PRUSSIANISM
AND ITS DESTRUCTION

By **Norman Angell**

Author of "The Great Illusion"

An answer to the question:
"Shall this war end the militarism which provoked it?"

"It ought to mean, perhaps by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the chaos of competition, for groupings and alliances, and a precarious equipoise, the substitution for all these things of a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced by a common will."

Mr. ASQUITH.

TORONTO: McCLELLAND, GOODCHILD AND STEWART

PRUSSIANISM AND ITS DESTRUCTION

SOME OPINIONS OF

THE GREAT ILLUSION

By NORMAN ANGELL

"Among the masses of printed books, there are a few that may be counted as acts, not books. The 'Contrat Social' was indisputably one; and I venture to suggest to you that a book published in late years, 'The Great Illusion,' by Norman Angell, is another. . . . The thesis of Galileo was not more diametrically opposed to current ideas than that of Norman Angell. Yet it had in the end a certain measure of success. . . . It is impossible to resist the conviction that this young thinker has opened a new chapter for us in the history of our modern world."—VISCOUNT ESHER in a Lecture at the Sorbonne, Paris, March 27, 1914.

"M. Norman Angell a exprimé dans son livre si bien raisonné des pensées sur lesquelles on ne saurait assez refléchir."—M. ANATOLE FRANCE, *English Review.*

". . . Rank its author with Cobden, among the greatest of our pamphleteers, perhaps the greatest since Swift."—*The Nation.*

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"A wealth of closely reasoned argument which makes the book one of the most damaging indictments that have yet appeared of the principles governing the relations of civilized nations to one another."—*Quarterly Review.*

"No book has attracted wider attention or has done more to stimulate thought in the present century."—*Daily Mail.*

"An inquiry into the nature and history of the forces that have shaped and are shaping our social development that throws more light upon the meaning and the probable outcome of the so-called "war upon war" than all that has been written and published upon both sides put together. The incontrovertible service that Mr. Angell has rendered us in 'The Great Illusion' is to have introduced intellectual order into an emotional chaos."—*Life*, New York.

"It is an extraordinarily clearly written treatise upon an absorbingly interesting subject, and it is one which no thinking soldier should neglect to study."—*United Service Magazine.*

PRUSSIANISM AND ITS DESTRUCTION

WITH WHICH IS REPRINTED PART II. OF

"THE GREAT ILLUSION"

BY

NORMAN ANGELL

McCLELLAND, GOODCHILD AND STEWART
TORONTO

Printed in England

The complete edition of "THE GREAT ILLUSION: *A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage*," *is made up of three parts, as follows:*

PART I

THE ECONOMICS OF THE CASE

CHAPTER

I. Statement of the Economic Case for War.
II. The Axioms of Modern Statecraft.
III. The Great Illusion.
IV. The Impossibility of Confiscation.
V. Foreign Trade and Military Power.
VI. The Indemnity Futility.
VII. How Colonies are Owned.
VIII. The Fight for "The Place in the Sun."
IX. The Bearing of Recent History.

PART II

THE HUMAN NATURE AND MORALS OF THE CASE

(Reprinted in this Volume.)

PART III

THE PRACTICAL OUTCOME

CHAPTER

I. The Relation of Defence to Aggression.
II. Armament, but not alone Armament.
III. Is the Political Reformation possible?
IV. Methods.

Part II. is here reprinted. To it has been added an introduction, three new chapters, and an appendix (indicating the practical policy that arises from the principles discussed), making the volume self-contained, and showing its relevance to the problems of the present war.

The reprinted matter has been left exactly as it appeared in "The Great Illusion" previous to the war.

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INTRODUCTION

FOR reasons connected with the demands of propaganda, a separate issue, at one shilling, of Part II. of "The Great Illusion" had been arranged long before the present war. The outstanding reason of that decision was, briefly, that certain fortuitous circumstances having caused attention to be directed to the First Part, to the exclusion of that here reprinted, a very lop-sided view of the case presented by the book as a whole, had gained currency. This is not an unusual result: very few 400-page books other than fiction get read with any attention beyond the first 200 pages. It was hoped that a separate publication, beginning at the 150th page and published at a shilling (for a large part of the public does not value the discussion of ideas on such trifles as war and peace at higher than "a shilling a shot"), might insure some attention equivalent to that given to the first part.

All the reasons that rendered such publication desirable before the war have since been greatly strengthened.

In the execution of the original intention, this volume has become something more than a reprint. In order to make it self-contained, and to show its relevance to the problems of the present war, the first chapter of Part II. of "The Great Illusion," and a small portion of the second, have been replaced by three new chapters,

while an appendix, indicating the practical policy at the present juncture prompted by the principles here advocated, has been added. The reprinted matter comprised in the last five chapters (or rather from page 105, to be verbally precise) has been left exactly as it appeared in the *ante-bellum* editions of "The Great Illusion." Not a word has been altered, and portions will consequently now read somewhat curiously. The reader will appreciate the reasons that have prompted me to leave the matter in these chapters unchanged, just as it was written years ago.

Had I been writing those chapters now, there are certain details, but not many, that would have been modified. However the form of statement of the case for Civilism as against Militarism might have been varied, the outstanding conclusion and the general thesis by which it is supported remain absolutely unaffected—as valid as ever. The broad principles elaborated here are not one whit less true because estimates formed years since as to the manner of their working—given rather as illustrations than as forecasts—do not in a world-wide war correspond in every detail to the event. To have made any pretension that they would (and I, happily, made no such prediction) would have been to put the study of sociology on the plane, not of a science, but of astrology and crystal-gazing, to enter upon a field more fittingly left to Old Moore's Almanac. "The Great Illusion" was not a prophecy; it was, as its subtitle indicates, "a study of the relation of military power to national advantage." The result of that study was the conclusion that a war of conquest and subjugation waged by one European nation against another, however successful from the military point of view, must prove, in terms of the

moral and material welfare of the victorious nation as a whole, futile or disastrous. It was shown that ambitions like those embodied in Pan-Germanism could not, however successful, serve any real end in promoting the happiness, well-being, or dignity, of the people who sanctioned them and whose sacrifices made the achievement of them possible. That conclusion this present war is now tragically and pathetically confirming, however much the complex details of the military and political struggle may vary the process of the demonstration. Even from the point of view of the moral and material well-being of the German people, the victory of the Prussian arms would be a disaster.

These considerations are not emphasized by way of personal vindication. It matters very little, of course —especially in times like these—whether this or that author should have been misunderstood or misrepresented. It matters a very great deal (if we are really determined that the vast heroisms, the dreadful sacrifices, of our peoples shall not be altogether wasted) whether distortion and misrepresentation obscure certain facts which must form the very foundations of the resettlements and reconstructions which we shall tomorrow be called upon to make. Unless those settlements are to prove as unsound and treacherous as the old, certain fallacies which have in the past exercised a fatal hypnotism over the statecraft of Europe—not of Germany alone—must be corrected, and the essential truths more generally recognized.

For some reason, the bias of old prejudices, natural human rebelliousness to modifying even slightly a familiar point of view, seems to expose any and every statement of those truths (I suppose my own experience is that of most who have preceded me in this field of

endeavour) to gross distortion, a mindless derision, honest and dishonest misrepresentation, falsification, and sheer falsehood.

For many years I have been trying to call attention to the fact that the political philosophy to which the nations have given, and still give, their allegiance must, so far as it is adhered to, inevitably involve conflict between them; that the means by which they have attempted to insure peace (by each of two parties—nations or groups—trying to be stronger than the other) could have in the nature of things, if continued, only one outcome—war.*

This result has been produced, and is accepted as a demonstration that we who predicted it as the natural result of this system were wrong! Those who have argued insistently that armaments could never alone achieve peace are supposed to be entirely routed by the fact that the peace has been broken; while those who urged that peace was to be secured by everybody having as large armaments as possible are believed to be vindicated by the fact of war—the fact that peace has *not* been secured. Some of these latter critics, of course, urge that their advice has not been followed, and that if England had added, by compulsion or otherwise, half a million soldiers to her army ten years ago, peace would in some way have been kept. But can it seriously be argued to-day that Germany (if her intentions were all that we suppose them to be) would not have met that increase? Even if she had doubled her army during the last ten years, she would not have imposed upon her population a blood-tax much

* See, notably, concluding Chapters II. and IV. (Part III.) of "The Great Illusion," and Chapter V. "Foundations of International Policy."

greater than that which France has assumed. Would the prospect of the addition of half a million to the fifteen millions odd now confronting Germany in the field have seriously deflected her policy if the other factors had remained the same?

But it is not in the confusion of argument that the grossest form of distortion to which I have referred occurs. That is to be found in categoric statements made hundreds of times in the English Press, that the series of books of which this is one, preach the impossibility of war. There is not in those books a line which justifies such a statement. The whole burden of them is to prove that our policy of the past could if unchanged lead only to a disastrous and futile war. If we who tried so persistently to awaken opinion to the danger of the old statecraft had really believed war to be impossible, why in Heaven's name did we waste our efforts in preventing what in any case could not take place?* And yet fairly intelligent and well-educated people, serious reviews, newspapers by the hundred, have been guilty of this silly rubbish, of describing such literature as the book of which this is a part as an attempt to prove the impossibility of war.

Very nearly the same measure of distortion is involved in the oft-repeated statement that "The Great Illusion" was based on the assumption that men only went to war to make money, and that it discussed the problem of war as a matter of so much per cent. on money invested.

* So far as this distortion has any origin other than the mere indolent refusal to examine unfamiliar conceptions, it arises from our refusal to admit the inevitability of war. Because we have argued that war is the outcome of eradicable folly, and can be prevented (by correcting the errors and defects which give rise to it), we are supposed to have argued that it cannot take place.

The last five chapters here constitute a large part of the book so criticized, and the reader may judge for himself how far that criticism is just. Whatever the motive that lay behind these gibes, the effect of them is to obscure a truth without the recognition of which it will be impossible to approach the problem of international relations, to establish an international society with any hope of permanent and stable success. That truth is that the desire of the nations for the welfare of their people, in the largest sense of the term, must be taken into consideration in dealing with the problem of their relationships. It is simply untrue (as the reader can readily prove for himself), it is in fact the exact contrary of the truth, to say that this study ignores the rôle of the moral factor in the larger sense of the term—national ideals, good and bad, passion, pride. But without food, "wealth," in its simpler form at least, there can be no human life or society or morals. "Economics" must therefore have their part in the problems of war, as in all problems of human society, but more particularly because it has been an age-long delusion of men that in some way war was bound up with "the struggle for life." Anyone even pretending to deal with this problem had to meet that point fairly, to show in what manner this assumed inevitability of struggle between societies for sustenance was a misconception. It was the nature of such misconceptions that "The Great Illusion" tried to make plain, and in the opinion, apparently, of even its bitterest critics did make plain; it tried to show that war cannot promote the struggle of peoples for life and its sustenance. Some at least of the selfsame critics, who had themselves for years been attempting to prove that the motive behind the German challenge was the desire for colonies, wealth,

trade, national prosperity, were among those who met the argument that war could not achieve these things, by declaring such argument too sordid to have any bearing upon so spiritual a thing as war.

To some small extent I have dealt with this particular phase of the problem—the relation of the desire for material well-being to moral and ideal motives—in the first chapter of this volume. I think it is worth the reader's attention, not because there is necessarily any particular importance in doing intellectual justice to an individual author, but because it forms a necessary and integral part of the whole problem of Prussianism—the name, by the way, which in the very earliest of my writings I gave to that group of ideas: the kind of ambitions and attitude of mind* which have been responsible for the aggression of the German State, and will inevitably in the future prompt like aggression by other States, unless such philosophy is radically discredited among the peoples concerned.

What that doctrine is we know. It is the belief that the things of greatest value in life, the ends for which we form our human societies, are best promoted by adding to the political and military power of the State; by making it dominant over others, by extending its rule and by expanding its territories.

It is this doctrine which I have christened "the Great Illusion." I have urged that military power cannot achieve any of those objects for which civilized States are founded, those objects which we in the Western world regard as the essential realities of daily life; that the military subjugation of others can add

* See Chapter VI. herewith, which was published some four years before the war, and "The Foundations of International Polity" (pp. xlv, xlviii).

neither to the happiness nor the dignity nor the moral and material well-being of men and women; that the whole theory upon which rest the supposed advantages of conquest or enlargement of territory, in the way of trade, need for expansion and the like, is based upon grave misconceptions of fact. I have urged further that the attempt to impose a national ideal by force of arms is as futile and as wicked as was the attempt in an earlier age to impose a religious ideal or form of faith by the same means; and that just as in the case of the religious wars peace did not come by one party—Catholic or Protestant—imposing its will upon the other, but by both agreeing to exclude military force from religious differences, so in the rivalry of political ideals there can be no real peace until there is a general recognition that military force should not be used to promote them.

Parenthetically, it is indicative of how little we thrash out this problem that, when we speak of military force, we use the term indifferently to indicate two forms of its employment which have diametrically opposed results. If our thought were as clear in these matters as it ought to be and might be, we should all realize that the proposition, that "Military force is religiously, socially, and economically futile," does not condemn a war of defence, or resistance to religious oppression, since such a war is not the imposition of military force upon others; it is the cancellation of such force, the attempt to see that military force is not imposed upon us. It is not defence which creates war or threatens nationality, for if there were no aggression there would be no need for defence, and nationality or religious faith would be safe. At the bottom of the whole problem lies the belief in the advantage, moral or material, of power over others.

The case so outlined does not rest upon elaborate theorems connected with abstruse points in economics or international trade, but upon the obvious facts of the life around us, as that the people of the great State—one might take as a type Russia—are not better in any way than the people of the small State (Switzerland, Holland, Norway, for instance); while the proposition that in the last resort civilization must rest upon something other than force is demonstrated every time the Conservative party, say, surrender the government in favour of their political enemies, the Liberals, although they (the Conservatives) know that force in the shape of the army may be on their side and against their political opponents; and is daily demonstrated by the fact that the army—which is the physical force of the country—does not in Britain appropriate rule to itself, as it would in certain other countries like Mexico or Venezuela. British liberties are secure, not because of the greater relative strength of its army or its physical force to its population, but because a political oath or convention can here be depended upon, and in Venezuela it cannot. And if within the frontier we have relative freedom and security, it is because there is no ethic or ideal which is placed above adherence to the social oath or compact, above truth and justice. Whereas in the international field there is an ideal which is placed above those things: all in some degree believe that patriotism should be so placed. "My country, right or wrong," is, wherever our formal allegiance may be given, the accepted morality of patriotism. As General Mercier, in defending the army of France against an accusation of injustice, so truly said, "What has justice to do with patriotism?"

The first chapter of this volume contains an attempt

to show how completely we have been won to the view that this war, and the transformation of the German people from a beneficent moral force in Europe to a very evil one, is all the work of an idea, of a false philosophy advocated by a few professors and writers. And yet while we are seriously attributing this miraculous power to false ideas, we also apparently assume that similar false ideas will never operate in similar fashion in Russia, Japan, France, or Servia, or in any of the other territories held by our present allies. Such is the belief into which we have managed to talk ourselves, although but yesterday our policy was based on the assumption that the aims of Russia and of France were as aggressive as are the aims inculcated by the German professors.

Let us be honest, at least with ourselves. We know perfectly well that this doctrine, the superlative importance of political and military power, is not German, or even European. It is world-wide. In all powerful nations it lurks, avowed or unavowed, in some degree. Each nation, while giving lip service to the ideals of peace, desires to be more powerful than the rest, to be in a position to impose its will upon its neighbours, convinced that such power is of the very highest value, and that conquest, if it can be rendered secure, will not only add to its prosperity, to its opportunities for trade and "expansion," but also to its dignity. Each holds, in spite of the denunciation of such an ideal in others, the belief that it is a worthy ideal to make the State militarily, politically and territorially great, to have it overtop others. All do to some extent believe that national ideals can and should be promoted not alone by the moral and intellectual forces contained in them, but

by the political and military power of the nation that nurses them.

It is very greatly to be feared that many of us are sincerely and honestly mistaking a very natural detestation of Prussians and their works for a detestation of this doctrine. If we are to approach this problem with any hope, we must in its approach shun self-deception and insincerity as the devil that will destroy us. If this doctrine is the real enemy, as we proclaim, we must know something of him, what gives him vitality, what moral forces stand behind him.

If what is said be really true—if the military struggle of peoples is merely one form of the struggle for life in the world, and if an expanding people have to fight by arms for their place on the earth—why, then we have an insoluble problem at the conference of nations that will mark the end of this war. But if it is not true, if it is based on a misunderstanding and a misconception, then how can we hope to vindicate the right doctrine, and to frame our future European society upon the right principles, unless we clearly realize in what the misconception consists, how and why that doctrine is false? Unless we are intellectually equipped to fight this enemy—the wrong idea—he will overcome us. At present we are nursing the dangerous illusion that all that is needed is to destroy the German State. But we may do that, we may send the Kaiser to St. Helena, we may execute every Prussian General whom we can prove guilty of barbarity in this war, we may partition Germany and Austria between the Allies, and if our task ends there the problem of Prussianism will remain almost as great a problem as though this war had never been fought. There will be the material fact of the existence in Central Europe of a hundred

millions of Germans, bred and trained in the ideas of Prussianism, with all sorts of opportunities, as demonstrated by their past history, and in the mutability of European alliances, for some military renaissance in the not very distant future. Moreover, behind that material fact will remain a still more obstinate, a much more important one—namely, that this evil doctrine will still exist to animate, not merely those hundred millions of men of German speech and tradition, but also two hundred millions of Slavs, with their territories touching the confines of Asia, influencing the conduct of some hundreds of millions in that continent. If this idea has seduced the great German nation from what we know it once was morally and intellectually to what we now believe it to be, what assurance have we that it may not exercise the same fatal seduction over those Slav millions whose minds are still malleable and unformed, with less deeply-rooted intellectual and literary traditions behind them, open to those influences which seem to have so fatal a fascination for primitive peoples? Is there no warning at all in the fact that Nietzsche was not a German, but a Slav; that his great pupil in the philosophy of history, to whom more than to any other man we ascribe the fatal turn in our generation of German policy, Treitschke, was also a Slav?

Very many will genuinely feel that this is not the time for any consideration save that of the triumph of our arms. The belief in the vital need for that I share as intensely as any could. But is there the faintest, the most fractional, danger of our forgetting that for a moment? Is not the desire for victory, the determination to achieve it, the one thing which always most readily animates any people, and in all history always has done so? But is there the same doggedness, the

same interest and persistence, in this other thing, the determination to avoid the errors and defects which have marked the relations of nations in the past? Have not all peoples as a quite simple fact throughout history remembered the first thing and forgotten the second? That is my justification for urging what we most readily forget, and leaving others to urge what there is not the slightest danger of our forgetting. "This is not the time." Perhaps. It never is: before the peace it is too early; after the peace it is too late. The real danger is that almost automatically the old ideas will after the war once more assert their sway. If that takes place, all our dreams of a more civilized society will have come to nought. We must not forget that we shall be the predominant political factor in Europe on the morrow of the war. And the direction that things will take will depend mainly upon the kind and force of the influence that we bring to bear. And that in its turn will depend upon the kind and force of the public opinion which stands behind the Government.

The danger that public opinion will not rise to its opportunity is very real. Despite the fact that we are all now agreed that this war and the transformation of the German people is the work of a false idea, and attribute, consequently, this stupendous power to the force of an idea, it is very doubtful whether, once the war is over, and the visibly tragic and theatrical side of it is finished with, we shall be interested in ideas at all, true or false. In all human probability we shall return to our daily occupations indifferent to the bad system and the evil fallacies which have wrought so much disaster in the past.

We shall be looking for some one scheme or plan, some paper Constitution that the diplomats will arrange

for us, and so solve the problem once for all, relieving us of all bother. But the prevention of future wars will not be the work of a paper scheme for the mechanical rearrangement of European administration and the redrawing of the European map; it will not be the work of a Conference sitting for three weeks or three months: it will be the result of policies to be shaped during the next ten or fifteen years by the general ideas obtaining in Europe. I have attempted in the appendix to this volume to show briefly, and very roughly and generally, in what manner the principles here enunciated might be applied to existing conditions. It would be possible, of course, to expand these general indications into a detailed and imposing paper scheme for the governance of the world: a model constitution for the United States of Europe. Such a paper scheme would, of course, be worth just nothing. However cunningly devised, it would be doomed to failure so long as current political conceptions give rise to conflicting ambitions, mutual fears, evil hate and passions. That is why this book deals mainly with those false conceptions. So long as we hold them they will render us as incapable as the Prussians themselves of so dealing with other peoples as to create and maintain a society of nations.

Particularly must we, because it is our privilege to lead Europe in political conceptions, approach the problem of relations between nations with real understanding and a sane temper. Then we may hope for better things. Not otherwise.

PRUSSIANISM AND ITS DESTRUCTION

CHAPTER I

THE DOCTRINE WE ARE FIGHTING

The importance of "theories"—This war by universal consent due to false theories—The German nation transformed by them—What is the theory that has caused the war?—How the ideals of a people may be changed—What do the Germans hope to achieve by their victory?—For what purpose are States maintained?—What is the ultimate test of good politics?—What does military and political power achieve for the ultimate realities of life?—"The Great Illusion"—The moral, intellectual, and economic foundations of Prussianism—Materialistic roots of militarism—No refuge save in the better mind of man.

"ALL fine-spun theories, all sentimental aspirations and vague generalities, the whole collection of shibboleths treasured by the idealists and the dreamers, are shattered by the first whiff of grapeshot," wrote a popular journalist some years ago. "The idealogues and doctrinaires," he went on, "do not seem capable of realizing the difference between the world of theory and the world of fact—the material world in which we live: that all the argument in the world won't penetrate an inch of armour-plate, and that a syllogism is no answer to a Dreadnought." It is the "practical" view always, one would have thought, that is beloved of the British

people: the importance of "facts"—Dreadnoughts, beefsteaks, machine-guns, and a balance at the bank—as opposed to the "theories," ideals, desires, aspirations, of the idealogues and the doctrinaires. These things cannot change human nature or the "hard" facts of the world; they can be no concern of men of affairs or those responsible for practical policy—above all, should such logomachies of the study be no concern of statesmen and men of action, since it is their business to deal with "things as they are."

Such is the attitude, as of course you are aware, if you have followed the discussion of the issues of war and peace or of the more fundamental problems of international relationship, that has invariably been adopted by all those who desire to retain their reputation for practicality and common-sense.

And now to-day we have not only become convinced, but are saying loudly and insistently, that, so far from theories, doctrines, professors, and philosophers, being of no account, the war in which we are engaged, the greatest in so many respects that has marked our history, or any history, has but one basic and fundamental cause: theories, aspirations, dreams, desires—the false theories of professors, the false ideals of idealogues.

For we in Britain are practically agreed that this war is the result of a false national doctrine, which is in its turn the work of half a dozen professors and a few writers and theorists—Nietzsche, Treitschke, and their school. Not only have their false ideas and ideals produced the greatest war of history, but they have accomplished a miracle still more startling: they have radically transformed the nature and character of a

nation of some seventy million souls. For very rightly we attribute the evil influence of the German to an idea and a tradition, and not to the inherent wickedness of the race. The Germans are, of all the peoples of Europe, the most nearly allied to ourselves in race and blood; in all the simple and homely things our very language is the same. Every time that we speak of house and love, father and mother, son and daughter, God and man, work and bread, we attest to common origins in the deepest and realest things that affect us. Our religious history is allied; our political ties have in the past been many. Our Royal Family is largely of German origin. No, if we say that German wickedness is inherent in the race, and not in doctrine, we condemn ourselves. If we are to see straight in this matter at all, we must, in judging Germans, remember what they *were* and what they have *become*. That is not easy.

The public memory is notoriously a short-lived one. If twenty years ago the average Briton had been asked what people in Europe were most like himself, in moral outlook, in their attitude to the things which really matter—family life, social morality, the relations of the sexes, and the respective importance which we ascribe to the various moral qualities—he would have said that that nation was Germany. The notion that we were more naturally allied in our character to the French would have appeared twenty years ago, to ninety-nine Britons out of a hundred, almost offensive. Until yesterday, for nearly three hundred years, among educated men in Europe, German idealism had been recognized as the outstanding moral force in Europe. From the days of the Reformation until military

ambitions and necessities changed it all, her great work has been in things of the mind. Voltaire embodied this common judgment of educated men in Europe two hundred years ago, when he said that "France ruled the land, England the sea, and Germany the clouds." And even now, in the passion and heat of war, there are Britons who cannot be accused of pro-Germanism who recognize this in the fullest degree. One of them has said quite recently:

"The world's debt to Germany for thought and knowledge is inestimable. . . . Germany was a land of dreams. Her peoples from the earliest times had been children of romance, and they became, not only pioneers of thought, but the unequalled masters of certain forms of imaginative art. Of that the mere names of their composers and poets—Grimm and Humperdinck, Schubert and Schumann, Schiller, Heine, Weber, Brahms—are sufficient testimony. Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Wagner—no other people has had such genius in the world of blended thought and emotion out of which music springs; and no other people has shown so constantly the power of laborious craftsmanship which musical creation demands. Goethe, who represented in his single work all three of the great movements of German mind—in science, in thought, and in romance—was typical of German capacity, and in his attitude to the world a typical German of his time. . . . The ideal of that Germany was art and culture, not patriotism. Its vital forces were turned to the production, not of political efficiency or military leadership, but of Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,' Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, and Goethe's 'Faust.' This was the Germany on which the figure of the genial professor, familiar to caricature, was founded. To it the world owes, and has always paid, a steady tribute of affection and gratitude."*

* "The Round Table," September, 1914. See also Chap. vi.

Here, then, are a people so closely allied to ourselves in race that their children in the hotels of France and Italy are mistaken for British children ; a people with whom we have for a thousand years maintained practically unbroken peace, from whom we have drawn our rulers, and with whom our Royal Family remains to-day closely associated, who have been so often our allies in the past, and to whom we have given unstinted admiration and respect—to-day become, thanks to the metamorphosis of a false doctrine and idea, unspeakable savages and barbarians quite unworthy to be regarded as belonging to the family of civilization, surpassing Huns in barbarity, Turks in wickedness. This miracle of transformation, the work of a few professors, has been accomplished within a period of half a century or less.

And the very practical British people who give this verdict were until yesterday declaring that ideas, theories, and doctrines, are of no account or import in the world; that, indeed, they are not "facts" at all, and that that term must be reserved only for such things as battleships and howitzers.

I hope the reader will not suppose that I am overstating a case in order to support a contention which happens to be the burden of everything that I have written upon this subject—namely, that war and peace, like all good and bad things in human relationship, like all problems of the good or bad use which we make of the raw materials of nature, depend upon the justice or the fallacy of the ideas of men ; that the final solution of this problem will come in the reform and clarification of ideas, and by no other way whatsoever.

The fact that a false theory, the fermentation of

wrong ideas, has wrought this incredible miracle, the production of the vastest war in human history, and the transformation of a nation from a very good to a very bad force in human society, is one upon which practically all Englishmen now writing on this subject are agreed.

Mr. H. G. Wells, for instance, puts the matter as follows:

"All the realities of this war are things of the mind. This is a conflict of cultures, and nothing else in the world. All the world-wide pain and weariness, fear and anxieties, the bloodshed and destruction, the innumerable torn bodies of men and horses, the stench of putrefaction, the misery of hundreds of millions of human beings, the waste of mankind, are but the material consequences of a false philosophy and foolish thinking. We fight not to destroy a nation, but a nest of evil ideas.

"We fight because a whole nation has become obsessed by pride, by the cant of cynicism and the vanity of violence, by the evil suggestion of such third-rate writers as Gobineau and Stewart Chamberlain, that they were a people of peculiar excellence destined to dominate the earth. . . .

"On the back of it all, spurring it on, are the idea-mongers, the base-spirited writing men, pretentious little professors in frock coats, scribbling colonels. They are the idea. They pointed the way, and whispered 'Go!' They ride the world now to catastrophe. It is as if God in a moment of wild humour had lent His whirlwinds for an outing to half a dozen fleas.

"And the real task before mankind is quite beyond the business of the fighting line, the simple, awful business of discrediting and discouraging these stupidities, by battleship, artillery, rifle, and the blood and courage of seven million men. The real task of mankind is to get better sense into the heads of these Germans, and therewith and thereby into

the heads of humanity generally, and to end not simply a war, but the idea of war. What printing and writing and talking have done, printing and writing and talking can undo. Let no man be fooled by bulk and matter. Rifles do but kill men, and fresh men are born to follow them. Our business is to kill ideas. The ultimate purpose of this war is propaganda—the destruction of certain beliefs, and the creation of others. It is to this propaganda that reasonable men must address themselves."*

Substantially the same view is expressed again and again in the leading articles of our great dailies. I take typical passages from the leaders of the *Times*, as follows:

"Peace cannot come till the theories of the Prussian Junkers and of the German military party, the theories of which men like Von Treitschke and Bernhardi are the frank exponents, the theories which are summed up in the principle that 'Might is the highest right,' have been universally renounced."†

"The spokesmen of the nation realize to the full that this, in Mr. Asquith's words, is a 'spiritual conflict.' We have not entered on this war for material gain or for military glory. We have gone into it, and we will fight it out, to defeat the monstrous code of international immorality which a certain school of German professors and German soldiers have long been teaching, and which the German Government have adopted to the horror of mankind."‡

"The Allies will go to Berlin to settle accounts, and not to lay waste the Fatherland. They have to say to the German people: 'This worship of war must cease, and the sword you have forged must be broken.' . . . Not until the capital is reached will the sword be struck from Germany's hands, and not until they see the conquerors in their midst will the

* *Nation*, August 29, 1914. † August 10, 1914.
‡ September 5, 1914.

Germans turn from Treitschke and Nietzsche to Luther and Goethe once more."*

An eminent journalist puts the case thus:

"As this great tragedy proceeds, it becomes increasingly clear that the issue that is being fought at this moment in the trenches of the Aisne is not this or that national gain or loss, but the spiritual governance of the world. Someone—I think it was Sir Robertson Nicoll—has expressed it in the phrase 'Corsica or Calvary.' I think that is more true than picturesque phrases ordinarily are, for the cause for which the Allies fight is more vast than any material motive that inspires them. They are the instruments of something greater than themselves.

"If the phrase is unjust, it is unjust to Corsica, for behind the militarism of Napoleon there was a certain human and even democratic fervour; but behind the gospel of the Kaiser there is nothing but the death of the free human spirit. . . . If he were to triumph, the world would have plunged back into barbarism. . . . We are fighting not against a nation so much as against an evil spirit who has taken possession of that nation, and we must destroy that spirit if Europe is to be habitable to us. . . . But at the moment we have one thing to do—to hang together until we have beaten the common enemy of humanity. When that is done, we shall remember the cause for which we stand. We shall break the Prussian idol for ever. . . . We stand for the spirit of light against the spirit of darkness."†

Mr. Thomas Hardy also gives testimony to the immense influence of a little group of professors:

"What a disastrous blight upon the glory and nobility of that great nation has been wrought by the writings of Nietzsche, with his followers! I should think there is no

* September 15, 1914.

† "A. G. G." in *Daily News*, September 26, 1914.

instance since history began of a country being so demoralized by a single writer."

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle writes in substantially identical terms, and concludes:

"Where, now, is that 'deep, patient Germany' of which Carlyle wrote? Was ever a nation's soul so perverted, so fallen from grace!"

Now, a doctrine that can accomplish this double miracle—so transform a great and civilizing nation as to make it a danger to mankind, and render it necessary for civilized Europe to put some fifteen millions of its soldiers into the field in order to fight it—is obviously worth a little study. We are very particularly concerned to know, now that we are engaged in destroying it, what will be necessary for its destruction, what will be the chances of its revival, what measures are likely to be successful in keeping it under—all these are practical problems which will concern us to-morrow, and we cannot pretend even to deal with our spiritual enemy unless we know something of the facts—for doctrines and ideas, false and true, are as much facts as shrapnel or dynamite, and far more difficult to deal with.

What, therefore, is the nature of the Prussian doctrine that has wrought all this havoc? Why, in fact, did Germany go to war? The need of an increasing population for territorial expansion? That motive—which I shall deal with presently—may have played its part; I think it has. The German, like most of the other men of Europe, may have a general impression that conquest will somehow enrich him; that he will be better off as the subject of a great empire than as the subject of a small one—which is much like saying that the people

of London are richer and better off than the people of Manchester or Leeds; or that a Russian is of course richer than a Hollander or Swiss. But as it is one of the beliefs universally accepted in Europe, he may share it.

But we are all agreed that the material motive alone does not explain German aggression. Germany, we believe, desires to make herself the master of Europe, and so of the world, and to impose her culture thereon, not necessarily, presumably, because Germans will be benefited thereby, but as a matter of national pride. It is an Ideal, sedulously cultivated by the new teachers who have won Germans from their old intellectual allegiance.*

The British public, indeed, are by this time fairly familiar with the cruder manifestations of this new Ideal owing to the immense circulation (in Britain) of such books as Bernhardi's "Germany and the Next War." According to the school which Bernhardi represents, triumph by arms is a thing desirable in itself; as, indeed, is war, which is "God's test of the nations." (The whole philosophy, by the way, as expounded by Germans, as distinct from the Polish exponents like Nietzsche and Treitschke is permeated by intense piety.) War, says Bernhardi, is the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power; it is

* The change of sentiment and ideal to which the writers I have cited one and all testify is the more remarkable because the older Germany (the Germany that influenced Europe intellectually and morally) had the nationalist spirit very feebly developed. Kant, for instance, with his "Dissertations on World Peace," was an internationalist and a cosmopolitan before the French had given names to those things; Goethe was so little nationalist or patriotic that he tells us that he could not bring himself to care particularly even about Napoleon's overrunning of the German States.

not so much a painful necessity as a splendid duty. It has already been for Germany a means to national union, and must now be a means of securing for the German spirit and German ideas that fitting recognition "which has hitherto been withheld from them." For, continues Bernhardi, a nation must dominate others, or be dominated by others; there is no other alternative. There is in all virile and worthy nations the "Will to Power," of which Nietzsche has sung, and which Treitschke, Stewart Chamberlain and other like non-German writers, and their followers, have applied to definite politics. Such a "Will to Power," such desire to dominate others, involves in the nation animated by it the belief, not merely that its own civilization is the best for itself, but that it is the best for all others; and that if war be needed to impose it, why, that justifies war, which is a great selective process, the weeder-out of the feeble, a school of discipline, a moral tonic. These philosophers declare that the motives prompting war are inherent in human nature, and that the amiable sentimentalists who would substitute for it peace and arbitration lack the virile human outlook, and are attempting to set at nought a great natural law. War is the struggle for life among nations corresponding to the struggle which goes on in all other spheres of sentient nature.

The philosophy need hardly be defined, indeed; it existed long before Nietzsche, and has been voiced by militarist exponents in every country that ever gained a military victory.

Behind it there lie very definite biological and economic fallacies: the idea that nations are con-

demned to struggle as rival units against one another for a fixed and limited quantity of sustenance and opportunity; that a people's relative advantage in such a fight depends upon the military or political power which it can exercise over others; that to be prosperous and to feed its population a nation must be great and expanding; that it acquires wealth by conquest of territory; and all the subsidiary illusions which are bound up with those fallacies. The latter of the series are dealt with in the first part of the book, of which this is the second part; and the former—the biological and sociological illusions—are dealt with in the pages that follow.

But the "Will to Power" philosophy goes a little deeper than the false arguments which buttress it. It is a crude expression of the idea that it is "inherent in human nature" for men to wish to see their nation more powerful than others, the ideals it represents triumphant over other ideals, its influence imposed on the world; that such a clash of nationalities is inevitable, because, in spiritual things, there must take place the same conflict as goes on in the struggle for physical life.

Well, there is the same confusion here as once made religious faith in Europe, not a matter of truth and feeling for the eternal verities, but a matter of opposing cavalry and artillery, and the cleverness of one general at deceiving and outwitting another in a trade where "all is fair." In the wars of religion the spiritual conflict was replaced by a very material one, a conflict dragged down from the higher plane whereon it might have purified men to a plane whereon it certainly debased them. For hundreds of years men

were sure that they had to fight out their religious differences by war, and that it was necessary to protect and promote their religious ideas by that means. The Protestants of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were as certain that Catholic power had to be destroyed by arms as Englishmen of the twentieth century that Prussianism must be destroyed by the same means. And, indeed, so long as Catholic and Protestant alike based their position upon military force, so long as both believed that their only security was in dominating the other by that force, collision was, of course, inevitable. This conflict, the determination of each group to impose its military domination on the other, was also certainly "inherent in human nature." Yet the day came when one group ceased to attach any very great value to the military domination of the other, because it came to be realized that the religious and moral value of such domination was nil, and that the military conflict was irrelevant to religious or moral realities; that the religious possessions of all were rendered more secure by ceasing to fight for them. If we are sufficiently wise, a like transformation will take place in the domain of the ideals of nationality. You had men in the religious struggles not concerned with religious dogma at all, but only with the military glory of their particular religious group, with the simple desire to have their side win as against the other side. And you have a corresponding motive in war as between nations: millions animated by a determination to achieve victory, and to give their lives for it, for the simple end of victory. In the Nietzschean and other "Will to Power" philosophies you will find plenty of this glorification of victory for itself, irrespective of any

moral or material aim whatsoever. It may be true, in fact, urge these defenders of war, that we could not impose our national ideals by war, that we cannot destroy our enemy's ideals by destroying his armies, that his language and literature and intellectual and moral influence in the world will still go on, and our military glory will be irrelevant to that conflict; but we shall have beaten him and vindicated our nation's military superiority.

And that we are told is the final poser, that you cannot get over this human desire to beat the other man.

It is one of the curiosities of the general attitude towards the less tangible but none the less real things, like ideals and aspirations, that they are regarded as unchangeable and immutable; not in any way the result of contact of mind with mind, born of literature and the intellectual activities of men, but as something which argument and discussion can in no way affect. Now, I submit that, far from argument and discussion not affecting ideals like those which I have indicated, they are the direct outcome of such intellectual activity, as I think the whole spectacle of the moral and intellectual transformation of Germany, and the still profounder change in Europe as a whole which has come over the relationship of rival religious groups, conclusively show. The desire of the Huguenots to impose their military and political power upon Catholics, and Catholics upon Huguenots, was marked by a hatred so intense that incidents like the massacre of St. Bartholomew, where tens of thousands of men, women, and children were murdered in cold blood, were the natural outcome. A Catholic would not sit at table

with a Huguenot "because of the special odour that attached to heretics." Yet as the result of an intellectual fermentation that went on through a period of theological discussion, not merely did Catholics and Huguenots cease massacring one another; something much more remarkable occurred: they ceased wanting to do so, and the odour of the heretic disappeared.

It is quite true that the question, "What does the power to dominate other men, to conquer them, achieve?" will be answered by millions in Europe, to the effect that it achieves nothing but itself; that is all it is intended to achieve. But the fact of wanting such a thing for itself depends upon our relative estimate of moral values—whether, for instance, we regard sheer physical domination of another as a worthy thing—as a fit aim for the nation that we desire to have respected—and that depends upon precisely this intellectual fermentation, the discussion and comparison of values to which I have referred.

That brings us to this: that you cannot deal with this problem of Prussianism, the moral attributes it connotes, and of the military conflicts which it provokes, without asking the question, "For what purpose does the State exist? What sort of life do we desire that it shall assure to its people?" "A life of war and struggle and victory," says the Nietzschean (and some Christians). "If it contains that, little else matters." Well, that might conceivably be the aim which a society should set before itself as the objective of its collective action—the common and final test of policy and conduct—but for this fact, that it cannot be common or universal. Men will always be able to form themselves into groups. Victory, domination,

mastery, cannot be for all. It is an ideal which presupposes victims, and no one will freely choose to be the victim. It is only for half the world—the top half—and as in war the decision as to which comes out on top is often a matter of accident—decided sometimes by such things as the sudden illness of a general, a fog or rain-storm, giving the advantage of a decisive battle to the side that would not otherwise have had it—no one who desires to be the master of his fate and to direct his conduct, will place himself knowingly in a position where he becomes the helpless puppet of physical accident and chance. Since Nietzscheanism involves surrender to blind physical forces, it defeats itself. Its inevitable end is the slavery of all—of the mind of all—to dead matter.

What, then, must be the ultimate test of the true aim of the State? There are rival conceptions of "good," of what men should strive for. Even religion does not furnish a common ultimate test—no common denominator—for the modern State has no common religious faith.

And yet both politics and religion have slowly been evolving a common test, and it is important to this discussion to note the direction of that development.

Early religious ideals have little to do with moral or social ends; their emotion is little concerned with the sanctification of human relations. The early Christian thought it meritorious to live a sterile life at the top of a pillar, eaten by vermin, just as the Hindoo saint to-day thinks it meritorious to live an equally sterile life upon a bed of spikes. But as the early Christian ideal progressed, sacrifices having no end connected with the betterment of mankind lost their appeal. Our

admiration now goes but faintly to the recluse, while the Christian saint who would allow the nails of his fingers to grow through the palms of his clasped hands would excite, not our admiration, but our revolt.

Something similar is taking place in politics. The first ideals are concerned simply with personal allegiance to some dynastic chief, a feudal lord, or a monarch; the well-being of a community hardly enters into the matter at all. Later, the chief must embody in his person that well-being, or he does not obtain the allegiance of a community of any enlightenment; later, the well-being of the community becomes the end in itself, without being embodied in the person of an hereditary chief, so that the people realize that their efforts, instead of being directed to the protection of the personal interests of some chief, are, as a matter of fact, directed to the protection of their own interests, and their altruism has become self-interest, since self-sacrifice of a community for the sake of the community is a contradiction in terms. More and more is a given religious code subject to this test: does it make for the improvement of society? If not, it stands condemned. Political ideals will inevitably follow a like development, and will be more and more subjected to a like test.

Now I well know the derision to which that test can be subjected: that it is a wide and question-begging term, since "well-being, improvement of society," can be variously interpreted; that so far as it is definite at all, it is material and sordid, and belongs to the order of "pig philosophy."*

* I happened once in Paris to be present at an informal discussion between some French priests touching the question of divorce,

And to that I would reply: the widest instincts of Christendom condemn that derision as ill-founded; the commonest sense of Christendom in our age gives a quite definite meaning to this term, knows full well what it implies—quite well enough for the practical purposes of politics—and has decided that the end it represents is neither sordid nor materialistic; the narrowing of the gulf which is supposed to separate ideal and material aims does not necessarily degrade religious emotion, and does sanctify the common labour and endeavours, the everyday things of life. It is suggestive that the Founder of Christianity in the invocation which has become the universal prayer of Christendom has embodied in it a plea for daily bread. That plea is not a sordid one because, without food, there can be no human life, and consequently no human emotion and morality or society. The ultimate realities of life, whether they be moral or material, are in part "economic" realities. And that is why "The Great Illusion" was in part an economic study (and why, in order to make this volume, which deals with the moral

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and the most suggestive thing about the whole, I thought, was their tendency to justify this or that line taken by the Church by one test—that it made, or it did not make, for the disintegration of society. And wherever the dogmatic sanction was introduced, I believe it was introduced as an afterthought. On another occasion a man of religious instincts resented what he regarded as a slighting reference of mine to St. Simon Stylites. He thought to reprove me by pointing out that these lives of austerity were a protest against a condition of society which amounted to social putrefaction. In other words, he justified them by attempting to show that they had a social end—that they made for the betterment of mankind in the widest terms. This line of argument pursued by such a person indicates that the Western man is simply incapable of any other conception.

half of the whole, self-contained, I want to give a hint of the economic principles involved). "For the economic interests of a people mean, not merely food and clothing and habitable houses, the means of decency and cleanliness and good health, but books, education, and some leisure, freedom from care and the cramping terror of destitution, from the effects of the deadly miasma of the slum. The material thing is but the expression of still profounder realities which cannot be separated therefrom, because with leisure and a wider outlook come a finer affection—the laughter of children, the grace of women, some assurance that maternity shall be a joy instead of a burden—the keener feeling for life. Bread is not merely the pulverized seed of a plant, it is the bloom on a child's cheek, it is life; for it is human food—that is to say, a part of what human life represents. And to save for mothers their children, and for men their wives; to prolong human life, to enlarge and dignify it, are aims not to be dismissed as an appeal to the pocket. And yet too often they are so dismissed."

The idealist of war may see in economics, in "the science of the daily bread," nothing but a sordid struggle for "profit." But that will certainly not indicate imaginativeness, nor is it an attitude that will make for the elevation of the common lives of men. To make of the activities to which the immense mass of mankind for the most of their lives are condemned something mean and sordid is to degrade the quality of ordinary life and of ordinary men. One cannot inspire those things by making ideals something apart from them, from the workaday world, something that one puts on for special occasions, like a Sunday

coat, and leaves behind for six days of the week. It can only be accomplished by the quite contrary process of giving to the week-day task something of inspiration and sanctity.

The great mass of the western world to-day knows full well that by "well-being" they imply a condition in which life is not only rendered possible, but expansive and inspiring, the things for which men, as a quite simple matter of fact, do devote their lives and work. The enlargement and security of those ultimate realities I have taken as the test by which our politics shall be judged.

The sub-title of "The Great Illusion," of which the chapters that follow are part, is indicated as "a study of the relation of military power to national advantage," and I have defined "advantage" as "national well-being in the widest sense of the term," as including such things as the fact of belonging by contact and association to people of one's own racial group, speech, and outlook; all that makes for happiness and dignity: health, sufficiency, cleanliness, leisure, laughter, contact of mind with mind, satisfaction of physical, intellectual, and emotional hunger and thirst, affection, the play of childhood, grace, courtesy, beauty, love—those things which, by the common consent of Christendom and the Western World, give value to human life.

Does victory, the political power of one State over other States, promote these things? So long as much doubt remains in our minds on that question, war will go on. We must realize at least that that is the ultimate test.

And this test, moreover, unlike the ideal of the Nietzschean, who extols war and force as beautiful and desir-

able in themselves, more beautiful and desirable than affection and laughter, and all the other components of happiness which I have indicated, is capable of universal application: all can accept all its implications, whereas no one will willingly choose defeat and slavery; and yet Nietzscheanism necessarily involves defeat and slavery for some. It involves victims on one side and those who profit by the victims on the other; but the ends which I have indicated are best achieved by the partnership of men, and in a sound partnership there are no victims.

We have at last, then, our least common denominator, a basic moral sanction common to all Western society, now that, whether we like it or not, such common sanction can no longer be found in religious dogma or in any universally accepted authoritative code. Here is the final test, the only one capable of universal application.

Now, this war is a struggle for political power and domination. We believe it is the outcome of an attempt on the part of Germany to dominate Europe. Germans believe it is an attempt of the Slav to do so. In any case, political power is the objective, and the question which "The Great Illusion" asks is this: "What can such political power, even when achieved by the victor, do for the betterment of his people?" And it has answered that question by saying that it does and can do nothing whatsoever for those things upon which we are agreed as the ultimate realities of life, the ends for which the State in the Western World is supposed to be created. As applied to this present war the question asked is this: "If you, Frank or Teuton, Slav or Briton, could secure this mastery of

Europe, how would it profit your people or add any mortal thing, moral or material, of value to your lives?" Again, the answer which the book gives is that it would profit them not at all morally or materially; that military and political power is economically, socially, spiritually futile.

Let us examine the thing a little more closely and in detail.

To take first the moral and ideal as distinct from the narrowly economic problem, accepting for the moment the conventional distinction.

Suppose that Germany had been able to carry out her intention and to bring Europe under her sway, conquer India, and force Britain to give up her Colonies, would any German have been the better morally, using that word in the largest sense? Would those German workmen and peasants and teachers gain anything whatsoever in the moral realities of life? Would they have been more truthful, better fathers and husbands, jollier, more sincere? Would the relationship they maintain together be finer? Would life have been emotionally keener? Would the children have shown greater affection? Would the love of the women have been deeper?—because the German State happened to have conquered unwilling provinces? Is it the people of the great States—Russia for instance—that display the moral qualities to a greater degree than the people of the little States, of Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Holland? Are these "little people" poorer in the spiritual realities of existence than the people of the great States, the Austrians, Germans, and the rest? Is life in a Russian village happier and spiritually fuller than life in a Dutch or Scandinavian

or Swiss village? What *is* the moral gain that comes of the power to dominate others by the sword?

There is no moral gain. It is an illusion. This political domination over other men is in terms of the deepest realities of human feeling an empty and futile thing, which adds neither to the dignity nor happiness of those who exercise it, and has in it an infinity of moral danger from which no people in history has yet escaped, nor can in the nature of things escape. It carries with it a fatal contradiction and stultification: it implies that a people who desire to be just to all men, to do as they would be done by, are asking others to accept a situation which they themselves would rather die than accept. We all believe it our duty to give our lives rather than be subject to the rule of foreigners, of aliens, yet this philosophy of conquest and imperialism demands that others shall accept the rule of aliens. That which we believe would be a moral degradation for ourselves we try to enforce upon other millions of our fellows; it is an arrangement which makes, as someone has said, of the top-dog a bully, and of the bottom dog a cur. It would divide the world into master and slave, and the world should be neither master nor slave; it is the negation of human dignity, and its moral foundations are unsound. It does not stand the first test which should be given to any principle of human relationship—namely, that it can be made of general application. We cannot all be conquerors; we can all be partners. This philosophy is poisoned at its roots, and there never yet was a people who permanently resisted the effect of such poison.

We say, therefore, that, on its moral side, this

Prussianism, this desire for domination, is an empty, futile, and evil thing, and when accomplished can achieve nothing of worth. We have not said that the desire does not exist. It does exist, just as did the desire among religious men a century or two ago to dominate by military means the men of other creeds; and it was that desire which brought about the wars of religion. But we have urged that this desire is in itself a human idea, due to the light in which we see certain things, and can be changed like all ideas by seeing those things in a different light, more clearly. And just as that fierce thirst for mastery in terms of force, for the military control of men of other faith, which kept Europe ablaze for a century or two, disappeared in large part with the correction of the intellectual and moral defect that caused it, as the result of certain definite intellectual and moral efforts of certain definite individual men, so in like manner can the senseless craving for political domination disappear.

So much for the ideal impulses that inspire Prussianism, but what of the economic and material side? If, as the Prussians say, war is also a struggle for bread, why, cessation of that struggle is for an expanding nation equivalent to slow starvation; and war will go on unless, of course, we can ask a nation to commit suicide. I cannot conceive of any morality which should demand that.

The economic case for military domination in the circumstances of a State like Germany have been well put by an English writer as follows:

"Germany *must* expand. Every year an extra million babies are crying out for more room, and, as the expansion of Germany by peaceful means seems impossible, Germany

can only provide for those babies at the cost of potential foes, and France is one of them.

"A vanquished France might give Germany all she wants. The immense colonial possessions of France present a tantalizing and provoking temptation to German cupidity, which, it cannot be too often repeated, is not mere envious greed, but stern necessity. The same struggle for life and space which more than a thousand years ago drove one Teutonic wave after another across the Rhine and the Alps is now once more a great compelling force. Colonies fit to receive the German surplus population are the greatest need of Germany. This aspect of the case may be all very sad and very wicked, but it is true. . . . Herein lies the temptation and the danger. Herein, too, lies the ceaseless and ruinous struggle of armaments, and herein for France lies the dire necessity of linking her foreign policy with that of powerful allies."*

The author by the way adds: "So it is impossible to accept the theory of Mr. Norman Angell." And, as a matter of fact, if this author's statement of the case is correct, my theory is absolutely and completely wrong. I will hazard, however, the guess that the writer of the article in question has not the faintest notion of how that theory is supported; his form of statement implies that it has burked the series of facts to which he refers; whereas, of course, it has, on its economic side, been stated in terms of them. This view concerning the necessity of Germany's expansion as a sheer matter of finding bread for her increasing population is the generally accepted view of the necessities of national expansion: she needs the wheat and food of Canada, or of some other colony, wherewith to feed her children.

* *National Review* September, 1913.

The illusion, the confusion of facts underlying this conception, can be indicated in a line or two. Is it not quite obvious that Germany can in normal times have the food of Canada now for paying for it, and that even if she conquered Canada, she would still have to pay for it? That the fact of political conquest would make no difference to the problem of subsistence one way or another? I can briefly indicate a process, which I have sketched in very considerable detail in Part I. of "The Great Illusion," by reproducing the following passage:

"In the days of the sailing ship, and the lumbering waggon dragging slowly over all but impassable roads, for one country to derive any considerable profit from another, it had practically to administer it politically. But the compound steam-engine, the railway, the telegraph, have profoundly modified the elements of the whole problem. In the modern world political dominion is playing a more and more effaced rôle as a factor in commerce; the non-political factors have in practice made it all but inoperative. It is the case with every modern nation actually, that the outside territories which it exploits most successfully are precisely those of which it does not 'own' a foot. Even with the most characteristically colonial of all—Great Britain—the greater part of her overseas trade is done with countries which she makes no attempt to 'own,' control, coerce, or dominate, and incidentally she has ceased to do any of those things with her colonies.

"Millions of Germans in Prussia and Westphalia derive profit or make their living out of countries to which their political dominion in no way extends. The modern German exploits South America by remaining at home. Where, forsaking this principle, he attempts to work through political power, he approaches futility. German colonies are colonies *pour vire*. The Government has to bribe Germans to go to them: her trade with them is microscopic; and if the twenty

millions who have been added to Germany's population since the war had to depend on their country's political conquest, they would have had to starve. What feeds them are countries which Germany has never 'owned,' and never hopes to 'own': Brazil, Argentina, the United States, India, Australia, Canada, Russia, France, and Britian. (Germany, which never spent a mark on its political conquest, to-day draws more tribute from South America than does Spain, which has poured out mountains of treasure and oceans of blood in its conquest.) These are Germany's real colonies."

In the part from which this extract is taken I have dealt in detail with questions which partially affect this generalization—the question of hostile tariffs, of preferential treatment in Colonies for the Motherland, and so forth. For the full treatment of those I must refer the reader thereto. But I would like to give a hint of the nature of the fallacy involved in the idea of the necessary economic conflict of States by reminding the reader of certain processes that have operated in human society:

When the men of Wessex were fighting with the men of Sussex, far more frequently and bitterly than to-day the men of Germany fight with those of France, or, either, with those of Russia, the separate States which formed this island were struggling with one another for sustenance, just as the tribes which inhabited the North American Continent at the time of our arrival there were struggling with one another for the game and hunting grounds. It was in both cases ultimately a "struggle for bread." At that time, when this island was composed of several separate States, that struggled thus with one another for land and food, it supported with great difficulty anything between one and two million inhabitants, just as the vast spaces now occupied by the United States supported about a hundred thousand, often

subject to famine, frequently suffering great shortage of food, furnishing just the barest existence of the simplest kind. To-day, although this island supports anything from twenty to forty times, and North America something like a thousand times, as large a population in much greater comfort, with no period of famine, with the whole population living much more largely and deriving much more from the soil than did the men of the Heptarchy, or the Red Indians, the "struggle for bread" does not now take the form of struggle between groups of the population.

This simple illustration is at least proof of this, that the struggle for material things does not involve any necessary struggle between the separate groups or States; for those material things are given in infinitely greater abundance when the States cease to struggle. Whatever, therefore, was the origin of those conflicts, that origin was not any inevitable conflict in the exploitation of the earth. If those conflicts were concerned with material things at all, they arose from a mistake about the best means of obtaining them, of exploiting the earth, and ceased when those concerned realized the mistake.

For the moral and material futility of war will never of itself stop war—it obviously has not stopped it. Only the recognition of that futility will stop it. Men's conduct is determined not necessarily by a right conclusion from the fact, but what it believes to be the right conclusion. "Not the facts, but men's opinions about the facts, is what matters," as someone has remarked. If the propositions I have quoted are true, war will go on; also, it will go on if men believe them to be true. As long as Europe is dominated by the old beliefs, those beliefs will have virtually the same effect in politics as though they were intrinsically sound.

That is the fundamental problem of all: Can men be brought to see their best interest and be guided by wisdom and reason? That is the ultimate question. Very rarely does either party to our discussion realize what that question involves; nor how essential it is that for any useful discussion we should realize its implications and relation to the whole problem.

Before dealing analytically with the moral and practical implications of this doctrine I want to recall once more two orders of historical fact that bear on it. One is that complete change of *feeling* that has followed upon a change of *opinion*. I have already touched upon the fact that it was impossible for the Catholics in the fifteenth century to sit at table with a heretic, "because of the odour which he carried." The odour at all events has disappeared in consequence of certain theological works appealing purely to reason. And the second one is the change of opinion in such a matter as witchcraft. Montaigne declared men would never lose this belief. "If," he argued, "educated judges trained in the laws of evidence can send old women to their deaths for changing themselves into snakes, how can we expect that the average uneducated person will rise above these errors?" Yet to-day a child would not be taken in by them, and is able without special learning to judge rightly where the "expert" of the past judged wrongly.

That shows this: that the essential truths of life are self-evident, if they are not overlaid by false theories. In the witchcraft days the interpretation of the common phenomena of life was in the judge's mind overlaid by false theories of devils and goblins. Destroy such theories, and the truth is self-evident to a child.

Our conception of foreign politics—of international relations—is in the witchcraft stage; it is overlaid with untrue analogies, false pictures of States as units and persons, that create artificial national animosities, abstractions that have no relation to fact. Destroy these things, and the real facts of human and international relationship will emerge as easily as does the truth about the witch story to a schoolboy. It is not a matter of expert knowledge upon abtruse points in economics and international trade; it is a matter of seeing the simple visible facts of life (*e.g.*, as that the people of a "great" and conquering State are no better off morally or materially than those of the little Powers) straight instead of crooked.

This, then, is the fundamental question: "Can the wisdom of men as a whole be so far strengthened as not merely to enable them to realize abstractedly the fallacy of war and devise means of avoiding it, but to use those means and be guided by this wisdom, and not by their passions and impatience?"

That man's fighting instincts are ineradicable, that he does not act by "reason," and cannot be guided by "logic," that wars are the result of forces beyond the control of the makers of theories, is a position which the average believer in orthodox political doctrine regards as so impregnable that the great majority hardly esteem it worth while to defend any other. So far, indeed, his instinct is correct. Not merely is the question I have indicated "the first and last," concerned with the whole philosophical foundations of our faith and attitude to life and politics, not merely is it the question which must be answered if we are to make any progress in this discussion at all, not merely do

many points of detail arise out of misconceptions concerning the problem it presents, but it represents practically, as well as philosophically, the most important phase of the whole problem. Now, suppose it were true that man does not act from reason, from an intelligent realization of his interest, but from temper, passion, his fighting instinct, blindly. What would be the conclusion to be drawn from it? The conclusion, say the militarists, is that you should give him as many destructive arms as possible, so that his capacity for damage while in his condition of blind rage should be as great as possible.

Is that the right conclusion? Or is not rather the right conclusion that, if man is really that kind of animal, it is the duty of all of us to keep destructive weapons out of the hands of such an irresponsible creature, and to use such lucid intervals as he may have to persuade him to drop them?

There are some militarist writers who seem to imagine that they can evade the consequences of their own conclusion by pleading, not that all parties should be highly armed, but only that we should be so armed ourselves. But, obviously, since every nation is free to adopt the same philosophy, the result is the same as if no qualification of the conclusion had been made.

So much for the bearing of the fundamental question upon the problems of armaments. Another conclusion drawn by militarist philosophers from their answer to this question gives still more startling results when subjected to a similar test. They say in effect: "Human reason," "logic," has not the slightest effect upon war. Man acts from forces which he cannot control. He is the plaything of fate. This is the note

of nearly all militarist literature. Professor Cramb (who is the best and most sympathetic interpreter of Bernhardi and Treitschke in English) says:

"The forces which determine the actions of empires and great nations . . . lie beyond the wishes or intentions of the individuals composing those nations. They may be even contrary to those wishes and intentions. . . . It may be questioned whether in the twentieth century any plebiscite would be in favour of war. . . . In the history of nations there is fate, an inexorable nexus of things . . . more akin to Nature and the elements than to the motives of human action."

The works of the American author, Homer Lea, more popular in England than in America, sound this note from beginning to end:

"National entities, in their birth, activities, and death, are controlled by the same laws that govern all life—plant, animal, or national—the law of struggle, the law of survival. These laws are universal as regards life and time, unalterable in causation and consummation. . . . Plans to thwart them, to shortcut them, to circumvent, to cozen, to deny, to scorn and violate them, is folly such as man's conceit alone makes possible."

Again, suppose that this were absolutely and completely true, what is the conclusion to be drawn?

Well, it is evident that if it were absolutely and completely true, all learning, all accumulated knowledge, all books and churches, codes, Ten Commandments, laws, would have no effect on human affairs, and that in so far as their practical work is concerned, they might just as well be swept away.

As a matter of fact, among great masses of men—in a great part of the Eastern World—that pure fatalism is

predominant. "Kismet, it is the will of Allah." It is an attitude of mind associated either as a cause or an effect—for the moment it doesn't matter much which—with the crudest forms of Oriental stagnation; it marks those who, at least as far as this world is concerned, have no hope. It is, indeed, a statement of the proposition that it does not matter how man uses his mind or moral effort, since impulses and forces that are stronger than his own volition will determine his conduct, despite any moral or intellectual effort of his own.

Now, this has only to be pointed out to be evident. It is certain, therefore, that the proposition in the crude form in which I have couched it—although that form is exactly that in which it is most generally made—cannot be absolutely and completely true.

It then becomes plain that the militarist has not asked himself in any clear and fresh and real way what his own proposition means, what even the immediate and necessary consequence must be. Otherwise he would not have enunciated it. To say that man is always in danger of losing his head, and of acting in opposition to his own best interests, is not an argument for furnishing him with the instruments of destruction. To say that reasoning and the effort to know the truth do not affect human conduct is to condemn all those activities which distinguish man from the beast.

Presumably, the militarist who had taken into account the consequence of his proposition as to the futility of human reason and the helplessness of man would put a qualified case, somewhat in these terms:

"War is the last resort in a collision of two rights. That is to say, two parties believe that each has right on his own side, and will not yield to the other. When this is the case,

and when the questions involved are fundamental enough, there is no outcome but force, and we can accept that fact because victory will in the long run go to the party which has the greater earnestness, the greater spiritual passion, the greater cohesion, and so forth. Man's instinct and intuition are in all crises a surer and better guide than ratiocination, argumentation. The profounder truths, which we know to be true, but which we are quite incapable of defending rationally, are those things which we perceive intuitively. As a matter of simple fact, again and again in history, you have two parties, both of whom are pushed by all their instincts and intuition to settle their differences by resort to the sword. And the outcome has been as true and as just as any that could have been devised by a court or lawyers or arbitrators, judging by dry law and the argumentation of legal advocates."*

Now, however, this statement of the case for war may disguise it, it is, nevertheless, a plea for the superiority of physical force or of chance to the force of the mind. It is either the statement in less crude terms of Napoleon's dictum, "That providence is on the side of the biggest battalions," or it is the philosophy which stood behind the trial by ordeal, a claim for matter as against reason, for muscle as against brains, for the dead weight of material things as against the spiritual,

* Thus Mr. Harold Wyatt, in an article which has had the honour of being twice printed in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, writes: "In the crash of conflict, in the horrors of battle-fields piled with the dead, the dying, and the wounded, a vast ethical intention has still prevailed. Not necessarily in any given case, but absolutely certainly in the majority of cases, the triumph of the victor has been the triumph of the nobler soul of man. . . . In that great majority of instances which determines general result, the issue of war has made for the ethical advantage of mankind. It must have been so; it could not be otherwise, because ethical quality has tended always to produce military efficiency.

the intellectual recognition of right and wrong. It is the abdication of the mind, of conscience. One may find among the reasons urged by old defenders of "trial by ordeal" pleas far more eloquent from this point of view, and about as compelling as any of those made in our day on behalf of warfare. The old lawyer urged with great sincerity that God would not permit the arm of the innocent man to be scalded when boiling oil or boiling water was poured over it or when it was plunged into a caldron. Still less would God permit, when accused and accuser met upon the field, that the innocent should be slain and the guilty should escape. But to-day, if you deny the justice of this argument in the case of the individual, why should we suppose that it would be any truer in the case of nations? We have recognized that a mere conflict of physical strength in the case of individuals does not establish the rights or wrongs of the case. It establishes nothing except which of the two is the stronger, or, in the case of the ordeal by boiling oil, which has the thicker skin. And just as in the establishment of equity and right in the individual field we cannot escape the need for understanding, so we cannot escape the need for understanding in the establishment of right and equity as between groups of men.

The appeal to force is at bottom an effort to escape the responsibility and labour of intellectual judgment, as was the "ordeal." If the judges had any strong feeling of the clear justice of the case, any strong feeling that one of the parties had been outrageously ill-treated, their consciences would have revolted at the idea of submitting the issue to the "ordeal of battle." But when the ideas of law and equity and obligation are

obscure and ill-defined, so that just decision is difficult, the judges naturally desire to escape the labour and responsibility of intellectual judgment, and to submit the matter to the outcome of mere physical conflict. And the outcome of physical conflict, the arbitrament of the sword, is in the end only an accident as far as the moral issues are concerned, dependent on the amount of force or the sharpness of the sword, not on any principle of justice or wisdom. Indeed, it is only where the issues are not clear that anyone thinks of appealing to force. Perhaps the whole case against the appeal to force rather than the appeal to reason, on behalf of justice, can be summarized by saying that justice will not be secured by intellectual laziness, and that the labour of the mind, quite as much as the labour of the body and the risk of the body, is necessary to secure the triumph of right.

It is necessary again and again to urge that we no more assume that men will act rationally than we assume the impossibility of war. Even so clear-sighted and well-informed a critic as Mr. Brailsford can be guilty of the confusion involved in the following remark: "Mr. Norman Angell is convinced that mankind is guided by reason." Mr. Norman Angell is convinced of nothing of the kind. About nineteen-twentieths of the time mankind seems to be guided by the negation of reason. I am convinced that when mankind acts wisely it is guided by reason. The trouble is that most of the time it does not act wisely. What I am convinced of is that its only hope lies in wisdom, and that that is the thing we must mature and cultivate.

So deep set is this materialist determinism in the mind of the militarist that he insists upon ascribing the same

attitude to the pacifist. Ninety-nine out of a hundred of our critics will tell you that pacifists are people who believe that "war is impossible," and every war is taken as a triumphant demonstration of the folly of their creed. There is not even a glimmering in the minds of such critics of the pacifists' real position: That whether war continues or not depends absolutely upon whether men decide to go on waging it or not.

"It is the last resort." Well, in a badly managed community, where even agriculture is not developed, one may get periods of famine when cannibalism is the last resort—it happened during some of the Irish famines, and it is said to happen during some of the Russian famines now. Conceivably one might argue from that, that cannibalism is justifiable. Well, so it may be in certain circumstances, but the fact that it is resorted to is not an argument for so neglecting the tilling of the soil that it is likely to be resorted to. Rather is it an argument for saying: "If we do not cultivate our fields, we shall suffer from hunger, and be compelled to eat our children; let us, therefore, cultivate our fields with industry." In the same way we should argue with reference to the use of force: "If we neglect the understanding of human relationship, and the cultivation of political wisdom, we shall in periods of tension get to flying at one another's throats, because we shall not be able to understand the differences which divide us. And that will lead to murder. Therefore let us so understand human relationship that we shall not be likely to degenerate to that kind of thing, and let us, perhaps, establish some sort of machinery for the settlement of difficulties so that those kinds of abominations shall be avoided."

But that is not the way men have argued. They have argued that what they want in this matter is not a better understanding of national relations, but better arms; not machinery for the settlement of difficulties with other nations, but machinery for their destruction. We have had no faith in a society of nations, we have given no real effort to establish it; we have derided and held up to scorn and contempt those who have urged it. If a hundredth part of the time and wealth, the sacrifice, heroism, discipline, expert knowledge, which have been given to preparing the destruction of the nations had been given to their consolidation, if we had been willing for the sake of ordered co-operation with other nations to expose our own to a tenth of the risk and sacrifice that we readily expose it to in war, war itself would have disappeared from Europe long since.

CHAPTER II

WILL ARMS ALONE SUFFICE?

What does the "annihilation" of Germany mean?—Can we kill sixty-five millions?—The partition of Germany would Prussianize all Europe—How Germany has become Prussianized—The military indestructibility of modern peoples—The extreme mutability of alliances—How Prussianism must be destroyed.

AT the beginning of the preceding chapter I have given a good deal of evidence to show how universally in Britain this war is regarded as having been caused by the prevalence of a false doctrine, which constitutes a menace to Europe, and must be destroyed if we are to have security and to be freed from the burdens of militarism for which that doctrine is responsible. It is evident from the evidence I have quoted that in the minds of an immense number of educated Britons this war is justified by the fact of being a "war against war," in having as its object the destruction of the Prussian idols of brute force and militarism. We go to Berlin, as our *Times* tells us, to insist "that the worship of war shall cease," and in order that the Germans may once more turn to Luther and to Goethe, and renounce Nietzsche, Treitschke, and Bernhardi. It has, for the British, indeed, become almost the war of pacifists, while progressive reformers, idealists, social-

ists, have in great numbers supported it on similar grounds. Mr. Blatchford sees in the war a new ally for Socialism, while his colleague, Mr. Neil Lyons, tells us that it is "the best fight for Socialism that has ever been waged anywhere or anywhen." Professor Gilbert Murray is convinced that this war will mark the liberalization of Russian institutions; for while the defeat of the autocracy in Germany is to liberate the German people, the victory of the autocracy in Russia is to liberate the Russian people, a view which is also shared by Mr. H. G. Wells and Mr. C. Hagberg Wright, who both write that—"This war has made Russia definitely liberal by linking her almost indissolubly with the Western liberal Powers."

Such, then, is for the moment the all but universal view: the military defeat of Germany will of itself destroy the old fallacies and sophisms, the old passions and ugly temper produced by the evil doctrines of militarism, the belief in force, the reign of bureaucracy. All this will disappear from Europe, and we shall have peace and security for some generations at least, if we do but "beat Germany to her knees." Indeed, we have come in our minds to make those evils synonymous with the German State: destroy the German State, and you have destroyed these things.

Now, I want to suggest that such a belief is both unsound and dangerous; that its prevalence may prove disastrous to the very results which our people hope to see accomplished by this war; that, indeed, if it is not corrected, it may absolutely defeat these results; that while it is true that we must secure at any cost the victory of the Allies, mere military victory will not of itself bring about that better and safer Europe which we

hope for, and which is the justification of this war; that the attainment of that object will depend not alone upon the defeat of Germany, but upon the kind of peace and settlement that follows such defeat, and the energy with which we insist upon the right kind of reconstruction after the war, and see that in our own policy and conduct we avoid the fallacies and errors of our enemy; that if we neglect this half of our task, the other half—the war itself, its infinite suffering and sacrifice—will be barren, and will render still more remote the achievement of the splendid aims and aspirations which sanctify it in the minds of our people.

Let us, at the risk of some repetition, get the position quite clear. It is essential to the best interests of Europe and mankind that the Allies should win, and that Prussian military autocracy should realize its helplessness as against its united neighbours. It is quite certain, moreover, that the British nation is going through with this war, and that it is going to win, at whatever cost. There is not the faintest risk of the nation wavering on that point. But there is a very grave risk that the other essential to what it desires to accomplish by the war may be overlooked. And it is for that reason that it is important to urge this fact—that victory will not of itself render the future peace of Europe secure; will not achieve any of these things in the direction of destroying militarism in Europe which are suggested in these very optimistic expressions of opinion I have quoted; that, unless victory is accompanied by political wisdom on our part, the crushing of Germany may leave us in a worse condition than before the war, expose us all to its renewal at no distant date, and fasten the shackles of militarism more

firmly than ever upon the long-suffering peoples of Europe.

If that futility is to be avoided, our doggedness in this war must be intelligent instead of unintelligent; we must fight not blindly, but with a clear vision of what we want; we must know what this war is about, and how its objects will be achieved, and with firm resolution not to share the errors and the faults of our enemies, not to be led away from the high aims with which it started into the low aims of even an excusable vengeance, with a determination not to "lose our tempers and call it patriotism."

It is probable that few things have been so fruitful in the creation of political error and false ideas as words or phrases or illustrations which, used in the first instance because they are picturesque or rhetorical, but not even pretending to be an exact statement of facts, are in the end taken as meaning exactly what they say or represent. Economists like Professor Cannan have shown us, for instance, how the employment of military terms with reference to international trade, and other economists how the habit of talking of "France" or the "United States" as doing so much trade, as though they were commercial corporations actually carrying on business (oblivious of the fact that France and America as nations or governments do no international trade at all), has given rise to essentially false ideas in economics. In the same way political writers have shown that to talk of nations "owning" a territory has given rise to other false ideas. So in the present juncture we talk picturesquely of "beating Germany to her knees" and "annihilating" her, of "wiping her from the map," of "smashing her." What

precisely do these resounding phrases mean? What, for instance, does the "destruction" of Germany mean? "Germany" comprises sixty-five millions of people. Do you propose to slit all their throats? Have you "destroyed" them because you have beaten their armies? Suppose that the Allies kill or disable in this war a million German soldiers (which will be a very large proportion), there will still remain to this population of sixty-five millions some five millions of fighting men. You cannot "destroy" them; you cannot massacre them; you cannot distribute them as prisoners of war among the Allies to be maintained as a permanent charge; you cannot even expel them from Germany.

It has been definitely suggested in several quarters that while, of course, you cannot annihilate Germany in the sense of destroying her population or even the men who have fought in her army, you can break up the German Empire by partitioning it as Poland was partitioned in the past. It is suggested that France and Belgium are between them to have all Germany up the Rhine, Schleswig-Holstein is to be given back to the Danes, Russia is to have other Baltic provinces and East Prussia, Switzerland is to be enlarged, and so forth.

Even though such a policy is not very much supported in Britain, it may conceivably be pushed by one or more of our Continental Allies, and it is important, therefore, to see what it involves, to examine the sort of Europe such a settlement would produce—whether it would be that liberalized one, freed from the doctrine of force, which the authorities I have quoted foretell. First, there would, of course, be, as the result of this "partitioning" of Germany *à la Pologne*, not

one Government holding down conquered provinces, but four or five. Now, a Government that is holding down unwilling provinces cannot be a democratic Government. It will have within its borders two degrees of representative government, two degrees of freedom, two degrees of democracy, for the reason that it will not be able to grant to a hostile, resentful, and conquered people the same freedom to express its wishes through its votes, or even through the medium of the Press, that it grants to its own people, properly speaking. Very many speak of this war as giving the prospect of liberalizing Russia, as enabling us to induce Russia to accept some of the parliamentary principles for which we stand; but if Russia annexes German provinces, it is quite certain that she will not give them freedom to express their views either through representative institutions or the ordinary machinery of a free people—popular meeting and demonstration, a free Press, and so forth. Because naturally a conquered province would at once use this freedom for the purpose of an agitation in favour of separation or autonomy, and this, of course, the conquering Government could not tolerate. Provinces which are in this way conquered by the sword would have to be held by the sword. The very fact of having within her borders a hostile element would compel the victorious conquering country to remain military in its make-up, and maintain the machinery of political repression. And in a lesser degree the same sort of thing would be taking place in France. If the France of the future were to include, as has been suggested, all the left bank of the Rhine, certain of those provinces, German since the earliest dawn of history, would not readily accept the

sway of their hereditary enemies. They, too, would have to be held by the sword, and to do that the victor must retain the sword. France, too, would have to set up the ugly machinery of repression; she could not tolerate separatist agitation in her new conquests. There would be laws against meetings, laws possibly against the use of German speech, and in France there would be two orders of citizens.*

* And, of course, such efforts at repression would fail. The fact that it is no longer possible as the result of military victory to dispossess a people of its material possessions makes it more and more difficult to push home military force with the old ruthlessness for the purpose of imposing an alien language or law. Our own experience in the attempt at Anglicizing provinces like Quebec or of Ireland, German experience with the Alsatians, Russian with the Finns, show that where economic considerations render it necessary to leave a people in possession of their means of livelihood, military force is as a matter of simple fact reduced to futility in these matters. I have summarized the matter in the synopsis of "The Great Illusion" as follows: "The forces which have brought about the economic futility of military power have also rendered it futile as a means of enforcing a nation's moral ideals or imposing its social institutions upon a conquered people. Germany could not turn Canada or Australia into a German colony—*i.e.*, stamp out their language, law, literature, traditions, etc.—by 'capturing' them. The necessary security in their material possessions enjoyed by the inhabitants of such conquered provinces, quick intercommunication by a cheap Press, widely-read literature, enable even small communities to become articulate and effectively defend their special social or moral possessions, even when military conquest has been complete. The fight for ideals can no longer take the form of fight between nations, because the lines of division on moral questions are within the nations themselves and intersect the political frontiers. There is no modern State which is completely Catholic or Protestant, or liberal or autocratic, or aristocratic or democratic, or socialist or individualist; the moral and spiritual struggles of the modern world go on as between citizens of the same State in unconscious intellectual co-operation with corresponding groups in other States, not as between the public powers of rival States."

From being a homogeneous people living under the same law for all, France would become like Russia, and, like the pathetic empire of Austria which has gone to pieces, an artificial creation possessing different races, different languages, different laws, one group dominating, another subservient; she also would be maintaining a system based not upon consent, but upon her ability to compel unwilling populations to submit to her rule, so that the net outcome of this war, to destroy militarism and Prussianism, would be to render liberal France more militarized than ever, to turn France into a kind of Prussia, and to Prussianize still further the great military empire of Russia.

Such, then, would be the outcome of a war entered upon for the liberalization of Europe; the vindication of the principle of nationality, the ending of the rule of the sword, the destruction of the philosophy of conquest, and of the holding down of people by sheer might; for the ending of military castes, of government based on brute force and armament. Having entered upon this war as a crusade to end those things, we finish it by breaking up a great nationality, by handing over provinces without their consent to alien rulers whom they detest, and—as a necessary and inevitable consequence—create several military autocracies, so as to enable the conquering Allies to hold their conquered provinces in subjugation. We should have in Europe not one Alsace-Lorraine—which has been sufficient of itself to keep alive during nearly half a century resentment and bitterness which have been a large factor, perhaps the dominating one, in creating the present catastrophe—but several. Yet Alsace was, after all, a German-speaking province, bound by a thousand years

of history to the German group, its union to France having been itself an act of conquest two centuries since. If annexation to the German Empire even under those conditions was an act of ruthless tyranny and oppression, as we believe it to have been, what shall be said of the transfer of German-speaking provinces to a Muscovite Empire, of the transfer of great free cities and ancient republics to the domination of the Russian bureaucracy, the Czar and the Grand-Dukes?

Is this to be the end of the "War of Liberation"? Is our Holy War against the Devil's Doctrine of Prussianism to end by the Allies actually committing the very crime which they accuse Germany of desiring to commit: of forcing their rule and civilization upon unwilling neighbours? Are we going to end this war by ourselves becoming converted to the Prussian doctrine?

When they actually tackle the problem, I do not suppose that the Western Governments would tolerate for a moment the transfer of a genuinely German province to Russian rule. Not only, however, is such an outcome of the war airily discussed in Britain itself, but there is a very real danger that we may be dragged by our Allies—and our Allies include, of course, Russia, Servia, Montenegro and Japan—into a settlement upon principles in which we as a free and democratic people do not believe. That this danger is not chimerical is proved by a sign or two which have already been given, of the sort of settlement which Russia, for instance, desires. The *Novoe Vremya*, a Russian paper which is pretty freely used by the Russian Government as a vehicle of official communications, has already show very considerable irritation at what it supposes to be Great Britain's reticence in preparing for the partition-

ing of the German Empire. The military critic of the *Times*, who will not be accused of undue democratic prejudice, comments on this as follows:

"The *Novoe Vremya* took our statesmen to task the other day for aiming only at the capture or the destruction of the German Navy and the humbling of German militarism. We ought, it seems, to aim higher—namely, at the crushing of Germany for good and all. In a great war between Allies, the criticism of one friendly Power by another is best suspended, for if we begin telling each other what we ought to do we shall not be so well prepared to pull together. We are all doing our best, fighting our own corners, and none of us wants to be told his business. If the *Novoe Vremya* will look into the matter, it will observe that to crush German militarism, and to make an end of the system which has burdened and oppressed Europe for so long, will give us all that we can legitimately desire. To crush the Germans as as a whole, we must either kill them all or occupy their countries permanently, and we do not want to substitute one tyranny for another. Nor, we can be sure, does Russia. We have to draw the teeth of this Prussian monster, to humble a military caste, and to leave Prussia herself at the peace with the Constitution which she has so long sought in vain. In these reasonable aims we shall sooner or later have large sections of the German people with us, and our ends can then be more quickly attained. But to kill or everlastingly to police a nation of sixty millions of people is an extravagant proposition, and in war one must aim at what is attainable, and not the reverse. This is a military as well as a political question. We must not impose upon strategy an impossible task, for if we do we may be unable to achieve aims which are both practicable and desirable."

One may reply, of course, that the Russians and the French are not like the Germans, that it is not in their nature to show the ruthlessness, and the brutality, and

the stupidity, that the Prussians have shown, and that they represent a different moral force to the Germans. But, as I have shown in the preceding chapter, the most obvious facts of the case cannot ascribe the crimes of the Germans to their race. For a very long time they stood, as a whole, as the least aggressive people in Europe—idealistic, so little nationalist or military that Goethe could not bring himself to be disturbed even by the Napoleonic invasion of his country.

There was a Germany that for centuries in Europe meant, as even our newspapers in war-time admit, "cradle-songs and fairy-stories, and Christmas in old moonlit towns, and a queer simple tenderness always childish and musical; with philosophers who could forget the world in thought like children at play, and musicians who could laugh suddenly like children through all their profundities of sound. The Germans of the past were always children, even when they were old and fat and learned; and the world loved, while it laughed at, the contrast between their power and their childishness. All other nations had some wickedness in them, but they kept a kind of innocence that made them the musicians of the world."*

Such was the old Germany; it was not the Germany of to-day, but that Germany was of the same race, of the same blood, as the evil Germany that we now know. And this revolution, this transformation, which has turned a great country from something beautiful into something ugly, from something good into something evil, is the work of an idea, of a false doctrine, and the effect of the institutions which have been the outgrowth of that false doctrine.

* *Times*, Literary Supplement, October 8, 1914.

Those institutions are the legacy of victory. The old Germany was a Germany of small self-governing States, of small political power; the new Germany is a "great" Germany, with a new ideal and spirit which comes of victory and military and political power, of the reshaping of political and social institutions which the retention of conquered territory demands: its militarization, regimentation, centralization, and unchallenged authority; the cultivation of the spirit of domination, the desire to justify and to frame a philosophy to buttress it. Someone has spoken of the war which made "Germany great and Germans small."

But why, when we talk of partitioning Germany among the conquering Allies, should we expect the causes which have worked such havoc with this people should work differently in the case of other European States? Have the races that inhabit them—remoter from our own than the German—some fundamental moral quality not possessed by the Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon stock, which will enable them to resist those evils which flow from the fatal glamour of political greatness and military conquest? Why should we suppose that these causes, which have worked so disastrously in the case of older Germany, should have any very different effect in the case of a triumphant and conquest-holding Russia and France? And if that happened, we should not have destroyed Prussianism and its philosophy; we should merely have transferred it from one capital to another or to others that may be more menacing, by reason of their situation and circumstances, even than Berlin. Do we desire, when we talk airily of giving France all Germany up to the Rhine, to

revive the French spirit which marked the France of Louis XIV., which for nearly two hundred years kept us in constant fear, and involved a long and bitter struggle worse, even, than that which is now being waged against Germany? Do we wish to revive once more that spectre which was laid but yesterday—the possible menace of a Russia, at present rudimentary and but partially civilized, but growing vastly in area and in numbers, to our position both in Asia and in Europe? If the most elementary wisdom guides us, there will be no "partitioning" of Germany *à la Pologne*.

Suggestions which have a much greater air of feasibility are that after the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine to France, or the creation in these provinces of an autonomous State like Luxemburg, and the retrocession of Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark, the incorporation of German Poland in the reconstituted Polish kingdom, the neutralization or internationalization of the Kiel Canal, the transfer of all the German colonies to Britain, and the destruction of her fleet, the German Empire would then be so weakened that she could not, for many generations at least, especially in view of the dismemberment of her ally Austria, threaten again the peace of Europe. Or if that should not suffice, the dethronement of the Kaiser and some possible bargain with the Southern German States would resolve the existing German Empire into a "geographical expression," which it was until half a century ago.

Now, there is much in this programme that is feasible and desirable, if it were accompanied by some guarantee of real autonomy in the case of a reconstituted Poland,

and the whole arrangement supplemented by the formation of a European League or Federation or Council of Nations, into which the German States should come on equal terms with the other European States, so that Germans would have some guarantee that the preponderant military power of their rivals would not be used in attempts to destroy their nationality, or to place them in a position in which their commerce and industry would be carried on with a handicap, and their work of national organization checked and hampered by foreign influences and jealousies. If, on the other hand, military and political power is used, for instance, to reduce their armament, while that of Russia, say, or of France, is allowed to grow unchecked; if Germany is placed under the tutelage of a Power like Russia, which she regards as non-European, or of France, her historic enemy, such use of force will be resisted, and, if history teaches any lessons at all, successfully resisted. If, indeed, the settlement is imposed on her from without, instead of being arranged with her co-operation and consent, it will not endure, and none of those results in the direction of a better, more stable and secure, less military and force-worshipping Europe which were to flow from German defeat can for a moment be expected to result from it.

I want to suggest that this failure of our expectations is certain if we, like the Prussians before us, base our settlement upon sheer military might, disregarding their consent or desires or co-operation, in view of the well-demonstrated fact that the sheer military subservience in those conditions of a people like the Germans can only be temporary, because (*a*) of the recuperative capacity shown by such conquered States in the past,

and (*b*) of the extreme mutability of alliances—it being a possibly temporary alliance which gives the preponderance of power against them.

The merely temporary effect upon a virile people of the destruction of their armies and political machinery, the artificial and unreal character of the apparent "wiping off the map" that follows, has been dramatically demonstrated in the case of Germany within the memory of the fathers of men still living. In the first few years of the nineteenth century Prussia was annihilated as a military force. The army was destroyed at Jéna and Auerstadt, and the whole country was overrun by the French. By the Peace of Tilsit, Prussia was deprived of all territory west of the Elbe and all her Polish provinces, of the southern part of West Prussia, of Dantzig, thus losing nearly half her population and area; the French army remained in occupation until heavy contributions demanded by France were paid, and by the subsequent treaty the Prussian army was limited to not more than 42,000 men, and she was forbidden to create a militia. She was broken, apparently, so completely that even some five years later she was compelled to furnish, at Napoleon's command, a contingent for the invasion of Russia. The German States were weakened and divided by all the statecraft that Napoleon could employ. He played upon their mutual jealousies, brought some of them into alliance with himself, created a buffer State of Westphalia, Frenchified many of the German Courts, endowed them with the Code Napoleon. Germany seemed so shattered that she was not even a "geographical expression." It seemed, indeed, as though the very soul of the people had been crushed, and that the moral resistance to the

invader had been stamped out, for, as one writer has said, it was the peculiar feature of the Germany which Napoleon overran, that her greatest men were either indifferent, like Goethe, or else gave a certain welcome to the ideas which the French invaders represented. Yet with this unpromising material the workmen of the German national renaissance laboured to such good purpose that within a little more than five years of the humiliation of the Peace of Tilsit, the last French army in Germany had been destroyed, and it was thanks to the very condition imposed by Napoleon, with the object of limiting her forces, that Prussia was able finally to take the major part in the destruction of the Napoleonic, and in the restoration of the German, Empire.* It was from the crushing of Prussia after Jéna that dates the revival of German national consciousness and the desire for German unity.

Now take the case of France in 1870. The German armies, drawn from States which within the memory of men then living had been mere appanages of Napoleon, which as a matter of fact had furnished some of the soldiers of his armies, had crushed the armies of Louis Napoleon. Not merely was France prostrated, her territory in the occupation of German soldiers, the French Empire overthrown and replaced by an unstable republic, but frightful civil conflicts like the Commune

* By the convention which followed the Peace of Tilsit, the Prussian Army was limited to 42,000 men. Scharnhorst kept to the terms of this convention, and at no time was the army more than 42,000 men; but he saw to it that each year or two they were a different 42,000, so that when Prussia's opportunity came, after the failure of Napoleon's Russian campaign, she was able to call up a quarter of a million trained men, and became by her energy and power the most formidable of the Continental members of the alliance which broke Napoleon.

had divided France against herself. So distraught, indeed, was she that Bismarck had almost to create a French Government with which to treat at all. What was at the time an immense indemnity had been imposed upon her, and it was generally believed that not for generations could she become a considerable military or political factor in Europe again. Her increase of population was feeble, tending to stagnation; her political institutions were unstable; she was torn by internal dissensions; and yet, as we know, within five years of the conclusion of peace France had already sufficiently recuperated to become a cause of anxiety to Bismarck, who believed that the work of "destruction" would have to be begun all over again. And if one goes back to earlier centuries, to the France of Louis XIV., and her recovery after her defeat in the War of the Austrian Succession, to the incredible exhaustion of Prussia in wars like the Thirty Years' War, when her population was cut in half, or the Seven Years' War, it is the same story: a virile people cannot be "wiped from the map." Their ideals, good or bad, cannot be destroyed by armies.

There are, moreover, one or two additional factors to be kept in mind. The marvellous renaissance of France after 1871 has become a commonplace; and yet this France which is once more challenging her old enemy, is a France of stationary population, not having, because not needing, the technical industrial capacity which marks certain other peoples, like the Americans and the Germans. The German population is not stationary; it is increasing at the rate of very nearly a million a year; and if the result of this war is to attenuate something of the luxury and materialism which has marked modern

Germany, that rate of population increase will not diminish, but rather be accelerated, for it is the people of simple life that are the people of large families. It is altogether likely that the highly artificial Austrian Empire (itself the work of the sword, not the product of natural growth), embracing so many different races and nationalities, will be politically rearranged. The result of that will be to give to German Austria an identity of aim and aspiration with the other German States, so that, however the frontiers may be rectified and whatever shuffling may take place, this solid fact will remain, that there will be in Central Europe seventy-five or eighty millions speaking German, and nursing, if their nationality is temporarily overpowered, the dream of reviving it when the opportunity shall occur.

And there is one more fact: as I have already hinted, the elements which distinguish one people from another both in its good and bad qualities are the things of the mind. Someone has asked, "What is it that makes the difference between the kind of society that existed in the State of Illinois five hundred years ago, and the kind of society that exists there to-day?" The Red Indian had the same soil and air and water, the same bodily vigour as, or better bodily vigour than, that possessed by the modern American; all the raw materials of a complex civilization were there as much five hundred years ago as now. The one thing which marks the difference between the modern American and the Red Indian is just the difference of knowledge and ideas, the accumulated experience and the secret of the management of matter. Given that, given this knowledge of the manipulation of the raw materials of Nature, and a completely new society is readily created. You may

go into American cities, of which fifteen years ago not one stone stood upon another, but which have all the machinery of civilization—the factories, the railroads, the tram-lines, telephones, telegraphs, newspapers, electric light, schools, warmed houses—that one can find in London or in Paris. It is merely accumulated knowledge which enables all these things to be created in a desert within a decade. Now, that fact means this, that given this accumulated knowledge and this technical capacity, the recuperation of a people from the destruction of war will be much more rapid in our day than it has been in the past. And that technical capacity, that special knowledge, the Germans possess to a very high degree; they have, indeed, been called the Americans of Europe. If we can imagine the machinery of civilization destroyed, their factories pulled down, and the railroads torn up (things which will not happen to any very great degree), even so, within a very few years it would all be restored once more, and we should have to reckon with this fact of seventy-five million Germans manufacturing, trading, teaching, organizing, scheming as before.

I come to the other group of factors which I have enumerated above, showing the impossibility permanently of suppressing by sheer force of arms a national ambition, good or bad, and that is the mutability of the alliances by which alone such a result can be achieved.

In the Balkan War we had manifested two extraordinary political phenomena that are particularly suggestive in this connection. The first Balkan War was won by a group of separate States, not linked by any public formal political bond, but thrown together by

one common fear, resentment, or ambition: the desire to wrest members of their race from Turkish tyranny. When the Balkan League started upon the war against Turkey, everyone prophesied that their jealousies and the difficulty of military co-operation would throw the advantage on the side of Turkey. Events falsified this prophesy. The Balkan League astonished the world by its successes against the very highly militarized power of Turkey. But immediately the war was over and this military success achieved, dissensions arose among the allies over the division of the spoils; and the first Balkan War was succeeded by a second Balkan War, in which the members of the Balkan League fought against one another, and the final settlement was such as to satisfy none of the parties.*

Now, at the bottom of all our system of alliances—notably those embodying the principle of the balance of power—is the assumption that the superior military force of one country can and will be used to its own advantage and to the disadvantage of weaker Powers. This, it is urged, implies the need for establishing a balance, an equilibrium, so that neither can challenge the other.

But it is obvious that the degree to which there is a belief in the advantages, moral or material, of conquest, the desire for the domination of someone else, there will always be a tendency for the individual member, when he sees a chance by the rearrangements of parties, to exchange the politically unprogressive condition of equilibrium for the progressive and expanding condition

* An eminent American who has recently travelled from one end of the Balkans to the other says that the prevailing remark everywhere is that *rien n'est fini.*

of victory over others. Or, to put it differently, so long as we believe (as we do believe) that there is advantage as well as safety in being stronger than others, there will always be an impulse so to rearrange the groupings that the obvious advantage of strength lies with us and against the rival, whether that rival be a group or a nation. Military power in any case is a thing very difficult to estimate; an apparently weaker group or nation has often proved, in fact, to be the stronger, so that there is a desire on the part of each side to give the benefit of the doubt to itself, and we come to believe that the way to secure peace is in Mr. Churchill's phrase, "to be so much stronger than your enemy that he will not dare to attack you." But the other side also thinks that, and each cannot be stronger than the other. Thus the natural and latent effort to be strongest is obviously fatal to any "balance." Neither side, in fact, desires a balance; each desires to have the balance tilted in its favour. This sets up a perpetual tendency to rearrangement, and regroupings, and reshufflings in these international alliances, sometimes taking place with extraordinary and startling rapidity, as in the case of the Balkan States. It is already illustrated in the present war—Italy has broken away from a formal alliance that everyone supposed would range her on the German side. There is at least a possibility that she may finally come down upon the Anglo-Franco-Russian side. You have Japan, which little more than a decade since was fighting bitterly against Russia, to-day ranged upon the side of Russia. The position of Russia is even still more startling. In the struggles of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Britain was always on the side of Russia; then for two genera-

tions we were taught that any increase of the power of Russia was a particularly dangerous menace. That once more was a decade ago suddenly changed, and we are now fighting to increase both relatively and absolutely the power of a country which our last war upon the Continent was fought to check. The war before that which we fought upon the Continent was fought in alliance with Germans against the power of France. As to the Austrians, whom we are now fighting, they were for many years our faithful allies. So it is very nearly true to say of all the combatants respectively, that they have no enemy to-day that was not, historically speaking, quite recently an ally, and not an ally to-day that was not in the recent past an enemy.

These combinations, therefore, are not, never have been, and never can be, permanent. If history, even quite recent history, has any meaning at all, the next ten or fifteen or twenty years will be bound to see among these nine combatants now in the field rearrangements and permutations out of which the crushed and suppressed Germany that is to follow the war—a Germany which will embrace, nevertheless, seventy-five million of the same race, highly efficient, highly educated, trained for co-ordination and common action—will be bound sooner or later to find her chance.

Let us summarize the conclusions of some of the queries that we have put.

The annihilation of Germany is a meaningless phrase. You cannot annihilate sixty-five or seventy-five million people. They will remain, the men who have built their homes and the men who have fought their battles will still be there. You cannot divide them up between France and Russia save at the cost of making those two

States highly militarized, undemocratic, and oppressive Powers. If you broke up these seventy-five millions into separate States, there is no reason why, if a Balkan League could be formed and fight with success, a German League could not do likewise. Those diplomatic combinations by which the German States of the future are to be kept in subjugation cannot be counted upon for permanence and stability—such combinations never have been, and in their nature cannot be, permanent or immutable.

For this reason Prussianism will never be destroyed by a mere military victory of one group over another. If the war is to begin and end with the defeat of the German armies and the subjugation of the German State, the result will be either to transfer Prussianism and all that it represents in the way of militarism from one capital to another or to others; or to create a situation in which the struggle for military domination on the part of the German people will break out afresh in another form; or else to achieve both these results: to revive the military ambitions of France, to stimulate those of Russia, and so to recast those of Germany as to make them material for future explosions.

The expectation that you can cure Germans of Prussianism, that you can drive a false doctrine from their minds merely by overpowering their armies and invading their country, is not only very false philosophy, but it happens to be, curiously enough, the characteristically Prussian philosophy; it is Prussianism pure and simple, and falls into the very fallacy which makes Prussianism as so stupid and evil a thing.

Let me put the matter very definitely: I submit—

(1) That because we are right when we say that

Prussianism is a false doctrine, a mischievous fallacy, an evil state of mind and temper, we are wrong when we think that the military defeat of an army can destroy it, since to do so is to ask that a man shall abandon his belief because a stronger man has struck him, or a larger army beaten his; it is to assume that beliefs depend not on the mind, but on the operation of material things—the heavier artillery or better cavalry, material force in fact.

I submit also (2) that belief in a false doctrine can only be corrected by recognition of its fallacy; that the false doctrine of Prussianism—the belief in the value of military power, the desire for political domination—is not confined to Northern Germany, but in greater or lesser degree infects all the great Powers of Europe.

(3) That a better Europe, therefore, depends not only—perhaps not mainly—upon the military defeat of one particular nation, but upon a general recognition that the struggle for political power which all nations have pursued when opportunity offered is a barren and evil thing; that the attainment of such power adds neither to the moral nor material welfare of those who achieved it; and that if ever Europe is to be truly civilized, we must honestly and sincerely abandon this struggle, and all the shoddy conceptions of pride and glory and patriotism with which it is bound up, in favour of the co-operation of all for the security and welfare of all. The society of nations must be based, as all other civilized societies are based, upon the agreement of partners co-operating to a common end, and in the circumstances the lead in this new conception must be given by the victorious Allies. Finally, I submit that upon the sincerity and pertinacity with which this aim

is followed by them, upon the genuineness of *their* disbelief in Prussianism, will the nature of the future depend.

All these propositions have been supported of late in somewhat unexpected quarters. The *Times* says:

> "If it be true that 'every man in the German Empire believes sincerely and honestly to-day that the war is one of self-defence against the hostile encroachments of Russia, France, and England,' 'every man' must be disillusioned. Not until the German people has been compelled to perceive this struggle in its true light can there be a prospect of lasting peace for the world.'

Well, that of course is exactly what I desire to urge: there will be no peace in Europe until the Germans are convinced that Russia, France, and England do not desire and do not intend to encroach upon their Fatherland. The question is, How shall we convince them of that? Some of us are saying, "By dismembering their Fatherland." Will that convince them that they are not threatened and do not need to revive their armaments?

There are many, of course, who urge that our main business is to convince them that they cannot encroach upon the countries of others; that what they think beyond that does not matter much to their neighbours. Well, I submit with the *Times* that it is very important indeed what opinion Germans form as to the motives and objects of their enemies.

We have decided in Britain that the Prussian military party desired and plotted this war for the purpose of subduing France, challenging the power of Britain, and making Germany the dominant State of the world. That is possibly a true view, but it is

not the explanation of the war which the military party have given to the German people. To the German people they represent this war as one of defence, and at the present moment the assumption cited by the *Times* is certainly true: sixty million Germans are absolutely persuaded that they are fighting this war in defence of their Fatherland, to save their nationality from destruction. It is not a question of whether they are right or wrong; that is undoubtedly what the overwhelming mass of Germans sincerely and honestly believe. The attitude of many to the military party has changed since the outbreak of the war. Before the war, when they were told by the Prussian military party that Germany needed far larger armaments, great sections in Germany did not believe them. The Social Democrats, for instance, which number one-third of the entire voters of the Empire, strenuously opposed the agitation of the German Navy League and Army League, and accused the Prussian military party of exaggeration or deception when that party urged that the country was in danger from its neighbours. But now the anti-militarist party in Germany, when they see their country or their colonies about to be invaded by five enemy nations, are wondering whether after all the Prussians were not right in asking for larger armaments. If Germany is beaten, the Prussians will be able to say: "If you had given us all that we asked for in the way of armaments, we should not have been beaten." Thus there are very many millions of Germans who, distrusting and detesting the Prussians before the war, are now disposed to say, "Perhaps after all the Prussians were right to be prepared and to have this

big and efficient military machine." Do you suppose the Germans will be less disposed to say that, if Germany is broken up and its territory, or any considerable portion of it, passes under alien government?

It is one of the outstanding characteristics of Prussian stupidity to assume that other people will be affected by motives which would never influence the conduct of a Prussian. The senseless philosophy of his warfare is based on the assumption that he can terrify the people of an invaded or conquered province out of the determination to defend their country, knowing perfectly well that if he, a Prussian, were defending Prussia, threats of harsh treatment would only make him more determined to resist the invader. If you examine the mistakes in the diplomacy and government of Prussia, you will find that most of them are due to this absolute incapacity of the Prussian to put himself in the other man's shoes, to the general assumption that the Prussian is "different"; that it is ridiculous to suppose that other people whose country he is pleased to invade are like him, and have an equal tenacity and determination not to yield to bullying and to force.

And yet, when we assume that by "smashing" Germany we are going to discredit militarism or induce the German to abandon his effort to remain a great military power, are we adopting any other than the Prussian way of reasoning? Let me put a definite case.

We have in this country a considerable number of people who for fifteen years have been urging that a much larger army than we have heretofore possessed was necessary for our defence, and that, if we could not get it otherwise, we ought to resort to compulsion.

Now, the views of those military advocates have not been adopted. But suppose we were beaten in this war, that our country were overrun by Germans and Austrians, that our Empire were broken up. Would the effect of that be to make national service less or more likely? Would a German invasion cause us to reduce our armaments in other respects, and to render us less anxious to be strong in the future? You know, of course, that it would have the exactly contrary effect. Why do you expect, therefore, that if the circumstances were reversed Germany would act differently?

Even though Germans succeeded somehow in preventing our raising an army, would that in any way alter our conviction that to raise an army is what we ought to do if we could? If our Empire were broken up, and our Colonies passed under German rule, does any Briton really think all the five nations of our British Empire would sit down and accept that as the last word, that we should not plot and scheme and dream and contrive and teach the old ideals to our children, and make them love the old memories and pray every day for their revival? Should we ever abandon hope that that revival and renaissance would take place?

Again, why, therefore, should we expect that other people would act differently?

Indeed, the case is stronger than I have put it. Suppose that this British Empire, broken up in the twentieth century, had only a hundred years before been broken up utterly, and yet had pieced itself together again, stronger and mightier than ever, would there be a Briton alive who would not know that, sooner or later, his chance would come, and that

he would re-establish this Empire again, as his fathers did before him?

Need we necessarily conclude, therefore, that the complete defeat of Germany in this war is unnecessary or undesirable? Not the least in the world. It is probably now true that there can be no permanent peace in Europe until Germany is defeated, but what I have urged throughout this pamphlet is that the defeat of Germany alone will not give us permanent peace; and that only by bold and constructive work along the lines I have indicated, involving the abandonment of false political doctrine by ourselves, as well as by our enemy, can we avoid this becoming the seed of future wars.

That conclusion is not in the least invalidated—indeed it is strengthened—even if we take the view that this war arises out of an attempt on the part of Germany to impose her rule upon Europe. We are told that Germany is fighting this war for the mastery of Europe as against the Slav; it is a struggle as to whether Slav or Teuton shall dominate the world. Whether the culprit in this case be German or Russian, there is only one thing which can permanently end it, and that is for both alike to realize that this thing for which they struggle is a futile, empty, and evil thing even when attained. If Germany could conquer all Europe, not a single one of the millions of men and women who make up Germany would be one whit the better morally or materially. They would in all human probability be morally and materially the worse. The men and women of the great States—of the Austrias, the Russias, and the Germanys—do not lead happier or better lives by reason of such "greatness" than do the

Swiss, or Dutch, or Scandinavians. This political power, bought at such infinite price, does not add any mortal thing morally or materially of value to the lives of those who purchase it so dearly.

It is the illusion as to the value of this thing for which the nations struggle that we must dispel. So long as we nurse the worship of this idea of political "greatness"—and such a worship is not a German any more than it is a French or British idea, it is European—we must expect the worship to take the form of these ignoble wars. It is this worship—of which we are all guilty—which is the true Prussianism, and which must be destroyed.

That result cannot be achieved by any purely mechanical means. It involves what all human progress involves, a correction of idea. It must be approached through the mind. We must realize that certain beliefs that we have held in the past are unsound, and we must be prepared, in order to vindicate the better creed, to take, if need be, certain risks, less risk than that involved in the European armed camp of the past, infinitely less, but still some risk. We have seen that the plan of the rivalry of armaments, the plan of each being more prepared for war, of being stronger than anyone else, has miserably failed. A plan based on universal distrust cannot give a decent human society. We shall have to try more honestly and more sincerely and with more persistence than we have tried before to agree together for our common good, and instead of having one group facing another group, three nations facing three nations and acting in rivalry, it must be six acting in common for our common good.

In the last resort human society does not and cannot rest upon force. When at an election the Conservatives vote the Liberals out of power, what assurance have they that the Liberals will surrender that power? You say the army? But it is the existing Liberal Government that commands the army, that holds all the instruments of power. There is no assurance that the Liberals will just step down and surrender the instruments of power to their rivals, save the agreement, the convention; and if that agreement were not abided by, the Conservatives would raise an army of rebellion and turn the Liberals out, just as in certain South American republics. And they, of course, would hold power until the Liberals had raised an army, and so you would have the sort of thing that prevails in Venezuela and the other countries where revolutions succeed one another every six months. It is not the existence of our army which prevents that, because countries like Venezuela have more soldiers in proportion to the number of the population than any others. The only thing which prevents it is the general faith that each reposes in the other playing the game. A similar convention must be extended to the international field, and until we get a general recognition of the need for action by that method between nations, Prussianism will never die. The only hope for its defeat resides in the triumph of a truer and better political doctrine, the realization that struggle for military ascendancy must be abandoned, not by one party alone, but by all alike. That international anarchism, the belief that there is no society of nations, must be abandoned for a frank recognition of the obvious fact that the nations do form a society, and these principles which all recognize as the sole hope of

the maintenance of civilization within the nations must also be applied as the only hope for the maintenance of civilized intercourse between nations.

There has just lately been given impressive evidence that even orthodox diplomatists, when the brink of tragedy reveals the realities beneath the superficialities of conventional statecraft, recognize the need for this new spirit and bolder method.

It will be remembered that, in the years preceding the war, British diplomacy had given its adherence to the principle of the "Balance of Power"—of throwing its weight on the side of one group as against another group which was presumed to be hostile to it. If such a system was designed to keep the peace, it has obviously and pathetically failed. The preceding pages give a hint of why, by virtue of its very nature, such a policy must fail. When, in the tragic days at the end of July, its failure became evident, Sir Edward Grey, at the eleventh hour and fifty-ninth minute, made a desperate and despairing effort hurriedly to formulate a policy which should be based on the opposite principle of the Concert, or European League. In a despatch he says:

"If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan Crisis, and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals; but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed,

I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite *rapprochement* between the Powers than has been possible hitherto."

It will be noted that in the previous crisis—that arising out of the Balkan War—Sir Edward Grey had abandoned the principle of the Balance of Power, and worked towards a European agreement. We may take it, therefore, that his influence may now be definitely won to this latter principle. One can only regret that the principle of the Balance of Power, having been abandoned in the Balkan crisis, was ever revived. For, as the events show, it is not at the last stroke of the clock, at the edge of the precipice, when all the disastrous forces of conflict have already gained a terrible momentum, that they can be stopped, and a new and revolutionary policy framed to cope with them. But after the war is over peace must be so arranged that it will be possible to revive that plan, and pursue it sincerely, resolutely, and patiently. Meanwhile, and as a last word, it is necessary to point out that, though it is essential to realize that the mere military victory of the Allies will not solve the old troubles, that victory is none the less necessary for their solution, and nothing that I have written here is in the slightest degree in conflict with insistence upon that great need. While we cannot destroy the doctrine of Prussianism with arms, neither can we destroy it if Prussian arms are victorious.

Let me try to make the position clear by an historical analogy, on which I have already touched. The ideals of the Catholic Church were at one period of the history of Europe "protected" and promoted by military force. That is to say, Catholic groups or States attempted to smash Protestant groups or States in the interests of

Catholicism, and to some extent, at least, the converse was true of Protestant groups or States. Each attempt was rightly resisted by the other party. The evil was not in either ideal; the evil was in the attempt to impose that ideal by force upon others, a proposition to which any Catholic or Protestant to-day will thoroughly agree. A good Catholic would to-day be as ready to die for his faith on the battle-field as were his forbears. But there are many good Catholics who would fight on the side of Protestants if we could imagine a Catholic group attempting to impose Catholicism by force. When Protestants were attacked in the sixteenth century, they very rightly defended themselves; but when, after victory, they made the mistake of attempting to smash Catholicism by the very same means which the Catholics had been using against them, they did nothing but perpetuate the wars of religion. Those wars ceased, not by one party finally overcoming and crushing the other, and making Europe completely Protestant or completely Catholic, but by both parties agreeing not to attempt to enforce their respective faith by the power of the sword. It was not the Catholic faith which created the wars of religion; it was the belief in the right to impose one's faith by force upon others. So in our day, it is not the German national faith, the *Deutschtum*, the belief that the German national ideal is best for the German—it is not that belief that is a danger to Europe, it is the belief that that German national ideal is the best for all other people, and that the Germans have a right to impose it by the force of their armies. It is that belief alone which can be destroyed by armies. We must show that we do not intend to be brought under German

rule, or have German ideals imposed upon us; and having demonstrated that, the Allies must show that they, in their turn, have no intention of imposing their ideals or their rule or their dominance upon German peoples. The Allies must show after this war that they do not desire to be the masters of the German peoples or States, but their partners and associates in a Europe which "none shall dominate, but which all shall share."

CHAPTER III

THE PRUSSIAN WITHIN OUR MIDST

The danger of self-deception in our advocacy of disarmament and universal peace—The attitude of our public to those things an important factor in the conference that will follow the war—The influence of militarist writers in shaping that opinion—A few examples of British Prussianism—The need for knowing the nature of the enemy doctrine—and of fighting.

"BRITAIN is fighting for disarmament and universal peace," says a writer in the *Times*.* I think most Britons are now persuaded of that, and of the belief that when Germany is destroyed war and armaments will oppress Europe no more.

It would be broadly true to say that for most of us just now armaments, militarism and war, international bad faith and rapacity, fear and resentment, all the errors of passion that lead to conflict, are merely, or at least mainly, German things; that they have not in the past in any period that need concern us, and presumably could not in the future, mark the conduct of our Allies, of countries like Russia, or France, or Servia, or Japan, or Montenegro; that all the immense difficulties which have stood heretofore in the way of

* Mr. Stephen Graham on "Russia's Holy War," October 13, 1914.

international co-operation will, at least in large part, disappear as soon as the German State has been destroyed.

This last point has been dealt with in the preceding chapter. It is with the former one—that these ideas are purely German ideas, and not likely in any circumstances to affect our own conduct—that I now want to deal. I think that we have quite genuinely talked ourselves into this view, and I want to suggest that it constitutes a very dangerous self-deception, which, if nursed, will come near to rendering impossible those changes for the better which it is the object of this war to accomplish; that this doctrine of Prussianism has very wide acceptance in Britain, as in most other countries of Europe; that it is the underlying sentiment behind most of Europe's diplomatic negotiations. Though I believe as strongly as anyone that it could never be the ground for an aggressive war on Britain's part, I suggest that that belief—if not corrected—will, nevertheless, affect the kind of influence which Britain will exercise in the Europe of to-morrow.

I want to emphasize the point that it is unlikely that the British nation would ever be brought to believe in the justice of an aggressive war waged for domination *à la* Bernhardi; but as I think I have shown towards the end of the first chapter, those ideas involve a good deal more than the advocacy of ruthless war for the mere sake of conquest. It involves the belief that universal peace is an idle dream; that even if it were realizable, it would be fruitful of slothfulness and decadence; that it is, in fact, hopeless to form a society of nations; that the true work of the patriot is to add to the political and military power of his State; that extension of territory

and domination over others is a justifiable subject of pride and glory for a nation. And after this war there is likely to be a widespread—and not unnatural—feeling that Germany has sacrificed any right to consideration; that our Allies will be placed in a position whereby their aggrandizement at the expense of Germany would be justified, and we may be brought to feel that circumstances excuse in our Allies that policy which we have condemned in the Prussians. If history teaches anything at all, such a fact will not be the means of assuaging international rivalry, for among other reasons those that I have dealt with in the preceding chapter.

Two things, let us hope, will be the outcome of this war: First, that the Allies will be absolutely and completely victorious; and second, that Great Britain will be the most powerful of the Allies, exercising a dominating influence on the settlement. How is she going to use that influence? Is she going so to use it that the struggle between European units will go on as before with a mere reshuffling of rôles, or is she going to put an end to that feature of European life? It is this latter policy which for the moment has the approval of the great mass of the people in this country. But to carry it out will not be the work of a single conference, or a few weeks of negotiation following the peace. It will be a matter of pursuing for many years with faith and persistence, during changes of party, through much criticism and many set-backs, a policy having that end in view. If it is to succeed, it will be because there is an abiding faith in its possibility of success on the part of the British people. That faith at present has a very slender intellectual foundation. If we end the war in the kind of temper (for which

there will be much excuse) indicated in the expression used by one paper, "that we must exterminate the vermin," then there will be no new Europe. It will be the old Europe with parts of it painted a different colour on the map.

Let me make this point clear. We are all hoping that the outcome of this war may be a general stock-taking, by which we shall get rid of the old rivalries, that we shall establish a real council of the nations, that we shall replace a struggle for domination by work in partnership to common ends, that we shall be able to agree to something in the shape of the reduction of armaments, because we shall see that it is to no one's advantage to use those armaments aggressively, to conquer, to subdue unwilling peoples, to impose unfavourable commercial conditions on others, and so forth.

But we go into this conference having certain obligations to allies less liberalized than ourselves—Russia, Servia, Japan, Montenegro—and if we believe that the annexation of conquered provinces is an advantage, that it is a just reward of victory, and that military expansion of virile peoples is a natural and inevitable process, shall we really be able to stand out against certain claims which will be made by those allies? Shall we not be charged justly with the accusation that we are prepared to favour our enemies rather than our friends? The only thing which could justify our insistence upon abstention from annexation, respect of nationality, and so forth, would be our belief that the essential condition of civilization, of a real society of nations, is the abandonment by all of the policy of conquest, and a determined effort by all to eliminate

war and conflict. But if we do not believe in that possibility, if we believe that the society of nations, the council of the world, are a mere Utopian dream setting at nought inherent tendencies, "biological laws," and Heaven knows what, how can we ever hope to use our influence, and to exercise that doggedness and patience, which alone, in peace as in war, can achieve great ends?

And it should be remembered that in the domain of political ideas we have been the leader of Europe and the world, that we are territorially, perhaps, the greatest Power of the world, and that the world must look to us for leadership in these things; but if underneath the mere conventional assent to the belief in the newer order there is a strong and instinctive belief that the old order represents the realities in a hard world, how can we hope for a moment that the net and final result of the very difficult struggle which faces us shall be anything but failure? How can we hope that our representatives, and that the public generally, will initiate and support with firmness, patience, and unbreakable faith—the only things which can give us victory in this second phase of the great European war—a case in which, as a matter of fact, they do not believe?

No one will doubt this: that a disarmed world living in perpetual peace will involve adherence on the part of many nations to a policy very different from that which they have pursued in the past; no one will deny that it will involve very deep-seated and radical changes of attitude and view, the abandonment of ideals and beliefs which have exercised a fatal fascination not merely over the Germans, but over very many peoples. A change so radical and profound will not come about

without difficulty, or all at once. If the new policy, until this war a very unpopular one, is to win, as against a very old and, until this war, very popular one, we, as the people most in favour of it, will have to maintain in the councils of Europe a long and earnest fight; maintain it through, it may be, many changes of ministry and of parties. And unless our faith is abiding, and our persistence for peace as great as our persistence in war, the old enemy, so powerfully entrenched intellectually and in the passions of men, will not be defeated. In any fight no fault is greater than this: contempt of one's enemy; and it is because I want to give to the British reader some true notion of the strength of that evil doctrine which he has so recently set out to fight that this chapter has been written.

All that we are now saying as to the miraculous force which this idea of conquest has exercised over the mind of the German, all that we are now pointing out as to the transformation which has been wrought in the German people by half a dozen writers, is striking evidence of the subtle power of the evil doctrine that must be destroyed. One point to note particularly is this: that the tempter did not come only in evil guise to the old Germans that the world respected, to the people who spun for us cradle songs and fairy stories, the songs of Christmas and the old moonlit towns, to the country of "philosophers who could forget the world in thought like children at play," who studied, indeed, so lovingly the untaught mind of the child. This people were not won from all that by a doctrine that came to them in the guise of brutality and wickedness. It came to them at first, at least, and in some respects, in a noble

form—the glory of their Fatherland, the safety of their homes, the vindication of their great ideals, the spread of enlightenment. Is there no danger that the evil may come in a like guise during the long contest that will follow this war, either to ourselves or to our Allies? Is there no danger there, unless we learn to penetrate these disguises and to know the various attractive forms under which our enemy can appear?

I want to suggest that this is a very real danger, that our national conversion to the creed of universal peace is too sudden to have gone very deep, and that the reversion may be as rapid as the conversion. And to do certain of the opponents of that idea justice, they have warned us against the easy self-deception to which I am referring. Thus, Lord Roberts earnestly warns his fellow-countrymen "not to be led away by those who say that the end of this great struggle is to be the end of war, and that it is bound to lead to a great reduction of armaments; nor should we pay any attention to the foolish prattle of those who talk of this war as the doom of conscription."

Now we have already noted that the transformation of the German spirit and the direction given to German policy has been the work of a few men. In very many circumstances a few active individuals can carry their point against a very large number that are inert and inarticulate. There is no evidence that the German nation as a whole has been actively indoctrinated with Nietzscheanism, but its inertia has been overcome. Bernhardi complains bitterly that he only speaks for a few. The British public in centering its attention upon Bernhardi's book seem to have overlooked the fact that as Bernhardi announces in his

introduction, he wrote the work because for the most part his countrymen did *not* share the ideas therein expressed. He accuses them of being unwarlike, unmilitary, dangerously permeated with the doctrines of peace and pacifism, just as our own militarists on our side say exactly the same thing of their country.

"The value of war for the political and moral development of mankind has been criticized by large sections of the modern civilized world in a way which threatens to weaken the defensive powers of States by undermining the warlike spirit of the people. Such ideas are widely disseminated in Germany, and whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal enthusiasm which constituted the greatness of its history. . . . They have to-day become a peace-loving—an almost 'too' peace-loving nation. A rude shock is needed to awaken their warlike instincts, and compel them to show their military strength. . . . An additional cause of the love of peace, besides those which are rooted in the very soul of the German people, is the wish not to be disturbed in commercial life. . . . Under the many-sided influence of such views and aspirations, we seem entirely to have forgotten the teaching which once the old German Empire received."*

It is as well, therefore, not lightly to dismiss as unimportant and isolated opinion the British expression of the Prussian doctrine here dealt with. Those readers of Bernhardi, by the way, who condemn his book as an expression of Nietzscheanism, which could only find support and sanction in Germany, and could in no circumstances voice a British opinion, seem to have overlooked the fact that some time before the war this book found warm commendation from no less a person

* "Germany and the Next War," pp. 1, 2, 3.

than Earl Roberts. The fact that Bernhardi's thesis should thus find warm applause from a great and valiant British soldier who certainly, be it noted, represents not a base and jingo spirit, but the spirit of very good and honourable Britons who have thought seriously on these matters, shows how little true it is to describe Bernhardi's as a purely Prussian doctrine.

Here is what Lord Roberts says:

"How was this Empire of Britain founded? War founded this Empire—war and conquest! When we, therefore, masters by war of one-third of the habitable globe, when *we* propose to Germany to disarm, to curtail her navy or diminish her army, Germany naturally refuses; and pointing, not without justice, to the road by which England, sword in hand, has climbed to her unmatched eminence, declares openly, or in the veiled language of diplomacy, that by the same path, if by no other, Germany is determined also to ascend! Who amongst us, knowing the past of this nation, and the past of all nations and cities that have ever added the lustre of their name to human annals, can accuse Germany or regard the utterance of one of her greatest a year and a half ago (or of General Bernhardi three months ago) with any feelings except those of respect?" *

And in order that there should be no doubt as to the meaning of this passage, Lord Roberts adds the following footnote:

"In March, 1911, when every pulpit and every newspaper, under the influence of President Taft's message, promised us within a brief period universal peace and disarmament, the German Chancellor, Herr Bethmann-Hollweg, had the courage and the common sense to stand apart; and, speaking for his Emperor and his nation, to lay it down as a maxim that, at the present stage of the world's history, the armed

* "Message to the Nation" (Murray), pp. 8, 9.

forces of any nation or empire must have a distinct relation to the material resources of that nation or empire. This position seems to me as statesmanlike as it is unanswerable; but in applying the principle to our own country, I should be inclined to modify it by saying that the armed forces of any nation or empire ought to represent, not only its material resources, but the spirit which animates that nation or empire —in a word, that its armed forces should be the measure of the nation's devotion to whatever ends it pursues."

As one disagreeing fundamentally with these views, I should like to emphasize the respect that I feel for Lord Roberts's candour and frankness. It is infinitely preferable that those who do not believe in the peace-ideal should say so, rather than that they should pay conventional homage to it and disguise their real feeling towards it.

In what follows I want to show how much Prussianism, which we now persuade ourselves is the work of Nietzsche and Treitschke, and has so large a responsibility for this war, is in reality just part of the general political conception of Europe, and how much our own thought has contributed to it.

Take, for instance, its more material and economic foundations. Few in the Anglo-Saxon world have greater authority in the domain of international politics than Admiral Mahan. And he has referred to the naval ambitions of Germany, which are at least one of the origins of the conflict, in these terms:

"Governments are corporations, and corporations have no souls; Governments, moreover, are trustees, and as such must put first the lawful interests of their wards—their own people. . . . More and more Germany needs the assured importation of raw materials, and, where possible, control of regions productive of such materials. More and more

she requires assured markets and security as to the importation of food, since less and less comparatively is produced within her own borders by her rapidly increasing population. This all means security at sea. . . . Yet the supremacy of Great Britain in European seas means a perpetually latent control of German commerce. . . . The world has long been accustomed to the idea of a predominant naval power, coupling it with the name of Great Britain, and it has been noted that such power, when achieved, is commonly often associated with commercial and industrial predominance, the struggle for which is now in progress between Great Britain and Germany. Such predominance forces a nation to seek markets, and, where possible, to control them to its own advantage by preponderant force, the ultimate expression of which is possession. . . . From this flow two results: the attempt to possess, and the organization of force by which to maintain possession already achieved. . . . This statement is simply a specific formulation of the general necessity stated; it is an inevitable link in the chain of logical sequences—industry markets, control, navy bases. . . ."*

Indeed, it has been more than hinted that Admiral Mahan's work played no small part in prompting the German naval policy. Professor Spenser Wilkinson remarks: "No wonder that when, in 1888, the American observer, Captain Mahan, published his volume, "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," other nations besides the British read from that book the lesson that victory at sea carries with it a prosperity, an influence, and a greatness obtainable by no other means."†

This plea of the inevitability of national conflict owing to the pressure of increasing needs and popu-

* "The Interest of America in International Conditions," Sampson, Low, Marston and Co., London.

† "Britain at Bay," p. 41.

lation in a world of limited space and opportunity is expressed with even greater frankness by certain British writers than by the great American authority on naval power. One characteristic presentation of the case is quoted in the first chapter.* Another British writer puts it as follows:

"The teaching of all history is that commerce grows under the shadow of armed strength. Did we not fight with Dutch and French to capture the Indian trade? Did we not beat Dutch and French because we happened to be the strongest? Could we have beaten either Dutch or French but for the fact that we had gained command of the sea?

"Disarmament will not abolish war; you *cannot* abolish war from a competitive system of civilization; competition is the root-basis of such a system of civilization, and competition is war. When a business firm crushes a trade rival from the markets by cut prices, there is exactly the same process at work as when a business nation crushes a trade rival by physical force; the means vary, but the end in view, and the ethical principles in question, are identical. In both cases the weaker goes to the wall; in both cases it is woe to the vanquished."†

The same view is expressed hardly less brutally in Mr. Homer Lea's book, "The Day of the Saxon," which had a year or two since a very considerable vogue in England, and which incidentally is dedicated to Lord Roberts. Mr. Lea says (pp. 10, 11):

"The brutality of all national development is apparent, and we make no excuse for it. To conceal it would be a denial of fact; to glamour it over, an apology to truth.

* See p. 24.

† "The Struggle for Bread," by A. Rifleman, pp. 142, 143, 209.

There is little in life that is not brutal except our ideal. As we increase the aggregate of individuals and their collective activities, we increase proportionately their brutality.

"Nations cannot be created, nor can they become great, by any purely ethical or spiritual expansion. The establishment, in great or small entities, of tribes and states is the resultant only of their physical power; and whenever there is a reversal, or an attempted reversal to this, the result is either internal dissolution or sudden destruction, their dismembered territories going to make up the dominions of their conquerors.

"In just such a manner has the British Empire been made up from the fragments of four great maritime Powers; the satrapies of petty potentates, and the wilderness of nameless savages."

Leaving for the moment economic Prussianism, we find the more mystic and idealistic side duplicated in an ample British literature. The author, who is perhaps the very best English interpreter of Treitschke, Professor Cramb, allows his admiration for the Prussian ideal absolutely to blaze out:

"Let me say with regard to Germany that of all England's enemies she is by far the greatest; and by 'greatness' I mean not merely magnitude, not her millions of soldiers, not her millions of inhabitants, I mean grandeur of soul. She is the greatest and most heroic enemy—if she is our enemy—that England, in the thousand years of her history, has ever confronted. In the sixteenth century we made war upon Spain and the empire of Spain. But Germany, in the twentieth century, is a greater power, greater in conception, in thought, in all that makes for human dignity, than was the Spain of Charles V. and Philip II. In the seventeenth century we fought against Holland; but the Germany of Bismarck and the Kaiser is greater than the Holland of De Witt. In the eighteenth century we fought

against France; and again the Germany of to-day is a higher, more august power than France under Louis XIV.

". . . These two empires, both the descendants of the war-god Odin, and yet, because of that, doomed to this great conflict." *

While he out-Bernhardi's Bernhardi in his moral justification of war as an end in itself:

"In the laws governing the States and individuals the highest functions transcend utility and transcend even reason itself. In the present stage of the world's history to end war is not only beyond man's power, but contrary to man's will, since in war there is some secret passion or lingering human glory to which man clings with an unchangeable persistence; some source of inspiration which he is afraid to lose, uplifting life beyond life itself; some sense of a redeeming task which, like his efforts to unriddle the universe, for ever baffled yet for ever renewed, gives a meaning to this else meaningless scheme of things." †

Indeed, when British writers and journalists hold up their hands in horror—which they have been doing since this war broke out—at Prussian and Nietzchean defence of war as an ennobling, elevating, and disciplining factor in human life, one wonders whether such writers have any memory at all for the attitude of certain great figures of English literature on the subject—Carlyle, Ruskin, Kingsley, Kipling, Swinburne, to mention just a few that come prominently to mind. Is there any German defence of war which transcends this passage from Ruskin:

"All the pure and noble arts of peace are founded on war. . . . There is no great art possible to a nation but that

* "Germany and England," p. 69.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 72.

which is based on battle. . . . All great nations learned their truth of word and strength of thought in war; they were nourished in war and wasted by peace; taught by war and deceived by peace; trained by war and betrayed by peace."*

As to the pietistic Prussianism, which we are apt to regard now as blasphemous, it has at all times found its counterpart among English theologians. Its ethic was very definitely voiced by a recent article in the *Nineteenth Century*,† entitled "God's Test by War" (by Mr. Wyatt), which the editor found so apposite to present circumstances that he reprinted it. Its avowals are significant from many points of view.

"The truth is that armaments are the reflexion of the national soul. The immense naval and military strength of Germany is the reflex of moral and social conditions better than our own. The excess of her birth-rate over ours (and still more over that of France) is in itself the proof of that superiority. For the growth of her population involves not the production of degenerates, but of a sound and vigorous race. Patriotism, public spirit, frugality, and industry are the essential moral factors which render possible the vast armed force which Germany wields. And in all these factors it must be admitted, with whatever shame and sorrow, that she surpasses England. Therefore, if in the gigantic process of international competition England fall before Germany—which fate may God avert—then that fall will follow from no other destiny than the destiny inwoven with the universal law which in this article I have attempted to set forth—the law that the higher morality tends to produce the greater military strength.

"If in all these considerations any force be admitted to inhere, then clearly the duty of patriotism and of preparation

* From an address on War in "Crown of Wild Olives," etc.

† September, 1914.

for war is reinforced ten thousandfold. If what has been here advanced is sound, then from every pulpit in the land the voice of exhortation should be heard, urging every man and every woman to serve God in and through service to their country.

"The discovery that Christianity is incompatible with the military spirit is made only among decaying peoples. While a nation is still vigorous, while its population is expanding, while the blood in its veins is strong, then on this head no scruples are felt. But when its energies begin to wither, when self-indulgence takes the place of self-sacrifice, when its sons and its daughters become degenerate, then it is that a spurious and bastard humanitarianism masquerading as religion declares war to be an anachronism and a barbaric sin. . . .

"What is manifest now is that the Anglo-Saxon world, with all its appurtenant Provinces and States, is in the most direct danger of overthrow, final and complete, and of the noble qualities upon which all military virtue is built. Throughout that world, in churches and in chapels, on the platform, as in the pulpit, in the Press, and on the stage, which is our chief temple now, the voice of every God-fearing man should be raised, through the spoken or through the written word, to kindle anew the spark that is dying, to preach the necessity of self-sacrifice for the country's cause, and to revive that dying military spirit which God gave to our race that it might accomplish His will upon earth."

It is only Prussia, we are now sure, that could frame the ideal of carrying its civilization and culture by force throughout the world. Yet it was a very great Englishman who visioned just such a rôle for Britain. We read of Cecil Rhodes that the dream of his life "was nothing less than the governance of the world by the British race." A will exists written in Mr. Rhodes's own handwriting in which he states his reasons for

accepting the aggrandizement and service of the British Empire as his highest ideal of practical achievement. The document begins with the characteristic sentence: "I contend that the British race is the finest which history has yet produced." His biographer tells us that—"The argument" (continued through some twenty foolscap pages) "is a clear if somewhat crude summary of the articles of faith on which the edifice of modern British Imperialism is based. It puts forward broadly, as an aim which must appeal to every elevated mind, the conception of working for the governance of the entire world by its finest race; and it ends with a single bequest of everything of which he might die possessed for the furtherance of this great purpose. Five-and-twenty years later his final will carried out, with some difference of detail, the same intention."*

Among other Englishmen who have not hesitated to give expression to the thought reflected in Rhodes's will is Earl Grey, who says:

"Probably everyone would agree that an Englishman would be right in considering his way of looking at the world and at life better than that of the Maori or Hottentot, and no one would object, in the abstract, to England doing her best to impose her better and higher view on those savages. But the same idea will carry you much farther. In so far as an Englishman differs in essentials from a Swede or Belgian, he believes that he represents a more perfectly developed standard of general excellence. Yes, and even those nations nearest to us in mind and sentiment —German and Scandinavian—we regard on the whole as

* F. L. S., in "Encyclopædia Britannica," new volumes, vol. xxxii. (tenth edition).

not so excellent as ourselves, comparing their typical characteristics with ours. Were this not so, our energies would be directed to becoming what they are. Without doing this, however, we may well endeavour to pick out their best qualities and add them to ours, believing that our compound will be superior to the common stock.*

It is, however, Lord Grey's view as to the point at which the champions of this ideal may find a moral justification for war that is particularly interesting in view of current condemnation of German world-ambitions. Lord Grey concludes the reflections just quoted as follows:

"It is the mark of an independent nation that it should feel thus. How far such a feeling is, in any particular case, justified, history alone decides. But it is essential that each claimant for the first place should put forward his whole energy to prove his right. This is the moral justification for international strife and for war, and a great change must come over the world and over men's minds before there can be any question of everlasting universal peace, or the settlement of international differences by arbitration."†

Nor were these writers alone in such conceptions. When Bernhardi uses the expression "World Power or Downfall," we see in it the indication of a particularly mischievous and dangerous political megalomania. Yet British writers of repute use almost this expression, and voice certainly this idea with reference to Britain without any particular misgiving. Among other well-known publicists, Professor Spenser Wilkinson has urged the need for England's assuming the "leadership of the

* "Memoir of Herbert Harvey," by Earl Grey. Arnold, 1899.
† *Ibid.*

human race." In the preface to his book, "The Great Alternative," he writes:

> "The Great Alternative is such a choice given to England—a choice between the first place among the nations of the world and the last; between the leadership of the human race and the loss of Empire and of all but the shadow of independence. The idea set forth in this book is that England has the choice between these two extremes, with no middle course open to her. . . ."

It may fairly be argued that what distinguishes German and British political ambition is that the former is pursued without regard to the rights of others, and the latter is not. As a statement of simple fact that can doubtless be accepted. But this distinguishing mark of our own action is not, I fear, due to the influence of our nationalist and militarist writers. To the degree to which they influence opinion and policy their tendency is to obliterate that difference. Even the article of the Bernhardi creed which (in him) so shocks us—the declaration that "What is right is decided by the arbitrament of war; war gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very nature of things"—differs in no essential from the deeply religious view of (for instance) Mr. Wyatt, whom I have quoted. Mr. Wyatt accepts to the full even the logical conclusion of Bernhardi's doctrine: "If in the gigantic process of international competition England fall before Germany—which fate may God avert—then that fall will follow from . . . the law that the higher morality tends to produce the greater military strength." Admiral Mahan comes very near to the same proposition that military might makes right:

"National power is surely a legitimate factor in international settlements; for it is the outcome of national efficiency, and efficiency is entitled to assert its fair position and chance of exercise in world matters. . . .

"The existence of might is no mere casual attribute, but the indication of qualities which should, as they assuredly will, make their way to the front and to the top in the relations of States."*

Among British writers Colonel Maude expresses an allied view when he says that—"War is the divinely appointed means by which the environment may be readjusted until ethically 'fittest' and 'best' become synonymous."†

In the vindication of this policy at least some of our popular military writers wave aside certain scruples as readily as could any Prussian. In the book on "The Day of the Saxon," which he has dedicated to Lord Roberts, Homer Lea writes concerning certain international moralities as follows:

"The necessity of a declaration of war is only a modern illusion. During the last two centuries we have less than ten cases where declarations have been issued prior to the regular commencement of hostilities, though in one form or another war already existed. During this same period of time we have one hundred and eleven cases where war was begun without any notification.

"No nation has followed more persistently than the English this principle of making war without prior declaration. They have done so, as have others, because the initiation of a conflict constitutes the most essential principle of warfare. . . . During the former century there are recorded forty-seven wars begun without any prior declara-

* "Armaments and Arbitration," pp. 84, 85.

† "War and the World's Life" (Smith, Elder), p. 18.

tion, while in the nineteenth century eighty wars were begun without any prior declaration.

"The occupation of the Persian and Afghanistan frontiers prior to war with Russia, or the European frontiers in a conflict with Germany, arouses in the British nation the appearance of great opposition to the violation of neutral territory. This is false, for the Empire is not moved by the sanctity of neutrality. . . .

"Neutrality of States under the conditions just mentioned has never heretofore nor will in future have any place in international association in time of war. Such neutrality is a modern delusion. It is an excrescence.

"In the year 1801 the island of Madeira was taken possession of by the British, without any previous communication to the Court of Lisbon, in order that it should not fall into the hands of the French, observing in this action the true principle governing such activities in war.

"In 1807 the British fleet, without any notification, with no intimation given of hostile intentions, no complaint of misconduct on the part of Denmark, entered the Baltic, seized the Danish fleet, and blockaded the island of Zealand, on which is situated the city of Copenhagen. At this time both nations had their Ambassadors residing in their respective capitals, and were in perfect harmony. The purpose of this attack was to anticipate the occupation of Denmark and the use of her fleets by France. So correct is the principle of this initiation that it stands out with remarkable brilliancy in the darkness of innumerable military errors made by the Saxon race.

"If England were, therefore, justified in seizing Denmark in the beginning of the nineteenth century for no other reason than to prevent the employment of the Danish fleet by the French, how much more is she justified during peace in the twentieth century in the occupation of its southern frontiers for the protection of both nations against German aggression."*

* "The Day of the Saxon," by Homer Lea, pp. 226, 228.

Nor do certain British military writers, to do them justice, shirk this point (and again I will emphasize the point that they do a real service to the sincere and honest discussion of these subjects by their frankness). Lord Roberts has written a laudatory preface to Major Stewart Murray's book, "The Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons." In this book (pp. 40, 41) Major Stewart Murray, speaking of the seizure of the Danish fleet in 1807, says:

"Nothing has ever been done by any other nation more utterly in defiance of the conventionalities of so-called international law. We considered it advisable and necessary and expedient, and we had the power to do it; therefore we did it.

"Are we ashamed of it? No, certainly not; we are proud of it. In like manner, if any nation can surprise Britain, far from being ashamed of it, they will be equally proud of it. And what sickening hypocrisy it must seem to other nations to hear us, of all people, prate of the sanctity of international law and call aloud on its sacred rules as a sure protection to our commerce and food supply, or as a sure protection against surprise. Whatever course of sudden and unexpected violence, whatever sudden naval surprise, whatever surprise attack on our commerce, etc., any nation may adopt against us, can be amply justified by the precedents we ourselves have set. . . .

"For people in this country to talk of the sanctity of international law is nothing but hypocrisy or ignorance."

And Major Murray has made it clear that ferocity in war is not Prussianism but—war. He welcomes Clausewitz as "the Shakespeare of military writers, the greatest and deepest of military thinkers, whose book forms to-day the foundation of all military thought in Europe, and should form the foundation of all military

thought in Britain," and warmly applauds the appeals against "sickening humanitarianism." Major Murray fully endorses the principle of making war as "frightful" as possible:

"The worst of all errors in war is a mistaken spirit of benevolence. . . . For 'he who uses his force unsparingly, without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, must obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise.' . . . Now this is an elementary fact which it is most desirable that those of our politicians and Exeter Hall preachers and numerous old women of both sexes who raise hideous outcries about 'methods of barbarism,' etc., every time we have a war, should endeavour to learn. By their very outcries for moderation and weakness they clearly show that they know nothing about war. They impede the proper energetic use of the national forces; they encourage the enemy to trade on our probable weakness and folly; they prevent the proper measures being taken to bring the war to a conclusion; they lengthen the war, thereby causing an infinitely greater loss of life and an infinitely greater sum of misery; and they delay the conclusion of peace. By their noisy, foolish, thoughtless din in the name of humanity they murder humanity. In this country their name is legion; they fill the pulpits and the platforms and Parliament with their outcries and the Press with their articles and letters, and do their utmost to mislead the people into a display of false humanity and deplorable weakness in the conduct of war. They are the greatest possible enemies to our peace."*

Nor does Major Murray stand alone. Dr. Miller Maguire, an English military critic and authority of standing, writes:

"The proper strategy consists in the first place in inflicting as terrible blows as possible upon the enemy's army,

* "Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons," p. 27.

and then in causing the inhabitants so much suffering that they must long for peace and force their Government to demand it. The people must be left with nothing but their eyes to weep with over the war. It will require the daily and hourly exertions of those who have been burnt out to procure a scanty subsistence to sustain life. When the soldier learns that his family—his wife and little children—are sure to suffer, he will become uneasy in his place, and will weigh the duty he owes his family; and what the promptings of nature will be it is not difficult to determine."*

Dr. Maguire borrows this reasoning from the Federal Generals of the American Civil War, and adds that "the Federal Generals knew their business. Their duty was to bring about peace by so ruining the property of the Confederate civilians as to make all classes disgusted with the war. This policy was deliberately and very properly applied."

It is not for the purpose of a trivial *tu quoque* that I have disinterred these opinions of English and American writers, but in order that, rereading them (counsels resembling those urged by Dr. Maguire were very common indeed at the time, for instance, of the South African War), we may honestly ask ourselves whether our real feeling just now is against the doctrine or against those who put it into effect—against Prussianism or against Prussians. For if it is against the people and not against the idea, then our feelings will not render us less, but more likely to become ourselves victims of the doctrine and to fall once more beneath its evil influence.

We talk of the danger and wickedness of the violation of right, implied in the German desire for world-wide

* *Times*, July 2, 1900.

dominion, but acclaim the British desire for world-wide dominion as a worthy and noble patriotism; we retain as a sort of secondary national anthem a hymn which voices such sentiments as these:

> "And thine shall be the subject main,
> And every shore it circles thine.
> . . . Still more majestic shalt thou rise,
> More dreadful from each foreign stroke."

We deem the crime of Germany fully proved because Bernhardi writes of "world-power or downfall," but when one of our own Oxford professors writes that England has no alternative between the leadership of the human race and loss of her empire, we accept it as a quite natural and laudable political conception; and we are horrified at German adulation of war as a noble thing in itself; but our own poets and clergymen urge just that thing, and we are not horrified at all. We point to German hostility to peace as a proof of her ineradicable barbarism, while our own popular journalists have for years poured ferocious contempt upon "the amiable sentimentalists at The Hague with their impossible dreams of arbitration and disarmament."

Do we really believe that this doctrine is an evil and antisocial thing, or merely that it is evil and antisocial when embraced by others. In that case—if we ourselves at the bottom of our hearts believe it and excuse allegiance to it in ourselves and our allies—then it is inevitably destined to dominate the policy and conduct of the nations after the war is over.

This truth has evidently appealed with particular force to a writer whose opinion in the special circumstances of Europe at this juncture should have weight with us. A very distinguished Belgian author, Dr.

Sarolea, whose work, "The Anglo-German Problems" has won the highest encomiums from, among others, the King of the Belgians, writes on this aspect of the problem as follows:

"What is even more serious and ominous, so far as the prospects of peace are concerned, the German, who knows that he is right from his own point of view, knows that he is also right from the English point of view; he knows that the premises on which he is reasoning are still accepted by a large section of the English people. Millions of English people are actuated in their policy by those very Imperialistic principles on which the Germans take their stand. After all, German statesmen are only applying the political lessons which England has taught them, which Mr. Rudyard Kipling has sung, and Mr. Chamberlain has proclaimed in speeches innumerable. Both the English Imperialist and the German Imperialist believe that the greatness of a country does not depend mainly on the virtues of the people, or on the resources of the home country, but largely on the capacity of the home country to acquire and to retain large tracts of territory all over the world. Both the English Imperialist and the German Imperialist have learnt the doctrine of Admiral Mahan, that the greatness and prosperity of a country depends mainly on sea-power. Both believe that efficiency and success in war is one of the main conditions of national prosperity.

"Now, as long as the two nations do not rise to a saner political ideal, as long as both English and German people are agreed in accepting the current political philosophy, as long as both nations shall consider military power not merely as a necessary and temporary evil to submit to, but as a permanent and noble ideal to strive after, the German argument remains unanswerable. War is indeed predestined, and no diplomatists sitting round a great table in the Wilhelmstrasse or the Ballplatz or the Quai d'Orsay

will be able to ward off the inevitable. It is only, therefore, in so far as both nations will move away from the old political philosophy, that an understanding between Germany and England will become possible. . . . It is the ideas and the ideals that must be fundamentally changed: "Instauratio facienda ab imis fundamentis." And those ideals once changed, all motives for a war between England and Germany would vanish as by magic. But alas! ideas and ideals do not change by magic or prestige—they can only change by the slow operation of intellectual conversion. Arguments alone can do it."

It could not be more lucidly expressed, and this Belgian author is good enough to add that it is particularly such arguments as those with which this book deals that must operate in any intellectual conversion.*

* "The Anglo-German Problem," p. 367.

CHAPTER IV

THE BIOLOGICAL FALLACIES OF MILITARISM

The real law of man's struggle: struggle with Nature, not with other men—Outline sketch of man's advance and main operating factor therein—The progress towards elimination of physical force—Co-operation across frontiers and its psychological result—Impossible to fix limits of community—Such limits irresistibly expanding—Break-up of State homogeneity—State limits no longer coinciding with real conflicts between men.

"WITHOUT any exception known to me," says Professor William James,* "militarist authors take a highly mystical view of their subject, and regard war as a biological or sociological necessity—our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bones and marrow, and thousands of years of peace won't breed it out of us."

Everyone will recognize the philosophical propositions to which Professor James refers. They have more than academic interest. They constitute a constant element of resistance to that reform of political thought and tradition in Europe which must be the necessary precedent of a sounder condition. Not merely, of course, do international situations become infinitely more dangerous when you get, on both sides of the frontier, a general "belief in war for war's sake,"

* *M'Clure's Magazine*, August, 1910.

but a tendency is directly created to discredit the use of patience, a quality as much needed in the relationship of nations as in that of individuals; and there is a further tendency to justify political action making for war as against action that might avoid it. All these pleas, biological and otherwise, are powerful factors in creating an atmosphere and temperament in Europe favourable to war and unfavourable to international agreement. For, be it noted, this philosophy is not special to any one country: one finds it plentifully expressed in Great Britain and America, as well as in France and Germany. It is a European doctrine, part of that "mind of Europe," of which someone has spoken, that among other factors determines the character of European civilization generally.

It is urged that the condition of man's advance in the past has been the survival of the fit by struggle and warfare, and that in that struggle it is precisely those endowed with combativeness and readiness to fight who have survived. Thus the tendency to combat is not a mere human perversity, but is part of the self-protective instinct rooted in a profound biological law—the struggle of nations for survival. International hostility is explained as merely the psychological stimulus to that combativeness which is a necessary element of existence, and which though, like other elemental instincts —our animal appetites, for instance—it may in some of its manifestations be ugly enough, makes for survival, and is to that extent a part of the great plan. Too great a readiness to accept the "friendly assurances" of another nation and an undue absence of distrust would, in accordance with a sort of Gresham's Law in international relationships, make steadily for the

disappearance of the humane and friendly communities in favour of the truculent and brutal. If friendliness and good-feeling towards other nations led us to relax our self-defensive efforts, the quarrelsome communities would see in this slackening an opportunity to commit aggression, and there would be a tendency, therefore, for the least civilized to wipe out the most. Animosity and hostility between nations is a corrective of this sentimental slackness, and to that extent it plays a a useful rôle, however ugly it may appear—"not pretty, but useful, like the dustman." Though the material and economic motives which prompt conflict may no longer obtain, other than economic motive will be found for collision, so profound is the psychological stimulus thereto.

Despite the apparent force of these propositions, they are founded upon a gross misreading of certain facts and especially upon a gross misapplication of a certain biological analogy.

It should be pointed out parenthetically, however, that in strict logic there is no need to answer this "biological case." For, excluding a few extremists, none of the advocates of militarist biology have the courage of their convictions—go, that is, to the extent of saying: "We will have a war if we can, because of its moral, sociological, or biological value." The militarist is always in favour of peace; he always justifies his large armaments on the ground that they are designed to insure peace. *Si vis pacem*, etc. As between war and peace he has made his choice, and he has chosen, as the definite object of his endeavours, peace. Having directed his efforts to secure peace, he must accept whatever disadvantages there may lie in

that state. He is prepared to admit that, of the two states, peace is preferable, and it is peace towards which our efforts should be directed. Having decided on that aim, what utility is there in showing that it is an undesirable one?

We must, as a matter of fact, be honest for our opponent. We must assume that in an alternative, where his action would determine the issue of war or peace, he will allow that action to be influenced by the general consideration that war might make for the moral advantage of his country. More important even than this consideration is that of the general national temper, to which his philosophy, however little in keeping with his professed policy and desire, necessarily gives rise. For these reasons it is worth while to consider in detail the biological case which he presents.

The illusion underlying that case arises from the indiscriminate application of scientific formulæ. Struggle is the law of survival with man, as elsewhere, but it is the struggle of man with the universe, not man with man. "Dog does not eat dog"; even tigers do not live on one another. Both dogs and tigers live upon their prey.

It is true that against this it is argued that dogs struggle with one another for the same prey; if the supply of food runs short, the weakest dog, or the weakest tiger, starves. But an analogy between this state and one in which co-operation is a direct means of increasing the supply of food obviously breaks down. If dogs and tigers were groups, organized on the basis of the division of labour, even the weakest dogs and tigers could, conceivably, perform functions which would increase the food-supply of the group as a

whole; and, conceivably, their existence would render the security of that supply greater than would their elimination. If to-day a territory like England supports in comfort a population of 45,000,000, where in other times rival groups, numbering at most two or three millions, found themselves struggling with one another for a bare subsistence, the greater quantity of food and the greater security of the supply is not due to any process of elimination of Wessex men by Sussex men, but is due precisely to the fact that this rivalry has been replaced by common action against their prey —the forces of Nature. The obvious facts of the development of communities show that there is a progressive replacement of rivalry by co-operation, and that the vitality of the social organism increases in direct ratio to the efficiency of the co-operation, and to the abandonment of the rivalry, between its parts.

All crude analogies between the processes of plant and animal survival and social survival which disregard the dynamic element of conscious co-operation are misleading and vicious, because fundamental facts of difference are not taken into account.*

That mankind as a whole represents the organism and the planet the environment, to which he is more and more adapting himself, is the only conclusion that consorts with the facts. If struggle between men is

* Since the publication of the first edition of this book there has appeared in France an admirable work by M. J. Novikow, "Le Darwinisme Social" (Félix Alcan, Paris), in which this application of the Darwinian theory to sociology is discussed with great ability, and at great length and in full detail, and the biological presentation of the case, as just outlined, has been inspired in no small part by M. Novkow's work. M. Novikow has established in biological terms what, previous to the publication of his book, I attempted to establish in economic terms.

the true reading of the law of life, those facts are absolutely inexplicable, for he is drifting away from conflict, from the use of physical force, and towards co-operation. This much is unchallengeable, as the facts which follow will show.

But in that case, if struggle for extermination of rivals between men is the law of life, mankind is setting at naught the natural law, and must be on the way to extinction.

Happily the natural law in this matter has been misread. The individual in his sociological aspect is not the complete organism. He who attempts to live without association with his fellows dies. Nor is the nation the complete organism. If Britain attempted to live without co-operation with other nations, half the population would starve. The completer the co-operation the greater the vitality; the more imperfect the co-operation the less the vitality. Now, a body the various parts of which are so interdependent that without co-ordination vitality is reduced or death ensues, must be regarded, in so far as the functions in question are concerned, not as a collection of rival organisms, but as one. This is in accord with what we know of the character of living organisms in their conflict with environment. The higher the organism, the greater the elaboration and interdependence of its part, the greater the need for co-ordination.*

If we take this as the reading of the biological law,

* Co-operation does not exclude competition. If a rival beats me in business, it is because he furnishes more efficient co-operation than I do; if a thief steals from me, he is not co-operating at all, and if he steals much will prevent my co-operation. The organism (society) has every interest in encouraging the competitor and suppressing the parasite.

the whole thing becomes plain; man's irresistible drift away from conflict and towards co-operation is but the completer adaptation of the organism (man) to its environment (the planet, wild nature), resulting in a more intense vitality.

The psychological development involved in man's struggle along these lines may best be stated by an outline sketch of the character of his advance.

When I kill my prisoner (cannibalism was a very common characteristic of early man), it is in "human nature" to keep him for my own larder without sharing him. It is the extreme form of the use of force, the extreme form of human individualism. But putrefaction sets in before I can consume him (it is as well to recall these real difficulties of the early man, because, of course, "human nature does not change"), and I am left without food.

But my two neighbours, each with his butchered prisoner, are in a similar difficulty, and though I could quite easily defend my larder, we deem it better on the next occasion to join forces and kill one prisoner at a time. I share mine with the other two; they share theirs with me. There is no waste through putrefaction. It is the earliest form of the surrender of the use of force in favour of co-operation—the first attenuation of the tendency to act on impulse. But when the three prisoners are consumed, and no more happen to be available, it strikes us that on the whole we should have done better to make them catch game and dig roots for us. The next prisoners that are caught are not killed—a further diminution of impulse and the factor of physical force —they are only enslaved, and the pugnacity which in the first case went to kill them is now diverted to

keeping them at work. But the pugnacity is so little controlled by rationalism that the slaves starve, and prove incapable of useful work. They are better treated; there is a diminution of pugnacity. They become sufficiently manageable for the masters themselves, while the slaves are digging roots, to do a little hunting. The pugnacity recently expended on the slaves is redirected to keeping hostile tribes from capturing them—a difficult matter, because the slaves themselves show a disposition to try a change of mastership. They are bribed into good behaviour by better treatment: a further diminution of force, a further drift towards co-operation; they give labour, we give food and protection. As the tribes enlarge, it is found that those have most cohesion where the position of slaves is recognized by definite rights and privileges. Slavery becomes serfdom or villeiny. The lord gives land and protection, the serf labour and military service: a further drift from force, a further drift towards co-operation, exchange. With the introduction of money even the form of force disappears: the labourer pays rent and the lord pays his soldiers. It is free exchange on both sides, and economic force has replaced physical force. The further the drift from force towards simple economic interest the better the result for the effort expended. The Tartar khan, who seizes by force the wealth in his State, giving no adequate return, soon has none to seize. Men will not work to create what they cannot enjoy, so that, finally, the khan has to kill a man by torture in order to obtain a sum which is the thousandth part of what a London tradesman will spend to secure a title carrying no right to the exercise of force from a Sovereign who has lost all right

to the use or exercise of physical force, the head of the wealthiest country in the world, the sources of whose wealth are the most removed from any process involving the exercise of physical force.

But while this process is going on inside the tribe, or group, or nation, force and hostility as between differing tribes or nations remain; but not undiminished. At first it suffices for the fuzzy head of a rival tribesman to appear above the bushes for primitive man to want to hit it. He is a foreigner: kill him. Later, he only wants to kill him if he is at war with his tribe. There are periods of peace: diminution of hostility. In the first conflicts all of the other tribe are killed—men, women, and children. Force and pugnacity are absolute. But the use of slaves, both as labourers and as concubines, attenuates this; there is a diminution of force. The women of the hostile tribe bear children by the conqueror: there is a diminution of pugnacity. At the next raid into the hostile territory it is found that there is nothing to take, because everything has been killed or carried off. So on later raids the conqueror kills the chiefs only (a further diminution of pugnacity, a further drift from mere impulse), or merely dispossesses them of their lands, which he divides among his followers (Norman Conquest type). We have already passed the stage of extermination.* The conqueror

* Without going to the somewhat obscure analogies of biological science, it is evident from the simple facts of the world that, if at any stage of human development warfare ever did make for the survival of the fit, we have long since passed out of that stage. When we conquer a nation in these days, we do not exterminate it: we leave it where it was. When we "overcome" the servile races, far from eliminating them, we give them added chances of life by introducing order, etc., so that the lower human quality

simply absorbs the conquered—or the conquered absorbs the conqueror, whichever you like. It is no longer the case of one gobbling up the other. Neither is gobbled. In the next stage we do not even dispossess the chiefs—a further sacrifice of physical force—we merely impose tribute. But the conquering nation soon finds itself in the position of the khan in his own State—the more he squeezes the less he gets, until, finally, the cost of getting the money by military means exceeds what is obtained. It was the case of Spain in Spanish America—the more territory she "owned" the poorer she became. The wise conqueror, then, finds that better than the exaction of tribute is an exclusive market—old British colonial type. But in the process of ensuring exclusiveness more is lost than is gained: the colonies are allowed to choose their own system—further drift from the use of force, further drift from hostility and pugnacity. Final result: complete

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tends to be perpetuated by conquest by the higher. If ever it happens that the Asiatic races challenge the white in the industrial or military field, it will be in large part thanks to the work of race conservation, which has been the result of England's conquest in India, Egypt, and Asia generally, and her action in China when she imposed commercial contact on the Chinese by virtue of military power. War between people of roughly equal development makes also for the survival of the unfit, since we no longer exterminate and massacre a conquered race, but only their best elements (those carrying on the war), and the conqueror uses up *his* best elements in the process, so that the less fit of both sides are left to perpetuate the species. Nor do the facts of the modern world lend any support to the theory that preparation for war under modern conditions tends to preserve virility, since those conditions involve an artificial barrack life, a highly mechanical training favourable to the destruction of initiative, and a mechanical uniformity and centralization tending to crush individuality, and to hasten the drift towards a centralized bureaucracy already too great.

abandonment of physical force, co-operation on basis of mutual profit the only relationship, with reference not merely to colonies which have become in fact foreign States, but also to States foreign in name as well as in fact. We have arrived not at the intensification of the struggle between men, but at a condition of vital dependence upon the prosperity of foreigners. Could England by some magic kill all foreigners, half the British population would starve. This is not a condition making indefinitely for hostility to foreigners; still less is it a condition in which such hostility finds its justification in any real instinct of self-preservation or in any deep-seated biological law. With each new intensification of dependence between the parts of the organism must go that psychological development which has marked every stage of the progress in the past, from the day that we killed our prisoner in order to eat him, and refused to share him with our fellow, to the day that the telegraph and the bank have rendered military force economically futile.

But the foregoing does not include all the facts, or all the factors. If Russia does England an injury—sinks a fishing fleet in time of peace, for instance—it is no satisfaction to us to go out and kill a lot of Frenchmen or Irishmen. We want to kill Russians. If, however, we knew a little less geography—if, for instance, we were Chinese Boxers, it would not matter in the least which we killed, because to the Chinaman all alike are "foreign devils": his knowledge of the case does not enable him to differentiate between the various nationalities of Europeans. In the case of a wronged negro in the Congo the collective responsibility is still wider; for a wrong inflicted by one white man he

will avenge himself on any other—German, British French, Dutch, Belgian, or Chinese. As our knowledge increases, our sense of the collective responsibility of outside groups narrows. But immediately we start on this differentiation there is no stopping. The yokel is satisfied if he can "get a whack at them foreigners"—Germans will do if Russians are not available. The more educated man wants Russians; but if he stops a moment longer, he will see that in killing Russian peasants he might as well be killing so many Hindoos, for all they had to do with the matter. He then wants to get at the Russian Government. But so do a great many Russians—Liberals, Reformers, etc. He then sees that the real conflict is not Britons against Russians at all, but the interest of all law-abiding folk—Russian and Briton alike—against oppression, corruption, and incompetence. To give the Russian Government an opportunity of going to war would only strengthen its hands against those with whom he was in sympathy—the Reformers. As war would increase the influence of the reactionary party in Russia, it would do nothing to prevent the recurrence of such incidents, and so quite the wrong party would suffer. Were the real facts and the real responsibilities understood, a Liberal people would reply to such an aggression by taking every means which the social and economic relationship of the two States afforded to enable Russian Liberals to hang a few Russian Admirals and establish a Russian Liberal Government. In any case, the realization of the fact attenuates our hostility. In the same way, as we become more familiar with the facts, we shall attenuate our hostility to "Germans." A British patriot recently said, "We must smash

Prussianism." The majority of Germans are in cordial agreement with him, and are working to that end. But if Great Britain went to war for that purpose, Germans would be compelled to fight for Prussianism. War between States for a political ideal of this kind is not only futile, it is the sure means of perpetuating the very condition which it would bring to an end. International hostilities repose for the most part upon our conception of the foreign State with which we are quarrelling as a homogeneous personality having the same character of responsibility as an individual, whereas the variety of interests, both material and moral, regardless of State boundaries, renders the analogy between nations and individuals an utterly false one.

Indeed, when the co-operation between the parts of the social organism is as complete as our mechanical development has recently made it, it is impossible to fix the limits not merely of the economic interests, but of the moral interests of the community, and to say what is one community and what is another. Certainly the State limits no longer define the limits of the community; and yet it is only the State limits which international antagonism predicates. If the Louisiana cotton crop fails, a part of Lancashire starves. There is closer community of interest in a vital matter between Lancashire and Louisiana than between Lancashire and, say, the Orkneys, part of the same State. There is much closer intercommunication between Britain and the United States in all that touches social and moral development than between Britain and, say, Bengal, part of the same State. A British nobleman has more community of thought and feeling with a European

continental aristocrat (in marrying his daughter, for instance) than he would think of claiming with such "fellow" British countrymen as a Bengal Babu, a Jamaica negro, or even a Dorset yokel. A professor at Oxford will have closer community of feeling with a member of the French Academy than with, say, a Whitechapel publican. One may go further, and say that a British subject of Quebec has closer contact with Paris than with London; the British subject of Dutch-speaking Africa with Holland than with Great Britain; the British subject of Hong Kong with Pekin than with London; of Egypt, with Constantinople than with London, and so on. In a thousand respects, association cuts across State boundaries, which are purely conventional, and renders the biological division of mankind into independent and warring States a scientific ineptitude.

Allied factors, introduced by the character of modern intercourse, have already gone far to render territorial conquest futile for the satisfaction of natural human pride and vanity. Just as in the economic sphere, factors peculiar to our generation have rendered the old analogy between States and persons a false one, so do these factors render the analogy in the sentimental sphere a false one. While the individual of great possessions does in fact obtain, by reason of his wealth, a deference which satisfies his pride and vanity, the individual of the great nation has no such sentimental advantage as against the citizen of the small nation. No one thinks of respecting the Russian mujik because he belongs to a great nation, or despising a Scandinavian or Belgian gentleman because he belongs to a small one; and any society will accord prestige to

the nobleman of Norway, Holland, Belgium, Spain, or even Portugal, which it refuses to a British "bounder." The nobleman of any country will marry the noble-woman of another more readily than a woman from a lower class of his own country. The prestige of the foreign country rarely counts for anything in the matter, when it comes to the real facts of everyday life, so shallow is the real sentiment which now divides States. Just as in material things community of interest and relationship cut clear across State boundaries, so inevitably will the psychic community of interest come so to do.

Just as, in the material domain, the real biological law, which is association and co-operation between individuals of the same species in the struggle with their environment, has pushed men in their material struggle to conform with that law, so will it do so in the sentimental sphere. We shall come to realize that the real psychic and moral divisions are not as between nations, but as between opposing conceptions of life. Even admitting that man's nature will never lose the combativeness, hostility, and animosity which are so large a part of it (although the manifestations of such feelings have so greatly changed within the historical period as almost to have changed in character), what we shall see is the diversion of those psychological qualities to the real, instead of the artificial, conflict of mankind. We shall see that at the bottom of any conflict between the armies or Governments of Germany and Great Britain lies not the opposition of "German" interests to "British" interests, but the conflict in both States between democracy and autocracy, or between Socialism and Individualism, or reaction and

progress, however one's sociological sympathies may classify it. That is the real division in both countries, and for Germans to conquer Britons, or Britons, Germans, would not advance the solution of such a conflict one iota; and as such conflict becomes more acute, the German individualist will see that it is more important to protect his freedom and property against the Socialist and trade unionist, who can and do attack them, than against the British Army, which cannot. In the same way the British Tory will be more concerned with what Mr. Lloyd George's Budgets can do than with what the Germans can do.* From the realization of these things to the realization on the part of the British democrat that what stands in the way of his securing for social expenditure enormous sums, that now go to armaments, is mainly a lack of co-operation between himself and the democrats of a hostile nation who are in a like case, is but a step, and a step that, if history has any meaning, is bound shortly to be taken. When it is taken, property, capital, Individualism

* One might doubt, indeed, whether the British patriot has really the feeling against the German that he has against his own countrymen of contrary views. Mr. Leo Maxse, in the *National Review* for February, 1911, indulges in the following expressions, applied, not to Germans, but to British statesmen elected by a majority of the British people: Mr. Lloyd George is "a fervid Celt animated by passionate hatred of all things English"; Mr. Churchill is simply a "Tammany Hall politician, without, however, a Tammany man's patriotism." Mr. Harcourt belongs to "that particular type of society demagogue who slangs Peers in public and fawns upon them in private." Mr. Leo Maxse suggests that some of the Ministers should be impeached and hanged. Mr. McKenna is Lord Fisher's "poll-parrot," and the House of Commons is the "poisonous Parliament of infamous memory," in which Ministers were supported by a vast *posse comitatus* of German jackals.

will have to give to its international organization, already far-reaching, a still more definite form, in which international differences will play no part. And when that condition is reached both peoples will find inconceivable the idea that artificial State divisions (which are coming more and more to approximate to mere administrative divisions, leaving free scope within them or across them for the development of genuine nationality) could ever in any way define the real conflicts of mankind.

There remains, of course, the question of time: that these developments will take "thousands" or "hundreds" of years. Yet the interdependence of modern nations is the growth of little more than fifty years. A century ago England could have been self-supporting, and little the worse for it. One must not overlook the Law of Acceleration. The age of man on the earth is placed variously at from thirty thousand to three hundred thousand years. He has in some respects developed more in the last two hundred years than in all the preceding ages. We see more change now in ten years than originally in ten thousand. Who shall foretell the developments of a generation?

CHAPTER V

UNCHANGING HUMAN NATURE

The progress from cannibalism to Herbert Spencer—The disappearance of religious oppression by government—Disappearance of the duel — The Crusaders and the Holy Sepulchre—The wail of militarist writers at man's drift away from militancy.

ALL of us who have had occasion to discuss this subject are familiar with the catch-phrases with which the whole matter is so often dismissed. "You cannot change human nature," "What man always has been during thousands of years, he always will be," are the sort of dicta generally delivered as self-evident propositions that do not need discussion. Or if, in deference to the fact that very profound changes, in which human nature is involved, *have* taken place in the habits of mankind, the statement of the proposition is somewhat less dogmatic, we are given to understand that any serious modification of the tendency to go to war can only be looked for in "thousands of years."

What are the facts? They are these:

That the alleged unchangeability of human nature in this matter is not borne out; that man's pugnacity, though not disappearing, is very visibly, under the

forces of mechanical and social development, being transformed and diverted from ends that are wasteful and destructive to ends that are less wasteful, which render easier that co-operation between men in the struggle with their environment which is the condition of their survival and advance; that changes which, in the historical period, have been extraordinarily rapid are necessarily quickening—quickening in geometrical rather than in arithmetical ratio.

With very great courtesy, one is impelled to ask those who argue that human nature in all its manifestations must remain unchanged how they interpret history. We have seen man progress from the mere animal fighting with other animals, seizing his food by force, seizing also by force his females, eating his own kind, the sons of the family struggling with the father for the possession of the father's wives; we have seen this incoherent welter of animal struggle at least partly abandoned for settled industry, and partly surviving as a more organized tribal warfare or a more ordered pillaging, like that of the Vikings and the Huns; we have seen even these pillagers abandon in part their pillaging for ordered industry, and in part for the more ceremonial conflict of feudal struggle; we have seen even the feudal conflict abandoned in favour of dynastic and religious and territorial conflict, and then dynastic and religious conflict abandoned. There remains now only the conflict of States, and that, too, at a time when the character and conception of the State are being profoundly modified.

Human nature may not change, whatever that vague phrase may mean; but human nature is a complex factor. It includes numberless motives, many of which

are modified in relation to the rest as circumstances change; so that the manifestations of human nature change out of all recognition. Do we mean by the phrase that "human nature does not change" that the feelings of the paleolithic man who ate the bodies of his enemies and of his own children are the same as those of a Herbert Spencer, or even of the modern Londoner who catches his train to town in the morning? If human nature does not change, may we therefore expect the city clerk to brain his mother and serve her up for dinner, or suppose that Lord Roberts, or Lord Kitchener, is in the habit, while on campaign, of catching the babies of his enemies on spear-heads, or driving his motor-car over the bodies of young girls, like the leaders of the old Northmen in their ox-wagons?

What *do* these phrases mean? These, and many like them, are repeated in a knowing way with an air of great wisdom and profundity by journalists and writers of repute, and one may find them blatant any day in our newspapers and reviews; yet the most cursory examination proves them to be neither wise nor profound, but simply parrot-like catch-phrases which lack common sense, and fly in the face of facts of everyday experience.

The truth is that the facts of the world as they stare us in the face show that in our common attitude we not only overlook the modifications in human nature which have occurred historically since yesterday—occurred even in our generation—but we also ignore the modification of human nature which mere difference of social habit and custom and outlook effect. Take the case of the duel. Even educated people in Germany,

France, and Italy, will tell you that it is "not in human nature" to expect a man of gentle birth to abandon the habit of the duel; the notion that honourable people should ever so place their honour at the mercy of whoever may care to insult them is, they assure you, both childish and sordid. With them the matter will not bear discussion.

Yet the great societies which exist in Great Britain, North America, Australia—the whole Anglo-Saxon world, in fact—have abandoned the duel, and we cannot lump the whole Anglo-Saxon race as either sordid or childish.

That such a change as this, which must have conflicted with human pugnacity in its most insidious form—pride and personal vanity, the traditions of an aristocratic status, every one of the psychological factors now involved in international conflict—has been effected in our own generation should surely give pause to those who dismiss as chimerical any hope that rationalism will ever dominate the conduct of nations.

Discussing the impossibility of allowing arbitration to cover all causes of difference, Mr. Roosevelt remarked in justification of large armaments: "We despise a nation, just as we despise a man, who fails to resent an insult."* Mr. Roosevelt seems to forget that the duel with us is extinct. Do *we*, the English-speaking people of the world, to whom presumably Mr. Roosevelt must have been referring, despise a man who fails to resent an insult by arms? Would we not, on the contrary, despise the man who should do so? Yet so recent is

* Speech at Stationers' Hall, June 6, 1910.

this change that it has not yet reached the majority of Europeans.

The vague talk of national honour, as a quality under the especial protection of the soldier, shows, perhaps more clearly than aught else, how much our notions concerning international politics have fallen behind the notions that dominate us in everyday life. When an individual begins to rave about his honour, we may be pretty sure he is about to do some irrational, most likely some disreputable deed. The word is like an oath, serving with its vague yet large meaning to intoxicate the fancy. Its vagueness and elasticity make it possible to regard a given incident, at will, as either harmless or a *casus belli*. Our sense of proportion in these matters approximates to that of the schoolboy. The passing jeer of a foreign journalist, a foolish cartoon, is sufficient to start the dogs of war baying up and down the land.* We call it "maintaining the national prestige," "enforcing respect," and I know not what other high-sounding name. It amounts to the same thing in the end.

The one distinctive advance in civil society achieved by the Anglo-Saxon world is fairly betokened by the passing away of this old notion of a peculiar possession in the way of honour, which has to be guarded by arms. It stands out as the one clear moral gain of the nineteenth century; and, when we observe the notion

* I have in mind here the ridiculous furore that was made by the Jingo Press over some French cartoons that appeared at the outbreak of the Boer War. It will be remembered that at that time France was the "enemy," and Germany was, on the strength of a speech by Mr. Chamberlain, a quasi-ally. We were at that time as warlike towards France as we are now towards Germany. And this is only ten years ago!

resurging in the minds of men, we may reasonably expect to find that it marks one of those reversions in development which so often occur in the realm of mind as well as in that of organic forms.

Two or three generations ago, this progress, even among Anglo-Saxons, towards a rational standard of conduct in this matter, as between individuals, would have seemed as unreasonable as do the hopes of international peace in our day. Even to-day the continental officer is as firmly convinced as ever that the maintenance of personal dignity is impossible save by the help of the duel. He will ask in triumph, "What will you do if one of your own order openly insults you? Can you preserve your self-respect by summoning him to the police-court?" And the question is taken as settling the matter offhand.

The survival, where national prestige is concerned, of the standards of the *code duello* is daily brought before us by the rhetoric of the patriots. Our army and our navy, not the good faith of our statesmen, are the "guardians of our national honour." Like the duellist, the patriot would have us believe that a dishonourable act is made honourable if the party suffering by the dishonour be killed. The patriot is careful to withdraw from the operation of possible arbitration all questions which could affect the "national honour." An "insult to the flag" must be "wiped out in blood." Small nations, which in the nature of the case cannot so resent the insults of great empires, have apparently no right to such a possession as "honour." It is the peculiar prerogative of world-wide empires. The patriots who would thus resent "insults to the flag" may well be asked whether they would condemn the

conduct of the German lieutenant who kills the unarmed civilian in cold blood "for the honour of the uniform."

It does not seem to have struck the patriot that, as personal dignity and conduct have not suffered but been improved by the abandonment of the principle of the duel, there is little reason to suppose that international conduct, or national dignity, would suffer by a similar change of standards.

The whole philosophy underlying the duel, where personal relations are concerned, excites in our day the infinite derision of all Anglo-Saxons. Yet these same Anglo-Saxons maintain it as rigorously as ever in the relations of States.

Profound as is the change involved in the Anglo-Saxon abandonment of the duel, a still more universal change, affecting still more nearly our psychological impulses, has been effected within a relatively recent historical period. I refer to the abandonment, by the Governments of Europe, of their right to prescribe the religious belief of their citizens. For hundreds of years, generation after generation, it was regarded as an evident part of a ruler's right and duty to dictate what his subjects should believe.

As Lecky has pointed out, the preoccupation which for numberless generations was the centre round which all other interests revolved has simply and purely disappeared; coalitions which were once the most serious occupation of statesmen now exist only in the speculations of the expounders of prophecy. Among all the elements of affinity and repulsion that regulate the combinations of nations, dogmatic influences which were once supreme can scarcely be said to exist. There

is a change here reaching down into the most fundamental impulses of the human mind. "Until the seventeenth century every mental discussion, which philosophy pronounces to be essential to legitimate research, was almost uniformly branded as a sin, and a large proportion of the most deadly intellectual vices were deliberately inculcated as virtues."

Anyone who argued that the differences between Catholics and Protestants were not such as force could settle, and that the time would come when man would realize this truth, and regard a religious war between European States as a wild and unimaginable anachronism, would have been put down as a futile doctrinaire, completely ignoring the most elementary facts of "unchanging human nature."

There is one striking incident of the religious struggle of States which illustrates vividly the change which has come over the spirit of man. For nearly two hundred years Christians fought the Infidel for the conquest of the Holy Sepulchre. All the nations of Europe joined in this great endeavour. It seemed to be the one thing which could unite them, and for generations, so profound was the impulse which produced the movement, the struggle went on. There is nothing in history, perhaps, quite comparable to it. Suppose that during this struggle one had told a European statesman of that age that the time would come when, assembled in a room, the representatives of a Europe, which had made itself the absolute master of the Infidel, could by a single stroke of the pen secure the Holy Sepulchre for all time to Christendom, but that, having discussed the matter cursorily twenty minutes or so, they would decide that on the whole it was not worth while!

Had such a thing been told to a mediæval statesman, he would certainly have regarded the prophecy as that of a madman. Yet this, of course, is precisely what has taken place.*

A glance over the common incidents of Europe's history will show the profound change which has visibly taken place, not only in the minds, but in the hearts of men. Things which even in our stage of civilization would no longer be possible, owing to that change in human nature which the military dogmatist denies, were commonplace incidents with our grandfathers. Indeed, the modifications in the religious attitude just touched on assuredly arise from an emotional as much as from an intellectual change. A theology which could declare that the unborn child would suffer eternal torment in the fires of hell for no crime, other than that of its conception, would be in our day impossible on merely emotional grounds.† What was once deemed a mere truism would now be

* In his "History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe,' Lecky says: "It was no political anxiety about the balance of power, but an intense religious enthusiasm that impelled the inhabitants of Christendom towards the site which was at once the cradle and the symbol of their faith. All interests were then absorbed, all classes were governed, all passions subdued or coloured, by religious fervour. National animosities that had raged for centuries were pacified by its power. The intrigues of statesmen and the jealousies of kings disappeared beneath its influence. Nearly two million lives are said to have been sacrificed in the cause. Neglected governments, exhausted finances, depopulated countries, were cheerfully accepted as the price of success. No wars the world has ever before seen were so popular as these, which were at the same time the most disastrous and the most unselfish."

† "Be assured," writes St. Augustine, "and doubt not that not only men who have obtained the use of their reason, but also little

viewed with horror and indignation. Again, as Lecky says, "For a great change has silently swept over Christendom. Without disturbance, an old doctrine has passed away from among the realizations of mankind."

But not alone in the religious sphere do we see the same progress. In a civilization which was in many respects an admirable one it was possible for 400 slaves to be slaughtered because one of them had committed some offence; for a lady of fashion to gratify a momentary caprice by ordering a slave to be crucified; and but a generation or two since for whole populations to turn torture into a public amusement* and a public

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children who have begun to live in their mother's womb and there died, or who, having been just born, have passed away from the world without the Sacrament of Holy Baptism, must be punished by the eternal torture of undying fire." To make the doctrine clearer, he illustrates it by the case of a mother who had two children. Each of these is but a lump of perdition. Neither had ever performed a moral or immoral act. The mother overlies one, and it perishes unbaptized. It goes to eternal torment. The other is baptized and saved.

* This appears sufficiently from the seasons in which, for instance, *autos da fé* in Spain took place. In the Gallery of Madrid there is a painting by Francisco Rizzi representing the execution, or rather the procession to the stake, of a number of heretics during the fêtes that followed the marriage of Charles II., and before the King, his bride, and the Court and clergy of Madrid. The great square was arranged like a theatre, and thronged with ladies in Court dress. The King sat on an elevated platform, surrounded by the chief members of the aristocracy.

Limborch, in his "History of the Inquisition," relates that among the victims of one *auto da fé* was a girl of sixteen, whose singular beauty struck all who saw her with admiration. As she passed to the stake she cried to the Queen: "Great Queen, is not your presence able to bring me some comfort under my misery?

festival; for kings, historically yesterday, to assist personally at the tortures of persons accused of witchcraft. It is related by Pitcairn, in his "Criminal Trials of Scotland," that James I. of Scotland personally presided over the tortures of one Dr. Fian, accused of having caused a storm at sea. The bones of the prisoner's legs were broken into small pieces in the boot, and it was the King himself who suggested the following variation and witnessed the execution of it: the nails of both hands were seized by a pair of pincers and torn from the fingers, and into the bleeding stumps of each finger two needles were thrust up to their heads!

Does anyone seriously contend that the conditions of modern life have not modified psychology in these matters? Does anyone seriously deny that our wider outlook, which is the result of somewhat larger conceptions, our wider reading, has wrought such a change that the repetition of things like these in London or in Edinburgh or in Berlin has become impossible?

Or, is it seriously argued that we may witness a repetition of such, that we are quite capable at any moment of taking pleasure in the burning alive of a beautiful child? Does the Catholic or the Protestant really stand in danger of such things from his religious rival? If human nature is unchanged by the progress of ideas, then he does, and Europe's general adoption of religious freedom is a mistake, and each sect should arm against the other in the old way, and the only real hope of religious peace and safety is in the domination of an absolutely universal Church. This

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Consider my youth, and that I am condemned for a religion which I have sucked in with my mother's milk."

was, indeed, the plea of the old inquisitor, just as it is the plea of the *Spectator* to-day, that the only hope of political peace is in the domination of an absolutely universal power:

"There is only one way to end war and preparation for war, and that is, as we have said, by a universal monarchy. If we can imagine one country—let us say Russia for the sake of argument—so powerful that she could disarm the rest of the world, and then maintain a force big enough to forbid any Power to invade the rights of any other Power . . . no doubt we should have universal peace."*

This dictum recalls one equally emphatic once voiced by a colleague of the late Procurator of the Holy Synod in Russia, who said:

"There is only one way to ensure religious peace in the State, to compel all in that State to conform to the State religion. Those that will not conform must in the interests of peace be driven out."

Mr. Lecky, who of all authors has written most suggestively, perhaps, on the disappearance of religious persecution, has pointed out that the strife between opposing religious bodies arose out of a religious spirit which, though often high-minded and disinterested (he protests with energy against the notion that persecution as a whole was dictated by interested motives), was unpurified by rationalism; and he adds that the irrationality which once characterized the religious sentiment has now been replaced by the irrationality of patriotism. Mr. Lecky says:

"If we take a broad view of the course of history, and examine the relations of great bodies of men, we find that

* *Spectator*, December 31, 1910.

religion and patriotism are the chief moral influences to which they have been subjected, and that the separate modifications and mutual interaction of these two agents may almost be said to constitute the moral history of mankind."

Is it to be expected that the rationalization and humanization which have taken place in the more complex domain of religious doctrine and belief will not also take place in the domain of patriotism? More especially, as the same author points out, because it is the necessities of material interest which brought about the reform in the first domain, and because "not only does interest, as distinct from passion, gain a greater empire with advancing civilization, but passion itself is mainly guided by its power."

Have we not abundant evidence, indeed, that the passion of patriotism as divorced from material interest is being modified by the pressure of material interest? Are not the numberless facts of national interdependence which I have indicated here pushing inevitably to that result? And are we not justified in concluding that, just as the progress of rationalism has made it possible for the various religious groups to live together, to exist side by side without physical conflict; just as there has been in that domain no necessary choice between universal domination or unending strife, so in like manner will the progress of political rationalism mark the evolution of the relationship of political groups; that the struggle for domination will cease because it will be realized that physical domination is futile, and that instead of either universal strife or universal domination there will come, without formal treaties or Holy Alliances, the general determination

for each to go his way undisturbed in his political allegiance, as he is now undisturbed in his religious allegiance?

But perhaps the very strongest evidence that the whole drift of human tendencies is away from such conflict as is represented by war between States is to be found in the writings of those who declare war to be inevitable. Among the writers quoted in the first chapter of this section, there is not one who, if his arguments are examined carefully, does not show that he realizes consciously, or subconsciously, that man's disposition to fight, far from being unchanged, is becoming rapidly enfeebled. Take, for instance, the latest work voicing the philosophy that war is inevitable; that, indeed, it is both wicked and childish to try and prevent it.* Notwithstanding that the inevitability of war is his thesis, he entitles the first section of his book "The Decline of Militancy," and shows clearly, in fact, that the commercial activities of the world lead directly away from war.

"Trade, ducats, and mortgages are regarded as far greater assets and sources of power than armies or navies. They produce national effeminacy and effeteness."

Now, as this tendency is common to all nations of Christendom—indeed, of the world—since commercial and industrial development is world-wide, it necessarily means, if it is true of any one nation, that the world as a whole is drifting away from the tendency to warfare.

A large part of General Lea's book is a sort of Carlylean girding at what he terms "protoplasmic

* See quotations, pp. 136, 137, from General Lea's book, "The Valour of Ignorance."

gourmandizing and retching" (otherwise the busy American industrial and social life of his countrymen). He declares that, when a country makes wealth production and industries its sole aim, it becomes "a glutton among nations, vulgar, swinish, arrogant"; "commercialism, having seized hold of the American people, overshadows it, and tends to destroy not only the aspirations and world-wide career open to the nation, but the Republic itself." "Patriotism in the true sense" (*i.e.*, the desire to go and kill other people) General Lea declares almost dead in the United States. The national ideals, even of the native-born American, are deplorably low:

> "There exists not only individual prejudice against military ideals, but public antipathy; antagonism of politicians, newspapers, churches, colleges, labour unions, theorists, and organized societies. They combat the military spirit as if it were a public evil and a national crime."

But in that case, what in the name of all that is muddleheaded comes of the "unchanging tendency towards warfare"? What is all this curious rhetoric of General Lea's (and I have dealt with him at some length, because his principles if not his language are those which characterize much similar literature in Great Britain, France, Germany, and the continent of Europe generally) but an admission that the whole tendency is not, as he would have us believe, towards war, but away from it? Here is an author who tells us that war is to be for ever inevitable, and in the same breath that men are rapidly conceiving not only a "slothful indifference" to fighting, but a profound antipathy to the military ideal.

Of course, General Lea implies that this tendency is peculiar to the American Republic, and is for that reason dangerous to his country; but, as a matter of fact, General Lea's book might be a free translation of much nationalist literature of either France or Germany.* I cannot recall a single author of either of the four great countries who, treating of the inevitability of war, does not bewail the falling away of his own country from the military ideal, or, at least, the tendency so to fall away. Thus the English journalist reviewing in the *Daily Mail* General Lea's book cannot refrain from saying:

"Is it necessary to point out that there is a moral in all this for us as well as for the American? Surely almost all that Mr. Lea says applies to Great Britain as forcibly as to the United States. We too have lain dreaming. We have let our ideals tarnish. We have grown gluttonous, also. . . . Shame and folly are upon us as well as upon our brethren. Let us hasten with all our energy to cleanse ourselves of them, that we can look the future in the face without fear."

Exactly the same note dominates the literature of a protagonist like Mr. Blatchford. He talks of the "fatal apathy" of the British people. "The people," he says, breaking out in anger at the small disposition they show

* Thus Captain d'Arbeux ("L'Officier Contemporaine," Grasset, Paris, 1911) laments "la disparition progressive de l'idéal de revanche," a military deterioration which is, he declares, working the country's ruin. The general truth of all this is not affected by the fact that 1911, owing to the Moroccan conflict and other matters, saw a revival of Chauvinism. But it is already spending itself. The *Matin*, December, 1911, remarks: "The number of candidates at St. Cyr and St. Maixent is decreasing to a terrifying degree. It is hardly a fourth of what it was a few years ago. . . . The profession of arms has no longer the attraction that it had."

to kill other people, "are conceited, self-indulgent, decadent, and greedy. They will shout for the Empire, but they will not fight for it."* A glance at such publications as *Blackwood's*, the *National Review*, the *Spectator*, the *World*, will reveal precisely similar outbursts.

Of course, Mr. Blatchford declares that the Germans are very different, and that what General Lea (in talking of *his* country) calls the "gourmandizing and retching" is not at all true of Germany. As a matter of fact, however, the phrase I have quoted might have been "lifted" from the work of any average Pan-German, or even from more responsible quarters. Have Mr. Blatchford and General Lea forgotten that no less a person than Prince von Bülow, in a speech made in the Prussian Diet, did, as a matter of fact, use almost the words I have quoted from Mr. Blatchford, and dwelt at length on the self-indulgence and degeneracy, the rage for luxury, etc., which possess modern Germany, and told how the old qualities which had marked the founders of the Empire were disappearing?†

Indeed, do not a great part of the governing classes of Germany almost daily bewail the infiltration of anti-militarist doctrines among the German people, and does not the extraordinary increase in the Socialist vote justify the complaint?

A precisely analogous plea is made by the Nationalist writer in France when he rails at the pacifist tendencies of *his* country, and points to the contrasting warlike activities of neighbouring nations. A glance at a copy

* "Germany and England," p. 19.

† See the first chapter of Mr. Harbutt Dawson's admirable work, "The Evolution of Modern Germany." T. Fisher Unwin, London.

of practically any Nationalist or Conservative paper in France will furnish ample evidence. Hardly a day passes but that the *Écho de Paris*, *Gaulois*, *Figaro*, *Journal des Débats*, *Patrie*, or *Presse*, sounds this note, while one may find it rampant in the works of such serious writers as Paul Bourget, Faguet, Le Bon, Barrès, Brunetière, Paul Adam, to say nothing of more popular publicists like Déroulède, Millevoye, Drumont, etc.

All these advocates of war, therefore—American, British, German, French—are at one in declaring that foreign countries are very warlike, but that their own country, "sunk in sloth," is drifting away from war. But, as presumably they know more of their own country than of others, their own testimony therefore involves mutual destruction of their own theories. They are thus unwilling witnesses to the truth, which is that we are all alike—British, Americans, Germans, French—losing the psychological impulse to war, just as we have lost the psychological impulse to kill our neighbours on account of religious differences, or (at least in the case of the Anglo-Saxon) to kill our neighbours in duel for some cause of wounded vanity.

How, indeed, could it be otherwise? How can modern life, with its overpowering proportion of industrial activities and its infinitesimal proportion of military, keep alive the instincts associated with war as against those developed by peace?

Not alone evolution, but common sense and common observation, teach us that we develop most those qualities which we exercise most, which serve us best in the occupation in which we are most engaged. A race of seamen is not developed by agricultural pursuits carried on hundreds of miles from the sea.

Take the case of what is reputed (quite wrongly incidentally) to be the most military nation in Europe —Germany. The immense majority of adult Germans —speaking practically, all who make up what we know as Germany—have never seen a battle, and in all human probability never will see one. In forty years eight thousand Germans have been in the field about twelve months—against naked blacks.* So that the proportion of warlike activities as compared with peaceful activities works out at one as against hundreds of thousands. I wish it were possible to illustrate this diagrammatically; but it could not be done in this book, because if a single dot the size of a full-stop were to be used to illustrate the expenditure of time in actual war, I should have to fill most of the book with dots to illustrate the time spent by the balance of the population in peace activities.†

In that case, how can we possibly expect to keep alive warlike qualities, when all our interests and activities—all our environments, in short—are peace-like?

In other words, the occupations which develop the qualities of industry and peace are so much in excess of those which would develop the qualities we associate

* I have excluded the "operations" with the Allies in China. But they only lasted a few weeks. And were they war? This illustration appears in M. Novikow's "Le Darwinisme Social."

† The most recent opinion on evolution would go to show that environment plays an even larger rôle in the formation of character than selection (see Prince Kropotkin's article, *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1910, in which he shows that experiment reveals the direct action of surroundings as the main factor of evolution). How immensely, therefore, must our industrial environment modify the pugnacious impulse of our nature!

with war that such excess has almost now passed beyond any ordinary means of visual illustration, and has entirely passed beyond any ordinary human capacity fully to appreciate. Peace is with us now nearly always; war is with us rarely, yet we are told that it is the qualities of war which will survive, and the qualities of peace which will be subsidiary.

I am not forgetting, of course, the military training, the barrack life which is to keep alive the military tradition. I have dealt with that question in the next chapter. It suffices for the moment to note that such training is justified on the ground (notably among those who would introduce it into Great Britain)—(1) that it insures peace; (2) that it renders a population more efficient in the arts of peace—that is to say, perpetuates that condition of "slothful ease" which we are told is so dangerous to our characters, in which we are bound to lose the "warlike qualities," and which renders society still more "gourmandizing" in Homer Lea's contemptuous phrase, still more "Cobdenite" in Mr. Leo Maxe's. One cannot have it both ways. If long-continued peace is enervating, it is mere self-stultification to plead for conscription on the ground that it will still further prolong that enervating condition. If Mr. Leo Maxe snears at industrial society and the peace ideal—"the Cobdenite ideal of buying cheap and selling dear"—he must not defend German conscription (though he does) on the ground that it renders German commerce more efficient—that, in other words, it advances that "Cobdenite ideal." In that case, the drift away from war will be stronger than ever. Perhaps some of all this inconsistency was in Mr. Roosevelt's mind when he declared that by

"war alone" can man develop those manly qualities, etc. If conscription really does prolong peace and increase our aptitude for the arts of peace, then conscription itself is but a factor in man's temperamental drift away from war, in the change of his nature towards peace.

It is not because man is degenerate or swinish or gluttonous (such language, indeed, applied as it is by General Lea to the larger and better part of the human race, suggests a not very high-minded ill-temper at the stubbornness of facts which rhetoric does not affect) that he is showing less and less disposition to fight, but because he is condemned by the real "primordial law" to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, and his nature in consequence develops those qualities which the bulk of his interests and capacities demand and favour.

And finally, of course, we are told that even though these forces be at work, they must take "thousands of years" to operate. This dogmatism ignores the Law of Acceleration, as true in the domain of sociology as in that of physics, which I have touched on at the close of the preceding chapter. The most recent evidence would seem to show that man as a fire-using animal dates back to the Tertiary epoch—say, three hundred thousand years. Now, in all that touches this discussion, man in Northern Europe (in Great Britain, say) remained unchanged for two hundred and ninety-eight thousand of those years. In the last two thousand years he changed more than in the two hundred and ninety-eight thousand preceding, and in one hundred he has changed more, perhaps, than in the preceding two thousand. The comparison becomes more under-

standable if we resolve it into hours. For, say, fifty years the man was a cannibal savage or a wild animal, hunting other wild animals, and then in the space of three months he became John Smith of Surbiton, attending church, passing laws, using the telephone, and so on. That is the history of European mankind. And in the face of it the wiseacres talk sapiently, and lay it down as a self-evident and demonstrable fact that the abandonment of inter-State war, which, by reason of the mechanics of our civilization, accomplishes nothing and can accomplish nothing, will for ever be rendered impossible because, once man has got the habit of doing a thing, he will go on doing it, although the reason which in the first instance prompted it has long since disappeared—because, in short, of the "unchangeability of human nature."

CHAPTER VI

DO THE WARLIKE NATIONS INHERIT THE EARTH?

The confident dogmatism of militarist writers on this subject—The facts—The lessons of Spanish America—How conquest makes for the survival of the unfit—Spanish method and English method in the New World—The virtues of military training—The Dreyfus case—The threatened Germanization of England—"The war which made Germany great and Germans small."

THE militarist authorities I have quoted in the preceding chapter admit, therefore, and admit very largely, man's drift, in a sentimental sense, away from war. But that drift, they declare, is degeneration; without those qualities which "war alone," in Mr. Roosevelt's phrase, can develop, man will "rot and decay."

This plea is, of course, directly germane to our subject. To say that the qualities which we associate with war, and nothing else but war, are necessary to assure a nation success in its struggles with other nations is equivalent to saying that those who drift away from war will go down before those whose warlike activity can conserve those qualities essential to survival; which is but another way of saying that men must always remain warlike if they are to survive, that the warlike nations inherit the earth; that men's pugnacity, therefore, is the outcome of the great natural law of survival, and that a decline of pugnacity

marks in any nation a recession and not an advance in its struggle for survival. I have already indicated (Chapter II., Part II.) the outlines of the proposition, which leaves no escape from this conclusion. This is the scientific basis of the proposition voiced by the authorities I have quoted—Mr. Roosevelt, Von Moltke, Coulton, Renan, Nietzsche, and various of the warlike clergy*—and it lies at the very bottom of the plea that man's nature, in so far as it touches the tendency of men as a whole to go to war, does not change; that the warlike qualities are a necessary part of human vitality in the struggle for existence; that, in short, all that we know of the law of evolution forbids the conclusion that man will ever lose this warlike pugnacity, or that nations will survive other than by the struggle of physical force.

The view is best voiced, perhaps, by Homer Lea, whom I have already quoted. He says, in his "Valour of Ignorance":

"As physical vigour represents the strength of man in his struggle for existence, in the same sense military vigour constitutes the strength of nations; ideals, laws, constitutions are but temporary effulgences" (p. 11). "The deterioration of the military force and the consequent destruction of the militant spirit have been concurrent with national decay"

* See, notably, Mr. Roosevelt's dictum: "In this world the nation that is trained to a career of unwarlike and isolated ease is bound to go down in the end before other nations which have not lost the manly and adventurous qualities." This view is even emphasized in the speech which Mr. Roosevelt recently delivered at the University of Berlin (see *Times*, May 13, 1910). "The Roman civilization," declared Mr. Roosevelt—perhaps, as the *Times* remarks, to the surprise of those who have been taught to believe that *latifundia perditere Italiam*—"went down primarily because the Roman citizen would not fight, because Rome had lost the fighting edge." (See footnote, p. 154.)

(p. 24). "International disagreements are . . . the result of the primordial conditions that sooner or later cause war. . . . the law of struggle, the law of survival, universal, unalterable . . . to thwart them, to short-cut them, to circumvent them, to cozen, to deny, to scorn, to violate them, is folly such as man's conceit alone makes possible. . . . Arbitration denies the inexorability of natural laws . . . that govern the existence of political entities" (pp. 76, 77). "Laws that govern the militancy of a people are not of man's framing, but follow the primitive ordinances of nature that govern all forms of life, from simple protozoa, awash in the sea, to the empires of man" ("The Valour of Ignorance." Harpers).

I have already indicated the grave misconception which lies at the bottom of the interpretation of the evolutionary law here indicated. What we are concerned with now is to deal with the facts on which this alleged general principle is inductively based. We have seen from the foregoing chapter that man's nature certainly does change; the next step is to show, from the facts of the present-day world, that the warlike qualities do not make for survival, that the warlike nations do not inherit the earth.

Which are the military nations? We generally think of them in Europe as Germany and France, or perhaps also Russia, Austria, and Italy. Admittedly (*vide* all the British and American military pundits and economists) Great Britain is the least militarized nation in Europe, the United States perhaps in the world. It is, above all, Germany that appeals to us as the type of the military nation, one in which the stern school of war makes for the preservation of the "manly and adventurous qualities."

The facts want a little closer examination. What is

a career of unwarlike ease, in Mr. Roosevelt's phrase? In the last chapter we saw that during the last forty years eight thousand out of sixty million Germans have been engaged in warfare during a trifle over a year, and that against Hottentots or Hereros—a proportion of war days per German as against peace days per German which is as one to some hundreds of thousands. So that if we are to take Germany as the type of the military nation, and if we are to accept Mr. Roosevelt's dictum that by war alone can we acquire "those virile qualities necessary to win in the stern strife of actual life," we shall nevertheless be doomed to lose them, for under conditions like those of Germany how many of us can ever see war, or can pretend to fall under its influence? As already pointed out, the men who really give the tone to the German nation, to German life and conduct—that is to say, the majority of adult Germans—have never seen a battle and never will see one. France has done much better. Not only has she seen infinitely more of actual fighting, but her population is much more militarized than that of Germany, 50 per cent. more, in fact, since, in order to maintain from a population of forty millions the same military effective as Germany does with sixty millions, 1½ per cent. of the French population is under arms as against 1 per cent. of the German.*

* See M. Messimy's Report on the War Budget for 1908 (annexe 3, p. 474). The importance of these figures is not generally realized. Astonishing as the assertion may sound, conscription in Germany is not universal, while it is in France. In the latter country every man of every class actually goes through the barracks, and is subjected to the real discipline of military training: the whole training of the nation is purely military. This is not the case in Germany. Very nearly half of the young

Still more military in both senses is Russia, as we know, and more military than Russia is Turkey, and more military than Turkey as a whole are the semi-independent sections of Turkey, Arabia, and Albania, and then, perhaps, comes Morocco.

On the Western Hemisphere we can draw a like table as to the "warlike, adventurous, manly and progressive peoples" as compared with the "peaceful, craven, slothful and decadent." The least warlike of all, the nation which has had the least training in war, the least experience of it, which has been the least purified by it, is Canada. After that comes the United States, and after that the best (excuse me, I mean, of course, the worst)—*i.e.*, the least warlike—of the Spanish American republics like Mexico and Argentina; while the most warlike of all, and consequently the most "manly and progressive," are the "Sambo" republics, like San Domingo, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Venezuela. They are always fighting. If they cannot manage to get up a fight between one another, the various parties in each republic will fight between

men of the country are not soldiers. Another important point is that the part of the German nation which makes up the country's intellectual life escapes the barracks. To all practical purposes very nearly all young men of the better class enter the army as one year volunteers, by which they escape more than a few weeks of barracks, and even then escape its worst features. It cannot be too often pointed out that intellectual Germany has never been subjected to real barrack influence. As one critic says: "The German system does not put this class through the mill," and is deliberately designed to save them from the grind of the mill. France's military activities since 1870 have, of course, been much greater than those of Germany—Tonkin, Madagascar, Algeria, Morocco. As against these, Germany has had only the Hereros campaign.

themselves. Here we get the real thing. The soldiers do not pass their lives in practising the goose-step, cleaning harness, pipeclaying belts, but in giving and taking hard pounding. Several of these progressive republics have never known a year since they declared their independence from Spain in which thay have not had a war. And quite a considerable proportion of the populations spend their lives in fighting. During the first twenty years of Venezuela's independent existence she fought no less than one hundred and twenty important battles, either with her neighbours or with herself, and she has maintained the average pretty well ever since. Every election is a fight—none of your "mouth-fighting," none of your craven talking-shops for them. Good, honest, hard, manly knocks, with anything from one to five thousand dead and wounded left on the field. The presidents of these strenuous republics are not poltroons of politicians, but soldiers—men of blood and iron with a vengeance, men after Mr. Roosevelt's own heart, all following "the good old rule, the simple plan." These are the people who have taken Carlyle's advice to "shut up the talking-shops." *They* fight it out like men; *they* talk with Gatling-guns and Mausers. Oh, they are a very fine, manly, military lot! If fighting makes for survival, they should completely oust from the field Canada and the United States, one of which has never had a real battle for the best part of its hundred years of craven, sordid, peaceful life, and the other of which General Homer Lea assures us is surely dying, because of its tendency to avoid fighting.

General Lea does not make any secret of the fact (and if he did, some of his rhetoric would display it)

that he is out of sympathy with predominant American ideals. He might emigrate to Venezuela, or Colombia, or Nicaragua. He would be able to prove to each military dictator in turn that, in converting the country into a shambles, far from committing a foul crime for which such dictators should be, and are, held in execration by civilized men the world over, they are, on the contrary, but obeying one of God's commands in tune with all the immutable laws of the universe. I desire to write in all seriousness, but to one who happens to have seen at first hand something of the conditions which arise from a real military conception of civilization it is very difficult. How does Mr. Roosevelt, who declares that "by war alone can we acquire those virile qualities necessary to win in the stern strife of actual life"; how does Von Stengel, who declares that "war is a test of a nation's health, political, physical, and moral"; how do our militarists, who infer that the military state is so much finer than the Cobdenite one of commercial pursuits; how does M. Ernest Renan, who declares that war is the condition of progress, and that under peace we should sink to a degree of degeneracy difficult to realize; and how do the various English clergymen who voice a like philosophy reconcile their creed with military Spanish America? How can they urge that non-military industrialism, which, with all its shortcomings, has on the Western Continent given us Canada and the United States, makes for decadence and degeneration, while militarism and the qualities and instincts that go with it have given us Venezuela and San Domingo? Do we not all recognize that industrialism—General Lea's "gourmandizing and retching" notwithstanding

—is the one thing which will save these military republics; that the one condition of their advance is that they shall give up the stupid and sordid gold-braid militarism and turn to honest work?

If ever there was a justification for Herbert Spencer's sweeping generalization that "advance to the highest forms of man and society depends on the decline of militancy and the growth of industrialism," it is to be found in the history of the South and Central American Republics. Indeed, Spanish America at the present moment affords more lessons than we seem to be drawing, and, if militancy makes for advance and survival, it is a most extraordinary thing that all who are in any way concerned with those countries, all who live in them and whose future is wrapped up in them, can never sufficiently express their thankfulness that at last there seems to be a tendency with some of them to get away from the blood and valour nonsense which has been their curse for three centuries, and to exchange the military ideal for the Cobdenite one of buying cheap and selling dear which excites so much contempt.

Some years ago an Italian lawyer, a certain Tomasso Caivano, wrote a letter detailing his experiences and memories of twenty years' life in Venezuela and the neighbouring republics, and his general conclusions have for this discussion a direct relevancy. As a sort of farewell exhortation to the Venezuelans, he wrote:

"The curse of your civilization is the soldier and the soldier's temper. It is impossible for two of you, still less for two parties, to carry on a discussion without one wanting to fight the other about the matter in hand. You regard it as a derogation of dignity to consider the point of view of

the other side, and to attempt to meet it, if it is possible to fight about it. You deem that personal valour atones for all defects. The soldier of evil character is more considered amongst you than the civilian of good character, and military adventure is deemed more honourable than honest labour. You overlook the worst corruption, the worst oppression, in your leaders if only they gild it with military fanfaronade and declamation about bravery and destiny and patriotism. Not until there is a change in this spirit will you cease to be the victims of evil oppression. Not until your general populace—your peasantry and your workers—refuse thus to be led to slaughter in quarrels of which they know and care nothing, but into which they are led because they also prefer fighting to work—not until all this happens will those beautiful lands which are among the most fertile on God's earth support a happy and prosperous people living in contentment and secure possession of the fruits of their labour."*

Spanish America seems at last in a fair way of throwing off the domination of the soldier and awakening from these nightmares of successive military despotisms tempered by assassination, though, in abandoning, in Signor Caivano's words, "military adventure for honest labour," she will necessarily have less to do with those deeds of blood and valour of which her history has been so full. But those in South America who matter are not mourning. Really they are not.†

* *Vox de la Naçion*, Caracas, April 22, 1897.

† Even Mr. Roosevelt calls South American history mean and bloody. It is noteworthy that, in his article published in the *Bachelor of Arts* for March, 1896, Mr. Roosevelt, who lectured Englishmen so vigorously on their duty at all costs not to be guided by sentimentalism in the government of Egypt, should write thus at the time of Mr. Cleveland's Venezuelan message to

And the thing can be duplicated absolutely on this side of the hemisphere. Change a few names, and you get Arabia or Morocco. Listen to this from a recent *Times* article :*

"The fact is that for many years past Turkey has almost invariably been at war in some part or other of Arabia. . . . At the present moment Turkey is actually conducting three separate small campaigns within Arabia or upon its borders, and a fourth series of minor operations in Mesopotamia. The last-named movement is against the Kurdish tribes of the Mosul district. . . . Another, and more important, advance is against the truculent Muntefik Arabs of the Euphrates delta. . . . The fourth, and by far the largest, campaign is the unending warfare in the province of Yemen, north of Aden, where the Turks have been fighting intermittently for more than a decade. The peoples of Arabia are also indulging in conflict on their own account. The interminable feud between the rival potentates of Nedjd, Ibn Saud of Riadh and Ibn Rashid of Hail, has broken out afresh, and the tribes of the coastal province of El Katar are supposed to have plunged into the fray. The Muntefik Arabs, not content with worrying the Turks, are harrying the territories of Sheikh Murbarak of Koweit. In the far south the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla, a feudatory of the British Government, is conducting a tiny war against a hostile tribe in the mysterious Hadramaut. In the west the Beduin are spasmodically menacing certain sections of the

England: "Mean and bloody though the history of the South American republics has been, it is distinctly in the interest of civilization that . . . they should be left to develop along their own lines . . . Under the best of circumstances, a colony is in a false position; but if a colony is a region where the colonizing race has to do its work by means of other and inferior races, the condition is much worse, There is no chance for any tropical colony owned by a Northern race."

* June 2, 1910.

Hedjaz Railway, which they very much dislike. . . . Ten years ago the Ibn Rashids were nominally masters of a great deal of Arabia, and grew so aggressive that they tried to seize Koweit. The fiery old Sheikh of Koweit marched against them, and alternately won and lost. He had his revenge. He sent an audacious scion of the Ibn Sauds to the old Wahabi capital of Riadh, and by a remarkable stratagem the youth captured the stronghold with only fifty men. The rival parties have been fighting at intervals ever since."

And so on and so on to the extent of a column. So that what Venezuela and Nicaragua are to the American Continent, Arabia, Albania, Armenia, Montenegro, and Morocco are to the Eastern Hemisphere. We find exactly the same rule—that just as one gets away from militancy one gets towards advance and civilization; as men lose the tendency to fight they gain the tendency to work, and it is by working with one another, and not by fighting against each other, that men advance.

Take the progression away from militancy, and it gives us a table something like this:

Arabia and Morocco.
Turkish territory as a whole.
The more unruly Balkan States. Montenegro.
Russia.
Spain, Italy, Austria.
France.
Germany.
Scandinavia. Holland. Belgium.
Great Britain.

Do Mr. Roosevelt, Admiral Mahan, Baron von Stengel, Marshal von Moltke, General Lea, and the

English clergymen seriously argue that this list should be reversed, and that Arabia and Turkey should be taken as the types of progressive nations, and England and Germany and Scandinavia as the decadent?

It may be urged that my list is not absolutely accurate, in that Great Britain, having fought more little wars (though the conflict with the Boers, waged with a small, pastoral people, shows how a little war may drain a great country), is more militarized than Germany, which has not been fighting at all. But I have tried in a very rough fashion to arrive at the degree of militancy in each State, and the absence of actual fighting in the case of Germany (as in that of the smaller States) is balanced by the fact of the military training of her people. As I have indicated, France is more military than Germany, both in the extent to which her people are put through the mill of universal military training, and by virtue of the fact that she has done so much more small fighting than Germany (Madagascar, Tonkin, Africa, etc.); while, of course, Russia and the Balkan States are still more military in both senses—more actual fighting, more military training.

Perhaps the militarist will argue that, while useless and unjust wars make for degeneration, just wars are a moral regeneration. But did a nation, group, tribe, family, or individual ever yet enter into a war which he did not think just? The British, or most of them. believed the war against the Boers just, but most of the authorities in favour of war in general outside of Great Britain believed it unjust. Nowhere do you find such deathless, absolute, unwavering belief in the justice of war as in those conflicts which all Christendom

knows to be at once unjust and unnecessary. I refer to the religious wars of Mohammedan fanaticism.

Do you suppose that when Nicaragua goes to war with San Salvador, or Costa Rica or Colombia with Peru, or Peru with Chili, or Chili with Argentina, they do not each and every one of them believe that they are fighting for immutable and deathless principles? The civilization of most of them is, of course, as like as two peas, and there is no more reason, except their dislike of rational thought and hard work, why they should fight with one another, than that Dorset should fight with Devon, despite General Lea's fine words as to the primordial character of national differences; to one another they are as alike, and whether San Salvador beats Costa Rica or Costa Rica San Salvador does not, so far as essentials are concerned, matter twopence. But their rhetoric of patriotism—the sacrifice, and the deathless glory, and the rest of it—is often just as sincere as ours. That is the tragedy of it, and it is that which gives to the solution of the problem in Spanish America its real difficulty.

But even if we admit that warfare *à l'espagnole* may be degrading, and that just wars are ennobling and necessary to our moral welfare, we should nevertheless be condemned to degeneracy and decline. A just war implies that someone must act unjustly towards us, but as the general condition improves—as it is improving in Europe as compared with Central and South America, or Morocco, or Arabia—we shall get less and less "moral purification"; as men become less and less disposed to make unjustifiable attacks, they will become more and more degenerate. In such incoherence are we landed by the pessimistic and impossible philosophy

that men will decay and die unless they go on killing each other.

What is the fundamental error at the base of the theory that war makes for the survival of the fit—that warfare is any necessary expression of the law of survival? It is the illusion induced by the hypnotism of a terminology which is obsolete. The same factor which leads us so astray in the economic domain leads us astray in this also.

Conquest does not make for the elimination of the conquered; the weakest do not go to the wall, though that is the process which those who adopt the formula of evolution in this matter have in their minds.

Great Britain has conquered India. Does that mean that the inferior race is replaced by the superior? Not the least in the world; the inferior race not only survives, but is given an extra lease of life by virtue of the conquest. If ever the Asiatic threatens the white race, it will be thanks in no small part to the work of race conservation which England's conquests in the East have involved. War, therefore, does not make for the elimination of the unfit and the survival of the fit. It would be truer to say that it makes for the survival of the unfit.

What is the real process of war? You carefully select from the general population on both sides the healthiest, sturdiest, the physically and mentally soundest, those possessing precisely the virile and manly qualities which you desire to preserve, and, having thus selected the élite of the two populations, you exterminate them by battle and disease, and leave the worst of both sides to amalgamate in the process of conquest or defeat—because, in so far as the final amal-

gamation is concerned, both processes have the same result—and from this amalgam of the worst of both sides you create the new nation or the new society which is to carry on the race. Even supposing the better nation wins, the fact of conquest results only in the absorption of the inferior qualities of the beaten nation—inferior presumably because beaten, and inferior because we have killed off their selected best and absorbed the rest, since we no longer exterminate the women, the children, the old men, and those too weak or too feeble to go into the army.*

You have only to carry on this process long enough and persistently enough to weed out completely from both sides the type of man to whom alone we can look for the conservation of virility, physical vigour, and hardihood. That such a process did play no small rôle in the degeneration of Rome and the populations on which the crux of the Empire reposed there can hardly be any reasonable doubt. And the process of degeneration on the part of the conqueror is aided by this added factor: If the conqueror profits much by

* Seeley says: The Roman Empire perished for want of men." One historian of Greece, discussing the end of the Peloponnesian wars, said: "Only cowards remained, and from their broods came the new generations."

Three million men — the élite of Europe — perished in the Napoleonic wars. It is said that after those wars the height standard of the French adult population fell abruptly 1 inch. However that may be, it is quite certain that the physical fitness of the French people was immensely worsened by the drain of the Napoleonic wars, since, as the result of a century of militarism, France is compelled every few years to reduce the standard of physical fitness in order to keep up her military strength, so that now even 3-feet dwarfs are impressed.

his conquest, as the Romans in one sense did, it is the conqueror who is threatened by the enervating effect of the soft and luxurious life; while it is the conquered who are forced to labour for the conqueror, and who learn in consequence those qualities of steady industry which are certainly a better moral training than living upon the fruits of others, upon labour extorted at the sword's point. It is the conqueror who becomes effete, and it is the conquered who learn discipline and the qualities making for a well-ordered State.

To say of war, therefore, as does Baron von Stengel, that it destroys the frail trees, leaving the sturdy oaks standing, is merely to state with absolute confidence the exact reverse of the truth: to take advantage of loose catch-phrases, which by inattention not only distort common thought in these matters, but often turn the truth upside down. Our everyday ideas are full of illustrations of the same thing. For hundreds of years we talked of the "riper wisdom of the ancients," implying that this generation is the youth in experience, and that the early ages had the accumulated experience—the exact reverse, of course, of the truth. Yet "the learning of the ancients" and "the wisdom of our forefathers" was a common catch-phrase, even in the British Parliament, until an English country parson killed this nonsense by ridicule.*

I do not urge that the somewhat simple, elementary, selective process which I have described accounts in itself for the decadence of military Powers. That is only a part of the process: the whole of it is somewhat

* I think one may say fairly that it *was* Sydney Smith's wit rather than Bacon's wisdom which killed this curious illusion.

more complicated, in that the process of elimination of the good in favour of the bad is quite as much sociological as biological; that is to say, if during long periods a nation gives itself up to war, trade languishes, the population loses the habit of steady industry, government and administration become corrupt, abuses escape punishment, and the real sources of a people's strength and expansion dwindle. What has caused the relative failure and decline of Spanish, Portuguese, and French expansion in Asia and the New World, and the relative success of British expansion therein? Was it the mere hazards of war which gave to Great Britain the domination of India and half of the New World? That is surely a superficial reading of history. It was, rather, that the methods and processes of Spain, Portugal, and France were military, while those of the Anglo-Saxon world were commercial and peaceful. Is it not a commonplace that in India, quite as much as in the New World, the trader and the settler drove out the soldier and the conqueror? The difference between the two methods was that one was a process of conquest, and the other of colonizing, or non-military administration for commercial purposes. The one embodied the sordid Cobdenite idea, which so excites the scorn of the militarists, and the other the lofty military ideal. The one was parasitism; the other co-operation.*

Those who confound the power of a nation with the size of its army and navy are mistaking the cheque-book for the money. A child, seeing its father paying bills in cheques, assumes that you only need plenty of

* See the distinction established at the commencement of Chapter VIII.

cheque-books in order to have plenty of money; it does not see that for the cheque-book to have power there must be unseen resources on which to draw. Of what use is domination unless there be individual capacity, social training, industrial resources, to profit thereby? How can you have these things if energy is wasted as in military adventure? Is not the failure of Spain explicable by the fact that she failed to realize this truth? For three centuries she attempted to live upon conquest, upon the force of her arms, and year after year got poorer in the process, and her modern social renaissance dates from the time when she lost the last of her American colonies. It is since the loss of Cuba and the Philippines that Spanish national securities have doubled in value. (At the outbreak of the Hispano-American War Spanish Fours were at 45; they have since touched par.) And if Spain has shown in the last decade a social renaissance not shown perhaps for a hundred and fifty years, it is because a nation still less military than Germany, and still more purely industrial, has compelled Spain once and for all to surrender all dreams of empire and conquest. The circumstances of the last surrender are eloquent in this connection as showing how even in warfare itself the industrial training and the industrial tradition—the Cobdenite ideal of militarist scorn—are more than a match for the training of a society in which military activities are predominant. If it be true that it was the German schoolmaster who conquered at Sedan, it was the Chicago merchant who conquered at Manila. The writer happens to have been in touch both with Spaniards and Americans at the time of the war, and well remembers the scorn with which

Spaniards referred to the notion that the Yankee pork-butchers could possibly conquer a nation of their military tradition, and to the idea that tradesmen would ever be a match for the soldiery and pride of old Spain. And French opinion was not so very different.* Shortly after the war I wrote in an American journal as follows:

"Spain represents the outcome of some centuries devoted mainly to military activity. No one can say that she has been unmilitary or at all deficient in those qualities which we associate with soldiers and soldiering. Yet, if such qualities in any way make for national efficiency, for the conservation of national force, the history of Spain is absolutely inexplicable. In their late contest with America, Spaniards showed no lack of the distinctive military virtues. Spain's inferiority—apart from deficiency of men and money—was precisely in those qualities which industrialism has bred in the unmilitary American. Authentic stories of wretched equipment, inadequate supplies, and bad leadership show to what depths of inefficiency the Spanish service, military and naval, had fallen. We are justified in believing that a much smaller nation than Spain, but one possessing a more industrial and less military training, would have done much better, both as regards resistance to America and the defence of her own colonies. The present position of Holland in Asia seems to prove this. The Dutch, whose traditions are industrial and non-military for the most part, have shown greater power and efficiency as a nation than the Spanish, who are more numerous.

* M. Pierre Loti, who happened to be at Madrid when the troops were leaving to fight the Americans, wrote: "They are, indeed, still the solid and splendid Spanish troops, heroic in every epoch; one only needs to look at them to divine the woe that awaits the American shopkeepers when brought face to face with such soldiers." He prophesied *des surprises sanglantes*. M. Loti is a member of the French Academy.

"Here, as always, it is shown that, in considering national efficiency, even as expressed in military power, the economic problem cannot be divorced from the military, and that it is a fatal mistake to suppose that the power of a nation depends solely upon the power of its public bodies, or that it can be judged simply from the size of its army. A large army may, indeed, be a sign of a national—that is, military—weakness. Warfare in these days is a business like other activities, and no courage, no heroism, no 'glorious past,' no 'immortal traditions,' will atone for deficient rations and fraudulent administration. Good civilian qualities are the ones that will in the end win a nation's battles. The Spaniard is the last one in the world to see this. He talks and dreams of Castilian bravery and Spanish honour, and is above shopkeeping details. . . . A writer on contemporary Spain remarks that any intelligent middle-class Spaniard will admit every charge of incompetence which can be brought against the conduct of public affairs. 'Yes, we have a wretched Government. In any other country somebody would be shot.' This is the hopeless military creed: killing somebody is the only remedy."

Here we see a trace of that intellectual legacy which Spain has left to the New World, and which has stamped itself so indelibly on the history of Spanish America. On a later occasion in this connection I wrote as follows:

"To appreciate the outcome of much soldiering, the condition in which persistent military training may leave a race, one should study Spanish America. Here we have a collection of some score of States, all very much alike in social and political make-up. Most of the South American States so resemble one another in language, laws, institutions, that to an outsider it would seem not to matter a straw under which particular six-months-old republic one should live; whether one be under the government of the pro-

nunciamento-created President of Colombia, or under that of the President of Venezuela, one's condition would appear to be much the same. Apparently no particular country has anything which differentiates it from another, and, consequently, anything to protect against the other. Absolutely the Governments might all change places and the people be none the wiser. Yet, so hypnotized are these little States by the 'necessity for self-protection,' by the glamour of armaments, that there is not one without a relatively elaborate and expensive military establishment to protect it from the rest.

"No conditions seem so propitious for a practical confederation as those of Spanish America; with a few exceptions, the virtual unity of language, laws, general race-ideals would seem to render protection of frontiers supererogatory. Yet the citizens give untold wealth, service, life, and suffering to be protected against a Government exactly like their own. All this waste of life and energy has gone on without it ever occurring to one of these States that it were preferable to be annexed a thousand times over, so trifling would be the resulting change in their condition, than continue the everlasting and futile tribute of blood and treasure. Over some absolutely unimportant matter—like that of the Patagonian roads, which nearly brought Argentina and Chili to grips the other day—as much patriotic devotion will be expended as ever the Old Guard lavished in protecting the honour of the Tricolour. Battles will be fought which will make all the struggles in South Africa appear mean in comparison. Actions in which the dead are counted in thousands will excite no more comment in the world than that produced by a skirmish in Natal, in which a score of yeomen are captured and released."*

In the decade since the foregoing was written things have enormously improved in South America. Why?

* See also letter quoted, pp. 147-48.

For the simple reason, as pointed out in Chapter V of the first part of this book, that Spanish America is being brought more and more into the economic movement of the world; and with the establishment of factories, in which large capital has been sunk, banks, businesses, etc., the whole attitude of mind of those interested in these ventures is changed. The Jingo, the military adventurer, the fomenter of trouble, are seen for what they are—not as patriots, but as representing exceedingly mischievous and maleficent forces.

This general truth has two facets: if long warfare diverts a people from the capacity for industry, so in the long run economic pressure—the influences, that is, which turn the energies of people to preoccupation with social well-being—is fatal to the military tradition. Neither tendency is constant: warfare produces poverty; poverty pushes to thrift and work, which result in wealth; wealth creates leisure and pride and pushes to warfare.

Where Nature does not respond readily to industrial effort, where it is at least apparently more profitable to plunder than to work, the military tradition survives. The Beduin has been a bandit since the time of Abraham, for the simple reason that the desert does not support industrial life nor respond to industrial effort. The only career offering a fair apparent return for effort is plunder. In Morocco, in Arabia, in all very poor pastoral countries, the same phenomenon is exhibited; in mountainous countries which are arid and are removed from the economic centres, *idem.* It may have been to some extent the case in Prussia before the era of coal and iron; but the fact that to-day 99 per cent. of the population is normally engaged in

trade and industry, and 1 per cent. only in military preparation, and some fraction too small to be properly estimated engaged in actual war, shows how far she has outgrown such a state—shows, incidentally, what little chance the ideal and tradition represented by 1 per cent. or some fractional percentage has against interests and activities represented by 99 per cent. The recent history of South and Central America, because it is recent, and because the factors are less complicated, illustrates best the tendency with which we are dealing. Spanish America inherited the military tradition in all its vigour. As I have already pointed out, the Spanish occupation of the American Continent was a process of conquest rather than of colonizing; and while the mother country got poorer and poorer by the process of conquest, the new countries also impoverished themselves in adherence to the same fatal illusion. The glamour of conquest was, of course, Spain's ruin. So long as it was possible for her to live on extorted bullion, neither social nor industrial development seemed possible. Despite the common idea to the contrary, Germany has known how to keep this fatal hypnotism at bay, and, far from allowing her military activities to absorb her industrial, it is precisely the military activities which are in a fair way now of being absorbed by the industrial and commercial, and her world commerce has its foundation, not in tribute or bullion exacted at the sword's point, but in sound and honest exchange. So that to-day the legitimate commercial tribute which Germany, who never sent a soldier there, exacts from Spanish America is immensely greater than that which goes to Spain, who poured out blood and treasure during three centuries

on these territories. In this way, again, do the warlike nations inherit the earth!

If Germany is never to duplicate Spain's decadence, it is precisely because (1) she has never had historically Spain's temptation to live by conquest, and (2) because, having to live by honest industry, her commercial hold, even upon the territories conquered by Spain, is more firmly set than that of Spain herself.

How may we sum up the whole case, keeping in mind every empire that ever existed—the Assyrian, the Babylonian, the Mede and Persian, the Macedonian, the Roman, the Frank, the Saxon, the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Bourbon, the Napoleonic? In all and every one of them we may see the same process, which is this: If it remains military it decays; if it prospers and takes its share of the work of the world it ceases to be military. There is no other reading of history.

That history furnishes no justification for the plea that pugnacity and antagonism between nations is bound up in any way with the real process of national survival, shows clearly enough that nations nurtured normally in peace are more than a match for nations nurtured normally in war; that communities of non-military tradition and instincts, like the Anglo-Saxon communities of the New World, show elements of survival stronger than those possessed by communities animated by the military tradition, like the Spanish and Portuguese nations of the New World; that the position of the industrial nations in Europe as compared with the military gives no justification for the plea that the warlike qualities make for survival. It is clearly evident that there is no biological justification in the terms of man's political evolution for the per-

petuation of antagonism between nations, or any justification for the plea that the diminution of such antagonism runs counter to the teachings of the "natural law." There is no such natural law; in accordance with natural laws, men are being thrust irresistibly towards co-operation between communities and not towards conflict.

There remains the argument that, though the conflict itself may make for degeneration, the preparation for that conflict makes for survival, for the improvement of human nature. I have already touched upon the hopeless confusion which comes of the plea that, while long-continued peace is bad, military preparations find justification in that they insure peace.

Almost every defence of the militarist system includes a sneer at Industrialism as involving the Cobdenite state of buying cheap and selling dear. But the argument for great armaments goes on, not as a means of promoting war, that valuable school, etc., but as the best means of securing peace; in other words, that condition of "buying cheap and selling dear" which but a moment before has been condemned as so defective. As though to make the stultification complete, we are told about the peace value of military training, and how German commerce has benefited from it—that, in other words, it has promoted the "Cobdenite ideal." The analysis of the reasoning, as has been brilliantly shown by Mr. John M. Robertson,* gives a result something like this: (1) War is a great school of morals, therefore we must have great armaments to insure peace; (2) secure peace engenders the Cobdenite ideal, which is bad, therefore we should adopt conscription, (*a*) because

* "Patriotism and Empire." Grant Richards.

it is the best safeguard of secure peace, (*b*) because it is a training for commerce—the Cobdenite ideal.

Is it true that barrack training—the sort of school which the competition of armaments during the last generation has imposed on the people of Continental Europe—makes for moral health? Is it likely that a "perpetual rehearsal for something never likely to come off, and when it comes off is not like the rehearsal," should be a training for life's realities? Is it likely that such a process would have the stamp and touch of closeness to real things? Is it likely that the mechanical routine of artificial occupations, artificial crimes, artificial virtues, artificial punishments should form any real training for the battle of real life?* What of the Dreyfus case? What of the abominable scandals that have marked German military life of late years? If peace military training is such a fine school, how could the *Times* write thus of France after she had submitted to a generation of a very severe form of it:

"A thrill of horror and shame ran through the whole civilized world outside France when the result of the Rennes Court Martial became known. . . . By their (the officers') own admission, whether flung defiantly at the judges, their

* "For permanent work the soldier is worse than useless; his whole training tends to make him a weakling. He has the easiest of lives; he has no freedom and no responsibility. He is, politically and socially, a child, with rations instead of rights—treated like a child, punished like a child, dressed prettily and washed and combed like a child, excused for outbreaks of naughtiness like a child, forbidden to marry like a child, and called 'Tommy' like a child. He has no real work to keep him from going mad except housemaid's work" ("John Bull's Other Island").

All those who are familiar with the large body of French literature dealing with the evils of barrack-life know how strongly such criticism confirms the above generalisation by Mr. Bernard Shaw.

inferiors, or wrung from them under cross-examination, Dreyfus's chief accusers were convicted of gross and fraudulent illegalities which, anywhere, would have sufficed, not only to discredit their testimony—had they any serious testimony to offer—but to transfer them speedily from the witness-box to the prisoner's dock. . . . Their vaunted honour 'rooted in dishonour stood.' . . . Five judges out of the seven have once more demonstrated the truth of the astounding axiom first propounded during the Zola trial, that 'military justice is not as other justice.' . . . We have no hesitation in saying that the Rennes Court Martial constitutes in itself the grossest, and, viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances, the most appalling prostitution of justice which the world has witnessed in modern times. . . . Flagrantly, deliberately, mercilessly trampled justice underfoot. . . . The verdict, which is a slap in the face to the public opinion of the civilized world, to the conscience of humanity. . . . France is henceforth on her trial before history. Arraigned at the bar of a tribunal far higher than that before which Dreyfus stood, it rests with her to show whether she will undo this great wrong and rehabilitate her fair name, or whether she will stand irrevocably condemned and disgraced by allowing it to be consummated. We can less than ever afford to underrate the forces against truth and justice. . . . Hypnotized by the wild tales perpetually dinned into all credulous ears of an international 'syndicate of treason,' conspiring against the honour of the army and the safety of France, the conscience of the French nation has been numbed, and its intelligence atrophied. . . . Amongst those statesmen who are in touch with the outside world in the Senate and Chamber there must be some that will remind her that nations, no more than individuals, cannot bear the burden of universal scorn and live. . . . France cannot close her ears to the voice of the civilized world, for that voice is the voice of history" (September 11, 1899).

And what the *Times* said then all England was saying, and not only all England, but all America.

And has Germany escaped a like condemnation? We commonly assume that the Dreyfus case could not be duplicated in Germany. But this is not the opinion of very many Germans themselves. Indeed, just before the Dreyfus case reached its crisis, the Kotze scandal —in its way just as grave as the Dreyfus affair, and revealing a moral condition just as serious—prompted the *Times* to declare that "certain features of German civilization are such as to make it difficult for Britons to understand how the whole State does not collapse from sheer rottenness." And if that could be said of the Kotze affair, what shall be said of the state of things which, among others, has been revealed by Maximilien Harden?

Need it be said that the writer of these lines does not desire to represent Germans as a whole as more corrupt than their neighbours? But impartial observers are not of opinion, and very many Germans are not of opinion, that there has been either economic, social, or moral advantage to the German people from the victories of 1870 and the state of regimentation which the sequel has imposed. This is surely evidenced by the actual position of affairs in the German Empire, the complex difficulty with which the German people are now struggling, the growing discontent, the growing influence of those elements which are nurtured in discontent, the growth on one side of radical intransigence and on the other of almost feudal autocracy, the failure to effect normally and easily those democratic developments which have been effected in almost every other European State, the danger for the future which such a situation represents, the precariousness of German finance, the relatively small profit which her popula-

tion as a whole has received from the greatly increased foreign trade—all this, and much more, confirms that view. We in Great Britain seem to be affected with the German superstition just now. With the curious perversity that marks "patriotic" judgments, the whole tendency at present is to make comparisons with Germany to the disadvantage of ourselves and of other European countries. Yet if Germans themselves are to be believed, much of that superiority which we see in Germany is as purely non-existent as the phantom German war-balloon to which our Press devoted serious columns, to the phantom army corps in Epping Forest, to the phantom stories of arms in London cellars, and to the German spy which our patriots see in every Italian waiter.*

Despite the hypnotism which German "progress" seems to exercise on the minds of our Jingoes, the German people themselves, as distinct from the small group of Prussian Junkers, are not in the least enamoured of it, as is proved by the unparalleled growth of the social-democratic element, which is the negation of military imperialism, and which, as the figures in Prussia prove, receives support not from one class of the population merely, but from the mercantile, industrial, and professional classes as well. The agitation for electoral reform in Prussia shows how acute the conflict has become: on the one side the increasing democratic element showing more and more of a revolutionary

* Things must have reached a pretty pass in England when the owner of the *Daily Mail* and the patron of Mr. Blatchford can devote a column and a half over his own signature to reproaching in vigorous terms the hysteria and sensationalism of his own readers.

tendency, and on the other side the Prussian autocracy showing less and less disposition to yield. Does anyone really believe that the situation will remain there, that the Democratic parties will continue to grow in numbers and be content for ever to be ridden down by the "booted Prussian," and that German democracy will indefinitely accept a situation in which it will be always possible—in the words of the Junker von Oldenburg, member of the Reichstag—for the German Emperor to say to a Lieutenant, "Take ten men and close the Reichstag"?

But what must be the German's appreciation of the value of military victory and militarization when, mainly because of such, he finds himself engaged in a struggle which elsewhere less militarized nations settled a generation since? And what has the British defender of the militarist regimen, who holds the German system up for imitation, to say of it as a school of national discipline, when the Imperial Chancellor himself defends the refusal of democratic suffrage like that obtaining in Great Britain on the ground that the Prussian people have not yet acquired those qualities of public discipline which make it workable in Great Britain?*

* The *Berliner Tageblatt* of March 14, 1911, says: "One must admire the consistent fidelity and patriotism of the English race, as compared with the uncertain and erratic methods of the German people, their mistrust, and suspicion. In spite of numerous wars, bloodshed, and disaster, England always emerges smoothly and easily from her military crises and settles down to new conditions and surroundings in her usual cool and deliberate manner. . . . Nor can one refrain from paying one's tribute to the sound qualities and character of the English aristocracy, which is always open to the ambitious and worthy of other classes, and thus slowly but surely widens the sphere of the middle classes by whom they are

Yet what Prussia, in the opinion of the Chancellor, is not yet fit for, Scandinavian nations, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, have fitted themselves for without the aid of military victory and subsequent regimentation. Did not someone once say that the war had made Germany great and Germans small?

When we ascribe so large a measure of Germany's social progress (which no one, so far as I know, is concerned to deny) to the victories and regimentation, why do we conveniently overlook the social progress of the small States which I have just mentioned, where such progress on the material side has certainly been as great as, and on the moral side greater than, in Germany? Why do we overlook the fact that, if Germany has done well in certain social organizations, Scandinavia and Switzerland have done better? And why do we overlook the fact that, if regimentation is of such social value, it has been so completely inoperative in States which are more highly militarized even than Germany —in Spain, Italy, Austria, Turkey, and Russia?

But even assuming—a very large assumption—that regimentation has played the rôle in German progress which our Germano-maniacs would have us believe, is there any justification for supposing that a like process would be in any way adaptable to our conditions social, moral, material, and historical?

The position of Germany since the war—what it has stood for in the generation since victory, and what it stood for in the generations that followed defeat—furnishes a much-needed lesson as to the outcome of the

in consequence honoured and respected—a state of affairs practically unknown in Germany, but which would be to our immense advantage."

philosophy of force. Practically all impartial observers of Germany are in agreement with Mr. Harbutt Dawson when he writes as follows:

"It is questionable whether unified Germany counts as much to-day as an intellectual and moral agent in the world as when it was little better than a geographical expression. . . . Germany has at command an apparently inexhaustible reserve of physical and material force, but the real influence and power which it exerts is disproportionately small. The history of civilization is full of proofs that the two things are not synonymous. A nation's mere force is, on ultimate analysis, its sum of brute strength. This force may, indeed, go with intrinsic power, yet such power can never depend permanently on force, and the test is easy to apply. . . . No one who genuinely admires the best in the German character, and who wishes well to the German people, will seek to minimize the extent of the loss which would appear to have befallen the old national ideals; hence the discontent of the enlightened classes with the political laws under which they live—a discontent often vague and indefinite, the discontent of men who do not know clearly what is wrong or what they want, but feel that a free play is denied them which belongs to the dignity and worth and essence of human personality."

"Is there a German culture to-day?" asks Fuchs.* "We Germans are able to perfect all works of civilizing power as well as, and indeed better than, the best in other nations. Yet nothing that the heroes of labour execute goes beyond our own border." And the most extraordinary thing is that those who do not in the least deny this condition to which Germany has fallen —who, indeed, exaggerate it, and ask us with triumph

* "Der Kaiser und die Zukunft des Deutschen Volkes."

to look upon the brutality of German method and German conception—ask us to go and follow Germany's example!

Most of our pro-armament agitation is based upon the plea that Germany is dominated by a philosophy of force. They point to books like those of General Bernhardi, idealizing the employment of force, and then urge a policy of replying by force—and force only—which would, of course, justify in Germany the Bernhardi school, and by the reaction of opposing forces stereotype the philosophy in Europe and make it part of the general European tradition. Great Britain stands in danger of becoming Prussianized by virtue of the fact of fighting Prussianism, or rather by virtue of the fact that, instead of fighting it with the intellectual tools that won religious freedom in Europe, we insist upon confining our efforts to the tools of physical force.

Some of the acutest foreign students of British progress—men like Edmond Demolins—ascribe such to the very range of qualities which the German system is bound to crush: our aptitude for initiative, our reliance upon our own efforts, our sturdy resistance to State interference (already weakening), our impatience with bureaucracy and red tape (also weakening), all of which is wrapped up with our general rebelliousness to regimentation.

Though we base part of the defence of armaments on the plea that, economic interest apart, we desire to live our own life in our own way, to develop in our own fashion, do we not run some danger that with this mania for the imitation of German method we may

Germanize Great Britain, though never a German soldier land on our soil?

Of course, it is always assumed that, though we may adopt the French and German system of conscription, we could never fall a victim to the defects of those systems, and that the scandals which break out from time to time in France and Germany could never be duplicated by *our* barrack system, and that the military atmosphere of our own barracks, the training in our own army, would always be wholesome. But what do even its defenders say?

Mr. Blatchford himself says:

"Barrack life is bad. Barrack life will always be bad. It is never good for a lot of men to live together apart from home influences and feminine. It is not good for women to live or work in communities of women. The sexes react upon each other; each provides for the other a natural restraint, a wholesome incentive. . . . The barracks and the garrison town are not good for young men. The young soldier, fenced and hemmed in by a discipline unnecessarily severe, and often stupid, has at the same time an amount of licence which is dangerous to all but those of strong good sense and strong will. I have seen clean, good, nice boys come into the Army and go to the devil in less than a year. I am no Puritan. I am a man of the world; but any sensible and honest man who has been in the Army will know at once that what I am saying is entirely true, and is the truth expressed with much restraint and moderation. A few hours in a barrack-room would teach a civilian more than all the soldier stories ever written. When I joined the Army I was unusually unsophisticated for a boy of twenty. I had been brought up by a mother. I had attended Sunday-school and chapel. I had lived a quiet, sheltered life, and I had an astonishing amount to learn. The language of the

barrack-room shocked me, appalled me. I could not understand half I heard; I could not credit much that I saw. When I began to realize the truth, I took my courage in both hands and went about the world I had come into with open eyes. So I learnt the facts, but I must not tell them."*

* "My Life in the Army," p. 119.

CHAPTER VII

THE STATE AS A PERSON: A FALSE ANALOGY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Why aggression upon a State does not correspond to aggression upon an individual—Our changing conception of collective responsibility—Psychological progress in this connection—The factors breaking down the homogeneous personality of States are of very recent growth.

DESPITE the common idea to the contrary, we dearly love an abstraction—especially, apparently, an abstraction which is based on half the facts. Whatever the foregoing chapters may have proved, they have at least proved this: that the character of the modern State, by virtue of a multitude of new factors which are special to our age, is essentially and fundamentally different from that of the ancient. Yet even those who have great and justified authority in this matter will still appeal to Aristotle's conception of the State as final, with the implication that everything which has happened since Aristotle's time should be calmly disregarded.

What some of those things are the preceding chapters have indicated: First, there is the fact of the change in human nature itself, bound up with the general drift away from the use of physical force—a drift explained by the unromantic fact that physical force does not

give so much response to expended effort as do other forms of energy. There is an interconnection of psychological and purely mechanical development in all this which it is not necessary to disentangle here. The results are evident enough. Very rarely, and to an infinitesimal extent, do we now employ force for the achievement of our ends. But, added to all these factors, there is still a further one bound up with them which remains to be considered, and which has perhaps a more direct bearing on the question of continued conflict between nations than any of the other factors.

Conflicts between nations and international pugnacity generally imply a conception of a State as a homogeneous whole, having the same sort of responsibility that we attach to a person who, hitting us, provokes us to hit back. Now only to a very small and rapidly diminishing extent can a State be regarded as such a person. There may have been a time—Aristotle's time—when this was the case. Yet the fine-spun theories on which are based the necessity for the use of force, as between nations, and the proposition that the relationship of nations can only be determined by force, and that international pugnacity will always be expressed by a physical struggle between nations, all arise from this fatal analogy, which in truth corresponds to very few of the facts.

Thus Professor Spenser Wilkinson, whose contributions to this subject have such deserved weight, infers that what will permanently render the abandonment of force as between nations impossible is the principle that "the employment of force for the maintenance of right is the foundation of all civilized human life, for it is the fundamental function of the State, and apart

from the State there is no civilization, no life worth living. . . . The mark of the State is sovereignty, or the identification of force and right, and the measure of the perfection of the State is furnished by the completeness of this identification."

This, whether true or not, is irrelevant to the matter in hand. Professor Spenser Wilkinson attempts to illustrate his thesis by quoting a case which would seem to imply that those who take their stand against the necessity of armaments do so on the ground that the employment of force is wicked. There may be such, but it is not necessary to introduce the question of right. If means other than force gave the same result more easily, with less effort to ourselves, why discuss the abstract right? And when he reinforces the appeal to this irrelevant abstract principle by a case which, while apparently relevant, is in truth irrelevant, he has successfully confused the whole issue. After quoting three verses from the fifth chapter of Matthew, Professor Spenser Wilkinson says:*

"There are those who believe, or fancy they believe, that the words I have quoted involve the principle that the use of force or violence between man and man or between nation and nation is wicked. To the man who thinks it right to submit to any violence or be killed rather than use violence in resistance I have no reply to make; the world cannot conquer him, and fear has no hold upon him. But even he can carry out his doctrine only to the extent of allowing himself to be ill-treated, as I will now convince him. Many years ago the people of Lancashire were horrified by the facts reported in a trial for murder. In a village on the outskirts of Bolton lived a young woman, much liked

* "Britain at Bay." Constable and Co.

and respected as a teacher in one of the Board-schools. On her way home from school she was accustomed to follow a footpath through a lonely wood, and here one evening her body was found. She had been strangled by a ruffian who had thought in this lonely place to have his wicked will of her. She had resisted successfully, and he had killed her in the struggle. Fortunately the murderer was caught, and the facts ascertained from circumstantial evidence were confirmed by his confession. Now the question I have to ask the man who takes his stand on the passage quoted from the Gospel is this: 'What would have been your duty had you been walking through that wood and came upon the girl struggling with the man who killed her?' This is the crucial factor which, I submit, utterly destroys the doctrine that the use of violence is in itself wrong. The right or wrong is not in the employment of force, but simply in the purpose for which it is used. What the case establishes, I think, is that to use violence in resistance to violent wrong is not only right, but necessary."

The above presents very cleverly the utterly false analogy with which we are dealing. Professor Spenser Wilkinson's cleverness, indeed, is a little Machiavellian, because he approximates non-resisters of a very extreme type to those who advocate agreement among nations in the matter of armaments—a false approximation, for the proportion of those who advocate the reduction of armaments on such grounds is so small that they can be disregarded in this discussion. A movement which is identified with some of the acutest minds in European affairs cannot be disposed of by associating it with such a theory. But the basis of the fallacy is in the approximation of a State to a person. Now a State is not a person, and is becoming less so every day, and

the difficulty which Professor Spenser Wilkinson indicates is a doctrinaire difficulty, not a real one. Professor Wilkinson would have us infer that a State can be injured or killed in the same simple way in which it is possible to kill or injure a person, and that because there must be physical force to restrain aggression upon persons, there must be physical force to restrain aggression upon States; and because there must be physical force to execute the judgment of a court of law in the case of individuals, there must be physical force to execute the judgment rendered by a decision as to differences between States. All of which is false, and arrived at by approximating a person to a State, and disregarding the numberless facts which render a person different from a State.

How do we know that these difficulties are doctrinaire ones? It is the British Empire which supplies the answer. The British Empire is made up in large part of practically independent States, and Great Britain not only exercises no control over their acts, but has surrendered in advance any intention of employing force concerning them. The British States have disagreements among themselves. They may or may not refer their differences to the British Government, but if they do, is Great Britain going to send an army to Canada, say, to enforce her judgment? Everyone knows that that is impossible. Even when one State commits what is in reality a serious breach of international comity on another, not only does Great Britain do nothing herself, but so far as she interferes at all, it is to prevent the employment of physical force. For years now British Indians have been subjected to most

cruel and unjust treatment in the State of Natal.* The British Government makes no secret of the fact that she regards this treatment as unjust and cruel; were Natal a foreign State, it is conceivable that she would employ force, but, following the principle laid down by Sir C. P. Lucas, "whether they are right or whether they are wrong, more perhaps when they are wrong than when they are right, they cannot be made amenable by force," the two States are left to adjust the difficulty as best they may without resort to force. In the last resort the British Empire reposes upon the expectation that its Colonies will behave as civilized communities, and in the long run the expectation is, of course, a well-founded one, because if they do not so behave retribution will come more surely by the ordinary operation of social and economic forces than it could come by any force of arms.

The case of the British Empire is not an isolated one. The fact is that most of the States of the world maintain their relations one with another without any possibility of a resort to force; half the States of the world have no means of enforcing by arms such wrongs as they may suffer at the hands of other States. Thousands of British subjects, for instance, make their homes in Switzerland, and it has happened that wrongs have been suffered by British subjects at the hands of the Swiss Government. Would, however, the relations between the two States, or the practical standard of protection of British subjects in Switzerland, be any the better were Switzerland the whole time threatened by the might of Great Britain? Switzerland knows that she is practically free from the possibility of the

* See details on this matter given in "The Great Illusion," chapter vii., part i.

exercise of that force, but this has not prevented her from behaving as a civilized community towards British subjects.

What is the real guarantee of the good behaviour of one State to another? It is the elaborate interdependence which, not only in the economic sense, but in every sense, makes an unwarrantable aggression of one State upon another react upon the interests of the aggressor. Switzerland has every interest in affording an absolutely secure asylum to British subjects; that fact, and not the might of the British Empire, gives protection to British subjects in Switzerland. Where, indeed, the British subject has to depend upon the force of his Government for protection it is a very frail protection indeed, because in practice the use of that force is so cumbersome, so difficult, so costly, that any other means are to be preferred to it. When the traveller in Greece had to depend upon British arms, great as was relatively the force of those arms, it proved but a very frail protection. In the same way, when physical force was used to impose on the South American and Central American States the observance of their financial obligations, such efforts failed utterly and miserably—so miserably that Great Britain finally surrendered any attempt at such enforcement. What other means have succeeded? The bringing of those countries under the influence of the great economic currents of our time, so that now property is infinitely more secure in Mexico and in Argentina than it was when British gunboats were bombarding their ports. More and more in international relationship is the purely economic motive—and the economic motive is only one of several possible ones—being employed to replace the

use of physical force. Austria the other day was untouched by any threat of the employment of the Turkish army when the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was consummated, but when the Turkish population enforced a very successful commercial boycott of Austrian goods and Austrian ships, Austrian merchants and public opinion made it quickly plain to the Austrian Government that pressure of this nature was not such as could be disregarded.

I anticipate the plea that while the elaborate interconnection of economic relations renders the employment of force as between nations unnecessary in so far as their material interests are concerned, those forces cannot cover a case of aggression upon what may be termed the moral property of nations. A critic of the first edition of this book* writes:

"The State is the only complete form in which human society exists, and there are a multitude of phenomena which will be found only as manifestations of human life in the form of a society united by the political bond into a State. The products of such society are law, literature, art and science, and it has yet to be shown that apart from that form of society known as the State, the family or education or development of character is possible. The State, in short, is an organism or living thing which can be wounded and can be killed, and like every other living thing requires protection against wounding and destruction. . . .

* *Morning Post*, April 21, 1910. I pass over the fact that to cite all this as a reason for armaments is absurd. Does the *Morning Post* really suggest that the Germans are going to attack England because they don't like the English taste in art, or music, or cooking? The notion that preferences of this sort need the protection of *Dreadnoughts* is surely to bring the whole thing within the domain of the grotesque.

Conscience and morals are products of social and not of individual life, and to say that the sole purpose of the State is to make possible a decent livelihood is as though a man should say that the sole object of human life is to satisfy the interests of existence. A man cannot live any kind of life without food, clothing, and shelter, but that condition does not abolish or diminish the value of the life industrial, the life intellectual, or the life artistic. The State is the condition of all these lives, and its purpose is to sustain them. That is why the State must defend itself. In the ideal the State represents and embodies the whole people's conception of what is true, of what is beautiful, and of what is right, and it is the sublime quality of human nature that every great nation has produced citizens ready to sacrifice themselves rather than submit to an external force attempting to dictate to them a conception other than their own of what is right."

One is, of course, surprised to see the foregoing in the *Morning Post;* the concluding phrase would justify the present agitation in India or in Egypt or Ireland against British rule. What is that agitation but an attempt on the part of the peoples of those provinces to resist "an external force attempting to dictate to them a conception other than their own of what is right"? Fortunately, however, for British Imperialism, a people's conception of "what is true, of what is beautiful, and of what is right," and their maintenance of that conception, need not necessarily have anything whatever to do with the particular administrative conditions under which they may live—the only thing that a conception of "State" predicates. The fallacy which runs through the whole passage just quoted, and which makes it, in fact, nonsense, is the same fallacy which dominates the quotation that I have made from Pro-

fessor Spenser Wilkinson's book, "Britain at Bay"—namely, the approximation of a State to a person, the assumption that the political delimitation coincides with the economic and moral delimitation, that in short a State is the embodiment of "the whole people's conception of what is true, etc." A State is nothing of the sort. Take the British Empire. This State embodies not a homogeneous conception, but a series of often absolutely contradictory conceptions of "what is true, etc."; it embodies the Mohammedan, the Buddhist, the Copt, the Catholic, the Protestant, the Pagan conceptions of right and truth. The fact which vitiates the whole of this conception of a State is that the frontiers which define the State do not coincide with the conception of any of those things which the *Morning Post* critic has enumerated; there is no such thing as British morality as opposed to French or German morality, or art or industry. One may, indeed, talk of an English conception of life, because that is a conception of life peculiar to England, but it would be opposed to the conception of life in other parts of the same State, in Ireland, in Scotland, in India, in Egypt, in Jamaica. And what is true of Great Britain is true of all the great modern States. Every one of them includes conceptions absolutely opposed to other conceptions in the same State, but many of them absolutely agree with conceptions in foreign States. The British State includes in Ireland a Catholic conception in cordial agreement with the Catholic conception in Italy, but in cordial disagreement with the Protestant conception in Scotland or the Mohammedan conception in Bengal. The real divisions of all those ideals which the critic enumerates cut right across State divisions, disregard

them entirely. And yet again it is only the State divisions which military conflict has in view.

What was one of the reasons leading to the cessation of religious wars between States? It was that religious conceptions cut across the State frontiers, so that the State ceased to coincide with the religious divisions of Europe, and a condition of things was brought about in which a Protestant Sweden was allied with a Catholic France. This rendered the conflict absurd, and religious wars became an anachronism.

But is not precisely the same thing taking place with reference to the conflicting conceptions of life which now separate men in Europe? Have we not in Great Britain now the same doctrinal struggle which is going on in France and Germany and in America? To take one instance—social conflict. On the one side in each case are all the interests bound up with order, authority, individual freedom without reference to the comfort of the weak, and on the other the reconstruction of human society along hitherto untried lines. These problems are for most men probably—are certainly coming to be, if they are not now—much more profound and fundamental than any conception which coincides with or can be identified with State divisions. Indeed, what are the conceptions of which the divisions coincide with the political frontiers of the British Empire, in view of the fact that that Empire includes nearly every race and nearly every religion under the sun? It may be said, of course, that in the case of Germany and Russia we have an autocratic conception of social organization as compared with a conception based on individual freedom in Great Britain and America. Both Mr. Hyndman and Mr. Blatchford seem to take this

view. "To me," says the former, "it is quite evident that if we Socialists were to achieve success we should at once be liable to attack from without by the military Powers," which calmly overlooks the fact that Socialism and anti-militarism have gone much farther and are far better organized in the "military" States than they are in England, and that the military Governments have all their work cut out as it is to keep those tendencies in check within their own borders, without quixotically undertaking to perform the same service in other States.

This conception of the State as the political embodiment of homogeneous doctrine is due in large part not only to the distortion produced by false analogy, but to the survival of a terminology which has become obsolete, and, indeed, the whole of this subject is vitiated by those two things. The State in ancient times was much more a personality than it is to-day, and it is mainly quite modern tendencies which have broken up its doctrinal homogeneity, and such break-up has results which are of the very first importance in their bearing upon international pugnacity. The matter deserves careful examination. Professor William McDougal, in his fascinating work, "An Introduction to Social Psychology," says in the chapter on the instinct of pugnacity:

"The replacement of individual by collective pugnacity is most clearly illustrated by barbarous peoples living in small, strongly organized communities. Within such communities individual combat and even expressions of personal anger may be almost completely suppressed, while the pugnacious instinct finds itself in perpetual warfare between communities whose relations remain subject to no law. As a rule no

material benefit is gained, and often none is sought, in these tribal wars. . . . All are kept in constant fear of attack, whole villages are often exterminated, and the population is in this way kept down very far below the limit on which any pressure on the means of subsistence could arise. This perpetual warfare, like the squabbles of a roomful of quarrelsome children, seems to be almost wholly and directly due to the uncomplicated operation of the instinct of pugnacity. No material benefits are sought; a few heads and sometimes a slave or two are the only trophies gained, and if one asks an intelligent chief why he keeps up this senseless practice, the best reason he can give is that unless he does so his neighbours will not respect him and his people, and will fall upon them and exterminate them."

Now, how does such hostility as that indicated in this passage differ from the hostility which marks international differences in our day? In certain very evident respects. It does not suffice in our case that the foreigner should be merely a foreigner for us to want to kill him: there must be some conflict of interest. We are completely indifferent to the Scandinavian, the Belgian, the Dutchman, the Spaniard, the Austrian, and the Italian, and we are supposed for the moment to be greatly in love with the French. The German is the enemy. But ten years ago it was the Frenchman who was the enemy, and Mr. Chamberlain was talking of an alliance with the Germans—our natural allies, he called them—while it was for France that he reserved his attacks.* It cannot be, therefore, that there is any inherent racial hostility in our national character,

* I refer to the remarkable speech in which Mr. Chamberlain notified France that she must "mend her manners or take the consequences" (see London daily papers between November 28 and December 5, 1899).

because the Germans have not changed their nature in ten years, nor the French theirs. If to-day the French are our quasi-allies and the Germans our enemies, it is simply because our respective interests or apparent interests have modified in the last ten years, and our political preferences have modified with them. In other words, our national hostilities follow the exigencies of our real or imagined political interests. Surely the point need not be laboured, seeing that we have boxed the compass of the whole of Europe in our likes and dislikes, and poured our hatred upon the Spaniards, the Dutch, the Americans, the Danes, the Russians, the Germans, the French, and again the Germans, all in turn. The phenomenon is a commonplace of individual relationship: "I never noticed his collars were dirty till he got in my way," said someone of a rival.

The second point of difference with Professor McDougal's savage is that when we get to grips our conflict does not include the whole tribe; we do not, in the Biblical fashion, exterminate men, women, children, and cattle. Enough of the old Adam remains for us to detest the women and children, so that our Poet Laureate could write of the "whelps and dams of murderous foes"; but we do not slaughter them.*

* Not that a very great period separates us from such methods. Froude quotes Maltby's Report to Government as follows: "I burned all their corn and houses, and committed to the sword all that could be found. In like manner I assailed a castle. When the garrison surrendered, I put them to the misericordia of my soldiers. They were all slain. Thence I went on, sparing none which came in my way, which cruelty did so amaze their fellows that they could not tell where to bestow themselves." Of the commander of the English forces at Munster we read: "He

But there is a third fact which we must note—that Professor McDougal's nation was made up of a single tribe entirely homogeneous. Even the fact of living across a river was sufficient to turn another tribe into foreigners and to involve a desire to kill them. The development from that stage to the present has included, in addition to the two factors just enumerated, this: we now include as fellow-countrymen many who would under the old conception necessarily be foreigners, and the process of our development, economic and otherwise, has made of foreigners, between whom, in General Lea's philosophy, there should exist this "primordial hostility leading inevitably to war," one State from which all conflict of interest has disappeared entirely. The modern State of France includes what were, even in historical times, eighty separate and warring States, since each of the old Gallic cities represented a different State. In Great Britain we have come to regard as fellow-citizens between whom there can be no sort of conflict of interest scores of tribes that spent their time mutually throat-cutting at no very distant period, as history goes. We recognize, indeed, that profound national differences like those which exist between the Welshman and the Englishman, or the Scotsman and the Irishman, need involve not only no conflict of interest, but even no separate political existence.

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diverted his forces into East Clanwilliam, and harassed the country; killed all mankind that were found therein . . . not leaving behind us man or beast, corn or cattle . . . sparing none of what quality, age, or sex soever. Beside many burned to death, we killed man, woman, child, horse, or beast, or whatever we could find."

One has heard in recent times of the gradual revival of Nationalism, and it is commonly argued that the principle of Nationality must stand in the way of co-operation between States. But the facts do not justify such conclusion for a moment. The formation of States has disregarded national divisions altogether. If conflicts are to coincide with national divisions, Wales should co-operate with Brittany and Ireland as against Normandy and England; Provence and Savoy with Sardinia as against—— I do not know what French province, because in the final rearrangement of European frontiers races and provinces have become so inextricably mixed, and have paid so little regard to "natural" and "inherent" divisions, that it is no longer possible to disentangle them.

In the beginning the State is a homogeneous tribe or family, and in the process of economic and social development these divisions so far break down that a State may include, as the British State does, not only half a dozen different races in the mother country, but a thousand different races scattered over various parts of the earth—white, black, yellow, brown, copper-coloured. This, surely, is one of the great sweeping tendencies of history—a tendency which operates immediately any complicated economic life is set up. What justification have we, therefore, for saying dogmatically that a tendency to co-operation which has swept before it profound ethnic differences, social and political divisions, a process which has been constant from the dawn of men's attempts to live and labour together, is to stop at the wall of modern State divisions, which represent none of the profound divisions of the human race, but mainly mere administrative conveni-

ence, and embody a conception which is being every day profoundly modified?

Some indication of the processes involved in this development has already been given in the outline sketch in Chapter II. of this section, to which the reader may be referred. I have there attempted to make plain that *pari passu* with the drift from physical force towards economic inducement goes a corresponding diminution of pugnacity, until the psychological factor which is the exact reverse of pugnacity comes to have more force even than the economic one. Quite apart from any economic question, it is no longer possible for the British Government to order the extermination of a whole population, of the women and children, in the old Biblical style. In the same way, the greater economic interdependence which improved means of communication have provoked must carry with it a greater moral interdependence, and a tendency which has broken down profound national divisions, like those which separated the Celt and the Saxon, will certainly break down on the psychological side divisions which are obviously more artificial.

Among the multiple factors which have entered into the great sweeping tendency just sketched are one or two which stand out as most likely to have immediate effect on the breakdown of a purely psychological hostility embodied by merely State divisions. One is that lessening of the reciprocal sentiment of collective responsibility which the complex heterogeneity of the modern State involves. What do I mean by this sense of collective responsibility? To the Chinese Boxer all Europeans are "foreign devils"; between Germans, English, Russians there is little distinction, just as to

the black in Africa there is little differentiation between the various white races. Even the yokel in England talks of "them foreigners." If a Chinese Boxer is injured by a Frenchman, he kills a German, and feels himself avenged—they are all "foreign devils." When an African tribe suffers from the depredations of a Belgian trader, the next white man who comes into its territory, whether he happens to be a British subject or a Frenchman, loses his life; the tribesmen also feel themselves avenged. But if the Chinese Boxer had our clear conception of the different European nations, he would feel no psychological satisfaction in killing a German because a Frenchman had injured him. There must be in the Boxer's mind some collective responsibility as between the two Europeans, or in the negro's mind between the two white men, in order to obtain this psychological satisfaction. If that collective responsibility does not exist, the hostility to the second white man in each case is not even raised.

Now, our international hostilities are largely based on the notion of a collective responsibility in each of the various States against which our hostility is directed, which does not, in fact, exist. There is at the present moment great ill-feeling in Great Britain against "the German." Now, "the German" is a non-existent abstraction. We are angry with the German because he is building warships, conceivably directed against us; but a great many Germans are as much opposed to that increase of armament as are we, and the desire of the yokel to "have a go at them Germans" depends absolutely upon a confusion just as great as—indeed, it is greater than—that which exists in the mind of the Boxer, who cannot differentiate between the various

European peoples. Mr. Blatchford commenced that series of articles which has done so much to accentuate ill-feeling with this phrase:

"Germany is deliberately preparing to destroy the British Empire";

and later in the articles he added:

"Britain is disunited; Germany is homogeneous. We are quarrelling about the Lords' Veto, Home Rule, and a dozen other questions of domestic politics. We have a Little Navy Party, an Anti-Militarist Party; Germany is unanimous upon the question of naval expansion."

It would be difficult to pack a more dangerous untruth into so few lines. What are the facts? If "Germany" means the bulk of the German people, Mr. Blatchford is perfectly aware that he is not telling the truth. It is not true to say of the bulk of the German people that they are deliberately preparing to destroy the British Empire. The bulk of the German people, if they are represented by any one party at all, are represented by the Social Democrats, who have stood from the first resolutely against any such intention. Now the facts have to be misstated in this way in order to produce that temper which makes for war. If the facts are correctly stated, no such temper arises.

What has a particularly competent German to say to Mr. Blatchford's generalization? Mr. Fried, the editor of *Die Friedenswarte*, writes:

"There is no one German people, no single Germany. . . . There are more abrupt contrasts between Germans and Germans than between Germans and Indians. Nay, the contradistinctions within Germany are greater than those between Germans and the units of any other foreign nation whatever. It might be possible to make efforts to promote

good understanding between Germans and Englishmen, between Germans and Frenchmen, to organize visits between nation and nation; but it will be for ever impossible to set on foot any such efforts at an understanding between German Social Democrats and Prussian Junkers, between German Anti-Semites and German Jews."*

The disappearance of most international hostility depends upon nothing more intricate than the realization of facts which are little more complex than the geographical knowledge which enables us to see that the anger of the yokel is absurd when he pummels a Frenchman because an Italian has swindled him.

It may be argued that there never has existed in the past this identification between a people and the acts of its Government which rendered the hatred of one country for another logical, yet that hatred has arisen. That is true; but certain new factors have entered recently to modify this problem. One is that never in the history of the world have nations been so complex as they are to-day; and the second is that never before have the dominating interests of mankind so completely cut across State divisions as they do to-day. The third factor is that never before has it been possible, as it is possible by our means of communication to-day, to offset a solidarity of classes and ideas as against a presumed State solidarity.

* In "The Evolution of Modern Germany" (Fisher Unwin, London) the same author says: "Germany implies not one people, but many peoples . . . of different culture, different political and social institutions . . . diversity of intellectual and economic life. . . . When the average Englishman speaks of Germany he really means Prussia, and consciously or not he ignores the fact that in but few things can Prussia be regarded as typical of the whole Empire."

Never at any stage of the world's development has there existed as exists to-day the machinery for embodying these interests and class ideas and ideals which cut across frontiers. It is not generally understood how many of our activities have become international. Two great forces have become internationalized: Capital on the one hand, Labour and Socialism on the other.

The Labour and Socialist movements have always been international, and become more so every year. Few considerable strikes take place in any one country without the labour organizations of other countries furnishing help, and very large sums have been contributed by the labour organizations of various countries in this way.

With reference to capital, it may almost be said that it is organized so naturally internationally that formal organization is not necessary. When the Bank of England is in danger, it is the Bank of France which comes automatically to its aid, even in a time of acute political hostility. It has been my good fortune in the last ten years to discuss these matters with financiers on one side and labour leaders on the other, and I have always been particularly struck by the fact that I have found in these two classes precisely the same attitude of internationalization. In no department of human activity is internationalization so complete as in finance. The capitalist has no country, and he knows, if he be of the modern type, that arms and conquests and jugglery with frontiers serve no ends of his, and may very well defeat them. But employers, as apart from capitalists, are also developing a strong international cohesive organization. Among the Berlin despatches in the *Times* of April 18, 1910, I find the following

concerning a big strike in the building trade, in which nearly a quarter of a million men went out. Quoting a writer in the *North German Gazette*, the correspondent says:

"The writer lays stress upon the efficiency of the employers' arrangements. He says, in particular, that it will probably be possible to extend the lock-out to industries associated with the building industry, especially the cement industry, and that the employers are completing a ring of cartel treaties, which will prevent German workmen from finding employment in neighbouring countries, and will insure for German employers all possible support from abroad. It is said that Switzerland and Austria were to conclude treaties yesterday on the same conditions as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, and France, and that Belgium and Italy would come in, so that there will be complete co-operation on the part of all Germany's neighbours except Russia. In the circumstances the men's organs rather overlabour the point when they produce elaborate evidence of premeditation. The *Vorwärts* proves that the employers have long been preparing for 'a trial of strength,' but that is admitted. The official organ of the employers says, in so many words, that any intervention is useless until 'the forces have been measured in open battle.'"

And have not these forces begun already to affect the psychological domain with which we are now especially dealing? Do we place national vanity, for instance, on the same plane as the individual? Have we not already realized the absurdity involved?

I have quoted Admiral Mahan as follows:

"That extension of national authority over alien communities, which is the dominant note in the world politics of to-day, dignifies and enlarges each State and each citizen that enters its fold. . . . Sentiment, imagination, aspiration,

the satisfaction of the rational and moral faculties in some object better than bread alone, all must find a part in a worthy motive. Like individuals, nations and empires have souls as well as bodies. Great and beneficent achievement ministers to worthier contentment than the filling of the pocket."

Whatever we may think of the individuals who work disinterestedly for the benefit of backward and alien peoples, and however their lives may be "dignified and enlarged" by their activities, it is surely absurd to suppose that other individuals, their fellow-citizens, who take no part in their work, and who remain thousands of miles from the scene of action, can possibly be credited with "great and beneficent achievement."

A man who boasts of his possessions is not a very pleasant or admirable type, but at least his possessions are for his own use and do bring a tangible satisfaction, materially as well as sentimentally. His is the object of a certain social deference by reason of his wealth—a deference which has not a very high motive, if you will, but the outward and visible signs of which are pleasing to a vain man. But is the same in any sense true, despite Admiral Mahan, of the individual of a big State as compared to the individual of a small one? Does anyone think of paying deference to the Russian *moujik* because he happens to belong to one of the biggest empires territorially? Does anyone think of despising an Ibsen or a Björnsen, or any educated Scandinavian or Belgian or Hollander, because they happen to belong to the smallest nations in Europe? The thing is absurd, and the notion is simply due to inattention. Just as we commonly overlook the fact that the individual citizen is quite unaffected materially by the

extent of his nation's territory, that the material position of the individual Dutchman as a citizen of a small State will not be improved by the mere fact of the absorption of such State by the German Empire, in which case he will become the citizen of a great nation, so in the same way his moral position remains unchanged; and the notion that an individual Russian is "dignified and enlarged" each time that Russia conquers some new Asiatic outpost, or Russifies a State like Finland, or that the Norwegian would be "dignified" were his State conquered by Russia and he became a Russian, is, of course, sheer sentimental fustian of a very mischievous order. This is the more emphasized when we remember that the best men of Russia are looking forward wistfully, not to the enlargement, but to the dissolution, of the unwieldy giant —"stupid with the stupidity of giants, ferocious with their ferocity"—and the rise in its stead of a multiplicity of self-contained, self-knowing communities, "whose members will be united together by organic and vital sympathies, and not by their common submission to a common policeman."

How small and thin a pretence is all the talk of national prestige when the matter is tested by its relation to the individual is shown by the commonplaces of our everyday social intercourse. In social consideration everything else takes precedence of nationality, even in those circles where Chauvinism is a cult. Our Royalty is so impressed with the dignity which attaches to membership of the British Empire that its Princes will marry into the royal houses of the smallest and meanest States in Europe, while they would regard marriage with a British commoner as an unheard-of *mésalliance*. This standard of social judgment so marks all the European royalties that at the present time not

one ruler in Europe belongs, properly speaking, to the race which he rules. In all social associations an analogous rule is followed. In our "selectest" circles an Italian, Roumanian, Portuguese, or even Turkish noble, is received where an English tradesman would be taboo.

This tendency has struck almost all authorities who have investigated scientifically modern international relations. Thus Mr. T. Baty, the well-known authority on international law, writes as follows:

"All over the world society is organizing itself by strata. The English merchant goes on business to Warsaw, Hamburg, or Leghorn; he finds in the merchants of Italy, German, and Russia the ideas, the standard of living, the sympathies, and the aversions which are familiar to him at home. Printing and the locomotive have enormously reduced the importance of locality. It is the mental atmosphere of its fellows, and not of its neighbourhood, which the child of the younger generation is beginning to breathe. Whether he reads the *Revue des Deux Mondes* or *Tit-Bits*, the modern citizen is becoming at once cosmopolitan and class-centred. Let the process work for a few more years; we shall see the common interests of cosmopolitan classes revealing themselves as far more potent factors than the shadowy common interests of the subjects of States. The Argentine merchant and the British capitalist alike regard the Trade Union as a possible enemy—whether British or Argentine matters to them less than nothing. The Hamburg docker and his brother of London do not put national interests before the primary claims of caste. International class feeling is a reality, and not even a nebulous reality; the nebula has developed centres of condensation. Only the other day Sir W. Runciman, who is certainly not a Conservative, presided over a meeting at which there were laid the foundations of an International Shipping Union, which is intended to unite shipowners of whatever country in a common organization. When it is once recognized

that the real interest of modern people are not national, but social, the results may be surprising."*

As Mr. Baty points out, this tendency, which he calls "stratification," extends to all classes:

"It is impossible to ignore the significance of the International Congresses, not only of Socialism, but of pacificism, of esperantism, of feminism, of every kind of art and science, that so conspicuously set their seal upon the holiday season. Nationality as a limiting force is breaking down before cosmopolitanism. In directing its forces into an international channel, Socialism will have no difficulty whatever.† . . . We are, therefore, confronted with a coming condition of affairs in which the force of nationality will be distinctly inferior to the force of class-cohesion, and in which classes will be internationally organized so as to wield their force with effect. The prospect induces some curious reflections."

We have here, at present in merely embryonic form, a group of motives otherwise opposed, but meeting and agreeing upon one point: the organization of society on other than territorial and national divisions. When motives of such breadth as these give force to a tendency, it may be said that the very stars in their courses are working to the same end.

* "International Law." John Murray, London.

† Lord Sanderson, dealing with the development of international intercourse in an address to the Royal Society of Arts (November 15, 1911), said: "The most notable feature of recent international intercourse, he thought, was the great increase in international exhibitions, associations, and conferences of every description and on every conceivable subject. When he first joined the Foreign Office, rather more than fifty years ago, conferences were confined almost entirely to formal diplomatic meetings to settle some urgent territorial or political question in which several States were interested. But as time had passed, not only were the number and frequency of political conferences increased, but a host of meetings of persons more or less official, termed indiscriminately conferences and congresses, had come into being.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DIMINISHING FACTOR OF PHYSICAL FORCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL RESULTS

Diminishing factor of physical force—Though diminishing one physical force has always been an important rôle in human affairs—What is underlying principle, determining advantageous and disadvantageous use of physical force?—Force that aids co-operation in accord with law of man's advance: force that is exercised for parasitism in conflict with such law and disadvantageous for both parties—Historical process of the abandonment of physical force—The Khan and the London tradesmen—Ancient Rome and modern Britain—The sentimental defence of war as the purifier of human life—The facts—The redirection of human pugnacity.

DESPITE the general tendency indicated by the facts dealt with in the preceding chapter, it will be urged (with perfect justice) that, though the methods of Anglo-Saxondom as compared with those of the Spanish, Portuguese, and French Empires, may have been mainly commercial and industrial rather than military, war was a necessary part of expansion; that but for some fighting the Anglo-Saxons would have been ousted from North America or Asia, or would never have gained a footing there.

Does this, however, prevent us establishing, on the basis of the facts exposed in the preceding chapter, a general principle sufficiently definite to serve as a

practical guide in policy, and to indicate reliably a general tendency in human affairs? Assuredly not. The principle which explains the uselessness of much of the force exerted by the military type of empire, and justifies in large part that employed by Britain, is neither obscure nor uncertain, although empiricism, rule of thumb (which is the curse of political thinking in our days, and more than anything else stands in the way of real progress), gets over the difficulty by declaring that no principle in human affairs can be pushed to its logical or theoretical conclusion; that what may be "right in theory" is wrong in practice.

Thus Mr. Roosevelt, who expresses with such admirable force and vigour the average thoughts of his hearers or readers, takes generally this line: We must be peaceful, but not too peaceful; warlike, but not too warlike; moral, but not too moral.*

With such verbal mystification are we encouraged to shirk the rough and stony places along the hard road of thinking. If we cannot carry a principle to its logical conclusion, at what point are we to stop? One will fix one and another will fix another with equal justice. What is it to be "moderately" peaceful, or "moderately" warlike? Temperament and predilection can stretch such limitations indefinitely. This sort of thing only darkens counsel.

If a theory is right, it can be pushed to its logical conclusion; indeed, the only real test of its value is that it *can* be pushed to its logical conclusion. If it is wrong in practice, it is wrong in theory, for the right

* I do not think this last generalization does any injustice to the essay "Latitude and Longitude among Reformers" ("Strenuous Life," pp. 41-61. The Century Company).

theory will take cognizance of all the facts, not only of one set.

In Chapter II. of this part (pp. 188-195), I have very broadly indicated the process by which the employment of physical force in the affairs of the world has been a constantly diminishing factor since the day that primitive man killed his fellow man in order to eat him. Yet throughout the whole process the employment of force has been an integral part of progress, until even to-day in the most advanced nations force—the police-force—is an integral part of their civilization.

What, then, is the principle determining the advantageous and the disadvantageous employment of force?

Preceding the outline sketch just referred to is another sketch indicating the real biological law of man's survival and advance; the key to that law is found in co-operation between men and struggle with nature. Mankind as a whole is the organism which needs to co-ordinate its parts in order to insure greater vitality by better adaptation to its environment.

Here, then, we get the key: force employed to secure completer co-operation between the parts, to facilitate exchange, makes for advance; force which runs counter to such co-operation, which attempts to replace the mutual benefit of exchange by compulsion, which is in any way a form of parasitism, makes for retrogression.

Why is the employment of force by the police justified? Because the bandit refuses to co-operate. He does not offer an exchange; he wants to live as a parasite, to take by force, and give nothing in exchange. If he increased in numbers, co-operation between the various parts of the organism would be impossible; he makes for disintegration. He must be restrained, and

so long as the police use their force in such restraint they are merely insuring co-operation. The police are not struggling against man; they are struggling with nature—crime.

Now, suppose that this police-force becomes the army of a political Power, and the diplomats of that Power say to a smaller one: "We outnumber you; we are going to annex your territory, and you are going to pay us tribute." And the smaller Power says: "What are you going to give us for that tribute?" And the larger replies: "Nothing. You are weak; we are strong; we gobble you up. It is the law of life; always has been—always will be to the end."

Now that police-force, become an army, is no longer making for co-operation; it has simply and purely taken the place of the bandits; and to approximate such an army to a police-force, and to say that because both operations involve the employment of force they both stand equally justified, is to ignore half the facts, and to be guilty of those lazy generalizations which we associate with savagery.*

But the difference is more than a moral one. If the reader will again return to the little sketch referred to above, he will probably agree that the diplomats of the larger Power are acting in an extraordinarily stupid fashion. I say nothing of their sham philosophy (which happens, however, to be that of European statecraft to-day), by which this aggression is made to appear in keeping with the law of man's struggle for life, when, as a matter of fact, it is the very negation of that law;

* See for further illustration of the difference and its bearing in practical politics Chapter VIII., Part I., "The Fight for the Place in the Sun."

but we know *now* that they are taking a course which gives the least result, even from *their* point of view, for the effort expended.

Here we get the key also to the difference between the respective histories of the military empires, like Spain, France, and Portugal, and the more industrial type, like Great Britain, which has been touched upon in the preceding chapter. Not the mere hazard of war, not a question of mere efficiency in the employment of force, has given to Great Britain influence in half a world, and taken it from Spain, but a radical, fundamental difference in underlying principles however imperfectly realized. Great Britain's exercise of force has approximated on the whole to the rôle of police; Spain's to that of the diplomats of the supposititious Power just referred to. Great Britain's has made for co-operation; Spain's for the embarrassment of co-operation. Great Britain's has been in keeping with the real law of man's struggle; Spain's in keeping with the sham law which the "blood and iron" empiricists are for ever throwing at our heads. For what has happened to all attempts to live on extorted tribute? They have all failed—failed miserably and utterly*—to such an extent that to-day the exaction of tribute has become an economic impossibility.

If, however, our supposititious diplomats, instead of asking for tribute, had said: "Your country is in disorder; your police-force is insufficient; our merchants are robbed and killed; we will lend you police and help you to maintain order; you will pay the police their just wage, and that is all;" and had honestly kept to this office, their exercise of force would have aided

* See Chapter VII., Part I.

human co-operation, not checked it. Again, it would have been a struggle, not against man, but against crime; the "predominant Power" would have been living, not on other men, but by more efficient organization of man's fight with nature.

That is why in the first section of this book I have laid emphasis on the truth that the justification of past wars has no bearing on the problem which confronts us: the precise degree of fighting which was necessary a hundred and fifty years ago is a somewhat academic problem. The degree of fighting which is necessary to-day is the problem which confronts us, and a great many factors have been introduced into it since Great Britain won India and North America. The face of the world has changed, and the factors of conflict have changed radically: to ignore that is to ignore facts and to be guided by the worst form of theorizing and sentimentalism—the theorizing that will not recognize the facts. Great Britain does not need to maintain order in Germany, nor Germany in France; and the struggle between those nations is no part of man's struggle with nature—has no justification in the real law of human struggle; it is an anachronism; it finds its justification in a sham philosophy that will not bear the test of facts, and, responding to no real need, and achieving no real purpose, is bound with increasing enlightenment to come to an end.

I wish it were not everlastingly necessary to reiterate the fact that the world has moved. Yet for the purposes of this discussion it is. If to-day an Italian warship were suddenly to bombard Liverpool without warning, the Bourse in Rome would present a condition, and the bank-rate in Rome would take a jump

that would ruin tens of thousands of Italians—do far more injury, probably to Italy than to Great Britain. Yet if five hundred years ago Italian pirates had landed from the Thames and sacked London itself, not an Italian in Italy would have been a penny the worse for it.

Is it seriously urged that in the matter of the exercise of physical force therefore there is no difference in these two conditions: and is it seriously urged that the psychological phenomena which go with the exercise of physical force are to remain unaffected?

The preceding chapter is, indeed, the historical justification of the economic truths established in the first section of this book in the terms of the facts of the present-day world, which show that the predominating factor in survival is shifting from the physical to the intellectual plane. This evolutionary process has now reached a point in international affairs which involves the complete economic futility of military force. In the last chapter but one I dealt with the psychological consequence of this profound change in the nature of man's normal activities, showing that his nature is coming more and more to adapt itself to what he normally and for the greater part of his life—in most cases all his life—is engaged in, and is losing the impulses concerned with an abnormal and unusual occupation.

Why have I presented the facts in this order, and dealt with the psychological result involved in this change before the change itself? I have adopted this order of treatment because the believer in war justifies his dogmatism for the most part by an appeal to what he

alleges is the one dominating fact of the situation—*i.e.*, that human nature is unchanging. Well, as will be seen from the chapter on that subject, such alleged fact does not bear investigation. Human nature is changing out of all recognition. Not only is man fighting less, but he is using all forms of physical compulsion less, and as a very natural result is losing those psychological attributes that go with the employment of physical force. And he is coming to employ physical force less because accumulated evidence is pushing him more and more to the conclusion that he can accomplish more easily that which he strives for by other means.

Few of us realize to what extent economic pressure—and I use that term in its just sense, as meaning, not only the struggle for money, but everything implied therein, well-being, social consideration, and the rest—has replaced physical force in human affairs. The primitive mind could not conceive a world in which everything was not regulated by force: even the great minds of antiquity could not believe the world would be an industrious one unless the great mass were made industrious by the use of physical force—*i.e.*, by slavery. Three-fourths of those who peopled what is now Italy in Rome's palmiest days were slaves, chained in the fields when at work, chained at night in their dormitories, and those who were porters chained to the doorways. It was a society of slavery—fighting slaves, working slaves, cultivating slaves, official slaves, and Gibbon adds that the Emperor himself was a slave, "the first slave to the ceremonies he imposed." Great and penetrating as were many of the minds of antiquity, none of them show much conception of any condition

of society in which the economic impulse could replace physical compulsion.* And had they been told that the time would come when the world would work very much harder under the impulse of an abstract thing known as economic interest, they would have regarded such a statement as that of a mere sentimental theorist. Indeed, one need not go so far: if one had told an American slaveholder of sixty years ago that the time would come when the South would produce more cotton under the free pressure of economic forces than under slavery, he would have made a like reply. He would probably have declared that "a good cowhide whip beats all economic pressure"—pretty much the sort of thing that one may hear from the mouth of the average militarist to-day. Very "practical" and virile, of course, but it has the disadvantage of not being true.

And the presumed necessity for physical compulsion did not stop at slavery. As we have already seen, it was accepted as an axiom in statecraft that men's religious beliefs had to be forcibly restrained, and not merely their religious belief, but their very clothing; and we have hundreds of years of complicated sumptuary laws, hundreds of years, also, of forcible control or, rather, the attempted forcible control of prices and trade, the elaborate system of monopolies, absolute prohibition of the entrance into the country of certain foreign goods, the violation of which prohibition was treated as a penal offence. We had even the use of forced money, the refusal to accept which was treated

* Aristotle did, however, have a flash of the truth. He said: "If the hammer and the shuttle could move themselves, slavery would be unnecessary."

as a penal offence. In many countries for years it was a crime to send gold abroad, all indicating the domination of the mind of man by the same curious obsession that man's life must be ruled by physical force, and it is only very slowly and very painfully that we have arrived at the truth that men will work best when left to unseen and invisible forces. And a world in which physical force was withdrawn from the regulation of men's labour, faith, clothes, trade, language, travel, would have been absolutely inconceivable to even the best minds during the three or four thousand years of history which mainly concern us. What is the central explanation of the profound change involved here—the shifting of the pivot in all human affairs, in so far as they touch both the individual and the community, from physical ponderable forces to economic imponderable forces? It is surely that, strange as it may seem, the latter forces accomplish the desired result more efficiently and more readily than do the former, which even when they are not completely futile are in comparison wasteful and stultifying. It is the law of the economy of effort. Indeed, the use of physical force usually involves in those employing it the same limitation of freedom (even if in lesser degree) as that which it is desired to impose. Herbert Spencer illustrates the process in the following suggestive passage:

"The exercise of mastery inevitably entails on the master himself some sort of slavery more or less pronounced. The uncultured masses and even the greater part of the cultured will regard this statement as absurd, and though many who have read history with an eye to essentials rather than to trivialities know that this is a paradox in the right sense—that is, true in fact though not seeming true—even they are

not fully conscious of the mass of evidence establishing it, and will be all the better for having illustrations recalled. Let me begin with the earliest and simplest which serves to symbolize the whole.

"Here is a prisoner, with his hands tied and a cord round his neck (as suggested by figures in Assyrian bas-reliefs), being led home by his savage conqueror, who intends to make him a slave. The one you say is captive and the other free. Are you quite sure the other is free? He holds one end of the cord and, unless he means his captive to escape, he must continue to be fastened by keeping hold of the cord in such way that it cannot easily be detached. He must be himself tied to the captive while the captive is tied to him. In other ways his activities are impeded and certain burdens are imposed on him. A wild animal crosses the track and he cannot pursue. If he wishes to drink of the adjacent stream he must tie up his captive, lest advantage be taken of his defenceless position. Moreover, he has to provide food for both. In various ways he is no longer, then, completely at liberty; and these worries adumbrate in a simple manner the universal truth that the instrumentalities by which the subordination of others is effected themselves subordinate the victor, the master, or the ruler."*

Thus it comes that all nations attempting to live by conquest end by being themselves the victims of a military tyranny precisely similar to that which they hope to inflict; or, in other terms, that the attempt to impose by force of arms a disadvantageous commercial situation to the advantage of the conqueror ends in the conqueror's falling a victim to the very disadvantages from which he hoped by a process of spoliation to profit.

But the truth that economic force always in the long

* "Facts and Comments," p. 112.

run outweighs physical or military force is illustrated by the simple fact of the universal use of money—the fact that the use of money is not a thing which we choose or can shake off, but a thing imposed by the operation of forces stronger than our volition, stronger than the tyranny of the cruellest tyrant who ever reigned by blood and iron. I think it is one of the most astounding things, to the man who takes a fairly fresh mind to the study of history, that the most absolute despots—men who can command the lives of their subjects with a completeness and a nonchalance of which the modern Western world furnishes no parallel—cannot command money. One asks oneself, indeed, why such an absolute ruler, able as he is by the sheer might of his position and by the sheer force of his power to take everything that exists in his kingdom, and able as he is to exact every sort and character of service, needs money, which is the means of obtaining goods or services by a freely consented exchange. Yet, as we know, it is precisely in ancient as in modern times the most absolute despot who is often the most financially embarrassed.* Is not this a demonstration that in reality physical force is operative in only very narrow limits? It is no mere rhetoric, but the cold truth, to say that under absolutism it is a simple thing to get men's lives, but often impossible to get money. And the more, apparently, that physical force was exercised, the more difficult did the command of money become. And for a very simple reason—a reason which

* Buckle ("History of Civilization") points out that Philip II., who ruled half the world and drew tribute from the whole of South America, was so poor that he could not pay his personal servants or meet the daily expenses of the Court!

reveals in rudimentary form that principle of the economic futility of military power with which we are dealing. The phenomenon is best illustrated by a concrete case. If one go to-day into one of the independent despotisms of Central Asia one will find generally a picture of the most abject poverty. Why? Because the ruler has absolute power to take wealth whenever he sees it, to take it by any means whatever—torture, death—up to the completest limit of uncontrolled physical force. What is the result? The wealth is not created, and torture itself cannot produce a thing which is non-existent. Step across the frontier into a State under British or Russian protection, where the Khan has some sort of limits imposed on his powers. The difference is immediately perceptible: evidence of wealth and comfort in relative profusion, and, other things being equal, the ruler whose physical force over his subjects is limited is a great deal richer than the ruler whose physical force over his subjects is unlimited. In other words, the farther one gets away from physical force in the acquisition of wealth, the greater is the result for the effort expended. At the one end of the scale you get the despot in rags exercising sway over what is probably a potentially rich territory reduced to having to kill a man by torture in order to obtain a sum which at the other end of the scale a London tradesman will spend on a restaurant dinner for the purpose of sitting at table with a duke—or the thousandth part of the sum which the same tradesman will spend in philanthropy or otherwise, for the sake of acquiring an empty title from a monarch who has lost all power of exercising any physical force whatsoever.

Which process, judged by all things that men desire, gives the better result, the physical force of blood and iron which we see, or the intellectual or psychic force which we cannot see? But the principle which operates in the limited fashion which I have indicated, operates with no less force in the larger domain of modern international politics. The wealth of the world is not represented by a fixed amount of gold or money now in the possession of one Power, and now in the possession of another, but depends on all the unchecked multiple activities of a community for the time being. Check that activity, whether by imposing tribute, or disadvantageous commercial conditions, or an unwelcome administration which sets up sterile political agitation, and you get less wealth—less wealth for the conqueror, as well as less for the conquered. The broadest statement of the case is that all experience—especially the experience indicated in the last chapter—shows that in trade by free consent carrying mutual benefit we get larger results for effort expended than in the exercise of physical force which attempts to exact advantage for one party at the expense of the other. I am not arguing over again the thesis of the first part of this book; but, as we shall see presently, the general principle of the diminishing factor of physical force in the affairs of the world carries with it a psychological change in human nature which modifies radically our impulses to sheer physical conflict. What it is important just now to keep in mind is the incalculable intensification of this diminution of physical force by our mechanical development. The principle was obviously less true for Rome than it is for Great Britain: Rome, however imperfectly, lived largely by tribute. The sheer

mechanical development of the modern world has rendered tribute in the Roman sense impossible. Rome did not have to create markets and find a field for the employment of her capital. We do. What result does this carry? Rome could afford to be relatively indifferent to the prosperity of her subject territory. We cannot. If the territory is not prosperous we have no market, and we have no field for our investments, and that is why we are checked at every point from doing what Rome was able to do. You can to some extent exact tribute by force; you cannot compel a man to buy your goods by force if he does not want them, and has not got the money to pay for them. Now, the difference which we see here has been brought about by the interaction of a whole series of mechanical changes — printing, gunpowder, steam, electricity, improved means of communication. It is the last-named which has mainly created the fact of credit. Now, credit is merely an extension of the use of money, and we can no more shake off the domination of the one than we can that of the other. We have seen that the bloodiest despot is himself the slave of money, in the sense that he is compelled to employ it. In the same way no physical force can in the modern world set at nought the force of credit.* It is no more possible for a great people of the modern world to live without credit than without money, of which it is a part. Do we not here get the same fact that intangible economic forces are setting at nought the force of arms?

One of the curiosities of this mechanical develop-

* I mean by credit all the mechanism of exchange which replaces the actual use of metal, or notes representing it.

ment, with its deep-seated psychological results, is the general failure to realize the real bearings of each step therein. Printing was regarded, in the first instance, as merely a new-fangled process which threw a great many copying scribes and monks out of employment. But who realized that in the simple invention of printing there was the liberation of a force greater than the power of kings? It is only here and there that we find an isolated thinker having a glimmering of the political bearing of such inventions; of the conception of the great truth that the more man succeeds in his struggle with nature, the less must be the rôle of physical force between men, for the reason that human society has become with each success in the struggle against nature a completer organism. That is to say that the interdependence of the parts has been increased, and that the possibility of one part injuring another without injury to itself has been diminished. Each part is more dependent on the other parts, and the impulses to injury therefore must in the nature of things be diminished. And that fact must, and does, daily redirect human pugnacity. And it is noteworthy that perhaps the best service which the improvement of the instruments of man's struggle with nature performs is the improvement of the human relation. Machinery and the steam-engine have done something more than make fortunes for manufacturers: they have abolished human slavery, as Aristotle foresaw they would. It was impossible for men in the mass to be other than superstitious and irrational until they had the printed book.* "Roads that are formed for

* Lecky ("Rationalism in Europe," p. 76) says: "Protestantism could not possibly have existed without a general diffusion of the

the circulation of wealth become channels for the circulation of ideas, and render possible that simultaneous action upon which all liberty depends." And banking done by telegraphy concerns much more than the stockbroker: it demonstrates clearly and dramatically the real interdependence of nations, and is destined to transform the mind of the statesman. Our struggle is with our environment, not with one another; and those who talk as though struggle between the parts of the same organism must necessarily go on, and as though impulses which are redirected every day can never receive the particular redirection involved in abandoning the struggle between States, ignorantly adopt the formula of science, but leave half the facts out of consideration. And just as the direction of the impulses will be changed, so will the character of the struggle be changed; the force which we shall use for our needs will be the force of intelligence, of hard work, of character, of patience, self-control, and a developed brain, and the pugnacity and combativeness which, instead of being used up and wasted in world conflicts of futile destructiveness, will be, and are being, diverted into the steady stream of rationally-directed effort. The virile impulses become, not the tyrant and master, but the tool and servant of the controlling brain.

The conception of abstract imponderable forces by the human mind is a very slow process. All man's history reveals this. The theologian has always felt

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Bible, and that diffusion was impossible until after the two inventions of paper and printing. . . . Before those inventions pictures and material images were the chief means of religious instruction." And thus religious belief became necessarily material, crude, anthropomorphic.

this difficulty. For thousands of years men could only conceive of evil as an animal with horns and a tail, going about the world devouring folk; abstract conceptions had to be made understandable by a crude anthropomorphism. Perhaps it is better that humanity should have some glimmering of the great facts of the universe, even though interpreted by legends of demons, and goblins, and fairies, and the rest; but we cannot overlook the truth that the facts *are* distorted in the process, and our advance in the conception of morals is marked largely by the extent to which we can form an abstract conception of the fact of evil—none the less a fact because unembodied—without having to translate it into a non-existent person or animal with a forked tail.

As our advance in the understanding of morality is marked by our dropping these crude physical conceptions, is it not likely that our advance in the understanding of those social problems, which so nearly affect our general well-being, will be marked in like manner?

Is it not somewhat childish and elementary to conceive of force only as the firing off of guns and the launching of *Dreadnoughts*, of struggle as the physical struggle between men, instead of the application of man's energies to his contest with the planet? Is not the time coming when the real struggle will inspire us with the same respect and even the same thrill as that now inspired by a charge in battle; especially as the charges in battle are getting very out of date, and are shortly to disappear from our warfare? The mind which can only conceive of struggle as bombardment and charges is, of course, the Dervish mind. Not that

Fuzzy-Wuzzy is not a fine fellow. He is manly, sturdy, hardy, with a courage and warlike qualities generally which no European can equal. But the frail and spectacled British official is his master, and a few score of such will make themselves the masters of teeming thousands of Sudanese; the relatively unwarlike Briton is doing the same thing all over Asia, and he is doing it by the simple virtue of superior brain and character, more thought, more rationalism, more steady and controlled hard work. It may be said that it is superior armament which does it. But what is the superior armament but the result of superior thought and work? And even without the superior armament the larger intelligence would still do it; for what the Englishman does the Roman did of old, with the same arms as his vassal worlds. Force is indeed the master, but it is force of intelligence, character, and rationalism.

I can imagine the contempt with which the man of physical force greets the foregoing. To fight with words, to fight with talk! No, not words, but ideas. And something more than ideas. Their translation into practical effort, into organization, into the direction and administration of organization, into the strategy and tactics of human life.

And what, indeed, is modern warfare in its highest phases but this? Is it not an altogether out-of-date and ignorant view to picture soldiering as riding about on horseback, bivouacking in forests, sleeping in tents, and dashing gallantly at the head of shining regiments in plumes and breastplates, and pounding in serried ranks against the equally serried ranks of the cruel foe, storming breaches—"war," in short, of Mr. Henty's

books for boys? How far does such conception correspond to the reality—to the German conception? Even if the whole picture were not out of date, what proportion of the most military nation would ever be destined to witness it or to take part in it? Not one in ten thousand. What is the character even of military conflict but for the most part years of hard and steady work, somewhat mechanical, somewhat divorced from real life, but not a whit more exciting? That is true of all ranks; and in the higher ranks of the directing mind war has become an almost purely intellectual process. Was it not the late W. H. Steevens who painted Lord Kitchener as the sort of man who would have made an admirable manager of Harrod's Stores; who fought all his battles in his study, and regarded the actual fighting as the mere culminating incident in the whole process, the dirty and noisy part of it, which he would have been glad to get away from?

The real soldiers of our time—those who represent the brain of the armies—have a life not very different from that of men of any intellectual calling; much less of physical strife than is called for in many civil occupations; less than falls to the lot of engineers, ranchers, sailors, miners, and so on. Even with armies the pugnacity must be translated into intellectual and not into physical effort.*

The very fact that war was for long an activity which was in some sense a change and relaxation from the

* "Battles are no longer the spectacular heroics of the past. The army of to-day and to-morrow is a sombre gigantic machine devoid of melodramatic heroics . . . a machine that it requires years to form in separate parts, years to assemble them together, and other years to make them work smoothly and irresistibly" (General Homer Lea in "The Valour of Ignorance," p. 49).

more intellectual strife of peaceful life, in which work was replaced by danger, thought by adventure, accounted in no small part for its attraction for us. But, as we have seen, war is becoming as hopelessly intellectual and scientific as any other form of work: officers are scientists, the men are workmen, the army is a machine, battles are "tactical operations," the charge is becoming out of date; a little while and war will become the least romantic of all professions.

In this domain, as in all others, intellectual force is replacing sheer physical force, and we are being pushed by the necessities even of this struggle to be more rational in our attitude to war, to rationalize our study of it; and as our attitude generally becomes more scientific, so will the purely impulsive element lose its empire over us. That is one factor; but, of course, there is the greater one. Our respect and admiration goes in the long run, despite momentary setbacks, to those qualities which achieve the results at which we are all in common aiming. If those results are mainly intellectual, it is the intellectual qualities that will receive the tribute of our admiration. We do not make a man Prime Minister because he holds the light-weight boxing championship, and nobody knows or cares whether Mr. Balfour or Mr. Asquith would be the better man at polo. But in a condition of society in which physical force was still the determining factor it would matter all in the world, and even when other factors had obtained considerable weight, as during the Middle Ages, physical combat went for a great deal: the knight in his shining armour established his prestige by his prowess in arms, and the vestige of this still remains in those countries that retain the duel. To

some small extent—a very small extent—a man's dexterity with sword and pistol will affect his political prestige in Paris, Rome, Buda-Pesth, or Berlin. But these are just interesting vestiges, and in the case of Anglo-Saxon societies have disappeared entirely. My commercial friend who declares that he works fifteen hours a day mainly for the purpose of going one better than his commercial rival across the street, must beat that rival in commerce, not in arms; it would satisfy no pride of either to "have it out" in the back garden in their shirt-sleeves. Nor is there the least danger that one will stick a knife into the other.

Are all these factors to leave the national relationship unaffected? Have they left it unaffected? Does the military prowess of Russia or of Turkey inspire any particular satisfaction in the minds of the individual Russian or of the individual Turk? Does it inspire Europe with any especial respect? Would not most of us just as soon be a non-military American as a military Turk? Do not, in short, all the factors show that sheer physical force is losing its prestige as much in the national as in the personal relationship?

I am not overlooking the case of Germany. Does the history of Germany during the last half-century show the blind instinctive pugnacity which is supposed to be so overpowering an element in international relationship as to outweigh all question of material interest altogether? Does the commonly accepted history of the trickery and negotiation which preceded the 1870 conflict, the cool calculation of those who swayed Germany's policy during those years, show that subordination to the blind lust for fight which the militarist would persuade us is always to be an element

in our international conflict? Does it not, on the contrary, show that German destinies were swayed by very cool and calculating motives of interest, though interest interpreted in terms of political and economic doctrines which the development of the last thirty years or so demonstrated to be obsolete? Nor am I overlooking the "Prussian tradition," the fact of a firmly entrenched, aristocratic status, the intellectual legacy of pagan knighthood and Heaven knows what else. But even a Prussian Junker becomes less of an energumen as he becomes more of a scientist,* and although German science has of late spent its energies in somewhat arid specialism, the influence of more enlightened conceptions in sociology and statecraft must sooner or later emerge from any thoroughgoing study of political and economical problems. Of course, there are survivals of the old temper, but can it seriously be argued that when the futility of physical force to accomplish those ends towards which we are all striving is fully demonstrated we shall go on maintaining war as a sort of theatrical entertainment? Has such a thing ever happened in the past, when our impulses and "sporting" instincts came into conflict with our larger social and economic interests?

All this, in other words, involves a great deal more

* General von Bernhardi, in his work on cavalry, deals with this very question of the bad influence on tactics of the "pomp of war," which he admits must disappear, adding very wisely: "The spirit of tradition consists not in the retention of antiquated forms, but in acting in that spirit which in the past led to such glorious success." The plea for the retention of the soldier because of his "spirit" could not be more neatly disposed of. See p. 111 of the English edition of Bernhardi's work (Hugh Rees, London).

than the mere change in the character of warfare. It involves a fundamental change in our psychological attitude thereto. Not only does it show that on every side, even the military side, conflict must become less impulsive and instinctive, more rational and sustained, less the blind strife of mutually hating men, and more and more the calculated effort to a definite end; but it will affect the very well-springs of much of the present defence of war.

Why is it that the authorities I have quoted in the first chapter of this section—Mr. Roosevelt, Von Moltke, Renan, and the English clergymen—sing the praises of war as such a valuable school of morals? Do these war advocates urge that war of itself is desirable? Would they urge going to war unnecessarily or unjustly merely because it is good for us? Emphatically no. Their argument in the last analysis resolves itself into this: that war, though bad, has redeeming qualities, as teaching staunchness, courage, and the rest. Well, so has cutting our legs off, or an operation for appendicitis. But whoever composed epics on typhoid fever or cancer? Such advocates might object to the efficient policing of a town because, while it is full of cut-throats, the inhabitants would be taught courage. One can almost imagine this sort of teacher pouring scorn upon those weaklings who want to call upon the police for protection, and saying, "Police are for sentimentalists and cowards and men of slothful ease. What will become of the strenuous life if you introduce police?"*

* The following letter to the *Manchester Guardian*, which appeared at the time of the Boer War, is worth reproduction in this connection :

The whole thing falls to the ground; and if we do not compose poems about typhoid it is because typhoid does not attract us and war does. That is the bottom

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"SIR,—I see that 'The Church's Duty in regard to War' is to be discussed at the Church Congress. This is right. For a year the heads of our Church have been telling us what war is and does—that it is a school of character; that it sobers men, cleans them, strengthens them, knits their hearts; makes them brave, patient, humble, tender, prone to self-sacrifice. Watered by 'war's red rain,' one Bishop tells us, virtue grows; a cannonade, he points out, is an 'oratorio'—almost a form of worship. True; and to the Church men look for help to save their souls from starving for lack of this good school, this kindly rain, this sacred music. Congresses are apt to lose themselves in wastes of words. This one must not, surely cannot, so straight is the way to the goal. It has simply to draft and submit a new Collect for war in our time, and to call for the reverent but firm emendation, in the spirit of the best modern thought, of those passages in Bible and Prayer-Book by which even the truest of Christians and the best of men have at times been blinded to the duty of seeking war and ensuing it. Still, man's moral nature cannot, I admit, live by war alone; nor do I say with some that peace is wholly bad. Even amid the horrors of peace you will find little shoots of character fed by the gentle and timely rains of plague and famine, tempest and fire; simple lessons of patience and courage conned in the schools of typhus, gout, and stone; not oratorios, perhaps, but homely anthems and rude hymns played on knife and probe in the long winter nights. Far from me to 'sin our mercies,' or to call mere twilight dark. Yet dark it may become; for remember that even these poor makeshift schools of character, these second-bests, these halting substitutes for war — remember that the efficiency of every one of them, be it hunger, accident, ignorance, sickness, or pain, is menaced by the intolerable strain of its struggles with secular doctors, plumbers, inventors, schoolmasters, and policemen. Every year thousands who would once have been braced and steeled by manly tussles with small-pox or diphtheria are robbed of that blessing by the great changes made in our drains. Every year thousands of women and children must go their way bereft of the rich spiritual experience of the widow and the orphan."

of the whole matter, and it simplifies things a great deal to admit honestly that while no one is thrilled by the spectacle of disease, most of us are thrilled by the spectacle of war—that while none of us are fascinated by the spectacle of a man struggling with a disease, most of us are by the spectacle of men struggling with one another in war There is something in warfare, in its story and in its paraphernalia, which profoundly stirs the emotions and sends the blood tingling through the veins of the most peaceable of us, and appeals to I know not what remote instincts, to say nothing of our natural admiration for courage, our love of adventure, of intense movement and action. But this romantic fascination resides to no small extent in that very spectacular quality of which modern conditions are depriving war.

As we become a little more educated we realize that human psychology is a complex and not a simple thing; that because we yield ourselves to the thrill of the battle spectacle we are not bound to conclude that the processes behind it and the nature behind it are necessarily all admirable; that the readiness to die is not the only test of virility or a fine or noble nature.

In the book to which I have just referred (Mr. Steevens' "With Kitchener to Khartoum") one may read the following:

"And the Dervishes? The honour of the fight must still go with the men who died. Our men were perfect, but the Dervishes were superb—beyond perfection. It was their largest, best and bravest army that ever fought against us for Mahdism, and it died worthily for the huge empire that Mahdism won and kept so long. Their riflemen, mangled by every kind of death and torment that man can devise, clung

round the black flag and the green, emptying their poor, rotten home-made cartridges dauntlessly. Their spearmen charged death every minute hopelessly. Their horsemen led each attack, riding into the bullets till nothing was left. . . . Not one rush, or two, or ten, but rush on rush, company on company, never stopping, though all their view that was not unshaken enemy was the bodies of the men who had rushed before them. A dusky line got up and stormed forward: it bent, broke up, fell apart, and disappeared. Before the smoke had cleared another line was bending and storming forward in the same track. . . . From the green army there now came only death-enamoured desperadoes, strolling one by one towards the rifles, pausing to take a spear, turning aside to recognize a corpse, then, caught by a sudden jet of fury, bounding forward, checking, sinking limply to the ground. Now under the black flag in a ring of bodies stood only three men, facing the three thousand of the Third Brigade. They folded their arms about the staff and gazed steadily forward. Two fell. The last Dervish stood up and filled his chest; he shouted the name of his God and hurled his spear. Then he stood quite still, waiting. It took him full; he quivered, gave at the knees, and toppled with his head on his arms and his face towards the legions of his conquerors."

Let us be honest. Is there anything in European history—Cambronne, the Light Brigade, anything you like—more magnificent than this? If we are honest we shall say, No.

But note what follows in Mr. Steevens' narrative. What sort of nature should we expect those savage heroes to display? Cruel, perhaps; but at least loyal. They will stand by their chief. Men who can die like that will not betray him for gain. They are uncorrupted by commercialism. Well, a few chapters after the scene just described, one may read this:

"As a ruler the Khalifa finished when he rode out of Omdurman. His own pampered Baggara horsemen killed his herdsmen and looted the cattle that were to feed them. Somebody betrayed the position of the reserve camels . . . His followers took to killing one another. . . . The whole population of the Khalifa's capital was now racing to pilfer the Khalifa's grain . . . Wonderful workings of the savage mind! Six hours before they were dying in regiments for their master; now they were looting his corn. Six hours before they were slashing our wounded to pieces; now they were asking us for coppers."

This difficulty with the soldier's psychology is not special to Dervishes or to savages.*

To do the soldiers justice, they very rarely raise this plea of war being a moral training-school. "War itself," said on one occasion an officer, "is an infernally dirty business. But somebody has got to do the dirty work of the world, and I am glad to think that it is the

* I have so far departed here from the rule to leave these chapters exactly as they appeared before the war as to cut out from the stereotyped plates of "The Great Illusion" at this point two somewhat long quotations from Captain March Phillips's book, "With Remington" (Methuen, pp. 255-6), dealing with the character of the British soldier. Their nett purpose is to show that "soldiers as a class are men who have disregarded the civil standard of morality altogether. They simply ignore it," and to justify in the soldier what no one would think of justifying in the civilian. These passages were cited simply as the evidence of a competent witness, and I did not necessarily associate myself with them. But they seem to have given immense offence to certain officer-readers, who have urged that, as they constitute a gross slander on the British soldier, they should at the earliest opportunity be deleted. In order not to become, even in the presentation of evidence, the vehicle of such slander, I have decided, with, I confess, very grave misgiving, to leave them out. The determining consideration in so doing is perhaps that Captain March Phillips wrote of the British soldier in the South African War, and that there is evidence to suggest that his characterization is out of date.

business of the soldier to prevent rather than to make war."

Not that I am concerned to deny that we owe a great deal to the soldier. I do not know even why we should deny that we owe a great deal to the Viking. Neither the one nor the other was in every aspect despicable. Both have bequeathed a heritage of courage, sturdiness, hardihood, and a spirit of ordered adventure; the capacity to take hard knocks and to give them; comradeship and rough discipline—all this and much more. It is not true to say of any emotion that it is wholly and absolutely good, or wholly and absolutely bad. The same psychological force which made the Vikings destructive and cruel pillagers made their descendants sturdy and resolute pioneers and colonists; and the same emotional force which turns so much of Africa into a sordid and bloody shambles would, with a different direction and distribution, turn it into a garden. Is it for nothing that the splendid Scandinavian race, who have converted their rugged and rock-strewn peninsula into a group of prosperous and stable States, which are an example to Europe, and have infused the great Anglo-Saxon stock with something of their sane but noble idealism, have the blood of Vikings in their veins? Is there no place for the free play of all the best qualities of the Viking and the soldier in a world still so sadly in need of men with courage enough, for instance, to face the truth, however difficult it may seem, however unkind to our pet prejudices?

There is not the least necessity for the peace advocate to ignore facts in this matter. The race of man loves a soldier just as boys we used to love the pirate, and many of us, perhaps to our very great advantage,

remain in part boys our lives through. But just as growing out of boyhood we regretfully discover the sad fact that we cannot be a pirate, that we cannot even hunt Indians, nor be a scout, nor even a trapper, so surely the time has come to realize that we have grown out of soldiering. The romantic appeal of war was just as true of the ventures of the old Vikings, and even later of piracy.* Yet we superseded the Viking and we hanged the pirate, though I doubt not we loved him while we hanged him; and I am not aware that those who urged the suppression of piracy were vilified, except by the pirates, as maudlin sentimentalists, who ignored human nature, or, as General Lea's phrase has it, as "half-educated, sick-brained visionaries, denying the inexorability of the primordial law of struggle." Piracy interfered seriously with the trade and industry of those who desired to earn for themselves as good a living as they could get, and to obtain from this imperfect world all that it had to offer. Piracy was magnificent, doubtless, but it was not business. We are prepared to sing about the Viking, but not to tolerate him on the high seas; and those of us who are quite prepared to give the soldier his due place in poetry and legend and romance, quite prepared to admit, with Mr. Roosevelt and Von Moltke and the rest, the qualities which perhaps we owe to him, and without which we should be poor folk indeed, are nevertheless inquiring whether the time has not come to place him (or a good portion

* Professor William James says: "Greek history is a panorama of war for war's sake . . . of the utter ruin of a civilization which in intellectual respects was perhaps the highest the earth has ever seen. The wars were purely piratical. Pride, gold, women, slaves, excitement were their only motives."—*McClure's Magazine* August, 1910.

of him) gently on the poetic shelf with the Viking; or at least to find other fields for those activities which, however much we may be attracted by them, have in their present form little place in a world in which, though, as Bacon has said, men like danger better than travail, travail is bound, alas!—despite ourselves, and whether we fight Germany or not, and whether we win or lose—to be our lot.

APPENDIX

"WHAT SHOULD WE DO?"

AND yet, at the end of it all, the practical man feels this: "What is the good of converting *us*, of making the Englishman see the fallacy of the old doctrine, when the German remains unconverted, and holds to it as strongly as ever? He has always refused to listen to plans for limitation of armaments. The prevalence of saner doctrine in England is not going to affect the conduct of Germany. Rather is it likely to encourage him to gamble for the domination of Europe, if he believes that the more liberal Powers are weakening in their armaments. The only thing for us to do is to show him that we are, and intend to remain, the stronger party, and that he cannot challenge us. Our only security is our own strength."

Now, as a matter of quite simple fact, it is obvious that, however essential military strength may be to our security, we do not and cannot base it on that alone. The security of our nation and Empire is, in part at least, based on international arrangement and treaty. The present position of the Allies, the fact that for defensive purposes engagements have been entered into between France, Russia, Belgium, Servia, Japan, Montenegro, and perhaps to-morrow Portugal and Italy, is proof, however little we may like it, that without

treaties and international engagements we can no longer be secure. And I want to suggest that the real line of advance is to extend the system we have adopted, render it more effective and more secure; that the older policy of "letting all foreigners go hang" and of each trusting only to his isolated military force, without regard to the possible co-operation of other nations in the work of mutual defence, is not "practical" at all. We have in any case abandoned it, and even the militarists have become internationalist. But the military internationalism so far adopted stops just at the point where from the point of view of the maintenance of peace it becomes self-stultifying. The preceding pages have shown why a "Balance of Power" based on the rivalry of two groups is a moral and physical absurdity. As it is impossible to estimate exactly the real power of the rival groups, and as each naturally wants to give the benefit of the doubt to itself, the system means that really to secure peace by it each must be stronger than the other. Superiority of strength on one side in rival groups of nations must always be unstable. These pages have already shown why we cannot "wipe out" or "destroy" a people of 80 or 100 million souls; why the extreme instability of a Balance of Power based on a shifting and changing system of alliances will always furnish such a people the possibility of forming some new combination which may tilt the balance in their favour. And yet we—each group, that is—must be stronger than the other, because each is everlastingly afraid of the other. This war has been well called the "war of fear." It is fear which has produced the present form of the alliances, and the war which that form of alliances has failed to avert. To give this place

to fear as among the causes of the war is not to overlook the plainly aggressive intentions of the Prussian war party.

It may be perfectly true that the Prussian party had from the first plotted the conquest of France or of England, or of both, but it is not in support of that plot that they won the sacrifices and enthusiasms of the whole German people which alone made it possible for them to prosecute it. When the German Government desired to get its budgets voted in the Reichstag, or to insure the co-operation of the Social Democrats, it was obliged to disavow any intention of aggression, and to base its appeal on the danger that Germany was exposed to from Russia and consequently (by the alliance) from France. If, during the last decade, the Government had been obliged year after year to avow that its armaments were for the purpose of conquest and aggression, there would have been a movement of opinion even in Germany which would have killed Pan-Germanism. The Social Democrats, for instance, have been won to the support of this war, and 65 million Germans are now fighting as a united nation, because all have been deluded into the belief that it is a war of defence against hostile nations determined to destroy German nationality. This, of course, is an utterly false view. But it happens to be that held by the German people.

This, then, is the common motive, and it will operate with even greater force after the war. Let us cast our minds forward to the stage at which England is completely victorious and is able to say to Germany: "You must never renew this mad race for armaments. Your military forces must be confined within such and such limits."

And suppose that Germany should reply about as follows:

"If our armaments are reduced as you desire, how shall we be in a position to defend ourselves against possible Russian aggression? Authoritative organs have already during the war demanded the Russian annexation of all North Prussia up to and including the Kiel Canal. You yourself have admitted that such a demand is monstrous; but imagine a Russia of greatly increased power of the future, drawing, it may be, on Asiatic populations for an enormous army, and possessing a force that outweighs ours. Are we not to be at liberty to meet this menace? Ten years since, your own political writers were declaring that Russia did constitute a menace to her neighbours. What guarantee can you give us that she will not again?"

Now, we can answer that in two ways. We can say: "We can give you no guarantee as to security from Russia; so far as we are concerned, Russia can act as she likes; our business is only to see that you have only very small armaments." And of course if we and the Allies mean business and mean to enforce that view, little short of the permanent occupation of Germany will make such a policy certain. Just how far indeed such a policy can be permanently enforced by outside military power has been discussed in some of the preceding pages.*

Or we can reply in another way and say: "We—all of us—will guarantee you against Russian aggression, just as we will guarantee Russia against your aggression. The international arrangements of the future will be on the basis, not of two rival groups, each confronting the other, but a sextuple or an octuple alliance com-

* See Chapter II.

prising all the members of the two groups pledged to act in common against any one disturber of the peace."

Now, for the purpose of this war, seven nations have combined against Germany and Austria. Why for the purpose of a permanent peace should not eight, or for that matter eighteen, undertake to combine against any one nation that commits aggression upon its neighbours? This would be a step at least toward allaying that fear which has produced such dire results.

The very fact of the discussion of such a proposal will place in the hands of those elements of the German population that will have become weary of this war an alternative to that re-arming which the Prussian party will certainly counsel.

Such a step is the natural development of the system of alliances to which we are already committed. It is the preliminary stage of the international police which we are unlikely to achieve at one bound from the present condition.

The step I have suggested is that which was taken by Sir Edward Grey himself in the last crisis which threatened Europe with war—the Balkan affair. It is the step which he took when the die had already, unfortunately, been cast in the crisis that led to this war.* Where time was available for the plan to operate, the new method succeeded in preventing war. All the circumstances after the war will probably be much more favourable for such a plan than they were before the war. The reshufflings and rearrangements, the weariness and exhaustion, the disposition to try new methods, and all the other psychological factors that generally precede developments of this nature, will be operative in full.

* See despatch, cited p. 70.

As against this will, of course, be urged all that we have heard for so many weary years—the impossibility of depending upon treaties or undertakings as between nations. But surely this objection overlooks the fact that the policy of the Balance of Power and the present resistance to Germany are themselves based upon agreements between nations; and between nations that by their characters have as little natural affinity as could well be imagined. In the present system of the Balance of Power we have international co-operation and combination between Servia, Japan, Russia, England, France, Belgium, and Portugal. Who would have said five years ago that England could by any possibility have found herself the ally of Servia? Or fifteen years ago who would have prophesied that England would be fighting to promote a Russian policy?

The facts of the present war show that we have already reached that stage at which we are *obliged* to depend for our safety upon the co-operation of nations with which we may have very serious causes of disagreement and conflict. For years our Australian fellow-subjects have been fearing the aggression of Japan, providing against it. Japan has been for a long time the prospective enemy most in their minds, yet that does not prevent the Australians being for this circumstance the allies of the Japanese. What should therefore prevent nations otherwise divided becoming for a special occassion and circumstance—*i.e.*, the breaking of the peace by one member of the society of nations—allies and co-operators? There are, of course, other difficulties of detail. Who is the aggressor? Our experience in this war shows that we can bring certain tests as to offensive as opposed to defensive action: mobilization

without the consent of the allied Powers would be considered an act of war. Other difficulties of detail should not prove more insoluble. If such an alliance of all the Powers of Europe is not to become an instrument for doubtful intrigues of diplomatists acting in secret, the engagements and deliberations of the Powers should be public, and secret arrangements between two or more individual members should be regarded as a violation of the international compact and of the new comity of nations. Moreover, it is by the publicity of the deliberations of the new council of the nations that we may hope to excite in the public itself sufficient interest in international relations to insure its gradual education in these matters and the improvement of its sense of responsibility for the immense issues that are involved.

One further proviso might be necessary: that there should be no transfer of territory from one Government to another without the consent of the population of that territory secured by as sound a means as international guarantees can insure. This principle of itself might go far to prevent wars of aggression: it would serve little purpose to fight a war of conquest if after the successful prosecution of the war it were necessary to submit the fate of the coveted territory to its inhabitants, a decision which may render the results of the war nugatory.

This, then, should be broadly the programme for the accomplishment of which British influence might work: the enlargement of our present alliance engagements so as to include all the combatants in this war, the purpose of such alliance being to throw against any one member of the group guilty of aggression the weight of

all the rest; publicity in the engagements made by the members; and no transfer of territory save by the consent of its inhabitants.

This falls very far short of more ambitious pacifist schemes—universal limitation of armaments, universal arbitration, etc. But it would be the first step to those ends. Without it they will never be achieved. When the defence in one country is, in addition to its own armament, based upon the support of the whole of Christendom, that fear which has been the main operative factor in the increase of armaments in the past, will be attenuated, to say the least. It would in principle transform the armaments of the world into the police force of the world, instead of their being as now a series of police forces pledged, not to the maintenance of order, but to fighting one another.

I am aware, of course, that this means the abandonment of certain Radical doctrines which have been held very tenaciously in the past: non-intervention, no military alliance with foreign countries, etc. But those doctrines, defensible as they were before the war, have, for good or ill, by our act been abandoned. We have become an integral part of the European system, and it is outside the domain of practical politics to go back. We must go forward to a condition which will obviate so far as may be the disadvantages and penalties which the steps already taken have involved.

If even this small development in the right direction is too Utopian, then indeed it is a choice between Utopia and Hell. The adoption of the principle suggested does not involve anything in the nature of non-resistance or a disparagement of the instinct of self-defence and nationality; nor the assumption that men will always

act wisely or nations always in their best interest; nor that international agreements can be implicitly relied upon; nor that nations will not violate their compacts. Such assumptions would be quite unfounded. But we must draw from that fact the right conclusion, which is, that if nations are so apt to lose their heads, it is important in normal times to develop a sense of real national interest so widespread and deeply rooted that even violent national passions will not entirely sweep it away; that since nationality is so sacred a thing we should all stand by one another to insure its respect; that since treaties are so unreliable we must have as many guarantors as possible; that as they are so flimsy, nothing less than the support of the whole of Christendom can render them reliable.

This is the only way. If we decline to follow it, but take the Prussian view that only force—the rival forces of rival units each nulifying the other—can give us security, then we shall have admitted that the boast of this being a war against the Prussian doctrine is a sham; it will be a confession that we ourselves believe such doctrine.

Those who hope to see England play a better part should fight this doctrine to the last, and by staking their policy upon the better creed, show both the courage and the faith without which no end of real worth can be accomplished.

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