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DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA

Address by General A.G.L. McNaughton, Permanent Delegate of Canada to the United Nations, to the Council of Foreign Relations, New York, April 12, 1948.

I appreciate very much indeed the opportunity which you have given me to speak to you this afternoon and to express my views on "The Defence of North America".

This is an immense subject with consequences in every aspect of the life of the peoples both of this continent and also of our neighbours in this hemisphere; and these consequences extend overseas to the nations and peoples of Europe and Asia who may be friendly or opposed, as the case may be.

I cannot, of course, cover more than a fraction of this vast subject and I have therefore thought it would be most useful if I should confine my remarks generally to the particular aspect of this problem which relates to the associations between Canada and the United States and the arrangements which we have set up to bring our common defence problems into focus and to plan and develop the measures which we should undertake for the protection and preservation of our joint interests.

I can say without compromise of security that these plans are well advanced and that agreed measures of implementation are in hand. Further than this in relation to specific information, I cannot, of course, go, and I am sure that everyone here will realize that in the present critical state of the world these are matters which must remain in the most confidential category in the keeping of the military staffs directly concerned.

However, in any event, I believe that it will be both more interesting and more profitable to use our limited time on the more fundamental aspects of the problem because it is clear from experience that in military cooperation between our countries our difficulties are rarely in implementation but more often in the realm of overcoming historical and political inhibitions and in developing what at first sight are seemingly the simplest elements of a basis for agreement as to what is to be done.

The very fact that the title to an address given by a Canadian to an audience comprised of citizens of the United States can appropriately include the collective term "Defence of North America" is significant, for it gives expression to the very remarkable position which we have reached in the development of close and friendly relations between the nations of the North American continent and more particularly in the relations which we now enjoy between Canada and the United States. The words betoken the fact that today within

North America there is happily no longer occasion for any nation to prepare armed forces to support its policy against its neighbours; on the contrary the defence interests of all nations of the continent have become closely similar in character and no divergence of view is apparent on any matters which may rightly be regarded as fundamental. The trends which menace our way of life into the future and the contingencies which have to be provided against are external to this continent; at least this is so as regards their origin.

In the study of military defence, it is most important to take note of the very remarkable progress which has come about, particularly during the last two decades, in the application of science and engineering to war. Today for those who are suitably prepared and equipped, distance has largely lost its former attenuating effect on the conduct of military operations and we must realize not only that continents are now within aircraft range of one another but that with new developments already shrunken space continues to shrink still further.

We now have to contemplate the possibility of aircraft at supersonic speeds; of guided missiles of great range; of atomic bombs of catastrophic power and we must realize that in the very near future these forms of bombardment may be rapidly followed up by considerable forces airborne but capable of operating with great effectiveness on the ground even in the face of the widespread destruction and contamination which will result from the long range air or atomic bombardment. With the increased range of action and of speed in transit, continents today have already become the least geographical units on the basis of which questions of defence can properly be stated; consequently, effective arrangements for the defence of the territory of one nation have become matters of vital concern to all other nations of that continent.

It is evident that the peoples of both Canada and the United States are well aware of the changes which have come about in the basic considerations governing defence and that they are deeply concerned to be correctly informed as regards the nature, the scope and the adequacy of the cooperative relations which exist between us.

In the preparation of the measures that should be taken to meet the contingencies which may arise it is well to have regard to the historical relations of those who need to cooperate because from the experiences of the past may come realization not only of the things which make cooperation easy, but as well and perhaps even more importantly, of the kind of actions or proposals which need to be most strictly avoided because of their danger to harmony in public opinion.

We must never forget that cooperation and close association are not conditions which should be taken for granted; and even in the case of Canada and the United States the present happy relations between our Armed Forces have only been attained and can only be maintained by continued care and effort directed to this end.

For this reason I propose to first review very briefly the highlights in Canadian-United States military relations down the years. Then, in order to obtain a sense of proportion of the defence arrangements which are possible

I will refer, again very briefly, to the character and magnitude of the effort put forth by Canada in World War I and again in World War II, noting some contrasts and changes in the nature of our undertakings which should be remembered by those whose business it is to plan our defence.

Canada and the United States have grown up together on the continent of North America but until comparatively recent years there was no mutual concern for one another's security; in fact, until well into the present century there were very few people in either country who would even assert a friendly interest in the other. The reason for this was, of course, historical, since we were engaged on opposite sides in the Revolutionary War. On the conclusion of that struggle, many of the inhabitants from the seceding territories, who held to a continuing connection with Britain, moved north, sacrificing their accumulated resources and preparing to commence life anew under the most primitive conditions. This background was not calculated to bespeak friendliness either in the displaced persons or in their descendants, to whom the tale of enforced hardship lost nothing in the telling and re-telling down the years.

Our ancestors again fought one another in the war of 1812-13-14. This war had its origin in causes with but the slightest relation to Canadian interests, but nevertheless we were engaged along the whole of our frontier. We suffered invasion and the burning of York, now Toronto. We gave some doughty blows in return on the St. Lawrence, on the Great Lakes, at Niagara, Detroit, etc. One good thing which came as a result of this episode was the Rush-Bagot Treaty which was signed in 1817 and which has remained ever since as a cardinal point in the policy of each country in reference to the other.

This Treaty limits naval armament on the Great Lakes to nominal amounts by calibre and by number of guns. It is much prized by both nations as probably the oldest disarmament treaty in the world which, while modified to meet the needs of changing times and altered circumstances, has nevertheless remained in full force and effect.

In the years which followed and despite this Treaty for the limitation of armament, conditions on the border were far from being marked by that quiet mutual confidence which one might have expected from the oft-repeated oratorical reference to the "3000 miles of undefended frontier". There was tension caused by the Fenian Movement which resulted in armed raids into Canada from the U.S.A. to force our annexation whether we liked the idea or not. There was the Maine boundary dispute, which in the result, rightly or wrongly, injected a salient of United States territory into the hinterland of our Atlantic Province of New Brunswick and forced our rail communications to go either by a circuitous route far to the north (the Inter-colonial Railway) or to suffer the disadvantages and inconveniences of passing through this foreign territory to a foreign port (Portland, Maine).

These and other incidents through the middle of the last century, such as the Oregon Boundary dispute and the slogan "54.40 or fight" had the effect of keeping feeling between Canada and the United States in a state of tension if in fact it was anxiety for the security of the British colonies in continental North America which was one of the

principal reasons which brought about their confederation into the Dominion of Canada.

During the latter half of last century the relations between Canada and the United States steadily bettered but the Alaska Boundary Dispute which again came to life at the opening of the new century, showed that doubtful feeling and anxiety were not far beneath the surface. In the award the British representative on the Commission voted with the United States against Canada, prompting the Prime Minister of the day to declare that Canada had once more been 'sacrificed on the altar of British diplomacy'. To what extent this might have been true is open to question and there are among the recent historians (Stephen Leacock) those who maintain not only that the decision in the Alaska Boundary strictly followed the evidence, but also that it was very fortunate for Canada in her early immature years not to have had the responsibility of the Alaska-panhandle littoral, a responsibility which might have been so serious vis-a-vis Japan as to have overtaxed our strength and thus have become a further cause for concern in our relations with the United States.

Certainly until this century was well along there was little recognition of common interest with the people of the U.S.A. and instead of the realization that the dangers of aggression lay in sources external to the North American continent, we in Canada viewed somewhat anxiously and perhaps not without reason, the intentions of the Government of the United States. The feeling at the time is evidenced by what took place in 1911 when Reciprocity was proposed in Customs arrangements. A casual remark by the then President of the United States that Reciprocity would lead to the absorption of Canada was enough to upset the mind of our people, and "no truck nor trade with the Yankees" became the slogan with which Borden swept the Government of Laurier out of office.

There then followed the Agadir incident in North Africa and in Canada our eyes centered on the growing German menace. We went to war in 1914 in the words of Prime Minister Borden "to maintain the integrity of the British Empire".

War was declared on 4 August 1914, and seven weeks later on 22 September there sailed from Quebec the first Canadian Division some 30,000 strong. This Contingent took with it practically all the guns, ammunition and equipment in the country. There were some United States citizens enrolled in this force which no doubt contributed substantially to the feeling that the interests of the United States and of Canada were the same in the defeat of Germany. Nevertheless, to almost completely strip Canada of armed forces was, to say the least, a gesture of supreme confidence in the friendship of our sister nation to the south. Of course, the British Navy was then all-powerful on the oceans of the world and under its protecting influence we had not the least concern about any major attack on our territory from overseas.

The progress of World War I brought the United States in as an ally, an ally whose potential strength turned the scales. I use the word 'potential' advisedly, because the total United States battle casualties were only of the same order of magnitude as our own, and these were distributed over a population some dozen times larger.

The United States emerged from World War I with

military power which had reached the first order of magnitude. At sea the U.S. Navy had become at least equivalent to that of the United Kingdom; the Jellico Mission of 1919 made it clear to us in no uncertain terms that in the face of the new United States sea power and having regard to the attenuation of naval power with distance, it was impractical even to contemplate the operation of the British Fleet on this side of the Atlantic.

There were at the time, as has always been the case on the conclusion of a major war, anxieties and jealousies, and incipient ill feeling between late allies. Certainly we were no exception and it was consideration of possible eventualities from the south that led to the retention in 1919 of the 12 Divisional organization in Canada, an organization which had been contemplated in an earlier era to absorb the whole of our manpower for use in a short intense effort pending reinforcement from overseas or the relief of pressure by the action of the British Navy against the coasts of the United States.

Today these ideas seem very strange and unreal. It is quite true that by 1919 they were outmoded and impracticable, but nevertheless such attitudes persist long after the passing of the conditions which brought them into existence and their effects have a disturbing way of coming to life when they should long since have been forgotten. For this reason, among others, it was not until the 1930's that we were able to bring our Army establishment in Canada to a 6 Division basis in keeping with our manpower available for use in a war of long duration overseas, and to dispense with the scores of unwanted units whose mere existence had been a dead load on our progress toward military efficiency.

Canadian effort in World War I was principally in the Army. Our Naval expansion was not large and in the Air our personnel were absorbed in the R.F.C., later the R.A.F. and in the R.N.A.S. In 1918 Canadians were reported to have constituted over 40% of the total flying personnel in the R.A.F. and R.N.A.S. combined. This condition of organization with the use of our men under other than Canadian command was not acceptable to the Government and people of Canada and in the last few months of the war a commencement was made in the organization of Canadian Fighter Squadrons overseas. Later the R.C.A.F. was organized in Canada, but in its early years it suffered most seriously from the fact that there had been no Canadian Air Force formations and Commands during the war.

The post World War I period was marked by two most important transitions in Canada. The first was the transition from Colonial dependence to Dominion responsibility; the second was the transition from an attitude of suspicion of the United States towards that full measure of mutual confidence which exists today.

By 1921 it was evident to students of international affairs that Japan was on the war path. There was the Anglo-Japanese Treaty which had served us well in bringing Japan in on our side against Germany in 1914. But this Treaty contained clauses which were susceptible to interpretation as requiring the intervention of the British Empire on the side of Japan in certain circumstances against the United States. Feeling in the U.S.A., particularly in the western states, was running high against the people of the Rising Sun across

the Pacific and the 'Yellow Peril', so-called, was in everyone's mind.

It seemed, therefore, that the danger from the clauses of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was neither academic nor remote and in consequence the Government of Canada became very anxious and Mr. Meighen, the Prime Minister, at the Imperial Conference of 1921 in London, insisted on notice of abrogation being given. We felt, and made no secret of our view, that we could not afford to leave any doubt whatever as to where we would stand in any conflict which might come about between the United States and Japan.

The further outcome of this action in the Washington Naval Treaties, etc., may not have been entirely agreeable to some schools of thought in other sections of the Commonwealth, but for Canada it did bring a definite and general realization that in seeking the security of our homeland we needed to place a continuance of friendly relations with the United States in the first place.

As far as I can determine the transition from the negative conception of Canada and the United States as two nations whose interests were separated by a frontier, to a recognition of a need for positive association in defence was first expressed publicly in Mr. Roosevelt's Declaration in August 1938, when he said that "the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened", and Mr. King's reply that "we, too, have our obligations as a good friendly neighbour and one of them is to see that, at our own insistence, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air to the United States, across Canadian territory". As the Prime Minister of Canada has said, these statements marked the first public recognition by both our countries of their reciprocity in defence based on mutual interest in one another's security.

This being the situation, when war broke out with Germany in 1939 there was no occasion for any anxiety as to the attitude of the United States and we could base our arrangements on the confident expectation that we would receive, as we did, every possible measure of help that was open to the U.S.A. to give, short of going to war.

Again in 1939, as in 1914, Canada went to war when the United Kingdom became involved in the European conflagration. In 1914, the British Declaration of war was sufficient to embrace all the Dominions and Dependencies of the Empire. In 1939 the situation was different. Our own Declaration of War was made of our own volition by Act of our own Parliament. While the procedure was different, the effect was the same and in each case, in a matter of weeks, a Division, together with other Units, was embarked for overseas to be followed by others in succession. In 1939, in addition to the Army, very large Naval and Air programmes were undertaken.

For the purpose of our discussion today, it is not necessary to trace the history of Canadian Forces overseas in detail. Until VE Day our Army was largely engaged in Europe, first in the U.K.; then in both the Western European and Mediterranean theatres; then concentrated in Western

Europe in consequence of instructions originating in Canada. Elsewhere there were only small detachments such as the Radar and Signal Specialists sent to Australia with the GL III C and Canadian 19 and other communication sets.

The Canadian Air Force provided a few Army Cooperation Squadrons initially, but these and the other additional squadrons authorized by the Canadian Government as an Army Air component in 1942 were soon detached under the influence of the pressure of those who believed in the separation of Air Force and Army. Apart from these Army Cooperation Squadrons the early Canadian air effort was principally devoted to training in which very large activity facilities were extended also to considerable numbers of candidates from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, etc., the product going mostly into R.A.F. Units and formations which were scattered over all the theatres of operations.

This system, again as in 1914-18, proved unacceptable to the Canadian public and later Canadian Squadrons of all types were established in increasing numbers and these were grouped in Canadian Wings, etc. In addition to a number of Fighter Wings Canada had one Group of Heavy Bombers under Bomber Command in the United Kingdom, and all of these created a most remarkable record in operations on the Western Front.

In the Battle of the Atlantic, Canada provided eventually the bulk of the Air units and Canadian Commanders and Staffs exercized control in the anti-submarine operations based on the Atlantic Coast, Newfoundland, Greenland and Iceland.

The Canadian Navy expanded from under 2000, all ranks, to nearly 100,000 manning some 780 ships. This immense development represents a new conception in the expansion of sea power, for heretofore it had been widely believed that the rate of increase in naval forces was necessarily strictly limited. The total enlistment in all Armed Forces, men and women, was 1,087,000 out of a population of about 12,000,000.

In addition to the effort in the Armed Forces there were many tens of thousands of men and women who were engaged on the farms, in the forests and mines and in industry. The Canadian war industry, which was organized and controlled by a Department of the Dominion Government, produced over twice as much for our allies as for ourselves, and its output embraced most of the materials wanted in quantity over the whole range of the requirements of the Armed Forces. It was distinguished by the excellence of the product, by the improvement in weapons, explosives, motor transport, tanks and other equipment introduced, and by the low costs in man hours of labor which were achieved. Our industrial effort was financed by Canada herself and the product of this effort was made available under Mutual Aid which was the Canadian equivalent of U.S. Lendlease.

Canadian industrial performance in World War II stands out in marked contrast to World War I where the output mostly took the form of raw materials or of such simple articles as shells and ammunition to sealed patterns designed elsewhere. Not a single gun or novel major piece of military equipment was made in Canada in World War I and the whole of

he industrial organization which was then set up was under he direction of The Imperial Munitions Board, an organization irected and financed from London.

In World War II it was shown conclusively that we eed not doubt our ability to invent, develop and produce any rticle of war short of the larger battlecraft which were, in ize, beyond the capacity of our plants. We did not under- ake to make everything because this would have been uneconoic in the case of supplies of satisfactory types otherwise vailable in sufficient quantities.

As Victory in Europe approached, attention was irected to the organization of Canada's part in the war with apan in the Pacific and the strengths and composition of the aval, Air and Army Contingents were fixed. Ships of the .C.N. and Units of the R.C.A.F. were to operate with the R.N. nd the R.A.F. respectively. The Canadian Army was to provide Division of special composition but organized generally on he United States war establishments. This Division was to perate as part of a United States Corps in the invasion of apan.

One of the primary reasons for the decision to asociate the Canadian Division with a United States Corps was o obtain experience with the United States system of Army rganization, in view of the obvious necessity for the future o coordinate the defence of North America as a firm base gainst possible contingencies. Actually, the organization f the 6th Canadian Division was well advanced when Japan surrendered and the need passed for its completion.

The fall of France in the spring of 1940 and the thdrawal of British Forces to the United Kingdom, which s then the only bridgehead against Nazi-dominated Europe, reated some anxiety as to the eventual security of North erica and it became necessary for Canada and the United tates to study the problems of the defence of this continent en if the time had not arrived when the United States should eclare war on Germany. In August 1940, the President of the ited States and the Prime Minister of Canada issued a joint tatement establishing a Permanent Joint Board on Defence, th terms of reference to "commence immediate studies rela- g to sea, land and air problems including personnel and terial. It will consider in the broad sense the defence of e north half of the Western hemisphere". This Board was signed as a permanent and sensible arrangement to work out d prepare the measures which should insure the continued istence of our two countries in safety on this continent til such time as the world had moved forward to a new order sed on friendship and good will between all nations. I nnot overemphasize that this Board does not represent any liance formed as a threat to other peoples.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defence is organized two national sections, each with a Chairman. When the ard meets formally, the Chairmen preside jointly, but with single purpose, which is to insure that a proper answer is ven to every problem in the interests of the maintenance of rth American security. The procedure is by way of discus- on and agreement, never by vote, and in all its history ry conclusion has been unanimous. Very often, discussions interchange of information serve to bring to attention e point on which there may have been a lack of understanding

in the relations between the Armed Forces of the two countries and when this happens the responsible representatives undertake to have the matter studied by their respective services and to report the results. This is usually sufficient to dispel the problem, which otherwise might, in the process of more formal diplomatic communication, have grown in magnitude.

The Permanent Joint Board is not a combined staff and likewise in its national sections it is not a rival to the Military Staffs in Washington or in Ottawa. Its strength for its special task lies in the fact that it has not been clothed with any executive responsibility. It cannot order anything, but it can suggest what needs to be done. The Board has the duty to constantly review the situation and if any of its suggestions have not been acted upon it can draw this situation to the attention of the President and the Prime Minister. In practice this has proved to be ample authority.

During the war the PJBD was very active in the discharge of its responsibilities and it was under its auspices that the basic plans for the defence of Canada and Alaska were drawn up; that arrangements were made for such important defence undertakings as the Alaska Highway, the Northwest Staging Route for ferrying aircraft to Russia and China, the Simson Route across Hudson's Bay, Baffin Land, Greenland, etc. to Europe, etc.

It was at the instance of the Board also, in the immediate post-war period, that steps were taken to transform the international character of the various installations of these joint undertakings to ensure that full ownership and clear title to all establishments in Canadian territories would vest in Canada. Very large sums of money were paid over by Canada to the United States in this process of liquidation.

Since then the Board has concerned itself with the future.

At an early meeting the Board recognized the need for wider interchange of officers and specialists, including those concerned with the design of new weapons with a view to eventual standardization; for joint tests and the interchange of observers on exercises, etc.

The result of these discussions was made known in a statement given simultaneously on 12 February, 1947 in Ottawa to Parliament by the Prime Minister, and in Washington by the Secretary of State. This statement defined the measure of agreement which had been reached for cooperation in our defence policies and set forth the following principles:

(1) Interchange of selected individuals so as to increase the familiarity of each country's defence establishment with that of the other country;

(2) General cooperation and exchange of observers in connection with exercises and with the development and tests of material of common interest..

(3) Encouragement of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization, methods of

training and new developments. As certain United Kingdom standards have long been in use in Canada, no radical change is contemplated or practicable and the application of this principle will be gradual.

(4) Mutual and reciprocal availability of military, naval and air facilities in each country; this principle to be applied as may be agreed in specific instances. Reciprocally each country will continue to provide, with a minimum of formality, for the transit through its territory and its territorial waters of military aircraft and public vessels of the other country.

(5) As an underlying principle all co-operative arrangements will be without impairment of the control of either country over all activities in its territory.

I think if you will consider and weigh these principles that you will feel, as I do, that everything which is essential for the closest military cooperation has been included and that there is thus provided a comprehensive basis on which either country may bring forward any defence matters which it may wish.

I think that it is particularly advantageous to Canada that we are enabled to make the very significant contribution of which I believe our engineers and scientists are capable in the fields of Weapon Development and Research. It has been our special concern, to insure that in this section of the nucleus of our war organization we are especially well equipped and staffed.

These arrangements with the United States are of great importance both because of the positive measures of association, collaboration and standardization which have been established between our respective armed forces, and for the mutual and reciprocal availability of military, naval and air facilities in each country which are announced. They are important also by reason of the statements of what is not intended and in this respect they make clear to all the world that Canada intends to continue, as we have always done, to carry our full and proper responsibilities for the defence of our own territory and that all arrangements within our own territory will remain strictly under our own control. That is, as Mr. Truman said in his address in Ottawa to both our Houses of Parliament on 11 June 1947, we "participate on the basis of equality and the sovereignty of each is carefully respected".

I think that the purpose to be served by this joint statement can best be explained by quoting some words used by Mr. St. Laurent, our Secretary of State for External Affairs, in an address which he gave in New York a year ago. He then said:

"If, on the one hand, the joint statement indicates that we in Canada and the United States of America intend to maintain our independence of action, it says equally that we are prepared to enter on the basis of honourable partnership into plans for security which must of necessity involve the action

of more than one state. As I have already said, we realize that no nation can live unto itself. We realize that the destiny of our country is bound up closely with that of the United States. We are, therefore, fully prepared to consider with you on the basis of our joint responsibilities and our joint interests whatever combined action either one of us may think desirable. This does not commit either one of us to agree to all the plans which the other one may put forward. It does, however, establish the fact that we shall discuss the question of defence freely with one another, and that where joint action commends itself to both of us, we shall be prepared to take it."

With these provisions for the free and intimate iscussion of defence matters which are of mutual concern to anada and to the United States and for their orderly conduct hrough the medium of our Permanent Joint Board on Defence, o one in either of our countries or in any other country of his hemisphere need fear lest any of the precautions essent- l to the security of this Continent are being neglected.

Canada, like the United States, is fullyaware that s security does not rest on the protection of the territory f this continent alone. We realize that this requires con- nued association with other peoples of goodwill, who, like rselves, are devoted to the cause of peace.

In addition to being a nation of the American con- nent, Canada is also a member of the British Commonwealth f Nations and she holds to that association with all the rm conviction which has marked the course of our history nce early times. She holds to that association, not as any pendent colony of a central authority in London, but as a tion in her own right, exercising full sovereign powers, t happy to cooperate in all matters which make for peace and derly progress in the Commonwealth and in the world.

There are some who may see a difficulty in recon- iling our position as a nation on the American continent with r membership in the British Commonwealth, but I do not are this anxiety.

In the first place, I believe that fundamentally the al interests of the member nations of the British Common- alth are very close to those of the United States -- both and firmly for peace, for individual freedom and for Democ- y as the proper form of Government. In the second place, think we are a practical people ready to deal with each stion as it arises on its merits and on the basis of the cts. We see no reason for conflict in interest, and every ason for cooperation between the British Commonwealth and United States; and you can be quite sure, with our deep ncern for the welfare of each of these great associations people with whom we are so intimately linked, we in Canada l devote ourselves on every occasion to promoting unanimity view.

The frontiers of North America are the Atlantic and ific Oceans and the North Polar Sea, where Canada finds self in closest geographical proximity to the great land ses of Europe and Asia. It is only across one or more of se expanses of water, or of ice, that any significant

threat to the security of this continent could come and it would be of interest to discuss the form and scale of such possible threats, their place in space and in time; and the means which should be developed by which they could be met.

It is clearly not possible in the limited time available on this occasion to marshal these factors in a closely reasoned account, but I shall endeavour to make a few observations on some of the more important considerations as I view them. I would emphasize that what I have to say represents my personal opinions alone.

The first question on which a conception must be formed is the source of a possible aggression against the frontiers of North America.

Having regard to the potential military and industrial strengths of the countries of the world as they exist today and as they may reasonably be projected some years into the future, it is clear that the only possible source of trouble which could threaten the safety of North America would be some combination of forces in Europe and Asia which had extended its dominance to the oceans to the west, to the east, and to the north. As matters stand, such a consolidation of power in Europe and Asia does not as yet exist, but there is evidence -- convincing evidence -- that such a consolidation is within the thought of those who direct the policy of the Soviet Union as a course of action which might be undertaken when circumstances become propitious.

By this the Soviet authorities might envisage their attainment to the possession of such advantages as the atomic bomb or other weapons of mass destruction; the weakening of the United States or of Great Britain or of France or other of the democratic countries through political disturbances, financial depression, unemployment, or otherwise; or, more probably, the improvement of the Soviet power relative to the rest of the world by reason of quarrels and disputes between nations which would bring turmoil and distraction in vital areas such as the Eastern Mediterranean.

The stated policy of the Government of Canada is to do everything possible through the United Nations or otherwise to settle disputes between nations and to prevent the outbreak of another world war, or failing that, should war come, to ensure that we and our potential allies are in a position to win and win quickly.

It is clear, therefore, that Canadian effort must be directed along both these lines of endeavour. The first developing international cooperation not only in the realm of security but also for dealing with the vital political and economic questions whose solution will serve to unite instead of dividing the world. The medium which has been established for this purpose is the United Nations and it is through this organization that ways are opening up for peaceful progress which, we still may hope, will yet transform opposing interests and suspicion into cooperative endeavour and mutual confidence and thus bring about for all nations of the world, a relationship similar to that which exists between Canada and the United States. We of this continent who have been greatly favoured by Providence have a special responsibility to help others less fortunate than ourselves. I have no doubt, therefore, that in the Assembly, the Interim Committee, the Atomic

nergy Commission, the Security Council, in which we now hold embership, and in other United Nations groups as well, Canada ill continue to press these matters with all the insistence hich she can muster. On the other hand, in this time of reat anxiety we must pay heed to the wise old saying that the strong man armed keepeth the peace".

The application of this axiom to our present posiion is that if we and our friends are strong in defence and onscious of our strength, we can go forward without anxiety o do those things which may make war impossible and to carry id and comfort to those in need; in the opposite case, it ay be expected that constructive action will again be paralyzed by timidity and fear or by indifference.

In consequence I would say that a very serious esponsibility now lies on all those who have to do with our rmed Forces.

The factors which make for military strength have aried from country to country and from age to age. Some imes it has been possession and skill in the use of a partiular weapon; some times an advantage in movement or in comunications; some times the stimulation of a great leader or great cause; some times, though not often in history, it as been sheer numbers that have given advantage.

Today the military strength of this continent rests n very special circumstances which exist here on a scale matched elsewhere through the world.

Our young people, on whom the future depends, are ost highly educated; they have been familiar since their rliest years with mechanism in all its forms and uses; they ve shown inventive abilities of the highest order and pabilities in research which are unexcelled; there is facility organizing to handle the largest enterprise; there is discipline when the occasion requires, and courage in action and pacity to endure adversity have been proved beyond dispute.

Behind these priceless human and moral resources, ich are notable characteristics of the people both of the ited States and of Canada, North America possesses the most mprehensive mass production industry in the world. We are rticularly fortunate that if we have to meet an emergency, start from the satisfactory position that in the standards, the methods and in the techniques of industry, there is de interchangeability between us. We have, or can have, ple supplies of most key materials required for peace or r war; and, for any potential shortages, there is capacity develop acceptable substitutes; capacity, too, of perfectg and rapidly producing the newer and better weapons of war the occasion may require them for purpose of defence or r the fulfillment of our obligations under the United Nations.

It is not on numbers in the armed forces that we in rth America depend for defence against any possible aggresn, though these must be sufficient. We depend in fact on more highly skilled and perfectly equipped forces by sea land and in the air which our special advantages make ssible -- hard hitting forces which can be mobile, far eaching, and as matters stand, decisive in their power against aggressor.

It is clear that if we are ever attacked, it is on "quality" forces and on "quality" weapons and equipment that we should place reliance. It is important that this be well remembered down the years and particularly by those entrusted with the conduct of negotiations for reductions in world armaments.

I think that in the period between World War I and World War II, both in Canada and in the United States, we learned the bitter lesson that unilateral disarmament is a delusion -- a very expensive delusion that brought us very near to disaster and that cost us very dear in the lives of our young people. Just such a bitter delusion would be the surrender of any of the special weapons of great power, with which I include those based on atomic energy, until we have acceptable assurance through mutually applicable safeguards and an effective international system of inspection and control which carries our confidence that they, or their like, will not be used against us.

On the contrary as the situation stands it is of the first importance that we give our closest attention and effort to extending the margin of superiority which we now possess in these special weapons and in insuring that we shall be able to use them effectively should the occasion require.

In these matters, the advantage of safeguards now possessed by the people of North America is not something which we could retain if we ceased to progress; if we allowed our industrial efficiencies to decline, then most certainly, we would soon be overtaken and surpassed. The best protection for the countries of North America, as well as for the world, would be an effective organization of security under the United Nations but until this can be brought about, the continued production and further improvement of all our weapons and the maintenance of industrial efficiency and preparedness are vital to the prevention of aggression by making impossible any prospect for its success.

I conclude these remarks on "The Defence of North America" by saying that until effective disarmament can be brought about and until the aspirations of all nations can be harmonized by peaceful means we will continue to need our armed forces, both as a deterrant to attack against ourselves and as an assurance to all other peaceloving nations, who link with us, that the peoples of North America remain strong and well able to help them.
