





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


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THE  
INTEREST OF GREAT-BRITAIN

WITH REGARD TO HER  
AMERICAN COLONIES,  
CONSIDERED.

TO WHICH IS ADDED  
AN APPENDIX,  
CONTAINING THE OUTLINES OF A PLAN FOR A  
GENERAL PACIFICATION.

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By JAMES ANDERSON, M.A.

AUTHOR OF OBSERVATIONS ON THE MEANS OF EXCITING  
A SPIRIT OF NATIONAL INDUSTRY, &c.

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L O N D O N:  
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## ADVERTISEMENT.

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**T**HE Author of the following Pages living in a remote Corner of the Country, wrote under the Difadvantage of not having ready Access to Books. On this Account he had not an Opportunity of obtaining a GREAT VARIETY of corroborative facts, nor of drawing those he has employed on all Occasions from the Originals; on some Occasions he has even been obliged to depend upon Memory only: He cannot, therefore, be  
answer-

answerable for their **PRECISE** Accuracy; unless where the Authorities are quoted. About this Matter he was the less solicitous, because his Conclusions are, for the most part, deducible from the **GENERAL TENOR** of the Circumstances, rather than from the precise Amount of the Particulars.

The same Circumstance that prevented him from having Access to Books, kept him at a Distance from Men. — He thought for himself, and wrote what his own Judgement dictated, without having it in his Power, had he been so inclined, to know whether what he has said will be agreeable or disagreeable to the Favourers of one Party or of the other.

The

The Prosperity of his Country was the chief Object of his Concern, and he would be happy to see the Members of every Party exerting themselves, as he has done, to the utmost of their Power to promote its Welfare.

DEC. 9, 1781.



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THE  
I N T E R E S T  
O F  
G R E A T B R I T A I N , &c.

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I N T R O D U C T I O N .

**I**T has appeared to me not a little extraordinary, that among the many treatises which have been written of late, in consequence of the disputes between Great Britain and her colonies, no attempt should have been made to ascertain with some degree of precision wherein consist the advantages that have accrued to the mother country, or the disadvantages that may be expected to be felt by her in consequence of her connection with the American colonies. I have waited long in the hope of seeing this investigation attempted by some person of abilities superior to mine—but in vain. I have, therefore,

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at last, been induced to offer my own sentiments on that head to the public. The subject is interesting; and the present time seems to be peculiarly proper for such an investigation. The minds of my countrymen, after having been violently agitated by the disputes originating from the present contest, have had time to acquire a comparative degree of tranquillity, which will permit them to attend to such a discussion with more temper than they could have done at any former period. The time seems also to approach when one or other of the contending parties will be obliged to listen to terms of accommodation: and in case of such an event it is certainly of much importance that we should be able to judge with precision of those circumstances relating to our colonies, that will tend most effectually to promote the interests of the state, and establish peace on a firm and lasting foundation.

In entering upon this discussion, I find it necessary to make some previous remarks on the different meanings which have been annexed to the word *colonies* in antient and in modern times. The language of man is imperfect. By the progress of society and the advancement of knowledge, every thing that relates to manners and government is perpetually changing; but as this change is gradual and imperceptible, language

does

does not keep pace with it. Names remain; while the things denoted by them are found to be at different periods extremely diversified, which is the source of much misapprehension in subsequent ages both as to facts and reasoning. This has been remarkably observable of late with regard to the word *colonies*. Precedents have been searched for in antient times, and, because of a similarity of name where no similarity of circumstances existed, inferences have been drawn that were extremely erroneous. Whether this proceeded from ignorance or design it boots not to enquire, but it is of importance to guard against similar mistakes in future. It is therefore hoped that the following slight historical sketches will not be deemed superfluous.

## C H A P. I.

*On the different meanings that have been annexed to the word COLONIES in antient and in modern times.*

**I**N the earliest period of time, the history of which has been transmitted to us, the word *colony* denoted a state whose original inhabitants had migrated in a body from some other known state. It retained not any dependence on the parent state; nor did there subsist any other bond of union between them than those friendly wishes which naturally sprang from the recollection of their former consanguinity. Like a swarm of bees those emigrants, having chosen a leader in whom they placed confidence, bid at once an eternal adieu to the place of their nativity. They looked for no assistance from home in their intended expedition, but depending on their own vigour and address for obtaining a place of residence, they regulated their government and internal police according to the plan that appeared most agreeable to themselves, and thus became, as soon as they were settled, in every respect a free and independent state. In this manner was Carthage a colony of Tyre, and Syracuse a colony of Corinth; and in this manner

in manner the Greek states in Asia Minor, Magna Grecia, and the islands of the Archipelago, though from the first free and independent; were universally allowed to be colonies which had, at different times, migrated from some one or other of the more antient Grecian states.

When Xerxes threatened to overpower Greece, the common danger induced the greatest part of those states to enter into a league for their mutual defence. On that occasion the members of the confederacy were arranged into two classes, *allies* and *colonies*. Under the title of *allies* were classed all those antient Grecian states whose origin was involved in obscurity. The class of *colonies* comprehended those which were *known* to have originated from some other state. The members, however, of both these classes were equally independent. Syracuse, though a colony, refused to enter into the confederacy, because she was not allowed to command either by sea or by land.

During that famous contest, the Spartans and Athenians early obtained a decided pre-eminence above all the other members of the confederacy. Athens, by the mildness of her manners, conciliated the good will of the whole, and on account of the inflexible integrity of Aristides, she was allowed to ascertain the proportional supplies

plies to be furnished by each of the confederates. The armies and the fleets coming at length to be also under the command of her generals, she became in time so powerful as to over-awe both *colonies* and *allies*. Contributions, at first voluntarily granted, were continued and augmented under various pretexts, till at last many of the *colonies* from having been voluntary allies in defence of Athens (which was threatened with immediate destruction) became tributaries and subjects to that ambitious state.

Thus by degrees the word *colony* became nearly synonymous with *subject*; and modern readers by bearing in mind the idea conveyed by the word *colony* at present, are naturally enough disposed, from certain concurring circumstances, to think it bore the same meaning at all times. To such readers the decrees of Athens relating to the colonies, appear to be the natural legislative acts of a parent state over her own colonies; which *as colonies*, originally established and supported by herself, had always been subjected to her sway. This, however, was far from being the case; those colonies were merely subjects. States which from being totally independent and unconnected with her, had been by fraud or force brought under her dominion, and retained in subjection by the same means. Their bearing the name of colonies was, *as to her*, merely an accidental

accidental circumstance. This appears to have been incontestibly the case in regard to the noted decree of the Athenians against the inhabitants of Lesbos. The Lesbians having endeavoured to free themselves from the usurped authority of Athens, were again overcome by their more powerful opponent. On this occasion the enraged Athenians decreed, that all the male inhabitants of Lesbos who had attained the age of puberty, should suffer death; and the women and children be sold for slaves\*. Lesbos was one of those states that ranked as a *colony*, but it was a colony of Æolis, not of Athens. It was not therefore because of her dependance on Athens *as a colony*, that she was punished by this severe decree. It was merely because of her inferiority as a subjected state †.

Rome, originally a colony of Alba, considered herself from the beginning as a free and independent state. But in process of time she adopted a mode of colonization, very different from those we have hitherto had occasion to observe.

Every

\* Thucyd. Lib. 3. Cap. 49.

† I have been obliged to represent this transaction in a very different light from that in which the ingenious author of the history of the colonization of the free states of antiquity has placed it, p. 55—58.

Every institution of that ambitious republic seems to have been made with a view to conquest. This was, at least, peculiarly the case in regard to those settlements upon which she bestowed the name of colonies. When she was suspicious of the designs of any conquered state, and afraid of a revolt, she took from it some fertile district of greater or smaller extent, as circumstances seemed to require, which she peopled with a sufficient number of Roman citizens, after having expelled the original inhabitants to make room for them. These Roman citizens were put under the government of a man of authority, in whose approved fidelity the state could safely confide. To these small communities, thus established, she gave the name of *colonies*. Every Roman citizen, it is well known, was a soldier. A Roman colony therefore, might be considered as equivalent to a fortress garrisoned by Roman soldiers, who received in lieu of pay, a certain proportion of land belonging to the conquered state.

To insure the attachment of these colonists, they were treated with the greatest mildness; and to keep up a perpetual distinction between them and the inhabitants of the provinces in which they were placed, a form of government was granted to them as nearly resembling that of Rome itself, as their situation and circumstances

stances would admit. Thus, each colony formed a distinct community by itself, different in laws, customs and manners from the subject-ed states around them. They were, therefore, in little danger of being drawn into a revolt by the same causes that would influence the natives of the country. They became, on the contrary, perpetual spies upon their conduct, and were always ready to suppress, or to give warning in time, of the smallest tendency towards a revolt.

Such were the principles of Roman colonization during the virtuous days of that republic. But when corruption became general among her people, and her nobles, by that means, aspired at dominion, the lands of her most virtuous citizens were seized, and the inhabitants driven away to make room for those rapacious soldiers, by whose assistance their ambitious leader had acquired supreme command. These last were called *military* colonies, to distinguish them from the former. As this class of colonies was composed of men whom the successful leader was induced to favour, on account of the obligations he himself had received from them, they were indulged in many excesses that were incompatible with good government. And as each successful competitor for power found himself obliged to make new settlements of the same sort, the country came at last to be almost entirely



tirely occupied by these military colonies, whose licentiousness was one of the principal causes of those perpetual civil dissensions, which ended not but with the total ruin of the empire.

With the Roman empire the very name of colonies seems to have disappeared for a time in Europe. Those barbarous tribes which burst forth from the northern regions, and seized successively the different provinces of that mighty empire, would, all of them according to the anti-ent and original meaning of the word, have been accounted colonies of those original states from which they migrated : but they never bore that name. They either retained their original name, or acquired that which their appearance\*, or the situation of the region from whence they issued† first suggested to the conquered nations. The same practice prevailed during the whole of that dark period, which has obtained the appellation of *the middle ages*. But, by whatever name they were called, the kingdoms then formed were free, and altogether independent of those states from whence their original founders migrated. The Normans in France, and Saxons in England bore sovereign sway without the intervention of the parent states. Even the Danes, who afterwards acquired the supreme power in Britain, estab-

lished

\* Longobardi.

† Normans.

lished in it an independent kingdom, which was in no respect subjected to the controul of Denmark, though both kingdoms were for some time governed by the same King. At an after period, when the phrenzy of the Crusades drove such multitudes from Europe to seize upon a barren spot in Asia, it never came into the mind of any one to entitle that a European colony. It obtained the name of the *kingdom of Jerusalem*.

Thus it happened, that during a period in which more numerous, as well as more powerful colonies were formed than perhaps had ever been known among mankind, the name was scarce any where to be found on the globe; whereas in the annals of Rome this name most frequently occurs, though during that time scarce any colonies were formed, either according to the antient or the modern idea annexed to that word.

But although the name of colonies seldom occurred during those ages of ignorance and barbarism, which succeeded the dismemberment of the Roman empire, yet it was during those dark ages that ideas began to be adopted which gave rise to a new class of colonies, that are more extensive, at least, than any that were known by that name in antient times, and which bid fair  
C 2 for.

for producing a chain of political events equally numerous and important.

The little learning that there was in those barbarous ages was entirely confined to the clergy, which gave to that class of men a superiority above all others, that they did not fail to improve to their own advantage. The Bishop of Rome having fallen upon means to persuade all Europe that he was entrusted with the keys of Heaven, found little difficulty to do on earth whatever seemed good in his eyes. He soon perceived that the degree of his authority, not less than the extent of his power, depended upon the number of his adherents. These, he knew, would be most effectually secured to his interest, by making them feel the temporal benefits they could reap in consequence of their attachment to him. He therefore took care to let it be universally known, that all who refused to submit to his decrees, were not only to be excluded from the kingdom of Heaven, but had no just claim to the enjoyment of any of the good things of this earth, and that these might lawfully be taken from them by his followers, wherever they were found. He even went farther, and taught that it was not only *lawful* to despoil such persons of their property, but that it was a service acceptable in the eyes of God Almighty, to cut them off from the face of the earth. The

crusades

crusades to the Holy land, and those undertakers against the harmless Albigenses, show how universally these ideas at one time prevailed in Europe. So universally indeed, that they came at last insensibly to influence that general system of politics, which, from its supposed universality, has obtained the name of *the law of nations*.

It was in consequence of this idea, that Ferdinand and Isabella, when they determined to send out Columbus on a voyage of discovery, solicited and obtained from the Pope a grant to them and their heirs for ever, of the sovereignty of all the countries he should discover. The original inhabitants, if there should be any, it was known were not of the Catholic faith, and, of course, they were considered as mere animals, which might either be put to death or reduced to slavery, as should best suit the views of their new sovereign or his substitutes. The same idea prevailed in regard to all the subsequent voyages of discovery that were made by the other powers of Europe: and it is under the sanction of this imaginary title, that all the colonies of the new world have been made. This has occasioned a very material difference between the modern ideas of colonization and those which prevailed among the ancients.

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The only motives which could tempt the ancients to make voyages of discovery, were either the desire of extending their commerce, or a desire to obtain abroad a settlement for such individuals as found their situation at home intolerably irksome. In the first case, the merchants expected to meet with peopled countries, with the natives of which they proposed to treat on terms of equality for their mutual conveniency. In the last case, the emigrants hoped to meet with countries either deserted, or so thinly peopled, as to enable them to obtain, by force or treaty, such a territory to themselves as should suffice for their subsistence. In either case the parent state claimed no right of sovereignty over the new discovered country. If the emigrants obtained a settlement, it was for themselves alone that they obtained it. Nor could the state, whose protection they had renounced, and which held itself for ever freed from any obligation to defend them, lay any claim to whatever they might afterwards acquire.

But in modern times (I speak of the times in which the American discoveries were made) in consequence of its having been in general understood that the sovereignty of all new discovered countries belonged of right to that nation whose subjects first took formal possession of them, every settlement that was made was considered as a  
part

part of the dominions of that country, whose subjects had made that settlement. Hence it is, that all the present European inhabitants of America hold what they there possess by a grant from the sovereign, in whose territories (according to the explanation of the word as above) they are settled; and as subjects lay claim to the support and protection of the parent state, as it is now called, against all enemies in every dangerous emergency. These principles are so universally acknowledged, and so invariably confirmed by all public acts relating to the colonies, that it would be an undertaking as idle to set about demonstrating them, as it would be vain to attempt disproving them.

The court of Spain, in the hope of deriving some unforeseen advantages from those unknown countries which Columbus promised to reveal, fitted out that armament he commanded, and gave him a commission to exercise authority in their name, in whatever country he should discover. Similar powers were given to those who succeeded him in the same employment. Those who first went out, had no views of forming colonies; they went not in the character of emigrants, but of discoverers, who were entitled to seize what came within their reach as conquerors. The hope of the rapid gain that might be obtained by plunder, induced many to follow the  
track

track of the first discoverers. They were disappointed at first, and instead of riches found only misery and want. Unable to return to their native country, despair added vigour to their undertakings. Cortes, assisted by men in these circumstances, seized a lucky moment, and got possession of the treasures of Mexico. The prospect of profiting by the riches of that country, induced the Court of Spain to support him in his successful invasion. Having stipulated for her own share of the plunder, other adventurers were excited to make further exertions. They were successful beyond her most sanguine hopes. Riches poured in upon Spain with a profusion that far exceeded her highest expectations, and gave to that court a brilliancy and splendor that had never before been seen in Europe. In these circumstances, it was not *apparently* her interest to restrain her people from going to those regions in which their activity so powerfully contributed towards the aggrandizement of the court. Distant consequences were not then foreseen; while she seemed to be growing in greatness, it was not perceived that her strength was gradually declining, in consequence of the numerous outlets that were thus made for carrying off her best and most industrious inhabitants.

While the court of Spain enjoyed the temporary splendor she derived from the plunder of  
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the new world, the neighbouring nations not only beheld her with terror, but with envy. Every European state wished anxiously to get some share of those distant territories, from which treasures were obtained in such abundance. Among the princes of those times none seems to have been more powerfully influenced by these passions than James the First of England, who through bad œconomy, was ever in want, and who, fond of arbitrary power, could ill put up with the parsimonious restraints his subjects so often put upon him. He, therefore, lent a willing ear to every proposal that opened the smallest prospect of giving him any part of those golden regions which he doubted not would soon enable him to reign with glory, independent of that officious parliament which so often thwarted his wishes. Nor were individuals wanting to second these views of the needy monarch. Sir Walter Raleigh, at once the boast and the opprobrium of the age in which he lived, by specious falsehoods took advantage of the popularity he enjoyed to poison the minds of the people, and to buoy up the prince in his favourite hopes. Raleigh failed, but still the idea prevailed that what he attempted in vain might yet be obtained by pursuing another plan. A company of merchants, with an ill advised temerity, undertook the task. The King, as might be expected, gave them all the encouragement in his power ;

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in imitation of the King of Spain reserving to himself a share of those treasures they all expected to obtain, he granted them whatever other privileges they desired. The adventurers effected a landing in America; but instead of those mountains of gold they looked for, they only found poverty and wretchedness; and soon fell a sacrifice to their own rapacity, improvidence, and brutality.

Various were the plans, and many were the attempts to effect this favourite project, before a permanent footing could be obtained upon the American continent: but nothing could extinguish the sanguine hopes of the Prince, or the eager cupidity of his subjects. A feeble settlement was at length effected, at an immense expence to the company, and with a deplorable waste of the human species, from which no adequate returns to the partners could ever be drawn. They were at last obliged to relinquish their hopes, and give up their property in an adventure which had been fraught with endless trouble and accumulated expences.

It is the nature of the human mind, that when it has once been accustomed to proceed in a certain track, it cannot easily be diverted from it. For more than a century the nation had been accustomed to look upon America as a paradise.

radise. Individuals indeed had experienced that this was a mistake, but the national prejudice still leaned to that side. New adventurers were found who wished to explore those regions.— Among these a sect of fanatics seem to have been the first who formed the idea of establishing a colony, with an intention of remaining for ever in that country. Persecuted at home by bigots, a number of persons still more bigoted, if possible, to their own chimerical tenets, than those they left behind them, under the sanction of that government which never could relinquish the idea of the treasures that would there be found, took possession of a part of that country which had so long excited the cupidity of Europe. The troubles that ensued in Britain, tended still more to people those newly settled regions with sectarists of different persuasions: nor was it till after the civil wars that either the King or the people had time to attend particularly to those distant settlements; the prosperity of which all parties wished to promote, from a certain preconceived opinion that they would prove in some way or other extremely beneficial to the parent state; although they could not at that time form a distinct idea of the manner in which those beneficial effects were to be produced.

Thus, from accident rather than from preconcerted design, was formed a species of colonies,

altogether different from any that had ever been known in Europe. Emigrants, instead of going out in a powerful body with a resolution to seek a settlement for themselves, and to retain no farther connection with the mother country, went out in small parties from that part of the King's dominions in which they had been born, to occupy what was deemed another part of the same King's dominions, under such conditions as government thought proper to grant them. These new settlements, although they in some respects resembled a Roman colony, were in other respects extremely different from it. A Roman province resembled in every respect a conquered state in modern times; its original inhabitants were still allowed to possess their native country, under such restrictions as the conquering state thought proper to impose. It was to secure the advantages arising from the inhabitants of those provinces, and to compel them to pay such tribute and services as were exacted from them, that the colonies were established. They therefore, as has been said, served the same purpose as a fortress in a conquered province at present. But an American colony resembles a Roman province only in point of situation; no advantage is proposed to be drawn from the natives of the country; the whole province is to be peopled by the original inhabitants of the state itself, which finds, or thinks it finds that it contributes

tributes more to its own prosperity, that a part of its inhabitants should be placed in that particular province, than that they should remain in any other part of its original possessions.

It was necessary to trace the origin of these colonies thus minutely, not only because it tends to place in a conspicuous point of view the difference between antient colonies and those which form the subject of our present discussion, but also to trace the gradual steps by which mankind were led to adopt a mode of colonization, so different in many respects from all others that have made their appearance on the globe. From the foregoing detail it is sufficiently obvious, that none of the parties who originally contributed to the forming these establishments, had an adequate idea of the distant effects that these changes were to produce on the affairs of Europe. Leaving that to be ascertained by others, all parties have been content with acting merely from the impulse of the present moment: nor does it appear, that their successors have ever yet taken the trouble to investigate the subject with the attention its great importance seems to demand. This I shall attempt to do in the following pages, after having taken a cursory view of some other European settlements which have also been called colonies; though differing from those on the American continent in several respects.

spects. The reader will thus be enabled to have under his eye at once all the different meanings, antient as well as modern, that have been annexed to the word *colonies*, and be enabled to distinguish in what cases any of the arguments that shall be employed may or may not apply to the other settlements that are known by the same name.

When the Portuguese began their voyages of discovery, they sent out feeble squadrons, with no other view than to explore the unknown coasts of Africa, and to establish a friendly commercial intercourse with the natives. Success induced them to extend their enterprizes, and they found it necessary to establish a few posts along the coast, where their factors could remain in safety during the absence of their ships. After they had doubled the Cape of Good Hope, and got access to the Indian seas, they found numerous nations, abounding in people, and considerably advanced in arts and civilization. With these they wished to establish a friendly correspondence; but being thwarted in their attempts, they, partly by intrigue, and partly by force, obtained possession of some sea-port towns, which they fortified for their own security. And although they afterwards took an active concern in the disputes between the Indian princes, as it seemed to promote their interest, yet their views were chiefly

chiefly confined to mercantile advantages; and they never grasped at territorial dominion farther than seemed necessary to secure their commerce. The Dutch, and the English, who gradually expelled the Portuguese and the Spaniards from those regions, pursued the same general plan of conduct. They endeavoured to bring the Indian princes under subjection, that they might obtain an exclusive right to their whole commerce: but there is no instance of their having attempted to make settlements with a view to cultivate the ground by their own people. The possessions, therefore, of the Dutch and of the English in the East Indies, are extremely unlike to those on the American continent; and if at any time they have acquired the name of *colonies*, they must be considered in a very different light from those already mentioned, and upon a proper investigation it would be found, that they are productive of political consequences to the states to which they belong, very different from those which have ensued from the establishment of the American colonies. But this is not within the limits of our present investigation.

The European settlements in the West India islands affords an example of another species of colonies, in several respects differing from either of those already mentioned. These islands fitted  
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by nature for producing several valuable articles which European climates cannot bring to perfection, have become the property of wealthy men, who reside chiefly in Europe. These proprietors cultivate their fields, neither by the natives of the country, as in the East-Indies, nor by European emigrants, as in North America, but by negro slaves, purchased with their money instead of cattle. The whole produce of these islands, therefore, after deducting the expence of management, belongs to the inhabitants of the state to which the settlement appertains. The political consequences which result from this arrangement also I do not attempt here to ascertain.

I now proceed to the investigation of the subject proposed.

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## C H A P. II.

*General Observations on the Consequences that result from extended Dominion.*

**I**T is universally admitted, that the real strength of a kingdom consists in the *number* of its inhabitants, and that its riches will be in proportion to the industry of its people.

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But this proposition admits of limitation: for, it is also admitted, that of two countries which contain an equal number of inhabitants, that whose territory is least extensive, will be the most powerful. This arises not only from the greater difficulty of defending a large territory than one of smaller extent, but also from several other causes, which, though equally important, are not at first sight so obvious.

Industry can never be carried to any considerable height, but in civilized countries. In a state of nature, every one is so much engaged in providing for his personal safety, that he has no leisure to attend to other objects; and his tenure of the things he possesses is at best so precarious, that he can have no sort of *stimulus* to induce him to become industrious. He subsists on the casual pittance that nature throws in his way; for as he has no power to secure to himself accumulated stores, he never thinks of extending his views far beyond the wants of the present moment.

But as man could not subsist in many parts of this globe without some precaution and fore-cast, he has been impelled by necessity to unite with others into society, for their mutual protection and well being. In every civil society a certain proportion of men must be invested with

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power, not only to punish such individuals as attempt to disturb the internal peace of the community, but also to guard against the attacks of others from without; to repel force by force, if need be, so as to secure the general tranquillity, and allow individuals to prosecute at leisure their particular employments, and to enjoy undisturbed the fruits of their own industry.

These blessings, however, cannot be obtained without subjecting individuals to some inconveniencies. Those who are entrusted with the care of preserving the public tranquillity, in other words, the ruling powers, must be liberally paid for their labour and care. The different persons who are required for enforcing the laws, and administering justice *within* the realm, as well as those who are necessary to defend it from *external* injuries, must all be paid by those who reap the benefits of protection and security. This constitutes a tax upon the subject, which will be more or less oppressive in proportion to its amount, the manner in which it is raised, and the ability of the people to pay it.

In a country of great extent, where the inhabitants are few, the *quantum* of this tax, in proportion to the number of inhabitants, must of necessity be much greater than in another country, where the same number of people are contained

tained in smaller room; where the people are numerous, a small inimical force could not produce any sensible inconvenience. Many men could in that case be suddenly collected, who would be able to repel such hostile attacks; a few forts could secure their frontiers, or a small number of troops could be so stationed, as to be ready to oppose any invaders. But many more garrisons, or troops much more numerous, will be required to secure the inhabitants of a wide extended country from danger and from insult.

The same reasoning applies in respect to the internal police of the country. The difficulty of obtaining prompt justice against every transgressor must, for obvious reasons, be much greater in those countries where the people are thinly scattered, than where they are more numerous, and therefore, the expence, if equal security is obtained, must be in proportion great upon the poor country; so I shall for brevity, stile, in future, that country which is most thinly peopled.

In consequence of these difficulties, others arise which tend still more and more to aggravate the distresses of the *poor* country.

The money which is required for supporting the civil and the military establishment, must be raised by some mode or other from the people,

and whatever mode shall be adopted, it will be found that the expence must be much higher in the poor than in the richer country. If this tax shall be either by excise or customs, so many persons become necessary to collect it in the poor country, that a great part of the money so collected, can never find its way into the treasury. Sometimes the whole that is collected, does not serve to pay the salary of the tax gatherers; whereas in a rich country, the proportion of the tax that is necessary to pay the collectors is very small\*. Much more money, therefore, must be paid

\* The expence of collecting the excise in *England*, is about six per cent. of the gross produce. The expence of collecting the excise in *Scotland* is about 31 per cent. of the gross produce. This difference is owing to *Scotland's* being upon the whole less populous than *England*. But if we consider, that in *England* the counties of *Derby*, *Northumberland*, *Cumberland*, *Cornwall*, and the whole principality of *Wales*, are nearly as thinly inhabited as most parts of *Scotland*, and therefore must tend to increase the proportional expence of collecting upon the whole, and if we at the same time consider, that in *Edinburgh*, *Glasgow*, *Aberdeen*, *Dundee*, and many other places in *Scotland*, the expence of collecting the excise must be as low as in any part of *England*; which must tend to diminish the proportional expence of collection upon the whole in that country; it is probable, that the rate of collection in the most populous parts of *Britain*, might be fixed at one and a half, or two per cent. and in the least populous at 80, 90, or 100 per cent. I myself know several country districts which I have been assured, from the most undoubted authority, never produced enough to pay the officers salary.

paid by the inhabitants of a poor than of a rich country, before an equal sum can be brought into the exchequer. But we have already seen, that a great deal more must be paid into the exchequer by the inhabitants of a poor country than a rich one, before they can obtain equal security; they must therefore be doubly oppressed. Thus it appears, that a thinly peopled country must not only be weaker, but the inhabitants must also be much more severely taxed than those of a smaller country, inhabited by an equal number of people: nor do their difficulties end here; other inconveniencies still attend them.

In a well peopled country, the labourer and manufacturer are necessarily so near to each other, that they can, with the utmost facility, make a mutual interchange of the products of their industry; the labourer giving of the product of his fields for the manufactures he stands in need of. In this case there is the least possible waste of labour, and therefore in this situation, both the produce of the fields and manufactures can be afforded at the lowest rate possible. If the goods in these circumstances be consigned to retailers, the case will not be altered, as the labourers and manufacturers will thus save more in time than will be sufficient to pay for the retailer's profit.

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But if the country be thinly peopled, all kinds of grain and manufactures must be carried from a considerable distance to market. Both buyers and sellers are subjected to many inconveniencies, and much loss of labour and time, because of the distance they must go for the various articles they need; and even at best can meet with but a poor assortment, and sales being slow and precarious, the retailer's profit must be proportionally high. This situation gives birth to a third employment, that of carriers, which, tho' necessary in these circumstances, is totally unproductive, because the whole gains they make must be added to the price of the several articles they transport, without adding to their value.

The poor country is still liable to new inconveniencies. Carriers must have roads; if these are bad, the charge of carriage is much augmented. But it requires much greater exertions to make good roads in a thinly peopled country, than in one where the inhabitants are numerous.

I might continue this parallel much farther, and shew that in every particular the advantage is greatly in favour of the peopled country; but that might be tiresome. Let it suffice here to observe in general, that in every state there are only two classes of people whose business is really productive, viz. the labourer and manufacturer,

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or artisan : that all other classes of people, under whatever denomination they appear, are unproductive, and therefore burthenfome to the state\*. The less numerous, therefore, this last class of citizens is in any state, the more vigorous will it be in proportion to the number of people it contains. But in a thinly peopled country, almost every denomination of this class of citizens must be necessarily more numerous than where people abound. In these circumstances, a greater number of places are necessary for regulating the affairs of government and police. More numerous judges, lawyers, with their dependents of inferior note, are required; more powerful armies and navies must be maintained. The officers for collecting the revenue must be multiplied almost in a geometrical proportion; and the class of carriers, &c. will be augmented nearly in the same degree. All which tends not less to diminish the number of the useful and productive class of citizens, than to clog their industry and abate their vigour.

These are a few of the numerous causes which have induced political writers to admit, that of  
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\* Were it necessary, it might be shewn, that some of those who are ranked among the unproductive inhabitants are useful in certain respects, others necessary, and a few destructive; but the discussion would be long, and on the present occasion is unnecessary, because it would not alter the general conclusion.

two countries, containing the same number of inhabitants, that shall be the weakest which occupies the greatest extent of territory. The exact proportion of this inferiority cannot be ascertained with mathematical precision; because it must vary with circumstances; but the usual computation which supposes, that if the one country be double the size of the other, its strength will be as *one*, while that of the other is as *four*, seems to be near the truth. We must regret, that a truth so necessary to be known, should be so little obvious to those who take but a superficial view of things; as the want of this degree of knowledge has occasioned more numerous mistakes in government, and has been productive of greater misery among mankind, than perhaps any other that could be named.

It is chiefly owing to this circumstance, that the history of past ages is little else than a narrative of enterprizes undertaken by weak or wicked princes, with a view to enlarge the extent of their dominion, in the hope of thus encreasing the power of themselves and their successors, and of misery to the people, and revolutions that ensued to the ruin of the prince, instead of that steady power they hoped to enjoy. The only states in which the felicity of the people has been considerable, and of long duration. have been those whose want of power precluded any  
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idea of conquest. Yet, the mind of man so naturally aspires at domination, that there is hardly an instance in the annals of past ages of any state having voluntarily declined to extend the limits of its empire when an opportunity offered, whatever were the circumstances of the country they were to annex to their own.

If the preceding reasoning be well founded, we have room to doubt if our forefathers acted with prudence, when they shewed so much solicitude to extend the bounds of the British empire in America. We thus acquired, it is true, an immense tract of country, abundantly fertile, and capable of maintaining an innumerable multitude of people, but that country totally destitute of inhabitants. As individuals in Britain have been accustomed to value their possessions, by the extent and fertility of the soil which belonged to them, we naturally enough applied the same rule to judge of the value of those countries that have been annexed to the British empire, not properly advertent to the difference of circumstances between ourselves and the western continent. Had Russia, which is a thinly peopled, and in many places a fertile country, acquired these possessions, individuals there would have judged of their value after a different manner. They know that at home it is neither the extent of their possessions, nor the richness of the  
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soil, that constitutes the value of an estate, but the number of people it contains. In transferring an estate, therefore, they mention not the number of its acres, but the number of its people, and according to that number they estimate its value. In Russia, therefore, those immense territories we have acquired without any inhabitants, upon the possession of which we plume ourselves so much, would not have been accounted of any value at all. Whether does the Russian or Briton in this case judge most wisely? Many particulars must be attended to before this question can be properly decided. It is only necessary here to remark, that they both judge from habit rather than from reasoning, and that they are of course equally liable to be mistaken. It is not thus that mankind should judge in matters of so much importance.

From what has already been said, it will appear evident, that although America had been contiguous to Britain, so as to have admitted of being united with it into one connected kingdom, although it would in that case have been more easily defended and governed than at present, yet on account of the dispersion of our people that would necessarily take place, upon the acquisition of such an extended territory, the empire must have been weakened, and its industry diminished. It follows, that as America

rica is situated, disjoined from Britain by such a tract of ocean, and therefore so much more difficult to be protected or governed, these inconveniences must be felt in a still stronger degree, unless their bad effects are counterbalanced by some favourable circumstances, that have not yet been taken into the account.

Again : had the interest of America been so much the same with that of Britain, as not to admit of their being in any case disjoined or opposed to each other, even then, for the reasons already adduced, the whole empire, consisting of the American colonies and Britain considered as one aggregate body, would have been considerably weakened, and its industry abated. But if the interests of America may, in many cases, be separated from those of Britain ; if they may be in some cases directly opposed to each other, it must follow, that Britain, considered merely in itself, must have been weakened in an infinitely greater proportion, in consequence of the settlement of these colonies.

That the interest of America is in most cases different from that of Britain, and that in many cases they directly oppose each other, will not be denied by any thinking man, who either knows the countries, or attends to the transactions that occur almost every day. We must not therefore

consider the people of Britain and those of America as one compacted whole, continually tending towards one object, but as an aggregate, consisting of discordant elements, which, acting in different ways, can in no case produce an effect at all proportioned to the power of the whole, and which acting on some occasions in *contrary* directions, mutually tend to weaken and destroy each other.

I wish the reader to attend to this circumstance as a matter of importance, which has been hitherto either overlooked or misunderstood. However much it may tend to promote the general security and prosperity, that both the parent state and the colonies should be rich and flourishing, yet it is contrary to nature to expect that each party will not wish to promote its own interest, rather than that of another, where they interfere. It cannot but promote the interest of the colonists; for them to bear as small a share as possible of the public expence; and therefore it must be their unanimous wish, to oppose by every means in their power, the imposition of taxes and duties of every kind upon them. It must, on the other hand, be the interest of Britain to free herself as much as possible from the expence of government; she must therefore wish to lay as great a proportion of that expence upon the colonies as she thinks their circumstances will permit.

permit. I say these things *must* happen so long as man continues to be influenced by those passions, by which he has been actuated in all ages and countries, and therefore it does not imply the smallest reflection on either party. Let them change situations as often as you please, the case would not be altered. The persons on both sides would act in the same manner as they do at present.

I purposely here omit making use of the word *right*, because it tends only to embarrass the argument. In matters of government, *necessity* is the only measure of right or wrong. If one man feels that his interest is hurt by another, he will submit to that as a hardship, so long as he finds he cannot avoid it without subjecting himself to a greater inconvenience, but no longer: and this is still more obviously the case with regard to nations. It is *interest* alone which establishes the *rights* of government, and *power* that maintains them. It follows, that in all cases the weak must make their interests yield to the strong, which will establish what are called *rights* of a kind that never would have been acknowledged but from necessity, and which will be immediately reclaimed as soon as the weak shall have power to protect themselves. It is vain, therefore, for any government ever to rely upon its *rights* as a means of perpetuating its dominion  
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over a subjected state, or of regulating its conduct. It is interest or power alone which can insure dominion.

Upon these principles, then, it will appear sufficiently obvious, that as it never can be the interest of a distant colony to contribute to the public expence, if it can possibly be avoided; so if they ever at any time submit to do it, this will be only through necessity, and with extreme reluctance. And however *just* that may be, if considered on the principles of *equity*, yet, as such burthens are imposed by a power which must itself be benefited by them, it will appear in the eyes of the weaker party an unjust imposition, which therefore will be accounted grievous, and will excite in the bosoms a spirit of discontent, that can never be allayed. The affections of the inhabitants will thus be gradually alienated from the parent state, and it will be impossible ever to bring them heartily to cooperate with her in any measure that does not tend *directly* to promote *their own* immediate interest.

These consequences might have been foreseen before the American colonies began to be planted; but nations are not apt to attend with care to distant consequences. They might have been clearly observed long before the present period,  
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and steps might have been taken to obviate them ; but national prejudices are not easily removed. It is not now, one would imagine, possible that the judicious part of the nation should not perceive them, and concur in adopting effectual measures for obviating the inconveniences complained of ; but it is easier to perceive a grievance than to remove it. It is easier to point it out, than to *convince* a multitude that it exists.

However that may be, I think myself authorised to conclude, that in examining the power or the riches of the British empire, we are not at liberty to include the people of America in our computation. We must consider Britain by herself, as the fundamental state, and regard America as an extraneous appendage, not necessarily connected with her. We must view it as an accidental acquisition which may be lost. Our aim, therefore, should be to preserve the vigour of the parent state independent of its colonies. To avail ourselves to the utmost of the benefits that may be derived from them, but not for a moment to forget, that they can never be connected with Britain into one compacted uniform empire ; that sooner or later they must be separated from her, and that she must so act as to be prepared for that event.

## C H A P. III.

*the Spanish and British Colonies in America compared.*

**I**N political speculations, so many circumstances require to be attended to, that it is in general much safer to trust to experience, than to reasoning: at least reasoning alone never commands such entire conviction, as when it is illustrated by opposite examples. I shall therefore have recourse to this mode of illustration, wherever an opportunity offers.

The Spanish and the British settlements in America resemble each other in so many respects, that it is impossible to treat of the one without thinking of the other; yet it is not a little singular to observe, that authors have not been more unanimous in attributing the ruin of Spain to her American colonies, than they have been in ascribing the prosperity of Britain to her's. From what causes, it may be asked, do two institutions, so nearly alike, produce such opposite effects?

Upon investigating this subject, I find no other reason assigned for the ruinous consequences that have

have resulted from the Spanish settlements; but that the chief pursuit of the inhabitants is the digging for the precious metals, whereas the British colonists have been chiefly occupied in cultivating the soil. This *auri sacra fames*, as it has been emphatically called, of the Spaniards, has afforded a copious field for declamation, which readily catches the attention of a careless reader; but a philosophical enquirer, when he coolly sets himself to discover how it should come to pass that one set of colonists, merely because they followed the business of mining, should prove so destructive to the parent state, while another set of colonists, nearly in similar circumstances in other respects, merely because they had betaken themselves chiefly to agriculture, should have so much benefited the parent state, will find himself much at a loss to account for these two opposite effects. He would naturally fall into a chain of reasoning of the following kind.

The prosperity of a state, he would say, depends on the industry of its inhabitants. If its people are fully employed at all times, and if they are enabled to earn wherewithal to procure the necessaries of life in abundance, it seems a matter of very great indifference what is the principal manufacture of the colony, provided that does not interfere with the manufactures of



the parent state. Agriculture, indeed, in as far as it tends to furnish the colonists with *food*, seems to claim the first attention of every society; but those necessaries being once obtained, it does not naturally claim a preference in a commercial view above any other employment. Local circumstances must, in this case, determine the preference. But it does not appear that the Spanish Americans ever suffer from the want of provisions, and therefore they are left at liberty to follow that kind of manufacture which best suits their situation and circumstances. Particular considerations have determined them to prosecute the business of mining in preference to that of agriculture; and where, I would ask, consists the destructive tendency of this choice? Considered in itself, it does not appear that this employment is accounted peculiarly pernicious to society. A great part of the inhabitants of Cornwall are continually employed in digging for tin, and smelting its ores; and those of Northumberland in digging coal-mines; yet who has ever imagined that either of these manufactures have proved hurtful to Britain? Have they not, on the contrary, been always esteemed highly beneficial, by furnishing constant employment for numbers of industrious subjects? In what respect does the digging for gold or silver, differ from the digging for other metals? I have never heard that

they

they were reckoned in any respect more pernicious. Long before the discovery of America, Spain itself possessed numerous mines of these precious metals, which were worked to a great extent, yet we never heard that the country was either weakened or impoverished by this employment. Why then, it may be asked, should this business prove so peculiarly pernicious in America? A satisfactory answer does not occur.

Should it be said that a lucky adventurer may gain extraordinary profits, which by suddenly enriching him will deprive the state of an industrious subject, and tend to introduce luxury and dissipation;—some would answer, that the sooner this should happen in a colony, so situated as these are, the better it would be for the parent state; because from thence must be obtained all the articles of elegance and luxurious splendour. But waving this argument, it might be justly observed, that the same thing may happen in regard to every other manufacture, and may still oftener be expected to occur in trade. Shall therefore commerce and manufactures be discouraged, because in the practice of them men by a lucky hit may sometimes amass amazing fortunes? The oftener such incidents occur, the sooner no doubt will luxury and dissipation prevail; but these are only lesser

evils, which must be expected to flow from the best of human institutions. Persevering industry itself will necessarily produce the same effects.

If we next turn our attention to the commerce and manufactures of the parent state, it does not appear in what respect the Spanish settlements should differ materially from those of Britain. Gold and silver are as much articles of commerce, as rice or tobacco; and the digging for them interferes as little with the manufactures of Spain, as the culture of any article reared in the British colonies does with the produce or manufactures of Britain, and infinitely less so than many of them; and as if Spanish colonists are supplied with as great a proportion of their cloaths, tools, furniture, and articles of luxury from the parent state, as any of the British colonists are, it does not appear that any satisfactory reason can be assigned why the Spanish colonies should not be *equally* beneficial to the parent state as those of Great-Britain.

It cannot however be denied, that since the discovery of America, the manufactures of Spain have greatly declined: whereas those of Great-Britain have rather increased since that period: and as no other way of accounting for this

this phenomenon appeared so easy as to ascribe the ruin of the Spanish manufactures to the abundance of the precious metals that flowed in upon Spain from America, no other reason has been sought for. But this opinion, if duly examined, will be found to be equally groundless with the former.

“When a country, it might be said, possesses much money in proportion to the neighbouring nations, the value of that money will naturally fall in proportion to the superabundance. Manufactures in these circumstances must necessarily become of a higher nominal value than before, and therefore could not be sold at the same price with the manufactures of other countries in which the money continued of as high a value as formerly. The demand therefore for the manufactures of the country abounding with money must soon cease, and with the demand the manufactures must fall to the ground. But in consequence of the great influx of the precious metals into Spain after the discovery of America, the value of these metals decreased, it is said, in a much higher proportion than in the neighbouring nations, which necessarily ruined the manufactures of that country. It is thus, say they, that the Spanish American colonies have ruined the mother country, while those of Britain, from which none of these metals have  
been

been obtained, have tended to encourage her manufactures as well as to extend her commerce.

It must be allowed that this reasoning would be conclusive, were the facts as they are there stated; but unluckily that is not the case. The treasures of America were never allowed to remain so long in Spain, as to sink the value of her specie below the standard of other commercial states in Europe. It is indeed doubtful if ever it there fell so low as it has long been both in Britain and Holland. The price of labour and provisions has, in general been much lower in Spain, than in either of those countries: yet it is well known that the manufactures of Britain and Holland continue still to flourish. The ruin of the Spanish manufactures therefore cannot be attributed to the trade they carry on to America for gold and silver:—it must arise from some other cause. Britain and Holland carry on an extensive trade to Cadiz for these metals, which trade instead of ruining their manufactures has tended to augment them.

From the whole of this investigation, we shall be obliged to conclude, that if Spain has been hurt in consequence of her connection with America, it cannot with any appearance of justice be ascribed to the mining for gold or silver, which

which constitutes the chief employment of her people. On the contrary, as this employment furnishes a trade equally lucrative and beneficial to the parent state, with any other they could have followed, we must search for some other cause of those inconveniencies that have been so long and so loudly complained of.

That some radical defect has prevailed in the political oeconomy of Spain ever since the discovery of America, will not be denied by any one who compares her condition at that period with what it is at present. Spain, according to her best historians, contained at the time that Columbus set sail for America, about twenty five millions of inhabitants, and possessed numerous manufactures which were in the most flourishing state. Her population *now* scarce amounts to eight millions, and her manufactures deserve not to be named. At that time she was the most warlike and powerful state in Europe; and the immediate successors of Ferdinand and Isabella, made large strides to the attainment of universal dominion, which neither they nor the princes around them considered as such a chimerical project as we now know it to have been. Little did they foresee that their descendants would so soon be obliged to rely upon the charitable aid of the neighbouring nations to prevent them from becoming the subjects of France.

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Their debility and indolence have almost become proverbial. To what cause are we to ascribe such an humiliating change?

The depopulation of Spain has been by many ascribed entirely to the banishment of the Moors and Jews out of that country, and the long wars waged by Ferdinand, Charles, and his son Philip. The wars of these cruel princes were indeed shocking and destructive, and the banishing of so many industrious subjects was impolitic in the extreme. It drained the country of several millions of her best inhabitants. But any one who considers that it is now about two hundred years since those wars ceased, and reflects upon what should have been the natural increase of twenty millions of people, (and I never heard it computed that the whole loss of people by war and banishment together amounted to five millions) in that period, will easily perceive that the whole loss sustained by these causes, would long before this time have been fully replaced by the natural increase of the remaining inhabitants, had not some powerful circumstance prevented it. So far is this loss however, from being replaced, that the depopulation has continued to proceed to an unexampled degree. And as no other cause for this depopulation can be assigned, except the peopling of America, we shall be constrained to admit



mit that it is her colonies, and not the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, that have at the same time diminished her inhabitants and ruined the manufactures of the kingdom. It behoves us now to enquire into the cause of this alarming phenomenon, which will be best discovered by a short detail of historical facts.

Soon after the discovery of America, the court of Spain in consequence of the protection she afforded to the merciless ravagers of that extensive continent, became possessed of such extensive revenues, independent of the aid of her European subjects, as enabled her at a very early period to trample upon the boasted liberties of Spain, and to erect upon their ruins that system of despotism both civil and religious, which ever since hath so remarkably prevailed in that country. This révolution alone would be sufficient to account in a great measure for that decline in the spirit of national industry which began to be observed about that time.

These unlooked-for treasures likewise cherished in the minds of the Spanish princes those seeds of ambition which had begun to appear ever since the junction of the crowns of Castile and Arragon; and engendered those long and bloody wars which for a century ravaged all Europe. During the continuance of those wars,

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little attention was bestowed upon the kingdom of Spain itself. America being then accounted an inexhaustible fund of treasure that would abundantly make up for all deficiencies, was more regarded: and as it was imagined that the returns from thence would be abundant in proportion to the numbers who went thither, no care was taken to prevent the emigration of that numberless multitude who pressed to go to those regions where gold was to be obtained with so much ease.\*

In consequence of these causes, added to those already enumerated, the inhabitants of Spain were much diminished in number; and by consequence

\* Some readers will think there is here a contradiction of what went before. THERE it was said that the gold and silver mines of America have not proved the ruin of Spain: HERE it seems as if the bad consequences that Spain experienced are attributed to the precious metals. A little attention will remove the ambiguity.

It has never been denied that the inordinate desire of obtaining riches operated the destruction of Spain. But although gold and silver constitute one species of riches, they are not the only substances which merit that appellation. Corn and wine may deserve the name of riches as justly as silver or gold: those, therefore, who conclude that because Spain was ruined by an inordinate desire for riches, she was ruined by the gold and silver mines of America, reason very illogically; as the same effect would have been

quence the industry of those who remained behind was much slackened. The army, however, while the wars continued, offered a ready

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asylum

been produced by the sudden acquisition of any other kind, —An example will best shew how these things may be effected.

Let us suppose that instead of America, Columbus had discovered another country of great extent, well peopled, amazingly fertile, in which the chief employment of the people was agriculture and arts, in both which they had attained great perfection.

Let us suppose that at the time of his arrival their granaries, which were constructed like those of Joseph, contained as much grain as would supply the whole inhabitants for several years. That their stores of wine of the most delicate flavour, exceeding even Tokay in richness, were almost inexhaustible; that the quantities of oil, indigo, cochineal, silk, cotton, tea, coffee, chocolate, tobacco, cinnamon, cloves, mace, and many of the most valuable products of the earth were equally abundant: that the houses were furnished in the most superb and elegant taste, consisting of mirrors of amazing magnitude and perfection, clocks, watches, &c. of the most curious workmanship: that their temples, gardens, and houses abounded with statues, busts and vases of the most elegant kind, which might have vied with those of Phydias, Buonoretti, or Bernini; that their houses were full of pictures of inestimable value: in short, that the whole country was one continued storehouse of those valuable things that mankind in general covet most, excepting gold and silver, not one grain of which was to be found in the whole territory; a certain

asylum for many, and from this cause was always easily recruited. For some time things went on very smoothly in this track; but after the

certain kind of glass, shells, and paper being the only kinds of money there known.

Let us further suppose that these innocent and industrious people were little acquainted with the art of war, and had neither implements nor discipline capable of making more than the most feeble resistance to the arms and military discipline of Europe.

In these circumstances, suppose the court of Spain lets it be known among her people, that whoever shall go over to that country to conquer it, shall obtain to himself a full right to the whole that he shall conquer, reserving for the King only a small proportion,—would not numberless persons greedily fly to those regions to appropriate such treasures to themselves? And would not the court be suddenly enriched by its proportion of those accumulated stores? Is it to be supposed that during these transactions many of the natives would not be massacred, to make way for their new masters—or that extravagance and waste would not abound till the new-found riches were exhausted?

During the whole time that these ravagers were proceeding in their conquest, they would be daily making new acquisitions of riches, to supply the waste of those that had been so lavishly dissipated. But when the whole country was subdued, those stores, however abundant, would be soon exhausted. Its new masters would then be obliged to find some other means of subsistence. No other means of effecting this occurs but by following the employment

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the plunder of the natives of America ceased, money became more scarce, and remittances home were less abundant. Treasures must then

of the original possessors of the country. They must betake themselves to the cultivating the soil from whence the treasures had been originally obtained. The soil, though equally rich now as formerly, in consequence of being so long neglected, has been suffered to run wild. Considerable exertions are required to bring it into its former state: but the means of effecting this are not to be found. The cattle formerly employed for that use were killed to load the luxurious tables of the new lords of the country. The people who were formerly employed in rural labours have been cut off in a thousand ways. The new masters, accustomed to rapine, cannot be brought to submit to the drudgery themselves: in consequence of these causes that country which used to abound in every valuable product, now affords but very scanty returns: slaves must be found to labour for the indolent owners, who must all be fed before the state can obtain its proportion of the produce.— Since the plunder ceased, the revenue of the state has been amazingly diminished: all things are totally changed, and these changes must be severely felt by every person concerned.

It thus appears that the phenomena complained of do not arise from the precious metals, considered as such, that were found in the new world, but from the accumulated treasures that were there found, and the rapine and devastation that were then permitted. The same effect might have been produced, had riches of any kind there abounded, and had the same destructive policy been permitted. The same effect would be produced by destroying the inhabitants,

then be dug from the mine instead of being wrested from the inhabitants. So many of the natives had been killed by the wantonness of cruelty, that hands were wanting to work the mines to perfection. Contrivances were invented to elude the payments due to the King. In short, the American revenue fell so far short of the demands of the crown, that there was a necessity for endeavouring to obtain somewhat more from the subjects of Old Spain than they had formerly given.

In consequence of the decrease of people in Spain, all the old taxes must necessarily have become less productive; and in consequence of the decline of industry, they must likewise have become more oppressive. Instead, however, of removing some part of this heavy load, as good policy would have required, necessity obliged the court to impose new taxes. This completed the ruin of the few manufactures that remained. The inhabitants at home oppressed beyond what could be borne, migrated in thousands to the colonies: the domestic revenue being thus in a  
manner

bitants, and wasting the property of the people of Britain. Plunder, when authorized, intirely destroys every species of industry. The riches thus obtained are soon exhausted, nor can the stores when once dispersed be easily replaced again.

manner annihilated, and the foreign revenue so considerably abated, mankind beheld a phenomenon perhaps the most unlooked for that ever happened: it was the lord of all the treasures of the new world, and the sovereign of the most extensive dominions in Europe, a public bankrupt. From that time, the projects of ambition were obliged to be relinquished, and it was soon found that instead of extending her conquests Spain was not able to protect her own dominions. Those taxes, however, which finished the ruin of her manufactures, were continued either through necessity or from short-sighted policy; and 'till this moment have prevented them from being re-established, so that although Spain continues to enjoy the trade to her own colonies, that trade only encourages the industry of others, not that of the parent state. The trade itself is advantageous, but it is only so to the merchants, and not to the body of the people. These colonies are as useful to Europe as other colonies are, but they are not so to Spain. By a blindness of conduct that has not perhaps a parallel in history, Spain has contrived to ruin herself for the sake of her colonies, and then has transferred the profits that result from them to other states.

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From this historical sketch we perceive that Spain has been ruined by her colonies, not because the inhabitants employ themselves in search of the precious metals, but because of an inadvertency too common in the affairs of government. If a general idea prevails in any country that more money can be got by following one employment than any other, a great number of persons will naturally choose to follow that mode of life. It was this principle that effected the ruin of Spain. A general idea prevailed, that more money could be made in the colonies of America, than at home. This opinion instead of being discouraged was favoured by the court: in consequence of this, people of all ranks flocked thither in numbers. Those left behind felt themselves less comfortably situated than before, and their situation becoming less and less agreeable as their numbers decreased, others were gradually forced to leave their native country, for the sake of subsistence, 'till it became reduced to that debilitated state in which we now find it.

Has Britain no reason to fear that similar evils may accrue to herself, in consequence of her American colonies? It is evident the circumstances are in many respects alike. In both countries an idea has prevailed, that it is easier to live comfortably in the colonies than at home.

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This idea has induced many individuals to leave their native homes for ever. Both kingdoms have been thus deprived of many of their best inhabitants: in both cases the expences of government have been thus necessarily augmented. taxes, of consequence, are heavier upon the people at home than they otherwise would have been, which must necessarily have a tendency to check the progress of manufactures; although it as necessarily increases the *appearance* of the operations of commerce. Whether this supposed increase is as real as it appears to be, and whether it is sufficient to overbalance the forementioned inconveniencies, will come to be examined, after we have finished the parallel between the Spanish and British colonies, and explained the reasons why the latter have not produced the same effects upon the parent state as the former.

In one respect the colonies of Spain differed extremely from those of Britain. From the beginning, Spain drew from her colonies a considerable revenue: Britain has never been able to draw from her colonies any revenue at all. We have seen, that in consequence of this American revenue, Spain was induced to embark in enterprises which made her waste her strength in fruitless exertions. Britain being freed from the



temptation, was preserved also from the consequences of that imprudent measure.

The same causes that enabled the court of Spain to draw a considerable revenue from her colonies *at the beginning*, tempted emigrants to go thither, at that early period, in immense numbers; which at once ruined the manufactures and destroyed the industry of the parent state. But those who went to the British settlements at first, had so many difficulties to overcome and hardships to struggle with, that large sums were obliged to be raised for their support by the inhabitants of Britain, before they could be induced to go thither. The first settlement of these colonies was slow, and it was not 'till of late that the emigrations to them became very considerable. Time, therefore, has not yet been allowed for our seeing the full effects of these copious migrations: and as the change was effected gradually, they have not been attended with those violent consequences that sudden changes in political arrangements never fail to produce.

To these considerations we must add, that since that period the constitution of Britain has experienced a revolution directly the reverse of that of Spain. There, liberty has been changed  
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into despotism, which in the most effectual manner prevents the people from availing themselves of the natural advantages they possess; represses the spirit of industry, and deters them from making any exertions to better their condition. Here, that despotic and persecuting spirit which first gave rise to our colonies, has been totally subdued, and the liberty of the subject so effectually secured, as to give full scope to every exertion of genius and industry. This has supported our manufactures and commerce in spite of occurrences that would have totally ruined them, if the nation had been subjected to the controul of any despotic power whatever.

These are the circumstances that have prevented Britain from experiencing a change similar to that of Spain; and this is the real foundation of that flourishing commerce which this island has possessed for a century past; and which has been so often ascribed to causes that have operated powerfully in retarding its prosperity.

## C H A P. IV.

*Of the Population and Trade of the American Colonies, and their Effects upon the Commerce, Population, and Manufactures of Great-Britain.*

**T**R A D E, it is well known, is not always or necessarily beneficial to the state, however much it may be advantageous to individuals. It is that commerce only which tends to excite the industry of the people, and promote the manufactures of the country, that is beneficial to the state. The commerce of Spain to her colonies, which is chiefly supported by the manufactures of other nations, is of very little benefit to herself. The commerce, however, that is carried on between Britain and her American colonies, as it consists chiefly of her own manufactures, it seems, at first view, must prove to her highly beneficial: but in regard to trade, appearances are often deceitful; and it is proper that we proceed in the present investigation with great circumspection. To assist us in forming an impartial judgement on this occasion, I shall put an imaginary case, which will perhaps enable us to see it more clearly than if

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we were to rely on real facts, as these cannot at all times be viewed without prejudice, and are usually in matters of this kind carefully concealed, or artfully disguised.

We shall suppose that there existed a small nation, separated from all others by impregnable barriers, and altogether independent in matters of government. Its number of people let us call ten thousand. Let its foreign exports, consisting entirely of its own products and manufactures, be supposed to amount at an average to the value of five thousand pounds a year. In this case, according to the common use of words, the trade of the nation would be said to be five thousand pounds per annum.

In these circumstances we shall suppose that by some lucky accident this people discovered another country, at a considerable distance from them, more extensive, more fertile than their own, and totally unoccupied. Of this they took possession, and sent out of their own inhabitants to the number of one thousand to occupy it, which number, on account of favourable circumstances, we shall suppose increased in time to two thousand. These colonists, we shall suppose, traded with the parent state, and consumed of her manufactures annually to the value of two thousand pounds. In this case, supposing her  
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commerce with other states has not declined, it appears that the colonies have increased the trade of the mother state to two-fifths more than its original value. Does it from hence follow that the parent state really manufactures goods to a greater value than formerly, or carries on a more extensive trade?—By no means. Her manufactures and trade must both have necessarily declined in consequence of this arrangement, as will appear from the following considerations.

The inhabitants of the original country, we are to suppose, were fed by the produce of their own country, and cloathed with its manufactures. Each individual therefore became a customer to the nation for all he consumed of its produce and manufactures. Hence, before we can draw any conclusion, we must take into the account its *internal*, as well as its *external* traffic. Taylors, shoe-makers, clothiers, dyers, and all others, must be fed by the farmer; and he in his turn must pay for every thing he purchases from any of them. The farmer at home who buys a yard of cloth for his own use, encourages the cloth manufacture as much as the Emperor of China would do, if he bought cloth to the same value; and the taylor who buys of the produce of the fields for his own sustenance, encourages agriculture as much as the Grand Signior would do, should he have occasion to transport

port the like quantity to Constantinople. To the manufacturer and farmer, it is not a matter of any moment *who* it is that consumes the produce of their labour, but what *is its amount*? The home market, therefore, is of equal importance, in proportion to its amount, as that which arises from a foreign demand, although from obvious causes, it does not furnish equal employment to the merchant, nor makes such a distinguished figure at the custom-house.

When we attempt to compute the amount of the internal commerce of a country, the easiest way is, to estimate the whole value of all the articles consumed or used by one person, at an average, in a year. This will be very different in different circumstances. Accordingly, we find that authors have varied widely from each other in their computations of this article. The lowest estimate I have seen rates the annual expence of one person at seven pounds, and the highest (I think) at twenty. Without entering into a very nice investigation of this matter, it is probable we shall not go beyond the truth, if we place it at ten pounds a head.\*

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\* All the computations of this kind I have seen are very erroneous, because of the omission of several articles that should be taken into the account.

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On that supposition, then, the trade of the original country, at the first mentioned period, would stand thus :

For food, raiment, and other necessaries for ten thousand persons : at	
£.10 a head	£. 100,000
Value of goods exported	5,000
	<hr/>
Total value of the products and manufactures of the country at this period	£. 105,000

At

The consumption of the produce and manufactures of a country is to be estimated by the expenditure of ALL the inhabitants (deducting what goes for foreign produce) and not those of any particular class only. Those who have hitherto examined this matter, have usually rated all as if they expended no more than the lowest class of the people, which is surely improper.

In estimating the consumption of this lowest class, likewise, they commit a mistake when they consider that as equal simply to their own expenditure. In almost every case the employer furnishes many articles which form a real part of their consumption, but are no part of their own expenditure. In many manufactures, shop-rent, fuel, candles, tools and machinery are furnished by the employer, and these, in some cases, amount to a great value.

All the animals likewise that are employed by man in his operations of industry, or for his amusement, consume the produce of the country, and ought to be taken into this

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So that the national trade instead of being increased to the value of two thousand pounds a year, as it appeared, has really decreased eight thousand pounds a year.

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To see what alteration this would produce, I shall state the expenditure of a farmer's family, rating, as is usual in cases of this kind, every thing at its lowest value,

The family, we shall suppose, consists of the farmer, his wife, two children, ten men servants, and two maid servants, whose annual expenditure for food, cloathing, fewel, candles, house-rent, washing, &c. amounts on an average to ten pounds each :

Hence for 16 persons	£. 160 0 0
Twenty horses, the maintenance of which at 6d. a day, is for 365 days £. 9 5 per ann. each. Hence 20 cost	185 0 0
Tear and wear, including interest on the value of the horses, 2 l. each per annum. Hence for 20	40 0 0
For shoes, harness, labouring utensils for ditto, at least	40 0 0
	<hr/>
	£. 425 0 0

The total annual expenditure of this family (though no other article is taken into the account) could not be less than four hundred and twenty-five pounds, which divided by 16, leaves £. 26 11 3 for each person, instead of ten pounds, as it appears on the face of the account.

The above shews how fallacious must be all those accounts which pretend to ascertain the consumption of the produce

It is thus that mankind are frequently imposed on by false appearances in matters relating to commerce; and it is by not duly attending to all the particulars which ought to

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be

produce and manufactures of a country, by computing only the number of persons in the country, and rating these at an average as only equal to the actual expenditure of the lowest class of its inhabitants. Not only horses, dogs, and other animals, which do not furnish food for man; but cattle, sheep, pigs, fowls, &c. should all be taken into the account, as all these consume of the produce of the country, and are an essential part of the national expenditure.

The justest way to come at the truth in this case, would be to ascertain what is the lowest rate at which a person can be maintained in health, without begging, who consumes only of the fruits of the earth, and who is lodged and clothed in the most homely and simple manner. This sum may be supposed necessary for every person in the kingdom, and should be considered as part of the annual expenditure of each.

Those in circumstances somewhat better, can afford to eat, besides vegetables and grain, beef and mutton. For their use therefore, those articles of food are produced, and to their account must be charged the whole annual expenditure occasioned by the animals which afford them.

Others in more easy circumstances eat still more expensively, and also keep horses, dogs, &c. for their convenience or amusement. All that these animals consume, therefore, as part of the national expenditure, must be charged to their account.

Besides

be taken into the account, that so many plans of improvement are found at last to prove hurtful instead of being beneficial.

From

Besides these, there is another article of great annual amount, viz. that which is expended by those in easy circumstances in fine furniture, cloathing, sewel, candles, strong liquors, &c. above the proportion expended on these articles by the poorest class of people.

Could all these articles be exactly ascertained, we should obtain a tolerably just account of the whole amount of the national consumption of produce and manufactures:— Without pretending to perfect accuracy, I shall here attempt to give a superficial estimate of them.

The lowest rate at which a person can be maintained in this island, in health, and without begging, including food, cloaths, lodging, furniture, washing, and sewel, is I think, four-pence a day, which, for 365 days, amounts to

£. 6 1 8

The number of horses I suppose to be equal to one fourth the number of people. (In the country they are much above that proportion) These will consume at an average the value of six-pence each a day; the 4th part of which (being what falls to the share of every person) is three-half-pence, or per annum

2 5 7½

For wear and tear of horses, harness, &c. equal to 4 l. per annum each—Hence per man

1 0 0

Carried over

9 7 3½

Brought

From the foregoing example the reader will see still greater reason to doubt if the American colonies have proved as beneficial to Great-Britain as has been commonly imagined. The im-

	Brought over	9 7 3 $\frac{1}{2}$
Dogs, cats, rats, and every other useless creature we shall suppose consume one tenth as much as the horses, hence		0 4 6 $\frac{3}{4}$
The number of cows and cattle of all sorts will equal the number of people, and their daily consumption may be rated at two-pence per head, which per annum is		3 0 10
Sheep may be computed to be equal in value and consumption to the cattle, hence		3 0 10
Pigs may be rated at one fourth of the cattle, which is		0 15 2 $\frac{1}{2}$
Fowls and poultry of all kinds, venison, &c. equal to the last		0 15 2 $\frac{1}{2}$
Fish of all sorts equal to one fourth the value of butcher's meat		1 10 9
For tools and machinery to manufacturers, elegance of furniture, richness of clothing, to people in higher rank, and greater waste of fuel, candles, washing, &c. beyond what is consumed by the lower class—suppose equal per head to		1 10 0
	Total	£. 20 5 0 $\frac{1}{4}$

From the whole of these considerations it appears, that the total consumption of produce and manufactures of Britain, cannot be estimated at less than twenty pounds sterling for each person at an average. It is only placed at half that sum in the text.

importance of the trade has usually been estimated by the value of the exports thither; but it is evident that many other particulars require to be taken into the account, before we can be in a condition to judge of the real effects of that trade upon the parent country.

I should willingly have declined proceeding farther in this investigation, had it been consistent with the task I have undertaken. It will lead me into discussions that carry somewhat of an invidious appearance with regard to our American brethren. This is an ungracious task: but conscious as I am that no man more cordially wishes to promote their prosperity than myself, wherever it does not interfere with the well-being of Britain, I shall proceed with temper and candour in this enquiry: being persuaded that the discovering what is the true interest of both parties will in the end be for the real interest of the colonies as well of Britain, however much it may tend to thwart the views of both at present.

I begin with examining what foundation there is for an opinion that has long been entertained both in Britain and America, relating to the amazing increase of the people on that continent. It has been said, and it is generally believed, that mankind increase so much faster in America  
by

by natural procreation, than in Britain, that the diminution of the inhabitants of this country bears no sort of proportion to their increase in the colonies, and that by consequence the loss we have sustained by the settling of America, is much more than made up to us by the gain we reap from the commerce of the colonies.

I have examined this question with attention, but have not been able to meet with any fact that tends to corroborate the opinion, unless it be the single circumstance of the rapid population of some of the provinces of America. But from this circumstance alone, we well know, that no such inference can be drawn. The inhabitants of London, Liverpool, Manchester, and many other places in Britain, have in like manner increased in a most rapid progression; but no man, because of this circumstance, has ever believed that those places are more favourable for population than others. It is on the contrary well known, that were it not for the continual supplies of people they constantly draw from the country, the inhabitants of those places would probably diminish instead of increasing. The same inference may be made with regard to the population of America, unless other facts are produced to prove a contrary opinion.

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From the most accurate enquiry I could make, I have not met with a single circumstance that tends to *prove* that the inhabitants of America increase by natural procreation in the smallest degree faster than they do in the country, and distant provinces of Britain. To ascertain this fact, I have enquired after parochial registers; but those of America could not be obtained. And if they could, unless they are kept with more than ordinary care, it would no be safe implicitly to rely on them.

For want of means of better information, I then had recourse to an expedient, which the reader may easily adopt if he inclines: It was, to put some of the American refugees (who at present abound in this country) upon recollecting the number of children in such families as they knew in America, whose parents were either dead, or past hopes of increasing their families; and comparing these with an equal number of families in Britain, in similar circumstances, taken also at random, from the recollection of persons who had never been out of the island. Upon this trial I could find no perceptible advantage on the side of America over the country places and distant provinces, (for it was to these places I confined my enquiry) in Great-Britain. It is not contended that very great accuracy could be obtained by this mode of enquiry;

but

but it is presumed that had the disparity in this respect been near so great as has been contended for, a sensible difference must have been perceived even by this mode of trial.

I then had recourse to historical records. But although I met with scattered notices of the numbers of the people in the different provinces at different times, yet I was not able to connect these into a regular progressive chain, or to ascertain what proportion of the inhabitants had emigrated from Britain, or had been reared in the colonies, unless in the single province of Virginia; with regard to which the following facts seem to be well authenticated.

Smith, the earliest and the best informed historian of American affairs, observes, that before the year 1625 there had been conveyed from England to Virginia *upwards* of nine thousand English subjects, at the enormous expence of fifty thousand pounds sterling.\* But of all this numerous emigration there remained no more alive at that period than about eighteen hundred persons.†

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Instead

\* Chap. 21.

† Chap. 23.



Instead of increasing, therefore, it appears that during the first twenty years the people of that colony greatly decreased. The same causes induced a similar waste of people (though not in the same proportion) in all the other colonies at the beginning, and to this hour operate in a smaller degree on every body of emigrants who settle in the distant uncultivated parts of the colonies.

“ It was a long time, says another historian,\* before Virginia saw a race of English born on the spot.”—“ But after the difficulties incident to the settlement of colonies were in some measure surmounted, and the voyage thither had been shortened by the improvement of navigation, and rendered familiar by use, *whole families* transported themselves thither. When the instructions of Charles I. gave large tracts of land to individuals, *men of consideration and wealth*, roused by religion, or ambition, or caprice, removed thither; and the population of that colony had increased to about twenty thousand souls at the commencement of the civil wars. The colonists enjoying plenty of good land, and subsisting with ease, naturally increased abundantly; and the cavaliers resorting thither during

\* Present State of America, 2d. Pt. 50, apud Chalmers's Political Annals, p. 125.

during the distresses of those times, Virginia contained about thirty thousand persons at the epoch of the restoration."

From these notices it appears, that the population of Virginia was chiefly promoted by *emigrations from Britain*. But we have not here any precise account either of the number of emigrants during that period, or of the proportional increase of the colonists. The following account is more distinct.

"We suppose, says Sir William Berkeley, in his Answer to the Enquiries of the Lords of the Committee of Colonies, anno 1671, and I am very sure we do not much miscount, that there are in Virginia about 40,000 persons, men, women, and children, of which there are 2000 black slaves, 6000 christian servants for a short time; and the rest have been born in the country, or have come in to settle or serve in the hope of bettering their condition in a growing country. Yearly we suppose there comes in of servants about 1500; of which most are English, few Scots, and fewer Irish; and not above two or three ships of negroes in seven years."\*

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Virginia

\* Political Annals of America, p. 327.

Virginia therefore contrined of inhabitants,

Anno	1625	—	1800
	1640	—	20,000
	1666	—	30,000
	1671	—	40,000

From these accounts it appears, that between the year 1625 and 1640, a period of fifteen years, the number of inhabitants had increased eighteen thousand two hundred, which must in all probability have been wholly by emigrants; for it is not to be supposed that a colony in which the diminution of inhabitants for the twenty years preceding had been so remarkable, could all at once have come to be in a state of population so remarkably progressive. It cannot even be supposed that if they had been left without any supply, their numbers would not rather have decreased. So that it is probable the emigrants from Europe during this period were considerably above eighteen thousand two hundred, the total increase of the colonists; which seems to be confirmed by what was observable in the subsequent period.

From the year 1640 to 1671, a period of thirty-one years, the total increase of the colonists was twenty thousand. Towards the end of that period, Sir William Berkeley informs us, that there

there were annually imported about 1500 Europeans, besides negroes. As Britain had been in a state of tranquillity for some years before the time at which he wrote, a stop must have been put to the numerous emigrations of cavaliers which took place during the usurpation. We may therefore reasonably suppose that the number of Europeans imported at the time that Sir William wrote, must have been much smaller than formerly; so that instead of whole families of substantial people that are mentioned at a former period as having gone thither, he only mentions *servants* and others of inferior note. Hence I think we may be authorized to infer, that during the whole of this period there were imported annually, at least fifteen hundred Europeans. These emigrants alone, supposing their numbers had been barely kept up by natural procreation without encreasing at all, would have amounted to 46,500 persons; to which if we add the 2000 negroes, and the 20,000 whites that were in Virginia in the year 1640, the whole will amount to 68,500, the number of persons that should have been in the colony in the year 1671 if they had neither encreased nor diminished. But the whole of the inhabitants at this last period only amounted to 40,000, so that instead of *encreasing* in the rapid progression we have been made to expect, there is the greatest reason to presume, that during this period they had decreased upwards

wards of 28,000, which is nearly two thirds of the then whole number of the colonists.

If we continue our enquiries downwards, I learn from Mr. Wynne, that at the time he wrote (about the year 1765, as I think) there were in the province of Virginia, about 170,000 souls, of whom 70,000 were whites, and 100,000 negroes\*. From hence it appears, that in little less than a century, 38,000 whites (deduct the 2000 negroes) have only encreased to 70,000, which instead of a rapid encrease by natural procreation, as we are taught to look for, increaseth a very slow one. This, I say, would have been accounted a slow encrease, had there been no emigrants sent from Europe to that province during all the beforementioned period. But it is well known that many were sent annually, so many indeed, that I make no doubt, they alone would have amounted to more than all the encrease of the inhabitants, 300 a year would have effected this.

Hence we have little reason to think that the inhabitants of Virginia have ever encreased at all since they went to America by natural procreation. The climate however, in that province, is as salutary and the soil as fertile, as in any  
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\* British Empire in America, vol. IV. p. 247.

of the other provinces, nor are the inhabitants in any respect less favourably circumstanced with regard to the encrease of their own people. But their mode of culture is less favourable for attracting poor colonists than that of most of the other provinces, which is the probable cause of the small increase of the people there in comparison of what is met with in some other parts of America.

I am far, however, from imagining that either in Virginia, or any other of the American colonies, those inhabitants who are once *fully established in the midst of a cultivated district*, do not encrease as fast as in any part of Europe. But as poor emigrants have always at the beginning numberless difficulties to encounter, and as the uncultivated spots on which they are obliged to settle, are always unwholesome and exposed to danger, their numbers like those of the original settlers in Virginia, must suffer a considerable diminution before they can begin to encrease. It is in this way we must account in part for the retardment of the population of that fertile province, and in part by the indented servants sometimes leaving that country after the term of their servitude is expired, to go to some of the other provinces where they could begin a settlement with a much smaller stock than in Virginia.

I shall

I shall not enter into any more minute detail on this subject, as these facts are sufficient to shew, that the opinion in general entertained of the rapid encrease of people in America, from natural procreation, is extremely problematical, if not entirely groundless. Indeed the great difference that is observed in the population of the different provinces, would alone be a sufficient proof of the groundlessness of that opinion. Where political causes induce emigrants to settle, the increase of the people is indeed extremely rapid. Where it is otherwise the population is proportionably slow. Just so London, Manchester, and Birmingham encrease in numbers, while the population of York, Lincoln, and Canterbury is at a stand.

But if the people do not encrease faster in the cultivated parts in America than they do out of towns, and in the distant provinces in Britain, and if in the uncultivated parts of it they decrease considerably before they begin to encrease, it must necessarily follow, that Britain has lost a greater number of people than America has gained since the first settlement of these colonies.

Some idea of the total amount of that change of inhabitants, and the loss of people that has been sustained thereby, may be obtained after the following manner.

It

It is in general corrupted that the natural encrease of mankind in a healthy country where they are well provided with the necessaries of life and freed from wars, pestilence, and uncommon misfortunes, may be about two thirds of their original numbers in thirty years.

This proportion I am sensible is higher than is ever found to take place in any modern European state, because it is impossible to keep them free from wars and other inconveniencies that will be mentioned by and by. But in favour of America we will suppose that the inhabitants *there* encrease according to that ratio, without any deduction.

We cannot ascertain the precise number of persons in America at each of the periods after-mentioned, but there is reason to think that the following numbers are not far from the truth. Perfect accuracy is not here pretended, an approximation is all that is wanted.

I. During the first period of thirty years, which for the sake of round numbers, we shall say ended at the year 1630, there is good reason to believe that the whole people settled in British America did not exceed

2,000.

M

II. Between



Brought over,	2,000
II. Between anno 1630 and 1660, these we shall suppose encreased by natural procreation in the above- mentioned proportion,	1,000
And by emigrants from Europe during this period,	40,000
	<hr/>
Therefore the total inhabitants anno 1660 would be	43,000

III. Between 1660 and 1690 the natural increase on these, as above should be, 28,814

And by emigrant from Europe during this period about, 100,000

Hence total inhabitants anno 1690, 171,814

IV. Between 1690 and 1720, the natural encrease on these at the abovementioned proportion would be 114,690  
And by emigration during this period, suppose 220,000

*Inde.* The total inhabitants anno 1720. 506,504

V. Between 1720 and 1750, the natural encrease on these, at the above-

above-mentioned proportion would be,	337,817
And by emigration during this peri- od, about	300,000
	<hr/>

*Inde.* The total inhabitants anno  
1750, 1,144,321

VI. Between 1750 to 1780, the natural increase on these at the abovementioned proportion would be,	762,362
And by emigration during this pe- riod,	600,000
	<hr/>

*Inde.* The total inhabitants anno 1780, 2,506,683

The above, exclusive of the inhabitants of Canada, and not taking into the account the losses that have been sustained by the present war, is probably a tolerably just account of the population of America, and of the manner in which it has been effected. At least, if any objection can be made to this computation it must be that the natural encrease is here placed considerably too high; no allowance being made for losses by wars and otherwise \*. But if this be too high,

\* I am not ignorant that Dr. Franklin has computed, that the inhabitants of America double their numbers by natu-

high, the number of emigrants must be in proportion too low, so that no room is given to say the scale is turned against America.

Let us now turn our attentions to Britain, and trace the consequences of these emigrations on *her* population.

It has been already said, that there is reason to think that mankind encrease, as fast by natural procreation in the distant provinces in Britain as they do in America. But many are the causes that retard the encrease of the number of her inhabitants, when compared with those of America.

Among persons in high life, population confessedly goes on more slowly than in lower stations ;

natural procreation in 25 years ; but for the reasons already given, and many others, there is the greatest reason to conclude he is in a mistake. I have not his book at hand, and therefore cannot remark on his arguments.



I have also seen accounts of remarkable fecundity of particular persons in America, mentioned from time to time in the newspapers. I could produce many instances of a similar kind that came within my own observation in Britain, were it much to the purpose. It was the INTEREST of the people in America to induce as many persons as possible to migrate to America, and therefore it has been their study to exhibit as flattering a picture as possible to the public of the salubrity and other excellencies of their country.

stations; and there are a greater number of these to be met with in Britain than America. In towns also, the inhabitants do not encrease so fast as in the country, \* and Britain contains rather a greater proportion of these than our colonies; though the disproportion in this respect is not very considerable. To obviate, however, all appearance of partiality on this head I shall suppose that one half of the whole inhabitants in Britain either live in towns, or are persons in exalted station, and that these never encrease at all, but barely serve to keep up their original numbers. The other half we will put on an equality with the Americans, and say they encrease at the rate of two thirds their number in thirty years.



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\* Those who form a comparative estimate of the increase of people in towns and in the country, merely from the births compared with the burials in each, form a very erroneous estimate. Those who are born in the country, and go into towns at an after period, have their births recorded in the country, but not their deaths: the births, therefore, must far exceed the deaths. On the contrary, these very persons have their deaths recorded in the towns, but no corresponding births, which must make the deaths far outnumber the births, even although the children that are born in a town should prove as healthy as others born in the country. No conclusion can be drawn from the comparative proportion of births and deaths in any two places, unless all migrations are taken into the account also.





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From these, however still great deductions are to be made, on account of the emigrations to America, to Ireland, and other more distant settlements, belonging to the British Empire. And on account of those lost in defence of ourselves and of our colonies, and in carrying on our extensive commerce to all parts of the globe.

In estimating the waste of our people by our military and commercial transactions, it is necessary that we take into the account, not only the persons themselves who might be enrolled in either of these classes were a *census* regularly taken, but those also who are connected with and dependent upon them, who are always much more numerous than the persons themselves. This swells the account much beyond what one who is not acquainted with these matters would expect to find. Of this class of people it further deserves to be remarked, that as they in general require to be renewed entirely once in ten years at most, in the following account which is divided into periods of thirty years, the whole number supposed to be employed at one time must be trebled.

With regard to the American emigrants, the account above given constitutes the basis of that which follows. But as it appears that at  
the



the early periods of these settlements many more emigrants went from Britain than were taken into the account in America, there is a necessity of making a proper allowance on that account. We have seen that not above one fifth part of the emigrants formed a permanent establishment in America. In proportion as the colonies became more powerful this great mortality diminished, till it came to the present standard of about one half. For under the most favourable circumstances for emigration, I am assured it never has been found that more than one half of those who leave Europe have been able to survive the hardships of a long voyage, \* change of climate and poverty, so as to be able to form a permanent establishment on the continent. I have made allowance for this change of circumstances and have marked the proportion at each period.

It

\* The hardships that poor emigrants suffer in going to America, are often much greater than those who are unacquainted with them can easily suspect. Ship-masters, with a view to make profit of the small freight these persons are able to afford, lay in provisions of the worst and cheapest kind, and in such small quantities as subjects them to the most grievous distresses, if the voyage is not extremely short. A little before the commencement of the present war, emigrations from Scotland were numerous. Some of the vessels were put back by bad weather, after they had failed some time. The poor creatures, when they arrived,

exhi -

It only needs to be further added, that at the time when the British settlements in America first began to take place, I suppose the whole inhabitants of Britain amounted to about five millions. These particulars being premised, the following account will be sufficiently intelligible.

I shall only further remark, that instead of dividing the inhabitants into two classes as above-mentioned, one half increasing two thirds of their whole number at each period, and the other half none at all. I mark it all under one, making the increase on the whole at each period one third, which comes exactly to the same thing.

I. Anno 1600, the inhabitants of  
Britain were by supposition about 5,000,000

Carried over 5,000,000

exhibited a pitiable spectacle to those who beheld them. Without money, with few cloaths, and little food, they must inevitably have perished every one, but for the charitable benefactions of those who had an opportunity of seeing them. What proportion of these reached America, I never could learn; but if one-fourth part of them survived the voyage, and the diseases contracted by it, it is more than any one who saw them expected.—Nor was the case at all uncommon.

Between

( 89 )

Brought over 5,000,000  
Between 1600 and 1630, the increase  
on that number, according to the  
above proportion would be 1,666,666

Making together 6,666,666

From which must be deducted  
For defence and commerce, about  
100,000, which multiplied by 3,  
gives 300,000

By emigrations to America  
during this period as be-  
fore, 2000, which multi-  
plied by 5 gives 10,000

By emigrations to all other  
places 50,000

360,000

Hence the whole amount of people  
in Britain anno 1630, would be 6,306,666

II. From 1630 to 1660, the natural  
increase on these at the above men-  
tioned proportion would amount to 2,102,222

Making in all 8,408,888

From which deduct

For defence and commerce,  
150,000 × 3 450,000

Carried over

N

Brought

( 90 )

Brought over	450,000	
By emigrations to America,		
40,000 × 4	160,000	
By ditto to Ireland and other		
places, suppose	300,000	
Destroyed by the civil wars		
during this period	500,000	
	<hr/>	1,410,000
Total people in Britain anno 1660		6,998,888

III. From 1660 to 1690, the natural  
increase on these as above is

2,332,962

    Making together

9,331,850

    From these deduct

For defence and commerce,

    160,000 × 3           480,000

By emigrants to America

    100 000 × 3.5       350,000

By emigrants to other places

    suppose           600,000

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1,430 000

Total inhabitants anno 1690

7,901,850

IV. From 1690 to 1720, the natural

increase on these as above is

2,633,950

    Making together

10,535,800

Carried over

Brought

	Brought over	10,535,800
From these deduct		
For defence and commerce,		
250,000 × 3	750,000	
By emigrants to America,		
220,000 × 3	660,000	
By emigrants to other places about	850,000	
	<hr/>	2,260,000
Total inhabitants anno 1720		<hr/> 8,275,800

V. From 1720 to 1750, the natural  
increase on these as above is 2,758,600

Making together 11,034,400

From these deduct		
For defence and commerce,		
220,000 × 3	660,000	
By emigrants to America,		
300,000 × 3.5	750,000	
By emigrants to other settle- ments, &c.	900,000	
	<hr/>	2,310,000
Total inhabitants anno 1750		<hr/> 8,724,400

VI. From 1750 to 1780, the natural  
increase on these as above is 2,908,133

Carried over

Making

Making together	11,632,533
From these deduct	
For defence, commerce, &c.	
240,000 × 3	720,000
By emigrants to America,	
500,000 × 2	1,000,000
By emigrants to other	
places	900,000
	<hr/> 2,620,000
Total inhabitants of Britain,	
anno 1780	9,012,533

I do not pretend to say that in the above calculation either the numbers or the proportions are *precisely* exact. They are acknowledged to be taken by conjecture as near the truth as could be guessed at to serve as a clue to direct in forming a judgement on this head. Nor could a small variation on some particular circumstances affect the general conclusions deducible from these data. It may make the excess be a little more or less; but the mode of progression will be the same. The population of any state must undoubtedly be retarded in consequence of emigrations from thence; and the numbers of her people be diminished in proportion to the number that shall be wanted in her defence. If her territories lie compact, and are defended by natural barriers that make the at-

tacks

tacks of her enemies extremely difficult, the waste of people in her defence will be out of all proportion smaller than if her territories are of immense extent, thinly inhabited and exposed to danger in a variety of quarters, so far distant from each other as not to admit of timely assistance from one to another in case of danger.

By the foregoing estimate, it seems that the loss to Britain arising from all these causes, does not yet quite equal the natural encrease by procreation, and that there is reason to think the population of Britain is still in a progressive state, though that progression is much slower than it would have been, but for the many emigrations that have taken place to our colonies. It is plain, however, that should the emigrations be permitted to go on encreasing a little longer, they would soon exceed the natural encrease, after which period, should the same causes continue to operate, our population would not only be retarded, it would stop, and soon after proceed to decrease almost in a geometrical progression, which would quickly bring us into a condition nearly similar to that of Spain. But it is to be hoped the good sense of the nation will ward off this threatened calamity.

Should the inquisitive reader be desirous of pushing his enquiries a little farther, and drawing

ing a parallel between what Britain now is, and what she probably would have been, he has before him the materials for satisfying himself on these heads. Were I not afraid of tiring my readers with long and disgusting calculations, I should have proceeded to state this one as fully as the others. For these reasons, I shall only here observe, that if he were to take the trouble of running over the last account, with no other alteration than barely to omit the article of emigrations to America, and to make a deduction of one third on the article defence, he would find that the number of inhabitants in Britain should at this time have amounted to better than fourteen millions and a half. If so, it is evident that Britain by peopling her American colonies, has lost about five millions and a half of inhabitants, while her colonies have gained only two millions and a half. This is a miserable waste of the human species, but which by being gradual and slow, has escaped the notice of ordinary observers.

If he were further to enquire what effect this change has produced in regard to the trade and industry of Britain, the account would stand thus.

The whole exports to America on an average of ten years preceding 1770, according to Sir Charles Whitworth's tables, (omitting fractions) amounted



amounted to the value of £. 2,300,000. On the other hand, the annual consumption of five millions and a half of people at home, at the rate of ten pounds a head, would have been £. 55,000,000. So that without making any allowance for the surplus of produce and manufactures, that would naturally have been exported to other countries, if Britain had possessed this numerous population, it appears that her industry suffers a diminution to the annual value of upwards of fifty two millions sterling, after allowing the American commerce to be rated at much more than the utmost value it ever was known to attain.

By the same mode of reasoning it will appear that if these colonies should be allowed to continue to encrease *after the same manner* as formerly, and if, in consequence thereof, our exports thither should encrease in the same proportion, yet this encreasing value of the American trade, instead of indicating an encreasing consumption of British produce and manufactures, and by consequence affording an additional *stimulus* to our national industry, would indicate directly the reverse, because our home consumption would decline as it encreased nearly in the proportion of twenty to one.

From

From these considerations I am compelled to draw this general conclusion. That our American colonies, instead of augmenting the trade and industry of Britain, have tended greatly to diminish them both.

Nor can this general conclusion be invalidated by any trifling error in the particulars of the foregoing account; for I must here again repeat it, that a little *more* or *less* in a case of this kind is of no moment, if the general principles are truly explained. If, instead of fifty millions it could be made appear, that the loss should have been stated at twenty, at ten, at five, the general conclusion must still remain the same. I myself believe that the case is nearly as it is here represented; but if another should find reason to think that the result should be either a little higher or a little lower, than I have made it, we have no occasion to differ on that account. My aim is not here to settle with exact precision the amount of the balance, but to shew clearly towards which side it turns.

Nor should we be so far dazzled with the present brilliancy in the appearance of our commerce, as to think there can be nothing real in these suggestions. Nothing is more common than for nations as well as individuals to make a greater brilliancy of appearance for a time, in  
consequence

consequence of a deranged œconomy than they could have done without it. That man, who amidst the giddy whirl of dissipation takes no time to examine into the state of his affairs, but meets with a complaisant banker who readily advances money upon mortgage whenever it is demanded, lives with much greater ease and splendor than he otherwise could have done. He perceives not that the source of his wealth are daily diminishing with an encreasing rapidity, nor thinks that in a short time he will be involved in the most pitiable distress. In like manner Portugal for a time carried on the most brilliant commerce, by means of her numerous settlements in almost every corner of the globe. She did not in due time perceive the consequence of such extended views. At last, however she severely felt, that the waste of people necessary for conducting these vast enterprises, thinned her native country of its best inhabitants, and reduced her to that exhausted state in which we now behold her. Spain, also, adopted a mode of colonization nearly similar to our own, and intoxicated with the benefits she *thought* she derived from it, enquired not into the real tendency of such measures till it was too late. Before she even suspected she was in a declining state, her declension had advanced so far that it was no longer possible for her to recover herself. What law in nature is

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there

there that tends to guard Britain from a similar fate if she shall pursue a similar conduct? And what argument can be adduced to shew that she is not now in a similar state of precarious glory? The population of Britain, there is reason to think, has hitherto continued to advance a little. In consequence of this, and other concurring causes, many of her manufactures have yet been able to keep their ground. Her vigour is yet great, but she stands upon the top of the wheel. Should it take a little turn. Should the time arrive that her population begins to decline, the ruin of her manufactures must quickly follow, in which event no human power could prevent her from sinking into a greater state of debility than has ever been experienced by any other European state. Let us not then neglect the present favourable moment which affords us such a happy opportunity of repairing past errors, and of giving stability to the strength and industry as well as to the constitution of the state. The genius of Britain calls out,

TIME NOW IS : may the period never arrive when she shall pronounce these awful words,  
AND TIME SHALL BE NO MORE \*.

CHAP.

\* This alludes to a popular alchemical tradition. After the process had been watched for many years, the tradition

## C H A P. V.

*Of the effects of the American colonies on Great Britain, with regard to civil Liberty, War and Taxes.*

**I**N forming a judgment concerning the expediency of any political measure, it is necessary that we should not only attend to the effects that seem immediately to spring from it, but also trace those distant consequences which by not being obviously connected with it are sometimes thought to be entirely independent of it. A judicious minister will sometimes effect his purpose by measures that *appear* to have a direct contrary tendency; and a nation is very often ruined by the very measures that have an apparent tendency to promote its prosperity.

This

dition goes, that when it arrived at the exact point of perfection, a voice was heard to say *TIME IS*, which if not attended to, was heard again to say *TIME WAS*, and in a little while it pronounced aloud in the most awful tone, *AND TIME SHALL BE NO MORE*. The last usually awakened the disconsolate operator; who, overcome with watching, had fallen into a sleep too profound to be awakened by the two former more gentle calls.

This maxim is in no case more frequently verified than in what relates to the extension of empire. To the bulk of mankind nothing seems so much to forward the prosperity of a state, and to add to its stability, as the enlarging of its territories, and the subjecting to its power some neighbouring state: yet this very circumstance has proved the destruction of more states than any other that could be named. The reasons why a bare extent of territory without a proportional increase of people proves always pernicious, have been already in some measure explained: but there are other evils that flow from the same cause that must now be taken into the account.

If manufactures and commerce depend in a great measure on the liberty of the subject, it must follow, that whatever has a tendency to endanger that liberty should be carefully guarded against in a free state. Considered in this light, extended empire can seldom prove favourable to a commercial state. Where there are large dominions many are the places of profit that come to be in the disposal of government; and the means of accumulating wealth without the exertions of industry are increased. Fortunes are thus suddenly acquired, which by introducing a great disparity between the condition of individuals of the same class, encourages

rages on one hand a spirit of dependence and dissipation, while it equally discourages a spirit of industry, moderation, and content. Many men who might have been useful members of society lose the best of their days idle expectancy, and remain for ever poor and dependent. Others, having acquired riches by means that perhaps would not bear the strictest scrutiny, have an interest to support the court, whose favour can most effectually screen from danger. In short, whoever has much to give must necessarily obtain many dependents; in proportion to the extent of affairs will be the temptation to abuse, and where there is abuse by those entrusted with command, a servile respect will be paid to the supreme executive power. It is from the operation of these causes that the liberties of Europe have gradually begun to disappear as the kingdoms became more extensive: and it was thus that the court of Spain in particular, at a very early period after she obtained possession of America, found herself enabled to trample upon the ancient privileges of that free and haughty people.

The constitution of Britain will effectually guard against a despotism under the same form with that of Spain; but many are the ways in which the same cause may operate destructive effects upon a trading nation. Every circumstance,

stance, therefore, which tends to facilitate the sudden acquisition of money by court favour, should be guarded against with care, as endangering the liberty of the state. In this sense, extended empire must ever prove pernicious.

But it is not on this account alone that our connection with the American settlements is to be dreaded. The temptation it affords for frequent wars, is a source of still greater mischiefs to a free, commercial, and manufacturing state.

Of all the scourges to which mankind are subjected, war is doubtless the most considerable. It not only sweeps away by a premature death numbers of the human species, but it often paves the way for such miseries to the survivors, as makes the lot of those who fell in battle worthy of envy. To develop all the mischiefs that flow from it would require a more masterly pen than mine; a few of its most obvious effects, and such as more nearly affect the object of our present disquisition, may be shortly delineated.

During the continuance of war, the national expence is greatly augmented; and in the confusion that necessarily arises from its numerous operations, a wide door is opened for accumulated frauds and abuses. Fortunes thus come  
to



to be acquired with a rapidity, and to an extent unknown at other periods: and this being foreseen, makes every needy expectant in the nation look forward with joy to the period when it seems to approach, and do every thing he can to accelerate it.

Nor is the idle and the needy dependents on the court only, who look forward with pleasure to the approach of war: monied men behold it with equal joy. They foresee that the wants of government will soon be such as to demand their assistance. To insure that, they know they will be placed in such a situation, as shall permit them to avail themselves to the utmost of those treasures, towards the accumulation of which their thoughts are chiefly directed. I forbear to point out the various arts which this class of men have devised for profiting by the exigencies of the public. It shall suffice for me here to observe, that they are so well known in Britain as most effectually to insure their concurrence to every measure that can tend to protract the war.

From the influence of these two powerful classes of men, aided by the national folly, which ever grasps at extended dominion, a wise and good minister, were he willing, dares hardly listen to terms of accommodation, 'till the nation

tion is involved in such misery as prevents a possibility of advancing farther. All other classes of men, indeed, so quickly feel the inconveniences of war, that were they capable of making themselves heard as well as the money-lenders, or were they as good judges of what promotes their own interest, they would soon put a stop to its career.

In consequence of the exorbitant profit to be made by money in the capital during war, all that can possibly be raised is carried thither. Money lent in the most distant corners of the country, for the purposes of industry or commerce, is recalled. This narrows the circle of credit in an amazing degree, and slackens the hand of industry in proportion. Manufactures decline, and poverty in the remote provinces is experienced to a distressing excess. Many are thus forced to leave their native homes, the seats of sober industry, and hasten to the capital, where they become fit tools for ministering to the wants of dissipation and of guilt, and are lost for ever as useful members of the community.

It is thus that war, while it destroys with wonderful rapidity the industrious part of the nation, increases almost in the same proportion the number of its useless, its destructive members. By drawing the whole money towards  
the

the capital, and a few other places, its circulation is confined. It involves the provinces in misery, while it overwhelms the court and its dependents with riches, and buries them in dissipation. National wealth, to those who judge only from the capital, is increasing; while in truth, want and indolence are approaching with hasty strides.

Such are the natural, and necessary consequences of war. How careful then should every wise state be to avoid placing herself in a situation that may give frequent opportunities for the worthless part of her people, by imposing upon the foolish, to involve her in war.— But extent of empire in every case, affords numberless temptations to engage in war; and an empire extended like the British empire in America, is peculiarly liable to this defect. It at the same time diminishes our strength, and exposes us to danger. Was it for the interest of Britain to drain herself of men, to people those vast deserts, when such effects might naturally be expected to flow from it?

But it is not by the unequal circulation of money only, nor by the temporary suspension of credit, that war and extended empire prove hurtful to a manufacturing kingdom. The money then expended forms a heavy load of debt,

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which

which continues to depress industry and retard manufactures long after the war is ended. The sums too that are acquired during peace to command respect, and to give security to our widely extended provinces, are of themselves so great, as to be alone a heavy burthen. Both together cannot fail to be attended with the most serious consequences.

Taxes necessarily enhance the price of manufactures, and by consequence depress the industry and diminish the trade of a manufacturing and commercial nation in proportion to their amount. This proposition is so generally assented to, as to need no illustration here. And as the expence of government must now-a-days be entirely defrayed by taxes, it follows that whatever increases the expence of government, must augment the taxes upon the subjects of the state.

But if, with the expence of government the number of the people increases in an equal proportion, the same taxes will become more productive, so as to answer the exigencies of the state without pressing more heavily upon any individuals, or discouraging manufactures in the smallest degree. If, on the contrary, that expence be greatly augmented, while the people do not increase nearly in the same proportion,

new

new taxes become necessary. Every individual must contribute more to the state than formerly. The price of manufactures must be enhanced, and the foreign demand must be diminished in proportion.

From hence it appears, that as the great business of a modern minister is to contrive ways and means for defraying the expence of government, without discouraging the agriculture or manufactures of a state, one effectual method of attaining that end is to promote as much as possible the population of the kingdom.

Since the discovery of America, this mode of augmenting the national revenue seems to have been entirely overlooked in Europe. In consequence of our settlements on that continent, the national expence has prodigiously augmented, and in proportion to that augmentation has our population been retarded. At the first period, five millions of people paid by taxes to the amount of one million and a half per annum; which amounted to about six shillings a head. At present nine millions of people pay fifteen millions per annum\*, or about one pound four-  
teen

\* Dr. Price computes the whole amount of the taxes levied on the people of Great Britain to be about 15 millions, exclusive of poor rates, turnpikes, &c. &c. Observations on Civil Liberty, 9th edit. Appendix.

teen shillings a head, which is almost six times the former sum. A disproportion which has raised the price of our manufactures and retarded their sale in every market to which they can be sent. An evil this that has been often felt and complained of, though little care has been bestowed to discover the source from whence it springs, or to guard against the effects that may naturally be expected from it.

The amount of our taxes has indeed afforded a subject for much declamation; but the causes of the great encrease of the national expence which occasions these taxes, has seldom been thought of. The pressure of our taxes has been complained of, but it has not been suggested that this pressure has been greatly augmented in consequence of the paucity of our people, which has been in a great measure occasioned by the emigrations to America, and our exertions in its defence. When our manufacturers have been thrown out of employment, from a stagnation of demand in foreign markets, occasioned by the circumstances abovenamed, instead of contriving means to alleviate their burthens, and to furnish them with employment at home, allurements have been held out to entice them to the colonies, where taxes were hardly known and protection has been afforded *gratis*. It does not seem to have been adverted to by those who promoted

promoted these measures, that in consequence of the migrations arising from these causes, the taxes on those behind would require to be augmented, and that of course, the evil complained of would be increased, and greater migrations become necessary; which, if the same conduct is to be observed, must go on increasing till the total depopulation of the state puts a stop to them.

Had our people instead of being enticed to go to America, been kept at home and encouraged to prosecute manufactures with vigour, we should have been at once freed of all the expence that has been laid out in the settlement and defence of that country, which can hardly be reckoned less than one half the whole national expence; instead of twenty millions our expediture would in that case, have in all probability, scarce amounted to six millions a year; and instead of nine millions of people, we should, in all probability, have possessed fifteen. In that case, our whole taxes, instead of forty-four shillings and five-pence, would not have amounted to more than seven shillings and six-pence a head. I leave any one to judge what encouragement our manufactures would receive, were such an abatement of our taxes at present to take place, or rather to consider what encouragement our manufactures would have received in regard to  
foreign

foreign trade, especially had such a rise in our taxes never taken place. In that case we should not have been obliged to have had recourse to monopolies and other similar contrivances to support our decaying manufactures, but would have found a ready sale in the world at large for all we could have produced, without the aid of any compulsory means whatever.

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## C H A P. VI,

*Of the effects of the monopoly of the American trade on the manufactures and commerce of Great Britain.*

**I**N consequence of the causes that have been enumerated in the last chapter, and others that shall soon be mentioned, the price of many of the manufactures of Britain has been so much enhanced, that they have not been able to stand a competition with the manufactures of other nations in foreign markets, and our trade in those articles has greatly declined. Our trade to the Levant in woollen cloths, which was once an object of great national importance, has dwindled to nothing, since the French and the Dutch



Dutch have there become our competitors in that article, and the sale of our woollen manufactures in Germany and the Baltic has, from the same causes greatly declined. To prevent the total downfall of that favourite national manufacture, no better expedient has been devised than to obtain a monopoly in the trade for woollen manufacture in all places in which we have had influence enough to effect it. This is the case in regard to Portugal, our colonies in America, and Britain itself: from all which places we have endeavoured by every device we could contrive to exclude the woollen manufactures of other nations. But small are the advantages that are derived from such despicable expedients as this.

..ffc

A monopoly of trade is always a favourite measure among merchants, because it tends directly to enrich the immediate monopolist. Yet it seldom happens that a nation is benefited *upon the whole* by a monopoly of trade; and it always happens that a monopoly of any branch of manufacture proves in the end extremely prejudicial to the interests of the community which obtains it. The reasons of this will be sufficiently obvious to any one who reflects but slightly upon the subject.

The

The manufacturer who finds himself freed from the concurrence of a competitor in the market, will naturally take less pains to have his goods made perfect in their kind, than he would have taken, had he dreaded the preference that might have been given to the goods of his rival.

The merchant likewise, when he finds that his customers cannot be supplied by any other than himself, demands and obtains a higher profit than he otherwise could have got.

No goods being returned or sold below prime cost in this market, both merchants and manufactures obtain very great profits for a time; and neither of them once think of the perfection of the goods, but merely how they may get them made at as small a price as possible, and thus augment their profits.

Things go on in this train for some time, till the workmen acquire a slovenly manner of working, that renders their goods less fit for other markets than they used to be. The master manufacturers thus finding their profits very considerable, wish, each of them, to possess as much of this lucrative business as possible; to obtain which they give a little more wages to their workmen than formerly. Other manufacturers

facturers to secure their business are obliged to give as much. Thus do they go on gradually outbidding one another till the wages raise so high that, that with all the advantages of the monopoly, no more money can be made by that branch of business than by any other.

Here however, it is observable, that the great profits which were at first divided between the master manufacturer and the merchant, gradually pass from them and come in time to be appropriated by the labouring manufacturers; who by thus obtaining more money than is necessary to maintain them in their former frugal mode of living, either work less, or acquire a taste for a more luxurious mode of living. In either case the effect upon the manufacture is the same. What was at first a mere gratuitous price, demanded only with a view to augment the profits of trade, comes at length to constitute a part of the price of the manufacture itself. Had that exorbitant profit never been demanded, the manufacture could have been carried on as formerly at its old low price; but so soon as this profit forms a part of the price of the goods they never will, nor indeed can be afforded lower, for reasons that shall by and by be made manifest.

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It

It is a peculiarity attending political regulations, that if the oeconomy is deranged in one particular instance, it is immediately communicated through the whole, and equally effects every department. Thus, in the case now under consideration, the particular manufacture alluded to, yielding higher profit to those employed in it than could be obtained in others, necessarily raises the wages of all other manufactures, till they become as high as in this branch. The same thing happens with labourers in agriculture ; which proportionally raises the price of the necessaries of life. By this transition the profit goes from the manufacturer to the labourer and landlord, where it reits. In this manner does every monopoly of manufacture naturally operate so as to raise the price of all the manufactures in the kingdom, and by consequence diminish the demand for them from the world at large where a free trade is allowed.

The free market for manufactures thus coming gradually to decay, the manufacturers turn their attention chiefly to the monopoly market. The price of the goods to themselves is now higher than formerly ; it must, by consequence be also higher to the consumers. The purchasers learn in time that they might be supplied cheaper from other markets. They complain.

But

But these complaints if the monopolists have power will procure them no redress. Attempts are made to elude the law that secures the monopoly. Severer laws are devised to enforce the former. The monopolists and consumers thus become secret and bitter enemies to each other. As the temptation to elude the laws become stronger, a contraband trade takes place, which no human power can ever prevent when the profit by it is considerable. In consequence of this demand for the manufacture even to this market gradually declines, and none other can be found. Manufacturers thus thrown out of employment must either beg or starve, or leave the country. A miserable choice, but a necessary one in such a case, unless measures shall have been previously taken to guard against this great evil.

Had the monopoly of the trade to our American colonies been as really efficacious as many seem to think it was, consequences similar to the above must long ago have been experienced: but luckily for Britain means were found by the colonists from the beginning to elude the force of these restraints in many essential articles, while the bulk of the nation believed they were strictly complied with. These circumstances however were always very well known to the ministers of Great Britain, but whether through

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indolence,

indolence, or from whatever other motives I pretend not to say, they were winked at; till of late, when an attempt to reform this, along with some other internal abuses that had long prevailed in the colonies, lighted up the civil war that rages at present: war that has been carried on with such pertinacity, as must prove highly prejudicial to both parties, and which will probably end in a considerable alteration in the circumstances of both. How far this alteration may be advantageous to either party, it is impossible to ascertain until the alteration has actually taken place. But it behoves every one concerned to look forward with a view to point out such circumstances as may lead to a settlement as little prejudicial to either party as possible.

From this minute survey of the foregoing particulars, it appears, that in every point of view in which we have considered the subject, the Interest of Great Britain has been hurt by the establishment of her North American colonies. This conclusion is, however, so contrary to the opinion of political writers in general, and to the prepossessions of the people of this country at large, that it will undoubtedly be by many deemed erroneous. In these circumstances, however much I myself may be convinced of the sufficiency of the foregoing arguments

ments to authorise the conclusion ; yet the respect that is in all cases due to the judgment of the many when opposed by an individual, induces me to examine with candour such other arguments as I have heard adduced in favour of the beneficial consequences that are supposed to have resulted to Britain from the colonies now under consideration.

## C H A P. VII.

*Miscellaneous observations on the importance of the American colonies to Great Britain considered.*

**I**T is alledged, " That the trade of Great Britain to her American colonies is an object of great magnitude: that it has gradually encreased with the encrease of inhabitants in the colonies, till at last it has become nearly equal to the whole exports from England to the world at large, before these colonies were planted. From hence it is contended, that had it not been for these colonies the commerce of the parent state would not  
" now

“ now have been of much more than half its  
 “ present value.”

It is not denied that the value of the exports to America, appear from the custom house books, to bear a very large proportion to that of the whole exports from Britain about two hundred years ago ; but it does not from hence follow, either that the commerce of Britain is nearly doubled since that period, or, supposing it has been doubled, that this would not have taken place, although the colonies had never existed.

With regard to the first of these positions, it has been already shewn, that if the exports to our colonies have encreased, the home consumption of our own produce and manufactures must have decreased in a much greater proportion. The greater therefore the amount of these exports, the greater must be the decrease of our manufactures *upon the whole*, although the particular branch of commerce that ranks under the head of *foreign* trade has encreased. Unfortunately this is the only branch of trade that seems to be attended to by modern political writers. Such has not always been the case. About the beginning of this century a political miscellany was published, entitled *The British Merchant*, under the immediate inspection



spection of Mr. Gee, Sir Josiah Child, Sir Theodore Janssen, and others of the most distinguished rank in the political and mercantile line, whose sentiments on this subject the author expresses thus.

“ The first and best market of England are “ the natives and inhabitants of England.” and he further computes “ that all our foreign markets cannot be equal to *one twentieth part* of “ our own for taking off our native product and “ manufactures.” \*

“ It remains therefore, continues he, as I said “ at first, that our own consumption, the consumption of our own people, are the best and “ greatest market for the product and manufactures of our own country.”

“ *The preservation and encrease of this market, “ ought therefore to be the thing principally attended to.*” †

How far this maxim has been attended to by those who have so much encouraged the settlement of America by our own people, every one is left to determine for himself. The very respectable

\* British merchant, vol. 1. p. 165.

† Ibid. vol. i. p. 167.

respectable authority, I have here produced in support of the arguments before made use of, will free me from the imputation of maintaining opinions either novel or paradoxical. But to return,

Neither does it follow, that if we never had possessed any share of the American trade, our exports and foreign commerce would not have encreased. The contrary seems demonstrable. Since the period mentioned, the liberties of British subjects have been secured, and their rights respected in a much higher degree than formerly; in consequence of which their exertions in manufactures and commerce have been much greater than heretofore. From these causes, our foreign trade, exclusive of that to our colonies, has increased to nearly three times its former amount. Had our people, instead of going to America, remained at home, our manufacturers would have been far more numerous than at present. Had we been freed of the expence of protecting them, our taxes would have been the fewer, and their pressure upon industry much less severe. Had we never experienced the destructive effects of the American monopoly, our labour would have been less expensive, and our manufacturers more industrious. From all these considerations it is obvious, that our manufactures in general could have been afforded much cheaper

cheaper than at present: in consequence of which they would have found a ready vent in those nations where our commerce has declined, because of the circumstances already enumerated. The probability therefore is, that our foreign trade, as well as our internal commerce would have increased to a much greater degree than it has done, had it not been for our American colonies.

II. " It is not uncommon to find authors  
 " who with a view to demonstrate the import-  
 " ance of the colonies, enter into a pompous de-  
 " tail of all the benefits that flow from trade ;  
 " the whole of which they pretend that Britain  
 " derives from her colonies: inferring from  
 " thence, that if we had not been possessed of  
 " these colonies, we never could have experi-  
 " enced any of those benefits."

To answer such an argument as this requires an apology; but in a country like Britain, where all mankind claim a right to decide on national affairs, it is necessary sometimes to prove such propositions, as that two and two are greater than three. To pass over an argument is by some believed to imply a tacit acknowledgement that it is unanswerable.

On this occasion, without attempting to reason, I would observe, that experience fully refutes the argument. According to the above reasoning, Spain, which possesses the most extensive colonies of any European power, should likewise enjoy the most extensive commerce: while Holland, whose trade to her own colonies (were it to do no more than supply their own demands, could easily be managed by one single vessel) should possess next to no trade at all. The fact however, is directly the reverse. Holland, which possesses scarce any colonies,\* carries on a very extensive and lucrative commerce, whereas the trade of Spain is small, and is, *to her*, rather destructive in its consequences. In Holland, manufactures flourish, though she has no extensive market abroad of her own people to whom she can send them. In Spain they languish, although she has a most extensive territory in America peopled with her own subjects, who depend on Europe for a great part of their manufactures, and to whose trade she claims an exclusive title.

From these facts it is evident that neither trade nor manufactures are inseparably connected with colonies. Britain enjoys a great trade, and carries on considerable manufactures, while she likewise possesses extensive colonies. This how-  
ever

\* I do not reckon her possessions in the East Indies colonies, properly so called.

ever does not imply but she might have enjoyed a still more extensive trade, and more flourishing manufactures without any colonies at all, had circumstances concurred to produce that effect.

III. " Our American colonies have been like-  
 " wise held up to public view, as the sole cause  
 " of that superiority at sea which is possessed by  
 " Britain, without which she must have ever  
 " remained an inconsiderable state, perpetually  
 " exposed to insults from her more powerful  
 " neighbours."

But is it not merely in consequence of an extensive trade, that any state can ever be enabled to acquire a superiority at sea? And has it not been just now shewn that trade is not necessarily connected with colonies? If so, neither can naval power be necessarily dependent on them. In fact, Britain possessed the superiority at sea before she had any colonies at all. Spain never enjoyed it, although she has always had more extensive colonies than any other European power. The Dutch, when they applied their minds to war, without possessing a single inch of territory beyond the bounds of their own marshes, beat the Spaniards in every part of the globe. It is not, therefore, colonies that ensure

a superiority at sea. It is other circumstances that may or may not be connected with them.

IV. " Others have contended that our American colonies have been of immense advantage to Britain, merely by preventing France or Spain from occupying these fertile regions and becoming our rivals in trade."

But supposing it could be proved that the trade thither would have been of as much consequence to those nations, or to us, as it is here supposed, would it not have been possible to have secured it to ourselves, by erecting proper forts along the coast, without adopting the idea of peopling the country? This has been done in Hudson's bay, in Africa, and in Asia, with an infinitely smaller expence and waste of people. Why might not the same have been done in America? The answer is easy. The trade with the natives would not have been worth even that expence, small as it might have been. But if the commerce with the natives was not worth the expence of strong factories along the coast, it was of small consequence who had taken possession of it. And if these desarts were to be peopled by the subjects of any European state, it has been already shewn, that the trade and manufactures of that state would be much hurt, and its internal riches and strength greatly diminished thereby. It was not therefore our  
intetest

interest to prevent either the French or the Spaniards from taking possession of it, and peopling it, if they had been so dispersed, we ought rather to have promoted this design, if we meant to avail ourselves of their distractions and internal weakness.

V. "Others have contended, that in a country  
 " where luxury is so far advanced as in Britain,  
 " there must always be some persons of desperate  
 " fortunes, who, by being unable to earn a com-  
 " fortible subsistence at home, are desirous of  
 " going to some distant country, where they may  
 " begin life, as it were, upon a new plan, with-  
 " out being under the eye of their old acquaint-  
 " ances. In these circumstances it is alledged,  
 " it is better to provide an asylum for them in  
 " our own settlements abroad, than to compel  
 " them to seek shelter in a foreign coun-  
 " try, where they would add to the riches and  
 " strength, perhaps of our enemies."

No doubt but the argument here used is just, in as far as it concerns men in these circumstances. But because it would be in some respects beneficial to Britain to retain in her distant settlements *a few* men of broken fortunes, does it follow that on their account she should attempt to people an immense continent at the expence of several millions of her best subjects? With the same consistency might a physician argue, that  
 because



because in certain acute disorders it is of use to take away a little blood; it would be necessary to have a principal vein opened, and to allow it to run *ad libitum* without attempting to stop it.

It is allowed that on all occasions it is better if possible to prevent a disease than to cure it. This maxim, so universally admitted in physic, seems to be too little attended to in political affairs. Hence laws are multiplied for punishing crimes, but little care is taken to remove those circumstances that give rise to them. Nothing, it has been shewn, has such a tendency to discourage a spirit of industry and frugality among a people, as a great inequality in the circumstances of individuals of the same class, when that is obtained by any other means than a steady application to business. It has been also shewn that the frequent wars and other transactions which accompany extended empire, are the most effectual means hitherto known for destroying that equality of condition which is the nurse of moderation and industry. The settling America, therefore, must have had a powerful tendency to augment the malady complained of, instead of removing it, as the advocates for this system have contended. The truth is, in a well-regulated state, the number of the unfortunate members of society above-mentioned



mentioned will be so small, as to require no particular establishment to be made on their account. In a state where commerce, in particular, is carried on to a very great extent, there will always be a sufficient number of outlets for industrious persons in these circumstances, without attempting to settle colonies on their account. A legislature which guards against institutions that have a tendency to involve unwary persons in distress, may leave to individuals the charge of taking care of the few who may happen to have been brought into distress by other causes.

VI. "Much as likewise been said about the  
 " expence of the poor laws in England. The  
 " number of poor and difficulty of provided  
 " for them here. The ease with which they  
 " could support themselves in America, and the  
 " propriety of allowing them to go thither,  
 " where they would encrease and become the  
 " fathers of a numerous posterity, instead of  
 " being an unproductive load on society here."

Without entering deeply into all the discussions which this investigation would naturally lead to, I shall only here observe, that however desirable it might be to have the numerous poor, who are such a heavy load on the industry of Britain, removed from thence, and however  
 practicable

practicable it might be for them to support themselves elsewhere, yet it is believed there is not a single instance to be found of one person who ever came upon the parish funds in England, having *voluntarily* gone over to America with a view to better his condition. It is the young, the active members of society that transport themselves thither, and not the aged or infirm. It is those who should contribute towards the poor's funds rather than those who draw sustenance from thence, who desert the country. Instead therefore of relieving the pressure of the poor laws, these emigrations rather tend to augment them. America therefore has never been of any use to England in that way. It may be added, she never can be so while the poor laws are suffered to remain on their present footing. To what country can a poor person go where he will be so liberally supported as in England? It is not surely to America.

But if the case had been otherwise. If it were even true that the poor were subjected to such hardships here as forced them to seek for relief in America, whether would it be wiser to suffer those grievances to continue, without applying a remedy, or to try to discover and remove the causes of that distress? No one will hesitate to say it would be wisest to attempt the last. If then our poor rates are expensive, inadequate  
and

and oppressive, why not investigate the causes of these grievances and remove them? It is not my intention here to enter into this discussion; but it may be proper to observe, that if they are expensive they are not so to the poor, but to those in easy circumstances. If they are oppressive they are not so to the idle, the spend-thrift, and the drunkard, but to the sober, the industrious, and the frugal. They have therefore a necessary tendency to attract poor instead of driving them away from the country. I add, a tendency to encourage dissipation and idleness at the expence of sobriety and industry. Is it wise to tolerate an evil of this nature?

We find in effect, it is not from those parts of the country, where the poor laws prevail, that the most copious emigrations take place. It is from those parts where this system of laws is not known. It is from those parts of the country where on account of the paucity of inhabitants, industry has not yet been fully established. Is it wise then to discourage their industry by exciting them to emigrations?

It will be said if the inhabitants there have already too little employment, is it not better to banish them to our colonies where they will become industrious, than to suffer them to remain indolent at home? If half the inhabitants are sufficient for all the labour, why not drive the other half away, that the former may live comfortable on what the latter used to consume?

This was probably the reasoning of Spain, as it is what her conduct has corresponded to. She did not perceive that by these measures the little industry she had must still be growing less.

I have had occasion to shew that by driving away the inhabitants you must necessarily diminish the industry of the state. Encrease them, and you as necessarily augment it. The inhabitants of their country, are the consumers of nineteen twentieths of its produce and manufactures; as it has been already computed— I would say rather of forty-nine fiftieths, as the reader will find proved in the margin.\* The diminution

\* We must not estimate the improvement, on the industry of a state by the value of its exports. It is only those exports which consist of the produce and manufactures of the country itself, which promote the industry of its inhabitants. Till these therefore are ascertained, the value of goods exported, can convey no idea of the benefit that the national industry derives from its trade. We export annually of East India goods to the value of seven or eight hundred thousand pounds. These do not promote the industry of the nations. We export annually to the value of near two millions in coin and bullion, that does not surely promote the manufactures of Britain. A nation might carry on trade to an immense extent, without exporting a single article either of their own manufactures or produce. The exports from St. Eustatia in time of war are perhaps equal to a thousand times the value of the whole produce of the Island. From hence I conclude, that no idea can be formed of the augmentation of the industry that Britain derives from her commerce, merely by considering the value of her exports.

We come somewhat nearer the truth by estimating it according-

diminution therefore, of this market must produce a very sensible change in the total amount of the national industry.

This diminution of industry is always in a much greater proportion than the diminution of the number of the people, and that for the reasons assigned at large in the second chapter. With the debility occasioned by these migrations the weight of the taxes must encrease, and the discouragements to manufactures be augmented. In proportion therefore as you remove the inhabitants you diminish their industry and augment their poverty, instead of augmenting their industry and adding to their riches, as the advocates for this system contend.

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For

According to the balance of the value of exports above the imports; though this also, like every thing that depends upon custom house books, is liable to great exceptions. The excess in this respect in favour of Britain, appears to be on an average of several years past, according to Sir Charles Whitworth's tables about two millions and a half per annum. From this must be deducted the value of bullion exported annually, as that, without a doubt must have been imported, although no such article appears on the custom-house books. This would leave little more than half a million clear in favour of Britain. I am far, however, from thinking that custom house books are of such authority as to be relied on implicitly, as a criterion in matters of this kind. But when it is considered that the national home consumption cannot be less than ninety millions, and that it *probably* amounts to upwards of a hundred and eighty, millions it will I hope be admitted that the position in the text is far from being beyond the truth.

For these, and other reasons, (which for brevity I omit,) it has always been experienced that in every country in which the inhabitants are decreasing in number, manufactures and industry are on the decline; and that on the contrary, wherever the people are encreasing, their industry is found to be encreasing in a yet more rapid progression than that of their numbers. This is a rule that I believe admits of no exception, and clearly proves the pernicious tendency of that popular spirit of monopoly which is at all times so jealous of admitting strangers to settle in a state, lest they should, in the proverbial language of the vulgar, *eat the bread out of their mouths*: as if all modern history was almost a continued illustration of the erroneousness of this doctrine. Whoever heard of the destructive effects produced to the nation, or the hardships imposed on the inhabitants by the Walloons whom Elizabeth protected? What evils has the republic of Holland experienced from the numbers of people to whom she has offered an asylum from all countries? Is it not to this cause alone she owes her prosperity and opulence? What bad effects do the inhabitants of Leeds, Manchester and Liverpool, experience from the great accession of people, from other parts of the country who have been drawn thither within a few years? Have these new comers eaten the bread *out of the mouths* of the old inhabitants? no such thing.

All

All parties live more easy than formerly, and industry is greatly augmented. Let a contrary revolution take place, let the inhabitants decrease in the same proportion, for an equal number of years, what would be the change? Their manufactures would be totally lost. Their few inhabitants would be reduced to a state of abject indolence. Provisions would not be produced sufficient to feed them, although for the present numerous body of people there is an abundance and to spare; and poverty and want would be universally experienced instead of the wealth with which those places abound at present.

The only other argument that occurs to me in favour of colonies is,

VII. "That when a country becomes too full of inhabitants so that they are straitened for room, and do not find means of subsistence, it becomes necessary to drive away a part of the people, that the remainder may be enabled to live."

This last seems to have been almost the sole reason for establishing colonies in *antient times*: but it is seldom mentioned *directly* by modern authors, though often hinted at in an indirect and oblique manner. There is good reason for this difference. In *antient times*, when industry, according to our idea of it was not known, the evil complained of was often *really* experienced.

In modern times such a thing is hardly possible.  
Industry



Industry and commerce can supply every defect, even where the very surface of the earth is wanting. Holland experiences an universal plenty, although its soil in its most improved state cannot, according to De Witt, support one third of its inhabitants, and in its original state could not perhaps have maintained one thousandth part of them \*. In a commercial state wherever industry prevails provisions will be found in abundance, however unfavourable the situation may be; of which Leeds and Wakefield in Yorkshire are noted examples: wherever indolence prevails, however rich the soil and few the inhabitants, scarcity will be often experienced. When Spain possessed above twenty five millions of people, they had all abundance of food and to spare. It was, of old, the granary, in some measure, of Carthage and of Rome; now, that its people exceed not eight millions they are often obliged to depend upon others for subsistence.

But if industry may procure subsistence to numerous inhabitants where the soil itself is altogether wanting, it will be far more easy to be effected where that is to be found in abundance. On a barren soil it is scarcely possible to form an idea of the improvement in point of fertility that

\* De Witt says, if all the land of Holland were sown with wheat, and if it yielded on an average ten sacks per morgen, (a morgen is about two acres) the whole produce would not be sufficient to afford the inhabitants one pound of bread per day each. Interest of Holland.



that may take place by human industry, nor will that be wanting wherever numbers of men are now collected together. I myself know fields which twenty years ago were so sterile, that the produce of a hundred acres would scarce have furnished subsistence to one man, any acre of which at present would be enough to furnish him with full subsistence throughout the year.

Here we cannot help remarking what an amazing difference there is between man and other animals. With regard to the last nature has set bounds to their increase by limiting their food. The amount of this they never can encrease, so that if their numbers rise beyond what that is able to maintain they must be starved. Not so with man in a civilized state. By his exertions he can encrease the quantity of his food to an inconceivable amount. Hence it may easily happen that a country which at one time produces a scanty proportion of provisions for a few inhabitants, may produce at another time more than sufficient for fifty times their number. Indeed this not only *may* but *must* be the case if surface of soil abounds, and industry encreases. The reverse must as necessarily happen if population and industry decrease; as the example of Spain, the pope's territories in Italy, and many others abundantly prove. Deterioration is still an easier process than amelioration.

Hence it follows that no commercial country can be too fully peopled where industry abounds.

But

But with regard to Britain in particular, whose territory could maintain, if fully improved, not less than an hundred times its present inhabitants, there was no necessity to search for colonies on this account.

Thus have I at length arrived at the end of this important disquisition. The result of the whole is. *That our American colonies instead of promoting the trade and manufactures of Great Britain, have tended in a most powerful manner to depress them. That instead of adding strength and stability to the empire, they have necessarily weakened it in a great degree, and exposed it to the most imminent danger. That, therefore, the settling of these colonies at first was unwise, and the subsequent encouragement that was given them highly impolitic.*

Here then my task should end. But I should leave the subject imperfect, did I not further enquire what are the most proper steps to be pursued by Britain to ward off the dangers which may be expected to spring from that source in future; or what is the most likely conduct now to be pursued to make these colonies contribute in the most effectual manner to promote the interest of the Mother Country. Such are the objects discussed in the following appendix.

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## A P P E N D I X.

**A**FTER considering what has been said in the preceding part of this Essay, the following question would naturally occur to every attentive enquirer.—

“ Although it should be admitted that it  
“ was at first unwise in Britain to begin to  
“ plant colonies in America, and impo-  
“ litic in her afterwards to encourage her  
“ subjects to migrate thither; yet, as these  
“ things have been already done, and can-  
“ not now be undone, and as in conse-  
“ quence thereof the colonies have become  
“ considerable, and their trade has grown  
“ to be an object of great magnitude,  
“ would it now be wise and politic in  
“ Britain to renounce all claim to that  
“ commerce? Would it not be more ju-  
“ dicious in her rather to cultivate that  
“ trade with the utmost care, as the most  
“ effectual means in her power to reap any  
“ advantage from the colonies, and repair  
“ the errors she has already committed? ”

The answer to this query is obvious. It is the interest of Britain to promote her own manufactures and commerce to the utmost of her power; therefore it should be her study, by every judicious method she can devise, to secure to herself as much of the American trade as possible.

“ Is it, on the other hand, the interest  
 “ of Britain to continue to defend and  
 “ protect her American colonies; to fight  
 “ their battles as heretofore, at her own  
 “ expence, without drawing from thence  
 “ sufficient funds to indemnify her for the  
 “ additional charge thus incurred, both  
 “ in her civil and military establishment?”  
 Surely not. Inevitable ruin, should such a system be persisted in, must be the consequence.

What is to be done in such a dilemma? America refuses to be taxed, or to submit to such regulations as are necessary to secure her trade to Britain. It would be happy if any device could be invented, by which the parent country could be secured in the possession of every thing essentially  
 valuable

valuable in their commerce, and be relieved from the expence of protecting them, while at the same time the Americans were left at liberty to assess on themselves whatever taxes they should incline, without the intervention of any foreign power whatever. Nor does it seem impossible to accomplish this, could the prejudices of all parties be for a short time removed.

There are particular regulations of government, which, without being in themselves more grievous than others; by holding up to view at all times an appearance of inferiority and subjection, are exceedingly humiliating and grievous to be borne. "Were reasons as thick as hops, says Falstaff, I would not give them *upon compulsion*." This is the language of human nature in all ages and countries; and this is the reason why every inferior society looks up with a malevolent jealousy to the superior power which governs it, and is at all times disposed to think itself oppressed by every exertion of power, however mild it may in effect be. In this manner the Americans have always beheld with a peculiar

cular jealousy and uneasiness those political regulations that Britain has adopted with regard to them. Nor should we—or any other body of men accustomed to the ideas of freedom, have been affected in any other manner. It was natural; the relation they bore to us, necessarily suggested it.—Why, then, should we be disposed to blame, with harsh epithets, men who have acted in a manner so natural, and in a manner not at all incompatible with the best dispositions of mind?

But if the people of America do not deserve to be harshly blamed for errors naturally arising from the peculiarity of their situation, far less do the Rulers in Britain deserve the severe epithets that have been bestowed upon them. I mean no apology for present men or measures. But, assuredly, protection received by any body of people requires an equivalent. Unfortunately, the Americans were not, nor ever could be, in a condition to pay a proper equivalent to Britain for the loss she sustained on their account. Their situation forbids it; and it is this untoward circumstance that has ever embarrassed Ministers  
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in respect to American affairs, and made it equally impossible, on the one hand, to promote, as they were bound to do, the interests of the parent state, and, on the other, to satisfy the ruling prejudices of the people.

The monopoly of the American trade has been at all times the favourite object of the English nation, and has, from the first settlement of these provinces, been an unceasing cause of discontent to the colonists. They felt it from the beginning, as a grievous mark of subjection, and it has continually rankled in their bosom. It was to them *the worm that never dieth*. It has been the secret cause of almost all the jarrings that have happened between them and us. Early did they make efforts to evade it; but it was at all times found to be such a sacred object in the eyes of the whole English nation, that not a whisper durst be uttered against it, for fear of giving an instant and universal alarm, which would have united all ranks of people in Britain as one man. Other causes of grievance, that would be more favourably received in Britain, were sought for; and, in  
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the mean time, every mode that ingenuity could devise, was adopted to elude such laws as were made to secure the monopoly.

Governors in America, and Ministers in Britain, long winked at almost an open and avowed contravention of these laws. This did not serve to conciliate the good-will of the Americans; it only laid the foundation of new distresses. In consequence of repeated notices from the servants of the Crown, peremptory instructions were sent to the Governors to check those flagrant transgressions of a law deemed the bulwark of the commerce of Britain. The consequence was, that the Americans were seized with the most inveterate antipathy to every person who favoured these schemes. Every contrivance which cunning could invent, was adopted to thwart the public exertions of any one who was concerned in these detested regulations. Those of the Americans, whose trade had suffered by the interruption of the contraband commerce, laid hold of every popular subject of declamation to inflame the minds of the people; which was the immediate cause of the disturbances that now prevail.

I have



I have been thus particular in tracing the cause of the present calamities, because it affords a lesson of the highest importance in colonial Government. I have already shewn, at great length, that Britain, instead of being benefited by this restraint on the American trade, was really hurt, considerably hurt by it, in as far as it took effect. She therefore imposed a load on the Americans, which they felt as a grievous oppression, without doing herself the smallest service. They felt it with indignation, like the Princes who were of old compelled to drag the chariots of their conquerors; not so much because of the pressure of the burthen, as because of the subjection it implied. Yet, hurtful as it was, or unimportant at the best, it is probable the British nation would, at any time, have willingly undertaken a ten years war rather than have voluntarily relinquished it.

Where prejudices of this kind prevail, it is almost vain to enter into argument; yet it is scarcely possible to avoid making some reflexions on a case of this nature. Were the measure fraught even with many beneficial consequences, these would be purchased



“ A List of the number of Surveyors and Riding Officers deputed by the Commissioners appointed by Act of Parliament, made in the first year of the reign of King William and Queen Mary, for preventing the Exportation of Wool, &c. with the Counties they were posted in; what seizures of Wool were made by them, and the value thereof; with the difficulties they underwent in that service, as well as charge in obtaining and entering informations; as also carrying on prosecutions against the Exporters of Wool in the Court of Exchequer.

Surveyors.	Counties under their charge.	Numbers of riding horses.	Packs of wool seized.	Value of appropriated wool at	Number of packs condemned.	Recovery there of.	Sacks refused from the officers.	Value of the wool refused from the officers.	Expenses of Officers annually in keeping themselves and horses, at 6s. per annum.
Captain Wm. Ingram, fen.	Northumber. Durham Cumberland	54	105	£. 530	57	£. 140	236	£. 1262	£. 3240
W. Ingram, jun.	Yorkshire	18	46	236	6	35	53	275	1080
Robert Moore	Lincolnshire	19	38	214	0	0	41	246	1140
Robert Carter	Lancashire	10	6	56	0	0	0	0	600
Thomas Braine	Cheshire	7	3	16	0	0	12	72	420
John Stokes	Norfolk	16	6	35	5	30	36	198	960
Edward Norden	Suffolk	9	4	22	4	23	0	0	540
John Hamilton	Essex	9	4	146	20	105	8	30	540
Ed. Anderson	Surrey	4	6	33	6	32	5	44	240
Robert Barker	Kent	36	65	362	8	44	45	270	2160
Charles Webb	Suffex	20	26	148	12	72	21	126	1200
Sam. Spicer	Hampshire	28	55	306	12	72	6	36	1680
W. Whotton	Dorsetshire	16	11	62	6	34	0	0	960
Chr. Pollard	Devonshire	12	9	52	5	36	25	140	720
Wm. Sims	Cornwall	14	12	68	6	33	4	24	840
J. Larton	Somerset and Bristol	12	9	52	5	36	25	150	720
J. Hughes	London and Middlesex	15	22	126	8	46	12	72	900

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attempt them in favour of a measure, that if accomplished must prove hurtful. Would it

The charges of the Commissioners for Wool, were annually as follow : £.

To postage of letters from their officers	— — —	43 0 0
To their secretary, clerks, messengers, and door-keepers	— — —	180 0 0
To the cost of a sloop, and fitting out to sea for cruising on the coast of Kent and Suffex, with the charge of victualing, wages, tear and wear	—	676 0 0
To seventeen supervisors, or chief agents, at 120l. per annum each	—	2040 0 0
To two hundred ninety-nine riding officers, at 60l. per annum	— — —	17940 0 0
Total		20879 0 0

“ N. B. The officers met with great discouragement from Justices of the Peace in several counties, especially Northumberland, and the bishoprick of Durham, by being imprisoned, and having legal seizures taken from them, viz. Sir Francis Blake, then Member of Parliament, Justice Howard, Forster, Taylor, Gray, Collingwood.”

“ Note, That of 3791 packs of Wool seized, there were but 162 condemned in the Exchequer; the remainder was either rescued, or not prosecuted, for

it not, therefore, be wise in Britain to remove that useless bar to the happiness of her

for want of money. The recoveries on those condemned, amounted to 744l. two-thirds of which was spent in prosecutions, and the moiety given by law to the Crown, so that the officers had no more than 248l. The sloop took 80 packs of Wool, which was appraised at 402l. most of which, after being condemned at the Captain's charge in the Court of Exchequer, lies now in the Custom-house warehouses, being refused to be delivered until the moiety due to the Crown was paid, which Edwards, the master of the sloop, was rendered unable to do, having expended his substance in carrying on prosecutions against the offenders, &c \*."

This exhibits a strong picture of the difficulty of restraining a trade, when it is directly contrary to the interests of the dealers that it should be so. From the same authority †, we learn, that, besides the above, the nation had been at the charge of 55,000l. annually for frigates and sloops; notwithstanding which, the exporting of Wool continued to be practised to a great extent, and almost openly. If such difficulties then occur in Britain, immediately

\* Smith's Memoirs of Wool, vol. 2. p. 166, 7, 8.

† Ibid. p. 170.

her colonies? Is it not sound policy to conciliate their affection, rather than provoke their hate?

In resolving to adopt a measure of this kind, what would Britain lose? She would lose a feather, and, in exchange, obtain a real treasure. The export trade from this country would continue as extensive as formerly, with this material difference, that in the one case the purchasers would be always satisfied of the reasonableness of their bargains, which, in the other case, they never could be convinced of. The export of manufactures from this country, it is highly probable, would even increase; because our manufacturers would become more careful, and our merchants less avaricious and less insolent. Our goods would of course be somewhat better, and could be afforded a little cheaper than formerly. They would, therefore, be voluntarily preferred to

ately under the eye of the Legislature, what may be expected in America? If our own Members of Parliament and Justices of Peace show such an open contempt of the laws in this case, can we be surprised at the Magistrates in America pursuing a similar conduct?

to those of other nations, through choice, if they are of equal value; and it is acknowledged, that it is in vain to think of *forcing* a trade, *in any circumstances*, by compulsory laws, where the goods of foreign nations can be afforded cheaper and better than our own. Britain never yet could sell goods to any considerable amount in America, which she could not have sold there if the trade had been entirely open. The same observation will apply to the colonies, in America, of every other European state.

If, then, we derive no advantage from our monopoly of the American trade, in respect to our own produce and manufactures, which we should not equally enjoy were it entirely laid open, why should we hesitate about giving up that distressing monopoly? And if we should resolve to adopt that salutary measure, what reason can we have to burthen ourselves any longer with the defence of those extensive regions? We cannot now be ignorant of the difficulty, if not the impossibility of ever drawing from thence a revenue in any degree proportioned to the expence of that protection. Why, then, should we take  
upon

upon ourselves the troublesome and ungracious task of squeezing from them a scanty pittance, that never could be adequate to the purposes required? The Americans themselves have offered to free us of that task. No satisfactory reason has yet been given, why we should not accept their offer.

I am aware that gentlemen in Britain will be at first startled at a proposal of the nature here made; but I beg they will take the trouble to reflect upon it coolly, before they come to a final determination. Our self-love, and the prejudices it engenders, often make us view transactions relating to ourselves in a very different light from that in which we behold similar transactions relating to others. There is not a man in Britain, who does not at once perceive that all the trading nations of Europe participate of the Spanish American trade, not only by an indirect, circuitous commerce, but even directly, in spite of the numerous *guarda costas*, with which the shores of her American colonies are continually surrounded. Are our American shores more easily guarded? It is well known



known that Holland, which possesses only a few lodgements in the West Indies, carries on a trade thither nearly as considerable, in the export of European commodities, as any of those powers which possess extensive colonies. What becomes of all these goods? They are sold by a contraband trade in the colonies of France, of Spain, of Portugal, and of BRITAIN.

If, then, (I am obliged to repeat it) no restrictive laws can insure to us the monopoly of our colonial trade—and if the attempt to enforce such a monopoly be attended with great expence, and other very bad consequences to ourselves, where would be the harm of renouncing it?

Against this last proposal there lies *one* very material objection. America offers to undertake a task, the difficulty of which she is not as yet acquainted with. A child who is ignorant of danger, often expresses the greatest desire to handle edged tools, or to walk upon a precipice, and, if warned of the danger, will, without fear, make many protestations of caution, and asseverations that no mischief will happen from granting

granting its request. But, is the danger the less, because the child sees it not? In such circumstances, it is prudent in the parent to deny the request, with whatever earnestness it may be urged. So it is in the case of America. We must not forget their near relation to us, nor cast them entirely off because they have indicated a little waywardness of disposition. Were they to be declared entirely independent, and left to struggle with the wide world, as well as to settle those internal disputes that would, in that case, infallibly arise, they would quickly be obliged to apply to some foreign power for assistance. This would lay a foundation either for their intire subjection to that power, or for a burdensome dependence, which would produce party disputes among themselves, and, at last, the interference of some other foreign power. Strife and wars would thus be perpetuated; the colonies, themselves, would be harrassed beyond measure; and, whatever other parties were engaged, Britain, because of the vicinity of her settlements, could not remain neutral. Thus should we lose at once our colonies and their trade, and be involved in still greater trouble and expence,

pence, on their account, than if they had continued to demand our sole protection.

To avoid all these evils, and obtain the blessings required, nothing more seems necessary than to lay open the trade to America to all the maritime states in Europe. In return for this favour, the whole maritime powers in Europe should become guarantees of the articles of convention, in as far as they regarded America. Great would be the advantages that the neutral powers would gain by such a plan of pacification, which would be wholly lost should the peace be disturbed by any one. Where, therefore, it is so strongly the interest of the whole conjunctly and severally to oppose any innovation, there is the greatest reason to think that it would be long preserved inviolate.

Upon these principles, I humbly offer to the public the following sketch of the outlines of a general pacification, which, in as far as I am able to judge, at the same time that it would be the most strictly just and equitable, would more effectually tend to promote the interests of every party

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concerned, and fix the general tranquillity of Europe on a firmer basis than could be effected by any other plan that has hitherto been made public.

Article I. All former treaties, contracts, immunities, and dependencies, between different states, in every thing relative to America, including the West-India islands, shall be wholly abolished.

Article II. The trade to every part of America, including the West-India islands as above, shall be open, and equally free, to all the powers who enter into this confederacy, either as principals, or guarantees: but all others shall be wholly excluded from thence.

Article III. All goods imported into any part of America after \_\_\_\_\_ weeks from the day of the signing of this treaty, by the subjects of any of the confederated powers above mentioned, shall be admitted duty free, and no bounties upon importation shall be allowed; excepting always consumable provisions of all kinds, with regard to which, the ruling powers of each district



ported by sea ; but that duty may be moderated, when exported by land, if it shall be judged expedient.

Article VI. With regard to the territorial jurisdiction in America, the following regulations shall take place. That is to say,

To Great Britain shall belong, Florida, east and west, Georgia, Carolina, the town of New York, with Long and Staten islands, and the county of New York, properly so called (if it shall be thought worth while to keep these ;) Nova Scotia, with its dependencies ; Canada, with its dependencies ; Terra de Labrador, and Hudson's Bay, Newfoundland, and all the islands in the West-Indies that Britain possessed at the beginning of the present war,—unless it should be otherwise stipulated.

To Spain, France, Portugal, Holland, and Denmark, the several territories and islands they respectively possessed at the beginning of the present war. And,

To the States of America, under the regula-

regulations contained in this treaty, the provinces of Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, the Jerseys, that part of New York not reserved by Britain, and New England, with all its dependencies. The boundaries of all these regions, where they border upon other states, to be ascertained with the utmost exactness, before the signing of the definitive treaty.

Article VII. All persons who have been deprived of their property in America, or who have otherwise suffered on account of their adherence to the antient form of government under Great Britain, shall have their estates restored to them; and the other damages they have sustained on this account, fully made up to them by the states of the several provinces where those damages were sustained. The extent of these damages to be ascertained on the spot, before Commissioners to be appointed expressly for that purpose. And they shall have liberty either to remain in the provinces, without any disturbance on this account in future, or to sell their effects, and retire whithersoever they shall incline.

Article

Article VIII. None of the confederated powers above named, shall in any way interfere in any internal disputes that shall arise in any of the American settlements that are not under their own immediate dominion.

Article IX. And if any one of the parties concerned in this confederacy, shall attack any of the dominions in America, that by this treaty are declared to belong to another, or shall otherwise infringe any of the articles of this treaty, the offending party shall, *ipso facto*, be put under the ban of the confederacy, and shall be proceeded against, by all its members, as a common enemy.

Article X. If, while any power shall be thus under the ban of the confederacy, any of its members shall be backward in treating the aggressor as an enemy, and shall neglect to do so, after being duly required, such neglecting power shall be excluded from the confederacy, and debarred from having any commerce with America ever after. Its ships may be seized by any of the confederates, and legally condemned as prizes, if they be found in any of the  
American



American seas, or any where else, if bound either to or from those parts.

Article XI. When any of the confederated powers shall be at war in Europe, all kinds of wood, fit for ship-building, hemp, ropes, saltpetre, gunpowder, instruments of war, and all kinds of naval and military stores, shall be declared contraband commodities, with respect to the belligerent powers; and, as such, may be legally seized and confiscated, when going to an enemy. The ship only, if neutral property, to be restored to the owners.

Article XII. Disputes arising between any of the confederates in Europe, shall in no wise extend to their settlements, if they have any, in America, which shall at all times remain in a state of the strictest neutrality, under the guarantee of this confederacy. Hostilities, in these cases, to cease every where to the westward of the Azores.

Article XIII. The Emperor, the Empress of Russia, and all the maritime powers in Europe, shall be invited to accede to this treaty, to become members of the  
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the confederacy, and guarantees of the present treaty, in as far as it relates to America only.

I do not enter into any other discussion relative to the peace, but in as far as regards America alone. There would probably be very little difficulty in adjusting all other differences.

A treaty, on the principles above mentioned, would, I am afraid, have too much of an Utopian appearance, to obtain a candid examination. If so, the world is come to a bad pass indeed, when nothing more is necessary to make a proposal be rejected without examination, than that it has the appearance of proving very extensively useful to mankind.

But, however chimerical such a plan may appear in modern times, it is well known that a league founded upon the same principles, operated the most beneficial consequences in Europe, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This was the Hanseatic confederacy so renowned in the history of arts and commerce.

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To think that man will ever be induced to pursue steadily any other object than what seems to promote his own interest, is, in my opinion, highly chimerical: and the same observation may be applied to states. They may, indeed, often misjudge what is for their own interest, and therefore pursue improper measures. The aim of sound policy should be, to correct these aberrations as much as possible. But if no principle of action is steady but self-interest, it will follow, that these aberrations can never be steadily and uniformly repressed, unless by contriving that the self-interest of *many* shall be hurt by the errors of any *one*. This is the principle upon which the whole of the foregoing plan depends: If that principle is erroneous, the plan must indeed be chimerical. If it be just, there is no impossibility but the plan may prove stable. It therefore deserves to be examined.

It is evidently the interest of all the neutral maritime powers in Europe to enter into this confederacy, should it ever be proposed to them; and it is equally their interest to maintain the articles of the confederacy

federacy inviolate, after it should be entered into. Singly, it would be long before they could force themselves into the great circle of commerce, when they were so often liable to interfere with certain rights that the great maritime powers think they have a title to enjoy. When thus called out in a body, they would become of importance—that importance would be lost, if ever they should disunite. It is fortunate here, too, that they are called to unite only in a case where all their interests must concur towards one point. Where their interests might interfere, they are still allowed to be as much disjoined as ever. To those powers, therefore, which are here invited to become guarantees only, there is little doubt but this proposal would be abundantly acceptable.

The proprietary states would, on the other hand, be still greater gainers. The profits made by the neutral maritime powers, if considered as a premium of insurance against losses by war, and money necessarily to be advanced for the security and defence of these colonies, would be found to bear such a small proportion to what has  
been

been at all times necessarily expended for these purposes, that the gains to the nation by this bargain must appear immense. With regard to Britain in particular, it is well known, that within the space of forty years she has been involved in three most bloody and expensive wars, purely on account of her colonies. These three wars (alone, without reckoning the stated annual expence on account of the colonies, which cannot be computed at less than one million a year) have not cost the nation less than two hundred millions of money. An amazing sum! It must, indeed, be a gainful commerce that is worth purchasing at such a rate,

By the present proposal we should be insured against all similar losses in future for next to nothing—(Perhaps, if I had said less than nothing, I should have been right.) It has been already proved, that it is not in the power of any one to prevent others from sharing in the trade of those countries, by any other means than by affording the articles wanted, cheaper than they can be obtained from others; and it has been likewise shewn, that a monopoly of trade tends

to raise the price of goods coming from the monopolizing state, and of thus favouring the commerce of its rivals, without obtaining so much as their good-will, far less any favours in return. By *voluntarily* granting them a participation in our trade, we grant them a favour\*, in return for which we receive another of the most essential importance, and that without diminishing our own trade in the smallest degree. On the contrary, if we reflect on what might have been the consequence to the manufactures and industry of the nation; if the sums of money above mentioned, instead of having been expended on the destructive operations of war, had been employed for the encouragement of domestic industry; and if the numerous people whose lives have been sacrificed in these wars, had been allowed to augment our inhabitants; we shall be convinced that our manufactures and commerce would now have

\* It deserves to be observed, that, with regard to the neutral states proposed, which could not for many centuries, if ever, have participated in the American trade, the favour is not less *real* than *apparent*.

have been in a much more flourishing state than at present. It follows, that if these drains, for the future, shall cease, in consequence of the proposed arrangement, similar beneficial effects will be experienced. As the same observations are equally applicable to all the proprietary kingdoms, it is unnecessary to repeat them.

Here, then, we discover a noble plan of national œconomy, a means of retrenching expenditure to an amazing extent, not only without diminishing the riches of any one state, but even by adding to the income of each. It is thus that trade and industry, when properly directed, augment the riches of all the parties concerned. A seeming paradox, which, though often explained, seems not to be in general sufficiently understood; otherwise we should not so often meet with gloomy politicians, who with such care compute the gains of others, and from the amount infer the extent of our own loss. It is impossible to prevent a little mind from being envious of the prosperity of another. Grovelling itself, it can never form an idea of rising to superior excellence, but wishes to sink others below

below its own level. It is equally impossible to prevent one of a dignified mind from feeling that he may attain to high and still higher degrees of excellence, and that nothing will contribute so much to forward these attainments as the advancing of others who in the same line endeavour to keep pace with him. He therefore glories in their progress. Their advancement forms a scale by which he measures his own. Like an intrepid officer at the head of a determined band, they mutually advance with confidence, to glory; well knowing that the endeavours of the whole contribute to the safety of each. The advances of the last keep pace with the progress of the first, and each preserves his station undisturbed.

In the same manner do states, vying with each other in exertions of industry and trade, when properly directed, mutually forward the attainments of each other. They advance together; but that one among them which is once foremost will continue foremost still, if equal exertions are made. If industry slackens in one place, the progress may be retarded; but if others advance,



advance, that state will infallibly be left behind, whatever efforts it may make to retard the progress of those within its reach.

Of all the parties concerned in this treaty, perhaps the British Americans would find their situation the least benefited by it. The debts they have contracted during the present contest, would occasion taxes of a very different kind from any they have hitherto experienced; and the expence of government would be much augmented. But they themselves will allow, that no other method they could propose would be nearly so efficacious for abridging that expence, and securing their liberties. They would, no doubt, strongly oppose the seventh of the above articles; but it would be an eternal disgrace upon Britain, should she ever recede from it. This ought therefore to be insisted on as a preliminary by Britain, without which no other condition should be listened to.

While I now write, the news of the surrender of Lord Cornwallis has just been brought me. Like every good subject, I  
regret

regret the misfortune of so many brave men; but the misfortune would be much more than counterbalanced, could the nation by this means be brought to reflect seriously on the nature of that object for which they are contending. I would not, from hence, wish to be understood, as if I meant to insinuate, that, were the object worth the charge of the contest, Britain has it not still in her power to compel the Colonists to accept of whatever terms she may think fit to dictate. But I wish not to see the Colonists reduced to that state of subjection. It is not the interest of Britain that they should be so. Happy would it be for all parties, if they could allow their animosities to subside, and be guided by those principles only which tend to promote their own interest and true glory. Then would they all, instead of wasting their best blood and treasure in pursuit of the phantom *conquest*, which seems ever near, but continually eludes the grasp, put up their swords in peace, and emulously strive which shall excel in healing most quickly those deep wounds that each has received from the blind folly and ungovernable phrenzy of the other.

Should

Should Britain, thus freed from the uninterrupted attention she has been obliged to bestow on external objects, be at liberty to examine her own internal condition, she would be astonished to find what unobserved treasures she possesses within herself; treasures which her own industry may effectually secure, in spite of all the efforts of mankind to wrest them from her; treasures which, if they had not belonged to herself, she would have coveted, and have made inconceivable exertions to obtain, had they been to be found at the extremities of the earth; but which, seemingly for no other reason but because they are at our door, and completely under our command, we have entirely disregarded. The treasures I speak of, are the fisheries on our coasts; the value of which has never yet been attempted to be ascertained\*. I say, they have not been attempted to be ascertained; because a few observations, that have

\* See on this subject Sir Walter Raleigh, and Morison's tracts; also Observations on the Means of exciting a Spirit of National Industry; also Locke's Essays on the Trade, Manufactures, and Fisheries of Scotland.

have been made by individuals, without public authority, can never be considered in this light.

Should she examine the state of her distant provinces, she would find she possesses multitudes of people who are capable of the highest exertions when called into action\*, but who, for want of proper attention, are suffered to languish in indolence. She would perceive that she possesses territories fit to maintain an immense population, which at present lie waste for want of mouths to consume their produce. She would see that she possesses extensive districts, that enjoy almost unrivalled advantages for carrying on manufactures and commerce, which are now deserted because no attention has been bestowed to employ them for those purposes. In short, it would then be made apparent, that Britain in herself could find subsistence for at least a hundred times the present number of her people; that these numerous inhabitants could be in a great measure supplied with materials in the island to keep them employed;

\* This alludes to the Highlanders of Scotland.

ployed; that no other rival state could possess nearly the same advantages, either in respect to manufactures or commerce; and that at a thousandth part of the expence which has been bestowed on America, these manufactures might be so firmly established, as to bid defiance to the combined efforts of the universe to disturb them. Trade would necessarily keep pace with them; not that kind of feeble distempered trade which is obliged to depend on monopolies for its existence, but that which by its native vigour will force its way into the remotest corners of the globe, by making it the interest of all people to participate of the advantages it will bring them.

Let us, therefore, secure America from the fear of disturbances, and turn our attention to our own domestic prosperity— Let us stop emigrations, by furnishing our people at home with the means of benefiting themselves by their own industry— Let us encourage others to come and settle among us, by allowing them to participate of the advantages we enjoy. They will add to our riches and our strength. Let us conciliate the good-will of the neighbouring powers,  
by

by allowing them a free participation with us in our trade to other nations, that they may not be disposed to cramp our trade with themselves by destructive restrictions, which, by tending to distress the *people* in all countries, enfeeble all without producing good to any. Thus should we become a great people, not less revered because of our power, than esteemed because of our beneficence and justice.

THE END.

