





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


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
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A N
A N S W E R

To an invidious Pamphlet, intituled,

A Brief State of the Province of
P E N S Y L V A N I A.

Wherein are exposed

The many false Assertions of the Author or
Authors, of the said Pamphlet, with a
View to render the Quakers of *Pensylvania*
and their Government obnoxious to the
British Parliament and Ministry;

AND THE

Several Transactions, most grossly misrepre-
sented therein, set in their true light.

L O N D O N:

Printed for S. BLADON, in *Pater-noster-Row.*

MDCCLV.

ANSWER

TO THE ANSWERS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED, UPON A RESOLUTION PASSED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, THE 17TH OF APRIL 1791, RELATIVE TO THE PETITION OF THE FREE TRADEMEN OF THE CITY OF LONDON, FOR A REPEAL OF THE ACTS RELATIVE TO THE TRADE OF THE SAID CITY.

AND THE ANSWERS THEREON, AS GIVEN BY THE SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, THE 17TH OF APRIL 1791, RELATIVE TO THE PETITION OF THE FREE TRADEMEN OF THE CITY OF LONDON, FOR A REPEAL OF THE ACTS RELATIVE TO THE TRADE OF THE SAID CITY.

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A N

ANSWER to, &c.

WHEN persons in power and office have given offence to the people over whom they are set, by attempts to destroy their privileges or other rights, and find them on the point of addressing the Crown against their unwarrantable proceedings; their usual method is to endeavour to get the start of them, and publish some false state of the case, calculated to justify themselves, and malign their opponents, in order to prejudice the Government, as well as the Public, against them, only till such time as the injured people have made their case known. In which they propose no farther to obtain their ends, than to take some little revenge for their disappointment, by vilifying the authors of it for a season.

This is in reality the case with the author, or rather authors, of a malicious pamphlet lately published here, and industriously propagated by the friends and espousers of the party, in favour of whom *the brief state of Pennsylvania* was written. For those gentlemen, finding they were not able to carry the point which they aimed at, and that the assembly, by their message to the Governor, of

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the 26th of *Dec.* last, * “ had come to a resolution “ to address the Crown, in support of their civil “ rights and liberties,” which they esteemed to be greatly infringed by the Governor’s refusing to accept any of the sums offered by them for the King’s service, though tendered in the manner and form which had always been used in the province; they resolved to be before hand with them, and publish the present pamphlet, full of invectives, fallities, and unjust reflections, against the assembly and their conduct.

The person † who wrote the letter is very well known to be a *Smith*, a proper tool enough for the club who employed him: but not to enter farther into his character (which is so *black*, that were we to display it in its proper colours, it would be sufficient to discredit his work) we shall begin, without farther detaining the reader, and refute his assertions; either from our own personal knowledge of matters, or from the transactions themselves, which pass between the Governor and the assembly, particularly in *December* and *January* last, printed in the *Pensylvania* and *New York Gazette*.

The title page has more the appearance of a puff, composed of several falsehoods, to set off the pamphlet to which it is prefixed, than any thing else: for in what part of it is *the true cause of the continual encroachments of the French display’d?* where is *the secret design of their late invasion, and settlement on the river Ohio*, set forth? strong expressions to raise the expectations of the Public, without any thing of a performance like what is promised. However, we may chance to supply

* See the *Pensylvania Gazette*, for the 31st of *Dec.* 1754.

† In a letter written on this occasion it is spelled *parson*, perhaps by mistake, as a *parson* and a *smith* seem to have no real connection, whatever they may in a metaphorical sense.
their

their defects, and set forth the affair in a true and clear, not, as the letter does, in a false and obscure light.

Of the same nature with the former are the words following, *to which are annexed, An easy plan for restoring quiet in the public measures of that province, and defeating the ambitious views of the French in time to come.*

One would imagine that his plan was calculated to defeat the designs of the *French*, not only against this province of *Pensylvania*, but all the other *English* provinces in *America*; and so doubtless the author, or authors, would have it understood: whereas their scheme is altogether particular, and consists solely in obtaining the ends which they have in view; namely, to strip the *Quakers* of their rights and privileges, and submit them to the arbitrary will of their governors. Let us now see whether what is farther declared in the title be true, namely, if *the conduct of the assemblies of Pensylvania is impartially examined.*

The writer of the pamphlet begins with a very fallacious question, as if put by his friend. *Why we who are esteemed one of the richest colonies in America, are the most backward in contributing to the defence of the British dominions in these parts?*

Pensylvania unhappily, like the rest of the colonies, is divided into two parties, one for the true interest of the province, the other against it. The letter writer would not be thought to be of the latter, but as he states the question, he makes himself of it, *why are we the most backward?* and this will appear to be the truth of the case; altho' by *we* he doubtless means the opposite party, or those of the assembly; in which he advances a great falsity: for the assembly of *Pensylvania* have always been as forward to contribute, upon any emergency,

as any of the other colonies. As a proof, in the present case, in their message to Governor *Morris*, of *December 12, 1754*. they declare, "As we account it our duty to do every thing in our power to comply with his Majesty's royal orders, or that may contribute to the welfare of the people we represent, we have chearfully and almost unanimously resolved to grant 20,000 *l.* for the King's use." This they did in the usual manner as they have heretofore done; but the Governor has refused it, on those terms, for reasons the author is unwilling to assign. --- The two greatest privileges under the constitution of that government are, the right which the assembly have to adjourn themselves, and meet on their own adjournments, and the application of all publick money; or, which is the same, a right of knowing in what manner it is applied. The advantages of these two privileges, and how necessary they are to the well-being of the colony, appears from the confusion and discontents which some neighbouring provinces, at certain times, have laboured under for want of them. The assemblies have been harrassed by their governors with tedious lengths of sitting: and it has been known, that when large sums have been demanded, under a pretence of applying it to the use of the public, the Governor, as soon as the money was raised, has put it all in his own pocket, without applying any of it to the service for which it was demanded.

The Governors of *Pennsylvania* have, for some time past, been using their endeavours, under various pretences, of getting the disposal of the public money into their own hands, without being obliged to give an account to the assembly; and this, we apprehend, will appear to every impartial person to be the true cause why the Governor has so often

often refused to accept the considerable sums offered by the assembly, though tendered in the usual form, and in reality much greater than could reasonably be expected from so small a fund of only 6 or 700 *l. per annum*, to defray all the charges of the Government, and other occasions of the province, and especially as there was, at the same time, scarce 500 *l.* in the treasury. This demonstrates that the assembly are neither backward, nor sparing, in their contributions for the King's service; and as a farther incontestible proof likewise, that they are not against the defence of their country by military methods, as the letter writer so often falsely asserts; they, not only in their frequent messages to the Governor, declare their readiness to provide for the defence of the colony, but, before they adjourned themselves on the 3d of *January* last, they ordered * " 5000 *l.* to be borrowed " on credit of the House, to be laid out for purchasing fresh victuals, and such other necessaries " as they should think expedient, for the use of " the King's troops at their arrival." Pursuant to the instructions sent from hence by the Secretaries of State.

The Governor, and his men, as they are called in *Pennsylvania*, who have been watching all opportunities to compass their design upon the assembly, imagined that the present encroachments of the *French* gave them a fair occasion of effecting it, and therefore, resolv'd to lay hold of it. They thought by this means either to decoy them out of their right of knowing how the public money is disposed of, or else to force it out of their hands. They apply for money to defend the colony: the assembly readily comply upon terms consistent with their

* See *Pennsylv. Gaz.* 14 *Jan.* 1755.

rights and powers. No; that won't do, say the party; we have you now in a cloven stick: you shall either give up your privileges, or be exposed to the ravages of the *French*; for you shall neither defend yourselves, nor be assisted by any province else, on any other terms. The circumstances of this affair, I think, clearly evince that this is the real state of the case.

The Letter-writer, p. 4. says, "We are now in an alarming situation: but we have brought the evil upon ourselves." He might have gone farther, and said, "And we are resolved to augment it, unless the assembly comply with our expectations." Although he owns, that his party have brought the evil on themselves, which is true enough; yet his modesty, poor gentleman! will not permit him to let the world know in what manner they brought it on themselves and the whole province. Well, to save him his blushes, I will venture to disclose the secret for him. The present encroachments of the *French* had its rise from a flagrant piece of iniquity, in burning the houses of a great number of families, who were settled on the *Juniatta*, a branch of *Sasquebanna* river; whose lands were not at the time purchased of the *Indians* by the proprietor, whatever intentions he might have had that way.

This unjustifiable proceeding, in the year 1750 or 51, drove near three-score families over to the *French*, then in the neighbourhood of the *Ohio*, where they have continued ever since; big with resentment and revenge for such cruel usage, which shocked those people whom we call savages: a name which more properly belongs to such merciless incendiaries, some of whom have met with

with the punishment on other occasions, which they had before deserved on that score.

This most inhuman action, which is cried up as a meritorious exploit by the party, was committed by the Secretary, and other Magistrates subject to his directions, as appears from his own letter to the Governor, by way of journal of his proceedings; which on his return in triumph from that glorious expedition, was printed at *Philadelphia*. This was a copy from Governor *B---g's* new way of ejection (as it is called in the colonies) in *North Carolina*, which perhaps exceeded the original itself. Is it to be wondered if such men as these give up the province to the *French*, sooner than depart from their unwarrantable pursuits.

We shall pass over what our author says on the flourishing condition of *Pensylvania*; and his wise reflections on the nature of popular governments, as well as sly insinuations applied to the *Quakers*, that a constitution, although extremely proper at first for preserving liberty and encouraging industry, may at length, on the alterations of circumstances, prove prejudicial to both: these things we leave for politicians to consider. Before we proceed to other facts, however, it may be proper to take notice of what he says, in the page before cited, with respect to the trade of *Pensylvania*, “That from the port of *Philadelphia* (only) at least 400 sail of vessels clear out annually.” This article requires some kind of elucidation, which our author, not so much thro’ haste, as unwillingness to enter into particulars, has omitted; for that might have led him to reveal certain secrets which carry no very favourable aspect, and declare, for instance, how many of those vessels go annually with provisions to the *French* and *Spaniards* in the *West-Indies*, and how many

contracts and factors were kept there all the last war? Likewise how six or eight particular persons of the Governors party claimed an exclusive right to that trade? and why, if any body else attempted the same, their vessels were sure to be seized?

The Letter-writer having inveighed against the power which the Assembly have of managing the public money, as a thing attended with very pernicious consequences; his next design is to make it be thought, that this power is a kind of usurpation, by representing it as having been obtained in some collusive and unwarrantable manner. This is evidently his meaning, p. 9. where, after telling us, that the heirs of the old proprietor, after his death in 1723, being at law among themselves about the government and soil, “*Sir William Keith*, who was then Governor, “*falling into the hands* of the assembly, passed a “law, giving them the sole disposal of all public money, in manifest contempt of all the instructions of the proprietary family.”

This paragraph would insinuate to the world, that *Sir William Keith*, without the proprietor's direction or knowledge, for a sum of money given him by the assembly for that purpose, passed the act he mentions. This is a very charitable reflection on *Sir William Keith* and the then assembly; but the fact was thus: at the death of *Mr. William Penn*, the old proprietor, as the writer calls him, the province of *Pensylvania* was not in that rich and flourishing condition which it is in at present, or has been for some years past; on the contrary, it was involved in great difficulties, and even reduced to a low ebb, being charged with a heavy mortgage: in order therefore to extricate the proprietors, his heirs, and discharge the province from that mortgage which was then threatened

threatened to be foreclosed; the Quakers, respected their old proprietor, as he was one of their persuasion, and to prevent the government falling into other hands, unanimously joined to raise the sums necessary for that end, which could not be done without passing the act in question: and had it not been for the Quakers exerting themselves upon that emergency, the soil and government of that province, in all likelihood, must have been alienated. But this explanation of the matter the opposite party are on this occasion willing to forget, though they have been the greatest beneficers by it.

The grievance is, that by this act, the Governor, and other provincial officers, cannot have as exorbitant salaries as they might demand; and most of them, it is well known, are never satisfied; especially when they happen to be such as go over to retrieve a broken fortune, which has been too often the case, both in this and other colonies.

The complaint is expressed in the next paragraph, where the writer says, "The assembly aim at rendering all succeeding governors dependent on them; for that now they annually either vote or withhold the salaries of the Governor and all such officers, according as they are or are not the creatures of the assembly."

It is true, that whatever sums the assembly vote for the Governor, is a benevolence, and what he has no right to demand: but he may expect a gratuity according to his behaviour; and if by his conduct it appears, that he has the public interest in view, more than his own private, never fails of having a good one. Ample provision likewise is otherwise made for him, and the rest

of

of the officers of government. What proportion does the officers in the appointment of the assembly, enumerated by the author of the letter, bear to those in the appointment of the Governor? I will answer: not more than ten does to ten thousand. What is the authority, profit, and honour of the chief justices and other judges of the supreme court? the judges and magistrates of all the counties and courts in the province? the prothonotaries, attorney-general, rangers, &c.? Let the balance be struck between the officers in the nomination of both parties, and see which will preponderate.

The writer next exclaims, p. 10. " That the
 " assembly being possessed of such unrestrained
 " powers and privileges, seem quite intoxicated,
 " are factious, contentious, and disregard the
 " proprietors and their Governors." This is to
 be understood, because they will not divest themselves of those powers and privileges, which they have purchased in great part by their wealth, and surrender them up to their proprietors and their deputies, to be treated by them at discretion. He adds, " Nay, they seem even to claim a kind
 " of independency of their mother-country, de-
 " spising the orders of the Crown, and refusing
 " to contribute their *quota*, either to the general
 " defence of *America*, or that of their own parti-
 " cular province."

The latter part of this nivective is a repetition of the false allegation, refuted before, whereby it appears that the charge may be justly turned upon those of his party; who when the assembly would have willingly and largely contributed for the general defence, hindered them from giving, by refusing to accept their offers, but on conditions injurious to their rights. As for the rest, the

Quakers

quakers to a man throughout the province, are so far from claiming an independency of their mother country, or despising the orders of the Crown, that they and every inhabitant in the province, save the party, would be glad to see the government reassumed and in the immediate possession and appointment of the crown.

To confirm what he had advanced, with respect to the assemblies refusing to contribute to the general defence of the colonies; he charges them with "opposing Governour *Thomas* in raising soldiers to send against the *Spaniards* in the *West Indies*, and an absolute refusal to contribute a farthing for that service."

In answer to this *glaring instance*, as it is termed by the letter writer, it must be observed first, that the Crown had made a provision for defraying the expence in raising men for that expedition, which rendered the assistance of the assembly in that case needless. Secondly, there was no opposition given by the assembly to Governour *Thomas* or any body else in raising soldiers for that service, where the men enlisted were free and proper to go upon that duty. The controversy was about the taking indentured servants and apprentices, which must be condemned as illegal: but such tyrannical influence was used by the Governour's partly at that time, that the distressed were obliged to send to *New York*, 100 miles distant, for lawyers to set forth their privilege of exemption.

Because the writer does not think a single instance, tho' such a *glaring* one, sufficient to prove his charge, he endeavours to muster up a great number of instances, by telling us "that since that time, during the whole course of the late war, they have often been called upon by the
Crown,

“ Crown, and by Governour Shirley of the
 “ Massachusets, for the expedition against *Cape*
 “ *Breton &c.*” Why this *et cetera*? Why stop
 short at this instance? perhaps he could not find
 that there was any other occasion during the war,
 for their being called upon. However they were
 called upon often it seems, and so it matters not
 in his opinion, whether it was upon several oc-
 casions or only upon one. It might be supposed
 also from the manner of introducing the charge
 that they never answered to any of those calls,
 especially that for *Cape Breton* which he men-
 tions.

But here we are balked a second time, for in-
 stead of saying they did not answer to any of the
 calls, or contribute towards the war, he in effect
 acknowledges that they did answer to them all ;
 but would have their compliance thought no bet-
 ter than a refusal, by depreciating the manner of
 doing it. “ To all which (says he) if they have
 “ at any time contributed, it has been done, in-
 “ directly, and in a manner shameful to that
 “ rich province ; so grudgingly and in such small
 “ sums, as rather to hurt than serve the common
 “ cause.”

Methinks the writer seems much put to his
 shifts how to make out a charge upon this head,
 and comes but lamely off in pretending that their
 contributions rather did hurt than good.

He might be asked whether they did more
hurt than *good* on occasion of the *Canada* expedi-
 tion, set on foot just before the conclusion of the
 last peace, when they voted 5000 pounds for the
 raising, arming and maintaining a number of
 companies to go on that service, which was three
 times the number furnished by *Virginia*. But this
 and other transactions in favour of the Quakers,
 perhaps

perhaps slipt his memory ; which with persons of his lying turn is commonly short ; or else he thought himself not obliged to mention any matter which was not for his purpose. 'Tis true their money on this occasion did no *good* to the public, but rather *hurt* to themselves, as the expedition perhaps was never designed to be put in execution ; or if it was did not proceed, being knocked in the head by the ensuing peace.

Now methinks their contributing so largely and freely to this expedition, might have atoned with this writer, for their seeming backwardness to advance a sum towards that of *Cape Breton* : but there was good reason for their different behaviour : the *Canada* expedition was a promising one, and afforded a very rational prospect of success ; whereas the latter was looked on in *America* as a piece of *Don Quixotism*, and it is said was carried in the assembly of *New England* by no more than one vote. This might well justify their not contributing at first more than most of the other provinces ; tho' after it was over they did contribute.

Governour Shirley in a speech, observed
 “ that scarce such an instance is to be found in
 “ history ; ” and a certain colonel in the expedition expressed himself thus. “ If the *French* had
 “ not given up *Louisburg*, we might have en-
 “ deavoured to storm it with the same success,
 “ as the devils might have stormed Heaven. If
 “ any one circumstance, says Dr. *Douglass* of
 “ *Boston*, had taken a wrong turn on our side, or
 “ any one circumstance had not taken a wrong
 “ turn on the *French* side, the expedition must
 “ have miscarried with shame to our forces—
 “ and the people of *New England* from genera-
 “ tion to generation, would have cursed the ad-
 “ visers

“visers and promoters of this *anaccountably rash*
“adventure.”

When this *French American* Dunkirk was given up, the *English* found 600 regular troops in garrison, with about 1300 militia; the main ditch 80 foot wide, the ramparts 30 high, mounted with above 65 pieces of cannon; the harbour mouth defended by a battery of 30 guns 42 pounders; and the island battery of as many 28 pounders: provisions for 6 months and ammunition sufficient. It was imagined by some that this place might have been taken by 1500 raw militia, and a few armed small craft of *New England*; but Governour Shirley thought 3000 militia and two 40 gun men of war much better. Very happily, but unexpectedly, Sir *Peter Warren* with his squadron came to their assistance, besides other men of war, which greatly intimidated the *French*; who imagined we were much stronger and better prepared for the siege of such a fortress than we were: for our guns were bad, and the scaling ladders were too short by ten feet; so that it might well be stiled a romantic expedition; which succeeded with 10,000 to one against them: it was in this light that the *Pensylvania* assembly, as well as all judicious people, considered it.

But to proceed, the writer continuing his charge, says, p. 11. that the Quakers “have not
“been more attentive to the defence of their
“own particular province, than of his majesties
“*American* dominions in general.” After what has been said in the preceding article, perhaps this article may be true and yet no reflection on them: for if they have contributed as well for the defence of their own province, as they have for that of all in general, I should be apt to think they have not done less than they ought to do;
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and it is likely they would do more for themselves than for others.

In case they have not fortified this province sufficiently, they have not done worse than most of the other colonies: For want of proper defence is the general charge to which almost all of them are liable. I do not say this as if I thought the Quakers excusable, in case they have not taken sufficient care for the security of *Pensylvania*, because other provinces have neglected theirs: but for that reason they ought not to be charged with this fault as if it was peculiar to them: and, indeed, if any are excusable for such a neglect, it should be those who make it a point of conscience not to bear arms; and, perhaps, was the power in other hands, *Pensylvania* would lie as defenceless as it is represented to be in the hands of the Quakers; that is, as most of the other provinces are.

The letter-writer says, they have but one small fortification in all *Pensylvania*; and takes care to extol the generosity of the proprietors, in making them a present of 12 large cannon, part of the 26 which they have mounted, and giving the gunner a salary of 20 l. a year. It doubtless was an acceptable present: but we should not have wondered if they had built the whole fort and bestowed all the cannon upon it: For, who would not fence and secure a valuable estate, rather than leave it open and exposed to be ravaged, especially when it lies in a bad neighbourhood? this charge, therefore, tho' intended against the Quaker inhabitants, may more properly be turned against the proprietors. He says, "the fort was raised and is maintained at the expence of private people." But he does not mention in what manner, or by whom. It may be, for any thing that appears, by

the very people he finds fault with as not having done it. Of the first of those two particulars I will supply the wilful defect, by explaining in what manner it was built. The money raised for that use was by *public* lotteries: and this is what the letter-writer calls being built by *private* people; As if it was done by a voluntary subscription of a few individuals. So candid and sincere is this author in relating his facts. But *lottery*, perhaps, is one of those terms which he did not care to make use of, as it might give occasion to the people on this side the water, to see that while he is blaming the Quakers for some acts of omission, there are others in *Pensylvania* who make no scruple of acting in open defiance of positive laws of the country. For there is one there particularly against public lotteries: so that this fort, however necessary for the defence of the colony, was erected in an illegal manner, which no friend of liberty can approve of. But this was done by the governor's men, and that is sufficient. The managers of the lotteries have some thousands yet in their hands unapplied, arising from that same fund.

To set forth the defenceless state of the country for want of forts by an instance, the writer tells us, "that in the last war, one of the *Spanish* privateers came up the *Delaware* within a few miles of *Philadelphia*." Now he could not, perhaps, have pitched on a more improper instance than this: for (1) from *New York* all the way to *South Carolina* there are no fortifications along the coasts; so that the *Pensylvanians* in this respect are not more blameable than their southern neighbours, (2) the reflection falls on *West Jersey* as much as on *Pensylvania*, as lying on one side of the river, and therefore equally concerned to secure

secure the entrance of the river against an enemy. (3) *Philadelphia* lies 150 miles from the sea, and the river is of very difficult navigation, especially for vessels of 2 or 300 tons; besides so large that the whole armada of *Spain* might have run up and returned again, unmolested, provided they ascended no farther than the privateer did: for, what but a naval force could hurt them in any open bay, near 20 miles wide?

So that in effect this is the part of the whole province, with respect to which least danger is to be apprehended. If he had brought an instance of an invasion by land, it might have been something to the purpose; and, indeed, not many years ago there did happen a very terrible one in the western borders of the province, on the *Juniatta* branch of *Susquebanna* river, where the settlements of above 60 poor families were destroyed by fire, and themselves reduced to the utmost distress. This was not only a *glaring* but a *flagrant* instance; however, one of this kind would not have served his turn: for the conflagration was not the act of an enemy, but of the governor or his party; an act not less illegal, and infinitely more detestable than that of the lottery.

I say again I would not be understood as if I excused the neglect of fortifications, or thought them needless: on the contrary I am of opinion, that they are very necessary for security of the colonies; and that forts ought to be built all along their coasts, as well as borders, in the places most exposed to the invasion of an enemy, either by sea or land. And altho' a single privateer in such a river as this might find much difficulty as well as run much hazard in landing; yet in case a desperate crew of fellows should land, and venture up into the country, they might do very considerable damage

to the inhabitants; a fort therefore in the narrowing of the river would be very convenient. It would likewise be proper on such alarms for the people to shew a proper zeal for defence of their country, and spirit against the invaders: But the association, which the author tells us was formed on this occasion was a vain ostentatious piece of parade, set on foot by the few to intimidate the people, and awe them at the ensuing election to chuse them. Besides, the proprietors themselves, 'tis said, when informed of it, thought it a very unwarrantable procedure. What more need be said to justify the behaviour of the Quakers, who considered it in no better a light than the proprietors?

But it is the business of the letter-writer to condemn the Quakers in every thing, and to misrepresent the facts well known in *America*, in order to blacken them here: Of which we are come to give the reader an instance, or to use his phrase a glaring instance, from the same page. There he tells the public, "that the proprietors of *Pennsylvania* five years ago proposed to the assembly, that if they would give money for building a strong house on the *Ohio*, they would contribute any reasonable proportion to the building and support of it: but this proposal," continues the author, was rejected with scorn, merely, perhaps, because it came from the proprietors: nor was it so much as thought worthy of a place in their minutes. Altho' it is clear, concludes he, that if it had been complied with, the *French* had not been fortified in the same river as they now are."

This charge with regard to the *Ohio*, which, if as the writer has represented it, would have afforded matter itself for a pamphlet, in the hands of a parson or parsons, who knows so well how to

improve the most distant hint, is thrown by him into a note, as an article which required no farther notice; altho' if the encroachments of the *French* on the *Ohio* were really owing to their rejection of the proprietors' proposal for erecting a strong house there, I know not any thing in his whole pamphlet which deserved his expatiation more, or would have gone so far to render the Quakers obnoxious to the government of *Great Britain*. But preparatory to what we shall say on this head, the reader is desired to take notice that he does not say the proprietors had any right to make such a proposal, either by having purchased the lands of the natives for building such a strong house upon; or by having obtained a grant or license of them for so doing. This it was absolutely necessary for him to have done, in order to fix the heinous offence, which he lays to the charge of the Quakers, as the cause of the present bad state of our affairs in *America*, as well as the trouble which we are involved in here on that account; and this the public may be sure he would have done had it been in his power; or at least would have ventured to assert, if he could have had the least hopes of not being detected. But the case is so well known to be otherwise, that he durst not go too far on this head. The true cause of the *French* encroachment on the *Ohio* is as follows:

One *George Craghan* an *Irish* papist, as an *Indian* trader, was frequently employed by the government of *Pensylvania* to carry presents to the *Indians* living on or about the *Ohio*, and to bring their answers back. About the year 1730, he sent a letter to the assembly of *Pensylvania* then sitting, to inform them, that the *Indians* on the *Ohio*, and in that neighbourhood, had invited the *English* to

build a strong house for the protection of their traders. The assembly taking the matter into consideration, thought it very extraordinary that the *Indians* should now desire a thing to be done which they had always, and but just before, so warmly opposed and denied. To be better informed, and know if it was not a design in *Craghan* to impose upon them, tho' earnestly recommended by the governor in his speech to them, they sent for *Conrad Weiser* the provincial interpreter, and one of the council of the six nations, to know his sentiments. *Weiser* acquainted them, "that the *Indians* had heard the *English* were forming such a scheme, and therefore gave him in charge to let them know they must make no such attempt, for that the natives were determined not to permit or suffer any such thing as a strong house to be built on their lands." *Craghan* being thus detected in a vile attempt to impose upon the assembly, who had often entrusted him in *Indian* affairs; in order to disculpate himself, sent a letter to the speaker, which was written to him by the governor for that purpose: but the governor denied, or in some measure excused it; and his tool *Craghan* fell a sacrifice to the assembly's resentment. He has never since dared to come within 100 miles of *Philadelphia*. Having quitted *Pensylvania*, he went and offered his service to the *Ohio* company in *Virginia*: but they rejected it; upon which he crossed over the mountains, and now lives at *Logstown* or at *Aughwick*, doing all the mischief he can in revenge, by influencing the *Indians* and *French* against the *English*. This whole affair appears at large upon the journal and in the votes of the assembly of *Pensylvania*. It is well worth the notice of the curious: but as
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an account has been already published of it, in *the State of the British and French colonies in North America, &c.* we shall refer the reader to that treatise, only observing that the author has been misinformed, where he says, "on the Governor's proposal to build a fort on the *Ohio*, the assembly voted 10,000 *l.*" whereas they discovered the imposition in time, by their sagacity, and rejected it, as hath been set forth above.

From hence therefore it plainly appears, that the proprietors had neither purchased any land for building a strong house, nor obtained any licence from the *Indians* for that purpose : consequently that the assembly were in the right to reject the proposal ; and they did not reject it, as the letter writer would insinuate, merely because it came from the proprietors. It likewise appears, that if they did not register the proposal of the proprietors, they gave a place in their minutes to signify that the proposal was an imposition on them ; therefore their refusal was not the cause of the *French* being now fortified on the *Ohio*. On the contrary it is evident that their invasion is more likely to be owing to the attempt of his party to impose upon the assembly, and build a fort on that river, without the consent of the *Indians* ; and this is demonstrable from the event. For the *Virginians*, by pursuing the same unfair and precipitate scheme, lost both the country, and the affections of the *Indians*, who went over to the *French* on that occasion, if they did not in reality call them in.

If therefore the *French* have invaded the province of *Pensylvania*, and built three forts, as he says, within the limits of it, who are to blame, but his party and the *Virginians* ? The *French* have been brought down upon the province by those who broached and pursued the project ; not by the *Quakers*, who rejected it when they found it an

unjust, fraudulent, and dangerous undertaking, as it turns out to be.

For the same reason therefore, the Quakers may have some reason to expect, that since the *Virginians* have brought an enemy upon their backs, the *Virginians* ought to be at the whole expence of driving them off again. If the just measures which the assembly of *Pensylvania* took, had been observed in their sister colony, none of the present calamity could have happened to them: and it seems very hard that they should be at the expence of repelling the danger which their neighbours have brought upon them. This might have excused them in good measure if they had been a little backward to contribute on this occasion: But this shameless writer has the confidence, not only to charge them with the crime which his own party was guilty of; but also with refusing to grant money for their defence, although they actually did grant it, and the same party would not accept it, without they also gave up their privileges. Thus they are not content with bringing the enemy upon their province, but at the same time would act the enemy within, by stripping them of their other rights.

The writer says indeed, that the other enemy also is in the province: if so, the poor Quakers have gotten two enemies within their borders, one a foreign, the other an intestine enemy; which last perhaps they are in most danger from. But if a body should deny that the *French* have erected three or any fort within their limits; I apprehend the letter writer, and his constituents would be hard put to it to prove what they assert, as they have neither had any astronomical observations made to ascertain the place, or places, to which the western bounds of *Pensylvania* may extend; nor have yet
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even so much as run a line, with a view to determine the matter. Methinks the proprietors ought long ago to have had the lands granted them accurately survey'd, and their limits, both as to latitude and longitude, precisely determin'd; for nothing else can do it unexceptionably. However the writer, to make the charge appear the heavier, ventures to declare what he cannot possibly know; and that in contradiction to what he does know, namely, that the *Virginians* claim the country of the *Ohio*, where the *French* have encroached, as belonging to their province, and that their invasion is, in *Great Britain*, called an invasion of the territories of *Virginia*. He does so, in effect, himself, p. 13 and 18.

After all, supposing the *French* forts were within the limits of the province, or rather on this side of a line drawn 5 degrees west of *Delaware* river; I would ask what right have the proprietors to the lands on which those forts are situated? have they bought them of the *Indians*? for nothing else can give them a right to them, even though they were actually within *Pensylvania*; and if they have not bought them, may not the neglect be considered as an abuse of royal bounty? Had that been done, and proper encouragement given, those lands might have been settled before now; and consequently might have been secure against the attempts of an enemy. For then they might have built forts, without giving offence to the *Indians*, who, in case of an invasion from the *French*, would readily have assisted to repel them. But this opportunity is now lost, perhaps, beyond a remedy; for should the *French* be driven out again, the *Indians* seem determin'd not to sell them any more; as from the insincere proceeding of the *English* of other colonies, they are become suspicious

of their having a design to seize their countries by force.

Besides, should they be inclined to sell them any more lands, they would doubtless hold them up at such a rate, that the proprietors would not care to purchase: for they have learned how extravagantly dear the proprietors sell the land which they bought of them for trifles; and therefore seem resolved no longer to part with them, for what, as they phrase it, *will run through their guts before they get home.*

The rule which prevailed in *Pensylvania*, instead of making a considerable purchase at once, and on the frontiers, in order to fortify the province, was to buy a small tract at a time; and after the proprietor and his officers had culled them in order to jobb, and parcel out at an extravagant rate, then the rest was sold occasionally by the proprietor's officers, to the highest bidder, for his sole benefit and advantage. The lands so bought were to be settled before the proprietors would purchase any more. Nor was it possible, under such restrictions, to settle the colony so fast as otherwise it might have been; for there is a positive law in force which prohibits every person to purchase from the *Indians*: the preference by such law being given to the proprietor, of whom every individual is obliged to purchase, as that law is construed by the officers of the proprietors, and courts of justice of their own constitution.

Was it not for that obstacle, the greater part of *Pensylvania*, and particularly the western part of it, would have been settled long ago, and a frontier formed too strong for the *French* to force. What is very extraordinary with regard to the proprietary purchases, although they were made for his own private benefit, yet they were chiefly paid for by
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the assembly, out of the public money; a thing which they have long complained of, and reluctantly comply'd with.

Upon the whole, I think it may be a proper question to ask the author, or authors, of the letter, why ought not the proprietor to contribute to the defence of the province as well as the assembly? since they claim the right and profit of the lands within it, and have little less than three fourths of the whole in their possession, ought they not, in that case, as standing in place of the Crown, to defend them and his people; or at least contribute to their defence? but although he draws so many thousands a year out of the province, it does not appear that he ever contributed any thing either to the defence of the colonies, or even that of his own, excepting the old guns. If he had, his party would have proclaimed it, with a noise as loud as that which all his 12 pieces of cannon could make.

To proceed. He says, "It may justly be presumed that, as soon as war is declared, the *French* will take possession of the whole province; since they may really be said to have a stronger footing in it than we." He must here be supposed to speak of the superior footing of the external enemy, the *French*, to that of the internal enemy, his own party; for he could hardly be so ridiculous as to mean that the *French*, with their three forts (supposing them to be situated within the borders of *Pensylvania*) had a stronger footing in the province than the inhabitants, who are actually possessed of the body of it, to the amount, as he confesses before, of 220,000. However that be, he is comforted to think "that the *Virginians* have taken the alarm, and called on them for assistance." He is all of a sudden reconciled, it
seems,

seems, with his brethren of *Virginia*, and ready to assist them; although they not only helped to bring on the the danger he speaks of, but not long before gave his party as terrible an alarm as the *French* have done, nay a much greater one in all probability. For the *French* may be said to have deprived them of little more land than their forts are built on, and their cannon can command; but the *Virginians*, before their coming, had surreptitiously deprived them of a great deal more, as they conceived, from the erection of the *Ohio* company. And although this writer stifles the matter, he very well knows that to revenge the injury, those of his party gave the first intimation to the *Indians* of that grant, and inflamed them against the *Virginians*; whom, on that account, they stiled false brethren, and branded with the most opprobrious names.

We are now come to the writer's two questions: The first of which is, "Why are our assemblies against defending a country in which their own fortunes and estates lie, if it is really in danger?"

Before the writer put this question, he ought to have proved that the assemblies are against defending their country. But he himself hath shewn that they are not against defending it, by acknowledging that they have offered to advance money, not only for defence of their own province, but also for that of other provinces. Nay his second question is a contradiction of the first, as it confesses that they have offered money for the King's use, but the Governor and his party will not accept of it. Therefore the only proper question should have been, Why will he not accept of the money? which is the second question.

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But before we proceed to it, we shall examine the wise reasons he assigns why persons at a distance might imagine the Quakers are indifferent whether or not the *French* shall make themselves masters of *Pensylvania*.

His first reason is the continued refusal of the assemblies to defend the province: which is no more than the question reduced to an assertion, which we have already proved to be a falsehood out of his own mouth. And as, by his own confession, they have offered to advance money to defend the province; it follows, in effect, from his own confession, that they are not indifferent whether or not the *French* shall make themselves masters of *Pensylvania*. On the other hand, as he likewise acknowledges that the Governor and his party would not accept of the money so offered by them; it follows, from the same way of reasoning, that the Governor and his party are indifferent whether the *French* shall make themselves masters of it. If the question was put, who are most against defending the province, they who offer to advance money for that purpose, or they who refuse to accept of it, would not every body say the latter?

It methinks this suggestion, that the Quakers are against defending their own country, comes with a very bad grace from persons, who at the same time find them so tenacious of their rights. If they are so unwilling to give up their privileges to those of his party, is it to be imagined that they would readily surrender both those and their country also to the *French*? No they don't intend to part with either, they would willingly defend both: but because they will defend one, his party will not permit them to defend the other.

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The Quakers are sensible that the province is in danger from the *French*, as appears from their messages to the Governor in the *Pensylvania Gazette*: but they are satisfied that it is not in so great danger as the party would make them believe; for which end to terrify them into a compliance, they have raised many false reports: but that of the 6000 men being landed one day at *Quebek* without ships, and transported the next to the *Ohio* without being seen or heard by any body, has quite ruined their credit, and proved them no conjurers.

His second reason is the extraordinary indulgence and privileges granted to Papists in this government; privileges, saith he, plainly repugnant to all our political interests, considered as a Protestant colony, bordering on the *French*.

The fact is so far true, that the Papists have an equal privilege with those of other religions. But what he would suggest on the occasion is false, as if the present generality of Quakers, inhabiting *Pensylvania*, had out of their great love and affection for Papists, granted them those extraordinary indulgences and privileges; whereas it was done by the father of the present proprietors, who therefore must be affected by this stigma, if it be one, and not the assemblies, who have passed no toleration act in favour of Papists.

It may be proper therefore to clear up this point. The original charter or grant from King *Charles II.* to *William Penn* esq; bearing date the 14th *March* 1681, gives to the proprietor a power to make by-laws. In consequence of such power, the 28th of *October* 1701, he granted a charter to the inhabitants, wherein is included the following clause, *viz.* “ I do hereby grant
 “ and declare that no person or persons inhabiting
 “ in this province or territories, who shall con-
 “ fe's

“ fefs and acknowledge *one Almighty God, &c.*
 “ shall be in any case molested or prejudiced in
 “ his or their person or estate, because of his
 “ or their conscientious persuasion or practi-
 “ ces, &c.”

In the first place, the public sees that the present body of Quakers have done nothing in this case of their own voluntary motion; and if they have strictly conformed to the tenor of the charter in allowing the liberty which is granted by it, methinks it is a very great article in their favour, as it shews that they have not abused their power; and this is a strong reason, for believing that they will not abuse it, and an instance of moderation, as well as fidelity to the trust reposed in them, which cannot be produced by most of the neighbouring colonies; who have persecuted their fellow Protestants, and even put some Quakers to death for obeying the dictates of conscience.

How far the father of this colony was in the right for granting such an extensive liberty of conscience to all religions without distinction or restriction, I will not positively say; but I dare venture to affirm that he did it from no bad motive. He doubtless considered those evil doctrines in the Romish church, which are inconsistent with humanity and subversive of the rights and liberties of mankind, as no parts of religion, or matters of conscience; any more than robbery or murder, which fall under the cognizance of the civil magistrate, with whom such pleas would not be admitted. It may be likewise considered that every religion contains doctrines which more or less tend to the prejudice or destruction of all other religions; and therefore thought, if he excepted one religion, he must injustice except more: altho' it must be confessed that Popery exceeds
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by many degrees all other religions now on earth in those principles, which seem not intitled to toleration. But as I am a zealous advocate for liberty, and think it cannot be supported but on general principles, I should be for excluding no people from liberty of conscience or their civil rights, who should formally disclaim and renounce all such tenets as seemed inconsistent with the safety of government or good of society; which for that purpose should be picked out of their several systems and made a test.

After having suggested against the assembly that they acted in favour of Papists, he subjoins a kind of draw-back to shew his great moderation in favour of the generality of Quakers. "Altho' this, saith he, might be insinuated, yet from observation I have reason to believe, that most of the Quakers without doors are really against defence from conscience and their religious tenets; but for those within doors, I cannot but ascribe their conduct rather to interest than conscience."

This writer imagines that his seemingly charitable opinion for the *many* would make his suggestions have the mere credit and weight with the reader against the *few*. But he did not consider what a blunder his hypocrisy has led him into; for can it without an absurdity be presumed, that the conscientious *many, without doors*, would make choice of the *few*, who have no conscience, to represent them within? Be that as it will, Governour *Morris* himself has in direct terms declared himself of a contrary opinion in his message to the assembly of the 18th of *December*, [see *Pensyl. Gaz.* the 26th of *December*] where he says, "he is convinced they act from upright motives, and what they esteem to be the true interest

“ interest of the province.” Need I ask the public which of the two they will believe, the governour or the letter writer? who, it appears from this single instance, deserves no credit in any thing which he affirms or suggests.

The writer next undertakes to enter into the views of the assembly in not complying with the designs of his party : “ Our assembly apprehend, “ says he, that as soon as they agree to give sufficient sums for the regular defence of the country, it would strike at the root of all their power as Quakers, by making a militia-law needful.” If they do so apprehend, they apprehend rightly : Such a law, especially such a one as the party aim at, would certainly produce the effects which he mentions ; and be the direct means of enslaving and depopulating the country : The importation of *Germans* and other foreigners, so much exclaimed against by this writer and his principals, has been the chief means of bringing the province of *Pensylvania* into that flourishing condition, which it now enjoys ; the greatest if not the sole motive for their preferring that colony to all others on the continent for settling in, was the privileges now complained of, the principal of which with them is that of their affirmation being admitted instead of an oath. If the inhabitants were deprived of these privileges, its flourishing days would be at an end ; few of those foreigners would pass over to settle there : and numbers of those who are there now would remove to other countries. The Quakers themselves would be forced to abandon their possessions ; for the party’s view in obtaining such a law would be to make it the instrument of their revenge,

venge, and oblige them to serve personally in wars.

If a militia law was to be established in *Pennsylvania* unless it was managed better than it is in other provinces, this colony had better be without it. In most of the others there is scarce any militia, and what there is of such is of very little or no service. They are drawn out by their officers when they want to make a show and display their address in military diversions: but the men get little by it but loss of time and a habit of idleness and drinking, so that these reviews or exercises do more hurt to industry, than service to the public security. As every *American* is a good marksman, has a gun, and other arms, 'tis thought by many that they will fight better if left as they are without that sort of training; and all would be ready enough to defend their property.

But why are the Quakers blamed for not having a militia law? did they ever refuse to pass one? does the Governour expect that the assembly will of their own accord propose a bill of that kind? why does not he get the attorney general to draw one up in a proper manner suitable to the principles of the people whom they are to apply to, and see if the assembly will not accept of it?

We come now to the second question of the letter writer. "Why have not the several sums been accepted, which they have offered for the King's use." Here it is acknowledged, as before observed, that the Quakers have offered several sums for the King's service: but it seems these never could be accepted; because while they have "the aforesaid apprehensions from a militia-law, it must be repugnant to their interest ever to
" offer

“ offer money for this purpose, unless in such a
 “ manner as they know to be inconsistent with
 “ the duty of a governour to pass their bill into a
 “ law.”

Now supposing they did know it to be inconsistent with the Governour's duty, by his instructions, to pass their bill into a law after the manner they would have it pass; that can be no reason why they ought to offer it in a manner agreeable to the Governour, in case that manner which would be agreeable to him, be as prejudicial to their rights (he allows it would be so to their interest) as the manner which they have offered it in is repugnant to his instructions. They plead a right by charter from the Crown, to certain privileges relating to the manner of raising as well as disposing of the public money; and the Governour will not pass any of their money bills unless they give up that right. Here is a contest of instructions, (and which appear to be only those of the proprietors) against charter right. Which ought to give way? surely the instructions, otherwise what will become of private property? who would be secure in his possessions if a landlord could at his will and pleasure break the covenants which he makes with his tenants? what in that case would deeds or leases signify? But if a landlord cannot at pleasure make void his own contract, how should his instructions to his steward or deputy operate against that of the crown? must it not be the highest presumption to attempt it? will not the King support his own charter, and punish any person who should offer to invade or controul it? besides a proprietor ought to be the more cautious how he proceeds in such a case, and consider that on the same principle by which

he would strip his tenants of their right, he himself might be stripped of his own. Be that as it will, methinks he would run a great hazard of being stripped of it, if it appeared that sums offered for the King's service can never be accepted of by his deputy governors, unless their own ends are served.

The writer comes now, p. 18, to give an account of what had passed between the governour and the assembly for the last two or three years, relating to their offer of money for the King's service on one side, and the reason for not accepting it on the other; and it is certain that a full and impartial state of this transaction was the most proper way of laying the conduct of both parties before the public, and enabling them to form a judgment who were in the right and who in the wrong: but such a state of the case would not serve the writer's purpose, which is to blacken, and even criminate the Quakers; and therefore he hath thought fit to state it neither fully nor fairly.

However we shall endeavour to supply some of his wilful imperfections, as well as correct some of his wilful mistakes, from more credible and authentic evidence than his own.

In the same page he tells us that " Mr. Hamilton, on receiving an account that the French had driven the Virginians from their fort, again called the assembly and conjured them to obey his Majesty's orders. He at the same time let them know that altho' his instructions restrained him from passing any paper money at all without a suspending clause, yet in the present pressing emergency he would risk it, provided they would vote handsomely and sink it within the time prescribed, by act of parliament

“ment in the case of *New England*: then and not till then, continues the writer, they voted 10,000 *l.* for his Majesty’s use, redeemable by the excise in twelve years, for which time the bills were to be sunk annually in equal proportions.”

The reasons assigned for the Governour’s not passing this bill, are (1) that it would be giving the Government out of his hands and rendering himself and successors unnecessary in the administration for 12 years.

(2) That as the excise would amount in that time to 45,000 *l.* it would still more increase their own power and enable them to abridge the Governour’s by putting 35,000 *l.* (the surplus when the 10,000 *l.* was paid) into their hands. “For these reasons says the letter, and *considering also* that the money was to continue 7 years longer than the act of parliament allows, the Governour refused his assent; upon which they adjourned: altho’ continues the writer, they knew very well before they proposed the bill that he could not give his assent, without incurring his Majesty’s highest displeasure.”

Here in the close great stress is laid on this circumstance, as if the Governour’s chief motive for refusing his assent was the danger of incurring the King’s displeasure; but, from the manner of relating this passage, *that* appears to have been the least of his concern: for the true motives were those which affected the Governour himself, as contained in the two first reasons: That of the money continuing 7 years longer than the act of parliament allows, is only brought-in in the last place, and as it were by-the-by, as a matter of less moment, with a *considering also*.

To render our answer to this objection more intelligible to the reader, I must previously observe certain matters antecedent to this transaction.

The province of *Pensylvania* standing in need of a paper currency to supply the want of real money, to circulate in the province; the assembly in the year 1739 applied to their Governour Colonel *Thomas*, at present governour of the *Leward islands*, to pass a bill for establishing a fund of 80,000 *l.* in paper money for the convenience of the inhabitants of the province in carrying on their trade and business among themselves. While this bill lay before him, in order to enforce an act of the 6th of Queen *Ann*, for regulating the coins in the plantations of *America*, the lords justices of *England* sent him an instruction, requiring him or the commander in chief *for the time being*, not to pass any act whereby bills of credit should be issued in lieu of money without a clause to suspend the execution of it till the pleasure of the crown should be known.* But it appearing to Governour *Thomas* that the crown had by charter, granted full powers to the people for passing all laws whatever they should judge fit for the benefit of the colony; and also that the paper currency which they applied for, was not only useful but necessary, he the 13th of *May* 1730 gave his assent to their bill, which being recommended to the Crown by the board of trade, it received the Royal sanction on the 12th of *May* 1740. † Afterwards in 1746, the same Governour gave his assent to another bill, granting 5000 *l.* for the King's use, to be sunk on the excise in 10 years, without a suspending clause;

* *Pensyl. Gaz.* 26th of *Dec.* Assemb. mess. 20th of *Dec.*

† *Ibid.* 14th of *Jan.* Assemb. mess. 10th of *Jan.*

notwithstanding

notwithstanding the instructions which he had received as aforesaid.

Since the 80,000 *l.* was established, the increase of people in *Pensylvania* has been so considerable that it requires a much greater quantity to supply their occasions; for this reason in offering 10,000 *l.* for the King's use, the assembly proposed an additional sum of paper money to be added to their present stock.

Altho' the instructions to Colonel *Thomas* being directed to *him*, or to the *Commander in chief for the time being*, seemed equally to affect Mr. *Hamilton*, yet he made no scruple after his predecessor's example to pass the bill without a suspending clause: But as not long before an act of parliament had passed in *England* for restraining the four provinces of *New England* from emitting paper currency, excepting in cases of extremity, and limited the term of such emission to 5 years, he either thought it proper, or else took upon him, to make it a rule in *Pensylvania*; and on the assembly's not submitting to what they looked on as an innovation and infringement of their charter rights, he refused to pass the bill.

Now let any person who has the least tincture of impartiality, judge in the case, who was to blame the Governor or the Assembly: the assembly have a charter and privileges in their favour, which no friend to liberty and property can blame them to defend. The Governor on his part had apparently nothing to justify his not passing their bill. The act of parliament which he went upon related solely to *New England*; and consequently can affect or bind *Pensylvania* no more than *Canada*. Nor had he so much as a direct instruction from the Crown (I don't say

that he had not one from the proprietors) to restrain him from passing the bill.

Of the two authorities which he alledged the general instruction of the Crown to Governor *Thomas*, and the act of parliament made to bind the provinces of *New England*, the first doubtless was most, if not only, to be regarded, (whether then in force or not) as it related directly to *Pensylvania*; if therefore he made no scruple to dispense with *that*, he had surely much less reason (if any at all) to scruple dispensing with the second: and since he was willing to risk passing paper money, altho' he apprehended his instructions ("that is the Royal instructions abovementioned,) restrained him from passing any," how could he justify his unwillingness to risk giving more time than 5 years, when he had no instructions to restrain him? could he imagine that he should incur his Majesty's displeasure more highly for not conforming to an act of parliament which does not concern *Pensylvania*, than for acting contrary to a Royal instruction drawn up for a governor of *Pensylvania*, and by which he *judged* himself to be bound?

It seems evident therefore that the act of parliament made to restrain the people of *New England*, could not be the Governor's motive, as the letter writer alleges, for not passing the assembly's bill for granting 10,000 *l.* for his Majesty's service; but must have been urged by the Governor as a bugbear, with a view to terrify them into a compliance with his demands; and in the letter, by the writer of it, to impose on people here: by endeavouring to make them believe that the Quakers had flown in the face of the government of *England*, and obstinately persisted

to get a bill passed by the Governor, in direct contradiction to an express act of parliament.

It is therefore to be believed, that in not receiving the 10,000 *l.* under the said pretence, that the Governor acted solely in conformity to his instructions from the proprietors; and the rather as it appears from the public papers, that he communicated to the assembly the instructions of his majesty, but refused to shew them those of his constituents.

Although the letter-writer, as before observed, brings in this argument of the act of parliament binding *New England*, in the last place, as weakest of the three he alledges, thro' a sense of its insufficiency; yet as it is the principal, and in reality only argument urged by the Governor for his extraordinary conduct in this affair, I have dwelt the longer in shewing how little it was to the purpose. I shall now examine the writer's other two reasons for the Governor's not passing the bill, which he lays the chief stress on. First, "That if he had accepted the 10,000 pounds offered by the assembly for the King's use, and allowed them ten years to sink it on the excise; it would be giving the government out of his hands, and rendering himself and his successors entirely unnecessary in the administration for twelve years."

This reason is a downright paradox, which the author ought to have explained; but which can be explained only by supposing his meaning to be, *that the Governor would in that case have consented to their having the disposal of the excise branch of the public money for so many years; a secret however which he did not care to disclose, and through his whole letter is very industrious to conceal: for in what sense otherwise could the*

Governor's hands be tied up? It is true, he would have allowed five years, in which case it may seem his hands likewise would have been tied up for so long time: but then he would, in so doing, have set aside their right by charter, to have what laws soever they think fit to propose passed by their Governors; and subjected it to the controul of an act of parliament, made to bind other provinces, and in short, for the future, to the will of a Governor, by wresting that privilege out of their hands.

The writer's second reason is, "That it would be putting 35,000 pounds into the hands of the Assembly, still more to increase their power, and enlarge those of their proprietors and Governors." To make this out, he says, p. 19, That in the space of twelve years the excise would raise 45,000 pounds; and that when the 10,000 pounds for the King's use was paid out of it, the remaining 35,000 would have been at their disposal for what uses they might think fit.

In these few lines the writer has committed four glaring falsehoods, to use his own term.

First, in saying, that the excise would amount in twelve years to 45,000 pounds, he would make it, one year with another, to be 3750 pounds, whereas it arises but to about 3000, and has a charge of 500 pounds *per an.* on it, as the assembly alledge to their present Governor *, who in his calculation for a particular year, makes it no more than 3519 †.

Secondly, instead of 45,000 pounds, grounded on that wrong assertion, it ought to be no more than 30,000 pounds, out of which deduct-

* *Pensylv. Gaz.* 7 Jan.

† *Ibid.* 14 Jan.

ing the 10,000 for the King's use, and there will remain but 20,000, 15,000 less than this writer affirms.

Thirdly, That remainder would not have been at their disposal more than it was before, as the excise is always in their power for applying to the uses of the Government; and it does not appear, from his shewing, that it was to be converted into paper currency. It may be presumed, that no more than the money granted was to be made current in that shape, and for no longer time than the twelve years; as in the case of the 5000 pounds before mentioned, granted by Colonel *Thomas* in 1746, which was to be sunk in ten years, at the rate of 500 pounds a-year, and is not yet discharged. The assembly extended it for that length of time, as well to prevent incumbering their small public fund, as that they might have the small addition of paper bills during that interval, though they gradually decreased by sinking every year.

The fourth falsity in the foregoing paragraph, is the writer's affirming, that the assembly might have disposed of the 35,000 *l.* at pleasure. This false assertion is farther aggravated at the bottom of the same page, where it is said, "That altho' the preambles to all our money-acts and to the excise say, that the interest-money, and what arises from the excise, are to be applied to the support of Government; yet they (meaning the assembly) apply it as they please, viz. to distress all who oppose their measures, and for building hospitals, purchasing lands, libraries, &c.

This falsehood, which might pass at a distance from *Pensylvania*, would appear *glaring* there even to the moderate of his own party, nothing being better known to every body than the contrary:

for

for the interest arising from the 80,000 pounds in paper currency, which is lent out at *5 per Cent.* on land-security, is annually examined and settled; and a just account of it, together with the excise returned to the assembly, and by them printed, that every individual may be satisfied in what manner the same is disposed of. The trustees of the Loan-office are also obliged to render an account to the assembly, and give ample security for the faithful discharge of their office, before they enter upon it. Can any better regulations be made, to prevent embezzling the public money? Too well they know this. In short, the thing which in reality grieves the party, whose tool the writer is, must be, that too much care is taken to prevent embezzling it, by requiring *an account* to be rendered from all who have the handling of it.

The reader may perceive from hence, how much this writer perverts the truth of things; as well as how little the passing that bill would have created the powers of the assembly, and more enabled them to abridge those of the Governor than they were before, had that been their intention.

For better explanation of what goes before, as well as follows, it may be proper to observe, that the revenue of *Pensylvania* is no more than 7000 pounds a-year, arising out of two articles: The interest of the 80,000 pounds above mentioned, lent out at *5 per cent.* interest, which brings in 4000 pounds a-year; and the excise above-mentioned, which is also paid into the loan-office. Out of these two funds all the salaries of the public officers, excepting the Governor's, are paid, and the remainder is to defray all other expenses of Government.

This fund is so scanty, that many years it is not sufficient to pay those salaries, and other contingent

tingent charges ; so that it is not to be expected, that ever considerable sums of public money, if any at all, should be found in the treasury. In case of an emergency therefore, when money is to be raised, the usual method is for the assembly to borrow it of the public, and discharge interest and principal out of the excise, by sinking so much yearly, more or less, according to the situation of affairs.

The loan is made by bills, which they call paper currency ; and when they borrow money of the people, they give them such bills in lieu of it : or which is the same, they emit so many bills as the sum, supposing 20,000 pounds, amounts to ; and having divided it in equal proportions, for instance, twelve parts, burn every year in an oven, so many bills as amount to the proportion, till the whole is sunk ; as in the case mentioned a little before of the 5000 pounds granted towards the *Canada* expedition in 1746.

The author of the letter proceeding in his narrative sets forth, that “ on the news of *Washington's* defeat last summer (1754), the Governor again summoned the assembly, and again entreated them to fall on ways and means to repel the enemy, consistent with his duty to pass their bill ; he having in the mean time received Sir *Dudley Rider's* opinion, that he could not, with safety to himself, pass such an act as they wanted. They then voted him 15,000 pounds to be raised exactly as before, being certain the Governor could not venture to pass it. Accordingly on his refusal they adjourned ; and to intimidate other Governors from daring to dispute their commands, withheld his yearly salary.”

The query on the case which *Mr. Hamilton* stated

stated to the Attorney-General here, was, " Whether he might legally and safely, or without
 " breach of his oath, bond, or duty to the king,
 " pass an act of assembly, whereby bills of cre-
 " dit may be issued in lieu of money, without
 " *the suspending clause* before-mentioned being
 " inserted therein." The letter-writer, with his
 usual sincerity, omits the reason here assigned,
 why Governor *Hamilton* could not with safety
 pass this 15,000 pound act, for two reasons: first,
 because Mr. *Hamilton* had, before he received the
 said opinion, made no scruple to pass the act for
 paper currency without *the suspending clause*. Se-
 condly, Because notwithstanding this opinion of
 the Attorney-General, the present Governor, Mr.
Morris, offered to do the same, provided the bills
 were to be sunk in five years; and therefore the
 writer, by that omission, would have it believed,
 the reason for Mr. *Hamilton's* latter refusal was still
 the same with his first, and that which his succes-
 sor alledged; namely, that the assembly would
 not submit to sink the money in five years, con-
 formable to the act of parliament binding *New*
England. Mr. *H.* seeing this act not tenable, quit-
 ted it; and stated the case for an excuse to come off.

The assembly alledged, " That the case, as it
 " was stated to the then Attorney-General, re-
 " garded only emissions of bills of credit on com-
 " mon and ordinary occasions, and so in their
 " opinion very little, if at all, affected the bill
 " then depending." They likewise observe,
 " That Mr. *Hamilton* seemed clearly, in his rea-
 " sonings with former assemblies, to have *acknow-*
 " *ledged* he *thought himself* at liberty to pass acts
 " of the same tenor with that bill, for granting
 " money for the king's use; and *never offered a*
 " *suspending clause*, notwithstanding his bonds to

“ the Crown. But, continue they, the point, whether he might or might not be safe in passing a bill, mentioned in his state of the case, could regard himself only, and does by no means determine the right which we claim under the royal charter :” A right which they say they have hopes will never be taken from them by act of parliament ; and the rather, as three bills, to extend the royal instructions over countries and assemblies in *America*, had been attempted in parliament without success*.

The assembly apprehended that Mr. *Hamilton* was prevented from passing the bill, not so much, if at all, from Royal, as from proprietary instructions, which he seems to have looked on in a very bad light, and of pernicious tendency to the colony : for the assembly observe, “ That he declared, in the journals of their house, and in a letter to the proprietary family themselves, (1.) That some instructions given to him conclude absurdly, and therefore are impracticable. (2.) That they are a positive *breach of the Charter* of privileges to the people. And (3.) That they are inconsistent with the legal prerogative of the Crown, settled by act of parliament.”

This being the case, it may be presumed, that the assembly's stopping his salary was not disagreeable to him, as it furnished him with a handle to write to the proprietaries to substitute another in his place : for that Gentleman, who is single, and of an independent fortune in the province, the place of his birth, could not but have been disgusted with instructions, which, in his opinion, tended to subvert the liberties and privileges of the inhabitants, in which common calamity he must have been involved himself ; and therefore

the

* *Pensylv. Gaz.* 26. *December.*

the letter, mentioned by the author of the state of *Pensylvania*, to have been written by Mr. *Hamilton* to the proprietaries, was doubtless that cited by the assembly, as before observed. This appears, in some measure, from what our author says, " That he wrote over to them to send him " a successor, assuring them, that he would no " longer continue to act as Governor:" altho' the *brief state* would give it another turn.

We come now to the last part of the history; which relates to the government of Mr. *Morris*. This Gentleman, he says, on his entering on the government, spoke in the most pathetic terms to the new assembly, consisting of the old members, who " offered a bill for 20,000 pounds; " conceived in the same terms as before, *viz.* " to make the paper money extend for twelve " years, though the new Governor had told " them before-hand, that he was subjected to " the same instructions as his predecessors, and " could not pass any such bill into a law."

This is all he says of this last transaction, which however being the most material of all, I shall state the particulars somewhat more minutely. Mr. *Morris* having, on the 3d of *December* last, laid before the assembly the dangerous state of the provinces, and exhorted them to contribute for their defence; in their answer or message of the 12th, they acknowledge, " That the efforts which the " *French* have made (on the side of the *Ohio*) " are truly alarming, and dangerous to the *British* interest in *North America*; but add, that " they had good reasons to believe, that the sums " granted to the King in their late assembly, had " the then Governor been pleased to pass the " bills,

“ bills, offered to him for that purpose, *might,*
 “ *in a great measure, if not totally, have prevented*
 “ *the bad situation of their affairs at present, and*
 “ have placed their duty to the best of Kings, as
 “ they always desire it should appear, among his
 “ most loving and loyal subjects *.”

As their bill proposed “ emitting 20,000
 “ pounds for the King’s use, to be current for
 “ twelve years, he declared in his message of *De-*
 “ *cember* 18th, that he could not by any means
 “ agree to it, as being *forbidden by a royal* instruc-
 “ tion, to pass any law for creating money in pa-
 “ per bills without a suspending clause; and al-
 “ leged the Attorney-General’s opinion before-
 “ mentioned, by which he said it clearly ap-
 “ peared that the instruction was most certainly
 “ in force, and binding on himself: that how-
 “ ever, as the act of parliament restraining the
 “ four eastern governments from emitting paper
 “ currency, gives them a power to make bills of
 “ credit in case of emergency,—he would there-
 “ fore join with them in any bill, for striking
 “ what sum they thought their pressing occa-
 “ sions demanded, provided a fund was esta-
 “ blished for sinking the same in five years.”

It seems to me very odd, that this Gentleman should first tell the assembly, that he could not by any means agree to pass the bill *without a suspending* clause, as being forbidden by a royal instruction, backed with the Attorney-General’s opinion; and yet presently after promise to pass it without such a clause, provided they would sink the bills in five years, conformable to the act of parliament binding *New England*: as if their compliance with the terms of this act took off the force

* *Pensylv. Gaz.* 19. *December.*

or obligation of the royal instruction; which yet at setting out is represented as an insuperable obstacle, and has no connection with the act, or the act with *Pensylvania*.

However, as the Governor had, between these two declarations, introduced the late Attorney-General's opinion in support of the first, the assembly mistook his meaning; and concluding he intended to insist on inserting the *suspending Clause*, entered into debate about it. In their answer of *December 20th*, they controvert the force or validity of that royal instruction, as Governor *Thomas*, to whom it was first directed in 1746, passed the 5000 *l.* bill before-mentioned, without a *suspending clause*, by extending the excise act for ten years; to which number they had reduced their demand of time in the new bill.

They say, that as Colonel *Thomas* gave his assent to that act, after the receipt of the said instruction, they hope he will not be more restricted by it than the Gentleman to whom it was immediately directed, and at present holds a government of great importance under the Crown, or than his predecessor Mr. *Hamilton*, who never offered a *suspending clause*.

Governor *Morris* made them sensible, that he never intended to insist on the *suspending clause*, provided they would sink the paper bills in five years. As they did not, he undertakes to prove, that the instruction (which he in his former message had consented to lay aside) was binding on him, and that Colonel *Thomas's* conduct was no rule to him. In short, the dispute is carried on as if the *suspending clause* was the only obstacle, and the act of parliament for reducing the ten years to five, which before was the grand impediment, was no longer insisted on. The reason he gives why he had insisted

Gtled on it is, that he *thought the reason of that act*
extended here (to Pennsylvania) although the force of
it did not *. Was not this reason enough why he
 should not so long have endeavoured to *force* this
 act upon the assembly; especially since, as he con-
 fesseth, the *reason* of its extending thither was
 no more than a conjecture of his own? whence it
 follows, that it was such conjecture or thought of
 his, which made him urge its authority, not any
 instruction from the Crown: yet two or three
 paragraphs after says, "He had before informed
 " them that he could not pass their bill in the
 " shape they had sent it, (that is requiring ten
 " years time to sink the bills) as being contrary to
 " his Majesty's instruction;" which instruction
 must, by these words, relate to the act restraining
 the emission of paper currency to five years: and
 yet it is no where expressly said by him to extend
 to that act, (supposing it concerned *Pennsylvania*)
 but to relate merely to the not passing of bills for
 creating paper money, without a suspending
 clause.

All this seems to me like playing at cross pur-
 poses, or fast and loose with royal instructions:
 sometimes they are treated as of no importance,
 and an act of parliament made only to bind one
 country, brought in to bind another: at another
 time the act seems to be neglected, and the in-
 struction only regarded. In one part of the Go-
 vernor's message the *reason* of the acts extending
 to *Pennsylvania* is only his conjecture, and he al-
 lows it has no *force* in itself to operate there; in
 another part it is made to operate by a royal in-
 struction. So that the royal instruction seems to
 be made a tool of by him to oblige the assembly

* Gazette December 31.

either to submit to have their bill clogged with a suspending clause, which as they say would be the same as to render it ineffectual, or else to reduce the number of years for sinking the money from ten to five; which seems extremely unreasonable: for the excise on which 20,000*l.* was to be sunk, would discharge but 15,000*l.* of the debt in 5 years, supposing it amounted to full 3000*l.* a year. But indeed it frequently falls some hundreds short, and in time of war becomes very inconsiderable; as the danger of being taken at sea cuts off most part of the trade of wine and rum, &c. out of which the excise arises: hence it might possibly happen that the excise income (already clogged with 500*l.* a year) might be reduced so low as not to afford a sum in 10 years sufficient to discharge the debt of 20,000*l.* So that was the whole to have been paid in 5 years, they must have been forced to break into their interest money also: this would have farther disabled them from defraying the charge of officers and other expences of government, by engaging more than one half of the public fund for discharge of the 20,000*l.*

It seems from the reason of the thing that the more money which is advanced, the more time ought to be allowed for repaying it out of so scanty a fund; and therefore if the assembly had asked longer time than either 10 or 12 years, it could not have been looked on as unreasonable, especially as they saw a war was near at hand, if not already commenced.

The letter writer was conscious of this, and therefore altho' he labors all he can to make their demand of 12 years appear unreasonable on their first offer of 10,000*l.* he says not a word about it, when he mentions their tender of 15, and 20,000*l.* his sole argument for the Governor's

refusal being, that it was contrary to the act of parliament to grant so long time, which we have already shewn to be an imposition.

As the Governor acted contrary to the rule just mentioned, the restriction proposed to be laid on the bill seems as if done with design to distress the assembly. At this rate what encouragement have they from the Governor to advance large sums, (which yet he was always pressing, alledging 20,000*l.* as inconsiderable) if they have no more time allowed for sinking large than small? Governor *Thomas* granted them 10 years on the excise for only sinking 5000*l.* which was at the rate of 500*l.* a year or one tenth of the public fund; and now they must be allowed but 5 for sinking 20,000*l.* which is 4000 a year out of 7000, or more than half of their whole fund every year.

Why should they be compelled to such a hardship? the reason is plain: the instruction to Colonel *Thomas* was by the Crown referred to the act of parliament the 6th of *Queen Ann*; but the present Governour by his superior power and authority, has extended the same instruction to the act made, not only to bind a different country (not *Pensylvania*) but also since that instruction was issued, and without the least reference to it.

The assembly having misapprehended the Governor's meaning as hath been observed, and imagining that he had then insisted on the *suspending* clause, acquaint him that in case he would not pass their bill, after all which they had said to induce him, "they should be obliged, as their
" last resource, to apply to the Crown for redress,
" or to the Lords of trade, or to their proprietaries." That therefore they might be enabled to state their case more fully, they entreat him to

inform them “ whether the royal instruction is
 “ the only impediment; or whether he had any
 “ farther instructions from their proprietaries,
 “ which influence him in refusing his assent to
 “ their bill.”

Governor *Morris* in answer says that “ altho’
 “ he thought it not quite decent, and he believed
 “ it unprecedented for a Governor to be called
 “ upon for a sight of his instructions; yet, adds he,
 “ I shall communicate them to the house (of as-
 “ ssembly) whenever the public service shall re-
 “ quire it.” And accordingly, as by way of
 advance, took that opportunity to acquaint them
 with some of his instructions from the proprietors,
 particularly to recommend to them to provide for
 defence of the province; not only by granting
 aids from time to time to the King, but also by
 establishing a *militia*, providing arms, stores of
 war and magazines in convenient places.

Here the Governor had a fair opportunity of
 trying if the assembly would pass a militia act,
 by proposing to them a bill for that purpose
 ready drawn as before; and it may seem strange
 to many that this never was done by the Govern-
 or. But as it might be more agreeable to his
 views that they should rather appear refractory
 than compliable, he did not care perhaps to ha-
 zard a point of so great importance, lest their
 answer might have deprived him of the pretence
 of declaiming on that head.

The assembly in their message of the 26th of
December, thank the Governor for offering to
 communicate the proprietary instructions; and
 say those to former Governors had been repeat-
 edly laid before them, of which they produce
 some instances: particularly those of Sir *William*
Keith in 1724, and Colonel *Thomas* in 1738.
 They

They tell him that as they are of opinion, " his proprietary instructions are the principal if not the sole obstruction to his passing their bill ; and that as whatever bill they might prepare for the then present, or any other purpose, after all the expence to the country and all their pains in framing them, would be liable to the same difficulties, unless they could know what those proprietary instructions are ; they therefore request he would *then* candidly communicate those instructions, as *the time when the public service requires*, since they intended to make them the *great end* of their humble address to his Majesty."

Governor *Morris*, whether piqued with their seeming to claim a right to see his instructions, or perhaps never intending to produce them, as his offer was equivocal ; in his answer or message of *December 30th*, refuses to communicate them, " as he could not at that time think it either for his Majesty's service or the interest of the province." He seems much disgusted likewise with their telling him they were of opinion that the proprietary instructions was the *principal or sole obstruction* to his passing their bill after he had told them he was hindered by a royal instruction : on which occasion he asks " how they came so intimately acquainted with his private sentiments, as to know that when he *said one thing he meant another ?*" upon my word this was a proper question. The Quakers sure must be conjurors if they penetrated so deep. 'Tis much the letter writer did not take the hint from this circumstance to charge them, among other things, with forcery.

To be serious ; how could they think otherwise when they knew that he could not be bound by the royal instruction on the suspending clause, be-

cause he had offered to pass the bill without such a clause ; and that as the act of parliament restraining the remission of paper currency in *New England* to 5 years, could not affect *Pensylvania*, he could not be bound by that act. Since then he could not be bound by either of these, what could bind him but instructions from the proprietaries ? that proprietary instructions may be contrary both to the royal instructions given to the Governor, and royal charter granted to the people, as well as absurd in themselves, appears from Mr. *Hamilton's* declaration before set forth. The assembly likewise produce an instance of a saving clause or restriction in the commission of Colonel *Evans*, so inconsistent with their charter rights, that being laid before the council (of *Pensylvania*) in 1724, of which *William Penn* the younger, was the principal member, they determined that *saving clause* to be void in itself.

As things stand, therefore the *Pensylvania* Quakers are in a very bad situation, lying as it were, between two millstones, unable to move; this verifies the text, *one cannot serve two masters* : if their commands be contrary and the people do not know them, which of the two shall they obey, or rather how shall they know which to obey ? to enable them therefore to act at all, it is absolutely necessary that they should see one of the Governor's instructions, and consequently the proprietary, as they ought to give place to the royal. After all the having proprietary Governments in a country is incompatible with the rights of Crowns. It is a kind of *imperium in imperio*, and consequently a solecism in politics.

To proceed in our relation of facts : as the assembly mistakes the Governor's meaning (I would be understood with respect to the suspending clause,

clause, not to the instructions which he acted from) so the Governor on his side mistakes that of the assembly. Altho' the bill which they sent up to him was for no more than 20,000*l.* he would persuade them it was for 40,000*l.* on which in their message of *January* the 3d 1755. they set forth the title as follows, " an act for " striking 40,000*l.* in bills of credit and for " granting 20,000*l.* thereof to the King's use, " and to provide a fund for applying the remainder to the exchange of torn and ragged bills " now current in this province." On which occasion they tell the governour, that he well knew, it added no more to their paper currency than the very 20,000*l.* granted the King; and even that struck for no other reason than to answer the immediate call of the crown, and to make the grant effectual.

On this faux pas or slip (willful or unwilling) of the Governor, the letter writer, no doubt, grounded his false assertion before-mentioned; that the excise would amount to 45,000*l.* in 12 years, and the assembly by their bill would have had 35,000 of it at their own disposal. But he has improved the hint considerably, by adding 5000*l.* to the Governor's 40,000*l.* and transferring the case from the 20,000 to the 10,000*l.* grant, in order to make their demand appear more unreasonable, from an augmentation of 15,000*l.*

After this some little altercation past between the Governor and the assembly with reference to the state of the funds. The Governor insisted that they had, or ought to have, 14 or 15,000*l.* in bank. They make appear that they had not half that sum, including mortgages and debts; and that there was not 600*l.* in the treasury.

To conclude this account of transactions : the assembly finding the Governor inflexibly bent not to pass their bill but with his own unwarrantable restrictions, they on the 10th of *January* 1755, adjourned themselves to the 12th of *May* following ; after voting 5000 *l.* for accommodating the King's troops when they should arrive, as hath been mentioned before.

This is the sum and issue of the affair. It is now left to the public to judge, which of the two parties ought to have receded from their pretensions ? who was to blame the assembly for insisting to tender the money in the accustomed form, or the Governor for persisting not to receive it in that form ?

If they think the Governour was in the wrong they will naturally conclude, according to what has been before suggested, that he was withheld from passing the assembly's bill by a proprietary instruction, not a royal one ; and this being admitted, they cannot be long at a loss to discover the purport of that instruction, which notwithstanding the writer so industriously avoids to mention it, transpires in two or three places of his letter, where he speaks so much against the assemblies having the disposal of the public money, and of what blessings would arise to the province from having that power lodged in the Governor. To wrest this power out of their hands was doubtless the sole motive of his conduct ; the sole object which he had in view. Had they given up this power, it is not to be doubted (according as the case is stated in the letter) but that the Governor would readily have passed the bill, had the time asked been 24 instead of 12 years ; and all his scruples would have been removed.

But

But if this power be so much wanted by either the proprietaries or the Governor, how comes it that the acquisition of it was not attempted before? why is this dangerous juncture pitched on to begin a contest, when the affairs of the colonies are too much distracted already; and methods should be used to unite the people, not to divide them?

The writer after having given a fallacious state of affair, and said all the false and malicious things which his fertile imagination could invent of the *Pensylvania* Quakers, endeavours to cajole the Quakers here into a bad opinion of their brethren in *America*, and list them into his party, pretending p. 22, “ to be well assured that the conduct “ of the assembly in *Pensylvania*, is very much “ disapproved of, and condemned by their brethren the Quakers in *England*, who are justly “ esteemed a quiet people, such as we already “ observed the first Quakers in this province “ were.”

As the Quakers are in reality a *quiet upright* people; quiet and perhaps upright for the general, beyond any sect of Christians in all the King's dominions; people who have been often oppressed by other sects both in *Europe* and *America*, but never retaliated on others the injuries which were done themselves, it is not probable that those of *Pensylvania* should so far degenerate from the meekness of their ancestors, or deviate from the manners of their brethren here, as to renounce their fundamental principles, and become turbulent, much less abettors of injustice. But, by this time the reader must have learned how to interpret the writer's words: with him to hold their privileges is to be unjust; and to refuse delivering them up to his party, is to be unquiet.

In like manner when he says, " it is very plain
 " that they have no mind to give a single shilling
 " for the King's use, unless they can thereby
 " increase their own power." It is the same
 thing as to say that the Governor will not re-
 ceive a shilling from them unless they gave him
 up their power. After what has been said must
 not the people have reason to think, as he con-
 fesses they do, " that every such rejection of a
 " money bill, is a design against their liberties,
 " and throw the whole blame on their proprietors
 " and Governors ?" As it is too well known that
 the people, and all but those of his party, are on
 the side of the assembly, he judged it could be
 of no use to conceal it : but he had better have
 said nothing than given so silly a reason for it,
 namely, " that they are not well enough ac-
 " quainted with the nature of Government, to
 " understand why the money bills cannot be
 " passed ;" their understanding must be very
 weak indeed, as weak as this writer's, if they
 cannot tell why the bills cannot be passed, in case
 the reason is, as he pretends, because they ask 12
 years for sinking them instead of 5.

He goes on p. 23, representing the miserable
 condition of the province and imputing it all to
 the assembly, in terms which may justly be turned
 on those of his party ; and then alleges two in-
 stances, first of a petition from 1000 poor families,
 who inhabit the back parts of the colony, to the
 assembly in *August 1754*, soon after *Washington's*
 defeat, praying that they might be furnished
 with arms and ammunition for their defence ; but
 this petition, he says, was rejected with scorn :
 the second is of a message in *December* following
 from their *Indian* allies to the Governor, begging
 that he would direct the building of a wooden
 fort,

fort, in which they offered to defend themselves and the inhabitants of *Pennsylvania* from incursions : this also he tells us the assembly refused, bidding them, if they were afraid, to retire farther within the province.

The reader, we presume, has seen too much of the malice and insincerity of this writer, to believe any thing which he affirms upon his bare testimony ; and after he has been so often detected in falsehoods, will not condemn the assembly on his single evidence : but at least suspend their judgments till they may have time to clear themselves, if necessary ; and the rather as we find this last particular very differently represented in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* of *Dec. 19*, which contains both the Governor's message and the assembly's answer on that occasion. Mr. *Morris*, on the 4th, recommended to them to make " provision for the maintenance of the *Indians* at *Aughwick*, and for setting up some stachados round the place they should fix on for their winter's residence."

The assembly on the 6th, after declaring " their willingness to treat them with justice, humanity, and tenderness, as till then they had done ; unanimously resolved to defray the reasonable charges for support of the *Indians*, till their next meeting : but as *Craghan* seemed resolved to remove from *Aughwick*, whereby the *Indians* would be left without any proper person to take care of providing for their subsistence, they recommend it to the Governor's consideration, whether it might not be more convenient for the *Indians* themselves, and less expence to the province, if they were invited to come nearer their back inhabitants, till by hunting, or otherwise, they might be able to subsist themselves with safety."

Is there any thing in all this so rude or regardless of the *Indians* as he represents the case? All suggestions that the Quakers will not defend themselves and their property, must be false, from the instances already produced to the contrary. Their opposition to the designs of the party is a confutation of the charge. They know it would be but of little significancy to secure their rights against the attempts of a Governor, if at the same time they suffered a foreign enemy to strip them of both liberty and property, without making any resistance. They know too that they could not expect to be left in possession of a country, unless they were resolved to defend it; and that the readiest way to be divested of the possession, would be to refuse contributing their utmost to preserve it: since, in reality, the province is the King's, from whom they have it in trust, on a presumption that they will secure it for him against all enemies; and who, in case of their failure, will resume the possession, in order to prevent the loss of it.

Although the Quakers, out of religious principle, are averse to bear arms themselves; yet they will, no more than those of other persuasions, suffer their property to be taken from them for want of making a proper opposition. If they do not fight in person, they are ready to pay those who will; which is as much as the generality of those do, who scruple not going to war out of conscience: and that *Pennsylvania* will afford men enough willing to fight, without compelling the Quakers, appears from the proprietary instructions to the present Governor, requiring men to be raised, but yet so as not to oblige any to bear arms who may be conscientiously scrupulous.

In King *William's* war, Mr. *Hull*, a Quaker of *Rhode Island*, who commanded a vessel of which
he

he was owner, was met at sea by a *French* privateer, which coming up with him, the captain ordered him to strike. The Quaker made answer that he could not resolve to part with either his ship or cargo, which were his property, and of considerable value; neither could he, by the laws of his religion, fight: but he would speak to his man *Charles*, who was of another persuasion, and in case he was inclined to fight, he would not hinder him. Accordingly *Charles* was called, who accepted the encounter; and falling to work with the *Frenchman*, soon obliged him to sheer off. This *Charles* was no other than the late Sir *Charles Wager*, who then served that honest Quaker; and the report which Mr. *Hull* made, when he arrived at *London* of this gallant action, was the first rise of that worthy admiral. The Quakers therefore, in effect, will fight; but the party are not content, that the Quakers, like themselves, should fight by proxy; they want to oblige them, against both law and conscience, to fight in person, though without any necessity. This is one part of the wicked tyrannic scheme which they are driving at. The Quakers, besides contributing their quota in the last war, behaved with more circumspection, as obedient, dutiful and loyal subjects to his Majesty and Government, than the party did who would represent them in a contrary light. For it is notorious, that the few now complaining and arraigning their conduct, held constant correspondence with the King's enemies, and supplied them with all sorts of stores and provisions; and, the better to carry on this treasonable trade, they had factors residing in all the remarkable ports of the *French* and *Spanish West-Indies*, during the last war.

In fine, as the Quakers do not profess loyalty to the King, and dishonour him in their actions, neither

ther do they refuse to advance money for his service ; all they desire is to see (according to a legal right which they have to see) that such money be laid out for his service, as to answer the public utility, for which it was voted ; and not to be sunk in the pockets of venal Lieutenant-Governors. Some of whom formerly have been sent over as hungry as sharks, in order, as it were, to prey upon the vitals of the inhabitants, and devour all the profits of the land. These men are not content with a handsome provision arising out of licences for public houses, to the amount of 2500 *l. per annum*, exclusive of what the assembly gives them, which is seldom less than 1000 *l.* more. How many gentlemen of superior merit and abilities for governing a province, would be perfectly easy with half such an appointment ? but sharks can never be satisfy'd.

“ From what has been said (saith the letter-writer, p. 25.) it clearly appears how much *we* “ suffer, by having all public money in such “ hands.” By *we*, must be understood solely of his party ; for all else think themselves great gainers, as he himself, in effect, allows but a few lines before, in the concern he expresses to find not only the *Germans*, who make one half of the inhabitants, but all the people in general in the interest of the assembly, whom they consider as their best friends.

He goes on “ were the case otherwise,” (that is, was the disposal of the public money in the hands of his party) “ matters might be managed with secrecy, “ ease, expedition, success, and a small expence, by “ embracing the proper opportunities.” O ! no doubt of it, as all the wisdom, integrity, and frugality, must needs be on the side of the Governor and his party, every thing would then go on
swim-

swimmingly. The charge of Government would be but a trifle to what it is now; the number of officers would be reduced half in half, as well as their salaries; and the Governor himself would be content with 1000, or 1500 *l.* a year, instead of 4000*l.* But will they find any without doors to believe them? or any within, among the assembly, weak enough to try them?

It must be observed, that this is one of the two places in the letter, where we meet with glimmerings of the grand point which the Governors are driving at, and the true cause of their not passing the money-bills, all along so industriously suppressed by this writer; namely, their not having the disposal of the money: which transpires a little in the words, “were the case otherwise;” but somewhat more clearly in those which follow; “the settlements of the *French* at *Crown Point*, and on the “*Ohio*, might both have been prevented at first, “with one 50th part of the expence it will now “take to dislodge them, had not the hands of all “our Governors been tied up, by having the disposal of no monies on such emergencies, nor any “hopes of obtaining it (the disposal of the money) “from the assemblies, if they should advance any “sums for the public service.”

Neither the disposal of the monies, nor hopes of obtaining such disposal from the assembly! poor gentlemen, *hinc ille lachrymæ*: who does not pity their deplorable case? who would not gratify their longings to finger the public money, but such hard-hearted men as the assembly, the Quakers, and the rest of of the people of *Pennsylvania*? But what need they fret? let them pluck up a heart and comfort themselves; since if they disappoint the Governor of his darling views, he will have it always in his power to be revenged on them,

by

by refusing to receive the money which they offer for the King's service, and putting the province in danger of being taken out of their hands by the *French*---provided the Government here does not interpose in time. If the Governor had been empowered with the disposal of the money, he would have done more than was incumbent on him, or perhaps would have been permitted him: he would not only have prevented the *French* encroachments on the *Ohio*, but would also have hindered their building *Crown Point* fort, although in another Governor's province. But as the assembly will not give up to him the disposal of the money, he will neither defend his own province himself, nor suffer the assembly to defend it. What should the Governor care if the *French* do take it, since they will not let him have his will? why should he have any care for the colony, if they will not give him the disposal of the cash? what is the colony to him without that?

Some indeed think, that if the Governor intended to act honestly, he would readily accept of the sum voted by the assembly for the King's use, and not be afraid to render an account whenever called upon: but they say they can have no good opinion of a Governor's designs, who unjustly attempts to wrest out of the hands of the people, a power which he knows they have a legal as well as natural right to.

“ But here it may be justly asked, by what means the Quakers, who are so small a part of the inhabitants, and whose measures are so unpopular (supposing them to be such as this writer represents them) get continually chosen into the assemblies of *Pennsylvania* ? ”

It is easy to see that this would be a considerable stumbling-block to the readers of the letter, and a grand

grand objection against the truth of the writer's accusations : for this reason he puts the question himself, and p. 26. undertakes to answer it. His answer, in substance, is this ; " that in the late *Spanish* war, Governor *Thomas* calling on them to arm for their defence, they were alarmed with the prospect of losing their power, if they should comply, as hath been shewn above : that they therefore entered into cabals, and persuaded the *Germans* there was a design to enslave them, and force their young men to be soldiers : that a military law was to be made, insupportable taxes laid on them, and what not, unless they joined to keep in the *Quakers*, under whose administration they had long enjoyed ease and tranquillity ; and to force out of the assembly all those who were likely to join the Governor, in giving money for annoying the enemy."

The instrument it seems they made use of to effect this, was one *Saüer* a *German* printer, who publishes a news-paper entirely in the *German* language. " In consequence of this, the *Germans* " who had hitherto been peaceable without meddling in elections, came down in shoals, and carried all before them. Near 1800 of them voted " in the county of *Philadelphia*, which threw the " balance on the side of the *Quakers* ; who having found out this secret, have ever since excluded all other persuasions from the assembly. " constantly calling in the *Germans* to their aid, " by means of this printer." A terrible and dangerous man to be sure !

This answer to the objection is plausible : and yet was it in the main true, it ought to throw no reflection on the *Quakers* : for first the land is properly their birthright, and the possession in justice belongs to them. They cannot therefore be blamed for using their endeavours to keep possession, and

hinder others from reaping the fruit of their labours, after taking so much care to bring the province into its present flourishing condition. Prudence therefore, as well as justice, evinces the obligation, and even necessity, of returning and continuing the Quakers in the assembly: not only as having been the first settlers and establishers of the Government; but also as having, by their good management and conduct ever since, shewn themselves to be the fittest persons for keeping up the prosperity of the colony, as well as the safest guardians who could be intrusted with the established rights and liberties of its inhabitants, against the many iniquitous attempts of the Governor's men.

If therefore they did solicit the assistance of the *Germans* to preserve their own interests, they were certainly in the right of it; and in case they, for that end, endeavoured to persuade those strangers that the Governor had in view, to make slaves of them, I cannot see how they can be thought to have been in the wrong, since an attempt to wrest from them by force their most valuable rights and privileges, might well be looked on in that light. They certainly had, or at least judged they had, just reason to call the *Germans* to their aid, or else they would not have done it; since the writer himself acknowledges that this was the first time that they had taken such a step.

To prevent a discovery, he conceals the time, or year, of the election which he mentions: but in all likelihood it was that of the year 1744, when they had very great reason indeed to make all the friends they could among the other inhabitants, to prevent the violent measures which were then set on foot to destroy the freedom of elections, and fill the assembly with creatures of the Governor; for all the privateer sailors in the harbour of *Philadelphia*,

adelphia, under the influence of the Governor's men, came armed to the Court House, where the Sheriff was then taking the pole; and with open violence hindered the legal voters, who were in the interest of the Quakers, from voting: knocking down, and beating in a most barbarous manner, all who appeared not to be of their party: And when the house of assembly came to sit, and take cognizance of the affair, in order to find out and bring the delinquents to justice, the Governor granted *noli prosequi's*. However, this alarming and lawless transaction, which struck terror into the minds of the people, throughout the whole province of *Pensylvania*, still remains fresh in the memory of every independent voter, and is to be seen, with all its circumstances at large, on the journals and votes of the assembly.

Is it then to be wondered after this, if ever since, as the writer says, they call in the *Germans* to their aid? but although he keeps these violent measures of his party from the knowledge of his readers, he does not pretend to charge the *Germans* with any unlawful or disorderly behaviour on the occasion; and yet if they had repelled violence by violence, nobody could have blamed them when they were provoked to it, and had acted merely in their own defence.

It is likewise worth observing, that although this writer would have calling in the *Germans* to vote to be reckoned a crime in the Quakers, yet his own party set them the example: for, previous to the election above-mentioned, the *Germans* were tampered with by the Governor's men; and, on their promising to vote for them, he, to qualify them for the purpose, procured many hundreds of them to be naturalized. The *Germans* however, voted afterwards on the Quakers side, from a con-

sciousness, or apprehension, that if the other party got a majority in the assembly, they would make such laws as served their own interests, however detrimental to the liberty of the people, and good of posterity; which, although the highest earthly blessings, are no longer dear to men than their principles remain uncorrupted.

From the partial account given of this affair by the author of the letter, the reader has a farther instance of his disingenuity, and how little his representation of any matters which relate to the Quakers is to be regarded. I shall not therefore take up his time with refuting the groundless reflections, which, for want of real matter to accuse them with, he throws out against them on this, as on all other occasions. It is sufficient to observe, that they are only general charges, supported by the bare assertions of a person who resolved with himself, when he sat down to write, to relate nothing truly; and as no one fact is charged upon them in direct terms, they ought to be treated, like himself, with contempt, and as the hateful offspring of malice and detraction.

However we must not pass on without taking notice of one very remarkable personage; I mean the *German* printer: he speaks of him in terms which shew the deepest concern, as well as dread of his power: as if all the distress of his party was owing to him; and that they can never hope to compass their ends, till the authority of that formidable foe is either lessened or destroyed. This printer seems to be more terrible to them than the Quakers themselves, as he hath above 100,000 *Germans* at his devotion, who, if he but whistles, *come down in shoals, and carry all before them*, as he shall direct.

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Whenever they want to call in these foreigners to their aid, they do it by means of this printer: by means of this printer, they represent all regular clergymen as spies and tools of state: whenever they know of any such minister in good terms with his people, they immediately attack his character, by means of this printer; and to be sure his business is done at once, for a single man has no chance to stand against such a printer as this *dominus fac totum*, who commands so many thousands, and obliges them to do whatever service he pleases to send them on.

Who would imagine that printers, and German printers too, should become so formidable in *America*, as to strike terror into the hearts of even Governors themselves, for the general, the most dreadful and assuming mortals of any to be found? Yet we have had, it seems, of late, two instances of the kind, Zenger in *New York*, and Sauer in *Pennsylvania*.

Not daring to try his strength at fair weapons, with this *Herculean* typographer, he has recourse to his usual method of calumny, and bestows invidious names on him, as those of *French* prophet, and *popish* emissary. Nor is it any wonder, that a printer who has wrought his party so much mischief, and blown up their designs against the assembly, should be the object of his keenest resentment. Accordingly the remainder of his letter, consisting of near one half, is employed in blackening the character of this printer, as well as the *Germans*, and contriving expedients to abridge his most extensive influence and authority in *Pennsylvania*.

This *German* printer has been a useful member in the society, if no otherwise than in preserving the liberty of the subject, by communicating and

exposing the evil designs and oppressions of the Governors to the people, in the same manner as *Zenger*, before-mentioned, had done at *New York*, not many years before: a proof of public spirit which an *English* printer at *Philadelphia* had not the courage or zeal to give, with-held by government-connections, and influence; which too generally destroy patriotism, and hinder men from discharging those duties which they owe to their country.

The writer has expatiated so much on the danger and ruin which must attend keeping the Quakers in the assembly, that one would have imagined it was the greatest evil which could possibly befall *Pensylvania*: but it seems, after all, that this is not the greatest evil: there is a worse than it, attending those insidious practices, carried on by means of the said printer with the *Germans*. For these people, it seems, “ Instead of
“ being peaceable and industrious as before, now
“ finding themselves of such consequence, are
“ grown insolent, sullen, and turbulent, in some
“ counties threatening the lives of all who oppose their views.” Surely such sons of slaughter cannot be averse to arms!

“ They give out, that they are a majority, and
“ strong enough to make the country their own.” Surely then they will not let the *French* take it from them for want of defending it. “ They
“ have suffered the greatest oppressions under
“ Popish Princes in their native countries, where
“ they could enjoy neither liberty of conscience,
“ nor their riches with safety: surely then it cannot be all one to them which King gets the
“ country,” *George* or *Louis*: the Protestant or the
“ Romish monarch. And altho’ many of them
should

should be Papists, as this writer asserts, they like a Protestant and *English* government better than their own, or they would not have left it to go live in *Pensylvania*; and their *knowing the worst which can happen*, if a Popish Prince should get the dominion, is the greater security to us, that they will never suffer him to obtain it, if they can possibly keep him out. It seems a very great inconsistency, that they should leave *Germany* to avoid the tyranny of their natural princes, and yet willingly put themselves under the power of the *French*, who are more arbitrary still than the *German*.

Yet this writer represents matters, as if not only the *French* of *Canada* have turned their hopes upon this great body of Germans settled in *Pensylvania*, but even that these people favour their design: so that if the *French* do but send their Jesuitical emissaries among them, to persuade them over to the Popish religion, they will draw them from the *English* in multitudes, or perhaps lead them in a body against us."

Surely, a man who can so confidently assert so great an improbability, as if he certainly knew it would be the case, must be capable of asserting any absurdity, as well as falshood: for, is it possible that people who abandoned their own country, chiefly to avoid the tyranny of the Popish religion, should so easily be reconciled to it, and induced to embrace what they fled to avoid? should so suddenly change their opinions, as to believe Popery amiable, which till then they looked on as monstrously deformed? and should all at once embrace what before they so greatly abhorred? This is the more unlikely still, as he confesseth, p. 35. that "The most considerable and weigh-

“ ty sect among them is the *Menonists*, whose
 “ principles are much the same with those of the
 “ Quakers; that many of them are *Moravians*,
 “ and that there are many other sects springing
 “ up among the *Germans*.” Which facts are so
 many confutations of what he has advanced; since
 it is well known that the Protestant sectaries, the
 farther they divide, the farther they remove from
 Popery, as their aim is to approach nearer to the
 simplicity of primitive Christianity.

It is true, he says, that near one fourth of the
Germans are supposed to be Romanists; and that
 the *Moravians* are suspected to be a dangerous
 people, because they conceal their religion, and
 seem to hold some tenets and customs much a-kin
 to the Papists. But as these, if not downright fal-
 sities, are only conjectures and surmises of the wri-
 ter and his party, *as far as they have an opportu-
 nity of judging*, they must yield place to the cha-
 racter given of them by those who had *good oppor-
 tunities of judging*, and are better acquainted with
 them. From such we learn that the *Germans* in
Pensylvania are a people easily governed, without
 power, and no ways ambitious of authority: there
 are not above five or six in the whole province,
 who hold any place of either trust or profit; they
 dread the thoughts of an absolute government,
 and are sensible of the liberty and other blessings
 which they enjoy under an *English* constitution;
 they have such horrible ideas of Popery and arbi-
 trary power from woeful experience in their own
 countries, especially that of the *French King*, that
 to a man they would prefer death rather than sub-
 mit to live under it.

The natural hatred which the *Germans* have
 for the *French*, and irreconcilable enmity which
 subsists

subsists between them in *America*, will always be a means to deter, rather than encourage the *French* to attempt any encroachments in the neighbourhood of the *German* settlers. Most of them are *Lutherans* and *Calvinists*, the rest *Moravians* and *Menonists*, a religious people, inoffensive and fond of instruction; but far from being ignorant, as the letter-writer represents them. They have schools and meeting-houses in almost every township through the province, and have more magnificent churches and other places of worship in the city of *Philadelphia* itself, than those of all the other persuasions added together. They abound likewise with able ministers and teachers. Thus the most numerous part of the *Germans* are provided with teachers; and the writer of the letter, p. 31, acknowledges that the rest might be made good Protestants, and good fighting subjects, in case regular ministers and schoolmasters were sent among them to instruct them. He likewise, p. 41, allows that a considerable progress is made in a design of this nature, and a considerable sum collected for it.

If this be the case, how little grounds must he have for those dreadful apprehensions which he affects, of the *Germans* being carried away in multitudes by the Popish emissaries, supposing them to be so ignorant as he asserts? Are these Romish priests more assiduous and dextrous in their work of converting, than the Protestant ministers in that of instructing and watching their flocks? or, has Popery a more alluring and captivating aspect in *America* than it has in *Europe*?

In short, all his objections against the *Germans* are malicious, false and forced: the only one which seems to be against them, or rather against those
who

who allotted them their settlements, is, their having settled too many of them together, instead of intermixing them with the other inhabitants. This method would have prevented any apprehensions of their power, by dividing them; and might have habituated them insensibly both to the language and customs, if not the manners of the *English*: but this course with them, which in all likelihood would have had all the effects which he so ardently desires, the writer never once mentions, either because that might have reflected on his own party, who settled them in their present districts; or else, because he had nothing more in view than to propose the best means he could think on of gaining his point as things now stand, and getting the power out of the hands of the assembly, without any real regard to the welfare of the province, or the *English* interest in it. For, if the *Germans* are so turbulent, and talk already of seizing the province, or giving it up to the *French*, as he alledges, the method which he would have taken with them, by stripping them of their privileges for thirty years, and compelling them, as it were, to receive the *English* language and religion, will only serve to exasperate them, and spur them to put such designs in execution: which, if they are able to do at present by their numbers, they will at any time be able to accomplish; as it may be presumed their increase will be in proportion to that of the rest of the inhabitants of *Pensylvania*, and consequently, that they will always be the majority.

To the *Germans*, in a great measure, is to be ascribed the present flourishing condition of the province, owing to their industry in cultivating the lands, and the wealth which they brought with them

them into *Pensylvania*. But as he thinks the country is already over-stocked with them, he would have a stop put to the "importation of any more," "and the migration turned another way." But, if they be the ungovernable wretches he represents them to be, how will that remedy the evil? It may remove, but not cure it; and the other provinces will not thank him for his advice: but he cares not what evils they brought on other provinces, so they could be taken off from voting at elections for the Quakers.

The reason which the writer gives, in a note, p. 32, for turning the migration from them, is, because "If new hands are continually brought in, and the old families go back to other colonies, as he says they do at present, (when ever they begin to get a little money, and know something of our language) we shall never make *Englishmen* of them." But whose fault is it, that the old families go off, except theirs of the writer's own party? It is in reality owing to the oppression of the proprietor's officers, entrusted with his land affairs, especially the Secretary of a certain principal man, who makes others fly from their native country, though not for such flagrant crimes as a person well known to himself fled from his own. This instrument of oppression, and another, has been for many years the plague of the province, by engrossing and monopolizing every spot of valuable land, in order to sell again at an exorbitant price; of which numerous instances might be produced, some whereof were complained of here about three years ago, and a proper admonition given to a certain person to look better to the behaviour of his officers.

After

After uttering so many falsehoods, and injurious reflections against the Quakers and the *Germans*, which his malice could invent, the reader, we presume, can no more believe that he was sorry the task *fell to his lot*, as he pretends, p. 37, than that *truth and duty obliged him to take up the pen*. Yet he seems confident, that his representation of things will be taken for granted, and matters ordered by the Parliament according to his four instructions.

The first of them is “ to oblige all those who sit in the assembly to take the oaths of allegiance to his Majesty ; and perhaps a test or declaration that they will not refuse to defend their country against all his Majesty’s enemies.”

This article is calculated not only to exclude the Quakers wholly from the assembly, by obliging them to take an oath ; but also to compell them personally to take up arms against their consciences, which confirms what we before suggested on this occasion. This proposal is so flagrantly unjust and oppressive, that if the character of the writer was not known, it might be wondered how he could have the presumption to offer such an insult to the British legislature. Yet he has the farther assurance to say *that is the smallest test of fidelity which can be required from them* : Altho’ he knew that Mr. Penn founder of the colony in his last charter of 1683, enjoins “ all who serve the government in any capacity, solemnly to promise when required allegiance to the crown and fidelity to the proprietor and Governor.” This solemn affirmation is all which can be expected from Quakers, consistent with their religious principles ; and which not many

many years ago the British legislature established by law ; as judging it from the conduct of the people, as well as the nature of the thing itself, to be really in all respects equivalent to an oath ; as without doubt it is. Many indeed murmured against this act when in agitation, as if it was indulging the Quakers with a greater privilege than any other Protestants, even church men, enjoyed ; and cast a slur or reproach on all those who take oaths. To this it may be answered, that it is in the power of other Protestants to wipe off the slur or reproach if they think it one, and intitle themselves to the same privilege with Quakers, by only leaving off the use of profane cursing and swearing. Whenever any sect or body of them shall prove themselves duly qualified, there is no doubt but the parliament will on their application substitute the solemn affirmation instead of an oath, as well for them as they have done for the Quakers.

His second direction is, “ to suspend the right
 “ of voting for members of assembly from the
 “ *Germans*, till they have a sufficient knowledge
 “ of our language and constitution ; this provi-
 “ sion he says, is as reasonable as the other.”
 I grant it ; that is, it is not reasonable at all : for
 after what has been said on the occasion, it does
 not appear that there is any ground for depriving
 those people of their privileges, especially as the
 Quakers would be entirely excluded from the as-
 sembly by the first article. This shews he is still
 afraid his party would not be able to obtain their
 ends ; and that three fourths of the people must
 be deprived of either the privilege of sitting in
 the assembly, or voting, before he thinks they
 would have a chance for it : and even then it is a
 hundred

hundred to one but they would find themselves mistaken, and be obliged to get three fourths of the church men and dissenters deprived of *their* right of voting also, before his party could have the least hopes of gaining their point : for the generality of all the different persuasions are in the same way of thinking, and act on the same principles with those of the Quakers.

The three remaining articles relate to the instruction of the *Germans* ; and seem to be inserted rather for a gloss to his plan than any thing else, as they are in effect contained in the second. All that is new in them, relates to having all bonds, contracts, wills and other legal writings made in the *English* tongue ; and that no news papers, almanacks, or other periodical paper should be printed in a foreign language, at least, unless an *English* version be printed in the opposite column or page : which two cautions are certainly proper and necessary, excepting that the article which relates to wills, may require some mitigation.

Thus having gone thro' the writer's letter, article by article, it remains only to take notice of what he says in the two or three last paragraphs. In the first of them, p. 43, he says that " during the late war, they (he means those of his party) petitioned his Majesty, setting forth their difficulties and the defenceless state of the province, but received no relief ; owing, as they presumed, to the other weighty affairs, which then engrossed the attention of the ministry."

Now this is notoriously false, and a reflection on his Majesty as well as his ministers : for upon an application for that purpose, the *Otter* sloop of war, captain *Baladine* was sent out to their aid and defence. She arrived and was in the port of

Philadelphia

Philadelphia when the *Spanish* privateer before-mentioned was in the river *Delaware*. The assembly voted the captain a handsome present, upon his arrival, to buy stores, &c. which it can't be supposed the author is a stranger to, or could forget; unless he has done it willfully, for fear the conduct and behaviour, to the captain, of the Governor's party (the few who had the sole trade to the *French* and *Spanish West-Indies*;) should be exposed. Could the author forget that the captain of the man of war fell in with one of their vessels, in the bay of *Dellaware*, freighted from the *Spanish West-Indies*? that he seized her and sent her to *Virginia* to be condemned? and that those people arrested the captain on his arrival at *Philadelphia* from his cruize, for the damage they pretended to have received from such capture? or could he forget the proceedings which followed thereupon?

Thus, that his conduct may be of a piece thro' the whole, as he begins with a falshood, so he continues his rout and ends with a falshood. If there be any thing of truth in his letter, to be sure it must be in those places where he speaks in praise of the proprietors and the Governors, whom he takes his leave of by averring, "it may be said, with the greatest justice, that they have done every thing in their power to assist us (that is his party) and keep up to an English constitution;" that is, by endeavouring to destroy that of the Quakers. He concludes, "whatever be the consequence, all our misfortunes can be charged no where, but upon our people themselves;" the Governor's men: I agree with him, and I have shewn, continues he, that it would be plainly repugnant to their interest to remedy grievances."

I agree with him in this point also. How truth will slip out often unawares?---He adds in the last place, "all redress therefore must, if it comes, come from his Majesty and the British parliament." In this particular, the Quakers, both here and in *Pensylvania*, are of opinion with the letter writer; nor is there any thing which they more ardently wish, as hath been already observed, than that their gracious King would take them under his own protection.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

P. 5. l. 5. for 700 read 7000.

P. 19. l. 4. for wree read were.

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