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# STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

Statement by the Under Secretary  
of States for External Affairs,  
Mr. James Taylor, at the opening  
of the Eleventh Session of the  
Stockholm Conference

STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN  
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Canada

We are beginning the eleventh session as we approach the eleventh hour of this conference. Unless real strides are made in elaborating a substantial set of confidence- and security-building measures during the next weeks, a successful outcome here may very well have eluded us -- shattering the hopes and expectations which attended the inauguration of this enterprise two and a half years ago.

The conference has moved from the open arena of public diplomacy to the confines of the negotiating table. It has set aside generalities and rhetoric in the search for specific and concrete forms of agreement. This movement is much to be applauded, and we have welcomed it.

But behind these welcome developments over the past weeks and months there still lingers the risk of political inertia and stagnation. As this negotiation moves into the home stretch, we must focus more precisely the energy of our broader political purpose and direct it with care and determination towards hammering out a full, solid agreement.

And broader political purpose there most certainly is.

We seek a new generation of confidence- and security-building measures that will inject vitality into the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the arms control process. After investing two and a half years in this enterprise, it would surely constitute a failure -- and a disappointment -- if we produced only a marginal embellishment of the measures in the final act.

We are beginning a process. It will clearly not be possible in this phase of the conference to solve all the problems of confidence-building in all its aspects. The subject is as vast as its concrete manifestations are essential to the underpinning of peace.

But it is crucial that this conference produce a result which is substantial enough to justify the effort to date, and to make it worthwhile to continue. This means that effort must now be concentrated -- and quickly -- on negotiating a set of measures covering the activity of land and combined forces which, no one can seriously doubt, poses the highest risk of war in Europe.

Ever-conscious that the ebb and flow of triumph and tragedy on this continent have shaped our national destiny in the past, and will almost certainly continue to

do so in the future, Canada is vitally concerned about the success of this conference as part of the CSCE. As my minister pointed out at the recent meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Halifax: "A long time ago, Canadians judged that our common civilization made the security of Europe indistinguishable from that of North America."

Throughout the years, Canada has striven to ensure this security by a solid commitment to collective defence and by a strong engagement to reduce levels of tension and confrontation. One of our priority objectives in the field of arms control and disarmament is to build confidence sufficient to facilitate the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

This confidence-building enterprise in which we are engaged is a unique negotiation. It is also a many faceted challenge. It has a political/military dimension; but it also has a humanitarian one. If this conference succeeds it could genuinely enhance the security and co-operation we seek through the CSCE. If it fails, it could impede the attainment of this objective. We should ensure that the Vienna follow-up meeting, in a wider context, is able to assess a set of confidence- and security-building measures that will constitute a real milestone towards the achievement of greater security, and is able to judge what further efforts will be necessary to continue this work.

From the first week at Stockholm the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance have called for concrete measures that would clarify the non-hostile intentions of the participating states. The treaty establishing the Western Alliance binds its members not to use force except in self-defence, a commitment we have reaffirmed on countless occasions.

Recently, General Secretary Gorbachev affirmed the defensive orientation of Soviet military doctrine as well.

The military policies of the neutral and non-aligned states participating in the CSCE are of a purely defensive character. The problem is therefore not a lack of expression of peaceful intentions, but rather how to demonstrate credibly to each other that security concerns for legitimate defence are the sole guidelines

for national military activity. This demonstration of the absence of feared threats can be made through greater openness in all of our activities, not least in the military sphere.

The foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance recently affirmed in Halifax their objective to strengthen stability and security in the whole of Europe through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. Recognizing the need for bold new steps, they set up a task force on how further to pursue their objectives for conventional arms control in Europe.

The results of this stage of the Stockholm conference will be fundamental in determining whether a new openness can be imparted to the conduct of military activity on the territory of Europe. The adoption, as this conference adjourns, of a substantial set of confidence- and security-building measures and their satisfactory implementation cannot fail to nourish in Europe a climate of confidence that ought to be strong enough to pave the way for more extensive measures of military restraint and reduction.

In this regard, we have noted Mr. Gorbachev's recent expression of Soviet willingness to seek conventional arms reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals. But public statements are not enough. We now await an equally constructive response from the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact to the detailed proposals that we have tabled aimed at enhancing stability and security.

The Soviet Union has recently stated that it is no less interested in effective verification than are the Western states and it has recognized the potential usefulness of on-site inspection as a means of verification. We await here a confirmation of this interest through positive and specific suggestions for co-operative and reciprocal verification measures accessible to all the participating states.

Verification measures have both political and military value as a means of ensuring compliance. Since military potentials on each side in Europe are very high, any major lack of compliance would require a considerable

military effort which could not go undetected. While minor non-compliance might not jeopardize the other side's military situation, any would-be violator would hesitate, weighing carefully the political consequences of any such action.

A co-operative and reciprocal inspection regime would help to clarify a situation before it could lead to a serious misunderstanding, or miscalculation, or worse. And, recognizing that the real world in which this system will operate is full of ambiguities and uncertainties, here as elsewhere flexibility will be required.

But the essential principle remains: an agreement lacking effective verification is not better than no agreement at all. An agreement that is permissive towards violations, or could give rise to allegations of non-compliance because it lacked effective verification provisions, could be a greater danger than no agreement at all. It could lead to tensions arising from dubious compliance when national security is seen to be at risk.

Efforts to control or reduce armaments in Europe must sooner or later involve the full range of political interests of all the participating states. Verification is essentially a co-operative and reciprocal process. Thus, all states assuming obligations under any agreement adopted here should be assured that they can effectively verify compliance with it.

This conference could take a major step forward in the verification process. Here is a forum where a common political commitment combined with technological expertise and multilateral diplomacy could produce a verification arrangement that will ensure that the agreed measures really do build confidence and security.

Verification is not an end in itself. But it will be of vital importance as a component of the final result here, because it enhances the confidence of the parties and creates a sense of predictability. And that comes close to the heart of our purpose. Detailed drafting on this issue is long overdue. Visible progress could offer new encouragement that an agreement is possible here: not just a minimal agreement, but a break-through agreement as befits the pioneering nature of this work. Because without provisions for effective verification there will be no agreement. Progress could

show that we are motivated by broader political purpose: because the problems of verification can only be solved through acts of political will and -- dare I say it to a conference dedicated to confidence-building -- by acts of political faith.