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No. 66/10 CANADA'S ROLE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Speech by the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at Carleton University, Ottawa, March 11, 1966.

I should like to express my appreciation, Mr. Chairman, to you and to Carleton University for the invitation to conclude the lecture series on "The Communist States and the West" by speaking on "Canada's Role in East-West Relations".

Anyone who has followed this series of lectures will already have asked himself what is the significance for a country like Canada of the far-reaching changes in the nature of world politics which my predecessors on this platform have analyzed. So far have these changes gone, in fact, that it is even legitimate to ask whether there is still such a thing as "East-West Relations". Is there still a contest between two camps, each arrayed around one of the super-powers, with a mass of non-aligned nations looking on, sometimes on the sidelines, sometimes caught in the cross-fire?

A few years ago this was the world scene. The expression "East-West Relations" in practice covered everything of real importance in international affairs. That bipolarity has gone, and we find ourselves today in a much more complicated political and economic and military environment. In such a situation of relative fluidity, it is clear that the smaller powers, including Canada, have greater scope both for the pursuit of their own national interests, which are unique by definition, and for the exercise of constructive initiative in search of solutions to problems of concern to the world as a whole.

This scope I intend to explore tonight. In doing so, I shall argue that the growth of pluralism does not necessarily mean the dissolution of "East" and "West" as we have known them, but rather the adoption by the Soviet Union and the Communist states closest to it (China, with its friends is perhaps another matter) of a pattern of international relations similar to that of the rest of the world. This I believe is likely to be accompanied by the gradual abandonment in practice of world revolution as an instrument of the policy of Communist states. The end result of this tendency, if it is maintained, would not necessarily be the disappearance of rivalry between the Communist and non-Communist worlds but the removal of that rivalry from the sphere of ideology and related military moves to a more rational and stable plane.

It is on such a plane that Canada can best play a creative role. But how close are we to it? Clearly, we have not yet reached a point of stable international balance, let alone international harmony. Evolution in that direction has gone perhaps far enough to demand adaptation of our policies, but we must not confuse identification of a tendency with its fulfillment.

Let us examine the nature of that evolution as it affects the Communist world. It is essential to define one's own view of that evolution before suggesting the policy implications for Canada and other Western countries. As I have said, the monolithic unity of the Stalin era is obviously long gone. The Sino-Soviet rift seems irreparable, short of a profound change of policy amounting to a de facto surrender by one side or the other to the ascendancy of its rival. The rift has been a lever which certain East European Communist countries, notably Roumania, and some non-ruling Communist parties, have used to enlarge somewhat the area of their independence from Soviet control.

This independence is real, if as yet sharply limited. It extends to some national cultural expression, with modest affirmation on its distinctness, especially from that of Russia; to some economic autonomy, with assertion of limited national control over planning; to a degree of divergency over political issues within the Communist world; and to the development of intellectual and trade relations with the West.

But it is to be noted that this independence stops short of any significant departure from the general line of Communist policy toward the non-Communist world. The most that can be said is that, having smaller resources and fewer vested interests elsewhere in the world than the Soviet Union itself, the East European countries are able to reap many of the advantages of the strategy of peaceful coexistence in its positive aspects, while avoiding serious involvement in those aspects which entail risks of conflict with the West, and specifically the strategy of wars of national liberation.

This is by no means the same as saying that the political unity of the Soviet camp has been seriously undermined. Neither the East European leaders nor the Soviet Union are prepared to allow that. The East European leaders seek to enlist for themselves the same support the regimes in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia enjoy, through the same appeal to nationalist sentiment which those regimes can make. Originally imposed from outside by Soviet bayonets, they are trying within the limits of strict adherence to the basic tenets of Marxist ideology to legitimize themselves by identifying their regimes with national interests, as far as they can. Because of their economic insufficiencies the most pressing of these are economic. But there is no necessary correlation between economic reform and political reform domestically, nor between variety of economic system and variety of political approach to the outside world.

Clearly, therefore, polycentrism in the Warsaw Pact area has not destroyed the cohesiveness or the essential Communism of the regimes. This is not surprising. The appeal to national sentiment was never intended to achieve this result. On the contrary, by attempting to strengthen the

domestic position of the regimes its basic aim was to consolidate their existing alignment, and this because the ultimate endurance of those regimes depends upon the support of the Soviet Union. All the signs point to precisely this strengthening -- the substitution of an elastic and therefore resilient form of unity for a rigid and therefore brittle discipline. The Russians' own term "socialist commonwealth" may perhaps be taking on substance.

It is worth examining at this point the question of ideology and its importance in the Communist world. This is not purely an academic question but is close to the heart of most of the problems with which the rest of the world must cope in its dealings with the Communist countries. Ideology is a motive, an instrument and a justification of the policy of Communist governments, but it is not the only one. At various times it may be more or less flexible, and its flexibility, the extent to which it will be adapted or revised, will be determined by a whole series of other factors, ranging from the psychological to the political, economic and geographical circumstances in which a particular group of Communist leaders find themselves.

How does this relate to the external policy of Communist states? Among Communist states, the pluralism of which I have spoken is obvious evidence of the capacity of Communist ideology to adapt itself to changing circumstances. The acknowledgement that there is more than one road to socialism has been extracted from the Soviet leadership by difficult stages and, until recent years, only painfully. Yugoslavia in 1948 and, even more, Hungary in 1956, show just how painfully. The acknowledgement once made, however, its consequences have multiplied. The old conception of one universal truth good for all times and all places has had to be abandoned where it can neither be maintained nor even, as in most of Africa and Asia, imposed in the first place.

But this policy does not represent a non-ideological or anti-ideological departure as a result of some putative conflict between ideology and the national interest of the U.S.S.R. I shall not go except indirectly into the ideological justification for it. It is more instructive to look at the motivation, and the extent to which it may be adjudged ideological.

The West in general is well content if countries in Africa and Asia remain independent and non-aligned. After a few disastrous experiences, the U.S.S.R. has decided that nothing is to be gained by direct attempts at Communization. Its policy has evolved in at least three distinct phases during the post-Stalin era. In the first four or five years up to 1959 the major thrust was toward the exploitation of anti-colonialism by direct external support of the new governments, without much concern about their domestic policies, in the belief that aid would have a decisive effect on their policies.

Anti-Communist measures taken in 1958-59 both in the U.A.R. and in India were a clear demonstration that this would not work, and the sudden emergence of large numbers of independent African states in 1960-61 made it imperative to devise a new approach. This was that of the "national democracy", wherein the "most advanced section of the working class", i.e. the Communists, where they existed, should ally themselves and co-operate with the nationalist ruling party in order to press on with the revolution which had only begun with the achievement of political independence.

Unfortunately for this line, only one or two of those countries in which the nationalists displayed really radical militancy were equipped with Communist parties, and they showed no particular anxiety to accept the Communists, who, as in Algeria, had done little or nothing to contribute to the achievement of independence, as allies. The others were certainly not prepared to allow the formation of Communist parties which would tend to divide a national unity which was often hard-won. Accordingly, the policy changed again. The third phase, which emerged during 1963, after the outlawing of the Algerian Communist Party, was that of liquidationism - the decision that Communists should work from within to promote the economic revolution, put their countries on the "non-capitalist path", and eventually succeed to the leadership.

Here we have an evolution away from a situation in which the U.S.S.R. worked in a largely non-ideological fashion through the cultivation of direct contacts with Afro-Asian governments regardless of their internal policy. The present Soviet policy, although it was arrived at under the pressure of tactical necessity, is nevertheless based firmly on an ideological preconception -- that social evolution of a non-capitalist kind is bound to be toward the Communist pattern, that the logic of history, in short, will lead the countries of the third world one by one into the Communist camp.

I have dwelt on the ideological question because I wanted to bring out this point. Ideological presuppositions determine policy choices both in Communist countries and the West. The main difference is that our ideology - or ideologies - are a good deal less constricting in the choices they permit us to perceive, or to make when we do perceive them. Bound by their "scientific" world views, the Communists, whether Soviet or Chinese in orientation, are united in the view that non-alignment is an historical dead end. The U.S.S.R. holds that it is a way-station on the road from colonialism to Communism. The Chinese reject it out of hand as impossible. In practice this does not prevent them from welcoming the rejection of Western alignment which it entails, but they do so *faute de mieux*. The difference between the two is an aspect of their different approaches to the question of peaceful coexistence.

Any discussion of relations between the Communist states and the West hinges on the meaning of peaceful coexistence, as this series of lectures has amply demonstrated. The Soviet Union is fond of saying that its policy has always been one of peaceful coexistence, ever since the days of Lenin. I want now to explore what sort of relation the Soviet Union and its allies, now they can no longer be properly called satellites, believe themselves to be conducting with us.

In the first place, we can probably take Soviet assurances at face value -- in peaceful coexistence, war *between states* is to be avoided. Other forms of war, namely national-liberation war, are not and, in fact, form an integral part of the policy of peaceful coexistence. The reasoning behind this is that the power of the Soviet Union and its allies is now such as to deter any attack by the "imperialists" on them. The existence of this power, it is claimed, both encourages revolutionary forces elsewhere to struggle for their freedom and inhibits the deployment of the full strength of "imperialism" against them. The support of the Communist camp will ensure the success of that struggle and the magnetism of its economic success will draw the liberated peoples inevitably into the Communist orbit.

There is no reason to doubt that this is what the Soviet leaders expect to happen, indeed believe is happening. Their justification of the current form of the policy of peaceful coexistence against its critics, notably the Chinese, lays emphasis on its militant aspects, and the execution of the policy itself, paradoxically enough at present, requires a more militant approach marginally in order to buttress the central premise that the success of Communism in the long term can come about through peaceful means.

The strategy of national liberation war is an integral part of peaceful coexistence, as the Soviet Union sees it. The success claimed for it justifies the policy whereby the Soviet Union can benefit from the advantages of a peaceful relation (more or less close - as the years since 1960 have shown) with the West, while the cause of world revolution progresses more or less by its own momentum. The parallel with Stalin's policy, whereby the prime duty of all other Communists was to contribute to the defence and development of the U.S.S.R. comes readily to mind. There is no particular reason, however, to think that the U.S.S.R. has a consistent policy toward violent revolutionary outbreaks, or necessarily has a hand in them when they occur. This is a matter of tactics. Thus the support, measured though it is, which the Soviet Government has given to North Vietnam and the NLF of South Vietnam since the end of 1964 differs from the relative indifference shown by Khrushchov before his fall, and differs again from the apparent reluctance of the Soviet Union to encourage armed insurgency in Latin America. In each case, however, confidence in Communist victory eventually underlies the approach adopted. There is no disposition to exploit crises in areas where the U.S.S.R. might become directly and dangerously involved in the consequences, no inclination to force the pace in areas where Communist influence may be expected to grow without incurring the risks of a violent upheaval.

But, whatever tactics the Soviet Union may employ in a particular situation, its present leadership asserts that "coexistence is indivisible". This slogan, used in criticism of United States Vietnam policy, is put forward as a warning that the United States cannot expect good relations with the U.S.S.R. while it is carrying on a war with another Communist country. Its meaning in fact goes beyond that. What the slogan means is precisely what it says: coexistence is not an acceptable policy for the Soviet Union if "national liberation struggles", as it understands them, cannot be carried on.

It is reasonable to ask why the U.S.S.R. should want to tie itself to revolutionary movements in various parts of the world which it cannot always control and which might embroil it in conflicts with Western countries with which it is in its own best interests to cultivate normal relations.

The general line as at present pursued by the Soviet Union, however, does give priority to the direct exercise of state power in international relations over its indirect exercise through support and manipulation of national liberation struggles. Having greater power than China, the Soviet Union is less dependent on the exploitation of such struggles to promote its objectives than is China. The constructive and skilful exercise of diplomacy at Tashkent advanced the Soviet Union's cause in a manner which does it credit.

If this approach were to come to typify Soviet foreign policy we should have less to fear from its advancement. This is certainly the most striking example we have yet seen of the Soviet use of state power for peaceful purposes.

Another part of the answer is that official Soviet doctrine holds that as a corollary of the decisive strength of the Communist world in the present stage of international relations, the "imperialist" world has gone over to the counter-offensive. Seeing their power inexorably slipping away from them, the "imperialists" are said to be turning desperately to military means to retain it. It is in these terms that events in the Congo, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and sometimes Indonesia are accounted for. In these circumstances, the U.S.S.R. maintains that it has no choice, it is its 'sacred duty" to give moral and material assistance to "peoples fighting for freedom and independence". The mix of moral with material, as we have seen, varies nevertheless according to the overriding interests of the U.S.S.R.

Finally, and this is a point of very special interest, the U.S.S.R. and its allies are inhibited from acknowledging the primacy of their national interests as states over the world revolutionary role they have traditionally assumed. This inhibition goes very deep. In the words of Raymond Aron, the Soviet Union "does not wish to disavow the ideocratic nature of its stage, nor can it do so. It will not admit to being a state 'like any other state', with national interests, for this would undermine the foundations of the regime".

Here we are back at the question of the role of ideology in Soviet policy. From the very beginning, its first and major function has been legitimization; the Soviet regime rests its claim to the exclusive loyalty of its people fundamentally on its revolutionary mission, and this has been preached incessantly for nearly 50 years. Unable to maintain with any hope of success that Soviet society is yet the best of all possible societies in a material sense, it has relied ultimately on its claim to moral superiority, and this has meant its claim to be fighting for the oppressed of all the world. As the revolutionary era of the U.S.S.R. itself slips into the past and popular ardour cools, the regime seeks increasingly to keep the spirit alive by identification first with Cuba, then with Vietnam.

It may thus be argued that the continuance of the Soviet system in its traditional form depends upon the maintenance of at least the appearance of world revolutionary leadership. And appearance might be enough, were it not for the determination of the Chinese to expose what they consider the betrayal of the world revolutionary cause by the revisionism of the Soviet leaders. This challenge the Soviet Union finds intolerable, and this is the remaining reason, and some would argue the most compelling reason, why the U.S.S.R. at this time cannot consult only that national interest which seems to dictate an accommodation with the West but must continue, in deeds as well as words, to try to make good its claim to leadership of a world revolutionary movement.

Returning to the Soviet Union and its allies, then, it is evident that the pluralistic but still basically united "East" is faced with a set of apparently contradictory choices in foreign policy. On the one hand, the perpetuation of its own social and political system and the retention of control over the international Communist movement, a weapon which has always been considered essential to the eventual triumph of that system, as well as a

basic national interest of the U.S.S.R., seem to demand a continuing commitment to a strategy which entails a constant danger of collision with the West.

On the other hand, the overriding need to avoid such a collision, with its danger of nuclear catastrophe, the need to find a solution to the problems of nuclear proliferation, and the necessity to resist the Chinese challenge - all these seem to demand accommodation with the West, and, therefore, relinquishment of a revolutionary role.

The solution which is apparently being tried is interesting and could be both disturbing and encouraging from the Western point of view. I prefer on the whole to regard it as encouraging. This development, which is logical, and would scarcely be remarkable in the policy of another country, is the increasing differentiation shown by the Soviet Union in its policy toward Western countries. If the revolutionary imperative prevents an accommodation with the West in general, it does not prevent accommodations with certain Western states in particular, and some of the benefits of détente can be retained even at a time when the most important détente, that with the United States, is in suspense because of the revolutionary imperative.

It would be a mistake to treat this development purely as a device to enable the U.S.S.R. to make the best of both worlds. There are clearly other advantages the U.S.S.R. may hope to derive from such a policy -- most obviously, perhaps, to divide the Western alliance, "to take advantage", as the journal Kommunist puts it, "of the contradictions in the imperialist camp in the interests of the U.S.S.R. and socialism". It is in this respect that this Soviet policy may be thought disturbing. Being both more subtle and more realistic, and at the same time ostensibly no less antagonistic, it confronts us with a more complex problem of the best response. As I have said, however, I judge this evolution to be encouraging, not only because I do not believe the unity of the Western alliance will be subverted by it, and because I know we are capable of finding the appropriate response, but also for the simple reason that any increase of realism is a contribution to the long-term understandings we seek.

Let me be more specific about the differentiation of Soviet policy towards the West. The best known example is of course the manifest Soviet desire to cultivate the friendship of France. The Soviet Union is also cultivating friendly relations with the Scandinavian countries, Japan and Canada. The significance of these should not be exaggerated. They are thrown into greater relief by the relative coolness of the Soviet attitude toward the United States, Britain and West Germany. They are, nevertheless, illustrative of Soviet recognition not only of the political but of the economic necessity of keeping its lines open to the other industrial nations of the world. This is yet another imperative, one which has come into play with greater force as it has become clearer that the Soviet economy is desperately ill-equipped to meet the social demands of the second half of the twentieth century.

It takes two to conduct friendly relations, and what is Canada's position vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R.? If the main lines of Soviet policy are formulated by leaders having a world view basically inimical to our own, if peaceful coexistence is a device to immobilize the West while national liberation wars gradually consume the rest of the non-Communist world, would it be short-sighted for us to welcome the opportunity to establish relations on a sane and rational footing with the Communist world?

I have, I think, said enough about our judgment of the Soviet world view to demonstrate why we do not consider it immutable. Inimical to us it may be in its origins, but it is equally inimical to the real interests of those who hold it, and those interests are increasingly making themselves felt.

I am not so naive, of course, as to believe that the growth of contacts, and exchanges, rapid though it is, between East and West, will work any miracles. To quote Kommunist once again:

> "As an ardent supporter of useful business contacts with capitalist countries, Lenin invariably warned against forgetting the class approach to these relations. He pointed out that the capitalists would seek in every way to undermine our system, to corrupt our people and to instil capitalist habits in them. It is necessary to watch closely each step of the enemy and to employ all means of control, supervision and persuasion to paralyse bourgeois influence. Peaceful coexistence calls for the intensification of Party ideological work inside the country and decisive struggle against bourgeois ideology in the international arena."

I need not emphasize that these are not idle words and that Soviet officialdom governs contacts with the West accordingly. But this is not the whole story. Those (and they exist both here and in the U.S.S.R.) who believe the old days are gone forever, and nothing serious now stands in the way of eternal goodwill, may have overestimated the pace of change; but change there is.

Canada, like most other Western countries, has participated in these exchanges for a number of years, not only with the U.S.S.R. but with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other countries of Eastern Europe. Canada, as everybody but the people who eat it knows, has sold great quantities of wheat to these same countries. The volume of private tourism from Canada to the European Communist countries is rising rapidly, and they have ceased to be entirely remote and mysterious regions. Our inter-governmental relations are reasonably good, always allowing for the gulf between us on fundamental issues.

What, then, can we conclude from this about Canada's role in East-West relations? The examples I have given refer to Canada's own particular relations with the Soviet "East", an area with which we have common geographical and economic problems, and from which we have drawn a substantial part of our population. There is clearly ample room for co-operation with those countries, and there would be a great deal more which it would be in our national interest to develop if the political obstacles were overcome.

Purely from the Canadian point of view, therefore, and leaving aside the vital concern we share with all humanity in finding the stable world order essential to our survival (a point I scarcely need to labour), we have a definite interest not only in the absence of hostility but in genuine co-operation. Moreover, like every other country (and, despite the vaulting ambitions of some of our visionaries to see Canada take a prominent part in every international situation, we are subject to the same sort of imperatives as every other country), Canada acts in the world and is acted upon in two ways -- as itself alone, pursuing its own unique national interests, and as an ally, a neighbour or a member of one or another group.

Obviously, there is constant interplay, even tension, between these two aspects of our international being. In a pluralistic world there is far greater scope for interplay and sometimes greater occasion for conflict. This being so, can it reasonably be argued that our commitment to a common Western cause runs counter to our true national interest?

A few years ago, it was not uncommon for fairly well-disposed people of Soviet sympathies to describe Canada as the "Poland of the West", meaning, presumably, a country allied to an overwhelmingly powerful neighbour but showing encouraging signs of independence whenever it could. With all due respect to the Polish people, with whom it is an honour to be compared, I have never been able to accept the analogy. But it throws light on the point I am trying to make -- our own conception of our place as a nation committed to the NATO Alliance in defence of the West is different from that attributed to us by the Communist countries, and this difference has an observable effect on the sort of role we can play in relations with them.

That role is also profoundly affected by another observable fact - that, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, there is really only one non-Communist country in the world whose policy is of vital significance to it - the United States. I do not discount the importance the Soviet Union attaches to its relations with other countries - India, Japan, France are all objects of special Soviet attention at present - but in Soviet calculations the United States is the ultimate interlocutor. And who is to deny the realism of this view?

What it means is that, in the absence of understandings between the two super-powers, no stable solution is possible of the key questions of world affairs -- Germany and European security, disarmament, problems of under-development. It does not mean, however, that the only worthwhile dialogue is that between the super-powers. The Soviet Union does not believe so, evidently, as the differentiation it makes among Western states confirms. But it is logical to suppose, and experience bears this out, that a dialogue with a lesser state is more or less interesting to the Communist world to the extent that state may be, or may be thought to be, associated with a concentration of power greater than itself alone.

It is a matter of traditional wisdom that Canada's closeness in all senses to the United States has lent its views greater weight than they might always have received uttered in isolation. This is the positive aspect of our situation, on which I think it reasonable to lay greater stress at this juncture in East-West relations than on the negative aspect, that we owe our

security in an age of super-powers to our great neighbour. But let that fact not be forgotten. I speak of "security" not in the sense that there would be anywhere to hide in the event of a nuclear war but in the sense that the long-term prospects for a stable peace rest on the continued ability of the West to resist military pressure.

We have not worked our way out of the cold war, just as we did not survive the bitter confrontation of Stalin's day, by giving way to such pressure. And the West's ability to resist it is basically the ability of the United States. Having that power of resistance confers the freedom to seek constructive solutions: it has not been used by the West to exert such pressure in its turn. In Hungary in 1956, in Berlin in 1961, in Cuba in 1962, a response in kind to extreme provocation would at the least have paralysed the process of internal evolution in the Communist world for years, even if it had not led to the ultimate disaster.

It is this engagement of the Soviet Union with the United States which enhances our role in East-West relations. Clearly, close relations with the United States, symbolized in the security field by our active co-operation in NATO and NORAD, are essential if our views are to be taken into account in Washington -- which they are. Similarly, on the Soviet side we are of interest less for what we are, a nation of 20 million people, than as a neighbour of the United States, sensitive to the movement of American public opinion and disposing of some influence in Washington.

Those who argue that Canada would be able to play a more effective role internationally if we withdrew from NATO fail to meet two arguments. They cannot demonstrate that we should gain new influence. We could not hope to lead the non-aligned states, whose principal concerns are different from our own. And we should lose the close association with the United States and the other major members of NATO which is the source of much of our influence in the world, an influence which is greater than our population and economic power would alone support.

Our alliance confers on us both influence and the freedom to use it constructively. What are we to do with it? What we are doing is this -- we are addressing ourselves to the central problems of disarmament, and specifically at present nuclear proliferation, in preparation for the time when genuine progress can be made. We are equally working on more immediate issues such as the war in Vietnam which stands almost impenetrably across the road to profitable resumption of the Soviet-American dialogue.

For reasons of its own, the Soviet Union has not yet seen fit to work openly for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, but neither has it cut its lines to the West as a whole because of it. Indeed, the Soviet Union has specifically declared that the war in Vietnam should not be allowed to obstruct the disarmament negotiations at Geneva.

Nevertheless, the manner in which the Vietnam war is ended will do much to shape the form of East-West relations in the future. Meanwhile, as long as no Soviet-American dialogue on the war and its attendant problems is taking place, Canada, with contacts in Washington and Moscow, Saigon and Hanoi, has both the responsibility and the opportunity to help span the gap.

There are other matters which are not so immediate or difficult but which are still important. Such matters as peace keeping, another field in which we actively seek to associate East and West in our common interest, and in which the conception of national-liberation war makes understanding seem remote. They also include the bilateral exchanges and trade which we conduct with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in increasing volume.

The importance which exchanges are assuming may be judged, however, by the fact that this summer a Soviet parliamentary delegation, which is to come to Canada to return a visit of Canadian parliamentarians last year, will be led by Mr. Dmitri Polyansky, one of the First Deputy Chairmen of the Soviet Council of Ministers and a member of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Mr. Polyansky will be by far the most important Soviet guest to have come to Canada so far, and his visit will mark a milestone in Canadian-Soviet relations.

All such exchanges contribute to the same purpose of introducing elements of normality and stability into a world where rapid social change and the monstrous destructiveness of weapons produce too volatile an atmosphere for widely divergent views to be carried to their logical conclusions.

There is still an "East" and still a "West" and we are not yet done with polarization, but pluralism provides diplomacy with opportunities both to divert such dangerous logic and to narrow the divergencies. To quote Raymond Aron again in conclusion: "This world of growing complexity promises to be a paradise for the analysts and a hell for statesmen. In it the first can display their ingenuity and the second will discover the limits of their power".

I take no particular delight in analytical ingenuity. My interest lies rather in the broad implications of our assessments for government policy. In this field, my conclusion would be somewhat different from Mr. Aron's so far as Canada is concerned. We may find the limits of Canada's role expanded rather than diminished by the growing complexity of the world. In that possibility lies our hope for rational discussion, for constructive diplomacy and for a determined attempt to ensure world peace.

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