Front Line<br>States.<br>VI — Ending the issuance of visitor<br>visas by our Embassy in   |
| <ul> <li>e) voluntary ban on tourism promotion to South Africa</li> <li>f) terminated Canadian government contracts grants, contributions and sales to South African</li> </ul>   |   | VI — Sport associations' com-<br>pliance with Govern-<br>ment policy on sporting   | Pretoria and requiring all South<br>African visitors to Canada to<br>apply in person for a visa<br>outside South Africa.<br>VII — Restrictions on contact<br>between officials of the two  |
| <ul> <li>majority-owned companies</li> <li>g) ended toll-processing of</li> <li>Namibian uranium</li> <li>h) terminated Canadian</li> <li>government procurement of</li> <li>South African goods and</li> </ul>                             |   | contacts tied to Govern-<br>ment funding.  | VIII — Cancellation of non-resident ac-<br>creditation to Canada of South<br>African diplomats (in particular,<br>Science, Labour, Mining and<br>Agriculture attachés).  |
| services (limited exception<br>for CIDA and Canadian Em-<br>bassies activities in<br>Southern Africa.)  |   |  | IX — Maintain an Anti-Apartheid<br>Register for Canadians to<br>publicly demonstrate their op-<br>position to apartheid.   |

# Southern Africa: the Way Ahead the Kuala Lumpur Statement

### South Africa

1. Heads of Government continued to view the system of apartheid in South Africa as a serious challenge to the values and principles of the Commonwealth and reaffirmed that its total eradication remained their shared responsibility and common goal.

2 Heads of Government reviewed the situation in South Africa against the possibility that significant changes in approach on the part of the South African regime, for which the Commonwealth had striven for so long, may yet prove to be within reach. In recent weeks, the regime had accepted a degree of peaceful political activity by the black majority and on the eve of this Meeting had released from prison eight political leaders.

3. However, they noted that the state of emergency remained in force; the ANC, the PAC and many other organisations remained banned; Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners remained incarcerated; many more continued to be detained without trial; and executions in political cases had not stopped. There had also been no action to indicate that the new South African Government was prepared to dismantle the pillars of apartheid, especially the Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act, the Bantustan 'homelands' policy and the system of separate education.

4. Heads of Government agreed that such encouraging signs as there had been were very much the product of a combination of internal and external pressures. In this context they welcomed the role now being played by the Mass Democratic Movement in its sustained, disciplined and peaceful opposition to apartheid. They attached importance to acceptance of peaceful demonstrations and political manifestations as a test of the sincerity of the new Government and its professed desire for change.

5. In considering the way forward, Heads of Government reiterated their preference for a negotiated and peaceful settlement and in this context reaffirmed the continuing validity of the EPG's 'Possible Negotiating Concept'. Among other measures, that Concept calls for

#### On the part of the (South African) Government:

- (a) Removal of the military from the townships, providing for freedom of assembly and discussion and suspension of detention without trial.
- (b) The release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees.

(c) The unbanning of the ANC and PAC and the permitting of normal political activity.

## On the part of the ANC and others:

Entering negotiations and suspending violence.

They noted with satisfaction the strong preference for the path of negotiated and peaceful settlement also inherent in the 1989 Harare Declaration of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Organisation of African Unity on Southern Africa endorsed by the Non-Aligned Movement at its Belgrade Summit last month. It is agreed on all sides that the South African Government and the authentic representatives of the majority population should come to the table prepared to negotiate the future of the country and its people in good faith, in an atmosphere free of violence from either side.

6. Heads of Government had recognised in their Nassau Accord that the constitutional system was a matter for all the people of South Africa to decide. They continued to believe that the Commonwealth's role in this regard was essentially to facilitate the opening of negotiations between the South African authorities and authentic black leaders.

7. They agreed that the only justification for sanctions against South Africa was the pressure they created for fundamental political change. Their purpose was not punitive, but to abolish apartheid by bringing Pretoria to the negotiating table and keeping it there until that change was irreversibly secured. In this respect Heads of Government noted that leading personalities in the South African Government had themselves acknowledged the increasing pressures on the South African economy, and that those pressures would not be diminished until fundamental political change had taken place.

8. Heads of Government, other than Britain, also acknowledged that the impact of sanctions had begun to influence the policies of the South African regime. The effectiveness of sanctions in this regard had also been demonstrated by the Report on Sanctions commissioned by the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa and prepared by a group of independent experts which was before the Meeting. They considered that the Report had made a significant contribution towards public understanding of the issues, and that its recommendations would need to be considered in the light of developments in South Africa and the region.

9. In considering what further steps they might take to advance the prospects for negotiations, Heads of Government expressed the view that this was not the time to consider any relaxation of existing sanctions and pressures. That would have to await evidence of clear and irreversible change. In the meantime, they agreed that all existing sanctions and measures should be maintained, and they called upon the wider international community to do likewise.

10. They also agreed, with the exception of Britain, that such measures should be tightened, and decided in this context

(a) to develop new forms of financial pressure on the Pretoria regime by seeking to intensify and extend financial sanctions, in particular by

6

- calling on all relevant banks and financial institutions to impose tougher conditions on day-to-day trade financing, specifically through reducing the maximum credit terms to 90 days; and
- calling on relevant governments to make trade credits harder to get by taking South Africa "off cover" with official government agencies for official trade credit and insurance purposes,
- and agreed that their Chairman should communicate these decisions to the relevant financial institutions and to other governments; and
- (b)

to support the initiative developed by the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa to strengthen the arms embargo, and continue to pursue it at the United Nations in the 421 Committee.

11. Heads of Government recognised the importance of South Africa's dealings with the international financial community and therefore, with the exception of Britain, endorsed the establishment of an independent agency to review and report on South Africa's international financial links on a regular basis, and to gather and publicise factual information on financial flows to, and policies towards, South Africa. They welcomed the offer of the Government of Australia to provide substantial initial funding.

12. Heads of Government noted that the longer apartheid remained in South Africa, the greater the challenge that would face a future government in rebuilding the South African economy. In particular, they noted that the resumption of international lending to South Africa would not be automatic and that an international effort to assist in the mobilisation of resources would probably be necessary. They agreed to ask appropriate international financial institutions, and in particular the IMF, to examine now how resources might be mobilised upon evidence of clear and irreversible change.

13. Heads of Government welcomed increasing instances of dialogue among South Africans across the racial divide. They were encouraged by the proposals for negotiations, many elements of which reflected Commonwealth concepts, which had been advanced by leaders of the black majority. In this regard, they agreed to continue, individually and collectively, to take advantage of all opportunities to promote dialogue among South Africans.

14. They agreed that the Commonwealth should continue to provide support to the victims and opponents of apartheid within South Africa. Of importance were educational programmes, including in particular the Nassau Fellowships, legal and humanitarian assistance to detainees and their families, support for the trade union movement, and economic and social development programmes including low-cost housing projects.

15. They attached importance to the work of the newly established Commonwealth network of non-governmental organisations, "Skills for South Africa", to provide high-level training and work experience for victims of apartheid and so contribute both to the process of change in South Africa and the development of the skills required in a post-apartheid society. They undertook to provide support and resources to assist in the implementation and co-ordination of this work.

7

16. Heads of Government reaffirmed the continuing high priority of the Commonwealth effort to expose the truth about apartheid and to counter South African propaganda and censorship. They welcomed the Commonwealth strategy prepared by the Working Party set up as part of the Okanagan Programme of Action. They noted that a number of countries had already implemented and funded national action plans. They stressed the particular importance of the support being given to the embatuled alternative press and other groups in South Africa resisting censorship.

### Namibia

17. Heads of Government welcomed the implementing of Resolution 435, and looked forward to the holding of free and fair elections leading to the emergence of a genuinely independent Namibia. They reaffirmed their full support for the United Nations Secretary-General, and the UN's efforts to ensure the integrity of the Settlement Plan. Heads of Government looked forward to welcoming a free Namibia into the Commonwealth.

18. They noted that the Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group on Namibia had identified a number of areas of urgent need if an independent Government emerging from the Resolution 435 process was to be able to govern effectively. They accordingly called for the provision of a special and enlarged multilateral package of assistance in addition to bilateral aid. To this end they requested the Commonwealth Sccretary- General to send a small team of experts to Namibia as soon as practicable after the elections to advise on possible Commonwealth assistance.

19. Heads of Government also noted that the Report drew attention to what the Group had viewed as moves by the South African Government to retain a continuing ability to destabilise an independent Namibia, and they were of the view that any steps taken by South Africa to this end would inevitably callinto question its declarations of good faith in respect of these and other matters, and particularly its expressed desire now to seek peaceful co-existence with its neighbours.

20. Heads of Government called on all the parties to the Resolution 435 Settlement Plan and all political groups within Namibia to fully meet their respective responsibilities and obligations, including full co-operation with the UN authorities, to conclude the process of bringing into being a free, independent and stable Namibia.

21. Heads of Government expressed their concern that a post-independence Namibia be able fully to realise its economic potential and contribute to the development of the larger Southern Africa region. In this respect, they expressed the hope that the early re-integration of Walvis Bay into Namibia in accordance with Security Council Resolution 432 (1978) would be able to be achieved, noting that compliance with this by South Africa would be a convincing demonstration of its good faith and commitment to the long-term viability of its newly independent neighbour.

#### Other Developments in the Southern African Region

22.

Heads of Government noted that notwithstanding international condemnation. South

Africa's campaign of destabilisation against its neighbours had resulted in untold misery and destruction and was graphically documented in The Destabilisation Report.

23. Despite some welcome improvement in the security situation in the south-west of the African continent. Heads of Government observed that the MNR's murderous activities continued on a major scale in Mozambique and elsewhere; and destabilisation remained a major factor in the region's security crisis. Heads of Government unreservedly condemned South Africa's support for the MNR and other acts of destabilisation. Heads of Government reiterated the view, however, that only the eradication of apartheid in South Africa would enable the region to develop in peace.

24. Special efforts were needed to strengthen and develop the economies of Southern Africa so as to relieve them of South African economic domination. Heads of Government considered that the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), deserved particular support and encouragement. To that end, they mandated the Secretary-General to carry out an Action Plan in consultation with SADCC, the AFRICA Fund, the Preferential Trade Area and the interested states in the region and elsewhere, to promote trade and investment in the Front-Line and neighbouring states. In the provision of assistance to SADCC countries, efforts should also be made, where possible, to purchase capital goods and services from within the region thus stimulating regional production, employment, trade and transportation.

25. Heads of Government identified a continuing need for assistance to the Front-Line States. While there had been significant contributions in this area by a number of Commonwealth and other governments, much remained to be done to meet the security needs identified in the special report by General Olusegun Obasanjo, commissioned by the Vancouver Meeting.

26. Heads of Government welcomed the successful establishment of the Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique, which had augmented bilateral contributions from Commonwealth countries including those of the Front-Line States. Heads of Government recognised the importance of continuing contributions to the Fund in view of Mozambique's key geographical position and its role in Southern Africa.

#### **Continuing Review**

27. With the exception of Britain, Heads of Government commended the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers established by the Okanagan Statement for its reports, and agreed that it should continue with its work, under the chairmanship of the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs; that the Foreign Minister of Malaysia be added to its members; and that it report again when Heads of Government next meet. They expressed the wish that it reconvene in April, some six months after the new administration in Pretoria took office.

> Putra World Trade Centre, Kuala Lumpur 22 October 1989



# DOCS

CA1 EA 90C41 ENG Clark announces meeting with Nelsc Mandela and leaders of the front line states in Lusaka and visit to Namibia. --43255720

