




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


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
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OBSERVATIONS

ON

*MR. STEDMAN'S*

HISTORY

OF THE

AMERICAN WAR.

---

By LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR HENRY CLINTON, K. B.

---

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. DEBRET, OPPOSITE BURLINGTON-HOUSE, PICCADILLY;

1794.

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## OBSERVATIONS, &c.

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SIR Henry Clinton finds himself obliged to notice some insinuations, and contradict some assertions in Mr. Stedman's History of the American War, lately published. The affair of Bunker's Hill has been stated to the public by the general officer who commanded there: the volunteer services of Sir H. Clinton in that action were amply rewarded by the manner in which Sir W. Howe accepted them.

But there are other parts of the History which prove, that Mr. Stedman wanted either attention or candour. He asserts, that the army, during the cannonade of the fleet on the 28th of June, 1776, had embarked two or three times in boats, but did not proceed or co-operate with the attack of the navy. Vol. I. page 186, Mr. Stedman says as follows; " at twelve o'clock " the light infantry, grenadiers, and the fifteenth regiment embarked in " boats, the floating batteries and armed craft getting under weigh at the " same time, to cover the landing on Sullivan's Island; scarcely, however, " had the detachments proceeded from Long Island before they were ordered " to disembark, and return to their encampment. Early in the morning of " the 29th they were again embarked, and almost immediately afterwards

B

" ordered

2/87 wt



“ ordered to disembark.”—The short *fact* is as follows: It had been *finally* settled by Commodore Sir P. Parker and General Clinton, that part of the troops (there were boats for) were to have landed *not* on Sullivan’s Island, as Mr. Stedman says, but on the main land, proceeding to it by creeks communicating with it; three of the frigates were to have co-operated with the troops in an intended attack upon Hedrall’s Point, where the enemy had a work covering their bridge of communication with Sullivan’s Island: the three frigates intended for co-operation with the troops, almost immediately run aground; in the hope they would soon float and proceed, the troops embarked on the 28th, and finding the frigates did not proceed, the troops of course disembarked, the same on the 29th, and as the frigates did not proceed, the troops could not. General Clinton did not see Sir P. Parker’s public letter, or know that his own had not been published, till the November following, when he received a letter from Lord C. Germaine, with his Majesty’s approbation of his conduct at Sullivan’s Island; but as there were certain parts of the Commodore’s letter by which it appeared he had not been sufficiently explicit with respect to the conduct of the General and the army, and as the Minister had not *judged proper* to publish General Clinton’s letter, General Clinton shall first give an extract of Sir P. Parker’s letter, and then an extract of his own letter, certain queries he made to Sir P. Parker, and that Gentleman’s answers.

*Extract of Sir P. PARKER’s Letter to P. STEPHENS Esq.*

July 9, 1776.

“ THE fort was silenced and evacuated for an hour and a half, but the  
 “ rebels finding the army could not take possession, re-entered the fort.—  
 “ Their Lordships will see plainly by this account, that if the troops could  
 “ have operated in the attack, his Majesty would have been in possession of  
 “ Sullivan’s Island.”

*Extract*

*Extract of General CLINTON's Letter to Lord G. GERMAINE,  
Long Island, July 2, 1776.*

“ IT was about eleven o'clock in the morning of the 28th of June, when  
“ we discovered the fleet going to the attack of Sullivan's Island; but as they  
“ did not appear, when they brought up, to be within such a distance as to  
“ avail themselves of the fire from their tops, grape-shot, or musquetry, I  
“ was apprehensive no impression would be made on the fort; I likewise  
“ saw that the three frigates which the Commodore had destined to cut off  
“ the rebel communication with Hedrall's Point, and to favour the attack of  
“ the troops on that battery, were aground soon after the leading ships had  
“ taken their station.”

General Clinton thought it necessary to put the following queries to the Commodore, after that gentleman had acknowledged “ he had been guilty  
“ of some omission, and had not been sufficiently explicit in *his* public letter  
“ with respect to the conduct of the army.”

*Quere 1st from Gen. CLINTON to Sir P. PARKER.*

“ DID I not, very early after I had landed on Long Island, inform you,  
“ it was discovered that there was no ford at low water between Long Island  
“ and Sullivan's Island; and that I feared the troops could not co-operate in  
“ the manner we at first intended they should?”

*Sir P. PARKER's Answer to Sir H. CLINTON.*

“ YOU certainly made known your difficulties; and in your letter of the  
“ 18th June you say, ‘ there is no ford, and that the Generals concurred  
“ with

“ with you in opinion, that the troops could not take the share in the intended attack they at first expected to do.”

*Quere 2d from General CLINTON to Sir P. PARKER.*

“ DID I not offer two battalions to embark on board the fleet, and General Vaughan to command them, should you see any service in which they might be useful on your side ?”

*Answer.*

“ SOME conversation passed between General Vaughan and myself about troops, but I did not think it material ; and I was so extremely ill on my bed during the time, that I could not attend to it, and am, therefore, obliged to refer you to General Vaughan for the particulars.”

*Quere 3d from General CLINTON to Sir P. PARKER.*

“ DID I not request, that the three frigates might co-operate with the troops on their intended attack on the post of Hedrall's Point ?”

*Answer.*

“ THE three frigates, besides performing the services mentioned in my public letter, were intended to co-operate with you.”

*Quere 4th from General CLINTON to Sir P. PARKER.*

“ IF the forts were silenced and evacuated for an hour and a half, was it the troops that were first to take possession (as Sir P. Parker's letter may seem to imply) or the sailors and marines, which Sir P. Parker informed Sir H. Clinton in his letter of the 25th June, he had practised for that purpose, that were first to land and take possession ?”

*Answer.*

“ I certainly did intend, as appears by my letter of 25th June, to have attempted taking possession of the fort with the sailors and marines first, but I could not have planned the doing of it with about 300 men, without the prospect of speedy support from you; and I saw, soon after the attack begun, from a variety of circumstances, you could take no effectual steps for that purpose.”

Sir H. Clinton is persuaded there needs no comment on the above: if he should make any, it would be the two following short ones:

First, Had the frigates been able to proceed to their stations, an attempt (possibly a successful one) might have been made on the port of Hedrall's Point.

Secondly, If Commodore Sir P. Parker had accepted the General's offer of two battalions to embark on board the fleet, he would have had a sufficient force to take and keep possession of the fort on Sullivan's Island, *had that fort ever been silenced or evacuated.*

Page 22. vol. ii. Mr. Stedman implies, that Sir H. Clinton had been censured for encumbering himself with such an enormous train of baggage, &c. in his march through Jersey in June, 1778. Had Mr. Stedman attended to Sir H. Clinton's letter to Lord G. Germaine, he would have seen the cause of his being so encumbered; and also “ of that enormous train not a waggon or cart was captured by the enemy.”

Respecting all that gentleman's remarks on the action of Monmouth Court House, Sir H. Clinton shall only observe, that had Mr. Stedman attended to Sir H. Clinton's letter to Lord G. Germaine, and General Lee's trial, which last he seems to have read, he would have observed, that the two Generals

opposed to each other on that day, had described the ground and detailed the events of the action the same. The comment which it is said the late King of Prussia made on this was, " that there needed no other proof of their " being both correct."

The fact is, that it would have been scarcely possible for General Washington to have gained any advantage that day (as he had put three defiles between his main army and General Lee's corps) unless, as General Lee says, " depending on the ungovernable impetuosity of the British; their rear " guard, which was all that had been engaged, had passed the third defile " and attacked General Washington's whole army, which I find, however, " by General Clinton's letter to Lord G. Germaine, he saw the impropriety " and danger of, and had no idea of doing." 'Tis true, however, that, from Sir H. Clinton's having been obliged to maintain the ground on his side the third defile till certain of the light troops (whose zeal and ardour had carried them much farther than was intended) had returned, the enemy might have hoped that Sir H. Clinton intended to attempt the passage of the third defile.

Mr. Stedman, after giving every merited credit to operations under those respectable officers, General Prevost and Sir A. Campbell in the Floridas and Carolina, and General Matthews and Sir G. Collier in the Chesapeake, in a note, page 134, vol. ii. says, " The Campaign in the northern parts of " America was spent in desultory operations." Surely that Gentleman might have known, that all those desultory movements were necessary precludes to others more solid, which could not be carried into execution for want of promised and adequate reinforcement; nor did he know, perhaps, that Admiral Arbuthnot, whom Sir. H. Clinton had been assured would sail in March with the reinforcement, did not sail till July, or arrive in America till the end of August; or that the Admiral brought in his fleet a jail fever,

which sent 6000 men to the hospital immediately; or that a superior French fleet, with troops on board, was on the coast.

Page 180, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman says, "that General Lincoln had reflected on the British Commanders for their tardiness in making their approaches to the siege of Charles Town." Surely, it might naturally occur to Mr. Stedman (as it has done to others) that every delay (mortifying and unavoidable as they were) tempted General Lincoln to fortify Charles Town Peninsula, and put the fate of both Carolinas on that of Charles Town.

Mr. Stedman imputes to Sir H. Clinton's proclamation of the 3d June, 1780 (calling upon all persons in the then state of the province to declare themselves) what surely cannot be attributed to it.

He says, page 200, vol. ii. "One Lisle, who had belonged to a rebel corps while it was under the command of Neale, and who had been banished to the islands upon the sea coasts as a *prisoner* upon parole, availing himself of the Commander in Chief's proclamation of the 3d of June, took the oath of allegiance, and exchanging his parole for a certificate of his being a good subject; returning to his former abode he obtained a command under Colonel Floyd, and as soon as the battalion of militia was supplied with arms and ammunition, had the treacherous address to carry it off to Colonel Neale." Is it quite so certain that such mischievous consequences can be imputed to Sir H. Clinton's proclamation of the 3d of June, 1780? Paroles had been given before the province of South Carolina had been subdued; but when General William's surrender had put an end to all opposition in that province, Sir H. Clinton, not as a Commander in Chief, but as his Majesty's *sole* Commissioner to his provinces in America, did issue the above proclamation; and, perhaps, under all circumstances, it was at the time it was issued both *politic* and *proper*. And if one *Lisle* did exchange his parole for a certificate of his being a good subject, &c. &c. this surely cannot be imputed to Sir H. Clinton's proclamation of the 3d June, 1780,

1780, for those who read it will find, that very proclamation forbids and excludes, by description, almost by name, Mr. Lisle from holding any commission in his Majesty's service, and that persons having been banished to the islands marked him sufficiently for suspicion at least; and surely if all this had been attended to, this same Lisle would not have obtained a certificate of his being a good subject, or have been appointed to any command, and consequently he would not have had it in his power to have committed the above traitorous act. Mr. Stedman may surely find other causes for the revolution in the minds of certain people in South Carolina at the time he mentions, even though he should have been convinced, the civil administration under which the province *then* was had not contributed. The approach of General Gates with an army; the French already arrived, and reinforcements expected; the Spanish interference; the Dutch added to Great Britain's enemies; and the armed neutrality; all these probably had their effect.

Page 319, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman, in a note, says, " Dr. Ramsey, in his " History of the Revolution in South Carolina, charges the British with " seizing the property of the Americans, and their Commissaries and " Quarter-masters with taking provisions and all other things they wanted " for the army, wherever they could find them, and charging them to the " British government." What Mr. Stedman observes is as follows; " That " speculation was carried on in some of the departments of the army, and that " many individuals made large fortunes, cannot be denied; but this never " took place to any extent in the southern army, and the writer of this (who " was Commissary of the army under Lord Cornwallis) takes the present " occasion of repelling the calumnies of Dr. Ramsey, as far as they may relate to himself."

Mr. Stedman has in the course of this History repeatedly implied, as Lord Cornwallis had done before in his examination at the Board of Public Accounts, in February, 1782, that this abuse, this scandalous speculation had existed;

existed; and Mr. Stedman further implies, that owing to his carrying into execution the orders of Lord Cornwallis, it had been stopped. Mr. Stedman points out the great advantage arising to the Army and the Public from these orders of Lord Cornwallis, as the Commissioners of Public Accounts had done before, in their Seventh Report on Expenditures, wherein they ascribe to the orders of Lord Cornwallis, of the 23d December, 1780, the merit of having struck at abuses, which, say those Gentlemen, *did actually exist* when his Lordship issued those orders. Sir H. Clinton has already, in a Letter to those Gentlemen, written and published in 1784, (a copy of which was then delivered to Lord Cornwallis) explained this whole business fully, and proved, *first*, that those Gentlemen had made their Seventh Report on *ex parte* information, when they might have had his, and those of certain Officers of the different departments, who had actually announced themselves to the Board before they delivered in their Seventh Report; that they had not availed themselves of authentic information and Sir H. Clinton's correspondence with the Treasury, both of which had been recommended to them by Mr. Robinson, and by order of the Lords of the Treasury; that they had passed an implied censure on Sir H. Clinton of negligence in the expenditure, and had given a merit to Lord Cornwallis that did not belong to his Lordship, but to Sir Henry Clinton: and, finally, that Letter proves, that there would have been no necessity for Lord Cornwallis's order of the 23d December, 1780, if his Lordship had paid proper attention to those of Sir Henry Clinton of many months prior date, and of which his Lordship could not be ignorant, as his Lordship was, at the time Sir H. Clinton issued these orders, in the same camp with him. But as Mr. Stedman chooses again to resume this subject, and to ascribe the merit of the economical system to Lord Cornwallis, as Sir H. Clinton's letter to the Commissioners of Public Accounts did not (Sir H. Clinton apprehends) circulate so generally as Sir H. Clinton hoped and intended



it should, he thinks it necessary to answer all the above insinuations and assertions, from whatever quarter they may come, in the following manner :

That Sir H. Clinton had issued orders of similar effect to those of Lord Cornwallis, of Dec. 23, 1780, as far as respects the Commissary General's department, and the delivering captured provisions to the troops *gratis*, and saving the Crown rations to the Public in 1776 and 1777, even before he commanded the army: that in July 1779, he appointed Commissioners of Captures (totally distinct from the Commissary General's department) and for the above purposes; that it had been reported to Sir H. Clinton, by the Deputy Commissary General, that near a million of rations had been saved to the Public while he remained in South Carolina, and his orders were attended to; during which time Lord Cornwallis was under his immediate orders, and Mr. Stedman was acting as Deputy Commissary of captured forage, by Sir H. Clinton's orders of February 1780. Sir H. Clinton perfectly agrees with Lord Cornwallis, the Commissioners of Public Accounts, and Messrs. Stedman and Ramsay, that infamous abuse and peculation might have existed, but takes leave again to assert, that he issued orders, soon after he came to the command, most effectually to prevent it; nor could it well have existed to the northward, at that time, for to enable Lord Cornwallis to act offensively, Sir H. Clinton had reduced the army under his immediate orders to a strict defensive. There needs no other proof when and where this peculation was effectually stopped, than the following letter from Mr. Robinson, written by order of the Lords of the Treasury, approving Sir H. Clinton's having established Commissaries of Captures *for the purpose of supplying the army gratis, and saving the Crown rations to the Public.*

*Copy of a letter from John Robinson, Esq. late Secretary to the Treasury, to Sir H. Clinton, late Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Army in North America, dated Treasury Chambers, 19th December, 1780.*

“ The Lords of his Majesty’s Treasury having received information of the  
“ steps which were taken by your Excellency to appoint Commissaries of  
“ Captures, upon your expedition to South Carolina, for the purpose of pre-  
“ serving the property of his Majesty’s loyal subjects in that country, and  
“ making them some recompense for their losses and damages sustained ; and  
“ for the purpose of converting to the good of his Majesty’s service, and to  
“ the use, convenience, and benefit of the army, all the cattle and moveable  
“ property which might be captured from his Majesty’s enemies ; and finding  
“ that Major Hay, one of the gentlemen appointed by your Excellency in  
“ February, 1780, one of the Commissioners was in England, on account of  
“ his health, their Lordships desired the favour of his attendance on their  
“ Board, to explain to them all the circumstances of that commission, and  
“ the nature of the proceedings thereon : and Major Hay having given their  
“ Lordships every satisfactory information thereon, it appears to their Lord-  
“ ships, that this measure has been not only of great utility and convenience  
“ to the army and navy, and his Majesty’s loyal subjects, but is an act of  
“ justice and humanity, and may be hereafter of the greatest consequence to  
“ prevent many abuses, and save considerable expences ; I am, therefore,  
“ commanded by their Lordships to acquaint your Excellency, that they  
“ approve entirely not only of your continuing such Commissioners in Caro-  
“ lina, but also of your establishing others of the like nature ; and their Lord-  
“ ships request that you will acquaint me, for their information, whether any  
“ such plan was adopted in the expeditions in Jersey, and from head of  
“ Elk to Philadelphia, in 1776 and 1777, or in any other ; and whether the  
“ cattle and moveables taken in such expeditions were brought to any account

“ for the benefit of the army, or advantage of the public, by such Commif-  
 “ faries, or any other perfons whatever ?

Sir H. Clinton, in answer to this letter, could only inform their Lordships, he was not in the chief command at that period, and refer the Lords of the Treasury to the Commissary General, Mr. Weier, assuring them at the same time, “ That even before he came to the command, whenever he had been de-  
 “ tached, he had always appointed Commissaries of Captures, that the army  
 “ and navy might receive such captured provisions gratis, and the Crown  
 “ provisions saved to the Public.”

Sir H. Clinton now leaves such of the Commissioners of Public Accounts as neglected to avail themselves of the information offered by the Treasury to Lord Cornwallis, and the Commissary of Captures, Mr. Stedman, to make their comments on the above; it will be obvious to the candid Public, that if the above economical system, so much approved by the Lords of His Majesty's Treasury, was established by Sir H. Clinton, in February and May, 1780, and near a million of rations were saved to the Public during that period, if there were no savings to the Public made between June and December, 1780, and that scandalous abuse alluded to did actually exist at that time, as Lord Cornwallis implies, and the Commissioners of Public Accounts assert it did, so far from commending his Lordship for having stopt the abuse by his order of the 23d December, 1780, they would have blamed him for having, by his inattention to Sir H. Clinton's orders, suffered it to exist so long.

Dr. Ramfay has, it is said also, insinuated, that the plunder taken at the siege of Charlestown was so considerable, that the Brigadier-Generals, serving at that siege, shared upwards of 5000l. Sir H. Clinton need not say, that he did not think it became him, as His Majesty's Commissioner to the Revolted Colonies, to take any share of plunder in *such a war* That there was money arising from the sale of public stores, &c. &c. is very certain, and that the navy, serving on that expedition, shared considerably fourteen years since: that a small sum, not exceeding 10,000l. was placed in the hands of agents,  
 appointed

appointed by the field officers of the army, is equally certain ; but it is no less certain, that those agents, though they have repeatedly received the Treasury mandates to pay that money into the Bank, have as constantly evaded the order under most frivolous pretences ; and that the army is now waiting to receive a very small share of plunder taken at a siege, and of which the navy divided their *ample* share full fourteen years since ! !

Page 244, vol. ii. Speaking of the attempt in Jersey, in June, 1780, Mr. Stedman says, " The real object of this expedition was probably against the  
 " American magazines at Morris Town ; but the opposition which the *Com-*  
 " *mander in Chief* met with at Springfield, was an indication that every mile  
 " of his future march through a country naturally difficult, and abounding  
 " with strong passes, would be not less obstinately disputed, and determined  
 " him to abandon the enterprize."

Mr. Stedman seems, in this account, to have followed American writers ; had he inquired, he would have found Sir H. Clinton did *not* arrive at New York till after this expedition had taken place ; that Sir H. Clinton knew nothing of this anticipated movement (which, as he had not the least reason to expect it, he had not forbid). If it had not taken place, or could have been stopt in time by either of the officers he had sent to prepare for one, in which he intended to have taken a part with the corps he had purposely brought from Charlestown, success of some importance might have been the consequence : as it was, every movement that *did* take place after Sir H. Clinton's return to New York, was merely to retire the corps (which had moved into Jersey) without affront.

Page 245, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman says, " When the French armament of  
 " eight sail of the line and 6000 troops, under Rochambeau and De la Ternay,  
 " arrived at Rhode Island, the British fleet under Admiral Arbuthnot was infe-  
 " rior, and a plan was laid for attacking New York ; but the arrival of six sail  
 " of the line from England, which followed close on the track of Chevalier de

E

" Ternay,

“ Ternay, soon gave Admiral Arbuthnot the superiority, and the British commanders, instead of waiting to be attacked, made preparations in their turn for acting offensively against the French at Rhode Island. Sir H. Clinton with the transports and troops destined for this expedition proceeded to Huntingdon Bay, in the Sound, whilst Admiral Arbuthnot with the ships of war sailed round Long Island, in order to co-operate by sea. But, in the mean time, General Washington, whose army had been increased by the arrival of several reinforcements, suddenly passed the North River and approached Kingbridge; so unexpected a movement obliged Sir H. Clinton to abandon the expedition to Rhode Island, and return with the troops for the protection of New York.”

Perhaps Mr. Stedman assigns here the best reason why the expedition could not take place; but as he proceeds and says, “ the object of this expedition was lost from a circumstance but too frequent in the history of this country, *a disagreement between the Commanders in Chief of the land and naval service.*” As this is the second insinuation of this sort Sir H. Clinton finds himself called upon to say a few words.

Sir H. Clinton, on receiving *private* information of the expected arrival of a French armament at Rhode Island, proposed to Admiral Arbuthnot (when he should be joined by Admiral Greaves) that the French troops should be met at their landing; for which purpose Sir H. Clinton was to have entered and landed in the Second Passage with 6000 men, covered by some frigates; and all that was requested of the Admiral was to block with his large ships the principal harbour, until any success the troops might meet with should induce the fleet to co-operate; but if the expedition should not take place before the French troops should have been landed, and have repaired the works of Newport, and they should also have been reinforced, in that case Sir H. Clinton had given it as his humble opinion, that the troops could not venture to act, unless the fleet would take an *active* part as well as the troops. It so happened,

that the French armament arrived at Rhode Island many days before Admiral Greaves had joined Admiral Arbuthnot, or that this last had been informed of their arrival : thus circumstanced, all were of opinion the troops could not act alone, and the Admiral did not judge it prudent to attempt the great entrance with his fleet, opposed by that of the enemy covered by batteries, and thought that of the Narraganset unsafe for ships of draft. Could this attempt have been made *immediately* on the arrival of the French armament, as it would have been unexpected, it might have succeeded ; but after the enemy had been in possession of such a place as Newport, and the Harbour and Islands, sixteen or eighteen days, Sir H. Clinton is free to own, he could have had little hopes (even if the fleet could have co-operated), which Sir Henry is far from saying he thinks they could.

Page 317, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman says, “ in the fall of the preceding year, the loss of Major Ferguson’s detachment obliged Lord Cornwallis to return from his Northern expedition, and fall back to WYUNESBOROUGH in South Carolina. Still, however, the *projected* movement into North Carolina was deemed so essential, that he only waited for reinforcements to renew it.”

In the first place, Sir H. Clinton cannot help being of opinion, that the loss of Colonel Ferguson was owing, in a great measure, to Lord Cornwallis’s having detached Colonel Ferguson with a body of Militia, without any support of regular troops, notwithstanding his Lordship had informed Sir H. Clinton, although that brave and zealous officer, judging of himself, had hoped he would make the militia fight without any support of regular troops.

His Lordship observed, “ That such hopes were contrary to the experience of the army, as well as of Major Ferguson himself.” That his Lordship should, *after this opinion*, not only suffer Colonel Ferguson to be detached without support, but put such a river as the Catawba between him and Ferguson, was matter of wonder to Sir H. Clinton and all who knew it.

Mr.

Mr. Steedman seems to imply, "that the second movement into North Carolina was made in consequence of a settled plan approved by Sir H. Clinton." Sir Henry, when he left Lord Cornwallis in command in South Carolina in June, 1780, left his Lordship with the following order: "Tis not my intention to prevent your Lordship acting offensively in case an opportunity offers *consistent with the security of Charles Town*, which is always to be considered as a primary object." Lord Cornwallis had therefore Sir H. Clinton's tacit approbation for any move he should judge proper to make *with perfect security to Charles Town*; and Sir H. Clinton, informed of Lord Cornwallis's intentions of going into North Carolina, had certainly approved. In his letter, however, to Lord Cornwallis, after he heard of the unfortunate affair of Cowpens, it will be seen, that if Sir H. Clinton had hopes, those hopes were founded in the opinion Sir Henry had of Lord Cornwallis's knowledge and abilities; but hearing his Lordship had lost all his light troops at Cowpens, convinced what little hopes he could have without them, though Sir H. Clinton certainly did not disapprove for the above reasons *then*: if his Lordship had informed him before he made the movement (as Sir Henry is persuaded his Lordship will acknowledge it would have been more regular to have done\*) "*that the works of Charles Town had been in part thrown down,*" and that capital (*which had been so strongly recommended to his particular care*) consequently open and exposed, Sir H. Clinton could not have approved of an operation of so much danger to South Carolina and its capital: nor, indeed, is it quite so certain that Lord Cornwallis was perfectly consistent when he made his second movement into North Carolina, for it would rather seem he made it somewhat in contradiction to his own opinion, given not many weeks before through Lord Rawdon, after his Lordship had returned from an unsuccessful attempt to recover North Carolina, in October, 1780. Lord Rawdon wrote to Sir H. Clinton, at Lord Cornwallis's desire, thus: "The people of North Carolina  
" had

\* Lord Rawdon's Letter to Lord Cornwallis.

“ had not given evidence enough either of their numbers or activity to justify the stake of South Carolina for the uncertain advantages which might attend an immediate junction with them :” and again, “ Lord Cornwallis foresees all the difficulties of a defensive war ; but his Lordship thinks they cannot be weighed against the dangers which must have attended an obstinate adherence to his former plan of marching into North Carolina.” But notwithstanding the above opinions of Lord Cornwallis, and after he had lost his light troops, that he had opened Charles Town, and was *certain* he should leave it in an exposed state, that he had destroyed his waggons, (except a few) and consequently had not the means of making a *solid move*, or of giving the experiment a *fair trial*, he proceeds on this expedition into North Carolina.

Page 348, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman says, “ three days after the action of Guilford, Lord Cornwallis began to retire, by easy days marches, towards Crosscreeks.”

Nobody can give Lord Cornwallis more credit for his zealous exertions at the battle of Guilford Court House than Sir H. Clinton ; but, alas ! that victory had every consequence of a defeat.

Page 352, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman says, “ nothing now remained to be done, but to proceed with the army to Wilmington.”

Perhaps Mr. Stedman does not know that Lord Cornwallis had been *ordered*, and had *promised*, in case of failure in North Carolina, to fall back on South Carolina, “ and secure it ;” that when at Crosscreek his Lordship was nearer to Campden (where Lord Rawdon was, and where he could be supplied with every thing) ; or, that by falling back from thence on Campden, he saved South Carolina, Charles Town, and Campden, as by going to Wilmington he exposed all three.

Page 353, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman assigns reasons for Lord Cornwallis's *not* going to South Carolina, and *for* his going to Virginia.



That Gentleman could not surely be ignorant that Lord Cornwallis could return safely into South Carolina. He may also have probably heard, that Colonel Balfour, Commandant of Charles Town, had entreated his Lordship to return to South Carolina, informed him that nothing else could save that province or its capital, that he might return by the Waggarmaw river, and that in the hope he would, he had sent galleys, &c. into that river, and had also occupied George Town; nor could there be the least doubt, but that by going into South Carolina (even though his Lordship had *embarked* and proceeded there) he saved that province and its capital; and that, on the contrary, by going into Virginia, he not only disregarded the orders of the Commander in Chief, as before stated, but put the southern provinces, his own corps, and that of General Phillips (which he had called into co-operation) into imminent danger; that by going into Virginia, he was about to break in upon the Commander in Chief's plan of operations for the campaign, to force him into others (he had always declared against) in the most *inimical* provinces, in the most *sickly* province, at the most *sickly* season; in a district where he could not long supply his army; from whence he could not retreat except under most disgraceful sacrifices; in which he could not remain in safety unless protected by a superior fleet, or a respectable place of arms till such fleet should arrive; and this while there were laying (and had been laying at Charles Town, from the 7th to the 24th of April) and coming to him, *and he knew it*, and that there might be hourly expected dispatches, orders, and instructions of the Commander in Chief, by the first line of which he would have read the following words, which *must have prevented his going into Virginia*; March 2d, 5th, and 8th, "Your Lordship may probably " have heard, that the navy and army in Virginia are blocked up by a " superior French fleet to that under Commodore Symonds;" and he would have seen also, that General Phillips had *not* been detached into Virginia, as his Lordship said he had understood from Colonel Balfour to have been

the substance of the Commander in Chief's dispatches, but that he waited the event of a naval action hourly expected, before he could venture to sail for Virginia.

Page 393, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman says, as Lord Cornwallis had done before, "that Sir H. Clinton had barely recommended his plan of operation to the "Southward or Delaware River;" and continues thus, "neither did his "Lordship mean to engage in the expedition to the upper part of the "Chesapeake Bay, of which he disapproved, without express orders from the "Commander in Chief, which would exempt him from all responsibility, at "least, for the plan of that expedition."

With respect to the plan, it has been so often and so fully detailed in Sir H. Clinton's narrative, and in his observations to Lord Cornwallis's reply to it, that Sir Henry thinks it needless to say any more than that it had been formed upon very general information, been *approved* by his Majesty's Cabinet early in 1781, and again re-approved in July, 1781, *alas! too late*, for Sir H. Clinton was then *deeply* and dangerously engaged in operation forced by Lord Cornwallis, and which, as he before stated, Sir Henry had received the King's commands to adopt and support. With respect to Sir H. Clinton's having barely recommended *his* plan, it will have been seen, that General Phillips (to whom Lord Cornwallis had succeeded) had been *ordered* to carry it into execution, and was actually on his march to do so when Lord Cornwallis called him back. In strictness it will be acknowledged, that Lord Cornwallis thus circumstanced, was required, when he arrived in Virginia, to obey such orders as he found General Phillips acting under: but on Mr. Stedman's own construction, "*that Sir H. Clinton had barely recommended it,*" was not Sir H. Clinton responsible for a plan which, out of delicacy to Lord Cornwallis's high rank, and after the above instructions he had received from his Majesty, he only barely *recommended?*

Page 396, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman implies, as Lord Cornwallis had done before in an official letter, " that his Lordship had occupied the naval station " in York River, according to the spirit of Sir H. Clinton's order of the " 11th July, 1781." The short fact is, there were two letters of that date, the first requiring his Lordship to occupy the Peninsula of Williamsburg (which Sir H. Clinton thought he had quitted a little too hasty, and owing to a misconception of orders) his Lordship was by that letter desired to wait there for further directions as to the post he should occupy, to be sent after Sir Henry had consulted the Admiral. The second letter was written after that consultation had taken place; and his Lordship was directed in it " to " examine and fortify Old Point Comfort in James River, to cover the naval " station of Hampton Road in that river;" and as an additional security to Old Point Comfort, his Lordship had Sir H. Clinton's consent to his fortifying York Heights also, *should he think that necessary*. How this can be construed, either by Lord Cornwallis or Mr. Stedman, into an implied order to remove the naval station from James River to York River, will be difficult to comprehend. Sir H. Clinton, so far from considering it as according to the spirit of his order of the 11th of July, thinks it was in direct disregard of it. Lord Cornwallis, if he disapproved of the station he had been directed to take in James River, should (Sir H. Clinton conceives) have reported his objections to Old Point Comfort, in James River, and recommended York River, and waited the Commander in Chief's approbation. Sir H. Clinton is free to acknowledge, however, he did not, nor should he not have disapproved of the choice his Lordship had made in preference in York River, as his Lordship, when he made it, assured Sir H. Clinton, " that it was the " only naval station in which he could hope to give effectual protection " to ships of the line," which was what the Admiral particularly wished for. But had Sir H. Clinton known *then*, what all the world knew afterwards, namely, that all the ships his Lordship did not sink, had been burned by the enemy's

enemy's shot and shells during the siege, he should not so readily have approved of his Lordship's disobedience.

Page 407, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman says, " Lord Cornwallis received assurances from Sir H. Clinton, bearing date the 6th September, that Sir Henry would join him with 4000 men, who were *then* embarked, as soon as the Admiral should be of opinion that he might venture; and that Admiral Digby was on the coast with troops on board, and might be daily expected."

The first part is certainly the substance of Sir H. Clinton's letter of 6th September, but the last not so by any means; for Sir H. Clinton told Lord Cornwallis, " he had heard from Europe, that Admiral Digby might soon be expected on the coast," but not a word of troops being on board.

Mr. Stedman says also, that, consistent with these orders and instructions, " and the information he had received, his Lordship could not venture to attack La Fayette before his junction with Washington."

When Sir H. Clinton wrote the letter of 6th September, he did not know what Lord Cornwallis *did know* when he received it; namely, that the whole French fleet, consisting of 37 of the line, and that 24 of them had had an action with the British fleet of 19, that the French fleet had returned, claiming victory, into Chesapeak Bay, and *there* joined four ships of the line, which they had left there, and Barra's squadron of seven, from Rhode Island. Sir H. Clinton is therefore at a loss to conceive, how either Lord Cornwallis or Mr. Stedman could suppose, that his Lordship could consider himself as restricted from venturing an attempt *to beat an army in detail which he knew was coming to besiege him*; an operation of such probable short duration, and such great appearance of success. Mr. Stedman is not correct either in saying, as Lord Cornwallis had done before, that the fleet and troops from New York *would sail*, to attempt to succour his Lordship, about the 5th October.

Mr. Stedman says, that "On receipt of Sir H. Clinton's dispatches on the 29th, dated the 24th, Lord Cornwallis withdrew his army within the works of York Town." Mr. Stedman speaks of Lord Cornwallis's quitting the exterior position, and retiring to the interior as a matter of course. If Mr. Stedman had attended to Lord Cornwallis's letter, of the 22d August, he would have seen (speaking of that exterior position) "that his Lordship's engineer had been many days making an exact survey of it; that he had proposed his plan for fortifying it, which his Lordship approving, had ordered to be executed; that it would probably be completed in about six weeks, without any great labour to the troops, and that his Lordship could spare 1000 men from every thing but labour:" nor does that Gentleman probably know the opinions certain officers of rank, who had seen the ground, gave of it before a Council of War of Admirals and Generals—their opinion was, "That his Lordship might defend that position twenty-one days, open trenches, against 20,000 men and a proportionable artillery." After all this, it no doubt appeared to Sir H. Clinton somewhat extraordinary, that his Lordship should quit such works in such a position, without a conflict, leaving to the enemy, in General Washington's own words, in his letter to Congress of October 1. "The enemy, to our astonishment, have quitted their exterior position, and we are now in possession of ground which commands, in a near advance, all the rest of their works," which works Lord Cornwallis describes himself, "as unfinished, enfiladed, and commanded;" nor is it less wonderful, that Lord Cornwallis should, after he had repeatedly and pressing invited Sir H. Clinton to join him in York River, give up the only door by which Sir Henry could enter.

Page 410, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman very justly observes, that "Lord Cornwallis could not venture to make large and frequent forties, from the manner and caution with which the enemy made their approaches, and in the unfinished state of his own works."

Page 394, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman says, that "Lord Cornwallis had, when  
 " his Lordship was reduced to extremity, formed a design of forcing his way  
 " through Maryland, &c. to New York." Sir H. Clinton confesses he never  
 saw the least day-light in this project; but, surely, if his Lordship had ever  
 had such an intention, he should have made it known to Sir H. Clinton, that  
*he* might have co-operated; and not, as he *did* repeatedly, tell Sir H. Clinton,  
 " that no diversion would be of the least use to him; that the only way  
 " to succour him was to join him in York River."

Page 394, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman says, that "Lord Cornwallis had expressed  
 " to the Commander in Chief, a willingness, if he approved, to return to  
 " Charles Town and resume the command there." It is very true, that his  
 Lordship did offer to return to South Carolina. *If his Lordship had never left*  
*it, His Majesty might have remained Sovereign of that great Continent;* but, surely,  
 after the opinion Sir H. Clinton had repeatedly given his Lordship and the  
 Minister, of the fatal consequences which had already happened, and pre-  
 dicted still others, it was little likely for Sir H. Clinton to consent to take the  
 whole responsibility of such operations on himself. Sir Henry therefore di-  
 rected Lord Cornwallis to occupy a naval station in James River, and left his  
 Lordship's force *entire* to secure that important station.

Page 397, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman says, " If any doubt existed before as to  
 " the point of attack, it was *now* removed. Nothing could any where be  
 " done without a fleet covering; and as the Comte de Grasse had determined  
 " to enter the Chesapeake, it was agreed between Washington and Rocham-  
 " beau, that Virginia should be the scene, and an attack upon Lord Corn-  
 " wallis the object of their operations. Letters to this effect were dispatched  
 " to meet Comte de Grasse on his passage; and, in the mean time, measures  
 " were taken to continue Sir H. Clinton in the belief, that New York, and  
 " not York Town in Virginia, was still the object of their enterprize. After  
 " several movements, and various deceptions to induce this belief, the allied  
 " army

“ army suddenly marched across Jersey to Philadelphia, where it arrived on  
“ the 30th of August.”

Mr. Stedman insinuates, (as others had done, but had long ceased to do) that Sir H. Clinton had been deceived into an idea that New York, and not York Town in Virginia, had been the object of the Allies. It is *now* well known, (and Sir H. Clinton did not conceive any person could be ignorant of it) that New York, and not York Town, was the object, even so late as when De Grasse arrived off Chesapeake from the West Indies; but, on his pilot's refusing to carry his large ships over the Bar of New York, finding also that the British fleet had *not* followed that of France in any proportion, seeing the exposed situation of Lord Cornwallis at York Town, it was determined to make his Lordship the object of their joint operations. If Sir H. Clinton was deceived, it was by Lord Cornwallis's coming into Virginia, disregarding Sir H. Clinton's orders, forming operations there, and recommending it to the Minister—by the Admirals in the West Indies not bringing or sending a sufficient naval force to protect such operations, as they had been repeatedly ordered to do, and by the Cabinet of that day not enforcing His Majesty's orders to his admirals.

Page 415, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman writes, “ Unfortunately, the letter written  
“ by Lord Cornwallis to the Commander in Chief, acquainting him with the  
“ surrender of the Ports of York and Gloucester, and narrating the causes  
“ which led to that event, with the motives that influenced his own conduct,  
“ produced a difference between them, which terminated in an appeal to the  
“ Public.”

Sir H. Clinton has, and does most willingly, leave it to the public to decide; and he trusts that the public have long since decided, that “ in narrating the  
“ causes which led to the catastrophe of York Town,” which closed the unfortunate campaign of 1781, and lost that great Continent, his Lordship has produced as causes, what he is not authorized to assert as facts, supported by  
any

any documents he has or can produce. Without repeating the whole of that letter, Sir H. Clinton will extract only one or two paragraphs :

First, his Lordship says, " I never saw this post in any favourable light ;  
 " but when I found I was to be attacked in it, in so unprepared a state, by so  
 " powerful an army and artillery, nothing but the *hopes*\* of relief would have  
 " induced me to attempt its defence ; for I would either have endeavoured to  
 " escape to New York by rapid marches from Gloucester side, *immediately* on  
 " the arrival of General Washington at Williamsburgh, or I would, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers, have attacked them in the open field,  
 " where it might have been just possible that fortune would have favoured the  
 " gallantry of the handful of troops under my command ; but being assured  
 " by your Excellency's letters, that every possible means would be tried by  
 " navy and army to relieve us, I could not think myself at liberty to venture  
 " upon either desperate attempts ; therefore, after remaining two days in a  
 " strong † position in the front of this place, *in the hopes of being attacked*, upon  
 " observing that the enemy were taking measures to turn my left flank in a  
 " short time, and receiving on the second evening your letter of the 24th  
 " September, informing me that relief *would* fail about the 5th October, I  
 " withdrew within the works on the night of the 29th September."

Sir H. Clinton must again appeal to the candour of the public to determine, whether, by the above extract, his Lordship does not in the strongest terms imply, nay assert, that he had been prevented attacking the enemy in the field, or escaping immediately on the junction of General Washington and La Fayette, by Sir H. Clinton's assurances that the navy and army would do every thing to succour him, and that relief *would* fail about the 5th October ? Sir

\* Lord Cornwallis could have no hopes till 29th September.

† His Lordship's own description of this exterior position—" a Gorge between two Creeks  
 " or Ravines, which come from the river on each side the town." What Washington says of this exterior position proves its situation in other respects. How such a position could be turned, or how it could be quitted without a shot, is for Lord Cornwallis to explain.



H. Clinton is once more under the necessity of asserting, that Lord Cornwallis did *not* receive any assurances of the exertions of the navy, or of the navy's making any attempt to succour him, till the 29th September (all which his Lordship has since acknowledged) and he consequently was not prevented from making either of the above attempts, by any assurances of succour he had received from Sir H. Clinton, as the junction with Washington and La Fayette was made two or three days before Lord Cornwallis received such assurances. Nor did Sir H. Clinton, in his letter of the 24th of September, which his Lordship received on the 29th, say, (as his Lordship asserts he did) *that relief would fail about the 5th of October.* Sir H. Clinton's words were, "there is every reason to hope the *fleet* will fail." Sir H. Clinton is under the necessity of mentioning this also, because the Admirals, on reading the above assertion of Lord Cornwallis, blamed Sir H. Clinton for having given his Lordship too much hopes.

Lord Cornwallis says also, "Our stock of intrenching tools, which did not "much exceed 400 when we began to work in the latter end of August, "was now much diminished."

Sir H. Clinton can only repeat, that a very great proportion indeed was sent to Chesapeake. He is informed that many were returned to New York by his Lordship's order; but he must declare, that when he called upon the Chief Engineer for *his return of intrenching tools upon the York side when the works were begun upon,* by *that* return it appears his Lordship had 992.

Now as his Lordship and Mr. Stedman both say, that his Lordship's letter of the 20th October was written to narrate the causes which led to the catastrophe of York Town, Sir H. Clinton finds himself authorised to assert, that his Lordship has produced as causes, and asserted as facts, what he cannot support as such.

One circumstance more Sir H. Clinton thinks necessary to mention, as it never has been well understood. About the month of March, 1782, certain

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Commissioners appointed by both parties met : whatever was the ostensible object of their meeting, it possibly answered some political purposes to both Chiefs. Certain Loyalists, from what motives I shall not attempt to account, were guilty of an act of atrocity, which, under all the circumstances attending it, is, I think, scarcely to be paralleled in history, and which tended to destroy the little confidence there remained between the parties at war, to prevent all future intercourse, and in short, seems to throw away the scabbard. Sir H. Clinton wishing to unite every exertion of the Continent, had formed a Board, composed of all the principal Refugees, given them powers to assemble troops and fleets, gave them vessels, victualled and armed them, and supplied them occasionally with money ; but fearing *their resentment* against the Rebels, (for which there was, no doubt, but too much cause) Sir H. Clinton endeavoured to guard against its dangerous effects, by limiting their powers in some respects. The above Board sent a message to Sir H. Clinton, desiring leave to take from the King's prisoners, a person of the name of Huddy, who had been taken by them ; they informed Sir Henry, it was their wish to send that prisoner to the rebel shore, there to offer him in exchange for one of their friends. Sir H. Clinton consented. They then delivered Huddy over to a person of the name of Lippicut, who was a Captain of theirs, and to whom, by their desire, Sir H. Clinton had given a militia commission. This person, and others with him, carried the prisoner Huddy to the rebel shore, landed him in Jersey, and instead of offering him in exchange, as they had informed Sir Henry they intended to do, they hanged him, and left him hanging on a tree. This happened while the above-named Congress were sitting not many miles distant. The instant Sir H. Clinton was informed of the outrage, he sent to the Board to direct them to inquire and report : their answer was, that Captain Lippicut was gone to the races, and on his return he probably would report to them. Offended that this message had been attended with so much levity, Sir H. Clinton ordered Captain Lippicut to be seized and brought prisoner.

soner. He then assembled all the superior officers of the navy and army, provincial and foreign, and, at their unanimous request, ordered Lippicut to be tried by a General Court Martial for *murder*. A Court Martial was assembled, composed as above. After it had sat three days, Sir H. Clinton received a very improper letter from General Washington, threatening to punish the innocent, unless the guilty were delivered up to him. Sir H. Clinton, in answer, rebuked Mr. Washington for presuming to interfere in his command, reminded him of the many atrocious provocations which had been given; informing him, however, what steps he had thought proper to take, and that he should be made acquainted with the result. The trial continued; General Robinson, who had at first been named to succeed Sir H. Clinton, begged his permission to write to General Washington, not doubting but he should be able, as he said, to soften him. Sir H. Clinton, after predicting the fate of such an application, consented. Sir Guy Carleton, who was appointed to succeed to Sir H. Clinton, arrived before General Washington had answered General Robinson's letter. Three days before Sir H. Clinton quitted the command, General Robinson received General Washington's answer in most insulting terms, threatening to punish the innocent for the guilty; and before Sir H. Clinton left New York, Sir Guy Carleton, who had also written to General Washington on the same subject, informed Sir H. Clinton, that though his answer was very civil *personally* to him, he was, nevertheless, determined respecting the subject he had written upon. Sir H. Clinton failed for Europe; and he has been informed since, that soon after the Court Martial had adjourned from day to day, and finally *sine die*; and that General Washington on this ordered the army of the York Town Convention to draw lots, which fell upon Captain Asgill of the Guards; that the Court Martial did re-assemble. It is presumed, that soon after this General Washington may have discovered that he had acted rather *rashly*, in seizing upon a prisoner under *formal Convention, and in which the French nation was included as a party*; he therefore

fore did all he could to induce Captain Asgill to escape. Captain Asgill, without the least suspicion of their motive, very honourably disdained to make use of the opportunities which presented themselves. Information, it is said, was repeatedly sent to Sir Guy Carleton, who probably saw it exactly as above stated, and judged that General Washington did not dare, for the above reasons, execute his threats. The Court Martial continued sitting, and proceeded to the following sentence: "That although Joshua Huddy was executed without proper authority, what the prisoner did in the matter was not the effect of malice or ill-will, but proceeded from a conviction, that it was his duty to obey the orders of the Board of Directors of Associated Loyalists; and his not doubting their having full authority to give such orders, they acquit him."

General Washington and Congress seeing that Captain Asgill would not escape, it is presumed, contrived to have it hinted to Captain Asgill's friends here, that they would do well to apply through the Court of France; they did so; and, it is said, the Queen of France asked as a favour of Congress and General Washington, what was certainly doing both a great favour, inasmuch as it relieved them from an awkward situation in which they had precipitately and inconsiderately plunged themselves. There is no doubt, if Captain Asgill had escaped, that Captain Schanks of the 57th regiment, a prisoner of war, or some other prisoner of war, would have been executed.

Page 429, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman seems to imply, that "Sir H. Clinton had been superseded in the command by Sir Guy Carleton."

Sir H. Clinton shall close these Observations with a few letters received from His Majesty's Ministers at different periods of his command in America, as proofs, that from the moment he first received His Majesty's orders to take that command, to the hour His Majesty was graciously pleased to permit him to resign to Sir Guy Carleton, he had the satisfaction to receive His Majesty's approbation of his conduct.

Sir H. Clinton was, by His Majesty's orders, to take the command of his armies in North America in 1778, on Sir William Howe having obtained His Majesty's permission to resign; but after 14,000 men, instead of being added to the army, (which Sir H. Clinton had every reason to expect) had been taken from it—finding, on the contrary, that the enemy opposed to him had increased in numbers; that many French officers had entered into it; that it had been reinforced by a French army, and its operations occasionally supported by a French fleet much superior to the British—that, although reduced in a great measure to a war of expedition, the Admiral, appointed as his colleague, thought and acted, in almost every instance different from Sir H. Clinton—finding, under all these circumstances, he could no longer have hopes of acting with advantage to his country, and honour and credit to himself, Sir Henry most humbly requested His Majesty's permission to resign the command of the army to Lord Cornwallis, as the next officer in rank to him. The following is the answer Sir H. Clinton received to his solicitation, dated November 4, 1779.

*Extract of Lord GEORGE GERMAINE's letter to Sir H. CLINTON, November 4, 1779.*

“ I did not omit the earliest opportunity of laying before his Majesty your  
 “ letter of 20th August, in which you express your desire of being permitted  
 “ to return to England, and resign the command of the troops to Lord Corn-  
 “ wallis. Though the King has great confidence in Lord Cornwallis's abili-  
 “ ties, yet his Majesty is too well satisfied with your conduct to wish to see  
 “ the command of his army in other hands. You have had too recent proofs  
 “ of his Majesty's favour to doubt of his Royal Approbation. Though your  
 “ army is much diminished, yet you have shewn, that activity and good con-  
 “ duct can ensure success; and, I must add, that Generals gain at least as  
 “ much

“ much honour by their able management of small armies, as where they act  
 “ with a superiority which commands success.”

This letter Sir H. Clinton received while engaged in the siege of Charles Town in April, 1780; at the successful conclusion of which, Sir Henry received most ample testimony of his Sovereign's approbation: but having still stronger reason to induce him to wish to resign the command, he persisted in his humble request, particularly when he found *his* plan of operations for the campaign of 1781, which he had flattered himself had been approved, was *now* suspended, and a preference given to one offered by a subordinate General, made without the means of general information, which Sir H. Clinton was ordered to adopt and support. Sir H. Clinton, who, from the particular situation of the army at the time, could not resign, had he even obtained his Majesty's permission, after making his strongest remonstrances, and pointing out the danger of the plan he was ordered to adopt, obeyed, re-inforced, supported, assisted operation to his utmost; and when (as he had predicted it would) the army under Lord Cornwallis was dangerously engaged, Sir H. Clinton embarked on board an inferior fleet of twenty-five sail of the line to force his way through thirty-seven of the enemy, and attempt a junction with Lord Cornwallis, determining, however, if he had succeeded, to resign the command to his Lordship. At the instant Sir H. Clinton had embarked, and was proceeding to attempt a junction with Lord Cornwallis, he received the following letter from Lord George Germaine, dated July 7, 1781:

“ The uneasiness you express about Admiral Arbuthnot's continuing in the  
 “ command of the fleet, must have ceased long before *this* reaches you, as  
 “ Admiral Digby is appointed to command his Majesty's ships in North  
 “ America, in the room of Admiral Arbuthnot, so that I conclude he will  
 “ have left the command some time before Mr. Digby arrives, and, I trust, in  
 “ full time to prevent your resigning the command to Earl Cornwallis.”

*Extract of a Letter from Lord G. GERMAINE, July 14, 1781.*

“ I lost no time in laying before His Majesty your letter, No. 130, and  
 “ that of the 9th June; and it is with unfeigned pleasure I obey his Majesty’s  
 “ commands in expressing to you his Royal Approbation of the plan you have  
 “ adopted for prosecuting the war on the south of Delawar, and of the suc-  
 “ cours you have furnished and instructions you have given for carrying it  
 “ into execution. I cannot close this letter without repeating to you the very  
 “ great satisfaction your dispatch has given me, and my most entire coincidence  
 “ with you in the plan you have proposed to Lord Cornwallis for distressing  
 “ the Rebels, and recovering the Southern Provinces to the King’s obedience;  
 “ and as his Lordship, when he receives your letters of the 8th and 11th of  
 “ June, will have fully seen the reasonableness of it, I have not the least  
 “ doubt but his Lordship has executed it.”

It will have been seen that Lord Cornwallis had not thought or acted as the Minister expected. If the catastrophe of York Town was completed before Sir H. Clinton arrived off Chesapeak Bay, if there were any delays in the equipment or sailing of the fleet, if Lord Cornwallis did not defend this exterior position, or the interior, so long as Sir H. Clinton had reason from his Lordship’s accounts to expect he would, none of them can be imputed surely to Sir H. Clinton or the army. The troops were actually embarked a fortnight before the fleet was ready to sail. On reading Lord Cornwallis’s letter of the 20th October, after his capitulation, the expressions before alluded to, had struck Sir H. Clinton; but out of delicacy he had sent that letter to England without any comment, waiting till he should have seen Lord Cornwallis. In a conversation he had with Lord Cornwallis, on his arrival at New York, Sir H. Clinton mentioned all the objectionable parts of that letter, and among other

other things that his Lordship had asserted, Sir Henry had *given assurances* of the exertions of the navy to attempt to succour his Lordship before the 24th September, which his Lordship had received the 29th; Lord Cornwallis acknowledged "if he had said so, he had said what was wrong." Sir Henry mentioned some other particulars, and Lord Cornwallis seemed either tacitly or formally to acknowledge Sir H. Clinton was right.

Sir H. Clinton finds it necessary to mention another proof of his Majesty's approbation of his conduct. Whether the severe censures passed upon Lord Cornwallis's 10th article of his capitulation of York Town, were merited or not, Sir H. Clinton shall not now enter into; the effect it had upon the whole body of Loyalists on the continent of America, was alarming indeed; and the impression it had made on his Majesty and his Ministers, is sufficiently shewn by the following extract of a letter from Lord George Germaine, dated December 6, 1781:

"It gave his Majesty great concern to find, by the copies of the articles of Lord Cornwallis's capitulation and correspondence with General Washington inclosed in your No. 146, that the alarm taken by the King's loyal subjects, who have borne arms in support of the Constitution, upon the rumours of the 10th article, *was not without cause*; but it gave great satisfaction to his Majesty to find, by the report I made him of your Aid-de-camp's conversation with me, that you had intended to take the most likely means of quieting their apprehensions, and restoring their confidence, by giving out in public orders the strongest assurances that no post, place, or garrison, should be surrendered on any terms which might discriminate between them, or put one on a worse footing than the other; and his Majesty commanded me to express to you his approbation of those orders, and to signify to you his Royal Pleasure, that you, in his Majesty's name, give the Loyal Refugees the strongest assurances, &c. &c."

K

Thus,



Thus, from the instant Sir H. Clinton was ordered to take the command of the army, to the moment he obtained his Majesty's permission to resign it, he flatters himself he produces indisputable proofs of his Majesty's fullest approbation of his conduct.

F I N I S.



