





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

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From The Popular Science Monthly -
Supplement 1888

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the "Descent of Man," and consider the whole theory from the point of view here laid down. The explanation of almost all the ornament and colors of birds and insects as having been produced by the perceptions and choice of the females has, I believe, staggered many evolutionists, but has been provisionally accepted because it was the only theory that even attempted to explain the facts. It may perhaps be a relief to some of them, as it has been to myself, to find that the phenomena can be shown to depend on the general laws of development, and on the action of "natural selection," which theory will, I venture to think, be relieved from an abnormal exorcism, and gain additional vitality by the adoption of my view of the subject.

Although we have arrived at the conclusion that tropical light and heat can in no sense be considered the cause of color, there remains to be explained the undoubted fact that all the more intense and gorgeous tints are manifested by the animal life of the tropics, while in some groups, such as butterflies and birds, there is a marked preponderance of highly-colored species. This is probably due to a variety of causes, some of which we can indicate, while others remain to be discovered. The luxuriant vegetation of the tropics throughout the entire year affords so much concealment, that color may there be safely developed to a much greater extent than in climates where the trees are bare in winter, during which season the struggle for existence is most severe, and even the slightest disadvantage may prove fatal. Equally important, probably, has been the permanence of favorable conditions in the tropics,

allowing certain groups to continue dominant for long periods, and thus to carry out in one unbroken line whatever developments of plumage or color may once have acquired an ascendancy. Changes of climatal conditions, and preëminently the Glacial epoch, probably led to the extinction of a host of highly-developed and finely-colored insects and birds in temperate zones, just as we know that it led to the extinction of the larger and more powerful mammalia which formerly characterized the temperate zone in both hemispheres. This view is supported by the fact that it is among those groups only which are now exclusively tropical that all the more extraordinary developments of ornament and color are found. The local causes of color will also have acted best in regions where the climatal conditions remained constant, and where migration was unnecessary; while whatever direct effect may be produced by light or heat will necessarily have acted more powerfully within the tropics. And, lastly, all these causes have been in action over an actually greater area in tropical than in temperate zones, while estimated potentially, in proportion to its life-sustaining power, the lands which enjoy a practically tropical climate (extending as they do considerably beyond the geographical tropics) are very much larger than the temperate regions of the earth. Combining the effects of all these various causes we are quite able to understand the superiority of the tropical parts of the globe, not only in the abundance and variety of their forms of life, but also as regards the ornamental appendages and vivid coloration which these forms present.—*Macmillan's Magazine*.

THE POLICY OF AGGRANDIZEMENT.

By PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH.

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W HATEVER may be the result of the present campaign or of the present war, the Ottoman Empire is doomed. It was already doomed when England took up arms in its defense, and, in the supposed interest of her Eastern possessions, became its quasi-protectress, the sponsor for the engagements to its Christian subjects, which it has shamelessly violated, and the virtual surety for its now repudiated loans. The internal causes of its decay are more certain and deadly in their operation than the attacks of ene-

mies from without, which, in fact, evoke and revive the only element of strength left in its composition—the native valor of the Ottoman. It is one of those military empires which have never become industrial, and which, the rush of conquest being over, and the conquerors having settled down as the dominant race, subsisting on the labor of the conquered, have been hurried by corruption and sensuality to the grave. It has never shown the slightest sign of civilization—political, intellectual, or commercial. If there

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has been any trade in the empire, it has been among the subject races, especially those whose yoke has been loosened, not among the Turks. Political organization has never got beyond the coarse and barbarous form of military satrapies, whose rule is cruelty, and whose taxation is rapine. Even for military science the Turk has recourse to the foreigner. There being no security for the fruits of labor, production has failed, and the blight of barrenness has spread over some of the fairest regions of the earth. The provinces are heterogeneous, and under such a system of government no progress toward assimilation could be made. A fatalist religion has repressed effort, even the effort necessary to save life from the plague. The same religion, by its political intolerance, has precluded the fusion of the conqueror with the conquered, and kept hostile races facing each other in every part of the empire. The numbers of the dominant race have been always dwindling under the effects of vice and of the military conscription, which, as the slaves cannot be trusted with arms, falls on the masters alone. By the institution of the Janizaries, which constantly infused new blood into the military system, the period of conquest was artificially prolonged, and, in measuring the rapidity of Turkish decay, it should be borne in mind that less than two centuries ago the Turks were still conquerors. But, in the absence of external intervention, a century would probably have sufficed to complete the process of dissolution; the ill-cemented provinces of the empire would have fallen apart, and the satraps would have defied the bow-string, and set up for themselves. The revolt of Egypt was an example which, had things been left to their natural course, other pashas would have followed. Diplomacy intervened, and held together the crumbling mass. When the resources of fiscal robbery were exhausted, and the sheep of the rayah had been sheared in winter to pay his taxes, English coffers, opened by the confident assurances of English ministers, supplied money, of which the greater part was squandered in barbarous and bestial luxury, while the rest provided a standing army, which, by rendering internal insurrection against the tyranny hopeless, compelled the oppressed to stretch their hands for aid to a foreign liberator, and thus embroiled Europe; just as our ancestors under James II., who had a standing army, were compelled to call in a foreign deliverer; whereas, under Charles I., who had no standing army, they were able to redress their wrongs with their own hands. The

present Turkish army may be victorious, but it will be the last, unless, by a miracle, confidence can be planted again in the bosoms of capitalists who have been swindled. Russia would, perhaps, have acted more wisely had she paused awhile, and allowed bankruptcy and repudiation to do their work. The question is one, not of sentiment or religion, but of political science; and it is a thing to be noted that a man so sagacious in a certain sphere as Palmerston, so adroit a manager of party, so clever a diplomatist, with all possible means of information at his command, should have persuaded himself that the Ottoman Empire was in course of rapid regeneration, only needing loans to complete the process, and should have induced his countrymen to lay down their money on the strength of that belief. It shows that in such questions the wisdom which styles itself practical, because it excludes general views and considerations, may lead to conclusions the reverse of wise. An ancient philosopher is said to have convinced his sneering countrymen of the utility of his science by a successful speculation in olives. We should be surprised to find that any one versed in the philosophy of history had been seduced into investing in Turkish bonds.

Fall the Ottoman Empire will, by corruption if not by the sword; and its fall will apparently bring on a crisis in the destinies of England, who will be called on to decide whether, out of the wreck, she will take Egypt. If she does, she will be committed far more deeply than ever to the policy of aggrandizement; foreign dominion sustained by arms will assume a greatly-increased importance with her relatively to domestic objects; and the spirit of her people will undergo a corresponding change. Egypt obviously means Eastern Africa, probably, indeed almost certainly, Syria, from which the fatal canal is commanded almost as much as from Egypt; possibly Crete, or some other convenient island. But it means a good deal more than this. It means that England is to undertake to secure against any possible attack the whole of the overland route to India; for, of course, there is no use in holding the gate when the avenue to it is in other hands, and, if Port Saïd is the gate, the avenue to it is the Mediterranean. To India by the Cape we had, as it were, a private way, not leading by many hostile doors, nor obliging you to appear as dominant under the noses of rival nations; but the overland route runs by the coasts of a whole line of maritime powers, to which will be added Germany, if she ever acquires Trieste, and Russia (exasperated by our demonstrations of enmity),

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if she ever acquires Constantinople; it is liable to attack from every port between Cherbourg and Port Saïd; its wardership will oblige us to flaunt the flag of our domination in the faces of all the dwellers on the Mediterranean. The present helplessness of France, no doubt, is our opportunity; but we are credibly assured that her jealousy will be at once aroused, and that her hostility awaits us in the end.

It is probable that in the present mood of the nation aggrandizement will carry the day. We say mood, and it does not seem that there has been any definite change of conviction such as new arguments produce since the time when more moderate views prevailed. But the nation is now flushed with wealth, and with the sense of power which wealth begets; it is infected with the military spirit which fills armed Europe; it has built a great fleet of iron-clads, and feels inclined to show its power. The aristocratic party is in the ascendant, and British aristocracy, as well as Russian despotism, is willing to divert the mind of the people from progress at home to aggrandizement abroad. The knowledge that the Government is favorable to them stimulates to activity all enterprising spirits, and at the decisive moment they throw into the scale, by enthusiastic and combined effort, a weight out of proportion to their mere numbers. In such a state of excitement are spirits of this sort at present, and so great has been the development of their ambition, that we read projects for making England mistress of all the water communications of the globe. What she would do with that magnificent possession we have not been informed. We need not to be informed what the other nations would do if they found all the water communications of the globe seized into the hands of one domineering power. There are politicians who, if they had their way, would make the battle of Dorking a reality in spite of Nature and of Fate.

Those who counsel England to seize on all the water communications of the globe seem to forget that, though still far the first of maritime powers, she is not, as she was at the close of the war with Napoleon, sole mistress of the seas. Other countries now have their navies, which, though singly not a match for hers, united must be a good deal more than a match, and which, moreover, would be free to strike with their full force, while she would have to disperse her force for the purpose of shielding unguarded dependencies in all parts of the world. Nor is it in this respect only that her position is changed.

Her naval and military power depends partly upon her superiority in wealth; her superiority in wealth depends in great measure on her supremacy in manufactures, and this also has been greatly reduced by the development of manufactures in other countries since the Napoleonic wars. The commercial progress of other countries, especially of France, where the military spirit seems to be gradually giving way to the commercial, threatens British interests, even British interests in the East, more seriously than the approach of Russia to Herat.

That there are certain classes, administrative, military, and commercial, which have a special interest in a policy of aggrandizement, no one needs to be told; our ears ring with the vociferous demonstrations of the fact. What it seems particularly desirable to elicit, before the irrevocable step of occupying Egypt is taken, is the proof that foreign dominion is equally beneficial to the whole people. Beneficial, we mean, either in the way of material well-being or in the way of real moral and intellectual elevation. The mere pride of dominion we confess does not seem to us a sufficient object. Besides being radically antagonistic to the tendencies of modern civilization, its enjoyment is confined to the few who play the game; it is not shared by the many who pay and bleed, scarcely conscious all the time of the existence of an empire.

To all who have not entirely abandoned themselves to the prevailing impulse it must be clear that aggrandizement is a question to which there are two sides. That there are two sides to it in a moral point of view, we all imply as often as we denounce on moral grounds the territorial ambition of Russia. But let us put the question of morality aside. In truth, it does not present itself in a very serious form so far as the occupation of Egypt is concerned. The general concurrence of the powers, at all events, if it could be obtained, might relieve us from any misgivings on that score. The khedive is, to the mass of his unhappy subjects, not a national sovereign, but an alien oppressor, whose dominion has no foundation but brute force, and whose power is exercised without the slightest regard for the welfare of the people. Anybody who can is morally at liberty to overturn him and relieve the victims of his oppression. There can be no doubt that English government, however it might affect the destinies of the country in the end, would at present be an enormous change for the better. Nor is it easy to see who could cast a stone at us. Certainly not France, with Algeria

in her hands. Bismarck is wise enough, he is sufficiently conscious of the conditions of real strength, and sufficiently in accord with the spirit of his age himself, to abstain from distant acquisitions; but we need fear no moral protests on his part.

And so with regard to the Empire of India, which is the thing mainly in question all the time, and for the sake of which, principally, these further acquisitions are proposed. Once acquired it must be kept; mere anarchy would be the consequence of our withdrawal from it; and its acquisition commenced in a period which, though not so very remote, was yet anterior, if not to international morality, certainly to the inclusion within the pale of international morality of those who were not within the pale of Christendom. No government in Europe at that time would have shrunk from taking the territory of the pagans of Hindostan any more than they shrank from enslaving the pagans of Africa. France, since our censor, was at that time our competitor, and she herself took Algeria at a later day, when the light of a higher morality had at least dawned upon the civilized world.

With the question of morality, we repeat, we have here nothing to do; but to the question of expediency also must be admitted that there are two sides. The decay of empires is the theme of history. They decay because they are sustained not by the moral forces which sustain national happiness, and the nature of which is to increase in strength, but by physical force, the nature of which is to decline, if not positively yet (what comes to the same thing) relatively to the forces around it. There is no reason why British virtue, energy, and industry, should not continue as they are, or increase with the lapse of time; and, therefore, there is no reason why the New-Zealander should ever moralize over the ruins of the British nation; but the man of the future, whoever he may be, is pretty sure one day to moralize over the ruins of the British Empire. We ourselves moralize over the ruined empire of Spain, and see clearly enough that the vast and scattered dependencies which were her pride, and which she imagined to be the sources of her strength, were really draining away her life-blood. We moralize over the effects of the error committed by Venice in leaving the true path, the path of commercial enterprise, to indulge a territorial ambition which led to the corruption of her government and, by the umbrage it gave to other powers, brought on her the League of Cambray. Yet we may be sure that every Spaniard

and every Venetian, in the days of Spanish and Venetian empire, would have felt himself bound by loyalty and patriotism to uphold aggrandizement and to denounce counsels of moderation as a betrayal of the honor and greatness of the country.

Palmerston's *Civis Romanus* is one of many indications that the image of the Roman Empire still vaguely hovers before our minds. The Roman Empire belonged to an age before Humanity, to an age in which morality was in the germ, to an age in which force was the only law and the only principle of organization. Coming when it did, it formed a sort of matrix for modern civilization, and thus served a purpose which conquest can never serve again. By uniting all the nations round the Mediterranean under a common yoke it repressed war, the great primeval obstacle to the progress of humanity, and rendered possible the diffusion of ideas, besides breaking down generally the barriers of tribal isolation. An attempt to reproduce it, or anything like it, in these days would be an anachronism of the most flagrant kind. Its stability depended upon the absence of any rival power, when once the conquest of the Mediterranean nations had been accomplished; and, in this respect also, an imitation of it in a world divided among a number of great powers would be not so much unseasonable as insane.

It is worthy of remark, too, that the more advanced civilization even of Rome herself was less prone, if not actually opposed, to conquest. In the golden age of the empire, which commenced with the accession of Nerva, though there were frontier wars, and some extensions of territory, as a consequence of those wars, the spirit of improvement decidedly predominated over that of aggrandizement, and the Antonines, if they were alive now, would probably be "pseudo-philanthropists" and "patriots of every country but their own."

The idea of Roman conquest in the nineteenth century is equal in irrationality as well as cogitate to that extreme theory of hero-worship which, totally ignoring historic progress, proposes to regenerate modern society by pounding it with the primeval sledge-hammer of Thor. The world changes, and the methods proposed by the worshippers of force for organizing what they imagine, in spite of their daily experience, to be an anarchy, would be the most brutal of all anarchies themselves.

At all events, there can be no harm in asking the advocates of a policy of aggrandizement clear-

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sume they are prepared. England will then ad-
vance her eagles not only with the assurance
that some of her sons would be greatly gratified
at present, but without misgiving as to the effect
on the general welfare of her people for the
future.

Does conquest bring strength to England?
That is the most obvious question, and for the
ordinary advocates of aggrandizement the most
important. To the Roman it brought strength,
because it brought him both tribute and military
contingents; to the Spaniard it brought tribute,
with which his armies were paid. But in the
case of England modern sentiment interposes.
England draws from her dependencies no tribute;
large sums come from India, but they come into
private hands. Sepoys were sent to Egypt at the
time of the war with France, and Mr. Sidney
Owen, in the preface to his "Selection from the
Wellesley Dispatches," contends that, though they
were not actually engaged, their presence pro-
duced an effect, and might be regarded as the
symbol of a real addition to the military power
of England. But rating this addition at the
highest, and taking into consideration also any
instance of the employment of negro regiments
from the West Indies, will it be contended that
the accession of force derived by England from
her dependencies bears any proportion to the
force expended by her in acquiring and defending
them?

India must be debited not only with all that
has been expended in her acquisition and defense,
but with all that has been expended in securing
access to her, and notably with a large portion of
the cost of the Crimean War. But the expendi-
ture, whether of money or of blood, is not all;
the whole foreign policy of England quivers with
alarm for India. We are being constantly drawn
away from that which would otherwise be the
manifest line of our interest by that besetting
fear. Under its influence we have sullied our
civilization by an alliance with the foul decrepi-
tude of Turkey, and made an enemy of Russia,
perhaps the only sincere friend we had in the
world.

The Roman Empire, though colossal, was ge-
ographically united, and the provinces, as time
went on, were more or less incorporated with the
imperial state. The Russian Empire, though
equally colossal, is also geographically united; it
annexes conterminous regions, which are gradu-
ally incorporated, and will no doubt be thoroughly
assimilated in the end. The Spanish Empire was

scattered; its dependencies were incapable of
incorporation, much more of assimilation, and
the same is the case with ours. A line of com-
munication with the East has to be maintained,
to the length of which, and the forces threaten-
ing it at every point, attention has been already
called.

In England the strength of England lies. Why
this thought should be unwelcome, it seems diffi-
cult to say; at any rate, such is the fact.

In the days before free trade, monopoly of
markets was a very intelligible and solid, though
not a very laudable, appanage of empire. But
free trade has thrown open the ports of the In-
dies, East and West, to all nations alike, and, if
England still has the lion's share of the trade, it
is not because she is the mistress, but because
she is the great exporting nation. The commer-
cial handling of the dependencies by planters,
contractors, and others engaged in the internal
production and trade, is, on the other hand, an
advantage connected with political dominion.
The only drawback from it is that English pro-
duction in the dependencies may exclude British
imports, as in the case of the cotton-manufactures
of India, which are supplanting British goods in
the Indian market.

It is said, and with truth, that empire trains
soldiers and administrators. But are they not,
for the most part, soldiers and administrators of
a special kind? Algeria trained soldiers, and
her training is said to have been one of the causes
of the military disasters which befell France.
Administrators generally end their official lives
in the dependency, and the benefit of the Indian
Civil Service is therefore reaped more by the in-
dividual Englishmen employed in it and their
families than by the country, except in so far as
the appointments may act as prizes in stimulat-
ing education. Even were it otherwise, bureau-
cracy, intensified by exclusiveness of race, and by
severance from English society and opinion, would
scarcely be a good school for the service of a free
nation. The author of "The Abode of Snow"
seems to be an acute observer, and he is certain-
ly not indifferent to the glory of British dominion,
or opposed to the extension of British influence.
In a passage on official character in India, which,
as its tenor is mixed, it may be fair to append in
a note, he draws a strong, and what seems a
probably just, distinction between the effect of
India on superior minds, or those immediately
under their influence, and its effect on the mind
of the ordinary official. His general estimate
may be somewhat adverse, and it may be fairly

met perhaps by an appeal to the net results of Indian administration. But he brings certain peculiarities, and the circumstances which produce them, distinctly under our view.¹

We have renounced for the present purpose

¹ "Society everywhere in India labors under very great disadvantages, and varies very much according to the character of its ever-changing leaders. Sir Emerson Tennent has observed that it is, 'unhappily, the tendency of small sections of society to decompose when separated from the great vital mass, as pools stagnate and putrefy when cut off from the invigorating flow of the sea;' and he adds that the process is variable, so that a colonial society which is repulsive to-day may be attractive to-morrow, or a contrary change may take place with one or two departures or new arrivals. The same holds good in India; and though Indian society can boast of some superiority to colonial (a superiority which is amusingly asserted on board mail-steamers), it has very great defects of its own, and in certain circumstances degenerates into the intolerable. One tendency of life in India is to create an immense amount of conceit, and to make men assume airs of superiority, not because of any superiority of mind or character, or on account of great services rendered to the state, but simply because long residence in the country, or in some particular district of it, has given them high appointments, or the advantage as regards local knowledge. Then, though military society has many good points, 'discipline must be observed,' and it was in perfect good faith, and expressing his own opinion as well as that which he believed to be generally entertained, that an old Indian remarked to me, 'We don't think much of any one's opinions here until he is a lieutenant-colonel at least.' Of course, in all countries opinions are often measured by the position of the spokesman, but in Europe that is not so much the case as in India, and in our happier climes it is easy to shun the society of snobs, whether social or intellectual, without becoming a social pariah. This social tendency is not corrected, but developed rather than otherwise, by a close bureaucracy, such as the Indian Civil Service—and there is no other element in the community sufficiently strong to correct it—while it is almost justified by the extraordinary effect India has in rapidly producing intense conceit and insufferable presumption among Europeans of a low order of mind and character, whatever classes of the community they may belong to. Nothing struck me more in that country than the contrast between its elevating and even ennobling effects on those Europeans whose minds were above a certain level, and its exactly contrary effects on almost all those who were below that level. What, then, Indian society has specially to struggle against are two apparently opposite tendencies, a slavish respect for mere position, and for exceptional power and knowledge in particular directions; and, on the other hand, excessive individual conceit and presumption. But these evil tendencies (which, curiously enough, belong also to the Indian native character) are not opposed in any such way as to counteract each other. On the contrary, they are apt to foster and inflame each other, because the old Indian justly sees that he has opposed to him an immense deal of ignorant presumption, which ought to be severely repressed, while the democrat and the griffin instinctively feel that they are oppressed by an amount of tyrannical old-fogysm which would not be allowed to exist in any other country."—"Abode of Snow," by Andrew Wilson, p. 56.)

the consideration of morality, but we must be allowed to consider the influence of empire on the political character of the imperial country. Our free institutions with the character on which they rest, and the corruption of which they would not survive, are supposed, apart from sentiment, to be objects of paramount importance. The addition of an unconstitutional title to the constitutional titles of the British sovereign seems aptly to symbolize a tendency already perceptible, and which that measure was perhaps partly intended to assist. Dependencies, even under the mildest system, must be governed on principles wholly different from those of a constitutional polity, and, though superior minds may be able to keep the distinction between the two spheres always before them, and to don the despot without doffing the citizen, in ordinary minds the lines of separate allegiance will become more or less blurred and the indefeasible sanctity of freedom will be lost. The effect will be intensified by every rebellion which breaks out in a dependency, and, after exciting the passions of the imperial nation, is quenched in servile blood. It was for this reason that many people who were by no means admirers of the East India Company deprecated its abolition, and the political identification of India with England which necessarily ensued. The company being under the control of the British Government, the responsibility under the old system was the same, but the danger of political contagion was not so great.

Anglo-Indians, as a body, return rich; they must therefore have some political influence, and it would be interesting to know what their political tendencies are, and what sort of citizens India sends back to England. In former days, before the dependencies were controlled, both East Indian nabobs and West Indian planters avenged the oppressed native upon the dominant race by playing a leading part in the corruption of the English Parliament. It was on the East India Bill and with the support of the nabobs that George III. gained the victory over the constitution which established his ascendancy, and enabled him to bring a train of calamities on the country.

But the reflex influence may go deeper still and affect not only those sentiments which lie at the root of political liberty, but those which lie at the root of all civilization. A conqueror necessarily persuades himself that his yoke is righteous, that submission to it is loyalty, that insurrection against it is the worst of treasons. He forgets that, as Pym said when Strafford pleaded that

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Ireland was a conquered country and you might do what you pleased in it: "If the king, by the right of a conqueror, gives laws to his people, the people must by the same reason be restored to the right of the conquered to recover their liberty if they can." The Scotch adore Wallace, but if they caught a Wallace in India they would blow him away from a gun. This inversion of morality by the conqueror in his own favor, with the effect which it produces on his character, is one of the ugliest features of conquest. The Sepoy was not a patriot, it is true; but he was an alien, and more than an alien, in race and in religion; he was a mercenary serving for nothing but his pay; to look for love and loyalty at his hands was looking for grapes on thistles; there could be no security for his fidelity but a vigilance which had been relaxed, and precautions which had been neglected. His caste—that is, his social and religious existence—had been threatened, as he imagined, by the greased cartridges. He had further been worked upon by the fiendish cunning of Nana Sahib, who had himself, it appears, been turned from a sycophant into a malignant enemy by unskillful handling. The frenzy into which the Sepoys burst was of the sort to which all barbarians are liable, and for which you must be prepared if you choose to take barbarians into your service. The wholesale slaughter of these wretched men, in cold blood, when they had laid down their arms, and in some cases when they had apparently been guilty of little more than being carried away like animals by a stampede, may have been a political necessity of conquest, but it will never be described by impartial history as an act of moral justice, and participation in it and in the hideous scenes of that period generally could hardly fail to affect the character of the Englishmen engaged. The work of Dr. Russell is well known. Lieutenant Majendie's "Up among the Pandies" is not so well known, but it is a vivid, simple, and apparently truthful photograph of scenes which that officer himself witnessed. We give a couple of extracts below,¹

¹ "I have before adverted to the hardness of heart which in some cases was shown by our men, and to the careless and callous indifference with which they took away human life; and I will here relate one of several instances which came under my notice in illustration of this fact. After we had occupied the Iron Bridge for some days, and when we supposed that the houses in the neighborhood were quite clear of the enemy, we were astonished one evening by hearing a shot in one of the many buildings which we occupied, and, directly after, some of the soldiers rushing in dragged out a decrepit old man, severely wounded in the thigh. It seems that the sentry, having heard somebody moving about the house, had

and the reader will probably agree with Lieutenant Majendie that, let the guilt of the sufferers be what it would, the work of the executioners must have bred in them "hardness of heart" and "callous indifference to taking human life." Sup-

challenged, and, receiving no answer, fired, and hit the poor old wretch in question in the leg. He was brought out, and soon surrounded by a noisy, gaping crowd of soldiers, who clamored loudly for his immediate execution, expressing themselves in language more remarkable by its vigor than either its elegance or its humanity. 'Ave his nut off,' said one; 'Hang the brute,' cried another; 'Put him out of mess,' said a third; 'Give him a Cawnpore dinner' (six inches of steel), cried a fourth, but the burden of all their cries was the same, and they meant death. The only person in the group who appeared unmoved and indifferent to what was going on was he who certainly had every right to be the most interested. I mean the old man himself, whose stoicism one could not but admire. He must have read his face a hundred times over in the angry gestures and looks of his captors, but never once did he open his lips to supplicate for mercy, or betray either agitation or emotion, giving one the idea of a man bored by the noise and the proceedings generally, but not otherwise affected. His was a case which hardly demanded a long or elaborate trial. He was a native—he could give no account of himself—he had been found prowling about our position at night; stealthily moving among houses, every one of which contained a quantity of gunpowder, and where, for aught we knew, and as was more than probable, mines may have existed, which a spark dropped from his hand would have ignited—or he was a spy, or—but what need of more? In this time of stern and summary justice (?) such evidence was more than ample; he was given over to two men, who received orders to 'destroy him' (the expression usually employed on these occasions, and implying in itself how dreadfully common such executions had become), and they led him away. This point being settled, the soldiers returned to their games of cards and their pipes, and seemed to feel no further interest in the matter, except when the two executioners returned, and one of their comrades carelessly asked, 'Well, Bill, what did yer do to him?' 'Oh,' said the man as he wiped the blood off an old tulwar, with an air of cool and horrible indifference which no words can convey—'oh, sliced his 'ed off,' resuming his rubber, and dropping the subject much as a man might who had drowned a litter of puppies" (page 222). This old man, it will be observed, was not a Sepoy, he was only a native, and not the slightest attempt appears to have been made to verify the suspicion as to a mine of gunpowder. In the next case the victim was a Sepoy, taken in a skirmish, in which a British officer of a Sikh regiment had fallen:

"Infuriated beyond measure by the death of their officer, the Sikhs (assisted, I regret to say, by some Englishmen) proceeded to take their revenge on this one wretched man. Seizing him by the two legs, they attempted to tear him in two. Falling in this, they dragged him along by the legs, stabbing him in the face with their bayonets as they went. I could see the poor wretch writhing as the blows fell upon him, and could hear his moans as his captors dug the sharp bayonets into his lacerated and trampled body, while his blood, trickling down, dyed the white sand over which he was being dragged. But the worst was yet to come: while still alive, though faint

pose these rebels had been natives of Algeria, and the executioners French Zouaves, should we not have been confirmed in the belief that Algeria was a doubtful gain to France?

The Sepoys were mutineers. But the people of Oude were not mutineers. They were fighting, most unwisely, no doubt, but not unnaturally, for their native dynasty. Their crime cannot be said to have been worse than that of the Scotch Jacobites, who are now objects of historic sympathy; yet they were included in the indiscriminating slaughter.

Lord Elgin was above the suspicion of pseudo-philanthropy, or of any weakness or illusion which could interfere with a rational pursuit of British interests. For that reason we shall make a free use of his testimony, as recorded in his "Letters and Diary." Visiting India, on his way to China, at the time of the mutiny, he came into contact with the spirit of sanguinary terrorism evoked among the dominant race; and the impression which it made upon him is not doubtful:

"August 21st.—It is a terrible business, however, this living among inferior races. I have seldom from man or woman since I came to the East heard a sentence which was reconcilable with the hypothesis that Christianity had ever come into the world. Detestation, contempt, ferocity, vengeance, whether Chinamen or Indians be the object. There are some three or four hundred servants in this house. When one first passes by their salaaming, one feels a little awkward. But the feeling soon wears off, and one moves among them with perfect indifference, treating them, not as dogs, because in that case one would whistle to them and pat them, but as machines with which one can have no communion or sympathy. Of course, those who can speak the language are somewhat more *en rapport* with the natives; but very slightly so I take it. When the passions of fear and hatred are ingrafted on this indifference, the result is frightful: an absolute callousness to the sufferings of the objects of those passions, which must be witnessed to be understood and believed.

and feeble from his many wounds, he was deliberately placed upon a small pile of dry sticks, which had been improvised for the purpose, and there held down, in spite of his dying struggles, which, becoming weaker and more feeble every moment, were, from their very faintness and futile desperation, cruel to behold. Once, during this frightful operation, the wretched victim, maddened by pain, managed to break away from his tormentors, and, already horribly burnt, fled a short distance, but he was immediately brought back and placed upon the fire, and there held till life was extinct." Englishmen were looking on all the time!

"August 22d.— ——— tells me that yesterday, at dinner, the fact that Government had removed some commissioners who, not content with hanging all the rebels they could lay their hands on, had been insulting them by destroying their caste, telling them that after death they should be cast to dogs to be devoured, etc., was mentioned. A reverend gentleman could not understand the conduct of Government; could not see that there was any impropriety in torturing men's souls; seemed to think that a good deal might be said for torturing their bodies as well. These are your teachers, O Israel! Imagine what the pupils become under such leading!" (page 199).

Subsequently, as governor-general, Lord Elgin had the opportunity of learning more of these events from sources which he deemed authentic:

"The feeling of the natives of India toward Canning was in some measure due to a similar cause. The clamor for blood and indiscriminate vengeance which raged around him, and the abuse poured upon him because he would not listen to it, imparted in their eyes to acts which carried justice to the very verge of severity the grace of clemency. I could give you plenty of proofs of this. . . . The following sentences occur in a letter written from Delhi during our recent panic by an officer: . . . 'The native force here is much too small to be a source of anxiety, and, unless they take the initiative, it is my opinion that there can be no important rising. The Mussulmans of Delhi are a contemptible race. Fanatics are very rare on this side of the Sutlej. The terrors of that period when every man who had two enemies was sure to swing are not forgotten. The people declare that the work of Nadir Shah was as nothing to it. His executions were completed in twelve hours. But, for months after the last fall of Delhi, no one was sure of his own life or that of the being dearest to him for an hour.'"

We might fancy ourselves reading an account of the reign of terror in Ireland after the rising in '98. That all this is not English, that it is utterly at variance with the general character of the English people, is certain; every candid critic of English society would say so; but no character is independent of circumstance, and if we choose to put ourselves into the circumstances of foreign conquerors, into the place of Nadir Shahs, the natural consequences will ensue. There is nothing to save us from them, any more than there was to save the Spanish conquerors of Mexico. From Egypt we shall infallibly be drawn on to Abyssinia; and in Abyssinia, if not in Egypt, there is likely to be just as bloody work as there has been in Hindostan.

Increased facilities of communication and rep-

resentation now bring scenes enacted in a distant dependency completely home to the minds of the people in the imperial country, so as closely to identify them with all that they do not repudiate and condemn. And when did the people of an imperial country heartily repudiate and effectually condemn acts necessary, or plausibly alleged to be necessary, to the maintenance of their own dominion?

In the Jamaica case we had a taste of the spirit which familiarity with slaughter in the case of the Indian rebels had evoked. All remember how Chief-Justice Cockburn charged in favor of outraged justice and humanity; how unavailing were his words; what homage was offered, and by what lips, to terrorism and murder; what sinister principles were propounded, and what ominous sentiments were expressed, not with reference to dependencies alone.

Less serious, but still worthy of notice, is the corrupting effect of the pageantry, the servility, the sultanism, of which dependencies are the licensed sphere. Through the newspaper accounts of the Prince of Wales's visit to India breathed something very like the spirit of a Byzantine court. Wise men laugh; but the crowd are impressed, and they do not say to themselves, "This is only for Hindostan or Egypt." If ever an attempt is made to revive anything like "a real throne" in this country (and the idea is perhaps not so remote from possibility as would be generally imagined), it will derive any chance of success it may have in some measure from the influence of the Indian Empire.

Therefore, before enthusiastic friends of England—and surely great enthusiasm may be predicated of those who can dwell with complacency on the idea of handing over not only the East but all Europe to the reactionary aristocracy of this country—before enthusiastic friends of England, we say, determine to give her Egypt, on the ground that she is the best representative of the principles of constitutional liberty, they ought to consider whether she is likely to continue the best representative of those principles when she has been charged with the functions of unconstitutional government in all parts of the globe. No political character could be stronger or more confirmed than that of the Roman, yet by empire it was radically changed.

The spirit of enterprise, no doubt, is displayed and fostered by conquest. Far be it from us to depreciate its value or to disparage the pride which its achievements excite in the nation. But it may be directed to more objects than one.

Cook, Franklin, and Livingstone, showed enterprise as well as the conquerors of the Indian Empire.

It is the fashion to accuse the Americans of unlimited voracity, but they seem really to be about the only people that look at a thing before they swallow it. St. Domingo, from its natural wealth and capabilities, was a most tempting morsel, and it was almost forced down the throat of the nation by President Grant, who was then in an ambitious mood. But it was steadfastly rejected on the ground that, though commercially rich, it was politically unwholesome, and would import a bad element into the Legislature of the United States.

We have spoken, so far, of the interest of the conqueror, or the dominant race. But modern sentiment demands that the interest of the conquered, or the subject race, shall also be considered, and we may say with truth that no imperial country has ever acknowledged this obligation so fully as England.

To India, English rule has given peace, saving our own wars and mutinies; a regular and equitable though costly administration; greatly increased security for life and property; railroads; the abolition of dark and cruel superstitions, such as Suttee and Thuggee. On the other hand, there are consequences which attend even the most humane of conquests, and, when one nation undertakes to provide happiness for another by overruling the natural course of things, measures conceived in the most beneficial spirit are apt to work out in unexpected ways, and to lead to mixed results.

Conquest must always extinguish the military spirit of the conquered and their power of self-defense. Roman conquest did this systematically, and, when the legions withdrew, bands of undisciplined though hardy barbarians stalked unresisted through the helpless provinces of the empire. British conquest has done the same thing, though not on system, and populations which we found warlike are now sheep, and would be the prey of the first wolf that descended on them, if British protection were withdrawn. But conquest must also kill all native germs of political life and all power of political self-organization. It is, of course, difficult to say what Nature would have produced, had India been left politically to itself, or rather had it been acted on by European influence only as Japan has been, not in the way of foreign domination. Regarded from the Indian point of view, Akbar was probably not less beneficent than a

viceroy, and whatever improvements he might effect would be more likely to adhere to the soil. In the case of Egypt, it is true, there would, so far as the mass of the natives are concerned, be little in the way of military, and nothing in the way of political, life to extinguish. We should only render impossible that which might otherwise be possible, the gradual growth, under an independent government, of an Egyptian nation.

To associate the conquered with the conqueror in the work of Indian government, and thus in time train India to self-rule, is a policy, the very conception of which attests the comparatively beneficent spirit of British conquest. But before it can be really carried into effect, not only must great political difficulties be overcome, but a bridge must be thrown over a social gulf, so wide as to be apparently impassable. Real participation in government implies political equality between the races, and political equality cannot exist between those who are socially far apart. The higher and more sympathetic minds may be able to surmount the prejudice of race, and to act with a Hindoo as cordially as with an Englishman. But this cannot be expected of the ordinary officials of the dominant nation, much less of the lower class of Europeans and the common soldier. We have heard Lord Elgin on the relations between the races. In another passage (p. 417), speaking of a murder committed by a European on a native, he says that, though not deliberate, it had a feature just as bad, and characteristic of homicides committed by Europeans on natives, inasmuch as it was done "in wanton recklessness, almost without provocation, under an impulse which would have been resisted if the life of the native had been estimated at the value of that of a dog." He goes on to mention another case, in which a native had been kicked to death for milking a goat which was alleged not to belong to him, and says that the local paper, instead of pitying the victim or his family, only complained of the hardship to which the homicide was subjected by having to go to Calcutta to answer for his conduct in hot weather. Assuredly, to make these two elements work together politically would be no easy matter. The gulf between the Hindoo and the European is no doubt partly caused by the strange primeval mystery of Hindoo nature. In the use of the Egyptian Fellah there would be no great obstacle of this kind; but the Fellah would probably be an object of still greater contempt than the Hindoo.

From war we have saved India. But what if in doing so we have unwittingly aggravated the

danger of famine? What if, in the calm but enfeebling security created by our rule, a helpless and shiftless population has multiplied without any limit but that of bare subsistence, to be the prey of this periodical destroyer, or to be rescued only by Government aid on an enormous scale? We may well feel proud both of the humanity which accepts the burden, and of the administrative vigor with which it is borne. Yet this may be an instance of the tendency of interference with the course of Nature in other countries to work out in unexpected ways.

Since England has taken India into her own hands, her sense of responsibility has compelled her to introduce improvements, administrative and educational, on the pattern of the best European civilization. But can India afford this system? Can she afford it when she has to pay exile price for all her officials, and to give them all large pensions besides? She is gorgeous, but, in proportion to her population, poor. The Duke of Wellington is reported to have said of her: "She is a magnificent country, and it would be a shame to govern her ill; but it would be ruinous to govern her well." With an annual deficit always called extraordinary, yet regularly recurring, is it certain that the duke's saying will not prove true? Bankruptcy is a foe at least as much to be dreaded by the Anglo-Indian Government as the Russian legions which fancy sees descending from the clouds of the Himalayas.

From bankruptcy the Indian Government is in fact saved only by the revenue from the opium-traffic, which, as the present Secretary of State for India said in defending it, "involves inconveniences of principle, but is wrapped up in our finances." Inconveniences of principle the traffic does seem to involve, when we consider that it is not merely, like the liquor-traffic in this country, a trade licensed by Government, but a Government trade. The Chinese Government is semi-barbarous, but it is paternal; and there is no reason for doubting the sincerity of its desire to save the souls and bodies of its people from the ravages of this hellish drug. But we, impelled by financial exigency, constrain the Chinese to admit it and bombard Canton when they refuse. The excuses put forward—that Government limits the traffic by undertaking it, and that private villainy might commit the crime if Government did not—would hardly impose upon a child. Such, however, is the pillar of Indian finance and it can hardly be thought adamantine, unless morality and religion cease to be forces in the world.

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The propagation of Christianity will hardly be alleged as the object of British conquest in India or anywhere else, especially as the governing class of the imperial nation is itself rapidly tending in a very different direction. Whatever else Christianity may be, it is not a religion of conquest. Its founders, and that later body of apostles who evangelized and civilized the northern tribes, presented themselves at all events as purely spiritual agencies, wholly unconnected with military power or with blowing rebels away from guns. A member of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel would, perhaps, be shocked by the suggestion that whatever is best and most spiritual in the nature of a Hindoo would be likely to restrain him from abandoning the religion of his fathers to embrace the religion of the conqueror. If the number of converts made by the Church of England in India, backed as she is by power and wealth, were compared with the number made by Xavier, taking the latter at the lowest possible estimate, the result would be by no means flattering to political religion. Nor, if the testimony of the shrewdest observers may be trusted, are the converts of Xavier likely to have been less respectable or less sincere than those made by the Church of England.

The political dominion of India is a legacy from generations, the political aims, the commercial policy, the public morality, and the general conditions of which were different from ours. Whether, if it were offered to us now for the first time, we should do wisely in accepting it—whether it would not be better to secure free commercial access without political dominion—may be reasonably doubted. In fact, even the generations by which the empire was founded were drawn on for the most part, not only without design, but against their wishes, and were always trying to set a limit to the progress of conquest, though they could never succeed in doing so.¹ But, by a course of events which there is little use in discussing, as it cannot now be reversed, India has become ours; and nobody would now propose that we should either give it up or let it be taken from us. Independently of imperial pride, we are bound to maintain our hold on it by strong bonds both of duty and of interest. Our departure, after suppressing the native governments and destroying the organizing forces, would consign the country to a sanguinary anarchy, and place in jeopardy British property and invest-

¹ See the preface to Mr. Sidney Owen's "Selection from Marquis Wellesley's Despatches," and the despatches themselves.

ments, the aggregate value of which can hardly be less than four hundred millions. Still, of the two objects, India and England, the most spirited advocate of aggrandizement must allow that England is to be preferred, and therefore that there is a limit to the perils to be incurred, and the sacrifices to be made, for the sake of India. Some things have been mentioned which seem to show that this limit is not entirely beyond the horizon, and even that, unless Indian finances assume a more hopeful aspect, it may come very distinctly into view.

There are two ways of keeping our hold on India. One, and no doubt the more certain while it lasts, is to forego internal improvement, and to lavish the earnings of our people in the maintenance of armaments large enough to command the Mediterranean, at the same time occupying Egypt and every place else that may be necessary in order literally to annex India to England by an unbroken line of British territories, fortresses, and waters. The other way is to keep on good terms with the Mediterranean nations. Whatever depends on amity must be to some extent precarious. But there is no apparent reason why this amity should be broken. Our possession of India does not hurt or menace the Mediterranean nations in the slightest degree; it benefits them, so long as we keep the Indian ports open to their trade, and it need not give them any sort of umbrage. To do wanton mischief may be in their power, but there is no ground for presuming that they will be inclined to do it, especially as they would obviously hurt themselves. As to the potentate, whoever he may be, through whose territory the Suez Canal runs, he will surely be no more tempted to destroy or close it than a turnpike man is tempted to nail up his own gate.

That Russia meditates an invasion of British India is a belief which, if it were not shared by some persons of mark, we should be inclined to call a chimera. Mere proximity does not denote hostile designs; if it did, there would be no peace on earth. The natural barrier between the two empires is stronger than that between any other two conterminous countries in the world. If Russia, reckoning by mere miles, without regard to obstacles, is near to us, we are equally near to her; and if she has arrived at this position by continual additions of territory, we have done the same. Both empires have grown in the same manner, and one as naturally as the other, by extension in a sort of political vacuum, where nothing opposed them but the arms of barbarous or half-civilized powers. In each case, probably,

the growth has been to a great extent willed, and even involuntary, though we persist in ascribing to deliberate and far-reaching ambition on the part of Russia that which we know, on our own part, is to be ascribed to nothing of the kind. That either England or Russia, having reached the foot of the Himalayas by extending her empire over regions unoccupied by any civilized nation, will proceed to scale the Himalayas for the purpose of attacking another great European power, is as little to be presumed as it is to be presumed that the tide will scale the cliff because it has raced in over a sandy flat. The movements of Russia farther west are assignable to an obvious cause, and one totally unconnected with any imaginable designs on India. Every great and growing power is led by a natural impulse to make its way to an open sea. England would hardly submit to being corked up in the Dardanelles in order to gratify the jealous apprehensions of Russia, and she cannot expect that Russia will complacently submit to being corked up in order to gratify hers. Suppose Russia, like ourselves, obtains the full freedom of the Mediterranean. All diplomatists and Russophobists hold up their hands in horror at the thought. But what is the specific evil which would ensue? Why is Sebastopol, or, if it came to that, Constantinople, so much more likely to be dangerous than Brest? If Russia is provoked, she will very likely give us trouble in India; but why should she be provoked?

It is assumed that the Suez Canal would be available in time of war. This is a point on which, of course, we cannot presume to form an opinion; but it lies so near the root of the whole question that it is to be hoped a deliberate opinion will be formed. To occupy Egypt in defiance of the wrath and future hostility of France, to go to the expense of creating armaments powerful enough to command the eastern Mediterranean, and then to see the object for which all this had been done practically annihilated by a few shillings' worth of dynamite or the scuttling of an old ship, would be mortifying in the extreme.

Already our nervous anxiety about the canal has brought an avalanche of calamity on the world. To avoid this war with all its horrors, and the danger of further conflagration which it involves, it was necessary that from the outset separate interests should be suppressed, and that the crisis should be treated as a European one, to be dealt with by the common councils of Europe. But hardly had it arrived when England avowed her intention of separately securing her own in-

terests, and pounced upon the Suez Canal. This was the signal that a wreck had commenced, and that everybody must look out for himself. Everybody did look out for himself; everybody made his own game. Cordial coöperation thenceforth was impossible, and the inevitable result was this war—a war which puts back civilization. Lord Derby has said that of British interests the greatest is peace, and what Lord Derby says is always wise. If we ask why Lord Derby did not make a sincere and resolute effort to preserve the greatest of British interests by enforcing in common with Russia and the other powers the reforms to which Turkey was pledged, and which, if vigorously pressed, she would most certainly have conceded, the answer will partly be that this obvious line of policy was crossed by the alarm about the Suez Canal and the interests of England in the East.

Egypt no doubt differs greatly in some respects from India. But in Egypt, as in India, you would have a dominant and a subject race. You would have a foreign government ruling, on arbitrary principles, over people divided from the officials by a wide social gulf. The reflex action on the character of the imperial country would probably be much the same.

In the course of empire, one act of aggrandizement leads to another. The conquest of a small territory round the British factories in India has led to the conquest of the whole country. This, again, leads to the occupation of Egypt. India being in the hands of England, no one will deny that the occupation of Egypt, in case of a break-up of the Turkish Empire, presents itself as a natural question for consideration. But the advocates of the measure must allow it to be fairly discussed, and not think to settle it by impugning the patriotism of their opponents, though, as we have already admitted, the nation is just now in a mood in which such appeals are likely to tell. If the party of moderation is inferior to the party of aggrandizement in anything, it is not in love of the country, but in power of discerning her true interests. It does not seem to itself to be advocating a policy of weakness. It holds that, as we said before, the strength of England is in herself, and that she derives more real strength from one of her own counties than she does from all her foreign dependencies put together. It holds, in fact, that acquisition of territory which is not self-defending is extension, not of strength, but of weakness; and in proof of the fact it may cite, among other things, the perpetual complaints of its opponents that the em-

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pire is unfortified, and their unheeded cries for further expenditure in defenses.¹ It avows that its main objects of interest are not external but internal, and that it is less solicitous about remote acquisitions, and those posts in Asia the names of which are dear and familiar to the pundits of Russophobia, than about the many millions of Englishmen who at present share only to a very miserable extent the advantages, moral, intellectual, or material, of English civilization. It does not admit that this is "parochialism," unless England is a parish. It desires, at all events, to see the proof that aggrandizement is good for the whole English people. As to the question of courage or cowardice, which is sometimes raised in the fervor of debate, statesmen and journalists, however bellicose, do not go to the front; and the only way in which they can show courage of any kind is by manfully expressing what seem to them true opinions, though they may happen to be unpopular at the time.

To make a perfectly clean breast, we will confess that there are some people who believe that the consecration of filibustering nationality is rather out of date; that the day of humanity has dawned, and that to resent its arrival is about as rational as to resent the arrival of autumn or anything else that the course of Nature brings.

It is the more desirable that at this crisis, on which the policy of the future may depend, there should be a full discussion of the subject in the press (which is now, more truly than Parliament, the great council of the nation), and that the mind of England should be deliberately made up, because otherwise her hand may be forced by agencies which the respectable advocates of aggrandizement would disown, though they can hardly help warning them into life by encouraging the general tendency and decrying the principles which restrain it. For a description of these agencies we will once more have recourse to Lord Elgin, who encountered them in China, where they have more than once been successful in drawing England into a use of her power which, it is to be hoped, no party among us would have deliberately approved:

"I never felt so ashamed of myself in my life, and Elliot remarked that the trip seemed to have made me sad. There we were, accumulating the means of destruction under the very eyes, and within the reach, of a population of about 1,000,000

¹ The Canadian Government was asked the other day, by an eminent organ of aggrandizement, to quadruple its military expenditure, and this in the face of a falling revenue. You might literally as well ask the Canadian Government for their heads.

people, against whom these means of destruction were to be employed! 'Yes,' I said to Elliot, 'I am sad, because when I look at that town, I feel that I am earning for myself a place in the Litany immediately after "plague, pestilence, and famine." I believe, however, that, as far as I am concerned, it was impossible for me to do otherwise than as I have done. I could not have abandoned the demand to enter the city after what happened last winter, without compromising our position in China altogether, and opening the way to calamities even greater than those now before us. I made my demands on Yeh as moderate as I could, so as to give him a chance of accepting; although, if he had accepted, I knew that I should have brought on my head the imprecations both of the navy and army and of the civilians, the time being given by the missionaries and the women. And now Yeh having refused, I shall do whatever I can possibly do to secure the adoption of plans of attack, etc., which will lead to the least destruction of life and property.' . . . The weather is charming; the thermometer about 60° in the shade in the morning; the sun powerful, and the atmosphere beautifully clear. When we steamed up to Canton, and saw the rich alluvial banks covered with the luxuriant evidences of unrivaled industry and natural fertility combined; beyond them, barren uplands, sprinkled with a soil of reddish tint, which gave them the appearance of heather slopes in the Highlands; and beyond these again, the white-cloud mountain-range, standing out bold and blue in the clear sunshine, I thought bitterly of those who, for the most selfish objects, are trampling under foot this ancient civilization."—("Letters and Journals," page 212.)

"I am now off from Canton, never, I hope, to see it again. Two months I have been there, engaged in this painful service, checking, as I have been best able to do, the disposition to maltreat this unfortunate people. . . . On the whole I think I have been successful. There never was a Chinese town which suffered so little by the occupation of a hostile force; and, considering the difficulties which our alliance with the French (though I have had all support from Gros, in so far as he can give it) has occasioned, it is a very signal success. The good people at Hong-Kong, etc., do not know whether to be incredulous or disgusted at this policy." (page 224.)

"The settlement here is against treaty. It consists mainly of agents of the two great opium houses, Dent and Jardine, with their hangers-on. This, with a considerable business in the coolie trade—which consists in kidnapping wretched coolies, putting them on board ships where all the horrors of the slave-trade are reproduced, and sending them on specious promises to such places as Cuba—is the chief business of the 'foreign' merchants at Swatow" (page 226).

"Besides, I own that I have a conscientious

feeling on the subject. I am sure that in our relations with these Chinese we have acted scandalously, and I would not have been a party to the measures of violence which have been taken, if I had not believed that I could work out of them some good for them. Could I leave this, the really noblest part of my task, to be worked out by others? Any one could have obtained the Treaty of Tientsin. What was really meritorious was, that it should have been obtained at so small a cost of human suffering. But this is also what discredits it in the eyes of *many*, of *almost all*, here. If we had carried on war for some years, if we had carried misery and desolation all over the empire, it would have been thought quite natural that the emperor should have been reduced to accept the terms imposed upon him at Tientsin. But to do all this by means of a demonstration at Tientsin! The announcement was received with a yell of derision by connoisseurs and baffled speculators in tea" (page 280).

"Have you read Russell's book on the Indian mutiny? I have done so, and I recommend it to you. It has made me very sad; but it only confirms what I believed before respecting the scan-

dalous treatment which the natives received at our hands in India. I am glad that he has had courage to speak out as he does on this point. Can I do anything to prevent England from calling down on herself God's curse for brutalities committed on another feeble Oriental race? Or are all my exertions to result only in the extension of the area over which Englishmen are to exhibit how hollow and superficial are both their civilization and their Christianity? The tone of the two or three men connected with mercantile houses in China, whom I find on board, is all for blood and massacre on a great scale. I hope they will be disappointed; but it is not a cheerful or hopeful prospect, look at it from what side one may" (page 325).

Lord Elgin, we repeat, was neither a pseudo-philanthropist nor a patriot of every country but his own; he was wanting neither in British feeling nor in courage; and the records of his experience deserve attention, as well as the shortcomings of the war-horses on the Stock Exchange and in Pall Mall.

—*Fortnightly Review*.

THE SKEPTICISM OF BELIEVERS.

By LESLIE STEPHEN.

NOT long ago an interesting question was discussed by a respectable and presumably competent meeting. Why, it was asked, does not the spiritual warfare against the unbeliever meet with greater success? A "materialistic atheism," as a high authority assured us, is "in the air;" and the malign contagion spreads in spite of Bampton lecturers, Christian Evidence Societies, and other apologetic machinery. At all which it is hard not to exclaim, *Sancta simplicitas!* Can you really not guess this very open secret? Men die of many diseases; creeds of one—the disease of being found out. Do you ever remember that David Hume died a century ago, and that the matter which absorbs the intellects of the most zealous part of the clergy at the present day is the "eastward position?" When such a spectacle as the Folkestone case is presented to gods and men, what wonder that unbelief spreads? If a more articulate reply were requested, one might perhaps say that the old belief is perishing chiefly for two reasons: first, because it has become a sham belief; secondly, because it is a negative belief. No man can make converts who does not believe what he

says; nor will he, as a general rule, make them rapidly, when his creed consists chiefly in denying the strongest and most fruitful convictions of his neighbors. I shall not here inquire into the first of these explanations; but it may be worth while briefly to defend the other, which, indeed, is, at first sight, in greater need of defense.

It sounds paradoxical to declare that the orthodox belief is essentially skeptical. The infidel is popularly identified with the Mephistopheles, whose essence it is to deny. He denies, it is said, a hereafter and a divine element in the present. That denial implies the abandonment of the most cheering hopes and highest aspirations of mankind. To bring the charge of skepticism against those who are fighting against materialism and atheism is at best to indulge in a frivolous *tu quoque*. A parallel phrase, however, is common on the lips of the orthodox. It is a commonplace to taunt skeptics with credulity, nor is the taunt without foundation. So long as men of science continue to dabble in the filth of "spiritualism" it will have a meaning. A confessor is, after all, better than a medium; and I

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