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**COMPENDIUM OF
VERBATIM STATEMENTS
ON VERIFICATION**



MAY 1988



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

CANADA



**COMPENDIUM OF
VERBATIM STATEMENTS
ON VERIFICATION**

43-260-511



Dept. of External Affairs
Min. des Affaires extérieures

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Preface

The last three years have seen significant developments respecting the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. In the United Nations, the General Assembly on 16 December 1985 adopted without a vote resolution 40/152(o) entitled "Verification In All Its Aspects". Since that time two successive General Assemblies have adopted resolutions on verification. In addition, the United Nations Disarmament Commission began its consideration of the subject in May 1987.

This volume is compiled from the verbatim records (PV) of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). It covers the sessions held in Geneva from 1985 to 1987 and contains the major statements made on the issue of verification of arms control and disarmament proposals. The growing recognition of the importance of verification in arms control and disarmament is reflected both in the number of statements made on this issue and in their content. This Compendium is intended to be used as a resource volume to provide easy access to statements on national positions on verification and to aid those who wish to investigate the development of those positions over a period of time.

The statements are presented in chronological order. Two additional lists of statements are included to aid in the use of this volume. The List of Verbatim

Statements by Issue organizes the statements according to the arms control issue being discussed. The major issues discussed in the CD during the 1985-1987 sessions include: a chemical weapons convention, a comprehensive test ban, nuclear disarmament, arms control in outer space, and a radiological weapons convention. The List of Verbatim Statements by Nation organizes the statements by nation. A coded reference is included in this list to indicate the issue being discussed in each statement. These lists will enable the user to easily access all the statements made by a nation or group of nations on a particular issue, all the statements made on a particular issue, or all the statements made by a particular nation on a particular issue.

Note that the verbatim records of the CD are also available as source documents in French and the other official languages of the United Nations.

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CD/PV.382	p.22	Italy/Franceschi	26.8.86	338
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CD/PV.385	p.28	Sweden/Theorin	3.2.87	342
CD/PV.385	pp.38-40	Australia/Butler	3.2.87	342
CD/PV.386	pp.5-11	USA/Adelman	5.2.87	344
CD/PV.386	pp.13-14	USSR/Nazarkin	5.2.87	349
CD/PV.386	pp.19-20	FRG/Bolewski	5.2.87	349
CD/PV.386	p.22	Poland/Turbanski	5.2.87	351
CD/PV.387	pp.7-11	Japan/Yamada	10.2.87	351
CD/PV.388	pp.3-5	Finland/Tornudd	12.2.87	354
CD/PV.388	pp.9-10	Romania/Dolgu	12.2.87	356
CD/PV.388	p.16	Hungary/Meiszter	12.2.87	357
CD/PV.389	pp.4-7	USSR/Nazarkin	17.2.87	357
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CD/PV.389	pp.29-30	Egypt/Alfarargi	17.2.87	366
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CD/PV.391	p.21	Nigeria/Tonwe	24.2.87	372
CD/PV.392	p.8	India/Teja	26.2.87	372
CD/PV.392	p.15	USSR/Nazarkin	26.2.87	373
CD/PV.394	pp.4-6	Italy/Pugliese	5.3.87	373
CD/PV.394	pp.7-12	USSR/Nazarkin	5.3.87	375
CD/PV.396	pp.3-4, 8-11	Netherlands/van Schaik	12.3.87	379
CD/PV.397	pp.4-6	Norway/Bakkevig	17.3.87	383
CD/PV.397	p.9	Burgaria/Tellalov	17.3.87	385

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CD/PV.398	pp.5-6	Venezuela/Taylhardat	19.3.87	388
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CD/PV.402	pp.18-19	Bulgaria/Tellalov	2.4.87	395
CD/PV.402	pp.27-30	<u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts/ Dahlman	2.4.87	397
CD/PV.403	pp.2-6	USA/Hansen	7.4.87	399
CD/PV.403	pp.7-8	GDR/Rose	7.4.87	403
CD/PV.403	pp.10,12	FRG/von Stulpnagel	7.4.87	404
CD/PV.403	pp.13-14	USSR/Nazarkin	7.4.87	405
CD/PV.404	pp.3,7	Iran/Velayati	9.4.87	406
CD/PV.404	pp.11-12	Sri Lanka/Dhanapala	9.4.87	407
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CD/PV.405	pp.5-6	UK/Cromartie	14.4.87	409
CD/PV.405	pp.8-9	Japan/Yamada	14.4.87	411
CD/PV.405	p.14	Romania/Dolgu	14.4.87	412
CD/PV.405	pp.16-18	USSR/Nazarkin	14.4.87	413
CD/PV.406	pp.3,7	Czechoslovakia/Chnoupek	16.4.87	414
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CD/PV.408	pp.29-31	USSR/Nazarkin	23.4.87	428
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CD/PV.409	pp.14-16	Pakistan/Asif Ezdi	28.4.87	430
CD/PV.409	pp.16-20	France/Morel	28.4.87	432
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CD/PV.410	pp.10-15	Canada/Beesley	30.4.87	437
CD/PV.411	pp.6-9	USSR/Petrovsky	9.6.87	441
CD/PV.411	pp.16-17	Sweden/Theorin	9.6.87	444
CD/PV.411	p.20	GDR/Rose	9.6.87	445

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CD/PV.413	p.9	Bulgaria/Tellalov	16.6.87	447
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CD/PV.413	pp.18-19	Pakistan/Ahmad	16.6.87	449
CD/PV.415	p.3	Mexico/Garcia Robles	23.6.87	451
CD/PV.416	p.5	Morocco/Benhima	25.6.87	451
CD/PV.416	pp.11-12	Mongolia/Bayart	25.6.87	452
CD/PV.416	p.17	GDR/Rose	25.6.87	453
CD/PV.417	pp.2-5	Norway/Kristvik	30.6.87	454
CD/PV.417	pp.8-9	USA/Friedersdorf	30.6.87	457
CD/PV.418	pp.5,7	Netherlands/ van den Broek	2.7.87	458
CD/PV.418	pp.10,12-14	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	2.7.87	459
CD/PV.418	p.16	USSR/Nazarkin	2.7.87	461
CD/PV.419	pp.4-6	Finland/Kahiluoto	7.7.87	462
CD/PV.419	pp.6-8	Norway/Huslid	7.7.87	464
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CD/PV.420	pp.4-6	Canada/Beesley	9.7.87	467
CD/PV.421	pp.6,8-9	UK/Mellor	14.7.87	469
CD/PV.421	pp.18-21	Mexico/Gracia Robles	14.7.87	471
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CD/PV.423	pp.2-4	Australia/Butler	21.7.87	475
CD/PV.423	pp.6-7	Argentina/Campora	21.7.87	477
CD/PV.423	pp.12-16	Canada/Beesley	21.7.87	478
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CD/PV.424	pp.7-10	Japan/Yamada	23.7.87	482
CD/PV.424	pp.14-15	Belgium/Tindemans	23.7.87	485
CD/PV.425	p.5	Iran/Velayati	28.7.87	486
CD/PV.425	pp.10-11	Bulgaria/Tellalov	28.7.87	487
CD/PV.425	pp.13-14	GDR/Rose	28.7.87	488
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CD/PV.426	p.18	USA/Friedersdorf	30.7.87	491
CD/PV.427	p.5	GDR/Rose	4.8.87	492
CD/PV.428	pp.8-11	USSR/Schevardnadze	6.8.87	492
CD/PV.428	pp.14-16	Argentina/Campora	6.8.87	495
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CD/PV.429	pp.2-6	USSR/Nazarkin	11.8.87	499

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CD/PV.431	p.11	India/Teja	18.8.87	511
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CD/PV.432	pp.25,27	Egypt/Alfarargi	20.8.87	517
CD/PV.432	pp.33-35	Sri Lanka/Rodrigo	20.8.87	517
CD/PV.432	pp.37-38	Australia/Butler	20.8.87	518
CD/PV.432	pp.38-40	Japan/Yamada	20.8.87	519
CD/PV.432	pp.43-44	Pakistan/Ahmad	20.8.87	521
CD/PV.432	pp.46-47	GDR/Rose	20.8.87	522
CD/PV.433	pp.5-10,12-14	Canada/Beesley	25.8.87	523
CD/PV.433	pp.16-17	Algeria/Hacene	25.8.87	527
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CD/PV.435	pp.3-4	France/de la Baume	28.8.87	528

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CD/PV.408	pp.22-27	USA/Hansen	23.4.87	425
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CD/PV.292	pp.20-21	Argentina/Carasales	19.2.85	10
CD/PV.292	pp.26-27	Australia/Butler	19.2.85	11
CD/PV.293	pp.14, 17-18	USSR/Issraelyan	21.2.85	12
CD/PV.293	p.20	FRG/Wegener	21.2.85	14
CD/PV.293	p.21	India/Kant Sharma	21.2.85	14
CD/PV.293	p.22	Mexico/Garcia Robles	21.2.85	15
CD/PV.294	pp.7-8	Pakistan/Ahmad	26.2.85	16
CD/PV.294	pp.21-22	Australia/Butler	26.2.85	16
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CD/PV.295	p.27	Morocco/Skali	28.2.85	17
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CD/PV.297	pp.13-14	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	7.3.85	20
CD/PV.297	pp.22-23	Mexico/Garcia Robles	7.3.85	21
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CD/PV.316	pp.11-13	USA/Lowitz	27.6.85	74
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CD/PV.324	pp.25-26	Australia/Butler	25.7.85	103
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CD/PV.330	p.41	USA/Lowitz	15.8.85	126
CD/PV.331	p.7	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	20.8.85	127
CD/PV.331	p.16	GDR/Rose	20.8.85	128
CD/PV.331	pp.18-19	USSR/Issraelyan	20.8.85	129
CD/PV.332	pp.25-27	Brazil/de Sousa e Silva	22.8.85	132
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CD/PV.340	pp.7-10	FRG/Wegener	18.2.86	150
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CD/PV.348	p.13	USSR/Gorbachev (letter)	18.3.86	190
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CD/PV.354	pp.16-18	Japan/Imai	8.4.86	218
CD/PV.354	pp.18-19	USSR/Prokofiev	8.4.86	220
CD/PV.356	pp.11-12	USA/Lowitz	15.4.86	225
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CD/PV.367	pp.26-29	Canada/Beesley	3.7.86	265
CD/PV.369	pp.7-12	Australia/Butler	10.7.86	274
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CD/PV.372	pp.2-4	Norway/Kristvik	22.7.86	285
CD/PV.372	pp.9-10	Australia/Butler	22.7.86	288
CD/PV.372	pp.11-13	USSR/Issraelyan	22.7.86	290
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CD/PV.374	pp.4-9	Netherlands/van Schaik	29.7.86	295
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CD/PV.379	pp.15-17	Australia/Butler	14.8.86	313
CD/PV.379	pp.18-20	<u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts/ Dahlman	14.8.86	315
CD/PV.380	pp.4-6	GDR/Rose	19.8.86	317
CD/PV.381	pp.9-10	USSR/Kashirin	21.8.86	323
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CD/PV.381	pp.31-33	Australia/Butler	21.8.86	328
CD/PV.381	p.41	USSR/Kashirin	21.8.86	332
CD/PV.382	pp.5-7	FRG/Ruth	26.8.86	332
CD/PV.382	pp.13-16	USA/Lowitz	26.8.86	334
CD/PV.382	pp.18-19	USSR/Issraelyan	26.8.86	336
CD/PV.383	p.19	USSR/Issraelyan	28.8.86	338
CD/PV.383	pp.25-26, 28	Sweden/Ekeus	28.8.86	338
CD/PV.383	pp.36-37	Canada/Despres	28.8.86	340
CD/PV.386	pp.13-14	USSR/Nazarkin	5.2.87	349
CD/PV.387	pp.7-11	Japan/Yamada	10.2.87	351
CD/PV.388	pp.3-5	Finland/Tornudd	12.2.87	354
CD/PV.388	pp.9-10	Romania/Dolgu	12.2.87	356
CD/PV.389	pp.14-18	FRG/von Stulpnagel	17.2.87	361
CD/PV.389	pp.21-22	GDR/Rose	17.2.87	365
CD/PV.390	pp.12-14	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	19.2.87	368
CD/PV.391	pp.5-6	Yugoslavia/Kosin	24.2.87	371
CD/PV.391	pp.11-12	USA/Hansen	24.2.87	371
CD/PV.391	p.21	Nigeria/Tonwe	24.2.87	372
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CD/PV.394	pp.4-6	Italy/Pugliese	5.3.87	373
CD/PV.396	pp.3-4, 8-11	Netherlands/van Schaik	12.3.87	379
CD/PV.397	pp.4-6	Norway/Bakkevig	17.3.87	383
CD/PV.397	p.9	Burgaria/Tellalov	17.3.87	385
CD/PV.397	pp.13-14	GRD/Rose	17.3.87	386
CD/PV.402	pp.27-30	<u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts/ Dahlman	2.4.87	397

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CD/PV.403	pp.10,12	FRG/von Stulpnagel	7.4.87	404
CD/PV.405	pp.5-6	UK/Cromartie	14.4.87	409
CD/PV.405	pp.8-9	Japan/Yamada	14.4.87	411
CD/PV.406	p.25	Pakistan/Ahmad	16.4.87	423
CD/PV.408	p.6	India/Natwar Singh	23.4.87	423
CD/PV.408	pp.22-27	USA/Hansen	23.4.87	425
CD/PV.408	pp.29-31	USSR/Nazarkin	23.4.87	428
CD/PV.409	p.6	GDR/Rose	28.4.87	429
CD/PV.409	p.9	Zaire/Monshemvula	28.4.87	430
CD/PV.410	pp.10-15	Canada/Beesley	30.4.87	437
CD/PV.411	pp.6-9	USSR/Petrovsky	9.6.87	441
CD/PV.413	pp.4-5	Hungary/Meiszter	16.6.87	446
CD/PV.413	p.9	Bulgaria/Tellalov	16.6.87	447
CD/PV.415	p.3	Mexico/Garcia Robles	23.6.87	451
CD/PV.416	p.5	Morocco/Benhima	25.6.87	451
CD/PV.416	pp.11-12	Mongolia/Bayart	25.6.87	452
CD/PV.416	p.17	GDR/Rose	25.6.87	453
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CD/PV.418	pp.10,12-14	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	2.7.87	459
CD/PV.421	pp.6,8-9	UK/Mellor	14.7.87	469
CD/PV.423	pp.2-4	Australia/Butler	21.7.87	475
CD/PV.423	p.16	New Zealand/Graham	21.7.87	481
CD/PV.424	pp.14-15	Belgium/Tindemans	23.7.87	485
CD/PV.426	pp.8,11-12	Australia/Butler	30.7.87	490
CD/PV.428	pp.8-11	USSR/Schevardnadze	6.8.87	492
CD/PV.430	pp.12-16	USSR/Nazarkin	13.8.87	503
CD/PV.431	pp.2-6	GDR/Rose	18.8.87	508
CD/PV.432	pp.6-7	Sweden/Andersson	20.8.87	511
CD/PV.432	pp.9-12	USA/Friedersdorf	20.8.87	513
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CD/PV.432	pp.33-35	Sri Lanka/Rodrigo	20.8.87	517
CD/PV.432	pp.37-38	Australia/Butler	20.8.87	518
CD/PV.432	pp.38-40	Japan/Yamada	20.8.87	519
CD/PV.432	pp.46-47	GDR/Rose	20.8.87	522
CD/PV.433	pp.5-10,12-14	Canada/Beesley	25.8.87	523
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CD/PV.290	pp.10-11, 13-14	USA/Adelman	12.2.85	3
CD/PV.291	pp.12-15	Japan/Imai	14.2.85	8
CD/PV.292	pp.26-27	Australia/Butler	19.2.85	11
CD/PV.294	pp.21-22	Australia/Butler	26.2.85	16
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CD/PV.301	pp.25-28	Belgium/Depasse	21.3.85	32
CD/PV.303	pp.7-13	USA/Lowitz	28.3.85	34
CD/PV.303	pp.28-29	USSR/Issraelyan	28.3.85	37
CD/PV.305	pp.12-14	FRG/Genscher	2.4.85	38
CD/PV.306	pp.13-16	USSR/Issraelyan	4.4.85	39
CD/PV.306	pp.25-28	Canada/Beesley	4.4.85	41
CD/PV.307	p.7-10	Japan/Imai	11.4.85	46
CD/PV.308	pp.17-20	UK/Cromartie	16.4.85	54
CD/PV.309	pp.16-18	Netherlands/van Schaik	18.4.85	56
CD/PV.309	pp.20-23	Australia/Butler	18.4.85	58
CD/PV.309	pp.25-28	USA/Barthelemy	18.4.85	61
CD/PV.309	pp.30-31	GDR/Rose	18.4.85	64
CD/PV.313	p.8	Canada/Beesley	18.6.85	68
CD/PV.315	p.11	GDR/Rose	25.6.85	69
CD/PV.315	p.23	FRG/Wegener	25.6.85	71
CD/PV.316	pp.6-8	Norway/Kristvik	27.6.85	71
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CD/PV.322	pp.11-13	USSR/Issraelyan	18.7.85	86
CD/PV.322	pp.25-26	Canada/Beesley	18.7.85	87
CD/PV.323	pp.8-9	USA/Lowitz	23.7.85	89
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CD/PV.324	pp.7-10	Japan/Imai	25.7.85	95
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CD/PV.324	pp.18-20	GDR/Rose	25.7.85	100

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CD/PV.330	p.30	Netherlands/van Schaik	15.8.85	124
CD/PV.331	pp.11-12	Sweden/Ekeus	20.8.85	127
CD/PV.332	p.15	USA/Lowitz	22.8.85	130
CD/PV.336	pp.48-51	Canada/Beesley	4.2.86	137
CD/PV.338	pp.7-10	USA/Lowitz	11.2.86	140
CD/PV.339	pp.10-13	Pakistan/Ahmad	13.2.86	143
CD/PV.339	pp.15-20	Japan/Imai	13.2.86	146
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CD/PV.339	pp.33-34	China/Qian Jiadon	13.2.86	150
CD/PV.341	pp.13-16	USSR/Kornienko	20.2.86	155
CD/PV.341	p.24	Pakistan/Ahmad	20.2.86	157
CD/PV.342	pp.7-12	UK/Renton	25.2.86	158
CD/PV.342	pp.15-16	Finland/Tornudd	25.2.86	161
CD/PV.343	pp.10-12	Norway/Froysnes	27.2.86	166
CD/PV.343	pp.14-18	Belgium/Clerckx	27.2.86	168
CD/PV.343	p.36	France/Jessel	27.2.86	178
CD/PV.346	pp.8-10	Canada/Beesley	11.3.86	183
CD/PV.347	pp.8-10	Yugoslavia/Vidas	13.3.86	185
CD/PV.347	pp.23-28	Netherlands/van Schaik	13.3.86	187
CD/PV.350	pp.8-11	China/Qian Jiadong	25.3.86	195
CD/PV.350	p.12	UK/Cromartie	25.3.86	198
CD/PV.350	p.21	Canada/Despres	25.3.86	199
CD/PV.351	pp.20-23	FRG/Wegener	27.3.86	203
CD/PV.353	pp.17-19	Japan/Imai	3.4.86	208
CD/PV.353	pp.20-24	USA/Lowitz	3.4.86	210
CD/PV.353	p.27	Romania/Chirila	3.4.86	213
CD/PV.353	pp.30-32	France/Jessel	3.4.86	213
CD/PV.354	pp.12-14	Argentina/Campora	8.4.86	215
CD/PV.355	pp.15-19	Hungary/Meiszter	10.4.86	221
CD/PV.357	pp.21-25	Australia/Butler	17.4.86	230
CD/PV.358	pp.23-24	USSR/Issraelyan	22.4.86	237
CD/PV.359	pp.7-9	Bulgaria/Tellalov	24.4.86	239
CD/PV.359	pp.20-22	FRG/Wegener	24.4.86	243
CD/PV.359	pp.37-38	Yugoslavia/Vidas	24.4.86	244
CD/PV.360	pp.7-9	FRG/Genscher	10.6.86	246
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CD/PV.364	pp.4-5,7,9	USSR/Petrovsky	24.6.86	255
CD/PV.364	pp.12-13	Norway/Huslid	24.6.86	256
CD/PV.365	pp.2-8	USA/Lowitz	26.6.86	258
CD/PV.365	p.16	USSR/Issraelyan	26.6.86	262
CD/PV.366	p.7	Romania/Datcu	1.7.86	263
CD/PV.367	pp.7-8	Morocco/Benhima	3.7.86	263
CD/PV.367	pp.26-29	Canada/Beesley	3.7.86	265
CD/PV.368	pp.4-8	Belgium/Clerckx	8.7.86	269
CD/PV.369	pp.4-5	USA/Barthelemy	10.7.86	273
CD/PV.369	pp.7-12	Australia/Butler	10.7.86	274
CD/PV.370	pp.4-7	UK/Renton	15.7.86	279
CD/PV.371	pp.4-5	Austria/Hinteregger	17.7.86	282
CD/PV.371	p.13	Japan/Imai	17.7.86	283
CD/PV.373	p.3	Peru/Morelli Pando	24.7.86	292
CD/PV.374	pp.4-9	Netherlands/van Schaik	29.7.86	295
CD/PV.376	pp.3-4	Canada/Clark (letter)	5.8.86	299
CD/PV.376	pp.12-13	Indonesia/Sutowardoyo	5.8.86	300
CD/PV.377	pp.4-5	Sri Lanka/Dhanapala	7.8.86	301
CD/PV.378	pp.8-11	India/Gonsalves	12.8.86	304
CD/PV.379	p.5	Iran/Velayati	14.8.86	310
CD/PV.380	pp.9-12	New Zealand/Lineham	19.8.86	319
CD/PV.381	pp.5-6	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	21.8.86	321
CD/PV.381	pp.23-25	Poland/Turbanski	21.8.86	325
CD/PV.381	pp.34-36	France/Jessel	21.8.86	330
CD/PV.382	pp.5-7	FRG/Ruth	26.8.86	332
CD/PV.382	pp.13-16	USA/Lowitz	26.8.86	334
CD/PV.383	pp.25-26,28	Sweden/Ekeus	28.8.86	338
CD/PV.385	p.28	Sweden/Theorin	3.2.87	342
CD/PV.386	pp.5-11	USA/Adelman	5.2.87	344
CD/PV.386	pp.19-20	FRG/Bolewski	5.2.87	349
CD/PV.386	p.22	Poland/Turbanski	5.2.87	351
CD/PV.387	pp.7-11	Japan/Yamada	10.2.87	351
CD/PV.388	pp.3-5	Finland/Tornudd	12.2.87	354
CD/PV.388	pp.9-10	Romania/Dolgu	12.2.87	356
CD/PV.388	p.16	Hungary/Meiszter	12.2.87	357
CD/PV.389	pp.4-7	USSR/Nazarkin	17.2.87	357
CD/PV.389	pp.14-18	FRG/von Stulpnagel	17.2.87	361

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CD/PV.389	pp.21-22	GDR/Rose	17.2.87	365
CD/PV.389	pp.29-30	Egypt/Alfarargi	17.2.87	366
CD/PV.390	pp.7-9	France/Raimond	19.2.87	366
CD/PV.390	pp.12-14	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	19.2.87	368
CD/PV.392	p.8	India/Teja	26.2.87	372
CD/PV.394	pp.4-6	Italy/Pugliese	5.3.87	373
CD/PV.394	pp.7-12	USSR/Nazarkin	5.3.87	375
CD/PV.396	pp.3-4,8-11	Netherlands/van Schaik	12.3.87	379
CD/PV.397	pp.4-6	Norway/Bakkevig	17.3.87	383
CD/PV.398	pp.5-6	Venezuela/Taylhardat	19.3.87	388
CD/PV.398	pp.10-11	FRG/von Stulpnagel	19.3.87	389
CD/PV.400	pp.8-9	France/Morel	26.3.87	390
CD/PV.400	pp.12-14	Mongolia/Bayart	26.3.87	392
CD/PV.401	p.3	Argentina/Campora	31.3.87	394
CD/PV.403	pp.2-6	USA/Hansen	7.4.87	399
CD/PV.403	pp.10,12	FRG/von Stulpnagel	7.4.87	404
CD/PV.403	pp.13-14	USSR/Nazarkin	7.4.87	405
CD/PV.404	pp.3,7	Iran/Velayati	9.4.87	406
CD/PV.404	pp.15-16	Belgium/Clerckx	9.4.87	408
CD/PV.405	pp.5-6	UK/Cromartie	14.4.87	409
CD/PV.405	p.14	Romania/Dolgu	14.4.87	412
CD/PV.405	pp.16-18	USSR/Nazarkin	14.4.87	413
CD/PV.406	pp.11-15	USSR/Nazarkin	16.4.87	416
CD/PV.406	pp.16-19	China/Fan Guoxiang	16.4.87	419
CD/PV.408	pp.17-19	Australia/Butler	23.4.87	423
CD/PV.408	pp.22-27	USA/Hansen	23.4.87	425
CD/PV.408	pp.29-31	USSR/Nazarkin	23.4.87	428
CD/PV.409	pp.14-16	Pakistan/Asif Ezdi	28.4.87	430
CD/PV.409	pp.16-20	France/Morel	28.4.87	432
CD/PV.410	pp.8-9	Poland/Turbanski	30.4.87	436
CD/PV.410	pp.10-15	Canada/Beesley	30.4.87	437
CD/PV.411	pp.16-17	Sweden/Theorin	9.6.87	444
CD/PV.413	pp.14-16	France/Morel	16.6.87	447
CD/PV.413	pp.18-19	Pakistan/Ahmad	16.6.87	449
CD/PV.417	pp.2-5	Norway/Kristvik	30.6.87	454
CD/PV.418	pp.5,7	Netherlands/ van den Broek	2.7.87	458
CD/PV.418	p.16	USSR/Nazarkin	2.7.87	461

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CD/PV.419	pp.6-8	Norway/Huslid	7.7.87	464
CD/PV.420	pp.4-6	Canada/Beesley	9.7.87	467
CD/PV.421	pp.6,8-9	UK/Mellor	14.7.87	469
CD/PV.421	pp.18-21	Mexico/Gracia Robles	14.7.87	471
CD/PV.422	pp.6-7	Spain/Carlos Miranda		
		y Elio	16.7.87	474
CD/PV.424	pp.7-10	Japan/Yamada	23.7.87	482
CD/PV.424	pp.14-15	Belgium/Tindemans	23.7.87	485
CD/PV.425	p.5	Iran/Velayati	28.7.87	486
CD/PV.426	p.18	USA/Friedersdorf	30.7.87	491
CD/PV.428	pp.8-11	USSR/Schevardnadze	6.8.87	492
CD/PV.428	pp.14-16	Argentina/Campora	6.8.87	495
CD/PV.428	pp.18-19	Peru/Calderon	6.8.87	497
CD/PV.429	pp.2-6	USSR/Nazarkin	11.8.87	499
CD/PV.431	pp.2-6	GDR/Rose	18.8.87	508
CD/PV.431	p.11	India/Teja	18.8.87	511
CD/PV.432	pp.9-12	USA/Friedersdorf	20.8.87	513
CD/PV.432	pp.21-23	Poland/Turbanski	20.8.87	515
CD/PV.432	pp.25,27	Egypt/Alfarargi	20.8.87	517
CD/PV.432	pp.33-35	Sri Lanka/Rodrigo	20.8.87	517
CD/PV.432	pp.43-44	Pakistan/Ahmad	20.8.87	521
CD/PV.433	pp.5-10,12-14	Canada/Beesley	25.8.87	523
CD/PV.433	pp.16-17	Algeria/Hacene	25.8.87	527
CD/PV.434	p.5	Bulgaria/Bojilov	27.8.87	528
CD/PV.435	pp.3-4	France/de la Baume	28.8.87	528

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CD/PV.332	pp.25-27	Brazil/de Sousa e Silva	22.8.85	132
CD/PV.357	p.27	Bulgaria/Tellalov	17.4.86	234
CD/PV.385	pp.38-40	Australia/Butler	3.2.87	342
CD/PV.428	pp.18-19	Peru/Calderon	6.8.87	497

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CD/PV.291	pp.12-15	Japan/Imai	14.2.85	8
CD/PV.310	pp.37-38	Senegal/Sene	23.4.85	65
CD/PV.320	pp.13-15	UK/Cromartie	11.7.85	79
CD/PV.339	pp.15-20	Japan/Imai	13.2.86	146

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CD/PV.405	pp.16-18	USSR/Nazarkin	14.4.87	413
CD/PV.406	pp.3,7	Czechoslovakia/Chnoupek	16.4.87	414
CD/PV.428	pp.8-11	USSR/Schevardnadze	6.8.87	492

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CD/PV.291	pp.12-15	Japan/Imai	14.2.85	8
CD/PV.296	pp.32-33	Italy/Alessi	5.3.85	20
CD/PV.297	pp.27,30	USSR/Issraelyan	7.3.85	22
CD/PV.298	pp.17-18	Finland/Tornudd	12.3.85	28
CD/PV.303	p.23	GDR/Rose	28.3.85	37
CD/PV.318	pp.15-16	FRG/Wegener	4.7.85	78
CD/PV.325	p.13	Sri Lanka/Dhanapala	30.7.85	104
CD/PV.329	pp.14-15	Australia/Butler	13.8.85	121
CD/PV.330	p.8	Italy/Alessi	15.8.85	122
CD/PV.330	pp.11-14	Pakistan/Ahmad	15.8.85	123
CD/PV.331	pp.21-22	UK/Edis	20.8.85	130
CD/PV.332	pp.23-24	USSR/Issraelyan	22.8.85	131
CD/PV.333	pp.13-14	India/Dubey	27.8.85	132
CD/PV.341	pp.13-16	USSR/Kornienko	20.2.86	155
CD/PV.348	p.15	Italy/Franceschi	18.3.86	191
CD/PV.354	p.10	Sri Lanka/Dhanapala	8.4.86	215
CD/PV.358	pp.10,12	India/Narayanan	22.4.86	234
CD/PV.358	pp.17-18	Pakistan/Ahmad	22.4.86	235
CD/PV.367	pp.26-29	Canada/Beesley	3.7.86	265
CD/PV.369	pp.7-12	Australia/Butler	10.7.86	274
CD/PV.371	p.11	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	17.7.86	282
CD/PV.372	p.7	China/Fan Guoxiang	22.7.86	288
CD/PV.373	pp.8-9	GDR/Rose	24.7.86	293

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CD/PV.377	pp.8-11	USSR/Issraelyan	7.8.86	302
CD/PV.382	p.22	Italy/Franceschi	26.8.86	338
CD/PV.385	pp.21-22	USSR/Vorontsov	3.2.87	342
CD/PV.390	pp.7-9	France/Raimond	19.2.87	366
CD/PV.390	pp.12-14	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	19.2.87	368
CD/PV.397	p.17	USSR/Nazarkin	17.3.87	387
CD/PV.400	pp.12-14	Mongolia/Bayart	26.3.87	392
CD/PV.402	p.12	Poland/Turbanski	2.4.87	395
CD/PV.402	pp.18-19	Bulgaria/Tellalov	2.4.87	395
CD/PV.404	pp.11-12	Sri Lanka/Dhanapala	9.4.87	407
CD/PV.406	pp.3,7	Czechoslovakia/Chnoupek	16.4.87	414
CD/PV.410	pp.10-15	Canada/Beesley	30.4.87	437
CD/PV.418	pp.10,12-14	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	2.7.87	459
CD/PV.419	pp.12-13	Japan/Yamada	7.7.87	466
CD/PV.423	pp.6-7	Argentina/Campora	21.7.87	477
CD/PV.423	pp.12-16	Canada/Beesley	21.7.87	478
CD/PV.425	pp.10-11	Bulgaria/Tellalov	28.7.87	487
CD/PV.425	pp.13-14	GDR/Rose	28.7.87	488
CD/PV.426	pp.8,11-12	Australia/Butler	30.7.87	490
CD/PV.427	p.5	GDR/Rose	4.8.87	492
CD/PV.428	pp.8-11	USSR/Schevardnadze	6.8.87	492
CD/PV.428	pp.18-19	Peru/Calderon	6.8.87	497
CD/PV.430	p.8	Sweden/Ekeus	13.8.87	502
CD/PV.430	pp.12-16	USSR/Nazarkin	13.8.87	503
CD/PV.432	pp.21-23	Poland/Turbanski	20.8.87	515
CD/PV.432	pp.33-35	Sri Lanka/Rodrigo	20.8.87	517
CD/PV.433	pp.5-10,12-14	Canada/Beesley	25.8.87	523
CD/PV.434	p.5	Bulgaria/Bojilov	27.8.87	528

Radiological Weapons

CD/PV.318	pp.10-11	USSR/Issraelyan	4.7.85	77
CD/PV.321	p.19	Netherlands/van Schaik	16.7.85	83
CD/PV.369	pp.7-12	Australia/Butler	10.7.86	274
CD/PV.383	pp.25-26,28	Sweden/Ekeus	28.8.86	338

List of Verbatim Statements by Issue

Verification in General

<u>Reference</u>		<u>Nation/Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.289	p.12	FRG/Wegener	7.2.85	2
CD/PV.290	pp.10-11, 13-14	USA/Adelman	12.2.85	3
CD/PV.290	pp.25-27	USSR/Issraelyan	12.2.85	5
CD/PV.295	pp.22-23	USSR/Issraelyan	28.2.85	16
CD/PV.300	p.27	USA/Lowitz	19.3.85	30
CD/PV.301	p.15	USA/Lowitz	21.3.85	32
CD/PV.305	pp.12-14	FRG/Genscher	2.4.85	38
CD/PV.336	pp.27-28, 31-32	Sweden/Theorin	4.2.86	134
CD/PV.336	pp.48-51	Canada/Beesley	4.2.86	137
CD/PV.338	pp.13-14	GDR/Rose	11.2.86	142
CD/PV.338	p.16	Mexico/Garcia Robles	11.2.86	143
CD/PV.340	pp.7-10	FRG/Wegener	18.2.86	150
CD/PV.341	pp.8-9	USSR/Gorbachev (letter)	20.2.86	155
CD/PV.342	pp.7-12	UK/Renton	25.2.86	158
CD/PV.343	pp.14-18	Belgium/Clerckx	27.2.86	168
CD/PV.343	pp.26,28-30	USA/Lowitz	27.2.86	174
CD/PV.347	pp.8-10	Yugoslavia/Vidas	13.3.86	185
CD/PV.357	pp.12-16	USA/Lowitz	17.4.86	226
CD/PV.360	pp.7-9	FRG/Genscher	10.6.86	246
CD/PV.362	pp.3,6,8	Czechoslovakia/Chnoupek	17.6.86	250
CD/PV.363	p.4	Hungary/Meiszter	19.6.86	254
CD/PV.364	pp.4-5,7,9	USSR/Petrovsky	24.6.86	255
CD/PV.382	pp.5-7	FRG/Ruth	26.8.86	332
CD/PV.386	pp.5-11	USA/Adelman	5.2.87	344
CD/PV.404	pp.3,7	Iran/Velayati	9.4.87	406
CD/PV.405	pp.16-18	USSR/Nazarkin	14.4.87	413
CD/PV.406	pp.3,7	Czechoslovakia/Chnoupek	16.4.87	414
CD/PV.411	p.20	GDR/Rose	9.6.87	445
CD/PV.418	pp.5,7	Netherlands/ van den Broek	2.7.87	458
CD/PV.423	pp.12-16	Canada/Beesley	21.7.87	478
CD/PV.426	p.4	Yugoslavia/Kosin	30.7.87	489
CD/PV.428	pp.8-11	USSR/Schevardnadze	6.8.87	492
CD/PV.433	pp.5-10,12-14	Canada/Beesley	25.8.87	523

List of Verbatim Statements by Nation

Explanation of Issue Codes

BW: Biological Weapons
 CW: Chemical Weapons
 CTB: Comprehensive Test Ban
 NFZ: Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
 NPT: Non-Proliferation Treaty
 NW: Nuclear Weapons
 OS: Outer Space
 RW: Radiological Weapons
 VER: Verification in General

Algeria

<u>Reference</u>		<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.381	p.19	Kerroum	21.8.86	CTB	325
CD/PV.433	pp.16-17	Hacene	25.8.87	CTB,CW	527

Argentina

<u>Reference</u>		<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.292	pp.20-21	Carasales	19.2.85	CTB	10
CD/PV.344	p.12	Campora	4.3.86	CTB	178
CD/PV.354	pp.12-14	Campora	8.4.86	CW	215
CD/PV.401	p.3	Campora	31.3.87	CW	394
CD/PV.423	pp.6-7	Campora	21.7.87	OS	477
CD/PV.428	pp.14-16	Campora	6.8.87	CW	495

Australia

<u>Reference</u>		<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.292	pp.26-27	Butler	19.2.85	CTB,CW	11
CD/PV.294	pp.21-22	Butler	26.2.85	CTB,CW	16
CD/PV.307	pp.17-18	Butler	11.4.85	CTB	51
CD/PV.309	pp.20-23	Butler	18.4.85	CW	58
CD/PV.311	p.16	Butler	11.6.85	CTB	67

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Australia

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.318 p.19	Butler	4.7.85	CW	78
CD/PV.324 pp.25-26	Butler	25.7.85	CTB	103
CD/PV.329 pp.14-15	Butler	13.8.85	OS	121
CD/PV.330 pp.35-39	Butler	15.8.85	CTB	124
CD/PV.336 p.12	Butler	4.2.86	CTB	134
CD/PV.357 pp.21-25	Butler	17.4.86	CW	230
CD/PV.359 pp.26-27	Butler	24.4.86	CTB	244
CD/PV.369 pp.7-12	Butler	10.7.86	CW, RW, OS, CTB	274
CD/PV.372 pp.9-10	Butler	22.7.86	CTB	288
CD/PV.379 pp.15-17	Butler	14.8.86	CTB	313
CD/PV.381 pp.31-33	Butler	21.8.86	CTB	328
CD/PV.385 pp.38-40	Butler	3.2.87	NFZ	342
CD/PV.408 pp.17-19	Butler	23.4.87	CW	423
CD/PV.423 pp.2-4	Butler	21.7.87	CTB	475
CD/PV.426 pp.8,11-12	Butler	30.7.87	CTB, OS	490
CD/PV.432 pp.37-38	Butler	20.8.87	CTB	518

Austria

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.371 pp.4-5	Hinteregger	17.7.86	CTB, CW	282

Belgium

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.301 pp.25-28	Depasse	21.3.85	CTB, CW	32
CD/PV.343 pp.14-18	Clerckx	27.2.86	VER, CW, CTB	168
CD/PV.368 pp.4-8	Clerckx	8.7.86	CW	269
CD/PV.404 pp.15-16	Clerckx	9.4.87	CW	408
CD/PV.424 pp.14-15	Tindemans	23.7.87	CW, CTB	485

List of Verbatim Statements by Nation

Brazil

<u>Reference</u>		<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.315	pp.17-18	de Sousa e Silva	25.6.85	CTB	70
CD/PV.332	pp.25-27	de Sousa e Silva	22.8.85	CTB, NFZ	132

Bulgaria

<u>Reference</u>		<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.323	pp.23-24	Tellalov	23.7.85	CW	93
CD/PV.337	pp.16-17	Tellalov	6.2.86	CTB	139
CD/PV.344	pp.16-17	Tellalov	4.3.86	CTB	179
CD/PV.357	p.27	Tellalov	17.4.86	NFZ	234
CD/PV.359	pp.7-9	Tellalov	24.4.86	CW	239
CD/PV.378	p.3	Tellalov	12.8.86	CTB	303
CD/PV.397	p.9	Tellalov	17.3.87	CTB	385
CD/PV.402	pp.18-19	Tellalov	2.4.87	OS	395
CD/PV.413	p.9	Tellalov	16.6.87	CTB	447
CD/PV.425	pp.10-11	Tellalov	28.7.87	OS	487
CD/PV.434	p.5	Bojilov	27.8.87	CTB, OS, CW	528

Burma

<u>Reference</u>		<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.358	p.19	U Tin Tin	22.4.86	CTB	237

Canada

<u>Reference</u>		<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.306	pp.25-28	Beesley	4.4.85	CTB, CW	41
CD/PV.313	p.8	Beesley	18.6.85	CW	68
CD/PV.322	pp.25-26	Beesley	18.7.85	CW	87
CD/PV.336	pp.48-51	Beesley	4.2.86	CW, CTB, VER	137
CD/PV.346	pp.8-10	Beesley	11.3.86	CW, CTB	183
CD/PV.350	p.21	Despres	25.3.86	CW	199

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Canada

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.367 pp.26-29	Beesley	3.7.86	CW,CTB,OS	265
CD/PV.376 pp.3-4	Clark (letter)	5.8.86	CW,CTB	299
CD/PV.383 pp.36-37	Despres	28.8.86	CTB	340
CD/PV.410 pp.10-15	Beesley	30.4.87	CTB,CW,OS	437
CD/PV.420 pp.4-6	Beesley	9.7.87	CW	467
CD/PV.423 pp.12-16	Beesley	21.7.87	VER,OS	478
CD/PV.433 pp.5-10,12-14	Beesley	25.8.87	VER,CW,CTB,OS	523

China

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.339 pp.33-34	Qian Jiadong	13.2.86	CW	150
CD/PV.350 pp.8-11	Qian Jiadong	25.3.86	CW	195
CD/PV.372 p.7	Fan Guoxiang	22.7.86	OS	288
CD/PV.406 pp.16-19	Fan Guoxiang	16.4.87	CW	419

Cuba

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.351 p.14	Lechuga Hevia	27.3.86	CTB	202

Czechoslovakia

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.297 pp.13-14	Vejvoda	7.3.85	CTB	20
CD/PV.331 p.7	Vejvoda	20.8.85	CTB	127
CD/PV.336 pp.41-42	Vejvoda	4.2.86	CTB	136
CD/PV.349 pp.6-8	Vejvoda	20.3.86	CTB	192
CD/PV.362 pp.3,6,8	Chnoupek	17.6.86	CTB,CW,VER	250
CD/PV.371 p.11	Vejvoda	17.7.86	OS	282
CD/PV.375 p.8	Cima	31.7.86	CTB	298
CD/PV.381 pp.5-6	Vejvoda	21.8.86	CW	321
CD/PV.390 pp.12-14	Vejvoda	19.2.87	CTB,OS,CW	368

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Czechoslovakia

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.406 pp.3,7	Chnoupek	16.4.87	NW, VER, OS	414
CD/PV.418 pp.10,12-14	Vejvoda	2.7.87	OS, CTB	459

Egypt

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.339 p.37	Alfarargi	13.2.86	CTB	150
CD/PV.389 pp.29-30	Alfarargi	17.2.87	CW	366
CD/PV.432 pp.25,27	Alfarargi	20.8.87	CTB, CW	517

Federal Republic of Germany

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.289 p.12	Wegener	7.2.85	VER	2
CD/PV.293 p.20	Wegener	21.2.85	CTB	14
CD/PV.305 pp.12-14	Genscher	2.4.85	VER, CW	38
CD/PV.307 pp.15-16	Wegener	11.4.85	CTB	49
CD/PV.315 p.23	Wegener	25.6.85	CW	71
CD/PV.318 pp.15-16	Wegener	4.7.85	OS	78
CD/PV.320 pp.21-22	Wegener	11.7.85	CTB	81
CD/PV.326 pp.12-14	Wegener	1.8.85	CTB	106
CD/PV.328 pp.6-8	Elbe	8.8.85	CW	114
CD/PV.340 pp.7-10	Wegener	18.2.86	CTB, VER	150
CD/PV.344 pp.21-25	Wegener	4.3.86	CTB	180
CD/PV.351 pp.20-23	Wegener	27.3.86	CW	203
CD/PV.359 pp.20-22	Wegener	24.4.86	CTB, CW	243
CD/PV.360 pp.7-9	Genscher	10.6.86	VER, CW, CTB	246
CD/PV.373 p.13	Wegener	24.7.86	CTB	294
CD/PV.378 pp.15-20	Wegener	12.8.86	CTB	305
CD/PV.382 pp.5-7	Ruth	26.8.86	VER, CTB, CW	332
CD/PV.386 pp.19-20	Bolewski	5.2.87	CW	349
CD/PV.389 pp.14-18	von Stulpnagel	17.2.87	CTB, CW	361

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Federal Republic of Germany

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.398 pp.10-11	von Stulpnagel	19.3.87	CW	389
CD/PV.403 pp.10,12	von Stulpnagel	7.4.87	CTB,CW	404

Finland

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.298 pp.17-18	Tornudd	12.3.85	CTB, OS, CW	28
CD/PV.342 pp.15-16	Tornudd	25.2.86	CW, CTB	161
CD/PV.388 pp.3-5	Tornudd	12.2.87	CTB, CW	354
CD/PV.419 pp.4-6	Kahiluoto	7.7.87	CW	462

France

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.313 p.7	Jessel	18.6.85	CTB	68
CD/PV.339 p.23	Jessel	13.2.86	CW	149
CD/PV.343 p.36	Jessel	27.2.86	CW	178
CD/PV.353 pp.30-32	Jessel	3.4.86	CW	213
CD/PV.381 pp.34-36	Jessel	21.8.86	CW	330
CD/PV.390 pp.7-9	Raimond	19.2.87	CW, OS	366
CD/PV.400 pp.8-9	Morel	26.3.87	CW	390
CD/PV.409 pp.16-20	Morel	28.4.87	CW	432
CD/PV.413 pp.14-16	Morel	16.6.87	CW	447
CD/PV.435 pp.3-4	de la Baume	28.8.87	CW	528

German Democratic Republic

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.297 p.44	Rose	7.3.85	CTB	25
CD/PV.303 p.23	Rose	28.3.85	OS	37
CD/PV.307 p.13	Rose	11.4.85	CTB	49
CD/PV.309 pp.30-31	Rose	18.4.85	CW	64
CD/PV.315 p.11	Rose	25.6.85	CW	69

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German Democratic Republic

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.324 pp.18-20	Rose	25.7.85	CW, CTB	100
CD/PV.327 pp.23-24	Rose	6.8.85	CTB	113
CD/PV.331 p.16	Rose	20.8.85	CTB	128
CD/PV.338 pp.13-14	Rose	11.2.86	VER, CTB	142
CD/PV.342 pp.35-36	Rose	25.2.86	CTB	165
CD/PV.354 pp.15-16	Rose	8.4.86	CTB	217
CD/PV.357 p.33	Rose	17.4.86	CTB	234
CD/PV.362 pp.17-18	Rose	17.6.86	CTB	253
CD/PV.373 pp.8-9	Rose	24.7.86	OS	293
CD/PV.380 pp.4-6	Rose	19.8.86	CTB	317
CD/PV.389 pp.21-22	Rose	17.2.87	CTB, CW	365
CD/PV.397 pp.13-14	Rose	17.3.87	CTB	386
CD/PV.403 pp.7-8	Rose	7.4.87	CTB	403
CD/PV.409 p.6	Rose	28.4.87	CTB	429
CD/PV.411 p.20	Rose	9.6.87	VER	445
CD/PV.416 p.17	Rose	25.6.87	CTB	453
CD/PV.425 pp.13-14	Rose	28.7.87	OS	488
CD/PV.427 p.5	Rose	4.8.87	OS	492
CD/PV.431 pp.2-6	Rose	18.8.87	CW, CTB	508
CD/PV.432 pp.46-47	Rose	20.8.87	CTB	522

Hungary

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.341 p.22	Meiszter	20.2.86	CTB	157
CD/PV.355 pp.15-19	Meiszter	10.4.86	CW	221
CD/PV.363 p.4	Meiszter	19.6.86	VER	254
CD/PV.388 p.16	Meiszter	12.2.87	CW	357
CD/PV.413 pp.4-5	Meiszter	16.6.87	CTB	446

India

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.293 p.21	Kant Sharma	21.2.85	CTB	14
CD/PV.333 pp.13-14	Dubey	27.8.85	OS, CTB	132

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India

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.342 pp.20-22	Gonsalves	25.2.86	CTB	162
CD/PV.358 pp.10,12	Narayanan	22.4.86	CTB, OS	234
CD/PV.378 pp.8-11	Gonsalves	12.8.86	CW, CTB	304
CD/PV.392 p.8	Teja	26.2.87	CW	372
CD/PV.408 p.6	Natwar Singh	23.4.87	CTB	423
CD/PV.431 p.11	Teja	18.8.87	CW	511

Indonesia

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.376 pp.12-13	Sutowardoyo	5.8.86	CW	300

Islamic Republic of Iran

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.379 p.5	Velayati	14.8.86	CW	310
CD/PV.404 pp.3,7	Velayati	9.4.87	VER, CW	406
CD/PV.425 p.5	Velayati	28.7.87	CW	486

Italy

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
CD/PV.296 pp.32-33	Alessi	5.3.85	OS	20
CD/PV.330 p.8	Alessi	15.8.85	OS	122
CD/PV.348 p.15	Franceschi	18.3.86	OS	191
CD/PV.359 pp.15-17	Franceschi	24.4.86	CTB	241
CD/PV.382 p.22	Franceschi	26.8.86	OS	338
CD/PV.394 pp.4-6	Pugliese	5.3.87	CTB, CW	373

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Japan

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CD/PV.291 pp.12-15	Imai	14.2.85	CTB, NPT, OS, CW	8
CD/PV.306 p.39	Imai	4.4.85	CTB	45
CD/PV.307 p.7-10	Imai	11.4.85	CW	46
CD/PV.324 pp.7-10	Imai	25.7.85	CW	95
CD/PV.327 pp.10-13	Imai	6.8.85	CTB	108
CD/PV.339 pp.15-20	Imai	13.2.86	NPT, CTB, CW	146
CD/PV.353 pp.17-19	Imai	3.4.86	CW	208
CD/PV.354 pp.16-18	Imai	8.4.86	CTB	218
CD/PV.362 pp.11-13	Imai	17.6.86	CTB	251
CD/PV.371 p.13	Imai	17.7.86	CW	283
CD/PV.379 pp.9-10	Imai	14.8.86	CTB	311
CD/PV.381 p.15	Imai	21.8.86	CTB	324
CD/PV.387 pp.7-11	Yamada	10.2.87	CTB, CW	351
CD/PV.405 pp.8-9	Yamada	14.4.87	CTB	411
CD/PV.419 pp.12-13	Yamada	7.7.87	OS	466
CD/PV.424 pp.7-10	Yamada	23.7.87	CW	482
CD/PV.432 pp.38-40	Yamada	20.8.87	CTB	519

Kenya

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Yugoslavia

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Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts

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The three nuclear Powers, who participated in the Tripartite Negotiations 1977-1980, recognized in their report to the second NPT Review Conference, that the members of the Committee on Disarmament had a strong interest in their negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon-test explosions. They also recognized that such a treaty would be of importance to all mankind. They agreed that a variety of measures should be provided to verify compliance, including national means of verification at their disposal. They further agreed on provisions establishing an international exchange of seismic data.

It is a minimum requirement that they at least recognize anew what they did then. If not -- further doubt would be cast over their commitment in the Non-Proliferation Treaty to negotiate in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. A comprehensive test ban treaty remains the most important issue relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. And still, 15 years after the NPT entered into force, there is not even a negotiation on a comprehensive test ban treaty!

There are no insurmountable technical obstacles to concluding such a treaty. It is obvious that some States give priority to a continued development of new types of nuclear weapons instead of honoring their commitments in the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is a dangerous and shortsighted attitude!

We have, however, reason to note with satisfaction the good co-operation experienced during the technical test of the international data exchange system. We look forward to hearing the report of the Ad Hoc Group of scientific experts on the experiment at a later stage of the session.

According to the National Defense Research Institute in Sweden, a total of 1,522 nuclear explosions have been carried out between 1945 and 1984. The United States leads this gloomy competition with 772 explosions -- 212 in the atmosphere and 560 underground -- followed by the Soviet Union with 556 explosions -- 161 in the atmosphere and 395 underground. The statistics show that the gap between the super-Powers is closing as the Soviet Union in recent years has been carrying out more explosions than the United States. France, the United Kingdom and China have conducted 127, 37 and 29 nuclear explosions respectively. And India has carried out one nuclear explosion.

In 1984, at least 53 nuclear explosions were carried out. The two main nuclear Powers were as usual responsible for most of them.

The United States carried out 16 tests in 1984 at the Nevada Test Site. A total of 27 nuclear explosions were recorded in the Soviet Union. Seventeen of these were conducted at test areas at Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemya. The remaining 10 Soviet nuclear explosions were carried out in areas outside the usual weapons test sites and may therefore have been conducted for non-military purposes.

According to the same statistics, France has conducted seven test explosions in 1984 at the test site in the Pacific, whereas the United Kingdom

has carried out one at the United States test site in Nevada. Two Chinese test explosions have been observed in 1984. All nuclear tests observed during 1984 were conducted underground.

It is obvious from these statistics that the testing of nuclear devices continues unabated.

It is of vital importance that the Conference on Disarmament should now start working on the test ban issue and make progress in time for the third NPT Review Conference. The responsibility will rest heavily on those who block progress in finding a mutually acceptable mandate for an ad hoc committee to deal with this question.

It is sometimes suggested that, while awaiting a political opening for a comprehensive test ban treaty, a gradual approach, that is a threshold approach, could be considered. I would like to warn against such proposals for the following reasons:

A multilateral threshold treaty could be interpreted as legitimizing nuclear weapons testing.

A threshold approach leaves open the possibility of continuing the modernization of nuclear arms.

A threshold treaty would be more difficult to verify than a comprehensive treaty. It is easier to detect a test than to estimate its exact yield.

New threshold arrangements could weaken the efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

A threshold approach is acceptable only if it is directly linked to a comprehensive test-ban treaty effective from an agreed date, and if the phase-out period is kept short.

CD/PV.289

p.12

FRG/Wegener

7.2.85

VER

On 5 February we heard from three of the countries whose Heads of State or Government participated in the recent Delhi Meeting about the hopes and expectations the authors of the important Joint Declaration of 28 January have associated with their announcement. The distinguished representative from the Soviet Union has equally commented on the declaration. Comments from other delegations would therefore also seem in order. The Federal Government shares the wish of the six Heads of State and Government to drastically reduce nuclear weapons and to work towards their ultimate elimination. By the same token it supports steps to avoid an uncontrolled dynamic build-up of armament in outer space; given the fact that outer space is a domain which the Soviet Union and the United States have already utilized for military purposes in large measure over the last few years this task will, however, be exceedingly complex and must take account of certain realities. Beyond these shared objectives, my Government has a number of doubts concerning the measures proposed by the Delhi Group. We regret that several formulations contained in their former statement of 22 May have been removed from the recent text. Unfortunately, the Declaration remains totally silent on the dangers of

conventional war and the destructive power of modern conventional weapons. In the view of my Government it is also to be regretted that the Western conception of the prevention of war by the combination of credible deterrence, strategic equilibrium and balanced disarmament is brushed aside without an adequate effort at rational argument. Significantly enough, in the comment on the Gromyko-Shultz agreement of 8 January, the stated goal of both Powers to enhance strategic stability is left out. The Declaration discounts the concepts of balance and stability altogether. In the view of my delegation a stable military balance between East and West is, however, an indispensable prerequisite for the maintenance of peace and freedom. The need to assure compliance with agreed disarmament measures by adequate international verification was more clearly spelled out in the Declaration of 27 May, while now verification has ceased to be an integral element of disarmament agreements and appears to be no more than an inconvenient adjunct. More important, the Declaration does not undertake to define the current threat to many regions in the world and does not spell out how States under such a threat could safeguard their security if the measures recommended in the Declaration were adopted. Lastly, Mr. President, let me mention that in the Declaration of New Delhi -- as already in the Joint Stockholm Declaration by the same authors -- all mention of the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is missing, undoubtedly in deference to three of the authors who have so far refused to join in the global non-proliferation effort.

CD/PV.290

pp.10-11, 13-14

USA/Adelman

12.2.85

VER
CW,CTB

Equally important is the binding obligation of all nations to abide by their other international legal obligations, including their undertakings in arms control agreements. Non-compliance with agreements -- failure to keep one's promises -- is a profound matter. It puts at risk the important security benefits derived from arms control and could create new security risks for those States relying upon the reward of arms control. Further, it undermines the confidence essential to a continued effective arms control process.

As members of the only multilateral organization charged with the task of forging arms control agreements of global scope, we in the Conference on Disarmament cannot close our eyes to the problems of compliance which are confronting us today. In January 1984, at the request of the United States Congress, President Reagan submitted a report on seven violations or probable violations of arms control obligations or related political commitments by the Soviet Union. Last week a follow-up report was submitted to the Congress which reconfirmed our conclusions of last year and in some cases strengthened them. It also dealt with a number of additional yet critical problems of non-compliance with existing commitments.

These reports come as no surprise to the Soviet Union, since we have vigorously pressed, and will continue vigorously to press, these issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.

The majority of the problems presented by Soviet non-compliance are related to bilateral undertakings -- the SALT I and SALT II agreements and the ABM Treaty. Other cases, however, deal with the very important multilateral

treaties. More specifically, the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices have resulted in considerable venting of radioactive matter and its movement beyond Soviet territorial limits. That violates the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Treaty was designed in part to prevent health risks to innocent peoples beyond a testing country's borders. Violations to that Treaty could endanger that very goal.

In addition, the Soviet Union has violated its obligations under the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and under international law as embodied by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Thankfully, there have been no confirmed attacks with lethal chemical toxin weapons in Kampuchea, Laos or Afghanistan in 1984. If those kinds of activities have indeed stopped, and we hope they have, that is all to the good and constitutes a testimony to the policy -- practiced here today -- of being forthright in raising arms control violations. The goal is not aimless accusations of another country but stopping such violations. It is a testimony to the outcry of people everywhere that such sentiments can and do stop such unacceptable activities.

This underscores the fact that compliance is not just a bilateral concern. To be serious about arms control is to be serious about compliance.

This Conference is, I know, serious about arms control and thus must be serious about the twin issues of compliance and verification. In this regard, the United States delegation today is introducing the President's message to the Congress of the United States, and his unclassified report on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements, as a Conference Document.

It is now clear that provisions of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which regrettably contains no verification provisions, have been violated at the cost of many lives of innocent peoples in less developed, and non-aligned countries. The United States recognizes that it was one of the States that did not fully appreciate the danger of the lack of adequate compliance provisions. It now sees a need to fashion such provisions.

Negotiations on the issues the Conference deals with must factor in whether the activities to be limited can be effectively verified. Just as we dare not sit by and permit our past efforts to be debased through violations, we likewise need to take the past compliance record fully into account as we seek to formulate new agreements. Each of us must tackle this urgent task. Better still, we can tackle it together.

We recognize that chemical weapons pose some of the most confounding verification problems encountered in the vast realm of arms control. For this very reason, we are seeking new and rather bold approaches, including an "open invitation" for mandatory international inspection on short notice.

As I noted earlier, overcoming the problems of verification and compliance is essential. Arms control is empty without compliance; and compliance, particularly for a closed society, is impossible to establish without verification. A ban on chemical weapons honoured by open societies and violated by closed societies would be no ban at all. It would constitute unilateral disarmament in the guise of multilateral arms control.

During the course of these discussions, I also encourage the Conference to look carefully at how to handle chemicals normally used in industry or agriculture, but which also can be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons. Chemical weapons used in Iraq's war with Iran were produced from just such substances. To help prevent development and use of chemical weapons in the future, we need to ensure that steps are taken to control the export of such chemicals and related equipment and technology. Countries with advanced chemical industries have a special obligation in this regard, and in the future should exercise considerable restraint. Personally, I believe this is an ever-increasing priority in arms control.

Besides the first priority of a global chemical weapons ban, the basis for an agreement banning radiological weapons has existed since 1979 in parallel United States-Soviet proposals. Considerable effort has been directed towards concluding an agreement on this proposal, as well as on a United States proposal to strengthen the agreement's compliance mechanisms. We hope this abundance of material will culminate in an early agreement that precludes this entire category of weapons, which, to date, are not known to exist and which, fortunately, have thus far attracted little military interest.

Serious work on verification and compliance issues should also receive priority in the Conference's work related to a nuclear test ban. The worldwide experiment sponsored by the Conference's Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to exchange seismic data has proven a promising contribution to this effort. The Conference might also consider additional expert study on the possibility of monitoring the atmosphere through radioactivity and acoustic data exchanges.

In this regard, I would note that President Reagan laid the groundwork for a related measure last fall. In his speech before the United Nations General Assembly, he proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union arrange for experts to visit each other's underground test sites to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapon tests. This step could enable the two countries to establish the basis for verification of effective limits on underground nuclear testing. We continue to await a positive response from Moscow, and have done everything possible to encourage such a response.

Multilateral efforts to improve nuclear testing verification would be very useful at this juncture. The United States has been ready and willing to discuss important aspects of a nuclear test ban. In this regard, we joined with other Western delegates in supporting a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee tabled last year in the Conference on Disarmament. We continue to support that mandate and we hope that those who have not agreed to it will do so very soon.

CD/PV.290

pp.25-27

USSR/Issraelyan

12.2.85

VER

Does the statement made today by Mr. Adelman, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, contribute to a constructive dialogue in the Conference on Disarmament? I think not. I am sure that it does not. If Mr. Adelman sought to contribute to the success of the Conference's work, he would not have told so many untruths about the policy of the USSR. In his statement, he spoke at length about the fact that the USSR allegedly

does not comply with international agreements it has signed, the bilateral agreements concluded between the USSR and the United States. It is hard to say why the United States representative found it necessary to raise these issues here when there is a Standing Consultative Commission which deals specially with these problems. However, as far as the substance of the United States assertions is concerned, I should like only to refer to the statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A.A. Gromyko, in January this year. In particular, he stated: "With regard to the assertions that allegedly the Soviet Union does not observe some of its obligations under agreements it has concluded, this is a fiction ... the memoranda or reports sent by the United States Administration to Congress, and sometimes transmitted to United Nations meetings, alleging that the Soviet Union is doing the kind of thing to which I have referred, contain expressions such as the following: there are doubts that the Soviet Union is fulfilling its obligations, or it seems that such obligations are not fully observed, which raises the question, they say, of verification of whether the Soviet Union is actually fulfilling those obligations. But it is never directly stated anywhere, with factual evidence, that the Soviet Union is actually committing any violation. We categorically refute this. It is not the custom of the Soviet Union to violate its obligations under treaties and agreements which it has signed and which other States have signed, whether they be bilateral or multi-lateral agreements. We take pride in this.

And by the way, the world is accustomed to this. When the Americans allege that there is something wrong with the Soviet Union's observance of the provisions of some agreement or another, this is received quite calmly, and no other State has ever claimed that such allegations correspond to the facts. Not at all. Our conscience is clear. We do not conclude agreements in order not to comply with them, we comply with such agreements from start to finish."

Why then do the American representatives repeat their false assertions concerning alleged violations by the Soviet Union of its agreements over and over again, including in serious international forums? They pursue various objectives here, the general direction being both ugly and obvious.

First, the United States wishes, by using slander against the Soviet Union's policy, to push its regular military programme through Congress.

Second, it is endeavouring to break off and bury the current international negotiations on arms limitation, on the pretext that they are supposedly ineffective.

Third, as it appears to us, it wishes from the outset to cast a shadow over the future talks in Geneva, and to create doubts about the possibility and utility of agreements with the Soviet Union.

All this is aimed in one direction -- to get public opinion to believe that there is no sensible alternative to the present United States policy of increasing its military preparations, and that the arms race is inevitable and efforts to prevent it vain.

In his statement, Mr. Adelman once again referred to the problem of verification of disarmament agreements. As the Soviet representatives have

repeatedly pointed out at various levels, including the very highest, the USSR is no less, and possibly more, interested than others in reliable control of compliance with agreements. It is strange, to say the least, that the United States representative, who recalled the number of dead in the First World War, said nothing at all about the fact that in the Second World War more than 50 million people were killed, 20 million of them Soviet citizens. Control is not our weak point. The Soviet Union has repeatedly put forward proposals on this score, going as far as general and complete control in the case of general and complete disarmament. These steps have invariably been supported by those who are actually interested in advancing the direction of arms limitation.

The United States takes a different position on the question of control. For them, control is the basic means of blocking progress and the achievement of mutually acceptable agreements. One does not have to go very far to find examples. Everyone knows that the proposal on chemical weapons submitted to the Conference by the United States set back negotiations in this field precisely on account of their absolutely unrealistic and unacceptable demands with regard to verification, deliberately put forward in such a way as to close all avenues for making progress. The authors of the proposal themselves recognized this. In particular, the Assistant Secretary of Defense of the United States, Richard Perle, baldly stated even when this American proposal was introduced that it would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union precisely because of the excessive verification requirements.

While verbally advocating control, the United States, when it comes to putting further verification measures into practice, change their line greatly. Thus, for already 11 years the United States has refused to ratify the 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon testing. The reason is absolutely clear and simple, and they do not even conceal it in Washington: the United States is afraid to carry into practice, by the proposed treaty, the clear and effective system of control of the scale of explosions carried out. If the United States agreed to such control, it would be much more awkward for it to develop ever newer nuclear warheads, including those for new powerful offensive missiles.

Mr. Adelman cited facts relating to the use of chemical weapons in a historical review, so to speak. He committed many inaccuracies, to put it lightly. In our statement in right of reply to the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. Bush, in February 1983 we already cited all the events concerning the use of chemical weapons from the time of the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and I shall not return to this question. But it is very surprising that he forgot to mention the use of toxic chemicals during a decade by the United States in their aggression in Viet Nam. At the same time, he repeated more than once the lie about the Soviet Union's use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and South East Asia. We have rejected and we reject this lie. In his statement and I must confess this is the first time that I encounter such a declaration by a representative of the United States -- Mr. Adelman said:

[Spoke in English] "thankfully, there have been no confirmed attacks with lethal chemical or toxic weapons in Kampuchea, Laos or Afghanistan in 1984."

[Spoke in Russian] Naturally so, inasmuch as neither in 1984 nor at any earlier time has the Soviet Union used chemical weapons. The fact that last year the United States decided to discontinue its campaign of insinuations on this score is explained solely by the fact that the American administration began its pseudo-peace-making rhetoric in pursuit of a definite goal: to improve its political image in the international arena.

CD/PV.291

pp.12-15

Japan/Imai

14.2.85

CTB, NPT,
OS, CW

Japan is of the view that an early and comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests would be an important step toward the realization of nuclear disarmament and, therefore, opposes nuclear tests by any country. We are all aware that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is the most effective means to prevent both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. A long history of negotiations accompanies this theme and a great deal of effort has been directed towards this end, but its attainment is, unfortunately, not in immediate sight.

Various political, strategic and technical factors have been given as the reasons for this difficulty, and one of the main problems is compliance and verification. We have expressed our views with regard to this problem at the Conference on many occasions in the past. This year, we intend to present a working paper in due course, outlining the necessary procedure for the establishment or up-grading of multilateral verification capability in this respect.

On the other hand, in view of the difficulty in making visible progress in the discussions on the subject, Foreign Minister Abe, in his statement here last June, proposed as a viable and realistic approach, a step-by-step concept in which a general "threshold" would be defined in view of the existing technical level of multilateral verification capabilities, with agreement to prohibit nuclear tests above such verification threshold, then, as efforts are concentrated on improving the technologies of detection and identification, the continued lowering of the threshold for the nuclear test ban to an eventual zero, which is the equivalent of a comprehensive test ban.

We believe that such efforts to approach a comprehensive nuclear test ban starting from and building on existing capabilities, would provide new perspectives as we advance forward, which, in turn, would make it easier to pursue further progress. It might be likened to a group of alpinists, who set out from Geneva as the first staging point. As they advance toward the summit, they would get a better perspective of the terrain of the attack and may be able to improve the plan of climb with the increased knowledge and indeed the self-confidence of having a better command of the situation. I need not add here that an alpinist's climb is a step-by-step venture and that, in the case of the high and important peak of CTB, it would seem that the step-by-step advancement would be much more preferable and also meaningful than just arguing over the strategy for the climb without leaving the base camp.

We hope that this step-by-step concept, along with any other proposals, will be given an opportunity to be discussed during this year's session of the

Conference. Further, it is our hope that the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts who have made substantial contributions to the technical aspect of the problem will continue to provide necessary assistance to our work. Especially, we await the experts' analysis and appraisal of the results of the International Seismic Data Exchange experiment which took place last year.

The next point concerns nuclear non-proliferation.

In April of this year, the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in September the Review Conference itself, will take place here in Geneva. The non-proliferation regime, through the unique system of safeguards, represents effective international verification, in which a balance has been sought between the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on the one hand, and the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons on the other.

My country welcomes the declaration last year by China, in which she indicated that in exporting nuclear materials and equipment the recipient countries would be requested to accept safeguards in line with the principles of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We are convinced that the adoption of such a position by another one of the nuclear-weapon States would strengthen the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime through the application of safeguards. In this connection we also wish to note that the Soviet Union recently negotiated a voluntary submission agreement accepting IAEA safeguards on some of its nuclear facilities. At the same time, we wish to again call upon China and France, and other States not yet parties to the NPT to recognize the importance of this Treaty and take steps to accede to it at an early opportunity.

Together with measures for non-proliferation and promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear disarmament plays a major role in maintaining the NPT system. It is in this sense that we fervently hope that the United States-Soviet negotiations due to commence next month in Geneva will achieve substantive progress in achieving deep reductions in nuclear arms.

Furthermore, in order to make the discussions at the NPT Review Conference as fruitful as possible, I should like to remind the Parties to the Treaty that they may submit their views and proposals on the final document through the members of the bureau of the Review Conference, according to the decision at the second session of the Preparatory Committee last year, so that discussion at the third session of the Preparatory Committee be better facilitated.

I should now like to comment on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We welcome the announced commencement of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union which are to cover space arms as well. At the same time, as I have tried to emphasize in the earlier part of this intervention, we feel it will be extremely meaningful and useful to take up this matter at this Conference as a subject of multilateral concern and prepare for possible arrangements to take preventive measures in view of the rapid advances in space-related technology. We consider that it is one of our urgent tasks to establish an ad hoc committee for careful examination of this question.

In considering the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we should start with an accurate understanding of what kind of military activities are conducted there at present and can be foreseen in the future, what implications these have for the maintenance of national and international security and what problems are posed by the need for verification. Since space activities involve the latest achievement in science and technology, it will be impossible to keep such discussions completely in a non-technical arena.

As my country is making efforts to develop technologies for peaceful uses of outer space, we have a great interest in this subject and we intend to make endeavours so as to contribute to the work of this Conference in this regard.

As we have stated before on many occasions, we believe that this Conference should deploy its best efforts for the early realization of a global and comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. Fortunately, the discussions have been very active in recent years, and we appreciate the fact that the major points of a future convention prohibiting chemical weapons have become clear and for this we have to thank the untiring efforts of the former chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus.

At the same time we note that with the increasing intensity of the discussions and further identification of related problems, we have been getting increasingly involved in details which are, of course, necessary and important but at the same time may have the effect of confusing the priorities. It may, therefore, be worthwhile to reconfirm the basic objectives of the convention; that is, the prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retaining, and transfer as well as use of chemical weapons and for the destruction of existing chemical weapons and their production facilities. In discussing this matter, we should always bear in mind that the chemical weapons convention as outlined above should work to enhance national security of all States while at the same time it should not pose any impediments to the development of normal activities of the world's peaceful chemical industries.

With this basic perception as a starting point, we should work out the problems facing us with regard to "objectives", "definitions", "destruction" and "verification". We should especially like to stress that we hope early agreement can be reached with regard to an explicit identification of the chemical substances to be prohibited or controlled under this convention, and to a practical system of verification measures designed to ensure compliance with the provisions of the convention.

CD/PV.292

pp.20-21

Argentina/Carasales

19.2.85

CTB

The question of verification is constantly invoked as a valid reason for not negotiating. The fact of the matter is, however, that, in this connection, it is virtually unanimously agreed that existing means of verification are adequate for the satisfactory detection of possible violations of a treaty. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has been saying this for a long time and has said so on many occasions. The other day, the representative of Sweden, a country which, as we have seen, keeps a reliable record of nuclear explosions throughout the world, also said as much when she stated that "there are no insurmountable technical obstacles to concluding such a

treaty". There are countless examples of similar expert opinions, such as those recently stated in an article by David Hafemeister on "Advances in verification technology", which appeared in the latest issue (January 1985) of the "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists".

It is possible and even probable that some aspects of the verification process still have to be completed or refined, but, at the same time, it has to be assumed that a totally perfect verification system which completely rules out any possibility of violations for ever and ever does not exist and will never exist in any disarmament agreement, either in respect of the nuclear-weapon-test ban or in any other field. To claim otherwise is to indulge in pipe-dreams. What has to be done is to design a verification system which will minimize risks of violation as much as possible and, at the same time, make it clear that the political risks involved in the detection of violations would far outweigh the military advantage it might create.

The doubt and concern that some people may continue to feel about the verification systems in a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests can and must be removed in the context of a multilateral negotiation process.

This is what is happening in respect of chemical weapons. As Mr. Adelman, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, recently stated: "We recognize that chemical weapons pose some of the most confounding verification problems encountered in the vast realm of arms control". This is correct and I would venture to say that such problems are far weightier than those posed by the verification of nuclear tests; and yet these difficult problems of verification are being discussed within the framework of the negotiation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

It is logical and explainable that this should be so. Any system of verification involves concessions and limitations on the rights of each and every one of the States parties to a treaty -- concessions and limitations whose nature and scope can be decided only in the context of the many interrelated questions that arise in connection with any convention.

CD/PV.292

pp.26-27

Australia/Butler

19.2.85

CTB,CW

Our proposed draft mandate, while less than what we want as an individual country, and this is an example of compromise, nevertheless provides for practical work to be conducted by the Conference on the two vital issues in such a treaty, verification and compliance. Under our proposal the Conference would take practical steps towards establishing the required verification procedures for a CTB. We also propose that it should move towards establishing such practical arrangements as a seismic monitoring network to monitor compliance with a CTB treaty.

In Australia's view, those countries which have reservations about the verifiability of a CTB treaty should take the opportunity of explaining their point of view in a subsidiary body devoted to this agenda item. Let us identify the problems and their means of solution. Likewise, those who assert that the means of verification are available should put forward their views to demonstrate this point. Only by addressing the practical matters at stake, in

detail, can this issue be resolved. Those who prevent such work, by insisting on a form of mandate behind which the opponents of a CTB treaty can hide, are complicit in preventing us from flushing out and defeating arguments against a CTB treaty. I appeal to others in this Conference to chance their arm with the western draft mandate for a CTB. Let us get some practical work going. Let us expose the reality of the CTB issue and let us do this now.

Let us test these arguments about a CTB and take practical steps on verification now. Let us work on a CTB now in 1985.

There is nothing which should divide members of this Conference with respect to the objective of removing all chemical weapons from this earth. The existing régime of international law relating to chemical weapons, while largely effective, is incomplete.

Chemical weapons should never be used and thus the case for their complete elimination and their non-production is absolute, and that case expands whenever we hear of the use of chemical weapons, as we regrettably have within the last 24 hours. The work which has been proceeding in the Conference towards this end is work of great importance; we all have an interest in its early and successful completion. Work on this Convention raises the fundamental question of the role of verification within arms control agreements. Because of the stakes at issue, an effective universal chemical weapons convention will need a level of verification which provides full confidence that the objectives of the convention are being met. We all know that there is, at present, an argument about what that level and nature of verification should be, but it is my Government's conviction that we can settle this argument.

CD/PV.293

pp.14, 17-18

USSR/Issraelyan

21.2.85

CTB

The steps which we have taken on questions relating to the scope of a ban, a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and the application of certain international verification procedures, including on-site inspection, all show that we do not lack goodwill. This list of compromise measures, confirming our genuine desire to resolve the test ban issue, can be extended further. For example, as is known, we have given evidence of our willingness for an agreement on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests to enter into force for a given period only for three nuclear-weapon States, if the other two are not prepared to accede to it at the very beginning. At last year's session of the Conference, we stated that we would be prepared under certain conditions to consider the possibility of organizing, as proposed by Sweden, an exchange of data on radioactivity of air masses including the establishment of appropriate international data centres on the same basis as that provided for in regard to the exchange of seismic data.

An attempt is now being made to convince us that continuing the work of the Conference on the question of a test ban on the basis of a "non-

negotiating" mandate can supposedly help to devise means to verify compliance with a test ban. In this context also, I should like to make some comments.

Firstly, we fully share the view of most States which was so well expressed in the statement by the representative of Sweden on 5 February, who said that there are no insurmountable technical obstacles to ensuring verification of compliance with an agreement on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban. States cannot use the so-called inadequacy of verification measures as a pretext for refusing to hold serious negotiations on such an agreement. Clearly, it is surprising that the same standpoint was reflected in the message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Conference on Disarmament which was read out by his Special Representative, Ambassador Komatina, at the first meeting of the current session.

By the way, I should like to draw attention to the fact that several delegations, including Western delegations, have referred to a large number of nuclear tests, basing their statements on Swedish sources. Those delegations clearly assumed the reliability of such data. Thus, they willingly or unwillingly support the view of Sweden concerning the adequacy of existing technical means for monitoring a test ban.

Secondly, an argument frequently advanced for considering the technical possibilities for control is that they are continually being improved. It is, of course, true that the technical means are being improved. However, a question arises: if a test ban is to relate to some remote future, is there any sense seriously to develop at present verification means which can be applied only during the next century? We are convinced that this is an unnecessary waste of time. Why? Because at present technological advances are proceeding at such a pace that these means will inevitably be obsolete in about 15 to 20 years.

Thirdly, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee or Ad Hoc Group in 1982-1983 provided an opportunity for detailed consideration of the questions of verification and control. In our considered opinion, the draft mandate proposed in document CD/521 is nothing other than an attempt to go over the same ground again. Therefore, a similar draft mandate was rejected last year, and the negative attitude of many States towards it was confirmed once again in the vote on paragraph 4 of resolution 39/53 at the last session of the General Assembly, in which this mandate was actually reproduced.

An attempt is also being made to persuade us that the consideration of control issues, however abstract they might be, will be a means for exerting pressure on those States which refuse to enter into negotiations on the agreement itself. We firmly disagree with this as well. On the contrary, there is a great danger that the appearance or illusion will be given that practical work is being done on this question thereby reducing the pressure of public opinion on those countries which are in fact blocking the negotiations. Thus, the initiation of the work of the ad hoc committee on the basis proposed to us by the West will not only be useless but, it seems to us even counter-productive, since it will mislead world public opinion. Such actions by the Conference can only cause further harm to the Conference's reputation and not help to improve it, as suggested in one of the statements at the last meeting of the Conference.

Thirdly, one major portion of Ambassador Issraelyan's statement was devoted to the necessity to have a subsidiary body of our Conference on nuclear testing, equipped with a firm and complete negotiating mandate. I do not want to take issue with the desirability of such a mandate but I would like to remind all delegates that we have a situation in which such a negotiating mandate is not possible because our Conference is run by consensus. I state the situation, I do not comment, or give my own value judgement on it. But this being so, the call for a full negotiating mandate and the simultaneous refusal to embark on any kind of work in the field of nuclear testing in its absence are futile. Those who ask for too much achieve nothing, and they prevent us from tackling some of the essential issues that we will have to deal with, with or without a negotiating mandate, if we are serious about a stop to nuclear testing. If there is no subsidiary body equipped with a general or specific mandate of whatever kind on this matter, where can we discuss the issue of verifiability? Of scope? Of the modalities of a seismic observation network? Of the institutional needs the future test ban regime would have? Those who ask for too much achieve nothing, and when we again in this Conference achieve nothing on this matter during the current year, the question of responsibility arises and we will have to think very precisely to find out where the responsibility will lie at that time.

Fourthly, Ambassador Issraelyan has, as often before, referred to present factual observations about testing in an intention to prove that all the verification problems are solved. I am afraid that there is a logical fallacy involved here. Today, testing is permitted, although not morally condoned by the international community. When testing is permitted, nobody has to conceal. We can take the statistical figures which institutes observe as a fair indication of the tests that are actually held; but when a CTBT is in force, then the issue is completely different because whoever wishes to test has to make arrangements to conceal. Then the question is put anew. Are our scientific capacities enough to detect concealed testing?

Secondly, the question of verification has been raised. In this connection I would like to bring to the attention of the Conference the statement which was made by the Group of 21 this morning as well as the statements which have been made in the Conference during the past two weeks. These statements have been very positive and hopeful about the developments which took place in Geneva in January and what will take place in Geneva in March. The whole world is expecting a lot from these developments, as the two major nuclear Powers will be negotiating with each other on a complex of questions. When they can negotiate with each other on a complex of questions which have an important bearing on nuclear weapons, when the question of verification does not prevent them from negotiating with each other, how is it then, that in the Conference on Disarmament, the question of a nuclear test ban, which is but a limited aspect of the whole complex of nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race, how is it that in this Conference the same Powers are not able to negotiate on a test ban? If verification is so important as to do away with everything else in the context of nuclear test ban, if verification is so important that pending its resolution the Conference on Disarmament cannot do

anything else, then how is it that the same verification does not prevent the two from negotiating with each other, from demanding those negotiations when such negotiations are suspended, and from giving the greatest importance to those negotiations when they are going on? Is there not an inconsistency in this kind of approach?

CD/PV.293

p.22

Mexico/Garcia Robles

21.2.85

CTB

I should like first of all to answer the question he raised concerning where issues such as scope and verification can be considered if we give a negotiating mandate to this subsidiary body, this ad hoc committee. To be specific on this point, yesterday I said that, as we saw the mandate of the ad hoc committee, it would be a mandate which would lend itself very well to a procedure similar to that which has been and is still used in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The necessary number of working groups would be set up within the Ad Hoc Committee, and there would be no problem whatsoever for one of those groups to devote itself wholly to the question of verification.

However, we all know what happened in connection with this issue. Last year, at the 283rd meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 21 August, I reviewed what had happened in relation to agenda items 1, 2, 3 and 5. I shall not repeat that review today in extenso. I should merely like to recall what I said on that occasion concerning the flexibility of which we gave ample proof and why we stated that there must be limits to flexibility, and particularly that it cannot be displayed only by one side. I also stressed on that occasion that the flexibility repeatedly shown by the Group of 21 in the lengthy consultations held with the other groups was explicitly recognized by the latter, including members of the Group of Western European and Other Countries, at a plenary meeting. However, that flexibility cannot, to use the words I pronounced then, "extend so far that delegations should, by taking advantage of it for domestic and political reasons, use the creation of working groups provided with meaningless mandates solely for the purpose of serving as a misleading smokescreen to create the belief that substantive negotiations were taking place".

Perhaps we were not far wrong in saying this, in expressing this conviction, because as we all know on 12 December 1984 the General Assembly adopted resolution 39/52 by no less than 122 votes in favour and only 2 against: in this resolution we find a preambular paragraph, the third, which has the following wording:

"Convinced that the existing means of verification are adequate to ensure compliance with a nuclear-test ban and that the alleged absence of such means of verification is nothing but an excuse for further development and refinement of nuclear weapons".

Thus, we are in very good company -- in the company of 122 Member States of the United Nations. At a later date, in a plenary meeting I shall have occasion to repeat, and perhaps expand upon, what I said yesterday in our informal meeting.

CD/PV.294

pp.7-8

Pakistan/Ahmad

26.2.85

CTB

The technical and scientific aspects of monitoring compliance with a test ban have already been exhaustively explored. (Seismologists have asserted that nuclear explosions of even militarily insignificant sizes, in some cases below one kiloton, have been detected, located and identified from distances of more than 3,000 kilometres. What is required is a political decision to seize the moment and relate our present knowledge, which is adequate, to the problem of the day. For those who are still worried about verification there should be assurance in the confidence that any serious violation will be detected. Movement towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty can also be facilitated by an agreement among nuclear-weapon States on an exchange of testing information.

CD/PV.294

pp.21-22

Australia/Butler

26.2.85

CTB,CW

Ambassador Issraelyan has correctly focused on the issue of verification. He in fact says the boat is safe, some others agree with him. But some of us in all honesty and in good faith are not sure that this is the case. So let us go down the path of providing that a CTB can be verified and we reject any suggestion, and this has been suggested, that our approach is designed to stall or delay. Our approach has the single purpose of getting us all, as it were, safely to sea, of bringing into existence a viable comprehensive test ban treaty.

Verification is the issue and it is true that considerable means of monitoring nuclear tests exist in a number of countries. But it is also true that more is required, a larger seismological capacity is required, in order that all may feel secure in our ability to monitor compliance with a comprehensive test ban treaty. The work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has been significant in this context and it must continue. It was therefore a matter of some concern to my delegation to hear Ambassador Issraelyan imply last Thursday that the Soviet view of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts was possibly ambiguous.

CD/PV.295

pp.22-23

USSR/Issraelyan

28.2.85

VER,CTB

It is in this light that we view document CD/561, distributed by the United States delegation, which contains crude attacks against the Soviet Union's policy. We also note that this is the first time that a document of such an anti-Soviet nature has been circulated by the United States delegation in the entire history of multilateral negotiations on disarmament over a quarter of a century. We are especially concerned at the fact that all this is being done on the eve of the opening of the bilateral talks. One must ask, what is the purpose of this? In our view, the aim of this action is not an attempt by the United States to discover the actual situation as regards compliance with any specific agreement, but to aggravate and stir up controversy, undermine confidence in the Soviet Union as a partner in the talks, and distract the Conference from its concrete problems. Another aim is also obvious: to justify to public opinion their own violations of the existing agreements, and to prepare it for violations by the United States of those

agreements through the implementation of military programmes which would render them inoperative in future.

The communication of the USSR Embassy in Washington to the United States State Department, which was transmitted to the United States the other day, contains our reaction to the smear campaign launched in the United States concerning the alleged "breaches" by the USSR of its international commitments. A convincing answer to those allegations is contained in the document circulated at the request of the Soviet delegation (CD/572) and entitled "Not sabotage, but compliance with obligations".

Of course, we are in agreement that a treaty without provisions relating to verification of compliance is impossible. We do not deny that some kinds of problems in this area have to be resolved. However, and I do not believe that anybody would disagree, in the field of verification of compliance with a test ban a good deal has already been accomplished. Technical, scientific and even political aspects of this problem have already been profoundly studied. Extremely useful work carried out by scientists of many countries, including experts in the framework of our Conference, has made it possible to build a foundation for the technical verification of compliance with a treaty. This work makes it possible to form the opinion that the existing technical means of verification are quite sufficient to guarantee compliance with the treaty.

If one recalls the trilateral negotiations which were, unfortunately, suspended unilaterally by our partners, it becomes clear that nothing is impossible as regards achieving political agreement on verification measures too if this is done in the specific context of elaborating an agreement. And I would like to stress this particularly -- in a specific context, not in the abstract and without relating it to the text of a treaty.

CD/PV.295 p.27 Morocco/Skali 28.2.85 CTB

That positive approach is in keeping with the appeal made to all members of this Conference by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 39/52, to initiate "immediately the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests and to exert their best endeavours in order that the Conference may transmit to the General Assembly at its fortieth session the complete draft of such a treaty".

In this regard, we are persuaded that the major obstacle to an agreement on this question is not the technical and scientific aspects of compliance and verification but the lack of political decisions. We believe that this obstacle may be overcome in the future, especially if our Conference is able to take advantage of the new dynamics created by the new international situation and by the recent approach adopted by China on this point.

CD/PV.296 p.15 New Zealand/Lange 5.3.85 CTB

But we recognize that there are serious issues to be resolved if a test ban is to be achieved. Foremost among these issues is that of verification.

No arms control or disarmament agreement would be worth the paper it was written on if there were no means of checking whether its terms were being complied with. All countries are entitled to assure themselves that nuclear explosions in contravention of a test ban treaty will be detected.

New Zealand has made a concerted effort to contribute to work in this field through its participation in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. We have contributed information gathered from the network of seismological stations established by New Zealand. We hope that the recently concluded test on the elements of a network to detect seismic events and the evaluation of that test by the Group of Scientific Experts can provide a basis for the establishment of a full-scale international network to monitor nuclear explosions. The data available from that test should also help determine the capacity of such a network to monitor compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty. There is much work that can still be done by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and it is therefore very disappointing to hear some voices suggesting that the future of the Group is in doubt. We hope that is not to be the case. Our commitment to the Group will continue.

There are other important questions that will have to be resolved in the course of negotiating a test ban. Foremost amongst those is that of the scope of the proposed ban. A test ban must be comprehensive -- it must prohibit all explosions in all environments for all time. We have difficulty with the suggestion some have made that a test ban treaty could be limited to the testing of nuclear weapons. It is an inescapable fact that any nuclear device that causes an explosion can be used for hostile purposes. It would, to our mind, be unforgivable if a test ban treaty were to be held up over difficulties in drawing a distinction between nuclear explosions for military purposes and so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. All tests should be banned.

CD/PV.296

pp.17-18

USA/Lowitz

5.3.85

CTB

A comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions remains a long-term goal of my Government, in the context of broad, deep and verifiable nuclear arms reductions, expanded confidence-building measures and improved verification capabilities. At this time, however, it is an important objective, but not the most important objective. The United States believes it is a mistake to imply that a comprehensive test ban is as urgent a matter as are efforts to reduce arsenals of weapons already in existence. This view is the same as was stated at the United Nations General Assembly in October 1982, by the then Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Rostow: "The United States does not believe that, under present circumstances, a comprehensive nuclear test ban would reduce the threat of nuclear war because such a ban would not reduce the threat implicit in the existing stockpile".

In addition to serious verification problems there continue to be significant concerns about other national security implications of a comprehensive test ban. Given the continuing dependence of the United States and its allies on nuclear weapons, any consideration of a total test ban must be related to the West's ability to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.

My delegation has listened with great interest to the many statements on the nuclear test ban issue made by delegations here during the past two

weeks. In particular, I would recall the remarks of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 28 February. There are a number of matters in this statement with which I can agree, such as the importance of not seeking military superiority and the importance of the reduction of weapons. And my delegation takes due note of the new agreement between the Soviet Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency placing certain Soviet nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards for the first time.

However, with regard to the situation on a nuclear test ban, I must dissent from the claim that existing technical means of verification are sufficient for ensuring compliance with a comprehensive, global ban on nuclear explosions. I believe that our experience, in the brief examination of this issue that was possible in the subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban in 1982 and 1983, indicates the contrary. There was then, and I believe there continues to be, a great variety of views on this crucial question. It would be most useful if the Conference would, without delay, resume its efforts to resolve these differences.

In his plenary statement of 21 February, Ambassador Issraelyan referred to the proposal made by President Reagan in his address to the United Nations General Assembly last September, that the United States and the Soviet Union send observers to each other's test sites to measure the yields of tests of nuclear weapons. Ambassador Issraelyan suggested that the United States sought by this proposal to legitimize nuclear testing. That is not correct. The United States has no such intention. The purpose for our proposal was made clear by President Reagan in his address. It was "to enable the two countries to establish the basis for effective limits on underground nuclear testing".

We have also been reminded recently of proposals for a temporary moratorium on nuclear testing, to be entered into while negotiations on a test ban treaty are going on. We do not believe such a moratorium would lead to a reduction in world tensions. A moratorium now, in the absence of reductions in nuclear arsenals and in the absence of sufficiently effective means of verification, could promote the opposite conditions: instability and increased international insecurity. Such a moratorium would not move us closer to resolving the verification and compliance issues which have proven so difficult. Nor would it affect the need to accomplish broad, deep and verifiable nuclear arms reductions. A moratorium based on presently available verification capabilities would, in our view, not be effectively verifiable.

It is worth recalling that the mutual suspension of nuclear explosions of the United States and the Soviet Union from 1958 to 1961 was not embodied in a binding agreement and did not make provision for effective verification. Rather, it was the result of unilateral declarations by the Soviet Union and the United States that said, in essence, "we will refrain from further nuclear tests if you will". But the ensuing breakdown of this test suspension in August of 1981, when the Soviet Union resumed testing, demonstrated the need for carefully negotiated obligations and precise limitations, lest arms control arrangements generate mistrust and suspicion rather than any long-term solution or genuine relaxation of tensions. Then, as now, trust and goodwill alone were not enough.

It is certainly significant that the prevention of an arms race in space should have been included in the bilateral negotiations, within the broader context of a reaffirmation of the link between the role of defence systems and reduction of offensive nuclear armaments. In the view of the Italian Government, the bilateral negotiations should set themselves the short-term objective of a radical reduction of nuclear-weapons and the longer-term objective of avoidance of competition likely to lead to an uncontrolled militarization of space, which might have destabilizing consequences. It is desirable to establish some discipline for the military use of space so as to contribute to the strengthening of strategic stability. The ABM Treaty of 1972 constitutes, from this standpoint, a stable reference point that should serve as point of departure for the bilateral negotiations which should then develop in the future. The undertaking to observe the ABM Treaty and effective verification of observance of the obligations arising from that Treaty form the basis for a constructive discussion of the role which anti-ballistic-missile systems can play, in the future, as a means of strengthening deterrence and increasing stability.

This whole subject must be dealt with, moreover, in a realistic manner. It is well known that space has long been used for military purposes. In so far as this use has stabilizing effects, it has never been challenged. Remote detection ensures protection against enemy attack by permitting observation of large-scale military movements or preparations, as well as verification of disarmament agreements. The satellites employed for these purposes are an important factor of stability. Their protection is therefore necessary and must be ensured by effective and verifiable agreements or by discouraging any attack likely to prevent the satellites from performing their functions.

Verification problems are often used as a pretext for blocking negotiations on all other aspects of a NTB. Many speakers before me have already expressed their view on this approach. Let me just quote from the statement of Ambassador Ahmad of 26 February: "the technical and scientific aspects of monitoring compliance have already been exhaustively explored. Seismologists have asserted that nuclear explosions of even militarily insignificant sizes, in some cases below one kiloton, have been detected, located and identified from distances of more than 3,000 kilometres. What is required is a political decision to seize the moment and relate our present knowledge, which is adequate, to the problem of the day".

We should not forget that we have already three reports of the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts. They have developed a project for the creation of a reliable international system for the exchange of seismic data on the global scale. Level I data are considered sufficient for the identification and localization of the overwhelming majority of seismic events by national centres having at their disposal data from a global network. In some cases stations situated so as to be in a position to make a clear record of a seismic event could also be required to supply Level II data. One such case might be parallel recording of several seismic events by a number of stations of the network; another one an attempt to make use of a strong earthquake to

cover nuclear explosion. Level II data could also be required in exceptional situations when the depth of a seismic event could not be clearly estimated on the basis of Level I data. One more advantage of the proposed system for the exchange of seismic data is that it is designed to ensure the full participation also of technically less developed countries which do not possess their own seismic means of verification, and of countries with a small territory not having a global network of seismic stations. It is our considered opinion that the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts in its three reports suggests the creation of a reliable system for the exchange of seismic data which could contribute highly to ensuring compliance with a NTB treaty.

CD/PV.297

pp.22-23

Mexico/García Robles

7.3.85

CTB

On 29 February 1972, Kurt Waldheim, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, addressing the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at the opening meeting of its 1972 session, stated in this very Chamber:

"No other question in the field of disarmament has been the subject of so much study and discussion as the question of stopping nuclear-weapon tests. I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement. There is an increasing conviction among the nations of the world that an underground test ban is the single most important measure, and perhaps the only feasible one in the near future, to halt the nuclear arms race, at least with regard to its qualitative aspects ..."

"When one takes into account the existing means of verification by seismic and other methods, and the possibilities provided by international procedures of verification such as consultation, inquiry and what has come to be known as 'verification by challenge' or 'inspection by invitation', it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban."

"In the light of all these considerations, I share the inescapable conclusion that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests".

The current Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, for his part, in a recent statement on 12 December 1984 said the following in this connection:

"I appeal for a renewed effort towards a comprehensive test ban treaty. No single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons. A comprehensive test ban treaty is the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament. Is it wise to develop new classes of ever more lethal, ever more technically complex weapons, whose control is ever more difficult to verify? We are at the point of leaving the decision on humanity's future to the automatic -- and fallible -- reactions of computers. Talks on a comprehensive test ban have been in abeyance for too long and their value has even been questioned. As with all arms-limitation negotiations, there will never be a perfect time to begin them in the opinion of all

sides. The time to recommence these talks is now: they should not be delayed any further."

Naturally, nobody could call for a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing that did not contain appropriate clauses for the verification of compliance with its provisions. But it is also absurd to claim that that subject should be given our total attention to the exclusion of several other elements of the future treaty, especially if it is taken into account that since 1977 the Conference on Disarmament has had a "draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing" (CCD/523) which was submitted to it on 22 February 1977 by the Soviet Union; a "Draft treaty banning any nuclear weapon test explosion in any environment" (CD/381) prepared by Sweden and circulated on 14 June 1983; and a document prepared by the Soviet Union which contains "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" (CD/346) which was circulated on 16 February, also in 1983.

CD/PV.297

pp.27,30

USSR/Issraelyan

7.3.85

OS

Let us now address the question of how the "Star Wars" programme would affect the process of disarmament. For our part at least, it is becoming our strong conviction that the stationing of attack systems in space would have the most damaging consequences for that process. One of those would be in the sphere of verification which, incidently, is so often invoked by the United States itself. It is quite obvious that compliance with a ban on a certain category of weapons can be much more easily verified before they are developed and tested.

The use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth, as well as from Earth against objects in space, should be prohibited for all time. The USSR proposes that agreement be reached on a radical solution of the question of preventing the militarization of space -- on banning and eliminating the whole class of space attack weapons, including anti-satellite and anti-missile space-based systems, as well as any land-based, sea-based or air-based systems designed to destroy objects in space.

Agreement on banning and eliminating the whole class of space attack systems clearly lends itself to reliable and effective verification of compliance by both sides with their obligations. Verification is made easier if only because of the fact that our proposal calls for a complete ban on developing such systems and the elimination of the few that have already been developed.

CD/PV.297

pp.37, 39-41

Sweden/Ekeus

7.3.85

CTB

We are told that the carrying out of nuclear tests is, in terms of credible deterrence, a necessary security precaution, at least as long as the other side is pursuing such tests. Another argument put forward for not wanting full and complete negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is that it would not be possible to fully verify such a treaty considering the state

of the art of monitoring capabilities. When scrutinizing these arguments, we believe it is necessary to evaluate them separately as well as in their interrelationship.

Considering the first of the two arguments advanced against a halt on nuclear testing -- that such testing should be necessary for security reasons -- it appears that the Soviet Union would be prepared to enter into a commitment not to test, provided the other side, the United States, would do likewise. On the other hand it seems clear that for the United States a declared halt or freeze of Soviet testing would not be sufficient reason for halting United States testing. Less clear to my delegation would be the position of the United States if a fully verifiable treaty would be ready for signing and ratification. The question is: Would the United States consider that its security concerns could be taken care of if it thus could get full and verifiable assurances that the Soviet Union would completely halt all testing?

In his statement on 5 March 1985 the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Lowitz, declared that for his Government a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions remains a long-term goal and he added, "in the context of broad, deep and verifiable nuclear arms reductions, expanded confidence-building measures and improved verification measures". He recognized that a nuclear test ban is an important objective but underlined that reductions of weapon arsenals are more urgent than such a ban. He questioned further whether a nuclear test ban now would not delay reductions in nuclear arsenals or even cause an increase in the total numbers of weapons.

Needless to say my delegation does not share the views expressed by Ambassador Lowitz. We consider, and on this point we may agree with the United States delegation, that the modernization of nuclear weapons is not only stimulated by nuclear testing, but that it has such testing as a necessary prerequisite. We do not, however, draw the same conclusion from this postulate. My delegation most certainly differs with the United States delegation when we state that the modernization of nuclear weapons accelerates the nuclear-arms race and tends to destabilize the relations between nuclear-weapon Powers.

In the opinion of my delegation there are no insurmountable technical obstacles to concluding a verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty. This does not mean, on the other hand, that all practical and technical details with regard to verification have been worked out. We understand that some other delegations may have a different attitude, holding the view that it is not possible to establish an effective verification system with the currently available technical knowledge. Of course we respect this position, even if we do not share it.

To reach an agreement on the verification provisions of a treaty would be the single most important step towards a treaty. If we could manage to elaborate together a viable verification system the major obstacle to concluding a treaty would have been removed.

The Swedish delegation would therefore -- within the framework of an ad hoc committee -- be eager to enter into a dialogue with those delegations holding similar or different views on the issue of verification. Such a dialogue could take the form of joint elaboration of the provisions necessary for the verification of a treaty. It could be supported by the continuous work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. Areas of disagreement could be identified in this process and the work should of course be concentrated on bridging these differences. The recently concluded technical test of the international data exchange system was encouraging in this respect. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts is examining technical problems and will soon be able to provide us with such result of their work which may support our effort to elaborate the verification provisions of a treaty.

The delegation of Sweden holds the view that the elaboration of the verification provisions of a treaty could effectively raze to the ground any technical obstacles put in the way of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This being done, nobody could use the absence of a verification system as a pretext or as a viable argument against such a treaty.

The reason why I, in this intervention, am speaking at some length on the verification question is that those opposing the concluding of a treaty now use the verification problem as the reason for their opposition. That does not exclude that there are other important problems remaining to be solved. In this context I will only mention that scope of a treaty and especially the problem of how peaceful nuclear explosions would be taken care of. On this problem there exist among delegations different positions which can only be taken care of in the form of the negotiations of provisions of a treaty.

We have now for some time analyzed the problems of a threshold arrangement to try to find out what kind of a proposal may be a viable one while at the same time considering to the largest degree possible the views of other delegations in the Conference.

Since one problem, admittedly a minor one but still a problem, for the major nuclear-weapon Powers is to adjust their nuclear testing systems to a situation with not testing at all, a phase-out programme or rather a transitional arrangement might make it easier for them to go along with a comprehensive test ban. The necessary link to the treaty would be that such a transitional arrangement should constitute an integral element of the comprehensive test ban treaty. The transitional arrangement would thus be operative within the framework of a treaty being in force.

The period of transition should be as short as possible without being insignificant. A period no longer than three years could, in our view, be considered.

Tests would, during this period and according to the transitional arrangement, only be allowed to be carried out at one test site in each nuclear State adhering to the treaty. Test explosions should not reach above a certain yield level. A threshold should be set at yields of a size that could confidently be detected and identified at, as Ambassador Imai of Japan put it in his statement on 26 July 1984, "the existing technical level of

multilateral verification capability". It is clear from statements of independent as well as of government experts in some nuclear-weapon States that on this basis a threshold in the range of 5 kilotons could be set at the present time.

Since an arrangement of this kind requires a capacity to estimate exact yields, special preparations should be made to provide confident yield determination at the test sites. These preparations could be undertaken according to the verification agreements in the bilateral treaties on the Threshold Test Ban of 1974 and on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions of 1976.

They should include exchange of detailed geological and geophysical information concerning the test sites. They should also include the establishment of a limited number of local seismological stations close to the test sites. These stations could be similar to those national seismic stations agreed upon during the trilateral negotiations. Since accurate yield estimations depend on measurements of calibration explosions at the actual sites with well determined yields, a certain calibration procedure should be foreseen in the transitional arrangement.

To monitor the treaty the verification arrangements outlined in article IV and Protocols I through III of the draft treaty on a nuclear-weapon-test ban (CD/381) presented by Sweden on 14 June 1983, could be employed. These arrangements comprise the use of national technical means, the establishment of international co-operative measures including exchanges of seismological data and data on atmospheric radio-activity and additional, international measures to facilitate the monitoring of the treaty. It further includes procedures for consultation, on-site inspections, and the establishment of a Consultative Committee supported by a Technical Expert Group and a Secretariat.

The verification system should then be further developed during the phase-out period so that, at the end of the three years, the system would provide global monitoring capabilities acceptable to all. We are confident that this will be possible.

PNEs could, during the phase-out period, be handled in accordance with the procedures outlined in the PNE Treaty of 1976. However, the yields of these explosions should be limited to the same threshold as that for nuclear weapon explosions. The extensive verification arrangements agreed upon in the PNE Treaty should be modified to apply to this lower threshold. This would not create any particular technical difficulties.

CD/PV.297

p.44

GDR/Rose

7.3.85

CTB

The discussions in the Conference on Disarmament will inevitably have to focus on the demand for a change in the position of those who stand in the way of practical and urgent work, that is, negotiations of a treaty. My delegation is, of course, aware that negotiation means intensive work in order to find generally acceptable solutions and formulations with respect to all the subjects at issue, including verification. But we cannot agree to a new round of non-committal verification and compliance discussions.

In the past, verification problems were widely debated both in the tri-lateral negotiations and in this body. Moreover, with a view to facilitating the start of negotiations, it was agreed to examine verification and compliance in detail at the 1982 and 1983 sessions. As to the result of that examination, the 1983 Report says: "A large number of delegations considered that the Ad Hoc Working Group had fulfilled its mandate by discussing and defining all the issues relating to verification and compliance of a nuclear test ban." In a spirit of goodwill, most of the delegations agreed at that time to a limited mandate despite serious reservations. It is now up to the other side to demonstrate that it is prepared to arrive at an understanding. Any repetition of the exercise would only engage the Conference in some kind of fake activity and create the false impression that things are moving towards the conclusion of a test-ban treaty, which would both be misleading and detrimental to genuine progress. The peoples of the world have the right to know the real situation concerning a comprehensive test ban.

CD/PV.297

p.47

Nigeria/Tonwe

7.3.85

CTB

The Conference could start off by immediately setting up an ad hoc committee with a meaningful negotiating mandate for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. The more progress is made in scientific detection, the more untenable the argument about reliable verification. Ambassador Maj Britt Theorin of Sweden recently gave this Conference some salient and precise figures about the number of nuclear explosions which were carried out by the principal nuclear-weapon States in 1984, and we have not yet heard any protests about those figures. Maybe the view, confirmed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/52, that the existing means of verification were adequate for a treaty to ban underground nuclear tests is, in fact, incontrovertible.

My delegation fully appreciates the legitimate concern of some principal nuclear-weapon States to ensure a fool-proof verification system for all disarmament agreements. We believe too that it is not by avoiding the problem that we shall find a solution to it. We must explore all avenues and seek new initiatives. In this regard, my delegation finds the idea of a verification team manned by a cluster of neutral (and may we add, non-aligned) States, put across recently by Ambassador Edouard Brunner, Secretary of State at the Swiss Department for Foreign Affairs, to be extremely interesting.

CD/PV.298

pp.11-12

UK/Luce

12.3.85

CW

A lot of work remains to be done especially in the vital field of the verification needed to provide assurance to each Party that others are complying fully with the Convention. My Government believes that confidence in the Convention as a whole needs to be sustained by a confirmation of several mutually reinforcing systems of verification. The task is a daunting one but I believe that solutions can and will be found. I welcome the broad agreement already reached on several aspects. First, it is common ground that assurance of compliance must in the last resort be provided by a system of fact-finding, including on-site inspection on request. Last year I tabled a paper, CD/431, on this issue of verification by challenge.

However, it is also accepted that this form of challenge inspection should be only a safety net. It could not, and should not act as the main system of verification. The vast majority of inspections -- indeed, we must hope the totality of inspections -- should be carried out by routine and regular means. There is, I believe, a consensus in this Conference on the relationship between routine and challenge inspection which I have outlined. This systematic routine supervision, including continuous on-site inspection, must cover the destruction of stockpiles and dismantling of chemical weapons factories.

Thirdly, it is agreed that as another element of routine verification there must be a permanent system of routine inspection of those sectors of the chemical industry making substances which might be diverted from civil use to the illicit manufacture of chemical weapons. My predecessor, Mr. Douglas Hurd, tabled detailed proposals on this non-production aspect in March 1983 in document CD/353. That paper asked other delegations to provide data on the production in their countries of certain chemicals known as "key precursors", compounds that can be used to make chemical weapons. We are grateful to those delegations who have responded to our request. I hope other delegations will soon follow their example, in order to enable informed negotiation on this aspect of the Convention. In the light of the information provided, the United Kingdom delegation presented a further paper on 10 July 1984 (CD/514) which classified chemical warfare agents and their precursors according to the perceived risk that they would pose to the Convention.

On each issue, proposals from different quarters are on the table. At this point, I must express my disappointment that the draft Convention (CD/500) tabled last April by the Vice-President of the United States has not given a greater impetus to the negotiations. This comprehensive piece of work provides an admirable basis for negotiation, and the Conference has not yet done it justice. Some delegations have criticized it, and particularly aspects of its verification provisions. But those delegations have not come forward with serious alternatives of their own. All agree on the need for a high degree of assurance that parties are complying with their obligations. There is now another need: for concentrated and detailed application. There will be no lack of effort on the part of my Government.

Today I have pleasure in introducing a further British paper, CD/575, relating to the verification of non-production. It makes specific proposals for a system of routine inspection of industrial plants making or handling substances identified as posing a high risk to the Convention. The paper also contains specific proposals for an international exchange of data on the production and transfer of a wider range of substances, some of which have actually been used as chemical warfare agents. This paper builds on the earlier British papers to which I have referred and on the relevant section of the United States draft Convention. I believe that it now offers a firm basis for a system of verification of non-production of chemical weapons which would complement the system of challenge inspection. Moreover, by creating a situation which should give rise to the minimum of suspicions that a party was misusing its civil chemical facilities for the manufacture of chemical weapons, I believe that it would ease the burden on the system of challenge inspection.

As I said earlier, challenges should be very few and far between. The fewer and the further apart, the better for the Convention. And the more robust the routine inspection régime, the less need to invoke the challenge procedures. In that sense, the details of these latter procedures need to be fitted into the broader picture of the routine arrangements. In the jigsaw of the Convention, the pieces for challenge may be the hardest to place. Let us therefore ease our task by building up the rest of the puzzle with agreement on the routine elements.

I would emphasize that it is not my Government's intention to hinder the manufacture or use of chemicals for civil, peaceful purposes. Our sole aim is to provide confidence that no party could exploit its civil chemical industry for the clandestine production of chemical weapons. Our paper draws where appropriate on the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which performs a similar function in the nuclear field. Of course, there are many important differences, which we have endeavoured to take into account. The ideas contained in our paper have been discussed with representatives of the chemical industry in the United Kingdom, who recognize the need for routine inspection. They have co-operated with the British Government considering how to ensure adequate verification without compromising commercially confidential information or hampering industrial activity. We believe that our proposals take due account of these problems. We hope that they will be of benefit to other delegations both for discussions in this Conference and for consultations with their national chemical industries.

This paper also touches on the role of the organization responsible for implementing this Convention. This organization should play a significant role in creating a new type of verifiable arms control agreement. It could also help to promote a positive climate for greater international co-operation between States Parties in the expansion and development of a safe chemical industry throughout the world. My delegation would be pleased to join others in studying this aspect further.

CD/PV.298

pp.17-18

Finland/Torrudd

12.3.85

CTB,
OS,CW

It is often argued that a complete test ban could not at present be sufficiently verifiable. Yet, important technical and scientific research has been made in respect of verification. Valuable work is carried out multi-laterally by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. A technical test of international seismic data exchange was successfully conducted by the Ad Hoc group in October-December 1984, with Finnish participation. Our experience of this test is positive. We look forward towards continued co-operation in this field.

Sophisticated methods for verification exist, and they can be perfected in parallel with the scientific progress. While recognizing the inherent complexity of the problem involved, we consider that it should not become a pretext for not negotiating a treaty on a complete ban of nuclear tests.

Last year a new formula was proposed whereby a step-by-step lowering of the threshold of permitted explosive yields would take place as verification

techniques are improved. We welcome this proposal as a fresh initiative in the present impasse of negotiations. However, this approach raises some important issues of principle relating, inter alia, to the legitimacy of the continuation of smaller nuclear explosions. If, however, such a proposal were to become a part of an agreed framework leading to a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in a not too distant future, it would certainly be useful.

The existing body of regulations concerning arms control in space is clearly incomplete. The issues related to the military applications using outer space for such functions as early warning and verification are not resolved. While the use of satellites for these and civilian purposes increases, a comprehensive legal framework covering their use is missing. Its creation should be supplemented by resolute action to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

Some progress has been made last year with regard to the negotiation of a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty. While we welcome this development, it is to be emphasized that the conclusion of a chemical weapons treaty is a most urgent task of the whole international community. This urgency was underlined by the statement of the United Nations Security Council that chemical weapons had been used in the Iran-Iraq conflict.

Additional efforts should be made in the field of verification of the future treaty. My country has contributed to this work in the past and will continue to do so. Solid scientific knowledge is, we believe, necessary in order to achieve a set of reliable methods for all the various tasks of verification. This will continue to be the focus of the Finnish chemical weapons verification project.

CD/PV.299

pp.7-8

Peru/Cannock

14.3.85

CTB

Some delegations, however, have opposed the start of negotiations leading to a test-ban treaty of this type on the grounds that at present there are no means of verifying compliance with such a ban.

It is true that perhaps the technical means of achieving a perfect verification system perhaps do not exist. It is also the case that, compared with absolute inactivity, the mere fact of setting up an ad hoc Committee on the subject might seem the lesser evil.

First of all, however, can the scientific investigation required to resolve completely the problem of verification actually be carried out by us, the members of this Conference, as our delegations currently stand? It would be much better and more suitable to entrust the task to a group of scientific experts, as has been done on previous occasions with, in our opinion, satisfactory results.

Secondly, can it be said that the solution of the technical issues of verification would be sufficient to make the treaty possible? We have listened to a clear and determined statement by a nuclear-weapon State which considers that a nuclear-test ban is only a long-term objective. Whatever

progress might be achieved in technical aspects during this session (and perhaps during several more sessions in the future), it could not be used for verifying a nuclear-test-ban treaty because there is at least one State which in any case wishes to continue to carry out tests.

In any event, we cannot know whether, in the course of this long term, the increased sophistication of nuclear weapons will not render obsolete the technical studies on verification which could be valid at this time. Lastly, we have no guarantee that mankind will survive in the long term, in the absence of agreements on nuclear disarmament.

On the other hand, the verification of compliance with any disarmament agreement is not solely a technical issue. The installation of automatic verification devices, the admission of international observers in situ, and the imposition of various types of monitoring may solve problems which otherwise would be insoluble. The willingness to accept such means of verification above all requires a political decision.

Since it can hardly be assumed that such a political decision will be taken unilaterally, the obvious conclusion is that an efficient system for verifying compliance with disarmament agreements cannot be achieved without frank negotiation, without a serious undertaking to take into account the interests of all the parties involved, and without each State assuming its responsibilities vis-à-vis the rest and vis-à-vis the international community.

Without such undertakings, without accepting individual and joint responsibilities and without this good faith, any agreement or disarmament will be a mockery, however perfect the existing scientific means of verification.

CD/PV.300

p.27

USA/Lowitz

19.3.85

VER

As stressed in document CD/561, non-compliance with arms control agreements now in force is a matter of crucial importance to my Government. But non-compliance is equally important to the world community. For whatever insistent calls may be issued here and there for sweeping new disarmament measures, often without regard to their verifiability, each of us here knows full well that arms control without confidence in strict compliance by all parties is a contradiction in terms. Such arms control does not add to world stability and security. It directly undermines these goals. Accordingly, the Conference on Disarmament surely has a vital stake in upholding the integrity of arms control agreements currently in force.

CD/PV.301

pp.8-10

Norway/Froysnes

21.3.85

CTB
CW

During the last year a step-by-step approach was suggested in order to arrive eventually at a comprehensive nuclear test ban. According to this strategy transitional arrangements should be agreed, involving the lowering of thresholds of permitted yields in testing. In our view these ideas raise a number of complex questions, not least related to verification. We would

welcome, however a discussion also of this approach to the extent that this may further our final objective which must be a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

During its sessions in 1982 and in 1983 the Conference on Disarmament did some very useful work in its subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban. Norway took part in the subsidiary body and presented two Working Papers on seismic verification of a test ban. The Norwegian Government regrets, however, that the deliberations since 1984 have not resulted in a concrete mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee. We believe that the test ban issue is ill-served by the continued lack of serious consideration in the Conference on Disarmament. This is all the more so as one of the nuclear weapon States -- China -- has now stated that she would be willing to reconsider her position and participate in the work of a committee on this issue.

As the verification issues have proved to be a major problem in connection with a test ban, Norway believes it essential that the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts be given the opportunity to further develop the scientific and technical aspects of a global seismological network. Since its establishment in 1976, Norway has been represented in this expert group and contributed to its work. We consider the third report, which the Group of Seismic Experts presented in March 1984, a significant step forward in the field of seismic verification of a nuclear test ban. In the autumn of 1984 the Group carried out a large-scale data exchange experiment, using the Global Telecommunications System of the World Meteorological Organization. We contributed to the experiment by providing data from the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR). Norwegian scientists will also participate in the evaluation of the results and in reporting to the Conference on Disarmament.

In order to throw further light on the verification aspects of a nuclear test ban I have the honour to invite representatives of both member and observer delegations to the Conference on Disarmament, as well as representatives of the Secretariat, to an international workshop on seismological verification of a comprehensive test ban. This international workshop is to be held in Oslo on 5 and 6 June this year. The invitations including a detailed programme have been distributed today.

The Workshop will be hosted by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and organized by the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) in co-operation with the Norwegian Council on Arms Control and Disarmament. The Workshop will address a number of aspects relevant to seismological verification of a nuclear test ban. In particular, it will include a demonstration of newly established seismological research facility which incorporates some of the most recent technological and scientific advances in seismic array design, instrumentation and data processing. I hope that we shall see many of you at the workshop in Oslo and I will also personally be involved in this arrangement.

Energetic efforts should now be made to prepare a draft convention at the earliest date. An important problem area involves solving the basic procedures for on-site inspections. Another major unsolved question refers to non-production of chemical weapons. Verification of non-production of chemical weapons should in principle be based on routine on-site inspections

and data exchange under the auspices of the Consultative Committee. In this regard we would welcome the detailed proposals put forward by the Minister of State of the United Kingdom, Mr. Luce, in his statement on 12 March and I would add that Norway has already submitted data to the Conference on Disarmament concerning civil uses of key components in the chemical field, or so-called key precursors.

In five days we shall see the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention. In Article IX of the Convention it is stated inter alia that each State Party undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of chemical weapons. The thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly decided on the basis of a Norwegian initiative to hold the second Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva in 1986. The holding of that Review Conference further underlines the urgency of the on-going negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

May I assure you that Norway will continue her research on verification questions relevant to a chemical weapons convention. It is our intention to present a new working paper, based on the results of the research this year, at the second part of the Conference's 1985 session.

CD/PV.301

p.15

USA/Lowitz

21.3.85

VER

The last element of our strategy to prevent war I intend to discuss today is that of adherence to and compliance with existing agreements. We must all be increasingly concerned with the question of compliance with arms control agreements -- both the historical record and what we can learn about the design of new treaties. In this regard, several delegations, including the delegation of the Soviet Union, have questioned the purpose of the statement made on 12 February by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman. The answer is clear. Along with other important points, Mr. Adelman illustrated the difficulties in the United States-Soviet Union relationship raised by the Soviet record on non-compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements. As experience shows, negotiations and agreements do not by themselves foster the will to negotiate further; it is confidence established by mutual compliance with existing agreements that increases the possibilities for progress.

In this forum we must focus, therefore, on the important questions of verification and compliance. Charges and counter-charges of non-compliance attest to the imperfection of the previous efforts. It is essential for the Conference in negotiating new agreements to take into account the effectiveness of existing agreements. We must continue to demand agreements which build confidence instead of sowing suspicion, lest we subvert our own goals.

CD/PV.301

pp.25-28

Belgium/Depasse

21.3.85

CTB,CW

With reference to the verifiability of a comprehensive test ban, my delegation can only share the opinion of our scientific experts who inform us that a nuclear explosion can, with verification techniques as they are now, be so camouflaged as to be interpreted as earthquake activity.

We noted in the statement made by Mrs. Theorin of Sweden at the opening of our session a number of statistics on nuclear tests. We know that all these tests have taken place. We are not sure that there have not been others. Furthermore, we are concerned by the possibility that should a nuclear-test-ban treaty be concluded without an adequate verification system, camouflage methods would make it possible for tests to elude observation and become clandestine. To accept the accuracy of the Swedish statistics it does not necessarily mean that we consider all the problems of verification to have been resolved. We still have very serious doubts on the subject and our doubts are based on scientific opinions. A comparison of scientific opinions seems to us to be the method to follow for considering this question of the verifiability of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

In this connection, my delegation has already pointed out the illogicality of affirming that all tests can be detected with current technology and at the same time not accepting the Japanese proposal to ban all tests above the detectability threshold since if all tests are detectable with current technology, the Japanese proposal leads directly to a comprehensive test ban, and if they are not, as we believe, it would at least lead to the suppression of the 53 tests of the type identified by Sweden in 1984. I consider that this would be a small step -- indeed, a step of considerable importance -- in the right direction.

In short, what we have done is justified by the conviction that scientific and technical work on verification must continue. In our opinion it is neither accurate nor fair to say that the alleged absence of adequate means of verification is only a pretext for developing and improving nuclear weapons. An accusation of this kind does not serve the cause of putting an end to tests. It is the pursuit of an agreement on methods of continuing the work indispensable for this purpose and continuing consultations with the desire to reach a conclusion which would serve this cause. In this regard, my delegation learned with great satisfaction that the People's Republic of China is ready to participate in the work of an ad hoc committee on the nuclear test ban. This is a new factor which should have a positive influence on the progress of our work.

Thirdly, the verification of the non-production of weapons is further hindered by the fact that production and stockpiling can take place relatively discreetly.

As a non-chemical-weapons industrial country which has had the sad privilege of numbering among its soldiers the first victims of chemical weapons, my country attaches primordial importance to the success of our work. It considers that the verification and monitoring of a ban on chemical weapons production is by no means incompatible with the conservation of the conditions for the optimum development of the industry. There are ways and means to be found, some difficulties to be solved, but the obstacles are not insurmountable. It is essential to establish an efficient verification system. We think that it is indispensable that when the convention is signed it should be clearly known that every measure has been taken to ensure that no suspicion of non-observance of the convention can last, and that doubts as to the behaviour of a party can be rapidly dissipated.

That is the price of the credibility of the convention. My delegation particularly appreciates the constructive efforts made to solve this problem of verification and non-production, including the important aspect of verification by challenge. It has noted with great interest the proposals transmitted to our Conference by the United Kingdom Minister of State, Mr. Richard Luce, on 12 March 1985. It regards the United Kingdom Working Paper as an extremely useful contribution to our work.

CD/PV.303

pp.7-13

USA/Lowitz

28.3.85

CW

Last year my own delegation presented a draft convention (document CD/500) which built upon the work already accomplished in the Conference and incorporated a number of new ideas of our own. The convention would provide a complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons without undue interference in the use of chemicals for permitted purposes. To ensure confidence in compliance -- confidence which is essential for an effective ban -- the convention would provide for a system of routine declarations and inspections of key facilities, supplemented by a flexible system for resolving concerns that may arise. It is our view that the types of verification measures contained in the United States draft convention would serve the interests of all countries.

This year, Finland and the United Kingdom have presented carefully elaborated and very constructive Working Papers. We welcome their dedicated work.

There is little doubt that recent violations of the Geneva Protocol are a threat to the integrity of the most venerable of arms control agreements and, in fact, a threat to the foundations of the arms control process itself: the belief that States may find genuine security based on international agreements and law instead of their own armaments. This should be a sobering thought for a conference seeking to negotiate new arms control agreements.

All States need confidence that the treaties they enter into are being complied with. When that confidence is eroded so is the hope we place in an international structure based on law.

Many nations prefer to treat compliance concerns as a matter only for the accuser and the accused. Yet in matters of international security, especially in the nuclear age, there can be no spectators. A State's responsibility for an arms control agreement must not end when it is signed. States cannot remain indifferent when such basic interests as the integrity of present and future treaties are involved: they must take an active role. However, the United States is not asking other nations to choose sides, but only to realize that the allegations are sufficiently troubling -- especially but not exclusively in the area of chemical weapons -- to warrant an active interest in the matter, including a search for resolution of the disputes.

Some States have justified silence by citing their high standards of proof. Indeed, we would agree that the evidence is complex and that the world rarely yields incontrovertible proof. But does this mean that States should

do nothing at all? Would they have those responsible for law enforcement in their own countries refuse even to investigate a case until the courts could guarantee a conviction? Such an approach would yield neither justice nor confidence within a country, and it cannot be expected to provide a stable system of international agreements.

States must realize that there is a direct relationship between the manner in which compliance concerns have been dealt with in the past and the kinds of verification measures in new arms control initiatives. The verification proposals in the United States draft convention are, in part, a direct result of our experience with the international response to our concerns about non-compliance. This experience forms a key part of the background to understanding our proposals.

At the current stage of the negotiations, three issues seem to my delegation to be the keys to progress. One is the declaration of locations of chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities. A second is how to ensure that chemical weapons are not produced under the guise of commercial chemical production. The third is what approach to take to challenge inspection. Today I will briefly recall the approach to each issue proposed in the United States draft convention (CD/500) and elaborated in the statement by my delegation on 23 August 1984.

Regarding the first issue, the United States has proposed that the locations of chemical weapons stocks and of chemical weapons production facilities be declared within 30 days after a State becomes a party to the convention. In our view this is essential for assessment of whether all stocks and facilities have been declared and thus for ensuring confidence in compliance. It is the key not only to assessing the initial declarations, but also to monitoring the declared stocks and facilities until they are destroyed.

On the second issue, the importance of ensuring that the chemical industry is not misused for chemical weapons purposes has been emphasized by Western, Socialist and Group of 21 delegations alike. The United States strongly supports the approach developed by the United Kingdom. Under this approach the level of verification would depend on the level of risk, and unnecessary interference in civil use of chemicals would be avoided.

As for the third issue, an effective compliance mechanism, including challenge inspection, is an essential safety net. It would supplement the system of routine verification, which should be the principal means for ensuring confidence in compliance. My Government, beginning with an assessment of the verification difficulties unique to chemical weapons and the dangers posed by undeclared stocks and sites, has taken the unprecedented step of proposing to open our country to mandatory inspection anywhere, any time. We are proud of this commitment: it was not an easy one to make. Yet it represents in our view the best and most effective way that we know of to deter possible violations -- by ensuring that suspect activities are promptly dealt with.

The Soviet delegation has responded to the United States proposal for "open invitation" challenge inspection. But not constructively. Those who choose to criticize have a responsibility to present an equally effective alternative. But the Soviet delegation has not done so. Furthermore, it has rejected or ignored United States efforts to meet Soviet concerns and continues to misrepresent the United States proposal for propaganda purposes.

The United States delegation has explained in detail the reasons why the locations of chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities must be declared promptly for the convention to be effective. In an effort to meet the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union, the United States is willing to consider the possibility that a party could move its chemical weapons stocks before declaration from their original storage sites in combat units to regional depots.

Since only the regional depots -- and not the combat units -- would contain chemical weapons, only the locations of these depots would have to be declared. Thus, the locations of combat units would not be revealed. The locations of depots would be declared within 30 days after the convention enters into force for the State.

As a second example, with respect to destruction of chemical weapons, the Soviet delegation has insisted that a party be allowed to divert some chemicals to industrial uses. My delegation has not been in favour of this concept. The Soviet delegation has not made clear what would be diverted nor how the peaceful use of the chemical would be verified. However, in an effort to meet the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union, the United States is willing to explore in detail whether a mutually-acceptable solution can be developed which would permit diversion under effective verification.

As a third example, the issue of how to identify so-called "key precursors" has consumed considerable amounts of time and energy. The Soviet position has been that "objective criteria" must be agreed to before lists can be developed. My delegation and others have questioned whether criteria could be established that were not subject to varying interpretation. The United States view has been that efforts should focus on the lists themselves, rather than on abstract and imprecise criteria. However, in an effort to meet the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union, the United States is willing to work in parallel on guidelines for the lists and on the lists themselves. In this way the interests of both sides could be accommodated.

The final example of our co-operative attitude is in the area of challenge inspection. My delegation believes strongly that mandatory, short-notice challenge inspection is essential for an effective chemical weapons ban. It is essential because of the difficulty in distinguishing between permitted and illicit production of chemicals and in establishing confidence that all declared stocks and sites are in fact all the stocks and sites there are.

However, as we have made clear on numerous occasions, we are willing to consider any counterproposal that is designed to meet our concerns. We have never insisted on retaining every jot and tittle of our convention: we have

sought only to satisfy our security concerns. The collective efforts of this body may develop a better, more effective way of meeting these concerns, and we would welcome such a development. Furthermore, in an effort to meet concerns expressed by the Soviet delegation, let me state again that my delegation is prepared to explore means to ensure that all relevant facilities are subject to challenge inspection, regardless of whether they are privately or State-owned.

CD/PV.303 p.23 GDR/Rose 28.3.85 OS

The political decision to do research into space weapons and to develop them must be reversed and turned into the resolve to keep space free of weapons. Such a step would require an agreement to prohibit space-based anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as all types of ground-launched, air-launched and sea-launched weaponry designed to destroy targets in space. What is needed, in other words, is the conclusion of verifiable treaties to prevent an arms race in outer space. Given political will, we are convinced that the issue of verification can be solved adequately.

CD/PV.303 pp.28-29 USSR/Issraelyan 28.3.85 CW

Ambassador Lowitz said: "The Soviet delegation has responded to the United States proposal for 'open invitation' challenge inspection. But not constructively." A question arises in my mind: the United States delegation seems to think that the only possible reaction to a United States proposal is enthusiastic approval, a storm of applause, unconditional acceptance. No, we have not and will not react in such a way, not because this is a United States proposal but because we adopt a serious and critical approach to any proposal. Those proposals which are really constructive and acceptable we accept, and in the case of those which are unacceptable to use we explain our motives in the most detailed manner possible. Let me recall once more that such comments were made by us in connection with the United States proposal concerning "open invitation" challenge inspection and that they can be read on pages 6 to 11 of the Russian text of document CD/PV.280. An English text certainly exists as well. Anyone can look and see why the Soviet delegation cannot accept this United States proposal.

And now my last point. The United States delegation has made an attempt to represent the United States position as being very flexible and constructive and going halfway to meet the positions of other delegations, including the Soviet Union, and the Soviet position as being rigid, stubborn and uncompromising. Is this really so, gentlemen? After all, in politics a State's position is judged not on the basis of self-advertisement but of comparison and of analysis of the development of the attitude of the State in question. And if you compare the position of the United States on the question of prohibition of chemical weapons in 1984 with, say, the position it adopted during the bilateral negotiations in 1976-1980 or even in 1983, you will see it has become more rigid, more unyielding and more unacceptable to many States, including the Soviet Union. Take, for example, the famous proposal on "open invitation" challenge inspection. On the other hand, I challenge any delegation to consider the Soviet Union's and other socialist countries' 1972 draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the 1982 Soviet draft

convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the way our position has moved forward to meet that of other delegations, including the delegation of the United States of America, and they will see whose position is flexible and whose position is unyielding. After all, we have to try to move towards one another, not away from each other. That is the ABC of diplomacy. Those are facts, and facts, Mr. President, are stubborn things, even in diplomacy.

CD/PV.305

pp.12-14

FRG/Genscher

2.4.85

VER,CW

Confidence-building must be a key term in the efforts to introduce a new phase of détente. Disarmament negotiations cannot flourish in an atmosphere of mistrust, slander and aloofness. There is a need for both respect for the legitimate security interests of all concerned and willingness to create confidence through increased transparency and effective verification.

Let me refer in this context to the standardized reporting system that exists in the United Nations for the military expenditure of Member States. Almost all members of the Western alliance and some non-aligned States participate regularly in this system. I repeat my appeal to the members of the Warsaw Pact to contribute to transparency by participating in this reporting system.

Effective verification, too, is indispensable to the creation of confidence. Anyone with nothing to hide can agree to specific verification measures. Anyone rejecting such measures arouses the impression that he may have something to hide.

That applies equally to the United States-Soviet negotiations, to the Stockholm CDE, to the MBFR negotiations in Vienna and to the negotiations here at the Conference on Disarmament. We want to create more confidence by means of more transparency and thus greater predictability.

The open democratic systems of government, through the transparency of their decision-making processes and of their intentions and capabilities, which derives from their underlying philosophy, render an important contribution in terms of security and predictability. But openness and transparency must not remain a one-sided concession. They must be extended if threat perceptions are to be eliminated and if confidence is to increase. Confidence-building requires the fundamental realization that one's own security must not be assured at the cost of the security of others.

The Federal Government attaches central importance to the negotiations on a world-wide agreement outlawing chemical weapons. We have long held the view that every effort must be made to attain a comprehensive, universally applicable and reliably verifiable ban on these weapons 60 years after the conclusion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The reports on the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iraq and Iran have in a horrifying manner confirmed fears regarding the proliferation of chemical weapons. Fresh dynamism and willingness to be flexible are now called for to expedite these negotiations.

Difficult questions in the fields of "on-challenge" inspections, verification of the destruction of stocks and production facilities, and verification of the non-production of chemical weapons are still to be resolved. In its active participation in the work of the Conference in these spheres, my country is the only one that can invoke practical experience of international controls in connection with its pledge not to produce chemical weapons, controls which have been carried out within the Western European Union framework.

This experience has shown that effective verification of the non-production of chemical weapons is possible and can be reasonably expected, even in cases where the country in question has such an extensive and widely diversified chemical industry as the Federal Republic of Germany.

CD/PV.306

pp.13-16

USSR/Israeli

4.4.85

CW

What is today the main obstacle, the main hindrance to the progress of chemical-weapon negotiations? Apparently, the continuing efforts by some of the parties to impose their own approaches and their own selfish perceptions on others. This attitude is utterly unsound. We are convinced that in the search for mutually acceptable solutions, in particular to key problems, one should bear in mind the specific political, economic and defence interests of each party, as well as remember the historical experience of every nation and people. I wish particularly to stress this. Some, and namely the Soviet Union, which has lost dozens of millions of lives as a result of foreign intervention and aggression, have been taught by the hard experience of their history to be especially cautious about various proposals calling for "openness", "publicity", unlimited verification and other dubious ideas. Meanwhile others, who have not had to go through the same ordeals as our people have, are proceeding mainly from the "experience" of petty suspicions, trumped up and blown out of all proportion by their own propaganda.

We were recently told in this chamber that, and I quote, "anyone with nothing to hide can agree to specific verification measures". This is probably true, provided that the one applying such measures acts in good faith and without ulterior motives. But given our historical experience, can we rest assured that such will always be the case?

The distinctive feature of Soviet proposals is precisely that we are not trying to force on others provisions which might impair their national security or inhibit their economy. Let us look, for instance, at the Soviet Union's approach to the question of chemicals used for permitted purposes.

This approach would spare the civilian, commercial chemical industry the considerable burden of intrusive outside verification procedures which would otherwise have extended virtually to each individual enterprise. At the same time, for the purposes of the convention, we feel obliged to propose several specific restrictions on the operations of chemical industries. We are suggesting that the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals should be restricted, as well as that of one particular class of substances which poses the greatest threat while having almost no peaceful uses -- namely the methyl-phosphorus compounds. Such restrictions could not do any significant damage to any party to the future convention. We would like to recall in this

connection that limitations on the production of certain chemicals are not completely unusual. It is common knowledge that pesticides are not nearly as dangerous to humans as are supertoxic lethal chemicals. Yet the production of some pesticides is actually subject to definite restrictions.

Indeed, do the peaceful branches of chemical industry in fact depend on supertoxic lethal chemicals as greatly as is sometimes portrayed by certain delegations? Would it not be wiser to consider including in the convention a provision allowing for such amendments with regard to supertoxic lethal chemicals and methyl-phosphorus compounds as may be required in view of scientific and technological developments and industrial needs for the future?

The other approach, which is not ours, is that of extending verification to all chemical industries, which would, in our view, be unpracticable and could most adversely affect the economic activities of States.

This has been only further proved to us by the Working Papers of the United Kingdom (CD/514 and CD/575) which reveal under close scrutiny that their authors would like to make hundreds and even thousands of different chemicals subject to all kinds of rigorous monitoring, which would be all-embracing rather than focused on the most dangerous technological stages of production. Now is this actually feasible?

One might properly ask what would be less burdening for the chemical industry -- a certain number of reasonable restrictions or an expensive across-the-board monitoring whose implications for the economic and other interests of States might prove to be far from benign?

During the negotiations some delegations suggest totally different régimes to be adopted for the very same chemicals. While for protective purposes supertoxic lethal chemicals could be produced only at a small-scale specialized facility in quantities up to one tonne per year and subject to the most stringent international control, their production for other permitted purposes would be allowed anywhere and in unlimited quantities. A convention based on such proposals, while eliminating the present industrial base for chemical-weapons production, could end up establishing all the prerequisites for the creation of a new, more advanced and sophisticated one. We cannot accept such a double standard for ensuring the non-production of chemical weapons. This must not be allowed. The Soviet delegation believes that a study of Finland's proposal on possible versions of the small-scale facility could be of some use in dealing with this issue.

Proposals from other delegations aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions receive our careful consideration. This applies in particular to the proposals of France concerning the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals, classification of facilities and determination of their respective régimes, and solution of the binary weapons problem, as well as proposals by the delegation of China and by other delegations.

The elaboration of principles and arrangements for challenge inspection to clarify ambiguous situations has been and remains one of our most formidable tasks. No one is suggesting, as the United States delegation is trying

to make it appear, that challenge inspection should not be conducted unless there is a proved violation of the convention. At least this is not our position. What we do believe is that challenge inspection requires a particular sense of responsibility and political realism on the part of States. It must be understood that compliance with the convention will be based primarily on the goodwill of the States parties to it, on their wish for a peaceful world less burdened by arms race, and on their desire to eliminate the very means of waging chemical war. It will also be based on the fact that States, which usually set a high value on their political prestige will not allow it to be damaged through their own fault.

This is the only approach that can help us place challenge inspection in a proper perspective within the convention and correctly formulate the relevant provisions without eroding the very purpose of such inspection or undermining the sovereign rights of States. It should be well understood in Washington that efforts to make challenge inspection mandatory and automatic will only waste our time in working out the convention. Our response to such proposals is unambiguously negative.

In this connection I would like to make the following point of principle which does not concern only the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As is well known, the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament indicates that the form and the terms of verification provided for in any particular agreement depend on the purposes, the scope and the nature of that agreement. Applied to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons which is now being drawn up, this obviously means that the form and the terms of verification must be such as to reliably ascertain whether the convention is being complied with, on the one hand, and not to go beyond its scope, on the other. Hence we cannot but object to forms of verification that could be used for purposes beyond those of the convention.

Prohibition of chemical weapons by no means requires such things as providing access to facilities which produce the types of weapons not affected by the agreement in question. It is therefore only natural that if we are to approach the task of banning chemical weapons seriously, verification procedures have to be drawn up that could not be abused to interfere in the activities of States not covered by the convention which bans one specific type of weapon of mass destruction.

We have repeatedly emphasized that general and complete verification can be discussed only at the stage of general and complete disarmament, whereas attempts to impose general and complete verification as part of a limited agreement banning one specific, although important, type of weapon of mass destruction -- namely chemical weapons -- is to raise artificial obstacles in the way of working out such an agreement.

CD/PV.306

pp.25-28

Canada/Beesley

4.4.85

CTB,CW

On the vital issue of a nuclear test ban, Canada advocated the re-establishment of a subsidiary body to expedite and crystalize efforts to resolve the problems relating to the practical aspects of verification and compliance.

This, as we see it, is a first step towards accelerating progress toward a treaty. Even in the absence of an agreed mandate, it is important to note that the international seismic-data exchange exercise last fall is an example of an undramatic event which, when results are analyzed, can contribute to real progress towards a nuclear test ban treaty. This experiment was conducted with a genuine spirit of co-operation among more than 30 countries. It produced a considerable amount of useful information which will allow the seismic group to further refine the seismic data exchange procedures described in its earlier reports to the Conference on Disarmament. The seismic group began its assessment of this experiment last week and has identified a significant amount of work yet to be done to complete the evaluation. This work and that on other issues of verification and compliance must, we suggest, continue, whatever the procedural decisions we make.

At the United Nations General Assembly we supported -- and indeed co-sponsored -- a resolution urging the Conference on Disarmament to take steps for the establishment as soon as possible of an international seismic monitoring network to monitor nuclear explosions and to determine the capabilities of such a network for monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Such a proposal goes to the heart of the disagreement we know of, as to whether a test ban could be verified. The resolution also urged the Conference on Disarmament to initiate detailed investigation of other measures to monitor and verify compliance with such a treaty, including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity.

Our expectation is that some further progress on these important questions is possible at this very session. However, the problem of a nuclear test ban will not be solved if we simply stop there. For Canada, the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty remains a fundamental Canadian objective. That is why the General Assembly resolution which we co-sponsored urged the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish at the beginning of its 1985 session and ad hoc committee to resume immediately its substantive work relating to a comprehensive test ban, -- but including now the issue of scope as well as those of verification and compliance, -- with a view to negotiation of a treaty. Thus the draft mandate for an ad hoc subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban as proposed by Canada and other Western delegations (CD/521) would significantly widen the nuclear test ban mandates as already agreed to in 1982 and 1983, by including the issue of scope. Here too, an attempt has been made, however modestly, to expand the area of common ground, and this is an example of an issue on which we can build and expand upon what was already accepted earlier, through a series of incremental realistic steps. Now, some may argue that even such an expanded mandate is unacceptable because it represents the lowest common denominator or even less. But we have to start somewhere, we do operate on the basis of consensus, if we are to progress toward a comprehensive test ban. I wonder, had we done so last year, whether we might now be a little closer to our objective of a total test ban.

Nearly a year ago in this chamber, I expressed Canada's support for a step-by-step approach to a nuclear test ban, both on procedure and substance: but let us first agree on a mandate. We should then seek to establish a common understanding on one crucial area, which is for many a pre-condition to further progress, namely the effectiveness of existing means of verifying an agreement. We are aware, for instance, that views differ on whether existing

technology is adequate to detect nuclear testing, but setting up an ad hoc committee would help us to determine whether or not this is the case. Then we can move on to the next agreed priority area. Clearly, negotiations must be our objective -- certainly that is the Canadian position -- but the necessary foundation for concrete negotiations can and should first be laid. This is the process we have followed in our work on chemical weapons with some measure of success. It is also the process we have now agreed to which I hope we follow, on outer space. On this issue, that process may require flexibility from some delegations, but if it could be accepted as the minimal common ground, we can begin work immediately.

Clearly, we are at a stage in the negotiations where we must address certain critical issues relating to verification. To delegations opposed to a discussion of the conceptual aspects of verification in isolation from concrete issues, let me say that we see too little indication of much willingness to come to grips by one means or another with the essential requirement of verification. For example, agreement must be found on procedures for the inspection of stockpile and production sites upon declaration at entry into force of the convention, which implies agreement on the principle of such inspection. How else can we be assured that the production sites are sealed and no longer active until they are destroyed? While the concept of continuous inspection during the destruction of existing chemical weapons has been generally accepted, similar agreement has eluded us on monitoring the destruction of the means of production. The issue of challenge verification must be addressed objectively, and I have listened with great interest to the important statement just delivered by the distinguished representative of the USSR which touched on that very issue. I think that what are needed are proposals, and we know that the United States delegation has taken the initiative in putting forward proposals outlining its views in detail on these issues. Without directing criticism at other delegations, we do think that those who see matters differently should be prepared to table their own proposals on possible alternative approaches, updated proposals from earlier ones if necessary, so that the process of real negotiation may move forward. The first step obviously is to address the issues, and this does now seem to be occurring; but the second, I would hope, would be the tabling of relevant proposals or counter-proposals, bearing in mind the present state of negotiations.

CD/PV.306

pp.37-38

USA/Barthelemy

4.4.85

CTB

The United States, along with many other nations, has committed significant resources in support of the work of the Group of Scientific Experts. It has done so because of the important contribution that the efforts of the Group of Scientific Experts make to our own work under agenda item one, nuclear test ban.

We need to develop the technical capabilities and understanding that support the international exchange of seismic data, an exchange that is necessary for the global monitoring of the underground environment under a future nuclear test ban. In this endeavour, the Group of Scientific Experts has been, and continues to be, a unique resource. The technical test is clear

testimony to the fact that the Group is continuing to make significant progress in drawing on the talents of the global seismic community to develop procedures for data collection, exchange and processing.

The 1984 technical test was planned by the Group of Scientific Experts to provide experience in handling and exchanging seismic data on an international basis. Its aim was to develop and test procedures for regular transmission of so-called Level I data over the global telecommunication system of the World Meteorological Organization. This exercise allowed tests of procedures for extracting Level I parameters at the national level. These were, in turn, transmitted to the Experimental International Data Centres and reprocessed for preparation of seismic event bulletins, testing the procedures for both communications and event bulletin preparation.

How well did the technical test succeed in carrying out these fundamental tasks? My delegation is encouraged to learn that the Group of Scientific Experts is proceeding with a thorough evaluation of the technical test that will provide us with a completed answer to this question. A remarkable amount of information in national reports has been contributed in support of this evaluation -- some 1,000 pages of documents, as Dr. Dahlman reported. We are also pleased to note the large number of additional countries that have taken part in the test. We believe that this increased level of participation will provide a more realistic assessment of the capabilities for international seismic data exchange. In this connection, we note the contribution to the technical test made by France in providing seismic data, and the participation of China in the 19th meeting of the Group of Scientific Experts. We look forward to increased co-operation from them in the Group and would welcome additional participants from the global seismic community.

My delegation looks forward to receiving the full report of the results of the technical test and to reviewing the conclusions the Group of Scientific Experts will draw from it. The United States is prepared to work diligently toward this end. It is disappointing, therefore, to learn that the Group will again be able to meet for only one week this summer, as it was constrained to do this spring. We understand that the experts from the Soviet Union were unwilling to agree to the normal two-week session. The unavoidable consequence will be a delay in the completion of the Group's report, a delay which is regrettable in light of the importance we all attach to receiving a thorough and complete report in a timely fashion.

My delegation also regrets that there were participants in the technical test who evidently elected not to report seismic data originating from nuclear explosions. We need to recall, in this regard, that the purpose of an eventual operational data exchange system is to provide participants with the capability to detect and identify seismic events. A number of nuclear explosions took place during the data collection period, and signals from these seismic events were widely recorded and reported. The technical test was conducted under procedures that were agreed upon by the Group of Scientific Experts prior to the test. A failure to report all seismic signals that would have been observed at a seismic station is, consequently, difficult to understand. In addition, seismic signals originating from nuclear explosions that had been reported by other participating countries were not processed by the Experimental International Data Centre operated by the Soviet Union during the test. This failure is disquieting and, unfortunately, raises

questions about the value of undertakings by the Soviet Union, not only in this matter but in larger matters as well.

Despite such disappointments, the preliminary results of the Ad Hoc Group's technical test are encouraging. Not only was a large amount of data exchanged and processed, but matters requiring future, concentrated work to improve the performance of a global exchange were identified. We shall therefore eagerly await the Group of Scientific Experts' report of its analysis, and particularly its recommendations for further work to enhance the performance of a global seismic data exchange system.

CD/PV.306

p.39

Japan/Imai

4.4.85

CTB

According to the progress report, we understand that the technical test which was conducted from 15 October to 14 December 1984 has produced very useful and interesting results and provided information about seismic data transmission. My delegation, as the one which took the initiative in formulating the arrangement with the World Meteorological Organization for the regular use of the GTS, is much pleased to see the great number of seismograph stations and countries which participated in this exercise and produced results. We wish to take this opportunity to express our appreciation through you Mr. President, to the WMO for the co-operation which the Ad Hoc Group has enjoyed during the test. We also appreciate the considerable efforts expended by Dr. McGregor of Australia on the over-all co-ordination of the test.

Noting, in the report, that the Group has collected and compiled a large amount of information and experience through the test in truly global context, we do hope that the Group will further analyze and evaluate them appropriately and thoroughly so that the report to be finally presented to the Conference will contain useful suggestions for action. The direction of the work of the Ad Hoc Group seems very encouraging in terms also of our own in-house activities to determine the cost effectiveness of upgrading the world seismic network and its data transmission capabilities as a multilateral verification system within the context of a nuclear test ban.

In this respect, we believe that the Conference should approve the continuation of the Group's work as suggested in the progress report.

The Group of Scientific Experts will be meeting again in the summer to further refine the analysis of the results, and to continue their works of evaluation. It will be very useful if the outcome of such evaluation will lead to added activities in terms of refinement of the global seismic observation network, as well as to refined technology in seeking unique correlation between seismic observation and the energy released from the event concerned. This will most likely involve the appropriate and efficient exchange of Level II data.

Next, I would like to look at how we are to define chemical weapons. My country would consider it to be most desirable if chemicals used exclusively for weapons purposes were to be identified and listed together with related munitions as substances to be prohibited under this convention. For the purpose of declaration, elimination and other controls, it is essential to start with a clearly defined list of chemicals. However, if it were to prove difficult to achieve general consensus on this approach, we consider it inevitable to follow the present understanding and rely on general-purpose criteria for defining chemical weapons. A certain difficulty accompanies this latter approach because a definition in this manner depends on a set of criteria for achievement of objectivity of judgement.

I have already pointed out, particularly during my intervention at a plenary in July 1983, that a definition on the basis of general-purpose criteria may call for a very difficult verification of the specific "intent" in regard to the material in question. It means that great care should be exercised so that an undue burden will not fall upon normal industrial activities through the process of inquiry into the reasons why various activities are conducted in chemical industries. We deem it necessary to include an explicit provision in recognition of this danger in the operative or pre-ambular part of the convention, and intend to present our ideas in more definite form to the Ad Hoc Committee in due course.

I should like to mention here that in looking for suitable verification technology to monitor chemical-weapons related facilities, especially facilities for elimination, it would be relevant to consider the application of what the IAEA utilizes as a reliable remote sensor technology in the implementation of safeguards. This is known as RECOVER, and I would like to present a working paper in due course introducing an example of this technology as applied to verification of a chemical weapons convention.

With regard to protective purposes, Japan is able to support the following two points, namely: that the production of super-toxic lethal and related chemicals for protective purposes should take place in a single specialized facility and in no case should the gross total of such chemicals exceed one ton; and that this specialized facility should be submitted to routine international on-site verification.

As regards peaceful purposes, such as industrial, agricultural, research, medical and other activities, language should be elaborated which takes due account of the guiding principle already agreed to previously, namely that States Parties to this convention undertake not to create any impediments to such peaceful activities.

There have been a number of proposals regarding the effective monitoring of the production and other related activities with regard to specific chemicals which might possibly hinder the attainment of the objectives of the convention. These measures are important means to enhance confidence amongst

the States Parties in the implementation of the convention. The basic approach which Japan supports with regard to this is as follows. First, specific chemicals to be put on the list of material to be so monitored should be defined as clearly as possible by giving the exact scientific name and, where necessary, the chemical formula. Second, the number of chemicals to be included in such a list should be kept to the bare minimum, but the list should be subjected to periodic review after the entry into force of the convention. Third, the list should start with super-toxic lethal chemicals used exclusively for weapons purposes, and go on to their immediate precursors which have little peaceful applications. I realize that whether we can agree to the above as the criteria to define a key precursor is something to be elaborated through future negotiations.

With respect to precursors other than those mentioned above and the so-called dual purpose substances, a great deal of care is required in their identification and listing because many of them are widely produced and used for peaceful purposes. It would seem extremely difficult to determine clearly and objectively whether a given chemical in this category was intended for peaceful purposes or for military purposes, whereas given our free market economy, we would be unable to accept undue restrictions on normal industrial production. This fact must always be borne in mind in all considerations to include these chemicals in the list and place them under some kind of control.

I wish now to turn to matters concerning verification, and especially how we are to provide for on-site inspection. It would seem to us to be most practical if the final details of on-site inspection of the individual facilities were to be worked out in the form of supplementary agreements between the States concerned and the Consultative Committee or its subsidiary organ following the entry into force of the convention. However, in order to provide for a smooth functioning of the convention from the very beginning, and further, to ensure a non-discriminatory and fair application to all States Parties, it would be preferable that agreed rules or guidelines to this end be developed and annexed to the convention as an integral part thereof. Since it is conceivable that peaceful industrial activities are included in on-site inspections in the course of implementation of the convention, especially where a challenge is involved, provisions should be included therein to protect industrial proprietary information and other industrial property.

Next, I would like to talk about procedures regarding compliance. On-going discussions on implementation indicate various modes for consultation and co-operation between parties, as well as fact-finding conducted under the supervision of the Consultative Committee or of its subsidiary body as the means of resolving all matters related to the implementation of the convention. Much ground has already been covered in previous work of the Ad Hoc Committee in this regard, which we hope will provide for an early agreement on principles.

With regard to the formulation of fact-finding arrangements and to its time-frame, there is a tendency to place emphasis on the element of speed. I should like to take this opportunity to present our comments in this regard.

We feel that the situation calling for prompt reaction is one in which suspicion has arisen with regard to possible chemical weapons use. There can also be problems of clandestine facilities and clandestine activities which call for prompt action. These two categories represent serious violations so that somewhat unusual procedures may be justified.

With regard to those facilities which are subject to routine international on-site inspection, we feel that challenge verification can be justified, in the form of a special inspection, when data transmitted from on-site instrumentation etc. indicate irregularities. The procedure for such special inspection should be set out in an annex to the convention.

Regardless of whether or not a certain facility is required to provide information under the convention on its activities, it is possible that a question might arise regarding diversion of chemicals from peaceful to military purposes. One can argue about a system of on-site inspection to provide for timely detection. On the other hand, excessive exercise of this right could create undue difficulty for the normal operation of the world's peaceful chemical industry. There are also practical limitations arising from availability of inspection resources. Therefore, with regard to suspicion concerning the activities of the peaceful civilian industry, the State concerned should first be given the opportunity to present information and explanation in order to clarify the situation. Only when doubts persist, would it be advisable to move on to other means of verification including procedural safeguards to prevent arbitrary exercise of requests for on-site inspection in advance, before deciding definitively as to what chemicals are to be included in the list, what their significant quantities are, what level of confidence one requires. This will give a very useful sensitivity analysis regarding the cost/effectiveness of chemical weapons verification.

CD/PV.307

pp.11-12

USSR/Prokofiev

11.4.85

CTB

.... The representative of the United States saw fit to use the issue of the technical test to slander the Soviet Union. The USSR delegation utterly and completely rejects these insinuations as yet another element in the propaganda ballyhoo raised by the United States about alleged "violations by the Soviet Union of its international obligations". We have already explained the goals pursued by the United States and the methods it uses to blow up this regular anti-Soviet campaign in our statements of 12 and 28 February of this year in connection with the statement of Mr. Edelman and document CD/561 circulated by the United States delegation. These comments fully apply also to the United States statement of 4 April. As regards the substance of the issue raised by the representative of the United States, we should like to remind him that the Soviet experts have already given appropriate explanations on this score in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. Was the United States representative aware of these explanations? I think that he was, and nevertheless thought it necessary to raise this question in a plenary meeting of the Conference for polemical purposes. It is therefore clear that what we have here is not an attempt to elucidate the facts but a desire to complicate the work both of the Conference and of the Group of Seismic Experts.

CD/PV.307

p.13

GDR/Rose

11.4.85

CTB

Today my delegation would like to comment briefly on the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The progress report of its nineteenth session has been submitted to us in document CD/583.

First of all, I want to thank Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, for his introduction to the progress report. His observations, as well as the report itself, make amply clear how much work is still required in order to evaluate the results of the technical test conducted last year. My delegation agrees to the organizational measures the Group has embarked upon in an effort to accomplish the tasks assigned to it. Without prejudice to the results the work of the Group will yield, we can already now infer that last year's test was valuable and successful. Its evaluation will enhance our knowledge about the procedures regarding the exchange and analysis of the so-called Level I data.

At the same time, my delegation wishes to stress, however, that the Group's activities must not be an end in itself. Rather, the Group was set up to facilitate the job of the Conference on Disarmament which, according to item 1, consists in negotiating as a matter of highest urgency a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests.

The fact that more countries took part in the test, that the participating nations assumed an immense workload to carry out the full test programme and that the participants spent considerable sums of money is not just an expression of purely scientific interest, but makes it perfectly plain how anxious many members of the international community are to get protected by a CTB Treaty. And their number is growing rather than diminishing.

CD/PV.307

pp.15-16

FRG/Wegener

11.4.85

CTB

As far as we gather from the progress report and from the oral contributions of the experts, the test run has been successfully concluded, and that is particularly valuable since we are all aware of the close connection between the work of the Ad Hoc Group and our own efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty.

At a time when weapons technology and testing technology evolve rapidly a reliable verification system for a CTB -- has a heightened importance, especially if we visualize the dangers at such period of dynamic weapons technology -- that could result from one-sided breaches of the future treaty for the security of all participating States and for international stability in general.

The test run has examined essential components of a future observation and verification system on the basis of seismic technology. These components comprise the extraction of Level I data, the transmission of these data over the WMO network to international data centres, and the establishment and distribution of seismic event bulletins. Only the full report will demonstrate to us the degree to which problems are solved. It will, no doubt, also highlight the weak spots, the grey areas, even the deficiencies, of the

presently existing system. In this connection we will have to focus specifically on the following problem areas: The quantity of the Level I data that are extracted by routine operation and the necessity to see them supplemented in future by Level II data.

Another area of concern is the problem of non-reception. We will find out at the appropriate time whether the quantity of messages transmitted and received by the WMO network could be raised above the level of 86 per cent achieved in a former partial test run. On the basis of that answer we will have to analyze the reasons for partial non-reception. Another problem area concerns the standardization of seismic data both in terms of their format and the contents. Have the problems of standardization been adequately solved? Then, has the test run demonstrated that all International Data Centres reported on an identical number of seismic events or were there significant variations? To what extent were there seismic signals which could not be associated with a particular event? Another issue is to what extent have differing levels of technological development in the participating countries lead to problems?

The answers to these questions -- and there are many others -- will allow us to assess the degree of reliability of present seismological verification systems and will point us to the need for further improvement. It is obvious that only partial or incomplete participation in the test run works to the detriment of the capability of the test run to produce meaningful results. In this connection it should be carefully examined to what degree the non-transmission of data on nuclear test explosions was compatible with the agreed rules of the game.

We welcome the intention of the Ad Hoc Group to submit a full and final report and we hope that at least some of the questions I have raised can be adequately answered in that report. We also hope, although with some doubt, that the one week in July when the Ad Hoc Group will again meet for a shortened session, will be enough to provide us with a truly comprehensive report that meets rigorous scientific standards and corresponds with the considerable work that has been put into the project.

We should note that a certain number of other important components of a future verification system have not been addressed by the present format of the test run. Among these there are the problems posed by differing systems and technologies for the discovery of seismic events. Equally, the test has not focused methods for the precise localization of events, especially for depth assessment. There are outstanding problems in connection with the identification of nuclear explosions in contrast with other seismic events. And, of course, there is a continuing need for methods for the assessment of nuclear test yields in connection with existing and future testing threshold arrangements. It is obvious that all these pose unsolved questions and therefore an intensive continuation of the work both in the direct framework of this Conference and in the framework of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts is imperative. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany will attempt to make its contribution to the solution of these issues. We hope that the Ad Hoc Group will continue, and that it will soon receive the possibility to gain further insight by means of an amplified and longer test run that will help it to implement improvements that are still necessary.

I would like to speak briefly on a subject that has been addressed several times this morning, that is, the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, the nineteenth report, that was given to us in document CD/583. The Australian approach to the work of that group is based on the fact that we attach immense priority importance to the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear tests. In that context one of the proposals that has been made by the Foreign Minister of Australia, before this Conference last August, was that the Conference on Disarmament should proceed to establish a seismological network that would enable us to monitor and verify compliance with a comprehensive test ban treaty. It is in this sense, then, that the work of the Ad Hoc Group is very significant. It is participated in by 17 member States of this Conference, and 5 non-member States have also joined in the work. It has had, as the nineteenth report demonstrates, contributions submitted to it by no less than 26 States. It is in this sense too that I was slightly puzzled to hear our colleague from the German Democratic Republic feel it necessary to say that this work is not an end in itself. I don't know whoever raised that question, but certainly from the point of view of my delegation this is important work, it is participated in by the number and range of States that I have just referred to, and I think we all understand that the work is a significant step, not an end in itself, on the way towards seismological verification of a nuclear test ban treaty. In the view of my delegation that is no small thing. It is something which deserves support from all of us.

Last week Dr. Dahlman, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, introduced the Nineteenth Progress Report of the Group, and that is the report given in document CD/583. We were very pleased to see that such a constructive start had been made by the Group on the very important task of preparing the report on the results of the technical tests which were carried out towards the end of last year. The report notes that considerable further work will be required by the Group to compile a comprehensive or final report and to evaluate the technical tests. That work will be vital to enable us to assess fully how well the test has worked, how well it has succeeded, in meeting its stated objectives. Now, there is no doubt that the test was a considerable undertaking and it involved a very heavy burden of work, particularly for the seismological and meteorological institutions in many countries. Indeed the report tells us that there were some 79 such seismological institutions connected to the test and so I certainly want to express on behalf of my delegation the deep appreciation that we have felt, and it is easy to say this I suppose, for the work of a countryman, for the work carried out by Dr. Peter McGregor, who co-ordinated the test. We think that the sort of co-operation that was brought about was itself a reflection of one of the fundamental features of how the Ad Hoc Group itself operates, and we want to see that continue. We would also like to express appreciation to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, Dr. Ola Dahlman, and to the Scientific Secretary, Dr. Ringdahl. Their efforts contributed sharply to the ongoing success of the work of the Ad Hoc Group.

Now, while a conclusive assessment of the success of the test will have to await the final report, our impression already, at this stage, is that the test has met its objectives. As the distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany has just pointed out, questions are still being answered,

related issues need further clarification. But we would like to state that there is no doubt in our minds that it is already clear that the test has met its objectives. It is already clear that the experience which has been acquired during the test will contribute significantly to further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the global system envisaged by that group, and may I repeat -- the global system -- the construction of which and bringing into existence of which, is something for which my Foreign Minister has called personally.

We were also pleased to see that such a large number of countries participated in the test -- there were 38 countries -- and that such a voluminous amount of information on national experiences has been presented to the Ad Hoc Group in the form of some 50 working documents. So I hope that the importance which Australia attaches to the work of the Ad Hoc Group is shared, as I think it is, by an increasing number of countries. In this context I must mention a very positive development that on this occasion, this year, China joined the work of the Ad Hoc Group. In the nineteenth report we are told by the Ad Hoc Group that for the completion of this work it requires to meet again and has asked that this Conference approve a proposal that it meet from 15 to 19 July for that purpose. I certainly want to make it clear that my delegation unhesitatingly supports that proposal and would hope that the Conference will do the same.

CD/PV.308

pp.14-15

Sri Lanka/Dhanapala

16.4.85

CTB

.... The predecessor body of the Conference on Disarmament negotiated on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests from 1958 when a moratorium was observed for some time. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, while being a significant step, is also an example of one of the lost opportunities in the history of disarmament negotiations. We are still 22 years later unable to come as close to a CTB as we did then. It is not my intention to analyze the causes for that diplomatic failure. The point of disagreement was over verification of underground tests and this remains so despite the major advances in the field of seismic technology.

My delegation would like, at this point, to compliment the professionally thorough and patient work undertaken by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. We have noted the latest progress report of the Ad Hoc Group in document CD/583 and welcome the conduct of the successful data-exchange experiment using the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization. It is an inspiring example of international co-operation, apart from being a serious demonstration of the existing and potential scope for a verification system to monitor the discontinuation of all test explosions for all time. We are also grateful to the kind invitation extended to all delegations in the Conference by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to participate in the International Workshop on Seismological Verification of a CTB to be held in Oslo on 5 and 6 June. We are sure this will be a useful experience in the present context of our discussion of this issue.

We would also like to welcome the statement of Ambassador Qian Jiadong of 19 February announcing the readiness of the delegation of China to participate in the work on NTB in this Conference if a subsidiary body is established for

this purpose. These are encouraging signs. But the overwhelming mood surrounding this issue in the Conference has been regrettably negative. During the frustrating stalemate on a CTB which has existed since 1963 a number of measures have been adopted. The unratified Treaties on the Threshold Test Ban, and the PNE, limiting explosions to a yield of 150 kilotons each, and more recent proposals to peg the threshold to what is perceived to be the available means of technical verification are among them. My delegation is concerned that these measures or "step-by-step" approaches however well-intentioned could in fact be repetitions of the lost opportunity of 1963. Expediency is not political realism. It is wrong-headed and premature to agree on measures that are less than what is desirable and possible. We must not seek to legitimize some testing when the all-important task is to ban all testing. Equally we must not allow the present technological capabilities exclusively to chart the course of disarmament. Despite these reservations we agree that these proposals must be discussed fully. We cannot preclude any approach to solve the problem before us. Any ad hoc committee must consider all existing proposals and future initiatives relevant to the subject.

My delegation in its statement on 5 March had occasion to welcome the bilateral talks between the United States and the USSR expressing cautious optimism over this development. The subject of a CTB is clearly not on the agenda of these talks. The failure to resume the trilateral negotiations since it recessed in 1980 is another reason to question the good faith of the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in seeking an end to vertical proliferation. It is agreed that a CTB is the first and most urgent step towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race but we remain in a state of inaction in taking practical steps towards it. It has been repeated on many occasions that only a political decision is necessary to achieve agreement.

As I have stated earlier, verification has become one of the reasons advanced by those who are not prepared to negotiate on NTB. Scientific evidence is available to prove that current techniques for monitoring seismic waves can detect tests down to explosions of one kiloton. An array of verification methods are available to provide adequate and effective guarantees against violations. Writing in the "Scientific American" in October 1982, Lynn R. Sykes and Jack F. Evernden stated:

"We address this question as seismologists who have been concerned for many years with the detection of underground explosions by seismic methods and with means of distinguishing underground explosions from earthquakes. We are certain that the state of knowledge of seismology and the techniques for monitoring seismic waves are sufficient to ensure that a feasible seismic network could soon detect a clandestine underground testing programme involving explosions as small as one kiloton. In short, the technical capabilities needed to police a comprehensive test ban down to explosions of very small size unquestionably exist. The issues to be resolved are political".

We are therefore surprised to hear statements to the contrary from one delegation. In other areas where verification techniques are regarded as inadequate bold proposals have been made as a means of advancing our work. No such proposals have been forthcoming in the NTB area. The reason for this is not obviously a poverty of technological expertise. It reflects rather a

political unwillingness to make progress in this field. There will inevitably be different approaches on verification techniques. The answer to that is to negotiate an acceptable method of verification. Why is there willingness to do this in one area and not in another? The national means of verification and the international exchange of seismic data have already been explored. My delegation is ready to discuss any other proposals that may be presented here.

United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/52 on the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons clearly traces the evolution of this subject and I would venture to recall in this instance, the declaration by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1972 that the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been fully explored and that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement on a test ban treaty. Therefore, it is ironic and disturbing that 13 years later we continue to ponder over the scientific and technical problems that are supposed to be insurmountable.

CD/PV.308

pp.17-20

UK/Cromartie

16.4.85

CW

I am speaking today to introduce a further British Working Paper entitled "Chemical Weapons Convention: Organs and Constitution of the Organization", which has already been circulated to all delegations as document CD/589. This paper is designed to complement the series of papers already tabled by the United Kingdom delegation on verification under a chemical weapons convention. The latest of these, CD/575, was tabled on 12 March by the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. Richard Luce, who emphasized the great importance attached by my Government to the early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons. The present paper on the constitution of the organization builds on a wide area of common ground that has already been identified in the course of the negotiations on this subject. In this particular area there is already broad agreement that there should be a Consultative Committee composed of representatives of all parties to the convention, with the primary task of ensuring compliance with its provisions. It is also common ground that there should be an Executive Council of limited membership, and an international Secretariat which would include an Inspectorate. Our paper contains detailed proposals for the constitution and functions of these three organs and for the division of responsibility between them. We believe that it would be important to define these responsibilities with care and precision if the Organization is to be fully effective in its vital task of ensuring compliance with the convention and thus providing the confidence needed for its conclusion and continual stability.

The Organization would be responsible for implementation of the various verification measures required under the Convention to give assurance of compliance with its provisions. It would be responsible for the verification of non-production of chemical weapons by routine inspection and data exchange for which we have made detailed proposals in earlier papers. It would also be responsible during the first 10 years of the life of the convention for the verification of destruction of stocks of chemical weapons and of facilities for their production. Last but not least, it would become responsible for carrying out fact-finding procedures for verification on challenge, which could provide the safety-net to supplement routine inspection and thus represent the ultimate source of confidence in the convention. If this system

of verification is to provide assurance to parties to the convention that its provisions are being complied with by other parties it would be essential that it should be, and be seen to be reliable and effective. For this purpose parties will need to have confidence in the Organization responsible for the operation of the verification system. With this aim in view my delegation proposes the creation of an independent international organization composed of parties to the convention, with a separate legal personality, on the lines of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which enjoys wide respect internationally for its effectiveness and impartiality. It would need a highly professional Secretariat which would command the confidence of all parties for its impartiality and integrity. The ability of the Secretariat to take effective action in a crisis in the event of suspicion of non-compliance would be fostered by its performance of the inspections on a routine basis of destruction of stockpiles and production facilities and of industry for the verification of non-production.

In addition to having an efficient and reliable Secretariat it would be essential for the Organization to have the capacity to make rapid and effective decisions to allay suspicions of non-compliance. It would not be practicable to convene the Consultative Committee composed of all parties within the timescale required to restore confidence in the convention. We have proposed therefore that the Executive Council should have delegated authority to carry out the day to day functions of the Organization and to be endowed with the necessary powers to enable it to carry out the objectives of the convention in a timely and efficient manner.

The proposals for verification of non-production we made in document CD/575 are carefully limited, both in the proposed measures of inspection and data exchange, and in the list of compounds to which they would be applied. Inspection on a routine basis is proposed only for those toxic agents and precursors which would pose a high risk to the convention if manufactured industrially. This category is confined to super-toxic lethal compounds and possibly other named compounds which can be used directly in chemical weapons, and to a strictly limited number of key precursors. The high-risk key precursors comprise four classes of compounds plus three particular compounds. The total number of compounds in this category that are manufactured on a significant scale is not numbered in hundreds still less in thousands. In fact the number of plants making such compounds, according to the data given to my delegation in response to the appeal we made two years ago in our document, CD/353, is less than 11, for all the high-risk compounds taken together. This figure is derived from the data given in the two Working Papers we have circulated at the end of the 1983 and 1984 sessions (CW/WP/57 and CW/WP/86) updated to include some additional data received since August 1984. We do not of course know with certainty how many such plants there are in other countries which have not yet provided us with the information requested. The onus is, however, on the countries which have not provided data to substantiate their claims that our proposals would not be feasible because of the large number of plants involved.

In view of the United Kingdom delegation, verification of non-production needs to be based on an agreed list of compounds or chemically defined classes of compounds. It would be desirable to have an agreed mechanism under the

aegis of the Consultative Committee to modify this list in the light of changing circumstances, especially in the development of new technology. In our view, however, the initial list of key precursors needs to be agreed before the Convention is concluded. The analysis of risks given in the United Kingdom Working Paper, CD/514, of 10 July 1984, was designed to provide a basis on which the list or lists of compounds could be agreed by negotiation between the delegations represented round this table. We should need to reach a collective judgement on which compounds should be included and which should not. For this purpose agreed criteria would be useful to define classes of chemical weapons which depend on quantitative experimental determinations, the criteria under discussion for defining key precursors would not lead unambiguously to a list of precursor compounds even if there were complete agreement on criteria. It would not inspire confidence in the Convention if one party were uncertain whether another party was interpreting the criteria to include a particular compound. The criteria that have been discussed include the concept of minimal peaceful use which is likely to vary with the advance of technology. For example, it would have been said only a few years ago that no compound containing a carbon-phosphorus bond had significant peaceful uses; but this is no longer true, because compounds in this category are used as flame retardants and for other civil purposes. Nevertheless, my delegation attaches great importance to the inclusion of this class of compound in any list of key precursors for the purpose of verification of non-production.

The Soviet proposal to ban altogether the manufacture of compounds containing a methyl-phosphorus bond goes further in this direction than we would wish to and would require the abandonment of existing civil applications of some compounds. Moreover, it would not be logical to ban these compounds containing a methyl group and to leave undeclared and uncontrolled ethyl and other homologues which could be used to make chemical weapons of a similar toxicity. We believe that the verification measures proposed in CD/575 would give adequate assurance that chemical industry was not being misused for the clandestine production of chemical weapons, without impeding industrial operations or compromising their commercial confidentiality.

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Netherlands/van Schaik 18.4.85

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The revised draft mandate the Western Group last year agreed upon after serious consideration (CD/521) would, in our view, allow for that. Thus, while the bilateral negotiations will proceed, our multilateral body could elaborate a complete system of verification and compliance of the future test ban treaty. It could work not only on the international seismic data exchange we are all more or less familiar with, but it could also address the question of monitoring air-borne radio-activity that results from testing. This concept, earlier proposed inter alia by the Netherlands, has, as we are satisfied to note, gained more interest in this Conference recently. We could also work out the required institutional arrangements, including the establishment of international data centres, permitting the comprehensive system to operate smoothly. The appropriate procedures for on-site inspection in the framework of the future treaty is another subject matter on which we yet have to start our work.

Let me mention in this context a substantive subject on which we still need to agree, i.e. the question of the so-called Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

(PNEs). The Netherlands remains firmly convinced that the only feasible way to reach agreement on a truly comprehensive test ban lies in our acceptance of the objective of prohibition of all explosions for all times and in all environments. Those delegations that continue to think in terms of banning nuclear weapon tests only, instead of nuclear tests in general, have yet to convince us that nuclear weapon tests and PNEs can be dealt with differently. How can it effectively be ensured that no benefits for weapons purposes will be derived from PNEs? In both cases nuclear testing makes use of essentially the same technology, and it therefore allows, in principle, for the same military benefits, quite apart from possible environmental and other side-effects arising from nuclear testing, be it for peaceful or military purposes. It should also be kept in mind that for peaceful explosions to be effective, they should often be miniaturized. It is precisely miniaturized explosions, rather than those in the higher yield ranges, that offer military benefits.

While dwelling on the issue of nuclear testing let me make some comments on the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts (GSE). We have heard the valuable report of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group concerning the test run that took place between 15 October to 14 December 1984 and we listened with interest to colleagues who offered comments. My delegation feels that all in all this test run was successful and allowed for an improved insight into the technical possibilities of international seismic monitoring, as well as into a number of problems still awaiting appropriate solutions. At this stage I simply wish to stress the importance we attach to the idea -- unfortunately not adhered to by all participants in the experiment -- of a universal non-selective approach with respect to the transmission of all data, therefore including those concerning nuclear explosions.

Some statistics obtained during the test are indeed impressive. With the much appreciated co-operation of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 79 seismograph stations from 38 countries provided seismic data. The seismological institute in the Netherlands, the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute, participated actively in this data exchange. It received a total of 3,500 messages. It contributed in this exercise with 66 seismo-messages covering a total of 300 seismic events. Despite the relatively limited capabilities of the Netherlands seismograph stations, they registered eight out of a total of 13 nuclear tests that could be identified and of four seismic events of which identification was questionable.

The subject of "non-production of chemical warfare agents in the civilian industry" is among the themes at present most debated in our work. The issue is of crucial importance, as the destruction of existing stockpiles and military production facilities of chemical weapons would virtually be of no avail if production could clandestinely be resumed in the civil chemical industry.

Two, so far contrasting, approaches have been developed for the prevention of production in the civilian industry. One concentrates on several constraining or, if possible, prohibiting the production of a few chemical weapons related components that have a very limited commercial use. The other focuses on routine verification of non-production for weapons

purposes of a large number of compounds with potential application for the production of chemical weapons (this latter approach was reflected in the interesting British Working Paper CD/549 and constituted the working hypothesis for the earlier Dutch Working Paper CD/445).

We think that these two approaches are, in principle, not mutually exclusive but could very well be complementary in nature. The first one, the partial practicability of which should further be explored, leaves in fact inadmissible loopholes in verification that cannot be justified by simple reference to the legitimate needs of the chemical industry. The second, while being in itself indispensable for adequate verification of the Convention, could become more effective if combined with the system of selective production restrictions. The draft treaty presented by the United States (CD/500) indicates how the two approaches could be combined. Other combinations are conceivable. Both approaches should, however, avoid hampering, or unduly interfering with the legitimate interests of the chemical industry in their activities on research, development, production, retention, transfer and use of chemical compounds for permitted purposes.

Other problems, including the question of challenge inspections, require further intensive work. It is therefore only natural that negotiations on chemical weapons will be continued beyond the close of the summer part of this year's session in August. It is for this reason that we reiterate our proposal that, in accordance with the relevant recommendations of last year's report, the Conference should take an early decision providing for an opportunity to extend the negotiations to a period between the months of August and January.

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pp.20-23

Australia/Butler

18.4.85

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The scope of our proposed convention on chemical weapons is complete. That convention would outlaw and eliminate all chemical weapons. It would state that they must not be used and for that purpose we would go on to ensure that they cannot be used precisely because they would not exist. This means that those weapons that do exist would be destroyed, and that destruction would be verified. This convention would mean that those weapons would not be developed or produced in the future and this would be verified.

In Australia's view, procedures for the verification of non-production should include: materials accountancy; routine, random inspections of the chemical industry; import/export regulations and customs checks; challenge inspection to resolve ambiguities.

Materials accountancy must form the basis for the monitoring of the chemical industry. We suggest that quantities of chemicals greater than 1 tonne should be monitored. Quantities less than this would not attract any regulation, thus leaving research free from undesirable control. In Australia an inventory is kept, by the Government, of all chemical substances produced or used in quantity greater than 1 tonne. New compounds which are to be imported or produced must be registered, with full details including toxicity, use, and fate in the environment. Other nations have or are about to acquire

such inventories. The information they contain would form a logical starting point for the process of materials accountancy for verification. Chemicals which have been designated by the convention as posing a possible threat to the purposes of the convention could be identified from such inventories.

Having been identified they should then be monitored in two ways. First, all such chemicals should be followed by the process of materials accountancy throughout their life time. Thus a precursor such as phosphorus oxychloride could be accounted for to a level of accuracy commensurate with the risk posed by any illegal diversion.

The type of data required would include: (a) total annual production, per cent used in the country of origin, purpose of such use, and nature of end-products; and (b) quantity exported and to whom.

Second, the production and use of such chemicals should be subject to routine, random inspection. Where a precursor is used in the last technological stage of the synthesis of a nerve agent, that is, the last reaction vessel, its relevance to the convention is apparent. The example of phosphorous oxychloride I have referred to is related to: (a) its use in the synthesis of tabun; and (b) the fact that it is made in a small number of facilities. It is made in large volume, but as it is corrosive a small number of plants make it, at least, that is, in the West.

The question arises of what chemicals are to be monitored in the way we have suggested. Clearly they must be listed, otherwise inspectors will not know what they must monitor. Super-toxic lethal and other lethal chemicals must be monitored, if there is any possibility that they could be diverted to military use. We have also discussed at length criteria for determining "key" precursors of such chemicals, which should also be monitored. In our view, such a precursor should be critical in determining the toxic properties of the final product, should take part in the last technological stage of the production of such a chemical, and should have little use in civilian industry. If a chemical can readily be converted into a nerve agent then it must be considered to pose a threat to the convention. In order to limit the number of compounds to be accounted for, an additional criterion could be that the chemical to be designated be produced in a small number of facilities. Additionally, our task would be easier if it were also used in a small number of facilities. This approach is pragmatic; where several precursors take part in the final reaction, we seek to control the precursors which are most readily accounted for.

Experience may teach us that the approach chosen is either inadequate or too cumbersome. But guidelines can be considered which will provide a framework for verification of non-diversion.

If it is agreed that designated chemicals and their precursors are to be accounted for throughout their lifetime, then we must decide on ways to do this. One method of controlling such chemicals would consist of banning all supertoxic lethal chemicals. Thus if any such chemicals appeared in national inventories or were found during inspections, steps could be taken to eliminate them. This procedure could suffer from several defects. Firstly, some supertoxic lethal compounds have legitimate uses in the pharmaceutical industry, as veterinary preparations, and in general chemistry. In the future

the number of such compounds may increase. The production of supertoxic lethal compounds should and will be monitored by States, because of the health hazard implicit in their production and use. Thus, the pharmaceutical industry is subject to rigorous control which extends from the production of scheduled drugs through to their consumption by the patient. States could therefore provide detailed information for the purposes of the convention, which could be checked, as appropriate.

A second and perhaps more cogent reason against an outright ban is that any cut-off point in toxicity would be arbitrary, and could lead to production of compounds slightly less toxic than the designated level, but which could pose a threat to the convention equal to the supertoxic lethal category. Further, binary technology highlights the need to control precursors as well as the supertoxic lethal chemical to which they can lead.

Restriction of the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals to a single facility has been suggested as a means of facilitating verification. Such a restriction would seem to offer several disadvantages, but few advantages. Pharmaceutical companies making small quantities of drugs (more than 1 tonne, but less than 10 tonnes) will use very different synthetic processes, and may use drugs of biological origin. Thus production may well be more effectively grouped according to the type of chemical process required rather than to the toxicity of the chemical. Drug dispensing also requires specialized facilities to ensure purity, sterility, etc. Such facilities are not required for industrial chemicals. Inspection of such facilities to confirm materials accountancy data should not present any particular problem. A further argument against the permitted production of supertoxic lethal compounds in one facility relates to the use of such compounds. Drugs present little problem in that they are used by patients (or farm animals) in small quantities, and are dispensed by pharmacies with rigorous controls on the safeholding of dangerous drugs.

Toxic industrial chemicals will be easiest controlled if they are used "on-stream" at the facility where they are produced, in the manufacture of an end product of low toxicity. Transport is in itself hazardous to the population, and could also lead to illegal diversion between one plant and another. Moving a chemical from a single facility to points of use would require verification. I have noted that materials accountancy methods will be needed to follow designated compounds throughout their lifetime. Thus, if the life of a chemical begins and ends in the one plant the task will be simplified and the burden of inspection reduced.

I have not, so far, addressed the criteria to be used in assessing the risk that compounds pose to the convention, or how we should differentiate between levels of risk, and the concomitant stringency of verification needed. The approach contained in document CD/112 laid the foundation for such criteria, and has served us well. Toxicity was seen as a cornerstone, supplemented with the general-purpose criterion. Concepts put forward since CD/112 have in fact merely extended and particularized the original criteria.

Our discussions of precursors and "key" precursors has highlighted the need to monitor these chemicals as well as their end-products. The possibility that toxic chemicals and/or their precursors could be diverted to military use from the civil chemical industry has led us to formulate ways to block such a loophole. We suggest that materials accountancy, carried out by

all States parties and processed by a central, dedicated computer would provide a suitable data base. This would be verified by routine, random inspection and sampling, backed up in case of serious ambiguity by challenge inspection.

Australia believes that, in verifying compliance with regard to "non-production", procedures which involve monitoring will always be preferable to outright bans, since there will be ways to circumvent bans. For instance, a ban on all methyl-phosphorous compounds would not stop the production of analogous compounds with equal toxicity but lacking the methyl-phosphorous group could equally well serve a military purpose.

Monitoring is a more flexible approach, since it can take account of technological changes which cannot be foreseen at the time of entry into force of the convention. It will, however, require constant vigilance by a technical secretariat to keep abreast of changes which might threaten the convention. Monitoring will lead to controls which may in our view include specific bans. However, the imposition of such bans should only be temporary, to control a particular set of circumstances, and would not be an integral part of the convention.

Thus, if it is agreed that it will be prohibited "to assist or induce anyone to take part in banned activities", a temporary ban might be placed on the export of identified chemicals to a State shown to be engaged in such activities. The process of monitoring should involve or lead to actions which are appropriate to the violation. The task ahead will require us to develop an adequate and cost-effective verification régime. Monitoring of stockpile destruction will involve some 10 years of work. However, monitoring of the non-production of chemicals for military purposes will be an ongoing process.

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pp.25-28

USA/Barthelemy

18.4.85

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The substantive issue I want to raise is how best to ensure that toxic chemicals and precursors that pose a particular threat to the convention are not produced in the chemical industry. In particular, how can we best ensure that organophosphorus nerve gases and their key precursors are not manufactured under the guise of production for peaceful purposes?

Two approaches have been put forward -- one by the Soviet Union; another by the United Kingdom, the United States and several other countries. Under the Soviet approach, production of super-toxic lethal chemicals or methylphosphorus compounds for all permitted purposes, including civilian use, would be limited to one small facility and a maximum aggregate amount of one ton per year. Under the approach we support, production facilities would be declared and inspected, and detailed information on the amount and uses of the chemicals would be reported.

It is our impression that both approaches stem from similar basic concerns. Both have stated their desire to ensure that production of the most dangerous types of chemical weapons does not occur in the chemical industry. Both sides want to ensure that States do not possess a production capability in excess of peaceful needs. In other words, both sides want to guard against development of a "break-out" capability: that is, one that would enable a

State to withdraw from the convention and then rapidly begin producing enormous quantities of super-toxic lethal agents. Finally, both sides want to ensure that production facilities for super-toxic lethal chemicals for peaceful purposes are not used to produce currently unknown agents for chemical-weapons purposes.

Which approach is the most useful? To find out, we need to compare them to see which most effectively meets the three concerns I have just mentioned. We also need to take into account the burden each approach would pose on the chemical industry and economic development.

First of all, how effectively would the two approaches prevent illegal production of nerve gas in the chemical industry? Here, we see the Soviet approach as having two serious inadequacies. Facilities for production of the banned chemicals that exist before the convention comes into force are ignored. They would be subject neither to declaration or inspection. Facilities for production of ethylphosphorus compounds are also ignored, even though most of them could easily produce either ethylphosphorus or methylphosphorus compounds for chemical weapons. As explained in document CD/CW/WP.51 both types of phosphorus chemicals are equally dangerous. The approach we support, on the other hand, deals effectively with both types of facilities through declaration and inspection.

Second, how effectively would the two approaches prevent development of a "break-out" capability? Here again, the Soviet approach has serious inadequacies in our view. Since pre-existing facilities and ethylphosphorus chemical facilities would be ignored, there would be no way to judge a State's break-out potential. The approach we support, however, deals more effectively with this problem through declaration and inspection of all relevant facilities. If a State declares more production capacity than others consider justified for peaceful purposes, the mechanism for dealing with compliance issues could be invoked to clarify the situation and to resolve any disputes that may arise.

Third, how effectively would the two approaches prevent production of unknown super-toxic lethal chemicals for chemical weapons purposes? We believe that the Soviet approach could actually encourage development of new agents since it ignores ethylphosphorus compounds, which could easily be substituted for the banned methylphosphorus compounds. The data in document CD/CW/WP.51 clearly demonstrate that ethylphosphorus-based nerve gases are virtually as deadly as the existing agents based on methylphosphorus compounds. The British approach, which we support, has no such loophole. It covers all high-risk toxic chemicals and high-risk precursors.

Finally, how would the chemical industry be affected under the two approaches? In our judgement, the Soviet approach is seriously deficient. It would mean that production of a number of useful chemicals for peaceful purposes would have to be stopped. The economic damage would be significant, both in terms of existing production and of lost opportunities for improving human life. The monetary costs alone would probably be in the range of millions of dollars. We have heard it said here that methylphosphorus chemicals have "almost no peaceful uses" and that the United Kingdom's proposal would extend inspection to all chemical industries. But such a statement does not take into account the chemical industries in western countries, nor even

the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons' own documents. For example, document CD/CW/CRP.90 makes clear there are plans to produce a methylphosphorus herbicide in industrial quantities in the Federal Republic of Germany. (Here it is worth noting that in the Soviet Union the preference is to use ethylphosphorus compounds instead. These would not be constrained by the Soviet proposal.) Document CD/CW/WP.86 substantiates our view that only a small number of chemical plants would be subject to inspection under the United Kingdom approach.

The production of super-toxic lethal chemicals, largely as drugs, is relatively small, but it is carried out by a number of companies. The super-toxic lethal chemicals which are of commercial interest are hardly suitable for chemical weapons purposes and pose no risk to the objectives of the convention. The question of production of large quantities of nerve gas for supposedly peaceful purposes does not arise. There is, in fact, a specific provision in our draft convention to prohibit it.

In contrast to the Soviet approach, the approach we support would not stop existing peaceful chemical production activities and prevent economic development. Rather it would allow peaceful activities to continue, and to expand, but -- and I emphasize this point -- under the watchful eye of the international community. All relevant facilities would be declared and inspected.

It seems to us that the burden of proof must be on those who would impose limitations on peaceful chemical production. They must demonstrate that such interference is absolutely necessary. But we have not heard any persuasive argument why our approach would not be effective.

In negotiating a convention the Conference must take into account that different States have different economic systems and different chemical industries. Perhaps the two different approaches in this area really reflect the differing economic systems in the Soviet Union and in western countries. The Soviet approach seems designed for a centrally-planned economy, in which all chemical production facilities are Government-owned and in which the chemicals in question have not yet been produced. It seems to ignore the reality of a market economy, where a number of different and highly competitive companies are involved and the types of chemicals in question are already in production.

How can a mutually-acceptable, compromise solution be found to this issue? A good place to start might be the approach outlined by the previous Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in document CD/CW/WP.89. Under this approach, a State could choose between production at a single site or at multiple sites. Verification provisions would be equivalent, whichever approach were chosen. This approach tries to take into account the differences between centrally-planned and market economies. At the same time it preserves the strengths of the earlier approaches. In some areas the new approach may need to be strengthened, for example, to deal adequately with pre-existing production facilities for super-toxic lethal chemicals. But we believe this approach is promising and deserves serious consideration.

In line with my country's past efforts to contribute to the success of the negotiations, my delegation would like to take this opportunity to present a few ideas on a number of different aspects of the convention, such as permitted activities and the national verification system.

An important function of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is to ensure that no chemical weapons are manufactured. In order to cover reliably the so-called non-production of chemical weapons, the activities permitted under the convention must be defined so as to preclude the abuse of certain chemicals for chemical weapons. My delegation made known its position on that score in the deliberations of the Working Group of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. What we need are effective provisions to govern permitted activities. In other words, major chemicals and those of particular relevance to the possible production of chemical weapons must be subjected to a special régime, based on the equality of all States.

Regarding the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals, all States would have to concentrate the production of those agents in a small-scale facility. It would not be justified to permit the option of manufacturing those chemicals in several plants, since such an option would virtually be tantamount to allowing certain countries to acquire a concealed chemical-weapon production capability. What is more, the concentration of the production of specific chemicals in a single installation would make effective national and international verification possible with little effort.

The convention should contain unambiguous stipulations regarding such a facility and its verification procedure. Details relating to the construction, mode of operation, and verification of the plant could be annexed to the convention.

The need to prevent the construction of chemical weapons facilities in countries not parties to the convention is another important matter touching upon the principle of equality and equal security. Document CD/CW/WP.93, submitted on this issue by Spain in January contains interesting ideas requiring close scrutiny. It must be made impossible for transnational corporations to sidestep the convention by moving the production of certain chemicals to other places. As a matter of fact, a lot more is involved here than verification in a traditional sense. To prevent the spread of chemical weapons, the country where such corporations are headquartered must be under the obligation to watch very strictly over their activities in third countries. The German Democratic Republic welcomes the agreement in principle that has been reached on an article concerning national measures to be taken to implement the convention. The article, contained in document CD/539, also provides for an appropriate national organization. Ever since the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has been set up my delegation has been advocating a solution to that effect and put forward a series of proposals on how that body should operate and be composed. Detailed suggestions have also been advanced by the Group of socialist countries in document CD/532 and by Yugoslavia, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany and other States.

Underlying this approach is the recognition that it will be up to the States themselves to implement the convention on the territory under their

jurisdiction and that a smoothly operating national verification system would offer a basis on which compliance with the convention can be monitored and dependable international inspection is possible. Current international practice proves that this approach is correct: just take the national systems that many countries have set up to account for and control nuclear materials.

My delegation believes that it would be helpful to work out guidelines on a national verification system and thus to give concrete shape to the provisions pertaining to national implementation measures and co-operation between the Consultative Committee and national organizations on a number of verification issues. Such guidelines could be added to the convention as an annex. They could be of use to the States parties to the convention when they establish, maintain and review their national implementation system. The latter could consist of the following main components: (a) a legal element, allowing governments to determine the area of verification; (b) government-level organizational and functional elements (national organizations); and (c) facility-level organizational and operational elements.

A major duty to be performed under the national system would be to verify the so-called non-production of chemical weapons, which is an aspect of the convention with long-term ramifications, while verification of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks and production facilities would cover a comparatively brief span of time only. Each party to the convention would, of course, have to work out and regularly review the laws, regulations and other measures needed to ensure that the provisions dealing with the accounting for and control of certain chemicals are observed in the territory under its jurisdiction. The measures we are talking about would relate to chemicals, facilities and international transfer. The question of how to cover the transnational corporations, as mentioned earlier, must be posed in this context.

It would be incumbent upon the governments of the States parties to the convention to create and maintain the national organization referred to above.

The facilities subject to verification should make available to the national organization information on the chemicals covered by the convention. The data thus obtained would serve as the basis for the reports to be transmitted to the Consultative Committee and for possible national verification activities.

In consultations and as the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and its subsidiary bodies progresses, my delegation will revert to these issues and advance further ideas.

CD/PV.310

pp.37-38

Senegal/Sene

23.4.85 CTB, NPT

The international community has been working for decades to obtain a complete nuclear-weapon-test ban, which is rightly considered an essential measure for halting the nuclear-arms race and for a process of gradually reducing nuclear arsenals. When signing the Partial Nuclear Test Ban treaty in 1963, each of the parties assumed the clear political commitment to pursue a complete test ban. While at first the Treaty was considered an unprecedented, historic step forwards, subsequent events showed that it was unable to

curb nuclear testing despite the General Assembly's repeated appeals. Furthermore, despite the many rounds of negotiations which have taken place on the issue and the great efforts made to that end, we are still far from our goal. Political, strategic and technical reasons are often advanced to explain the difficulties encountered, but the main problem to be resolved remains that of verification.

The proposal for a gradual approach based on a steady reduction on the part of the Powers authorized to carry out nuclear tests, even if it brings us closer to our final objective, also raises some issues, including that of verification. In this field, we must highlight the useful contribution made by the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts who undertook a wide-ranging test exchange of data using the Global Telecommunications System of WMO. I should like to take this occasion to thank the Norwegian delegation for its invitation to visit its installations for research in this field.

This scientific and technical monitoring could be pursued by a study on the aspects of a world seismological network or on the possibility of monitoring the atmosphere by means of acoustic or radioactivity data in order to detect nuclear explosions.

In any event, it is our belief that despite the differences in views there are no major obstacles to explain the postponement of a nuclear-test ban. In our opinion, further progress must be made towards a nuclear-test ban, in all environments, which would be an essential stage for ending the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Obviously, the efforts aimed at reversing the growth of nuclear arsenals must be accompanied by a sustained effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which do not possess them. In this connection, the Tlatelolco Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1963 which was hailed as the most important international agreement in the disarmament field since the dawn of the nuclear age, and as an event of considerable importance for the cause of peace, is certainly important in many respects. The non-proliferation régime, through the safeguards system, represents a means of international verification whereby it is sought to achieve a balance between the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

With regard to new developments, we welcome the agreement negotiated by the Soviet Union, a Party to the Treaty, under which it accepts the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency for its nuclear facilities.

As for China, although not a Party, last year it stated that in the event of the export of nuclear material and equipment, the countries of destination would have to accept the application of the safeguards in accordance with the principles of the IAEA Statute.

It should be recalled that France, without signing the Treaty, stated at the twenty-second General Assembly that it would in future conduct itself exactly in the same manner as the States Parties to the Treaty.

CD/PV.311

p.11

Sweden/Theorin

11.6.85

CTB

Two years ago, I introduced in the Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty on a nuclear-weapon-test ban. This proposal has so far not been subjected to a full and detailed examination in this Conference. Nor have many other detailed and important proposals.

Discussions of a general nature have been carried out more or less continuously since the late Fifties, and certainly in great detail since the Partial Test Ban Treaty entered in to force 22 years ago. The Conference should now address the remaining problems through the elaboration of provisions of a treaty, including scope, verification, preambular parts and general provisions.

It is vital that the Conference on Disarmament should start working on the test-ban issue before the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article VI of the Treaty obliges each of the parties to the Treaty to negotiate in good faith to achieve results on nuclear disarmament. The one disarmament measure singled out in the Treaty is a comprehensive test ban. There is no acceptable explanation for further delays in starting negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The international experiment arranged by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on the exchange of seismic data was a success. Although the Ad Hoc Group has not yet been able to fully assess and analyze all aspects of the experiment, it is already clear that a system of exchange of data is feasible today. Some of the findings will influence the drafting of a test-ban treaty. Others will not be relevant until after a treaty has entered into force. We attach great importance to the work of the Ad Hoc Group and are pleased to note that it will continue its task.

Another important event in this sphere was the workshop on seismological verification arranged last week in Norway. I would like to congratulate the hosts on the arrangements and express our appreciation for this important, constructive and helpful initiative. The workshop created an opportunity for the participating delegates to consider in detail some important issues relevant to seismic monitoring of a nuclear-test ban.

CD/PV.311

p.16

Australia/Butler

11.6.85

CTB

I want to record briefly in the record of the Conference on Disarmament the very deep gratitude of my Government to the Government of Norway for the Workshop that was held last week. That Workshop was entitled "A Workshop on Seismological Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban" and, as is well known in this Conference, my Government places the highest priority upon the earliest possible achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban which would prevent all nuclear testing by all States, in all environments, for all time.

In our attempt to achieve that goal, one of the issues to which my Foreign Minister, Mr. Bill Hayden has drawn attention in this Conference is the importance of seismological means of verification of such a treaty. What we saw last week in Oslo was a technically excellent, clear demonstration of

precisely those kinds of means, and we must all be grateful to Norway for the work that it is doing and for inviting us to go to Oslo to see that work. In excess of 80 persons went to that Workshop, some from this Conference; many were experts who had come from across the world to take part in the Workshop, and there is no doubt that the Workshop was a signal success. Together with the sort of work that is being done by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts in the global experiment, it points the way towards effective verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I do want to recall again that the Foreign Minister of Australia proposed on 7 August 1984 in this Conference that we should go on with that work and that, in fact, this Conference should decide to establish such a network, a seismological network, in order to demonstrate that a comprehensive test-ban treaty can be verified. I do want to repeat the gratitude of my delegation to Norway for this positive step that was taken last week and to underline my Government's full support for continuing efforts to develop a world seismological network which would verify a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

CD/PV.313

p.7

France/Jessel

18.6.85

CTB

The 1925 Protocol does not provide for any verification procedure to establish possible violations; France and a number of other countries therefore sponsored resolution 37/98 D whose purpose is to establish provisional procedures of that kind, pending the conclusion of the negotiation of a permanent convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons, with a view to prompt and impartial fact-finding in case of alleged use.

The support given to this initiative shows the extent to which the international community is concerned to preserve the permanent authority of the Geneva Protocol.

CD/PV.313

p.8

Canada/Beesley

18.6.85

CW

.... I pointed out on an earlier occasion that what we are seeking to achieve in our chemical weapons negotiations is of four-fold importance: firstly, we are seeking a disarmament treaty and not merely a limited arms-control measure; secondly, we are seeking an effective non-proliferation treaty; thirdly, we are seeking a comprehensive treaty that would ban development, production and stock-piling and transfer of chemical weapons with provision for destruction of stockpiles and production facilities and, most important in our view, appropriate verification; and fourthly, what we are seeking is a law-making treaty which could have far-reaching legal implications in its own right which would transcend the obligations it would lay down for its immediate parties.

We remain convinced that it is possible for us to draft our proposed convention in such a way that we reinforce the Geneva Protocol and in no sense weaken it. I would repeat, however, what I said on an earlier occasion, "it would be of very limited utility if we were to produce a convention that leaves open the possibility that renunciation of its obligation would also thereby remove any pre-existing obligation under the 1925 Protocol".

Rising international concern within and outside the United Nations stemming from allegations of chemical-weapons use and the consequential alarming threat to the rule of law and to the authority of the 1925 Protocol, coupled with growing public awareness of the potential for proliferation, add immediacy to our efforts to reach agreement on an effective, comprehensive non-proliferation treaty.

In the meantime, however, as pointed out by the distinguished representative of France, as an interim measure, pending a complete and verifiable ban on development, production, storage and use of chemical weapons, important steps have been taken within the United Nations to enable the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of use of these weapons. He deserves the support of all Members of the United Nations in such efforts. His fact-finding mission helped bridge the gap between prohibition and verification, between legislation and enforcement. Again, in summing up, we consider that the allegations of recent use and the dangers of increasing proliferation give tremendous urgency to our own negotiations and we hope that we are all going to be able to take note of this in our on-going action.

CD/PV.314

pp.6-7

Morocco/Skalli

20.6.85

CTB

Thus, the Conference was unable to set up an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban despite the new situation created by the position recently adopted by the People's Republic of China on this issue. The reason advanced for this was that it was first necessary to carry out a thorough study of the technical aspects of verification.

However, the demonstrations which many of us attended at the workshop recently organized by our Norwegian friends -- to whom we address our sincere thanks and congratulations for this praiseworthy initiative -- have in our opinion convincingly proved that it is possible to detect any seismic event, whatever its location and its nature, and thus that effective verification is feasible in the framework of a treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

This is an important fact, in our view, which corroborates the viewpoint taken by the Group of 21 that the real obstacle to negotiations for the preparation of a treaty for a complete prohibition of nuclear testing is the lack of genuine political will.

CD/PV.315

p.11

GDR/Rose

25.6.85

CW

.... The appropriation of funds by the United States House of Representatives for the production of binary weapons is definitely a development that has exceedingly adverse effects on our work.

The funding decision confirms the suspicion, which my delegation voiced on previous occasions, that the primary aim of the calls for unrealistic verification measures is to hamper progress in the negotiations and to divert attention from the plans to deploy a completely new generation of chemical weapons.

This Conference has before it three draft proposals for the treatment of item 1. Document CD/540, proposed by the Group of 21, which Brazil continues to support, would establish an ad hoc committee for the immediate negotiation of a treaty; document CD/522, tabled by a group of socialist countries, seeks a similar objective; and document CD/521, of the Western Group, proposes that the subsidiary body should deal primarily with questions related to verification.

The experience of the sessions of 1982 and 1983, when a working group met on verification matters, explains why this latter approach no longer enjoys the consensus of the Conference. On that occasion, there had been a clear agreement that the mandate of the working group would be revised. The subsequent objection to that revision, raised by two delegations, doomed any further effort to achieve procedural progress.

In the light of past and recent experience, it would appear that the question of verification is no longer an obstacle to the achievement of a nuclear test ban.

Most delegations represented here were present at the workshop on seismological verification sponsored by the Government of Norway, only three weeks ago. The results of that event make obvious once again, as previous studies and opinions already indicated, that it is technically possible to detect and identify nuclear explosions, even of a small yield, particularly if an adequate array of instruments is deployed at convenient locations. The obstacles to the achievement of a treaty must then be of a different nature.

In order to understand the nature of such obstacles, let us examine the positions of the two super-Powers concerning the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The Soviet Union has consistently advocated the multilateral negotiation of a ban. In his statement last Thursday, 20 June, the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, said that his country is prepared to declare a moratorium on nuclear tests, starting 6 August next, the anniversary of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima, or even earlier. Such a moratorium would be in force until the conclusion of a treaty.

Given the fact that the Soviet Union is responsible for the largest proportion of nuclear tests in recent years, according to SIPRI data, and that it does not seem inclined to relent its build-up of nuclear arsenals, one might ask whether it would also be prepared to accept the obligations derived from the need for effective verification of that undertaking. Such obligations could conceivably include, for instance, the placement in its territory of remote sensors and other devices to monitor compliance with a moratorium of with the ensuing treaty, as well as on-site inspections that might be called for under the terms of the ban.

Some clarifications must be given in a manner satisfactory to the international community, which might otherwise conclude that the Soviet Union only wishes to preserve its present comfortable position with regard to the test ban. In fact, the Soviet Union can always count on the negative posture taken

by its super-Power rival, and so be at liberty to continue testing, in order to increase and improve its nuclear arsenals, while appearing in the eyes of public opinion as the champion of the cause of the prohibition of tests.

CD/PV.315

p.23

FRG/Wegener

25.6.85

CW

In the first statement of this morning, Ambassador Rose, my distinguished neighbour, has among many other important things, laid out before us and spoken again of the project of a zone free of chemical weapons in parts of Europe. He has alluded to a recent joint memorandum by two parties -- two political parties -- including the State Party of the German Democratic Republic.

Several colleagues have inquired of me the significance of this memorandum and that is why I thought I should take the opportunity, briefly, to give my Government's perspective of it. You know that I have often spoken about the idea of establishing a zone free of chemical weapons as a Government delegate. The present framework agreement of which mention was made by Ambassador Rose does not stem from governments, it stems from political parties. On the part of the Federal Republic of Germany it has been agreed upon by the Social Democratic Party, one of our political parties, presently in opposition. It is thus a minority view; but it purports to help towards the elimination of chemical weapons. That is an important purpose and that is why the memorandum merits thorough examination. That examination is taking place at the moment. It will be conducted under three major criteria: the first criteria is: will it help military security? The second one is: will it help with the verification of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban? and the third criteria is: will it promote or rather hinder the negotiation and conclusion of the world-wide chemical weapons ban, the negotiation of which we are engaged in?

Now, some preliminary insights are already quite certain as part of this examination. My Government believes that such a zone project will not help military security because it leaves the arsenals untouched; they would only be removed East to join other important arsenals, especially the immense arsenals of chemical weapons held by the Soviet Union, where, as we all know, the production of such weapons still continues unabated. Nor does the framework agreement envisage the destruction of production facilities that might exist in the potential zone.

The second criteria is verification. Does the project help verification? My Government is of the opinion that it aggravates the verification problems, since only one more intricate verification problem is added to the well-known difficult verification issues we deal with: guaranteeing that the weapons are not brought back: a zone agreement would require the verification of access.

CD/PV.316

pp.6-8

Norway/Kristvik

27.6.85

CTB,CW

In his statement to the Conference on Disarmament on 21 March this year, the Norwegian State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Torbjorn Froysnes, invited both member and observer delegations to the Conference, as well as

representatives of its secretariat, to a workshop on seismological verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban in Oslo during the period 4 to 7 June. Today, I take pleasure in introducing document CD/599 which is a brief report on that workshop.

The objective of the workshop was, through briefings and demonstrations at seismological facilities in Norway, to shed further light on the seismological verification aspects of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. As we all know, verification issues are considered to be a major problem in connection with a test ban.

We are indeed pleased that the workshop was attended by a total of 84 participants from 41 countries and from the secretariat of the Conference. In his opening address the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sverre Stray, stresses that the holding of the workshop demonstrated the great importance which the Government of Norway attaches to the Conference on Disarmament and to Norway's participation in the Conference. In addition to briefings and lectures, the programme included a demonstration at the Data Processing Centre of NORSAR, which is a large aperture array designed to detect seismic events occurring at distances between 3,000 and 10,000 km. The participants also surveyed the field installations of the Norwegian Regional Seismic Array System (NORESS), which incorporates the most recent technological and scientific advances in seismic array design, instrumentation and data processing and which is designed to detect weak seismic events occurring at distances less than 3,000 km.

Document CD/599 contains extracts of the lectures given during the workshop. It also lists the three main conclusions which the Norwegian authorities have drawn on the basis of demonstrations and briefings. First of all, substantial technological progress has been achieved during the last few years as regards seismological verification of a test ban. Secondly, it is essential to establish a global seismological network as proposed by the Group of Seismic Experts and to see to it that such a network can ensure international data exchange on the basis of the most modern technology available at the time of its establishment. Thirdly, some technical problems still remain to be solved. These problems concern in particular detection and identification of very low-yield explosions and explosions that are conducted in an environment that produces very weak seismic signals, for example in underground cavities. In addition, the reduced seismic detection possibilities immediately after the occurrence of large earthquakes represent a problem that needs further study.

It is the hope of my Government that the workshop and document CD/599 can contribute to further the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of a test ban. The Group of Seismic Experts is to have a new session in July. The Conference should as well resume its substantive examination of specific issues relative to a test ban, including the issue of scope and verification and compliance with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject.

In his statement on 21 March the Norwegian State Secretary of Foreign Affairs also confirmed that Norway was continuing her research on verification questions relevant to a chemical weapons convention and that we intended to present the results of this year's research in the second part of the 1985

session. The research programme, which was initiated in 1981 in connection with Norway's participation in the subsidiary body on chemical weapons, concerns sampling and identification of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions. I should like to stress that this research has been undertaken on the basis of field experiments in order to make sure that the findings have as realistic a basis as possible and thus avoid the artificial conditions of a laboratory set-up.

Today, I have the honour to present three documents on chemical weapons.

First of all, I should like to draw your attention to the detailed report on the research undertaken during the winter 1984/85. The report is circulated as an annex to document CD/598. Additional copies of the report are available from the Permanent Mission of Norway in Geneva. The working paper in document CD/600 outlines the results of, and the conclusions which can be drawn from, the field experiments and research undertaken during the last winter. This year the research was concentrated on the verification of arsenic compounds in snow samples, on detection of thiodiglycol which is the hydrolysis product of mustard, and analysis of biological samples from humans which had been contaminated by mustard. The work on sample handling was continued and elaboration of a procedure for system analysis for sampling was started.

In the third document on chemical weapons -- CD/601 -- we have prepared preliminary proposals for procedures that could be used by a fact-finding team under the Consultative Committee when investigating alleged use of chemical weapons under winter conditions. These proposed procedures are based on the field experiments undertaken during the last four winters and on documents presented by Norway to the Conference since 1981 in connection with the research programme.

The timing for presenting these proposed procedures should be seen in light of the progress which so far has been made in the open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee concerning the inclusion of prohibition of use of chemical weapons in a convention. In our view, the draft preambular and operative paragraphs contained in document CD/CW/WP.107 of 22 April represent a solid basis for consensus, which should be further consolidated during this part of the 1985 session.

Our proposals concerning the following four aspects of the investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons under winter conditions: the composition of a fact-finding team under the Consultative Committee, the collection of samples, the handling of samples and listing of equipment for a fact-finding team. It is recommended that the team should include a military expert, a chemist, a medically qualified person and an interpreter. An Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) expert would also be of importance. In some circumstances it may be of value to include a sociologist, ethnologist or a cultural anthropologist. A collection of 20 samples from a target area of approximately 100,000m² is recommended. Procedures for the extraction of the chemical agents to an organic solvent in the field as well as the means for subsequent safe transportation have also been proposed. The annexed detailed list of equipment recommended for a fact-finding team concerns equipment for personal protection, field detection, sampling and handling.

I would like to stress that these proposed procedures are not presented in order to be included in a draft convention. They are, rather, proposals which could facilitate the implementation of a new convention. It is the intention of Norway to develop these procedures further and to elaborate a more complete draft system for selection, handling, transportation and analysis of samples collected in the field.

CD/PV.316

pp.11-13

USA/Lowitz

27.6.85

CTB

A number of different interpretations have been offered of what the briefings, the demonstrations, and the inspection of the field installations of some of the latest seismic and data processing equipment represent for the work of our Conference. Some delegations present at the workshop have apparently concluded that no more technical work needs to be carried out before a fully elaborated seismic monitoring system, which would provide data -- on a global basis -- for the detection, location, and identification of underground seismic events could be set in place on an operational basis. They argue that the present technical capability in seismic detection is sufficient for effective monitoring of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

In the view of my delegation, however, it is more appropriate -- more accurate -- to conclude that a considerable amount of work on the vital matter of verification of and compliance with a nuclear test ban remains to be carried out. For example, the important issue of the identification of low-magnitude events -- the ability, in other words, of discriminating between earthquakes and explosions -- which is being addressed at the Norwegian research facilities and elsewhere is clearly not completely resolved. Beyond this question are other issues such as how to ensure that large chemical explosions are not in fact nuclear explosions, or an occasion for masking a nuclear explosion. Nor is the need yet fully met to ensure that other techniques for evading a nuclear test ban were not being employed. Such techniques include hiding an explosion signal in an earthquake signal and decoupling the signal by means of a large cavity.

In support of efforts to resolve these issues, my Government has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the development of the sciences and technologies that comprise seismic detection, location and identification, and data processing and exchange. In support of these efforts, my Government has endorsed, and continues to endorse strongly, the important work being carried out by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts under the auspices of our Conference. Their recent technical test, and the report the Ad Hoc Group is preparing will certainly contribute to our understanding of ways to collect, analyze and disseminate data from an international, global network of seismic observatories.

And, in support of these efforts, my delegation is prepared, now, to continue in a subsidiary body the serious and detailed examination of the issues of verification of and compliance with a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions, as well as other issues related to such an agreement. We are prepared to do so under the provisions of the draft mandate contained in CD/521, of which my delegation is a sponsor.

In this regard, my delegation has listened very carefully to the remarks on the subject of a nuclear test ban made by the distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Souza E Silva, at our previous plenary meeting. And we have carefully examined the proposal which the delegation of Brazil has made in CD/602 with regard to a mandate for the establishment of a subsidiary body under agenda item one. Ambassador de Souza E Silva made a very thoughtful statement, as always, and he has raised a number of serious issues. I want to make four observations concerning them.

First, Ambassador de Souza E Silva called attention to the magnitude of the nuclear test programme of the Soviet Union and to its unrelenting build-up of nuclear arsenals. It is not unreasonable for us to suppose that the scope of the Soviet Union's testing programme is related to its continuing strategic force modernization.

Second, my delegation has not agreed that the work of the Conference under the auspices of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban was fully completed at the end of the 1983 session of the Conference. On the contrary, my delegation's position was then -- as it continues to be -- that a full and thorough discussion of all of the issues involved with verification of and compliance with a comprehensive test ban had not been completed, and that more work on these matters was required. This view was reflected in the conclusions of the 1983 report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, CD/412, and in the United States plenary statement of 30 August of that year, as contained in CD/PV.238, page 15.

It was, thus, in a spirit of compromise that my delegation agreed to the proposal contained in CD/521, supported by a group of western delegations, made first in 1984 and repeated in 1985, to expand the mandate of such a subsidiary body to deal with all issues of relevance to a comprehensive test ban. In an effort to accommodate the views of other delegations, and in the hope that further work will be carried out on the nuclear test ban agenda item, my delegation was and continues to be willing to agree to this expanded mandate despite the failure of the Conference to complete its work under the previous mandate. My delegation continues to believe that this proposed mandate is the appropriate one on which the Conference should base its work, and my delegation continues to be prepared to begin work promptly in an Ad Hoc committee, with an appropriate programme of work which would provide a clear framework for the substantive examination which we are prepared to undertake.

Third, I believe that Ambassador de Souza E Silva misunderstood my remarks of 5 March, which he described as representing a "significant shift in the American position" regarding a nuclear test ban, and regarding its place in the larger context of our efforts to achieve nuclear arms control and disarmament. The position of the United States on this question remains that set forth consistently by the present Administration -- that a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions remains a long-term objective in the context of broad, deep, and verifiable reductions of nuclear arms, expanded confidence-building measures, maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent, and improved verification capabilities.

With regard to verification, the United States' favourite topic which it uses as a smokescreen to hide its very real refusal to conclude a treaty prohibiting underground testing, any number of quotations of the highest authority, all from western countries or international officials, can be adduced to show that this is purely a pretext without any valid foundation whatsoever. So as not to lengthen this statement unduly, I shall solely review three of them:

In his first statement to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Mr. Kurt Waldheim, who was then and for 10 years Secretary-General of the United Nations, said the following on 29 February 1972:

"No other question in the field of disarmament has been the subject of so much study and discussion as the question of stopping nuclear-weapon tests. I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement. There is an increasing conviction among the nations of the world that an underground test ban is the single most important measure, and perhaps the only feasible one in the near future, to halt the nuclear arms race, at least with regard to its qualitative aspects. There is a growing belief that an agreement to halt all underground testing would facilitate the achievement of agreements at SALT and might also have a beneficial effect on the possibilities of halting all tests in all environments by everyone. It is my firm belief that the sorry tale of lost opportunities that have existed in the past should not be repeated and that the question can and should be solved now."

"While I recognize that differences of views still remain concerning the effectiveness of seismic methods of detection and identification of underground nuclear tests, experts of the highest standing believe that it is possible to identify all such explosions down to the level of a few kilotons. Even if a few such tests could be conducted clandestinely, it is most unlikely that a series of such tests could escape detection. Moreover, it may be questioned whether there are any important strategic reasons for continuing such tests or, indeed, whether there would be much military significance to tests of such small magnitude."

"When one takes into account the existing means of verification by seismic and other methods, and the possibilities provided by international procedures of verification such as consultation, inquiry and what has come to be known as 'verification by challenge' or 'inspection by invitation', it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban."

"In the light of all these considerations, I share the inescapable conclusion that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests."

.... I think it is worth closing this statement with a third much more recent quotation from barely a week ago: on June 27 the Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Olof Palme, in the Keynote Address at the Colloquium recently organized by the Groupe de Bellerive in Geneva, said the following:

"A treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests would be the single most important step to slow down the qualitative arms race. It would be a good complement to the bilateral negotiations by reducing the risk that cuts in the arsenals eventually agreed upon in the strategic talks would be nullified by the development of new nuclear systems. The work done by experts in my country in this field for a long time has convinced me that existing scientific and technical capabilities make it possible adequately to verify a comprehensive nuclear test ban."

CD/PV.318

pp.10-11

USSR/Issraelyan

4.7.85

RW

Having carefully analyzed these proposals, the socialist countries have come to the conclusion that the most appropriate solution would be that the ban on attacks against nuclear facilities should apply to those under IAEA safeguards.

We consider that this criterion is universal and does not harm the interests of any State. By means of this criterion it would be possible successfully to overcome the difficulties which inevitably emerge in the definition of facilities to be protected. To put a facility under protection is a completely voluntary matter and a sovereign right of each State-Party. If any State wants to put its nuclear facility under protection it should confirm the peaceful character of this facility. And, vice versa, if it does not want to put its nuclear facilities under control, to extend IAEA safeguards on it, this facility will naturally not be under the protection of an international legal instrument.

The fact that the determination of the character of the activities of nuclear installations and, especially, the control over changes in their activities can only be carried out effectively on a continuing basis, is also an argument in favour of IAEA guarantees being accepted as a criterion. To create for that purpose a special international system of verification is expensive and complicated, and also unjustified since there exists an international organization entrusted, among other things, with identifying the peaceful character of activities of nuclear facilities. We hope this criterion will be acceptable to the States members of the Conference on Disarmament.

In addition to the above-mentioned steps taken to meet positions of other States, the Working Paper of the socialist countries contains other provisions which bear witness to the constructiveness of their approach. It states that the countries find acceptable the list of facilities to be protected from attacks contained in the above-mentioned document CD/530, subject to the understanding that such facilities are covered by IAEA safeguards.

During the past discussions of the protection of civilian nuclear facilities a number of delegations have attached great importance to determining criteria of violations of a future agreement. Various criteria have

been proposed, such as: the degree of destruction, the volume of radioactive materials released, the determination of the intentions of the attacking side, the very fact of an attack, or a combination of these criteria.

Having thoroughly analyzed these approaches, we have drawn the conclusion that the most acceptable criteria of the violation of an agreement is the very fact of an attack against a facility that is under international protection in accordance with the agreement to be worked out, irrespective of the possible consequences of that attack.

CD/PV.318

pp.15-16

FRG/Wegener

4.7.85

OS

A similar need for updating concerns verification techniques, so indispensable for the building of confidence. The insufficiencies of substantive legal prescription for the desired degree of demilitarization of outer space and celestial bodies correspond to the lack of suitable procedures for the verification of compliance with substantive obligations. It should be noted in this respect that none of the treaties regulating outer space has so far provided for an effective monitoring and compliance system. However, it is evident that if States are to agree to new treaties which aim at the use of outer space wholly or predominantly for "peaceful purposes", stringent provisions of verification, preventing an abuse of space technology are of the absolute essence. Even if such verification techniques can be identified and agreed upon, one grave problem remains, their quasi-monopolistic possession by only a few countries while the majority of signatory States will in all probability not dispose of the necessary technical prowess to verify by themselves. The involvement of international verification organizations is therefore an urgent requirement for such future international legislation. Despite the considerable cost such mechanisms may entail the projected International Satellite Monitoring Agency, planned and developed by France, or -- in a regional context -- the European Space Agency might be called upon to take on practical responsibilities in this field.

CD/PV.318

p.19

Australia/Butler

4.7.85

CW

There is more than enough reason to bring this work to an early and successful conclusion. There is more than enough danger to us all if we fail to do so. What then is the problem? The answer would seem to lie in the area of verification, and if one takes the verification provisions of the United States draft convention as an example, article X of that convention serves as a case in point.

Some delegations have said that draft article X is unacceptable and have even gone to the point of saying that it displays a cynical approach to a universal convention. They say it is so ambitious in its terms of verification that it was clearly never intended to be taken seriously.

My delegation has no reason to accept such a cynical interpretation. On the other hand we can understand and give serious consideration to criticisms of such a provision because verification is crucial and should not be taken lightly. It is a key to progress towards a universal convention. What we would have hoped to see, therefore, is a willingness on the part of the

critics of the American approach to suggest alternatives. Surely both sincerity and rationality demand no less.

CD/PV.320

pp.13-15

UK/Cromartie

11.7.85 CTB,NPT

The United Kingdom considers that a test ban treaty would be unacceptable unless it contained adequate provision to ensure compliance by all its parties. The importance of resolving outstanding difficulties over how to verify compliance lies at the heart of the extensive consideration of a comprehensive test-ban over the last 25 years. The issue cannot be evaded or dismissed as too complicated, too hard to understand or too detailed to merit further discussion, because an inadequate comprehensive test-ban treaty which lent itself to evasion would be worse than useless. Clandestine continuation of nuclear testing at levels sufficient to confer a significant military advantage would have extremely serious and far-reaching consequences, not only for the Treaty itself, but also for the general framework of international security and stability. It is therefore an essential element of a comprehensive test-ban that such clandestine testing be effectively precluded. I stress the word effective -- we are not looking for 100 per cent verification. The questions which in our view need to be answered are:

Will any undetected evasion of the agreement provide a significant military advantage?

Will significant non-observance of the agreement be detected early enough to allow any necessary counter-measures to be taken?

If the evidence of such non-observance is available, will it be convincing enough to justify such counter-measures?

And if we are confident that we can give the right answers to these questions, can we also be confident that the risk of international exposure will outweigh any temptation to depart from strict compliance with the agreement?

The United Kingdom is closely involved in the useful technical work performed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts set up by a predecessor body of the Conference on Disarmament. I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the work of the Ad Hoc Group and to its Chairman, Dr. Dahlman of Sweden, the Scientific Secretary, Dr. Ringdal of Norway, and the Co-ordinator of the Technical Test, Mr. McGregor of Australia. The Group will be meeting in Geneva again shortly. A lot of work remains to be done under their present mandate, and there is further work of great value that they could undertake. We therefore hope that the Ad Hoc Group's mandate can be renewed, and if necessary extended, by general agreement.

The members of the Conference have recently had an admirable opportunity to see on the ground in Norway how research in this field is conducted and how seismological observations are made. I should like to use this occasion to thank the Norwegian Government publicly for their generous hospitality, and for all that they did to make our visit to Norway so successful both from the professional and the personal point of view. The visit gave me a first-hand picture of the great delicacy of the seismological equipment required for this

task and the extraordinary complexity of the task of the transmission, correlation and analysis of the results of the observations. The Noress array is a pioneer effort to improve the possibilities of detection and identification of weak seismic signals at regional distances, which promises to improve substantially our capability to detect and identify them within the relatively short range for which it is destined. We hope that this experiment will provide in time a solution to some of the outstanding technical problems to which the conclusions of the Norwegian paper (CD/599) on the Oslo Workshop refer. We support the Norwegian view that it is essential to establish the global seismological network proposed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

The United Kingdom Working Paper of 1983, to which I have referred earlier (CD/402) identified seismic monitoring as the most promising technology for the long-range collection of data on underground explosions and as an essential element in any verification arrangement for a comprehensive test-ban. It also drew attention to the fact that current techniques of seismic monitoring would require improvement before adequate verification of a comprehensive test-ban could be envisaged. It has been disappointing that this paper has not so far received any detailed study in this Conference.

My delegation continues to hope that the Western draft mandate to which I referred earlier will provide a basis for establishing an ad hoc committee of this Conference in which detailed discussion of these complex issues can take place. With this in mind I should like to introduce today a further British Working Paper entitled "Seismic Monitoring for a Comprehensive Test Ban", which has been circulated as document CD/610. This Paper is designed to supplement the earlier paper by a more detailed analysis of the issues of seismic verification. It aims to explain and distinguish between the two fundamental problems involving in monitoring a nuclear test-ban by seismic means: the detection of seismic signals from nuclear explosions against the ambient seismic noise background and the identification of seismic signals, that is, discrimination between signals observed from earthquakes and from man-made explosions. In each case the Paper describes the current technical capabilities and the prospects for their improvement. It reviews some of the techniques that might be used to provide detection or identification of clandestine tests carried out under a comprehensive test-ban régime, assesses their likely effectiveness and discusses the technical possibilities in a global seismic network for monitoring a comprehensive test-ban at tele-seismic range. The United Kingdom delegation believes that this Working Paper should make a substantial contribution to further discussion in this Conference of the verification of a nuclear test-ban, the major unresolved problem relating to the achievement of an effective ban.

The problem of verification of a comprehensive test-ban is in any case a difficult one. It is made infinitely more so by the insistence of some members of this Conference on claiming exemption from a test ban for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. This problem was analyzed in detail in the other British Working Paper to which I referred earlier, CD/383 of 17 June 1983. As the then Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. Douglas Hurd, made clear in his Plenary statement on 10 March 1983, the British Government would be prepared to renounce permanently the right to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as part of an agreement on a comprehensive test-ban of all nuclear explosions in all environments. As

Mr. Hurd said, it is for those who seek an exemption for peaceful nuclear explosions, which Britain does not seek, to tell us in detail what practical system of verification they propose to give confidence that the nuclear explosions they might carry out were exclusively peaceful and brought no military advantage of any kind.

Finally, I should like to turn to a major existing achievement of multilateral arms control negotiations, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was negotiated in a predecessor of this Conference, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. My delegation looks forward to a thorough review of its operation and achievements in the same constructive spirit as has been shown at the three meetings of its preparatory Committee held here in Geneva. The Treaty now has 129 parties, the highest number for any multilateral Treaty in the field of arms control and disarmament. In the view of my Government, it has brought increased security not only to all of us who are parties to the Treaty but to the world as a whole. It has been influential in inhibiting the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons both by establishing a basis of mutual confidence and by providing a norm of international behaviour. It has thus made an important contribution to the achievement of one of the aims we have set ourselves in this Conference, the prevention of nuclear war. Its unique comprehensive system of verification provided by the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency has generated wide international confidence, and has provided a basis for the development of nuclear trade and of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in many countries throughout the world. The provision in its Article VI for negotiations on effective measures related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament express a common longing among all its parties to see the achievement of these goals. The early years after the Treaty came into force in 1970 brought a wave of noteworthy achievements in disarmament both on a multilateral and on a bilateral basis. To the great regret of all of us the international climate in the present decade has not so far been propitious for further achievements in this field. This year we have new hope with the re-establishment of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, on a more comprehensive basis than ever before, aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. We must all hope fervently for the success of these negotiations and do all in our power to contribute to it. In the meantime, it is essential to maintain and strengthen the broad degree of consensus that already exists on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is in this spirit that my delegation will approach the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation régime.

CD/PV.320

pp.21-22

FRG/Wegener

11.7.85

CTB

I am pleased that the tabling of this document coincides with the introduction of another Working Paper on the same subject by the delegation of the United Kingdom. As explained to us by the distinguished Ambassador of the United Kingdom, that Paper provides an excellent description of the technical and political problems involved in test ban issues, and, in particular of the present state of the art of seismic technology. Working Paper CD/610 merits a serious and detailed discussion in this Conference. My delegation fully

supports its thrust. This British Working Paper should be looked at in close conjunction with the Working Paper I am introducing today.

The Federal Government attaches great importance to the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. It thus supports initiatives which allow further progress in the realization of this objective. At the same time, my Government is conscious of the significance that must be attributed to the Geneva negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and lends its full support to the goal of deep reductions of nuclear-weapon arsenals. It is in this general context that the present Working Paper on "the Establishment and Progressive Improvement of an International Seismic Monitoring and Verification System relating to a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban" has been conceived.

Despite numerous efforts and consultations among delegations it has so far not proven possible to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the agenda item "Nuclear Test Ban" in the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation deplores this fact. We are convinced that important work remains to be done, in particular, in the field of monitoring and verifying a CTB. Although a consensus on a mandate for a CTB work organ eludes us, my delegation is determined to continue the analysis and search for solutions of those problems which are crucial to the implementation of, and compliance with, a future comprehensive test-ban.

The effective verification of compliance with a test ban constitutes the key to a successful conclusion of efforts to bring a comprehensive test-ban treaty about. The willingness of States to commit themselves to an absolute nuclear test stop presupposes the conviction at a very high level of confidence that continued and militarily significant nuclear testing cannot go undetected. For this very reason the major part of efforts in this Conference and in its predecessor bodies to establish a CTB has focused on issues related to verification, in particular verification by seismic means. All of these considerations, however, have been geared to the elaboration of a legal instrument and to the moment where such an instrument in the ultimate form of a test-ban treaty would be put into effect.

In contrast to this anticipatory approach it is the purpose of this Working Paper to initiate the establishment and continuous operation of a monitoring and verification system based on seismic technology at the present time, well before the conclusion of a CTB Treaty. In order to set such a process in motion the international seismic-data-exchange system, as tested in the 1984 GSE test run, should be put into a continuous operating mode. While in operation this system would be geographically expanded and technically improved with the objective to implement a global seismic network which would meet the degree of sophistication desired for monitoring and verifying a CTB on the global level. The proposed project would give scientists the opportunity to resolve, in a learning-by-doing process, remaining problems of monitoring and verification and to increase, progressively, the system's capability to detect and identify explosions. In a dynamic process of scientific research and practical application the global seismic network would mature over time and be available and operational upon the conclusion of a CTBT.

The establishment and continuous operation of such a network needs to be embedded in an institutional framework. It is, therefore suggested in the Working Paper that during the transitional period, that is during the pre-treaty phase, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should be assigned the task of supervising the establishment and continuous operation of the global network and making recommendations for its further improvement. The GSE would, as in the past, submit its recommendations and reports to the Conference on Disarmament. Its new task could be bestowed upon the GSE by way of a new mandate once the GSE has finalized, and submitted, its comprehensive report on the 1984 technical test run. Seismological facilities and data centres would be operated, as during the 1984 experiment, by participating States.

Mr. President, let me add a brief comment on the technical section of the Working Paper. This section is a summary of a more detailed scientific study which will shortly be presented to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts by the Federal Government's scientific advisors. The data provided in the present summary reflect a broad over-all approach to the intricate problems of estimating magnitude-yield relations. They need further refinement in the light of additional calibration data.

The Paper focuses on monitoring and verification by seismic means. This does not, however, exclude other possibilities, such as for instance monitoring of atmospheric radioactivity, to the extent that they could also make a contribution. Such additional technological approaches to verifying a future CTB could and should be incorporated in the proposed institutional framework.

CD/PV.321

p.19

Netherlands/van Schaik 16.7.85

EW

But, and this is my second observation, there is another side to the coin. In order to qualify for protection, facilities should be inspected so as to establish whether they meet the definitions and criteria set by the legal instrument we have in mind. It is possible that States parties possessing military nuclear facilities will not allow inspection as, in their judgement, inspection could jeopardize military secrets they wish to protect. If the future legal instrument is based on the principle: "No protection without inspection" those States parties should weigh the advantages of protection of their military nuclear facilities and therefore the absence of mass destruction risks against the disadvantages such inspection would entail. It is clear that the future instrument should provide for a mechanism enabling States parties to decide for themselves whether all relevant nuclear facilities on their territory are to be protected -- clearly preferable from a mass destruction point of view -- or only part of them.

In document CD/530 the Swedish delegation has suggested that a register be established. Facilities would have to be entered in that register and subsequently inspected before enjoying protection. This suggestion seems to us to have a number of advantages. First, no distinction is made between civilian and military facilities, which would be desirable if we really wish to aim at a comprehensive régime preventing mass destruction. It further offers the advantage that each government can decide for itself which facilities it wished to enter into the register and, therefore, which of its

facilities would be offered for inspection and would subsequently enjoy protection.

Under the Swedish proposal, therefore, mass destruction would be the criterion, whereas the register procedure would ensure the proper implementation.

What about systems proposed by delegations in which IAEA inspection plays in one way or another a role? First, it is clear that the exclusive use of the IAEA safeguards criterion would bring many facilities under protection which pose no danger of mass destruction. In a recent document, CD/594, submitted by a group of socialist countries, a combination is suggested of the IAEA safeguards criterion and the mass destruction criterion. Although such a system would ensure that protection will be limited to cases of potential mass destruction, it would, in our view, not cover all relevant cases. Military nuclear facilities would be excluded as well as other facilities to which up to now, for a variety of reasons, IAEA inspectors have not had access.

The Swedish proposal would not put such limits on the scope of the agreement. A State party having decided to place its installations under protection, will simply offer them for inspection under the terms of the treaty.

Let me say that in actual practice many of the relevant installations will be under IAEA safeguards. In those cases IAEA data can be used for inspection. Nuclear-weapon States, moreover, could through their "voluntary offer" bring some of their installations under IAEA safeguards. The necessary secretariat and/or inspection teams to administer these data and to cover the remaining relevant installations could then be very limited in size. For practical purposes an organizational link could be envisaged with IAEA similar to the link between the IAEA and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR).

CD/PV.322

pp.8-10

Yugoslavia/Mihajlovic

18.7.85

CW

Mr. President, I am taking the floor to introduce the Yugoslav Working Paper entitled "Permitted Activities and Verification Measures", which has been distributed to delegations under the symbol CD/613. Besides its basic task of banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, the future convention should also have an important task of regulating a number of permitted activities for which specific verification measures should be provided. These permitted activities concern permitted activities for protective purposes and so-called other permitted activities.

The permitted activities for protective purposes imply all activities aimed at the research, development and production of protective items and medicaments-antidotes. Some of these activities may create doubt about compliance with the convention and thus lessen confidence among States parties. In order to avoid this, the Working Paper points to the necessity of defining criteria for specific types of toxic chemicals which will be used for protective purposes, and measures of verification applicable to the production facilities for these purposes. To this end the production of toxic chemicals, mostly of super-toxic lethal chemicals, not exceeding 1 metric tonne per year

is envisaged. Such production of toxic chemicals for these purposes should be carried out in a special facility the capacity of which should not exceed these quantities. Hence, such a facility should by its size belong to the category of small-scale production facilities.

Bearing in mind that this type of facility is used for the synthesis of highly toxic chemicals, of chemical warfare agents for the most part, it should be effectively automated. Automation would be needed for effective data recording, monitoring of the production and process control. The monitoring of all wastes would also be necessary. The monitoring of the production should, for its part, meet the basic requirements of continuous control of the material and energy balances of the synthesis and storage of the data in a computer centre. The verification of such a facility should, in our view, be international, and its method random inspection or challenge, depending on the consensus reached. The declaration of such a facility should be as detailed as possible, with all the necessary information on the technological processes, capacity of the facility and end use both of intermediates and final products.

With the framework of other permitted activities, the attention of the previous negotiations was focused on the production of chemicals (other lethal chemicals, other harmful chemicals) which are widely used today in the civilian commercial industry. Such production is now being carried out, and is likely to be carried out in the future as well, in large industrial facilities. Further processing of such toxic chemicals is more often than not carried out within one technological process in the same facility. In this case the control of these chemicals is very simple, especially if the process is automated. The situation is a little more complex if the chemicals are sent to another processor. Then, in our view, the appropriate declaration should be made to permit verification. In any case, the verification of these facilities should, according to our Paper, be carried out by a national authority which should regularly inform the Consultative Committee about the production. Only if there is doubt that the convention is being violated will it be possible to proceed to international verification.

Having in mind the proposals put forward by many delegations that the convention should not prevent the development of the chemical, and pharmaceutical industry in particular, the Yugoslav delegation considers that there is a need to examine the possibility of producing super-toxic lethal chemicals for other permitted purposes. Namely, the rapid development of synthetic organic chemistry over the past decades has brought about new methods of synthesis of biologically active chemical compounds whose structure is similar to that of natural compounds. Some of these compounds are highly toxic, but have, nevertheless, certain therapeutic characteristics which are increasingly being used in the treatment of many diseases. Due to their high toxicity, the doses of these chemicals used in human and veterinary treatment are very small. Consequently, the production of these compounds can be carried out in a pilot plant. In the view of the Yugoslav delegation, the annual production of these super-toxic lethal chemicals for other permitted purposes should not exceed 1 metric tonne, and only exceptionally their production should be maximally 2 metric tonnes per year. The number of such facilities will depend on the development of the pharmaceutical industry. The facility, however, should be so designed to permit full automation and monitoring at all stages of the production process. As in the case of small-scale production facilities for

protective purposes, these facilities also should be equipped with instruments for recording aggregate material and energy balances and all parameters (pressure, temperature, etc.) in the process of synthesis.

As with the small-scale production facilities for protective purposes, the verification of these facilities should be carried out on an international basis depending on the consensus achieved. Having in mind, further, that the commercial products are also involved, it is necessary, we believe, to provide detailed information on the end user.

CD/PV.322

pp.11-13

USSR/Israeli

18.7.85

CW

.... It is well known from the records of disarmament negotiations that it is far simpler to prevent the development of a new type of weapon than to try to remove it from arsenals after it has been developed. This applies to binary weapons to an even greater degree, above all, because of the additional difficulties which can arise in singling out components of binary weapons from the vast, diversified area of commercial activities and the determination of the régime for key components and verification of compliance with that régime.

What is the basic difference between binary and non-binary chemical systems? Above all, it is that in order to produce components of binary weapons it is not absolutely necessary to create facilities specially designed for the purpose, whereas this is necessary for non-binary weapons. By their properties, the components of binary weapons can be produced at all usual commercial facilities of the chemical industry. That is the first basic difference between binary and unitary weapons.

Furthermore, key components and key precursors, are by no means the same from the standpoint of their military importance, in spite of the fact that according to their level of toxicity they could belong to the same category of chemicals. To produce the final product, i.e. supertoxic lethal chemicals, at least one more technological stage of production in industry is needed. But a key component is by no means a semi-product in the technological chain of the production of supertoxic lethal chemical that is one or more technological processes away from the stage of munition-filling; it is a part of a munition that is completely ready for use.

Industrial facilities are not required to produce the final product from the key component. The production process will be carried out during the delivery of the munition to the target, and at the point of use in combat the supertoxic lethal chemical, for instance YX nerve gas, would be released from the munition, as if the latter contained that chemical and not its precursor.

Thus, both supertoxic lethal chemicals and key components whose reaction with other components would produce this supertoxic lethal chemical at the moment of combat use, are chemicals of one and the same type, the same category. That is why the same requirements should apply to both supertoxic lethal chemicals and key components, both from the point of view of prohibition and limitations and from the point of view of the verification of how the prohibition and limitations are complied with. In this connection a whole number of additional complex questions can arise, which we will have to resolve taking due account of the United States decision to produce binary weapons.

If, within the framework of the convention which is being elaborated now, we were to ban binary weapons on the same basis as other types of chemical weapons, then, bearing in mind the above-mentioned specific features of binary weapons, the convention would contain very significant loopholes.

We have been told that binary weapons can be banned by the provisions on the verification of key precursors, which would be included into the convention. In other words, the same régime is proposed for the limitation and verification of both key components and key precursors, which would differ from the régime for supertoxic lethal chemicals. We agree with this as far as key precursors are concerned, for key precursors of such chemicals can be used in peaceful industry too. This softer régime for key precursors would also be justified with regard to the interests of the commercial chemical industry as well as the purposes of the convention because, as I have already said, key precursors by themselves cannot directly serve destructive purposes. To process them into supertoxic lethal chemical would require an entire industrial cycle or cycles. And it is precisely this stage -- and as far as we understand there is a broad understanding in this regard -- that should be controlled in an especially strict manner.

Needless to say, in the negotiations there are many other complicated issues, chief among which may be said to be the question of verification. The Soviet Union has already demonstrated considerable flexibility on this question, having agreed to systematic on-site inspections of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and of permitted production at special facilities. With regard to other types of activities to be prohibited, we also admit the use of international procedures, in particular on-site inspections on a voluntary basis. The combination of national forms of verification with international procedures provides, in our view, the basis on which the problem of verification could be resolved.

CD/PV.322

pp.25-26

Canada/Beesley

18.7.85

CW

It is no news to anyone here that to Canada verification and compliance are considered to be the most difficult and contentious but most important issue, and that is the point we will come to a little later when, if we manage to finish our homework, we will submit a working paper. However, we consider that the confidence of the parties that the treaty is being universally and effectively observed will depend on the efficacy of just such a provision. It is too easy in this case for something to be occurring without any obvious means of detecting it. That does not necessarily assume that we must all agree on the most intrusive types of inspection available, but it means that if we settle for less than that, there is going to have to be an element of good faith. It does not seem to be very much in evidence thus far, and perhaps we could work on that problem a little too.

We accept that delicate and legitimate issues arise touching on sovereignty and national security concerns for all States here represented and for all of those we represent collectively who are not in this Conference. These questions are involved. We accept also that patience, imagination and a very strong political commitment are required if we are going to avoid having

this particular issue go the same route as others, on which we seem to have established a kind of track record for seven years, of a lot of talk, not much action.

The Canadian Government attaches great priority to these chemical weapons negotiations, and is particularly mindful of the need to ensure that any verification provisions are both effective -- that is to say capable of providing reasonable assurances of compliance -- and realistic in the sense of being operationally viable. Now I said I would give an example, I am going to do so, and I'm well aware that it is a sensitive one. In reflecting these concerns, the Canadian Government recently commissioned a private study by two Canadian jurists versed in international law, and perhaps as important for us, in Canadian constitutional law, to examine the implications for the Canadian Government and for Canadian industry -- for Canada, in other words, -- of a hypothetical requirement to implement a chemical weapons treaty incorporating verification provisions of the type set out in CD/500.

Now others may have made this kind of statement to accept such provisions, but I must have been sleeping when such statements were made. When we made this study, special attention was given to the potential implications of the open invitation verification provision as given in that text. If there is any importance to my statement it is in our effort to make clear that the central conclusion of our study -- and I confess that we were somewhat surprised -- is that existing Canadian legislation would, in fact, allow for verification which includes on-site inspection on short notice. Such inspections are seen, for example, as no more stringent than existing domestic law, to which the Canadian chemical industry is already subject.

I recognize the distinction between internal process and something that involves representatives of other countries. Nonetheless, there is not a constitutional difficulty for us, and maybe for others, including perhaps some western States, some non-aligned, perhaps some socialist States. We consulted representatives of the Canadian chemical producers, and we still came to the same conclusions.

We recognize that this conclusion in relation to the constitutional, legal and regulatory processes of Canada may not have application to the situations in other States. Further, we recognize that the commissioning of this study and its conclusions, about which I have informed the Conference today, and I would like to emphasize this, should not be interpreted as signifying that the Government of Canada advocates agreement by this Conference on the precise verification provisions set out in CD/500. The purpose of my intervention is a more modest one, but one at least as concrete as that. It is to illustrate, as we see it, the desirability of each member State in the Conference on Disarmament, which is after all a representative body, giving close examination to the practical and operational implications of all proposals put before this body, from all sides, and I have spoken before of the USSR proposal on destruction of stocks, which we take quite seriously, in order to arrive at a considered evaluation of their acceptability. If we cannot find them acceptable then we continue to say that we should be trying to produce counter-proposals, even if they do not necessarily reflect the final word of the State or of the delegation putting them forward.

The lamentable situation with regard to the use of chemical weapons also underlines the need for the convention to contain a mechanism rapidly and unequivocally to determine the facts whenever and wherever a violation is suspected. Unfortunately, the delegation of the Soviet Union has repeatedly refused to address the general wish of other delegations for reliable verification of provisions in the chemical weapons ban, and it has repeatedly criticized as "not serious" the detailed United States proposals for verification of compliance. It has not, however, been forthcoming with concrete alternatives that address the need to establish mutual confidence that States are, in fact, in compliance with the convention. My delegation encourages all delegations to make specific and concrete proposals, so that we may have a firm and rational basis for resolving our different views. The United States draft convention in CD/500 is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, but its provisions do respond to the need for reliable verification. We are prepared to consider any alternatives that provide for an equal or greater degree of effectiveness. We cannot accept less.

In Working Group "C", we look forward to an examination of the issue of challenge inspection. This is certainly one of the key issues of the negotiations, and we should give it the full discussion it deserves. A discussion of the principles underlying the important concept of challenge inspection and of the necessity for States rapidly to satisfy concerns about compliance with the convention is a clear necessity to further our negotiations.

My last suggestion for accelerating work was related to delegations' willingness to negotiate. I note with sadness that the delegation of the Soviet Union has remained virtually silent in many of the sessions of the Working Groups. This silence has done nothing to further our progress, and it raises serious questions whether the Soviet Union, despite its claims, is interested in a chemical weapons convention. In addition, while it criticizes our verification proposals, the Soviet delegation has not introduced a concrete proposal on this subject in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons since the United States tabled its draft convention last year.

In the opinion of the Spanish Government, a nuclear-test ban, that is to say, a ban on nuclear test explosions, should not be limited to the testing of nuclear weapons, but should cover all types of nuclear explosions, basically for two reasons. One is that we consider that the continuation of tests including nuclear explosions, even for peaceful purposes, would leave the door open for their immediate use for military purposes, and the other is that it would make the problem of verification even more difficult.

In order for a nuclear-test ban to be efficient and reliable, efficient and reliable verification is also required. Treaties banning the use of an arm are one thing; when they are violated it is quite evident. Treaties aimed at banning tests on certain weapons or types of weapon are a very different thing. Even leaving aside the terrible specialized nature of atomic weapons,

treaties banning tests and also treaties to prevent the manufacture, stockpiling or development of certain weapons, require particularly reliable verification systems because one cannot wait for an armed conflict to occur to check that the treaty is being observed or rather, was being observed.

In a nuclear-test ban, therefore, the provisions concerning verification are as important as, or even more important than the actual substantive provisions of the ban. If a future agreement in this regard (and we do not lose hope that such an agreement will be achieved) is to be observed, a complete and efficient verification system is required which will be accepted without reservations by all parties.

My delegation is therefore following the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts with interest and expectation in the hope that the necessary bases can be found for setting up a system which will meet these conditions. Allow me in referring to this issue to congratulate the Government of Norway for the very interesting workshop which was held in Oslo in early June. The information obtained during those days has been extremely useful.

In my delegation's opinion the necessary requirement for the reliability of a detection system is not so much that the future system should have the full co-operation in good faith of all the parties concerned and that the observatories of all parties should contribute fully at all times. We think that it is still more important that the system, i.e., the network of monitoring stations, should be capable of detecting possible banned tests, even without the collaboration of the alleged offender.

We think that it would be too much to envisage a system in which an alleged offender would have to furnish the data obtained by its observatories which might reveal a violation of the ban in its territory. It is, however, necessary for the system to be able to provide sufficient indications of a violation without the offender's co-operation so that the verification machinery can be set in motion, including, where necessary, on-site inspections.

For these reasons my delegation has welcomed with great interest the report on the work of the Ad Hoc Group contained in document CD/585 and impatiently awaits the conclusion of the work on the analysis and assessment of the results of the technical test carried out from 15 October to 14 December 1984.

During the last United Nations General Assembly, the Spanish delegation was among the sponsors of resolution 39/53. We regret that to date the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to set up an ad hoc committee to study this vital issue. As observers we cannot but feel concerned at the difficulties that the Conference encounters in reaching an agreement on the mandate of this committee and we sometimes wonder if this difficulty is not a purely semantic one. As we have already said, the ban cannot be divorced from verification, since they interact on a completely reciprocal basis, and we think that an ad hoc committee could now at last begin the work required for an active consideration of both issues, thus going beyond the confines of statements heard at plenary meetings of the Conference.

At the beginning of this statement I mentioned the specific problems arising from agreements of the type of the future convention on the prohibition, not only of the use, like the 1925 Protocol, but also of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons. While in accepting that Protocol States were able to formulate appropriate reservations and even announce that they were prepared to take reprisals if attacked with chemical weapons, in our opinion that possibility has no place in the future convention. In our future convention the possibility of reprisals should not even be mentioned for the simple reason that they would not be possible, at least for States which observed the convention to the full and in good faith; once the period -- perhaps 10 years -- set for the destruction of stockpiles of weapons had elapsed, they would not be in a position to take reprisals. Furthermore, what possible reprisals could there be if any of the parties to the Convention, violating its obligations, should renew its research, manufacture or stockpiling of chemical weapons? Would that induce other parties to the convention also to carry out those activities in reprisal? In any case it could not mean mere reprisals but the total destruction of the convention since the latter cannot be broken down into a large number of bilateral relationships.

That is why we said that the possibility of reprisals should not be mentioned because it would simply not be possible. In this type of agreement, once again verification should deprive reprisals of any meaning. That is why simple verification systems are not possible. The certainty that nobody is developing, stockpiling or manufacturing chemical weapons or certain chemical substances is much more difficult to verify than the mere non-use of such weapons. That certainly is, however, vital for the convention to have the desired effects. If verification shows that someone is violating the convention, the first response cannot be a reprisal. The offender must be discovered in time. If, by misfortune, that should not be possible, the convention would lose all its force, and, call it reprisals or denunciation, by the application of well-known rules of treaty law, the convention would have ceased to exist.

Of course, if conventions of this type do exist, like the 1972 Convention prohibiting biological weapons, which lack an efficient verification system and seem to have operated satisfactorily because there have been no reports of violation, in actual fact it is because we do not know whether this apparent state may not just be an illusion. We do not know, and we would have to wait for the violation of the prohibition on the use of such weapons which would certainly leave the party which had observed the Convention in good faith in a very difficult situation without any possibility of defence or response.

This is why my Government considers the issues of verification, where difficulties continue to exist, to be of such importance in our future convention; we hope that the recent proposals contained in document CD/575 can provide a basis for progress in the sphere of verification of non-production, and we hope to see proposals on verification of destruction of existing weapons and on the necessary declarations, particularly with regard to the location of arsenals. It should be possible to ensure that within a reasonable period existing weapons can be placed under international control in depots devoted exclusively to that purpose, during the period necessary for their complete destruction, we think that it will be possible in this way to avoid the difficulty which some States understandably experience with regard

to proposals which involve a need to declare the location of depots or stockpiles belonging to their armed forces which also contain other types of weapons, while at the same time the danger of their use during the destruction period would be eliminated thanks to this international control.

With regard to the definition of chemical weapons and of the chemical agents which should be prohibited and placed on the appropriate list, for the purposes both of destruction and of non-manufacture in the future (except for protective purposes in a single facility), our delegation considers that the treaty should only contain an express prohibition concerning single-purpose agents. The list of such agents should be adopted, and possibly updated, by all parties by consensus. We would reiterate that it should be the single-purpose criterion which is basically used for the list.

Other agents, on whose inclusion in the above-mentioned list there was no consensus, could be prohibited by applying the general-purpose criterion to them, and they would appear on another list. Their production for permitted purposes, other than for protection, would not be restricted to a single facility nor their quantity to one metric tonne, but their production would have to be subject to very strict on-site inspection.

I should like to add here that in our opinion such an inspection would necessarily require appropriate institutional organization; in this sphere we largely agree with the substance of document CD/589, recently submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom.

For other agents, both supertoxic lethal agents and precursors (key or otherwise) which are indisputably dual-purpose, constructive solutions have been proposed. To conclude my reference to lists of agents, I should like to add that in any case these lists must be open-ended and we believe that there is already some degree of consensus to the effect that they could be updated by the Consultative Committee of the organization to be set up, and that, of course, the fact that an agent was not included in the list would not alone automatically mean that its production must be unconditionally legalized.

For the identification of the chemical agents to be included in those lists and for the consideration of the numerous technical problems which emerge at each stage of our work, we think that it might be very useful for a group of chemical and military experts to hold meetings, as already suggested by the representative of Japan in his statement of April last. We would add that those meetings could be periodic and should report to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on their results.

As for the Executive Council of the future organization to be set up, we think that it should be constituted according to criteria of equitable geographical and political distribution. We also believe that all States which have made a positive declaration of production of chemical agents (not necessarily chemical weapons) appearing in the above-mentioned lists should be represented in it.

Apart from the foregoing, although it is certainly related to the issue of the declaration of stocks and destruction of chemical weapons, I should like to add that our delegation considers that a special treatment for binary

weapons does not seem to be justified. We believe that the agents used to manufacture them should be subject to the arrangements that apply to them as chemical agents, and the weapons subject to that laid down for weapons.

CD/PV.323 pp.23-24 Bulgaria/Tellalov 23.7.85 CW

A comprehensive solution is also required for the issue of measures to be applied towards the chemical industry with the aim of ensuring non-production of chemical weapons in general. A final agreement is feasible following a consensus on the approaches for identification of the various categories of chemicals and on the role of the so-called "single small-scale facility". In the long run the only method in this regard is that of agreeing on balanced and realistic arrangements for data reporting and verification.

In my delegation's view, it would be unrealistic and incorrect to bind down a considerable part of the chemical industries of tens of countries around the world -- once the convention enters into force and for untold number of years thereafter -- with some kind of continuous, obtrusive international control, of the kind some delegations suggest.

A calm, sensible and realistic approach on the problem of verification as a whole should prevail. A positive fact is already at hand -- the emerging understanding on the question of the role and functions of the national body for implementation and control of the convention.

My delegation has been upholding the view that the role of continuous and uninterrupted national control for compliance with the provisions of the chemical weapons convention would be of particular importance and that it should be supplemented by international control measures.

CD/PV.323 pp.25-26 Ad Hoc Group of 23.7.85 CTB
Scientific Experts/
Dahlman

In my intervention here on 4 April this year, I had the pleasure of giving you a preliminary report on the technical test, which our Group conducted during a two-month period in the autumn of 1984.

As you may recall, one objective of the technical test was to test procedures for extracting level-I data at seismological stations. Those of you who participated in the recent workshop in Norway now have first-hand experience on how this may be carried out at a modern seismic array station. The further objectives of our technical test were to test procedures for regular use of WMO/GTS for the exchange of seismic messages and procedures to be used at International Data Centres.

Last time I could report that the test was successfully conducted and that the collection and compilation of the large amount of information generated during the test had started.

Since then considerable efforts have been made at seismological stations and laboratories and at Experimental International Data Centres to further

analyze and study the large amount of data that was collected during the test and to evaluate the results and experiences obtained. Many people around the world have been involved in this work. Most of the basic material that is needed for an overall evaluation of the technical test is now also available and compiled. The large material collected during the test might prove valuable also for future more detailed national scientific investigations.

The co-ordinator of the technical test, Dr. Peter McGregor, Australia, and the Convenors and Co-convenors of our study groups have made great efforts in collecting, compiling and evaluating the large material. They have also assisted the Ad Hoc Group's Scientific Secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdal, in working out the preliminary draft of a report on the test. This draft has been the basis for the Ad Hoc Group's discussion last week. The dedicated efforts of all involved in the evaluation of the test, both within the Ad Hoc Group of Experts and at institutions around the world should be greatly appreciated. During the evaluation of the test, as during all other phases of the technical test, the Ad Hoc Group has enjoyed excellent co-operation with the WMO. I will in this context also recall the most co-operative and constructive spirit that has been shown among all experts in the Ad Hoc Group throughout our formal meetings as well as in the frequent informal contacts that have been established to conduct our work. We also greatly appreciate the eminent services provided by the secretariat and we are impressed by the way it handles our very technical material.

During last week's meeting the Ad Hoc Group discussed the factual results of the test as contained in a preliminary report. In my view there are now only few marginal questions that remain to be clarified as to the factual description of the test and its results, given the level of details needed for the Ad Hoc Group's overall evaluation of the test. The remaining uncertainties are not likely to affect the overall conclusions.

Coming back to some of the examples I gave last April to illustrate the size of the technical test we have now found that 76 seismological stations in 36 countries contributed data to the test. However, for organizational and technical reasons, all of these countries did not provide and receive data for the entire time period. I could also mention that almost 5,000 messages were exchanged and that the variation from one day to another was quite substantial. The number of messages received daily at Experimental International Data Centres ranged for example from 2 to 212. It has also now been established that in all 953 seismic events were observed and located during the test.

The Ad Hoc Group also discussed how the obtained results related to the original objectives of the test as stated in document CD/534. The Ad Hoc Group agreed that the objectives of the technical test were successfully fulfilled and further that the test has provided extremely valuable experience and technical information which was previously unavailable, on the actual topics to be tested.

This, I think, most important conclusion of the Ad Hoc Group, means that the technical test was successfully conducted in accordance with the plans established for the test. It also means that the test provided valuable experience and technical information on the various procedures to be used for the extraction of level-I data at seismological stations, for the exchange of

seismic and bulletin data over the WMO/GTS and for the work at International Data Centres. The fact that this experience and information simply was not available before the technical test means that a lot of knowledge of vital importance for developing procedures for the exchange and analysis of seismic data can be obtained only through technical tests.

What now remained to be done is to make an assessment of the various procedures earlier proposed by the Ad Hoc Group in the light of the experience gained from this test and try to find out which procedures worked well, and quite a lot certainly did, and which procedures might need to be refined and improved. Areas where uncertainties still prevail might also be identified.

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pp.7-10

Japan/Imai

25.7.85

CW

It has been one of the constant themes of the Japanese delegation in the discussion of disarmament measures that effective, acceptable and appropriate multilateral verification is one of the most central, although complicated and thus challenging, tasks. The difficulties stem not only from political considerations of disarmament but from technical details, and very much more and very often from the fact that one is dealing with the complicated and sophisticated structure of modern industries. To find an adequate system to suit the purpose is not easy. At the same time, we consider it fortunate that the international community has a wealth of experience at least in one form of such multilateral verification measures. I refer here to the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the implementation of safeguards against diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to possible military applications primarily under the régime of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There are many aspects of that experience that are useful in other areas of disarmament verification.

Let me add in haste, however, that IAEA safeguards have their own unique features which make it difficult to think about direct applications to other fields. For example, the IAEA system deals only with two chemical elements, namely uranium and plutonium, and in future possibly a third element, namely thorium, may be added to the list. These elements are unique in the sense that they emit distinct and characteristic radioactive energy. This is often called their unique signature which makes them very easy to locate and identify even in very minute and so-called trace quantities. There are not very many areas of industry in which these two or three chemical elements are used on a day-to-day basis. Compared to that, what we are dealing with in the context of a chemical weapons convention is a much more complicated situation. The chemical elements in question include chlorine, phosphate, hydrogen, oxygen and carbon, etc., which are among the most commonly available on earth or in the atmosphere.

The situation leads to the distinction that in the case of the nuclear industry, the pattern of what is called a nuclear fuel cycle is fairly limited and thus makes it easier to simplify the whole problem into mathematical models, and thus enable application of the theory of statistical sampling in order to calculate inspection frequencies. The complexity of the chemical industry as we know it today is such that I do not dare to even begin to discuss the general outline of the problems involved.

It should be clear from the outset that there is little likelihood of direct application of the IAEA safeguards technology to the case of a chemical weapons convention, and that careful assessment and evaluation are required in order to transfer various outcomes of the IAEA safeguards to let us say a chemical weapons convention.

At the same time, since we are talking about multilateral verification and related technologies, it is possible that there can be a number of basic concepts which are common and on which we can draw useful analogy from the work already done in the area of nuclear safeguards.

I would like to point out as one such example the application of the theory of statistical sampling in determination of the frequency of routine inspections. What is involved is that one determines the flow chart of chemicals within a designated facility, that is both the chemical forms and quantity as well as the pattern of their reactions, and then set a desired level of confidence of verification at, say, 85 per cent; then the theory will permit one to determine the frequency of routine sample-taking on a random basis in order to assure that if anything irregular is happening, one becomes aware of it with a level of confidence up to 85 per cent. It may be easier to understand if one said that the underlying mathematics is the same as that for quality control in industrial production. I shall not go into further details of the mathematics of sample-taking, but would like to mention that the IAEA safeguards have arrived at an extensive application of this idea after considerable debate, and it now forms the basis of determining what is called the maximum frequency of routine inspection for different facilities. It might be useful in due course for us to arrange to look into its applicability in the case of our CW convention.

Another device which may find useful application in the CW case is an extensive use of tamper-proof, or more exactly, tamper-resistant automated mechanisms. These may be seals to ensure that no unauthorized withdrawal of material has taken place from a designated store. In this case, there is a choice of dispatching international inspectors every now and then to confirm the integrity of the seal. Or one may adopt a slightly more costly but overall more cost-effective way of remote sensing so that any violation of the seal would be known to the control centre, at the time of such violation. Introduction of on-line real-time remote sensors, connecting the objects to be verified with control centres through modern electronic devices is probably what Norbert Wiener once described as the "humane use of human beings" in that it will release a considerable number of human inspectors from the tedious chore of looking at seals and meters on-site, all day long, and enable them to turn to more creative and profitable work. One may note in passing that this is the basic concept for introduction of robots into various industrial processes. The idea of continual remote verification had already been introduced in our forum, for instance through CD/271 and other papers. What I am presenting today is an advanced version of such a concept which we have developed in Japan and have found useful in the case of IAEA safeguards.

The system as described in CD/619 is made of various devices which convert data into digital form and then transmit them either through ordinary telephone lines or through special satellite communication devices to the control centre. Advancement in sensor technology, in analog-to-digital converters, and miniaturization of data transmission devices makes it possible

now to send: (a) readings from meters and other instrument panels; (b) still pictures; and (c) written messages, almost instantly, automatically and with a great deal of accuracy and reliability. It is thus possible to carry out a constant monitor of flow, temperature, or even chemical components, or to take intermittent time interval pictures of a premise from a distance. It is no surprise that high-speed, high-density communication through use of devices such as fibre-optics represent the most advanced of the so-called high technologies of today, so that the above-mentioned functions, if applied on a consistent scale, can be achieved without much of an additional cost.

The occasions where this technique may be applied are, for example: firstly, declared CW stockpiles, after initial verification to ensure against any unauthorized and unscheduled removal of material in question; secondly, to ensure that the process of elimination or destruction at the declared dedicated facilities is taking place according to the schedule, and in accordance with the declared method; and thirdly, to ascertain that production of those categories of chemicals for permitted activities are within the stipulated limits.

There may be many other applications of this technology. It is at the same time important to realize that automated, remote, on-line verification can be feasible only when the design and lay-out of the facilities in question, as well as the flow pattern of chemicals in process is accurately known. In this sense, there is no difference from the case of the continued presence of human inspectors on site.

I would not want to bother my colleagues any further with the technical details on this subject, I hope that Working Paper CD/619 will be enough, at least for the moment, to give the outline of the proposed concept. One important point that I would like to emphasize is that the system as described in the Working Paper is one that we know to actually work, and that it is on the basis of such knowledge that we consider it can find application in certain aspects of a verification of a CW convention. What is more, I would like to point out that automated, remote sensing has an additional merit to the advantage of cost/effectiveness in the employment of human inspectors. It has the merit of objectivity and uniformity in the quality of data they collect and transmit, which are very important elements in verification.

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pp.16-18

Sweden/Ekeus

25.7.85

CW

We are proposing a way to structure the substance involved, covering all the different aspects of the Convention from declarations, through elimination of chemical weapons and continued production, to verification of the various articles. The proposed structure draws upon principles on which we seem to agree and is founded on the basic structure and definitions as presented in CD/539, Annex I. The principles and solutions proposed could rather easily be transformed into texts for articles incorporated under the headlines of CD/539, Annex I.

The proposal in substance uses elements which, according to our understanding of the result of the work in the Ad Hoc Committee, represent a common approach, without being necessarily formally agreed upon.

Thus the proposal does not contain any new elements or alternatives to what appears to have a general support in the Committee. What could be looked upon as new is the way in which the generally acceptable elements are organized and registered. We would like to characterize the proposal as ideas for a structure of already accepted elements of substance. With this proposal we hope to make a contribution to the efforts to speed up the drafting of articles of the future convention.

The philosophy of the proposal is simple. We base ourselves on the definitions as they already appear in CD/539, Annex I. Following declarations, it is proposed that the supertoxic lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals, key precursors and precursors to be arranged in three groups. To summarize, Group I contains mainly supertoxic lethal chemicals which could be used for chemical weapons and single-purpose key precursors. Group II contains the remaining supertoxic lethal chemicals and key precursors. Group III comprises other lethal and most of the other harmful chemicals and some precursors.

For each one of these three groups a régime for elimination, production and verification is devised. Régime I should be the most stringent and demanding one and shall apply to all Group I chemicals. Régime II should also be stringent but somewhat less burdensome and apply to all the Group II chemicals. Régime III would be least stringent of the three and apply to the Group III chemicals.

I would now like to elaborate a little on this approach.

My delegation considers that with respect to Group I the following chemicals are relevant: all supertoxic lethal chemicals which are or could be used for chemical weapons. Group I also should include single purpose other lethal chemicals, if any, and some other harmful chemicals, for example glycollate incapacitants. Another category which should be among the Group I chemicals are all key precursors with no or little peaceful use including those which could be used as key components of multicomponent weapons, such as DF and QL.

In Group II, my delegation would put chemicals which according to their toxicity are supertoxic lethal chemicals but which are used only for peaceful purposes, mainly within the pharmaceutical industry. Heart glucosides and some carbamates are examples of such chemicals. There is always a risk that the development of these chemicals could lead to the development of new chemical weapons. Therefore, if a State Party has reason to believe that a chemical in this group is a potential chemical weapon it may propose that the Consultative Committee move it to Group I.

Group II should also include key precursors which have peaceful uses.

In Group III we would include other lethal chemicals which have widespread peaceful uses but which have also been produced for chemical weapons purposes. Furthermore Group III would encompass "other harmful chemicals", other than those in Group I, as well as some precursors with widespread peaceful uses which might also be used in the early stages of the production of chemical weapons.

Having thus outlined the groups of chemicals, the basic principles for three corresponding régimes should be drawn up.

Régime I should apply to all the Group I chemicals. It should be a very strict and demanding régime, since the Group I chemicals basically are the ones solely intended for chemical weapons.

As regards the question of elimination of stocks the rule of Régime I should be elimination through destruction. Exceptions to this rule should be very few and must be explicitly permitted. One such exception would be a provision in the Convention that Group I chemicals may be retained for protective purposes in aggregate quantities not exceeding one ton annually.

As regards continued production the rules should be: no such production. Here again, some limited and explicit exceptions could, however, be envisaged. I am thinking about production for protective purposes in which case the aggregate amounts produced and retained should not exceed one ton annually. All such production should take place in a single small scale facility. Production for other purposes could also be permitted on a laboratory scale, in very small quantities, measured in grams/year.

As regards capacity for production of Group I chemicals, the rule should be that such capacity should be declared and eliminated.

The verification measures applicable in Régime I should be the most stringent and include the permanent presence of international inspectors as regards the elimination processes and monitoring and systematic international on-site inspection of the production.

Finally, Régime I should naturally apply also to munitions and other devices.

Régime II should be designed for the Group II chemicals. Key precursors existing in stocks for chemical weapons purposes should be eliminated either through destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes. Since Group II contains chemicals with a certain potential for future development of new chemical weapons, the continued production could be limited to a certain quantity annually and should take place at a single small-scale facility or at other specially approved facilities.

Facilities having produced these chemicals should be declared if the production has exceeded a certain quantity. It should also be declared if the production will continue or new production is planned.

To ensure that these chemicals are not developed into new types of chemical weapons the verification régime would need to be stringent. Data reporting as well as systematic international on-site inspections are envisaged.

The elimination of the Group III chemicals in chemical-weapons stocks could be carried out through destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes. Continued production should be declared. Facilities having produced the Group III chemicals should also be declared if production has exceeded, let us say, one ton annually.

The verification measures applicable under Régime III would comprise data-reporting and systematic international on-site inspection.

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pp.18-20

GDR/Rose

25.7.85

CW,CTB

Mr. President, in my statement today, I would like to present a Working Paper, CD/620, which my delegation has prepared on measures to verify compliance with a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In recent years, we have repeatedly expressed our views and positions on that subject. My country is convinced that the combination of national verification measures and international procedures constitutes the basis on which the problems can be solved.

In the last few years, agreement has been reached to the effect that certain forms of international verification may be used with regard to various aspects of the CW convention. The formulation of measures concerning international inspections should be approached in a realistic and balanced manner, since security, national sovereignty, and commercial and financial issues are involved.

My delegation concurs with the opinion the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai, put forward here on 14 February that the CW convention "should work to enhance the national security of all States, while at the same time it should not pose any impediments in the development of normal activities of the world's peaceful chemical industries". My country believes that it is in the first instance up to the States themselves to enforce on their national territories what they have undertaken internationally and to give other parties the assurance that those obligations are being complied with. The establishment of a national control system is, of course, the prerogative of the countries concerned. But this should not prevent us from making recommendations relating to such a system in connection with a chemical weapons convention.

National verification measures are of fundamental significance. In applying them, States would live up to the responsibility they have for the implementation of the Convention. What is more, those measures represent the basis on which the entire system of verification must be built.

International verification procedures can only be effectively developed in close connection with national procedures. The sovereign right of States to decide on international measures for the implementation of the Convention is beyond all doubt. Likewise, it should be recognized that the exchange of information on the essentials of those measures will be indispensable, if confidence is to be created, which will be necessary to ensure co-operation among the parties to the Convention.

The purpose of the Working Paper is to stimulate the process of drafting provisions pertaining to two aspects of national verification, that is, guidelines for the establishment of a national verification authority and principles relative to the control of certain chemicals.

Part I contains proposals and possible international guidelines concerning the operation of a national authority. By setting up a special body or commissioning an existing one, the party in question would be in a position to meet its responsibility for the implementation of the Convention on its territory and for compliance with it. The national authority should have appropriate powers and co-operate with the international consultative committee, especially with regard to the exchange of data and support for international procedures. It may be set up as a single body. Its duties may also be performed by several separate bodies.

Part II sets out possible guidelines for a national system of accounting for and control of chemicals in connection with the Convention. An important aspect of the activities of the national authority is to ensure that chemical weapons are not produced.

The problem of non-production has recently added topicality in view of the plans to produce a new generation of chemical weapons. The Convention must, therefore, provide for appropriate measures to guarantee that such weapons are not manufactured in a way circumventing the Convention. Clearly-phrased regulations concerning permitted activities in the Convention will have to satisfy that requirement.

The floor having been given to me, I would like to comment very briefly on another subject. It is with great interest that my delegation has taken note of the progress report presented by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. We have learnt from that report that the evaluation of the technical test concerning the exchange of Level I data, making regular use of the WMO/GTS, has made further headway. We expect the final report at the spring part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation would like to express its gratitude to the Chairman, Mr. Dahlman, the Co-Ordinator, the Conveners and all the members of the Ad Hoc Group for what they have accomplished so far. My country, which participated in the test and which is taking part in the evaluation process, regards the report as a contribution to the effort to work out a comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. Like the majority of delegations to the Conference, my country believes that the conclusion of such a treaty is of great importance and urgency.

The contribution of the Ad Hoc Working Group can, of course, become effective only if and when negotiations on a CTB treaty start. Attempts to separate the work of the Group from the efforts to attain such an accord would not only go contrary to the mandate and the general understanding on which the Group operates, but they would also counteract the activities aimed at reserving the problems under item 1 of our agenda.

In the light of the positions formulated in two Working Papers, CD/610 and CD/612, recently introduced by the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, my delegation has deemed it necessary to elaborate on that aspect.

I do not want to go into any details at this time, but it should be made perfectly clear that any attempt to divorce the verification issue from the test-ban treaty itself is bound to lead to a situation where the cessation of

all nuclear-weapon testing will be postponed indefinitely. A test ban, however, is a must if the nuclear-arms race is to be stopped and a nuclear war is to be prevented, in other words, if we are to accomplish the number one task of mankind.

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p.23

USSR/Issraelyan

25.7.85

CW

As a major indication of the United States' interest in concluding a convention the United States delegation referred in its statement of 23 July to the fact that in 1984 the United States side submitted a draft convention on the subject. The mere fact, however, of submitting a document of some kind does not mean that it furthers progress in the negotiations. Sometimes, in fact, the result is quite the reverse. This is exactly what happened as a result of the submission of the United States draft convention. Instead of searching for a way to bring positions closer together, the authors of this document submitted a so-called "new convention" which hardened even further the United States position on the verification issue, and thus, in other words, represented a departure by the United States side from its positions not in the direction of agreement but in quite the opposite direction.

One of the authors of the "new convention", United States Assistant Secretary of Defence Perle, according to reports in the United States press, obtained the inclusion in the draft convention of verification provisions which would inevitably stalemate the negotiations. He himself did not hide this. Mr. Perle publicly acknowledged that "we will not be able to reach agreement on this basis. They [the Russians] may turn out to be simply unready to go to that level of inspection".

We considered the United States' submission of the draft convention as intended to create new difficulties in the negotiations and to prevent further work in preparing the convention for which the prospects were favourable in 1984 as a result of efforts by many delegations and, in particular, of proposals advanced by the Soviet Union which went to meet the positions of our negotiating partners, including the western countries. Their positive nature was recognized by many delegations, including western delegations. The representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Norway and even the United States expressed satisfaction over our proposals on verification of stocks and of the elimination of chemical weapons. We had the right to expect that this satisfaction would lead to movement towards us from the other side, and that it would facilitate the search for agreement in other areas too. However, the response was a hardening of the United States' position.

It must be said that the United States achieved its goal. Actually, after the introduction of the United States draft here, an extremely complicated situation has developed in the negotiations.

On 23 July the United States delegation asserted that although the United States draft convention was not an ultimatum, the verification provisions it contained do have the character of an ultimatum. In essence the United States delegation has refused to discuss verification proposals which would be less rigid, less burdensome for States (in the American terminology, "less effective").

We are convinced that this Conference can and should work on the question of a nuclear-test ban. We believe this view is widely shared in the Conference. For this reason we find it difficult to understand why those delegations which are amongst the firmest proponents of such a treaty continue to resist proposals we have made which would enable practical work related to such a treaty to be continued and pursued with vigour.

On July 24 last year, exactly one year ago, I had the honour of tabling on behalf of the same group of countries a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 -- document CD/521. That draft was the product of deep, thorough consideration and extensive consultation. It also reflected new flexibility. That draft mandate, drawn up pursuant to paragraph 120 of the final document would enable the Conference to resume practical work on "specific issues relating to a comprehensive test ban -- with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject". We all know what those issues are. They are -- the scope of such a treaty and the means through which verification of it and compliance with it could be assured.

We have not pressed our draft mandate to a decision but we would welcome consensus on it.

Such a consensus has not yet been possible to achieve, and among the reasons given for this are that no further work on verification is required and that our draft mandate does not provide for the immediate negotiation of a treaty. But what is the reality? With regard to verification, there are clearly many and various views on what is technically possible and on what would be required for adequate and effective verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This is the fact, but what are we to make of it? Surely, where there are honest differences of view we should meet in a subsidiary body and work together on verification and other substantive issues in order to sort out our differences.

Significant contributions to this end have been made in the past and in the current session by Western delegations through their action in tabling technical papers on the problems of verification and on the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

A number of those papers have made significant proposals but in the absence of an ad hoc committee it is difficult to see how these proposals can be given the serious attention and consideration they deserve.

In response we have often heard a simple flat assertion that there are no verification problems. This is neither an adequate nor a factual response and it certainly is not helpful. It is not acceptable to write off genuinely-held and valid concerns by a simple assertion that the problem does not exist. The courageous response would be to join in the discussion to seek to prove one's point of view, to seek to demonstrate that there are no problems, or if there are problems, to seek to co-operate together in finding the solutions to them.

Another area in which my delegation thinks we can commence work with a good prospect of making substantial progress is high-altitude ASATs. A ban on these, including their development, deployment and testing, is feasible at the present stage when only low-altitude ASATs are in existence. Inevitably we have to engage in a collective quest for clear definitions of what we mean by high-altitude ASATs. If we accomplish this, existing national technical means of verification can undertake the task of verifying compliance with the ban. These means of verification possess facilities for precise determination of the orbits of space objects and can detect testing of guidance and homing mechanisms necessary for ASATs. Such a ban may seem to be of peripheral value considering the fact that it will not interfere with current military and defence strategies which a ban on BMD systems would. Nevertheless working on such a ban of these destabilizing weapons is an important step where, according to our view, agreement is more likely than others. Progress in this area could well provide the encouragement and impetus to move into other fields. Failure to do so will call in question the bona fides of delegations so dogmatic and implacably opposed to any negotiation that they will reject the opportunity of looking for an agreement even in a non-controversial area. It will also open the way for developing beam weapons to strike early warning satellites orbiting at 36,000 km in a fraction of a second, increasing the risk of an accident in the crowded geostationary orbit.

My delegation was also pleased to note in the progress report the citation of the extensive participation by States and seismic stations in the technical test -- 36 States and 76 stations. This is an impressive count, and reflects the widely-shared view of the great usefulness of the work of the GSE for verification of compliance with a future nuclear test ban.

In view of the value of their work, it is important that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts continue to enjoy the strong support of all delegations represented here. That this is the case for my delegation goes without saying. We eagerly await the GSE's report, and we look forward to their future efforts to develop further the best possible ways to collect, analyze and exchange data to detect and identify seismic events on a global basis.

My delegation wishes to record again its appreciation for the outstanding contributions of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden, the Scientific Secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdal of Norway, and the Co-ordinator of the technical test, Dr. Peter McGregor of Australia. It is due to their dedication, patience, and persistence, and to that of their scientific colleagues, that the work of the GSE has advanced successfully to its present stage.

If one devotes but a little time to investigating the work of the Group of scientific experts, one conclusion quickly emerges: the work of the GSE is far from being completed. It cannot be fairly said that a global network for the exchange of seismic data is in place, is operational, or that this network answers all questions and meets all needs of prospective parties to a future comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Even a relatively brief test of an

experimental global system, such as the 1984 technical test, generated very large quantities of data, raised many questions and has provided many important lessons for the future. The GSE is now devoting its considerable talents to digesting and understanding these matters, but without prejudging their conclusions, my delegation is convinced that much productive work yet remains.

Accordingly, my delegation stresses again that we look to the further work of the GSE, as well as other efforts, to resolve problems in the vital area of verification of compliance with a nuclear test ban.

A related effort should certainly be the resumption of a detailed and substantive examination of these issues, as well as of other nuclear test ban issues, in an ad hoc committee under agenda item one.

The distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler, spoke on 25 July for a group of Western States in introducing a work programme illustrating how an ad hoc committee could proceed, under the mandate proposed by Western delegations in CD/521. My delegation fully supports Ambassador Butler's statement, and the programme of work he introduced. This programme of work, CD/621, which also enjoys the sponsorship of Norway, clearly indicates that practical efforts are possible in the Conference on Disarmament on specific issues related to a nuclear test ban, including slope, verification and compliance, and that it is not western delegations that are blocking such practical work.

Moreover, the Conference has before it new Working Papers introduced by Norway, CD/599, by the United Kingdom, CD/610, and by the Federal Republic of Germany, CD/612. These documents are substantive, detailed, and significant. They contain an abundance of material which should be thoroughly assessed by the Conference. Getting down to work on these and other contributions in an ad hoc committee is a more useful and practical way to proceed on a nuclear test ban than restricting our work only to plenary sessions.

My delegation has taken due note of the announcement, read to us on 30 July by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, concerning a suspension of nuclear explosions by the USSR beginning on 6 August. We may wish to return to this subject at a later time, but we are, of course, aware of the historical significance of the chosen date, as well as our historical experience with previous moratoriums and subsequent large-scale Soviet testing efforts. Historically, the Soviet Union has demonstrated that it has no reluctance for nuclear testing, and that it will conduct such tests whenever it considers it in its national interest to do so. We have serious doubts, therefore, that such moratoriums are a sound basis for a genuine agreement on verifiable testing limitations, that they would limit further growth in nuclear arsenals, or that they would contribute significantly to the stability and confidence that sustains disarmament negotiations.

The United States position on a complete cessation of nuclear explosions remains as I have stated it in this body as recently as 27 June. And while the United States believes that the most direct path to the elimination of

nuclear weapons is through equitable and verifiable reductions, it also believes that verifiable limitations on nuclear explosions can play a useful, though more modest, role.

In this connection, I draw the attention of my colleagues to the announcement made on 29 July in Washington of the new United States proposal designed to improve confidence in monitoring capability and compliance with nuclear testing limitations. This proposal goes beyond the offer made by President Reagan in his address to the United Nations General Assembly last 24 September, when he called on the Soviet Union to exchange experts at each other's nuclear test sites to measure test yields directly. The latest United States proposal contains a new, substantial and concrete element: an unconditional invitation to the Soviet Union for its experts to visit a United States test site, and to bring any equipment they deem necessary to carry out the direct yield measurement of a test.

Although the proposal was made without any conditions, it is our hope that such a practical step will be one of the "measures" of which Ambassador Turbanski spoke, and that it will stimulate a process which will enable the United States and the Soviet Union to establish the basis for the verification of effective limits on underground nuclear testing.

CD/PV.326

pp.12-14

FRG/Wegener

1.8.85

CTB

Three weeks ago, on 11 July, my delegation tabled a Working Paper, CD/612, in which it proposed to establish a global seismic network on a continuous basis, and to improve the capabilities of this network while it is being operated, in a learning-by-doing process. The intention in undertaking this project is to set up a working global monitoring and verification system for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban based on seismic technology and to do this already before the conclusion of a CTB treaty. It is a realistic assumption that the physical installation of a global seismic monitoring and verification system, that is, the qualitative upgrading as well as the geographical expansion of the network and the establishment of a global data communication system, will take time, somewhere in the order of several years. Given this time frame, my delegation is of the view that the period between now and the conclusion of a test-ban treaty should not be wasted, but used for the establishment of such a system which will have to be set up in any case in order to verify compliance with a CTB treaty. I would therefore like to emphasize that our proposed project is intended to be a parallel and complementary action to the work of a CTB ad hoc committee of this Conference.

Working Paper CD/612 provided a detailed description of the institutional arrangements for a seismic monitoring and verification system and an outline of the measures that need to be taken.

Today, I am introducing a study, which is before you as document CD/624, that elaborates in a detailed manner on these scientific and technical aspects of the proposed project.

The study analyzes the requirements and conditions under which the verification capability of a global seismic network, that is, to detect, locate and identify explosions, can be progressively increased and describes the measures which should be taken to achieve the desired improvements.

The study concludes that a global seismic monitoring system which would operate in the teleseismic range could be brought to a standard of performance which would allow for detection and identification of explosions down to a body-wave magnitude 4.0. This measurement is approximately equivalent to an explosion yield of 5 to 20 kt in dry unconsolidated rock or to a yield of about 1 kt for explosions in wet hard rock.

A special section of the study is devoted to the possibility of setting up explosions in large underground cavities which would result in a significant muffling or even a complete decoupling of the generated seismic signals from the geological environment of the explosion. This would open up the possibility of evading detection and identification of test explosions. The capabilities of a global network, operating in the teleseismic range would in this case not be sufficient. An appropriate number of additional regional or in-country networks would be required which could significantly improve the capability to detect and identify explosions and which would make successful evasion by cavity-decoupling a rather difficult and risky undertaking.

One has, however, to conclude from the study that a number of serious uncertainties remain at this juncture in the area of low yield explosions, in particular in connection with cavity-decoupling techniques which require further scientific investigation. Efforts are already in process to cope with these rather intricate problems. As an example I would like to point to current studies of the significance of high-frequency signals for the detection of explosions in underground cavities.

The preparation and introduction to this Conference of Working Paper CD/612 and the present scientific study express the importance which the Federal Government attaches to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Our proposal to establish a global seismic monitoring and verification system which should be progressively improved while in operation is a serious one and should not be dismissed as yet another interesting idea which is best dealt with by preserving it in the files of delegations. We are determined to find ways and means to put our proposed project into operation. In this view we are asking delegations to seek a dialogue with us, to express their views and to join us in a pragmatic approach to the issues related to a comprehensive test ban.

The natural place to engage in such an exercise is a subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament. However, to the great disappointment of my delegation, this Conference has so far not been able to agree on a mandate for a CTB ad hoc committee. We are seriously concerned about the stagnation of the mandate issue and we grow increasingly impatient with the all-or-nothing attitude of some delegations in this Conference which in effect results in a waste of time which should better be used for the solution to outstanding problems related to a CTB.

My delegation is among those which tabled a programme of work for a CTB committee on 25 July. This draft programme demonstrates the wide range of issues and the practical work that could and should be pursued under the proposed Western mandate in CD/521. Even in the absence of a formal subsidiary body, Western delegations have continued their efforts to contribute to the identification and better understanding of the remaining problems related to the scope, institutional organization, and verification of

a comprehensive test ban. Several Western delegations have tabled substantive working papers. Norway invited delegations to a workshop during which in a very pragmatic, effective, and comprehensive manner the state of the art and the limits of verification by seismic means were presented. May I seize this opportunity to thank the Norwegian Government again for the excellent execution and the host of valuable information obtained in the course of this workshop.

We hope that the present stalemate on the question of a CTB mandate can still be overcome during this session. In the meantime, however, our efforts related to a comprehensive test ban should not stand still. The establishment and continuous operation of a global seismic monitoring and verification system can be and should be discussed in the Conference on Disarmament now. Let me repeat: we expect delegations to respond to our proposed project; we expect them to join us in a fruitful exchange of ideas and the commitment to practical work on the setting up of such a seismic monitoring and verification network.

The Working Paper which I have tabled today is technical in nature; and, indeed, the proposal in its entirety relates to a technical support system for a future comprehensive test ban. This, however, must not becloud the fact that we are dealing with a highly political subject matter and that the initiative of my delegation is intended to be a political one. In my statement of 11 July, I gave the reasons why my Government wants the early conclusion of a CTBT, and outlined the circumstances under which such a treaty should come about. We look at it as an important milestone in the larger process of nuclear disarmament. Accomplishments of such significance cannot be reached by mere declaratory activities, by short-term proposals without any real military significance, proposals that are mainly -- and obviously -- designed to evoke applause from the gallery. Whoever wants a durable serious solution to the testing issues, must acknowledge their complexity. My delegation has always been of the view that the price for progress in disarmament is serious, intensive work with the participation of all concerned. The most important unsolved problem of efforts to reach a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the question of verification. An increasingly satisfactory solution to this issue is the key to a durable prohibition -- or even limitation -- of testing. This insight should also provide the yardstick for measuring the worth of the two important proposals by the United States and the Soviet Union on testing of which we have been apprized at the beginning of this week. The merit of the United States proposal -- an invitation allowing precise measurements and calibration of instruments on-site -- is that it can contribute to giving a new impetus to the verification debate. On the other hand we regret that the short-term moratorium proposal of the Soviet Union does not address the verification problem at all. This limits its contribution to a durable solution of the problems on hand.

CD/PV.327

pp.10-13

Japan/Imai

6.8.85

CTB

I have asked for the floor today primarily to introduce Working Paper CD/626 on the subject of verification of a NTB agreement. It is entitled "Concrete measures for the realization of the International Seismic Data Exchange System" and is very much of a technical nature. It attempts to assess the necessary amount of effort, equipment as well as the cost and

personnel requirements to upgrade a multilateral seismic monitoring and data exchange network so that the level of reliability on such a system and confidence in its output will greatly increase.

Before getting into details of this Working Paper, I would like to highlight some of the basic considerations on the subject of a comprehensive test ban and its verification.

There is indeed no need to repeat here the important role a comprehensive test ban can play in preventing both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Within the history of arms control and disarmament, the concept and the work on a nuclear test ban have been a very important ingredient of what we might call the Geneva process, in which Japan has always taken a keen interest and worked with a view to making significant contribution toward its realization. It started with the combined concern of the world back in the 1950s about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as about the harmful environmental effects imposed by various atmospheric and other nuclear testing.

After the partial test ban was achieved in 1963, the seeming lack of progress in the area of the underground test ban prevailed and I do not need to remind colleagues how frustrating this whole process has been. This situation is often tied to the issue of verification and compliance; I shall refrain from elucidating the philosophy and logic of verification here, because I had an opportunity to do so already back in 1983 in considerable detail, when I presented Working Paper CD/379 entitled "Verification of Compliance in Disarmament and Arms Control Agreements". I shall merely point out here that verification can be neither a technological solution to a political problem nor a political solution to what is essentially a technological problem, and that there is no verification technology that assures 100 per cent certainty. Verification, if it is to be effective, convincing, and acceptable, has to reside in the inter-disciplinary area between technology and politics of disarmament, the important ingredient of which should be "confidence" among the parties. There is always a need for technical effort to increase the credibility of the various verification means involved.

A very important aspect of verification in the case of CTB is that it be conceived and function as a multilateral mechanism. It is important that the contribution of data into this system should come not just from the nuclear-weapon States, but also from many capable non-nuclear-weapon States suitably situated around the globe with adequate seismic observation stations which will input data into a global system in which information is constantly flowing and is available for near-real-time analysis. An international organ will be necessary to maintain the high-quality operation of this system. Equally the assessment of data and determination of steps to be taken should be in the domain of concrete multilateral action by such an international organ.

Japan already presented Working Paper CD/389 in 1983 regarding effective functioning of this system, and welcomes new inputs of important ideas such as those contained in Working Papers CD/612 of the Federal Republic of Germany and CD/610 of the United Kingdom. In addition to technical means of verification, and means of collecting and analyzing information, the definition of legal and other functions, as well as the economics of such a multilateral

structure will have to be carefully defined in order to make the system workable. When Foreign Minister Abe of Japan made a proposal on a "step-by-step approach to CTB" here at this Conference in June last year, he had in fact envisioned many of these practical steps that are required before we can arrive at a meaningful CTB. The process of converting a CTB ideal to the working realities of an international disarmament régime requires many difficult and tedious steps, especially when the general international atmosphere is not particularly conducive to this goal.

One may refer here to the issues of multilateral verification in the case of vertical proliferation, such as the upgrading of nuclear warheads and proliferation and refinement of means of weapons delivery as well as their countermeasures. There is a considerable debate today about verifiability regarding number, quality, location, etc. of ballistic missiles, anti-ballistic missiles, anti-tactical ballistic missiles, etc., and the associated command and control systems on the ground, in the atmosphere, or in outer space. A good part of the means of detection and analysis and thus of verification in this domain is performed through national technical means or NTM. Some aspects of NTM capabilities such as various imaging systems and electronic listening devices are closely guarded military secrets which makes multilateralization of verification rather difficult. This is not the place or time to elaborate on the problems regarding technologies involved in the various NTM, their limitations or possible solutions. A considerable amount of argument is already available in open literature. It is worthwhile to take note that a certain amount of mutual co-operation among the parties of, let us say, the SALT/ABM Treaties, starting from the pledge not to disturb the operation of the NTM of the other side, is becoming an accepted ingredient. At the same time ideas such as an independent international verification satellite is mentioned as one of the possible approaches to multilateralize the process, and to ensure a wide-range of participation in verification, although legal, technical and financial problems need to be carefully examined and a well-established international organ will have to emerge in order to assure the cost-effective operation of the satellites in question.

Compared to all this, an international seismic network for a CTB is in an easier situation. Thanks to the continued work by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, we have a far better grasp and understanding of what this network is or should be like as well as what it can and cannot do. Since the seismic data of interest and concern are often very small, weak and distant signals masked under environmental, artificial and other noises, there are a number of points on which special care has to be taken. Firstly, seismic data collected must be processed in such a way as to make the world-wide exchange possible. Secondly, data so collected, processed and transmitted should be reliable, and should be susceptible of meaningful mathematical analysis. Thirdly, methodology used for data processing and analysis should be established and accepted internationally as adequate and reliable.

Based on the above considerations, taking information and criteria in the Ad Hoc Group's own work embodied in CCD/558, CD/43, CD/448, we have enumerated the steps necessary to upgrade the existing seismic network to an acceptable high level of detection capabilities. Document CCD/558 mentions: about 50 detection systems; exchange of data through WMO/GTS; exchange of level II data to supplement level I data; and three international data centres.

Further steps can be taken to improve the detection capabilities to cover with high confidence any underground explosion anywhere on Earth. We have also calculated the number of personnel and the cost of installation and operation of such an improved system including high sensitivity seismological detection instruments, digitalization of information, improved communication through a computerized data network etc. For general interest, the total cost of upgrading the network is calculated to be about half a billion dollars at the initial stage.

I shall merely refer to the usual argument regarding disarmament expenditure and say that the cost of having and operating an upgraded seismic monitoring system even almost to perfection is an order of magnitude smaller than what is often required for modern sophisticated weapons.

So much of our work depends on the outcome of the elaboration by the Ad Hoc Group and our Working Paper CD/626 is also explicit evidence of the quality and usefulness of their work. It should come as no surprise, therefore, if I insist that this body, which was established in 1976, and which has given us very important insight into the problem of the seismic means of verification regarding CTB, be further requested to continue and expand their work. We would like to advocate that the Conference should make a further request to this body, to complete the work of assessment of the data exchange tests of 1984, the work which the Ad Hoc Group has undertaken in July also, to continue additional examination regarding Level I data extraction, transmission and processing and combine that with the automatic introduction of Level II data as a means to further increase the confidence in verification.

I would also like to observe that in the case of a seismic network for a CTB we are talking about highly sensitive sensors to detect and discriminate among weak and distant signals and transmit them accurately through a complicated global communications system, so that the aggregate value of information so compounded is enough to serve as evidence in connection with an arms control agreement. In this regard I would like to express our appreciation for the workshop sponsored by the Norwegian Government last June. The work being done with the seismic array, NORSAR, is undoubtedly an important factor in the development of the system. I would also like to add that this is the area of high technology that is advancing the most rapidly at present and calls for a very wide and extensive application throughout the world. We believe that the kind of considerations I have discussed, and presented in the Working Paper should be also useful in the future development of a verification system for arms control agreement other than a CTBT.

It is in such a spirit that I have today taken the floor and introduced this Working Paper. It may be a small step in a long way. I am aware that there are various arguments regarding the verification of underground nuclear testing; the correlation between identification and detection, possible explosions so small that they might escape detection, or the need for installation of black boxes to catch high frequency signals. These may be important elements to be considered in the evaluation of a CTB régime in the final form. These, however, are not the things I am talking about today. Today I would like to re-emphasize the resolve of Japanese people to reach a CTBT, if only step by step.

Pretext Three, has on many occasions been raised here at the Conference on Disarmament too. It is that a negative approach towards the moratorium is explained by the fact that it is impossible to verify compliance with it.

However, not only Soviet but also prominent scientists and experts of other countries, including the United States, clearly reject this artificial pretext. Suffice it to refer to the statement by Mr. Colby, former Director of the CIA, who directly stated the other day that compliance with the moratorium on nuclear explosions "could be, no doubt, guaranteed with existing national technical means of control".

The solution of the task of verification is facilitated by the circumstance that the Soviet moratorium applies to the cessation of all nuclear explosions, whether military (i.e. nuclear-weapon tests) or peaceful.

However, verification is not the crux of the matter. The true reason is quite different. It can be clearly seen, for example, in an official letter of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to Congress in response to the latter's request. This letter explains why the United States Government opposes the cessation of nuclear tests: "before it (cessation of tests) could meet the best interests of the United States, it is necessary to resolve some important problems". What are these problems? "Nuclear tests" -- the letter goes on to say -- "are especially needed for the development, modernization and certification of warheads, preservation of the reliability of present stockpiles and assessment of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons".

One cannot put it more clearly.

As for the speculation in the West about verification, we cannot but point this out. We are told that if the Soviet Union advocates the ratification of the treaties of 1974 and 1976 on underground nuclear explosions, why then is it against the adaptation of the provisions on control and verification of these treaties as proposed by the United States?

There is no need for such adaptation since modern national technical means enable both sides to control nuclear tests with a high degree of precision and reliability. Moreover, due to its geographic situation the United States has better verification possibilities than the Soviet Union. In this case too, then, it is a question not of control but of the intention of the United States not to bring the signed treaties into force, and to continue a large-scale programme of nuclear tests.

Finally, there are some people in Washington, and also here at the Conference, who try to present as a very important step in the cessation of tests the United States proposal to the Soviet Union to send Soviet experts to an American nuclear-weapon test site and to attend such tests.

Why should Soviet representatives go to the United States? To consecrate, so to speak, by their presence the American nuclear explosions? One should stop nuclear explosions and not extend invitations to observe how they are conducted. This is too serious a problem to try to reduce it to a

propaganda gimmick. The international community consistently seeks a rapid, unconditional, unlimited ban on nuclear tests, and not the continuation of tests under the cover of various bogus procedures.

CD/PV.327

pp.23-24

GDR/Rose

6.8.85

CTB

The draft mandate in CD/521 focuses on the examination -- not the negotiation -- of specific issues such as scope and verification of compliance. Under that mandate, "the institutional arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network as part of an effective verification system" would have to be studied further. The mandate was not adopted. However, the Working Papers, CD/610, CD/612 and CD/624 submitted by the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, respectively, and emphatically supported by the delegation of the United States of America, have shed some light on what the proposed mandate is really about.

CD/610 comes to the incorrect conclusion that the exchange of seismic data received by the stations of the States parties to a future CTB treaty would not be sufficient to ensure compliance with the treaty. I do not intend to go into the details of why such a wrong conclusion was possible, but I should like to mention that the paper itself says that it does not deal either with the problems of on-site inspection or with questions relating to monitoring other than for the underground environment. This selective approach itself artificially creates problems which do not exist in practice. Papers CD/612 and CD/624 expound the idea of a global seismic verification system. Based on the present situation with respect to experimental data exchange, the documents propose the gradual development and setting in operation of such a system without any regard for the efforts to work out and conclude a CTB treaty. In a rather ambiguous manner, the papers give estimated time-frames for the different steps, ranging from two and four years to eight years.

The first question we would have to ask in this context is: what has happened to the general consensus that any verification measures should always relate to the relevant arms limitation or disarmament agreement? This important general consensus has existed for a long period. It was already reflected in the Zorin-McCloy Agreement of 20 September 1961, unanimously approved by General Assembly resolution 1722/XVI. Article 31 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament invokes the same consensus in a clear and concise sentence: "The form and the modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement". If we neglect this dependence, our efforts will not produce a tool for halting and reversing the nuclear arms race but for monitoring it.

From a practical point of view, the three papers are unable to give satisfactory answers to the following questions: How can a highly sophisticated system be possibly established without the scope of prohibition being known? How can you seriously design such a system, if it is completely unclear -- in the absence of an agreement -- which countries will join it? But who else could participate in verification activities, if not the States parties to the treaty? How can a situation where nuclear-weapon States carry

out underground explosions at their test sites serve as a model for the prevention of clandestine tests in the future, when such activities will be strictly prohibited? How about the role of the Conference on Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts and the United Nations secretariat, whose most prominent task is the promotion of disarmament, if they performed, as proposed in the working papers, functions under a system designed to monitor an ongoing arms race?

We cannot escape the conclusion that the measures suggested in the papers would run counter to the aim of ceasing nuclear-weapon tests as soon as possible. They would justify attempts to declare a CTB a long-term goal by advancing sophisticated arguments to the effect that it would be impossible to organize verification satisfactorily before the end of this century, if we were to follow the suggestions made, the Conference would be deprived of its negotiating role and political importance. The Conference would then be left with the Sisyphean task of constantly refining a system which, because of scientific and technological progress, could never be perfect.

The papers concerned, the elaboration of which was certainly very time consuming, were submitted from a special tactical point of view. However, they rather confirm us in our opinion that the issue of cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests -- as well as all other significant problems of international security and disarmament -- in the long run cannot be solved by technical means but only by political ones. Technical means, important as they may be, can exclusively support their solution.

CD/PV.328

pp.6-8

FRG/EIbe

8.8.85

CW

... I should like to introduce a Working Paper that deals with the verification of the non-production of chemical warfare agents by means of inspections in the civilian chemical industry. The Paper is now before you and bears the symbol CD/627.

It has been a longstanding tradition of my delegation to focus its interest upon the question of verifying a future chemical weapons convention.

We note that important progress has been achieved in particular in the field of verification of the elimination of existing arsenals of chemical weapons. My delegation has frequently stated that the destruction of stocks requires primary attention since the actual threat for mankind emanates from the existing chemical warfare capabilities.

The technical possibilities, however, of producing chemical weapons anew relatively easily present an equally dangerous threat that requires effective control of the industrial sector.

My delegation has therefore paid at an early stage of our negotiations serious attention to the solution of the problem of verifying non-production of chemical weapons. The chemical industry plays a key role in the industrial performance of the Federal Republic of Germany. We are one of the most important partners in the trade in chemical products. We therefore consider it as our duty to the Conference to make our experience and knowledge available to others.

Today we attempt to introduce another contribution to the problem of verification of non-production which logically builds on previous papers.

I would like to recall our very early conceptual contributions as contained in CD/WP.265, CD/WP.326 and CD/WP.439. My delegation was the first to introduce the idea that on-site inspections should be carried out on a random basis by casting lots. This idea has been meanwhile generally accepted in the Conference.

It goes without saying that a future convention on banning chemical weapons must include a régime that submits the chemical industry to international controls in order to prevent the fundamental prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons being circumvented. On the other hand, the future convention must be implemented in such a manner that is designed in so far as possible to avoid hampering the economic or technological activities of States parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities, including the international exchange of toxic chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of toxic chemicals for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of a future CW convention.

Obviously these two conflicting principles -- namely, an effective ban on chemical weapons and the unencumbered functioning of the chemical industry and trade -- require solutions that maintain a fine balance between them. There should be on the one hand a sufficiently stringent system of international monitoring of the relevant sectors of the chemical industry that creates the necessary confidence that no chemical weapons are produced. On the other hand, such a monitoring system should avoid unnecessary intrusiveness.

My delegation believes that its present Working Paper contributes to finding a solution that keeps the afore-mentioned conflicting principles adequately balanced.

We feel all the more encouraged to undertake a new search for such an equilibrium point because my country possesses some practical experience in this field. In 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany declared in an internationally binding form that it will not produce chemical weapons and ever since its chemical industry has been subject to international controls carried out by the Western European Union.

Under a convention prohibiting chemical weapons, the branches of the civilian chemical industry relevant to the verification of non-production would be subject to systematic international inspections.

In our view such inspections would apply in the industrial sector both to producers, manufacturing industries, and end-users.

Working Paper CD/627 surveys the range of substances involved and the scope of surveillance and outlines the industrial sector that would have to be covered.

The choice of substances for non-production inspections may cover products usable exclusively for chemical warfare (single-purpose agents),

characteristic key precursors for their production, and substances that are both of military and civilian significance (dual-purpose agents).

As to the criteria for the selection of such substances, we deem it necessary that a future convention should contain a definition of the term "key precursor".

In the opinion of the Federal Republic of Germany the precursors in the final technical reaction stage of the production of supertoxic lethal weapons which are characteristic for the toxicity of the end-product should be defined as key precursors. This definition is already contained in Working Paper CD/439 on the transfer problem submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1984.

Notwithstanding this general rule, other precursors could be treated as key precursors if, within the meaning of the convention, they constitute a risk and if the competent body under the convention reaches agreement on this point. The designated key precursors would be listed and annexed to the convention.

We consider the combination of a definition of key precursors -- based on objective criteria -- and the application of the exception-from-the-rule principle to be a reasonable instrument providing sufficient flexibility for the purposes of the convention.

As far as supertoxic lethal chemicals and their precursors for which there is no civilian use are concerned, an explicit ban would appear to suggest itself. Such a ban should be included explicitly in a list and ought to cover any quantities in excess of a production of one metric ton per annum.

It goes without saying that key precursors for multi-component weapons for which there is no permitted use would equally have to be included in the list of banned substances. I am saying this with such explicit clarity because one delegation recently expressed the view in this forum that there were some delegations "seeking to brush aside the problem of binary weapons". My delegation, however, was unable to identify any such delegation in our midst.

As for the scope of inspections, my delegation holds the view that the intensity of inspection procedures must be such as to ensure to an adequate degree of certainty that compliance with the contractual undertaking not to produce chemical weapons is systematically and internationally verifiable.

Inspections of key precursors should be conducted on the basis of annual statistical data and on-site inspections if the total annual quantity produced exceeds one metric ton.

To ensure that the manufacturers of the key precursors in question receive equal treatment, on-site inspections should be carried out on a random basis. Companies should be determined by lot, with a competent body under the convention fixing every year the percentage of all firms to be subjected to inspections. The inspection, consisting of statistical data, the review of plant records, interviews, viewing of facility areas, as well as sampling and

analysis, must ensure reliable verification of the non-production of chemical weapons.

We are quite certain that an effective monitoring régime can be established without violating the legitimate interests of the chemical industry and without disclosure of secret technological and industrial information.

My delegation expresses the hope that the present Working Paper CD/627 will contribute to facilitating the ongoing negotiations on the elaboration of an adequate system of international verification of non-production of chemical weapons.

CD/PV.329

pp.7-11

Netherlands/van Schaik 13.8.85

CTB

Over the years the Netherlands has pursued a consistent policy advocating the banning of all nuclear test explosions for all times. We continue to be strongly in favour of the conclusion of a final agreement to that effect. In 1963 an important step was taken, when it was agreed to ban all nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Agreements have been signed that at least reduce testing underground. A comprehensive test ban treaty, however, has so far not been within our reach, one of the main problems being that the elaboration of a satisfactory verification régime has not been completed.

The Netherlands has taken note of the recent proposal by General Secretary Gorbachev to the effect that the Soviet Union will observe a moratorium on nuclear testing from 6 August until 1 January next. The Netherlands, of course, would appreciate every step made in good faith that substantially contributes to a treaty on a comprehensive test ban. But we are of the opinion that such a moratorium, which is not accompanied by adequate and effective verification measures, could certainly not be a substitute for a treaty comprehensively banning all nuclear test explosions. We also note that before the Soviet announcement was made, as far as could be verified, five nuclear test explosions took place within a relatively brief time-span.

The early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty remains a major objective for the Netherlands Government. We regret that for the second year in a row it has not been possible to resume our work. We regret this in particular, because much work remains to be done, notably in the field of verification and compliance, where technical, organizational and administrative matters deserve our attention. We remain ready, together with other delegations to this Conference, to resume concrete work on the test ban issue. We fully support the Western proposal for a work programme, recently introduced by Ambassador Butler of Australia in document CD/621, which spells out what in our view can be done and should be done.

Problems of verification and compliance which are, amongst other issues, addressed in the Western proposal can, as experts generally agree, be solved, although it will require time and money. The Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts has indicated a line of march towards a CTB, which can overcome the difficulties, given the necessary co-operation on both sides and given sufficient financial means.

We are grateful to those delegations which, despite the impasse in our work on a comprehensive test ban, continue to come forward with new ideas. I refer in particular to the Working Papers recently submitted by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan. The Working Papers of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom stress inter alia, that for an international seismic monitoring network to be effective, prior testing in practice is essential. This to us seems sound reasoning, as no matter how sophisticated such a network would be in its theoretical set-up it will only be through its actual operation that we shall be in a position to judge whether it will be adequately tailored to the complicated task of monitoring of and verifying compliance with a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. The recent test of a limited international seismic network through the World Meteorological Organization/ Global Telecommunications System (WMO/GTS) network bears this out.

The main idea the Federal Republic of Germany proposed in Working Paper CD/612, and subsequently elaborated in technical terms in document CD/624, is intriguing: pending the establishment of a CTBT, a network could already be established. An international seismic monitoring network would gradually evolve up to the point that, at the moment of inception of the test ban, it could enter into force. We are prepared together with others to make a careful study of the implications of this suggestion.

The British document, CD/610, also devotes much attention to the concept of an international seismic monitoring network and to the need to test it in practice. Like its authors, we think that over the years considerable progress has been made with regard to verification techniques, but that yet a number of questions remain to be solved.

The usefulness of the MB:MS criterion, as an identification technique in seismology, has no doubt its limits. Fortunately in recent years, considerable progress has been made in the use of other techniques, such as spectrum analysis. It is the combination of techniques, especially in so far as those can be used independently of each other, that is a powerful tool in detecting nuclear tests.

In addition, we shall have to make full use of improvements in technology available to the international seismological community. Improved sensitivity of seismometric equipment, combined with automated digital data processing, seems to hold promise that the rich variety of seismic events occurring on Earth, whether man-made or natural, can adequately be handled for the purpose of the future treaty.

One type of man-made seismic event that we have to take into account are large conventional explosions. Due to the sensitivity of modern equipment the very large conventional explosions, e.g. above 0.1 kton, could by mistake be interpreted as a nuclear explosion. In this connection I may recall the Swedish draft treaty of 1983 (CD/381) in which a provision for conventional explosions is included. We indeed think that a notification and verification procedure for those explosions would have be part of a future CTBT.

Whatever we may eventually expect from teleseismology, it seems realistic to recognize that, according to the nuclear-weapon States, an international seismic monitoring network in itself will not be sufficient. This was already

clear at the time of the trilateral negotiations. It was again stressed in the British Working Paper, CD/610, and it is also known to us from other sources. Teleseismic verification would not be sufficient because the detection and identification of clandestine testing could be rendered impossible by evasion techniques. Local stations, or rather a regional network of such stations in addition to a global network, seem to be called for to solve this type of problem. Such networks of regional seismic stations, operated in combination with a global teleseismic network, would greatly enhance overall verification capabilities. This was highlighted in a special issue of the Energy and Technology Review, published by the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in May 1983. In this study the following conclusion was drawn:

"Our seismological analyses indicate that a network that includes 15 high-quality array stations in the Soviet Union could provide an overall detection capability in the Soviet Union of seismic magnitude 3.0 (with a detection capability up to 0.6 magnitude units better in some regions). When we compare this capability with the threat posed by cavity decoupling, we conclude that such a network would have a 90 per cent degree of confidence of detecting decoupled explosions with yields as small as 3 to 10 kt."

Given the fact that large cavities can often be spotted by satellites and that cavities have never been made on a significant scale, bearing also in mind that even a detection probability much lower than 90 per cent would be a strong deterrent, we believe even a more modest local network to be sufficient to verify compliance with a future CTB.

The question of additional in-country seismic networks, particularly in nuclear-weapon States, to perfect and complete an international seismic network is a subject deserving serious consideration by the Conference both on policy level and by the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts. Only then it will be possible to get a clearer and more complete picture of the possibilities to verify a comprehensive test ban. Although apparently during the trilateral talks a separate system of regional networks in nuclear-weapon States has been considered, the integration of local networks in a world-wide system seems also quite possible and logical.

Last year I underlined the importance of an early ratification by the United States and the Soviet Union of the two bilateral threshold treaties concluded in 1974 and 1976, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. Let me make some further comments on this issue.

The two threshold treaties in question, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, of course, cannot be seen as a substitute for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Nonetheless, their ratification and subsequent entry into force would be a step in the right direction. This is the more so as tests close to the threshold of 150 kiloton foreseen in both treaties continue to be conducted.

It is important to note that in the case of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty pioneering work has been done, in particular with regard to on-site inspections. The provisions for on-site inspection in that treaty are

technically sophisticated and sometimes original in their solution of practical problems.

It is not this PNE Treaty but the TTBT that appears to pose problems. The TTBT stipulates that the two parties exchange certain geological and geophysical data with respect to their test-sites. In so far as an outsider can judge -- after all, the Netherlands is not a nuclear-weapon Power itself -- the crux of the problem lies not so much in the exchange of these data but in the fact that in themselves those data are insufficient to verify the precise relationship between the yield of an explosion and the ensuing seismic shock. Therefore the TTBT stipulates that for each test-site so-called calibration tests should be conducted. The exact data obtained from these calibration tests ought equally to be exchanged between the two parties for the purpose of calibrating their respective seismometers. One key question remains, however. How can one be sure that information given by a party to the treaty on yields for calibration purposes is exact? The exact yield-shock ratio remains in the dark and yield estimates remain therefore insufficiently precise. As a result an essential link in the chain of operations leading to an optimum yield estimate will be missing. In other words, a key element remains to be addressed if one wishes a high reliability of yield estimates. In one way or another the calibration yields must be confirmed, a requirement the TTBT at present does not provide for.

In our view the solution to this problem may be found in an agreement between the parties to allow for such on-site inspection of a limited scope. In this context we wonder whether an effort could not be made to harmonize the verification provisions of the two threshold treaties, one of which, the PNET, already contains provisions for on-site inspection. Since both treaties have identical aims, namely the limiting of yields of nuclear tests, the possibilities of a harmonized verification régime may usefully be explored. Of course, due account would have to be taken of the differences between military test-sites and the locations where explosions for peaceful purposes (at present only being conducted in the Soviet Union) are taking place. If for some reason harmonization of verification provisions does not prove to be feasible, perhaps even simpler procedures can be followed. Both countries may consent in admitting designated personnel of the other for measuring the data of some tests at military test-sites, to be used for calibration purposes. Similar opportunities were already offered in the PNET, in particular in article III.

In the light of the urgency of the solution of these technical problems, the Netherlands therefore wishes to express its appreciation for the invitation President Reagan extended to the Soviet Union to send a team of experts, with the equipment they desire to take with them, to the Nevada test-site, in order to carry out yield measurements. We strongly urge the Soviet Union to accept this offer. We are confident that such a co-operative effort between the United States and the Soviet Union could pave the way for the long-awaited ratification of the two treaties. Since we trust that the Soviet Union shares the view that those treaties are still valid, we cannot see why a proposal that could lead to the actual implementation of those treaties could be qualified as, and I quote "bogus procedures". Indeed, in our view it would constitute an important confidence-building measure on the road towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty for all times.

Before concluding, I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate the delegation of Norway on the very successful outcome of the Workshop on seismological verification of a CTBT the Norwegian authorities recently organized. My delegation was impressed by the high level of sophistication of the Norwegian endeavours in this field. Technical progress such as has been made in that country strengthens us in our conviction that insufficient know-how need not for long remain an obstacle to the realization of an adequately and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

CD/PV.329

pp.14-15

Australia/Butler

13.8.85

OS

A second area which demands consideration is that relating to measures to protect satellites from attack. Delegations will recall the proposal which was made by the Foreign Minister of Australia, Mr. Hayden, when he addressed the Conference on Disarmament on 7 August last year. He referred to the French initiative tabled in the Conference on 12 June 1984 which called for the "prevention of destabilizing military developments without affecting military activities in space that contribute to strategic stability and those which may be instrumental in monitoring disarmament agreements".

Mr. Hayden proposed that the Conference, in its exploration of the issues relevant to arms control in outer space, consider the possibility of measures to protect from attack all satellites (early warning, communications and the like) which contribute to the preservation of strategic stability and which can be instrumental in monitoring disarmament and arms control agreements. He also suggested that the same protection to be extended to the ground stations essential for the operation of those satellites.

It is arguable that some -- but not all -- elements of this proposal are already encapsulated in those provisions of the ABM Treaty and SALT Accords which prohibit interference with national technical means of verification. These are, however, bilateral and not multilateral agreements.

The implementation of our proposal would constitute an important confidence-building measure and would directly support present and future arms control and disarmament agreements. Above all, the proposal is directed at contributing to the maintenance of stability until the required disarmament agreements make this no longer necessary. The ultimate outcome of the proposal might be an understanding, possibly codified in an international agreement, to the effect that satellites which promote international stability and serve to monitor disarmament agreements should not be attacked.

In making this proposal we are aware that a number of difficulties are involved. For example: How are we to decide which satellites contribute to stability and which do not? How might such an international agreement be related to a treaty banning the development, testing and deployment of ASAT systems? How are we to establish which ground stations are essential to the operation of those satellites? How could we verify such an agreement?

My delegation does not purport to have all the answers to all of these questions. On the first question, perhaps one possible aid in determining which satellites (if not all satellites) should be protected, would be through the provision by States launching satellites of detailed and specific infor-

mation regarding the purpose of an object launched into space. As a number of delegations have suggested, both in their plenary statements and in the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space, the present régime for the registration of space objects could be improved upon by the competent organ dealing with that question.

On the same point, if a consideration of the functions of satellites were to lead us to the conclusion that some categories of satellites are inimical to stability then presumably for the same reason, that is stability, those satellites should be banned. Verification of such a ban and indeed of any agreements in outer space, as was noted above, is also a problem for all but those few States with their own national technical means. Accordingly, verification of compliance with existing and future outer space agreements should be done by an independent international agency along the lines, for example, of the projected International Satellite Monitoring Agency.

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p.8

Italy/Alessi

15.8.85

OS

The Italian delegation considers that the arms control process, at the bilateral as well as the multilateral levels, should have two objectives: firstly, to encourage the use of outer space for peaceful purposes or for certain specific political-military purposes such as verification and control; and secondly, to limit the military use of space to activities which should strengthen stability. My Government therefore agrees that it is necessary to promote a better knowledge of space activities, to give priority to measures to strengthen confidence among States, to study the possibility of strengthening the legal régime for the protection of satellites, and to improve international co-operation in the verification of agreements by satellite, as advocated in a French proposal with which we are all familiar.

The fortieth anniversary of a tragic page in the history of mankind, the use of the first atomic bombs, has rekindled the discussion on the relationship between science and war: a debate which also concerns the space sector and has to some extent infiltrated into the Ad Hoc Committee's work.

We think it would be not only illusory but contrary to common sense to try to use the context of disarmament to curb, in a kind of modern obscurantism, scientific research which stems from man's irresistible thirst for knowledge. The role of arms control is not to place an anathema on research, which will continue in any case, but to agree on measures which should channel the results of such research towards objectives of stabilization, to avoid their use for aggressive purposes, to narrow the margin of error or of risk, and finally to extend their benefits to the entire international community.

The discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee, although brief and thus perhaps somewhat superficial, has nevertheless opened the way for consideration in greater depth of the more significant problems relating to the prevention of an arms race in space. The analysis of proposals has only just begun; with the sole exception of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union, the proposals submitted so far have been only preliminary and certainly call for further elaboration by their authors. With regard to all these proposals, as well as any submitted in the future, my delegation continues to emphasize the importance of verifiability: all initiatives must be assessed from the stand-

point of the political, legal and technical possibilities of ensuring compliance with the proposed measures. This is all the more true in space, where the novelty of the problems in terms of legal arrangements and technical complicity render all negotiations on effective verification systems particularly tricky. The in-depth study of the problems, concepts, existing agreements and proposals should therefore be pursued, as it has proved useful and promising. The assistance of experts might be valuable in developing and supplementing the consideration of the various aspects and thus enabling a basis to be laid as rapidly as possible for concrete progress at the multilateral level.

CD/PV.330 pp.11-14 Pakistan/Ahmad 15.8.85 CTB
OS

The second development relates to the working documents on the verification aspect of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, submitted during this session by the delegations of the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany and Japan.

Working Papers CD/612 and CD/624, submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, aim at the progressive establishment of a sophisticated global seismic monitoring system. According to these Working Papers, measures to gradually bring about such a global system should be undertaken as efforts to agree on a CTBT continue. The proposal seems to be based on the premise that a global verification system should be available before a test ban treaty could be concluded. Work on both, in the view of my delegation, can be pursued simultaneously. May I, therefore express my delegation's readiness to follow up this initiative within the framework of an ad hoc committee established under a comprehensive negotiating mandate.

It should also be possible to dovetail the proposal contained in CD/612 with the step-by-step approach suggested last year by the Foreign Minister of Japan. Under a combined approach, with the advancement in detection capabilities and simultaneously with the negotiation of a CTBT, the nuclear-weapon States should be able immediately to take the first step by agreeing to reduce the upper limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and lowering it progressively according to a time-frame as the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban progresses.

Lastly, the existing inequitable use of outer space must be rectified through the establishment of an international monitoring agency that conducts surveillance and reconnaissance activities by space satellites and disseminates relevant data on a non-discriminatory basis. Such an organization would be useful in promoting international security by providing advance information on crisis situations to the international community. It could also be used as an independent and impartial mechanism to verify compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements in a manner that would overcome the credibility gap which characterizes the prevailing uses of national technical means for verification. Such an arrangement would also be beneficial to those countries that do not possess adequate national means of verification.

In concluding on the subject of chemical weapons, I wish to express my Government's interest in the issue of verification of the prohibition of production of chemical weapons and its practical implications for the civilian chemical industry. We noted that the assessment of those implications for the chemical industry may differ from country to country. But we presume there certainly are common elements to be taken into account.

In the light thereof, the Netherlands authorities intend to organize a workshop in the Netherlands on the subject of verification of the prohibition of production, in which also representatives of the Netherlands chemical industry would be associated. The intended workshop would take place in early June, immediately preceding the summer part of the session in 1986. We very much hope that delegations, some of whom may not be that familiar with the intricacies of the chemical industry, will be prepared to come to my country in order to deepen their insight into the practical problems arising from the implementation of our future convention. In due course, we shall present you with an outline of the programme for this workshop, at which stage we shall certainly be grateful for any comments that you might wish to make.

In the first instance, in July 1984, I presented to this Conference, on behalf of a group of Western delegations, a draft mandate for such an Ad Hoc Committee in document CD/521. The core of that mandate was its identification of three problems which need solution in order to put into place a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and those, of course, as we all know, are problems of scope, verification and compliance. A hallmark of that mandate was that it is the only one on the table of this Conference which calls for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, banning such tests by all States in all environments, for all time.

On 7 August 1984, the Foreign Minister of Australia, Mr. Bill Hayden, came to this Conference and as part of his statement to the Conference introduced a paper which was given the symbol CD/531, a paper on the principles for the verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. That paper, I think it is fair to say, was received with very great interest and significant statements of support for those principles were made.

Then later in the same year, in November-December 1984, a resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on the subject, "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty". Indeed, its correct title was "The Urgent Need for a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty". That resolution was among three resolutions, or possibly, four, on that subject, but there were three major resolutions on the subject of nuclear test ban which were put to the vote. The vote that was cast on resolution number 53, calling for the urgent conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty, was 124 votes in favour, none against and 24 abstentions.

The resolution received the highest number of votes from amongst any of the comparable resolutions, and that resolution has a scope which is comprehensive. It is the only one that has that scope. A separate vote on paragraph 4 of that resolution was brought about by a group of socialist

States; the vote on paragraph 4 was 84 for, 19 against and 41 abstentions. As a consequence, the attempt to excise from that resolution one of its fundamental and critical parts was rejected. I want to return to that resolution in a few moments time.

The next step in the chronology of events I want to refer to was in July this year when a programme of work for an ad hoc committee on item 1 was tabled by me on behalf of a Group of Western States, in document CD/621. That programme of work illustrated clearly the practical steps that would be required to bring into existence by this body, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The last point in my chronology of events was the tabling in the same month of July here by the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan of three working papers addressing precisely the same questions. The questions of verification and monitoring of compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Those papers have been referred to this morning by other speakers. One of their key points of significance, is that they provide an absolutely solid basis for consideration of the three core issues I have already referred to. Those are the issues of scope, verification and compliance.

I want to return to the separate vote on paragraph 4 of resolution 53 of the last General Assembly. This was a separate vote asked for by a number of countries and directed at what was the fundamental part of our resolution. The purpose of the vote was to seek to excise from that resolution our fundamental paragraph. Now what was it that was being sought to be removed? Paragraph 4 called upon this Conference to resume immediately its substantive work under item 1. I will not take up too much time of the Conference by reading this in extenso, it is there for all to check: to resume immediately our work on item 1, with a view to the negotiation of a treaty on the subject. It then called for "the establishment of a seismic monitoring network to monitor nuclear explosions and to determine the capabilities of such a network for monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty." Such compliance, such verification being precisely what is required for such a treaty and precisely what we all know to be in dispute, irrespective of how others seek to misrepresent what is required and what is being called for. Paragraph 4 also called for "detailed investigation of other measures to monitor and verify compliance with such a treaty, including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity". That is what it was sought to remove. Not something on the edges, not something declaratory, but the very core of what is required for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The quest for that removal did not work. Why was that done? I am not sure; I have some theories, but it is perhaps best not to share them with you. But I do want to turn now, in the same context, to a very interesting report relevant to this subject which I received today. It comes from an interview given to TASS, the Soviet News Agency, on 13 August by the General-Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev.

He was addressing the question of moratoriums, test-bans, etc., and I apologize to our Soviet colleague who I see has a copy of Pravda, I must read it in English, but I hope the translation is correct. At one stage, Mr.

Gorbachev, in answer to a question, says the following, "Unilateral steps to end nuclear explosions cannot, of course, solve, to the end the problem of a complete and general cessation of nuclear weapon testing. An international agreement is essential for the problem to be solved once and for all, apart from appropriate obligations, it would also contain an appropriate system of verification measures, both national and international." I agree that that is a fair definition of what is required in terms of scope, verification and compliance, and I certainly agree too, that unilateral measures are not enough. To be fair to TASS, to Mr. Gorbachev, to the Soviet delegation, I should mention that Mr. Gorbachev said something else. "It is sometimes said that the question of ending nuclear-weapon testing should be considered at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Well, we are prepared to discuss it there as well but in Geneva the United States and other Western countries have been sabotaging the conduct of such talks for a long time already." Here I do not agree. It has sometimes been said that it should be done in Geneva. It is perfectly clear that it is item 1 on our agenda and that it has been there for sometime. This concept of sabotaging our efforts is, of course, unacceptable. I am not sure who has advised Mr. Gorbachev that this is the state of things in Geneva. I know he is a busy man but it would be helpful perhaps if he could read our proposed program of work.

Another approach towards misrepresenting what we have proposed was made recently in this Conference on 6 August by the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic who sought to dispose of what has been proposed in terms which, up till now I had thought frankly, did not require the compliment of too much rational discussion. But it is best summed up by pointing out that on page 4 of the copy of the speech that I have, Ambassador Rose does at least seem to agree that scope, verification and compliance are the major and significant issues and he poses some questions about them. I agree, questions need to be posed about these issues, but he insists that there is no way that those questions can be satisfactorily posed or answered in the working papers that the three countries have put so much effort into; but above all, he will not sit down and attempt to answer those questions with us in a Committee. Not interested! To pose them in a speech, misrepresent some of the ways in which they have been put in the working papers, that is fair enough, that is fine, apparently; but he will not sit in a committee with us and do the work required to answer precisely the questions that he himself agrees need to be answered.

CD/PV.330

p.41

USA/Lowitz

15.8.85

CTB

We do believe that the most effective way of reducing the risk of nuclear war is to make significant and verifiable cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States. The United States is determined, if others share our commitment, to conclude a comprehensive chemical weapons ban as a matter of high priority. My Government has also urged the leadership of the Soviet Union to resolve questions relating to compliance with existing arms-control agreements and to establish a constructive dialogue on ways to reduce the risk of accidental war. And the President's invitation to the Soviet Union to send a team of experts to our Nevada test site to measure the yield of a nuclear test remains open. We believe that this initiative would lead to greater confidence in verifiable limits on nuclear testing. The United States believes that serious substantive work in all these areas would

produce substantial progress toward reducing the risk of war, and would constitute real movement to de-escalate the present military confrontation.

CD/PV.331

p.7

Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda 20.8.85

CTB

We consider that the achievement of a nuclear-test ban would be an important and, certainly, not overly difficult, positive step creating a favourable atmosphere for further negotiations on nuclear disarmament. But we have to stop talking about why it can't be agreed upon and, instead, search for ways how it must be achieved. Recently, a very good example was offered in this respect. The declaration by the Soviet Union of a unilateral moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests is a step which, if followed by the United States of America, could become a starting point on the way towards the NTB. This view is widely shared, as is shown by international reaction to the Soviet proposal. Attempts to speculate on the motives behind this move and to denigrate it show that the other side is not ready to face its own responsibility in this regard. As was stated by Mikhail Gorbachev on 13 August, the United States had, so far, carried out more nuclear explosions than the Soviet Union and a roughly equal number of tests in the course of this year prior to the declaration of the moratorium. In view of the moratorium, the Soviet test programme had to be interrupted. All suggestions that the United States has to go on with nuclear tests since their cessation would fix an alleged Soviet advantage are simply unfounded. It is, moreover, absolutely clear that the moratorium is not meant as a substitution for the final solution of the problem of nuclear weapon testing, which will be, as was stressed by Mikhail Gorbachev, an international agreement containing, besides relevant obligations, also an international system of both national and international verification provisions. But the moratorium would, undoubtedly, contribute to the achievement of this final goal, especially if it were reciprocated and extended beyond 1 January on the basis of mutuality, as is proposed by the Soviet Union. My delegation is encouraged by the positive response of a number of delegations in this room to this important initiative. This reaction is only natural, since one cannot call sincerely for a nuclear-test ban and, at the same time, ignore unilateral steps of such magnitude.

I have also some comments to make on the work of the group of seismic experts and on its experiment last year on the transmission of seismic data through the channels of the World Meteorological Organization. We have definite ideas on how the system for the exchange of seismic data should serve the purposes of the future test ban. But it seems preferable to put aside these comments for a while and to revert to them when we are in a position to consider verification aspects in conjunction with other basic provisions of the treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

CD/PV.331

pp.11-12

Sweden/Ekeus

20.8.85

CW

On 25 July I made a statement in this forum on the negotiations of a chemical weapons convention and on the difficulties in devising measures to be applied to the different chemicals involved. Today, I have asked for the floor to introduce a working paper containing the ideas presented in the statement of 25 July.

For the purpose of the Convention, the relevant chemicals have in CD/539 been divided into five categories, i.e. super-toxic lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals, key precursors including key components for binary and multicomponent chemical systems for chemical weapons, and precursors. This has proved to be a very useful categorization. However, attempts to apply one and the same set of measures to all relevant chemicals in each one of the five categories have failed.

There is now a growing recognition that the diversity within a category and the different purposes for which these chemicals are produced need to be taken into account when elaborating the measures to be applied, in order not to hamper the development of the peaceful chemical industry, while at the same time ensuring that chemicals are not produced for chemical-weapons purposes. There is also concern that one and the same chemical might be subject to qualitatively different measures depending on the purpose of its production and that this might create "loopholes" in the Convention. The time has therefore come to refine the concepts somewhat and to look for alternative ways of structuring the relationship between the categories of chemicals and the measures to be applied to them.

In the statement in July, my delegation suggested a comprehensive approach for dealing with all the chemicals relevant to the Convention. This alternative approach allows for bringing together chemicals from different categories under one and the same régime, as well as for applying different régimes to different chemicals within one and the same category. This could be achieved through a regrouping of the chemicals without in any way changing the definitions and the five categories already agreed upon.

Such a regrouping also opens the way for a comprehensive way of dealing with the chemicals, so that one and the same chemical would be subject to the same régime in all parts of the Convention (i.e., as regard declarations, elimination, permitted production and verification). The philosophy of the approach is simple. Based on existing definitions, the chemicals are arranged in three groups. For each group a régime for the declarations, elimination, production and verification is devised. Régime I is the most stringent and demanding one and applies to all Group I chemicals. Régime II is also stringent but somewhat less burdensome and applies to all the Group II chemicals. Régime III is the least stringent of the three and applies to the Group III chemicals.

CD/PV.331

p.16

GCR/Rose

20.8.85

CTB

Much to our regret, the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler, elaborating on the test-ban issue in his statement on 15 August, avoided a clear answer to that moratorium. He referred, inter alia, to my statement on 6 August. In that statement, I introduced on behalf of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and of my own country a working paper containing a proposal as to how to approach the entire subject of a CTB through systematic negotiations. Simultaneously, we reaffirmed the demand to establish a committee and to start the negotiating process within this framework. This made Ambassador Butler claim that we were against a business-like dialogue in order to discuss, among other things, the questions I had raised. It remains his secret how to bring his assertions in line with the realities. Everyone

recognizes the simple truth that negotiations are necessary in order to reach a treaty. We do not want only to discuss questions, but we want to solve them this way. It is not sufficient to do "some practical work". And, let me add, what some people understand by "some practical work" is, in our opinion, nothing else but the attempt to replace the necessary political negotiating process by non-committal and endless technical discussions on verification, while nuclear explosions continue to be carried out.

CD/PV.331

pp.18-19

USSR/Israeliyan

20.8.85

CTB

They say, for example, that the moratorium does not lend itself to verification. Well, then, let us see whether the opponents of the moratorium have the slightest grounds for expressing doubt concerning the unwavering observance by the Soviet Union of the obligation it has solemnly taken upon itself.

They assert that the problem of monitoring nuclear tests is always "super complicated". For several decades now the saboteurs of the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests have looked to this argument as their "friend in need". But it has long since failed them. The scientific and technical facilities that exist in the United States give them the necessary degree of certainty that a nuclear explosion, even a low-yield one, will be detected and they are well aware of this in the United States. Just recently, the International Herald Tribune wrote that the United States system for detecting nuclear explosions includes seismic observatories in 35 countries. The article states, in particular, the authoritative opinion of a famous American seismologist, Jack Evernden, to the effect that, using this widespread network of seismic stations, and particularly a new array in Norway, the United States can detect all Soviet tests, "even fully decoupled ones". The Soviet Union, too, has adequate means for detecting nuclear explosions.

Another important conclusion to which many representatives came in their statements -- and one with which we fully agree -- is that the building material for the elaboration of a treaty is already to hand. It is the draft basic provisions for a nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty which the Soviet Union introduced in 1982 and in which account is taken of the degree of agreement attained in the course of the trilateral talks; it is the draft treaty on a nuclear-test ban introduced by the delegation of Sweden. It is, finally, the constructive views and proposals expressed by many States concerning the specific content of a nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty, including the issues of verification of such a treaty.

And one further important conclusion present in the statements of most delegates is that the reason why there is no treaty is not that there is no basis for its elaboration or that there are any supposedly insuperable difficulties in devising verification measures, but the absence of political will on the part of certain Powers fundamentally to resolve the problem of banning tests.

It was clear from the Committee's examination of existing agreements that there already exists a considerable body of international law and practice, both multilateral and bilateral, bearing on the question of outer space. Indeed, it was remarked with justification that the arms control régime in outer space, which does not at present constitute a permanently inhabited area, is in many ways more comprehensive than that on Earth; for example, in banning the use of nuclear weapons in space and from space to Earth. Military activities on, and military activities from the Moon and other celestial bodies are also forbidden. And at least implicit immunity is accorded by existing agreements and practice to certain satellites which constitute national technical means of verification. These conclusions seemed to be common ground in the Committee, although the limited time permitted did not allow for exhaustive examination of the subject.

The Committee's look at existing proposals and future initiatives was also necessarily preliminary and tentative, though a number of interesting proposals meriting further examination were made. These included the establishment of a "rules of the road" agreement for outer space; the possible multilateralization of existing bilateral agreements, for example, in relation to the immunity of certain satellites; international monitoring of satellites; and the possibility of constraints upon elements of anti-satellite activity.

One point that came very clearly out of the discussion, especially of the latter two points, was the sheer complexity as well as the importance of verification in relation to additional measures of arms control in outer space. This applies particularly with regard to proposals of a far-reaching nature. In space as on Earth, proposals for unverifiable blanket bans are not only useless, but, worse than that, they are disingenuous and potentially dangerous too. What we should be searching for are not easy propaganda gestures, but rather realistic and practical measures which build on the existing legal régime and which will complement agreements which we all hope will emerge from the bilateral negotiations.

We also note the progress made, Mr. President, on the subject of declarations of chemical weapons and on outlining the form of a future agreement on production facilities. However, the Committee has not yet agreed on the timing of the declaration of stockpile locations, nor has it yet developed a régime that would permit diversion to peaceful purposes under effective verification.

In order to move the negotiations along in the area of elimination of production facilities, my delegation has introduced at the working level an approach that may help us past the current impasse over definitions. We hope that this approach, which provides for the sequential examination of different types of facilities, will be a useful way to move ahead in an area that has been deadlocked too long.

Another key area, clearly, is that of challenge inspection. The need for mandatory, short-notice challenge-inspection provisions to complement the

routine verification provisions of the convention is basic. Again, as my delegation has made clear in the past, it is a question of the level of verification required to satisfy security concerns, not specific language, that is important. I hope that next year our work will be furthered through the development of a mutually acceptable framework as a basis for coming to terms with the requirements in this area.

CD/PV.332

pp.23-24

USSR/Issraelyan

22.8.85

OS

In order to facilitate international co-operation by States in the exploration and use of outer space and in view also of the desires expressed by a whole range of States for the establishment of specific organizational forms of such co-operation, the Soviet Union considers that there could be created a world space organization for international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization.

As the Soviet Union sees the matter, that organization would be responsible for ensuring, on the basis of mutual advantage, non-discriminatory access by all States to the results of scientific and technical advances connected with the study and peaceful exploration of space. It could undertake international projects connected with the pooling of efforts and resources for the purposes of outer-space research and the use of space technology. An important element in the activities of such an organization would be the provision of comprehensive assistance to developing countries, which do not have adequate technical or material resources at their disposal, as regards access to the exploration and use of outer space and the application of the practical results of such activity for the purposes of their economic and social development in accordance with their needs and without any conditions infringing their sovereignty. The proposed world organization could assume the role of co-ordinator on an international scale of the activities of other international organizations in the field of space.

In our view, such an organization could facilitate the effecting of the requisite verification of compliance with the agreements already concluded or to be concluded with a view to preventing an arms race in space. Such functions for an international organization would, in our view, be consistent with the repeatedly expressed wishes of a whole range of States.

With regard to practical matters, the USSR proposes the convening not later than 1987 of a representative international conference with the participation of, inter alia, the States having major space potential in order to review all aspects of the problem of international co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization with a view to agreeing on the main lines and principles of such co-operation. The same conference would also consider the question of setting up an international space organization for international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. The establishment in practice of that organization could be undertaken following the reaching of agreements effectively ensuring the non-militarization of space.

Most of the delegations present here took part in the workshop on seismic detection organized by the Norwegian Government, for which we are very grateful. We had the opportunity to visit a seismic array installed and operated in co-operation with one of the super-Powers. During that event, qualified experts confirmed our conviction that no significant problems of verification remain in the path of negotiations to achieve a test ban treaty. We also read recent statements in the international press to the effect that nuclear-weapon tests are considered necessary to the national security of one super-Power, while the other conducted the largest amount of tests in the recent past before proposing a moratorium.

In this regard, Brazil has consistently held the view that adequate and effective verification procedures are essential to achieve confidence that the agreements are being complied with by all parties concerned, thus strengthening the régime instituted by the zone. We have stated this opinion in this Conference and in the General Assembly of the United Nations, and most recently at the ninth session of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), held in Mexico City.

Agreements aimed at establishing denuclearized zones might profit by taking into account the Latin American experience. In our continent it has not been possible to determine with any degree of certainty whether the Powers that possess nuclear weapons have or have not introduced them in the zone of application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This situation persists in view of the increasing geographic proliferation and of the policies of the nuclear-weapon Powers regarding the whereabouts of their weapons, coupled with the absence of verification procedures that would ascertain their compliance with the commitments they accepted in the Protocols annexed to the Treaty. I would like to quote, in this connection, the very pertinent observation made this morning, on the subject of verification, by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Lowitz: "If a nation is to rely on arms control agreements rather than unilateral actions for its security, this requires assurance that other nations are abiding by their commitments."

Unilateral statements of compliance, of a general character, that cannot be verified, are simply not sufficient to generate confidence and promote the objectives of any treaty in the field of disarmament and security. As the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves have so frequently contended, unilateral statements of compliance amount to self-verification.

One of the space-weapon systems, that is ASAT systems, are already at an advanced stage of development. For my country, as for many others, satellites are a part of a peaceful effort for the benefit of our people. We are directly concerned if weapons are developed to destroy satellites. It is indeed disconcerting for us to see that, in the Conference on Disarmament, instead of

undertaking negotiations for an agreement for banning such weapons, efforts are being made to distinguish between the various kinds of satellites and various activities of satellites and demands are being made to have perfect verifiability before considering any ban on anti-satellite weapons. In our opinion, the only sensible course open for us is to ban the testing, development and deployment of all kinds of ASAT weapons and destroy existing such weapons. In such an approach, there is no scope for any partial agreement. We also believe that, if such action is taken before these weapons are further developed, the problem of verifiability will be manageable. In our opinion, the extent of verification is a function of the kind of treaty that is to be negotiated and to be verified. We also feel that, in the ultimate analysis, verification is a matter of trust and political will and therefore it cannot be seen only in technical terms. If we must have foolproof verification before any disarmament treaty can be negotiated, then the very nature of the present weapons system will ab initio render most disarmament efforts fruitless and the prospect for peace in the world indeed very grim. What is worse is that there is an increasing tendency these days, including in the case of a treaty to ban the ASAT-weapon systems, to put the verification cart before the disarmament horse in an attempt to permit the uninterrupted development of the new weapon systems in pursuit of the illusion of deterrence, parity or superiority.

In this connection, I would like to say how deeply my delegation appreciated the effort of the Norwegian Government in organizing a workshop on seismic monitoring of nuclear explosions in Oslo during this summer. We are grateful to Ambassador Huslid and his colleague, Mr. Sten Lundbo, for the thorough and efficient manner in which they organized the visit to their beautiful country, giving a rare opportunity both to understand the complexities of seismic networks and to have the privilege of receiving generous Norwegian hospitality. Our delegation is further convinced in its view, which was shared by the experts in Oslo, that the existing network for seismic monitoring can solve all the verification problems once a CTB is negotiated.

CD/PV.333

pp.24-25

Venezuela/Ter Horst

27.8.85

CTB

If anything can be reaffirmed at the end of this 1985 session, it is that the achievement of a nuclear test ban treaty is the first and most basic step towards a credible process of nuclear disarmament. The mere beginning of a process of negotiation aimed at producing that treaty would already create an encouraging feeling about positive consequences that are hard to imagine in the current circumstances. We also welcome in this respect the moratorium on nuclear tests announced by the Soviet Union, although we all know that it comes at the end of a particularly intensive period of testing. Nevertheless, the moratorium itself seems to us to be highly positive and we shall not attempt to detract from that decision. We trust that this Soviet commitment, which has been given for virtually six months, can be extended and that the other nuclear Powers will rapidly take the same decision. The door is now ajar and from our modest perspective we venture to say that it is an opportunity that must be used to generate the impetus that will ultimately lead us to the treaty. For just as war has its own dynamics, so has disarmament. Not to mention that, as regards this issue, the infernal problem of

verification has disappeared, at least for all practical purposes, as was clearly shown by the demonstrations organized by our Norwegian friends last June.

CD/PV.336

p.12

Australia/Butler

4.2.86

CTB

For that purpose we need to establish the means of verification of such a treaty. This includes seismological and other means. With regard to seismological verification we must build further on the work of the Group of Scientific Experts. Some Member States declare that the means of verification of such a treaty are already available. We believe it is incumbent on them to join with the Conference on Disarmament in demonstrating the capabilities of the system. Those who are not convinced that the means of verification are adequate should explain their difficulties in detail and, together, we should seek solutions. A major aspect of the interrelationship between the multilateral and bilateral negotiation of disarmament agreements is the opportunity which this conference has to advance prospects for agreement between the nuclear Powers on a nuclear test ban. That objective would be advanced by the Conference on Disarmament undertaking substantive work on the practical matters which must be resolved before a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty could be concluded. Australia deplors this Conference's failure to date to avail itself of this opportunity.

CD/PV.336

p.20

Mexico/Garcia Robles

4.2.86

CTB

Lastly, it should be borne in mind that inadequate means of verification, an argument adduced on previous occasions as an excuse for not accepting a comprehensive nuclear test ban, can no longer be considered an obstacle, since the Soviet Union has, for its part, in the statement of 15 January I have already quoted, expressed with the utmost clarity its acceptance that appropriate measures of verification should be ensured entirely by national technical means and by international procedures, including on-site inspections, should this be necessary. Again, the six authors of the New Delhi Declaration in the message addressed to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on 24 October 1985, after proposing the suspension of all nuclear tests for a period of 12 months, stated that:

"The problems of verifying the suspension we propose are difficult, but not insurmountable ... Third-party verification could provide a high degree of certainty that testing programmes have ceased. We propose to establish verification mechanisms on our territories to achieve this objective."

CD/PV.336

pp.27-28, 31-32

Sweden/Theorin

4.2.86

VER
CTB

Alva Myrdal initiated several proposals that became fundamental in subsequent negotiations. In the early days of the ENDC she spent a great deal of effort on a ban on nuclear tests. In August 1962 (ENDC/PV.64), she suggested that verification of a test ban should be based on the findings of the scientific community of the world, and not on bilateral and mutual

observations by the intelligence services of the super-Powers. Her model was the project of the International Geophysical Year of 1957.

This idea was later followed up by the proposal, in 1965 (ENDC/154), of the "detection club" and the setting-up of an advanced seismic observatory in Sweden the next year. The detection club constitutes the origin of the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

In 1966 Alva Myrdal developed the "verification by challenge" concept in a comprehensive effort to solve the test-ban verification problems (ENDC/PV.247).

Generally speaking, Alva Myrdal by these concepts opened the test-ban issue to negotiation, co-operation and verification for all States, not only for the nuclear-weapon States. Her line of openness was continued in the proposal in 1972 for general access to satellite data for verification purposes, an idea that was rejected by the leading space Powers at the time, but has since been pursued by others.

I should like to take this opportunity to underline the importance my Government attributes to the Group of Scientific Experts. It is essential that it be able to continue its work on the verification issues related to a comprehensive test ban treaty. Once the political decision to stop nuclear testing is taken, the conclusion of a treaty must not be delayed because of outstanding technical matters. There is rapid technical development. It is important that it be taken fully into account in the verification systems, and that such systems not be permitted to lag behind.

The so-called Five-Continent Peace Initiative has underlined the importance of being able to monitor all nuclear explosions. Together with the other States behind this initiative, Sweden has announced its willingness to take part in the monitoring of a comprehensive test ban. The data centre that Sweden operated as part of an international experiment in the autumn of 1984, and which we have offered to run and finance as part of our commitment to a test ban, can be put to use at very short notice.

The question of verification has for decades been put forward as the main obstacle to a comprehensive test ban. The two major nuclear-weapon States have not been able to agree on what is needed in order to verify such a ban. That period now seems to be over. The Soviet Union has stated its willingness to accept international procedures including on-site inspections in order to verify compliance with a reciprocal moratorium. Both sides thus seem to agree on a basis for a verification system.

Sweden therefore proposes that negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty start immediately. We feel that the establishment of an international verification system including on-site inspections should be initiated at an early stage in the negotiations. The co-operative measures worked out by the Group of Scientific Experts could serve as a basis for that, and monitoring be started by using existing facilities around the globe. These facilities could be rapidly improved using modern technology and methods. In this way, the

entry into force of a future treaty will not be delayed for technical verification reasons.

CD/PV.336

pp.41-42

Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda 4.2.86

CTB

Let us look in the first place at the problem of the nuclear test ban. We consider it unquestionable that either we did not deal with it at all, or when we did, the method we chose was inappropriate. We do not share the view that the Working Group's activity in 1982 and 1983 demonstrated that a number of verification problems needed to be solved. What it really indicated was that some remaining verification problems cannot be settled if treated separately from other basic provisions of the test ban. The same applies to the activity of the Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events. In a couple of weeks this Group is going to finalize its third report. With the evaluation of the results of the first two practical experiments of the transmission of seismic data the third report could indeed represent a positive contribution. But a contribution to what? If the negotiations on the NTB are going to be blocked again, then the valuable work of the Group of Scientific Experts will be bound to remain just an exercise in modern seismology, an opportunity for experts to exchange information and experience and a check of the communication channels of the World Meteorological Organization. On the other hand, if negotiations on all aspects of the NTB were to start, the third report of the Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events could become a real contribution to the future establishment of a system for the transmission of seismic data, which would constitute an important part of the NTB verification procedures.

In addressing the NTB problem the Conference on Disarmament has to take into account new, important developments related to this question. During the second half of last year, one of the two major military Powers was left alone on the road of active nuclear testing. The Soviet leadership in an effort to break the usual "logic" of the arms race, introduced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests. Regrettably, the other side ignored the invitation to reciprocate and to render the nuclear testing moratorium a lasting measure until a general and complete ban is negotiated. Thus, this major country remained in this respect a lonely zealous competitor in an awkward arms race with just one participant. And even after the expiry of the six months originally proposed, the "solo race" continues, since the Soviet Union prolonged its unilateral moratorium for the next three months. We consider this additional measure an extraordinary example of the only approach that could break the vicious circle of the arms race.

Nor can the problems of verification serve any longer as an excuse for not joining the moratorium and for the deadlock in the NTB negotiations. The Soviet Union stated unequivocally that verification is no problem so far as it is concerned. Appropriate verification of compliance with the moratorium -- should the United States join it -- would be fully ensured by national technical means as well as through international procedures, including on-site inspections whenever necessary.

Despite the considerable progress which has been made, there remain several difficult issues to be resolved if a chemical weapons ban is to be concluded. Among these, the verification provisions of the treaty will require especially serious and dispassionate effort if agreement is to be achieved. It will be recalled that in April 1984, almost two years ago, the Vice-President of the United States of America tabled in this forum a draft treaty text which is the most comprehensive proposal yet before us, setting out in detail the kind of verification régime his Government prefers and would regard as adequate. Canada has indicated its readiness in principle to accept and apply the kinds of verification provisions contained in the United States text. However, while there has been much criticism of these proposals, no delegation has thus far come forward with concrete, substantive alternative proposals which would delineate with clarity the area of common ground and the areas of disagreement, thus providing a basis for serious negotiation with a view to arriving at verification provisions which would be acceptable to all.

The Canadian Government noted, and welcomed, the reaffirmation by the United States spokesman in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 31 October 1985 that "No imbalance in inspection obligations is either desired, intended or contained in any provisions of the United States draft convention banning chemical weapons." The Canadian Government has also noted with particular care and interest the recent statement by General Secretary Gorbachev that, with reference to declarations of the location of chemical weapons production facilities, the cessation of production, the destruction of production facilities and the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, "All these measures would be carried out under strict control including international on-site inspections." We are greatly encouraged by this statement. We hope that during the present session of this Conference the delegation of the USSR will be in a position to further elaborate on its particular meaning. The task of seriously negotiating effective, operable and politically acceptable verification provisions for a chemical weapons treaty will be difficult and time-consuming. However, it should not be postponed any longer.

During the session, the Canadian delegation intends to continue to make substantive inputs to the negotiation of a chemical weapons ban. We will be submitting a HANDBOOK FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. The Handbook identifies procedures, equipment and standard formats which could go a long way toward ensuring that the findings of an investigation of alleged chemical weapons use would be as conclusive, convincing and impartial as possible. It reflects Canadian experience and expertise and our longstanding interest in various aspects of verification. It should be of particular value in relation to the provisions of a chemical weapons treaty dealing with a verifiable ban on chemical weapons use, as is being negotiated in this forum. We will also be submitting a technical working paper dealing with identification of chemical substances. We will also be making available to all delegations through the Secretariat a compendium of all chemical weapons documentation of this Conference during the period 1983 - 1985.

I wish to emphasize that a negotiated, verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a fundamental objective of the Canadian Government. Canada continues to favour a careful, step-by-step approach to a nuclear test ban, both on procedure and substance although we respect the views of those who differ. The Canadian Government is clearly on record as favouring the re-establishment in the Conference of a subsidiary body to address this subject, and I now reiterate that position. Such a body must have a concrete and realistic mandate which would enable the immediate resumption of substantive work, with a view to negotiation of a treaty. We suggest that priority attention be given to reaching agreement on a programme of work, which might address the issues of scope, as well as verification and compliance, with appropriately structured working groups. We sense among the countries represented in this room a growing recognition of the potential value of a focused approach along these lines. The Canadian delegation would be ready to take an active and constructive part in implementing an agreed work programme. We hope too that, in support of such efforts, there could be general agreement to press ahead with our important work on seismic exchanges.

Finally, although it is not a separate agenda item here, I would like to speak briefly on the broad issue of verification. As is well known here, this is a subject of longstanding priority for Canada, going well beyond mere rhetoric. Significant amounts of the scarce financial and personal resources available to the Canadian Government are being devoted to a serious and methodical examination of the problems and issues connected with verification. Within Canada's Department of External Affairs, for example, a special verification research unit has been established, with an annual budget of a million dollars. As one concrete step, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs announced at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly that the Canadian Government has decided to upgrade in a substantial way its seismic facility in our Northwest Territories. By this and other means, we intend to accumulate a store of experience and add to our expertise which can increase Canada's ability to contribute in practical and constructive ways to the international negotiation of effective, verifiable arms control measures.

This Canadian approach reflects our firm belief that the verification aspects of arms control and disarmament agreements are in no way subsidiary or secondary elements but are integral and essential parts of such agreements, in some cases amounting to pre-conditions to final agreement, but not obstacles to be utilized to obfuscate or postpone serious negotiations. This approach reflects our view that questions of confidence are central to all arms control negotiations. The reconfigurations of national arsenals which arise from arms control agreements both reflect and reinforce a certain level of reciprocal confidence in the intentions and capabilities of the parties. When it is appreciated that States are being asked to give up security based on weaponry in return for security based on arms control agreements, the importance of this element of trust and confidence is readily apparent. If the necessary levels of confidence are to be sustained and increased, all parties to such agreements must be able to assure effective compliance through adequate verification. Conversely, the inability adequately to assure compliance can lead to reduced levels of confidence, an increase of mistrust and, through a vicious spiral, could bring the whole arms control and disarmament process to a halt. We, of course, recognize that the legitimate need for adequate verification can be abused. For our part, we are convinced that a rational

and imaginative approach to verification, far from being a smoke-screen, is a prerequisite in every serious arms control negotiation. In circumstances when all parties are negotiating in good faith, meticulous attention to verification provisions will not be a hindrance to the negotiating process. On the contrary, it should facilitate such negotiations.

From this perspective, the Canadian Government was especially gratified at the adoption by consensus at the fortieth session of the General Assembly of a resolution reaffirming resoundingly the importance of verification as an essential element of arms control negotiating process. This confirms to us the high importance of effective verification in disarmament and arms control agreements -- not as a partisan issue but as a matter on which there is international consensus. This consensus may be fragile, yet it is a foundation on which we can build. It is in this context that the Canadian delegation will shortly be making available to all delegations a comprehensive, cross-indexed compendium of verbatim statements on verification which have been made in this Conference and its predecessors during the period 1962 - 1983. These records, the sheer size of which some of you may find intimidating, are in fact instructive in indicating the extent to which there is common ground on which we can expand. I trust that this compendium will prove to be a valuable tool for our collective work. The compendium has already been referred to variously in the Canadian delegation. The polite ones call it "heavy stuff". Others say it has a very weighty tone. But these adjectives mean these are the three volumes that were prepared to be made available to the delegations that are interested in it.

CD/PV.337 pp.16-17 Bulgaria/Tellalov 6.2.86 CTB

The question of nuclear test-ban is now more than ripe for solution. The unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions, declared on 6 August last year, has been universally welcomed. The extension of this moratorium for three additional months is fresh evidence that the Soviet leadership means deeds, and only deeds. These steps are, in the words of Madame Margarita Papandreou at the opening of the NGO Conference in Geneva on 20 January this year, a "disarmament by challenge", a challenge which, if met by the United States, would create a most favourable atmosphere for negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban. References to the problem of control cannot continue to serve as an excuse for not accepting the offer for a joint Soviet-United States moratorium. Such a problem does not exist any longer. General Secretary M. Gorbachev clearly stated that the Soviet Union is willing to apply any forms of control by national technical means, international verification mechanisms, on-site inspections.

CD/PV.337 p.20 Pakistan/Ahmad 6.2.86 CTB

We have repeatedly stated in this Conference that we attach the utmost importance to a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions, which we believe can serve to check both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our assertion that verification could not be the insurmountable barrier that it might have been at some earlier stage and that what was required to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty was, in fact, a political decision has been vindicated by a number of recent statements. We, of course, recognize that, in a world characterized by mistrust, it is difficult to

conceive of disarmament or arms-control agreements which do not provide for adequate verification arrangements to ensure compliance. We, therefore, welcome the acceptance in the Soviet proposals of the concept of on-site inspection and the expression of a willingness to reach agreement on any other additional verification measures.

CD/PV.338

pp.7-10

USA/Lowitz

11.2.86

CW,CTB

We look for progress on the numerous issues which await resolution in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We attach particular importance to the following issues: the important problem of ensuring that chemical weapons will not be produced in the civilian industry, the elimination of chemical weapons facilities, and the matter of resolving questions about compliance, including by challenge inspection. Progress in the Committee is needed on all these issues in parallel. It might seem easier to postpone resolution of the difficult issues, including verification, to a later time, and to make progress on the less difficult matters. But such an approach would be misleading. It would create a false impression that sufficient momentum had been generated to sweep all obstacles aside in the interests of concluding an agreement. The shortest path to our agreed objective lies rather in a candid recognition from the outset that verification issues, and in particular the matter of challenge inspection, need to be settled sooner rather than later. There should be no mistake about the views of the United States on challenge inspection. They remain as I described them in my statement of 22 August last: a fundamental need for an effective convention is mandatory, short-notice challenge inspection provisions to complement its routine verification provisions. The issue is the effectiveness of the provisions in satisfying security concerns, not specific language.

Within the structure of the common outline of a chemical weapons convention as contained in the 1985 report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, CD/636, it should be possible to narrow differences of view on many of the areas in which blanks, or bracketed text, are present. Again, I believe that this should apply at least as much to the crucial issue of verification of compliance with the convention as to other issues.

A number of speakers during this session already have addressed the first item on our agenda, that of a nuclear-test ban. Some have called for the prompt initiation of negotiations on a treaty that would prohibit underground nuclear explosions as well as those already off limits as a result of the 1963 Limited Test-Ban Treaty. A number of speakers have also expressed a willingness to show flexibility so as to renew practical work on issues related to a nuclear-test ban, or, in the case of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, to continue the outstanding work that the Group has performed. My delegation stands prepared to participate in both of these efforts. The United States view on the appropriate role that a comprehensive test ban can play in reducing and eventually eliminating the threat to security posed by nuclear weapons has not altered. For the United States, a nuclear-test ban remains an objective to be achieved in due course, in the context of significant reductions in the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons and the development of substantially improved verification measures. We have also made it clear

that, at the present levels of nuclear weapons, testing plays a role in ensuring the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent which remains a key element in the security of the Western Alliance.

My delegation realizes that the importance of verification for a future comprehensive test ban is universally recognized, but that there is a division of opinion as to whether effective means of verification exist. In our view, more work is necessary in the field of seismic verification, and in other areas such as on-site inspection. We believe the present status of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts reflects this reality. Let the Conference, then, agree to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban that last met in 1983, under the mandate and with the programme of work proposed by Western delegations in CD/521 and CD/621, and carry forward the practical work which would establish the facts in this regard.

The questions of verification and compliance, both in the chemical weapons area and in the area of nuclear testing, point to the broader issue of compliance with existing agreements and undertakings in the entire field of arms control and disarmament. This issue is one to which my delegation devoted considerable attention last year: in the opening statement made by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, in my closing remarks in August, and in our other interventions and activities during the session.

During the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the United States, together with eight other States, was pleased to introduce a resolution, 40/94 L, concerning compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements. With the indulgence of my colleagues around this table, I would like to consider this resolution, which passed in the General Assembly by a vote of 131 to 0 with 16 abstentions, in some detail. The General Assembly expressed its awareness of "the abiding concern of all Member States for preserving respect for rights and obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law," and agreed that it was essential for the strengthening of international security to observe "the Charter of the United Nations, relevant treaties and other sources of international law." It took note of "the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them."

The resolution stressed that "any violation" of arms control agreements "not only adversely affects the security of the States Parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements," and "that any weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system". Members of the General Assembly supporting this resolution further stated their belief that "compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements by States Parties is, therefore, a matter of interest and concern to the international community."

Resolution 40/94 L "Urges all States Parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions subscribed to", "Calls on all Member States to give serious

consideration to the implications of non-compliance with those obligations for international security and stability, as well as for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament", and appeals for support for "efforts aimed at the resolution of non-compliance questions, with a view toward encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements."

I think it is obvious that the matters with which this resolution was concerned, and which attracted such a large degree of support from the world community, should be matters that we in this conference keep firmly in view in our own work. The resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly do not exert a binding force on the Conference on Disarmament, which operates on the basis of mutual consent among its members. But clearly the principles embodied in this resolution are essential for the conclusion of new agreements, specifically, at this juncture, on chemical weapons.

CD/PV.338

pp.13-14

GDR/Rose

11.2.86

VER,
CTB

Based on the position that the implementation of disarmament accords needs to be reliably verified, the programme contains new aspects, on the understanding, of course, that all sides involved have equal obligations. Verification should become what it actually has to be, namely, an instrument to promote disarmament and not to impede it. I am sure, discussions and negotiations at our Conference would gain from that approach.

The extension of the unilateral Soviet moratorium has met with a broad positive response. It is now up to the United States to take up the challenge. Time is pressing. A moratorium to be agreed between the Soviet Union and the United States would be interpreted by everyone as a clear indication of the two nations' firm resolve to implement the document signed at the Geneva summit.

At our Conference, work should start without delay so that a global treaty may be achieved as quickly as possible. To this end, a committee, operating on the basis of the guidelines set out in United Nations resolutions, will have to be established. The term "flexibility" is used quite often in this context. Right now, flexibility means above all that delegations should put on record their willingness to take part in the process of working out an agreement. Lack of such willingness cannot, with the best will in the world, be compensated by procedural compromises. On the other hand, if that readiness is there, understanding on adequate procedures could easily be reached.

At no time was the verification issue a genuine obstacle to the negotiations on a multilateral treaty. This, I am sure, will become even more apparent during this session.

CD/PV.338

p.16

Mexico/Garcia Robles

11.2.86

VER

"Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.66/Rev.1, which is now a General Assembly resolution, embodies a series of provisions the validity and pertinence of which no one who takes his duties as a representative to the United Nations seriously can call into question. It is enough to examine any of its paragraphs to realize that is so. To illustrate my point, by way of example I shall take the liberty of reading out the following three paragraphs.

In the third preambular paragraph, the Assembly emphasizes 'the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them'. A little later, in the fifth preambular paragraph, the Assembly stresses 'that any weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system'. And in operative paragraph 1, the Assembly 'urges all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions subscribed to'.

CD/PV.339

pp.10-13

Pakistan/Ahmad

13.2.86

CW

Ideally, declarations regarding chemical weapon stockpiles and their production facilities should be made before the convention is opened for signature. An agreement on these lines would, besides enhancing the value of the convention, also serve as a confidence-building measure. If this is not possible, a consensus on the time frame within which declarations are to be made should not be too difficult to reach. The declarations should not only be comprehensive but also verifiable. My delegation finds it difficult to sympathize with the position that detailed declarations would compromise the security interests of the possessor States. Such arguments appear to ignore the concerns of those who have not exercised the option to acquire chemical weapons.

Complete elimination of chemical weapon stockpiles, their production facilities and means of delivery should be a central feature of the convention. We hope the chemical-weapon States will eschew viewing the destruction process exclusively from their own military perspective. The process should begin very soon after the convention enters into force, if not before it, and should be completed at the quickest possible pace under international supervision. It is absolutely essential, in this regard, to define chemical-weapon production facilities in a manner that does not impinge upon or interfere with the peaceful chemical industry in any country. As a non-aligned and non-chemical-weapon State, we find it difficult to appreciate the spending of valuable time over working out agreed destruction schedules whose central objective appears to be to ensure that the security of the two alliance systems is not put in jeopardy during the elimination process. When viewed in the light of the fact that the security of the two is not based on chemical weapons but on nuclear arsenals, this debate appears somewhat unnecessary. In our view the destruction process should provide for the elimination of

chemical-weapon production facilities ahead of chemical weapon stockpiles. Similarly newer stocks should be destroyed before the older ones. Further, a 10-year period should not necessarily be required to complete the elimination process. It should be possible for States possessing chemical weapons to eliminate their stockpiles and production facilities in a period considerably less than 10 years.

The issue of establishing confidence in compliance with the future chemical weapons convention lies at the heart of our negotiations. Consequently provisions relating to verification and compliance, which would in any case constitute the backbone of the convention, would have to construct a régime which ensures that undertakings relating to destruction, non-production and non-acquisition were complied with. Given the limitations of the existing capabilities as well as the misgivings attached with too intrusive a verification régime, 100 per cent effective compliance machinery does not appear within the realm of possibility. This, however, does not mean that a verification régime containing a mix of national and international means of an intrusive nature cannot be arrived at. It is clear to us that the type and intrusiveness of verification to which an activity is subjected should be determined by the element of risk which that particular activity posed for the convention.

It would perhaps be too simplistic to base a vitally important international convention only on the premise that States would adhere to it in good faith and with the intention of abiding by its provisions. Trust blended with mutual self-interest, therefore, seems a better basis for an agreement. In our view it would be in the general interest to ensure compliance through an effective and equitable verification system and an efficacious and non-discriminatory complaints procedure duly supported by a viable organizational structure.

A general understanding appears to exist that the future chemical weapons convention should provide for the establishment of a consultative committee -- a body composed of all the States parties -- as the principal organ responsible for overseeing the implementation of the convention. A consensus also seems to prevail that the Consultative Committee should have as its main subsidiary organ an executive council, a body composed of a fixed number of States which remains permanently in session and exercises authority delegated to it by the Consultative Committee. My delegation believes that the organization and functioning of these bodies should be arranged in a manner that ensures their effectiveness without compromising the principle of sovereign equality, which is an essential basis on which States adhere to international agreements. We disagree in this regard with arguments calling for the establishment of an organizational set-up which would give a privileged position to the developed nations at the expense of the developing countries. We realize the existing inequalities in the present-day world but cannot support their being institutionalized through international agreements.

In case the States with highly developed chemical industries find it difficult to accept the notion of an executive council in which some of them might not be represented, the solution could perhaps lie in starting with an executive council which is larger than the 15 member body that has often been mentioned. Simultaneously the convention could provide for an increase in the membership of the Executive Council once the total number of States parties

goes beyond a certain figure. Another solution could be to fix the membership of the executive council at a certain percentage of the total number of States parties to the convention. A figure between 30 and 40 per cent should be considered as adequate. This would allow for automatic expansion in the executive council membership as the convention is acceded to by more and more States. Such solutions would be equitable and allow for a sufficient number of developed countries to be always represented in the executive council in order to protect their special interests.

The question of decision-taking is an important element in determining the effectiveness of the bodies set up under the convention. The consensus principle, by giving everyone virtually the right to veto, would be a prescription for paralysis, especially in situations where a decision or action is most required. On the other hand a significant number of States may be highly reluctant to accept decisions by a simple majority, especially in so far as substantive matters are concerned. There is also the additional question of determining as to what is substantive and what is procedural. The dilemma could be resolved by basing all decisions, procedural and substantive, on a qualified majority. Such a solution would not only be unambiguous but also have the merit of being simple and efficient. My delegation has explained this approach in a working paper submitted last year. We realize that the suggestion may be considered unconventional but we should not be afraid of breaking new ground if it signals improvement over past practice and contributes towards our goal of achieving an effective and efficient convention.

The future chemical weapons convention must also lay down procedures for resolving doubts, apprehensions and complaints about non-compliance. These would, however, have to be carefully balanced. While on the one hand they impinge on the sensitive issue of national sovereignty, they are essential, on the other hand, to ensure a healthy respect for the convention. The fact-finding procedures should thus be devised in a manner which operates as a safety net around the convention. The convention while acknowledging the value of clarifying suspicions and ambiguities through bilateral means should provide for a graduated, though not necessarily rigid, framework for resolving doubts through the machinery to be established under it.

While any breach would be a grave development, use of chemical weapons should be treated as the most serious violation of the convention. It is essential that a separate procedure is provided in the convention for expeditiously dealing with allegations of use of chemical weapons.

In the less than perfect world in which we live, inter-State relations often tend to be characterized by mistrust, mutual rivalries and competing interests. So long as the current situation obtains, efforts at having a watertight convention do not come as a surprise to us. Comprehensive, unambiguous and stringent procedures would greatly help in promoting international confidence in any agreement. Provisions aimed at ensuring compliance with the convention should, therefore, not be seen as directed against this or that State or group of States, but rather at enhancing the credibility of the convention. The relationship between sovereign rights of States and international obligations freely entered into has been and will remain a sensitive issue as well as an interesting debating point. However, sovereignty voluntarily conceded for the greater good of all is altruism at its best.

From this perspective, we note with particular interest the fact that in the joint statement issued after the meeting, the two leaders noted "proposals recently tabled by the United States and the Soviet Union" and "called for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 per cent reductions in the nuclear arms of the United States and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement". "During the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon."

The Third NPT Review Conference held in September last year adopted by consensus a final document declaring continued support for the three objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: namely, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It also declared the determination of the States Parties to enhance the implementation of the Treaty and to further strengthen its authority.

This outcome was of particular importance. At the same time, we hold in common many of the views expressed by States Parties concerning the Treaty and on disarmament, and share much of their concern. We also believe that the agreement which was reached after negotiations extending until early in the morning of the last scheduled day of the Review Conference was a reflection of the clear and common recognition among the States Parties that there was no alternative to maintaining the nuclear non-proliferation régime set forth in this Treaty.

It goes without saying that the successful conclusion of this Review Conference presupposes the faithful observance by the nuclear-weapon States of the obligations undertaken in accordance with the Treaty, including the commitment to pursue negotiations in good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in accordance with Article VI. It is therefore significant that the United States-Soviet Union joint statement of November 1985 reiterated clear recognition of this point. We sincerely hope that States not Parties will now give serious attention to the fact that this Treaty has so far achieved its objective in preventing nuclear proliferation among the non-nuclear-weapon States over the past 16 years and realize the significance of the fact that some 130 States have elected to become Parties to this Treaty.

One major issue with regard to the nuclear-test ban is the question of verification and its limitations, which is obviously linked to the question of compliance. We regret the fact that this Conference has not been able to consider these aspects because we do not have an ad hoc committee on this subject. Had we been broadminded enough to provide a working forum in the name of an ad hoc committee, we certainly would have had ample opportunities to undertake in-depth consideration of this matter.

The issue seems to be one of the technology required to detect, identify and evaluate very small-scale nuclear explosions which take place in differing geographic conditions and locations under the Earth's surface, together with the problem of an international data link to provide for common and well-organized determinations. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has been working on such problems for quite some time, and we hope that their mandate will be enlarged so as to enable further in-depth study on detection, identification and evaluation. For our part, we are considering to take further steps as a contribution toward such a goal in the near future and we expect to be in consultation with like-minded countries regarding the means of conducting further seismic data exchange.

When we turn our attention to the fortieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, we were again unable to obtain a single unified resolution on a comprehensive test ban and three differing approaches were presented. However, we should like to note that one of them showed a more practical approach than had been the case previously and laid out the questions to be considered as those concerning "structure", "scope", "compliance" and "verification" of a NTB treaty. Though we take the view that the Conference on Disarmament need not be directly bound by United Nations resolutions, none the less we welcome such a development as above as an indication of widening common understanding regarding the substantive matters to be taken up by the Ad Hoc Committee.

Furthermore, concerning the technology of verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban, it is clear that the nuclear-weapon States, and especially the United States and the Soviet Union, who together possess a wealth of relevant information accumulated throughout the years, should take the lead and show a practical and forward-looking posture in developing an agreement on effective and reliable verification measures.

With regard to verification, I should like to point out the following developments which have come to our attention.

The United States has, since 1984, proposed mutual visits by experts between the United States and USSR to the other's nuclear test sites in order to assure precise calibration of measurements. Further, it has recently made a unilateral invitation for Soviet experts to visit United States sites.

In response to these initiatives, the Soviet Union has shown that it too emphasizes the importance of verification and, though with the precondition of a moratorium on nuclear testing, has supported the idea of an international verification system, including agreement to on-site inspection. We are aware that the efficacy of on-site inspection is very much governed by the conditions under which it is conducted. Given the common understanding on the importance of verification as was declared by the joint statement following the November Summit, we would like to think that common ground concerning verification in general, including the questions of on-site inspection and calibration of the yield of actual nuclear explosions is slowly emerging. We look forward to early consultations and a solution to this matter between the two States.

It is against such broadening of common understanding that my country strongly hopes for a recommencement of substantial considerations for a nuclear-test-ban at the Conference on Disarmament this year.

In 1984, we made a proposal for a step-by-step approach to a nuclear-test ban and in 1985 presented a working paper on concrete measures for the realization of the International Seismic Data Exchange System. There are important contributions made by various States which still await the Conference's consideration in detail. We remain fully prepared to co-operate with other States so that these worthy ideas and proposals may not be brushed aside with some general statement of principle, but will be fully considered according to their respective merits and exploited for the realization of a nuclear-test ban.

I wish next to state our views on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In this connection, I should like to mention some of the obvious problems in the wish to find just solutions.

First, if we were to list those substances to be prohibited from among those now identified, we shall wind up leaving new technological developments unregulated.

Second, if we were to try to circumvent the above situation by laying down a comprehensive ban, we might rule out existing or future peaceful use which could be made possible through technological development.

Third, it would be just as inappropriate to provide for an unduly strict ban on those substances which have peaceful uses as it would be to provide for a loose regulatory régime on account of the peaceful uses.

Fourth, if the regulatory régime were to be extended to cover too wide an area of the chemical industry, its implementation could become impractical, thus creating disenchantment with such a régime.

Fifth, we should not forget that the problems related to the day-to-day management of the convention (namely, the composition of the secretariat, procedures for decision-making, etc.) are matters of delicate political balance.

These and other questions should be taken fully into account and considered together with the varied situations States find themselves in, so that a solution acceptable to all may be developed. I might add that the five points enumerated above are not necessarily unique to the case of chemical weapons. They are common to wide ranges of modern technology for which the distinction between military and peaceful uses is often found in the domain of subjective judgement.

With regard to our work for the present year, I submit for consideration the possibility of holding separate expert group meetings to draw up a list of chemicals and precursors in accordance with guidelines to be developed. I realize that for the past three years or so, the experts have not held that

kind of a meeting but have basically participated in the general considerations directly, providing inputs from the expert's point of view. I would be the first to acknowledge that the utility of this approach has been well proven. At the same time, I feel that it may also be useful to reconvene an experts' meeting to deal with matters of a purely technical nature.

When discussing questions of verification in relation to chemical weapons, I believe that we are assuming an integrated system of routine verification as a basis for the structure of operations, which seems from time to time to have taken secondary place in the considerations due to very active discussions concerning challenge inspections. The working paper my country submitted last year dealt with a part of the problems regarding routine verification activities by showing how it could be possible to utilize various sensors and equipment, and we hope that this and other relevant proposals would be discussed further.

Though all States seem to be in agreement concerning the need for challenge inspection, differing views have been expressed as to the concrete formulation for such verification. We feel that the significance of challenge verification lies in ensuring compliance with the future convention and thus assuring security for all States; in other words, in its deterrence role. With such a perspective in mind, we should undertake a full examination of the question in search of a feasible solution.

In such work, much consideration should be given to the various reasons concerning which one among the possible different modes of challenge inspection might have to be invoked, together with the time frame and scenario for an actual inspection. Further, full consideration should be given to the various procedures by which a request for on-site inspection may arise, whether they emerge from routine inspection or from some other procedure, taking into account such views as may be expressed by the experts.

CD/PV.339

p.23

France/Jessel

13.2.86

CW

Among the many problems which should be examined by our Conference, France considers that priority attention should be given to the following:

- (i) The procedures for verification of civilian factories producing substances which might be diverted for the purpose of manufacturing chemical warfare agents.
- (ii) The elimination of stocks and of production facilities, concerning which last year the French delegation submitted a text that is contained in document CD/630. We have also observed that, in the area of verification, the language of the Soviet proposals of 15 January prompts us to ask for additional information which will, we hope, help further the discussion in this area.
- (iii) The composition and modus operandi of the bodies to be set up under the Convention.

CD/PV.339

pp.33-34

China/Qian Jiadong

13.2.86

CW

However, blind optimism will do us no good. We have to keep a sober mind on the fact that tremendous work has yet to be done, and divergences on some key issues still remain. The question of verification, especially challenge verification, is one of the thorny problems calling for greater efforts. At the initiative of the Canadian delegation, the United Nations General Assembly last year adopted by consensus a resolution on the question of verification. Although this resolution only deals with the question of verification in general, we hope it will bear a positive impact on our negotiations. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has started its work. We wish it renewed success.

CD/PV.339

p.37

Egypt/Alfarargy

13.2.86

CTB .

We welcome the declaration by the Soviet Union on its readiness to initiate negotiations on a nuclear-test ban treaty, whether on a bilateral basis with the United States, or by the resumption of the tripartite negotiations with the participation of the United Kingdom, or in the Conference on Disarmament. At the same time, we express our regret at the declaration by the United States on the continuation of its nuclear tests, and its position that attaining a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban is a long-term objective.

If verification is considered to be the main obstacle which delays the endeavours to reach a comprehensive test-ban treaty, then it behooves us to refer and pay tribute to the declaration by the Soviet Union on its readiness to accept on-site inspection, whenever necessary, and to the initiative by the six States signatories of the Delhi Declaration on their readiness to participate in the verification efforts of a nuclear-test ban. Doubtless, any step that brings us closer to the objective of a comprehensive test ban is worthy of appreciation and support. When all cannot be achieved, all need not be abandoned. That is why we welcome the Soviet Union's decision to freeze its nuclear tests as of 6 August 1985 until the beginning of 1986, and also its subsequent decision to extend the moratorium for another three months and its readiness to extend such a freeze further if it is reciprocated by the United States, which is what we all hope will happen.

CD/PV.340

pp.7-10

FRG/Wegener

18.2.86

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A second criterion for a meaningful comprehensive test-ban treaty is, as we all know, effective international control. My Government has noted in this connection that the recent proposals by General Secretary Gorbachev indicate some possible movement in the field of verification and indicate, in particular, that verification would not be allowed to be an obstacle to the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. It should be noted specifically that the Soviet Union would now also appear to accept on-site inspections for the monitoring of tests or for the verification of their absence. We hope that these new openings will develop further momentum. It is equally encouraging that the Six Heads of State and Government from four continents, in their recent declaration, have also offered seismic control measures, thereby

underlining their positive disposition towards the necessity of making a reliable international control mechanism an integral part of a future test-ban agreement.

The importance of adequate verification, tailored to the purposes, scope and nature of disarmament agreements, is now universally recognized. United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/152 0 testifies to this welcome evolution and to the increasing conceptual clarity with which verification matters are viewed. It now hardly needs argument anymore that disarmament agreements that dodge the verification issue and do not contain appropriate provisions for the monitoring of compliance are incomplete and may, in case of controversy, tend to wreck the mutual confidence of States rather than enhance it. This issue will be placed squarely before many delegations when the Bacteriological Weapon Treaty will come up for its next review later this year. Resolution 40/152 0, however, also makes it quite clear that verification is not an abstract purpose by itself, but subservient to specific arms control purposes. Excessive demands on verification are therefore self-destructive and may generate the suspicion that the proponents are less interested in the conclusion of a disarmament agreement than its avoidance. The important and responsible task for negotiators is to define precisely the levels of confidence that are needed for the effective monitoring of compliance of a given agreement and to determine, on the basis of full knowledge of the state of art of verification techniques, how these can be achieved and maintained.

Verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is not an easy task and nobody should proclaim that the inherent technical issues are reliably resolved. Those who tend to quote statements to this effect from earlier periods are oblivious to the rapidly changing technological environment in which both nuclear testing and verification can be operated, not to speak of the evolution, potentially equally rapid, of various evasion techniques.

It is in the spirit of such a responsible search for an adequate negotiated verification system for a future test ban that my delegation last year introduced two Working Papers, CD/612 and CD/624. Both -- one illuminating the political aspects, the other more oriented towards technical solutions -- proposed the gradual establishment of a permanent global seismic monitoring network. The intention of this initiative is to contribute in a concrete and practical manner to the work on a comprehensive test ban. This initiative has been based on the recognition of the fact that verification models are complex and need a period of elaboration and further evolution. It is therefore necessary that the work, with a clear finality link to the future treaty, be taken in hand at an early juncture so that no time be lost and all scientific methods be used in a purposeful manner to achieve the desired result at the appropriate time.

Significant progress in the application of seismic technology has been made, in particular in recent years. Four areas, however, can be identified which require further practical work and refinement before a global network can perform in a reliable manner.

The establishment of a comprehensive test ban régime necessitates the installation of a global seismic network in order to ensure worldwide compliance with a treaty which for obvious reasons should have universal

adherence. The physical establishment of an effective global network will, however, take time somewhere in the order of several years depending on the intensity of efforts and the amount of financial resources applied. If a comprehensive test-ban treaty were concluded tomorrow, the necessary seismic installations to guarantee reliable verification of compliance on a worldwide scale at an appropriate level of confidence would be lacking.

A second consideration relates to the level of development, the state of the art of seismic technology. Although a wide range of questions concerning the detection and identification of nuclear explosions have been theoretically solved and some of the individual components and systems of seismic installations have been tested and operated, a number of open questions remain, in particular with a view to possible evasion scenarios such as, for instance, the muffling or even decoupling of seismic signals generated by a nuclear explosion tested in a large underground cavity. The search for practical and reliable solutions to these crucial issues is still underway in the scientific community.

Thirdly, the question of operationability of a complex worldwide system of seismic data collection, communication, and processing has to be addressed. Although individual seismographic stations might work effectively, the task of operating smoothly and reliably an interlinked system of 50 to 100 seismic stations based in different countries and parts of the world and operated by many nations and the communication of data to and from international data centres has not yet been satisfactorily resolved as the upcoming report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) on the technical test run in 1984 will demonstrate.

Finally, available seismic technology has heretofore only been applied and tested on a worldwide scale during the past test runs executed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and these test runs were limited in scope. Advanced technology such as, for instance, high-performance data acquisition systems, Level II-data, fast real-time data communication, and automated seismic installations have not yet been installed and tested within the setting of a global network.

It is on the basis of these considerations that the Federal Government introduced the proposal to gradually establish a global seismic monitoring and verification system already before the conclusion of a CTBT in order to make use, in a most effective manner, of the available time span prior to the functioning of the treaty. In order to set such a process in motion the international seismic data exchange system, as tested in the 1984 GSE test run, should be put into a continuous operating mode. While in operation the system would be geographically expanded and technically upgraded with the objective of implementing a global seismic network which would meet the degree of sophistication desired for monitoring and verifying a CTB on a global level. The proposed project would give scientists the opportunity to resolve, in a learning-by-doing process, remaining problems of monitoring and verification and to increase, progressively, the system's capability to detect, locate, and identify explosions. In a dynamic process of scientific research and practical application the global seismic network would mature over time and would be available and operational whenever needed.

The establishment and continuous operation of such a network needs to be embedded in an institutional framework. It is, therefore, suggested that during the transitional period, i.e., during the pre-treaty phase, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should be assigned the task of supervising the establishment and continuous operation of a global network and to make recommendations for its further improvement. Seismological facilities and data centres would be operated, as during the 1984 experiment, by participating states. The GSE would, as in the past, submit its recommendations and reports to the Conference on Disarmament as the political decision-making body. Upon conclusion of a test-ban treaty the global network and its terms of operation would immediately become part of the treaty provisions.

The proposal that I have outlined is geared exclusively to the establishment of a multilateral and worldwide seismic network. As the technical study which my delegation introduced in document CD/624 concludes, a global seismic network utilizing the most advanced technology could be brought to a standard of performance which would allow for detection and identification of explosions down to a bodywave magnitude of 4.0. This measurement is approximately equivalent to an explosion yield of 5 to 10 kt in dry unconsolidated rock or to a yield of about 1 kt for explosions in wet hard rock. An appropriate number of additional in-country networks would be required which would significantly improve the capability to detect and identify explosions and which would make the testing of low yield explosions and successful evasion by cavity-decoupling a rather difficult and risky undertaking.

I would like to emphasize that the intention of this initiative is in no way to detract from the importance of other work that needs to be done in connection with the resolution of outstanding issues related to a CTB. As stated before, my Government attaches great importance to the continuation of the work on a CTB in the Conference on Disarmament. The proposed project offers an opportunity to the Conference to engage in practical and concrete work on the central issue of verifying a nuclear test ban which needs to be done in any event. The establishment of a global seismic monitoring network will contribute significantly to this task. My delegation stands ready to resume the work in an Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Test Ban and hopes that this concrete and practical proposal will find a positive and supportive and detailed reaction from delegations in this Conference.

CD/PV.340

pp.14-15

Sri Lanka/Dhanapala

18.2.86

CTB

Statements have already been made since we opened the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament on the need to make progress on Item 1 of our agenda, "Nuclear Test Ban". The unilateral extension of the USSR moratorium on nuclear testing up to 31 March lends an urgency and demands that we act speedily. The two resolutions adopted in the last session of the United Nations General Assembly appealed to us here in the Conference on Disarmament to carry out negotiations on the complete cessation of nuclear test explosions and recommended flexible approaches to this. The absence of any mention in the Joint Statement of the Geneva Summit of this crucial item on the global agenda for disarmament is regrettable. We in the Conference on Disarmament cannot betray the hopes of the people of the world. Nor can we undermine our role as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament by failing to act on an important issue in which we have had a group of scientific experts

working so successfully on the related issue of verification. We are alarmed at the shifting arguments of those opposed to a nuclear-test ban. When the argument on verification proved to be unconvincing because of scientific developments in verification techniques and the political decision of some countries to permit on-site inspection if necessary, fresh reasons were advanced to resist the demand for a comprehensive test ban. These include the importance of testing in the development of new weapons and the need to test and modernize existing arsenals. If deep and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons arsenals are considered the higher priority surely testing to develop new weapons and maintain existing weapons is a non-sequitur. Logic and reason have seldom characterized the arguments of those who want bigger and better bombs. A test ban is a beginning. It is not an end in itself. We are gratified that the impact of world public opinion in favour of a nuclear-test ban has resulted in a decrease in the number of tests detected in 1985. The Conference must commence work on negotiating a nuclear-test ban and there would be nothing more appropriate than if we did so under the Presidency of one whose country has been at the vanguard in seeking such a ban.

CD/PV.340

p.23

Nigeria/Tonwe

18.2.86

CTB

The argument, or perhaps excuses, which were advanced for delaying a comprehensive test ban, verification and mutual confidence are now unconvincing. Authoritative scientific reports have confirmed for some time that national technical resources are adequate. Secondly, reliable neutral and non-aligned States have assured us that they can organize a satisfactory verification system for an agreement. And with regard to mutual confidence, the major military Powers are concluding agreements in other areas which are as sensitive and require a comparable level of mutual confidence. So what we need is the political will, that very common factor which is so rarely demonstrated in international relations without ulterior motives.

CD/PV.340

pp.27-28

Kenya/Afande

18.2.86

CTB

The agenda before us this year contains a host of critical important issues vital to the future of humanity and linked to the overall objective of disarmament and security. The question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty, to which my Government attaches great importance, has always been inscribed on the Conference's agenda as an item of highest priority. It has, however, unfortunately become one of the more contentious items. The intensity generated by this item shows the inherent acquisition of more nuclear weapons as a strategic policy of major world Powers, particularly the super-Powers, and the profound public anxieties arising from an awareness of the massive destructive power of such weapons. While recognizing that real and potential difficulties stand in the way of the conclusion of acceptable treaties to reduce the danger of vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, I wish to reaffirm my Government's strong belief that a negotiated verifiable comprehensive agreement limiting nuclear tests would be a logical step in that direction. Since the partial test-ban Treaty came into force some 20 years ago, there have been no meaningful results achieved towards reaching agreement on a comprehensive test-ban which would be an effective barrier against the development of a new generation of nuclear systems, and thereby strengthen efforts to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear

war. Although initially believed to be of historic significance, the emergence of the partial test-ban treaty has not slowed down the nuclear-arms race among the major nuclear Powers. On the contrary and tragically, the Treaty seems to have served as a licence for accelerating nuclear testing despite the existence of numerous General Assembly resolutions against such testing. We share the view that verification arrangements can be adequately negotiated and accommodated in a final treaty. The cessation of testing could significantly reduce the qualitative aspects of the nuclear-arms race and encourage an end to the development of nuclear weapons and the reduction of existing stockpiles.

CD/PV.341 pp.8-9 USSR/Gorbachev (letter) 20.2.86 VER
CTB

I should like to emphasize strongly that we propose that all practical measures of arms limitation and disarmament should be buttressed by measures of effective control and verification. No less than other States, the USSR is interested in having assurance of strict compliance with agreements reached.

A number of points in our plan have a direct bearing on the Conference on Disarmament.

Suffice it to say that at the top of its agenda is the test-ban issue, whose radical solution could, in our opinion, become a turning point in the efforts to eliminate the nuclear threat.

The Soviet Union, for its part, has been doing all it can to help achieve this goal. In particular, it is agreeable to the strictest control over a ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including on-site inspections and the use of all the latest developments in seismology.

CD/PV.341 pp.13-16 USSR/Kornienko 20.2.86 OS
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Finally, when all conceivable and inconceivable arguments would seem to have been exhausted, the question of verification is dragged out by the opponents of disarmament, as always happens in such cases. It is alleged, that, anyway, scientific research cannot be banned because it does not lend itself to verification, and, generally, human thought cannot be stopped.

Banning research deliberately aimed at the development of space strike arms and effectively verifying such a ban is quite possible. A common will is all that would be required. Opening the laboratories concerned for verification would be enough, and the Soviet Union is ready for that. For instance, if someone ventured to violate the ban on the development of space strike arms the fact would inevitably become known, since to prevent such research from reaching a dead end, tests outside the laboratory would be needed, which cannot be carried out in secret.

Those who oppose the cessation of nuclear tests have made a habit of referring to the difficulties of verifying their cessation. That, however, is refuted by facts. The following example, in particular, provides an indication of the capabilities of national technical means. Soon after the moratorium was introduced by the Soviet Union, a test explosion was set off at the Nevada test range which has to date not been reported in the United States. They must have expected that due to its low yield the explosion would not be detected and that therefore if the need arose, it could be claimed that it is impossible to verify such explosions. But despite its low yield the explosion was registered in the Soviet Union and the United States Government is well aware of that.

The Soviet Union does not, however, suggest that verification should be confined to national technical means. It is agreeable to supplementing it with international procedures, including on-site inspections if necessary.

All verification measures, including on-site inspections, that the Soviet Union considers possible for ensuring strict compliance with the moratorium on nuclear explosions would be also applicable, naturally, to an agreement on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, in case the agreement in question is achieved.

It is known that extensive work has already been done within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament to work out an international seismic data exchange system for the verification of a nuclear-weapon-test ban. The USSR favours the continuation of that work as well.

One thing, however, must be absolutely clear -- in any case what can be dealt with is, specifically, the verification of compliance with an agreement to stop nuclear tests, and by no means with the supervision of nuclear explosions. Proposals to do the latter are nothing but a mockery of common sense.

It should be said that the Soviet Union favours the earliest possible elimination of the existing stockpiles of chemical weapons as well as of the industrial base for their production.

Accordingly, our position envisages the timely declaration of the locations of enterprises producing chemical weapons and the timely cessation of their production. We are in favour of starting to work out procedures for destroying the relevant industrial base and for proceeding to eliminate stockpiles of chemical weapons soon after the convention enters into force.

Again, it should be emphasized that all these measures would be carried out under strict control including international on-site inspections. Here, as in other cases, the Soviet Union is no less interested in such control than other States.

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Hungary/Meiszter

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CTB

As I have already had occasion to point out earlier in my statement, confidence-building requires actions or the avoidance of certain actions. In this particular case it requires the renunciation of an action -- the testing of nuclear explosive devices. That is a real non-action in the best sense of the word. No verification, not even the unattainable 100 per cent perfect verification system, could be a substitute for the necessary action. Without the required action, without the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, verification cannot in itself create confidence. But on the basis of a certain level of confidence the necessary verification system could be elaborated gradually. We are convinced that a moratorium on all nuclear explosions is the best way to achieve the level of confidence, on the basis of which all the required verification measures could be safely developed, tested and introduced. We are also convinced that such an interaction of processes -- not endless talks on verification in abstract -- is the only feasible way to arrive at the results so badly needed for so long a time.

We must all acknowledge that now almost all the necessary components are at hand. The unilateral moratorium, introduced by the Soviet Union last August, and extended by an additional three months in January, is still in effect. The necessary verification means are available, and the Soviet Union has declared its readiness to reach agreement with the United States on further measures deemed necessary to verify compliance with the moratorium. There exists already an elaborate international system that has worked for years with sufficient accuracy and could be upgraded in a reasonably short time. There is only one more thing required: a responsible political decision by the United States to reciprocate the Soviet Union's gesture.

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Pakistan/Ahmad

20.2.86

CW

In my statement last Thursday I had in very broad terms described my delegation's views on the question of fact-finding. In doing so I had made the point that the fact-finding procedures should be devised in such a manner that they operate as a safety net around the Convention. I has also stated that the Convention should provide for a graduated, though not necessarily rigid, framework for resolving doubts through the machinery to be established under it. The Working Paper that we have submitted elaborates our views on this subject.

The overall approach spelt out in document CD/664 aims at handling the question of fact-finding at four different levels, which though separately identifiable, cannot be deemed to impose a strict discipline whereunder one level has necessarily to be traversed in order to reach the next one.

In our opinion most of the doubts and ambiguous situations emerging in the implementation or observance of the chemical weapons convention should be resolved through clarifications sought and obtained within the framework of bilateral consultations in a co-operative mood. This could be described as the first or the least acrimonious level at which suspicions could be allayed.

In case a State party having some doubts about the observance of the convention by some other State party does not wish to directly approach the

latter it should have the right to seek clarification through the organization set up under the chemical weapons convention. This could be described as clarification through the multilateral process and referred to as the second tier for resolving doubts.

The third tier would come into operation when a State party failing to satisfy its concerns through either of the approaches already mentioned by me, or without resorting to them, submits a request for the dispatch of a fact-finding mission to another State party in order to clarify a situation that gives rise to doubts about compliance with the convention. Fact-finding at this level acquires a more serious nature and needs to be carefully elaborated since it implies, inter alia, direct interference in the affairs of another State.

The fourth level of the fact-finding procedure involves a complaint regarding the use of chemical weapons. Since such a complaint would denote a violation of the gravest nature it would need to be handled in the most expeditious manner. It should be obvious that delayed action could lead to the removal or diffusion of the evidence of the use of chemical weapons.

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Poland/Turbanski

20.2.86

CTB

The problem has to be addressed comprehensively, not just from the point of view of verification, which obviously is a very important question and has to be resolved with respect to every disarmament agreement at the appropriate stage of negotiations. We are, for instance, negotiating a chemical-weapons ban, although we are aware that verification problems have not yet been resolved. We still do not know what the whole verification procedure would look like, though we have various, sometimes very detailed, proposals.

The Soviet proposals with respect to a NTB open various possibilities for starting practical work. They offer a three-month extension of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions introduced in August 1985, they appeal to the United States to join this moratorium which could be appropriately verified by national technical means as well as through international procedures -- including on-site inspections whenever necessary. Such a reciprocal, agreed and verified moratorium, which could be joined by other nuclear Powers, would certainly bring about practical experience which might be useful in the Conference's work on a test-ban treaty.

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UK/Renton

25.2.86

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It is also vital that agreements should be verifiable. As my Prime Minister said in her speech to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, this is the heart of the matter, not an optional extra. Verification is essential if any arms-control agreement is genuinely to enhance stability and security. We welcome the renewed recognition given to this basic principle by the General Assembly in a resolution adopted at its recent session. We also note the fact that recent Soviet statements seem to indicate recognition of the importance of this factor. It is also vital for the prospects of future agreements that Parties

abide by and comply with those agreements already negotiated. It is with regret that I must note legitimate concerns in this respect about previous agreements.

I must record at the same time our disappointment at the first evidence of how we are to interpret Mr. Gorbachev's positive words, when translated into deeds. He stated last month that in the Vienna MBFR talks he was willing to accept reasonable verification measures. We therefore looked for a constructive response to the Western proposal of December 1985 which contained significant moves on verification and provided a sound basis for progress; but what did we get last week? Merely the rehashing of the proposals the Eastern side tabled in 1983. These were inadequate in 1983. They are still inadequate, because on both information exchange and verification they do not provide the basis necessary to ensure the accurate monitoring of compliance. As I said, a disappointing response, and hardly consistent with what Mr. Gorbachev's statements had led us to expect. I very much hope that this will not prove the last word from the East on the subject.

Our goal in the negotiations on chemical weapons -- a global and verifiable ban on their development, production or stockpiling -- is ambitious. It will be a new milestone in arms control agreements. We therefore regard our present task as immensely important. Many delegations -- among them, I am glad to say, that of the United Kingdom -- have put forward detailed ideas and concepts designed to contribute to a solution. All delegations are agreed on the goal of a complete ban on chemical weapons which is set out in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. As a result of the painstaking efforts of this Committee over the last four years, we may now be better placed to resolve the outstanding problems. In particular, there is general agreement on the basic framework of the Convention and on a considerable amount of substantive language for its content.

We welcome the joint commitment by President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev that they will accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter. We can all surely take heart from this common expression of determination. We also welcome the recent statement by Mr. Gorbachev, reinforced in his message to this Conference, in which he called for early and complete elimination of chemical weapons and of the industrial basis for their production. We look forward to hearing detailed ideas from the Soviet delegation on how to put this into practice.

There seems to be general agreement that the main problem still to be solved is that of providing assurance to each party that other parties are complying fully with their obligations under the Convention. We must all work together to agree on provisions for the Convention that would give all countries the confidence they will require on this point. As chemical weapons are relatively easy to make and to conceal, stringent measures of verification will be needed to overcome suspicion that such weapons are being clandestinely retained or produced in violation of the convention; or that facilities for their production are being maintained under the guise of the civil chemical

industry. To allay these suspicions, we shall need a combination of verification methods: first, during the transitional period covering the complete elimination of chemical weapons and their production facilities; and second, on a permanent basis, to ensure that material is not being diverted from civil purposes to make these weapons.

I think it is widely accepted that the measures of verification should include a system of fact-finding which could be initiated by a party suspicious about the compliance of another party. The convention would, however, be a fragile one if it depended for its verification mainly on a system of challenges. The British delegation has made detailed proposals for complementing ad hoc fact-finding with a system of international inspection on a random routine basis, combined with the international exchange of data. The purpose is to forestall suspicion that substances used for peaceful purposes might be diverted to the manufacture of chemical weapons. After detailed consultations with our own chemical industry, we are convinced that this purpose can be accomplished, without disrupting peaceful industrial operations or infringing their commercial confidentiality. In this context, we warmly welcome the invitation of the Government of the Netherlands to show members of the Conference just what this means on the ground in June. We hope that all delegations to this Conference will participate.

It is particularly incumbent on those countries which possess large stocks of chemical weapons to help devise means of convincing others that they will destroy them; and to agree to measures of verification that will give others the confidence, in both the short and long term, that they will not make them again. Many detailed proposals have been made to this end. If we are to accelerate work on this convention this year -- as the British Government is determined to do -- it will be necessary for all delegations either to accept what has been proposed or to offer detailed specific alternative suggestions for generating the confidence required. I have read with interest the remarks on this subject by Deputy Minister Kornienko of the Soviet Union. In the English saying, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. We look forward to tasting the new menu which we are promised.

A good deal has been said recently, not least by General Secretary Gorbachev, about a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I should like to make clear the British policy. We see such a treaty as one of the objectives in our overall arms control policy. However, we continue to be gravely concerned on the score of verification. Key security interests would be involved in any treaty. The risks posed by undetected non-compliance would be especially grave. It would be pleasant indeed to be able to dismiss verification in the cavalier spirit that some, in both East and West, adopt; to shrug our shoulders and walk away from the issue. But life is not that simple. Nor is arms control.

As noted in British papers submitted to the Conference, the latest of which was tabled last July, there are at present inadequacies in our ability both to detect and identify nuclear testing. These underline the need for improvements in any potential régime for verification before agreement can be reached on a ban. Claims that these technical problems no longer exist, and can therefore be ignored, are not consistent with the scientific advice avail-

able to the British Government. They seem, I have to say this, the product more of wishful thinking, or even of propaganda, than of impartial scientific analysis. Furthermore, experience of previous negotiations in this area suggests that these problems will not be easily overcome. And it indicates that it would be premature to resume negotiations until solutions to these remaining problems become more apparent.

Nor is the establishment of an adequate verification régime merely a technical matter. Let us not forget that scientists' assessments are not the whole story. For the assessment of adequacy remains a political judgement, backed up by technical findings. And such a judgement rests upon a range of considerations, including the extent of political confidence on the part of one party that others will comply with a treaty.

It is clear that there is plenty of work still to be done. Some of this can profitably be pursued here at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. We regret that some countries have refused to allow this work to proceed since 1984. Discussions on the technical issues of verification and the scope of a ban could provide new guidelines for possible progress. I therefore hope that agreement can be reached at this session on establishing an ad hoc committee on the subject with a mandate acceptable to all. Let us make every effort to advance to agreement by pursuing, where necessary, a step-by-step approach. This can be done at the Conference on Disarmament. There are other steps that can be taken.

In the case of nuclear testing, the two treaties concluded in the 1970s between the Soviet Union and the United States remain unratified by either side. These treaties would restrict nuclear testing to a ceiling of 150 kilotons. They would also make detailed provisions for ways in which so-called peaceful nuclear explosions might be conducted, should either side believe them necessary. Both parties have announced the intention to observe the threshold limit. We believe that formal ratification of these treaties would be a useful step, always provided that both sides can be confident in the other's compliance with its obligations.

We have therefore welcomed the offer by President Reagan to exchange observers at test sites in order to improve the verification potential. In addition, President Reagan has invited the Soviet Union to send observers to a test in the United States, without any equivalent mutual obligation. We urge the Soviet Union to accept these offers. We hope that, as a result of such co-operation, early moves towards ratification will be possible.

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pp.15-16

Finland/Tormudd

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The remaining obstacles are none the less difficult. One of them concerns the definition of high-risk chemical compounds and of the corresponding régimes such compounds must be submitted to in order to ensure their solely non-military use. It is important that the system finally arrived at is both effectively verifiable and sufficiently realistic. All parties must feel confident that the régime in question is credible, that it can be complied with. At the same time, it must avoid unduly hampering the operations of civilian chemical industry.

Another major issue is the verification provisions of the convention, particularly the régime to be applied to the various verification tasks, such as the provisions relating to challenge inspection. It is clear that effective verification requires both on-site inspections and the use of modern monitoring equipment.

Automatic monitoring equipment for chemical-weapon verification purposes has been studied and tested within the Finnish chemical-weapon verification project since 1972. The project seeks to develop verification methods that would cover all the verification requirements under the convention: non-production, destruction of existing stocks as well as detection of alleged use. The most recent findings will again be incorporated in a "Blue Book" and presented to the Conference at the summer part of its session this year.

Although verification by technical means only does not in itself suffice to provide the necessary assurance of compliance in all cases, it can be helpful as a complement to on-site inspection. One could also give consideration to a combination of different methods incorporating different degrees of intrusiveness.

We welcome the unilateral moratorium on testing declared, and recently extended, by the Soviet Union. A moratorium joined by all nuclear-weapon States and declared for an indefinite period, preferably in conjunction with a decision to begin negotiations for a comprehensive test ban, would be a truly major step forward.

At the Conference on Disarmament, discussions on a comprehensive test ban have centred around the issues of scope and verification. Finland's position has always been that the very comprehensiveness of a test ban precludes partial solutions. All nuclear explosions must be covered. In a technical sense, the so-called peaceful nuclear explosions are indistinguishable from nuclear explosions for military purposes. The question is one of intent, not of technology.

A comprehensive test ban must also include adequate provisions for verification in order to be effective. Modern verification capabilities which detect even small nuclear explosions are under constant development. In the view of some experts, the available capabilities are even now sufficient to permit credible verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Some recent statements with regard to verification in a number of arms-control negotiations should also ease the way for productive talks on this issue. It is high time to move forward on the road to ending all nuclear explosions in all environments for all time.

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India/Gonsalves

25.2.86

CTB

There are two aspects to the problem of a nuclear-test ban put forward by the opponents of a nuclear-test ban. Firstly, reference is made to the security advantage vis-à-vis the adversary of securing modernization and non-obsolence of existing weapons. Secondly, reference is made to the perceived disadvantage to the State Parties to a future test-ban treaty in the

event of evasion by others. Let us examine the first question. For the maintenance of the existing precarious state of deterrence we do not see how carrying out more nuclear tests is essential, especially when the existing nuclear weapons with the super-Powers are, on each side's admission, adequate to deter the adversary. The former Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, Dr. David Owen, stated in categorical terms in a speech in September last year that the shelf-life argument for continued nuclear testing was a bogus one which was invented at a particular point of time by the armaments lobby to ward off pressure for a comprehensive test ban. It is also doubtful if such marginal advantage as may be derived by continued testing could be so significant as to alter the present state of mutual vulnerability with which the super-Powers are faced. In fact, since the super-Powers have agreed at the highest level in Geneva that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" they clearly acknowledged that neither side can or should trigger off a nuclear war. Moreover, their commitment in Geneva that "they will not seek to achieve military superiority" should logically negate previous arguments about the perceived marginal advantage to be derived over the adversary from continued testing and modernization of weapons. Therefore, the argument that nuclear tests are necessary to buttress the security policies of one military alliance or to maintain the credibility of so-called deterrence would appear to be entirely groundless.

The second argument about the adversary deriving advantage from cheating in a test-ban treaty should also be carefully scrutinized. The efficacy of national and international seismic monitoring arrangements is by objective international scientific standards adequate for effective verification and can moreover very easily and speedily be upgraded. The Soviet Union has for its part acknowledged the imperative need for an effective verification régime and has agreed to on-site inspections as necessary to consolidate this régime. The limited nature of the remaining problem nevertheless merits some examination. It is established by scientific consensus that to a very small threshold sneaky nuclear explosions cannot be carried out without being detected and identified through existing seismic monitoring stations. Nuclear explosions in the vicinity of a kiloton range are generally known to be detected and identified without problems. The only way to cheat, we are told, is to carry out muffled explosions of a higher yield. Thus a would-be-evader would either have to carry out an explosion lower than that of a kiloton yield or muffle a larger yield explosion through the artifice of a cavity in the hard rock. In the context of the super-Powers this would appear to be of little use for the simple reason that a tiny explosion may be under too many handicaps to be of significant use and is unlikely to provide any appreciable advantage.

Arguments about possible evasion attribute to the would-be-evader a degree of inventiveness in the matter of arrangements for clandestine tests which hardly accord with reality. As against this it should be borne in mind that the political commitment of the international community as a whole to a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban will in itself be an effective deterrent against attempts to go in for evasion. Moreover, with the improved efficacy of international seismic monitoring arrangements it would be extremely imprudent to resort to cheating as the political cost of being detected will far outweigh the limited and inherently speculative gains which might be derived from a clandestine test. The reason is that the very notion of a minimum level of detection is largely statistical, there being no absolute

lower limit. Besides, prior to testing it is bound to be infinitely difficult to set any guaranteed upper limit to the yield of a weapon. Therefore, an evader will face enormous problems in designing a device which it can successfully test clandestinely. If in spite of these constraints any of the major nuclear-weapon States were to design a weapon to cheat the test-ban régime it would have to do so at an altogether new test site as existing sites would in any case be expected to be under effective surveillance in any test ban régime. New test sites cannot be developed without being detected by satellites. Arrangements to undertake explosions at such sites will be problematic indeed.

In the super-Power context a test carried out under such severe constraints would necessarily have to furnish significant fresh results. Clearly, there are too many imponderables in the evasion game for either of the super-Powers to appreciably improve its relative nuclear muscle vis-à-vis the other by trying to evade a test ban. The overall conclusion, therefore, is that if the super-Powers are committed not to achieve military superiority over one another and if their existing weaponry rules out the feasibility of winning or fighting nuclear war, the continuation of nuclear testing cannot play any role in promoting the security of either of them. The resultant need is to abandon all nuclear-weapon tests through an act of enlightened political will.

As for the non-nuclear-weapon States, the problem of evasion may theoretically pose greater dangers. The fact, however, is that none of these States have objected to negotiations of a nuclear-test ban. Thus those who have much more at risk and who enjoy no assurance of their security are nevertheless better disposed to take this risk.

We welcome the latest proposals put forward by General Secretary Gorbachev as they have further removed obstacles in the way of a nuclear-test ban treaty. We appreciate the Soviet decision to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing by three months. It is to be hoped that this gesture will be reciprocated by the United States and that the moratorium can be periodically extended while business-like negotiations on a comprehensive test ban proceed. The acceptance by the Soviet Union of "on-site inspections whenever necessary" greatly enhances the ability of the international community to work out an effective verification régime for a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban. It is now our firm belief that actual negotiation of a treaty alone can remove remaining doubts. Previous experience in the Conference on Disarmament points to the futility of mere general discussion. In fact, the experience of negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons very clearly shows how difficult it is to negotiate an appropriate verification régime even after the two sides have expressed the maximum readiness to co-operate. Nothing would be more befitting to the spirit of Geneva than the commencement of detailed negotiations of a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban within the Conference on Disarmament.

Morocco, like the other members of the Group of 21, is convinced that the nuclear-test ban treaty can be achieved. We also consider the claim that the

treaty would be difficult to verify to be entirely without foundation and merely a ploy to conceal a lack of political will.

This conviction is based on two observations:

Firstly, for 15 years the Secretary-General of the United Nations has maintained that all the scientific and technical aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision would be needed to reach a final agreement.

Secondly, the seminar organized last year by Norway on the seismological verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban enabled many of us to take note of the considerable technical progress which has been achieved in the field of seismological verification. The main conclusion arising from the demonstrations and talks whose scientific accuracy is not in doubt, is that seismological verification of compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty is a real possibility.

Whatever different opinions the members of this Conference may hold on the issue of verification, reluctance to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear tests is liable to have a serious effect on the unity of the Conference and jeopardize its credibility. My delegation therefore appeals to all members to support the efforts of the President, Mr. Butler, in the consultations which he is undertaking with such tact and discernment with the aim of re-establishing an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate.

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GDR/Rose

25.2.86

CTB

The Conference could make progress much more easily if the discussion about verification were conducted in a more down-to-earth fashion. Some re-thinking will be needed therefore. The verification issue must be taken out of the tactical arsenal and addressed with emphasis on the actual goal to be achieved.

I am convinced that delegations have noted with satisfaction the following passage in the message General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev sent to the Conference on Disarmament last Thursday: "Suffice it to say that at the top of its agenda is the test-ban issue, whose radical solution could, in our opinion, become a turning point in the efforts to eliminate the nuclear threat. The Soviet Union, for its part, has been doing all it can to help achieve this goal. In particular, it is agreeable to the most strict control over a ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including on-site inspections and the use of all achievements in seismology." A new approach to verification would almost automatically produce a balanced programme of work for a committee, a programme that would be acceptable to all States and furnish an opportunity for the in-depth deliberation of all individual issues. Resolution 40/80, which Mexico sponsored at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, is an example of how all the facets of the subject can be adequately dealt with. If two working groups were created, as suggested in that resolution, the main subjects could be considered in the following organizational format:

Working Group I -- Structure and Scope of the Treaty -- could address such topics as: a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests in all environments; issues pertaining to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; and non-assistance to other States in carrying out nuclear-weapon tests.

Working Group II -- Compliance and Verification -- could mainly deal with: means of verification, i.e., national technical means, international exchange of seismic data, exchange of data on the radioactivity of air masses; procedures for consultation and co-operation; and on-site inspection.

Any goal-oriented consideration of the verification issue will have to exclude the possibility of intentional or unintentional one-sidedness. We should labour for a system that is attainable and provides sufficient assurances that clandestine tests would be detected. It can be achieved by a combined political and scientific-technological effort. Verification, by its very nature, comprises a complex of political, administrative and technical measures, a whole array of procedures, as it were. Obviously an international seismic data exchange system will be of importance in this context.

The material prepared by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts including the report on the technical test, which the Conference is going to consider in 1986 furnishes valuable technical expertise when it comes to the solution of verification problems. Because of the close interrelationship between the political and technical aspects involved, work would be facilitated if the future of the GSE were determined within the framework of the committee to be established. If we are to provide for a properly functioning verification system, operational when a CTB enters into force, we should recognize the irrefutable truth that there are no mere technical solutions to that problem, just as to any other problem in the disarmament field. What is more, technical solutions must be sought on the basis of all the scientific knowledge available in order that realistic conclusions may be drawn also as regards the time-frame. In the final analysis, it is our inescapable task to prohibit nuclear tests and not to monitor them.

My delegation is, of course, aware of the fact that verification is not the only element of the treaty that poses problems. What strikes us as problematic, too, is, for instance, the scope of the accord. In my statement of 11 February 1986, I have already expressed the belief that, as positions are coming closer, it will be possible to find an answer to this question, an answer that satisfies all the sides involved. In this connection, permit me to draw your attention again to United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/88, proposed by Hungary and co-sponsored also by my country. The relevant paragraph specifies that the treaty to be worked out "would contain provisions, acceptable to all, preventing the circumvention of this ban by means of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes".

CD/PV.343

pp.10-12

Norway/Froynes

27.2.86

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How do we achieve the urgent progress which we need? I see a two-fold strategy. Firstly, it is the responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament to undertake and complete the negotiations on the convention. Secondly, the major chemical weapons Powers have also a special role to play. Indeed, it is

highly significant that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at their meeting in November 1985 agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on chemical weapons. We welcome their agreement to intensify bilateral discussions at the expert level on all aspects of such a chemical-weapons ban, including the question of verification. This agreement has special significance in light of the fact that the verification issues have proved to be among the most difficult questions to solve.

We know that verification of a chemical-weapons convention will be a complex matter, necessitating more comprehensive monitoring systems than in any existing disarmament treaties. In fact, the Conference on Disarmament has to break new ground in order to establish an adequate verification mechanism. The system which will be developed by the Conference will have a bearing on verification provisions in other future disarmament agreements as well. Among the issues which have to be solved, the question of on-site inspection on challenge retains special significance. We believe that an effective and verifiable convention will necessitate a compulsory system of on-site inspections without making use of unnecessary intrusiveness. The elaboration of such a system is a momentous task, which will require an open mind and a flexible attitude from all the parties concerned.

So where do we go from here? I wish to recall that the United States, for its part, has tabled comprehensive proposals in the draft convention of April 1984. This was a welcome contribution. My Government attaches importance to the fact that the United States underlined that the draft was not presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. This is a necessary approach for all the parties at the present time. In his statement on 15 January General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would accept strict control, including international on-site inspection, for a number of major measures to be covered by the convention, inter alia destruction of the relevant industrial base for production of chemical weapons.

In our view, a global seismological network would have to play a central role in verifying compliance with a test ban. Norway has invested considerable resources in this field. As a follow-up to the workshop which was organized in Norway last year, we shall later this year present a proposal to the Conference on Disarmament on the role of small-aperture arrays in a global seismological network. The proposal will be based on the experience already gained during the operation of the small-aperture array NORESS in Southern Norway. This array, which was inaugurated in May 1985, incorporates some of the most recent technological and scientific advances in seismic array design, instrumentation and data processing. I would like to stress that our research indicates that some technical problems still remain to be solved as regards seismological verification of a test ban, although significant, and in a negotiating context, important progress has recently been made. For this reason it must be a major interest to continue the work of the Group of Scientific Experts, which started its work 10 years ago. As the work towards a test ban progresses, the Conference on Disarmament should in our view be able to draw on the competence of this group. We must ensure that practical work towards the gradual establishment of a global seismological network as an integral part of a treaty régime continues.

In addition to the global seismological network, other verification possibilities need to be further examined, such as an international atmospheric radioactivity monitoring network, on-site inspection procedures and national technical means. We note several important initiatives in this field during the last year. In our view, the American offer last year to experts from the Soviet Union to visit a test site in the United States would contribute to a better basis for verifying limits on underground nuclear testing. A Soviet declaration in December last year stated that the Soviet Union favours reaching agreement with the United States on a number of in situ monitoring measures to eliminate doubts about the observance of a reciprocal moratorium on nuclear tests. We understand that such an acceptance of on-site inspections would not only be valid for a mutual moratorium, but indeed for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. In our view these are elements that need further exploring in a way which would concretely further the work of this Conference.

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pp.14-18

Belgium/Clerckx

27.2.86

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We have noted in this regard some encouraging signs including the fact there has been a rapprochement over concerns about verification. The adoption, by consensus, of resolution 40/152 0, "Verification in all its aspects", of which Canada was both the initiator and main sponsor, is undoubtedly one of the most positive achievements of the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

We hope that our Conference will translate into concrete agreements this rapprochement at the level of principles. The bilateral disarmament negotiating process, which is clearly of concern to all countries, is taking place in a constructive manner, to judge by the exchange of proposals and counter-proposals of which we are all aware. These negotiations are difficult, but we continue to be fully confident that they will lead to successful and substantial results.

In the opinion of Belgium, the complete elimination of chemical weapons, the existence of which is reported in the arsenals of several countries, and the use of which it has been necessary to deplore on several occasions, even recently, as His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran has just reminded us once again, is a matter of the highest priority. We believe that it is one of the main areas in which our negotiations can succeed, and succeed rapidly. It goes without saying, however, that a disarmament agreement will be valid only if it is scrupulously respected by its contracting parties.

If the agreement is violated, its credibility is likely to be affected. Suspicion may also spread to other agreements which have been or are about to be concluded. We are, I believe, fully alive to this danger: hence the attention we are giving to the questions of control and surveillance that arise of course in their own specific ways under any disarmament agreement.

In this regard, the future convention on chemical weapons should include adequate safeguards, since we cannot permit a situation to arise in which the renunciations to which some States would accede in good faith could one day be exploited to their detriment.

We would not wish to allow room for doubt among States parties concerning respect for the convention without provision being made for dispelling such doubt as quickly as possible through a binding investigating mechanism.

For the various chemicals likely to be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons, the systematic verification arrangements would be adapted in such a way as to encourage States parties to have confidence in the intentions of the other parties, while on the other hand preserving all opportunities for peaceful research and development and progress in the industry. In our opinion, these two concerns can be met if one is guided by what is called the "general purpose criterion", which has already proved to be an essential tool.

The objective sought by Belgium is a total and effectively verified ban on chemical weapons. It is clear that the object of the convention will not be to authorize the peaceful activities of the chemical industry but to prohibit and effectively prevent chemical production from being diverted to armaments. Chemical weapons are the result of the desire to have such weapons, coupled with the possession of chemicals or a combination of chemicals of which the characteristics and quantities are such that they can satisfy that desire.

It is the combination of these two elements, the intentional and the material which will be covered by the prohibition on development, manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and utilization.

The objective of total prohibition corresponds perfectly, in our opinion, to the criterion of equal security for all or of non-discrimination. It should be pursued for itself alone, particularly since it concerns a weapon the use of which has been renounced by all of us in acceding to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This weapon can be legitimately possessed by some countries only as a safeguard against a violation of the commitments entered into under the Protocol.

As soon as all member countries of this Conference, and therefore the main presumed possessors of this weapon, have demonstrated the will to achieve an agreement on the total prohibition of its manufacture, to accept the elimination of their weapon stockpiles and production facilities under international control, there is no possible justification for not considering that the active pursuit and rapid conclusion of our work are a matter of priority, at the very moment when all participants in the convention demonstrate an equal interest in the solution of verification problems which constitute, we are well aware, the main difficulty.

So long as this convention has not been concluded and ratified by a significant group of States, the outcome of our efforts will remain uncertain and the security risks connected with chemical weapons will continue to exist. It is the success of these negotiations, which are of course difficult but not insurmountably so, that will give expression to the desire so often proclaimed by so many to make a contribution to that end, and confirm beyond doubt the sincerity of our decisions.

We are, I think, all aware of the full significance that this crowning of our efforts would have. We shall have shown that it is possible to prohibit totally and effectively an entire category of weapons which is not merely foreseeable or hypothetical but which exists. We shall have shown in particular that it is possible to agree on procedures for effective verification and for all of us to submit to them, without any exception.

In our opinion, it would not be going too far to say that the future of disarmament hinges on such concrete demonstrations, since it is evident that the more a disarmament agreement is significant for the security of States the more it should be verified, for the insecurity created by any violations would be more serious.

The question of the prohibition of nuclear tests leads me back to the important issue of verification, which is often associated with this subject. In a situation where most countries demonstrate equal concern in this regard, it may be thought that an agreement on the complete prohibition of tests should necessarily include rather strict and sufficiently elaborated verification procedures.

If we could resume the political consideration of the verification problems of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests, studied in detail and updated by proceeding to an in-depth examination of the various points of view, we would advance towards the objective of the conclusion of such a treaty.

Belgium is in favour of continuing the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts who are helping to increase the knowledge which will enable us to set up a network for detecting and identifying seismic events and for an exchange of data, which might be gradually brought to the level required for the purpose of verifying a complete ban on nuclear tests.

Belgium considers that documents CD/524 of Japan and CD/612 of the Federal Republic of Germany make extremely positive contributions to our work and that they might usefully serve as a basis for future action, in particular with a view to building confidence among the parties.

CD/PV.343

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Sweden/Ekeus

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Then there is another explanation given for not wanting a nuclear-test ban, that it would not be possible to sufficiently verify such a treaty. Sweden, like other States represented in the Conference, considers that disarmament agreements must be verifiable if they are to function effectively.

It goes without saying that a nuclear-test-ban treaty must be adequately verifiable. Sweden considers that the present state of the art of seismic detection and identification makes full verification of a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear testing feasible. To prepare for such a verification system to be established we need now to embark on further substantial work, both in terms of drafting provisions and in the technical field. True, some basic material is already in existence, such as the report of 1980 from the

trilateral negotiations, the document submitted in 1983 by the delegation of the Soviet Union on "Basic provisions of a treaty" (CD/346) and the draft treaty likewise submitted in 1983 by Sweden (CD/381). According to the Swedish delegation the work of the Ad Hoc Committee should aim at outlining the structure of a treaty and the main undertakings of States parties. It should address the problem of scope, national and international means of verification, procedures for compliance, institutional arrangements and final provisions. In General Assembly resolution 40/80, initiated by Mexico, and with Sweden as a co-sponsor, the Assembly makes some important proposals of a practical nature by recommending the Conference to set up, within the Ad Hoc Committee, two Working Groups -- one for the structure and scope of the treaty and another for compliance and verification. This proposed arrangement could be an ideal organizational framework for the necessary substantive work to be undertaken.

Let me now return to the question of verification of a CTB treaty.

To analyse this problem we can draw upon a number of important contributions made during last year's session. One of them was the workshop on seismological verification hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. On that occasion a well-organized and highly interesting demonstration of a modern and efficient seismological installation was offered. The demonstration showed that modern technology can be utilized to create a sensitive seismological station providing high quality data and an efficient data analysis facility. An instructive document (CD/599) was issued by Norway as a result of the workshop.

The NORESS station that was demonstrated is a so-called mini-array which is primarily designed to detect events at regional distances, that is at distances of less than 2,000 to 3,000 km. At this regional distance detection capability is considerably improved compared to detection at larger, so-called teleseismic distances. However, this capability varies considerably between different regions of the world. When estimating global detection capabilities only the teleseismic capability is usually taken into account. Such estimates usually give detection capabilities of around magnitude 4. In the Norwegian Working Paper detection capabilities of magnitude 2-3 are mentioned for regional and local distances, corresponding to yields of one tenth to one hundredth of a KT.

Experiences from a fairly dense local network in Sweden show that detection capabilities of magnitude 1 can be obtained at distances of up to a few hundred kilometres and that such a network also gives a very high location and depth estimation capability. How to utilize recordings at local and regional distances for test-ban verification and how this would improve the overall capability of a global system, merits, in our view, further consideration. The examples show, however, that verification is a political rather than a technical issue. It is the task of the negotiators of a test-ban treaty to reach agreement on the establishment of a sufficiently dense network of seismic stations -- including stations at suitable points on the territories of the nuclear-weapon States designed to measure signals at local and regional distances -- so that all Parties to the future treaty would have full assurances that compliance with it could be verified and that cheating was not possible.

The potential of such a network of seismic stations was, by the way, clearly spelled out by the Netherlands delegation in its interesting statement on 13 August 1985.

The importance of utilizing modern instrumentation at seismological stations is also discussed in the Norwegian Working Paper. We share the view that available modern technology should be utilized in a global verification system. Our experience of the Hagfors array station in Sweden, where a mini-array technique similar to that demonstrated in Norway is being utilized, tells us that this array design concept should be most valuable not only for detection at regional but also at larger, teleseismic distances.

The Working Paper presented by Japan (CD/626) gives, in our view, a good account of the concrete measures needed to realize an international seismic data exchange system. It stresses the need to modernize and standardize seismic stations and to establish modern stations in areas where such stations do not exist today. The Japanese Working Paper further gives concrete examples on how such a modernization could be carried out to establish a homogeneous network of high-quality stations able to operate with high reliability. Modern and well-equipped international data centres are other important components in this proposed system.

Sweden welcomes these concrete proposals and shares the view of incorporating the latest available scientific and technological achievements into a global system and to make such a system as homogeneous as possible.

The Japanese Working Paper further includes valuable preliminary cost estimates to establish and operate such a network. We have a preliminary feeling that it should be possible to reduce these estimates. In any case they show that the cost of establishing efficient verification measures to monitor disarmament agreements is reasonable, especially when considering the goals they are intended to further.

The proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany, presented by Ambassador Wegener in his statement on 18 February, to gradually set up a permanent global seismic monitoring network is based upon two Working Papers (CD/612 and CD/624) tabled last year, which we have studied with great interest. Working Paper CD/624 contains a most comprehensive and valuable assessment of a system design for the improvement of seismic monitoring capabilities for a test-ban treaty. This paper also stresses the need to establish modern stations, taking into account the latest scientific and technological achievements.

The Working Paper also offers a thorough discussion of the estimated verification capabilities of global and regional station networks. Such estimates always carry a considerable uncertainty due to regional differences in signal propagation which are difficult to take into account with existing modelling techniques. The diagrams presented, however, clearly show the importance of also using stations at close distances, forming a regional network, to improve the verification capability. The high sensitivity and the regional dependence of signal propagation at short distances is also clearly illustrated.

The Working Paper contains an interesting section on cavity decoupling of nuclear explosions. The calculations show that decoupling is substantially

reduced for signals at high frequencies. As such signals can be recorded primarily at short distances, this provides an additional argument for using stations at close distances for test-ban monitoring.

The United Kingdom Working Paper (CD/610) also contains a discussion of cavity decoupling and the possibility of using high frequency signals to counteract such evasive actions. The British Paper arrives at conclusions similar to those of the Working Paper of the Federal Republic of Germany, even if the figures differ somewhat. The United Kingdom Working Paper states that while signal strength at the frequency of 1 Hz might be reduced by a factor of 100 through cavity decoupling the reduction at 5-10 Hz could be as little as 5.

The lack of experience of cavity decoupling and the present difficulty of predicting the signals from such explosions, together with the possibility of recording high frequency signals, especially in the continental areas, substantially reduces, in our view, the credibility of decoupling as a way of conducting clandestine nuclear testing.

The British document also presents an evasion scenario of multiple explosions in which a number of explosions are to be set off in a time sequence so as to generate signals similar to those from earthquakes. This means that the signals will be detected at monitoring stations but that they, supposedly, will be misidentified as coming from earthquakes. We think this method lacks credibility. It would be extremely difficult to predict in detail the actual signal waveforms at distant recording stations to make sure that the explosions are not identified by advanced computer processing.

As to the possibility of hiding an explosion in an earthquake we share the view expressed in the British document that such a procedure would cause considerable operational problems. The location and size of a suitable earthquake must be determined and the explosion set off within less than a minute after the earthquake occurred. Technology has not proven its ability in this regard. We have made quite a thorough investigation of the number of expected opportunities necessary to hide explosions in nearby earthquakes. As an example we found less than one such opportunity per year to set off a magnitude 5 explosion in the most seismic regions of the Kuril and Aleutian Islands. A military significant weapons development programme cannot be based on such uncertain testing possibilities, the political risks aside.

In addition to the evasion issues which I have commented on, the United Kingdom Working Paper contains an interesting and detailed survey of seismic verification. We do not necessarily agree with the estimates that are presented and with the quite pessimistic conclusion as to the overall capability of a verification system. In a Working Paper to be presented at a later stage we intend to offer more detailed comments to issues raised in this and other working papers.

When presenting the British document on 11 July last year, Ambassador Cromartie brought up the problem of how nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be handled in a test-ban treaty. He said "it is for those who seek an exemption for peaceful nuclear explosions to tell us in detail what practical system of verification they propose to give confidence that nuclear explosions they might carry out were exclusively peaceful and brought no military advantage of any kind".

My delegation agrees with this statement. The Swedish draft treaty of 1983, in its Article II, presents one way to resolve this problem.

After having gone through the documents referred to above, I have the impression that we all seem to agree that modern technology and the latest scientific achievements should be fully utilized in designing an efficient verification system. In the message by General Secretary Gorbachev recently to this Conference it was stated that the Soviet Union "is agreeable to the most strict control over a ban on nuclear weapon tests, including on-site inspections and the use of all achievements in seismology". One task for the Group of Scientific Experts should be to utilize the latest scientific and technological achievements to work out technical specifications for a recording station which would be able to collect high quality digital data from seismic events at all distances. Such a "CD-designed" station could then be the basis for a global verification system to be tested and then established on a permanent basis, within the framework of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

When discussing modern instrumentation we also have to discuss how to make full use of the data that is collected. It has been shown that simultaneous analysis of waveform data from globally distributed stations considerably improves the possibilities of defining and locating seismic events. This also decreases the number of unassociated observations. It further substantially improves the possibilities of accurately estimating the depth of seismic events. This waveform analysis could be standardized in the same way as has been agreed upon for Level I data analysis at the International Data Centres. Procedures for such routine use of waveform data for these defined purposes and the ways and means of exchanging such data should be worked out by the Group of Scientific Experts. Use of waveform data would in no way change the basic rules for the international co-operation system. The final assessment of whether an event is an explosion or an earthquake will still be made at the national level.

A global verification system is not only a question of hardware such as station instrumentation and computers. It is also -- and to at least an equal extent -- a question of software, that is methods, procedures and human knowledge. This stresses the importance of continued international co-operation in the developing and testing of methods and procedures and in promoting and exchanging scientific and technical information around the world. Through such experiments involving a growing number of countries, some with limited experience so far in the use of seismology for test-ban verification, knowledge and experience are spread globally. These experiments offer education and practical training of personnel at a number of stations and data exchange facilities around the world. This is precisely the kind of patient scientific work that is needed to establish how available seismic technology should be most effectively utilized to create an effective, global data exchange system to help verify a test ban. It is important that full use be made of recent developments in science and technology for this purpose and that available techniques can be utilized on a global scale.

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On a broader problem, President Reagan expressed pleasure that the Soviet Union has given public recognition to the critical importance of verification

in negotiating agreements. The specific issues in this regard will be pursued at the negotiating table.

We have noted the interest in verification expressed in recent statements by the Soviet Union. I hardly need repeat to my colleagues here the essential nature of this aspect of arms control and disarmament. It is an aspect stressed by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Georgy Kornienko, in his 20 February address before this Conference. It remains for this general commitment to verification to be translated into specific proposals which can be embodied in agreements currently under negotiation in this body, in the nuclear and space talks, in the Stockholm Disarmament Conference, and in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations.

With regard to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations in Vienna, I share the disappointment expressed by the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom in his statement of 25 February. It is regrettable that the hopeful reports of prospects for progress have very recently been dampened by the news that verification may still be as much a problem there as before. Recent initiatives do not appear to have elicited a forthcoming response, but rather a return to earlier positions of the Eastern negotiators on verification. It is my hope that this apparent regression is not an omen presaging a slow-down -- rather than an acceleration, as called for in the 21 November Joint Statement -- in forward movement in all of the negotiations now under way. It would be doubly regrettable were this to be the case, because agreements reached in one forum should mutually reinforce agreements negotiated in other forums.

One of these steps would be a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear explosions -- what our Conference describes as a nuclear-test ban. Surely it is unnecessary for me to describe the United States position on this question -- a position which remains unchanged -- at greater length than I have done in past interventions. A nuclear-test ban is an objective which can be realized in the context of the steps that I have discussed above -- steps involving deep reductions in nuclear weapons; steps addressing the security concerns posed by the conventional force imbalance between East and West and the resulting need of the West to maintain an effective and reliable nuclear deterrent posture; and steps for the development and improvement of means that would be applied to the verification of compliance with such a ban.

We have taken due note of that part of the message from Mr. Gorbachev to the Conference on Disarmament on 20 February, as read by Minister Kornienko, that the Soviet Union will accept on-site inspection to verify compliance with a nuclear-test ban, as well as "the use of all achievements in seismology". On-site inspection is an issue which would be highly appropriate for practical work in an Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 1 in the Conference on Disarmament. It was, in fact, an issue on which consideration had only begun in the summer of 1983 when the work of the subsidiary body ended for the year. The failure of this Conference to take the necessary steps to resume this work has, accordingly, precluded an in-depth consideration of the many aspects of this matter.

The United States has long advocated a dialogue with the Soviet Union to arrive at the improved verification procedures necessary for any nuclear testing limitation. To the extent that Mr. Gorbachev's statement may reflect the development of common ground on this crucial issue, it is hopeful. We would welcome any dialogue with the Soviet Union that would narrow differences on this issue.

It is clear to my Government that the existing seismological assets available for monitoring a nuclear-test ban would not constitute an adequate basis for such an agreement. It would be important for the Conference on Disarmament to continue its consideration of this matter in a committee charged with doing so. In this way delegations that have argued in this body that seismology now provides a basis for verification can lay out their views in detail so that other delegations may benefit from their analyses. Clearly, this also would permit other delegations to present alternative positions. It is not only the problem of monitoring the underground environment under normal circumstances that is at issue here. A verification system also must work against attempts to evade a test ban. Such attempts would involve taking steps to hide an explosion: by lowering its yield, by masking the seismic signal, by concealing the nuclear test in a large chemical explosion, or by still other means. Let me cite one example in this regard. In his 25 February statement, Ambassador Gonsalves argues that existing seismological means are sufficient and that cheating would be too difficult, even statistically impossible. But how would seismic means ensure that nuclear explosions were not masked by large chemical explosions? Other approaches, such as on-site inspection, would also be needed.

In our view, it is important to continue work on the technologies and means of verification. We had a very useful contribution to this work in the seismic workshop sponsored last June by Norway. Closer to home, work is continuing in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. With regard to the GSE, I welcome the support for the continued efforts of this outstanding body expressed by Mr. Kornienko in his statement last Thursday.

The nuclear-test-ban issue is one of longstanding, as we all know. We hear statements in this body that the verification problem has been "solved", and we hear that because the problem has supposedly been solved, it is only a matter of "political will" that blocks the immediate initiation of multilateral negotiations to work out an agreement. If those who make this argument are suggesting that the United States is acting in a cavalier or capricious way, then they underestimate the seriousness with which my Government approaches this issue. In fact, it is because, in the United States view, the question of nuclear testing is directly related to our security and that of the Western alliance -- through the role testing plays in the maintenance of a reliable nuclear deterrent, a deterrent made necessary by the hard facts of international life in our day -- that our position on this issue is a careful and principled one.

I noted earlier that we should like to see negotiations on a comprehensive-nuclear-test ban commence in the near future. Our General Assembly resolution urged the Conference to establish an ad hoc committee to

begin negotiations and such a process inevitably involves a considerable amount of preparatory work, both of an administrative and substantive nature.

We recognize that there are differences of approach within this Conference on questions of timing and scope. At the same time, there is widespread agreement that the goal must be a comprehensive test ban. The proper forum for consideration and resolution of the differences that exist would be in an ad hoc committee which focused, in the initial stages, on those aspects of scope, verification and compliance where more work is yet to be done. In order to get down to constructive work on a nuclear-test ban, all parties may have to re-examine their attitudes and policies if any progress is to be made.

My Government considers that there are certain minimal conditions that a test ban must meet. The ban must be comprehensive, banning all nuclear explosions and including those alleged to be for purely peaceful purposes. It must also be a ban that can be satisfactorily verified. We have never viewed unilateral test ban moratoria or other non-binding initiatives which lack adequate measures of verification as capable of ensuring stability and mutual security. They may have a contribution to make, but it would fall far short of that from a comprehensive and verifiable agreement.

That being said, we do welcome any reduction in the number of nuclear tests. A genuine moratorium, provided it was not followed with a burst of "catch-up" tests, could have an impact on the current political situation. But infinitely more significant would be the permanent discontinuance of all testing programmes. There is no need for further nuclear tests. A moratorium is not enough.

A fundamental part of New Zealand's approach to a test ban is the issue of verification. The brightest spot in the Conference's consideration of a test ban has been the gradual progress made over the years on seismic monitoring by the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts. In General Assembly resolution 40/81, the Conference on Disarmament was urged to "take immediate steps for the establishment, with the widest possible participation, of an international seismic monitoring network to determine the capabilities of such a network for monitoring and verifying compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban-treaty". The Conference was also asked to take into account the work performed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. It also seemed appropriate to the sponsors of the resolution that the Conference should initiate a detailed investigation of other measures to monitor and verify compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

We do not accept that it is impossible to verify compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The excellent workshop run by the Norwegian Government in 1985 showed that the technical facilities are already at a high level of sophistication. With the appropriate distribution of such facilities it should be possible for even small nuclear explosions to be detected and verified. The techniques upon which verification depends are already available -- it is mainly the political will to deploy them that has been lacking until now.

We are encouraged by positive comments that have been made already in this session that the work of the Ad Hoc Seismic Group should continue. We are committed to the Group, of which we have been an active member for many years. New Zealand is an earthquake-prone country and we have built up considerable experience in seismic monitoring techniques. We will continue to contribute wherever we can in the verification work that must be completed as a prerequisite to the implementation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

We were particularly interested in the comments of the distinguished representative for the Federal Republic of Germany last week concerning the kind of work that needs to be done before a global seismic monitoring network can be said to be performing satisfactorily and reliably. We acknowledge the detailed work done on this subject by his and other Governments. His proposal deserves close attention and we shall be considering carefully how New Zealand, which maintains a small network of monitoring stations in the South Pacific, can best make a contribution in this area.

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France/Jessel

27.2.86

CW

Furthermore, on various occasions France has condemned quite categorically any use anywhere of the toxic warfare agents prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In doing so, my Government has merely been adhering to what has been France's unswerving policy since the signing of the Protocol more than 60 years ago. It has further reason for doing so in view of its responsibilities as a depository State of the Convention. I recalled this in my statement before the Conference on 18 June 1985, and I recall it once again today.

As you know, the 1925 Convention does not include any verification procedure. That is why, pending the conclusion of the Convention currently being negotiated in our Conference, France and a number of other States submitted a resolution providing for interim verification procedures to the General Assembly of the United Nations, which adopted it. In this connection, France welcomes the decision just taken by the United Nations Secretary-General to send a fact-finding mission. We welcome the Secretary-General's action, which is in our opinion in keeping with the spirit of resolution 37/98 D, which serves the same purpose and has the same objective.

CD/PV.344

p.12

Argentina/Campora

4.3.86

CTB

As stated in paragraph 31 of the Final Document, the form and modalities of a verification system depend on the purposes, scope and nature of the corresponding agreement. Consequently, it is logical to believe that the requirements of the verification system should be considered in the course of the negotiations on a treaty. Only then is it possible to hope to reach agreement on suitable measures which will satisfy all interested parties because, in the absence of genuine negotiations, it cannot be expected that the necessary concessions will be made to arrive at generally acceptable solutions.

We therefore cannot accept the argument that negotiation of the treaty should wait until verification issues have been resolved; especially when the delegations taking this position are the very ones which consider that veri-

fication is the fundamental problem outstanding in the case of a chemical-weapons convention, on which we have been pursuing active negotiations for some years. In the case of the chemical weapons convention there was no insistence on resolving verification problems in advance.

In view of the foregoing, there is no practical purpose in analysing the details of a verification system. Nevertheless, I think it is worth stressing some fundamental principles which the delegation believes should govern the machinery and procedures relating to verification and implementation of a nuclear-weapon-test-ban treaty in order to avoid the rather unsatisfactory experience of other treaties.

The system should guarantee equality of rights and obligations of all parties, in other words, it should apply equally to all parties and ensure their right of participation and access. In this connection, I wish to recall the issues already raised by the Group of 21 in 1981 in document CD/181 and at the informal meetings held on the issue in March and April 1981. Furthermore, in accordance with the Final Document, verification methods and procedures should not only not be discriminatory but should not interfere unduly in the internal affairs of States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

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Bulgaria/Tellalov

4.3.86

CTB

Verification is not an obstacle to a moratorium and a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Both measures could be satisfactorily monitored by a variety of means, national as well as international. We find great difficulties in comprehending the concerns still being voiced by some delegations as to the need to wait for further improvements in the methods of verification.

We have heard reports on important developments in national monitoring capabilities, resulting from steady progress in research programmes in the field of geophysics and explosion seismology. New seismic arrays which measure high-frequency signals have been introduced recently in order to pick up extremely low-yield nuclear explosions at much longer distances than has been possible hitherto.

We were much impressed by the announcement made by Georgy Kornienko that after the introduction of the Soviet moratorium a very low-yield nuclear-test explosion carried out by the United States had been detected in the Soviet Union -- an explosion that had not been announced by the United States Government. Dr. Lynn R. Sykes, a Columbia University Professor and Pentagon consultant stated last November before the United States House Armed Services Committee Panel on Arms Control that "recent advances in seismology ensure that attempts to detonate clandestine explosions under a test-ban will even be easier to detect than was thought only a few years ago".

These scientific advances increase confidence that a moratorium, as well as a comprehensive ban on nuclear-test explosions, could adequately be verified, even from a long distance.

We welcome the offer made in the Six Nations Initiative to provide good offices in order to facilitate the establishment of effective verification arrangements. The establishment of verification mechanisms on the territories of these countries, as proposed by the six leaders, would undoubtedly be one useful way to achieve this objective.

Those who would seek further assurances of the adequate verifiability of the nuclear-test ban could base their final political judgement in this respect also on analyses using an international exchange of seismic data, organized within the framework of the respective comprehensive treaty. If there were a need to identify the real nature of a suspicious seismic or other event thought to be relevant to compliance with such a treaty, on-site inspections could well be contemplated. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev stated clearly in his message to this Conference that the Soviet Union is ready to accept "most strict control over a ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including on-site inspections and use of all achievements in seismology".

The contention that it may be virtually impossible, at present, to verify a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, and that deep cuts in nuclear weapons should be achieved before such a ban is negotiated, is unacceptable even to the United States Congress. After the Senate 1984 resolution was passed by a vote of 77 against 22, the House of Representatives approved last week, by a majority of 268 against 148, a similar resolution urging an immediate resumption of negotiations with the Soviet Union on a comprehensive NTB treaty.

CD/PV.344

pp.21-25

FRG/Wegener

4.3.86

CTB

I was the first speaker under the agenda item on a nuclear-test ban, may I also be allowed to conclude that debate by way of commenting on this intensive two-week plenary discussion. Many delegations have taken the floor to address this vital subject, and many have done so with a remarkable degree of earnestness and sense of responsibility. On the whole, our debate has taken stock, more than in previous years, of the great complexity of the subject and of the dimension of the international efforts necessary to realize and implement a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Both the relationship of a future CTB to the larger problems of nuclear disarmament, and the challenge of effective international verification of such a treaty, have been extensively reviewed. This is important, since only a full grasp of the complexity of the issues will enable the Conference to elaborate, progressively, the solutions to the various problems that remain posed. Simplifying or denying the more problematic aspects of the nuclear-testing issues, on the contrary, will not help us towards the desired end. In this vein I would particularly like to commend the distinguished delegate of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus, for his statement of 27 February which provides a useful overview over the current problems, specifically in the realm of verification. His comparative analysis of the various contributions to an incipient seismic monitoring and verification régime for the future treaty will prove its value as our work progresses. It certainly raises the level of our discourse.

In statements on the state of seismic technology and its role in the verification of a future test-ban treaty, it has been claimed that existing national and international seismic monitoring arrangements are now perfectly adequate for effective verification -- and that their eventual up-grading would also be problemless. Despite the rapid advance of seismic technology in recent years, this is manifestly incorrect, and the many working papers and statements before this Conference, including the contributions of my own delegation, should have provided that important message. The difficulties of discrimination between nuclear explosions and natural seismic events, seismic measurement uncertainties, the incomplete and uneven state of seismic facilities on a global scale, the lack of in-country seismic networks in countries crucial to a CTBT, and, finally potential evasive options, including cavity decoupling, are insufficiently taken into consideration. The "scientific consensus" on several of these issues which such statements invoke simply does not exist. As my delegation has undertaken to establish, an effective global seismic monitoring and verification network can certainly be created over time but I have also made clear that this will be time-consuming and not entirely gratuitous. Such an exercise will need the best of our efforts.

One speaker was particularly mistaken when he belittled the significance of very small nuclear tests. The increasing miniaturization of explosive devices, the possibility of constructing and testing nuclear weapons with a suppressed yield or, generally, a yield below the kt-range show that such nuclear events cannot be neglected, especially in view of the fact that in this realm significant military accomplishments may be attained -- as I have indicated above -- with one or two nuclear tests only.

It is not true that muffled explosions of a higher yield are the only methods of achieving such military advantages. But muffling is, of course, a largely unresolved problem and this becomes clearer when one accepts the scientific evidence that muffling in cavities can reduce the seismic signal by a factor of up to 100 -- two full orders of magnitude.

The same speaker dismissed possible evasion attempts of a future CTBT in a rather cavalier fashion. The necessary "degree of inventiveness" of a possible evader -- which he ruled out as a real possibility -- will certainly be mustered if the military advantage that could be gained by a violation of the treaty is of such proportions that it becomes an attractive security option. Evasion of the treaty, and the realization of evasion scenarios are thus not the material for far-fetched science fiction, but could be real perceived choices for one Power, or be attributed to a potential adversary, and indeed are choices that ought to be eliminated by appropriate verification techniques and the creation of mutual confidence. The gains which an evader might obtain are not "inherently speculative" but could imply very real risks against which any contracting party must hedge. In the same statement there is also an almost inexplicable denigration of the very principle of verification, when the speaker maintains that "political commitment" as such would be an effective deterrent against breach of the treaty. This statement is perfectly incompatible with paragraph 31 of the Final Document.

It is circular reasoning to assume, as the same speaker did, that since existing test sites would be particularly subject to verification measures (the critical question is, instead, whether verification measures can be

effective there and elsewhere) evaders would resort to new test sites, and that such new test sites could not be developed undetected. Even a limited study of the working papers before the Conference would disclose the whole range of scientific facts relating to these issues.

A number of speakers have praised the Soviet Union's decision to observe a testing moratorium for a limited time. In the view of my delegation moratoria detract from the overall objective of a CTBT, and they should therefore very much be seen for what they are. Although proposals for the verification of testing moratoria have recently been made, the fact of the matter is that they are at present unverified and unverifiable. My delegation does not have the slightest reason to suspect the Soviet Union of not observing its own moratorium, but as a matter of principle, and speaking as an arms control negotiator, I must insist that an unverified claim that a moratorium is observed, remains on the level of a unilateral claim. A moratorium should also be seen as a very partial matter in so far as it does by no means exclude intensive preparations, in the meantime, for the post-moratorium period. When the Soviet Union chose to terminate, one-sidedly, the 1958 to 1961 moratorium, the intermediate period had obviously been put to good use, and the Soviet authorities surprised their American counterparts and everybody else by conducting, in the immediate aftermath of the moratorium a test series of unprecedented proportions, conducting about 100 tests in the atmosphere and an unknown but obviously substantial number underground in a very short period, ranging from very small yields to the largest nuclear explosive tests ever conducted, one of about 60 megatons. During that period the Soviet Union conducted more tests above 1 megaton than the United States has in its entire history. In assessing the value of moratoria, it would therefore appear wise to remain mindful of this historical perspective.

CD/PV.346

pp.6-7

Mexico/Garcia Robles

11.3.86

CTB

The two documents to which I have just referred -- the bilateral communiqué of 8 January and the Joint Declaration of 21 November -- undoubtedly contain valuable conclusions and attractive statements of good intentions. The same positive evaluation can be made of the proposal advanced by General Secretary Gorbachev in his important statement of 15 January. He proposed a 15-year process, in three stages, which would culminate by the end of this century with the total elimination of nuclear weapons and whose verification would be carried out "both with the help of national technical means and through the carrying out of on-site inspections". Mention should also be made in this connection of the proposal transmitted by the President of the United States to the Soviet leader, in the second half of February, relating to a start to execution of the plan which envisages a 50 per cent reduction in the offensive nuclear forces of both sides and the negotiation of an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

It is necessary, however, to bear in mind in this regard that, as expressed by the signatories to the New Delhi Declaration in the joint message addressed barely 10 days ago, on 28 February, to the leaders of the two super-Powers, "no concrete measures have as yet been agreed upon which would help to 'prevent an arms race in space and terminate it on Earth'". This is the more regrettable if account is taken of what is stated, in the following terms, in the same Joint Message -- which has been distributed here today as document CD/676:

"This is a task of the utmost urgency for the future of humanity and the very survival of our planet is at stake. As long as nuclear weapons exist, there can be no security for the world. We all live confronting the awful possibility of our extinction in a nuclear holocaust, whether by accident or by design. This is why we feel it is incumbent on us to do all that we can to avert this threat, and to build a new concept of global security without nuclear weapons."

The authors of the Joint Message, whose significance, as I see it, is in inverse ratio to its brevity, after stressing that the new summit meeting, which is expected to take place during the second half of this year, will constitute a "crucial opportunity" for the two participants to come to an agreement on "concrete steps to halt the nuclear arms race", express their conviction about the need to adopt confidence building measures, beginning with one which, despite its modesty, or perhaps precisely because of it, may prove to be of incalculable efficacy. The adoption of that measure is suggested in the message in the following terms:

"We urge you not to authorize any nuclear test in the coming months before the summit. We are convinced that this would be seen, in the rest of the world, as a signal that the two of you at that meeting are prepared to draw practical conclusions from your joint statement in Geneva that 'a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought'.

We reiterate our offer to assist in verifying any halt in nuclear testing, to remove doubts about compliance and possible violations. Such assistance could include on-site inspection as well as monitoring activities both on your territories and in our own countries."

CD/PV.346

pp.8-10

Canada/Beesley

11.3.86

CW,
CTB

In my statement of 4 February, we gave notice of our intention to submit documents intended to advance the negotiation of a comprehensive chemical-weapons treaty. I wish now to inform the Conference that the Canadian document entitled Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons has been submitted today to the secretariat for distribution to delegations. As I pointed out earlier, this working document identifies procedures, equipment and standard formats to help ensure that the findings of an investigation of alleged chemical weapons use would be as conclusive, convincing, objective and impartial as possible. It reflects Canadian experience and expertise, but also recognizes and benefits from important contributions by several other countries involved in extensive research in this area, particularly Sweden, Norway and Finland.

As stated in the introduction to the document, "such a handbook is both useful today in the context of the existing authority of the Secretary-General under resolution 37/98 D or under the Charter of the United Nations; and it should also be of use in the future in the context of a verification régime that would be part of a future chemical weapons convention as it is currently being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament." The Handbook, as some delegations are aware, has already been submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in New York.

It should be noted that this handbook does not deal with the procedures and criteria leading up to the initiation of an investigation. This issue is still very much a subject for negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament. The focus of this study is on what investigators should know and do when called upon to implement a decision to conduct an investigation, including the procedures that might be followed and the equipment that might be needed.

A technical working paper dealing with the identification of chemical substances will soon also be tabled in the appropriate Working Group by the Canadian delegation. That paper proposes a method for identifying chemical substances based on Chemical Abstracts Service registry numbers, which could be of considerable utility in reducing ambiguity in the identification process and in helping to simplify and standardize eventual data flows relating to the implementation of the convention, taking full advantage of computerized methods now available to search chemical literature.

In addition, as mentioned in my earlier statement, we will also be distributing an indexed compendium of all chemical weapons documentation for the period 1983 to 1985 to assist delegations in their work.

The third, and perhaps the most important, issue I wish to address is that of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The extensive number of statements during recent weeks have shown that most delegations share our view as to the importance of this issue. Yet, it has not been possible to establish a subsidiary body which would allow concrete work to be done, particularly on such issues as scope, verification and compliance. Several substantive papers have been tabled on various aspects of a CTB, but we have not yet even begun to discuss them thoroughly. One of the most important aspects raised in statements and working papers on this question relates to seismic verification. Much common ground exists in this area, developed through the intensive work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts over the years. I wish now to announce that the Canadian delegation is today making available directly to other delegations a brochure recently published by the Department of External Affairs of Canada on seismic verification. Although produced mainly with the Canadian public in mind, this document is the product of extensive research, is based entirely on scientific advice, and is intended to provide useful clarification of some of the issues relating to seismic verification.

Our purpose in distributing this brochure is a simple one. The achievement of a CTB is a fundamental Canadian objective. Canada has played a particularly prominent role on verification, a central issue in which seismic technology is a key. Since 1976 Canadian scientists have participated in the work of the international group of seismic experts in the Conference on Disarmament studying technical aspects of a world-wide exchange of seismic data. Indeed the Canadian participants will again be tabling a working paper during the current session of the GSE.

The most recent activity of the GSE was the conduct and evaluation of a large-scale technical test involving 31 States. This work is the object of an extensive report being prepared for the Conference on Disarmament. The test has indicated that a number of technical issues require further consideration by the GSE. Canada strongly supports the continuation of this work. The

brochure gives some indication of the value and importance of this work, and the need to continue it.

In this context I should like also to make known to the Conference on Disarmament that the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, announced on 7 February that the Government of Canada has agreed to provide \$3.2 million during the period 1986-1989 to upgrade the Canadian Yellowknife seismic array as a major Canadian contribution to monitoring an eventual comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Yellowknife is recognized as a unique and sensitive location to monitor global seismic events, including underground nuclear tests. Updating and modernization of the Yellowknife seismic array, which consists of a series of short-period and long-period seismometers, will enable Canada to contribute to an international system which would constitute an essential monitoring element of a negotiated CTB, utilizing the best technology available. Canada will be using the Yellowknife development to assist the GSE in coming to standards and specifications of seismograph stations that will contribute to seismic verification of a CTB.

Mr. President, we are attempting to show by action rather than rhetoric that we mean what we say on verification and regard it not as an obstacle, but as part of the solution.

CD/PV.347

pp.8-10

Yugoslavia/Vidas

13.3.86

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One of the positive signs of the promotion of negotiations on disarmament is the growing convergence of views on matters of verification and compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements. This was manifested both in General Assembly resolution A/RES/40/152 0, unanimously adopted at its fortieth session, as well as in many statements by official representatives accompanying the submission and explanation of proposals. We hope therefore that the generally expressed readiness to accept and implement the measures of verification will facilitate the conclusion of specific disarmament agreements.

The basis upon which this Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established has been laid in General Assembly resolution 40/80 A, calling for the establishment of two working groups to deal respectively with the interrelated questions of the structure and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification. The resolution has, in this way, outlined the basic programme of work in the Committee, although it will have to be elaborated in more detail once the Committee is re-established. We are ready to consider in an open way any approach which could ensure substantial progress towards conclusion of the treaty.

No other nuclear issue seems to attract so much attention as the nuclear-test ban. This is understandable because that would be not only the first, but also one of the effective steps towards halting the nuclear-arms race, which would inevitably lead to the cessation of the development and production of the new types of nuclear weapons and to progressive elimination of nuclear arsenals.

The arguments advanced that the major issues of verification are still not resolved and that the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests does not have the importance ascribed to it, are not, in our view, convincing. This is particularly so in the light of the agreement by the two biggest nuclear-weapon States at their summit meeting in respect to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a relatively short time-span. Further development of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing is, to our mind, inconsistent with the objectives set out by the two nuclear-weapon Powers at their Geneva summit, i.e. with their position that "nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". It is also inconsistent with their obligations under the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Although the moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing cannot be in itself a substitute for the test-ban treaty, its acceptance also by the United States and further extension of the moratorium by the USSR would be an important step towards a comprehensive test ban.

Yugoslavia supports the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts charged with continuing the consideration and elaboration of technical measures of verification relating to a nuclear test ban. Verification is not purely a technical matter but also an important political instrument for strengthening mutual confidence and for identifying the common interests with regard to treaty compliance. Verification is very important as, after all, it should not be viewed as something static and immutable; it should be developed and complemented alongside with technological development. Therefore, we hope that the obstacles standing in the way of re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Nuclear Test Ban will be overcome and that it will begin its work without further delay.

In the negotiations held last year in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, some progress was made in defining and listing relevant chemicals, and in continuing the elaboration of some parts of the convention. Useful work was undertaken on identifying chemical-weapon production facilities as well as on measures for their elimination. However, on many issues substantive efforts will be needed in order to arrive at acceptable solutions. These include elaboration of the principles for the limitation of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons, and the régime for precluding the possibility of the production of new types of chemical weapons by the chemical industry. A very important question which necessitates further examination concerns the elaboration of principles, procedures and organization in connection with strict compliance with the provisions of the Convention. We believe that the Ad Hoc Committee will make further progress in drafting the convention this year as well. We are encouraged by the decision of the United States and the Soviet Union to accelerate their bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons. However, we consider that the chemical-weapons negotiations pursued in the Conference should be completed at an early date, keeping in mind the road travelled so far and the results achieved in these negotiations. Yugoslavia, for its part, will continue to make its contribution towards that end.

Also against the background of the serious bilateral interchange, it is regrettable that this Conference has been unable to find a way out of the procedural imbroglio which has prevented it, for more than two years now, to continue practical work on a nuclear-test ban. The Soviet proposals reiterate a willingness to accept international on-site inspection "whenever necessary", as it is phrased and this, as we understand it, also in the context of a future nuclear-test ban. Early resumption of our work on the issue of nuclear testing would allow us, amongst other things, further to probe this question, on which so far we have not agreed. In the meantime, my delegation remains interested in hearing from the Soviet delegation whether the ideas recently put forward signal in any way an evolution in the Soviet position since the moment it accepted international on-site inspection, including the use of on-site monitoring instruments, during the trilaterals in the late 1970s and since it elaborated on the modalities of such inspections in the basic provisions of a nuclear-test ban as submitted by the Soviet delegation to this Conference in 1982.

The Netherlands remains firmly convinced of the urgent need for a comprehensive test ban on all nuclear explosions in all environments for all time. We are eager to resume our practical work in this area in the Conference, which, we feel it is important to underline, will be done with a view to negotiating such a treaty. In this Conference a number of interesting working documents, ideas and suggestions, including those of my delegation, are on the table waiting for consideration. As I said, we hope for a substantive input to matters of verification on the part of the Soviet Union.

In this context I also wish to mention the future work of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts. This group could do useful work on the many recommendations to be made in its forthcoming and nearly finished report, with a view to improving verification capabilities and communication and data procedures. We propose that the Group should also incorporate in its work for the next period an analysis of the value of regional seismic stations also in nuclear-weapon States for the overall detection and identification capabilities of an international seismic monitoring network. Such an analysis would be of substantial importance for our future deliberations.

All delegations in this room agree on the objective of a timely conclusion of a convention completely banning chemical weapons. That common objective of ours is, in my view, slowly but steadily taking shape. In the last few years in particular, a general understanding has been reached on the structure of the future convention. Much agreed language on various parts of the convention has been drafted in a common effort. We have a fair amount of ideas in common now on what it is that the convention will have to prohibit. As a result we have a clearer picture of what will have to be monitored, so as to ensure that the convention is fully complied with and therefore consonant with member countries' security concerns.

But as we gained a clearer insight into the issues involved, our focus sharpened also on what still needs to be resolved. First, there are the modalities for carrying out the various undertakings under the convention, which in many cases still need to be discussed and negotiated upon. Mere details as they may appear to some, they are vital to the adequate functioning of the convention. And then, there are certain basic undertakings of the convention that have hardly been touched upon. We welcome the fact that General Secretary Gorbachev has stressed the determination of the Soviet Union to achieve the early and complete elimination of chemical weapons and of what is called "the industrial base for their production". We are interested to hear how the Soviet delegation wishes to amplify this statement in detail in due course.

Enough has been said, I think, to illustrate that progress is possible but that we are not going to sign the convention next week. Key issues, in particular with regard to verification and compliance, remain to be resolved. We must make sure that all existing chemical-weapon stocks are declared and subsequently destroyed over a period of time; that declared chemical weapons plants stop production and are dismantled; that no new chemical weapons are produced clandestinely either in a chemical weapons production facility that never had been declared or under the perfectly innocent guise of the civil chemical industry. Chemical weapons are relatively easy to produce and it is perhaps still easier to hide them. Effectively verifying that the convention is not violated appears to be an immense task. Yet from an organizational point of view the task seems to be manageable as was also indicated in a working document introduced by my delegation in this Conference in 1984 (CD/445).

As already announced in my statement on 15 August 1985, the Netherlands Government intends this year to make a further contribution to clarifying the organizational and technical issues involved in verifying compliance with a future comprehensive chemical-weapons ban. In a workshop to be held this summer, we intend to focus on the questions of non-production of chemical weapons in the civil chemical industry. In the past the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom has organized very useful visits to civil chemical plants for members of delegations of the Conference on Disarmament. This time, we aim at making one further step, by concentrating in more detail on the possible methods of verification of non-production. We therefore hope, in co-operation with participants, to do some pioneering work, as it were.

We certainly do not pretend to provide delegations once and for all with the solutions to the problems of verification of non-production, nor will the workshop give participants a full picture of what a routine inspection of a modern chemical plant will look like under a Chemical Weapons Convention. None the less we are confident that it will lead to a greater insight into the technical and organizational problems of verifying non-production and we trust that in this way it will give an impetus to ongoing negotiations on the subject.

I am pleased to announce that the Netherlands Workshop on Verification of Non-Production of Chemical Weapons in the Civil Chemical Industry will be held in our country on 4, 5 and 6 June next. Delegations will shortly receive an invitation to participate in the Workshop. A provisional programme as well as some practical information will be sent as an annex to the invitation. My delegation welcomes any comments or suggestions which may improve or comple-

ment the suggested programme. We remain at the disposal of delegations for any additional information they may wish to receive. For the moment, I shall limit myself to some preliminary observations.

It is our intention to enable the participants to acquaint themselves with some of the possibilities for and problems connected with inspecting chemical industries in general. We all know, for instance, that the future chemical-weapons ban will have to strike a careful balance between the need of an effective verification régime, inspiring State parties with confidence in compliance with the Convention and, on the other hand, the need to safeguard the legitimate commercial interests of the chemical industry to be inspected. In other words, we have to balance the need for verification of non-production of chemical weapons with the need for not hampering legitimate civil production. Crucial to success in this balancing act is accurate knowledge of all factors involved. I feel confident that we have sufficient knowledge about the chemical weapons aspects of the problem, but I have the impression that we often lack precise knowledge about relevant aspects of the civil use of key precursors. We shall touch upon the latter issue on the first day of the Workshop. To that end, participants will receive an overview of existing national regulations in the Netherlands.

The task of developing methods of verification that take the required balance into account is a formidable one. But there certainly is no reason for despair. As undoubtedly in many other countries, we in the Netherlands have acquired a lot of experience with inspecting chemical industries for a variety of purposes, such as environmental protection, public health and safety. This system of inspection can, if necessary, be very intrusive, but at the same time it safeguards the intellectual property of the inspected plants.

We are, of course, very well aware of the difference between existing national inspection for civil purposes and the kind of international inspection needed under a chemical weapons convention. We believe, however, that a brief review of the experience the Netherlands has gained with existing national inspection will provide a proper background for a fruitful discussion -- at the Workshop, but also later on in the Conference -- on the international inspection we are heading for in the chemical weapons convention.

The centre-piece of our Workshop will be a report to be prepared for the Workshop on an experimental inspection of a production installation that is processing trimethyl phosphite. A few words may serve to clarify the relevance of verification of non-production in such a production installation.

There seems to be a consensus amongst delegations that the production of compounds with a P-methyl bond deserves special treatment in a chemical weapons convention because of the importance of those compounds as key precursors of certain nerve agents. Trimethyl phosphite is not a compound with a P-methyl bond but can relatively easily be transformed into such a compound. The main purpose of the experimental inspection is to study and test organizational and technical aspects involved in verification measures that are to ensure that the production installation processing trimethyl phosphite is not used for the production of compounds with a P-methyl bond.

The results of this experimental inspection will be discussed at the Workshop on the basis of documentation on the experiment to be made available to delegations. And, of course, the inspected chemical plant itself will be visited, in order to permit participants to get a better insight into the nature of the problem on the spot.

We hope that all delegations will be in a position and willing to participate in the Workshop. I would say: come and see for yourself this summer.

In making a contribution to the solution of the issue of verification of non-production we hope to give a fresh impetus towards the solution of the verification issue in general. Problems at present under discussion in the negotiations are indeed complex, but technicalities can never be so complex that we cannot overcome them. This work of ours may sometimes appear less spectacular and will perhaps also be more tedious than the deliberations of a more general nature and on a more elevated level to which we are used in this chamber. But it should remind us of Werner Sombart's words: "Das richtige ist meistens langweiliger als das Falsche" -- "Right action is generally more tedious than falsehood".

CD/PV.348 pp.11 Peru/Mariategui 18.3.86 CTB

For many years there were no negotiations on this item because the nuclear Powers argued that the verification problem was the principal obstacle. In 1982 and 1983 an Ad Hoc Committee undertook substantive work on all aspects of verification and the necessary means to ensure compliance with a nuclear test ban; its work was technically exhaustive. Now the Soviet Union has formally stated that it is agreeable to very strict control of a nuclear test ban, including on-site inspections and the use of all the latest developments in seismology.

Various bodies have testified that the progress in scientific and technical means in this connection has reached a suitably effective level and could be still further improved. This is shown by the workshop on seismic verification in Norway last year and the so-called Five Continent Peace Initiative has also stated this. There is therefore no valid ground for continuing to oppose negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty simply by arguing that there are shortcomings in the verification systems.

CD/PV.348 pp.13 USSR/Gorbachev (letter) 18.3.86 CTB

As regards the problem of verification, I should like to stress once again that we attach great importance to it, because we have an interest in agreements' being honoured unswervingly and in all parties' to them being fully convinced that that is so.

With respect to a nuclear test ban, verification can be ensured by national technical means and with the help of international procedures - including on-site inspection if need be. We propose to the American side the conclusion of an agreement on the granting to observers from both sides of the possibility of visiting, on a mutual basis and upon request, places where

unclear phenomena occur in order to eliminate possible doubts as to whether such phenomena are connected with nuclear explosions.

We are willing to take up your proposal - if, of course, it is accepted by the other side too - to provide assistance, including on-site inspections, in verifying the halting of nuclear tests.

CD/PV.348 pp.15 Italy/Franceschi 18.3.86 OS

The discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee, although brief and thus somewhat superficial, showed the great complexity of the issue to be discussed, as lucidly described by the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, in his remarkable statement of 30 July 1985. This same discussion has nevertheless opened the way for consideration in greater depth of the more significant problems relating to the prevention of an arms race in space. The analysis of proposals has only just begun, these proposals in many cases call for a further elaboration by their authors. But what seems particularly important in this context is a consideration of the question of effective verification mechanisms. The in-depth study of the problems, concepts, existing agreements and proposals should therefore be pursued, as it has proved useful and promising. The work-programme adopted last year gives us the widest chance to proceed in this direction. The assistance of experts might also be valuable for the consideration of a subject which, in its novelty, needs a thorough examination of almost all its aspects in order to achieve concrete progress at the multilateral level.

Under these auspices, the Ad Hoc Committee can make an important contribution in the field of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, thus responding to the attention with which this question is now deeply perceived.

CD/PV.348 pp.24-25 Mongolia/Bayart 18.3.86 CTB

In fact, what objective obstacles can there be to the United States joining in the moratorium? The impossibility of verification of compliance properly is advanced as a major obstacle. However, this is quite false. As is well known, the Soviet Union has declared that verification is not a problem for it, and that if the United States agrees to discontinue all nuclear tests on a mutual basis the necessary verification of compliance with the moratorium will be fully ensured by national technical means and also by international procedures, including on-site inspection when necessary.

The Soviet Union and the United States possess extremely sophisticated national technical means which can reliably convince the parties that the moratorium is being observed. A further guarantee of the effectiveness of verification would be the silent testing sites. The fact that the Soviet Union has not conducted any nuclear explosions for eight months now provides such a guarantee.

In circumstances where no nuclear explosions are carried out, neither side could proceed to violate the moratorium without the risk of incurring the terrible burden of political responsibility for such a step.

In order to increase the effectiveness of verification, the Soviet Union, as is known, has also endorsed the idea of the six States concerning the setting up of special stations on their territories to monitor compliance with the agreement to discontinue tests.

Finally, the Soviet Union has stated that in order to establish a joint moratorium on nuclear explosions now, it is in favour of reaching agreement with the United States on some on-site verification measures in order to remove possible doubts concerning compliance with the moratorium.

We consider that the Soviet Union's approach is constructive and makes it possible to solve the verification problem. Needless to say, this concerns verification of the prohibition of nuclear testing, not of how nuclear tests are carried out.

We consider that in general, when approaching any problem, however complicated, it is necessary above all to start from a belief in the possibility of overcoming and solving it positively, and not from doubt, distrust and suspicion. Without the united efforts of all the nuclear-weapon Powers, the problem of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests cannot be solved. We therefore address our appeal for a moratorium also to the other nuclear Powers and not only to the United States. In the first place, needless to say, we await such a step from the United States. There would then be a much better chance that the other nuclear-weapon Powers too would find it possible to refrain from nuclear-weapon tests, since they would not fear that the United States and the USSR would advance further in building up and developing their nuclear arsenals.

Needless to say, anything that can be done to ensure strict compliance with a moratorium on nuclear explosions could also be applied to an agreement for a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban. Such an agreement is possible. The one thing that is required to that end is a display of political wisdom, and understanding by States of their responsibility before the present and future generations.

CD/PV.349

pp.6-8

Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda 20.3.86

CTB

The Conference on Disarmament should not stay aloof from the efforts aimed at the achievement of the NTB. The Czechoslovak delegation is for the establishment of an ad hoc committee with a mandate ensuring practical progress towards the NTB. The verification problems should not constitute the central problem in the debate on the organizational framework. The socialist countries have repeatedly demonstrated, to all those willing to recognize it, that they are prepared to agree to adequate verification measures assuring necessary confidence. Recently, the highest Soviet representatives repeatedly stressed that the Soviet Union had no problems as far as verification was concerned. That included also international on-site inspection wherever necessary. However, one thing should be recalled. While the socialist countries are ready to verify disarmament, by no means are they willing to verify the continued arms race. Consequently, the cessation of nuclear testing deserves effective control, but the verification and monitoring of continued tests would be senseless. In view of this we do not see the merit

in the recent invitation by the United States President to Soviet experts to observe the United States tests in Nevada, whatever techniques are applied.

Czechoslovakia considers that the combination of seismic and non-seismic methods of verification can provide all participants to the NTB with necessary confidence that it is fully complied with. It now appears clear that national technical means are sufficient for reliable verification of NTB compliance. For instance, the United States receives seismic data from its own national global network of seismic stations through transmission by satellite. If this network alone was used for the verification of the NTB, compliance could be ensured to a high degree.

At the same time, as was demonstrated by the technical test of the transmission of seismic data through the WMO/GTS channels in 1984, an international network of seismic stations could assist national verification means. One should also keep in mind, that the distribution of seismic stations participating in the test was not optimal. While there were many stations in Europe there were none in some large regions of the world, e.g. Central and West Asia, China, and few of them were in Africa and on the oceans.

Seismic methods of verification could be supplemented by non-seismic means, which is especially important for very weak explosions. Some of them would be based on various physical effects of a nuclear explosion, for instance the heat, electromagnetic and some other effects. The sensors for these effects could be placed, for example, on satellites and could reliably register any of those effects within the observed territory.

Urgency of the conclusion of the NTB stems also from the fact that the character and intensity of nuclear tests are changing constantly. Some 20-30 years ago tests were usually much stronger than today. They produced a strong mechanical and also seismic effect. The complete prohibition of such explosions would today be easily verifiable. But with time the strength of explosions has gradually gone down and their destructive effect has moved from mechanico-demolishing towards the elimination of human beings through radiation, like the infamous neutron weapon, and the recent nuclear explosions in the United States are calculated to be the source of energy for laser weapons. Such weapons would never have been created if a complete ban on nuclear testing had been agreed in the past. And if some countries are going to hesitate on the NTB for another decade or two it is not excluded that we might come to a point when it would be impossible to verify through seismic methods some possible new forms of nuclear explosions.

In consequence, what has been done by the GSE hitherto will be in vain. In the past, as the seismic effect of nuclear explosions went down, the developing seismology could, albeit with some retard, catch up and identify the weaker explosions. But who can say for sure that seismology, with its techniques, will one day finally not lose that race? In connection with new types of tested nuclear devices we could be confronted, in the near future, with a complicated problem of definition of a nuclear-weapon test. The basic conclusion is that the sooner we achieve the NTB the easier will be its verification.

In his statement of 18 February Ambassador Wegener dealt at some length with the activity of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismology. He recalled the proposal of his country to gradually establish a global seismic monitoring and verification system already before the conclusion of the NTB. He also suggested that an international seismic data exchange system should be put into a continuous operating mode. And the GSE should be assigned the task of supervising the establishment and continuous operation of a global network and to make recommendations for its further improvement.

We would agree that the establishment of a reliable and permanent system for seismic data exchange is not possible overnight. But for the initiation of such a system some minimal favourable conditions are required. One of them would be if the United States joined the moratorium on nuclear testing, observed now by the Soviet Union, and negotiations started on the NTB. Some time would also be available between the conclusion of the NTB and its entry into force after its ratification by the required number of States. Anyway, as I have already said, we are for the verification of the absence of nuclear-weapon tests and not for their continuation. The premature establishment of a permanent system for seismic data exchange is, on the one hand, not as urgent and necessary as some would have us believe, and on the other hand it could create misleading impression that something is being done against the continued nuclear testing. Measurements of the tests and any exercise in seismology can't bring us an inch closer towards the NTB if the necessary political will is lacking. Virtually in all languages there is a saying which, in French, Mr. President, I believe goes as follows:

"C'est une faiblesse que de ne pas savoir entendre la vérité".

Proceeding from this principled position we, however, do not consider that the GSE has nothing useful to do. It could continue work on the scientific and technical aspects for a future permanent system of seismic data exchange, on the technical equipment of the stations and centres; on the improvement of data processing in the centres; as well as on the transmission capabilities of the WMO/GTS channels where they are insufficient, etc. These problems could be discussed theoretically and, if the Conference is able to make specific steps towards the NTB, they could also be treated on a more practical level.

Possible evasion scenarios for nuclear testing were pointed out, e.g. the diminishing of the seismic effect of a nuclear explosion by carrying it out in an underground cavity (i.e. decoupling). Problems of monitoring very weak nuclear explosions, differentiating between weak natural and artificial seismic events, as well as between weak nuclear and chemical explosions, were stressed. We agree that these problems should be treated and should be taken into account for the future development of seismic technology. However, it would not be accurate to describe them as almost unsolvable difficulties today. Even very weak explosions can't escape the combination of seismic and non-seismic monitoring. A good demonstration in this regard was offered in this room some days ago by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Georgi Kornienko, who informed us about a weak American nuclear test which was not officially announced.

Some remarks concerning the exchange of level II data. We consider the exchange of level I data sufficient for the identification and localization of

the overwhelming majority of seismic events by national centres having at their disposal data from a global network. In some exceptional cases level II data could also be required. This could apply, e.g. to parallel recording of several seismic events by a number of stations of the network; another case might be an attempt to make use of a strong earthquake to hide nuclear explosion, some stations, so situated as to be in a position to make a clear record of a seismic event, could also be required to submit level II data. It is also not excluded that in exceptional situations the depth of a seismic event could not be clearly estimated on the basis of level I data: level II data could then be required as well. We consider it important that the seismic data exchange system ensures the full participation of all countries, including those which are technically less developed. One has to take into account that at present not all States have necessary technical means for the obtaining, transmission, computer processing and storing of the level II data and that these means are not used routinely even in all technically developed countries.

CD/PV.350

pp.8-11

China/Qian Jiadong

25.3.86

CW

Compared with other items, the prohibition of chemical weapons is indeed the most promising. The work over the past few years has resulted in some progress in the negotiations on chemical weapons. A preliminary structure of the future convention is already before us. With regard to a number of long-standing controversial issues, differences have gradually been narrowed in some cases, while consensus is emerging on others. On the scope of prohibition, all sides have basically agreed that it should cover prohibition of use and that the principles, purposes and obligations assumed under the 1925 Geneva Protocol should be reaffirmed in the convention. With regard to destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles, the principle of continuous on-site inspections has been generally accepted. During the resumed session in January, an integrated approach was adopted for listing relevant chemicals, thus freeing us, on the elaboration of lists and criteria, from the three-year-old argument about "which should come first, the chicken or the egg?". All these demonstrate that, given the sincere will of all sides to iron out differences in a spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation, it is possible for our negotiations to move forward.

Since the beginning of the current session, we have seen some new developments that are conducive to our negotiations. It didn't take long before we re-established the Ad Hoc Committee and the three working groups and adopted their respective work programmes through consultations. A high degree of enthusiasm is manifested by many delegations in their statements on this item. Some delegations have submitted or will submit new working papers. The Canadian delegation has prepared specially for the Conference a Compendium of All Chemical Weapons Documentation for the Period 1983 to 1985 and a Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons. Besides, it has been noted that the two States with the largest chemical weapons arsenals have both expressed their willingness to accelerate the negotiations on the convention and to help solve problems in the multi-lateral negotiations through their bilateral talks. All these are undoubtedly encouraging developments. People have every reason to expect that, under the able guidance of Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and that of the Chairman of the three working groups, as

well as with the joint efforts of all the delegations, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will be crowned with further achievements this year.

We cannot, of course, overlook the fact that the task before us is still very heavy. Divergences remain on a number of issues while some other issues have yet to be dealt with in depth. Great efforts still have to be made in order to resolve these issues. With a view to facilitating the progress of the on-going negotiations, the Chinese delegation wishes to offer its observations on the following issues.

First, lists of chemicals. Although an integrated approach for listing relevant chemicals was established during the resumed session in January, the lists are after all preliminary ones and have yet to be enriched through further discussions. In this connection, a new aspect that merits our attention is the régimes to which chemicals of various categories are subject. This is a matter of concern to many delegations and their concern is not without grounds, because without knowing the régimes for the listed chemicals, it would be difficult to judge whether the categorization of chemicals is rational, and this will probably lead to another round of "chicken or egg" arguments. We are very pleased to note that at present the relevant working group has already adopted the right approach of considering the lists, criteria and régimes together. The comprehensive approach for elaborating régimes for chemicals submitted by the Swedish delegation (CD/632) last year which contains three régimes for different chemicals merits our careful study and utilization.

Second, identification of chemical weapons production facilities. Useful discussions were held on this subject during the resumed session in January and the discussions should be pursued. The greater part of the discussions involved the question of criteria for the elaboration of the definition of chemical weapons production facilities, a question of whether it is better to make the scope of the criteria wider or narrower. It is our consistent view that only the facilities and technological units used solely for production of chemical warfare agents and their key precursors with no peaceful purposes be defined as chemical weapons production facilities, so that the scope of the criteria will not be made too wide, for too wide a scope will not be conducive to the effectiveness of the future convention. One idea suggests that it should also cover dual-purpose production facilities and that the identification may be based on the ratio between the products for peaceful purposes and the products for chemical weapons purposes. In our view, this will give rise to many difficulties that are not easy to overcome, one of which is that for various reasons, the demand for civilian products might change year by year. If the identification is based on the percentage designated to the products, then which year's data shall be taken as the standard? And how could future economic and scientific developments be taken into account? Therefore, we believe a more appropriate way to handle dual-purpose production facilities is to subject them to supervision and control under the system of CW non-production verification.

Third, the definition of chemical weapons and destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. In order to eliminate once and for all the threat of chemical warfare, destruction of the existing chemical weapons stockpiles should be the primary objective of the future convention; at the same time,

effective régimes should be established for those chemicals that may be used for chemical weapons purposes according to their chemical and physical properties, so as to prevent the emergence of new types of chemical weapons. To this end, it is necessary to elaborate a scientific definition for chemical weapons. In this connection, it is our consistent proposition that the concept of "chemical warfare agents" should be used. Because, concise as it is, it can reflect clearly the most important criterion in the elaboration of the convention, namely, the general purpose criterion. Furthermore, the concept itself contains some objective technical criteria for judging whether a toxic chemical can be used for hostile purposes. Therefore, it covers all the toxic chemicals that can be used for hostile purposes, both the existing ones and the ones that may possibly emerge in future. As a matter of fact, this concept has been in general use internationally for many years. However, some delegations have all along held differing views on using the concept in the convention. Over the past two years, we have adopted a relatively flexible approach and agreed to use other expressions and retain our views in the footnote. However, in the course of discussions over the past year, we have felt that in the elaboration of the definition of chemical weapons the use of neutral terms that cannot reflect the general purpose criterion could easily lead to confusion and misunderstanding. We hope that with regard to the question of definition, explorations will be continued with a view to reaching a solution satisfactory to all.

With regard to destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, in our Working Paper CD/443, submitted in 1984, we proposed that in order to free mankind from the threat of chemical warfare as early as possible, the States that possess chemical weapons should in the first place destroy those chemical weapons stockpiles which are most toxic and dangerous. In 1985, we further submitted document CD/605 concerning the question of destruction. In that document, we proposed that States parties should destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles proportionally and by stages, and in addition, we also introduced the concept of "stockpile equivalent of chemical warfare agents" and the calculation formula that takes into account both the quantity of stockpiles and toxicity intensity in determining the quantity to be destroyed. We are very pleased that the paper has received positive appraisals. We will continue to work in co-operation with other delegations to further improve it. We are also prepared to study relevant suggestions from other delegations.

Fourth, verification. This is the key issue in the elaboration of the future convention, and it could even be said that it is an issue of decisive importance to the reaching of an agreement on the convention. It is gratifying to note that on verification of the process of destruction, views of various sides appear to be converging. Since 1984, it has been agreed in principle that the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles should be carried out under strict supervision by continuous international on-site inspections. We believe it is time now to start with the elaboration of specific verification procedures. A number of delegations have already submitted some papers on the subject, which can serve as the basis for our work.

Challenge verification, or fact-finding, has all along been the most difficult issue. If the countries concerned continue to stick to their respective positions and level charges against each other, progress in the

negotiations will be out of the question. It is the consistent view of China that verification should be strict and effective, and at the same time, appropriate and rational. The resolution on the question of verification adopted by consensus at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly also emphatically points out: "Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures that are non-discriminatory and that do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development." As we see it, since all sides have accepted such a guideline, then, given the sincere will, it should not be difficult to find a solution acceptable to all. Working Paper CD/664, entitled "Fact-Finding Under the Future Chemical Weapons Convention", submitted not long ago by the delegation of Pakistan, represents a valuable effort to reconcile differing positions and deserves our serious study.

CD/PV.350

pp.12

UK/Cromartie

25.3.86

CW

As in the two previous years the Ad Hoc Committee has established three Working Groups, which reported yesterday to the Committee on their first month of work. For the first time responsibility has been divided between Working Groups on the basis of numbered Articles in the draft convention. Working Group A, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Rowe of Australia, is responsible for Articles II and VI of the draft convention. It has been concentrating its work on Article VI and in particular on the lists of substances of concern under a chemical-weapons convention and the régimes to be applied to them. Working Group B, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Poptchev of Bulgaria, is responsible for Articles III, IV and V of the convention and has been concentrating its work on the first two articles on régimes for the declaration and destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons. Working Group C, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia, is responsible for Articles I, VII, VIII and IX of the convention and for the question of herbicides. The Working Group is concentrating initially on Article VIII on the Consultative Committee and related organs, which will provide the institutional framework for overseeing the implementation of the convention. It seems to me important that there should be a credible international institutional basis to contribute to the international confidence that will be required to bring into force the convention which we are negotiating and to sustain it against the pressures to which it will be exposed. The institutionalization of the convention will be important to provide a multilateral basis for consultation, co-operation and fact-finding under Article IX of the convention. It will equally be important to provide the framework for international oversight during the transitional period of the elimination of existing chemical weapons and facilities for their production under Articles III, IV and V of the convention. Last, but not least an effective organization will be important on a continuing basis to provide assurance under Article VI of the convention that the civil chemical industry is not being misused for the clandestine manufacture of chemical weapons. I am sure that it is right to pursue these three elements of the convention independently in the three Working Groups but I should like to take this opportunity of emphasizing their interdependence. Confidence in the convention will need to be built on a combination of methods of verification, which will all require an effective organization for their implementation.

CD/PV.350

pp.21

Canada/Despres

25.3.86

CW

It is well known that the investigation of allegations of chemical weapons use is a matter in which Canada has taken a particular interest and to which we have devoted considerable effort. During the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, presented to the Secretary-General a handbook on the investigation of allegations of the use of chemical weapons or biological weapons precisely for the purpose of assisting in investigations of the kind that has recently been completed. On 11 March that handbook was submitted in this forum as something that would be of use in the future in the context of a verification régime that would be part of a chemical-weapons convention as it is being negotiated. Canada lauds the Secretary-General for again taking the initiative to investigate the most recent allegations of chemical weapons use.

CD/PV.350

pp.23-26

USSR/Issraelyan

25.3.86

CTB

I should like to stress from the outset that the Soviet Union is no less interested than anyone else in the reliability and strictness of verification and in absolute respect for agreements, and in ensuring that all participants should have full confidence in that respect. As is stated clearly in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev on 15 January 1986: "For us verification is not a problem. Should the United States agree to stop all nuclear explosions on a reciprocal basis, appropriate verification of compliance with the moratorium would be fully ensured by national technical means as well as with the help of international procedures including on-site inspection when necessary".

The Soviet Union also made a proposal to the American side to agree to provide a possibility for observers from both sides to visit, on a reciprocal basis and when so requested, the site of unclear events in order to remove possible doubts as to whether such events might be related to nuclear explosions. In short, the Soviet Union is open for verification -- as long as it is the verification of compliance with specific agreements.

We have already suggested to the American side to agree to hold a meeting of experts of our two countries to work out appropriate procedures for the verification of a bilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions.

Thus, the Soviet Union does not limit the methods of verification of a nuclear-test ban to national technical means alone, although -- and this should be stated clearly -- the existing technological possibilities available to the Soviet Union, and particularly to the United States, provide the means reliably to monitor the fact that nuclear tests are not carried out. The United States, incidentally, has greater possibilities for such verification than the Soviet Union. The reason for that is the fact that the whole territory of the Soviet Union is surrounded by seismic stations established either by the United States or under its auspices. A number of such stations are located in countries directly adjacent to the Soviet Union and the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and thus the reliability and precision of the determination of the place, time and depth and the evaluation of the yield of explosions are increased. The total number of such stations amounts to some 200 while we have some 20 of them on our side. The Soviet Union considers

that our 20 stations are sufficient to monitor nuclear tests carried out outside our territory.

It is hard to believe that 200 American stations equipped with the most modern instruments and situated far more conveniently than our 20 should be inferior to ours. This is evidently not the case. The conclusions of American seismologists themselves show that the seismic network of only 15 stations located outside the frontiers of the Soviet Union allow the detection of underground explosions with a yield of one kiloton carried out in any place in the Soviet Union with the probability of detection of not less than 90 per cent. The capabilities of the seismic method are proved by the registration by a number of seismic stations in the world of low-yield industrial explosions of chemical explosives. According to the Bulletin of the International Seismic Centre, explosions with a yield of 20 to 30 tons are recorded at distances of 2,000 to 3,000 kilometres.

Thus the seismic network of the United States practically ensures a high probability of detection of underground nuclear explosions on the territory of the Soviet Union with a yield of considerably less than one kiloton.

A realistic assessment clearly establishes that there are no practical possibilities for clandestine nuclear explosions either. Even the use of concealment measures does not provide an opportunity to carry out a nuclear explosion without detection. Although it is a fact that the seismic effect of low-yield explosions in large cavities can be reduced tenfold (known as "decoupling") such cavities themselves can be made either by first exploding a high-yield nuclear charge or by other methods involving considerable technical difficulties. Neither the first method of creating a cavity nor any others can in practical terms remain undetected. Moreover, seismic signals caused by an explosion of a low-yield charge (up to 1 or 2 kilotons) in a cavity can be registered at a distance of thousands of kilometres.

As to the concealment of underground nuclear explosions against a background of earthquakes, it must be pointed out that the modern methods of processing seismic oscillations registered by a network of stations enable us to single out seismic signals of nuclear explosions even against the background of the recordings of earthquakes. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that this method of concealment of nuclear explosions is not practically possible as it is impossible to predict the exact time, location and strength of an earthquake so as to place a nuclear charge in advance and carry out other necessary preparatory work for the nuclear test.

There are some people, including some of the participants of our Conference, who make the point that a big chemical industrial explosion may be an effective means of concealment of a nuclear explosion. However, in practice we see that this method is, in fact, inapplicable as well, since such explosions would have to be dozens of times greater than the concealed nuclear explosions.

It should be pointed out that the seismic method of verification of underground nuclear explosions may be supplemented by other methods. At present the effects of an infrasonic acoustic wave accompanying an underground nuclear explosion on the ionosphere and on the magnetic field of the Earth are

under study. Such effects can be registered by ground stations and satellites. Seismic and hydro acoustic devices placed in the seas and oceans can be used to detect nuclear explosions. Satellites scanning the Earth are capable of detecting and registering the preparatory work for carrying out underground nuclear explosions and the aftermath of such explosions at ground zero (craters, surface disturbances, temperature changes, etc.).

It can therefore be stated with certainty that the present level of knowledge of the effects accompanying underground nuclear explosions and the capabilities of a number of States enable us to detect nuclear tests dependably by national technical means. International procedures, including on-site inspections, remove all doubts as to the reliability of verification; moreover, with the cessation of nuclear explosions by all States the solution of this task would be considerably facilitated.

As for the Soviet Union, our position on the issue of a nuclear-test ban is quite clear and constructive. It consists in the following:

First. The Soviet Union stated in response to the letter of the leaders of the six States that the Soviet Union will not conduct nuclear explosions even after 31 March -- until the United States carries out its first nuclear explosion.

Second. We are in favour of verification by national technical means of a ban on nuclear tests being supplemented by appropriate international procedures with the use of all the achievements in seismology and, if need be, by on-site inspections.

Third. We are ready to make use of the proposal of the leaders of the six States to assist in the verification of compliance with the nuclear-test ban, including on-site inspections, provided, of course, that this proposal is accepted by the other side.

Fourth. We propose beginning without delay the elaboration of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the resumption or starting of the appropriate negotiations in any form -- bilateral, trilateral, multilateral -- without linking this issue to any other issues.

Fifth. We propose dealing simultaneously with verification issues from the outset in such negotiations.

Sixth. We are even ready to agree to a solution whereby at first only the USSR and the United States would agree to stop any nuclear explosions while the rest of nuclear-weapon States would discontinue such tests later.

Seventh. We are in favour of the start of multilateral negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament on all the aspects of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, including adequate measures of verification. The objective of the talks should be the elaboration of a draft treaty which would effectively prohibit the carrying out of any test explosions of nuclear weapons anywhere and by anyone and which would

include universally acceptable provisions preventing the sidestepping of this ban by way of undertaking nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Eighth. We are ready to ratify without delay, on a reciprocal basis, the bilateral Soviet-United States agreements of 1974 and 1976 and do not put forward any preconditions for doing so.

Ninth. We agree with the idea of carrying out consultations with the aim of extending the scope of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 to underground tests which it does not cover.

Tenth. We also have a flexible position on the issue of the mandate for an appropriate ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament. We are ready to co-operate on this subject with the Non-Aligned States as well as with those Western States that are in favour of starting negotiations on a nuclear-test ban, and we do not oppose the proposal to create within the ad hoc committee, should it be established, working groups on the scope of prohibition and on verification of compliance with the Treaty. Neither do we oppose the inclusion in its programme of work of the consideration of all the key issues of the future Treaty.

And lastly. The Soviet Union is concerned to achieve a nuclear-test ban as rapidly as possible, and is therefore prepared to support the proposal to continue the activities of the Group of Experts on Seismology with the objective of the further sophistication of the international seismic data exchange. This is further proof of our desire to assist in every way in the elaboration of effective measures for the verification of compliance with a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

CD/PV.351

pp.14

Cuba/Lechuga Hevia

27.3.86

CTB

The United States has unremittingly repeated that the question of verification is the major obstacle in the way of the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests. It does not matter that the rest of the world is convinced that with existing means, both national and international, this is a problem that has been resolved: it goes on repeating this argument. But we believe that with the information given here in the Conference by Ambassador Issraelyan of the Soviet Union it will be very difficult for anyone to entertain the least doubt. We confess that it came as a surprise to us to learn of the abundance of means in the United States to monitor explosions in the territory of the USSR and, in comparison, the limited means available to the USSR to ensure sufficient verification of what is happening in the United States. According to that information, the territory of the Soviet Union is surrounded by seismic stations, many of them in territories adjacent to the Soviet Union or near the frontiers of its Warsaw Pact allies. There are some 200 of them, and they are capable of determining precisely the place, time, depth and intensity of explosions. But what is most important for members of the Conference is to know that with only 20 seismic stations the USSR states that it is in a position to detect nuclear tests carried out outside its territory. We do not know how it will be possible to go on talking in this forum of the impossibility of verifying nuclear explosions. And we will not repeat the other information supplied showing that with the means already available to the United States they can verify any type or variant of

explosion, because you all heard the statement by the head of the Soviet delegation.

CD/PV.351 pp.17 Zaire/Monshemvula 27.3.86 CTB

A problem which has given rise to differences of view is that of verification, and yet the United Nations General Assembly remains convinced that existing means of verification are sufficient to ensure compliance with a nuclear test-ban agreement. Last year the Zairian delegation took part in the Workshop organized by the Norwegian Government in Oslo from 4 to 7 June. The programme of work of the Workshop included a demonstration at the NORSAR data processing centre, which is a fully equipped station and one of the biggest seismological laboratories in the world. The lesson that can be learned from the demonstrations and papers presented at the Workshop is that considerable technical progress has been made in recent years in the field of seismological verification of a nuclear test-ban. Furthermore, the conclusion has been drawn that it is essential to set up a world seismic network as proposed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Zaire delegation is in favour of the setting up of a world seismic monitoring and verification system.

CD/PV.351 pp.20-23 FRG/Wegener 27.3.86 CW

Speaking in the First Committee at the fortieth session of the General Assembly, on 6 November 1985, my delegation attempted to direct the attention of all delegations to the major problem areas on which this year's negotiating effort would thus have to concentrate: the verification of non-production, and on-challenge verification. No substantial progress has been achieved in these two major focal areas; worse, a true negotiating effort has not been deployed on either of them, and delegations -- even at the relatively successful and constructive rump session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in January of this year -- have continued to indulge in a mere exchange of philosophical views.

Is there hope that this will change, that 1986 will bring us a breakthrough on the really significant political issues of the convention? Two events have occurred since my delegation voiced its concerns in this respect during the General Assembly's session last year, and both have been commented upon frequently and positively during the present spring session. On 21 November 1985, President Reagan and General-Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed their commitment to a chemical weapons ban and agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter. There are 40 parties negotiating this international convention, but the significance of this firm undertaking by the two major military Powers can hardly be overestimated. General-Secretary Gorbachev's declaration of 15 January 1986, again, show a welcome preoccupation with the elimination of chemical weapons. Both the joint statement of the November summit and General-Secretary Gorbachev's utterances on chemical weapons have largely contributed to the tangible spirit of optimism and the constructive atmosphere that have prevailed during this session of the Conference on the subject of chemical weapons. It is therefore particularly important to probe the extent

and precise meaning of these two major documents under the auspices of the two overriding negotiating tasks of which I have spoken and on which the success of this annual session hinges.

General-Secretary Gorbachev's statement in part IV of his declaration of 15 January is equally important for what it spells out, and because of the points he passes over in silence. The sense of urgency which the author conveys in speaking of banning chemical weapons and his appeal to all participants in the negotiations to take "a fresh look at things" are praiseworthy. It is equally gratifying that the Soviet statement -- here as in other areas -- seems to take a constructive and unencumbered view of the necessity for effective and appropriate international verification measures. In addition, the statement offers a number of new perspectives, both as regards the declaration of location of current production facilities and the preparedness to move forcefully on the future elimination of production facilities for, and stockpiles of, chemical weapons. In these areas the Soviet policy, as now announced, coincides with universally held views in the negotiations and can be put to good use in widening the existing consensus and intensifying the work on particular treaty language.

It appears that the "fresh look at things" has also been translated by the Soviet delegation, since the commencement of our annual session, into an open and constructive attitude on a number of issues, leading one to the hypothesis that in its search for means to accelerate the negotiations the Soviet delegation would now be willing to provide a greater amount of flexibility on controversial issues than has been the case in the past.

If that is what is meant by the Soviet call for a "fresh look", it would be all for the better. In a sense, the Soviet statement seems to have captured in its formulation the very essence of multilateral negotiating, for it is a necessary prerequisite for further progress in such negotiations that all participants, without exception, continuously reassess their previous positions, as evidenced in earlier Conference documents, and look anew to common objectives and the possibility of adjusting their previous stance to mutually acceptable positions, striking a balance between one's perceived national security needs and the security requirements of the international community at large.

Yet, behind this outwardly constructive attitude a number of serious questions emerge. Even though my delegation -- and, I am confident, all other delegations in this room -- are prepared to give the Soviet delegation the benefit of the doubt, it must be said that, so far, most of the principles enunciated in the Soviet statement of 15 January have not been translated into concrete negotiating positions, and that it has not become evident where possible flexible departures from earlier views could become a feature of the negotiating process. No doubt, a statement such as that of 15 January, with its enormous width and broad coverage of all disarmament problems, once agreed upon at high level, needs a certain time to be fleshed out and detailed at the working level. This is a natural ingredient of any bureaucratic process in a negotiating environment. However, more than two months have passed since the announcement of the Soviet proposals and, in all honesty, the Conference has not seen on any of the particular issues what detailed manifestations of the new policy are going to be. In the view of my delegation, the time has therefore come to pose to the Soviet delegation a number of questions in order to

satisfy the legitimate need of other delegations to know where the negotiations are heading.

The question is whether we will have the full benefit of a new constructive attitude or whether, conceivably, only a minimalist version will be offered to us and at the working level an attempt is made to nibble away at the more positive and constructive tone employed at the highest level of political authority.

It is in a spirit of earnest endeavour, seeking to explore the concrete negotiating mode of one of the major participants in our negotiations, that I have, on behalf of my delegation, the following questions to ask:

(1) The very problem areas that are of perhaps crucial significance for the ultimate success of our negotiations, control of future non-production, and the complex issues of fact-finding and verification in cases where a suspicion of a breach of treaty has been voiced, are not explicitly addressed by the Soviet Union in its statement. Can one nevertheless assume that its call for a "fresh look at things" and the preparedness to agree to measures of strict control, including international on-site inspections would also pertain to these important subjects?

(2) Is the Soviet Union prepared, in the spirit of its statement of 15 January to modify its present position, as expressed in document CD/636, that on-challenge on-site inspections should be carried out only with the consent of a State party in regard to which the request is made? What is the interpretation to be attached to the remarks of Ambassador Issraelyan of 22 January before the Ad Hoc Working Group on article IX of the Convention that the decision to accept an on-site inspection should not be of an "entirely discretionary nature"?

(3) In the light of this latter statement, what would be the interpretation the Soviet Union now attaches to "strict control, including international on-site inspection" in such on-challenge cases? Will the Soviet Union now be prepared to engage in negotiations on a meaningful fact-finding system designed to clarify and resolve any situation which gives rise to suspicions about actions in breach of obligations under the future Convention?

(4) Since the Soviet Union advocates, among possible interim steps, a prohibition to transfer chemical weapons or to deploy them elsewhere, and since the Soviet Union affirms that it already strictly abides by such principles, would this mean that there are at present no chemical weapons whatsoever on the territories of other States, specifically in the Warsaw Treaty area, that have been transferred to these States by the Soviet Union, or are produced or deployed under Soviet jurisdiction or control?

(5) Is it correct to assume from the readiness, as announced in the statement, to declare the location of enterprises producing chemical weapons, that presently existing military storage sites of such weapons are not going to be communicated? And if so, how can it be reliably ascertained that all existing stocks be fully declared at the inception of the validity of the Convention and be fully subjected to destruction procedures?

(6) In the spirit of its readiness to eliminate the industrial base for the production of chemical weapons, will the Soviet Union agree to subject the industrial manufacture of key precursors which are suitable for the production of chemical weapons to mandatory systematic international verification, designed to prevent effectively the circumvention of the future Convention on the one hand, but not hindering the economic and technological activities of the contracting parties in the field of peaceful chemical activities?

(7) Can one conclude from the statement of 15 January and its emphasis on eliminating the industrial base of weapons production, that the Soviet Union is now prepared to abandon an earlier approach by which the civilian production of super-toxic lethal substances for permitted purposes, as needed in any modern industrial society, would be limited to only one small-scale facility under international supervision?

I am certain that other delegations share the interest of mine in a reply to these important questions and may eventually have questions of their own. It would thus be useful for all participants in the negotiations to receive a reply to these queries, both in the plenary of this Conference and in the relevant negotiation committee. May I conclude by thanking the Soviet delegation in advance for giving attention to the various questions I have formulated.

CD/PV.351 pp.30-31 Ad Hoc Group of
Scientific Experts/Dahlman 27.3.86 CTB

I would like today to introduce two documents, CD/681, containing a provisional summary of the report on the Group's technical test, and CD/682, containing a progress report on our latest session.

During its two weeks' session the Group discussed a draft of a detailed report on the test, prepared by our scientific secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdal. The Group had more meetings during this session than I think during any session before, trying to accommodate and evaluate all results obtained at a large number of facilities around the world. We greatly appreciate the eminent services provided by the secretariat throughout the session. During our meeting, provisional agreement on substantial parts of this detailed report was reached. Due to considerable redrafting, which in part was due to requirements to limit the size of the report, it was, for practical reasons, not possible to finish the considerations of the detailed report and its technical appendices at this meeting.

However, the Group reached consensus on a provisional summary of the report, which is presented to the Conference in document CD/681. This report summarizes in eight pages the purposes of the technical test (GSETT), the results obtained and the conclusions we have drawn. In my view this summary contains a comprehensive review of what was achieved during the technical test conducted in 1984.

In earlier interventions on 4 April and 23 July last year I presented results from this test, a test in which 36 countries on all continents contributed data from 76 stations in all. Almost 5,000 messages containing more than 150,000 reported parameters were transmitted over the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization. Data were

exchanged between the stations and the experimental international data centres operated in three countries.

Today I will present the overall conclusions from the test on which the Group has reached agreement: "Overall, the GSETT proved very successful, as the test has provided a vast amount of experience, previously unavailable, on many aspects of practical operation of a global seismic data exchange system. The GSETT demonstrated that the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization in many parts of the world ensures in general an operative and undistorted transmission of Level I seismic data for the proposed international system for exchange of such data. The GSETT showed that most of the procedures developed by the Group to collect, exchange, compile and analyse seismic Level I data worked satisfactorily in practice. However, the Technical Test also showed that in some areas further developments are necessary." With this I leave the provisional summary report of what I regard to be a successful international undertaking.

In its progress report, contained in document CD/682, the Group concludes that provisional agreement was reached on substantial portions of the detailed report and that this report should be submitted to the Conference on Disarmament following the Group's next meeting. The Group discussed plans for its further work and agreed "to recommend that it define the emphasis of its future work at its next session. The work would draw upon its previous results and experiences, taking into account all achievements of seismology, for the further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the global system". As to the relation of the Group's work to developments outside the Group, different views were expressed and these are reflected in the progress report.

CD/PV.353

pp.9,11-12

USSR/Petrosyants

3.4.86

CTB

In refusing to discontinue nuclear testing the United States advances three reservations which, to my mind, under closer scrutiny prove to be in conflict with each other, and one of them in fact rules out any cessation of tests. Ambassador Lowitz of the United States presented these reservations in his statement at the Conference on Disarmament on 11 February: "For the United States, a nuclear-test ban remains an objective to be achieved in due course, in the context of significant reductions in the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons and the development of substantially improved verification measures. We have also made it clear that, at the present levels of nuclear weapons, testing plays a role in ensuring the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent which remains a key element in the security of the Western Alliance.

Thus the reservations are as follows: firstly, cessation of tests is linked to nuclear disarmament measures. Secondly, the verification problem is to be resolved. Thirdly, testing is necessary to maintain the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence.

I have already mentioned that the problem of verification no longer exists. Let me elaborate on that. First of all we believe that there are

enough national technical means for the purposes of verification of a comprehensive test ban. They can be supplemented by the international exchange of seismic data. The establishing of a network of seismic stations improves verification capabilities. Suffice it to mention in this regard the experience and results gained in Norway, Sweden, and in other countries. The seminar held in Norway has demonstrated a modern and efficient seismicological station. Today verification techniques are so sophisticated that they are fully capable of ensuring full verification. However, in order completely to remove the so-called verification difficulties, the Soviet Union agrees to supplement national technical means by the strictest measures of verification including on-site inspections. We are prepared to take up the proposal by the heads of the six States to provide help in verifying the cessation of nuclear tests, including on-site inspections, if it is accepted by the other side.

I would like to recall as well that, in the context of the United States proposal concerning a meeting of experts of our two countries on verification issues, we stated that we agree to the holding of such a meeting in order to develop appropriate procedures to verify that there is a mutual abstention from carrying out nuclear explosions.

This is the present situation in the area of verification. What else remains to be done here? Only one thing: namely, to get down to negotiations and agree on technical details.

The United States of America has invited our scientists to visit their test ground in Nevada in April to observe its next nuclear-weapon test. President Reagan portrayed his proposal to send Soviet experts to the United States of America as an attempt to create the necessary basis for mutual trust between the two countries. He said in his statement: "As a reflection of our resolve to make tangible progress, in my new proposal I identified to Mr. Gorbachev a specific new technical method -- known as Cortex ... This is a hydrodynamic yield measurement technique that measures the propagation of the underground shock wave from a nuclear explosion."

I have to state here at the Conference that there is nothing new in this technical method. Firstly, we know this method very well and we sometimes use it in the USSR. We call it "MIS", or method of impulse sensing. Secondly, this method gives only an approximate value of the yield of the explosion.

Certainly, together with the United States experts we could clarify many technical details if the United States resolutely and unequivocally stated that it is in favour of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, and that it is ready to resume without delay the interrupted elaboration of a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban, in other words, to deal seriously with this matter.

CD/PV.353

pp.17-19

Japan/Imai

3.4.86

CW

Another approach that is of practical importance in determining this threshold is to talk about an amount which is so small that it is not cost-effective to exercise control. In addition to the effectiveness aspect of the definition, it tries to determine the corresponding cost of control, or

verification as the case may be. This will be very strongly influenced by the total efforts and resources available for control as well as the desire to find a method of their optimum distribution throughout the system of chemicals to be watched. For instance, when one thinks of the requirement for verification of initial stocks of chemical weapons, their destruction, or the need to verify permitted use and non-diversion, the amount of control resources that can be allocated to civilian chemical industry may not be very large. Then it may not be very meaningful to set a threshold at too low a level.

An additional element of consideration which makes the subject very interesting is that for practical use in control activities, such a threshold will need to be expressed in terms of tons per year for each independent facility. I shall not go into the explanation of why this conversion from tons for an entire State at any given time to a different unit is necessary. As an illustration, within the international nuclear safeguards system, 25 kgs of highly enriched uranium or 8 kgs of plutonium are a "significant quantity" in that they roughly correspond to the quantity of special fissionable material required for a single nuclear explosive device. The threshold amount for control is often taken to be 25 kgs and 8 kgs respectively per annum regarding individual nuclear facilities. Somehow, for practical reasons, the threshold is defined as one bomb, per facility, per annum and accepted as a viable working hypothesis. On this and other items discussed today, my delegation intends to present further explanations to the Ad Hoc Committee or its Working Groups, so that these notions may continue to be looked into.

If the various steps of verification and control of chemical weapons follow the path of the material balance and its accountancy, we have an important lesson to learn from the work regarding the safeguard of nuclear materials under the IAEA. I would hasten to add that there is a considerable difference in approach between that for chemical weapons and the material balance for the very limited number of chemical elements under the IAEA, namely, uranium and plutonium, which have only limited use outside of the nuclear industry, and which have a clear and distinct signature of their existence even in minute quantities, namely radioactivity. However, when we look at the verification exercise as a matter of counting numbers, measuring weight, and doing chemical analysis, and realize that much of these activities have to be done on the basis of random sampling, because it is physically not possible to take measurements of thousands of tons of chemicals, there is an important requirement that the level of confidence and the level of accumulated error in measurement have to be the same throughout the process.

In other words, if the declaration of the initial stock is verified to 90 per cent confidence and with an allowable error of one ton, then the verification of the transfer of material from store to destruction facility should be consistent with this level. Similarly, when destruction is carried out either through incineration or another chemical decomposition process, and its verification is carried out through sampling of the waste stream, the confidence and accuracy of such verification should also be consistent.

What I have intended to do here today is merely to indicate the existence of the problem and not to present any sample calculations regarding the subject. One may add that it is only through such a quantitatively consistent system that it is possible to establish an objective criteria for triggering challenge inspection.

There are of course two possible kinds of challenge inspection. One is the anomaly suspected through the process of routine inspections, and it is this one that I am referring to here. The case of challenge inspection in the case of suspected clandestine activities requires different considerations.

CD/PV.353

pp.20-24

USA/Lowitz

3.4.86

CW

Two years ago this month, Vice-President Bush addressed this Conference and presented the United States draft convention to ban chemical weapons, CD/500. At that time, the United States delegation had hopes that the Conference would be able to reach agreement on a comprehensive ban within a reasonably short time. As the months went by, however, it became apparent that not all delegations were able to work constructively to achieve that goal. Throughout the summer of 1984 and all of 1985, we saw the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons become entangled unnecessarily in procedural controversies.

One of the principal difficulties was the apparent unwillingness of some nations to commit themselves to the range of verification measures necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. Both in 1984 and in 1985, some delegations responded to verification proposals by indicating they believed that it was not yet time seriously to address the issue of verification. As the months went by, many delegations began to wonder if those States were seriously prepared to negotiate a chemical weapons convention.

This was the state of affairs when President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Geneva in November 1985. The Joint Statement issued after that meeting rekindled the optimism of my delegation, and, I think, was a source of renewed hope for all delegations. My delegation was further encouraged by General Secretary Gorbachev's statement of 15 January of this year, in which he stated that the Soviet Union was ready to reach agreement on verification measures, and in which he indicated specifically acceptance of the concept of on-site verification in the elimination of production facilities. Thus, it appeared that one of the major hurdles to a comprehensive chemical-weapons ban may have been eliminated.

In the Conference we have heard much from delegations of the Group of Socialist States about the importance of verification. However, up to now these statements have largely been confined to generalities. In essence, what we have been hearing about verification over the past months is little more than the word itself. We have waited patiently for the delegation of the Soviet Union to introduce specific verification proposals. Such proposals could be a positive step that could move us closer to our goal. The Conference on Disarmament is still waiting for the detailed information necessary to transform Mr. Gorbachev's general statements on verification into concrete negotiating proposals.

In this regard, the excellent statement on 27 March of the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, was particularly appropriate and timely. The series of questions contained in this statement go to the heart of the verification issues. It is important

that the members of this Conference soon receive the answers to the questions Ambassador Wegener raised.

We recognize recent increased participation on the part of members of the Group of Socialist States who have begun to provide somewhat more detailed explanation of their positions on some verification issues. If this foreshadows a change in approach, we welcome it. We can carry our negotiations forward only when we clearly understand one another's views on these critical issues.

Finally, Working Group C has made some progress in dealing with the form and function of the Consultative Committee. Chairman Wisnoemerti of Indonesia presented a text for Article VIII that has received serious consideration. My delegation appreciates both the level of detail that it incorporates, and the time and effort that were devoted to its preparations.

We are concerned, however, that adequate consideration be devoted in Working Group C to the critical issue of compliance during this session. The paper introduced by the delegation of Pakistan, as well as other documents, provides a useful starting point for this consideration. This effort will be indispensable to the negotiation of verification provisions that will be appropriate and effective. My delegation encourages all delegations to participate in developing specific measures -- especially those related to challenge inspection -- which would eliminate the last sentence of Article IX in CD/636, which reads: "the further contents of Article IX remain to be elaborated". Our present state of progress is, unfortunately, precisely indicated by this sentence.

The United States has delineated its own views on challenge inspection very specifically in our draft convention, CD/500. Since that time my delegation has made every effort to explain our views on this matter and why the United States considers mandatory challenge inspection essential for an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. We have stated repeatedly that the United States would welcome suggestions for ways to improve the procedures and formulations so long as the same level of confidence is maintained.

Our 1984 proposal for challenge inspection was made with full awareness of the proposal of the Soviet Union, contained in its draft convention of 1982. Our proposal recognizes the critical need for a verification régime that would constitute a credible deterrent to a potential violator. Our proposal was made because we do not believe that making a challenge inspection voluntary, as the Soviet Union suggested, would provide either a credible deterrent or the necessary confidence of compliance with the provisions of the convention. A great majority of the delegations in this Conference recognizes, as have we, that deterrence of violations and confidence in compliance with a future convention are critical. This recognition has been most recently reflected in the proposal made by the delegation of Pakistan, particularly in its provisions for investigating allegations of use. We respectfully suggest that the Soviet Union give further consideration to the inadequacies of its existing proposal, made at a very early stage of the negotiations. The Soviet Union should now make a new proposal which provides

the deterrence and confidence necessary for an effective convention. Such a proposal would demonstrate that the Soviet Union is indeed seeking realistic solutions to the verification issues of a chemical-weapon convention, and would be in keeping with the recent statements of General Secretary Gorbachev and others.

In the period since we tabled our draft convention, we have continued to explain and elaborate various aspects of our substantive proposals. While our discussions in the Conference have served to clarify many issues, certain misunderstandings appear to remain. In particular it has been alleged that Article X of the United States draft convention, by its use of language referring to "government-controlled" facilities, would have the effect of discriminating against States whose economies are so structured that they have little or no large-scale involvement of private enterprise in their chemical industries. As my delegation has repeatedly sought to make clear, this is a mistaken impression. No imbalance -- I repeat no imbalance -- in inspection obligations is either intended or contained in Article X of the United States proposal in CD/500.

The United States is willing to do whatever it can to avoid any apparent misunderstanding. Therefore, in order to make our position absolutely clear, my delegation is today introducing an amendment to Article X of CD/500. This amendment will be submitted both as a Conference document and as a Chemical Weapons Committee Working Paper. The English-language text of the amendment is being circulated at this time.

I wish to emphasize that this amendment does not alter the United States position. Rather, it is intended to make even more clear that Article X obligations would apply equally to all States, regardless of their economic or governmental system. Specifically, the amendment deletes the term "government-controlled", and, in its place, substitutes new language descriptive of the types of privately-owned locations and facilities the United States intends to be covered by Article X.

Whatever the source of the apparent misunderstandings that we have heard expressed, my delegation trusts that this amendment will make it absolutely clear that Article X applies both to privately-owned and to public facilities. We trust as well that this amendment will make it absolutely clear that Article X is intended to cover any privately-owned location or facility that in the future might be suspected of being used for activities in violation of the convention. The key point is that no violation of the convention should escape the régime.

My delegation recognizes its responsibility to ensure that the United States position is understood by all. Effective negotiation cannot proceed without thorough understanding. I very much hope that this clarification will dispel any possibility of further misunderstanding on this point. We are introducing this clarification now, before the issue has been taken up in Working Group C, in the hopes that it will contribute to progress on the essential matter of challenge inspection. I hope that the other delegations will follow suit and introduce suggestions which will effectively clarify their own positions, not only on issues of verification and compliance, but on all other issues in the negotiation of the chemical-weapons convention.

CD/PV.353

p.27

Romania/Chirila

3.4.86

CW

With regards to the lists of significant chemicals and their régimes, we appreciate the fact that in the January meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, formulations were reached, and subsequently improved and consolidated during this session, they command all our attention in order to elaborate the text of the draft convention. At the same time, we consider it necessary for the future convention to provide for a review of the lists, in other words, an opportunity to insert new chemicals, in keeping with advances in modern chemistry and chemical technology, and to transfer a substance from one list to another or even to remove a substance from the lists, if appropriate. The lists of chemicals covered by all of Article IV of the draft convention should provide complete assurance that the civilian chemical industry will not be used for clandestine production of chemical substances which can be used as weapons of war. Similarly, the establishment of lists and appropriate régimes should in no sense affect or limit development of the chemical industry, and the research and peaceful uses of this industry, which is essential to the economy of many countries. Again, it is important to arrive at a better definition of the concept of chemical weapons production facilities, so that it does not hinder the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes of many countries.

The question of confidence building in regard to implementation and observance of the future convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons is also one of the priority issues in our negotiations. Of course, we are relying on the good faith, the confidence and the interests of all and Romania, for its part, intends without any hesitation to act in such a way. At the same time, it would be in the general interest to ensure full observance of the convention by establishing a system of effective and appropriate verification without any discrimination, in accordance with generally acceptable procedures that are fully in accord with the purpose and the very nature of future conventions. At the same time, in the establishment and functioning of the Consultative Committee to monitor implementation of the convention, and other organs and procedures that may be envisaged, full respect for the principle of sovereign equality and the prevention of any possible discrimination must lie at the very core of any system of regulation.

CD/PV.353

pp.30-32

France/Jessel

3.4.86

CW

With regard to the draft convention on the prohibition of production and stockpiling, we note that while progress has been made on some issues for the time being there is no consensus on a fundamental matter on which the success of our work depends, namely, the question of respect for the convention and the resulting verification measures. Obviously, the principal difficulty lies in the verification of non-production. In this connection, we consider it essential to provide for the organization of international on-site inspections, or routine inspections, and also for a regular exchange of statistical information which in the very large majority of cases will make it possible to ensure that there is no diversion for chemical weapon production purposes of a number of substances produced in varying amounts by the civilian chemical industry. As a result of this set of verification measures, the use of challenge inspection should be confined to exceptional cases. All our delegations recognize that challenge inspection is necessary, but its modalities

have yet to be established, and this remains an area of profound differences of view.

We consider it all the more important to have thorough exchanges of views on the question of routine inspection in that this is an issue which brings together various essential provisions of the convention concerning, firstly, the list of sensitive products; secondly, the balance to be struck between the various forms of verification; thirdly, the status of former production facilities which have been converted under supervision; and fourthly, permitted activities.

Let us take up these issues one by one. With regard to the list of sensitive chemicals, there are of course key precursors, but also a number of other chemicals which we must define jointly, which presents a genuine danger in terms of respect for the provisions of the convention.

Secondly, with regard to the balance to be struck between the different types of verification, the dangers are not all on a similar level. For some products, on-site international inspections must be organized in conditions which we must examine together: we believe that, for the system to remain effective, the inspections to be carried out within a given period should be decided by lot.

To ensure regular inspections on a fair basis, a formula combining the following elements could be considered, for example: countries would be divided into geographical groups, within which the country or countries to be inspected would be drawn by lot every year. For each of them, there would be a second drawing by lot to choose the facility or facilities to be inspected. Every country and every facility should be inspected at least once every five years. Of course, this is merely an example, and only an aspect of the problem: many other questions have to be resolved in this sphere.

For other very widely used chemicals, a regular exchange of statistical data will provide a basis for control: large variations from one year to another might, in the absence of satisfactory explanations, prompt on-site inspection measures to ensure that there has not been a violation of the convention through the production of chemical warfare agents.

Finally, in some cases, the on-site recording of data concerning production and stockpiling by automatic remote monitoring devices could be envisaged.

Thirdly, with respect to the status of former production facilities that have been converted, conversion is only acceptable if accompanied by especially strict verification measures. These must include international on-site inspection to ensure that there is no prohibited re-use of shops or parts of facilities which had previously served for the production of prohibited substances.

Fourthly, with regard to activities permitted under the Convention, the production of limited amounts of prohibited chemicals should be strictly supervised, including by on-site inspections.

I should like to remind you that in 1985 we submitted a working paper on another essential aspect of the convention, namely the destruction of stocks and of production facilities. We hope that the document will contribute to progress in our work this session. The thinking behind that paper may be summarized as follows: the destruction of stockpiles will take place over quite a long period - 10 years - during which it is essential to retain a small safety stockpile consisting of deterrent weapons (which is why we considered that the oldest toxic warfare stocks should be destroyed first). But it would be contrary to the spirit and purposes of the convention to retain production facilities intact until the end of the 10 year period. That would signify a desire to continue manufacturing new weapons, which the convention would prohibit upon its entry into force. We therefore proposed a time-table which would combine the destruction of stockpiles with the complete elimination of production facilities.

It seems to us that rapid progress may be made on this question of the destruction of stocks and production facilities. In his statement of 15 January, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev, confirmed that his country accepted the principle of on-site verification of destruction. It remains to establish the ways and means, in other words, the essential points have yet to be discussed. Furthermore, in the event of conversion of some facilities, the question of how to organize on-site inspections to ensure that no prohibited use takes place also remains to be spelled out.

The principle of international on-site verification must be accepted for the verification of non-production. In this connection, it is not clear to us whether the Soviet Union's proposal, as recalled here in the Conference by Mr. Kornienko, could apply to the verification of non-production in facilities which produce permitted chemicals. This would hypothetically be a possible means of getting around the convention which obviously could not be overlooked.

CD/PV.354 p.10 Sri Lanka/Dhanapala 8.4.86 OS

While this research goes on we have now to safeguard existing satellites from ASAT systems. This can be done by banning ASAT systems or by limiting the destructive potential of such systems through various forms of counter-action. The latter is both expensive and uncertain and consequently we must work for an ASAT ban. A draft treaty has been submitted and remains open for discussion and negotiation. If it is not acceptable in its present form we could propose improvements to ban anti-satellite weapons and their testing from space. With one ASAT system in place and another being tested for operation by 1987 we are at an opportune moment to impose this ban. The verification of this ban on the testing and deployment of ASAT systems is feasible at present.

CD/PV.354 pp.12-14 Argentina/Campora 8.4.86 CW

An effective and universal convention on chemical weapons should contain four essential elements. Firstly, it should include an absolute and unconditional prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Secondly, it should

contain categorical provisions on the destruction of existing arsenals, production facilities and the prohibition of the development and future production of such weapons. Thirdly, it should include suitable verification machinery that must be in keeping with the scope and nature of the instrument in accordance with the undertakings entered into under the Treaty. Fourthly, it must in no way be discriminatory or represent an obstacle to civil chemical industry and international co-operation in this field.

From this standpoint, the convention should apply to chemical weapons in the strict sense of the word, in other words, super-toxic, lethal and toxic chemicals, including key precursors, which are produced exclusively for military purposes. Thus, the object of the convention would be to prohibit the development, production, etc. of such chemicals if they are intended for use as weapons. In this context, it should be borne in mind that chemicals are not weapons in themselves. On the contrary, many chemicals of varying degrees of toxicity are widely used in various spheres of civil industry. Obviously, the use of such chemicals for civil purposes should not be covered by the scope of the prohibition.

We agree with those who have argued that the purpose of the convention is not to regulate civil chemical industry but solely to prohibit chemical weapons. Consequently, we share the view that the term of "permitted purposes" in the convention should be replaced by something else which suitably reflects this situation.

In the light of these considerations, particular attention should be paid to the formulation of the scope of the convention and to avoiding excessively wide concepts. Thus, the time has perhaps come to re-examine the definitions and criteria contained in the text which reflects the state of the negotiations. In this connection, it is worth recalling that the basic premise of the provisions concerning what must be declared and eliminated is the general-purpose criterion.

We also understand that at this point in our negotiations the working group on this issue should attach priority to the identification and listing of chemicals used exclusively for the production of chemical weapons.

At the same time we recognize the dangers which can stem from other chemicals if used for hostile purposes. Consequently, the convention must include balanced and reasonable provisions to ensure that these chemicals are exclusively confined to peaceful purposes. In the treatment of these chemicals which are used for industrial, agricultural, pharmaceutical, research and other activities, the fundamental principle to be respected should be that of not establishing regulations which hinder development, production, transfer and use of any kind for civil purposes.

This is of particular importance for a country such as mine, where the chemical industry plays an important role in the development, of both the agricultural and the industrial sectors; hence our repeated insistence on the need to ensure that the future convention does not hinder economic and technological activities or harm international co-operation in civil chemical activities. The convention should not hinder the transfer of toxic chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of such chemicals for peaceful purposes, nor hinder the wide and non-discriminatory use of

scientific progress in chemistry for peaceful purposes in accordance with the needs and interests of each State and its economic and social priorities. In the light of these considerations, the Foreign Minister of Argentina recently stated in this chamber our concern at references to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons, an objective which constitutes a discriminatory approach in that the priority objective of the Conference in this sphere must be to arrive at the universal, and permanent prohibition of such weapons.

CD/PV.354

pp.15-16

GDR/Rose

8.4.86

CTB

I should like to take this opportunity to express to the Chairman and all the other members of the Group my delegation's appreciation for the enormous work done in preparing, conducting and evaluating the Technical Test. The above-mentioned concise provisional summary provides an insight into the scientific and technical problems encountered and, in general, satisfactorily solved.

When the complete report on the Technical Test is presented, we shall have an opportunity to appraise the experience gathered. In this context, the question will have to be answered what activities the GSE should pursue in the future. My delegation wishes to reaffirm its position that all endeavours towards a CTB must be promoted. For this reason, the Group should continue its efforts. When it comes to the further development of the scientific and technical elements of the global system, it would be desirable to draw a conclusion from the experience obtained so far and determine which achievements of seismology should be taken into account in the years ahead.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic will continue to regard the activities of the Ad Hoc Group as a contribution to a verified test ban and oppose attempts to transform it into an instrument in charge of monitoring and justifying ongoing tests.

Obviously, the Group's future will be very much contingent on progress in drawing up the nuclear-test-ban treaty. It is regrettable therefore, that a dissenting opinion on this elementary fact is recorded in the progress report, something which is unique in the Group's history. I would like to state in this connection that the linkage between the Ad Hoc Group's activities and item 1 on the agenda of our Conference -- nuclear test ban -- has been generally recognized in the last 10 years as a basic principle. The delegations which regard headway in the attainment of a nuclear-test ban as something that lies outside the Group's work should recall that the then Conference on the Committee on Disarmament established the Ad Hoc Group on 22 July 1976, and I quote from the Group's first report, "to facilitate the monitoring of a comprehensive test ban".

Also, in the decision which the Conference took at its 48th meeting, to which the progress report before us refers, it spoke of "the international exchange of seismological data under a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in a protocol which could be an integral part of the treaty".

By affirming the full validity of the above text, the delegations concerned should dispel the doubts they themselves created. This would be important for the Ad Hoc Group's future work.

Since I have the floor, Mr. President, allow me briefly to put on record my country's unqualified support for the recent Soviet initiative aimed at ending nuclear testing. General Secretary Gorbachev's appeal of 29 March to take advantage of the current opportunity exemplifies the degree of responsibility towards mankind which should be displayed in this day and age by the two leading nuclear Powers. Yet, it took only a few hours for the Government of the other nuclear Power to bluntly reject the call for an act of reason, i.e., to come together and agree on a nuclear test moratorium.

Since it is still not too late, it is our hope that the pleas by Governments from all over the world, manifested also at this Conference, will not remain without a positive response from the United States Administration.

My delegation would like to express its fundamental conviction that the United States cannot justify nuclear testing in any way. Rather, from what is available in terms of facts, the following conclusions must be drawn:

Firstly, a comprehensive test ban would be a relatively uncomplicated but extremely effective measure to put a stop to the nuclear arms build-up and to facilitate disarmament. Anyone really committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons cannot be opposed to a test ban.

Secondly, by decreeing a mutual moratorium, effective right away, the Soviet Union and the United States would live up to their special responsibility to prevent a nuclear war. The moratorium would in no way adversely affect the legitimate security interests of either side. Those who reject a moratorium do not seek a military and strategic balance but superiority, i.e., destabilization.

Thirdly, compliance with a moratorium can be monitored by national means. It is even possible to agree on additional methods of verification. Furthermore, it is possible to ensure compliance with a CTBT by a completely adequate system of verification. Concrete provisions can be hammered out in the process of drawing up a treaty. This goes for complementary procedures as well.

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I want first to express the gratitude of my delegation to Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, for his enduring efforts to finalize the Report on the Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test concerning the exchange of Level I data through the WMO/GTS system, conducted during 1984. In spite of the endeavours of all the experts representing 24 countries, there still remain points of differences to be resolved further in this Report. Appreciating as we do that a Provisional Summary has been agreed upon this time, we are nevertheless disappointed at this inability to finalize the Report itself this time. We strongly hope that the Ad Hoc Group, at its next session from 21 July to 1 August, will finally be able to adopt the Report.

We also hope that during the next session there will be time enough to consult on the further work of the Ad Hoc Group, enabling us to consolidate a basis for its future activities.

In this connection, I would like to note with pleasure the statement made by our distinguished colleague Ambassador Issraelyan on 25 March that "the Soviet Union is prepared to support the proposal to continue the activities of the Group of Experts on seismology with the objective of the further sophistication of the international seismic data exchange". As I mentioned at the plenary meeting of 13 February, one major issue with regard to the nuclear-test ban is the question of verification and its limitations, which is obviously linked to the question of compliance. One important aspect seemed to be the technology required to detect, identify and evaluate very small-scale nuclear explosions as they take place in different geographic conditions and locations under the Earth's surface, while another issue of equal importance is the problem of an international system of data link to provide for common and well-organized determinations. The Ad Hoc Group has been working on these and other related problems for quite some time, and we hope that their mandate will be enlarged in due course so as to enable further in-depth study on identification and evaluation as part of a comprehensive verification system.

Seismic data may be divided into two categories, namely, parameters which are discrete and digital and waveforms which are more or less analogue information. For an exchange of parametric seismic data or Level I data, we have conducted GSETT and hopefully obtained satisfactory results. However, for exchange of waveform data or Level II data, which we will eventually have to consider, we do not have as common and powerful a tool as the WMO/GTS as a channel of information as we do in the case of Level I data exchange. In this connection, I stated in my speech of 13 February that Japan was considering taking a step to improve this situation. I am now pleased to be able to inform the Conference that our parliament, the Diet, recently authorized the budget which will enable Japan to further engage in Level II data exchange with other countries. Consultations have already begun with like-minded countries regarding the actual manner of conducting Level II data exchanges and we believe that we should start preparatory technical discussions and investigations into matters related to a waveform data exchange on co-operative national basis. During the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group, our expert, Dr. Suehiro, presented an explanation of our plan on co-operative national investigations of seismic data communications and exchange methods, to which all members are invited to participate. Up to now 17 countries have indicated interest in participating in these co-operative national measures. To participate in these investigations does not necessarily obligate parties to actually start waveform data exchange in the immediate future. Rather we call upon as many countries as feasible to begin the co-operative investigation of the technical issues relating to the exchange and to report the result to the Ad Hoc Group. We hope that the Ad Hoc Group will be kept well informed of the state of art in this field.

As is well known, Japan considers a comprehensive test ban as the task of the highest priority in the field of nuclear disarmament. In particular, it has been making an active contribution to the solution of verification problems. In June 1984, Foreign Minister Abe addressed this Conference and made a concrete and realistic proposal for a "step-by-step approach" towards

the realization of a comprehensive test ban. In August last year I submitted a Working Paper, CD/626, entitled "Concrete Measures for the Realization of the International Seismic Data Exchange System". That we have now taken the new initiative for the exchange of Level II data should be further testimony to our ardent desire for the prohibition of nuclear tests as well as to our belief in the importance of more refined and sophisticated means of verification which would convince us all of their reliability to the attainment of our goal.

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The Conference on Disarmament has before it for consideration the Provisional Summary of the Fourth Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD/681) and the Progress Report on the Ad Hoc Group's twenty-first session (CD/682).

The Soviet delegation has studied these documents. They show that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has carried out much useful work in the preparation of the Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the results of the technical test for the exchange of seismic data, carried out from 15 October to 14 December 1984. We approve of the results of the work carried out by the Ad Hoc Group at its twenty-first session. Unfortunately, the work on the preparation of the report on the above-mentioned technical test has been somewhat dragged out in particular because during the session some experts submitted new modifications which were not previously included in the Ad Hoc Group's materials.

We hope that the experience gained during the technical test will make a contribution to the further development of the scientific and technical aspects of a global seismic data exchange for the purposes of verification of a nuclear-weapon-test ban.

At the same time, the analysis of the results of the test has not yet been completed, and we hope that the Ad Hoc Group will do its best to complete the preparation of an objective and scientifically sound report as rapidly as possible. The Soviet Union is concerned to obtain a nuclear-weapon-test ban as quickly as possible, and is therefore in favour of continuing in the Conference on Disarmament the work on the development on an international system of seismic data exchange for the purposes of the verification of a nuclear-weapon-test ban. As stated in the message of M.S. Gorbachev to the Conference on Disarmament, the Soviet Union "is agreeable to the strictest control over a ban on nuclear weapon tests, including on-site inspections and use of all the latest developments in seismology".

The Soviet Union is ready to support the proposal for continuing the activity of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts aimed at the further improvement of the international exchange of seismic data. This position should be viewed as evidence of our desire to contribute in every possible way to drawing up effective verification measures for a nuclear-weapon-test ban.

It is self-evident that the work of the Ad Hoc Group, which was set up and operates within the Conference on Disarmament, is organically linked with progress on the question of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This is clear in particular from the first paragraph of the Provisional Summary of the Ad Hoc Group's Fourth Report (CD/681 of 21 March 1986). I shall read out that paragraph:

"1. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, so as to facilitate the verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, was established in 1976 by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and has later been maintained by the Committee on Disarmament (CD) ..."

Thus, it is absolutely clear that the work of the Ad Hoc Group should be directed towards working out an international system of seismic data exchange for the purposes of the verification of a nuclear-weapon-test ban. In any event, its work concerns the verification of observance of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear testing, but by no means the supervision of how such tests are conducted.

In this connection, we must express our concern at the lack of practical progress in resolving the question of a nuclear test ban. This is one of the top priority issues in modern international politics. As is well known, the USSR is doing everything it can for the question to be resolved forthwith.

We appeal to all concerned to adopt a serious and responsible approach to the problem of a nuclear weapon test ban, including of course, questions relating to the verification of such a ban, and, accordingly, to the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

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In spite of long years of negotiations, the regulation of the two most important categories -- supertoxic lethal chemicals and key components of binary systems -- continues to be unresolved, although this is a cardinal question in respect of not only permitted activities but also the whole of the convention. As for concrete negotiating positions, the differences continue to persist on the following question: in addition to the protective-purposes limitation, should there be any limitation on other permitted-purposes production and acquisition of supertoxic lethal chemicals and key components of binary systems.

The socialist countries have proposed that the aggregate quantity of supertoxic lethal chemicals and key components of binary systems for permitted purposes should be limited to an amount which is the lowest possible, and in any case does not exceed one metric tonne per year for each State party, and the production of such chemicals for permitted purposes should be concentrated at a single small scale facility. They propose the monitoring of the small-scale production facility by annual data reporting with justification, on-site instruments, and systematic international on-site inspections. They contemplate as well a prohibition of the production of compounds with methyl-phosphorous bond.

Some other delegations do not accept the notion of limiting the permitted-purposes production and acquisition of those chemicals belonging to the categories mentioned earlier, which have justified civil uses. They provide merely for the monitoring of all facilities producing supertoxic lethal chemicals by regular reporting which would include description and justification of the civil uses for which the chemicals are produced, and systematic international on-site inspection.

Let us now compare the feasibility of these two approaches, and their consequences.

The cardinal issue is whether there should be any limitation on the production for permitted purposes of supertoxic-lethal chemicals and potential binary components. The opponents of limitation keep referring to imperative economic realities and the interest of the unhampered development of chemical industry. Oddly enough, apart from the putative plans to produce certain supertoxic-lethal compounds, they cannot quote precedents of significant on-going production which would justify the creation of a general no-limitation rule. Notwithstanding that, they preclude in principle the possibility of imposing any limitations on chemical industry. Does such an approach stand the proof? Are there precedents of economically profitable activities being limited by any consideration whatsoever? Are there such precedents in the field of chemical industry?

Well, such precedents do exist. Both in relation to economic activities in a wider sense, and to chemical industry, in particular. The precedents, generally speaking, provide for limitations for the sake of protection of health and the environment.

The severe regulations of environmental protection, widely imposed on the automobile and heavy industries, offer a set of recent examples, demonstrating how far regulations and industries can go in order to meet global interests. In the chemical industry, too, there are constant endeavours to replace certain groups of chemicals, and to change the direction which certain branches of the chemical industry follow. For example, many chemical research groups are working on the development of low-mammalian-toxic insecticides, that is selective insecticides, to substitute for some of the insecticides of high toxicity currently in use.

Considering that for the moment there are no instances of supertoxic-lethal chemicals being widely produced for permitted purposes, the chemical industry is now at a crossroads. It is still in a position to choose, with minimal possible losses, the directions of its development, which are the most optimal, not only from an economic point of view. Ludwigshafen, Derbyshire, Seveso and lately Bhopal, are some of the momentoes of the consequences which chemical emergencies might cause to the workers and the surrounding population. The endeavours to limit to the lowest possible level the production of the most dangerous chemicals might seem even more justified in view of estimates that there are supertoxic-lethal chemicals 100 times more deadly than methyl isocyanate, the substance that caused the death of more than 2,500 people and injured nearly 100,000 overnight in Bhopal.

Turning to examples of regulations and restrictions affecting the chemical industry, special mention should be made of control actions, which

numerous countries have taken, to ban or severely restrict the use or handling of pesticides in order to protect health or the environment. The best-known example is that of DDT. Concern over the effect of phosphates on eutrophication of water supplies led, for example, to the European Agreement on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Detergents in Washing and Cleaning Products, signed under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1968.

In 1971 the Council of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) established a Procedure for Notification and Consultation on Measures for Control of Substances Affecting Man and his Environment. Up to 1984 there were 36 notifications on such measures. Limitations, bans and regulations placed at the national level on hazardous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceutical products are, in fact, so common that in a 1983 report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the legislation and mechanisms existing at regional, national and international levels to obtain and exchange information on banned hazardous chemicals one can read the following: most of the 38 countries covered by the report have institutions for reviewing and dealing with scientific and technological information on banned hazardous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceutical products.

Legal and administrative limitations, bans and regulations placed on potentially toxic chemicals are now on such a large scale, that they have necessitated the co-ordination at the international level of activities for the exchange of information on banned hazardous chemicals. Recent developments of special interest in this connection include, the provisional notification scheme for banned and severely restricted chemicals proposed by an Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts of the United Nations Environment Programme, the draft guiding principles developed in the OECD on the exchange of information related to export of banned and severely restricted chemicals, the work of the Organization of American States (OAS) with regard to the preparation of a list of substances banned or significantly restricted in the United States of America.

In December 1983, a Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on Products Harmful to Health and the Environment was transmitted to Governments. A consolidated list attached to it, presents in a unified manner information on important restrictive regulatory decisions (bans, withdrawals, non-approvals, and severe restrictions) taken by 60 Governments on pharmaceuticals, agricultural and industrial chemicals, and consumer products. Although the list does not constitute a full inventory of decisions taken by those Governments, it contains nearly 500 chemicals.

These facts prove quite unequivocally that it is not a novel or unique phenomenon to apply restrictions on the activities of the chemical industry. On the contrary, such restrictions do exist, limiting on a large scale the activities of the chemical industry. It is true, however, that for the time being, they only provide protection against health, occupational and environmental hazards. But if health and environmental hazards caused by chemicals might justify economic sacrifices to remedy them, is it not legitimate to ask whether the hazards posed by certain chemicals to the "health" of the future chemical disarmament régime, and to the "international security environment" would not justify certain sacrifices, if any, to be made.

A comparison of existing practices and negotiating positions reveals that some countries would not, for the sake of disarmament and international security, think of accepting, even in principle, what they widely apply in practice for the sake of protecting health and environment. At the same time, even a superficial glance at the relevant items in the budgets of the same States would show that security, if measured in terms of financial "sacrifices" for military purposes, would not lag far behind the protection of health and environment, to say the least, in certain cases.

Let us assume now that the proposed production restrictions would require certain sacrifices, though in the absence of any significant reported production of the chemicals concerned such an assumption remains a mere speculation. Is it justified to measure the costs of such restrictions exclusively in terms of economic losses for individual countries? Our answer is resolutely negative. The contemplated regulation has to be judged from the point of cost-effectiveness, measured not only in economic but also in security and political terms, and expressed not individually but on a collective level. Possible advantages may stem from a no-limitation production régime, that is true. But would they justify such production if measured against the extra financial and manpower burdens required by the ever increasing verification needs of such a production?

Would those possible advantages justify such a production if measured against the expenditures which unflagging chemical protection efforts might entail? Uncertainties about existing adversary capabilities might easily undermine confidence even under a chemical disarmament régime, and could prevent any decrease in protection efforts, or, what is worse, might generate further increases. Judging from available data, such protective efforts might consume several billion dollars.

Would those possible advantages justify such production if measured against the losses resulting from mutual suspicions caused by ever increasing chemical weapons capabilities of the adversaries?

And finally, would those possible advantages justify such production if measured against its possible political and security costs, costs which are not quantifiable? Those costs might result from a situation where, in the absence of mutual confidence, States embarked upon a hidden arms race in the guise of peaceful chemical activities within the framework of the chemical weapons convention, thus rendering senseless the whole chemical disarmament régime.

No verification measure would provide guarantees against the latter eventuality, since verification can only ascertain whether the justified production and acquisition quota are observed or not. But it cannot prevent the misuse of those readily available capabilities, or at least cannot defuse the chain reaction of mistrust resulting from anxiety about ever increasing adversary potentials to acquire chemical weapons capabilities, and about the ever decreasing lag-time to counter such capabilities.

As stated in a recently tabled Australian Working Paper on the non-diversion of supertoxic lethal chemicals, diversion of chemicals produced in

thousands of tons per year could occur after leaving the plant. Such an eventuality raises further doubts about the advisability of a production régime with no limitation on supertoxic lethal chemicals and possible binary component compounds.

I would like to recall a statement made in 1969 during a series of United States Congressional hearings, in order to give at least a rough idea what the existence of readily available binary production capacities might mean, even if there is a legitimate justification for their existence:

"A move into binaries would mean that the limiting factor in the rate of nerve gas weapon production would cease to be the rate at which chemical agents could be manufactured, it would instead become the rate at which munitions could be fabricated, a much lesser obstacle."

If I may attempt to summarize the possible answers to the two questions that I posed at the outset of this statement, that could be done as follows:

First, the viability and efficacy of the future chemical weapons disarmament régime can only be guaranteed by extending to the maximum possible the distance, or lag-time, that separates chemical weapons capabilities from the eventual use of chemical weapons. The elimination of the links of development, production and stockpiling for military purposes from the chemical weapons chain might prove to be of limited value if alternative chemical weapons potentials of military significance survived in chemical industry, capable of restoring, partly or entirely, the missing links of that chain.

Second, it is imperative, on the one hand, and not at all unprecedented, on the other, to apply certain restrictions on some activities of chemical industry in order to bring about a viable chemical weapons disarmament régime. It is for the skill and inventive faculties of the negotiators here in Geneva to win acceptance of the interests of the future chemical weapons disarmament régime in such a manner as would minimize the possible individual economic losses, while assuring to the maximum the common overall advantages stemming from such a régime.

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On the other hand, such work is impeded by public relations campaigns that impede real solutions to problems surrounding the complex issue of nuclear testing. For the solution of such problems I again recall the President's invitation to the Soviet Union to seek adequate verification arrangements, including his most recent invitation to share our knowledge about the hydro-dynamic yield measurements technique, so that we may move toward ratification of the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosion test ban treaty. And I again recall that the Conference on Disarmament can agree now on the Ad Hoc Committee for agenda item 1, and continue the kind of practical and necessary work begun by the Conference in 1983 that is so sorely needed in this area.

History will ultimately record how successful or unsuccessful we have been in devising means whereby States can strengthen their security and avoid catastrophes such as the First and Second World Wars. We know we have failed in many ways, as regional wars, and terrorism, supported by States in violation of the United Nations Charter have left millions of casualties in their wake. We see the efforts to resolve disputes peacefully dashed on the shoals of violence. But the hope of many of us is that States will come to rely less on their own armaments and military alliances and more on international law and agreements for their security. In seeking to reach arms-control agreements that will strengthen international security, we believe that it is essential to ensure compliance with these agreements by providing effectively for their verification.

In some respects, compliance and verification are two sides of the same coin. And verification is a matter to which we do devote a very large portion of our energies, and without which -- very clearly -- it would be impossible to pursue our work at all. The amount of time the Ad Hoc Committee on the chemical weapons negotiations, or the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, devotes to support of verification issues, indicates how true this is.

But it is because the question of compliance is so inseparable from the task of verification of future agreements, and because compliance fundamentally affects the basis and prospects for all arms control agreements -- by determining policies and attitudes of Governments towards them -- that this issue also must become one to which we pay more critical attention.

My delegation views the issue of compliance as one of basic significance for the future of our work, an issue that requires a continuous examination and deeper reflection by all Governments. For unfortunately, compliance remains more an ideal, than the reality it should be, in our world today.

In my statement of 22 August 1985, I discussed the issue of compliance. In my statement of 11 February of this year I addressed compliance and indicated my intention to return to it again. My previous remarks laid out many points of importance, and continue to be appropriate now.

Let us look at the subject of compliance -- compliance with existing and prospective arms control agreements -- and compliance as a vital part of our work in the Conference on Disarmament.

What do we mean by compliance? The answer to the question may at first glance appear straightforward. There is a simple answer: compliance means that States who agree to carry out certain actions, or to refrain from certain activities, will do so. In other words, compliance means living up to the obligations which a State has agreed to undertake.

But this simple answer does not begin to describe the more complex reality embodied in the principle of compliance. If we could draw up a document in which, for example, the parties verbally agreed to undertake not to possess chemical weapons, and the parties were confident that all other parties would comply with this undertaking, the Conference on Disarmament could rapidly complete its work. Of course the reality is different, we must

carefully consider the scope of an agreement, and define terms where necessary. We must then develop measures and procedures by which the adherence of States parties to the agreement can be verified, and provide mechanisms to resolve questions that may arise during the term of the agreement. In some cases, verification of compliance with an agreement is determined solely by the national capabilities of its parties. In other cases, such as the draft convention prohibiting chemical weapons, verification procedures need to be detailed and far-reaching, and they will require a considerable degree of co-operation by the States parties. The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency is an example of a successful mechanism built on a high degree of international co-operation that serves to ensure compliance with obligations of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In every arms-control agreement, several factors are involved in a consideration of compliance. The first is the scope of the agreement. The second is to determine the confidence that can be established at a given level of verification by national monitoring or by international procedures.

Although the United States has sometimes been accused of using verification as an obstruction, we believe it is an absolute essential. Of course we recognize that the particular verification requirements of arms-control agreements will vary. We are and will continue to be active in proposing concrete, specific measures suitable to particular agreements. Measures suitable for verifying compliance with agreements on intercontinental ballistic missiles must be very different from those in a chemical weapons convention.

My Government believes that the presence of effective verification provisions in international disarmament agreements will provide a means of detecting violations and thereby providing timely warning of threats to the treaty régime. They will also serve the role of deterring violations by increasing the risk of detection. Verification provisions build confidence in the viability of an arms-control agreement by providing evidence that the parties to it are in fact living up to their obligations.

The United States is not the sole or original proponent that the idea of verification is an essential element of arms control. Canada, for example, has been a leader in this area, and deserves much credit for the important resolution on verification passed at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Canada has also performed an invaluable service for our Conference by preparing and distributing a three-volume compendium of statements made in the Conference on the subject of verification. Even a cursory review of the volumes allows one to appreciate how clearly the significance of verification was recognized and how competent and useful many of the discussions have been.

A third factor, Mr. President, is the basic reality that both technological conditions and the importance of issues change over time. The arms control world of 1986 is obviously not that of 1966. Change is an established element in our work, and agreements must be flexible enough to accommodate it.

Let me turn now to the fourth factor in considering the issue of compliance. It can be described in the following way: there is now a sufficient number of arms-control agreements in force, and sufficient

experience with the attitudes and behaviour of States with respect to those agreements, that the record of compliance and non-compliance of States with those agreements can be assessed and taken into account by other States with those agreements. The effectiveness of verification provisions and compliance procedures established by those agreements can also be evaluated.

This experience factor is a valuable asset in the negotiation of treaties. If we know that negotiating parties have, in the past, failed to comply with other treaties to which they are a party, we must ensure that the verification provisions we draft are stringent enough to discourage such non-compliance.

Clearly these four factors show that compliance is not a simple matter. The requirements of compliance stem from the complexities of our world, with its system of States and values, and the interests of those States which are, unfortunately, often antagonistic. Coupled with what we know of the actions of others, we are led to the conclusion that the established degree of trust among nations is often very low.

This lack of trust is reinforced by our experience with instances of non-compliance. Such non-compliance is a serious matter. It negates security benefits that might otherwise be derived from arms control, creates new security risks, and decreases stability. It undermines the confidence necessary to an effective arms control process in the future. Despite our efforts to date to seek a solution to the problem, non-compliance continues, in particular the non-compliance of the Soviet Union with its obligations under both multilateral agreements such as the biological and toxin weapons Convention, and bilateral agreements such as the ABM Treaty.

During our 1985 session, I addressed the question of Soviet non-compliance and my delegation introduced as a Conference Document a report from the President of the United States to the United States Congress, prepared at its request, detailing a number of areas of concern with regard to the Soviet Union's non-compliance with existing obligations. My delegation also provided to a number of members of the Conference additional detailed information on the Soviet pattern of non-compliance.

During this part of the 1986 session, my delegation has made available the most recent report by President Reagan to the United States Congress concerning non-compliance by the Soviet Union with existing agreements, as well as a related report released by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Additional copies of these documents are available from my delegation. The record of non-compliance presented in these reports has prompted consideration by my Government of a number of possibilities for taking proportionate responses consistent with our security interests.

Our experience with the non-compliance record of the Soviet Union is central to our understanding of the problems and possibilities of future arms-control agreements. One of the conclusions to be drawn from this experience is that closed societies make arms control more difficult. But we believe that all States that accept both the letter and spirit of verification provisions designed to compensate for this secretiveness will discover that the amount of sovereignty lost to such provisions is extremely small when

compared to the gains achieved from the conclusion and application of the agreements themselves.

It is encouraging in this regard that the Soviet Union, which in many instances has been resistant to the idea of verification by on-site inspection, now has, in general terms, suggested that such a verification procedure would be acceptable. We continue to look forward to elaboration of this promising indication.

Our insistence on the ability to ensure compliance influences our proposals for verification, which in turn are influenced by our experience with the international response, or lack of response, to non-compliance: if the international community establishes such high standards of proof before even beginning to act on a serious report of non-compliance, then it should insist that in new agreements there must be some kind of verification arrangements that will ensure that those standards are met.

All these issues have led us to seek to increase the awareness of States of the importance of the question of compliance with arms-control agreements and of the need to take effective action to rectify an unacceptable situation.

In this regard, we are pleased that at the United Nations General Assembly last fall, 131 States joined in approving resolution 40/94 L, introduced by my Government and eight other States, which strongly endorses the view that compliance is a question that matters, and matters very importantly, to the international system which we seek to strengthen. The specific provisions of this resolution were reviewed in detail in my plenary statement of 11 February.

The large vote for resolution 40/94 L demonstrates that the importance of compliance is being acknowledged by Member States. This is a healthy development. It is one the United States has sought, and one that my delegation welcomes and continues to encourage.

On the other hand, it is clear from the continuing instances of non-compliance with arms-control agreements that the acknowledgement of the importance of compliance, and the acknowledgement that strict verification measures are necessary to ensure compliance with future agreements, are not enough.

In this conference it is true that we deal with words and with language. They are the essence of our business, and provide the common medium for reaching agreement. But in negotiating an agreement we must take account of the realities that words and language represent. It is the consonance of a State's actions with the obligations recorded in an agreement that is required if agreements are to be worth more than the paper they are printed on.

How then should our Conference proceed? Certainly, the Conference must take seriously the facts of the existing situation regarding non-compliance with existing agreements -- facts made abundantly clear in documents available to us all. The Conference must take into account these regrettable events as it negotiates new agreements. Experience shows that future agreements require appropriate verification and compliance mechanisms to ensure their success. And by success we mean unequivocal compliance. In the area of chemical

weapons, for example, our experience with non-compliance with the biological and toxin weapons Convention has influenced our approach when developing proposals to ensure compliance with a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

It is also important, however, that members of the Conference, entrusted as we are by the international community with special responsibilities in the field of arms control, lend active support to rectifying situations in which non-compliance with existing agreements continues. As I made clear last August, those States that strongly urge the nuclear-weapon States to seek to reduce the probability of a nuclear catastrophe which could engulf them as well, must not then ignore their responsibility to seek full compliance with all arms limitation agreements, including those between the nuclear-weapon States. States that bury their heads in the sand when legitimate concerns are voiced by a State party to an agreement cannot then urge that same State to embark blindly on new agreements if it lacks confidence that they will be honoured.

We should all speak up when presented with the facts concerning non-compliance with an agreement. We should voice our own concerns, and more importantly, we should insist on a higher standard of behaviour.

In conclusion, I suggest that non-compliance with an arms-control agreement is an urgent issue that concerns not only parties to the agreement. Non-compliance is of universal concern. Non-compliance can threaten the future of our work, and the work in other arms-control forums. Non-compliance is an issue that will not go away until States resolve that they will comply with their obligations, until States insist that other States do likewise, and until new agreements provide for verification measures that will reliably ensure compliance. Non-compliance is an issue that we can and we must address in all its aspects. And compliance can make the difference between our failure and our success.

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Article VI, at present entitled "permitted activities", of the draft convention text in CD/636 provides that each State party has the right, in accordance with the provisions of the convention, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for permitted purposes. This is a fundamental and essential right. A State party must be able to carry out activities, involving toxic chemicals and their precursors in the industrial and agricultural fields, among others, for purposes not prohibited by the convention. What is also important, however, is that these chemical substances are not diverted from these legitimate activities for purposes which are prohibited by the convention. The Chemical Weapons Committee has given much attention in recent years to the development of appropriate régimes to ensure that such diversion does not occur. A number of delegations, including our own, have presented working papers which have indicated the complexity of the issue. Those papers, including a significant contribution by the Netherlands delegation in Working Paper CD/CW/WP. 133, tabled last Monday, have sought to find the most appropriate ways to ensure that diversion does not occur.

Working Group "A" of the Committee is currently engaged in continuing the valuable work undertaken last October and January, and through consideration of an interrelated approach encompassing definitions, criteria, and lists of chemicals, is endeavouring to develop régimes for designated chemicals.

Some progress has been achieved this session in listing chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical-weapons purposes, and in developing the elements of a régime for these chemicals.

A key element in an effective régime will, in our view, be the system of monitoring which is established for listed chemicals. It is axiomatic that the monitoring system we are developing must be effective. There must be no loopholes permitting unauthorized diversion. This is not to say, however, that we will need to account for the production and use of every kilogram of a designated chemical. The system must be cost-effective and designed to require the minimum allocation of resources consistent with its aims. It should not interfere with the normal functioning of the chemical industry. The data required from industry should be relevant and sufficient, and confidentiality should be maintained by appropriate procedures.

Thus the monitoring system must be effective, cost-effective, and it must preserve commercial confidentiality.

The monitoring system which is set up and becomes effective at the time of entry into force of the convention may fulfill these criteria adequately. However, circumstances in the chemical industry may change. The system may, therefore, require periodic review. Such a review might possibly reveal ways to simplify or tighten up the system.

On several occasions in the past the Australian delegation has noted that the monitoring of non-diversion will require a comprehensive system of data reporting. We envisage that information relating to relevant chemicals will flow through the appropriate national organs to the Consultative Committee. We have suggested that a process of materials accountancy should apply throughout the lifetime of designated chemicals.

The most cost-effective way to collect such data is, in the Australian view, to utilize data reporting systems which are already in place on a national basis. Enquiries that we have carried out in Australia lead us to believe that most, if not all, the information that will be needed is already available to governments. A national authority set up to collect, maintain and collate this information might need to supplement and/or check this data to fulfill the requirements of the convention. This will be for the State party to determine.

A second way to achieve a cost-effective régime would be to keep the lists of designated chemicals as short as is consistent with the purpose of listing them. This criterion will, however, necessarily involve us in considerable investigation, particularly in relation to precursors and key precursors. More attention needs to be given to the way these compounds are routinely used in industry. An understanding of the place of such chemicals in the flow-through of the manufacturing process might help to identify points where quantitative data reporting might be particularly meaningful.

The preservation of commercial confidentiality is likely to involve a number of factors. The most important (and obvious) will be the personal integrity of the technical inspectorate. Other factors will involve procedures to protect data held on computers, the coding of samples which may be taken as part of an inspection and the application of need-to-know rules whereby information is released in an agreed way.

We have noted that the number of chemicals that are listed for monitoring should be kept to a minimum which is consistent with the security of the convention. Another way to avoid the collection of irrelevant data would be to apply a quantity threshold below which reporting of a chemical is not required. Thus a facility or plant which produces less than a given threshold in a 12-month period would not be required to report it.

The threshold value for chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical-weapons purposes might be higher than say, for some precursor chemicals. A figure of one tonne seems appropriate to separate research quantities from production quantities. This figure might, however, be much higher for chemicals produced in large quantities where national production may be in the order of thousands of tonnes.

It is our view that the system of data reporting should be qualitatively similar for all listed chemicals. Different thresholds might be set, and more detailed production figures required for chemicals such as the methylphosphonates compared with phosgene. However, the format of reporting should be the same.

There is a minimum amount of information which would be required annually under the suggested approach of "materials accountancy". This might encompass:

Total production, consumption, end uses, import and export of listed chemicals; location of production; percentage used on-site at production facility; percentage sold to another factory; purposes of consumption and type of end-product or products.

The régime for data reporting that we suggest would cover all situations for the transfer of chemicals except that between a State party and a State non-party. It is possible that the sale of a designated chemical to a State non-party to the convention could be considered to assist such a non-party to acquire a chemical warfare capability.

This possibility could be covered by a requirement for an end-use certificate. Such a document would have no legal standing under the convention but might be considered to give the State party some confidence that it was not inadvertently assisting a State to acquire chemical weapons. Similarly, re-transfer would need to be documented.

It will be necessary to verify the accuracy of the data reported to the technical secretariat so as to assure the Consultative Committee that all States parties are in compliance with the convention. An adequate system of data reporting should enable the technical secretariat to identify trading patterns. Any changes in such patterns or ambiguities in reported data could

be settled by fact-finding consultations between the national authority and the technical secretariat, or by on-site inspections as appropriate.

The only restriction that will be placed on the civilian chemical industry of a State party by the convention will be the prohibition to produce, consume, export or import designated chemicals for purposes which are prohibited by the convention. The burden imposed by a system of data reporting supported by fact-finding consultations and, where appropriate, on-site inspections would be, in our view, minimal. It would endure that relevant chemicals were not being diverted for prohibited purposes.

The régime to be established for verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the civil chemical industry is a vitally important aspect of the convention we are negotiating. We therefore welcome the initiative which the Netherlands Government has taken in organizing a Workshop on verification of non-production to be held in early June. We consider that the programme for the Workshop, as outlined by Ambassador Van Shaik to the plenary on 13 March, will provide us with a greater insight into the technical and organizational problems of verifying non-production and will be a valuable contribution to consideration of this subject in the negotiations during the summer session.

Another area of the convention which is of vital importance are the provisions to be elaborated for consultation, co-operation and fact-finding -- Article IX in the draft contained in CD/636.

We are pleased that Working Group "C" has embarked on consideration of Article IX using, as a basis the very thoughtful paper prepared by the delegation of Pakistan (CD/634).

One aspect of this article which has yet to be given thorough consideration, however, is the régime to be established for challenge inspection.

In this regard, Australia has supported Article X of the United States draft chemical-weapons convention as indicating the standard of verification required of the convention in relation to situations where, in exceptional circumstances, serious doubts exist or arise about a State party's compliance with its obligations under the convention.

Article X has been the focus of criticism by a number of delegations who have argued that it made a distinction in the verification régime from one country to another, depending on the degree of State ownership of the chemical industry.

Australia's view was -- and remains -- that the verification provisions of the future convention should apply with equal effectiveness to all countries, whatever their economic, social and political systems, and that comparable facilities, irrespective of ownership, should be subject to comparable controls.

In this respect, Australia took careful note of earlier United States statements that no such imbalance was intended and that the United States was also ready to work with others to ensure its verification proposals applied fairly to differing economic and political systems. We welcome the action

which the United States has now unilaterally taken to amend its draft to take account of the perceived imbalance in Article X. But I want to emphasize that we will only be able to give in-depth consideration to the appropriate challenge inspection system to be incorporated in the convention if delegations which have alternative approaches to that embodied in the United States draft put forward their own detailed proposals. They should do so now.

It is only through discussion of specific texts that our consideration and efforts in relation to challenge verification can be focussed sharply.

This consideration will be facilitated in Working Group "C" by the additional proposals put forward recently by Pakistan and, jointly, by the German Democratic Republic and Poland.

We should now make a concerted effort -- as others have suggested -- to reach agreement on Article IX, incorporating provisions on challenge verification which will provide a high standard of confidence of compliance with the convention.

CD/PV.357 p.27 Bulgaria/Tellalov 17.4.86 NFZ

The Warsaw Treaty Member States hold the view that the nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements must be in conformity with the generally recognized norms of international law and provide for strict observance of their genuine and verifiable non-nuclear status. The nuclear-weapon States should assume obligations to strictly respect the status of such zones and to refrain from use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the zonal States.

CD/PV.357 p.33 GDR/Rose 17.4.86 CTB

The socialist countries attach exceptionally great importance to envisaging reliable verification measures with respect to the carrying out of the agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests. They are in favour of the strictest control up to on-site inspections. References to the problem of verification cannot justify the evasion of negotiations. At all talks, the issues of the verification of the implementation of the future agreements could be considered simultaneously with the consideration of the other substantive issues of the prohibition of nuclear explosions.

CD/PV.358 pp.10,12 India/Narayanan 22.4.86 CTB,
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Measures for the avoidance of nuclear war will have to be accompanied by a concrete programme for nuclear disarmament. In this regard a comprehensive test-ban treaty claims the highest priority. We are unable to accept the view that a test ban can be considered only after deep and substantial reductions in nuclear forces have been made. Both aspects can and must be tackled simultaneously since as long as nuclear testing facilitates the sophistication of arsenals the result can only be competitive escalation rather than reversal of the process of arms race. The Six Nations Initiative has for these reasons

concentrated its most recent efforts on the prohibition of testing, and appealed for a moratorium on nuclear testing as an interim measure. We are constantly told that verification constitutes an obstacle in the way of concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We have not been convinced by the validity of this argument particularly as on-site inspections have been offered to supplement national technical means to verify compliance to a test ban. Besides, the Six Nations themselves have offered their considerable technical expertise for monitoring such nuclear tests. In addition, the Soviet Union had declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. In this context the Six Nations including India have expressed their regret at the recent nuclear test conducted by the United States. The Foreign Ministers of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-aligned Countries at their Delhi conference called upon the United States of America to stop nuclear weapon tests and requested the USSR to continue to refrain from these tests in accordance with the initial moratorium declared in August 1985 until an agreement was reached on test ban or at least until the next meeting at the summit between the two Powers takes place. In any case we believe that the issue of test-ban treaty should be addressed in an ad hoc committee of this Conference which should be constituted with an appropriate negotiating mandate without further delay. Refusal to establish such a subsidiary body would be a negative development showing the absence of political will.

There is the question of verification of compliance with agreements banning weapons in outer space. For this purpose there must be a readiness to accept full transparency in the development of national space programmes so that clandestine weapons development can be prevented. This would mean that agreement must be sought to ensure that technologies and systems that are developed will not evade international control and surveillance. We have at the same time to ensure that existing arms control agreements relating to outer space are strictly observed. The crucial instrument in this context is the ABM Treaty. Compliance with this Treaty may appear to be the exclusive concern of the two Governments which are parties to it. It is, however, obvious that the violations of the restraint imposed by this Treaty are of a direct concern to all Government and nations. Similarly existing restraints and ceilings on offensive nuclear weapons should be strictly observed to rule out the possibility of a runaway offensive arms race being triggered off by the development of space weapons. This complex of issues is of direct concern to the Conference on Disarmament. The negotiation of agreements calculated to prevent an arms race in outer space is a central responsibility of this Conference as has been repeatedly established by the United Nations General Assembly. We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the position that any substantive work on outer space by this Conference would necessarily prejudice bilateral negotiations on the subject. It is the responsibility of this Conference to commence substantive negotiations to avert an arms race in outer space before it is too late to take such preventive action.

First, the Conference on Disarmament should commence early negotiations on a comprehensive international convention to prohibit a conventional or nuclear-arms race in outer space and promote multilateral co-operation in the

peaceful uses of this zone. To facilitate this aim, an international space agency should be established with a mandate to promote peaceful uses of space as well as to provide the international community with a capability to verify disarmament agreements independently of the two super-Powers in a manner that would overcome the credibility gap that characterizes the existing national technical means of verification. Such a multilateral mechanism would also overcome the existing inability of most countries to protect their interests in outer space and would guard against violations of international treaties to the satisfaction of the world community. In this context, we recognize the relevance of the proposals submitted by France for the creation of an international space agency.

Second, immediate efforts should be undertaken to contain ASAT weaponry initially through such interim measures as a moratorium on their development, testing and deployment, as well as a commitment by the space-Powers on the non-first use of these weapons. These interim measures could also be strengthened by proposals such as the recent Soviet suggestion to establish the immunity of space objects. These incremental measures should be consciously geared towards the elaboration of a comprehensive treaty prohibiting anti-satellite weapons.

Third, to prevent the erosion of the international legal régime in outer space the Conference should, as a first step, call upon the United States and the USSR to confirm their commitments to abide by the ABM Treaty, in particular article 5 under which they have undertaken not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components of such systems that are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based. In the same context the Conference should undertake efforts towards evolving an objective and impartial interpretation of the ambiguous aspects of the ABM Treaty, in particular of such activities as "research" and the use of "other physical principles". Such an exercise could contribute towards identifying a common interpretation of these concepts.

Fourth, as an interim measure and until the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space, the Conference should adopt an international instrument to supplement the ABM Treaty with a view to ensuring that the self-restraint accepted by the two super-Powers in the ABM Treaty, for preventing the further escalation of the arms race in the interests of the entire international community, is not negated by acts of omission or commission by either or both super-Powers. Such an instrument should be composed of the following five principles: it should (a) recognize and reconfirm the importance of the United States-USSR ABM Treaty in preventing the escalation of an arms race, especially in outer space; (b) note the commitment of the two Powers to continue to abide strictly by the provisions of this Treaty; (c) provide a clear interpretation of the research activities permissible under the ABM Treaty not only for the two parties but also for other technologically advanced States; (d) include a commitment by other technologically advanced States not to take their own research beyond the limits accepted by the United States and the USSR; and (e) include a mechanism to provide for the redress of such activities that are contrary to the limitations contained in the ABM Treaty.

My delegation has always attached great importance to all the nuclear issues on the agenda of the Conference. Agenda item 1, "Nuclear Test Ban", is a matter of highest priority. My delegation sincerely believes that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests by all States would constitute a significant step towards ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons, and preventing the proliferation of those weapons. This question of the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests has been explored and examined by the international community for more than a quarter of a century now. The United Nations General Assembly has thus far adopted nearly 50 resolutions on this subject. Yet this goal of the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests still eludes us. The reasons for the undue delay in achieving a complete ban on all nuclear-weapon tests are not technical. As early as 1972, the Secretary-General of the United Nations declared that all the technical and scientific aspects of this question have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve the final agreement. Moreover, many experts espouse the view that the existing means of seismic and other forms of verification today, supplemented by on-site inspections, offer reasonably effective verification possibilities to monitor a comprehensive nuclear test ban. There should not be any further delay for the conclusion of an agreement on the complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests.

Fourthly, the Soviet Union, proceeding from its readiness to ensure the timely cessation of the production of chemical weapons, proposes the following: (a) Immediately after the convention enters into force each State party will cease all activities at chemical-weapon production facilities except those required for their closure. The official declaration to this effect shall be made not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force; (b) During the three months following the entry into force of the convention each State party will take national measures to ensure the non-operation (i.e. the closure) of the facilities, taking into account whether they are located separately from or together with other production facilities (prohibition of occupation of buildings, disconnection and dismantling of all communication services of the facility, and also of protective constructions for personnel safety, etc.).

Fifthly, in connection with the readiness of the USSR to start developing procedures for destroying the relevant industrial base, expressed in the statement of M.S. Gorbachev of 15 January, the Soviet Union proposes the following guidelines: (a) procedures for the destruction and dismantling of the relevant facilities should be developed, taking due account of the nature and special features of those facilities, (b) destruction of chemical-weapon production facilities should be understood as the physical destruction of all the technological equipment of the final stage of the synthesis of super-toxic lethal chemicals and of the specialized equipment for the filling of chemical munitions. In the dismantling of such facilities, the removal (disassembling) of the basic units of technological equipment of the final stage of the synthesis of super-toxic lethal chemicals, and their mandatory subsequent destruction, would take place. The equipment (units, installations) not

subject to unconditional destruction can be used for other chemical production with strict guarantees of its non-use for the purposes prohibited by the convention.

Sixthly, the Soviet Union proposes that the cessation of the operation of every chemical weapon production facility, including those of private enterprises and transnational corporations, should be ensured by means of strict verification, including systematic on-site inspections, such as the verification of the accuracy of declarations, the sealing by inspectors of the facility to be closed, the periodic checking of the preservation of seals up to the moment when the seals are removed and the destruction or the dismantling of the facility is initiated. In the process of joint examinations of facilities by the representatives of the national verification organization and the international inspectorate reports would be prepared to be transmitted to the Consultative Committee.

For the purpose of the effective verification of the destruction and the dismantling of chemical-weapon production facilities the Soviet Union proposes that provision should be made for the conducting of systematic international on-site inspections and that a procedure should be worked out for visits to a facility by international inspectors whereby inspectors would be present at all important operations for the destruction or dismantling of a chemical-weapon production facility. Final international verification would be carried out upon the full termination of the process of the elimination or dismantling of the entire facility.

The conversion of facilities for the purposes of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons, as well as their elimination upon the completion of their utilization for the destruction of stocks, should also be carried out under the supervision of the international verification personnel.

Seventh, the convention should envisage measures to ensure its strict observance and implementation by each State party, irrespective of whether State-owned or private enterprises or transnational corporations are involved, and above all the prevention of the use of the commercial chemical industry for the development and production of chemical weapons.

CD/PV.358

p.30

Poland/Rychlak

22.4.86

CTB

For years the main argument against a nuclear-test ban has been the alleged insufficiency of the existing means of verification to effectively safeguard compliance of such a ban. Nowadays the opponents of a test ban speak less of the supposed insufficiency of the potential verification system, but openly say that the test ban is simply contradictory to their plans to develop new nuclear weapons designs, including designs of nuclear devices necessary for the realization of the Strategic Defence Initiative. In short, we have come back to square one, that is, there is no intention to undertake negotiations on a nuclear-test ban because it would spoil the American plans for further modernization of its strategic arsenal and its hopes for the attainment of nuclear superiority. It is clear to us now that there has never been a problem of verification as a real obstacle in arriving at the international agreement on a nuclear-test ban. The only problem with this noble

goal is simply that some States do not want it as it contravenes their militaristic designs.

CD/PV.359

pp.7-9

Bulgaria/Tellalov

24.4.86

CW

At the last plenary meeting, on 22 April, the USSR introduced new, concrete proposals which are an organic development of the ideas expressed by the Soviet leader in January. Thus, the Soviet Union has made yet another very important step in the direction of accelerating the elaboration of a chemical-weapon convention. The essence of these proposals testifies to the resolve of the Soviet Union to contribute to overcoming existing differences of view on the elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production. The procedures for ensuring the non-operation of chemical-weapon production facilities and the activities for the removal of the basic units of technological equipment have been addressed thoroughly. The same goes for the specific co-operation between the national authority and the international inspectorate. The activities for the destruction and dismantling of the relevant production base are intended to comprise all facilities regardless of their ownership at the time of entry into force of the convention.

The new Soviet proposals create a solid basis for the elaboration of an effective and realistic procedure for verification, and take into account the interests of the other participants in the negotiations. My delegation welcomes the constructive approach of the Soviet Union on all these key issues of the draft convention.

In the same vein of positive assessment we would like to commend the elaboration of the so-called Integrated Approach, contained in document CD/651, which represents the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for its extended session in January, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski. My delegation is happy to have been associated with the elaboration of the Integrated Approach. Undoubtedly, this Approach to listing relevant chemicals has certain deficiencies, in particular from the point of view of the structure of List A and List B. None the less, it must be emphasized that for the first time it was possible to incorporate in a jointly prepared paper practically all chemicals that could be considered -- in conformity with specific criteria -- to fall under régimes which would regulate the permitted activities with these chemicals. My delegation would like to commend this document as an example of serious and constructive co-operation of all delegations with a view to advancing the negotiations on some of the most complex matters of the convention. The Integrated Approach is a solution in transition: its full potential could be developed and used only at the stage of completing the analytical work on listing the relevant chemicals in the right-hand column of List "A" (key precursors), List "B" (key components of binary and multicomponent chemical weapons systems or especially dangerous key precursors), and List "C" (chemicals that are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes).

For this work to succeed, all delegations, in our opinion, should strictly abide by the understanding that guided the elaboration of the Integrated Approach in January, i.e. the lists of relevant chemicals should be considered in interrelationship with the criteria and the definitions for the

respective category of chemicals. From this point of view my delegation would like to recommend the completion of the process of perfecting the criteria for defining key precursors and on this basis to list these chemicals in the right-hand column of List "A", so that the elements of a régime in this area could be more usefully considered. The same goes for the need to co-ordinate the criteria for defining key components of binary and multicomponent chemical weapons systems. My delegation is convinced that only carefully elaborated and precise understandings in the context of all definitional problems related to the Integrated Approach could ensure a smooth functioning of a reliable system for controlling the chemicals and related data, with a view to excluding possibilities for diverting chemicals for chemical-weapons purposes.

Judging, inter alia, by the useful work in regard to assigning chemicals to List "C" and elements of a respective régime done in Working Group "A", my delegation has no doubts about the "vitality" of the Integrated Approach.

Another important aspect of the Integrated Approach is that the more it is being developed, the more it increases the level of specificity and purposefulness of the negotiations, including those on matters related to verification and compliance.

Many of the provisions of a régime in regard to supertoxic lethal chemicals have been agreed last year. On the other hand, important issues remain to be resolved. In this connection we bear witness to the fact that both at the national and the international level measures are being taken to restrict the production and use of the various chemical components, even of whole groups of products, which inflict irreparable damage to the environment and, in some cases, to man. According to Western estimates in the third world alone 10,000 people die annually through effects of pesticides and herbicides. Therefore, restrictions are being imposed which, in certain countries, amount to something like a total prohibition. A most general example in this regard is the restrictions placed upon the utilization of phosphate detergents, some medicines, etc. They are considerably less toxic than the supertoxic lethal chemicals, which lie at the basis of chemical arsenals.

In the course of our negotiations only single cases of supertoxic lethal chemicals with useful peaceful application have been cited. Such chemicals are, however, produced in very restricted quantities, and are available for practical utilization in a strongly diluted form. This peculiarity is one of the main considerations why the Warsaw Treaty Member States consider that the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals should be concentrated at a single small-scale production facility. Such an approach can hardly be prejudicial to the real commercial and scientific interests of any country whatsoever. Chemistry, like any other science, is in permanent motion, development and expansion. As a result of chance or systematic synthesis, new supertoxic lethal substances may appear. They have to be announced and placed under control promptly, following their identification with this category of chemicals, and this can be safely and effectively done at a single small-scale production facility.

Another point relevant to the solidity of a régime on supertoxic lethal chemicals is the need to adhere strictly to the long-standing agreements on the toxicity levels which delimit the group of supertoxic lethal chemicals from the group of other lethal chemicals.

For practical purposes, deriving from purely commercial interests, some Western delegations tend to overlook toxicity levels as a definitional criterion. In the opinion of my delegation such an approach, even if it succeeds in satisfying some restricted interests, is likely to create grave problems with important security implications.

A number of delegations have addressed the chemical-weapon negotiations from the point of view of their country's commercial interests. My delegation shares this concern and is endeavouring to assist in the search for ideas which may open up the way for a common solution.

At this stage of the negotiations we are confronted, however, with a much more substantial problem: the implementation of the so-called binary programme of the United States which threatens to severely jeopardize the chemical-weapon negotiations.

The purpose of that programme is, by varying the components of binary mixes, to achieve greater toxicity and basically new mechanisms of action of end chemical-weapon agents with the aim of overcoming the system of detection and of troop and civilian treatment and protection.

In our submission the relative simplicity of the manufacture of binary components could lead to a world-wide proliferation of chemical weapons with unpredictable consequences for mankind. And last but not least, the binary programme is fraught with the danger of creating conditions for circumventing the verification of the provisions of a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The danger of the binary programme lies also in the unleashing of a new round of the development of offensive types of weapons of mass destruction on a qualitatively new, higher level.

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pp.15-17

Italy/Francheschi

24.4.86

CTB

We, and one non-member State, Norway, have further exemplified our position on this item in a detailed way by both presenting a suggested programme of work for an ad hoc committee under item 1 -- this is given in document CD/621 -- and through the tabling by individual members of the Western group of papers on the issues involved in the substantive examination. It is rather a lengthy list but I think it might be useful to enumerate them in this context. These papers are the following:

Document CD/383, of 17 June 1983, by the United Kingdom, entitled "Working paper: peaceful nuclear explosions in relation to a nuclear test ban";

Document CD/384, of June 1983, by Australia, entitled "Institutional arrangements for a CTB verification system: an illustrative list of questions";

Document CD/388, of 8 July 1983, by Japan, entitled "Verification and compliance of a nuclear test ban";

Document CD/389, of 8 July 1983, by Japan, entitled "Views on a system of international exchange of seismic data";

Document CD/390, of 8 July 1983, by Japan, entitled "Working paper on a contribution to an international monitoring system using a newly installed small seismic array of Japan";

Document CD/395, of 19 July 1983, by Norway, entitled "Working paper: the role of international seismic data exchange under a comprehensive nuclear test ban";

Document CD/400, of 22 July 1983, by Australia, entitled "International management panel";

Document CD/402, of 1 August 1983, by the United Kingdom, entitled "Verification aspects of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty";

Document CD/405, of 4 August 1983, by Australia, entitled "Proposal for the scope of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty";

Document CD/491, of 28 March 1984, by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Working paper: Aspects of modern developments in seismic event recording techniques";

Document CD/507, of 15 June 1984, by Norway, entitled "Seismic Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban: future directions";

Document CD/524, of 25 July 1984, by Japan, entitled "Working paper: Step by step approach to a Comprehensive Test Ban";

Document CD/531, of 6 August 1984, by Australia, entitled "Working paper: Principles for the verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty";

Document CD/599, of 20 June 1985, by Norway, entitled "Working paper: Seismological verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban - Report on the Workshop in Oslo, Norway, 4-7 June 1985";

Document CD/610, of 9 July 1985, by the United Kingdom, entitled "Seismic monitoring for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban";

Document CD/612, of 10 July 1985, by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Working paper: a proposal for the establishment and progressive improvement of an international seismic monitoring and verification system relating to a comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban";

Document CD/624, of 26 July 1985, by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "A system designed for the gradual improvement of seismic monitoring and verification capabilities for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban";

Document CD/626, of 1 August 1985, by Japan, entitled "Concrete measures for the realization of the International Seismic Data Exchange System".

In addition, other Western nations have distributed brochures and other substantive materials that contribute to our better understanding of the central issues of scope, verification and compliance. Just this session, for

example, Canada has made available to all members -- and at its own expense, not by taxing the resources of the secretariat -- a three-volume Compendium of CD statements on verification from 1962 through 1984, and an informed brochure on seismic verification.

As is evident, this is an extensive list of papers tabled by members of the Western Group. It is a source of deep concern to us that failure to establish an ad hoc committee on item 1 has meant, inter alia, that these papers have not been given serious consideration by the Conference.

We also note that with one notable exception, similar substantive papers have not been tabled by members of other Groups in the Conference even though they often state that item 1 of the agenda is of deep importance to them.

CD/PV.359

pp.20-22

FRG/Wegener

24.4.86

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In order to facilitate future measures of nuclear disarmament, many of the technical prerequisites for such future measures could be created in advance. A good case in point appears to my delegation the accelerated creation of a seismic monitoring and verification network to be improved steadily in a dynamic process, and designed to be available at such time as a comprehensive nuclear test ban would finally enter into effect. Other activities of the Conference could even be more closely associated with specific ongoing bilateral negotiations. Many delegations have repeated their calls for an appropriate and continuous information about ongoing nuclear disarmament negotiations, without prejudice to the progress of these negotiations and relevant arrangements for confidentiality. A process of mutual communication, where States, via multilateral channels, can bring their concerns and recommendations to bear on a continuing basis, could facilitate the successful outcome of these negotiations and encourage the negotiators to proceed purposefully. Such intense preoccupation with the bilateral negotiations could exert a mobilizing influence on the negotiators and instill in their work a desirable measure of urgency.

May I however note in this connection that replies on the part of the Soviet delegation to a number of questions I have put in the context of our negotiations on chemical weapons, in a statement of 27 March, have not yet been forthcoming. My delegation had nourished the hope that at least a partial reply might be contained in the proposals the Soviet delegation put before us on 22 April. These proposals for the implementation and verification of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks and production facilities flesh out the positions which General Secretary Gorbachev had already announced on 15 January. The proposals mark, to a considerable extent, the agreement of the Soviet Union with positions which the Conference on Disarmament had already worked out for the solution of the issues inherent in the destruction phase. They thus constitute a positive Soviet contribution to the solution of two important aspects of the difficult task of verifying a chemical weapons ban. My delegation is engaged in a careful examination of the Soviet proposals and the useful clarifications and technical details they contain. On first sight, however, it appears that the proposals do not solve all

relevant verification issues. In the field of destruction of stocks and facilities, there seem to be a number of restrictive elements. Beyond that, the proposals do not address the two vital areas in which negotiators are presently engaged, the issue of surveillance of chemical production to ensure future non-production of chemical weapons, and verification in on-challenge cases. These, however, were the very areas to which the questions of my delegation to the Soviet delegation related.

My Government expects that the Soviet Union -- by broadening the scope and contents of its past positions -- will soon also make a contribution to the solution of these crucial issues, thus paving the way for a breakthrough regarding the central problems of a chemical-weapon treaty. We feel encouraged in this anticipation by the partial proposals that are now before us.

CD/PV.359

pp.26-27

Australia/Butler

24.4.86

CTB

A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is not a subject on which there is widespread or abundant patience. Many delegations say they want a treaty now or that it should be able to be created in a very short time. Others point out that a good deal of work needs to be done on, for example, methods of verification. Australia has no precise answer to the questions -- how long will this work take or when might we expect to see a treaty. What we do say is this: the longer we delay starting the work the longer it will take to see the result. We want this Conference to resume its work on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as soon as possible.

We do not want to be in the situation where when it is decided to bring a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty into existence, we are unable to take that step because we have not done the necessary work and we have not put in place the necessary means of verification. The delay which would then ensue would be an ironic and intolerable one.

This is why, for example, the Foreign Minister of Australia, Mr. Bill Hayden, proposed in this Conference in August 1984 that the Conference should proceed to bring about the establishment of a global seismological monitoring network. This is why we are up-grading our own national seismological monitoring network so that we can play a full part in a global network. This is why we continue to firmly support the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and have welcomed assurances from certain member states, including an assurance given by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union in his recent statement to this Conference, that the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts would continue to enjoy the support of the Conference.

CD/PV.359

pp.37-38

Yugoslavia/Vidas

24.4.86

CW

Regarding verification measures, the Yugoslav delegation has always held the view that it is necessary to implement such measures of verification which will be internationally agreed, effective and verifiable. These measures should also be flexible enough to allow for the unhampered operation of the civil chemical industry, but very effective so as to leave no doubt about the possible abuse of such flexibility. In its working papers, the Yugoslav delegation has presented in more detail its views on implementation and measures

to be taken within the framework of international and national verification bodies in compliance with the convention. We note with satisfaction that the results of the ongoing negotiations in the working groups prove that many of our conclusions are shared by other delegations. In the further work of the Committee, it will be necessary to elaborate the tasks and composition of the above-mentioned bodies. Nevertheless, the results achieved so far are encouraging.

We consider that the lists of chemicals established during the course of negotiations provide a good basis for further conduct of negotiations. These lists will have to be elaborated in great detail even after the convention comes into force, because of the development of the chemical industry and technology.

At the same time, however, the lists of chemicals contained in document CD/651 constitute at this stage a realistic basis for the elaboration of verification measures.

In elaborating the list of chemicals, a further effort should, in our opinion, be made to classify them as accurately as possible on the basis of general-purpose criteria and bearing in mind the current level of development of science and technology. All relevant chemicals today can be classified as single-purpose and dual-purpose chemicals, no matter whether they belong to super-toxic lethal chemicals or to other chemicals. In these considerations, special importance should be attributed to the military use of these chemicals, on the one hand, and on the other to the overall requirements of the civilian industry, agriculture, medicine, etc., regardless of the toxicity of these chemicals. Furthermore, sight should not be lost of the fact that the economic factor and the development of science and technology require such an approach. We believe that this will be the best way to deal with the activities that should be prohibited under the Convention without affecting further progress of mankind.

As far as single-purpose chemicals are concerned, it is understood that they should be subject to the most strict and elaborate régime in respect to their declaration and destruction, according to the timetable to be determined by the Convention. The dual-purpose chemicals, on the other hand, should be dealt with in two ways. The super-toxic lethal chemicals should be dealt with having in mind their peaceful uses, while their production and transfer should be allowed only under strict control. It goes without saying that their production facilities will play a large role in determining the régime of verification.

The other chemicals which are massively produced in the chemical industry either for industrial purposes or for pesticides, make up a special group of chemicals that deserve attention. Everyday life today is unimaginable without them. These chemicals are found everywhere around us in different forms and are part of everyday contemporary living, and subsequently some of them are produced in large quantities. The great economic importance of these chemicals makes it necessary that the convention regulate their production in such a way as not to prevent further progress and not involve a vast international machinery for the verification of production, and that each State Party undertake not to breach the basic concepts of the convention. We welcome in this connection the initiative put forward by the Dutch Government

to organize a workshop on verification of non-production, to be held in early June, as a contribution towards consideration of technical and organizational problems related to verification of non-production.

As we have underlined in our earlier working papers, the verification of super-toxic lethal chemicals, whether involving destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons or stockpiles of single-purpose chemicals for peaceful purposes, should be international in character. In connection with the super-toxic lethal chemicals, attention should be paid to the chemicals produced for medical, agricultural and other purposes, and on the basis of the production facilities, a régime of verification should be established with participation of international organs.

On the other hand, production of other chemicals, though in most cases involving large-scale facilities, should be subject to national means of verification. The responsibilities and obligations of such national organs are very important in view of the fact that these chemicals may be used for military purposes as well.

A ban on chemical weapons and the adoption of the chemical-weapon convention is an urgent task. The complexity of the problems faced cannot be an excuse for prolonging the drafting of the convention which has been under way for a number of years. We have listened with great interest to the proposals advanced by the distinguished representative of the USSR, His Excellency Victor Issraelyan, in his statement on 22 April 1986, which constitutes a new contribution to negotiations for the elaboration of the chemical weapons convention. Until the completion of the convention, interim and unilateral measures may be undertaken in line with the principled agreements reached. Thus, we would like to hear from time to time that a country possessing large stockpiles of chemical weapons has decided -- pending the destruction of all stockpiles of these weapons on the basis of the convention -- to unilaterally destroy at least a fraction of its stockpiles and invited other countries to observe it. However, such an example of one country should not remain isolated. We are confident that such a gesture would be widely welcomed, and that it could contribute to the climate of confidence which is essential to any agreement, in particular in the field of disarmament.

CD/PV.360

pp.7-9

FRG/Genscher

10.6.86

VER,
CW,CTB

In the Halifax statement on conventional arms control, the Alliance stated that its objective is the strengthening of stability and security in the whole of Europe through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. The Alliance thus underscored its view that account must be taken of the interrelationship of all elements of the military balance. Only in this way can one attain the paramount goal of Western security policy: the prevention of any war, be it nuclear or conventional.

At Halifax, the decision was taken to set up a high-level task force on arms control in the whole of Europe, which will prepare analyses and proposals, building on the negotiations in Vienna and Stockholm and the Western proposals submitted there. It will also take account of General

Secretary Gorbachev's declaration of 18 April 1986, in which he stated that the Soviet Union, too, is ready to seek reductions of conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Co-operation through arms control requires the disclosure of certain military data and procedures. A key problem in this context is that of verification, which is of the utmost importance at all the negotiations just mentioned. We have noted with interest the various statements made of late by General Secretary Gorbachev on the need for effective monitoring of arms control agreements. We hope that effect will now be given to those statements at the various negotiating tables.

The problem of verification is of key importance for the negotiations concerning a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. These negotiations have already reached an advanced stage. There is no major issue of this technically and legally complicated subject-matter that has not yet been dealt with in depth by the Conference on Disarmament. The still unresolved problems concern verification. It is encouraging to note the perseverance and objectiveness shown by the delegations at the Conference on Disarmament in developing adequate verification provisions both for systematic inspections and for on-challenge inspections. The Conference has, however, reached the stage where more is involved than elaboration of the legal and technical aspects of the subject. Now the aim must be to achieve, through action geared to early results, a consensus on an adequate international system of verification assisting the attainment of the purposes of the chemical weapons convention.

In paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Members of the United Nations declared that disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties.

In my Government's view the term "adequate" assumes special significance. It implies, on the one hand, that no contracting party should learn more through verification than it needs to know for the purpose of monitoring the observance of an arms control agreement, and, on the other, that the verification system should give no contracting party the chance to avoid the inspections necessary in order to determine whether the provisions of the agreement are being complied with. Only if such an agreement exists can all involved be confident that this is the case.

We welcome the Soviet Union's statement of 22 April 1986 agreeing to international controls, including on-site inspections, to ensure the destruction of remaining chemical weapons and the dismantling of manufacturing facilities. But two major problems of verification still have to be solved: the one concerning monitoring the non-production of chemical weapons, the other on-challenge inspections.

As regards the verification of non-production, we consider it necessary to establish a system of random, international on-site inspections to monitor substances that can serve as key precursors for the production of chemical weapons.

The Federal Republic of Germany has had practical experience with such controls. Under the 1954 WEU Treaty it undertook not to manufacture chemical weapons and agreed to appropriate controls. This monitoring takes the form of random inspections which cannot be used for anything but verification purposes.

The experience gained in this process has been incorporated in a number of the working papers we have submitted. Monitoring of the non-production of chemical warfare agents can be effected by agreeing on a list of relevant chemical substances and carrying out regular inspections at manufacturing facilities. In our view this procedure can be applied to the key precursors for all chemical weapons.

The question of how to proceed if a contracting party is suspected of violating the chemical weapons convention raises particularly difficult problems which, basically, are of a political nature. Thus the extent to which nations are prepared to help solve the problem of on-challenge procedures will show how serious are their intentions with regard to a convention banning chemical weapons.

The purpose of on-challenge procedures is to create a safety-net for those cases that cannot be covered by regular inspections. Here, too, adequate and identical criteria must apply to all parties concerned so as not to create different conditions on account of different economic systems. Flexibility and a readiness for compromise are called for if the negotiations on this question are not to grind to a halt. The Federal Republic of Germany will do its utmost to help bring about a solution.

The recent use of chemical weapons in regional Third World conflicts has underlined the urgency of a global prohibition. It also shows that there is no reasonable alternative to such a universal ban. There must not be zones where chemical weapons are banned and others where they are allowed. Rather than provide more safety, that would create mistrust, instability and uncertainty. Moreover, it would further complicate the verification issue.

All nations have the same right to be free from the threat of chemical weapons. Together with our immediate neighbours we shall use every opportunity to achieve progress towards a solution of the outstanding problems in connection with a convention establishing a global ban. We have taken the initiative for talks between our delegation to the Conference on Disarmament and the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomes the efforts to take stock of existing agreements on outer space and to identify problems and possibilities for multilateral action, with regard to preventing an arms race in space. It strongly endorses its commitment to a comprehensive and verifiable test ban to take effect as soon as possible. It will continue to make a practical contribution where it possesses particular expertise, that is to say, in the seismological monitoring of nuclear explosions.

CD/PV.360

pp.22-23

USSR/Issraelyan

10.6.86

CW

The Soviet Union advocates the early elimination, already in this century, of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production. I would like to stress in particular that the Soviet Union does not envision chemical disarmament without strict and effective verification, including international control. As a follow-up to the statement of 15 January, the USSR delegation on 22 April submitted a set of new proposals on a number of key issues under discussion. When preparing these proposals we were hoping above all for an intensification of work on the draft convention, which would be impossible without due regard for other participants' positions -- provided one is guided by a constructive approach to the negotiations and respect for the interests of those involved. As we see it, the Conference now has real opportunities to reach agreement on a number of key provisions of the convention. I have in mind the first place the time-frame for the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities, announcement by the participating States of the location and number of such facilities, discontinuance of their functioning and assurance of non-functioning, procedures for destroying the production base, etc. Agreement is now within reach on the necessary verification measures, including systematic international on-site inspections, to observe the cessation of operation of each facility, as well as its destruction and dismantling.

Work is to continue on drawing up a list of chemicals to be covered by the convention. We believe that the convention should envisage measures ensuring its strict observance and implementation by each State party, regardless of whether public or private enterprises or transnational corporations are involved, and above all preventing the use of the commercial chemical industry for the development and production of chemical weapons.

The question of challenge verification is also of importance. There is already understanding of the need to provide for such inspections in the convention so that ambiguous situations that may arise with regard to compliance with the provisions of the convention can be dispelled speedily and efficiently. The Soviet Union supports the many realistic and constructive proposals introduced to this effect by various delegations.

CD/PV.361

pp.8-9

Venezuela/Taylhardat

12.6.86

CTB

The other major nuclear Power not only has not responded to the invitation to observe the moratorium but, a few days after the announcement of the new extension and after the frightening accident in Chernobyl, it once again carried out a nuclear test, then the eleventh since the Soviet Union suspended its own tests: I understand another test has since been carried out, bringing the number of nuclear tests to 12. We cannot refrain from expressing our concern at the fact that another nuclear Power is continuing unremittingly its programme of nuclear testing, and has carried out four tests so far this year. The non-nuclear countries categorically reject all the arguments that have been adduced to try and justify the continuation of the nuclear tests. We reject the notion that the existing means of verification are not sufficient, especially as the Soviet Union has indicated its willingness to accept on-site verification and to co-operate in the establishment of sophisticated procedures of seismological verification. Likewise we reject

the notion that the continuation of nuclear tests is necessary as long as deterrence has to be based on nuclear weapons. We also reject with the same vehemence the notion that nuclear tests are necessary to ensure the reliability, security and survivability of nuclear weapons, as well as for their modernization, or to carry out tests designed to develop new systems of weapons based on new technologies. In accordance with information that recently appeared in the press the latest nuclear tests are indicated to experiment with developments in x-ray lasers; but the same reports indicate that, given current scientific know-how in this field, hundreds of underground nuclear tests will be necessary before a weapon based on the use of the x-ray laser can be perfected.

CD/PV.362

pp.3,6,8

Czechoslovakia/Chnoupek 17.6.86

CTB,
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We therefore advocate the initiation of concrete talks on all aspects of a ban on nuclear-weapon tests. It would represent a major obstacle to the further perfecting of these weapons and would create a substantially more favourable climate for their elimination. In the interests of a speedy conclusion of the respective agreement, we consider it proper for this Conference to decide on the establishment of a working organ with a corresponding mandate. We support the efforts of the Conference to create a system of an international exchange of seismic data. We appreciate the agreement between Soviet and American scientists on mutual exchange of data by monitoring stations in the territories of both States.

We also attach fundamental importance to the deliberations of this Conference on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons which, in their new modalities, are gradually becoming comparable to nuclear weapons. Thus, their proliferation and threat of use represent a dangerous component of strategic destabilization. The socialist countries have repeatedly demonstrated their sincere desire to achieve the definitive elimination of chemical arsenals. They have been and continue to be ready to take into consideration the security interests of all States. A graphic example in that respect was the proposals of the Soviet Union of 22 April of this year. They organically combine the Soviet concept of chemical disarmament with the demands of the Western States and they offer convincing proof that it is not questions of verification which frustrate the achievement of a chemical convention or of other disarmament agreements. We are of the opinion that these Soviet proposals provide a framework which should make possible a speedy solution of the question of the declaration of chemical weapons and facilities for their production as well as their gradual, complete destruction.

As for verification measures and the consistent observance of disarmament agreements, I wish to point out that we do not reject anything that sincerely follows the sole purpose of securing their observance, in keeping with the thousand-year-old legal principle: Pacta sunt servanda. In other words, anything which is not a scheme concocted for creating conflict situations and

deliberate collisions with the sovereignty of States. Anyone who studies our proposals seriously knows very well that this is so.

CD/PV.362

pp.11-13

Japan/Imai

17.6.86

CTB

It is with all these points in mind that I now would like to take up the questions of scope, verification and compliance of a comprehensive test-ban treaty with a view to facilitating the substantive deliberation at the plenary meetings.

First, I shall deal with the question of scope. The discussion so far has moved around the following three possible positions. The first position proposes to prohibit tests for weapons purposes, but to permit tests for peaceful purposes. The second is to prohibit all tests on the ground that it is technically impossible to distinguish between the two kinds of tests. The third is to prohibit all tests, pending the acceptance of this kind of distinction by the international community. The latter two positions prohibit in effect all tests. The fundamental difference of view is about whether or not there exist at present practical measures to distinguish between peaceful and military nuclear tests. The view to the effect that we do not have such measures has been well supported and documented, for example, in the British Working Paper CD/383. But the position that we do have such means of distinguishing does not seem to be supported in comparable detail in terms of what exactly these measures are, or how to prevent the results of a peaceful test from being utilized for military purposes. We hope there will be further discussion and clarification on this point.

Secondly, I would like to take up the question of verification, which, I need not add, is an extremely complex issue. In reality, I must add with regret that the Conference so far does not seem to have devoted an in-depth substantive deliberation to this subject. I must say that we have spent so much time talking around verification that we have not yet had time enough to examine the issue in earnest. Here, I would like to confine myself to three points, namely, the difficulties of verification in general, on-site inspection, and exchange of seismic data. It might be useful to point out some of the issues concerning these three points which would merit further discussion at the meetings of the plenary.

To begin with, we can classify the difficulties of verification into two categories; those under natural conditions and those arising from deliberate attempts to confuse and conceal. In coping with the former difficulties, the usefulness of the ratio between surface and body wave transmission in identification has long been pointed out. But, all the authorities seem to agree that this criterion turns out to be less reliable at lower levels of seismic energy, and therefore such other means as monitoring at regional distances and closer observation of high-frequency signals have been suggested. Furthermore, monitoring the countries with large land masses for seismic signals present a special case. In order to improve the accuracy of monitoring, it may be necessary to install regional arrays or borehole stations as the case may be, and to have access to geological and geophysical data. On-site calibration will provide very useful information.

With regard to cheating, various possibilities have been suggested: masking nuclear explosion under the cover of natural earthquakes or chemical explosions, conducting concurrent multiple explosions, decoupling and so on. At the same time, it is pointed out that there are as yet no effective measures to deal with all such cases. All these points which I have mentioned here are set out in detail in Working Papers of the United Kingdom, CD/402 and CD/610, and of the Federal Republic of Germany, CD/612 and CD/624. In this connection, Ambassador Issraelyan of the Soviet Union in his statement of 25 March this year referred to the possibility of detecting nuclear explosions of low yield in a cavity. He mentioned the use of satellites as well as seismic and hydroacoustic means placed in the seas and oceans. We took note of this statement with interest. But, he did not give us sufficient explanation as to how these means can be effective in eliminating or alleviating the difficulties inherent in verification. Furthermore, Mr. Petrosyants, Chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, stated in his speech of 3 April in the Conference on Disarmament, concerning a new technical method known as cortex which was proposed by the United States, that the Soviet Union knew this method very well, but that "it gives only an approximate value of the yield of the explosion". In view of the Soviet Union, is this method not effective? Or does the Soviet Union have a more effective method? All the points I have touched upon here call for concrete responses, whether they are to be worked out by ourselves or by the experts. What we expect to happen here among us or among the experts is a discussion on such practical questions relating to verification. We should use the forum of the Conference not just for raising questions, but for solving and answering them.

Next, I would like to turn to the question of on-site inspection. An important issue to be faced is whether or not the acceptance of on-site inspection should be obligatory. The Draft Treaty of Sweden CD/381 as well as the Basic Provisions of a Treaty of the Soviet Union provide for a case in which a country may not agree to an on-site inspection. The Working Paper of Japan CD/388 states that "it is of crucial importance that the request for an on-site inspection will not meet with a refusal on the part of a State Party in whose territory it should be conducted". Also some other Working Papers point out that on-site inspection is indispensable. In this regard, the Soviet statements concerning the implementation of on-site inspection are very often qualified with provisions such as "if need be" or "whenever necessary". This is all the more confusing because the Soviet Union has lately demonstrated her readiness to deal with the question of verification in a positive manner, as is shown in the statement by the General-Secretary, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev dated 15 January. In what sort of cases does the Soviet Union think the on-site inspection necessary and in which other cases does she think it unnecessary? Inasmuch as this judgement is, in the view of the Soviet Union, left to the country on whose territory an inspection has been requested, it is very important to clarify this distinction.

A point relating to the need for an on-site inspection is its range of activities. It is described in the Swedish Draft Treaty. But there has hardly been any discussion on it. We hope that the nuclear-weapon States will take the initiative to take up these issues.

As to the third item with regard to verification, let me address the question of exchange of seismic data. It is generally recognized that an international exchange of seismic data constitutes an essential element of a

verification system of a nuclear-test ban. It is further recognized that in setting up such an exchange the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should be used as a basis. Japan has submitted Working Papers CD/389 and CD/626 regarding the shortcomings in the existing verification capabilities as well as the ways and means to upgrade and improve the capabilities from the administrative and financial points of view. Other countries have also made various proposals in their working papers. The recent Working Papers CD/612 and CD/624 of the Federal Republic of Germany have made a proposal for the establishment and progressive improvement of an international seismic monitoring and verification system on the basis of the verification capabilities of existing seismic installations, as tested by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. We have been given to understand that Australia has a similar idea. Two years ago our country proposed a step-by-step approach of practically expanding the scope of nuclear tests to be prohibited, by constantly upgrading the level of international verification capabilities. Recently, our country has proposed an exchange of Level II data. All these proposals seem to have one thing in common. They represent an attempt to make a practical and evolutionary approach to the objective of a nuclear-test ban. We expect that further attempts of this nature will be made and a substantive discussion will be held on a wide range of proposals.

Finally, I come to the question of compliance, another important element of a comprehensive test-ban treaty besides the scope and verification. In the Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban established in 1983, it was generally recognized that it would be desirable to provide for a multilateral organ of States Parties, assisted by technical experts, to facilitate consultations and co-operation among those States. But, there has not been an in-depth examination concerning the composition, competences and functions of such an organ. Furthermore, although the need for procedures for complaints, or challenge, as the case may be, was also widely recognized, there has not been any detailed discussion on it, either. I believe a useful exchange of views can be made at this forum on all these points.

CD/PV.362

pp.17-18

GDR/Rose

17.6.86

CTB

With a view to encouraging practical work in the Conference in the nuclear field, my delegation would like to present, on behalf of a group of socialist countries, Working Paper CD/701 concerning Negotiations on a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of All Nuclear-Weapon Tests.

In the document, the verification issue receives due attention. Whenever substantive matters of the treaty are discussed, verification should be addressed as well. All avenues should be explored in an effort to put in place a practicable system providing sufficient guarantees of strict compliance with the accord. The proposal by the signatories of the Delhi Declaration is also taken into account, as is the contribution which the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts is capable of making towards a treaty.

I wish to draw the attention of the Conference to paragraph 9 of the Working Paper, which says that the treaty should be worked out in such a manner that the coming into force of the CTBT coincides with the start of the operation of the verification system.

My delegation believes that the great emphasis which the highest representatives of the Warsaw Treaty member States have placed on the complex problem of verification has been carefully noted by all the delegations at our Conference. As on several previous occasions and in the context of various individual subjects, it is again made clear beyond any doubt that effective verification in all areas and in all stages of arms reduction and disarmament is an absolute necessity for our countries. We consider verification an essential part of any agreement of arms limitation, reduction or disarmament. Verification must consist of adequate measures for national and international procedures, including on-site inspection and any other supplementary measures, which fully correspond to the measures of limitation, reduction, prohibition or destruction contained in any such agreement. As usual, this subject has been treated in Budapest with great determination and much flexibility.

The insufficiency of means of verification, which has been adduced in the past as an excuse for not accepting a total nuclear-weapon-test ban, can no longer be considered an obstacle: of this we are firmly convinced, inter alia, for the following reasons.

In his statement of 15 January 1986 (document CD/649), General Secretary Gorbachev stated absolutely clearly that he accepted that compliance with the cessation of all nuclear explosions "would be fully ensured by national technical means as well as through international procedures -- including on-site inspections whenever necessary".

In the message they addressed to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on 24 October 1986 (A/40/825), the six Heads of State or Government who were the authors of the New Delhi Declaration stated: "Third-party verification could provide a high degree of certainty that testing programmes have ceased. We propose to establish verification mechanisms on our territories to achieve this objective."

The same six signatories of the New Delhi Declaration, in another Joint Message addressed to the same persons on 28 February 1986, stated: "We reiterate our offer to assist in verifying any halt in nuclear testing, to remove doubts about compliance and possible violations. Such assistance could include on-site inspection as well as monitoring activities both on your territories and in our countries."

In a third Joint Message, again addressed to the same persons, dated 8 April 1986, we find a fresh reiteration of the foregoing couched in the following terms: "We are convinced that adequate verification of compliance with any cessation of nuclear tests is possible, particularly in view of the fact that your two countries have now declared that they are ready to accept on-site inspection. Given the political will and a sufficient degree of mutual confidence on both sides, a joint decision may be taken to suspend tests without delay."

In the light of facts such as those which I have just recalled, it is clearly impossible to continue invoking the pretext of the inadequacy of the means of verification to try to justify the continuation of nuclear-weapon tests. Thus the super-Power that has since 1981 adopted a position in open contradiction with the position to which it apposed its signature in the "Report presented to the Committee on Disarmament" (document CD/130), which together with the other two participants in the trilateral negotiations it presented to the Committee on Disarmament on 30 July 1980 has tried to find fresh excuses for its dialectical juggling act. One of these, summarized in the New York Times of 22 April last, is so comical that it would be an insult to the distinguished representatives present here to try to refute it, since I am sure that none of them could take seriously the argument that a total test-ban treaty would be a measure which would "encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons".

CD/364

pp.4-5,7,9

USSR/Petrovsky

24.6.86

CTB,
VER,CW

For many years now the problem of verification has been raised. The problem simply does not exist today. National technical means of verification have become more sophisticated and can be supplemented by international procedures. The Soviet Union favours the strictest possible verification of the ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including on-site inspections and making use of all achievements in seismology. We stand ready to consider favourably all constructive proposals in this field no matter where they come from.

We are sometimes asked what we mean by saying that on-site inspection of the prohibition of nuclear tests might be carried out "if necessary". Some would like to interpret this wording as a desire on our part to preserve a loophole in order to refuse on-site verification. I want to state with the utmost responsibility that there is no loophole here at all. Should any ambiguous situation arise when, for example, an exchange of seismic data would make it difficult to determine whether or not there had been a nuclear explosion or an underground tremor due to some other reason, that would in fact be just case when an on-site inspection would be required.

In a word, there are neither technical nor negotiating problems here. The issue of a test ban has now reached the moment of truth when one can see clearly what political course is being pursued by whom.

Today we once again call upon the Conference on Disarmament immediately to start multilateral negotiations and to work towards a draft treaty. Let us act, and let there be no question of what should be considered first, verification or prohibition. Let us solve these problems simultaneously, but the main thing is to solve them.

.... Furthermore, I would like also to stress, particularly in the light of recent decisions of the Political Consultative Committee in Budapest, that in seeking to put into practice the concept of a nuclear-free world we are far

from desiring to retain and further increase the mountains of conventional weapons. Here too, as in the case of nuclear weapons, we have presented a programme of action with a clearcut time-frame.

We propose mutual reductions not only of land troops but also of strike tactical aircraft applicable to the whole territory of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Already by the beginning of the 1990s, the numerical strength of troops would be reduced by not less than one-quarter, that is, the total reduction would be one million troops. A sizeable measure has also been proposed as a first step to reduce personnel on each side by 100 to 150,000 men within the next one or two years.

Our programme lays special stress on questions of verification. All the proposed measures would be carried out under strict and effective control, including international procedures, up to and including on-site inspections. In fact, even operational activities of troops remaining after the reductions would also be open to monitoring. As additional guarantees, an exchange of statistical data would be provided on the total strength of troops and tactical airforces, and on specific separate parameters.

With regard to verification, our proposals, together with the systematic international verification of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks and of the permitted production of all supertoxic lethal chemicals as proposed earlier by the Soviet Union, constitute an integrated system ensuring the highest degree of confidence in the implementation by States of their commitments.

CD/PV.364

pp.12-13

Norway/Huslid

24.6.86

CW

An important outstanding problem is, as we know, the question of verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry. Norway is of the opinion that a solution to this problem must primarily be based on routine random on-site inspections of the relevant chemical facilities. The Workshop which was organized in the Netherlands on 4-6 June has made a significant contribution to a solution of this question. I should like through you, Mr. President, to congratulate the Dutch delegation on a most successful workshop, which has highlighted possible procedures to be utilized to monitor the non-production of chemical weapons. In this connection, I welcome the progress which has been made during the present session of the Conference in developing and refining definitions, criteria and lists of relevant chemicals, as well as appropriate régimes to which the listed chemicals would be subject.

Whereas there seems to be an emerging consensus on the principle of on-site inspection of destruction of chemical weapons and the elimination of chemical weapons production facilities, there is still major disagreement as to how to deal with requests for on-site inspections on challenge. As a rule routine inspections would seem to be sufficient to ensure that the States Parties are complying with their obligations. Only in exceptional circumstances would it be necessary to make use of an inspection procedure on challenge. Such an exceptional procedure should, however, imply an obligation

by the States Parties to accept a request. We believe that it ought to be possible to work out a procedure for this to which all the countries taking part in the negotiations can agree.

It is extremely regrettable that chemical weapons have repeatedly been used in the Gulf War in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which now more than 100 countries are parties. The Norwegian Government strongly condemns any use of chemical weapons. Such use underlines the necessity of incorporating a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in a global convention, which must also provide necessary verification provisions. It would in this connection be necessary to agree on specific provisions dealing with international verification of complaints on the use of such weapons. The Norwegian research programme on the sampling and identification of chemical warfare agents should be viewed against this background. In relation to the global convention this programme has two objectives, which are to contribute to the negotiations on such specific provisions and to provide material for the elaboration by the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary bodies of guidelines for on-site inspection concerning alleged use of chemical weapons.

In order to provide sound and realistic data the Norwegian experiments have been undertaken under field conditions. During the first five years the research programme was limited to winter conditions, but I am now able to present research results which concern investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons on an all-year basis. May I, in this regard, underline that the Norwegian papers which I have the honour to present today are complementary to the Canadian document CD/677 and the two Dutch Working Papers CD/306 and CD/307 which already contain concrete and valuable recommendations.

It is the ultimate objective of the Norwegian research programme to develop comprehensive procedures for identification, handling, transportation, and analysis of samples collected in the field, on which the investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons can be based. Today, I can present two new Working Papers and a research report. These papers are of necessity somewhat technical in nature and I cannot here go into any detail as to their contents. I should, however, by way of general explanation like to mention the following:

Working Paper CD/703 contains proposals for procedures for sample handling in the field on an all-year basis, to be followed by the fact-finding team in investigating alleged use. Two methods for sample handling have been developed in the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. These methods are of general use in the field on an all-year basis. They supplement each other and are based on use of simple equipment. Already in 1984/85 the method of organic solvent extraction proved to be successful in such field experiments. This method gives a high recovery of all known chemical warfare agents and can easily be applied under field conditions. It requires, however, use of glassware and organic solvents in the field. An alternative method has, therefore, been explored. This method makes use of the adsorption of chemical warfare agents to columns containing porous polymers. The use of two different polymers has been tested in detail. This method of porous polymers is slightly less efficient than the extraction with organic solvent, but the columns are easy to use and are well suited for transportation and storage.

The second Working Paper, CD/704, evaluates methods for identification of arsenic containing chemical warfare agents. Little research has been undertaken on this important group of chemical weapons comprising inter alia adamsite, clark I and clark II. In brief, the Working Paper concludes that high-performance liquid chromatography with electrochemical detection is recommended as a method for identifying these strongly irritating compounds.

CD/PV.365

pp.2-8

USA/Lowitz

26.6.86

CW

It is sobering to realize that negotiations to ban chemical weapons have been under way in bilateral or multilateral form for 10 years without the conclusion of a convention. It is even more sobering to realize that during this same period the threat to international security posed by chemical weapons has gotten much worse. More countries possess chemical weapons today than in 1977. Since negotiations began 10 years ago, chemical weapons have been used repeatedly in combat in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

It is true that agreement has been reached on a number of substantial aspects of a comprehensive ban during the past decade. The general scope of the convention was settled rapidly. And work has gradually advanced on the nature of verification arrangements. The 1985 report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, contained in CD/636, records the progress we have made in this Conference. I should add that it reflects the tireless dedication of the successive chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee, which is exemplified by the efforts of our present Chairman Ambassador Cromartie, of the Chairman of the Working Groups established under the Committee's aegis, and of the many delegates who have contributed to the Committee's work.

But CD/636 also makes it painfully clear how much work remains to be accomplished. There continue to be significant gaps in the body of the draft convention, particularly in areas relating to verification of compliance. Moreover, the annexes that will contain the detailed arrangements for implementing the convention's provisions exist only in fragmentary form.

However, there are some encouraging developments. Several delegations have contributed to efforts to develop effective verification provisions. The Workshop sponsored by the Netherlands earlier this month, and the working papers introduced by the delegation of Norway on 24 June concerning investigation of use of chemical weapons, are the most recent examples. These represent precisely the types of careful and serious efforts that are needed to ensure that the future convention will be effective.

What strategy does the United States propose? In the view of my delegation, the following elements are essential:

First, states must work to restore and strengthen the foundations of the future agreement. Compliance with and respect for the 1925 Geneva Protocol must be maintained, or there will be no sound basis on which to erect a comprehensive and enduring prohibition. States must also co-operate in

curtailing the spread of chemical weapons, which moves us further from our goal, and makes it even more difficult to reach multilateral agreement.

Let me take up this last point in my strategic outline, that concerning the resolution of major problems. What are the key negotiating issues before us? In my delegation's view there continue to be four issues of particular importance at this stage. These issues are nearly identical to those outlined in my statement of 28 March 1985. That these issues have remained the most important unresolved problems, despite some progress and an entire year of work, is another sober reminder of the slow pace of the negotiations.

These issues are as follows: (1) declaration and monitoring of chemical weapons stockpiles; (2) elimination of chemical weapons production facilities; (3) prevention of the misuse of the chemical industry for chemical weapons production; and (4) challenge inspection. I will comment on each in turn.

Unfortunately, there has been little progress in the last several years in resolving differences concerning the declaration and monitoring of chemical weapons stockpiles. Agreement was reached several years ago that the composition of stockpiles should be declared promptly and in detail. Useful work was accomplished last year in developing a format for such declarations. However, other important aspects of the verification régime for stockpiles remain unresolved. The United States has proposed that the locations of stockpiles also be declared promptly, so that the accuracy of the declaration can be confirmed and the stockpiles can be monitored by the inspectorate until they are destroyed.

The delegation of the Soviet Union frequently contends that declaration of locations of forward-deployed stockpiles would reveal military secrets. This had been universally interpreted to refer to stockpiles in other countries. Such an argument is difficult to understand, in view of General Secretary Gorbachev's 15 January statement that States should agree not to deploy chemical weapons in the territories of other States and that the Soviet Union has always strictly abided by this principle in its practical policies.

On the other hand, other statements by Soviet spokesman convey the impression that the Soviet Union considers the simple fact that it has chemical weapons to be an important military secret. How else can one interpret the claims made by Major General Anatoly Kuntsevich in a press conference in Moscow on 20 May, that the Soviet Union has no chemical weapons stockpile?

My delegation finds it disturbing that the Soviet Union is unwilling to acknowledge, during negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, that it possesses chemical weapons. Why is this fact being denied? A simple acknowledgement of what everyone knows to be the real situation would help considerably to build the confidence that is so important to completing the Convention.

Let me reiterate the United States position on the issue of stockpiles. A chemical weapons convention, to be effective, must require prompt declaration of the locations of chemical weapons stockpiles, as well as on-site inspection to confirm the declaration and to ensure that the stockpiles remain

inactive until they are destroyed. Such an approach has already been developed for chemical weapons production facilities. We welcome, and we will carefully consider, alternative proposals from other delegations that would provide the requisite level of assurance about stockpiles. But we cannot allow this issue to be set aside and ignored.

On the issue of chemical weapons production facilities, differences seem to have narrowed through the common approach that appears to have been reached on prompt declaration of such facilities, on-site international verification, and elimination over a 10-year period. However, agreement has not been reached on exactly what must be destroyed. The definition of the term "chemical weapons production facility" cannot be fully determined until the scope of the destruction process is agreed upon, and we have not yet finally resolved either matter. These important issues need to be settled.

The comments on chemical weapons production facilities by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union in his plenary statement of 22 April appear to be an elaboration on the statement made on 15 January by General Secretary Gorbachev. It was disappointing, however, that it did not fulfil the expectations raised by Mr. Gorbachev's statement in East Berlin on 18 April, that the Soviet delegation in Geneva would offer proposals to resolve the remaining differences in the chemical weapons negotiations.

Nonetheless, we consider Ambassador Issraelyan's statement of the Soviet position on chemical weapons production facilities to be a constructive and positive development. While important aspects remain to be clarified and resolved, it is our hope that an article on chemical weapons production facilities can be put in draft form before the end of this session.

Work on ways to prevent misuse of the chemical industry for chemical weapons production has been given a major impetus by the Netherlands Workshop. Also during this Workshop, the Australian Government reported on an experimental inspection conducted by Australian experts. The United States is deeply grateful to the Netherlands for its sponsorship of the Workshop and to Australia for its research project. These efforts have given us and others important insights into the "non-production" issue. We support the conclusion of both the Netherlands and Australia that an effective verification system can be developed that will take into account the legitimate interests of the chemical industry.

The Netherlands Workshop and the report by Australia on its own studies represent the most recent in a long series of contributions by Western delegations to resolving the "non-production" issue. It is noteworthy that Western countries with advanced chemical industries have taken the lead in drawing attention to the need for effective monitoring of the chemical industry, and in presenting concrete proposals to accomplish such monitoring.

Since the Netherlands Workshop, discussions on the "non-production" issue in Working Group A have intensified. There are signs of a co-operative, problem solving approach on the part of those involved. This is encouraging.

However, the position of the Soviet Union and other members of the Group of Socialist States has not yet been clearly defined, despite their many

expressions of concern about the misuse of the chemical industry for chemical weapons production. The 10 June plenary statement of the Soviet delegation says only that "the Convention should envisage measures ensuring its strict observance and implementation by each State Party, irrespective of whether State-owned or private enterprises or transnational corporations are involved, first of all the prevention of the use of the commercial chemical industry for the development and production of chemical weapons". But this is no more than what the Soviet delegation was saying on 22 April, before the Netherlands Workshop. It would be difficult to dispute this broad, general principle. The Conference needs to know -- specifically -- how the Soviet delegation believes this principle should be implemented in practical terms. Does it accept the approach outlined by the Netherlands delegation in CD/CW/WP.133, by the United Kingdom delegation in CD/575, and by the United States delegation in CD/500? If not, what concrete alternative would the Soviet Union propose?

We are encouraged by the acceptance by General Secretary Gorbachev of the concept of on-site inspection in arms control agreements. As we have heard the assurances of various delegations that on-site inspection will be an integral part of the verification régime of the chemical weapons ban. But we have also heard the Soviet delegation question the idea of surprise inspection at commercial chemical plants. We would welcome hearing more about the Soviet Union's views about on-site inspection in the chemical industry. If their concept of on-site inspection entails nothing more than scheduled periodic visits announced well in advance, we would appreciate an explanation of how such inspections will provide confidence that the obligations of the chemical weapons convention are being honoured.

The last of the key issues is challenge inspection. Challenge inspection is the safety net providing the back-up to the other parts of the verification system. It is, in the last analysis, the best and only sufficient deterrent to actions inconsistent with the convention. All here in the Conference hope that the safety net will seldom, if ever, be used. But when it is used, it must be effective. A safety net that is poorly designed and constructed will fail to do its job. And an ineffective safety net is worthless, indeed dangerous.

The United States approach to challenge inspection is well-known, but it has been imperfectly understood. In April, we went so far as to revise Article X of the United States draft convention, contained in CD/500, to meet Soviet concerns that this article did not cover privately-owned facilities. Rather than trying to meet our concerns, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, in his remarks to Working Group C on 20 June, ridiculed the time-frames incorporated into Article X.

It is most regrettable when one delegation resorts to bad humour sharply to attack a major proposal of another member of the Conference, and then fails even to propose an alternative. Those who criticize have the responsibility to make a counterproposal. But no such counterproposal has been forthcoming. Indeed, the formally-stated Soviet position that challenge inspection should, in the final analysis, be voluntary has remained unchanged since 1982. However, during less formal working group discussions, the Soviet Union has appeared to move away from its 1982 position by voicing support for the approach contained in document CD/CW/WP.136, presented by the German

Democratic Republic and Poland on 18 April. Yet, it remains vague and non-committal in its formal statements in plenary meetings. My delegation is left to wonder what the real Soviet position is.

There are other aspects of the Soviet position that remain unclear as well. On at least two occasions in Working Group C, Soviet representatives have associated themselves with the approach contained in the United Kingdom Working Paper of 10 February 1984, CD/431. This paper is based on the principle that "Every State Party should be under a stringent obligation to accept challenge on-site inspection.". Can one conclude from Soviet statements that the Soviet Union can accept this principle?

The United States delegation is not alone in lacking a clear picture of the Soviet position on challenge inspection. As one example, it should be recalled that on 27 March the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, requested the Soviet delegation to clarify its views on several issues, including challenge inspection. I will look forward to responses to those questions as well as to the ones I have raised today.

In his statement to the press on 19 June, Ambassador Issraelyan called upon the United States to demonstrate its genuine interest in chemical disarmament by making new proposals. While it was not said so explicitly, there can be little doubt that the United States was supposed to change its position on challenge inspection. The United States delegation is not going to negotiate with itself. Rather than simply to criticize the United States position, we expect the Soviet Union to make clear what the Soviet position really is.

I have said it many times, and I will say it again: Article X was not presented as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. The United States is prepared to consider seriously any alternative proposals that will provide the same level of confidence. But we will not accept an ineffective approach to challenge inspection.

Unfortunately, much of the debate about challenge inspection has dealt with formulas and their political acceptability. Some States have lost sight of the concept of effectiveness. In order to make progress on challenge inspection there needs to be discussion of how to ensure effectiveness, while at the same time minimizing the risk of abuse of the challenge provision. The Chemical Weapons Committee needs to evaluate all of the various proposals in these terms.

CD/PV.365

p.16

USSR/Issraelyan

26.6.86

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Comrade President, the statement of the United States this morning was principally devoted to a commentary on the position of the Soviet Union on the banning of chemical weapons. References were made to the statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mr. Gorbachev, to statements of the Soviet delegation at plenary meetings of the Conference, statements of Soviet representatives in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to statements by Soviet representatives to the press, and even to unofficial comments by Soviet representatives. I think that is a good thing that the United

States delegation should follow so attentively the statements of representatives of the Soviet Union on such an important, priority item on our agenda. Certainly, we express our views on the prohibition of chemical weapons openly, freely, and honestly; we are interested in the positions of others, we study them very attentively, and we compare them with one purpose in view: to improve our own positions in the light of the positions of other countries. We understand that negotiations are not a one-way street. To confirm what we are really aiming at in being so active in our statements, talks and contacts, both officially and unofficially, there are the concrete proposals which the Soviet Union introduces, inter alia as a result of this kind of open and free exchange of views with other delegations. I would remind you that the basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons were tabled by the Soviet Union in 1982. Since that time we have worked on improving and developing our position. For example we proposed that there should be systematic and continuous monitoring of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons. We agreed with the view of many non-aligned countries that the convention should include provisions which confirm the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. We introduced detailed proposals on the work of the consultative committee which would be set up as a result of the signing of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Finally, reference has been made here to our statement of 22 April of this year, which contained a whole range of proposals concerning the declaration, destruction and monitoring of the industrial base for the production of chemical weapons.

CD/PV.366

p.7

Romania/Datcu

1.7.86

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In the work of this year's session, among the specific subjects in which major advances are likely we see in particular the prohibition of chemical weapons. The progress made thus far on the basis of various proposals and amendments total more than 300 Working Papers over the last few years, as well as the consensus reached at this session on the particular urgency of drawing up an international legal instrument to ban all chemical weapons, fully justify the hope that within a relatively short period of time the Conference might be in a position thus to make a concrete contribution to a genuine disarmament process.

Our delegation believes that this is the right opportunity, which should be seized in a effective and constructive manner, for a general, responsible commitment to transforming the elements of the agreement into specific texts for a future convention. Important advances have been made in clarifying certain problems relating to verification of the implementation of the provisions of the convention, including on-site inspection. Accordingly, we wish to express our keen appreciation of the contribution by the Netherlands through its initiative in organizing a workshop, in which Romania took part, on verification of non-production of chemical warfare substances and their precursors in the civilian chemical industry.

CD/PV.367

pp.7-8

Morocco/Benhima

3.7.86

CW

The elimination of chemical weapons, through their destruction and not their diversion, is, we believe, the best procedure to avoid possible diversions of chemical substances to doubtful ends. Moreover, the period of

elimination of chemical weapons, which some delegations wish to last 10 years, seems too long to us, particularly since military and security reasons have been advanced to justify the choice of chemical substances to be eliminated first. It seems none the less paradoxical that in the age of nuclear neutron weapons and military orbital stations, security concerns might be invoked during this period of elimination of chemical weapons. The concept seems all the more indefensible in that their possessors have at no time shown concern for the security of those who do not possess chemical weapons.

The balance of security during this crucial period can be guaranteed only by the establishment of mutual confidence. This cannot be born from a mere signature but from the essential condition of strict compliance with the commitments which the parties to the future convention would have fully subscribed to.

If the Geneva 1925 Protocol has often been flouted, that is because it did not include any verification system that could ensure strict compliance with its provisions. It is in order to prevent such a situation that the convention on chemical weapons which is being negotiated will be given means of verification. The purpose of this machinery is to guarantee that this agreement enjoys maximum effectiveness and respect.

It is this spirit that I should like to recall here that an international instrument without an appropriate and reliable verification machinery is a hollow instrument. Moreover, a convention which is not given a legal arsenal guaranteeing effective and non-prejudicial international control would be more dangerous than the lack of a convention, as it would give the illusion of respect and control and would lead to suspicions with unforeseeable consequences.

This is why the slowness and hesitation which have marked the negotiations on this important chapter of the convention for some time lead us to fear that an attempt may be made to side-step the issue by seeking an easy way out. Thus we believe that a modicum of political will must be requested, indeed demanded, from certain countries so as to overcome the present deadlock in the negotiations. Those countries cannot indefinitely hide behind the political and technical complexity of verification, and by their security and commercial considerations block the conclusion of agreements on this part of the convention which is justly considered as being crucial.

In this connection we believe that the very constructive proposals of the Pakistani delegation contained in document CD/664, could break the deadlock in which the Ad Hoc Committee finds itself. The favourable response that they have met with strengthens our belief.

Indeed, and without going too far, the Pakistani plan for fact-finding can satisfy our requirements for effective verification and as well as concerns relating to security and protection of information and of industrial property so as not to place the facilities inspected at a commercial disadvantage. Finally, the document of the Pakistani delegation has the merit of contemplating machinery capable of detecting any threat which might weigh on the future treaty régime and of resolving all problems that can arise during the duration of the convention.

Without undue illusions we, nevertheless, harbour the hope that political goodwill may be shown on this work of the Conference on Disarmament in order to enable it to complete it before it is too late.

By way of conclusion, I should like to express the profound gratitude of my delegation to the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands for the Workshop to which we were invited at the beginning of June. The Workshop which was devoted to the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry was an opportunity for us all, and in particular for my delegation, to come to grips with the complexity of verification. This complexity, in our view, should not be a source of discouragement to us; far from it, it should incite our Conference to step up its efforts in order to find the best system to ensure unfailing respect for the future convention on chemical weapons.

CD/PV.367

pp.26-29

Canada/Beesley

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It is clear that every effort should be made, as soon as possible, to clear up outstanding doubts on matters of compliance. It is a profoundly disturbing possibility that vital arms control measures may come unravelled because of inadequate confidence concerning compliance with such agreements.

Let me turn for the moment to the subject of conventional arms. Recent weeks have also seen significant developments concerning the possibilities for negotiated reductions in levels of conventional arms. General Secretary Gorbachev's proposal of 18 April and the further elaboration thereon in the Warsaw Pact communiqué on 11 June, as well as the statement by NATO members in Halifax on 30 May, are all welcome developments. They reflect a growing, reciprocal awareness of the importance of conventional arms reductions as a necessary element of the broad effort to reduce weapons arsenals of all types. The proposals which have been made involve not only complex questions of substance but also considerations as to the most appropriate negotiating forum and zone of application. Most certainly, in this as in other arms control and disarmament subject areas, verification mechanisms for sustaining mutual confidence in the execution of any agreed measures will be critically important. In addition, the ability of the Stockholm Conference to agree on a substantive package of confidence and security-building measures will be a touchstone for the prospects of negotiating significant reductions in conventional arms. Likewise, in Vienna, a major Western initiative is on the table; it has yet to elicit a satisfactory response, but we remain hopeful that one will be forthcoming.

Since the adjournment of our spring session, there has occurred a major tragedy at a civilian nuclear energy facility in Chernobyl, the full consequences of which have yet to be known. We extend our condolences to the Government and people of the USSR, through the distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Issraelyan, in relation to this tragic event. We owe it to the victims and their families -- and to our shared ecology -- to draw the proper lessons from it. To this end, Canada will actively participate in the special programme in nuclear safety now being organized under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which includes, among other projects, the drafting of international conventions committing the parties to

early notification and a co-ordinated response in case of nuclear emergency or accident with transboundary implications. This long-term programme will assist national authorities, with whom primary responsibility for safety must lie, in their efforts to ensure the safe operation of nuclear facilities in their respective countries. I understand that steps are also being taken in the World Meteorological Organization to lay the groundwork for a more effective monitoring system of atmospheric radiation levels. One of the more disturbing aspects of the Chernobyl tragedy, as we see it, was its effect in illustrating the fragility of the confidence-building process, and, conversely, the consequences of mistrust. There could hardly be a more persuasive demonstration of the need for greater transparency in such matters. May I take the opportunity of welcoming the statement we have just heard from the distinguished representative of the USSR. The information he has given us will be subjected to careful study around the world. There are no silver linings to any nuclear cloud but perhaps if we can learn from this tragic event then we can better assure that it does not recur anywhere.

Returning to my theme of verification, it is the consistent, considered and continuing view of the Canadian Government that the answer to problems of verification, compliance and confidence does not lie in the unilateral announcement of changes in practice or in the possible renunciation of important agreements. The answer, rather, lies in meticulous negotiations and incorporation within agreements of specific verification measures agreed to by all parties. Such verification provisions, by effectively deterring non-compliance and by demonstrating compliance, are vital in maintaining necessary confidence and assuring mutual security if the entire arms control and disarmament process is not to go into reverse gear.

The self-sufficient approach to verification, as embodied in a primary reliance on national technical means in bilateral treaties, is not sufficient in all circumstances. In the multilateral context, co-operative institutions, procedures and techniques must be worked out which provide for equitable participation and sharing of responsibility by a multiplicity of parties with diverse interests and differing resources at their disposal.

I will give some illustrations of this in the fields of chemical weapons and nuclear test ban.

On the subject of chemical weapons verification, in our lengthy negotiations directed toward a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, it has become increasingly apparent, particularly during the spring portion of our 1986 session, that for the purpose of monitoring non-production, there is unlikely to be agreement on the precise substances to be controlled until there is also agreement on exactly what types of controls would be applied. Agreement on verification provisions cannot be put off to the final phase of our negotiation. On 22 April, the Soviet delegation put forward proposals relating primarily to the destruction of stocks and of production facilities. These proposals represent a substantive advance on previous Soviet positions and are thus most welcome. If there is to be eventual agreement on a treaty, however, these proposals will need to be supplemented by further proposals relating to the verification of declarations of stocks and of non-production, including at the sites of facilities which will have been destroyed. Agreement on some form of a "challenge inspection" provision will also be required as a necessary "safety net" to ensure that anomalous situations are quickly

clarified. Nevertheless, in light of the proposals which have been made, the Canadian delegation has increased hope that these critical issues can begin to be addressed more directly during our present session. The Canadian Government attaches high priority to further substantive advance on this important agenda item. If there is not significant, substantive progress during our present session, it may become necessary to explore new ways to overcome obstacles to progress in these negotiations.

I would like to take this opportunity to express the gratitude of my delegation, through Ambassador van Schaik, to the Government of the Netherlands for the very interesting and useful workshop conducted in The Hague and Rotterdam on aspects of the verification of chemical weapons non-production in the civil chemical industry. The workshop, and the working papers associated with it, constitute a significant contribution to progress on these outstanding issues.

I would also like to pay tribute to the Norwegian Government for the important research it has carried out over the past several years on the sampling and identification of chemical warfare agents. The two papers recently tabled by the Norwegian delegation (CD/703 and CD/704) constitute an important contribution in this area. This work ties in with similar research done by Canadian experts which resulted in the "Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons" tabled in this forum in April.

I would like to turn now to the subject of the verification of a nuclear test ban. The conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement remains a fundamental policy objective of the Canadian Government. Our failure during the first portion of our session even to reach agreement on a mandate for a subsidiary body on agenda item 1 (Nuclear Test Ban) was cause for great disappointment to my delegation. We hope there can be early agreement on a mandate, or on a programme of work in the absence of a mandate, which will permit concrete work on the interrelated matters of scope, verification and compliance.

As I indicated in my intervention of 11 March 1986, the Canadian Government has devoted considerable human and financial resources to seismic verification efforts. These include the major upgrading of key seismic facilities in Northern Canada as well as support for basic seismic research at the University of Toronto. Further, Canada proposes to conduct, early in October in Ottawa, a workshop for seismic experts to discuss, and where possible resolve, some of the questions relating to the exchange of level 2 waveform data. This will supplement the largely successful test in late 1984 by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) involving the exchange of level 1 data. It will also build upon the experience of the workshop held in Norway 4-7 June 1985 and reported in CD/599. It is against this background that Canada strongly favours the continued vital work being done by the GSE.

I would like to turn now to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Canadian Government believes that this negotiating body can make a substantive contribution to our shared objective of preventing an arms race in outer space. It is important that this be done in ways which complement and support, and do not disrupt, the efforts of the United States and the USSR to seek the same objective in their bilateral negotiations.

The lengthy delay in reaching agreement on a mandate for a subsidiary body on agenda item 5 (prevention of an arms race in outer space) was therefore cause for much disappointment. However, now that the mandate has been accepted, we can hope that our agreed programme of work will permit speedy resumption of substantive discussion of this item. Supplementary to the broad legal survey Canada submitted last year, my delegation intends later in the session to submit a further working paper dealing with selected aspects of legal terminology in relation to outer space. The working paper will, we trust, further elucidate the legality or otherwise of current and contemplated activities in outer space in light of existing treaties and legal precepts.

Canada is also continuing to devote a major effort to its PAXSAT studies, centering on the technical feasibility of using certain types of existing space technologies for verification purposes. The results of these studies will become available in due course. In one of its key aspects, the PAXSAT concept is based on the notion that existing non-classified technology permits the designing of satellites capable of determining with an acceptably high degree of confidence whether other space objects have been designed to perform a weapons function. The Canadian studies are intended to develop a data base with respect to PAXSAT from which it may be possible to assess other similar related concepts.

Returning again to the question of verification in all its aspects, in the view of my Government, the issues of compliance, verification and confidence building lie at the heart of the entire arms control and disarmament process. It will be on the successful resolution of these issues that the entire process will stand or fall. As indicated in my statement in plenary on 4 February 1986, Canada sees the adoption by consensus at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly of a resolution affirming the importance of verification as indicating that this is not a partisan issue but a matter on which there is an international consensus. That resolution, inter alia, invited Governments to submit to the Secretary-General views on verification. Several have already done so. We hope more will follow. As a country which has taken a lead role in this issue, I think it both appropriate and useful to place before this forum the Canadian Government's response to that resolution. My delegation, therefore, is making available, as official documents of the Conference, the text of the letter of 14 April 1986 to the United Nations Secretary-General from Canada's Permanent Representative in New York, together with its accompanying booklet entitled "Verification In All Its Aspects". We think both documents, which have just been distributed to all delegations, merit careful study. Having in mind the need to economize to meet current financial constraints, my delegation will not require that these documents be processed in all official languages of the Conference.

In concluding my statement, I should like to renew our earlier plea for the submission of concrete working papers to supplement our statements of policy positions and, in so doing, I compliment the distinguished representative of Pakistan who has just submitted such a paper.

The distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Lowitz, at our meeting on 26 June, told us that on 5 June last, President Reagan and Vice-President Bush reaffirmed the importance they attach to stepping up efforts to conclude an effective and properly verifiable agreement. On that occasion Ambassador Lowitz shared with us some very pertinent thoughts whose realistic, pragmatic and constructive nature prompts us to hope that a number of fundamental issues currently still in abeyance will be solved.

The Soviet Union for its part recently formulated, through Ambassador Issraelyan, a series of proposals which in our view indicate a desire to advance. But the intentions of the Soviet Union require further clarification, particularly with respect to verification, of which the USSR, unless there is an error of interpretation, seems indeed to recognize the importance now.

Verification should be international and is essential, not only in the area of the elimination of existing chemical-weapon stockpiles, in the area of declaration of production facilities and in the area of the destruction of these facilities, but also and above all as far as non-production is concerned. On this last score the Workshop organized by the Netherlands was very constructive indeed and my delegation wishes to thank here the Netherlands authorities for having so perfectly carried out the excellent initiative they had taken.

The negotiations of a Convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons is, in the view of Belgium, an absolute priority for the Conference. My country welcomes the fact that a new will seems to be developing to step up the work. The statements made recently by the distinguished representatives of the United States and the USSR, to which I have referred, are welcome and comforting confirmation of this.

My delegation would like to share some thoughts with you in order to help to clarify some of these ideas.

Firstly, let us agree that in negotiating the elimination of chemical weapons, it is essential to have a precise idea of what we want to eliminate. Drawing up an appropriate definition of such weapons has some influence on the nature of the prohibition measures and their verification, on the legitimate interests of the civilian chemical industry which, as a matter of principle, should not be unduly suspected, controlled or limited in its development, and on scientific research and technological progress in chemistry, where any trend towards the production of chemical weapons should be prohibited and prevented.

So far, our work has essentially focused on the identification of the constituent elements of chemical weapons, particularly the list of toxic chemicals and their key precursors. This work is being conducted in a clear-sighted and substantive manner, and now we already have very advanced lists. Our role, however, is not to negotiate the elimination of lethal, harmful and dangerous chemicals, but chemical weapons, that is, the manufacture of a weapon whose destructive effect is constituted by chemicals. I think that

article II as now drafted or proposed, does not reflect, or at least does not sufficiently reflect, the purpose which is decisive for the very concept of a weapon.

We believe that it is time to tackle this question of definition anew, and Belgium intends to contribute in due course to the final drafting of article II. Our work is now happily progressing at a more rapid pace and we should concern ourselves with clearly establishing exactly what is to be the object of the fundamental obligations and prohibitions that the future Convention will set forth in its article I, in other words, we must have a body of definitions appropriate to the ends we are pursuing.

The task that the Conference on Disarmament should carry out with respect to chemical weapons is twofold in nature. Firstly, we should organize chemical disarmament stricto sensu, in other words, the elimination under international control of stockpiles of weapons and direct production facilities. Secondly, we must make sure that the renunciation of the acquisition of chemical weapons, to which the parties will commit themselves, is and remains credible, thanks to appropriate and effective verification measures. Verification is crucial to both of these aspects.

The problems arising in the two types of verification are doubtless very different and hardly comparable: the interests which have to be taken into account are essentially military security in the first case and economic in the second. In the first case, the presence of chemical weapons is certain and recognized, in the second, it is simply a theoretical possibility which must be effectively prevented from becoming a reality. I will come back to this later.

I should like first to tackle the first aspect, that is, chemical disarmament stricto sensu, in other words the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles and their production facilities, which should take place as early as possible after entry into force. The total elimination period should be fixed in light to the time technically necessary to destroy the largest arsenals of chemical weapons held by a single country.

Belgium does not possess any chemical weapons, nor does it intend to possess them. We periodically find chemical weapons that were abandoned on part of its territory by the armed forces of other countries at the end of the first World War. These outdated chemical munitions are periodically eliminated and will continue to be eliminated as long as they are found. They present a danger only for my compatriots, as well again shown by a recent accident that led to the deaths of four persons. We hope that this problem will be dealt with separately by the Convention or an annex to the Convention, in view of its very specific aspects.

Working Group B is responsible for drawing up arrangements for the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles and production facilities. We are particularly pleased that the concern here is to get down to essentials, that is, to establish a complete set of rules. It would indeed be inconceivable for the credibility of the Convention and its chances of universal accession that after its entry into force it should turn out that the destruction of stockpiles is delayed pending the solution of problems relating to the declaration or location of stocks, etc.

An important problem which was the focus of our attention during the Spring session and to which we will have to return, is the order of the destruction of these stockpiles. My delegation hopes that it has contributed to showing, thanks to a proposal submitted by Belgium last April, that the difficulties, serious as they might be, could be surmounted.

We have included a method for the general comparison of stockpiles of weapons of varying composition in a proposed overall scheme for the order of destruction, as these two problems are closely linked. We have developed a proposal made by China, which constituted a conceptual breakthrough in the area of comparability of stockpiles.

As for the elimination of production facilities, we have noted with interest the specific proposals made by the Soviet Union, and we have known since the beginning of this year that it is ready to accept on-site international verification of the process. The distinguished representative of the United States, in his statement in plenary on 26 June last, stated however that it remained to be agreed "exactly what must be destroyed", thus illustrating the interest, it seems to us, of having an appropriate definition of what is to be considered a chemical-weapon production facility. We must be able to draw a distinction between the production facilities that have actually served for production of what could undeniably be called chemical weapons. Here again we come back to the problem of definition which I mentioned earlier.

The second essential aspect of the Convention is that of the prevention of the acquisition of chemical weapons. The aim here must be to draw up the most appropriate verification régimes so as to reassure de facto the parties that their commitments not to develop, manufacture, stockpile, or transfer chemical weapons are really respected.

The negotiations of Working Group A, since October 1985 have aimed towards the concrete identification of the physical elements which would be most likely to serve for the clandestine production of chemical weapons, which include, obviously, a number of chemicals which are universally recognized as combat chemical agents, as well as the precursors that necessarily make it possible to obtain them. In the choice of the prohibition and verification régimes to be applied to each of these chemicals, we will first and foremost have to ask whether the substance in question is or is not capable of serving purposes other than armaments. Only chemicals known only to serve, and to serve only for, arms purposes should be totally prohibited, except of course, if as a result of a scientific discovery, a State party began to produce one of these chemicals for purely peaceful purposes which it would have been able to demonstrate to the international control organization that it will be necessary to set up. In drawing up our rules, we cannot lose sight of the development of science and technology which could lead us either to lift the prohibition on the production of certain chemicals, while keeping them under strict control, or to place them under a stricter régime in the case of chemicals hitherto manufactured for peaceful purposes but subsequently used otherwise, or else to include in the lists annexed to the Convention chemicals previously not recognized as chemical combat agents or new precursors.

It is important to keep in mind here the essential difference which exists between chemicals which present an inherent risk of being used for chemical weapons and those which are actually used for such a purpose. An appropriate definition of chemical weapons would here again have its full significance, and moreover it is verification and control which will enable us, for all dual-purpose chemicals, and I stress, dual-purpose chemicals, to determine whether or not they are on the prohibited side of the alternative.

While the national authorities will have the obligation to ensure that a country's industries co-operate with the international control body, in the provisions concerning non-production it is none the less essential to safeguard the legitimate interests of the chemical industry. The roles should not be reversed. Our philosophy in this connection should be that whatever is not explicitly prohibited is permitted, rather than the contrary. For otherwise we would place an unjustified and unbearable burden on civilian chemical industry and we would be opening the door to excessive, gratuitous or vexatious controls. Neither in the exchange of data nor in on-site verification should the régimes established under article VI have the effect of substituting the international organization for national authorities in respect of the responsibility for compliance with the Convention.

We may and we must expect from States parties that they will respect all the commitments that they will have subscribed to. We see systematic verification as a positive means to strengthen confidence among the parties which becomes necessary wherever the presumption of good faith in respective commitments cannot alone suffice to ensure such confidence.

This leads me to the question of the measures contemplated to cope with ambiguous factual situations which prompted doubts as to compliance with the fundamental provisions contained in article I of the treaty, namely, the obligation to destroy chemical-weapon stockpiles and their production facilities according to agreed time-tables and the prohibition on the development, production, stockpiling, transfer or use of chemical weapons. Measures whereby an international organization to be created would play an active role are envisaged: they range from the exchange of additional information to on-site challenge inspection which would cover undeclared sites not subject to the systematic inspection provided for in other articles of the Convention.

The difficulties encountered by the Conference on the latter question should not unduly surprise us in so far as we are seeking a new formula for a set of verifiable disarmament measures of unprecedented scope. Sizeable differences persist. It is essential, however, to arrive without delay at a credible and effective solution for challenge inspection so as to ensure that regular verification measures do not have the result of totally exempting from all control anything that is not explicitly contemplated as falling under them. To a great extent, challenge inspection would then contribute to the credibility of systematic inspection measures linked to declared sites and accepted as such by States.

The future Convention will, of course, have to include effective provisions which can be implemented as early as possible enabling on-site fact-finding in the event of credible allegations by a State party concerning the use of chemical weapons. Let us hope, however, that such an eventuality will never happen again and that the future convention will be sufficiently

effective in all its provisions of verification to rule it out forever. It will thus have given a concrete example of a very ambitious disarmament measure that has been carried out and is verifiable, and will prompt to redouble our efforts along this path in order also to achieve, in the conventional and nuclear fields the very essential and urgent dismantlement of overarmament in the world.

CD/PV.369

pp.4-5

USA/Barthelemy

10.7.86

CW

The members of the Conference are aware, of course, that the United States Congress has directed the disposal of the present American stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions as an adjunct to the acquisition of a smaller, safer chemical weapon deterrent.

My Government has summarized preliminary planning for this destruction process in a document entitled "chemical stockpile disposal program" prepared by the United States Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency. My delegation has asked the secretariat to distribute copies of this document to all delegations, and we will ask that it be designated as a chemical weapons working paper. In keeping with our strong endorsement of the cost-cutting efforts undertaken by the secretariat, we are distributing this study at no cost to the Conference.

Two weeks ago, Ambassador Lowitz reiterated the United States position that a chemical weapons ban must require prompt declaration of the location of chemical weapons stockpiles. States must have confidence in the verifiability that all stockpiles have been declared and will be destroyed. To provide that verification, prompt declaration is required. The data you will receive today includes the location of every chemical weapons storage site in the United States. It is the hope of my delegation that this disclosure will encourage others, who have thus far manifested reluctance to accept prompt disclosure of stockpile locations, to show flexibility on this issue. If the United States can make this type of detailed disclosure now, surely others can do the same promptly once the chemical weapons convention has entered into effect.

In his statement on 26 June, Ambassador Lowitz pointed out that agreement on a chemical-weapons ban would be facilitated by confidence that the parties will comply with its provisions, and it would help build that confidence if the nation with the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union, would be open and candid about possessing chemical-weapons stockpiles.

The United States Government does not believe that national security demands secrecy regarding its possession of a chemical weapons retaliatory capability. In any event, in a free and open society such as the United States, it would not be possible to conceal the fact.

The national security of all States will be affected by the success or failure of the Conference's efforts to achieve a chemical-weapons ban. We believe the step we are taking today will contribute to such success. We are distributing a document that goes far beyond confirmation that the United States possesses chemical weapons. It describes in considerable detail the specific chemical agents located in each United States site, the type of weapon or container used, and the percentage of the total United States-based chemical weapons tonnage that is located at each site. In demonstrating the

kind of candour we seek from others, my delegation hopes to set the example for future negotiations. We recognize, of course, that at this stage of negotiations, parties cannot open their files completely. However, progress should not be impeded, nor confidence eroded, by secrecy, without reasonable purpose.

Since 1969, the United States has maintained -- unilaterally -- a moratorium on the production of chemical weapons. Some others have not followed this example. Now, 17 years later, even as it becomes necessary to modernize our deteriorating chemical weapons capability, the United States is taking another step directed toward the complete elimination of chemical weapons. It is greatly reducing the size of its chemical weapons arsenal. Once again, we do this without assurance of reciprocal action by the USSR or others, but we invite others to join us by making similar reductions.

In planning and implementing this disposal process, the United States will gain valuable experience and technical expertise in the destruction of chemical agents and weapons. We want to share this with other nations. In this regard, my delegation would ask each of you to give serious consideration implementation of a chemical-weapons ban.

CD/PV.369

pp.7-12

Australia/Butler

10.7.86

CW, RW,
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One area of the current negotiations, to which Australia has given particular attention, is that of so-called "permitted activities" -- article VI of the draft convention text in CD/636. Through our chairmanship of Working Group A we have been endeavouring to foster the development of lists of chemicals and the régimes which should apply to them, with the objective of ensuring that chemical substances which might pose a risk to the Convention are not produced for purposes which are prohibited by the Convention, or diverted from their legitimate activities in the civil chemical industry. During the summer the Working Group has been concentrating mainly on the list of the applicable régime for key precursor chemicals, carrying forward the valuable work undertaken in January this year, as reflected in document CD/651. Work has also been undertaken on further refining the listing and régime for chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical-weapons purposes.

We are confident that given the continuing co-operation of all delegations, it should be possible to arrive soon at common agreement on the lists and the basic elements which would constitute the régimes for these two categories of chemicals. We would also hope that, by the end of the session, consideration of the important category of super-toxic lethal chemicals will be advanced.

In devising these régimes it is important to keep in mind that the future convention will ban the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, States parties will, however, have the right to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors, for purposes not prohibited by the convention.

It is recognized, however, that it will be necessary to monitor the civilian chemical industry to ensure that chemical weapons are not produced, or their precursors diverted, for purposes in contravention of the convention. The burden imposed by a system of data reporting supported by fact-finding consultations and, where appropriate, on-site inspections would be, in our firm view, minimal. And it would ensure that relevant chemicals were not being diverted for prohibited purposes.

The work done during the summer in relation to all these chemicals and their régimes will assist the further consideration of the other part of the mandate designated for Working Group A, namely, the definitions and criteria article of the draft convention text. We are deeply conscious of the complexity of the subject matter which has been assigned to Working Group A, but sufficient common ground has already been identified to enable the basic provisions and related annexes for article VI to be set down.

The approach of consolidating parts of the convention as they are drawn up is one which we strongly support. Thereafter, there will be the need to refine, perhaps in greater detail, some of the constituent elements. This is a necessary and integral part of the ongoing process of developing the convention text.

Our work on the subject of non-production of chemical weapons by the civil chemical industry has been greatly assisted, this session, by the workshop which was organized by the Netherlands Government in June.

We have already expressed our appreciation to the Netherlands delegation for their important initiative. We have all seen in the subsequent discussion in Working Group A, the benefits which we have derived from that Workshop.

The Workshop has provided us with an immense amount of material and information. It has enabled us to focus more sharply on particular aspects of verification of non-production and non-diversion in the civil industry. It is through workshops of this kind, where the practical considerations involved in verification can be examined thoroughly, that we will obtain a clearer understanding of what is required and what can be implemented as an effective régime for inclusion in the convention.

It was in this same spirit that Australia organized a trial inspection of a chemical facility earlier this year -- the report of which was tabled in the Chemical Weapons Committee in June. We believe that it would be useful if other countries were also to conduct trial inspections of their own chemical facilities and report the results to the Conference.

I will now turn to radiological weapons. A few weeks ago, at a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, the Soviet representative presented an account of the accident at Chernobyl and of measures that were now under way to clean up the site and to combat radiation damage in the region.

My delegation welcomed this information contained in that account and looks forward to the promised complete technical report.

The accident at Chernobyl raised at least three important issues: reactor safety and management procedures, the management of an accident, including the need for prompt and detailed international communication about such an event, the consequences of a premeditated attack upon such a facility.

The first two issues are largely within the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as far as international co-operation is concerned.

The third issue, a premeditated attack on a nuclear facility, is one of major concern to the Conference's Radiological Weapons Committee.

Events at Chernobyl made clear the terrible dangers inherent in the release of significant levels of ionizing radiation. What is also clear is that what could be released under circumstances of a full-scale attack upon a nuclear facility could be even more catastrophic. Perhaps no such demonstration was needed, but the events at Chernobyl have highlighted the urgency of work in the Radiological Weapons Committee towards the conclusion of an agreement to prevent attacks on nuclear facilities.

We need to create an instrument which, both in political and legal terms, will establish a norm of international behaviour to this effect. I am aware that there are different points of view about the desirability of such a treaty and the provisions it should contain. But there should be no doubt about the necessity of such a treaty.

The central objective is to prevent an attack on a nuclear facility which could lead to the release of ionizing radiation at levels which would cause unacceptable damage to humans and their environment. The conclusion of a track B treaty would fulfill the objective of contributing, in a specific way, to the protection of an already fragile ecology.

One of the principal problems in our discussions so far has been the question of verifying the statement that protected nuclear facilities are designated for peaceful purposes. The system of IAEA safeguards is in our view currently the best means available to determine the peaceful nature of a nuclear facility. The "unitary approach" we have followed in our work on a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons has been a useful device. It has served us well. But, I submit, it should not prevent us from pursuing the urgent objective, during this session, of coming closer to the conclusion of treaty on track B.

I will now turn to the question of outer space. The prevention of an arms race in outer space is a priority issue for Australia.

In our view the objective of the prevention of an arms race in outer space has two dimensions: the prevention of the emergence in space of a competition between defensive and offensive systems and active and passive counter measures against each of these, and the protection of the existing uses of space which, although capable of supporting and even enhancing terrestrial military capability, have to a large extent, operated in the interests of stability and arms control verification.

It will therefore be important for us, in this Conference, to reach a common understanding on the military functions performed from or through space which are desirable or tolerable, even in time of war, and which in turn -- and this is of fundamental importance -- could reduce the incentives to engage in an arms race in outer space.

For these reasons it is not enough to concentrate in our Committee on ballistic missile defence in space and we should also certainly avoid debating current issues in a way that could be taken as implying that space-based weapons are inherently bad but ground-based weapons are somehow not. Surely the point is that any anti-ballistic missile defences, additional to those allowed in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, are not admissible.

Our mandate clearly states that we must examine and identify issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This means that we must examine all issues relevant to this goal. We must not allow our Committee to degenerate into a seminar on the definition of so-called "space-strike weapons" or to become merely a forum for accusations about the validity and permissibility of current activities in outer space.

We would miss the point of our responsibility if we were to devote ourselves exclusively to a discussion of what is currently the subject of negotiations between the two Powers with the major capability for the military use of space. That bilateral process must be complemented by the multilateral process we are engaged in here and, in a practical and realistic way. Our programme of work gives us ample opportunity to do this.

First, we recognize that there are existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that these must be fully understood. In this regard, we have to concentrate on the following: what do these rules cover and how much do they cover? Are they being fully complied with? Do they need to be strengthened, and how can this be done? How can they be verified?

In this context we agree fully with the United Kingdom delegation that greater terminological precision is desirable, so that we can work on a common vocabulary. That process has already begun during the discussions of point one of our programme of work. But that process is far from complete, and it does not apply only to the identification and understanding of terminology relevant to ballistic missile defence in space. Accordingly we also welcome Canada's announcement that it will table a paper on terminology relevant to this item.

The final point in our programme of work deals with existing proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Conference will be aware of the proposal made by the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Bill Hayden, in the Conference on 7 August 1984, that we study the possibility of agreements to protect satellites and their ground stations which contribute to global stability. We attach particular importance to the contribution which reconnaissance, early warning and communication satellites make to such stability.

I want now to recall the second part of the objective for the prevention of an arms race in outer space -- to reduce the incentive to engage in a arms race in outer space by ensuring the maintenance of global stability in the context of our overriding aim to advance international peace, stability and security and, to find ways in which this can best be achieved.

There are other proposals than our own already tabled, which the Conference can address under its current mandate and programme of work.

These include the problem of implementing existing rules, the question of the multilateralization of existing agreements, the necessity to strengthen and devise new confidence-building measures, the possibility of establishing an international information and monitoring system, and the fundamental and extremely complex question of verification and compliance with existing and possible future agreements. Here we welcome the United Kingdom's announcement that it plans to submit an additional paper on verification.

I would now like to turn to the subject of a nuclear test ban. The goal is clear -- a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty banning all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time. The unique responsibility of this Conference, in working towards the achievement of that goal, is beyond question. But we are stationary. None of us should accept this. We should strive to find the solution now.

It is claimed repeatedly that there is only one obstacle which prevents us from establishing an ad hoc committee. That obstacle is said to be the position of the Western group of member States, as reflected in the mandate for an ad hoc committee set forth in document CD/521.

It makes no sense in logic or in fact to lay the charge that CD/521 is an obstacle. CD/521 describes precisely what everyone knows is at issue in work towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It expresses the clear and irrefutable willingness of the States which sponsored that draft mandate to start work immediately on scope, verification and compliance -- "with a view to the negotiation of a treaty on the subject".

I believe that no other mandate has within it such a clear perception of the technical and political factors which are involved, in their interrelationship, in the work towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Any suggestion that this mandate is an obstacle is the opposite of the truth, nothing less than to call black, white. In addition, the suggestion that there is only one alleged obstacle ignores the reality of the flexibility that is demanded if there is to be progress in a conference which works on the basis of consensus. The Western group of States has proclaimed that flexibility. They have said that while CD/521 remains a completely adequate and practical basis for work towards this treaty, they do not shut the door, they do not refuse to consider other approaches. But they have responsibly made clear the approach which, in their view, is correct and will work. The approach that they accept, now, is that which is spelled out, with crystal clarity, especially in the main substantive paragraph of CD/521.

If we are to talk of obstacles which we would frankly prefer not to do, we would surely also have to include the obstacle that has been erected in the past by those who claim that there are no problems of verification, that all such problems have been solved.

This has not been demonstrated technically and, it is not a view which is shared by the clear majority of member States of this Conference. So when such an assertion is made, which is clearly not able to be validated but instead needs to be investigated, the determination to prefer that assertion rather than to investigate it surely constitutes an obstacle to resuming practical work on a comprehensive test ban.

CD/PV.370

pp.4-7

UK/Renton

15.7.86

CW

It is with these considerations in mind that we should address what still divides us in the crucial negotiations here at Geneva. My Government has considered with great care the statement made at this Conference by Ambassador Issraelyan on 22 April. We recognize that this has built upon the statement by Mr. Gorbachev on 15 January. We believe it represents a small but welcome step forward. We are greatly encouraged that the Soviet Union is at last setting out its position in detail, although it must be said that much of this detail does no more than reflect what already seemed to be the consensus view at the Conference. But a serious Soviet statement deserves a serious response. The United Kingdom delegation will work to respond fully to all these points.

What must not be forgotten, however, is that Ambassador Issraelyan's statement follows years of negotiation in which Western and non-aligned delegations put forward a range of constructive and practical suggestions for advancing the negotiations, to be met largely by indifference or silence from the Soviet Union. I point in particular to the series of United Kingdom papers on the verification of non-production in the civil chemical industry, CD/353, CD/514 and CD/575. Bearing in mind the lessons of the immensely useful workshop conducted by the Netherlands Government -- and I would like to express my Government's thanks to the Netherlands Government for all the effort that must have been put into this undertaking -- we hope that the time is now ripe to incorporate this thinking and these practical lessons into article VI of our convention.

I should now like to say some words on one of the core issues of our negotiations, challenge inspection. In doing so I wish at the same time to introduce a new United Kingdom paper. It is essential that we should all understand the objective of a challenge inspection régime. Without such an understanding, we risk making our work far more difficult, and delaying that moment of success to which we all profess ourselves to be committed.

First we must distinguish between the separate roles of challenge inspection and routine inspection. In the latter case there will need to be not only a system of data exchange, but also mandatory international on-site inspection to ensure confidence in initial declarations, in the destruction of stockpiles, in the destruction of production facilities, in the non-diversion of chemicals from the civil industry into weapons production, and in the operation of the single permitted facility for defence purposes. All of that, I believe, is common ground between us, even though the details still require extensive and complex negotiation. However, these routine verification measures should, taken together, provide confidence to all parties to the convention that others are complying with their obligations in respect to declared sites, facilities and stockpiles.

None the less we must recognize that concern may still be aroused about activities by States parties which cannot be resolved by routine inspection measures. We believe that States parties should therefore have the ability to resolve such matters by bilateral or multilateral co-operation, the convention, in other words, must have a fact-finding procedure which can invoke the authority of the Executive Council. We are encouraged by the degree of consensus which has already emerged within the Conference on this degree of consensus which has already emerged within the Conference on this type of co-operation, and which has been reflected in article IX of the draft convention, CD/636. Nothing I shall subsequently say today is designed to cast doubt on that degree of consensus, or to suggest that it reflects anything but a valuable achievement. We ourselves will work hard to build upon it, and we look to others with confidence to join us in that effort.

However, the convention will not be a secure and complete achievement, a truly lasting monument to arms control in which all who have participated in its negotiation can take justifiable pride, unless it is supplemented by one vital, additional measure: a stringent régime providing for inspection on challenge in exceptional circumstances. Such a régime, as has been said before by British Ministers and others, must act as the safety net to the convention, providing the mechanism of last resort whereby all States to the convention can feel truly assured that their security has been lastingly enhanced.

Challenge inspection must perform two roles, and the provisions governing it must make allowance for both. In the first case, its function is to prevent any breaches of the convention occurring in the first place. In other words, it must act as a major deterrent to any contemplated violation of obligations under the convention. It must make the probability that such violations would be discovered so likely that any States parties which might be so tempted would be discouraged from considering such acts. Such States would also, under a challenge inspection régime, have to take account of the likely reaction of other States, were they to attempt to conceal breaches by refusing a challenge inspection. It therefore follows that such an inspection régime must be as stringent as possible, but that the right in the convention to request such an inspection on challenge might -- we would strongly hope -- never to have to be invoked.

The second function of the régime is, of course, to provide the basis for an inspection should that be required. Here again, the most stringent provisions will be required, in order to fulfill the fundamental objective of challenge inspection. A weak and inadequate régime would be a recipe for a weak and inadequate convention, one which I trust no participant in the present negotiations would find acceptable.

Over the past two years a range of proposals have been made at this conference for implementing in treaty form the sort of ideas I have elaborated. The British Government first tabled its own proposals in February 1984 in the paper CD/431. Subsequently, we have seen other comprehensive proposals, notably those contained in the valuable United States draft treaty CD/500 and in the interesting paper from Pakistan CD/664. We have also taken account of the valuable discussions which have been going on in one of the working groups of the overall Committee which we have the privilege to chair this year, and I pay tribute at this point to the able work of Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia in this field. None the less we feel that there remains a clear and enduring difference of approach between many delegations here.

The purpose of the paper I am introducing today is to try to accommodate the concerns expressed by the various parties to the negotiations, and to establish a new basis for consensus which could then provide one of the several, solid pillars on which a successful convention must be based.

In summary our proposals envisage that each State party to the convention would have the right, in exceptional circumstances, directly to request a challenge inspection of another. The challenged State would then be under an obligation to demonstrate to others, and especially the challenging State, that it remained in compliance. It would be required to meet its obligation quickly and, it would be expected, by enabling a comprehensive investigation of the issue relating to compliance. However, in very limited circumstances there would be a right of refusal of direct inspection. In those circumstances a challenged State would propose alternative measures which would then enable the matter under consideration to be resolved.

I do not propose to go into further detail now on the specific provisions included in the new United Kingdom paper. These are spelled out at length in the paper itself and its accompanying annex. I trust that other delegations will find in them an acceptable response to their own preoccupations, and a sound foundation for consensus. I should however like to enlarge on three specific points.

First, our approach is based on the principle that in accepting any international agreement, a State voluntarily accepts certain obligations which implicitly affect its right to take sovereign action. A vital further principle follows from this. In order to provide confidence in any agreement it is in a nation's own interests to demonstrate to others that it is fulfilling the obligations it has assumed. I wish to underline that point. Were it not to do so, other States would be less ready to accept similar limitations on their own sovereign rights. On this basis, should any party request clarification or resolution of any matter causing doubts about compliance, each State party receiving such a request should be obliged to provide satisfaction to other States parties, and especially the requesting party, that it remains in full compliance with its obligations assumed under the chemical weapons convention.

Second, our proposal specifies a time-limit of 10 days for the provision of satisfaction. This is essential for two reasons. Confidence in the convention would rapidly be jeopardized if it was open to the requested State to draw out the time-scale by procedural delays. Once a suspicion of non-compliance had been aroused, it would have to be scotched urgently. The 10-day time-scale is also dictated by the risks that breaches could be subsequently concealed. For example, stocks of chemical weapons kept clandestinely could be rapidly moved to another site within a short time after a challenge. We therefore consider it wrong in all cases to demand prior multi-lateral consideration before initiation of an inspection, but of course the requesting State could exercise this option if it so wished.

Third, in our earlier United Kingdom paper of 1984 we recognized that in some very exceptional circumstances, which must be avoided if at all possible, a very limited right of refusal of direct inspection might form part of a challenge inspection régime. Such a right would have to be very restricted. Above all, it must not be allowed to detract from, or to weaken the funda-

mental obligation to demonstrate compliance. In such exceptional circumstances a State would have the right to propose alternative measures which would then enable the matter under consideration to be resolved. Were such alternative measures to fail in that endeavour, the State under challenge would still be obliged to find other ways to demonstrate its compliance. Otherwise, it would be failing in its fundamental obligations under the convention.

CD/PV.371

pp.4-5

Austria/Hinteregger

17.7.86

CTB
CW

The problem of adequate verification of a CTBT has played an important part in the deliberations on that question. We understand from our experts -- and the majority of the international community shares that view -- that verification, within reasonable margins, of compliance with a CTBT is technically within reach. Austria has actively participated in the Ad Hoc Group of seismological experts for many years. This Group has achieved notable progress in establishing a mechanism for exchanging seismological data to help detect and identify underground tests.

Those technological considerations, important as they are, cannot, however, in themselves produce a solution to what is a political problem. They can only ensure that the conclusion of an agreement is not obstructed by a lack of mutual trust. What is needed is the political will to conclude an agreement. That political will must be generated by a security philosophy of which arms control is an essential part.

The abolition of chemical weapons seems to be the field where major progress may be possible in the near future. We noted with appreciation that during the last sessions of the Conference on Disarmament the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons moved forward in such important areas as the definition of chemical substances, permitted activities, destruction of existing stockpiles, and key precursors.

Agreed verification procedures will, of course, constitute an essential element of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. The issue is complex and it is obvious that no 100 per cent effective procedure can be found. There is, however, no reason why the Conference should not be able to establish adequate verification provisions that are generally acceptable.

Austrian experts have taken part in the technical discussions initiated by this Conference and would be available for participation in a safeguard system on request.

CD/PV.371

pp.11

Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda

17.7.86

OS

In view of all these realities, with military and peaceful aspects mutually interconnected, we associate ourselves with the plan for the creation of a solid material, political and organizational foundation of "star peace" in the spirit of the three-stage programme of joint steps proposed by the Soviet Union on 12 June 1986. We consider it a realistic plan, starting with the thorough study of the needs of humanity concerning the uses of space

technology, with agreeing on the main directions of the qualitatively new co-operation and common projects for the peaceful uses of outer space, proceeding gradually to the establishment of the material basis for such co-operation through the development and build-up of the relevant space technology and, finally, resulting, by the end of this century, in the carrying out of specific programmes with the most effective application of space technology. We are attracted by the proposal to establish, by 1990, the World Space Organization, which could co-ordinate peaceful uses of outer space and verify compliance with agreements aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It would be possible to proceed to such verification without undue delay since, in the first stage, the WSO could use technical means offered by countries active in space exploration.

CD/PV.371

pp.13

Japan/Imai

17.7.86

CW

It is in such a spirit that the delegation of Japan is today tabling Working Paper CD/713. This paper contains proposals and analysis which are primarily scientific, which I have had opportunities to discuss in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Also, back on 3 April, I had an opportunity to recall general principles which should run through the process of considerations of our chemical weapons agreement. Then, I called it a matter of quantitative consistency, so that various arrangements under the convention should be based on a accepted mathematical principle and thus be logically consistent. What this Working Paper proposes is the open recognition of such a need, and that the mathematical accountancy aspect of chemical weapons-convention verification be clearly established. The rest is, I hope, self-explanatory.

But in case it is not, I would like to give a short preview. We all know that in taking opinion polls on a national scale, one can somehow make telephone calls to several hundred persons and derive from such an exercise the entirety of the national trend with something like 90 per cent confidence. This is because the samples are carefully chosen on a "random and stratified basis" so that mathematical theory will ensure that there can be high confidence estimates on a population 100,000 times larger than the sample. Random sampling is a technique used in the quality control of industrial products, thus avoiding the need for testing and checking all the products, day in and day out. Random and systematic components together make up what is called statistical sampling. What is being discussed in our working paper is that by making use of the principles and theories of statistical sampling, we may establish a credible verification system regarding chemical weapon depots, destruction facilities and production facilities. In some cases, continued on-site inspection may be required, but then one may also employ tamper-proof remote sensing devices.

One additional comment I would like to make on this occasion is that we need not elaborate all the details of the chemical weapons convention at the Ad Hoc Committee meetings. It is the view of my delegation that the Committee may best serve its purposes by identifying governing principles for the different portions of the chemical weapons convention. Thus, we do not think that the Conference or its subsidiary body should be too much concerned with details regarding random sample verification and its statistics or the fine

details concerning rights and obligations of international inspectors. We believe that once the governing principles have been worked out, it is better and more effective that the filling out of details be left to groups of competent experts.

CD/PV.371

pp.14-16

Sweden/Ekeus

17.7.86

CTB

Several years have gone by since the Conference was in a position to address in substance the question of nuclear-test ban. Although it was not possible in 1982 and 1983 to make much headway, some very useful proposals in the form of Working Papers and other documents were introduced to the Ad hoc Working Group. Due to its limited mandate the Group could not carry out a full examination of all material of relevance to a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Questions of verification, however, were dealt with at some length and some limited progress was achieved.

In the field of verification, important developments have taken place since then. In 1984 the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts carried out a technical test concerning the exchange and analysis of Level I data providing a vast amount of experience, previously unavailable. The test also showed that most of the procedures developed by the Group with regard to Level I data worked satisfactorily, but that further developments were necessary in some areas.

As has been recognized by all participant States, A CTB must be verified. The main means of verifying compliance with a nuclear-test ban is through a world-wide network of seismological stations, with sufficient sensitivity and with a capacity to discriminate with a high level of confidence between events of natural origin and those that are man-made. This again calls for international co-operation far beyond what could be envisaged if only the nuclear-weapon States were concerned.

The Swedish delegation today introduces a Working paper on Nuclear-Test-Ban Verification (CD/712). This paper contains an analysis of the technical aspects of nuclear testing and seismological verification. A number of working papers has been presented to the Conference during the last year, elaborating upon the detection capability of seismic methods with regard to underground explosions, for example the United Kingdom's Working Paper CD/610, Japan's Working Paper CD/626 and the Federal Republic of Germany's Working paper CD/624. These working papers discuss evasion scenarios and verification problems related to small nuclear explosions. In the Swedish paper the problems raised are analysed. The overall conclusion is rather optimistic. It should be possible to create a verification and compliance system that would provide enough confidence that the parties to a nuclear-test ban observe their obligations with regard to underground testing. But it is also clear that a considerable amount of work on a system for verification of a test ban remains to be done. And that system should be, as stressed before, an international one. In this light, it should be a matter of highest priority to immediately start substantive work on creating such a system, all the more so as this task even when addressed in good faith and with the best of intentions, might require a couple of years to be successfully resolved.

The new Working Paper by Sweden contains a description of some basic characteristics of nuclear weapons in order to clarify the validity of yield thresholds for halting development of nuclear weapons. It is concluded that a ban on tests above a certain threshold does not prevent the development of warheads with yields far above that threshold. However, it is also argued that tests with yields significantly lower than one kiloton would be of limited interest from the point of view of the general weapons development.

Furthermore, the Working Paper contains an assessment of the possibilities to discriminate between seismic signals generated by earthquakes and by underground explosions.

One conclusion is that it would be possible quickly to identify 90-95 per cent of all observed earthquakes by estimating their depths and their location and that, for the remaining seismic events, other discrimination techniques could be used. Such techniques are described in the paper. On this basis it is concluded that the probability is extremely low that a detected seismic event would remain unidentified after an analysis using all techniques. In fact, the seismological means of disclosing CTB violations are potentially so effective that only the remaining marginal uncertainty may be subject to further investigation by other means, such as on-site inspection.

Several evasion scenarios are considered, including all those described in some of the working papers mentioned earlier, based on efforts of either reducing seismic signals from nuclear explosions below the detection threshold or manipulating signals in such a way that explosions would be misidentified as earthquakes. Technical requirements for detection and identification of nuclear explosions hidden by means of decoupling, multiple explosions or so-called "hide-in-earthquakes" are elaborated upon.

An important part of the Working Paper is devoted in network detection capabilities with regard to both global network and regional distances. The Working Paper discusses the need to design a prototype detection station and recommends that such a "CD monitoring station" should be developed and tested. An important concluding statement is that it could be possible to monitor nuclear-test explosions to any requested level. The verification limit depends primarily on the number of seismic stations used in the verification systems, their location and the technical performance of the stations.

CD/PV.372

pp.2-4

Norway/Kristvik

22.7.86

CTB

I have asked for the floor today to present a Working Paper on seismological verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, document CD/714. The introduction of this document takes place on the day of the tenth anniversary of the decision to establish the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. On 22 July 1976 the then Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (the CCD) decided to establish this group to assist in the verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. May I, in that connection, pay tribute to the Group's first Chairman, the late Dr. Ericsson and the present Chairman, Dr. Dahlman of Sweden. Since 1976 Dr. Ringdal of Norway has been the Group's scientific secretary.

Before introducing the new Norwegian Working Paper I would like to underline the singular importance of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban in the multilateral disarmament process. To be truly comprehensive a test ban must prohibit both nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It must also be applicable to all States in all environments on a permanent basis. If these conditions are fulfilled a test ban would represent a significant contribution to the aims of both halting the nuclear-arms race and of promoting non-proliferation efforts. All possible efforts should, therefore, be taken to make concrete progress towards such a ban. The Norwegian Government thus welcomes the initiation of talks and expert level on nuclear testing verification issues between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States. It is to be hoped that these talks can pave the way for progress in this field. In addition, the Conference on Disarmament, as the single negotiating forum for global disarmament questions, should take up the substantive examination of specific issues of a nuclear-test ban, such as scope, verification and compliance, with a view to negotiation of a treaty. With this in mind, Norway last year co-sponsored a proposal for a concrete programme of work for a subsidiary body on agenda item 1. The suggested programme identifies issues which need to be addressed in detail by this Conference. It would inter alia include examination of technical aspects concerning detection and identification of very low-yield explosions and of explosions which are conducted in an environment that produces very weak seismic signal, e.g. underground cavities.

Some headway and positive development have taken place in the Conference on Disarmament over the last few years. The Norwegian Government thus welcomes the readiness of China to participate in a Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban. The 1983 Report of the Conference stated that it was generally recognized that an international exchange of seismic data constituted an essential element of a verification system of a nuclear-test ban. In March 1984 the Group of Scientific Experts presented a comprehensive third report, and it is hoped that the Group will be able to finalize a new report during its present session, which started yesterday. In this connection it is of importance that there now seems to be wide support for making use of relevant technological achievements in seismological verification of a test ban.

It is, in this field, of particular importance to take advantage of the rapid technological advances with respect to computer and data communication technology, which has opened up new possibilities to improve the effectiveness of a global exchange of seismic data. A primary objective of the workshop which Norway organized in June 1985 was to demonstrate the newly developed Norwegian Regional Array System (NORESS), which is a small-aperture seismic array designed to detect in particular small seismic events occurring at distances of less than 3,000 km and which incorporates some of the most recent technological and scientific advances in seismic array design. Document CD/599 of 20 June 1985 contains the conclusions which the Norwegian authorities drew on the basis of the demonstrations and briefings during the workshop. At that time only preliminary results from the NORESS data analysis were available. NORESS has now been in full operation for more than a year. The Working Paper which I have the honor to introduce today summarizes a more

comprehensive assessment of the research results and their implications for the seismological verification problem. In particular, it contains a concrete proposal concerning utilization of small-aperture seismic arrays in a global seismological network.

The first year of NORESS experiences has confirmed the assertion that automated data processing will be essential at stations in a global network, given that it will be necessary to process the large number of low-magnitude seismic events occurring world wide. Thus, the automatic detector at NORESS has registered about 40,000 seismic signals during the first year, or more than 100 per day. The ability of an array to separate between local and remote seismic events is a most important feature which will greatly facilitate the processing of Level I data from a future global network at the international Data Centres envisaged by the Group of Scientific Experts. Although NORESS was designed for optimum performance in recording seismic events within a 3,000 km distance, a large number of events at greater distances are also being detected by the array. In fact, for many regions of the world, the small NORESS array approaches the teleseismic detection capability of the much larger NORSAR array, which has been in operation for 15 years and which is one of the world's largest seismological observatories. This is an observation of major importance, as it shows that the well-known benefits of using large and medium sized seismic arrays for detection purposes might be translated into arrays deployed over a very small geographical area, when emphasis is placed on high signal frequencies.

A global seismological network along the lines first proposed by the Group of Scientific Experts would comprise a variety of stations offered by the host countries participating in the envisaged international seismic data exchange. The Group has also recognized the need for such modernization and standardization. The NORESS system offers an example of how this could be achieved, taking into account the most recent developments in seismic instrumentation, automatic data processing and telecommunications technology. It thus includes considerable flexibility with respect to array configuration, sensor spacing and the number of array elements. Accordingly, the first year of operation of NORESS has demonstrated that the utilization of small-aperture arrays can provide a significantly increased capability within a global seismological network, as recommended by the group.

With the envisaged station network being supplemented by small-aperture arrays, the performance of such a global system would be greatly enhanced. This applies in particular to achieving reliable analysis of small seismic events, which is of crucial importance in ensuring confidence that a comprehensive nuclear-test ban is complied with. The NORESS concept offers a possible basis for standardization and modernization of a global seismological network to aid in the verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

Against this background, Norway proposes that the global seismological network, to the extent it is practically possible, incorporate the establishment of small-aperture seismic arrays. May I in that connection underline that NORSAR is prepared to offer technical assistance to seismological institutions interested in establishing such an array.

These legal instruments contain no provisions explicitly banning any arms race in outer space, totally prohibiting military activities therein, or banning all space weapons. For instance, the Outer Space Treaty, though prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in outer space, does not cover "non-nuclear space weapons" in its scope of prohibition. The fact that quite a few space weapons non-existent at the time of its formulation nearly 20 years ago have since appeared indicates that its arms control provisions are far from being adequate for the total prevention of an arms race in outer space. This shows that general provisions banning nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction alone are not sufficient and that the scope of prohibition should be extended to include all space weapons, i.e., all devices or installations either space-, land-, sea-, or atmosphere-based, which are designed to attack or damage space-vehicles in outer space, or disrupt their normal functioning, or change their orbits, and all devices or installations based in space (including those based on the moon and other celestial bodies) which are designed to attack or damage objects in the atmosphere, or on land, or at sea, or disrupt their normal functioning. Furthermore, though the Treaty stipulates that the Moon and other celestial bodies should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, it does not expressly provide that the entire outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects is another case in point. Though providing for the general liability of the launching State of space objects for damage caused by its space activities, the Convention is silent on the militarization of or the arms race in outer space, which threaten international peace and security, nor does it provide for the international liability for damage to other States caused by the testing, deployment and use of space weapons, or by other military activities in outer space. Consequently, this Convention cannot restrain the gradual militarization and weaponization of outer space. The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space provides another example. The Convention only stipulates that each State of registry shall provide the "general function" and additional information it wishes to furnish to the United Nations Secretary-General. As a result, though approximately two thirds of the satellites launched by the major space Powers are military satellites or used for military purposes, their military functions have not been specifically registered.

On the issue of verification, the provisions contained in some relevant international legal instruments on outer space are inadequate to ensure the effective monitoring of their compliance.

A review of the history of the quest for the CTBT reveals that a major impediment has been the question of verification and compliance and the associated issue of how to deal with co-called peaceful nuclear explosions.

While this Conference continues to consider the re-establishment of a committee to work on a CTBT there is something concrete and essential that can be decided upon and established now -- a global seismic monitoring network.

Such a network would be required for a future comprehensive test-ban treaty. The decision to establish it now would avoid the situation where when it is decided to bring a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty into existence we would be unable to that step because we had not done the necessary practical work and had not established the necessary means of verification.

For its own part Australia is upgrading its national seismological network so that it can play a significant role in a future global network.

It has long been recognized that a global seismic monitoring network lies at the heart of the verification régime needed to support a CTBT. The scale and nature of such a network has been the subject of detailed study in several forums including by this Conference's Group of Scientific Experts. In a few weeks time that Group of Scientific Experts will complete its report on the global experiment it conducted in 1984.

The Group has already concluded that most of the procedures it developed to collect exchange, compile and analyse the seismic level I data, worked satisfactorily in practice. But its Technical Test also revealed problem areas that will have to be addressed. These included improving the links to the World Meteorological Organization's Global Telecommunications System, particularly for countries in South America, Africa and the Pacific.

More recently, in August 1985, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany introduced Working Papers -- CD/626, CD/612 and CD/624 respectively. These papers have a common aim -- to create the best possible global network on the basis of existing seismic facilities and communications systems, and then to expand and refine that system progressively, to maximize confidence in its ability to detect and identify underground nuclear explosions. The Working Paper tabled by Norway today represents a very valuable contribution in this regard. Similarly the Five-Continent Peace Initiative includes a proposal to make available seismic facilities in the territories of the countries who have participated in that initiative. Their facilities are widely dispersed around the globe and would assist in monitoring a test ban.

The process of expanding and refining the initial network should focus, first, on the problem of maximizing the risk of detection even if attempts are made to test clandestinely in the ways addressed in the United Kingdom's Working Papers CD/502 and CD/610 and more recently, in the Swedish Working Paper CD/712.

Another important first goal would be to seek to ensure that the network was truly global in coverage. This approach would then facilitate identification of additional measures needed to ensure complete confidence in compliance with a CTBT including on-site verification provisions which the major nuclear Powers have agreed, since 1958, are needed to complement the seismic network.

We are convinced that the most effective way of building the global seismic monitoring network that is required would be for the Conference on Disarmament to decide to build that network now. What we need and indeed all we need is the political decision to recognize that what we already have in hand is the beginnings of a global network in the form of existing seismic

stations, means of communication and centres to process and analyse data, and to dedicate ourselves to the task of filling in the gaps and refining existing capabilities. This Conference on Disarmament can call the network into being by one simple act, that is, to express the will of the Conference that the network should exist. We propose that it takes action before the end of the present session.

In a Working Paper we have distributed to the Conference today, Australia formally proposes that the Conference on Disarmament take the following actions, firstly, decide to establish forthwith a global seismic monitoring network based on existing facilities and equipment. Secondly, pledge to make available to this network appropriate national facilities and equipment. Thirdly, invite non-member countries to make appropriate national facilities and equipment available to this network, and fourthly, task the Group of Scientific Experts to prepare, within six months, a plan of action for the further development of the global seismic network.

CD/PV.372

pp.11-13

USSR/Issraelyan

22.7.86

CTB

In its statement today, the Soviet delegation would like to address several aspects of verification of non-carrying out nuclear tests. This issue is still the focus of the attention of the Conference on Disarmament as well as of public opinion throughout the world.

We have repeatedly stated that the Soviet Union is open to verification that nuclear explosions are not being carried out, it is in favour of the most strict verification including on-site inspections and use of all achievements of seismology. We are ready to consider favourably any constructive proposals to this end no matter where they come from. In this regard there is a significant agreement between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the United States Natural Resources Defence Council under which American and Soviet scientists installed seismic equipment on Soviet territory near the testing site in the area of Semipalatinsk. This initiative once again proved the possibility of joint verification of the complete prohibition of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union welcomes this initiative of the Soviet and American scientists. Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated that "we are assisting and will be assisting the Soviet and American scientists in carrying out their initiative with the use of special equipment to verify that nuclear explosions are not being carried out."

The Conference on Disarmament is called upon to play an important role in resolving the problem of verification that nuclear explosions are not being carried out, and the Ad hoc Group of Seismic Experts is conducting its work within the framework of the Conference. Its regular session began yesterday on 21 July. The significance of the practical work of this Group stems among other things from the fact that all the prerequisites for the detection of any nuclear test with the help of seismic means of verification now exist. This is borne out, in particular, by the Working Paper of Sweden (CD/712), which contains a considerable amount of data in support of this important conclusion. Of special importance, in our view, is the statement in that paper to the effect that "it would be possible to principle to monitor nuclear tests explosions down to any requested level," as well as the conclusion that "the

ability to distinguish between explosions and earthquakes with the aid of seismological measurements is so good that it should in fact deter any State from conducting explosions in violation of a treaty". These statements are consonant with the Declaration of the Forum of Scientists for an End to Nuclear Testing, held in Moscow, which says that "The latest achievements in seismology combined with relevant, mutually-observed international procedures, including on-site inspection, provide a high degree of certainty that nuclear tests are no longer carried out". We fully share this conclusion drawn by the scientists.

It is especially important in these circumstances that the work of the Ad hoc Group of Seismic Experts should continue beyond the preparation of its Fourth Report. Our support for the continuation of the Group's activities stems from our interest in the earliest prohibition of nuclear tests. In this regard, there arises a question of its terms of reference or mandate -- in other words, what issues it has to deal with later. The Soviet delegation would like to make some comments in this connection.

At present, as a result of the intensive development of digital recording devices as well as systems of data transmission and processing in large computer centres, there arises a possibility of a broader use of the actual signal recordings, or Level-2 data as they are called, in the international system of seismic data exchange developed by the Ad hoc Group of Seismic Experts.

It is well known that conventional seismic stations can record industrial explosions of chemical explosives substances with a yield of even 20 to 30 tonnes at a distance of 2,000 to 3,000 kilometres. The information on the recording of such explosions is published regularly in seismological bulletins of the International Seismological Centre. It is natural that the use of Level 2 data for detection at stations and processing at international centres should further increase the possibilities for the international data exchange system to locate and evaluate the parameters of a source of weak seismic events.

Since its establishment the Ad hoc Group of Seismic Experts has accomplished much useful work in developing automatic procedures for the analysis of seismic data at stations and international centres. The Ad hoc Group's experts have organized and successfully carried out a number of international technical tests to transmit Level 1 seismic data, that is, signal parameters, from stations to the temporary international centres using the Global Telecommunications System of the World Meteorological Organization, and in some cases other channels of communication. These tests and especially the last one in 1984 in which 72 stations from 32 States located virtually all over the globe participated, have demonstrated that the procedures developed are in general effective.

In view of the existing practical possibilities in terms of means and methods of recording as well as procedures for the transmission and processing seismic information, the Soviet Union deems it appropriate to go on to more profound research into the possibilities of using Level 2 data in the international exchange of seismic data. We consider that the timely transmission of Level 2 data from stations to the centres and their processing at inter-

national centres will significantly increase the effectiveness of this international system of data exchange for the purposes of verification of compliance with a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests by all participants in the treaty.

We specifically propose that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should start to develop a system of prompt transmission on Level 2 seismic data which would serve as a basis for international seismic verification of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. That data would be promptly transmitted from seismic stations participating in the global network using satellite communication channels for processing at the international data centres. There would also be automatic data exchange between those centres, using especially allocated communication channels. In studying these issues, the relevant experience gained by specific States could be taken into account.

We also propose that an international experiment on the exchange of Level 2 data should be carried out using both the GTS/WMO channels and other possible channels. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should, in our opinion, be entrusted with the thorough preparation of such an experiment, which could be conducted in 1988, for example.

We hope that our new proposals will be appraised according to their merits by delegations, since they reflect our sincere desire to resolve as soon as possible all questions pertaining to seismic methods of verification that nuclear explosions are not being carried out. The Soviet delegation is certainly ready to study the proposals of other States to this effect, including those contained in documents CD/712, CD/714 and CD/717. Our main aspiration, one that is, we are sure, largely shared by delegations, is to use all the opportunities offered by the Conference on Disarmament, including the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts, to accomplish a noble task -- to ban nuclear explosions.

CD/PV.373

p.3

Peru/Morelli Pando

24.7.86

CW

There is no doubt that successful completion of our work in the short term implies firm political will, particularly from those who have the greatest responsibility because they are involved in the production of chemical weapons. As the Disarmament Conference is a forum for negotiating on disarmament in terms of its various priorities and not a forum to justify or explain the arms race, my country trusts that political will be displayed as soon as possible.

In this connection, it is clear that the establishment of a mechanism designed to reduce mistrust or fear among States by means of transparency concerning inventories of existing chemical weapons in various countries would help the ongoing negotiations. In order to overcome the conceptual problem, the information could be confined to anything that unquestionably is considered a chemical weapon, although everyone knows that this as well as any other difficulty can be overcome given political will.

With regard to the various elements which are to become part of the future treaty, my delegation feels that it is worth making the following comments. First, the prohibition should be complete and without any

distinction between States parties. Second, in the likely case that some States will remain outside that multilateral instrument, the prohibition should also include all forms of co-operation which may make it possible for a third party to manufacture such weapons of mass destruction. Third, the verification system should be designed to guarantee destruction of existing chemical weapons and also to avoid their development and production, in view of the risk of timely detection, whether covertly or using lawful means. Fourth, the treaty should establish an international body to carry out the verification measures as well as routine and challenge inspection activities. Fifth, there should also be established a mechanism for verification in cases where the use of these weapons of mass destruction is suspected.

CD/PV.373

pp.8-9

GDR/Rose

24.7.86

OS

In all disarmament negotiations and deliberations the issue of verification is emphasized, by some representatives -- sometimes so intensely that the real subject is pushed into the background. Let us briefly consider the issue of space weapons also from the angle of verification.

One can concede that verification of the prohibition of research is difficult to implement. But it begins to be feasible, at the latest, with testing weapon capability. Therefore the cycle of development should be stopped, at the latest, at that stage. An agreement should prohibit the testing phase because after the transition into production compliance with an agreement on prohibition would hardly be verifiable any more.

Let us take ASAT weapons, for instance. On 13 September 1985 the United States demonstrated a new ASAT system. Further tests are planned. The deployment of an ASAT system with two squadrons of F-15 fighters is intended to be effected in 1987. If it were possible to obtain a treaty on the prevention of ASAT weapons in the near future, before the planned further testing of the complete system, then the observance of that treaty could be easily verified. Even national technical means would be sufficient. The situation in this field can change very quickly however. The verification of a possible prohibition would pose much greater problems after the demonstration of weapons capability. F-15 fighters and ASAT weapons can be stationed at many airports and easily be camouflaged. At advanced levels verification would become more and more difficult. In this respect, the general awareness corroborated by practical experience is particularly true: the earlier the conclusion of an agreement, the easier and more effective the verification.

During the deliberations we have had so far in the Committee, several delegations have emphasized the importance of certain terms and asserted that the solution of substantial problems depended on them. I see no obstacle to a constructive discussion of definitions if they are necessary for the agreements to be worked out. The point is to orient our work more towards practical objectives. Therefore we advocate setting about elaborating without delay an agreement or several agreements on the prevention of the arms race in outer space.

The USSR has proposed as a first step to begin with the prohibition of ASAT weapons and the immunity of space objects. This seems to us a very realistic approach. A preparedness by the United States also to observe a

moratorium on ASAT weapons, as the USSR has unilaterally undertaken it since 1983, would considerably favour negotiations on that issue. Such a step would be all the more urgent as ASAT experiments already cause at the present time a number of interferences in peaceful activities in outer space.

The objective is clear but ideas are required on the ways and means to achieve it. Like other delegations, we concern ourselves with the question of what a treaty on the prohibition of ASAT weapons and the immunity of satellites would look like. Taking into consideration previous discussions at the Committee, a future treaty could contain in our view the following principle elements: firstly, outer space should be free of any weapon intended for use against space objects, second, any weapons system on Earth intended to be used against space objects has to be prohibited, third, a prohibition of the use of space objects as means to destroy, damage and disturb the normal functioning, or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States, fourth, a prohibition of the threat or use of force against space objects, fifth, any harmful effects on outer space should be prevented in order to preserve its attributes for further exploration and peaceful utilization, sixth, unintentional interference with the functioning of space objects should be minimized, seventh, the free access of any State to outer space in accordance with the principles of international law should be guaranteed.

During the process of deliberation and negotiation, terms such as "space objects", "outer space" etc. would have to be defined for the purpose of that treaty. a system of verification measures would have to be agreed upon, too.

CD/PV.373

p.13

FRG/Wegener

24.7.86

CTB

Working Paper CD/688 submitted by Argentina is equally noteworthy and encounters a number of concerns and purposes of my own delegation. On the basis of its well-known views of the nuclear dilemma, as specifically expressed in the New Delhi Declaration of January 1985, the Argentine delegation recognizes the need for measures -- even though they may be interim measures -- aimed at reducing the risk of a nuclear war. Many of the detailed measures that are here recommended merit a detailed review in our Conference with a view to arriving at common positions. In good part, these may not be too difficult to achieve. May I indicate certain elements of these comprehensive views which have particularly struck my delegation.

In its discussion of a nuclear-weapon-test moratorium -- although the difficulties with this idea are well known -- it is noteworthy that the Argentinian Paper insists on effective verification arrangements, even in a moratorium context. The emphasis on the importance of the ratification and strict observance of arms-limitation agreements, and the fullest use of the consultation procedures provided for in such agreements, meet with my delegation's complete approval. In another passage of the Paper an interesting distinction is made between the deployment of nuclear weapons in areas which are already part of the nuclear power equation, and those areas which have so far remained free of the confrontation between military alliances. The main emphasis of the Paper is placed on a large array of confidence-building measures, where recourse to the peaceful settlement of dispute, the extension of the existing agreements and mechanisms of rapid communication between nuclear-weapon States in time of emergency and other negotiable measures for

the reduction of the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war are cited. It is particularly noteworthy that the Working Paper of Argentina explores, in an initial fashion, the possibilities for broadening existing risk reduction agreements between nuclear Powers to multilateral agreements, for which this Conference might indeed provide proper framework. Equally, in praising language contained in the Joint Statement of the two Geneva summit partners for the establishment of risk reduction centres, the Working paper by Argentina explores the possibilities of crisis control centres to be established in and by non-nuclear countries, thereby acknowledging that the current threat, especially to third world countries, is not merely of a nuclear quality, and that crisis prevention and crisis management in the third world should be one major focus of our attention.

CD/PV.374

pp.4-9

Netherlands/van Schaik 29.7.86

CTB
CW

We all are familiar with a fourth agreement against a test ban, which is not related to the merits of a ban as such, but rather to the question whether and to what extent a test ban can be verified. In our view, verification is, of course, very important, even essential, but we should always be aware that it is only a means to an end: to ensure compliance with a treaty. Verification will, for technical reasons, seldom ensure compliance 100 per cent, whatever the subject of the agreement may be. In matters of disarmament, adequate verification means that, to the extent feasible, a verification régime must be established which will at least greatly reduce the number and the size of the loopholes through which a malevolent country may wish to wriggle.

In case a 100-per-cent assurance cannot be achieved, adequate verification may be defined as a level of verification beyond which the military advantage of successful cheating would be disproportionate to the political risk of being caught "red-handed".

It is, to say the least, not an easy task to define at what level of technology such "adequate" verification would be ensured. But let us not forget that, even if we have determined that level of technology, it requires another major step before technology is actually deployed, and this of course at considerable expense. The Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts, meeting again during these weeks, is undertaking the arduous work of designing an international seismic monitoring network and it has even initiated field testing. We hope agreement can be reached on communication techniques of a higher technological level to be introduced in this network.

National technical means of verification have tremendously improved over the past few years. Once progress is being made towards a CTB and if the political decisions are then taken to go ahead with the deployment of seismic measuring devices and the establishment of a corresponding institutional network, an "adequate" verification régime can certainly be designed. We assume that the identification and verification threshold can, in fact, be reduced to levels that will prove to be "adequate", acceptable, probably well below 1 kt.

In this context, the interesting statement made by Ambassador Issraelyan a week ago is relevant. We shall study his proposals carefully. But let me now say that we would welcome Soviet participation in work on the incorporation of the exchange of Level II data in the system.

To some extent we must in these verification matters rely on the adage that the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. We trust that, once the network can be tested on an operational basis, a satisfactory basis for the solution of the verification issue will be found, even if centred only on tests in the United States and the Soviet Union.

We took note with interest of the agreement reached between groups of American and Soviet scientists to install seismic monitoring equipment near a nuclear-test site in the Soviet Union. We understand this agreement is being implemented. The use of on-site instruments may reduce the threshold at which nuclear explosions are detected and identified and may yield data necessary for better calibration of instruments measuring the strength of such explosions.

While we do not consider the objections I referred to as convincing arguments against a CTB, they should, of course, be addressed seriously. An alternative approach, seemingly bypassing all those difficulties, has been to halt tests unilaterally, to declare a moratorium. A moratorium can, under appropriate circumstances, constitute a confidence-building step towards the conclusion of a verifiable agreement. With a unilateral moratorium a degree of self-restraint is demonstrated. We have, therefore, in itself appreciation for the moratorium that the Soviet Union announced a year ago, and has since that time extended till the beginning of next month. But the Soviet moratorium has in our view not been effective, to the extent that it did not provide us with an answer to the questions raised by the implementation of a verifiable test-ban treaty. It did not provide us with an answer to the arguments against a test ban, to which I referred earlier.

Unfortunately, past experience with moratoria, even applied by only three parties, has been that they ended in a breakaway, leading to an explosive outburst of new series of tests, rapidly making up for tests temporarily renounced. As a matter of fact, in August it will be 25 years ago that the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom ended a moratorium on nuclear tests, respected up to them, in a spectacular way and turned it into its reverse. We must conclude that moratoria can never be a substitute for a bilateral or a multilateral agreement on a comprehensive test ban, laying down the details of scope and verification.

The question with which we are faced is now to reconcile two positions. One is: "test ban first, disposal of nuclear arms later", and the other: "disposal of nuclear arms first, test ban later".

In the past, suggestions have been made at the Conference on interim measures, in particular on a threshold treaty. I do not now wish to enter into the merits and the drawbacks of the idea of a threshold treaty, but I wish to point out the risk that, if such a treaty were a multilateral treaty, open for accession by non-nuclear-weapon States, it might provide those countries with legal, or at least moral, arguments for taking up testing under the threshold level set by the treaty. Since a multilateral CTBT ought to

strengthen the non-proliferation régime, we think countries should beware of interim régimes on a multilateral basis. A CTB should be truly comprehensive, including a ban on so-called peaceful nuclear explosions.

My authorities have reached the conclusion that any interim approach towards the goal of a multilateral CTB should involve only the States that are responsible for the bulk of nuclear test explosions. Such an interim approach should furthermore aim at meeting to the extent possible all objections that have thus far come to light.

It is with these considerations in mind that the Netherlands has reached the following conclusions on this point.

First, we wish to encourage the United States and the Soviet Union -- I repeat -- to continue the discussions on verification issues that have just started. These countries should, as soon as possible, reach agreement on terms that permit the ratification of the threshold treaties (TTBT and PNET). If the Soviet Union were to allow the United States to undertake some calibration measurements in the vicinity of relevant Soviet test sites, this will certainly be conducive to reaching such agreements. The President of the United States made an offer to the Soviet Union last year for Soviet scientists to acquaint themselves with the measuring techniques of the Corrtex type. We still hold the view that the Soviet leaders should positively respond to this offer, thus opening the door to the ratification of these treaties.

We are encouraged by the admission to the Soviet Union of a group of American seismologists, to which I referred earlier. We understand they have installed measuring devices near Semipalatinsk. Although these devices are far away (150 km) from the actual test site and it is not clear whether they will continue to function once the Soviet Union will resume its nuclear tests, we do hope this new event can be considered as signalling an encouraging change in the Soviet position on on-site inspection in general.

Permit me now to make a few remarks on chemical weapons. Recently various speakers have observed that negotiations on chemical weapons have received a fresh impulse, but that the tempo at which the negotiations are conducted is still too low. We believe that, in fact, there is every reason to step up our efforts in order to achieve tangible results.

It may partly be a question of how quickly Governments react to new positions adopted by other delegations at this Conference. It would be of great importance if Governments not only showed more flexibility, but also showed that flexibility at the appropriate time. I may take as an example the very interesting statement made on 15 July by the British Minister of State, Mr. Renton, who indicated a new approach for the procedures to be followed in face of a request for challenge inspections. My Government, after careful study of this proposal, has reached the conclusion that this new proposal offers an appropriate basis for dealing with this thorny issue. Whereas the proposed provisions ensure stringent rules that do not permit a country to get away with a simple negative reaction to a request for challenge inspection, it at the same time also prevents challenge inspections becoming the rule. An

inappropriate use of the challenge inspection clause, should be avoided, so as to ensure a balanced implementation of the treaty.

Recent contributions to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee from various delegations are a promising signal of the interest delegations take in the work on chemical weapons. I mention the very useful document CD/713, chemical presented by Ambassador Imai of Japan, about quantitative aspects of a chemical weapons convention. The basic conclusion in this Paper, namely that in various chemical facilities verification can be assured by taking a surprisingly small number of random samples, is encouraging. It would mean that, according to this method, intrusiveness can be kept at a modest level.

The Working Papers from Norway submitted to the plenary as CD/702, CD/703, and CD/704 on the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, are again proof of the long-standing high quality of the research conducted by Norway in this field.

The problem of chemical weapons production facilities was addressed in the statement of Ambassador Issraelyan on 22 April last. We consider this contribution as a modest but constructive step forward. We hope that other important aspects of this problem will receive also due attention.

We welcome the document presented by the United States on the chemical stockpile disposal problem (circulated under CD/711). This paper provides us with a great amount of interesting and hitherto unknown details about location and composition of chemical stockpiles in the United States. It would, indeed, be important if other countries will follow suit by providing us with information on the stocks located in their country.

CD/PV.375

p.8

Czechoslovakia/Cima

31.7.86

CTB

Speaking about the problem of nuclear testing, it is impossible to avoid mentioning that one nuclear country has been refrained from nuclear-weapon tests for practically one year now. We consider the unilateral Soviet moratorium an unprecedented, bold step which clearly indicates the readiness of the Soviet Union to stop nuclear testing and to approach that problem with the necessary courage. Its introduction and repeated prolongations were welcomed world wide. These are deeds, not words. We deeply regret that other nuclear countries, especially the United States, have, as yet, not reacted positively and have not joined the moratorium. We do not accept arguments that the moratorium is unverifiable and cannot replace a negotiated ban on nuclear testing. According to our knowledge no one has ever suggested that such a moratorium should replace a permanent ban. As to its verifiability we consider that, with the present technical means, the Earth has become too small to hide nuclear explosions even under its surface, especially if those technical means are used rationally and in mutually agreed, international co-operation. In any event, we would still like to believe that some positive reaction to the Soviet moratorium from other nuclear countries might be forthcoming. We would deeply regret it if, one day, we had to look back at it as a lost opportunity.

CD/PV.375

pp.12-13

Yugoslavia/Vidas

31.7.86

CTB

We welcome the news about the ongoing talks between the United States and Soviet experts on nuclear-test-ban issues and hope they will be instrumental in removing obstacles to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. We also note as a positive development that a non-governmental group of American scientists was invited by the Soviet Academy of Sciences to install, together with the Soviet scientists, a monitoring station at a nuclear-test site in the Soviet Union. This is proof that monitoring will not be a difficult task to perform once a decision has been made to this effect by the countries concerned. It has been recognized that for a test ban to be effective it must be global and verifiable, and that the main means of verifying the compliance of a nuclear-test ban is through a world-wide network of seismological stations. In order to be effective, such a verification system must be based on the widest possible international co-operation that would provide sufficient confidence that the parties to a nuclear-test ban observe their obligations with regard to underground testing.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has so far provided a vast amount of useful experience in this field and is continuing with further scientific analysis and development of necessary procedure. Its task is not yet completed and we understand that fresh efforts are needed before it can recommend more definite solutions. My delegation wishes to express its appreciation for the useful work this Group is performing.

Many scientists believe, and we share their belief, that existing technological devices make it possible to distinguish to a high degree between nuclear tests and natural seismic events. This is an encouraging deduction pointing to the possibility of establishing a global seismic monitoring network even prior to the conclusion of an NTB treaty and as its most direct preparation. There should be no technical difficulties in accomplishing this task. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts could contribute considerably to speeding up the whole process of monitoring and conclusion of the Treaty if it would work out a plan and programme regarding the number, location and type of monitoring stations to be installed and utilized in the territories of individual States. We do not see any reason why this should not be undertaken right away.

CD/PV.376

pp.3-4

Canada/Clark (letter)

5.8.86

CW
CTB

In the effort to negotiate a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, there were several welcome developments during the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. The United States delegation made an important clarification of its thinking on how a treaty might apply to differing social systems. The USSR delegation made new and positive substantive proposals relating to certain aspects of verification of a treaty, which my Government hopes will soon be supplemented by further proposals dealing with other aspects of verification. The Canadian Government hopes also that the important recent United Kingdom initiative will facilitate a convergency of views on the sensitive and vital issue of challenge inspections. Under energetic and notably competent chairmanship, the Ad Hoc Committee has made further progress toward resolving some of the more difficult technical issues. The Canadian

delegation submitted two working papers as a contribution to the collective effort. The holding by the Netherlands of a workshop relating to verification of non-production, as well as the broad attendance at that workshop, was gratifying and encouraging. It is important that the momentum thus generated be maintained, including through inter-sessional work to the extent practicable.

The issue of a ban on nuclear tests has properly continued to occupy a prominent place in the Conference's agenda. The negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a fundamental objective of the Canadian Government. We were therefore disappointed at the failure to agree on a mandate for a subsidiary body on this question, which might have permitted practical work in preparing the ground for the negotiation of such a ban. This session, nevertheless, was not without positive developments. We have noted carefully, and welcome, the recent Soviet statement indicating a forthcoming approach on technical and institutional matters relating to the establishment and operation of a global seismic monitoring network. We are also pleased that the USSR and the United States of America are holding expert level discussions on the nuclear test issues. Australia's call for a decision to establish an international seismic network is wholly consistent with Canada's longstanding concern to develop means for reliably verifying a test ban. The Conference on Disarmament is aware that we are upgrading a seismic array in our own northern territory and have commissioned other related research, and that we will be conducting a technical workshop in Ottawa this autumn, at which we hope Conference members will be widely represented. In the Canadian view, a gradual incremental step-by-step approach will be required if a comprehensive test ban is to become a reality. We intend to pursue vigorously our efforts to this end in the Conference on Disarmament and in other forums.

CD/PV.376

pp.12-13

Indonesia/Sutowardoyo

5.8.86

CW

We are also grateful to the Netherlands Government for organizing the workshop on verification of non-production of chemical weapons in Holland last June, which has been very instructive and useful and, I might as well say, has helped to advance our work on this important question. I should like to make use of this opportunity to express my Government's appreciation to the Dutch Government for having taken the much-needed initiative.

Some major issues still need to be resolved to justify optimism at this stage about the prospect of an early conclusion of our work on chemical weapons. Indeed the questions which remain are of a nature which might daunt less hardened spirits. Take, for instance, the question of challenge on-site inspection in the context of Article IX which is being dealt with in Working Group C, of which we feel honoured to have a member of the Indonesian delegation acting as its Chairman. Further intensive work is still required for its final solution. But, on the other hand, let us consider who would have dared to predict even at the beginning of our session this year, that by this time we would have reached the stage in which we are finding ourselves now.

Although some key issues of a future convention such as scope, definition and criteria remain to be solved, it is apparent that the major area of controversy lies in the subject area of Article IX. The Working Papers presented by the delegation of Pakistan [CD/664] and the delegation of the United Kingdom [CD/715] in an obvious attempt to reconcile the divergent perceptions on this issue, are useful contributions which merit careful study. In this connection it is of paramount importance for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to act in unison to consolidate the achievements of Working Group C, which performed useful work under its able Chairman, Mr. Wisnomoerti of Indonesia. In Annex III of its report on Article IX especially formulations presented for a procedure for requesting a fact finding mission could be considered as a valuable point of departure for future work.

In this context may I draw the attention of the Conference to some relevant issues that may be important in the resolution of the complex issues of verification and compliance. It has been generally acknowledged that absolute transparency within a chemical weapons convention is neither necessary nor realistic. The military significance of chemical weapons to the nuclear-weapon States dependent on the strategy of nuclear deterrence is obviously not a core issue. And yet to insist on the most rigorous standards of verification for these weapons raises doubts on their relevance to actual security needs. An intrusive and elaborate system of challenge inspection is redundant in the light of the efficacy of certain national technical means available to the two major alliances, some of which have been used adequately to monitor existing treaties. A rigid strait-jacket system of challenge verification could become politically destabilizing in a context of a tense and sensitive political climate not only between major alliances but more so in regional situations where accusations and counter accusations can become the order of the day. Such a verification machinery will be difficult to operate in the best of times.

These reasons, inter alia, aptly demonstrate the need for compromise and realism. We are confident that a package which could include elements involved in the various verification methods propose, viz. "systematic continuous", "continuous random", "continuous regular", "fact finding", "on challenge" etc., could be reasonably put together if the political will exists to install an adequate system of verification to ensure compliance. After all it is clear that when there is no political will States could even withdraw or implicitly violate existing Conventions.

There are other important issues, albeit not as central as the verification issue, on which the attention of the CW Committee should be focused sooner rather than later. The question of herbicides has all along had a relevance in the negotiations of a chemical weapons ban. However this important question has not been addressed at all during this session. Ever since herbicides were used as chemical agents in hostilities, the danger of its use again is not the remote possibility that we can dismiss. A simple prohibition clause prohibiting the use of herbicides as a method of warfare against an adversary within the convention of chemical weapons or as an integral part of the convention will certainly act as a deterrent for its use

in hostilities in future satisfying the legitimate concerns of countries which depend so vitally on agriculture, the tree crop sector and natural cover.

The chemical industry in many developing countries like Sri Lanka cannot be compared in extent or content with those in the developed or industrially advanced countries. Our chemical industry is largely concentrated on petro-chemicals, fertilizer, pesticides, synthetic fibres, dyes or paints. In some cases the industry is under multinational control. Therefore the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should also take cognizance of the activities of multinational and transnational corporations in particular in the deliberations over Article V [CW production facilities], Article VII [National Implementation Measures], Article IX [Consultation, Co-operation and Fact Finding] and in other relevant articles. Also, in this context, in developing countries, the verification machinery envisaged under the convention should not be a burden on the already hard pressed economies of developing countries. Multinational corporations could contribute towards sharing the burden with the expertise available to them.

CD/PV.377

pp.8-11

USSR/Issraelyan

7.8.86

OS
CTB

The Soviet Union sees the WSO as a universal inter-State organization with its own charter in the form of an international treaty, associated with the United Nations through a co-operation agreement. The Organization would co-ordinate the implementation of specialized programmes and be financed primarily by countries possessing a major space capability and by other economically developed States.

The WSO's efforts would be directed towards the peaceful exploration of outer space and verifying the observance of agreements on preventing the spread of the arms race into space as they are concluded. To exercise such control, it would initially use technical facilities granted by space Powers, and later its own facilities.

The twenty-second session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to detect and identify seismic events finished its work last week. Unlike a number of previous sessions of this important body, this time the Ad hoc Group produced many useful results. The report on the technical experiment conducted by the Ad hoc Group in 1984 to exchange Level I seismic data was agreed upon. This document sums up the results of long work in which not only seismic experts but dozens and hundreds of people in a number of countries of the world participated.

The results of the experiment, reflected in the report, should be thoroughly studied by experts of the States members of the Conference and other interested countries, but already now it can be said that they are a major contribution towards the establishment of a seismic system to verify a nuclear-weapon-test ban.

The Ad hoc Group will face still more important tasks in the future. As you know, the Soviet Union has recently proposed that the Ad hoc Group of

seismic experts should start work on the development of a system for the prompt transmission of Level II seismic data, which could serve as a basis for the international seismic verification of a nuclear-test-ban. It has also put forward the idea of carrying out an appropriate new international experiment.

We note with satisfaction that these ideas have been included in the recommendations unanimously adopted by the Ad hoc Group concerning its further work which, as it is stressed in the Group's report, should be conducted using all the latest advances in seismology.

I would like to express the hope that at its next session, proposed to be held in March 1987, the seismic experts will get down to the practical resolution of the new problems facing them. The Soviet Union, which considers the stopping and banning of nuclear tests a high priority issue of today and advocates strict verification of such a régime, will provide the necessary assistance to the Ad hoc Group in its important work.

CD/PV.378

p.3

Bulgaria/Tellalov

12.8.86

CTB

The nuclear-test-ban issue has been in the centre of our deliberations during the whole session. The unilateral Soviet moratorium, introduced on 6 August last year, has been extended several times over. This is a courageous step which has been widely welcomed as a convincing gesture of goodwill. It has broken standard military logic. It has proved that the Soviet Union means deeds. The moratorium has created conditions favouring the mutual renunciation of all nuclear tests. It is unfortunate that the other major nuclear Power has not, so far, deemed it necessary to consider this possibility seriously. Numerous appeals have been made to this effect by State leaders, public organizations and the United States Congress itself. The international community rightly expects that all other nuclear-weapon States will also respond positively to these appeals.

In this context, we welcome the new statement by the six Heads of State who advanced the Five-Continent-Peace Initiative. Their recent follow-up meeting in Mexico has produced some fresh ideas relevant to the nuclear test ban issue. The delegation of Bulgaria is going to study carefully the Ixtapa statement of the six States and reflect on it at another occasion. We believe that this new initiative deserves a constructive response by all States concerned, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States, with a view to an early cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and their consequent negotiated ban.

The USSR and the United States are now engaged in a dialogue on "the entire scope of issues related to nuclear testing". The conclusions of leading scientists and disarmament experts from different countries, the reports of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts, working papers and plenary statements in the Conference on Disarmament, have convincingly shown that there are no objective obstacles to a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban. The latest achievements in seismology, combined with relevant mutually observed procedures, including on-site inspections, provide a high degree of certainty that such a ban can effectively be verified.

In this context, we share the conclusions drawn in document CD/712, submitted by Sweden, in response to some doubts raised by individual delegations with respect to the adequacy of the existing monitoring capabilities. We welcome also the relevant analysis offered on 29 July this year by the distinguished Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands to the effect that objections to a CTB, based on concerns related to the nuclear weapons modernization, reliably testing and the wish to keep design laboratories alive, are not relevant to the problem we all face.

CD/PV.378

pp.8-11

India/Gonsalves

12.8.86

CW
CTB

One group of States in the Conference has quite blatantly suggested that the Conference can legitimately hope to substantively tackle only the issue of a chemical weapons convention. The progress that is being made in this area alone is sought to be cited as satisfactory evidence that the Conference is in fact discharging its responsibilities. It is of course true that there have been several important contributions on this subject and I would particularly like to thank the Netherlands Government for the valuable workshop it arranged in June. There has been general agreement that the Ad hoc Committee on this subject under the able stewardship of Ambassador Cromartie has made reasonable progress during the current year and it is gratifying to note the expression of hope on either side of the ideological divide that an agreed CW convention can be presented to the forty-second session of the General Assembly. We are ourselves considerably less optimistic. While we hear reports of useful bilateral super-Power exchanges on this subject we regret the persistent tendency not to share the results of these exchanges with the Conference on Disarmament. We have at the same time heard the complaint that participation in the work of the Ad hoc Committee is not adequately representative to ensure the conclusion of a convention acceptable to all. In our view this situation is in no way related to or responsible for the continuing sharp differences on verification and other issues between the parties possessing the largest stockpiles. These differences can be resolved only if they display a much higher degree of mutual confidence and accommodation than has been the case so far. There is thus much ground to be covered if we are to attain the goal of a CW convention. We cannot in any case satisfy the expectant international community with the assurance that the only issue on which we are registering some progress is chemical weapons more particularly since the role of these weapons in the global military strategies of the two alliances is essentially of a secondary if not marginal character.

A pressing preoccupation of the Six-Nation Initiative and the Group of 21 is the immediate commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Various reasons are advanced for rejecting this proposition. The first of these relates to the absence of adequate verification machinery. Our views on this matter have been stated in considerable detail earlier. Working Paper CD/712 submitted by the delegation of Sweden constitutes a very valuable contribution to our work in that it places verification issues in their proper perspective. Let me state quite categorically for the record that we are all interested in effective verification machinery. The Six Nations Meeting in Mexico last week made a concrete offer of assistance to achieve adequate

verification arrangements. These will be made available to the Conference. So far as the Conference is concerned the simple point is that we can sort out our differences on this question only if the political will can be manifested to establish an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate. That is sadly not the case. The second argument advanced is that a comprehensive test ban cannot be envisaged as testing is required to ensure the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. Our own understanding is that testing is being continued inter alia to develop an altogether new genre of weapons. The process of modernizing weapons by one side inevitably produces retaliatory action by the other and thus results in escalation of the nuclear arms race. The Six Nation Mexico Declaration of 7 August states that both the qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbates the arms race and both would be inhibited by a complete abolition of nuclear weapons testing. The argument about the maintenance of a credible deterrent if pushed to its logical conclusion would mean that a nuclear-weapon-test ban would cease to be a goal even in the long run. Such a posture violates existing solemn treaty commitments and cannot but disappoint the international community. It was particularly gratifying in this context to note how effectively the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands in his important statement on 29 July countered the familiar arguments in support of continued nuclear-weapon testing. In our view the moratorium on nuclear weapon testing which has been maintained by the Soviet Union for a year constitutes an important step forward and the Six Nations have earnestly urged the United States to reciprocate this gesture at least until the next super power summit as a preliminary towards negotiations on a comprehensive weapon-test ban.

CD/PV.378

pp.15-20

FRG/Wegener

12.8.86

CTB

Our own work has centered on one of the crucial problem areas of a CTBT: the prerequisites for its effective international verification. In the view of my delegation, the Conference has reached a remarkable momentum towards general acceptance of an effective international monitoring and verification system. This promising development, as we see it, is due to the efforts of many delegations who have all contributed important elements to a new and more refined view of test ban verification. These contributions -- notably by Japan, Sweden, Norway, Australia, my own delegation and lately the Soviet Union -- are all mutually compatible and supportive, in the sense that they have allowed us to proceed from the original and shared basic insight that an international seismic control network is indispensable for the operation of a CTBT, to far-reaching agreement on the configuration, extent and time element in the establishment of the system. We have thus jointly reached a further stage of conceptualization in the field of test ban verification.

Needless to say, the conceptual accomplishments which I will review subsequently could only have been achieved on the basis of the purposeful and dedicated contribution by the GSE over the last 10 years, a successful co-operative international endeavour that deserves to be clearly recognized.

The novel element in my own country's contribution to this new level of verification methodology, as presented in CD/612 and 624, has been its dynamic dimension. As I recalled extensively in a statement on 18 February, our proposal aims at the gradual establishment of a permanent global seismic monitoring network, based initially on the existing facilities, as used for,

and co-ordinated during the 1984 GSETT, but equipped with a built-in mechanism for geographical extension and further technical evolution in keeping with the advances of seismic technology. The advantage of this scheme, as we presented it, lies in its readiness for immediate application, its potential for gaining experience with long-term operations and for filling in its lacunae, as well as in its availability, at state-of-the-art-level, at the very entry into force of a CTBT, thus moving from a comprehensive monitoring device to a true verification system.

Our approach has been taken up most clearly by Australia in Working Paper CD/717, which endorses it, heightens the sense of urgency of its application, and offers a number of useful and welcome operational indices for its swift enactment. My delegation commends Australia on its proposal and advises its early consideration by the Conference.

Australia may have offered the most clear-cut endorsement of our dynamic approach, supplementing it in a welcome manner, but other delegations, in their presentations, have also demonstrated their express or implied support, confirming my delegation in its view that all current contributions to this topic are truly compatible and complementary. This is encouraging, the more so since there has been no reasoned opposition to our scheme.

Full compatibility can, especially, be recognized in the Swedish Working Paper CD/712, an admirable and knowledgeable compilation of present insight into the requirements of a global seismic network, testifying to the excellent scientific backstopping services which the Swedish delegation commands, one of the hallmarks of its exceptional contribution to the work of our Conference. The important achievement of CD/712 appears to lie in its call for -- and precise definition of -- prototype monitoring stations, along the lines my delegation has recommended, prototypes that could soon be emplaced, but then developed further in a dynamic mode.

Norway, in its Working Paper CD/714, provides recent topical information on the experience gathered by the newly developed Norwegian regional seismic array system NORESS, information not yet available in June 1985 when the Norwegian Government invited members of the Conference to visit NORESS. Norway's contribution is particularly significant in that it explores the interaction of regional small-aperture seismic arrays with a global network incorporating such arrays. The practical experiences with NORESS and similar regional arrangements provide a tangible input for the operability and continuous improvement of an effective global system.

Recent statements by Soviet speakers also indicate movement in the field of test ban verification. They clarify that verification, including on-site inspection, would not be an obstacle to the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. Advanced technology, including high performance data acquisition systems and fast real-time data communication installations capable of handling Waveform or Level II-data, is indispensable for any meaningful attempt to verify compliance with a CTBT, by way of a global network. It is therefore noteworthy that Ambassador Issraelyan in his intervention on 22 July announced that the Soviet Union was now prepared not only to accede to an in-depth discussion of the exchange of Level II-data in the context of the work of the Group of Seismological Experts (GSE) but also to engage in a practical test exchange of these data during a test run for which the Soviet

delegate envisaged the year 1988. This is good news. The crucial question of operability of a complex world-wide system of seismic data collection, communication and processing has thus been responsibly addressed. Although individual seismographic stations might work effectively, the task of operating in a reliable manner an interlinked system of as many as 50 to 100 seismic stations based in different countries and parts of the world and run by many nations and the communication of data to and from international data centres has not yet been satisfactorily resolved, as the report of the GSE on the technical test run in 1984 has shown. Thus we look forward with great expectations of the experiment proposed by the Soviet Union for 1988 that would, if successfully completed, represent a qualitative improvement in the field of verification both as to the characteristics of the data exchanged and as to the speed and reliability with which these data are transmitted. In order both to make the envisaged 1988 test run an unqualified success and at the same time to encourage even more States to participate in a test on a truly global scale, an additional and prolonged test run on the basis of the 1984 specifications, those technical difficulties that surfaced during the 1984 test run should be eliminated prior to the more demanding test in 1988.

Again, the new Soviet proposal appears in no way incompatible with our own approach. My delegation considers it gratifying that the Soviet delegation has taken this important step, moving closer to our own verification philosophy.

My brief review of some pertinent proceedings of our Conference, in the view of my delegation amply substantiates my initial claim: the substantial progress in our work towards a common concept and a common methodology have been achieved. It is this positive trend which has recently brought Chancellor Helmut Kohl to express the view of the Government of the Federal Republic that "the possibilities of verification should now cease to form the main obstacle for an agreement" on a nuclear-test ban.

Yet, even the conceptual progress which I have observed, and which provides ample justification for Chancellor Kohl's statement, does not resolve all remaining difficulties. Verification of a CTBT will not be an easy task, and nobody can rightfully proclaim that all inherent technical problems are reliably removed. The difficulties of discrimination between nuclear explosions and seismic events, seismic measurement uncertainties, the incomplete and uneven state of seismic facilities world-wide, the lack of in-country seismic networks in countries crucial to a CTBT, and, finally, potential evasive options, including cavity-decoupling, all persist.

These challenges will continue to be with us -- yet all these problems will, in our concept, be susceptible to gradual solution, on a continuous basis, in the framework of a dynamically conceived, self-perfecting monitoring and verification system.

One of the obvious criteria by which a verification system must be measured is its effectiveness in excluding concealed nuclear explosions. Like other delegations in their previous presentations, Working Paper CD/712 by Sweden does not seriously consider successful attempts at surreptitious breach of a CTBT as probable. There is no doubt that the technical reasoning behind this view is sound. Evasion scenarios will be extremely difficult to effect, and even the existing, let alone further capabilities of a global verification system will preclude that they become a frequent occurrence.

Yet the question remains posed: how should a future verification system look at evasion options? The important thing appears to be a balanced approach, in which far-fetched evasion scenarios are just as much avoided as a mere glossing-over of evasion possibilities that may be available to a potential offender.

The dangers of breach of treaty must be soberly assessed against the technical fact that today even very few and very small test explosions may confer upon the evader a significant military advantage, and may therefore become an attractive military option -- or, on the side of other parties to the treaty a very real security risk. The possibilities of evasion must therefore be taken seriously by all. An ideal verification system would exclude all variants of evasion. In a non-ideal world the challenge is to determine levels of efficiency and confidence which allow all future parties to find assurance. That task can be mastered on the basis of a calm, technically well-versed and responsible analysis of all possible evasion threats.

The gradual establishment and operation of a world-wide monitoring and verification system is not gratuitous. It demands the best, from all participants, in terms of material and scientific resources. In this perspective, it is desirable that States capable of doing so embark on a major effort as of now, in order to make the best possible input into the global endeavour. As a step towards substantiating its own commitment to a global system, the Federal Government has recently decided to intensify its co-operative efforts in the field of fast and reliable data exchange and storage of formally acquired seismic data. It currently finances, on a priority basis, the establishment and continuous operation of data analysis centres, as for instance the one installed at the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources in Hanover. By way of direct computer-to-computer links with other countries the Institute is in a position to exchange all relevant seismic data including waveform or Level II-data. GSE documents define as means of data exchange the whole range of communications, from postal mailing services to special-purpose satellite systems, while some national reports have shown that modern telecommunication systems can provide rapid exchange of the most complex data without any particular restrictions on the amount of the transmitting capacity. Yet, only a few years ago, only a limited number of countries were able to make full use of these techniques for seismic data transfer. Meanwhile, digital data networks have been established in many countries around the globe. One of these new telecommunication systems, the packet-switched-data network (PSDN), is presently available in more than 70 countries of the world. These developments have led the Federal Government to concentrate its research in the field of designing the hardware and software necessary to acquire, analyse and transmit seismic data including wave form data on direct computer-to-computer links. By designing German seismic data centres, specifically and from the outset, for open access and for remote data treatment via telecommunication links we want to share our specific knowledge in this field with interested seismic scientists from virtually any country. We explicitly request all members of the Conference to make use of this service which is described in a more technical and detailed manner in a Working Paper submitted to the GSE on 21 July last. By offering these services -- and in cases of particular interest by arranging visits of guest scientists to the participating installations the Federal Republic of

Germany hopes to add, in a significant and meaningful way, to the creation of an international seismic monitoring network, destined to become a reliable verification instrument in the context of a future CTB.

On the background of our work on verification here in the Conference, and on the basis of the developments I have described, the recent proposal of the Six Heads of State or Government at their meeting at Ixtapa, Mexico, takes on great significance. While a detailed study of their proposal remains to be undertaken, the commitment of the six participants to effective verification and on-site inspection is most welcome. The proposed practical steps for the implementation of an on-site verification system merit the attention of this Conference. Chancellor Kohl has -- in a letter addressed to the participants in the Ixtapa meeting on the eve of their reunion -- reiterated the Federal Government's commitment to work for the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban at the earliest possible moment. In his letter, the Chancellor has also conveyed his ideas on other current urgent issues of arms control and disarmament policy. His remarks will be of interest to delegations, and I have seen to it that copies are distributed while I am speaking.

In the context of verification we have noted the resurgence of plans to move towards a CTBT by way of interim steps. These take different forms. In the first place, the question of entry into force of the 1974 TTBT, and its companion piece, the PNET, is still of topical importance, and these particularly at a time when bilateral contacts on the future of these instruments have resumed. Taking the yield-threshold idea as a clue, and linking it with the problem of verifiability, the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Shimtaro Abe, in a now famous statement before this Conference advocated the negotiated introduction of ever lower yield limits, in keeping with the evolution of verification technology. This proposal is still before us. Over a number of years, my Government has also considered a number of possibilities for approximating a test ban through test limitations in the form of a negotiated interim régime.

On 11 April 1986, Chancellor Kohl urged that the two major Powers:

"could, as a first step, or as an interim solution, reflect on a limitation of tests. Thus, for instance, the tests required for the maintenance of the operationability of nuclear weapons could be confined to agreed, limited time intervals, and gradually be entirely discontinued in the framework of the negotiated reduction of nuclear weapons".

Now that these thought patterns regarding interim measures have become more frequent, they are emulated in many quarters, both private and official. There is thus reason enough for the Conference to establish their relative merit, and to explore their potential.

In any such discussion, the finality of the interim measure must be clearly kept in view, the further and obviously more rewarding perspective of a comprehensive test ban must remain visible. The important thing will be to visualize an interim measure as a sign of welcome movement in the right direction. The essence of such interim measures is that they would at least lead to less tests.

Interim measures, too, must be visualized in the perspective of the NPT. The legal constraints on the signatories emanating from that Treaty and from other internationally binding non-proliferation arrangements remain as unaffected by such interim agreements as the political constraints operating on the members of the international community generally.

The developments I have mentioned in this statement are welcome to my Government. They should help up to reach workable, universally acceptable solutions in our quest for a comprehensive, fully verifiable test ban. Effective verification is one indispensable prerequisite for a CTBT. Our purposeful concentration on this aspect must, however, not becloud the essential relationship between a test ban and the larger processes of nuclear disarmament. The views of my Government on this complex relationship are unchanged. May I again cite Chancellor Kohl who said earlier this year:

"In my view there is now a good opportunity for promising negotiations on a limitation and future cessation of nuclear tests, and on their verification. I would, however, like to state clearly that a test ban cannot be a substitute for a substantial reduction of existing arsenals of weapons."

Recently, in our midst, Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands has provided us with his views on the delicate interaction between nuclear disarmament and progress towards a CTBT. No matter whether one agrees with all his arguments, his closely reasoned analysis is certainly thought-provoking and calls for a detailed and full consideration by the Conference.

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p.5

Iran/Velayati

14.8.86

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In the meantime, it seems that the continuation of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq has drawn the attention of all nations towards the dangers emanating from such weapons and, contrary to other working groups of the Conference on Disarmament, we have been witness to a certain progress. Particularly in the current session on discussions related to the Convention on banning the production, deployment, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons -- although achieving a final result seems remote. Regardless of agreement on those kinds of chemical substances which can be turned into weapons and their inclusion in the Convention, the modalities and nature of the implementation of the provisions of the Convention about other countries and the way of compliance and verification have still not gained any definite agreement. It is true that if any country is given the right of verification whenever its local information provides it, this matter provides certain ground for abuse, but allowing this process to depend on the consent of the other party can also create practical impediments to the implementation of the Treaty. Recent proposals in this area can lead us to a breakthrough although we believe that an international committee should make the final decision and judgement on the verification of each case. Such a committee should give top priority to the verification and destruction of stockpiles and means of producing chemical weapons in those countries identified as users of chemical weapons.

I have asked for the floor wishing to make a few comments on the Progress Report on the twenty-second session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts which is being introduced today.

I first want to express the gratitude of my delegation to Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, for his successful efforts to finalize the Report on the Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test concerning the exchange of Level I data through the WMO/GTS system, conducted during late 1984. It was indeed a source of great pleasure that at last the Report was adopted with the consent of all the experts representing 24 countries, identifying both the achievements as well as points of future improvements in the data exchange. It is heartening to realize that such a global scale experiment, involving so much technical preparations and advance thinking by so many scientists, has come to satisfactory results. I would also like to take this opportunity to express appreciation to the World Meteorological Organization for making available the use of the Global Telecommunication System for the experiment, and for suggesting its even further use for high-speed data transmission.

At this session, the Ad Hoc Group has made an encouraging step forward. With regard to its future work, an agreement has been reached to begin preparations for "a modern international system based on the expeditious exchange of waveform (Level II) and parameter (Level I) data and on the processing of such data at International Data Centres".

As I stated in my speech of 8 April, Japan has taken the initiative for an exchange of Level II data with the co-operation of a number of other countries. During the recent session, informal but very fruitful consultations took place with like-minded delegations from non-aligned, socialist, Western and other countries regarding the actual manner of conducting Level II data exchange. We also presented national papers GSE/JAP/23 and 24.

The Progress Report says that a large-scale experiment on the exchange of Level II data must be carefully prepared on the basis of an analysis of national investigations and also of partial bilateral and multilateral experiments. This is a good reflection of the position which Japan has been advocating as a necessary forerunner of the future global test, and I appreciate that our initiative has been well received in such a manner.

In this connection, we welcome the Canadian call for holding a workshop of data communications experts in October this year. It is, in fact, in support of our initiative and we value that all interested countries are called upon to participate. On the basis of the arrangements for communication to be made by the experts at this meeting, we would proceed to the implementation of an exchange of waveform data on a co-operative national basis by the end of this year. We shall be very happy to report the results of this exchange to the next session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, thus consolidating the basis for a global test to be conducted in 1988.

The second document I mentioned at the outset, that is, on verification measures, starts as follows:

"It is the responsibility of the nuclear Powers to halt nuclear testing as a significant step to curb the nuclear arms race. The United States and the USSR, being the two major nuclear Powers, have a special obligation to initiate the process of nuclear disarmament by immediately halting their nuclear testing. To facilitate such an immediate step the six nations of the Five Continent Initiative are prepared to assist in the monitoring of a mutual moratorium or a test ban."

The way in which the assistance offered by the Six will be given is explained in the document. It looks basically at the verification of a moratorium in co-operation with the United States and the Soviet Union, which would be an important step in establishing an appropriate verification system for a treaty on the complete banning of nuclear tests. The two following possibilities are envisaged.

First, monitoring of existing test sites, which would be intended to ensure that they are not used for clandestine tests. Three sites are involved: Nevada in the United States, and Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya in the Soviet Union. These are quite small geographically, and could be monitored by a small number of seismic stations placed in the two countries, at or near the test sites. If it were possible to agree on the cessation of nuclear tests by both sides, the procedure envisaged in the document is set out as follows:

"Our six nations are prepared to establish promptly and in co-operation with the United States and the USSR, temporary monitoring stations at existing test sites and to operate them for an initial period of one year. All data should be available to the six nations and to the United States and the USSR. Data analysis could be a joint undertaking and preliminary analysis would be done at the sites. Monitoring of test sites by instruments installed on-site would provide an extremely high sensitivity down to small fractions of a kiloton and even tones of explosives".

The second hypothesis considered in the document is that of the monitoring of the territories of the United States and the USSR outside the test sites, which, as stated in the document, would be necessary to ensure that nuclear explosions are not conducted and that natural earthquakes are not misinterpreted as clandestine nuclear test explosions. Here the authors of the Mexico document indicate that: "It might be desirable to establish specific verification arrangements in some of these areas, and our six nations are prepared to co-operate with the United States and the USSR on this issue".

This statement is followed up by the suggestion that there should be an "internationalization" of a number of seismic stations selected from among those existing in the United States and the Soviet Union, "tentatively 20 to 30, in each of the two countries, by placing observers" from the six nations at the stations. Their task "would be to verify that the instruments are properly operated and that all information obtained is reported without omission. We are prepared to work out the necessary arrangements which could

be made with little delay and to contribute observers for an initial period of one year".

In order to replace these temporary measures with permanent arrangements, the experts of the six nations, according to the authors of the document, "are ready to co-operate with experts of the United States and the USSR in the development of permanent verification facilities at test sites, and also in the development of an optimal network of internal stations in the United States and the USSR".

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pp.15-17

Australia/Butler

14.8.86

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Australia has participated strongly in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, and we are convinced that the Ad Hoc Group's work has made an invaluable contribution to global co-operation in seismology and we have very high expectations of future work to be carried out by the Ad Hoc Group.

We have studied its progress report and will readily agree to the recommendations provided in it.

It has been recognized for many many years that a global seismological monitoring network would lie at the heart of the verification régime needed to support a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The mandate under which the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts operates calls upon the Group to "work on such measures which might be established in the future for the international exchange of seismological data under a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests". It will be understood why I will not at present comment on the scope aspects of that mandate. What is relevant now is for us to recognize two things. First, the mandate for the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts clearly envisages the establishment of a global seismological network. Second, in the work that has been undertaken by the Ad Hoc Group under this mandate and in work undertaken by way of individual national efforts, we have arrived at the point where it would be entirely appropriate and certainly positive for the Conference to take the decision Australia has called for, that is to call into existence a global seismological network.

The programme of future work proposed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts would be compatible with such a decision and would in fact constitute further practical steps towards realizing a fully operational and permanent global network.

There have been some other relevant developments, including some in recent time, on some of which we have heard reports this morning. I have in mind, for example, the resumption of bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on verification issues.

Last week an immensely significant set of decisions were taken by the six Heads of Government meeting at Ixtapa in Mexico which included the offer by those six States of an important contribution to verification of a nuclear-test-ban treaty, including by seismological means. Three weeks ago, in this Conference, the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union announced a new policy approach towards Level II data on the part of his Government, and

at our last plenary session on Tuesday an extremely constructive and highly relevant statement was made by the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany. In that statement he recalled other contributions which have been made to this work by other delegations, including my own. A lot has happened in this field.

Three weeks ago, I tabled at this Conference document CD/717 which constituted a proposal to the Conference that it should express its will that a global seismological network should exist. It is the hope of my delegation that the point of decision on this proposal will be, next week, at the time of the Conference's action on the Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on its twenty-second session.

The fact is that all of the elements of a global seismological network exist. The technical test conducted by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts in 1984 gave us an illustration of how important parts of such a network would operate.

Only one further step is required to make the network a reality and that is for us to decide to establish a global network thus ensuring that all further work, for example under the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, will be conducted within the framework of the establishment of a global network.

Once we have labelled the existing capabilities as constituting a global network, Conference members could dedicate themselves to filling in the gaps and improving that network by stepping up exchanges of data and technology and by establishing the administrative structure necessary to manage global network.

In this regard, the proposed future work of the GSE is highly relevant: filling in gaps and defining, as well as refining, existing and future capabilities -- first on the basis of an analysis of national investigations, second through partial bilateral and multilateral experiments in the use of Level II data, culminating in the large-scale global experiment now foreshadowed for 1988.

It is true that we have heard some concern and questions raised about the financial constraints on what countries might be able to do immediately in the field of international co-operation in seismic monitoring.

Australia is not free from such financial constraints but we do believe that a hard look at the possibilities will find that there are useful things that can be done within existing budgets and we are doing this.

Indeed, it is obvious that none of us will know whether we would be willing or able to fund additional undertakings until we have considered precisely what such undertakings might be and how they would fit in with global activities, and therefore what they would cost and what their benefits would be.

I might mention that Australia stands prepared to fully co-operate with other countries on seismic monitoring, and to expand that co-operation just as we are at present expanding our own seismological capability, and we will, in fact do this irrespective of what action on this matter is pursued in the event in the context of the Conference on Disarmament.

But in discussing this proposal, or thinking about this proposal, I would like to recall a piece of history which is that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts' work, which is now so widely supported, started rather more modestly as a Swedish initiative a number of years ago. The truth is, it was only adopted by the Conference on Disarmament when its work became so interesting that very few wanted to be left out. I think that it is a model and an example that we should bear in mind when we look towards a decision on a global seismological network. We propose that the Conference take that action because it is required, it is realistic, it would represent progress, it is within the competence of the Conference and it would be a clear step in the right direction. This can be done by the Conference agreeing to the principle of the proposal made in document CD/717, to establish a global seismological network and we hope that it will do this next week when it adopts the report of the twenty-second session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

CD/PV.379 pp.18-20 Ad Hoc Group of
Scientific Experts/Dahlman 14.8.86 CTB

The establishment of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts 10 years ago provided a frame of systematic work towards a global data exchange system and for a constructive dialogue on related technical issues between experts of member and non-member countries of the Conference.

The Group has outlined the principal design of an international data exchange system containing three basic components: a global network of seismological stations operated by individual countries; a system for the exchange of data between individual countries and specially established international data centres; and international data centres where data are routinely processed and from which results are distributed to participating countries.

During its work the Group has established detailed technical specifications guiding the establishment and operation of such an international system. These include instructions on how to operate seismological stations and to analyse data in a standardized way. Together with the WMO the Group has established detailed specifications for the exchange of parameter or Level I data. Procedures and computer programs to be used at international data centres have been developed for the routine analyses of such data.

The Group has not only developed methods and procedures, it has also conducted technical tests of various components of the system. Some of these experiments have been small-scale bilateral undertakings, others have been more extensive with broad participation. In 1984 the Group conducted a large-scale technical test with the participation of 75 seismological stations in 37 countries and three international data centres. The test was conducted in close co-operation with the WMO, an organization with which the Group has enjoyed an excellent co-operation throughout the years.

The present work of the Expert Group has been supported by research programmes in a number of countries. Numerous national working papers, summarizing results of these programmes have been presented as a necessary technical and scientific basis for the Group's work. The data exchange system

that has been developed is thus the result not only of efforts by experts in the Group but also of research work conducted by a large number of people at seismological stations and laboratories around the world.

I have on earlier occasions reported to the Conference on the successful outcome of the 1984 Technical Test, skillfully co-ordinated by Dr. Peter McGregor of Australia, and on the excellent co-operation that was established between participating institutes worldwide. I will today not reiterate the results of the Test but only report that the Group at its recent meeting finalized its fourth report, which covers the Test. I have the pleasure to introduce this report, which is contained in document CD/720. The report has extensive appendices containing the more detailed technical material, which will not be distributed but will be available at the secretariat in the Group's working languages. I also introduce the summary report, contained in CD/681/Rev.1, which is only a slight and formal revision of the provisional summary (CD/681) submitted to the Conference on 24 March 1986.

In introducing these reports I express my gratitude to the Group's Scientific Secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdal of Norway, who has done an excellent drafting work. I also express my appreciation to the secretariat for its efforts and co-operation in finalizing these documents.

In its work until now the Group has primarily focused on the exchange and processing of parameter or Level I data. During its recent meeting the Group devoted considerable time to in-depth considerations of its continued work. In the progress report from its meeting, as contained in document CD/721, which I have the pleasure to introduce, the Group recommends:

"That it continue its work under the existing mandate, given by the Committee on Disarmament on 7 August 1979 (CD/PV.48).

The future work of the Group should be directed towards the design of a modern international system based on the expeditious exchange of waveform (Level II) and parameter (Level I) data and on the processing of such data at International Data Centres (IDCs). This work should draw upon previous results and experiences, taking into account the Group's recommendations in its earlier reports, and making use of all achievements in seismology. This work would, inter alia, include:

- working out technical specifications of modern prototype stations able to collect and exchange high quality waveform data from seismic events at all distances, including arrays able to provide preliminary location data for detected events;
- further developing and testing methods, procedures and computer algorithms for automatic signal detection as well as for computer-interactive data analysis;
- developing and testing methods and procedures and investigating and testing communication links to be used for the expeditious exchange of seismic waveform and parameter data between national facilities and international data centres;

- further developing and testing methods, procedures and computer algorithms to be used at IDCs, for the processing of waveform and parameter data, for co-operation and communication among such centres and for the distribution of event bulletins to national facilities.

This system specification would require substantial research and testing.

The Group's further work should include planning and carrying out a large-scale experiment on the exchange of Level II data. The experiment, which will include Level I data as well, will be conducted using the WMO/GTS and other accessible channels of communication, including satellite transmission where possible. It must be carefully prepared on the basis of an analysis of national investigations and also of partial bilateral and multi-lateral experiments in the use of Level II data. The Group envisages carrying out this experiment in approximately 1988.

The principal purpose of this experiment should be testing of methods and procedures developed by the Ad Hoc Group to extract and transmit the data from stations to the Experimental International Data Centres (EIDCs) and to process them at EIDCs."

The Group took note of the recent decision of the WMO Executive Council that the WMO/GTS circuits may accommodate a certain amount of additional types of seismic data. To contribute to the preparation and efficient carrying out of the experiment the Ad Hoc Group recommends that the Conference on Disarmament request the WMO to allocate its transmission channels on a regular basis starting as soon as possible for the transmission of Level II seismic data. I have informally submitted some suggestions to the President of the Conference as to the content of such a recommendation to the WMO and this has been circulated to you.

The Ad Hoc Group further recommends that the Conference assist in involving as many States as possible in carrying out the experiment.

The design and testing of a modern international seismological data exchange system, based on the expeditious exchange and processing of waveform data, is a considerable undertaking and is likely to provide a number of scientific and technological challenges. In addition to considerable efforts within the Group this task would require extensive national and co-operative international research and development efforts. This is necessary to provide the scientific and technological basis for the design of a system which in many aspects goes far beyond what is available today on a global scale.

CD/PV.380

pp.4-6

GDR/Rose

19.8.86

CTB

Secondly, some remarks about the verification problem. As in the past, various delegations have suggested this year, as a solution to the problem, that we should, for the time being, deal exclusively or predominantly with the verification of nuclear tests. They have gone so far as to propose an elaborate comprehensive verification system to be established no matter whether a test ban exists or not or negotiations on it have begun. In an

effort to explain this position, CD/717 refers to the history of test-ban negotiations: "Review of this history reveals that the principal stumbling block has consistently been the capacity to verify compliance and the associated issue of how to deal with so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. In the late 1970s an opportunity to conclude a test ban among three nuclear-weapon States was lost as a result of protracted argument over the verification requirements." My delegation has doubts about this statement. Permit me to quote from the report issued on 31 July 1980 by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom to the then Committee on Disarmament: "The three negotiating parties believe that the verification measures being negotiated -- particularly the provisions regarding the international exchange of seismic data, the committee of experts, and on-site inspections -- broke significant new ground in international arms limitation efforts and will give all treaty parties the opportunity to participate in a substantial and constructive way in the process of verifying compliance with the treaty." At any rate, the historical view is of no more relevance to the development since 1980, as a glance at the reasons given in rejecting the conclusion of a CTBT as a present-day task will easily reveal.

In our search for an accord, we should be aware of existing differences in positions. Like the other socialist countries, the German Democratic Republic supports effective and reliable verification of compliance with a test ban. Whatever is necessary to this end must be negotiated and agreed. Still, my delegation remains firmly convinced that the verification issue can, in the final analysis, only be resolved in connection with the drafting of a treaty. Whenever my delegation speaks of practical work, it means the entire subject. I share the view that verification must not be an end in itself, an opinion that has been expressed by various sides.

The main objective is a verifiable test ban. Scientific and technical background material on verification can, of course, be useful in this context. So, Working Paper CD/712, submitted by Sweden, contains remarkable conclusions. Any future discussion would certainly be enhanced if other papers were revised in the light of latest developments. Many scientific studies undertaken in the last few years have furnished proof that even small and concealed nuclear explosions can be reliably monitored. Even the comparatively small stations used by United States scientists at the Soviet test site near Semipalatinsk were able to record perfectly well a test conducted in the Nevada Desert more than 10,000 kilometres distant. By employing state-of-the-art techniques and complementing them by on-site inspections, very effective verification is possible. The statement published following the scientific meeting held in Moscow a few weeks ago under the theme "For an End of Nuclear Testing" and a recent in-depth study by the American Geophysical Union are all agreed on that.

My delegation welcomes the readiness to take part in the monitoring of a reciprocal moratorium on a test ban expressed at the second six-nation summit in Mexico. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that today's verification techniques, which rely on seismic means, are of so sophisticated a nature that they can guarantee full and credible verification. My delegation endorses the view that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should continue its activities and start developing a system ensuring the prompt transmission of Level-2 seismic data and prepare for an international experiment on their exchange.

The recommendation in paragraph 12 of the Group's progress report, published in CD/721 of 1 August 1986, meets with the full support of my delegation.

What my delegation regards as very problematic indeed, are proposals aimed at verifying continued testing rather than verifying a test ban, and at setting up a seismic monitoring system, independently of a test ban. There is no doubt about it, a verification system needs to be created and tried and tested in time. In so doing, the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests must always remain the agreed fundamental objective. This is exactly the position on which Working Paper CD/701, presented by the socialist countries, is based.

With this in mind, my delegation has serious problems with the proposal in Working Paper CD/717, concerning the establishment of a global seismic monitoring network. For the purpose of clarification, I would appreciate an answer to the following question: would the sponsor of that document be prepared to accept a slight modification of the first line in the operative part of his text so that it would read: "... decide to establish forthwith, in the framework of a mutual USSR-US moratorium on nuclear testing, a global seismic monitoring network ..."?

I wish to reiterate that my delegation is opposed to the monitoring of a continued arms race that is becoming more and more dangerous, since no monitoring will change that. It supports, however, most effective verification of arms limitation and disarmament measures. Naturally, a great deal at this Conference will depend on how things are progressing outside the conference hall. It is to be hoped that events will turn out favourably. As for our practical activities, we should seize any opportunity presenting itself in the months until the beginning of the next session to prepare the ground for an understanding on a committee mandate acceptable to all so that we may be able to work out the details of a CTBT as soon as possible.

CD/PV.380

pp.9-12

New Zealand/Lineham

19.8.86

CW

Earlier this year a group of specialists appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General confirmed that Iraqi forces had used chemical weapons against Iranian forces. And there have been assessments made in this Conference by other delegations that further countries are developing the capability to produce and deploy chemical weapons. These developments point out the necessity and the urgency of concluding as soon as possible a comprehensive chemical weapons convention.

New Zealand has always condemned the use of these barbaric weapons, whose employment in war has been outlawed for over 60 years. We have accepted and strongly support the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons. New Zealand was associated with the resolution 37/98D adopted by the United Nations General Assembly which elaborated the procedures which provide for investigation by the Secretary-General into allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

Pursuant to these procedures we nominated a chemistry laboratory of the New Zealand Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to undertake tests for the presence of prohibited chemical agents if called upon to do so.

More recently the Government took further steps in order to limit the possibility that chemical manufacturers or suppliers in New Zealand could be used indirectly to contribute to the proliferation or use of chemical weapons. Since 1984 we have controlled the export of chemicals that could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons, and have warned our industry of other chemicals that could be used in that category.

Notwithstanding all the action that we and other countries have already taken, there is no substitute for the successful negotiation in this Conference, of a treaty imposing a comprehensive prohibition on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.

A comprehensive convention would reinforce the existing international legal prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. It would stop any further proliferation of chemical weapons. It would provide for the total elimination, over as short a time as possible, of chemical weapons and production facilities. And it would also build confidence and enhance mutual security through measures to ensure the observance of its prohibitions.

Much work has been done on lists of chemicals that pose a risk of diversion for the production of chemical weapons. Consideration is being given to listing chemicals that will be banned and chemicals that will be subject to monitoring régimes of varying degrees of stringency. This is necessary work since the toxic chemicals and their precursors that are subject to surveillance will need to be clearly listed so that the parties to the convention and the chemical industry are certain of the chemicals involved.

Consideration has also been given this year, however to the régimes applied to those chemicals, and it does seem to us that this is a key area for future work. It is the devising of acceptable and effective régimes that will determine whether any chemical-weapons convention will be successful. We are encouraged by the progress that has been achieved in Working Group A this year, during intensive work under Australian chairmanship, on the whole question of criteria, lists and régimes and permitted activities.

In a disarmament treaty of this kind, where a whole category of weapons of mass destruction is to be banned forever, the formulation of provisions to verify compliance with the convention is central to the convention régime. Such provisions would include procedures for conducting international on-site inspections -- we do not see that such inspections could be left to national verification authorities -- and also for conducting inspections at short notice, so-called challenge inspections, in cases when breaches of the convention are suspected. It is expected that such cases would be exceptional.

Inspections will need to be provided for not only in the case of alleged breaches of obligations to declare and to destroy existing chemical weapons and production facilities, but also in the case of the obligation not to produce new chemical weapons. There are grounds for some encouragement at the progress that has been made in the negotiations in this area. We have appreciated the intensive efforts made by the Indonesian delegation on verification and compliance issues in Working Group C. We have also noted the very

recent United Kingdom proposals on "challenge inspection" which seem to have given rise to a good deal of interest.

These and other proposals were put forward in this Conference in an effort to find consensus, and we would hope that procedures which are acceptable to all can be devised to resolve this long-standing issue. Agreement on the inspection provisions would constitute a major breakthrough in the negotiations. This should be a priority area for future work.

A comprehensive prohibition on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and in particular procedures in the Convention for verification of compliance, could be expected to be of some significance for the civilian chemical industry. We expect that New Zealand's industry, like others, would co-operate in the application of such measures and by doing so demonstrate that it does not want to contribute in any way to the manufacturing of chemical weapons.

In the elaboration of the procedures there will naturally be some concerns, such as the protection of commercial confidentiality and the unhindered commercial operations of the industry, which will have to be taken fully into account. But the devising of procedures which meet such concerns should be seen as a positive and constructive process which will contribute to the objectives of the convention and not as an obstacle in the negotiations.

I would like, before concluding, to touch on some other developments in the Conference this year on the subject of chemical weapons. The New Zealand delegation would like to express particular appreciation to the Government of the Netherlands for the Workshop on the verification of the chemical weapons ban held in June this year and for making it possible for countries like my own to participate. This was, in our view, a superbly organized affair and we would further thank the Dutch delegation for its follow-up reports and willingness to enter into discussions, in the Committee, on the results of the Workshop. Similarly, as another practical reference point for the negotiations, we would thank the Australian Government for its paper, tabled again in June, on the trial inspection of an Australian chemical facility conducted earlier in the year. We would also commend Canada for the material that it has made available to the Conference this year, including a handbook for the investigation of allegations of the use of chemical or biological weapons and the very useful compendia of Conference working papers and statements.

Finally, we would mention recent initiatives of both the United States and the Soviet Union relevant to the negotiations, that is, the provision by the Soviet Union in April of detailed proposals on certain issues in the negotiations, and the demonstration by the United States, in its paper on its chemical stockpile disposal programme, of the sort of openness that will help to build confidence that chemical-weapon stockpiles have, in fact, been destroyed. We welcome such developments.

If binary and multi-component weapons production is launched, the verification of the desired CW ban will be substantially complicated. The problem is that the components required for binary weapons can be made in the

civilian chemical industry with no need to conceal huge stockpiles. They may also be used for peaceful purposes, e.g. to manufacture insecticides, pharmaceuticals or other chemicals. Furthermore, the binary technology makes it possible to contemplate the use of substances earlier thought to be unsuitable for military application because of their shortlived chemical stability. These are by no means all the potential dangers this new technology might bring about. If we fail to prevent binary-weapons production, we would set ourselves on a path full of unknown and often unpredictable dangers.

In our opinion, no country would start binary-weapons production out of purely security considerations. Rather, various aggressive designs will be kept in mind as well as the eternal quest for profits. And the mass production of binary and multi-component chemical weapons would ensure the arms contractors involved enormous extra profits. About \$US 10 billion is to be spent on the binary-weapons programme of the United States in the years up to 1990. Moreover, the eventual introduction of binary weapons into various regions of the world would substantially increase the chemical threat to many countries, which can only contribute to further proliferation of chemical weapons. We maintain that neither staunch aggressiveness of outdated military strategists nor financial interests of the military industrial complex represent a valid reason for States to launch a new round of the chemical-arms race. We are ready to believe that political realism will prevail and that finally the right choice -- the chemical-weapons ban -- will be made in time.

Let me stress one more aspect which renders a CW ban an urgent measure. With the development of the chemical industry one might note that commercial and military chemical substances are somewhat closer to each other than in the past. Nobody can exclude that in the relatively near future some military use might be found for today's purely commercial chemicals and vice versa. For instance, single-purpose precursors, like QL or DF, have no commercial use today. But with the rapid development of science and technology no one can give us a guarantee that in the future some commercial use will not be found even for these substances. If that happens, these substances might spread quickly throughout civilian chemical industry. If the CW ban has not been achieved by that time, it would become then substantially more difficult to negotiate it and ensure compliance with it. Thus, a rather peculiar situation emerges -- in the absence of the CW ban, the natural development of chemical science and technology, which no one can stop, might objectively hamper prospects for the cessation of the chemical-arms race. On the contrary, early achievement of the ban and full compliance with it can give us a sufficient guarantee that future development in the field of chemistry will remain peaceful, with more favourable conditions for fruitful international co-operation.

We appreciate the fact that the Conference is paying due attention to the elaboration of the CW ban. Its relevant Ad Hoc Committee is by far the most active working body of the Conference with a unique negotiating mandate. Delegations are prepared to work actively not only during the Conference session itself but also in the intersessional period. Serious interest in chemical disarmament is also demonstrated by such actions as the recent Workshop on the verification of non-production of CW organized by the Netherlands, for which we would like to thank the Dutch delegation.

We maintain that each and every delegation should contribute towards the achievement of the CW ban. This is not a problem for only the handful of countries that possess the largest chemical capabilities. The need to provide for world-wide compliance with the ban, and its possible impacts on the civilian chemical industry and international trade in the field, require that countries take an active part in the formulation of the convention's basic provisions. It would not be a wise choice to wait until the convention is ready and then only try to fit it to a State's own interests.

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USSR/Kashirin

21.8.86

CTB

In this respect, I would like to emphasize that, as we have stressed on numerous occasions in the past, the Soviet Union does not regard a moratorium as an end in itself or as a substitute for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but as an important first step towards such a treaty. Moreover, the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to agree on a series of verification measures to check compliance with a Soviet-United States bilateral moratorium, including on-site inspections when necessary.

Thus, a mutually verifiable moratorium could become the dress rehearsal, as it were, for the comprehensive test-ban treaty the conclusion of which has been and is still our principal goal in this sphere. In this respect, I would remind you that, in the past, a moratorium on nuclear testing contributed to the conclusion of the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

Many delegations at the Conference have noted with concern that the United States still refuses to follow the Soviet Union's example and join in a moratorium. Indeed, the United States, the champion as regards the number of explosions for 40 years, has detonated another 18 nuclear devices during the year of the Soviet moratorium, and three of them were not declared. Moreover, as a rule it has done so ostentatiously, timing the tests to coincide either with a Soviet announcement of the extension of the moratorium or with some other Soviet initiative. They even invited us to Nevada to watch it all happening. To this it should be added that the present United States Administration is implementing the broadest of military programmes. In a word, the Soviet Union has ample justification for resuming its nuclear tests. And yet we are still convinced that the ending of nuclear testing not only by the Soviet Union but also by the United States would be genuine breakthrough towards stopping the nuclear arms race and would speed up the elimination of nuclear weapons. The logic here is simple: if there are no tests, there will be no upgrading of nuclear weapons -- which both sides have in any case stockpiled in abundance. This is demonstrated by the appeals made to the United States and the Soviet Union by a substantial and prestigious part of the world community States. It includes the "Delhi Six", a standing forum of leaders of countries in four continents -- Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden. A few days ago, at a meeting in the city of Ixtapa, they adopted the Mexico Declaration, which contains a further appeal for an end to all nuclear tests. That is also the demand of the majority of the States members of the non-aligned movement. The Soviet Union is, of course, aware that forces which have no wish to disarm at all are active in the United States. Moreover, they are doing their utmost to drag us into ever-new spirals of the arms race, to provoke us into slamming the door at the talks.

But we would like to hope the realism and understanding of the need for a joint quest for ways of improving the international situation, halting the senseless arms race, to eliminate nuclear weapons, will prevail in American assessments and actions.

Under these conditions, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Government of the Soviet Union having thoroughly and scrupulously weighed all the pros and cons and guided by their responsibility for the fate of the world, have decided to extend the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions until 1 January 1987. In taking this step, the Soviet Union believes that people in all countries of the world, political circles and international public opinion will correctly assess the lengthy silence on Soviet nuclear test ranges. As Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized in this connection, and I quote, "On behalf of the Soviet people, I appeal to the reason and dignity of Americans not to miss another historic chance on the path towards an end to the arms race". The Soviet Union is confident that an agreement on ending nuclear tests can be reached speedily and signed before the end of this year at the Soviet-American summit meeting. That event would, without a doubt, be the main tangible outcome of the meeting and a considerable step towards ending the arms race. It would be a kind of prologue to further progress at the talks on nuclear weapons and their elimination and to radical improvement in the world situation as a whole. The Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear explosions, being an action and not merely a proposal, is practical proof of the earnestness and sincerity of our nuclear disarmament programme and of our calls for a new policy, a policy of realism, peace and co-operation. More than half of 1986, which was declared the Year of Peace by the United Nations, has passed. By extending its unilateral moratorium, the Soviet Union is contributing to the common striving to ensure that this year goes down in history as being worthy of its name. That is the essence of the Soviet Union's new political initiative.

The Soviet delegation would like to take this opportunity to introduce its working paper, CD/724, devoted to issues of seismic verification of the non-conducting of nuclear tests. This document has already been distributed to delegations. The document puts forward the Soviet Union's ideas on this important aspect of verification of a nuclear test ban, including the relatively rapid exchange of Level II seismic data, and on the carrying out of an appropriate international experiment. The Soviet Union's proposals on this matter are prompted by a desire to expedite in every possible way the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on a general and comprehensive nuclear test ban under effective control.

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Japan/Imai

21.8.86

CTB

Japan has consistently emphasized the importance of the world-wide seismic network in which both Level I and Level II data may be effectively exchanged. We have presented a number of working papers on the subject and have made proposals in the hope of making some sort of viable multilateral verification system a real going concern. The recent developments in the Conference to encourage further work by the GSE (Group of Scientific Experts) is gratifying. What is not very clear is the question of bilateral verification. The maximum sensitivities of NTM or National Technical Means are never made known (nor for that matter have NTMs ever been defined in an interna-

tional agreement) and we do not know whether there exists a certain band below which detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions becomes unclear. Even with the on-site installation of devices capable of detecting and analysing weak signals, unless they are installed in the immediate neighbourhood of any and all test sites, there may be a limit below which the signal-to-noise ratio would be such that meaningful identification is difficult. At the same time, there are reports of nuclear devices of sub-kiloton yields which are useful either as weapons or as triggering devices for other weapons. Although the probability that computer simulation can effectively take the place of an actual nuclear explosion does not sound very convincing, it provides an opportunity to carefully review the meaning of a CTB régime.

CD/PV.381 p.19 Algeria/Kerroum 21.8.86 CTB

The greatest disappointment concerns a nuclear test ban; that is because of the symbolic importance of such a ban, which is seen as an indication of the determination to halt and then reverse the arms race. General acceptance of a moratorium and full preparedness to embark on a negotiating process continue to constitute the sole appropriate response to the expectations of the international community. The inability to set up an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate, and the attendant interminable discussions, can only lead to frustration.

The debate on this item, however, was certainly not futile. Backed up by the work of the Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, the debate has helped to show that, where nuclear tests are concerned -- and this applies to chemical weapons too -- verification problems are no longer insurmountable obstacles if there is political will to succeed and the necessity of an agreement is accepted.

CD/PV.381 pp.23-25 Poland/Turbanski 21.8.86 CW

My delegation considers as well that the Workshop held in the Netherlands in June this year also served its purpose. It brought out a better understanding of problems concerning verification of chemical industry with regard to the area of non-production, making it also more clear that actual possibilities of such verification are not unlimited, that they are bound to have certain limitations which need further study. At the same time it seems that this practical exercise indicated the important role which verification at the national level could and should play in this respect. Allow me, Mr. President, through you to thank the authorities and the delegation of the Netherlands for this useful initiative, hospitality, and excellent organization of the Workshop.

Many other interesting, thought-provoking working and conference room papers were put forward in the Committee, in the plenary and in the Working Groups, especially with regard to various aspects of verification of the future convention.

The question of non-production is one of the basic issues of the future convention, the one which from the very beginning would have direct bearing on chemical industry of all States parties to the future convention, though, due to various structures and level of development of chemical industry, this bearing may differ.

If we have a look at the issues considered in Group A, it becomes clear that the existing material worked out by the Group consolidated and developed last year's work, especially the so-called Integrated Approach for Listing Relevant Chemicals. A more clear picture of the problems we face in this area was created. It is obvious, however, that article VI, that is Activities not prohibited by the Convention, and relevant annexes, especially Annex I relative to Super-Toxic Lethal Chemicals and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems], still need a lot of work before they could reach a stage of mutual agreement and actual drafting. Some further consideration of this question is needed in the capitals. With regard to my delegation this will be done during the recess in the Committee's work. I do believe that consultations to be undertaken by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee in the intersessional period would be a very useful forum to further elaborate on these issues before they are formally put again for consideration by the Committee.

It is especially in this area of non-production that all delegations should bring the most active contribution to working out final solutions. Only by a common effort would we be able to agree on uniform procedures of transmitting statistical data and procedures of systematic international on-site inspections. We all know and agree that this system of control should not be detrimental to the normal activity of chemical industry, but we seem to understand it in different ways. Statements of some delegations in the Ad hoc Committee suggest their reluctance to submit the relevant chemical industry to adequate control.

If one takes a closer look at issues under consideration in Group A, it seems that at this stage of negotiations particular attention should be paid to the following questions:

Scope of data on production, distribution and use of relevant chemicals to be submitted to the Consultative Committee. In our view, it would be the simplest, the most basic and the cheapest form of verification of non-production of chemical weapons.

We are of the opinion that an important and urgent task should be to reach agreement on the list of key precursors in Annex II to Article VI. The problem is difficult as there seem to exist rather opposed approaches either to broaden or to narrow this list. Like always, a mutually satisfactory solution has to be found.

There is a need to work out an appropriate régime for key precursors. It is yet not entirely clear -- at least for my delegation -- whether such a régime should be uniform with regard to all chemicals in the list, or should be diversified. A preliminary scheme of this régime would make it easier to finally agree on the whole list. It would also be helpful to determine a militarily significant level for every key precursor.

A still deeper analysis is needed with regard to the issue of super-toxic lethal chemicals (STLC), which at present are not used in CW production, but their future use for that purpose cannot be totally excluded today. As is known, some STLCs are being produced by the pharmaceutical industry, others in small quantities in research laboratories. I think that a clearer picture of this question is needed in order to solve comprehensively the STLC issue in the convention.

More attention should also be paid to multinational corporations, as they create some additional specific questions in the context of the verification of non-production of CW.

There has been a promising development of Group B in a very difficult and sensitive area of elimination both of chemical weapons and of the CW production facilities.

I think everybody would agree that further rapprochement of positions was achieved with regard to the content of relevant declarations as well as to the process of elimination and its control. It has to be noticed that formulations of Articles IV - Measures on Chemical Weapons and V - Measures on Chemical Weapons Production Facilities, together with relevant annexes, though still in some instances heavily bracketed and footnoted, show a clearer picture of this difficult part of the convention than was the case last year.

The results achieved in Group B, especially with regard to production facilities, would be very helpful in working out a still outstanding definition of production facility.

What seems to be more and more perceptible is a comprehensive blue-print of indispensable provisions concerning the whole process from declarations up to final elimination of CW stocks and CW production facilities. That is why we see in the present text of these articles obvious signs of progress. No doubt we have gained momentum in our work on these issues, and this momentum should not be lost.

One of the crucial outstanding issues is still the question of challenge inspection. There has been some conceptual rapprochement of positions which, however, does not suffice at present for working out a mutually acceptable solution. I think I would commit no mistake by saying that there seems to be general agreement that challenge inspection should not occur in everyday practice but rather in exceptional circumstances. There is, however, not enough clarity as to what is really meant by these exceptional circumstances. The need to resort to challenge inspection would depend very much on the efficiency of the whole system of verification including systematic on-site inspection. The better the routine verification system, the lesser, to our mind, the probability that challenge inspection would be needed. In short, we think that having a clear and precise picture of the whole system of so-called routine verification would help in final construction of the concept of challenge inspection.

What would be "meaningful" work other than work on the scope of the means of verification and compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty? This is precisely the meaningful work, specifically defined and called for in the draft mandate provided in document CD/521.

While the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic has avoided addressing this question when he refers to "meaningful" work, he has not resisted the temptation of throwing up the other, now extraordinarily tired and battered roadblock which is to question the need for collective work on the means of verification of a test-ban treaty. Indeed, he has chosen to distort what my delegation and other Western delegations have said about verification when he has claimed that we want to concentrate "predominantly" on the issue of verification.

Mr. President, if this seems confused, then we should be patient, because there is more.

The Ambassador claimed that the German Democratic Republic "supports effective and reliable verification and compliance with a test ban", yet he charges us with some deception or with some transgression when we say that we want the same. But he is generous. He offers a solution and that is that "the verification issue can, in the final analysis, only be resolved in connection with drafting of a treaty".

May I pose another question, that is, why? Why does he assert that these two related but quite different activities must be inherently, fundamentally, connected? The drafting of a treaty is something that we all know could be done, perhaps not in the twinkle of an eye, but in only a little longer time than that. The treaty itself would be an amazingly simple document. After all, it would presumably contain one and only one obligation, that is, never to conduct nuclear tests. The hard part is to settle the scope of such a treaty and to build the means of verification and compliance with the simple undertaking that would be stated in that treaty.

So, by making the difficult part completely dependent upon the totally simple part, the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic would single-handedly prevent the beginning of work on solving the only serious problems which need to be solved if there is to be an end to nuclear testing. And he asks us to believe that this policy is pursued because of the sanctity of an entirely notional concept called negotiation. And worse, he says that those who question the logic and sincerity of his position should stand accused of some kind of perfidy.

My delegation has proposed that the Conference establish, without delay, a global seismological network. Australia has done this because it knows that such a network will be required as part of the means of verifying compliance with a nuclear test-ban treaty. We have made this proposal now because we know that, if a treaty were written down on a piece of paper in the way that the German Democratic Republic seems to prefer, it would be nothing more than a piece of paper, unless and until the obligations it established were able to be verified. We have also made this proposal partly because the work of the Group of Scientific Experts has progressed to the point, and will progress

further, where it is practical and feasible for such a global network to be established. Yet the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic has said this proposal is not acceptable.

I pose another question: Why is it not acceptable, especially given that he says his Government and those other Governments for whom he is occasionally charged to speak, want to see the means of verification of a treaty established? Why, then, is this proposal not acceptable to his Government? What reason does he give?

The best answer he has been able to supply so far is an answer in the form of a question to my delegation to the effect: will we be prepared to consider a "slight modification" to our proposal so that it proposes the establishment forthwith of a global seismological monitoring network "in the framework of a USSR-United States moratorium on nuclear testing"?

So, all is now revealed: The delegation which claims an interest in any means of verification is not, in fact, interested in the establishment of such means. Apparently its only interest is to use the proposal for such a network as a bargaining chip, as leverage, towards the establishment of a bilateral nuclear testing moratorium.

By this action, he makes the establishment of a vital means of verification, a means that would be fundamental to any serious global non-nuclear testing régime, hostage to a different and separate political consideration. Surely this calls into serious question the sincerity of his Government's position and that of any others for whom he claims to speak, on the fundamental issue of verification as such. Specifically, nowhere does he say that a global seismological system isn't needed, can't be built, or wouldn't work. He prefers instead a bilateral moratorium. I guess this would sit well with his proposed chemical-weapons-free zone in central Europe. I might be forgiven for commenting that such Eurocentricity is matched only by this gross insensitivity to our 40-nation Conference. Quite simply, what about the other nuclear-weapon States? What about those of us who don't live in Europe? What about French nuclear testing in the Pacific? Most of us in this room want a universal comprehensive test ban, not a bilateral moratorium. It was interesting that just half an hour ago in this room, the representative of the Soviet Union confirmed that a bilateral moratorium is "not an end in itself but an important first step towards a treaty". The Soviet Union would thus seem to be clearer about our real objective than it has appeared to be in the past and we will certainly study carefully the paper tabled today. Perhaps the delegation of the German Democratic Republic may now wish, in the light of that announcement, to reconsider the question it put to us last Tuesday.

Anyone who is serious about bringing about an end to nuclear testing via a treaty with that purpose and effect will begin by recognizing that is easy to write down the treaty obligation on a piece of paper. The hard part is to produce the means of verification which will make that treaty effective. Thus we should begin by solving the practical problems of verification. To refuse to do this is to refuse to walk down what the German Democratic Republic has called the "direct road".

I hope to have another opportunity to take stock of the results and prospects of our present session and I would like to devote my statement today to our negotiations on chemical weapons. I should like to say at the outset that I do not share the opinion of those who consider that these negotiations are only a secondary matter. On the contrary, this is a problem and these are negotiations to which we attach great importance and it is our impression that many people around this table share that attitude. In addition, our role as a depositary of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 induces us to give this problem particular attention and vigilance. For this reason we continue to denounce all violations of that Protocol wherever they occur and by whomever they are perpetrated. For this reason we are anxious to help with everything that can further progress in the current negotiations.

For this reason too, we are happy to note that the Ad Hoc Committee and its working groups have done a serious job, in a constructive spirit, as the report adopted yesterday by the Committee shows. The Workshop on verification organized by the Netherlands in June gave a first-hand view of the complexity of the problems which confront us and contributed to the serious atmosphere and realism of our work this summer. For that reason, I am happy to join those who have already expressed their deep gratitude to the Netherlands authorities for having organized that very useful meeting and organized it so well.

We welcome the decision taken, as last year, to continue consultations between sessions in order to make progress on the matters remaining pending. France had been making similar proposals for a long time, it even hoped that more would be done, but the agreement now reached is satisfactory.

It is true, after all, that a whole series of problems still require considerable work for the various viewpoints to be brought closer together. That is why, in particular, agreement has not yet been possible on the question which is at the heart of our negotiations, that of verification of compliance with the Convention. Within our Conference, and outside it too, everyone has noted the new things being said on this matter by the Soviet Union. However, the clarifications we have been given, including those given within the framework of the Conference, do not seem to us to have provided so far the truly decisive elements that we expected. We must therefore patiently continue the search for a satisfactory solution to this key problem.

Here in April I presented France's view of the general structure of a verification system based, in almost all cases, on international on-site inspections -- "routine" inspections -- and on the regular exchange of statistical data. Unfortunately, this has been a further year with no in-depth discussion of those matters.

To be complete, the system we have to set up must also provide for the exceptional cases where, doubt having arisen regarding the compliance with its obligations by a State party to the Convention, the regular "routine" inspection measures cannot be enough to dissipate it. In that case it becomes necessary to be able to resort to other measures, to other machinery. To be effective, such a "safety net" must, in our view, meet several criteria: first, the time interval between the request for an on-site inspection and the

implementation of that request should be extremely brief so that there is no time to get rid of the evidence of a possible violation; for this reason, the procedure must be automatic, that is a State which wants to initiate an inspection should not have to go through an institutional obstacle course which, aside from wasting time, would also have the disadvantage of making it possible to block a request; finally, replying to a challenge should as a general rule be mandatory and not simply voluntary. Only if it meets these three criteria can an international on-site challenge-inspection régime serve as a genuine deterrent.

The United Kingdom delegation has submitted to the Conference, in working document CD/715, a draft which meets these criteria. It is based on two fundamental elements which seem to us both to guarantee the effectiveness of the system proposed and to respect the legitimate security requirements of each State.

To explain: on the one hand, the United Kingdom proposal calls for a public procedure of which the bodies of the Convention would be kept fully informed from beginning to end but the implementation of which would be the responsibility of the two States concerned, the State which requests the inspection and the State to which the request is addressed. The initiation of the procedure as well as the consequences to be drawn there from are up to them. Thus, whether the replies given by the "challenged" State are satisfactory or not can, all things considered, only be decided by the party whose suspicions have been aroused.

The second characteristic of this proposal is to provide that in very exceptional cases, where the security of a State is at stake, satisfaction could be given by measures other than unrestricted access to the installation with regard to which there are doubts. But those measures would have to be such as to enable the challenging State to come to the conviction that prohibited activities were not taking place at the installation in question. A State which requests an inspection being by definition the only judge of when it considers itself reassured regarding the activities being carried out at the installation, this procedure seems to us to meet the requirements that I have just stated. In addition, it would have a deterrent effect because no State concerned with its international reputation would be likely to take the risk to undertaking manufacture in violation of the Convention when it had, in advance, accepted as a general rule that an international inspection team could go to factories that came under suspicion.

The situation is different for the proposals that have been put forward elsewhere. Those which would only allow inspection at sites defined in advance would have the effect of defining, a contrario, the places where it would be permissible to circumvent the provisions of the Convention. Others, which would leave open the possibility of purely and simply refusing a request for access, would simply aggravate the crisis of confidence which has led to the call for challenge inspection; yet others, which would permit parties to hide behind delaying procedures within a committee that would in all likelihood be unable, because of the absence of agreement among its members, to make the necessary decisions, would ultimately lead to a result just as negative as the rest.

For all these reasons, and after very careful study of the problem, the French delegation gives its full support to the United Kingdom proposal. It earnestly hopes that proposal will win the support of all sides and thus contribute to solving one of the key problems of these negotiations.

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USSR/Kashirin

21.8.86

CTB

We have been compelled to ask for the floor because at this morning's meeting the representative of Australia initiated a discussion and, regrettably, quite rudely made what, to our mind, were insulting attacks on the delegation of the German Democratic Republic. In so doing, the representative of Australia resorted to what, in our view, were not entirely fitting methods of using statements by, in particular, the Soviet delegation to the effect that the Soviet Union views a moratorium not as an end in itself or as a substitute for a comprehensive test ban treaty, but as an important first step towards such a treaty. The distinguished representative of Australia made accusations against the German Democratic Republic, alleging that the delegation of that country was distorting Australia's position. I think that such a description is entirely applicable to the methods that have been employed today by the representative of Australia. Yes, the Soviet Union views a moratorium as something other than an end in itself; that is entirely obvious, and the entire logic of human thought tells us that a moratorium is really a temporary measure. When, at Tuesday's meeting, the representative of the German Democratic Republic suggested an amendment to the Australian proposal so that the proposal would be truly applicable to a moratorium by the USSR and the United States, that appeal to another nuclear Power seemingly similarly aroused the anger of the Australian delegation. But why, if the Australian delegation is so concerned to achieve the earliest possible agreement on the banning of nuclear-weapon tests, does it not, like the Delhi Six and many other delegations here and non-aligned States, call upon the other nuclear Powers to follow the example of the Soviet Union? That would really open the way to the achievement of a genuine and verifiable accord. The Soviet Union will not accept verification of the conducting of tests; it has said that repeatedly and will say it again. The Soviet Union will accept the most resolute and effective measures for the verification of the non-conducting of such tests. And that is just what was proposed in the suggestion by the German Democratic Republic.

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pp.5-7

FRG/Ruth

26.8.86

VER, CTB
CW

In the present situation we are faced with the question of whether the emphasis on the limitation of military potentials can be replaced by a process dominated by agreements on reductions. Recent developments could then prove to be the beginning of a new chapter in the history of arms control and disarmament. The arms control policy of the Federal Government is based on the obligation enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force and is directed towards the overriding goal of preventing war.

Determining principles of this policy are:

Arms control efforts must encompass the entire military balance between East and West, including conventional forces. The reduction of nuclear weapons must not be allowed to increase the likelihood of a conventional conflict in Europe;

Arms control efforts must take account of the need to maintain defensive capabilities and of the role of the Alliance. They must respect the legitimate security interests of all concerned;

Arms control efforts must be designed as a step-by-step process so that the effects can be calculated and controlled at every stage. They must guarantee undiminished security;

Greater transparency and openness can lead to greater predictability of military behaviour. The West is already making substantial contributions to this goal;

Agreement on the reduction and limitation of forces and weapons must be based on reliable data;

Arms control agreements must be balanced and militarily significant;

And finally, reliable verification of compliance with arms control agreements in line with their purpose is indispensable. Verification is the consequence of mistrust existing between potential parties to a treaty. It is needed to create confidence in disarmament and arms control agreements being implemented and complied with. Verification can, on the one hand, be understood as an offer of openness to convince the other parties to the treaty of one's own faithful compliance with the treaty. It is, on the other hand, a contribution made by one side to justify the other side's confidence in the reliability of the agreement.

We note with satisfaction that the East is also moving in the direction of these principles, despite some differences on individual points. Potentially of great importance for the further development of arms control are the recent declarations by the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact showing a greater readiness to allow effective verification. It is now essential that the substance of those declarations be demonstrated in the individual negotiation forums. Above all, it is important that verification does not just relate to the implementation of reductions, but also to the effective monitoring of compliance with agreements through sufficiently detailed information and obligatory on-site inspections. This would permit decisive improvement in the field of military predictability through transparency and thus bring about greater confidence.

As far as nuclear tests are concerned, we welcome the fact that another session of Soviet and American experts recently examined the question of how limitations of nuclear tests and a subsequent comprehensive ban on tests can be reliably verified. These talks, too, will be continued shortly. These

contacts hold out the prospect of ratification of the agreements of 1974/1976 and a possible programme for the reduction of tests, thus bringing us nearer the goal of a global, comprehensive test ban.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany strongly supports a comprehensive and verifiable ban on tests at the earliest possible date. The key problem of arms control in the field of nuclear tests consists in ensuring reliable verification. In connection with the extension of the unilateral Soviet moratorium until 1 January 1987, General Secretary Gorbachev stated on 18 August, as you know, that the Soviet Union is willing to allow on-site verification of this moratorium; this willingness should be translated into verification proposals aimed at reliably monitoring all nuclear tests. The Federal Government has, for its part, made a substantial contribution to the discussion of this subject here at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament by submitting a proposal for a world-wide seismological system for monitoring nuclear tests. I note with satisfaction that this approach has met with the broad support of the countries represented here.

We also welcome developments which have recently taken place in this Conference's negotiations concerning a global ban on chemical weapons. The Federal Government greatly welcomes the proposal recently submitted by the United Kingdom relating to on-challenge inspections. In our opinion, the approach chosen by the United Kingdom -- while insisting on the obligatory nature of inspections -- could show a way of advancing the negotiations in a positive fashion.

Another problem to which this Conference must still devote extensive attention is that of effective means of verifying the non-production of chemical weapons. We remain convinced that it will be possible to resolve this problem, including verification of a ban on new developments. We note with satisfaction that here at the Conference a high degree of agreement is emerging on the concept of a triple matrix listing the chemical substances that are to be subjected to controls. On this basis, we consider routine inspections and an exchange of statistical data to be suitable measures for effectively verifying that no substances are being diverted from civilian chemicals production to the manufacture of warfare agents. Our delegation is preparing a working paper on methods for exchanging statistical data.

CD/PV.382

pp.13-16

USA/Lowitz

26.8.86

CW
CTB

The most noteworthy progress has been recorded in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, is to be congratulated for overseeing a year in which significant elaboration and restructuring of the draft text of the convention took place. As a result, five articles of the rolling text now appear in a more complete form: these are the articles on the elimination of chemical weapons production facilities, on chemical weapon stockpile destruction, on activities not to be prohibited by the Convention, on the consultative committee, and on consultation, co-operation and fact-finding. In addition, progress is reflected in the elaboration of four annexes addressing supertoxic lethal chemicals, key precursors, large volume commercial chemicals which could be used as weapons, and principles, methods and organization of the elimination of chemical weapons.

Last August, my delegation expressed cautious optimism for these negotiations. It seems to me that this optimism was justified, and that it can again be expressed for their future course.

This is not to say, of course, that complete agreement has been reached on any of the new texts. Bracketed sections, footnotes, and incomplete text reflect that many important issues have not yet been resolved. All areas require additional work. Key outstanding issues include the declaration of stockpiles, non-production in the civil industry, and challenge inspection. And work has barely begun on working out detailed verification procedures.

In particular, the United States delegation looks forward to a serious consideration of challenge inspection. My delegation would be particularly interested in hearing the detailed views of the Soviet Union on challenge inspection. While a number of States have provided constructive contributions in the area of verification during the session, and the Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed its acceptance of the concept of challenge inspection, it has yet to set forth any comprehensive proposal. This is of concern to my delegation. We need to be mindful of what has transpired in other multi-lateral negotiating forums. In particular, in the Stockholm Conference, the highly publicized "agreement in principle" by the USSR to on-site inspection is now apparently so qualified as effectively to obstruct progress on this issue.

It is to be hoped that we are not witnessing a trend which could adversely affect the progress we see in other areas of the chemical weapons negotiations.

My delegation repeats yet again its view: that article X of the United States draft, document CD/500, was not presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and other approaches that provide the equivalent level of effectiveness to article X will find a ready reception for careful consideration. The crucial importance of the issue of compliance with agreements, and the experience of my Government with regard to non-compliance with existing agreements, remains a key factor in our work.

With regard to the nuclear test-ban issue, agenda item 1, there has also been considerable intensification of effort. Most notably, the United States and the Soviet Union completed at the end of July an initial round of discussions on the full range of issues concerning nuclear testing. These talks were the subject of a joint press statement issued on 1 August. The statement is not long, and it is worth setting out in full:

"Meetings have been held between United States and Soviet experts on the entire scope of issues related to nuclear testing.

"Extensive discussions have been held and a detailed exchange of views has taken place.

"Both sides expect to meet again in Geneva in early September, after a recess announced on 1 August, to allow further study of the issues that had been discussed."

I should point out that these talks, which the United States had long sought and which it now welcomes, did not constitute negotiations. They were characterized as discussions, because that is what they were. Accordingly, I must respectfully disagree with the remark of the distinguished deputy representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kashirin, made at our last plenary meeting, that "a round of United States-Soviet negotiations on ceasing nuclear tests was held in Geneva 25-31 July".

In these discussions the United States presented and discussed its views on the verification of existing agreements on nuclear testing. As President Reagan has affirmed, agreement on measures that would provide for effective verification would allow the United States to move forward on the ratification of the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976.

With regard to our own work on the nuclear test-ban agenda item, the Conference has taken note on 21 August of the progress report of the Group of Scientific Experts dealing with seismic monitoring of the underground environment in connection with a nuclear test ban. It goes without saying that the United States wholeheartedly welcomes this report containing the recommendations of the GSE for its future work, together with the report of the 1984 Technical Test of Global Seismic Data Exchange Procedures. My delegation again congratulates the experts who worked so long and hard on the Technical Test, and who over the years have sought to introduce new concepts and technology into the approaches to a global seismic network. Of the large number of those experts, I would single out for special commendation Dr. Peter McGregor of Australia, Dr. Frode Ringdal of Norway, and Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden.

Part of the future work envisioned by the GSE is more extensive and intensive use of so-called Level II seismic data, that is, the exchange on a rapid basis of larger quantities of full seismic waveforms. As long ago as the 181st plenary on 24 August 1982, the United States urged that such work be undertaken. My delegation is naturally very pleased that other delegations, including that of the Soviet Union, have now become persuaded of the utility of investigating issues related to Level II data exchange. There is undoubtedly a considerable amount of work to do in this regard. The efforts of delegations such as Canada, which plans to sponsor a workshop on topics related to Level II exchange, have already pointed this work in the right direction.

CD/PV.382

pp.18-19

USSR/Issraelyan

26.8.86

CTB

"Guided by a sense of responsibility for the fate of mankind, we instituted a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. Today, after it has been in effect for one year, the Soviet leadership has once again decided to extend it until the beginning of 1987."

As Mr. Gorbachev stressed,

"It was not an easy decision for us to arrive at. You know that the United States, in spite of our moratorium, has not ceased conducting nuclear explosions and is consequently moving forward in building up nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless we consider that our unilateral action is

justified because it should help to solve the problem of nuclear testing and to save mankind from the nuclear threat. In taking this step, we believe that people in all countries will correctly assess the lengthy silence reigning at Soviet testing sites. It is my profound conviction that if the United States joined the Soviet moratorium -- and the extension of our moratorium gives it a further chance to do so -- a serious and responsible step would have been taken towards stopping the improvement of the most destructive weapons and their stockpiling. Such a bilateral moratorium would undoubtedly promote progress towards a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests. The verification measures developed to monitor compliance with the moratorium could become an important step towards the establishment of a system to verify compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty."

In this connection I should like to draw the attention of representatives to the press conference held in Moscow yesterday by the Soviet Foreign Ministry with the participation of the First Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Y.M. Vorontsov, and the Chief of General Staff, Field-Marshal S.S. Akhromeyev. At this press conference Mr. Vorontsov stated in particular that the Soviet Union saw no obstacles to the monitoring of a test ban.

In a general political context, too, the moratorium could create favourable preconditions for the conclusion of such a treaty. The Soviet-United States talks which began in Geneva in late July should work towards that goal.

At the same time, Mr. Gorbachev also spoke of the important role which the Conference on Disarmament can play in banning nuclear tests. In his reply to the six leaders he states: "The Disarmament Conference could become an important forum for multilateral talks on this problem if artificial barriers preventing it from working effectively to prepare a draft treaty banning all test explosions were removed."

In our view, efforts in this field should be made in all areas and one set of talks should not preclude or replace others but, on the contrary, complement them. "I therefore believe", Mr. Gorbachev emphasized, "that the meeting you propose between experts from the six countries and Soviet and United States experts could make a valuable contribution to achieving the goal of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and set the stage for an energetic and businesslike multilateral dialogue on these issues. We are ready to send Soviet experts to such a meeting".

"The Soviet Union has already expressed its readiness", the letter continues, "to follow up your proposal concerning the provision of assistance in verifying the suspension of nuclear tests, including on-site inspections, providing of course it is accepted by the other side. Naturally, it would be useful to consider your new proposals jointly and to seek mutually acceptable solutions to the problem of verifying the cessation of nuclear testing".

CD/PV.382

p.22

Italy/Franceschi

26.8.86

OS

Moreover, the important issue of verification has not yet received the attention which it deserves. We would note the contribution on this subject made by the United Kingdom in the Committee on 29 July. Verification is at the heart of any arms control measure: an undertaking which cannot be adequately verified can have a negative and destabilizing influence. In the context of outer space there are clearly particular difficulties such as detecting, identifying and tracking in the vastness of space itself; the possibility of concealment of existing weapon systems on Earth; and the limitations of existing verification technology.

CD/PV.383

p.19

USSR/Issraelyan

28.8.86

CTB

The Soviet Union has put forward numerous proposals within the framework of bilateral and multilateral forums and has supported these with bold, concrete steps, thus displaying its preparedness to immediately resolve one of the crucial problems of our time, the stopping of nuclear tests.

A unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions has been in force for more than a year already, and has been repeatedly extended despite the absence of reciprocity. The Soviet Union has made a number of important steps in the sphere of verification of the discontinuance of tests using international forms of verification, including on-site inspections. Quite recently our proposal on seismic verification in this sphere was circulated as a working paper of the Conference. It is based on the expeditious exchange of Level 2 seismic data.

CD/PV.383

pp.25-26,28

Sweden/Ekeus

28.8.86

CW,RW
CTB

During the intersessional work this autumn and in January 1987 we will be able to address a broad range of issues vital for a Chemical Weapons Convention. My delegation would look with special interest on the questions of régimes for super-toxic lethal chemicals and of order of destruction.

Although we hope that we shall be able to register real progress during the intersessional work, many difficult problems remain. I can only mention declaration and verification of stocks of chemical weapons and the related issue of order of destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities as well as régimes for different categories and items of chemical weapons production facilities and for activities not prohibited by the Convention.

One of the outstanding key issues is the question of challenge inspection. Useful work on this issue has been carried out within Working Group C of the Committee under the able guidance of Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia.

We note the statement, repeated in the Conference as late as earlier this week, by the United States, that the challenge inspection arrangements contained in the United States proposal, document CD/500, is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. We have in this context studied with great attention the

recent proposal by the United Kingdom, document CD/715, which contains some important elements. Likewise, we consider the proposals by the German Democratic Republic and Poland, document CD/CW/WP.136, and by Pakistan, document CD/685, as being helpful to the work.

My delegation shares the view that if, in exceptional circumstances, there were serious and well-founded suspicions of significant breaches of the provisions of the Convention, a State Party should be obliged to accept some form of on-site inspection without undue delay. At the same time, it is of the greatest importance that provisions for such inspections take into consideration legitimate security interests of States Parties and that they should not, in this context, be used for purposes not directly connected to the Convention on Chemical Weapons.

One of the problems in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee has been the insistence of some delegations that nuclear facilities to be covered by the prohibition of attack should be installations devoted to peaceful purposes. As the application of IAEA safeguards is the only means of verifying that a facility is devoted to peaceful purposes, some delegations have expressed the view that only safeguarded facilities could be considered in this respect. Sweden, having submitted its nuclear programme to full-scope IAEA safeguards, has however pointed out that such an approach would mean that some installations in non-nuclear-weapon States would not be covered by the prohibition and that many nuclear energy installations in nuclear-weapon States would likewise not be covered. As the aim of the proposed prohibition is to prevent mass destruction as a consequence of attacks on nuclear facilities, it is of course not desirable that a number of important installations would not be within the scope of prohibition. Sweden has therefore proposed that a party could assure itself of protection against attacks by requesting that facilities it wished to have covered by a prohibition should be put on a list, kept by the Depositary. Parties to the treaty would undertake not to attack installations included in such a list. A simple control arrangement to confirm the necessary data to be included on the list, which are exact location and capacity as expressed in thermal output or contents of radioactive material, would be required. Such data could be obtained in most cases by documentation from the IAEA or, in case such data were not available, by an inspection. It appears that delegations from non-nuclear-weapon States, with some nuclear facilities not subject to IAEA safeguards, have in one way or the other made objections to this approach. It is my impression that all other delegations, however, appear to have no objections to this cost-efficient and practical method.

The work of the GSE as well as the very interesting statements in the plenary of the Conference during this session have demonstrated an emerging consensus that reliable verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would be feasible. There are still differences as to what are the necessary arrangements to verify a treaty. An encouraging development was the statement by Ambassador Issraelyan of the Soviet Union of 22 July, when he stated the interest of the Soviet Union in using the exchange of so-called Level II data as part of a global system of verification of a nuclear test ban. The GSE will now, on the basis of an emerging consensus of using wave-

form data, further develop the capacity of a future global seismic verification system. It intends to carry out, in 1988, a global test with regard to the exchange of Level II data. If this test is as successful as the test of 1984 a considerable step will have taken to solve the technical problems of verification of a nuclear test ban.

However, a verification system cannot be established through technical solutions only. Negotiations on the design of the verification system must also be carried out on a diplomatic level. Such negotiations would cover, inter alia, the questions of seismic stations, international data centres, data exchange and installation with regard to data on radiation, routine inspection, challenge on-site inspections, other compliance elements and institutional arrangements. Obviously, a verification system must be developed in interrelationship with the scope of a prospective nuclear test ban treaty. In this respect, the debate during this session of the Conference has been especially rewarding, inasmuch as more interest than hitherto has been devoted to the problem of small and very small explosions. My delegation is hopeful that the elements discussed in document CD/712 could constitute a basis for the solution of this problem, which we consider an important one among the scope problems to be settled. With regard to peaceful explosions, the Swedish draft treaty of 1983, document CD/381, in principle based upon the Tripartite Report of the Committee on Disarmament, document CD/130, offers the outline for what we consider a mutually and generally acceptable solution.

A great number of problems related to the questions of scope and verification of a future treaty must thus be solved before a treaty can be finally concluded.

CD/PV.383

pp.36-37

Canada/Despres

28.8.86

CTB

I would like to take this opportunity to comment on the Fourth Report to the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which was presented to the Conference on 21 August.

It has been 10 years since the Conference on Disarmament first gave a mandate to the GSE. From the beginning of its discussions Canada has strongly supported and actively participated in the Group's work. The Group has sponsored several practical experiments with the aim of facilitating the specification of the technical features of an international seismic data exchange, which, it is generally recognized, would constitute a key component, though not the only component, of any verification system for a nuclear test ban agreement covering underground tests. By far the most ambitious and important of these experiments is the GSE's 1984 Technical Test, which is the subject of the report submitted on 21 August. Canadian experts are fully familiar with this Technical Test, having participated in its design, implementation and evaluation. Data from three Canadian seismograph stations -- two in Canada's North and one in Quebec province -- constituted a significant proportion of the total data collected and processed.

Even a brief glance at the detailed report cannot fail to impress us with the diligence and dedication of the GSE in carrying out its mandate. On behalf of the Canadian Government, I would like to emphasize our gratitude for the work of the GSE.

The GSE, through its activities, has gone a long way to facilitating the verification of any future agreement on a CTB or any other agreement on a nuclear test ban. The report is an excellent example of the Group's activities. The activities of the GSE have also, in the Canadian view, highlighted the useful work that can still be done on verification questions. The adoption by consensus of resolution 40/152 (0) by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1985 certainly reflects the recognition by the international community of the great importance of verification in the process of developing arms control and disarmament agreements.

If the work of the GSE and of the Conference regarding verification of a CTB are not yet finished, much has been accomplished on which we can build and for which we salute the GSE. This was pointed out in the brochure on existing technological capabilities for seismic monitoring of a test ban, distributed earlier to all delegations. The Canadian delegation therefore unhesitatingly endorses the recommendations in the GSE's report for continuing its work.

The work of the GSE clearly merits the support of all the Conference's members and other interested countries. This work, in our view, is not only allowing clarification of technical issues but is also contributing to an emerging consensus on the need for the eventual establishment of a global seismic network if a comprehensive test ban is to be adequately verified. Canada, like many others, is doing what it can to make human and technical resources available in support of the GSE's work and will continue to do so. Ambassador Beesley referred to some of Canada's actions in his statement to this body on 11 March and they do not need to be repeated again.

In connection with the GSE's work, I would like to draw the Conference's attention to the statement to this body on 14 August by Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the GSE, where he refers to the recommendations of the Group. Among the future recommended activities of the GSE will be "the developing and testing of methods and procedures and investigating and testing of communications links to be used for the expeditious exchange of seismic waveform and parameter data between national facilities and international data centres." The Group also plans to carry out a large-scale experiment on the exchange of Level II data, probably in 1988. In this context, we think that the Ottawa workshop of seismic data communications experts scheduled for October will prove a useful step towards these goals and we encourage wide participation by appropriate experts from interested countries. In a more immediate context, this workshop integrates well with the recent Japanese initiative for an exchange of Level II data.

I would conclude this brief statement by noting that the practical work of the GSE occurs against a background of favourable developments in the political realm, some of which are likely to be critically important in determining whether and in what manner the results of our labours will be applied. Nevertheless, when taken together with other indications of a more forthcoming approach on issues of verification, these developments are further evidence that common ground is being developed on these questions. That common ground is the essential prerequisite to a negotiated NTB.

CD/PV.385

pp.21-22

USSR/Vorontsov

3.2.87

OS

The Conference has good potential for businesslike and concrete discussion of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space. This problem affects all States and is a case in which the Conference could not only become the generator of useful ideas, but also engage in concrete negotiations on certain aspects of this problem. For instance, in our view, the Conference could engage in the businesslike consideration of the question of the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. After all, from outer space it is possible to select as a "laser target" not only Soviet cities, but any town in any "disobedient" country. The Conference could also consider the possibility of creating a system of international verification guaranteeing unswerving compliance with an agreement of the kind in question and, in particular, study the idea of an international inspectorate. Such an inspectorate, for instance, would have the right to access for the purpose of carrying out on-site inspections to all facilities designed for the launching and deployment in outer space of space devices and to the corresponding launch vehicles.

CD/PV.385

p.28

Sweden/Theorin

3.2.87

CW

A number of problems remain and must now be addressed vigorously. One is the régime for declaring and verifying existing stockpiles of chemical weapons. Another is the search for an effective, but not excessive system for international challenge inspections. The general narrowing of positions on verification that has been demonstrated lately should help to facilitate agreement on this issue. A third major problem is verification of future non-production of chemical weapons. Steps have been taken towards generally acceptable verification régimes applicable to different categories of chemicals. Such a verification system should, of course, not hamper legitimate activities of the chemical industry. Other important problems to be solved are questions related to the functioning of the Consultative Committee and its organs, including the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat.

CD/PV.385

pp.38-40

Australia/Butler

3.2.87

NFZ

The Treaty of Rarotonga provides that: no South Pacific country which becomes a Party to the Treaty will develop, manufacture, acquire or receive from others any nuclear explosive devices; there should be no testing of nuclear explosive devices in the South Pacific; there will be no stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territories of participating States; nuclear activities in the region, including the export of nuclear material, are to be conducted under strict safeguards to ensure exclusively peaceful, non-explosive use; South Pacific countries shall retain their unqualified sovereign rights to decide for themselves such questions as access to their ports and airfields by vessels or aircraft of other countries; international law with regard to freedom of the sea will be fully respected; and finally, performance of obligations by Parties will be subject to strict verification. The Treaty also bans the dumping of radioactive waste at sea in the region and in this it complements the SPREP Convention concluded in 1986 for the environmental protection of the South Pacific region. The Treaty of Rarotonga reflects deeply-felt and longstanding concern in the South Pacific region

about nuclear testing, the ocean dumping of nuclear wastes and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It expresses the strong community of interests which members of the South Pacific Forum share in environmental and security matters and, in the words of the Treaty's Preamble, the determination of the Parties to ensure "that the bounty and beauty of the land and the sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their people and their descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace".

There are three Protocols to the Treaty and they were opened for signature on 1 December 1986. The first of them invites France, the United States of America and the United Kingdom to apply key provisions of the Treaty to their South Pacific territories. The other two Protocols respectively invite the five nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Parties to the Treaty and not to test nuclear explosive devices within the Zone.

It is our firm view that the Treaty of Rarotonga constitutes an important contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in the region it covers and is a significant nuclear arms control agreement. Its significance in this respect would be further enhanced if those nuclear-weapon States which have been invited to sign the Protocols to the Treaty relevant to them did so as expeditiously as possible. One State, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, did so on 15 December of last year, and Australia welcomed this.

A significant feature of the Treaty of Rarotonga is that the South Pacific Forum, which produced the Treaty, is an association of regional Governments which traditionally operates by consensus. Members of this Conference will be sensitive to the difficulties associated with the process of arriving at a consensus in producing arms control and disarmament agreements, and aware that, in coming to an agreement, the interests of all participants must be taken into account. The Treaty of Rarotonga is a document which is a product of just that process, a consensus document agreed to by a number of States, a number in fact numerically equivalent to a third of this Conference.

I have said that this Treaty is an important arms control measure. No nuclear weapons are stationed on the territory of the South Pacific States. This Treaty provides a strong guarantee that this will remain the case. The Treaty also creates verification mechanisms with respect to this undertaking. Other areas where a similar undertaking has been institutionalized, with the overwhelming support of the international community, are Antarctica, Latin America, outer space and the sea bed. The Treaty of Rarotonga marks an important additional contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, a contribution with significant consequences both for the South Pacific region and for neighbouring regions. It is a major contribution towards preventing a sizeable part of the globe becoming yet another location in which the geographical spread of nuclear weapons could occur. The prohibition of the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of South Pacific countries is of particular importance in this regard. It extends beyond the obligations that these countries have entered into under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As I mentioned earlier, the text of the Treaty of Rarotonga was circulated to this Conference in 1985 in document CD/633. Since then, following consultations by a South Pacific Forum delegation of officials with all the prospective

Protocol States, the Protocols have been adopted in final form by the South Pacific Forum, meeting at Suva in August 1986. The final text of the Protocols has been circulated today jointly by the delegations of Australia and New Zealand as an annex to document CD/633. That has been placed on the table of delegations today. The text of the Treaty proper, including all the annexes, with the exception of the amended Protocols circulated today, remains identical to what is contained in CD/633.

CD/PV.386

pp.5-11

USA/Adelman

5.2.87

VER
CW

Second, there is a direct, practical link between openness and progress in arms control. That link lies in the problem of verification, in which I know this Conference is so interested and on which you have heard so much over the years. Verification has always defined the outer frontier of what we can achieve in arms control. We can control effectively only what we can verify effectively. But verification is often directly limited in turn by the degree of openness permitted by the States that subscribe to an arms control agreement.

In an open society like the United States, relevant information on defence programmes is readily available. That is why, when dealing with open, democratic societies, one does not have to rely exclusively on what we call "national technical means" or elaborate verification mechanisms to verify arms agreements. Often in the past I have been asked about the Soviet ability to verify our arms control agreements and I say basically that all the Soviet Union needs to verify our compliance with arms control is a subscription to various open publications in the United States -- The New York Times, The Washington Post, Aviation Week, and publications like that -- because, if there were ever a case where the United States violated an arms control agreement, it would be readily available in the open press.

That is one reason why the United States has called for greater openness in all nations. Since 1982, when I worked with many of you here in this room there in the First Committee at the United Nations, the United States has consistently pressed for resolutions on disarmament and openness in the United Nations General Assembly and I am sure Jan Martenson will remember that, in 1982, we introduced a resolution on disarmament and openness and it was adopted by the General Assembly as I remember, by consensus. This resolution explicitly stated the connection between advancing disarmament and advancing openness and free discussion and free dissemination of information in all nations. It encouraged all nations to advance the cause of openness as a way of advancing the cause of disarmament as a way of advancing the cause of arms control.

And basically this is my message to you today: the path to more ambitious arms control, in all areas, lies through the gateway of greater openness. To quote Dr. Sakharov, once again, the issue here "is not simply a moral one, but also a paramount, practical ingredient of international trust and security".

The world is still very far from achieving this kind of openness, which is one reason why arms control remains a very painstaking, very difficult, very timely business. Take an issue as rudimentary as published figures on defence spending. You all know just as well as I do how slow and careful we must be in terms of arms control and how frustrating is a lot of the pace of the arms control talks, because all of us in this room grapple with the issue on a daily basis. But take an issue as rudimentary as published figures on defence spending, something that the United Nations has also been discussing for a good number of years.

In 1985, according to our best estimates, the United States and the Soviet Union each devoted around \$250 billion to defence. Figures on United States defence spending are, of course, widely available in open sources. They are broken down by category. They are extensively discussed. They are scrutinized in the United States Congress -- probably scrutinized a little too much, if you ask me -- but they are scrutinized in the United States Congress and elsewhere in our society. Figures for Soviet defence spending, on the other hand, must be derived from careful analysis. Why? Because published Soviet figures bear absolutely no relationship to the reality of the Soviet defence effort.

In 1985, for example, the Soviet Union claims to have spent 20.3 billion roubles on defence. Assuming the official exchange rate of approximately \$1.50 per rouble, that comes to less than \$35 billion. Now, that is a ridiculously small sum -- some 15 per cent of what they really spend -- for the declared defence budget of a State regarded as a military super-Power. It bears no relationship at all to the \$250 billion figure I mentioned a moment ago, which suggests what it would cost the United States to mount an effort equivalent to the present Soviet defence effort. There is no way in the world that the Soviet Union could be mounting its current defence effort on a declared budget of 20.3 billion roubles. It is spending many, many, many times that, and we all know that.

Or again, take the public statements of the two sides on the issue of strategic defences. The United States Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), of which you have heard some, I am sure, in this room, is an openly declared programme. Its budget is published and voted on by the United States Congress. Its activities are reported to the Congress, where it is widely discussed and debated. The President of the United States often discusses the programme in his speeches. In fact I have personally found it hard to stop him from discussing the subject of SDI at any time, in his speeches or otherwise.

Yet to this day, even as we negotiate on defence and space issues with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union continues to deny that it has the equivalent of an SDI programme of its own. We know this denial to be false. I believe everybody in this room knows the denial to be false. We know that the Soviet Union began investigating several advanced strategic defence technologies before we did, years before. We know it is extensively engaged in exploration and development of these technologies. We know, for example, that the Soviet Union has an extensive laser research programme which involves about 10,000 scientists and expenditure of resources worth approximately \$1 billion a year just on that kind of laser research programme. And we know it is researching a host of other technologies, advanced technologies, as well.

Can it surprise anyone that our progress in arms control is often slow and halting when there is such a lack of openness and honesty between Governments about even such an elementary fact as this one?

There is, in short almost no area of arms control in which greater openness would not lead to greater openness on the way to greater progress. In some of these areas, lack of openness is among the most crucial barriers to a meaningful agreement. Thus, my message to you today can be summed up as this: unless the Soviet Union moves to the openness it now talks about, accomplishments in arms control are just going to be limited, if not thwarted altogether. That movement towards greater openness is necessary for progress on an issue like the one this Conference has before it.

Of the tasks before you, my Government, as you know, considers the negotiations on achieving a comprehensive and effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons to have the highest priority. International negotiators have been striving to remove the chemical weapons threat since the late nineteenth century. Here it is 1987. Nearly a century has passed since the Hague Conference prohibited use of chemical projectiles, in 1899. Yet the world finds that the problem of chemical weapons remains; indeed, as the world edges toward the twenty-first century, the chemical weapons danger continues to grow. Shockingly, we have witnessed use of chemical weapons by some nations in this decade and even during the past year.

It is high time that chemical weapons use was rendered a thing of the past. It is high time that these barbaric weapons were banished from the face of the earth. But it is obvious that, if these weapons are to be banned, a thorough and effective mechanism of verification is necessary. My country will just not accept, and no free nations should accept, a ban on chemical weapons without sound machinery of verification.

A chemical weapons ban without confidence of compliance will be no more effective than the Hague Conference's 1899 prohibition on use of artillery containing poison gas, which did nothing to prevent extensive use of chemical weapons in the First World War. The use of chemical weapons, as I remember, produced some 1 million casualties. It will be no better than so many of the misguided disarmament measures of the 1920s and 1930s, which, the great American commentator, Walter Lippmann, said, were "tragically successful in disarming the nations that believed in disarmament" while permitting aggressor nations to maintain and expand their own arsenals. Until an effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban is in place, the American people will insist, and rightly so, that the United States maintain adequate chemical forces to deter use of these heinous weapons by an aggressor.

While the establishment of procedures for the effective verification of arms control agreements is often extremely demanding both technologically and politically, in the case of chemical weapons, the challenges are especially great. The toxic chemicals which are or could be used as agents of warfare are in general not very different from a variety of substances having legitimate civilian use. Clearly, the chemical process equipment used in their production can be found in the legitimate manufacture of pesticides or corrosives. Chemical agents can be stored in bulk, facilitating transportation as well as concealment. Chemical munitions have no particular characteristics which distinguish them from other types of munitions. They are too small and easily transported and concealed.

Thus, as I mentioned before, the issue of openness goes to the heart of achieving a chemical weapons ban. Article III of the rolling text of the draft Convention on chemical weapons (CD/734) requires each State Party to declare whether it possesses chemical weapons. And yet today the United States is the only country in this room, the United States is the only country in the world, that publicly admits to having chemical weapons and has made public its stockpile locations. That, to me, is astonishing -- especially when so many countries are pressing the urgency of a chemical weapons ban. Some are even criticizing the United States for holding up progress and for developing chemical weapons.

The production of chemical weapons is not illegal. The use of chemical weapons is illegal. Since it signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the United States has never used chemical weapons; others have -- others, who do not even publicly admit to possessing chemical weapons, they have used them; others, with representatives in this very room, they have used chemical weapons. The world expects better than this.

The United States openly declares its possession and development of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union, along with other nations, does not. The world expects better than this.

The United States has presented publicly an extraordinary amount of information concerning its binary weapons programme. The details are known to everyone. The Soviet Union has told us nothing about its chemical weapons programme. The world expects better than this.

The United States has invited all members of this Conference to examine procedures for the destruction of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has yet to accept this invitation, which is still outstanding. The world expects better than this.

The United States will devote some \$500 million under the fiscal 1987 defence budget to the elimination of its current chemical munitions stocks. The Soviet Union, apparently, has no similar chemical weapons elimination or demilitarization programme. The world expects better than this.

The United has maintained a unilateral moratorium on the development of chemical weapons for 17 years. The Soviet Union has never stopped producing chemical weapons and it continues today to expand its facilities and to expand its capabilities. The world expects better than this.

It is because of this sad state of affairs, because of this glaring lack of openness in the realm of chemical weapons, that we are more than ever convinced that confidence in compliance is essential to a chemical weapons ban. We are more than ever convinced that nothing less than an inspection régime institutionalizing the right of short-notice access upon demand to any location or facility suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons will effectively deter non-compliance -- that is, of course, the challenge-inspection provision of Article X of the United States draft convention, CD/500.

But every article of the convention must be designed to contribute to this overall objective of confidence in compliance. And, to be effective, each provision must be clearly and unambiguously defined, written, and understood. It will do little good to have broad agreement on the basic provisions concerning permitted and prohibited activities if inspection procedures are inadequate or if they are imprecise.

At present, it is a point of consensus among all our Governments that each State Party will provide international access to its destruction sites, its production facilities to be eliminated, and its facilities for producing permitted chemicals. But the working out of precise procedures for all these tasks had only just been begun by Ambassador Lowitz and his fine delegation. And the vital question of how to ensure confidence in compliance with regard to undeclared sites still remains at issue.

But, again and again, wherever we turn in this negotiation, we run up against the same problem: it is precisely the absence of openness, the absence of glasnost, that is standing in the way, blocking further progress. In the draft Convention, I count no less than 13 different types of declarations that each State Party must be expected to make about its stockpiles and about their destruction, about its chemical weapons production facilities and about their elimination, and about its chemical industry.

Article IV is a key element in this series of declarations -- calling for the declaration of all stockpiles. Everyone agrees that each State Party should declare the amount and composition of its stockpile. Everyone agrees with the basic objective that the complete stockpile should be destroyed. And yet the Soviet Union continues to reject two particular "openness" provisions; each is necessary if we are to have confidence that this objective is fulfilled. One is the early and complete declaration of the stockpile locations and on-site verification to ensure that the declaration reflects reality. The second is on-site monitoring of the stocks until destruction to ensure that some weapons are not clandestinely diverted to undeclared sites before destruction. And it is obvious that we face the serious risk that a State will not declare all its stockpile locations or the entire amount of its stockpile.

The consequences of lack of openness in this realm are unfortunate, and they are not lost on world opinion. I think the 1983 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) identified the problem -- and identified the solution -- as well as anyone did:

"Faced with a high degree of uncertainty about Soviet CW intentions, Western defence authorities have no prudent option but to assume that they pose a threat. If it decided to do so, the Soviet Government could probably find a way for reducing the ambiguities attaching to its CW stance in Western (and non-aligned country) eyes without at the same time jeopardizing Soviet security to the point of net detriment. Yet even though the need for such mistrust-reducing measures is so evidently growing, it seems that Moscow has not chosen to act in such a manner, a failure which is becoming more and more conspicuous and damaging".

And that is from the Stockholm Institute (SIPRI).

Clearly, there is a gap between the way certain States conduct business today and the way they promise they will behave under a convention banning chemical weapons. And it is simply not possible for a nation to yield national control over its own defence to an international agreement -- as we will be asked to do when we have a convention ready for signature -- on the basis of a mere promise of a new and better pattern of behaviour by other States like the Soviet Union.

CD/PV.386

pp.13-14

USSR/Nazarkin

5.2.87

CTB

There are no reasons, except false and fictitious ones, preventing agreement on a nuclear-test ban. There was a time when the United States argued that it would be impossible to verify such an agreement, but now, thanks to Soviet initiatives, these so-called arguments have been dispelled once and for all. The Soviet Union is willing -- and this has repeatedly been affirmed at the highest level -- to see any measures of verification in this field. It has been clearly stated by the Soviet side that such verification could be implemented both by national technical means and on the basis of international procedures, including on-site inspections.

When the United States was no longer in a position to use the verification issue for delaying a solution to the question of the cessation of nuclear testing, it advanced new arguments. It now argues that nuclear tests can only be ceased in the event of complete nuclear disarmament and that, so long as nuclear arsenals exist, there is need for nuclear testing. However, to put the question in that way is to do nothing more than to deny the existence of the problem of a nuclear-test ban as an issue in its own right in the field of disarmament. After all, since 1954, when this question first appeared on the agenda of international disarmament negotiations, it has been understood that the cessation of nuclear testing is a significant measure in the limiting of the nuclear arms race and a step towards nuclear disarmament, and that its implementation will in fact put an end to qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, lead to their elimination and promote the conclusion of radical agreements on the reduction and elimination of these weapons. The new American logic puts the cart before the horse. After all, nobody would take it into their head to argue that nuclear tests will be needed even when all nuclear arsenals have been destroyed. That line of argument, too, is nothing more than yet another unsuccessful attempt to justify the unjustifiable, that is, the unwillingness of the United States Administration to start curbing the nuclear arms race.

CD/PV.386

pp.19-20

FRG/Bolewski

5.2.87

CW

My Government has emphasized on many occasions that it attributes the highest priority to the negotiations of a worldwide ban on CW. In this context, permit me also to quote from the North Atlantic Council Communiqué of 12 December 1986: "At the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, we seek a convention which meets our objective, the general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all existing stockpiles".

The North Atlantic Council further states: "If the Soviet Union is prepared to take a constructive attitude on all aspects of an effective verification régime, such an agreement is within reach. We appeal to the USSR to join us in overcoming the outstanding obstacles".

At this point, my delegation would like to reaffirm the position of my Government on the need for effective verification. Our wish is that agreement be reached as soon as possible on a system of verification which effectively prevents the production of chemical weapons. It must be impossible for any contracting party to evade the inspections required for the attainment of this goal. Of decisive importance is verification especially in areas where there is a danger of chemical weapons production. The inspections must therefore be tailored to the very purpose of the convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

Our object is and remains, for example, to control super-toxic lethal chemicals which are suitable for CW, not dangerous substances of the chemical industry in general. But even if a total control of the chemical industry were feasible or acceptable -- not only of the commercial industry, but of any chemical industry -- this would not render superfluous challenge inspections, because even such a total control would not mean that there could not be undeclared or unknown facilities and stocks which might present a risk. That is why my delegation insists on the necessity for any challenge inspection not to be limited to declared facilities, but to cover all possible installations and all locations. This, then, in turn will be a factor reacting upon the regular controls.

The pre-condition to make challenge inspection a really satisfying operation is the acceptance of such a demand for control as a rule. But there are other elements on which consensus does not seem to be achieved yet. This concerns, for example, a further pre-condition, namely that the demand of a challenging State should prevail and not be made dependent upon a plebiscitarian machinery of any sort. In our view, majority results or minority failures are hardly apt procedures, even if they are called democratic, to solve international security problems -- and this is what we are dealing with here. If a State perceives an imminent danger to its security, then that State -- no State -- will want to rely on a multilateral process to accept or discard its perception. In addition to that, we might run the risk of establishing the right to veto for one or even more groups in the international supervising body, depending upon the qualifications chosen for representation in that body. A right of veto or a blocking minority would be a completely new element in an international convention, the central logic of which is to guarantee all States equal rights to security and equal duties to contribute towards its realization.

As for on-challenge inspections, we continue to regard the British proposal as the basis of a solution that answers the need for stringent verification while taking account of the legitimate interests of the participating countries in terms of protection.

CD/PV.386

p.22

Poland/Turbanski

5.2.87

CW

The time has come to make necessary political decisions which would open the way to a successful solution of some of the outstanding issues. There is no need to repeat what we all know, i.e. what the areas of agreement are, or to point out issues where political solutions are needed. It seems, however, that both last year's session and the inter-sessional period have demonstrated clearly the growing significance of the overall problem of verification, both verification of non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry and challenge verification. We are of the opinion that verification measures should be in the centre of our work. The verification system should provide confidence for all States parties that the provisions of the convention are observed. We should be careful to close all loopholes which may either open the way to re-emergence of chemical weapons or become a constant source of misunderstandings.

CD/PV.387

pp.7-11

Japan/Yamada

10.2.87

CTB
CW

As is well known, Japan has consistently considered the realization of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban as being the priority item in the field of disarmament, and strongly wishes to see a resumption of substantial work by the Conference on the issue. We believe that the following circumstances hold out prospects for recommencement in 1987 of this long-suspended work.

First, there now seems to be a genuine desire on the part of a number of member States that substantial work be resumed. In the General Assembly last year, a great majority of non-aligned countries and socialist States, in contrast to their previous abstentions, voted in favour of the resolution 41/47 which Japan co-sponsored, calling for various actions to be taken in order that a CTB treaty may be concluded at an early date. We are encouraged by the wide support shown for the resolution, in particular, the call on the Conference on Disarmament, in its operative paragraph 2(a), to "commence practical work on a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of the 1987 session."

Secondly, there is now a widening common perception as to the subject matter of the work. Resolution 41/46 A lists "contents and scope" of a treaty and "compliance and verification" as the subject matter of the work which, in comparison to the similar resolution of the previous year, shows a more realistic approach, an approach which we view favourably.

Thirdly, all groups now seem to share a more or less common perception of the importance of verification in developing a CTB régime.

A comprehensive nuclear-test ban has serious implications for the security concerns of all States. Verification measures to ensure compliance are therefore essential. It is from such a perspective that my Government has, in a number, of ways, contributed to the work on verification, including, in particular, the proposal in June 1984 for a step-by-step approach, whereby those nuclear tests which are at present verifiable would be prohibited, and as progress is made in verification technologies, the scope of prohibition would be expanded, finally arriving at a comprehensive prohibition. It is

also well known that other Western States such as Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom have made concrete proposals which stress the need for adequate verification measures.

We welcome the fact that the socialist States, at the 1986 session of the Conference, began to attach importance to verification measures with regard to a CTB. As Mr. Petrovsky, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, stated in his intervention on 24 June, "the Soviet Union favours the strictest possible verification of the ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including on-site inspection and making use of all achievements in seismology". He went on to state that the Soviet Union does not favour any loopholes in the régime for an on-site inspection and that "Should any ambiguous situation arise when, for example, an exchange of seismic data would make it difficult to determine whether or not there had been a nuclear explosion or an underground tremor due to some other reason, that would in fact be just the case when an on-site inspection would be required". I do hope that such positive statement by the socialist States with regard to the problem of verification, will be translated into concrete proposals in the course of substantial work on a CTB.

The non-aligned and neutral States have also stressed the need for specific measures of verification with regard to a CTB, and have made clear their willingness to co-operate actively. For example, the "Document issued at the Mexico Summit on Verification Measures" by the Leaders of the Six Nations, in August 1986 in Ixtapa, Mexico, recognizes the importance of verification and expresses the preparedness of the six countries to participate in on-site inspections at the nuclear-test sites of the United States and the Soviet Union, and in monitoring of the territories of the two States outside of the test sites.

The conclusion of a CTB treaty will necessitate the establishment of an international seismic monitoring network as an indispensable international mechanism to ensure compliance. In this connection, we highly value the Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test (GSETT) 1984, presented last year, concerning an exchange and analysis of Level I data, as well as the agreement by the experts to begin work directed towards the design of a modern international system based on the expeditious exchange of waveform (Level II) and parameter (Level I) data and on the processing of such data at International Data Centres. We had, in April 1986, presented our ideas on an exchange of Level II data with like-minded countries, and, following up the results of the Canadian Workshop in October 1986 for data communications experts, we began an experimental exchange of Level II data in December 1986 with several interested countries. We will report on the results of this experiment to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts this year. May I take this opportunity to thank the Canadian Government for its sponsorship of this useful workshop.

Useful ideas on the organization of an international seismic monitoring network indispensable for verifying compliance with a CTB treaty have been presented by Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Sweden and

others. Discussions on this important question of organization would require much work. From this point of view also, I earnestly hope for an early establishment of an ad hoc committee on CTB.

First, the definition of chemical weapons is one of the basic issues of the convention. It is a most complicated and difficult problem. But the definition should, in principle, be understood to be "substances of particular relevance to chemical weapons" and related munitions. In drafting, the focus up to now has been placed on the prohibited substances under Article VI. Would that be sufficient? We should probably also take into consideration those substances as will be declared under Article IV.

In this connection, my delegation thinks that the convention should not create impediments for the legitimate activities of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes, and thus feels that due significance should be given to the general purpose criterion. It is therefore imperative that the concept of "permitted purposes" be given careful attention in drafting the definition.

Second, with regard to the destruction of chemical weapons, the declaration of location of stocks, together with the declarations on the entirety of the stockpile and on its composition, should be made at an early point in time following the entry into force of the convention. These declarations should be verified by on-site inspection.

In this connection, my Government welcomed the presentation in July 1986 by the United States delegation of a document in which detailed information on United States stockpiles and plans for their destruction were given. It was a courageous step helpful to the negotiations. If the other countries possessing chemical weapons were to follow suit, during the course of the negotiations, it would greatly contribute to the solution of the problems we now face, in particular, with regard to Articles IV and V.

Third, in Article VI, which deals with the question of permitted activities, we should strive to develop common language on the verification measures to be applied to each of the categories of substances.

There is much work to be done, also, on the issues of thresholds for the control of various chemical substances, the concept of militarily significant quantities, the mechanism for revising lists of chemicals, the cost factor, and so on. We feel however that these problems might be better assigned to the experts for their consideration and advice. It would be more productive for the Ad Hoc Committee to agree on the basic utility of these concepts in implementing Article VI, and then proceed to work out the body of Article VI and its annexes.

With regard to the substances on which there is no agreement as to whether they should be included in a particular list of régime, we suggest that it would do no harm to put them aside temporarily by putting them on a preliminary list, returning to settle the question of the outstanding substances once the régimes to which they would be subject are more developed.

Fourth, as regards the organizational questions in Article VIII, we feel it appropriate to maintain the present draft text for the time being. When the various substantive provisions on the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities, régimes for permitted activities, challenge verification, and so forth are developed, there will be a need for a thorough review. The organs of the convention will need to be fully worked out and be in existence by the time of the entry into force of the convention. As they require extensive work, my delegation thinks that these, including the financial clauses, would be another set of problems which we could delegate for expert consideration at an appropriate time.

Fifth, there seems to be common understanding on a challenge inspection régime under Article IX, that this inspection is to be of an exceptional nature to be conducted within a short time scale. However, when we get down to working out the details of its implementation, the divergences seem to be as wide as ever. In order to overcome this impasse, we must develop our thoughts as to whether we are pursuing a rectifying effect as regards possible contraventions of the convention or the restoration of confidence among the parties to the convention, whether our aim is to drive the offending party out of the convention régime, or whether bilateral solutions may possibly be contemplated. We should review existing proposals and engage in quiet and informal discussions to seek a solution to the problem.

CD/PV.388

pp.3-5

Finland/Torvudd

12.2.87

CTB

CW

We continue to believe that a comprehensive test-ban treaty with adequate verification provisions is achievable right now. However, we also recognize that, even on this important question, the best should not be the enemy of the good. At the present juncture, step-by-step negotiations, firmly geared to the generally accepted goal of ending all nuclear tests in all environments for all time, would seem to offer the best available means out of the deadlock. We welcome the willingness of both sides to explore a gradual approach to this important issue.

The Conference on Disarmament has already done a considerable amount of useful work on the subject of a test ban. That work needs to be continued bearing in mind the possibility of interim steps. One such step might well be the establishment by the Conference of an international seismic monitoring network based on existing facilities around the world, as recently recommended in General Assembly resolution 41/47.

Clearly, confidence in a comprehensive test ban requires that it be verifiable. Mandated by this Conference, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has done valuable work in laying the necessary technical groundwork for reliable monitoring of seismic events for verification of a test ban. We welcome the steps toward developing an international data exchange system now underway. This work would be further assisted if all States conducting nuclear explosions were to provide the Secretary-General of the United Nations with information concerning these explosions as requested by General Assembly resolution 41/59 N.

Finland participates actively in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts. With government funding, the University of Helsinki has for some years conducted a special seismological project for this purpose. In view of the new and demanding tasks the GSE set for itself at its last meeting, the Government of Finland has recently decided to allocate considerable additional resources to the project as of this year.

Since 1980, Finland has co-operated with Zambia in establishing a seismic network there and training Zambian personnel to operate it. Zambia participated with success in the Level I data exchange experiment organized by the GSE in 1984. We look forward to Zambian participation in the even more complex Level II data exchange experiment scheduled for 1988.

Since I last spoke from this rostrum one year ago, considerable progress has been achieved with regard to another priority item on the agenda of this Conference, the elaboration of a convention to ban chemical weapons. Although a number of critically important issues remain to be settled, the pace of progress over the past year gives rise to the hope that the remaining problems, too, can be solved in the not too distant future. We wish the new Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, every success in his important task.

Challenge inspection is undoubtedly the major unresolved issue at this point. We are glad to note that, as last year's Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, noted in his report to the Committee, a convergence of views now exists on at least four points. Enlarging this common ground to the point of consensus -- by working out the appropriate detailed procedures to everyone's satisfaction -- poses a challenge of its own. Perhaps differentiation by types of challenge inspection objects and accumulating experience from on-site inspections might help to solve this problem.

We are heartened by the progress made in developing régimes for the verification of various categories of chemicals relevant to the convention. For the first time, there is now a provisional list of at least nine known chemical warfare agents which will be banned, except for small-scale production for research, medical or protective purposes. Important work has also been done in developing detailed verification measures for such production. We believe that in perfecting these measures care should be taken not to hamper basic research routinely undertaken in university laboratories or elsewhere.

It is clear that effective verification of the chemical weapons convention requires, in addition to data reporting, both on-site inspections and the use of modern monitoring equipment.

Monitoring equipment for verification purposes has been studied and tested by the Finnish chemical weapons verification project since 1972. As part of our continuing effort to help to provide the necessary technical means for assuring confidence in the convention, the Finnish project is hosting, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, a special workshop in Helsinki. The workshop, convened at expert level, will address questions of automatic

monitoring in terms of detection of alleged use, verification of destruction and verification of non-production. The results of the workshop will be communicated to all members of the Conference on Disarmament in written form as soon as they are available.

CD/PV.388

pp.9-10

Romania/Dolgu

12.2.87

CTB

CW

The Romanian delegation firmly advocates that the problem of prohibition of nuclear testing should occupy a central place in the work of this session. We therefore favour the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this item. In view of the importance and gravity of this problem of nuclear tests, Romania proposes the convening of an international conference on a nuclear-test ban. Such a conference could be entrusted with debating all aspects involved in this problem, including the role of non-nuclear-weapon countries in the negotiation of an international nuclear-test-ban treaty and the application of a reliable and effective system of monitoring the provisions of such a treaty. The Conference on Disarmament could be the appropriate setting for the preparation of such a conference. As an interim step the Conference could also call for the establishment of a moratorium on all nuclear tests.

Romania welcomes the idea of the creation of a network of seismic stations in different countries which, through the exchange of data and information, could contribute to monitoring the implementation of a future treaty banning all nuclear tests. We are prepared to participate in this with the technical means available to us.

Romania attaches great importance to the total prohibition and final elimination of chemical weapons, and thus to the preparation by the Conference of a draft convention. The results achieved to date by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the skilful guidance of Ambassador Cromartie to whom we wish to express the Romanian delegation's gratitude, represent remarkable steps towards the elaboration of the text of the convention. Several delegations that have already spoken have stressed the importance and urgency of developing a text of this convention as well as their willingness to exert the necessary efforts for resolving the problems or issues that remain pending: notably verification of non-production of chemical weapons by civilian industry, challenge inspection, declaration and verification of stocks of chemical weapons and other problems. In all these areas, verification remains the key problem. The agreed measures should be such as to inspire confidence that the provisions of the convention will be respected by all States parties. It is on that aspect in particular that we shall have to focus our attention during the process of searching for generally acceptable solutions. As regards the verification provisions, especially on-site inspection, we suggest using the formulas contained in the document of the Stockholm Conference. In our view, the monitoring system agreed upon should not in any way affect the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes, or the enhancement of the technical and scientific potential of each country.

CD/PV.388

p.16

Hungary/Meiszter

12.2.87

CW

Last year's work in the Ad Hoc Committee, and complemented by the two rounds of intersessional work, yielded a reliable basis which offers a real possibility for a breakthrough. In saying that, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom for the able guidance he rendered to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Major issues related to verification in the field of CW stocks and their destruction, CW production facilities and the non-production of chemical weapons are generally agreed upon, and the main lines of methods of verification have been drawn up.

On-challenge inspection has been generally accepted as part of the international verification system. Realistic guidelines have been spelled out for conducting such an inspection. Many delegations, including those most concerned, accepted the British proposal as a basis for work.

In our view all the necessary prerequisites are at hand now to accomplish the work on the convention this year. What is needed is a firm determination, and a good deal of efficient diplomatic professional work. It is encouraging to know that Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden has already made the first steps to gear the work of the Ad Hoc Committee to a higher level of efficiency.

CD/PV.389

pp.4-7

USSR/Nazarkin

17.2.87

CW

I have already referred to chemical-weapon stocks. They are the subject matter of Article 4, "chemical weapons", of the draft convention which is now under discussion and negotiation. Agreement has already been reached on a number of important provisions of that article, including those relating to declarations of volumes of stocks, their methods of destruction, and verification of operations of chemical-weapon destruction facilities. So far, however, it has not been possible to come to an agreement on the provisions in the convention relating to declarations of locations of chemical-weapon stocks and to international verification of such locations. Agreement has been hampered by a number of perfectly legitimate national security concerns expressed, for example, by the delegation of France and my delegation. We, for our part, have once again weighed up all the factors, viewed them in the context of the need for speedy progress at the negotiations and the concerns expressed by a number of countries, including the United States, which attach particular importance to finding a solution to this very question as rapidly as possible.

As a result, we have come to the conclusion that with a view to finding a speedy solution to this question it would be advisable to agree to the proposal to provide, immediately after the convention enters into force, access to chemical weapons for the purposes of systematic international on-site verification of declarations of chemical-weapon stocks.

In our view each State party to the convention should, not later than 30 days after its entry into force, make a declaration containing detailed information on the locations of chemical-weapon stocks (storage facilities) at the time of the convention's entry into force, both in its national territory

and elsewhere under its jurisdiction or control. Such a declaration, inter alia, would specify the precise location of each storage facility, the quantity and composition of the chemical weapons in each location, methods of storage indicating the name of each chemical, munition types and calibres, etc. A State party should, within 30 days after the convention enters into force, take measures to ensure a closure of chemical-weapon storage facilities and prevent movement of stocks other than movement for their elimination.

For the purposes of effective verification of closed chemical-weapon storage facilities, it is necessary to provide for systematic international verification with permanent use of instruments, including verification of the correctness of declarations; closure of storage facilities, installation by inspectors of devices for this purpose and periodic checks on such devices, presence of inspectors at the time when chemical weapons are moved out of the facility for elimination, sealing of the means of transport, etc. Upon complete removal of all chemical weapons from the facility, an international inspection team would draw up a statement certifying this fact.

We expect that the proposals we have presented will enable us to agree promptly and without delay on the provisions relating to declarations of chemical weapons.

A number of other issues relating to Article 4, "chemical weapons", of the convention, are to be considered in the near future. We express our willingness to reach agreement on all outstanding issues in that article, including those related to the time-frame, order and methods of elimination. Bearing in mind that the proposal that a State party should have the right to divert chemical weapons has caused difficulties, we have carefully weighed up all the pros and cons of the proposal: we now proceed on the assumption that all chemical weapons are to be destroyed.

The Soviet delegation hopes that our flexible approach will make it possible to find solutions to the above-mentioned issue and will help accelerate the negotiations. We also call upon other delegations to join in these efforts and to present concrete proposals for mutually acceptable solutions.

In this statement yesterday, General Secretary Gorbachev, referring to problems of verification, said inter alia: "Now that we are coming to consider major measures for actual disarmament affecting the most sensitive area of national security, the Soviet Union will be pressing for the most stringent system of supervision and verification, including international verification. There must be complete certainty that the commitments are honoured by all."

That is precisely why the Soviet Union gives priority to negotiating an agreement on effective international verification of compliance by all States parties with their obligations under the convention. Such verification should not only effectively ensure confidence in the destruction of chemical weapons and facilities for their production but also effectively preclude any rebirth of chemical weapons anywhere and in any country.

The negotiations on verification machinery are based on a general understanding that the basis will be a system of "routine" international inspections. On the other hand, it has also been recognized that such international inspections should be complemented by on-site challenge inspections

so that the whole verification mechanism of the Convention may be particularly reliable. Thus challenge inspections would serve above all the purpose of preventing breaches of the convention. Ultimately they would ensure the possibility of implementing international verification with regard to any activities relevant to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. These principles should be taken fully into account in elaborating specific procedures for such challenge inspection.

We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the participants in the negotiations, despite agreement on a number of important aspects, still encounter great difficulty in finalizing agreements on challenge inspection. We believe that basically these difficulties have a perfectly objective and real basis: States may indeed have certain locations and facilities which are not relevant to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Access to such locations and facilities, due to their particularly sensitive nature, is normally prohibited or restricted. One cannot therefore exclude the possibility of a State having the right to refuse a challenge inspection in exceptional cases when its supreme interests are jeopardized. The existence of such areas and sensitive points have by the way been recognized in the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. In this context we consider that the view expressed by Ambassador Dolgu, Head of the delegation of Romania, was quite justified, namely that it would be advisable to use the provisions of that document at the negotiations on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The participants in the negotiations have different views on solutions to the issue of challenge inspections at the present time. Some propose that the Executive Council be involved. Others, while in favour of providing access to a number of sensitive locations and facilities automatically, immediately upon request, make exemptions for private premises. Moreover the procedure for implementing challenge inspections envisaged under these proposals while securing the interest of the major Powers and members of military alliances, gives a small number of States certain rights of which practically all the other parties to the convention are deprived of. There is also a proposal to the effect that in the event of a challenge, the challenged State should have the right to propose alternative measures which should satisfy the challenging State.

In view of these various proposals and approaches, movement towards agreement apparently might be initiated by defining a number of cases where refusal of an inspection on the requested scale would not be allowed: for example, in the event of suspected use of chemical weapons, or inspection of locations and facilities declared under the convention. It appears this idea enjoys wide support at the negotiations, and understandably so, for we are dealing with the cases and facilities which are most directly relevant to a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and consequently there should be no reason for refusing an inspection.

As for other cases and other locations and facilities, in elaborating agreement on challenge inspections the idea of using alternative measures, to viewing the facility from within and collecting chemical samples near the facility, might be helpful. Such a differentiation would, in our view, ensure progress towards agreement on this issue which, while unresolved, hampers agreement on other issues of the convention.

Of course, there remains the difficult problem of what should be done if the alternative measures still do not satisfy the challenging State.

We share the hope expressed by the head of the Swedish delegation, Ambassador Theorin, that the "general narrowing of positions on verification that has been demonstrated lately should help to facilitate agreement on this issue" -- i.e. international challenge inspection. The Soviet delegation declares itself ready to seek actively for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of any positive ideas and suggestions which are on the negotiating table.

We have been asked by a number of delegations to explain what is meant by permanent international verification which the Soviet Union proposes applying to chemical-weapon destruction facilities, specialized facilities for the production of category I chemicals for permitted purposes and to a certain number of facilities producing key precursors. I would like to explain our understanding of permanent verification. In our view, such verification can be implemented either through the permanent presence of international inspectors at facilities or through visits to facilities by international inspectors in combination with permanent use of control and measuring instruments at facilities, including remote monitoring. As for the order and modalities for the use of such instruments, helpful solutions in our view might be prompted by the experience in the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Identification of "important" (in terms of verification) points at the facilities, sealing of certain units, installation of photo and video equipment, measuring devices in agreed sections of the technological process, maintenance of international verification instruments by international inspectors, etc.

As for systematic international inspection, we propose that their frequency and timing be determined by the Consultative Committee on the basis of the risk posed to the convention by a given chemical or facility. In working out the details of systematic international inspections, we could also draw on the experience and practices of the IAEA, in particular with regard to providing the different types of systematic inspections, (routine and special), the frequency and time-frame of inspections, and the right of the IAEA to determine the facilities to be inspected at a given time. We believe that the experience and practices of the IAEA might also prompt us to the right solutions on other questions of verifying compliance with the chemical weapons convention. They might be drawn upon in working out an agreement on the activities of the inspectorate too, that is the appointment of inspectors, their privileges, inspection procedures, etc.

On the basis of the provisions included in the convention, it would be advisable to elaborate subsequently, along the lines of the IAEA, a model agreement between a State Party and an appropriate body of the Convention which would govern the practical aspects of implementing international verification at facilities (the verification procedure, specific measures for the closure of facilities, etc.)

When the convention is in effect, specific measures of verification with regard to chemical-weapon production facilities and chemical-weapon destruction facilities would be agreed upon by a State party and the Consultative Committee and included in the relevant plans for the elimination of stocks and facilities.

The controversy concerning the formulation of those parts in last year's report of the Conference on item no. 1 tends still to obscure the view of what has already been achieved in terms of a considerable narrowing of differences in an important field of the CTB discussion, i.e. the question of verification. In our view the Conference has reached a remarkable momentum towards general acceptance of an effective international monitoring and verification system. This promising development, as we see it, is due to the efforts of many delegations who have contributed important elements to a new and more refined view of test-ban safeguards. Needless to say, the conceptual accomplishments that have enlarged the common ground on which to build could only be achieved on the basis of the purposeful contribution by the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts over the last 10 years, and especially by its last progress report, CD/721, which has opened remarkable new perspectives towards the realization of an international seismic monitoring system by detailing plans to integrate the exchange of level II (waveform) data into the next international seismic data exchange experiment.

We consider hallmarks some of the contributions of individual delegations during last year's session of the Conference. There is, for one, the Swedish Working paper CD/712, representing an admirable and knowledgeable compilation of present insights into the requirements of a global seismic network; calling for the definition and development of prototype monitoring stations, this paper further develops a proposal my delegation had already advanced in Working Papers CD/612 and CD/624.

Norway's contribution, in this Working Paper CD/714, was particularly significant in that it explores the interaction of regional small-aperture seismic arrays with a global network incorporating a number of such arrays. The practical experiences with the Norwegian regional seismic array system NORESS provide an indispensable input for the operationality and the continuous improvement of an effective global system.

The most unambiguous demand for an early installation of a world-wide seismic monitoring network along the lines of the working papers of my delegation I already mentioned is contained in the Australian Working Paper, CD/717, which clearly points out the advantage to be harvested by swift enactment of the proposals contained in it: by establishing a permanent global seismic monitoring network based initially on the existing facilities.

In keeping with the advances of seismic technology, experience could be gained with long-term operations and the system could be perfected in such a way that, on the very entry into force of a CTBT, the comprehensive monitoring devices could at once become a truly safeguarding system.

Among other valuable contributions of individual delegations one has certainly to count Working Paper CD/724 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in which it formalized a change of position concerning the inclusion of the level II data exchange in further discussions.

This brief review of some of the proceedings of our Conference during its 1986 session amply substantiates my intitial claim that substantial progress towards common concepts, common methodology, has been achieved during last year's session in spite of some attempts to the contrary. In the view of my delegation the time has come to discuss inter alia those common concepts within an ad hoc committee on a CTB, to be established at the earliest possible juncture. The work of the Committee should help us reach practical and universally acceptable solutions in our quest for a comprehensive, fully verifiable test ban; it is our firm belief that this should be possible on the basis of the working programme proposed in CD/621 and within the confines of a mandate as contained, for instance, in CD/521.

Certainly, if an ad hoc committee were instituted, its discussions would not be exhausted in merely technical deliberations; a comprehensive and fully verifiable test ban would, if agreed upon, be of eminent importance for the security policies of States world wide. It is exactly for this reason that the topic of a CTB cannot be discussed by the Conference without paying due attention to its general implications in the nuclear age. The Federal Government believes that the goal of agreement on a reliably verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban at the earliest possible juncture can be realized gradually. This should be achieved by reducing allowed testing to agreed and defined intervals of time and by consequently refraining from testing altogether in the framework of agreed reductions of nuclear weapons.

While my delegation wishes for timely results from the bilateral talks which the United States of America and the Soviet Union are holding here at Geneva about questions relevant to test limitation in all its aspects and which are scheduled to enter into a new round in the middle of March, my Government has never hesitated to express its view that there are more than bilateral aspects to the problem of a CTBT. The community of States can indeed contribute substantially to the solution of those problems which still stand in the way of an agreement.

We do not agree, though, with some delegations which content themselves with dwelling lengthily on their finding that the verification problems still facing us can be solved -- and indeed some went as far as to imply that they were already solved. In our view attention should be drawn to the numerous prerequisites listed in the Swedish Working Paper CD/712 to ensure the incorporation of state-of-the-art technology into a global monitoring network that does not yet exist and has only once been tested in a most elementary form. A great number of stations that participate in the 1984 GSETT, though already representing a high level of technological achievement in themselves, would not match the definitions given in the last chapter of CD/712 for the prototype of a CD monitoring station. Although individual seismographic stations, even if they fell short of the aforementioned demands concerning their equipment, might work effectively, the task of operating in a reliable manner an interlinked system of as much as 50 to 100 seismic stations based in different countries and run by many nations, as well as the task of communicating the data derived from these stations to and from international data centres -- possibly in real time -- has not yet been satisfactorily resolved, as the report of the GSE on the technical test run in 1984 has demonstrated. Furthermore, CD/712 proposes as an additional measure for the analysis of doubtful seismic events to combine the findings of the international seismic

monitoring network with data derived from satellite inspection. The realization of this proposal would indeed greatly enhance verification capabilities and most probably resolve most of the outstanding verification problems; but no multilaterally accessible satellite system for verification purposes exists as of today or of tomorrow. And we do not know that even the most ardent NTB proponent has volunteered with a corresponding offer. The conclusion we draw from this is that we should do everything possible to improve the global seismic monitoring system until the possibility depicted in the Swedish Working Paper may come true.

My Government has noted with great pleasure that the six Heads of State or Government, of the New Dehli initiative, at the meeting in Mexico on 7 August 1986, have expressed their readiness to actively participate in surmounting the outstanding verification problems of a future CTBT. We would welcome it if, besides Sweden, also other States participating in the initiative would see fit to send their experts to the GSE, especially with regard to the new test run of the global monitoring system envisaged for 1988.

My Government has repeatedly declared that it considers a CTB as one of the main goals of its disarmament and arms control policy. And if we think that we still see some difficulties in the field of verification, we do not want to give room to any doubt that we will actively pursue a course aimed at clearing away these obstacles, which in any case we do not find insurmountable.

As a step towards substantiating its own commitment to this global system, the Federal Government decided to intensify its co-operative efforts in the field of fast and reliable data exchange and storage of acquired seismic data. It therefore finances the continuous operation of a seismic data analysis centre installed at the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources in Hannover. The Institute, by way of direct computer-to-computer links with other countries, is in a position to store and to exchange all relevant seismic data including Level II (waveform) data. We have concentrated our research in the field of designing the hardware and software necessary to acquire, analyse and transmit seismic data including waveform data on direct computer-to-computer links. Our seismic data centres, specifically and from the outset, are designed for open access and remote data treatment via telecommunication links so as to freely share our specific knowledge in this field with interested seismic scientists. We explicitly request all members of the Conference to make use of this hitherto singular service, two demonstrations of which will be given to interested heads of delegations and to the experts of the GSE on 5 and 6 March 1987 here in Geneva. The data centre described above in our view constitutes an important step forward on the way to the creation and reliable operation of an international seismic monitoring network.

Mr. President, let me now turn shortly to other subjects on our agenda. In our view the negotiations on a world-wide ban of chemical weapons command high priority. In document CD/734 we have the outlines of a treaty which, in important parts, is already well developed. The Conference on Disarmament has before it the task of solving the questions still open, especially in the field of verification, as rapidly as possible.

Concerning the verification of non-production, it is in our view important that the selection of substances which are to be forbidden or controlled should satisfy the criteria of possible use, or better misuse, for military purposes. It would not be a sensible contribution to the solution of that problem if we included in that selection substances which are militarily irrelevant.

As to challenge inspection, we still see in CD/715 the model which could finally satisfy all interests. We appeal to our partners in this negotiation to co-operate in the search of a solution because it is this co-operation which is the true expression of credibility of negotiating partners. Readiness to adopt CD/715, as expressed in principle by formerly hesitant delegations, is welcome as long as the conceptual approach of this proposal is not diluted. We will, in this context, screen carefully what the Soviet delegation has said this morning, which leads itself to the interpretation that the Soviet delegation now accepts the principle of mandatory or obligatory challenge inspections; but as I say, we will have to look at the text very closely and see what the other conditions which go along with it will mean. A procedural arrangement for example prior to an on-challenge-inspection that would put into question the inspection itself, or in any case delay it, is not acceptable to us. We are convinced that an effective verification of a chemical-weapon ban is attainable if the controls on non-production and challenge inspections are adequately formed. What has to be secured is that the Convention can reliably prevent that militarily significant amounts of chemical weapons or their precursors from being produced or stocked secretly. The methods and volume of the controls must be realistic, credible and effective. These are the essentials and we think that within the near future we could make decisive progress in this field. We are ready to co-operate.

My delegation welcomes the long-established Finnish initiative to provide advice for the necessary monitoring equipment and technical means for verification purposes. I understand that the recent special workshop on automatic monitoring in terms of detection of alleged used, verification of destruction and non-production in Helsinki is another step towards the common goal of effective verification. My Government looks forward to the communication of the results of this workshop.

We noted with interest the reference which the Romanian delegation made in our CW negotiations to the Document of the Stockholm Conference which was taken up today. Indeed, the most important aspect of the Stockholm Conference is the agreement on on-site inspections without refusal. Thereby, obligatory on-site inspection has been recognized as an essential element of effective verification for any arms control and disarmament agreement. We think this is an essential breakthrough to which we attach great importance in light of the whole arms control process. But then, Stockholm is not part of the true arms control process. It is a measure of confidence-building measures, and not what we are doing here in the realm of chemical weapons, disarmament measures. As my delegation pointed out in our Plenary Statement of 5 February of this year already challenge inspections should cover all possible installations and all locations -- they all must be "challenge inspection objects", and there we differ from what we have heard this morning.

CD/PV.389

pp.21-22

GDR/Rose

17.2.87

CTB
CW

Firstly, the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests will remain an international task of utmost urgency. Achieving it would impact very favourably on the entire disarmament process, and appropriate disarmament forums should be used to pursue this goal. This Conference, however, seems to us particularly capable of working out a universal treaty.

Secondly, we believe in the possibility of intermediate measures in the event that a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests is recognized and formulated as an explicit commitment.

This idea is not new to socialist countries. Just take the Threshold Treaties of 1974 and 1976, the Soviet programme of 15 January 1986 and the proposals put forward by the USSR in Reyjavik. Clearly, a moratorium by the Soviet Union and the United States, to which the USSR has not slammed the door after all, would be particularly effective. It will be of crucial importance in this regard that any partial step be geared to a comprehensive, legally binding ban.

Thirdly, it appears indispensable to us to discuss all the elements of a future treaty in their complexity. Any selective approach is liable to leave out of consideration the interrelated nature of the subjects involved and would thus not yield the desired result.

Fourthly, it will be necessary to rid the verification issue of all political encumbrances and to resolve it in a constructive manner, in line with the requirements of the treaty. Whatever it may take to do that is there. We need parallelism between the Committee's activities and the Group of Scientific Experts, which should expeditiously prepare the level-2 data experiment to be carried out in 1988.

My delegation takes the view that a committee should be set up as quickly as possible. We second the proposal that two working groups should be created -- one on matters of contents and scope of the treaty, and the other on compliance and verification.

Given strong commitment to accommodation and dedicated work, we could well rise to the occasion. The far-reaching proposals which the Soviet delegation has just tabled are of special significance in this context and we welcome them as yet another exemplary contribution to our work. Solving the remaining issues of substance would speed up the negotiating process. This is particularly true of challenge inspection, the locations of stocks and their verification, and matters relating to the non-production of chemical weapons in civil industry. Results are possible on the basis of existing proposals.

Once this and other blanks in the text of the convention are filled, it will be a lot easier to work out details. We are convinced of the possibility of an understanding on what is needed now and what could be completed at a later stage.

We support the Chairman's desire to streamline operations of the committee so that it is able to perform its current duties. Apart from the efforts undertaken at the Conference proper, everything should be done to maintain and improve the atmosphere needed for constructive work. The USSR has suggested an agreement under which chemical weapons would be neither produced nor deployed. Such a step would give a fresh impetus to the present negotiations.

My delegation is gratified to note the interests evoked by the seminar on the prohibition of chemical weapons to be organized by the German Democratic Republic's National Pugwash Group next month. The event will focus on the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. The Government of the German Democratic Republic is doing its utmost to make that seminar a success.

CD/PV.389

pp.29-30

Egypt/Alfarargi

17.2.87

CW

Egypt was one of the first States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Egypt was at the forefront of the States that signed the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons and on their destruction, although the circumstances prevailing in our regions prevented us from speeding up its ratification. From this background and in the framework of the continuity of Egyptian policy, we fully support the current efforts to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Egypt will not hesitate to exert every effort to achieve this objective. We look forward to a treaty that fully and effectively bans the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction; a treaty that does not, however, impede the peaceful chemical activities. We aspire to a treaty which includes effective verification provisions without such procedures that would exceed the actual requirements of the treaty, or be used as an indirect means to threaten the national security of the States parties. We believe that acceding to the treaty will depend to a large extent on the provisions it contains providing for international co-operation to develop the peaceful uses of chemical industries. In this context we welcome the decision by the Ad Hoc Committee to consider this aspect of the treaty during its current session. Lastly, I would like to mention the fact that concluding a treaty which is acceptable to all parties and to which all would accede is one of the prerequisites for its acquiring universality.

CD/PV.390

pp.7-9

France/Raimond

19.2.87

CW

OS

The work of this Conference with a view to elaborating an international convention on the prohibition of the manufacture of chemical weapons and the elimination of stocks is certainly one of the most delicate tasks to which it has addressed itself.

The effort made has enabled us to find some significant points of convergence on the shape and a number of important elements of the future convention. It remains true that as the work progresses the real difficulties come to light. This stems from the natural course of negotiations in such complex field, but it also means that a number of choices have to be made.

First, do we want a convention which, like the one on biological weapons, simply postulates that chemical weapons should be banned, without really doing anything about the effectiveness of such a prohibition and its verification?

Or do we consider that these are weapons whose military effectiveness unfortunately has less and less to be demonstrated and which therefore are likely to become commonplace? Results achieved step by step, and limited not geographically (because the ease with which such arms can be transported would make such an approach utterly meaningless) but in terms of stockpiles, would surely already be a considerable achievement.

Secondly, do we want verification measures to be aimed at putting permanent pressure on any possible cheating, or are we prepared to settle for imperfect verification because nobody will ever know whether clandestine stocks have been reconstituted or hidden?

Third, what links should be established between the future convention and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 concerning the use of chemical weapons?

Fourth, should we concentrate our efforts mainly on conventional chemical weapons, those which could be described as "bottom of the range" and accessible to most countries with industrial facilities? Or on the contrary, do we mean to give priority to the most modern chemical warfare agents or even prevent the appearances of future technologies in these areas? Is such an ambition even realistic?

These discussions underly the work of your Conference. They explain their complexity and therefore their inevitable slowness.

My country wishes to achieve results, even if they prove to be limited, in an initial stage, for example, to the progressive destruction of stocks and production facilities during a period to be determined.

This same stage-by-stage approach could be used with respect to the solution to be found for the problem of the lists of supertoxic agents. We know that it is difficult at this stage of identify the possibilities of military use of some of them which are already being used in civilian industry, for example, in pharmaceutical products. It should be possible to ask the Consultative Committee envisaged by the convention to determine the régime during a later stage of the negotiations, or during the implementation of the convention. The French delegation will put forward proposals along these lines. Generally speaking, quite obviously, it will spare no effort to ensure that concrete results are achieved, including during this session.

Nevertheless, it is in the light of these uncertainties in the negotiations that France does not rule out the possibility of acquiring a limited and purely deterrent capability in this area. In accordance with the commitments

assumed by France when signing the Geneva Protocol of 1925, this would only be used for retaliation and not for a first attack. In any case, the current negotiations, to which we continue to attach very high priority, could not constitute a moratorium for France, nor for that matter for any other country.

Everybody here knows that side by side with the discussions which this Conference is to pursue concerning measures to contribute to the prevention of the arms race in outer space, negotiations are going on a bilateral basis in this same city between the Soviet Union and the United States. Our objective cannot be to give preference to one or other of these approaches, or to cause them to hinder one another.

It remains true that in the mid-1980s the international community included among its concerns the problems of the military use of space in the same way as in the mid-1950s it recognized that the problems of the nuclear age could not be a matter of indifference to it, even though the possession of nuclear weapons was at the time limited to two countries. In 1978, when proposing the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, and then in 1984, through the proposals it put before this Conference, France emphasized that these problems could not be excluded from the multilateral debate.

We naturally attach the greatest importance to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. It remains true, as your work has clearly shown, that the present régime seems inadequate, particularly with respect to the immunity of satellites of third parties. France will submit, within the framework of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, proposals which take account of the difficulty of formulating a régime based solely on the definition of an anti-satellite weapon.

In fact there is no single way of destroying satellites, and it would therefore not be realistic to found an international régime on the prohibition of ASAT systems, which could only be incomplete. What does seem to be a matter of priority is to implement the fundamental principles of the present space régime, that is, its utilization under conditions of equality, non-discrimination among States, and non-appropriation of space. If such an approach is adopted, a number of specific measures can be considered concerning the registration and notification of space objects, as well as the multilateral code of conduct applicable to space activities.

At the institutional level, the idea of entrusting responsibility for seeing to the application of transparency measures and the code of conduct for space activities to the International Satellite Monitoring Agency might be considered.

CD/PV.390

pp.12-14

Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda 19.2.87 CTB,OS
CW

We fully associate ourselves with those who call for the establishment of a working body for the NTB. There is a lot to be done in this area, including on verification. In our opinion, active and purpose-oriented work of such an organ could clearly demonstrate the following.

First, the achievement of the NTB is an urgent measure which could substantially contribute to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and create an atmosphere conducive to successful negotiations on measures of nuclear disarmament.

Second, the overwhelming majority of States are in favour of the cessation of nuclear testing and realize that the universal test ban would correspond to their vital security interests.

Third, there are all necessary ingredients for an effective NTB to be negotiated, including its verification machinery.

Fourth, there is a need to consider, in a businesslike manner and in one forum, numerous proposals concerning the scope and nature of the NTB, possible partial measures, various approaches towards verification, including individual offers of States or groups of States, so as to combine them into one system, ensuring, in the most effective way, full compliance with the test ban.

Fifth, the Ad Hoc Committee on the NTB could also constitute a necessary bridge between the useful work of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts and the actual state of efforts aimed at the achievement of the NTB. That link would be useful, inter alia, for putting the results of the planned test of level II seismic data transmission next year into a proper perspective.

Fruitful work by the NTB Ad Hoc Committee can also give us the necessary specific criteria for consideration of the utility of establishing a permanent international system for the exchange of seismic data.

Thus, we see a number of valid arguments in favour of the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the NTB. My delegation would be ready to participate in its proceedings actively and to display the necessary flexibility so that the Conference can finally, undertake some specific steps towards the nuclear-test ban.

It is our hope that the Ad Hoc Committee for the prevention of an arms race in outer space is going to be re-established shortly. The Conference should not close its eyes to the danger of outer space being completely militarized. The Committee's mandate should reflect the objective necessity to establish quite clearly, and in a more conclusive form, the impact of the present legal régime for outer space and to define what additional measures are needed. At the same time we do not consider that a mandate, thus conceived, should prevent us from an exchange of views on specific proposals which already have been, or might be proposed in the coming months. In this respect we were attracted by the statement of the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Yuli Vorontsov, containing, inter alia, the proposal to establish an international inspectorate to verify that arms are not being placed on objects launched into outer space. This is a new, far-reaching and radical measure which could, in our opinion, represent a solid barrier against the direct militarization of outer space.

Our delegation welcomes the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has promptly been re-established under the able guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. This early commencement, as well as a new, purpose-oriented approach, gives us a guarantee that the Conference will try to use its potential fully and that everything will be done so that the CW convention is finalized already this year. Nothing can prevent us from solving the remaining political and technical aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons providing there is the political will to do so. Just two days ago the Conference witnessed another good example of the required constructive approach when the Head of the USSR delegation, Ambassador Nazarkin, spoke on the problem of location of chemical weapons stocks, on the question of destruction versus diversion, and some aspects of verification on challenge. We consider that all the proposals advanced reveal genuine interest in speeding up our work on the CW convention and should be approached seriously. Any hasty conclusions, especially if they are rather beside the point, are somewhat out of place. We would like to hope that the suggestions made by Ambassador Nazarkin will be discussed thoroughly on an appropriate working level.

We follow attentively the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the problem of non-production of chemical weapons and on challenge verification. During the brief sessions in autumn of last year and in January we noticed that divergencies in the positions of various countries were being gradually reduced. It is a delicate process which should be further pursued in a calm, businesslike manner. We are confident that by the end of this year's session the remaining differences will have been narrowed down sufficiently in order to permit us to formulate what, for the purposes of the convention, could be considered as essentially common positions also on articles VI and IX.

The CW convention is, unfortunately, not yet definitely agreed upon. But it is clear that its basic outline has already evolved and one may already have quite an accurate idea of the basic provisions of its individual articles. Verification will be extensive, covering a large number of activities right from the entry into force of the convention, through the destruction of CW stocks and facilities for their production, as well as with a view of permanent assurance that the convention is fully complied with in the future. Such a wide verification system is sort of acknowledgement that the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons is an ambitious and difficult task. We consider that it would be fully in compliance with this ambition to try to cover the whole road which substances have to travel before they become chemical weapons. Everyone would apparently agree that the first step to create a toxic substance is a synthesis. The only places where this may happen are laboratories. Let us recall that such first category substances as tabun, sarin or soman were also the results of laboratory research. We therefore support the idea that this first step in the creation of chemical weapons should be recognized and dealt with by the convention. It would be futile to try to control regularly all existing laboratories, but it would be a grave mistake to ignore that new supertoxic lethal chemicals of category I may permanently be synthesized in the laboratories, whether deliberately or by coincidence. The number of relevant laboratories is relatively limited in each country and their declaration, with a possibility of inspection on challenge, should not represent an extraordinarily heavy burden. Smooth application of such procedures could create the necessary confidence and would represent a kind of introduction to the effective verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the civilian chemical industry.

CD/PV.391

pp.5-6

Yugoslavia/Kosin

24.2.87

CTB

Within the framework of nuclear disarmament issues, we devote special attention to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban (CTB). The argument that the objective of a CTB is a long-term one is unacceptable to us. It is not accidental that this question has been the focus of interest of the entire international community for a quarter of a century already, with virtually unanimous calls for a test ban. Hence, a CTB would both have practical and symbolic value. It represents, in effect, the most important individual step towards curbing the nuclear-arms race and arresting the development of new generations of deadlier and deadlier nuclear weapons.

There is no need to repeat that the nuclear-weapon States themselves have undertaken the obligations under existing international agreements, including some signed but unratified treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union. Of no less significance in this connection is the fact that practical behaviour has proved that even the on-site inspection of nuclear testing grounds are acceptable. We hope therefore that the United States will join the Soviet Union which has already expressed its readiness for a bilateral moratorium on nuclear tests.

CD/PV.391

pp.11-12

USA/Hansen

24.2.87

CTB

The United States sees a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing as a long-term objective which must be viewed in the context of a time when the United States and its allies do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability. This condition does not exist now and will not exist during 1987. This condition cannot come into being without deep reductions in nuclear arms, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures and greater balance in conventional forces.

Nevertheless, my Government has begun a process which should proceed in an orderly, step-by-step fashion. The first priority is improved verification of the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. The kinds of questions both parties to these Treaties have raised concerning the other's compliance indicate that an agreement on improved verification is clearly warranted. Once agreement is reached on direct measurement to ensure that the yield limits of these Treaties are being respected, the United States intends to ratify them. Immediately thereafter, we are prepared to enter into negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel programme -- in association with a programme to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons -- of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

This policy is being implemented. President Reagan has informed the United States Senate of his willingness to ratify the Treaties once verification improvements have been agreed; the Senate is now taking appropriate action.

Also in accordance with this policy, Soviet and United States experts have been meeting here in Geneva to agree on the agenda for bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing issues. The last round of these meetings is now in a working recess; experts are preparing to meet again on 16 March.

The United States is prepared to engage in this process with utmost seriousness and solemnity. However, this process must build on a series of key understandings reached between the States most intimately involved.

This Conference can neither replace nor duplicate the delicate work which is just getting under way bilaterally. Nevertheless, this Conference can usefully consider and work on a number of nuclear testing issues, including compliance and verification issues essential to any future accord. The Conference on Disarmament can make contributions on these and other test-ban issues of particular importance. Bearing in mind the ultimate objective of banning nuclear tests, the delegation of the United States is prepared therefore to resume work on nuclear-test-ban issues in a committee with an appropriate non-negotiating mandate as proposed by members of the Western group.

The United States welcomes the plans of the Group of Scientific Experts to carry out further experiments aimed at the application of advanced techniques to the collection and exchange of seismic data useful for monitoring against possible underground nuclear explosions. This work should significantly increase the contribution that a global network of seismometers could make to the monitoring and verification of an eventual agreement on nuclear testing. We particularly welcome the fact that the Soviet Union has withdrawn its opposition to work on the exchange of so-called level II, or full waveform, seismic data. And we look forward to the demonstration relating to seismic monitoring which is to be given by authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany.

CD/PV.391

p.21

Nigeria/Tonwe

24.2.87

CTB

The argument that tests do not prevent an acceptable, and therefore verifiable, agreement on nuclear-weapon cutbacks is not at all convincing. It is now common knowledge that testing permits nuclear-weapon States to refine and modernize their arsenals and thus aggravate the crisis of confidence. This cannot be said to support the aim of our negotiations. The argument about detection difficulties no longer holds. Scientists on both sides have confirmed that they can detect, by national means, nuclear explosions with yields of even less than 1 kiloton. In this connection, we welcome the indications that seismologists of the super-Powers have been exchanging data and visits. This should be intensified, as it would create the understanding and trust needed to produce and hold an agreement.

CD/PV.392

p.8

India/Teja

26.2.87

CW

The issues relating to organizational aspects and the structure of the authority which will be responsible for the implementation of this Convention also deserve urgent and thorough consideration. Given the unique nature of this instrument, it is necessary to design new solutions to meet the requirements of the Convention.

Finally, while still on chemical weapons, another significant aspect is that of the challenge inspection régime. It is heartening to note that there is now a convergence on the basic concepts underlying this measure and we hope that it will soon be possible to convert it into an agreement on the details of this exercise. An early resolution of this issue will go a long way in strengthening our determination to conclude the Convention by the end of 1987.

CD/PV.392

p.15

USSR/Nazarkin

26.2.87

CTB

The Ad Hoc Group of Seismological Experts will shortly resume its work in the framework of the Conference. The Soviet experts are already in Geneva and are ready to participate constructively in the Group's work with a view to developing a system of international seismic level II data exchange and preparing the international experiment.

There is no need for me to remind you of our proposals of verifying compliance with a complete nuclear-test ban agreement. Seeking to use every opportunity to intensify efforts in this field, the Soviet Union has already expressed its willingness to make use of the proposals by the six leaders to this effect. The verification problem can no longer be used as an excuse for avoiding agreement.

CD/PV.394

pp.4-6

Italy/Pugliese

5.3.87

CTB
CW

Another important aspect of this problem is verification. In fact, Italy believes that a test-ban treaty would be unacceptable unless it contained adequate provisions for verification to ensure compliance by all parties. This issue is really a key one, because clandestine nuclear testing might have far-reaching consequences for the general framework of international security and stability. In our opinion, verification problems can be gradually solved also through improved technology, and allow for the implementation of a step-by-step approach to a CTB. In this context a first significant step would certainly be represented by the ratification of the TTB Treaty of 1974 and of the PNE Treaty of 1976. The Italian Government has been encouraged by the talks held between the United States and the USSR in Geneva on the possibility of limitations on tests and considers this to be of good omen also for the work of this Conference on this specific issue.

My delegation remains convinced of the value of further concrete work towards a comprehensive test ban at this Conference. Several substantive Working Papers on behalf of a group of Western States members of the Conference have been tabled on various aspects of a CTB and have not yet been discussed thoroughly.

My delegation is therefore eager to resume our practical work on all the substantive aspects of a CTB and in particular on such key issues as scope, verification and compliance, in line with our commitment to make any possible effort towards the goal of bringing about a cessation of all nuclear tests. We have pointed out many times our willingness to begin work immediately on a concrete examination of essential issues that would be involved in a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The draft mandate contained in document CD/521 is a proposal by which we continue to stand. In our firm view, that mandate, if adopted, would lead immediately to the creation of a subsidiary body in which a substantive examination of central issues relevant to the formulation of a CTBT could be undertaken with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject. We have further exemplified our position on this item in a detailed way by presenting a suggested programme of work for an ad hoc committee under item 1, which is included in document CD/621.

My Government recognizes also that these issues are complex and difficult to solve and that they should be thoroughly examined in a constructive way, i.e., by sitting down together, in a properly mandated ad hoc committee, and working together to try to resolve them.

The negotiation of a global ban on the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, which seems to us one of the most important and urgent disarmament goals, has achieved encouraging progress during the 1986 session. Steps forward have been made regarding a more efficient compilation of Articles III, IV and V; a great amount of work was also accomplished by Working Group A with regard to Article VI, in connection with the criteria and the listing of the various categories of chemicals. As for Article IX, we wish to express our appreciation and thanks to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom and to Mr. Wisnoemerti of Indonesia: the four points on which Ambassador Cromartie detected a convergence of views constitute in the opinion of the Italian delegation, a sound basis for a solution of the key issue of on-challenge verification.

Indeed, while not minimizing the importance of other outstanding items, I believe that, after all, the success of our work depends largely on our capability to reach an agreement on a convention banning chemical weapons and that consequently we should aim at conclusive results during this year. The main difficulties lying ahead in this context are still connected with the problem of verification which, indeed, is not simply a technical one. It is a problem having an obvious political dimension; admittedly, verifications can also have a confidence-building effect.

By envisaging a verification system for a convention banning all chemical weapons and prescribing their removal from the military arsenals we believe that the Italian delegation is aware that "intrusive" and stringent forms of verification may sometimes be seen by some as restraining national sovereign discretion to a certain extent, or as being prejudicial to the protection of national industrial and commercial secrets. However, we are convinced that such concerns should be overcome through a careful assessment and a better knowledge of the implications of different types of verification, in a spirit of mutual co-operation and goodwill. Moreover, we believe that the elimination of such a hideous category of weapons and the confidence that an eventual ban is being loyally complied with, are priority goals for all countries and, especially, for those, such as Italy, which have long renounced the chemical military option.

It is vital to ensure that prohibited chemicals are neither manufactured in previous production facilities, nor in new ones; that States should not manufacture "single purpose" chemical warfare agents or their precursors and that "dual-purpose" agents or precursors should not be diverted to warfare purposes.

We are convinced that an effective verification system should include systematic inspections and "on-challenge" inspections of a stringent nature. On this question, there are two Western Working Papers on the table: CD/500 by delegation of the United States and CD/715 by the delegation of the United Kingdom. My Government considers it essential that a verification of compliance should represent a basic obligation. On the other hand States signing the Convention have also the right to demonstrate their compliance

with it, when they are faced with a challenge. In this respect the Italian delegation considers that the recent proposals made by the USSR delegation on 17 February last, while still requiring some expansion of their scope, represent an interesting contribution and may hold promise of constructive negotiations.

CD/PV.394

pp.7-12

USSR/Nazarkin

5.3.87

CW

In its statement in the plenary of the Conference on 17 February, the Soviet delegation, wishing from the outset to give a fresh impetus to the negotiations, outlined a number of proposals with a view to reaching a speedy agreement on the question assigned to the first cluster for discussion. These proposals contained comprehensive provisions for declarations to be made by each State party to a future convention specifying detailed information on locations of chemical weapons stocks (storage facilities) at the time the convention enters into force; for closure of storage facilities and prevention of movement of stocks; and for effective verification of the closed storage facilities on the basis of systematic international inspections along with permanent use of instruments. The positive significance of these proposals has just been noted by the distinguished representative of Italy, Ambassador Pugliese.

Until recently, the fact that the question of declarations of storage facilities remained unresolved gave rise to a pessimistic view of the prospects for a speedy conclusion of the convention. In presenting its proposals to the Soviet Union proceeded from the interest of finding without delay a solution to this question. We are satisfied that these proposals of ours have made it possible to take a major step forward at the negotiations and we hope that progress on the question of declaration and international verification of chemical stockpile locations will have a positive effect on the work on other subjects and on the whole process of the subsequent negotiations.

Wishing to maintain the momentum in our work, the Soviet delegation is making a proposal for a resolution to the question of a time-frame for elimination of chemical weapons, in view of the situation which has emerged at the negotiations. As you know, the Soviet Union's earlier proposals, motivated but the desire to see the process of chemical weapon destruction initiated as quickly as possible, was that this destruction should begin not later than six months after the convention enters into force. That proposal met with objections, in particular from the United States, which stated that it was not ready to proceed to the elimination of chemical weapons shortly after the convention entered into force. In view of this fact, we are prepared not to insist on our proposal which, of course, remains valid, and we do not object to beginning the destruction of chemical weapons not later than after one year. We are also prepared, taking into account that the convention would provide for permanent international verification of chemical weapon destruction facilities and the full responsibility of States for the way those facilities operate, not to insist that such facilities should in all cases be State-owned. We expect that these additional proposals will make it possible to find appropriate solutions.

As the documents of the Ad Hoc Committee indicate, a number of provisions of article 4 ("chemical weapons") and Annex 4 have not been finalized yet. There are naturally various reasons for that -- objective difficulties and complicated technical issues which have yet to be resolved -- but we cannot ignore the obstacles which might very well not have been there had all delegations adopted a constructive approach.

This applies above all to the question of destruction of chemical weapons. On 17 February the Soviet Union proposed that all chemical weapons should be destroyed. In presenting that proposal we took into account the difficulties referred to by the United States delegation which had for a long time been opposed to the very concept of diversion of chemical weapons for permitted purposes. Wishing to meet the concerns of our partners in the negotiations we withdrew our requirement that a State should have the right to decide on the ways of elimination chemical weapon stockpiles, although I should point out that our arguments that diversion might be economically justified remain valid. It appeared that since we accepted the United States position agreement was at hand. However, the United States delegation has again blocked agreement and, quite contrary to its previous position, has suddenly begun to insist on diversion of chemical weapon stocks. This fact is of course regrettable. The Soviet delegation reaffirms its willingness to seek a solution to the question of the elimination of chemical weapons. That requires now, above all, that the United States delegation should present concrete proposals on the types and quantities of chemical weapons the United States would like to divert.

One of the most difficult of the outstanding questions is the problem of the order of elimination of chemical weapon stocks. Discussions on the question have shown above all the technical difficulties involved in working out a so-called equivalent unit for comparing various categories of chemicals. In view of this fact and of possible differences in the composition of chemical weapon stockpiles we would like to propose that the following order of elimination of chemical weapon stockpiles be discussed. Firstly, the whole elimination period shall be divided into nine one-year periods. Secondly, within each one-year period a State party shall eliminate one-ninth of its chemical-weapon stockpiles in each of the existing categories. Thirdly, a State party may carry out the elimination of chemical weapons at a faster pace than under the agreed order of elimination.

We would be interested to hear the view of others delegations on these questions. The Soviet delegation is prepared, in the course of further negotiations, to seek mutually acceptable solutions on the question of the order of elimination of chemical weapons. It is our hope that by the end of the spring session of the Conference the full text of Article 4 and Annex 4 will be finalized.

The Soviet Union is in favour of achieving, as a matter of principle, the prompt and complete elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production. The Soviet side has made repeated statements to this effect on a number of occasions, including at the highest level. In this context we should like once again to draw your attention to the statement of General Secretary Gorbachev of 15 January 1986, in which it was stated inter alia that "We are prepared to ensure a timely declaration of the location of

enterprises producing chemical weapons and the cessation of their production, and we are ready to start developing procedures for destroying the relevant industrial base and to proceed, soon after the Convention enters into force, to the elimination of the stockpiles of chemical weapons".

This statement makes it clear beyond any doubt that in pursuing chemical disarmament we do not seek unilateral disarmament of the other side. In case such a convention is concluded chemical weapons and the production base for their manufacture are to be destroyed by all States possessing such weapons, including both the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is now proceeding to the consideration of the cluster of questions relating to non-production of chemical weapons in the commercial (civil) industry. This, if anything, is the most difficult aspect of the convention. In November 1986 the Soviet Union made a series of proposals on the subject which, as is widely recognized, have considerably advanced the negotiations. Today we would like to present some new ideas on this question.

Important work lies ahead in order to finalize the list for various categories of chemicals which would be subjected to different régimes of limitation and verification. We expect category I, along with super-toxic lethal chemicals possessing a set of properties characteristic of chemical warfare agents and key components of binary chemical weapons, to cover incapacities as well.

The viability of a future convention will be ensured only when it is able to keep pace with the times and the achievements of applied and fundamental chemistry and to prevent the development of chemical weapons. This purpose could be served among other things by basic guidelines for revision of the lists of chemicals which would be initially included in the convention. We propose that such a revision be carried out both on a periodical (annual) basis and at the request of any State party as new chemicals appear, as the production technology for such chemicals develops, and on the basis of the declarations by States of their chemical weapon stockpiles.

One of the possible loop-holes for breaching the convention might be through the commercial production of super-toxic lethal chemicals. Nobody denies the risk to the convention posed by the high level of toxicity of these chemicals, for toxicity is the determining property of a chemical warfare agent. Consequently there should be a general interest in removing this risk.

As you know, at one time the Soviet Union proposed applying most stringent prohibition measures to the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals. This position, however, met with objections from a number of parties to the negotiations, based on commercial consideration, who argued in favour of preserving the procedure and methods of production of these chemicals in the commercial industry existing in their countries. Back in 1985, at the initiative of Western delegations, provisions were developed for a division of super-toxic lethal chemical into two categories: super-toxic lethal chemicals used in chemical weapons and super-toxic lethal chemicals

which cannot be used in chemical weapons. At the time this agreement which provided for international on-site verification of the production of these chemicals was welcomed by Western countries as a major success in the negotiations.

In preparing its proposals which were presented in November 1986 the Soviet Union took into account the position of Western countries and agreed to divide super-toxic lethal chemicals into two categories and spelled out specific ideas on a régime for permitted production of such chemicals. The way to work the finaliation of the relevant provisions of the convention now seemed open. However, the issue of permitted production of super-toxic lethal chemicals began to slide: one would not wish to believe that in the place of progress towards agreement there might be backward movement on the question which appeared to be ripe for a final solution.

With a view to contributing to the success of the work on the question of non-production of chemical weapons in the commercial industry and in particular facilitating progress towards agreement on régime for the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals which do not possess a set of properties characteristic of chemical warfare agents, that is category 2 chemicals, we are presenting an additional proposal on the threshold for annual capacity above which facilities for the production of such chemicals are to be declared and subjected to systematic verification. The annual volume of production of each such chemical included into the list for this category would be set at 10 kilograms according to our proposal. The frequency and timing of systematic international inspection would be determined by the Consultative Committee taking into account the risk to the Convention posed by a given chemical or facility.

The question of challenge on-site inspection undoubtedly deserves the special attention of the parties to the negotiations. The fact that there is no agreement on this essential element of the verification mechanism of a future convention hampers agreement on quite a number of other issues relating to a comprehensive and total chemical-weapons ban.

The Soviet Union, in the course of negotiations, has presented some ideas which, taking into account the position of other States, are aimed at bringing closer the positions of the parties to the negotiations. Progress towards a mutually acceptable agreement has also been facilitated by the proposals of the United Kingdom, Pakistan and the paper of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia. The result has been that it has been possible for the first time to register some areas of convergence on the question of challenge inspection which are outlined in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, document CD/734. In particular, there is general agreement that the procedure for processing a challenge should ensure that inspections be carried out in the shortest time-frame.

It would be fair to say as well that the parties to the negotiations recognize that the locations and facilities to be subject to challenge inspections differ, and that that difference is based not on ownership of such locations and facilities but on their objective relevance to the scope of the convention. No one disagrees that in certain cases no refusal of an inspection to the full extent requested would be permitted -- for example, in the event of suspected use of chemical weapons and inspections of locations

and facilities declared under the convention. At the same time, it cannot be ignored that there might be exceptional cases when the conduct of an inspection could jeopardize the supreme interests of a State party. In those cases, carefully considered means are required which, on the one hand, would ensure the integrity of the convention and confidence in compliance with it, and on the other hand would take into account the legitimate interests (political defence, economic, etc.) of a State party. It is our view that in this respect a good balance was struck in the British paper. We believe we should make maximum use as a basis for agreement of the idea of using alternative measures in cases where a State deems access of inspectors to the location unfeasible, an idea contained in that paper.

The Soviet delegation is in favour of an active search for mutually acceptable solutions on challenge inspections, and intends actively to participate in this process. We call on all parties to take the same course of reasonable compromise.

CD/PV.396

pp.3-4,8-11

Netherlands/Van Schaik 12.3.87 CTB,CW

In July last year I addressed some substantial issues with regard to a nuclear-test ban. Needless to say, the Netherlands Government is, as it has always has been, in favour of a CTB and has considered its realization an important goal to be achieved. Regrettably, progress on the road towards a CTB has been slow. But we see it as a positive sign that currently talks are being held by Soviet and United States experts on the subject of nuclear tests, in particular on the verification of the TTBT and PNE Treaties. We look forward to the ratification of these Treaties as a step on the road to a comprehensive ban. We also welcome the discussions being conducted by United States and Soviet experts on the idea of interim steps with respect to nuclear tests, to which I shall return in a moment.

We are encouraged by the increasing awareness, as demonstrated in the international debate on the test-ban issue, that an effective test-ban agreement requires a stringent verification régime and -- and this is very important -- that such a régime should be technically feasible. At their Ixtapa meeting, the countries of the Five Continents Initiative, the New Delhi Six, rightly recognized in their statement that verification is an important issue and accordingly forwarded useful proposals to enhance verification capabilities. Verification no longer seems an issue that, as such, divides us, although, of course, a great deal of work still has to be done.

It is encouraging that the Soviet delegation has accepted so-called level II data exchange and is ready to participate in a practical test envisaged for 1988 on the basis of such data during a test run. We also took note of Soviet declarations to the effect that the USSR is open to the most strict forms of verification, such as on-site inspection and the use of all possibilities of seismology. We regret that such on-site inspection was not permitted during the recent Soviet test on 26 February and, as I said earlier, that the Soviet Union did not accept the invitation of the United States Government to observe and monitor a test at the Nevada site.

With a view to bringing about the cessation of nuclear testing, we wish to reiterate our hope that the two major nuclear Powers will continue to explore the possibilities of reducing tests, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to the reduction of arsenals. Fewer nuclear

weapons, few nuclear tests; and depending on the scope of the arms control agreement, no tests for certain types of nuclear weapons. In this context, we recall the statement of Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic on 17 February, in which he said that the concept of interim steps has always been part of the socialist approach to a CTB.

If, as we hope, such steps lead the major nuclear Powers on the road towards a CTB, it would be a great pity that the Conference should remain an impotent observer. As long as we cannot negotiate on the treaty itself, we in the Conference should do everything feasible that will bring us nearer to the goal. That includes work that can be undertaken under the mandate proposed by a group of Western countries (CD/521). It seems of little interest to us whether that work will be granted the title of "negotiations". It is not on the basis of such labelling that major nations can be forced to negotiate on a final treaty banning all testing. In fact, we hope that such practical work will also bridge differences that separate those who consider a CTB an immediate objective and others who, for the time being, consider it from a different perspective.

Let us, on the basis of CD/521, finally resume the substantive work on scope, verification and compliance related to a comprehensive test ban. For too long we have been waiting for a thorough discussion of the many interesting papers that have been submitted, such as the ones presented by the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, Norway and Australia. As Ambassador Turbanski of Poland underlined in his intervention on 26 February, it is unfortunate that more than a month has passed and that we are unable to do substantial work on the subject. We wish to echo the Polish Ambassador's reminder that the mandate, though important, is not an aim in itself.

Many colleagues have said we should make use of the momentum in the negotiations. In fact, our goal should be to reach agreement before the end of the year. As I myself said in July last year, my delegation indeed hopes that before the end of the year we can break the back of the problems. Recent moves made by the Soviet delegation are indeed encouraging. We hope this sets the trend for further progress.

However, we also wish to voice a note of caution. A variety of important and sensitive issues must still be addressed. A great number of practical issues have to be dealt with at some moment before an agreement be signed. It would not be wise to leave major loopholes in the convention that could later lead the misinterpretation and arouse suspicion on implementation, if not worse.

Three major areas of disagreement have plagued this Conference for many years. They concern challenge inspection, the question how to verify that the civil chemical industry is not misused for the production of chemical weapons and the issue of how to declare and monitor existing chemical weapons stockpiles. Although in particular on the first of those issues, challenge inspection, we still have a long way to go, it is reassuring to note that on each of these issues progress has been made in recent months.

Let me first take the subject on which, in our view, the most significant steps have been made, the declaration and monitoring of stocks. It has now become clear that the Soviet Union is prepared under the convention to make a declaration containing detailed information on locations of chemical-weapon stocks shortly after the entry into force of convention. We welcome this, because we infer from it that a system of successive declarations, phased out over the entire period of destruction is no longer deemed necessary.

We were also happy to note that destruction, rather than diversion, of CW stocks for peaceful purposes is now the objective, even if the issue of a possible diversion of stocks on a very limited scale is not finally settled yet. A lot of substantive work still remains to be done on the issue of stocks -- I mention only the sensitive issue of the order in which stocks must be destroyed -- but we feel that a good basis is now available for further consultations and negotiations on remaining issues. This work is, as I understand, well under way under the able guidance of the item co-ordinator for Cluster I, Mr. Nieuwenhuys.

In the area of verification of non-production of chemical weapons, the second major issue I just mentioned, the work of the conference drew great benefit from informal consultations in the inter-sessional period at the end of last year, and from the deliberations at the session in January. In that relatively brief period discussion of hitherto "untouchable" issues appeared to be possible. We hope that the spirit prevailing in that period will continue to inspire us in these weeks when the Committee is dealing with article VI of the convention.

My delegation welcomes Soviet concurrence with the notion of risk in determining the stringency of verification of non-production. In our view, the risk factor -- essentially the risk that a civil chemical plant will in fact violate the convention -- is important in determining the intensity with which the plant in question should be subject to a monitoring régime. The idea of defining a threshold for annual production, to which Ambassador Nazarkin referred in his statement on 5 March, has been under discussion for some time. Such a quantitative criterion would indeed provide us with one of the factors to determine the risk involved.

In the coming weeks we shall have to get down to the level of practical implementation: what factors are relevant to determine the risks various chemical substances and types of production pose and consequently which inspection régime will be applied for each of them? We are encouraged by the constructive suggestions the item co-ordinator for Cluster III, Mr. Macedo, has recently made on this point.

Useful work on the classification of substances has already been done by the former Chairman of Working Group A, Mr. Richard Rowe. Under his guidance three categories of substances were elaborated under article VI, together with a first outline of a régime for each category. While generally appreciative of the progress achieved so far, my delegation realizes that a number of important issues related so monitoring of production of chemicals have hardly been addressed. The still virtually unexplored and very complex area of commercially produced super-toxic lethal chemicals and the risk they may pose to the convention is only an illustration of the many important problems awaiting a judicious solution.

As for on-site challenge inspection, the third outstanding and perhaps most important issue of disagreement, my delegation appreciates that in his latest interventions, Ambassador Nazarkin has made observations that seem to narrow down some of the differences. We acknowledge that the Soviet delegation has identified two important areas where requests for challenge inspections cannot be refused and that it has broadly supported the British approach for alternative solutions in exceptional circumstances.

However, we are still faced with the essential problem of how to act in case stocks or facilities have not been registered and challenge inspections are refused. Especially in countries with a large territory and with traditionally less open systems of communication, this can present a major problem, if no adequate verification régime is established.

Since this problem goes to the heart of the convention, I think it may be useful to explain what we see as the crux of challenge inspections.

When the convention enters into force the envisaged system of routine inspection will in general give adequate assurances that existing stockpiles of chemical weapons are destroyed and no new stockpiles are built. However, doubts may arise, in particular about places and facilities that are not declared. The root of the problem may in such cases be misunderstanding, perhaps of a technical nature, and it is obvious that a challenge inspection can most effectively dissipate any misgivings.

But the doubts expressed may also be based on suspicion that a State Party is in fact deliberately not properly implementing the convention. Cases such as clandestine stockpiling and production of chemical weapons should indeed also be covered by the convention.

It is of crucial importance that in case of such malevolent practices no legal, procedural or other obstacle can be put in the way of a justified request for challenge inspection. For the effective functioning of the convention, confidence in its implementation is essential. Confidence can only be instilled if intrusive on-site inspection is, in those cases of supposed malpractices, guaranteed.

The United States delegation has, now three years ago, in its proposal under article X (CD/500) rightly pointed out the way in which we should find a solution. We feel the British approach, as presented in CD/715, building on the United States proposal, to be a realistic one. The British Working Paper advanced the idea that in exceptional circumstances, in particular for national security reasons, alternative measures may be proposed by the challenged State, but those should be to the satisfaction of the challenging State. If the latter State is not satisfied and if the challenged State cannot in time advance other alternative measures, contracting parties will face a situation in which the challenged State may be declared as violating the convention.

It is clear that all parties have an interest that such a crisis will never break out. It could in fact undermine the overall functioning of the treaty as such. It is therefore of the greatest importance that in the coming months we seek a solution which minimizes the risk that such a crisis

situation will in fact lead to the breaking down of the convention. But the rule should remain that the complaining party has the right to international challenge inspection on the spot.

Some delegations have suggested that we could make good use of the example of the confidence-building measures (CBMs) that were agreed upon in Stockholm in September 1986, in the framework of the European Disarmament Conference. We agree with those delegations in so far as we should be inspired by the constructive spirit which led to results at the Stockholm Conference. But we believe the parallel cannot be drawn any further because, as Ambassador Von Stülpnagel rightly said, the negotiations in Stockholm served a different purpose.

In Stockholm the objective was to build confidence. Here our more radical objective is the complete abolition of all chemical weapons. We cannot confine ourselves to a system that gives "some" confidence. What we need is a system of verification that gives full confidence.

Full confidence will also require full confidence in the organization we shall establish and in the rules of decision-making we shall draft. I refer in this context to the Netherlands Working Paper CD/445 of March 1984, on the size and structure of a chemical disarmament inspectorate. But there is far more to it. As Ambassador Cromartie said in his final statement as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on 3 February, provisions under article IX, but also under article VIII, of the convention would be required to underpin confidence in the convention. Provisions on a strong organization and on strong rules of decision-making should provide the necessary confidence in the draft convention as a whole, to enable it to be concluded.

CD/PV.397

pp.4-6

Norway/Bakkevig

17.3.87 CW,CTB

Difficult problems still remain to be resolved, particularly in the field of verification. However, the momentum in the negotiations has been sustained, and we are pleased to note the progress achieved so far during the 1987 session.

We feel assured that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1987, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, will spare no efforts in trying to find early and satisfactory solutions to the outstanding problems. In particular, it is necessary to work out details for verification régimes, including routine and on-site inspection on challenge of all facilities and sites where violations could occur. No doubt, solving these questions represents a difficult and complex task. We noted in this regard the statement of Ambassador Nazarkin of the Soviet Union at the plenary meeting on 5 March, when he said that "chemical weapons and the production base for their manufacture are to be destroyed by all States possessing such weapons, including both the Soviet Union and the United States".

The Norwegian Government attaches importance as well to the bilateral consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union on an effective and verifiable global convention on chemical weapons. These consultations have already contributed positively to the negotiating process within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

A basic and still unresolved question is the elaboration of modalities for handling requests for on-site inspection on challenge. Norway is of the opinion that the provisions concerning routine on-site inspections should be supplemented by a stringent system for on-site inspections to verify allegations of non-compliance. This would provide the ultimate source of confidence in the convention. Such a system has to satisfy certain criteria, of which the following three are the most essential: firstly, the challenged State must be under the obligation to demonstrate to other States, and especially the challenging State, that it complies with the provisions of the convention. Secondly, an inspection would have to be undertaken immediately after the issue of a challenge. Thirdly, the investigation should be detailed and comprehensive.

Whereas Norway takes part in all aspects of the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban in the Conference on Disarmament, we have put special emphasis on the question of verification of alleged use of these weapons. In 1981 the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated a comprehensive research programme concerning verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. This research programme is carried out by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. It is based on field experiments in order to make sure that the findings are as realistic as possible.

We have developed procedures for identification of the contaminated area, sampling, field analysis, transportation and final analysis in a laboratory in order to determine whether chemical weapons have been used. These procedures, which can be used on an all-year basis, are now being tested in field exercises. The results of these tests will be presented in a new research report, which will be submitted to the Conference on Disarmament during the second part of this year's session. We intend also to submit a working paper outlining more detailed proposals concerning procedures for verification of alleged use, which would be relevant to the effective implementation of the convention.

As a further contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the Norwegian Council on Arms Control and Disarmament will hold a symposium on the Chemical Weapons Convention in Oslo from 26 to 27 May. Representatives from the three groups and China in the Conference on Disarmament have been invited to present their views on the chemical weapons negotiations.

It is the firm view of the Norwegian Government that efforts should be intensified with a view to an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which is one of the most important issues on the international disarmament agenda. A comprehensive nuclear-test ban would play a key role in promoting the nuclear disarmament process. In addition, it would be essential for the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The fourth session of discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear testing has just resumed. Norway hopes that an agenda for the initiation of negotiations on a step-by-step programme towards a test-ban treaty can be agreed during this resumed session. The ratification of the 1974 Threshold Test-ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty would be a desirable first step in such a programme.

Being the sole negotiating forum for global disarmament questions, the Conference on Disarmament should resume its work on issues relevant to a nuclear-test ban. In our view the Conference did useful work in 1982 and 1983 in the field of compliance and verification. Norway regrets that disagreement over its mandate for three years has prevented the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban. Through an in-depth and interrelated deliberation of such issues as scope, compliance and verification, the Conference on Disarmament can resolve questions which in any case need to be addressed prior to the conclusion of a test-ban treaty.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts completed last week its twenty-third session under the able chairmanship of Dr. Dahlman of Sweden. The Group has made remarkable progress in achieving consensus on the concepts for a modern international seismic data exchange system under a future comprehensive test-ban treaty.

We are particularly pleased with this development, as Norway for many years has strongly advocated many of the ideas that are now coming to fruition. Let me recall the demonstration of data exchange here at the Palais des Nations in 1982, the CD Workshop in Oslo in 1985, as well as recent Working Papers presented to the Conference.

Looking to the future, the Ad Hoc Group is currently planning a large-scale international experiment for the exchange and processing of so-called Level II seismic data, or seismic waveforms, using the most advanced data communication methods available, including satellite transmissions. Norway will take an active part in the planning, carrying out and evaluation of this experiment. To this end, we shall make available data from the existing seismic installations in Norway, the NORSAR and NORESS observatories.

During the second part of this year's session, Norway plans to table a working paper dealing with methods and procedures for seismic Level II data exchange. This working paper will place particular emphasis on seismic data transmission by satellite. In this connection, let me draw attention to the transatlantic satellite transmission facilities of the NORESS array, which has provided us with considerable technical experience in this field. We believe that our experience could be helpful inter alia in relation to the international data exchange experiment. This experiment will be an important step in the development of an effective international system for verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

CD/PV.397

p.9

Bulgaria/Tellalov

17.3.87

CTB

The purpose of nuclear disarmament is to limit and finally remove the nuclear threat. To achieve this goal parallel steps are needed to curb both the quantitative and the qualitative nuclear-arms race. If the nuclear disarmament process is restricted to numerical cuts only, new nuclear weapons with greater effectiveness could be introduced, thus leaving the nuclear threat intact. A CTB has long been recognized as the most effective measure to prevent this. Cessation of nuclear testing is, therefore, of immediate concern. As the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden, Mrs. Theorin, rightly recalled "nuclear weapon development is taking place now, and to halt it a test ban a necessity now".

The Conference on Disarmament has once again been told that a CTB should be viewed in the context of a time when certain States will not need to depend on nuclear deterrence. We doubt the rationale of such a linkage.

In the technical community, there is a strong consensus that stockpile reliability maintenance does not require nuclear testing. Alternative simulation methods are available and offer equally precise but safer results. Scientists maintain that two generations of nuclear weapons -- the atomic and hydrogen warheads -- have matured to the point where, because of basic scientific limitations, no major new qualitative advances in nuclear warheads are in prospect.

In the United States Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, Volume 42, No. 9, page 11, the November 1986 issue, it is emphasized that, "From a national security standpoint, nuclear warheads innovations and nuclear tests are entirely dispensable... The precise combination of yield accuracy and radiation effect from a nuclear warhead is insignificant, compared to the overall consequence of a nuclear attack. Deterrence, independent as it is of the details of nuclear warhead design, will persist, whether or not nuclear tests are conducted. An abrupt adoption of a CTB would interrupt the United States nuclear weapons development program without harming the nation's ability to maintain a safe and reliable deterrence".

In this context, we share the concern expressed by Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt about "the insistence of some nuclear-weapon States to persevere in nuclear testing, using as a pretext the arguments of maintaining their capacity of nuclear deterrence, to ensure the worthiness of their nuclear-weapon stocks". Like him, we believe that "all these arguments are not valid". It seems to us that they, indeed, are "merely used to justify the continuation of nuclear tests".

Available information indicates that such tests are currently used for the creation of a "third generation" of nuclear weapons. Development of such weapons is, however, something else which, as scientific believe, may need further extensive nuclear testing in a non-foreseeable future. Nuclear weapons of this type such as nuclear-pump X-ray lasers are part of the SDI programme. Again according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, the "only real reason for continued nuclear testing is to design new weapons systems".

As for the traditional reference to "the need of substantially improved verification capabilities", today it is more evident than ever before that there are no technical obstacles to a conclusion of an adequately and effectively verifiable NTB treaty.

CD/PV.397

pp.13-14

GDR/Rose

17.3.87

CTB

In view of the fact that the components of such a ban will be intimately interrelated, the content of the treaty must be discussed in an integrated manner. Our feeling is that any selective approach would render the conclusion of an accord more difficult. The resolutions which the United Nations General Assembly adopted on the test-ban issue at its forty-first session take that aspect into account and may very well serve to guide our work. Most countries find it possible to support them. Although not identical in every detail, the resolutions have important traits in common in

that they: first, call for a comprehensive test ban as a task of fundamental urgency; second, reaffirm the CD's negotiating role in bringing about such a treaty; third, endorse the idea of starting practical work on a test-ban right at the beginning of the 1987 session of the Conference; fourth, call on all nuclear-weapon States to participate actively in the drafting of the treaty; and fifth, demand additional measures to encourage the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

This enables us to address content and scope of the treaty and verification and compliance as subjects that interact with each other.

Working Paper CD/743 advocates that a prospective committee should set up appropriate working groups.

As for the content and scope of the accord, all States should be prohibited from carrying out test explosions of nuclear weapons in all environments and at all times. The order in which the nuclear-weapon Powers would have to become parties to the treaty should be discussed and determined. Other steps conducive to the conclusion of a treaty could also be contemplated in one of the groups, for example, the idea of phasing out all tests under a specific time-frame.

Appropriate measures would have to be devised to ensure that the ban is not circumvented through nuclear explosions.

As far as compliance with an NTB is concerned, a host of ideas and suggestions have already been advanced in regard to possible means of verification, such as national means, including remote sensing, as well as on-site inspection and international seismic data exchanges. My delegation endorses the objective of having an international verification system in place when the treaty enters into effect.

Apart from having this subject treated by a working group of a committee, we should encourage the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to pursue its activities in a goal-oriented fashion and, among other things, prepare the international experiment envisaged for the exchange of seismic level-II data in 1988.

CD/PV.397

p.17

USSR/Nazarkin

17.3.87

OS

Non-employment of any weapons in outer space should be effectively verified. The Soviet Union is in favour of such verification. You may recall that the Soviet Union has already proposed that a future world space organization should also have verification functions with regard to compliance with agreements on the prevention of an arms race in space and that it be endowed with its own technical means to that end.

In order to move the discussion of the question of prevention of an arms race in space from a standstill already now, we propose consideration of the possibility of establishing an international verification of non-deployment of any weapons in outer space, a system which provides for the establishment of an international inspectorate. Such an inspectorate, for example, would be given right of access, for the purpose of on-site inspections, to all objects destined to be launched and stationed in space, and to their corresponding launch vehicles. Inspectors could monitor any launching of space objects.

In presenting this proposal, we are aware of its far-reaching nature. It is another indication that verification will not be a problem for the Soviet Union if the goal is really to prevent the arms race from spreading to space.

CD/PV.398

pp.5-6

Venezuela/Taylorhardat

19.3.87

CW

We wish to express our satisfaction at the way in which negotiations on chemical weapons have progressed in the Conference. We wish to express our gratitude to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom for the major advances made under his Chairmanship of Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We also wish to express appreciation at the way in which Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden has been chairing the Ad Hoc Committee since our work began this year. We are sure that under his able leadership it will be possible to move forward to the final results.

Everything appears to suggest that the conditions are ripe for specific results to be achieved quite quickly. Over recent months there has clearly been considerably more flexibility in the position of the Soviet Union, especially with regard to the régime of supervision and verification that will have to govern the implementation of the Convention when it enters into force.

The Conference is also facing up to the challenge resulting from the decision by the United States Government, and endorsed by the U.S. Congress, to begin producing binary chemical weapons in the Autumn of this year if no agreement has been reached by then on the elimination of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons. Given this prospect, there is no alternative to speeding up the on-going negotiations both at the bilateral level and within this Conference.

However, we should like to share with the members of the Conference a concern prompted by the negotiations being carried out on the draft treaty for the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is clear that the question of verification is decisive, and the fate of the treaty, or indeed of any disarmament treaty, hinges on it. We have the impression, however, that the endeavour praiseworthy as it may be, to set up a verification mechanism that would be as perfect as possible is leading to the design of a tremendously complex structure, the operation of which would be very costly. We fear that the financial obligations which would derive from the cost of the operation of the verification system for the treaty will be so high that finally very few countries will be in a position to defray them, with the result being that the number of countries willing to be parties to the treaty will be very small, which in turn will limit the effectiveness of the instrument.

It is important therefore to bear in mind the experience of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which to some extent is serving as a model for the verification structure of the future treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The safeguards system is relatively simple to operate. What is more, its field of action is very restricted and it has a special financing mechanism which lightens the burden on the developing countries. Even so, many developing countries have serious difficulties in meeting their financial obligations relating to the safeguards system. The prevailing world economic situation would seem to make it even more difficult to have a viable treaty for the prohibition of chemical weapons if the verification mechanism were to be too costly, as would seem to be the

case of the system that is being designed. To give an idea of the reason for our concern, one need only point out that for 1987 the cost of financing the IAEA safeguards system is \$34,362,000 and it is estimated that this cost will rise by about \$2 million a year. Thus for 1988 the estimate is \$36,323,000 for 1989, \$38 million, for 1990, \$40 million, and for 1991, \$42 million.

For a disarmament treaty to be effective, besides being reliable and verifiable it must be universal. In order to be universal it must secure the participation of the greatest possible number of countries, and to this end it is necessary to ensure that the financial burden on the parties is as light as possible.

CD/PV.398

pp.10-11

FRG/von Stulpnagel

19.3.87

CW

My government wishes to demonstrate its political determination to achieve a CW convention as soon as possible by introducing a Working Paper concerning the collection and forwarding of data and other information to verify the non-production of chemical weapons. This paper will be submitted tomorrow and given to the Ad Hoc Committee under the symbol CD/CW/WP.159.

It provides for a two-tier system whereby the national authority collects extensive data from its industry, which it then forwards to the international authority in a weighted manner according to the substances belonging either to category 2 or 3.

The international authority in return should have the right to request clarifications about these data transmitted by the national authority. This right to clarification should be formulated in a business-like manner in order to reserve on-challenge inspections for cases of grave doubts about compliance with the convention.

The total extent of the data and other information required to verify the non-production of CW is determined both by the number of substances listed in Annexes 2 and 3 and by the intensity of the control régime for each category. Of particular importance in this respect is the threshold, still to be fixed, for the exclusion of small quantities which do not pose a military threat and which therefore are irrelevant for CW control purposes; this threshold will have a considerable influence on the number of producers and users who are required to provide information. The question of where this line is to be drawn should be examined separately on the basis of militarily significant quantities.

The Working Paper we are to present is based on the following conception: the submission of the data needed to verify the non-production of chemical weapons is intended to contribute to effective international verification by the international authority. This presupposes selection of the appropriate date. More data does not automatically mean greater security against violations of the convention. The international authority should be given the data it needs in order to keep track of the production, acquisition, use, transfer and storage of the substances listed in the Annexes. The requirements in terms of specific details can and must be greater for the substances listed in Annex 2 than for those in Annex 3. While with regard to the handling of the substances listed in Annex 2 both facility-related figures and aggregate national data will have to be submitted, only the latter data, in our view, need be submitted on the substances listed in Annex 3.

The system of national data collection and transfer as described here, in connection with the right of the international authority to ask for clarification, will guarantee the largest necessary transparency of data handling and the most effective international control. The main work of data collection and processing is to be done at a national level; the international authority obtains an overview, which it can supplement as necessary by asking for clarification. At the same time, we are aware that verification is invariably an international task and that the national authority can therefore only be an instrument with which the individual contracting parties implement the convention.

Let me on this occasion comment on a few speeches made recently in this forum. My delegation recognizes the positive and constructive approach the Soviet delegation has displayed in its latest statements concerning the crucial questions of declaration and elimination of CW stocks and revision of lists of chemicals which are under careful consideration.

In other areas, such as on-challenge inspection, the Soviet view of no refusal of on-site inspections still has to be enlarged in our view to all facilities and sites where violations could occur in order to guarantee a degree of effective verification of compliance acceptable to all.

The constructive spirit of Stockholm should be adapted to our negotiations -- as the delegations of Romania and the Netherlands suggest -- with respect to its support for the obligation to accept on-site inspections and not to its particular restrictions concerning certain areas and sensitive points, because -- as the delegation of the Netherlands rightly acknowledged -- in Stockholm the objective was to build confidence whereas we are faced with the more encompassing task of abolishing an entire category of weapons. Consequently, our solution has to be a more far-reaching one to be effective and generally acceptable.

My delegation welcomes also the constructive approach taken by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 17 March 1987, towards the verification of alleged use of CW by developing procedures for identification of the contaminated area, sampling, field analysis, transportation and final analysis in a laboratory. We are looking forward to the announced working paper incorporating the new research report.

My delegation shared the detailed assessment given by the Netherlands delegation on 12 March 1987. This applies, firstly, to the notion of risk to the convention as a determining factor for the verification of non-production, building on the division of relevant CW substances into three categories with the appropriate régimes. Unless a list of commercially produced super-toxic lethal chemicals of CW relevance is produced, their inclusion in any of these established categories cannot be justified. Secondly, as was pointed out by the Netherlands delegation, the threshold still has to be fixed for the exclusion of small quantities which do not pose a military threat and which therefore are irrelevant for CW verification purposes.

CD/PV.400

pp.8-9

France/Morel

26.3.87

CW

As we know, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is at the present working on issues relating to non-production of chemical weapons. The French delegation wishes to make an active contribution to the discussions on a topic

to which it attaches great importance, and therefore now has the honour to introduce today document CD/747, entitled "Non-production of chemical weapons", which spells out the details of the preliminary remarks expressed by our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jean Bernard Raimond, on this subject a month ago, on 19 February, in this chamber.

The starting-point for our approach is that it has gradually become clear from discussions on article 6 of the convention that it is not desirable to build a convention that would be perfect for the present but which would be threatened with obsolescence in the near future and would therefore become increasingly inoperative. We do not think that it is useful to establish a definitive schedule of substances to be prohibited, with their attendant régimes of verifications. The convention must obviously be comprehensive and binding for everything with which we are familiar, but precisely in order to ensure the full observance and authority of the convention we must also be able to make provision for all that at the present remains hypothetical, little-known or indeed unknown. How, for example, can we regulate, without harming the legitimate interests of each country, the potential inherent in industries that are producing for permissible requirements substances that could be diverted for weapons purposes? How can the scientific and technological progress which will certainly come about, both in the chemical industry and on the control and verification side, be taken into account? Such questions cannot but convince us that, while we must be absolutely firm in everything relating to the goals, principles and ground rules, flexibility is essential in the application of the convention for everything that is not yet fully identified.

Thus, our document identifies the areas where, taking this evolutionary perspective I have outlined, developments may well occur.

With regard to the schedules of substances to be controlled, the essential and most difficult task is to define the toxicity criterion. Here we have to set aside the idea of attaining theoretical perfection and rather seek agreement on a definition and procedures of acquisition that are acceptable to everybody and could serve as a reference.

With regard to super-toxic lethal chemicals which are not chemical weapons, we do not think that, given their characteristics, it would be useful to draw up an exhaustive list at this stage. What is essential is to establish definitional criteria to assess the possibility of any particular substance becoming a chemical weapon, and to set a production threshold over which its manufacture must be declared.

Finally, we must give thought to monitoring new products and technologies, a major sphere on which the survival of the convention hinges, and which the Committee has not yet discussed.

Quite clearly, some of the tasks I have mentioned could best be carried out by a special body, and that is what is proposed in our document. We suggest that a Scientific Council should be set up, consisting of independent eminent persons, chosen solely for their scientific competence. As stated in our document, this new body would have responsibilities at the following stages: First, following the declaration of stocks, to finalize the lists of

chemicals to be prohibited and monitored, for by definition, the exact composition of the stockpiles will be known only after each country has made its declaration, which will happen on the entry into force of the convention.

Secondly, during the administration of the convention. The Scientific Council should inform the Consultative Committee of the appearance of any new substance or new technology which might pose a risk to the convention, and propose appropriate measures and verification procedures.

We attach a great deal of importance both to the independence of the eminent persons selected, and to a precise definition of their powers, so as to avoid any duplication with other bodies. Thus, the Scientific Council would have an advisory role but no power of decision whatsoever. One annual meeting could be scheduled, together with meetings at the request of the Consultative Committee where necessary.

My delegation is today submitting document CD/747 with the intention of breaking new ground while at the same time paying due heed to the need for realism and flexibility. The document suggests some practical measures, which I have summarized, but it also seeks to prompt us to think about how the convention will actually work. Very strict rules are essential, but they will not be enough in themselves. We have also to provide for instruments, tools, criteria for action, and therefore for an administration that is suited to the future circumstances of research and production in the chemical industry. What we are building must not be a great monument that is threatened by time but a living, active, credible institution. This is the spirit underlying our proposals, and of course we are quite open to any comments and suggestions to which they may give rise on the part of member States.

CD/PV.400

pp.12-14

Mongolia/Bayart

26.3.87

OS,CW

The Soviet delegation has tabled a new proposal for the creation of a system of international control for the non-deployment in outer space of weapons of any kind, envisaging the establishment of an international inspectorate. We are impressed by the idea of an international inspectorate. This measure will be especially effective if we achieve a full ban on all types of space weaponry -- space-based anti-missile weapons, anti-satellite weapons and space-to-Earth weapons. If the ban is a partial one, for example, just covering one class of outer space weapons, then, obviously, we will need additional control measures. This, by the way, is just another argument in favour of a full ban.

An inspectorate would probably not exhaust all the control possibilities in such a system. We could think about combining such an inspectorate with national means of verification and control and collective consultative machinery which would deal with disputes.

We hope that the idea of an inspectorate will be discussed in the Conference. It would be interesting to hear the reactions of representatives of other countries, in particular those traditionally especially interested in such issues of control.

Obviously, this idea will be further developed in more detail as we work towards the elaboration of specific measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

There can be no doubt that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is a high-priority task, one of the most important tasks, in fact, which awaits a solution. Therefore, the Mongolian delegation, like many others, considers that this task should occupy its due place in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which is being elaborated.

I would now like to make a few comments on the question of a chemical-weapons ban. A definite amount of success has recently been achieved in the drafting of the chemical-weapons convention. Many positions of principle and specific technical issues have been reconciled and there is the necessary basis for further progress. Amongst the unresolved questions of principle is the question of on-site challenge inspection. At this stage of the negotiations this is a basic problem of universal significance for the convention.

What is the actual situation as regards the solution of this problem? Several positions have been stated in the negotiations. Each of them reflects the interests of one or another group of delegations or the interests of specific delegations. These interests have to be taken into account and brought into line with the common aim: the elaboration of a convention which can universally and really be implemented.

The socialist countries are in favour of a régime of challenge inspections which would be as effective as possible and, at the same time, would not be detrimental to the higher interests of States. This aim, we feel, is met by the approach set out in the proposal of the United Kingdom contained in document CD/715, and in particular the central idea of that proposal -- the possibility of proposing and applying alternative measures.

It seems to us that the proposal that challenge verifications concerning declared locations and facilities and also in cases of suspicion of the use of chemical weapons should be mandatory is a promising one from the point of view of finding a compromise. Perhaps we should think about those other cases which we could include in the list of those where a refusal to allow full verification to be carried out would not be allowable.

For many years it was impossible to agree on questions of verifying the destruction of chemical weapon stocks and the elimination of their production facilities, as well as the permitted sphere of activities.

The proposals made by the Soviet delegation take account of the position of the Western and non-aligned States and fully remove any obstacle to the elaboration of comprehensive and strict control over chemical weapon stocks, production facilities and permitted activities. On these issues we have practically all the necessary basis for the formulation of articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Nevertheless, unfortunately, we cannot but note certain negative factors which are delaying the consolidation of the success achieved: for example, the unexpected difficulties which have arisen in resolving questions such as diversion of chemical weapons (the delegation of the United States of America has departed from its earlier position just when the USSR delegation took its preoccupations into account and tried to accommodate them), as well as the elaboration of provisions concerning chemicals in the second category.

The singling out of super-toxic lethal chemicals used for pharmaceutical, medicinal, scientific and research purposes, which do not have the set of properties peculiar to chemical warfare agents, is a step towards accommodating the wishes of the Western delegations. Nevertheless, the selfsame Western delegations are not devoting the due energy towards the solution of this issue.

These delegations are also delaying a solution to the question of irritants. The use of chemical weapons based on harmful chemicals against developing countries which do not have the necessary level of protection could be extremely detrimental to their defence capability. In the first place, there would be suffering on the part of the civilian population and damage to the peaceful spheres of activity in those countries. We also need to see a solution to the issue of the use of herbicides for military purposes.

There is nothing insoluble about these issues. All we need is a will to bring about a constructive agreement.

The important problem of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks and the elimination of production facilities has in principle been resolved. On the destruction of stocks, we have not yet achieved agreement on the order for their destruction. However, there does exist a common understanding that the régime for destruction would have to be simple and fair. The discussion of the idea of using equivalence in comparing various categories of chemical weapon stocks has shown that the practical implementation of this idea is going to be extremely complicated. The most simple and realistic way would lie in the grouping of chemical weapons in comparable categories which would have to be destroyed in equal amounts by weight during each period of destruction of stocks.

CD/PV.401

p.3

Argentina/Campora

31.3.87

CW

The negotiation of a convention that would ban chemical weapons is of unprecedented importance. This is a real leading case for the international community, since never yet has it undertaken the drafting of an instrument of such political and technical complexity in the field of disarmament with a view to eliminating weapons of real military significance. The task that has been started implies that national territories will be opened up to international scrutiny. This in itself will be a very important step in the strengthening of international confidence.

It is difficult to imagine the Major Powers open to international inspection to verify the destruction of their arsenals of chemical weapons and production installations. However, all the negotiations are directed towards that aim, and there should be no retreat or vacillation in achieving it.

We have heard so many times delegations from the Great Powers state here that the task of the Conference on Disarmament should be to give priority to the negotiation of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons that we cannot accept at this stage of our work any pretext which would hinder the speedy conclusion of that instrument.

CD/PV.402

p.12

Poland/Turbanski

2.4.87

OS

Each of the three above-mentioned concepts, namely, the international protection régime for satellites, the ban on ASAT weapons and the "rules of the road" agreement would -- if implemented -- mark a significant step on the road towards peace in space. But they are coherently linked together and supplement each other. Thus, in our opinion, the smartest thing the Conference can do is to change quantity into quality, and to start work towards negotiations on international instruments in those three spheres. It would be a bold move, it would require a lot of courage and imagination, but it would be a responsible answer to the challenges the Conference faces now. For beyond any doubt, such a set of agreements, once it has entered into force, would bring about a qualitatively new political environment. In the meantime, any substantial progress in negotiations could facilitate a headway in the bilateral negotiations.

And last, but by no means the least, the question of verification, which in space -- given the vastness of this domain and the technological advancement of space activities -- will create serious difficulties. That is true, but it is worth remembering that each day of delay in the creation of a verification régime will render these difficulties more serious, for increased sophistication of weapons objectively tends to make the task of verification more complicated. Proceeding from this premise, the Polish delegation supports the Soviet initiative to consider the possibility of creating an international inspectorate the task of which would be to monitor the non-deployment of weapons in space, and the rights of which would go so far as an on-site inspection. What stricter régime could be envisaged? Besides, I should like to draw once again the attention of the Conference to the apparent logic of such a move. The International Inspectorate, possibly a division of the International Space Organization, would be an inescapable link in the above-mentioned chain of structures and instruments. All of them, taken together, would constitute a solid frame of the system of peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

CD/PV.402

pp.18-19

Bulgaria/Tellalov

2.4.87

OS

A new idea relevant to all specific measures providing for the non-introduction of space weapons has been advanced by the delegation of the Soviet Union. The proposal to establish an international inspectorate for the purpose of verifying such agreements was formally made on 3 February by the First Deputy Foreign Minister, Y.M. Vorontsov. The distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Nazarkin, elaborated on this idea in his statement on 17 March. He suggested that such an inspectorate should be given the right of access to all objects designed to be launched and stationed in outer space, as well as to their launching vehicles.

The new Soviet idea is a valuable one. It seems to us that a comprehensive agreement on non-deployment of weapons in outer space could be effectively verified through co-operative measures providing for inspections of the launching sites. Such launches cannot be hidden. They have long been monitored by national technical means. Complementing these activities by international on-site inspections would strengthen the verification régime. International inspectors, present at the launching of space objects, would

have the right of access to them as well as to their launching vehicles, thus ensuring confidence in compliance with the respective agreements banning deployment of outer space weapons. This is valid for weapons of any type, whether ASAT or ABM, which are designed to be deployed in outer space. The idea of an international inspectorate could, therefore, be utilized for the verification purposes of both an ASAT ban and a comprehensive prohibition of space weapons.

We cannot but conclude that the establishment of an international inspectorate deserves very serious attention. We believe that the Ad Hoc Committee should consider it carefully, in the context of examining appropriate measures to prevent the weaponization of outer space. The Committee could, inter alia, elaborate on the principles of the establishment and functioning of such a system.

The delegation of Bulgaria would favour the continuation in the Ad Hoc Committee of the work aimed at a comprehensive prohibition of the whole class of space weapons. Arriving at a general agreement on the scope of such a ban would facilitate our task. Several interesting formulations were suggested last year in an initial attempt to define the weapons that are to be outlawed. We are ready to continue the exploration of this avenue.

Appropriate partial measures could also lead us to the achievement of the same objective. On 19 March, Ambassador Taylhardat spoke about the possibility of amending article 4 of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, so that its prohibition provisions cover any type of outer space weapons. This is an approach which, in our submission, deserves to be analysed and pursued further in the Ad Hoc Committee.

A number of delegations have proposed that the Conference on Disarmament should elaborate an agreement on an appropriate ASAT ban. The idea of ensuring immunity of satellites has been put forward as a partial measure. This idea underlines the need to prevent the development, testing and deployment of new dedicated ASAT weapons systems, and to eliminate the existing ones. The suggested approach envisages also establishing a prohibition on the use of force against space objects. The merit of such a provision is that it would outlaw interference with the normal functioning of space objects by any weapon system which normally serves other purposes but could be used in an ASAT mode.

We support such an approach to the ASAT ban, and believe that the Ad Hoc Committee should allocate more time to its consideration. Anti-satellite weapons are generally considered to be destabilizing. The destruction or disruption of early-warning and strategic communications satellites could, for examples, facilitate contemplating a first strike. The arms control missions of satellites are also extremely important. Furthermore, ASAT developments could well cover possible efforts to circumvent the existing restraints on ABM systems, due to the similar character of these two technologies. A multilateral agreement, preventing introduction of ASAT weapons in outer space and providing for the verifiable destruction of the existing ASAT systems, would be in the interest of all States, both those launching space objects into orbits and those using the services of satellites.

The national data centres should be responsible for providing agreed seismic data from all participating stations within the country to the international data centres and to receive the processed information. The data to be expeditiously transmitted contains digital waveform data for each detected event and basic parameter data necessary for routine determination of location, depth and magnitude of seismic events. The routine exchange and use of waveform data means that the number of reported parameters would be substantially reduced compared to what was earlier foreseen. National data centres should further supply, on request, waveform data for any specified time interval. This would require that data are continuously recorded and stored.

Large sequences of seismic events may sometimes occur, for example following a large earthquake, and it may be necessary to define special procedures for reporting the large amount of data that is generated in such cases.

Data reporting within the global system, and thus the capability of the system, is primarily based on signal detection at individual stations. It is therefore essential to develop improved signal detection methods, using automatic computer processing supplemented by interactive analyst review.

A demonstration was given by the Federal Republic of Germany during the session, illustrating how seismological data could be efficiently retrieved, presented and processed by interactive computer procedures. I regard this to be a valuable and interesting demonstration of a modern national seismological data processing facility.

The global system would require efficient data communication facilities both between the different international data centres and between international and national data centres. The data volumes to be exchanged are orders of magnitudes larger than those foreseen in the previous system.

The Group agreed that high-capacity, dedicated data communication links, using satellite transmission or other means, should be established between IDCs. These dedicated links should be operated in such a way that any data transmitted from a national to an international data centre will automatically and instantaneously be transmitted to all other IDCs.

These communication links should have sufficient capacity to handle also the substantial exchange of data and information between the various IDCs.

National data centres would communicate with the international centres using the most efficient and appropriate communication channels available in the particular region. This might include on-demand commercial communication links or the use of the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization.

During its session the Group received a report from an informal workshop on data communication held in Canada from 6 to 8 October 1986 -- a workshop in which many experts from the Group participated and which, in my view, provided valuable technical information of importance for the design of the data exchange system.

An important new function of international data centres will be the use of seismic wave form data in their regular analysis. The Group agreed that IDCs should fully utilize available waveform and parameter data in the process of event definition, location and estimation of source parameters.

To utilize waveform data implies considerable new requirements for the IDCs, not only with respect to data handling and analysis facilities, but also concerning the scientific methods and procedures for analysing data from a global network. The necessary methods and procedures for the analysis of globally collected waveform data do not exist today and have to be developed. This will require considerable scientific efforts.

The Group agreed that the IDCs should be open facilities providing free and easy access to any data and analysis results. Participating States should be able to automatically access and extract information from the data bases at the IDCs.

As I reported in my intervention of 14 August 1986, the Group has agreed that a large-scale experiment should be conducted in approximately 1988. The purpose of this experiment should be to test the various components of the system I have just described. It would include the testing of procedures to record and extract data at national data centres and to report these data to experimental international data centres. The reported data would be analysed in a co-operative effort among the established experimental international data centres, using the new methods and procedures being developed. The results of the analysis will be reported back to the participants. The Group envisages that experimental international data centres will be in operation during the experiment in Canberra, Moscow, Stockholm and Washington.

Experts from the institutions responsible for the preparatory work at these four locations met in Stockholm from 21 to 23 January 1987, in an informal workshop to discuss, in technical details, methods and procedures to be used at international data centres. The Group received a report from this meeting.

Such a large-scale experiment is a considerable undertaking that would require careful planning and also a number of preparatory experiments. A stage-by-stage approach would thus be required in which initially a number of bilateral and multilateral experiments will be needed. Bilateral and multilateral data exchange experiments using waveform data are already going on between several institutions around the world. It will be essential to conduct such preparatory experiments also to test the various proposed functions of international data centres. This will require a close co-operation among the four EIDCs and also the co-operation of some national data centres.

CD/PV.403

pp.2-6

USA/Hansen

7.4.87

CW

Over the course of the chemical weapons negotiations the United States has stressed that effective verification provisions are essential for building confidence in compliance. But, clearly, confidence is not something that suddenly appears the day the convention enters into force. Unless some degree

of confidence among States already exists, it must be created, or reaching agreement will be an extremely difficult task. Thus, the building of confidence must be a step-by-step process that begins well before the negotiations have been completed.

Confidence-building should start with greater openness on the part of all members of the CD. The United States is concerned that some other States participating in the negotiations have been extremely secretive about their chemical weapons programmes. If countries possessing chemical weapons refuse to acknowledge such capabilities during the negotiations, confidence is seriously undermined. Therefore, we must all agree that greater openness is essential for building the kind of confidence States must have before they will be willing to give up their own chemical weapons. The United States has consistently stressed this concern in bilateral negotiations and wishes to make this point clear in the multilateral context.

The fact that the United States maintains a chemical weapons deterrent and retaliatory capability has long been a matter of public record. On 10 July 1986, the United States delegation sought to promote the confidence-building process by unilaterally providing its negotiating partners here with further detailed information about its stockpiles of chemical weapons, including information on stockpile locations and the chemicals in the stockpile. We urge others to follow our example of openness.

On March of this year the Soviet Union finally make an oblique reference to its possessions of chemical weapons in a plenary statement. The United States welcomes this small, helpful step by the Soviet Union. We hope it was only the first step towards increasing openness by the Soviet Union and its allies about their chemical weapons programmes. Other States could usefully take similar steps.

In this connection we have also noted the candid statement by the Foreign Minister of France on 19 February that his country is considering endowing itself with a limited and purely deterrent capability in the chemical weapons field.

It should not be forgotten that over the years a number of States, primarily from the Western Group, have made clear in the CD that they do not possess chemical weapons. Such statements can only be welcomed.

Many CD member States, however, have said nothing. Most undoubtedly do not possess chemical weapons; but it would be very useful for them to say so. Unfortunately, it cannot be ruled out that other States participating in the negotiations do possess chemical weapon capabilities. For example, we would welcome clarification by the Iranian delegation of press reports concerning an Iranian chemical weapons capability.

Because of the magnitude of the chemical weapons capabilities possessed by the Soviet Union, the United States has stressed to Soviet authorities the importance of greater openness. But the principle applies equally to other States. Within the CD, we call upon all our negotiating partners to indicate possession or non-possession of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities. It would be useful if the secretariat were to compile

all relevant statements, with the assistance of delegations making them. We also call upon the Soviet Union, and any others who acknowledge possession of chemical weapons, to provide more detailed information, as the United States has already done.

Our objective is to rid the world of chemical weapons. This can only happen if all of the States possessing chemical weapons become parties to a future convention. Obviously, this will not happen automatically. The members of the CD need to consider carefully how to promote the widest possible adherence to the convention. It is not too soon to address the question of how to obtain participation in the convention by as many as possible of the 15 or so States that are currently believed to possess a chemical weapons capability. Similarly, States need to consider the risk posed by States which possess chemical weapons remaining outside the convention. What can be done to minimize this risk? There are, of course, hard questions, but they must be faced.

I would now like to address a number of specific negotiating issues relating to the CW Convention.

One useful result of the intersessional negotiations was agreement that article III of the rolling text should include a provision to declare any "facility or establishment" for the development of chemical weapons. However, the discussion showed that the scope of the key phrase "facility or establishment" was very unclear. Thus, a footnote in the rolling text states that more work is necessary. To assist in resolving this matter the United States proposes that the phrase in question refer to facilities or establishments that "specialize" in chemical weapons development. This would provide a practical approach that covers the locations of direct concern. It would avoid covering facilities that may have only an indirect or one-time involvement, such as a wind-tunnel that might on occasion have been used for aerodynamic tests.

Much has already been achieved in Cluster I in developing procedures for the declaration of chemical weapons and for monitoring the declared stocks prior to destruction.

One important step was made when the Soviet delegation announced on 17 February that it could agree to destruction of all chemical weapons and would no longer insist on a right to divert some chemicals to peaceful purposes. This was a constructive step. It was, however, curious to hear the Soviet accusation on 5 March that the United States had then blocked agreement in this area by changing its previous position. At the bottom of this tempest-in-a-teapot was the United States view that such common and innocuous commercial chemicals as sulphur and isopropyl alcohol that were stored for chemical weapons purposes need not be destroyed and might be diverted for civilian use. Apparently the Soviet delegation had failed to notice that the United States adopted this view more than a year ago, in early 1986, as a move toward the Soviet position. To be castigated now for moving to the Soviet position calls into question the seriousness of the Soviet accusation. None the less, since our attempted concession has apparently become an obstacle in the negotiations, we will resolve the problem by returning to our original position that all chemical weapons stocks, including harmless precursors stored for chemical weapons purposes, should be destroyed. There should now be full agreement in this area.

With respect to chemical weapons production facilities, my delegation has suggested that work in Cluster II focus initially in areas where there is broad agreement. We believe it is appropriate for the Committee to examine how a verification system for eliminating such facilities would function. My delegation has introduced an informal outline to assist in this examination. To help these discussions move forward, we are circulating today a paper containing more detailed suggestions for a step-by-step approach to verifying the elimination of CW production facilities.

A clear idea of the verification steps necessary for international assurance that parties are eliminating their chemical weapons production facilities is essential from the beginning. For an effective verification system, we must ensure that the measures for declarations, inspections and on-site monitoring with instruments are carefully integrated with specific verification objectives. Before one can decide what to declare, the purpose of declarations must be clear. Before one can write procedures or determine the frequency of inspection, one must know the objectives of an inspection. Before one can decide on what types of instruments may be needed, one must know what objectives instrument monitoring must satisfy. In our outline, we propose such objectives for each facet of the verification system for chemical weapons production facilities.

In article V we also note that there are still fundamental issues to be resolved about how chemical weapons production facilities are to be eliminated. However, we believe that broad agreement in principle already exists on the general approach to verification in this regard. In our view much important work can be done toward converting this agreement in principle into provisions for a verification without prejudging the remaining issues.

The final issue on which I would like to comment today is challenge inspection. This subject remains one of the key negotiating problems, although by no means the only one. There seems to be broad agreement that quick action is needed to carry out inspections and that in at least two cases inspection will be mandatory. While we regard the evolution of the Soviet approach in a positive light, we view the new Soviet position announced on 17 February as being internally inconsistent and falling far short of what is needed for an effective challenge provision.

Allow me to give two examples of why the Soviet position is internally inconsistent.

In his statement of 17 February the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union said that the Soviet Union will be pressing for the most stringent system of supervision and verification. The USSR has argued for strict routine inspection provisions for the chemical industry. Yet it continues to oppose mandatory challenge inspection, the most stringent system proposed, for the vast majority of plants in the chemical industry that it is ostensibly so concerned about. For under the Soviet approach, only the relatively few plants already subject to declaration would be open to mandatory challenge inspection. Soviet statements about stringent verification and the detailed Soviet position are clearly not consistent with each other.

Furthermore, the Soviet delegation emphasizes the importance and utility of alternatives to on-site inspection. It has suggested such alternative measures as viewing a facility from outside and collecting chemical samples nearby. But it cannot explain, or has not explained, for example, how these or any other alternative measures would be useful in determining whether or not a suspect munitions bunker contains chemical weapons. It seems obvious that only inspection of the bunker itself will permit an inspector to determine whether or not there are chemical weapons inside. But if the Soviet delegation knows of an alternative to inspection that would resolve such questions, such alternative should in our view be thoroughly explained. The United States is not opposed to discussing effective alternatives, but if an alternative cannot be agreed the mandatory right to access within the 48-hour period must remain.

The issue of challenge inspection will be discussed soon in Cluster IV. We welcome the examination of each facet of challenge inspection, as is planned. Such an approach can help to focus on the substantive merit of methods for ensuring effective verification; this, rather than arguments based on authorship, is what is required. The United States delegation will participate actively and constructively in the forthcoming discussion. We will not, however, relax our standards for effective verification.

CD/PV.403

pp.7-8

GDR/Rose

7.4.87

CTB

My delegation would like to make some observations on the Progress Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the Twenty-Third Session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, put out as document CD/745. Our thanks go to the Group's Chairman, Dr. Ola Dhalmann, and the other experts for the competent and constructive work they have done. Their efforts represent an essential part of the activities the Conference is undertaking in order to bring about a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Every single scientific and technical and methodological problem solved by the Group is a contribution towards progress on an NTB treaty and helps clear the road of remaining obstacles.

The Report provides a useful overview of the various components of which a seismic data exchange system will be made up. In fact, it signals that obvious headway has been achieved in devising a global international system to exchange seismic data -- a system which will routinely rely on waveform (Level II) data for all seismic events. As far as preparations for the international experiment on the exchange of such data are concerned, progress has been recorded as well.

I think we should commend the Group on the single-mindedness with which it has tackled its tasks, using the latest seismological findings and the most modern data acquisition, transmission and processing techniques. If you compare the present Report with previous ones, what leaps to the eye is that automation and computerization are becoming more and more important in international seismic data exchanges.

The scientific and technical issues to be discussed and resolved by the Group are very complex indeed. Even though the mandate requires that they be dealt with from a methodological point of view only, everyone will readily

admit that details may very well produce difficulties. It will be easier to overcome them if national efforts in the relevant fields are increased and international co-operation is deepened.

In approving the Progress Report, my delegation endorses also the recommendations advanced in paragraph 13. As has been said already, timely and thorough preparations for the international experiment on the exchange of Level II seismic data, scheduled to be conducted in 1988, will be of major importance. For this reason, the Group of Scientific Experts must at all times be afforded the working conditions it needs in order to carry on smoothly. Within the scope of the resources available to the Conference on Disarmament in the week from 27 to 31 July 1987, the Group should, therefore, be provided with the conference services required to ensure effective work.

The global seismic data exchange system envisaged will have a crucial role to play in reliably verifying compliance with a future treaty on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. The meaningful work done by the Group of Experts should induce the Conference, in parallel, to commence and vigorously pursue the drafting of all the elements of an NTB treaty.

CD/PV.403

pp.10,12

FRG/von Stulpnagel

7.4.87 CTB, CW

In this connection, my delegation regards as encouraging the remarks made by Ambassador Rose on 17 March on the subject of an NTB/CTB. We are pleased to note that they reflect an idea which we too presented to the Conference: that a satisfactory verification system for monitoring compliance with an NTBT/CTBT should be operative when the desired treaty comes into force.

The contribution on the subject of verification which we have made of late at this Conference and in the Group of Seismic Experts serves to outline the associated tasks. While suggesting that the verification problems can certainly be solved, we must not forget how much work is still needed until a global seismic monitoring system can be achieved. My delegation has repeatedly pointed out that in a world in which we hope there will soon be fewer nuclear weapons, any circumvention of a comprehensive test ban would present an unacceptable security risk for the countries faithful to the treaty establishing the ban. Not least for this reason, a solution to the rather artificial problem of peaceful nuclear explosions must be found which is genuinely satisfactory and acceptable from the point of view of security.

My delegation's concentration on the main elements of the convention is meant to be a practical contribution. All delegations know the dilemma between the necessary political oversight and decision on one side, and the unavoidable scrutiny of the small print on the other. We must be guided by the principle that the underlying uniform commitments for all countries must first be dealt with politically and then be formulated in no vague terms. For example, only by an adequate verification régime can all countries be convinced that a convention banning chemical weapons worldwide in the most reliable guarantee that they will not be used. Such verification must be both effective and practicable. Striking the necessary balance is a major task for

this Conference. We feel that on the central political issue of a chemical weapons convention, that of on-challenge inspections, this balance has been achieved satisfactorily in the British proposal in Working Paper CD/715. We therefore continue to strongly support this proposal.

CD/PV.403

pp.13-14

USSR/Nazarkin

7.4.87

CW

The distinguished representative of the United States raised the question of challenge inspection. That is today one of the most important issues facing us in the chemical weapons negotiations, and the exchange of views on it is undoubtedly essential. Evidently, such an exchange is also appropriate in a less formal situation, and on the whole this is happening. Therefore, it would hardly be correct for me to embark on a detailed discussion of the comments made today by Ambassador Hansen. We will have occasion to do this in other circumstances. I would just today like to point out that, unfortunately, on the basis of the comments made by the Ambassador Hansen on challenge inspection, we see that there still remains the position which the United States adopted three years ago, back in 1984, concerning the automatic nature of challenge inspections.

This will not be conducive to progress in the negotiations, considering in particular the fact that many other delegations have made very varied comments on other ways in which the question of challenge inspection could be resolved. Ambassador Hansen, as far as I could see, showed interest in the idea of alternative measures. I would not like to deprive the authors of that idea -- it was put forward as you know, by the United Kingdom delegation -- of the opportunity of justifying their own proposal. But in any case the detailed exchange of views on the nature of alternative measures could well take place during a less formal exchange of views.

I would like to appeal to the United States delegation to give serious consideration to the British proposal and adopt a more positive and constructive view of it, as it enjoys broad support in the negotiations. In fact today we heard support for it confirmed by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the statement of Ambassador von Stülpnagel. I think that on the basis of the British proposal movement towards a solution to the problem of challenge inspection could be achieved.

Now, the matter of confidence. Of course, it is extremely important, and obviously it cannot be built in one day. I noted the Ambassador Hansen made a positive appreciation of the steps recently taken in that direction by the Soviet side. At the same time, I must point out that confidence-building is a two-way process. Ambassador Hansen referred to the fact that the United States has published data on its chemical weapons -- I have the following to say in that connection: of course the publication of some weapons data is evidence of a certain level of openness, but from my standpoint, confidence would be strengthened much more by information, not on armaments or plans to produce binary weapons, but on arms reductions or on the renunciation of plans to develop armaments. Such steps would indeed lead to the building of true confidence. In this connection, I would refer to the appeals made by the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, in March this year, not to undertake any steps which might complicate the achievement of mutually acceptable accords in the negotiations or slow

them down, and also not to produce chemical weapons, including binary or multi-component varieties. Such measures would in fact help to develop confidence and hasten successful progress in the chemical weapons negotiations.

CD/PV.404

pp.3, 7

Iran/Velayati

9.4.87 VER, CW

We have already expressed many times in this forum the fact that at the present situation, when almost all parties to disarmament talks are aware of the limits and different aspects of technicalities of the subject under discussion, such technicalities have for long lost any basis to cause real practical obstacles in the way of disarmament negotiations.

In particular, I want to stress that non-nuclear-weapon States may not be deceived and convinced as to the slow pace of disarmament talks in this forum with the excuse of so-called "technical considerations". Lack of political will is the sole cause responsible for any stalemate in the whole area of disarmament.

Twenty-five years have elapsed since the commencement of the activities of the Conference on Disarmament but for the last decade we have not had any sizeable agreement in the relevant fields. Lack of agreement on the important issue of verification has been projected for many years as the major obstacle in the way of any serious development. True, verification in our view really constitutes one of the major guarantees for the establishment of an international, effective and collective control system over many fields of armament. But recent flexibilities offered in connection with verification, especially on-site inspection, has made this last technical excuse quite irrelevant.

Fourthly, the unprecedented level of the use of chemical warfare in recent years has proved beyond doubt that the effective implementation of the international convention on the production, use, stockpiling, transfer and development of chemical weapons is an urgent imperative. Any further postponement of the submission of the draft to the General Assembly under whatever pretext is not acceptable. However, we share the views expressed by those States which attach great importance to the issue of compliance. While an international verification and on-site inspection system is an undeniable necessity, the ultimate confidence in the convention would not be provided unless international punitive measures against any serious and deliberate violations of the convention would also be provided.

The Iraqi practice must always be kept in mind. The United Nations expert teams dispatched to our country to verify the use of chemical weapons have on numerous occasions come out with clear verified cases. At this point we would like to express our appreciation to those States which have, by convening educative international gatherings, enhanced public awareness about the inhuman effects of the use of these weapons.

Such endeavours will undoubtedly have substantial positive effects. Efforts by some of the Nordic countries are also impressive. Research programmes on verification of the implications of chemical weapons are still

going on and we are awaiting the result. Similarly, research on the effects of the deployment of chemical weapons on the environment as well as remedies for chemically afflicted people and other research efforts are noteworthy.

CD/PV.404

pp.11-12

Sri Lanka/Dhanapala

9.4.87

OS

With the resumption of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, delegations will now endeavour to ensure that constructive work is begun without delay. For our part we have found the contributions made in recent weeks in the plenary debate on this item replete with ideas that could be discussed further in the Ad Hoc Committee -- preferably with the assistance of experts. Among the ideas presented to us at this session is the proposal for a multilateral agreement conferring on space objects an immunity from attack or interference thereby contributing to confidence building and stability. We have stated before that while the militarization of space is a fait accompli, the weaponization of space is not -- at least not yet. By the militarization of space we refer to the fact that three out of four satellites in space are there for military purposes. To grant immunity to them is tantamount to legitimizing the military uses of space unless we are clear about their specific purpose and function. In this connection we would be well advised to re-examine the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space concluded in 1975. This Convention sought to establish a mandatory system of registering objects launched into outer space not only for identification purposes but also to, and I quote from the preamble, "contribute to the application and development of international law governing the exploration and use of outer space". Launching States are required under the Convention to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of specific details of space objects launched by them including their general function. In the implementation of this Convention there are many inadequacies, particularly concerning information on the function of space objects. In terms of Article X of the Convention the opportunity arose at the forty-first session of the General Assembly to re-examine the Convention. This opportunity was unfortunately missed because of disagreement among Member States and the Secretary-General was merely requested to prepare a report on the past application of the Convention to be submitted to the Legal Sub-Committee for the information of Member States. The report falls far short of the review exercise contemplated in Article X. The strengthening of this Convention must go hand in hand with any move to grant immunity to certain space objects.

Another interesting proposal made is that of an international inspectorate to supervise on-site the launching of space objects. We are aware that this proposal is conceived as a verification measure to ensure the non-deployment of space weapons. We appreciate this but would consider that in logical sequence it should be examined when we are negotiating a ban on all space weapons based on all physical principles. Again we believe that the strengthening of the Space Registration Convention should also be undertaken as a means of reinforcing the existing provisions to prevent an arms race in outer space. The continuing relevance of the proposal of France made at SSOD I for an international satellite monitoring agency has already been noted in our discussions at this session. The potential of such an agency to usher in an age of transparency and to assist in the verification of a future agreement banning space weapons requires to be explored fully. Vast strides in civilian space technology and the ready access to its benefits not only prove the

importance of reserving space for exclusively peaceful purposes but also underscore the viability of satellite monitoring of disarmament agreements, including a ban on space weapons. The efficacy of an international satellite monitoring agency as compared to an international inspectorate and more importantly the cost-effectiveness of the two modes of verification require detailed study. We are aware of the useful work going on in Canada on verification, such as PAXSAT, and are grateful to Ambassador Beesley for his invitation to all CD delegations to attend the May workshop in Montreal. Another proposal is for an arms control and conflict observation satellite (ACCOS) to help in the observation of space weapon development. A recent SIPRI study recommends that these concepts of verification should be explored in the Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of this Conference and we endorse this view.

The central issue is the need for an effective ban on space weapons. While we endeavour to negotiate an agreement or agreements for this purpose a number of measures have been suggested. They include an ASAT weapon ban, an amendment to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, a "rules of the road" code for space, etc. The proposals arise out of a fundamental desire to act urgently to prevent an arms race in outer space. We have always recognized that the developments of concern to us are not confined to one space Power. The space weapons ban has of necessity to apply universally and must have effective provisions for verification, as General Assembly resolution 41/53 recognizes. Interim measures must also be applicable universally. That is why it is envisaged that with an ASAT weapon ban the existing ASAT system will be destroyed. My delegation does not consider it appropriate to enter into the controversy surrounding the interpretation of Article V of the bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Our objective is a multilateral agreement to ban all space weapons including anti-ballistic missiles and other ballistic missile defence systems under the terms of General Assembly resolution 41/53. The same resolution emphasizes the peaceful uses of space and we welcome in this context the Agreement on Co-operation in Exploring and Using Space for Peaceful Purposes signed by the Governments of the USSR and the United Kingdom on 31 March in Moscow.

I have referred already to the ASAT weapon ban which has been proposed. The Harare Declaration of Non-Aligned Heads of State or Government specifically called on this Conference and stressed the urgency of halting the development of anti-satellite weapons and the dismantling of the existing system. In negotiating an ASAT weapon ban we recognize that such weapons must be defined since space objects could be used in an ASAT role to disable other satellites by impact or explosion. A useful distinction has therefore been made between dedicated ASATs designed and tested for a flexible attack capability, and ancillary ASATs with limited and not clearly identifiable ASAT capability. A proliferation of ASAT capability is a real possibility and can endanger the peaceful uses of space.

CD/PV.404

pp.15-16

Belgium/Clerckx

9.4.87

CW

Thus, the principles of on-site verification of the destruction of chemical weapons and of the destruction of production facilities for such weapons have for the first time been set down in the draft treaty.

In the field of challenge inspection, so crucial for the safety of the future convention, the negotiations have taken what we feel to be a promising turn, bearing in mind the earlier fundamental conflicts of views. In particular, the United Kingdom proposal contained in document CD/715 contributed to this favourable development which we hope will continue in the future. There seems to be a more widespread feeling that an ambitious solution is both necessary and attainable. Success in such an unprecedented undertaking as the verified elimination of a whole category of arms justifies unprecedented remedies. Belgium's preference goes to a set of rules which will be no less stringent in the constraints imposed upon any party faced with a request for inspection than the other obligations contained in the convention. Here we must avoid any discrimination amongst the parties depending on the importance of their military or economic potential, the size of their territory or any other reason. An important question facing us all is whether it can be left to a State party, whichever State party it may be, to determine in the final analysis whether a facility located on its territory comes under the convention or not.

In the field of the verification of non-production of chemical weapons, article 6, we have managed to lay the foundations of three verification régimes with lists of products whose production, processing and international trade would be subject to international verification. These are either well-known chemical warfare agents, such as choking agents, blister agents, blood agents, incapacitants or nerve gases, or their key precursors. Some of these products have peaceful applications and are produced by industry for that purpose. We have started to recognize the legitimacy of peaceful industrial activities relating to those chemical products which have a dual purpose and which in some countries are or have been used for armaments purposes. We are especially pleased at this shift towards what we feel to be common sense, which was indeed something whose slow pace was a source of concern to us.

My delegation has very frequently repeated here that total, permanent and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons is one of the main priorities for Belgium in the field of disarmament. His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran has again this morning illustrated the acute, urgent human, moral and political necessity of this by referring to facts which we cannot but condemn categorically.

CD/PV.405

pp.5-6

UK/Cromartie

14.4.87

CW
CTB

The United Kingdom has tabled as a contribution to the negotiations a series of papers on different aspects of the convention, several on the verification of non-production, one on the constitution of the organization that will need to be set up under the convention, and most recently on challenge inspection. The proposals tabled last July by the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. Renton, for Article IX of the Treaty, remain firmly on the table. Mr. Gorbachev confirmed to Mrs. Thatcher during her visit to Moscow that the Soviet Union accepted broadly the British approach. We welcome the greater readiness the Soviet Union has shown in this area as in some others to consider effective verification. It is an important step down the road to building the confidence between States that must be fundamental for our convention.

Our work on verification has thrown into relief that further practical work remains to be done in other areas of the draft convention. In particular, we must resolve how to provide for effective administration of the convention. It is becoming clear that the organization to be set up under Article VIII will need to be effective from the moment the convention comes into force. It will need to provide inspectors immediately to conduct initial inspection and evaluation of declarations and to provide effective international monitoring of destruction of stocks and production facilities. Verification of certain sectors of the civil chemical industry under Article VI of the convention will also be required at an early stage. A trained corps of inspectors will be needed to conduct challenge inspection under Article IX. In addition the organization will have an important task of receiving and collating data reported by States Parties. It will be essential to have an effective organization in which all parties will have confidence. To achieve this aim we must consider now how it is to be recruited, trained, equipped and paid for.

Further work is needed on the régime for the different schedules of substances under Article VI and their relation to the organization. A mechanism for revising schedules will also be essential.

Nor must we lose sight that if our convention is to be effective, it must be global. As the distinguished representative of the United States asked recently, we wonder why more countries have not stated whether or not they possess chemical weapons? My delegation has made its position clear on many occasions but we willingly do so again. The United Kingdom unilaterally abandoned its chemical warfare capability in the 1950s. We believe, as Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Gorbachev agreed in Moscow, that the conclusion of an effective chemical weapons convention is one of the top priorities.

Turning to the nuclear-test ban item, we are still regrettably in a situation where no practical work is being done in this Conference in an ad hoc committee. Among other things, this means that the technical papers which my delegation has tabled on the subject, the latest being CD/610, have not received full consideration. It now seems to be accepted, at least by the vast majority of members of the Conference, that the best way forward procedurally is a non-negotiating mandate which will allow work on outstanding problems with regard to verification and also of scope. The latter is equally crucial since in our view it is essential that a Comprehensive Test Ban should cover all nuclear explosions, whatever their declared purpose.

During the deadlock on the mandate of an ad hoc committee, we particularly welcome the valuable continuing contribution on seismic monitoring of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts, as well as the related activities sponsored by Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany. We look forward to the further Level II experiment, for which the way has now been cleared, and we hope that where possible countries from all groups in the Conference will participate in this important and practical work.

We also welcome the bilateral discussions going on concurrently between the United States and the Soviet Union on matters related to nuclear testing. We hope that these will soon be able to clear the way for progress on the apparent agreement at the Reykjavik Summit between the two sides to a step-by-step approach starting with ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

Today, I would like to make a few observations on the Progress Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events contained in Document CD/745, which is before us.

First, I wish to pay tribute to the Chairman of the Group, Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden, for the dedicated and superb work he has been performing to bring together the expertise of the seismological experts of the interested countries to provide the important scientific underpinning to our top priority item, namely agenda item 1, Nuclear Test Ban.

I was happy to learn from Dr. Dahlman's presentation on 2 April of the Progress Report that substantial progress has been made towards the design and testing of a modern seismic data exchange system.

It is particularly encouraging that the Ad Hoc Group has reached agreement in principle on the design, or the major components, of such a modern system -- a system which is based on the expeditious exchange of all available seismic information, both waveform and parameter data, for all detected signals, and the routine use of all data at international data centres.

As I understand from Dr. Dahlman's report, the Ad Hoc Group is to engage in working out the details of the modern seismic data exchange system, some of which involves the breaking of new grounds in seismology.

I am certain that my colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament share my hope that we will hear the fruitful outcome of the work of the scientific experts in this regard at the earliest possible date.

As we look forward with anticipation to the work of scientific experts, I wish to draw the attention of the Conference to a couple of important pointers which are already contained in the Progress Report of the Ad Hoc Group.

The Report states, "The Group agreed that the IDCs (International Data Centres) should be open facilities for participating States, providing free and easy access to any data and analysis results. It is important that the data base structure at IDCs allow participating States easy automatic access to and extraction of information".

I believe that this principle of openness and free and easy access constitutes a very important guideline as we engage ourselves in the task of building a modern international seismic data exchange system.

Speaking for my own country, this is also the basic principle which guides Japan's contribution to this worthy international undertaking.

We have attached particular importance to establishing and widening the network of co-operative national investigations into Level II or waveform data exchange. Since our proposal to this end in March 1986, we successfully

obtained the participation of 16 countries in the exercise, and the investigations have been under way since last December. I am happy to report to the Conference that progress to date has been encouraging, thanks to the keen interest on the part of participating countries.

In the course of the Meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts last month, the Japanese expert, Dr. Suehiro, worked together with his colleagues from 18 countries covering the Western, Non-Aligned, Socialist and other Groups, to compile a report entitled "Progress of Co-operative National Investigations into Waveform Data Exchange", submitted to the Ad Hoc Group as Document GSE/JAPAN/26. In this connection, I wish to express my appreciation to the Canadian Government for having organized an informal workshop on data communication in October last year which played a valuable role in furthering our common work. Our thanks are also due to the Federal Republic of Germany which organized a useful and interesting demonstration of existing national facilities in the course of the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group.

As is mentioned in GSE/JAPAN/26, there are already clear and positive signs for further evolution and widening of these co-operative endeavours. A number of countries other than the present 16 have indicated that they will take part in the near future.

I welcome the prospect of wider participation in our undertaking, and wish at the same time to reiterate my delegation's hope that as many countries as possible will see fit to participate in these and similar exercises.

Another point of note in document CD/745 is the realistic approach taken with respect to the preparation for a large-scale experiment on the exchange of Level II data, which the Ad Hoc Group envisages carrying out in approximately 1988. Such a large-scale experiment provides an important target towards which the Ad Hoc Group can intensify and focus its work. At the same time, it is important that when the experiment takes place, it be carried out on the basis of careful planning through a series of preparatory experiments. I therefore fully support the stage-by-stage approach taken by the Ad Hoc Group, which will call initially for a number of bilateral and multilateral experiments. I feel certain that the co-operative investigations I mentioned earlier will play an important role as a part of such multilateral experiments.

CD/PV.405

p.14

Romania/Dolgu

14.4.87

CW

As far as the prohibition of chemical weapons is concerned, like many other delegations we have also welcomed the new positions expressed by the Soviet delegation in the statements of 24 November 1986, 17 February 1987 and 5 March 1987, intended to contribute to finding solutions to certain crucial problems: the declaration of chemical weapons stocks, and their verification, the non-production of chemical weapons by civilian industry, and international on-site inspection including challenge inspection. We also welcome the new measures recently announced by the Soviet Union, particularly the cessation of the production of chemical weapons and the beginning of the construction of a facility for the destruction of stocks. These are important steps which should help confidence-building and facilitate the conclusion of the convention.

We consider that, on the basis of results achieved in the intersessional period, the new proposals which I have mentioned and the willingness of all delegations, remarkable results have been achieved, particularly in the first part of the session. Thus thanks to the personal qualities and the dedication of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, His Excellency Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, and the Group Co-ordinators, Mr. Nieuwenhys, Mr. Macedo and Dr. Krutzsch, and through the contributions of delegations, sizeable progress has been achieved in the drafting of article IV and its annex regarding chemical weapon stocks, as well as in the clarification of certain elements of article VI and its annexes on non-production of chemical weapons in civilian industry, and article VIII on the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary bodies.

CD/PV.405

pp-16-18

USSR/Nazarkin

14.4.87

VER,NW,
CW

Frequently, including here in the Conference on Disarmament, we hear allegations that it is impossible to achieve a radical breakthrough on the question of nuclear disarmament due to the absence of a solution on the problem of verification, resulting from the alleged unwillingness of the Soviet Union to accept far-reaching verification measures. This is far from being the case. The Soviet Union's position on verification was again explained in the Prague statement made by Mr. Gorbachev. Once again the world can see that on questions of verification, the Soviet Union is prepared to go as far as is necessary to find a solution.

The participants in the Conference are aware of our concrete proposals on verification of compliance with future agreements on the prohibition of chemical weapons, on the cessation of nuclear tests, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as well as on other matters. Our concept of verification encompasses the whole spectrum of arms and armed forces. Needless to say, the Soviet Union pays due attention to other States' proposals on verification, and participates in the joint elaboration of the most effective forms of verification. I repeat that we regard verification as an essential component of effective agreements, if it is a question of the real limitation, reduction and elimination of arms, armed forces or military activity.

Since, according to the new Soviet proposals, we are talking about the elimination of whole classes of nuclear arms in Europe, questions of verification of compliance with future agreements take on a qualitatively new meaning. The Soviet Union favours the strictest measures in this field. Appropriate verification, including on-site inspection, must cover the missiles and launchers remaining after the cuts, both in combat service and at all other facilities -- test ranges, manufacturing plants, training centres, etc. Inspectors should also have access to military bases in third countries. One would think that the proposals of the Soviet Union on verification measures, with regard to reductions in nuclear weapons, could also be used in solving verification problems in the multilateral negotiations on item 2 of the Conference's agenda. The Soviet Union has consistently favoured the beginning of such negotiations.

We see the process of lowering the military balance in Europe as a step-by-step process, with equilibrium maintained at a level of reasonable adequacy, with international verification and on-site inspection, as well as with an exchange of data on armed forces and arms.

In his Prague statement, General Secretary Gorbachev announced new practical steps on the part of my country in this direction. The Soviet Union has ceased production of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union does not have any chemical weapons outside its borders. Construction of a special facility for the destruction of chemical-weapon stocks has begun in the Soviet Union. The commissioning of this facility will allow the rapid implementation of the process of chemical disarmament once the international convention was concluded. Here I would like to thank the distinguished representative of Romania, Ambassador Dolgu, for the high appreciation he expressed today of the steps we have taken.

In making such steps, the Soviet Union proceeds from the firm assumption that the chemical weapons convention will be ready for signature in 1987. This, naturally, requires that States must begin now to take practical measures to prepare for the implementation of the obligation they will take upon themselves as parties to the future convention.

As with other measures for real disarmament, the Soviet Union is seeking to establish the most stringent system of verification, including international verification, regarding the elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their manufacture. On the basis of such an approach, we are prepared to look for mutually acceptable solutions to questions related to compliance with the convention by all parties and to confidence-building among them. I note with satisfaction the positive attitude of the United Kingdom towards our steps in the area of effective verification of compliance with the future convention.

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pp.3,7

Czechoslovakia/Chnoupek

16.4.87

NW,VER,
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In order to facilitate the conclusion without delay of an agreement that is of the highest importance today -- on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe -- the proposal has been made in Prague to initiate talks on reducing and, subsequently, eliminating missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometres without linking this issue with either the conduct or the outcome of the negotiations on the problem of medium-range missiles. As soon as an agreement is signed, then, regardless of the status of the talks on operational-tactical missiles, the missiles stationed there as a retaliatory measure for the deployment of the Pershing 2 missiles and the cruise missiles in Western Europe will be removed from our territory as well as from the territory of the German Democratic Republic, in agreement with our Governments.

All this is to be done under strict verification which, after the Prague statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, can no longer be a problem in the process of disarmament. In fact, these questions have undergone a fundamental re-evaluation on our part in both approach and conception. Therefore they have to be seen in a totally new light. It has been strongly emphasized that verification, which includes on-site inspection, must cover missiles and launching facilities remaining after the cut-backs, and that means not only those in combat readiness but also in all other installations -- testing ranges, production plants and training centres. The inspectors must have access also to military bases of the other side located on the territory of third countries. All that is necessary for us to have complete certainty that the agreement is being strictly observed. I want to reiterate that there are no obstacles on our side in the way of resolving the questions of verification. We have, by the way, demonstrated this through our proposals submitted in this respect at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly where, perhaps for the first time in history, consensus was reached on these important questions with the direct participation of all interested countries. It is a matter of course that such a solution must be based on reciprocity, equality and undiminished security of any of the participants.

It is therefore obvious that with regard to the reduction and, even more so, the elimination of whole classes of nuclear weapons in Europe, verification issues are assuming a qualitatively new importance from the point of view of the observance of future agreements. Indeed, in these conditions verification truly becomes one of the most important means of safeguarding security. We therefore advocate that the strictest possible measures be worked out in this area in the future with the understanding, of course, that we shall not be interested in verification for the sake of verification but in the verification of the fulfilment of obligations assumed by the two parties at all stages of nuclear disarmament.

This applies also to the singularly important task of agreeing upon the ban on nuclear-weapon testing: few other issues now command so much attention. This was demonstrated particularly during the 568 days of the Soviet moratorium, that resolute act of responsibility and good will which went as far as was possible. This remains valid now, when this opportunity is still open, and when, due to the moratorium, practical evidence has been supplied to attest the highest reliability of verification procedures, whose further improvement is one of the matters to be addressed by this Conference. It is thus high time that the Conference exerted much more energetic efforts to prepare an overall treaty. It is high time it agreed upon the mandate of the appropriate negotiating body and proceeded to concrete solution of the outstanding questions.

We expect from the Conference much more intensive endeavours also in the sphere relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. An analysis of the legal régime pertaining to outer space is being conducted at present. In our opinion, such analysis can be useful only if it produces as soon as possible practical conclusions on measures preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space. First of all, there should be a ban on anti-satellite weapons and offensive space systems. Their definition can be agreed upon at this forum. It is also possible to set up an international inspectorate that would verify that no weapons are placed on space installations, as is proposed

by the Soviet Union. We are convinced that an energetic solution of those issues by the Conference would be greatly instrumental in the pursuit of the goals of star peace, which also constitutes a way towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. We believe that it would also enhance constructive effort to find a realistic solution to the problem of the so-called space defences, as embodied primarily in the SDI project pursued by the United States.

CD/PV.406

pp.11-15

USSR/Nazarkin

16.4.87 CW,BW

The Soviet Union attaches primary importance to questions of verification of compliance with disarmament agreements. At a time when real disarmament measures are under way, verification becomes one of the major means of ensuring security, as Comrade Chnoupek rightly pointed out in his statement today.

We note with satisfaction that our initiatives on verification, along with other countries' proposals, have made it possible to remove many obstacles to the elaboration of a mutually acceptable system of verifying compliance with the convention. These Soviet initiatives took into account the concerns of our partners in the negotiations, including the United States and other Western countries. In so doing we, among other things, wanted to dispel the mistrust on the part of the West, to invite its representatives to an open and honest dialogue on effective international verification. We note the positive ideas on a number of aspects of a future verification system expressed by the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Indonesia and other countries.

The problem of challenge inspections is now the central political problem in the negotiations on a CW ban. It runs through the entire convention and without a solution to this problem it is difficult to envisage a finalization of many of the convention's provisions.

We note with satisfaction that discussion of a ban on chemical weapons with the United Kingdom during the recent visit to Moscow by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher revealed that the positions of the two sides are close, and even coincide on some aspects, including challenge inspections. The British proposal, contained in document CD/715, is a basis for reaching compromise solutions and we believe maximum use should be made of it as a basis for an agreement.

In our view, the central point in the British proposal is the idea of the possibility of proposing alternative measures. This approach, we believe, will impart the necessary flexibility to the whole system of challenge inspections, and at the same time meets the general concern that challenge inspections should be an effective means of preventing and detecting breaches of the conventions's provisions.

We have noted that in the 7 April statement of the United States delegation it was announced that the United States no longer objects to discussing alternative measures. We welcome this change. At the same time, the United States continues to argue that alternative measures are unworkable in some cases, for example in cases of suspicion relating to concealed CW stocks. Ambassador Hansen said on 7 April: "It seems obvious that only inspection of the bunker will permit an inspector to determine whether or not

there are chemical weapons inside". He also asked the Soviet delegation to explain what alternatives could be used in such a case.

I can say the following in this connection. In our view, if concealed stocks are suspected, alternative measures providing a satisfactory answer can be found (if, naturally, full access is unfeasible). For one thing, one cannot exclude that the challenging State could be satisfied if provided by the challenged party with information allaying its concern. For another thing, it is well known that one of the characteristics of CW stocks is that they require systematic maintenance, monitoring of the condition of munitions and containers with chemical agents, and preventive and protective measures. CW storage facilities require ventilation systems, special sewerage, air filtering and waste water treatment installations, monitoring instruments, etc.

In this context, observation of a suspicious site from outside to detect activities relating to maintenance of CW stocks and the presence of systems for the protection of the maintenance personnel and the environment can be regarded as a possible alternative measure. Collection of air and effluent samples around the facility's perimeter and in the vicinity of treatment installations can provide definite information about whether or not CW stocks are present. On the face of it, one also cannot exclude the possibility of automatic sampling inside storage facilities. Such methods could be discussed in the negotiations. Possible alternative measures in each particular case may vary. It appears, therefore, that the challenged party will be able to find a way of proving compliance (if, of course, it has not violated the convention) even if it does not agree to let inspectors enter the bunker.

Of course, in the discussion of the idea of alternative measures the question arises as to what the procedure should be if the challenging party and the challenged party cannot come to an agreement on the procedure for inspection or resolve the disagreement in a way satisfactory to both parties. This is the so-called "last word" problem: in the final analysis, who should decide how the inspection should be conducted?

Some delegations believe that it is the challenging party which should have the "final say". We believe such a solution would be too simplistic and, in practice, it would not facilitate the joint search for an agreement and the resolution of a controversial situation. It would be much more appropriate to resolve this problem as envisaged in the British paper, which says that in the event that the challenging State considers the alternative measures proposed by the challenged state to be unsatisfactory, the obligation of the latter to convince the challenging state that it is in compliance with its obligations will continue to apply.

The inclusion of a provision in the convention to the effect that the "final say" on the inspection procedure should belong to the challenging State does not create conditions for a mutually acceptable solution, for the challenging party will thus have no interest in agreeing on alternative measures. After all, in such a case the challenging party will just have to wait until the time-frame for proposing and agreeing on alternatives expires, and then the inspection will go ahead according to its initial demand. Of course, under these circumstances there can be no serious negotiations on alternatives and the very idea of proposing such measures is called into question.

If it were accepted that challenge inspections are to be completely automatic in all cases, then we would achieve clarity in one respect only: a refusal to accept an inspection would mean violation of the convention. But such clarity can prove misleading, for the main question -- whether or not the suspected State has chemical weapons -- will remain unresolved. After all, this should be our task, and not the purely formal accusation against a State of violating any provision of the convention. In our view, such purely formal accusations, particularly if abused, may weaken the convention and undermine its authority.

In our view, in the event that it proves impossible to agree on alternative measures, all facts relevant to the matter and all proposals of the parties should be submitted for consideration to an international authority to be established under the convention which, having considered all the circumstances, would evaluate each party's case and would be in a position to decide that there is a case of non-compliance by a two-thirds majority. We believe that negotiating alternative measures in good faith should constitute one of the obligations under the convention.

One of the elements of challenge inspections is the question whether it would be appropriate to have in this mechanism a body which would decide whether a particular challenge is justified and whether the inspection should be carried out -- in other words, would act, as it were, as sort of a filter.

We appreciate the concern of those countries which are afraid that without a filter there would be a possibility for abuse of the right to make a challenge. Presumably, the Fact-Finding Panel proposed in the United States paper (CD/500) is meant to act as such a filter. One should think that it is hardly to be expected that a body which is so undemocratic in its composition and method of decision-making could have the support of the participants in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. We would prefer to have the Executive Council act as a "filter". At the same time, in the view of the Soviet delegation, the question as to whether or not there will be a "multilateral filter" in the Convention is not an essential issue. If the participants in the negotiations feel that the convention should not provide for any "filters" at all and that, as provided in the British paper, challenge inspections should be carried out by a technical secretariat without the Executive Council getting involved, we could consider such an arrangement as well, provided, of course, that all other issues relating to challenge inspections are resolved.

I would like to emphasize that, for the Soviet delegation, the fundamental point in the challenge inspection procedure, as, by the way, in all other elements of the convention, is the requirement of complete equality of the contracting parties, the absence of any discrimination against the socialist countries and the socialist form of property. We proceed from the belief that the procedure for making a challenge, conducting inspections and evaluating their results should put the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries in an equal position and give them equal rights and opportunities. Any departure from this provision, we are convinced, would lead to diminished security of the party treated in a discriminatory way.

Conditions are now favourable for a speedy elaboration of an international convention on a total and comprehensive CW ban. The necessary preconditions have been created for finding, this year, solutions to the

outstanding issues, taking into account the totality of the proposals made in the Conference on Disarmament. We share the assessment of the state of affairs at the negotiations made by Ambassador K. Hacene of Algeria in his statement of 2 April: "agreement has still to be reached on significant aspects of the future convention, but this should not deter us from our objective of concluding this instrument." Quite a number of countries have come out in favour of finalizing the convention this year, including Australia, the United Kingdom, Egypt, India, Kenya, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sri Lanka and others. The Soviet Union, together with other Warsaw Treaty member States, believes that the year 1987 can and must mark the beginning of general and complete chemical disarmament. The real opportunity to eliminate chemical weapons and remove the chemical threat to all mankind once and for all should not be missed.

Here I should like to express full agreement with Comrade Chnoupek's statement to the effect that a "dual" solution, involving the elimination of chemical weapons together with the build-up of binary weapons, is unacceptable. This approach of justifying the alleged deterrent nature of chemical weapons cannot fail to do serious harm to the negotiations.

I wish to refer today to one more question. Yesterday, the Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons, convened pursuant to the decision of the Second Review Conference, ended its work. That Convention, prepared in our forum in 1972, still remains the only real disarmament measure that has banned a whole class of weapons of mass destruction.

The work of the meeting was devoted to negotiating practical measures for building confidence among the States Parties to the Convention and developing co-operation in the peaceful use of the achievements of biology. Overall, we are satisfied with its results, although, in our view, the agreements could have been broader. Nevertheless, the results already achieved -- agreements on the exchange of information on the activities of a certain number of research centres, on mutual notification of unusual outbreaks of infectious diseases, on broadening contacts among scientists, on encouraging publication of the results of research -- will all contribute to building confidence among the Parties to the Convention and enhancing its effectiveness.

We intend to continue to work actively towards raising the authority of the Convention, in particular through strengthening its verification system with regard to compliance. Our proposals to this effect, inter alia on the elaboration of an appropriate additional protocol and a special conference for this purpose, as well as the proposals on extensive confidence-building measures and all-round development of international co-operation in the biological field, still stand and we invite other Parties to the Convention to continue the businesslike and productive dialogue.

CD/PV.406

pp.16-19

China/Fan Guoxiang

16.4.87

CW

The fundamental objective of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is to eliminate the threat to the people of the world posed by this type of detestable weapon. Therefore, the priority issue that should be addressed by the Convention is the elimination of all the existing stock-piles of chemical weapons and their production facilities. The States possessing chemical weapons are obliged to declare and destroy their stock-

piles and production facilities under international verification. In this regard I would like to welcome the compromise and flexibility displayed by some delegations on certain issues which have long been subjects of controversy. With respect to the order of destruction, the Chinese delegation has proposed that the most toxic and harmful chemical warfare agents be destroyed first so as to ensure the security of all States. It has further introduced the concept of "stockpile equivalent" and its calculating formula as a technical contribution to the early solution of the issues concerning the destruction. In view of its complex nature, this issue undoubtedly calls for further in-depth study and discussion. We hope that specific provisions on the destruction of chemical weapons and its verification acceptable to all parties can be worked out at an early date after further consultations and negotiations. Obviously, an appropriate settlement of the issue of destruction will have a favourable impact on the solution of other outstanding issues.

In the process of eliminating the existing chemical weapon stockpiles and their production facilities and after their total destruction, ways should also be found to prevent the production of new chemical weapons. While the States Parties enjoy the right to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for peaceful purposes, they also have the obligation not to use their chemicals for purposes prohibited by the convention. Therefore, the non-production of chemical weapons by the civil chemical industry is yet another important issue to be addressed by the future convention. This has a direct bearing on the States Parties' confidence in the convention and on its effectiveness. In recent years, a series of proposals and working papers on the issue of non-production put forward by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Australia respectively have been useful to the discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. After the inter-sessional consultations of last winter and the resumed meeting of last January, the Ad Hoc Committee has formulated, on a preliminary basis, lists of chemicals relevant to the convention and their verification régimes. Not long ago, the Ad Hoc Committee further deliberated the issues of the modality of revision of the lists, the frequency of inspections and spot checks. The discussions have resulted in the clarification of issues and the identification of differences and therefore are conducive to our future work. Now I would like to state the views of the Chinese delegation on the issue of non-production.

In our opinion, in order to ensure that civil chemical enterprises do not produce chemical weapons, the chemical enterprises of all States should accept international monitoring, including on-site inspections. The monitoring and verification measures should be effective, reasonable and feasible. By effective, we mean that measures should be sufficient to prevent enterprises from diverting chemicals for weapon purposes so as to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of the convention; by reasonable, we mean that the measures should not exceed certain necessary limits so as not to impair the legitimate interests of the enterprises or obstruct their management and development; by feasible, we mean that the measures should be acceptable to all States Parties and that their implementation does not require excessive human and financial resources. In a word, we should strive for the maximum verification effect with minimum cost.

Those basic ideas have been shared by many delegations during our deliberations. It is widely felt that only those facilities whose capacity is above a certain limit and may pose a risk to the objective of the convention

should be subject to international verification. It has also been agreed that those facilities producing and using the key precursors contained in the lists should be subject to international routine on-site inspections; whereas those facilities producing chemicals that have extensive civilian uses but that can also be used for chemical-weapon purposes may be subject to a data-reporting system.

To us, the following situation and factors should be taken into account when formulating specific inspection procedures and determining frequency of inspection of the facilities producing and using key precursors.

Firstly, key targets should be identified so as to avoid an overspread of resources to no avail. Verification should focus on those facilities that pose a greater threat to the objective of the convention because non-production verification covers many aspects as well as numerous facilities. In this way, we could enhance the efficiency of the inspection and improve its cost-effectiveness. To that end, negotiations should be conducted to agree on a "threshold value", taking into account the different chemicals. Data-reporting will be sufficient for the facilities which are below the "threshold value", as they only pose a negligible threat to the objective of the convention, and therefore, could be excluded from the scope of routine on-site inspection.

Secondly, the frequency and intensity of on-site inspection should be determined according to the relevant chemicals produced by the facilities as well as the characteristics of the facilities themselves. As for the chemicals produced by those facilities, their risk to the objective of the convention increases in direct proportion with the level of toxicity of the end products evolved and the closeness of being able to produce compounds prohibited by the convention, i.e. chemical warfare agents. As for the characterization of a facility, it comprises various factors. In order to facilitate the determination of frequency and intensity of inspections, the factors should be classified according to their respective importance, taking the principal one as the basis and the others as points of reference. Among the factors relating to the characteristics of those facilities which produce key precursors, the production capacity is the most crucial element, while for the facilities using key precursors, the consumption quantity is the key factor. Thus, we are of the view that in determining the frequency and intensity of inspections, the level of toxicity of end-products, the production capacity of the facilities and the quantity of consumption constitute the main elements.

Thirdly, due regard should be given to the legitimate interests of enterprises, and steps should be taken to protect commercial and technical confidentiality. This question involves several factors, including both the human factor (inspectors) and the technical factor. In carrying out inspections, efforts should concentrate on setting an appropriate scope, which would cover primarily those parts which are likely to be diverted for the purpose of weapon production rather than going into the technical details of the related enterprises. For enterprises producing key precursors, the scope of verification should be limited to the process which starts with immediately direct raw materials and ends with the output of the compounds concerned; as for enterprises using key precursors, the scope should only cover the sections involving the use of key precursors up to the formation of compounds unrelated to the convention, not the whole process of forming end-products.

With regard to facilities producing chemicals which are used extensively for civilian purposes and which at the same time could be used for weapons purposes, in view of their great number and the large quantity of chemical industrial products produced which do not pose a great threat to the objective of the convention, the data-reporting system should not be devised in an over-complicated manner so as to avoid placing an excessive burden on those enterprises. In certain cases, an enterprise may produce a compound in its production process relevant to the convention, but instead of being separated, the compound is immediately subject to the next step of chemical reaction which would result in a chemical product not prohibited by the convention. In this case, the enterprise would not be required to report the relevant data, for such a declaration would be unfeasible owing to the fact that the intermediate chemical substance thus formed is not separated, measured or stockpiled.

Opinions still differ among various parties on the issue of a "spot check" for facilities covered by the data-reporting system. In our view, as most of the chemicals produced by those facilities are the raw materials of key precursors, the provisions of an effective verification régime governing the facilities producing or using key precursors would suffice to a large extent in forestalling chemical enterprises from producing chemical weapons. Of course, this issue is still open to discussion before a satisfactory solution is arrived at.

In spite of the difficulties involved with the issue of verification of non-production, due to its complexity, we still believe that through our common endeavours a régime which is both effective and not detrimental to the legitimate interests of chemical enterprises could be worked out. Compared with the verification of non-production, challenge inspection stands out as an even more difficult task, because the former only relates to routine inspections under normal conditions, while the latter relates to inspections of a special nature under exceptional circumstances. Up to now, the divergence over challenge inspection has shown little sign of narrowing. It is our hope that with consultations and negotiations in various forms and through different channels, a breakthrough will result on this key issue so as to remove a major obstacle in the way to the convention.

At the present stage of negotiations, the destruction of chemical weapons, the verification of non-production and challenge inspection are the major outstanding issues which call for priority attention. Apart from these, however, some other important issues remain to be addressed, one of which being that of definition. In the course of our negotiations, the Chinese delegation and some other delegations have felt that the definition of chemical weapons as it stands now is deficient and easily leads to conceptual confusions. Therefore, it needs to be further examined. For that purpose, we stand ready to engage in consultations and discussions with other delegations in order to find an appropriate solution.

CD/PV.406

p.25

Pakistan/Ahmad

16.4.87

CTB

For many years the question of verification was used as an argument to postpone the negotiation of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. This argument can no longer be accepted. There are today no technical or scientific obstacles to a verifiable ban. We welcome the readiness expressed by the Soviet Union to accept the strictest possible verification, including on-site inspection, making use of all achievements in seismology. The Group of Scientific Experts has done commendable work in laying the groundwork for the establishment of a reliable international seismic monitoring network for the verification of a test-ban. It is particularly heartening to note from the Group's latest report that it has made remarkable progress towards the design and testing of an international data exchange system based on a network of seismic stations in different parts of the world.

CD/PV.408

p.6

India/Natwar Singh

23.4.87

CTB

At first we were told that lack of adequate verification capability constituted an obstacle in the way of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Even though we have never been convinced by the validity of this argument, we gave it serious consideration. In full cognizance of the technical requirements, and confident that they possessed the requisite and technical expertise and geographic spread to be able to verify compliance with the moratorium, the Six Nations offered their good offices to facilitate effective verification of such a moratorium. Any remaining doubts due to ambiguity in interpretation of monitored data etc. could, moreover, have been taken care of by mutual on-site inspections.

CD/PV.408

pp.17-19

Australia/Butler

23.4.87

CW

Informal consultations in the Conference are focusing at present on the issue of challenge inspection. I think it would be widely agreed that this is an issue that needs to be resolved urgently and satisfactorily so that we can move forward towards the goal of a universal convention. I would like to make a couple of comments on the issue of challenge inspection.

Our approach, the Australian approach, is that such a system is required, that it should be in the Convention. We believe that it should be a mandatory system, but we believe that its application should be at the point of last resort. That should be its main characteristic. The question of the problem of so-called frivolous use of a system of challenge inspection seems to be causing fairly widespread concern. We believe that one should keep this issue carefully in perspective. Let me try and illustrate what I mean.

Surely these are the facts. The basic obligations of the Convention are of fundamental importance. There will be a clear difference between a State which decides to join this Convention and one which does not. Surely, as in other similar treaties, each State will be faced with a choice. Do you want to ban chemical weapons or not?

Having made that choice, and such State will immediately assume some fundamental obligations, and those obligations will be immediately verified. They will have to declare any stockpile they have. Those stockpiles will have to be destroyed, and verification of their destruction made effective. They will have to accept a continuing routine of inspection of the relevant industry to ensure that new supplies of chemical weapons are not produced.

Those are the fundamental obligations, and surely it will be a matter of great importance to see the difference between States that enter into those obligations and those that do not. My point here is that there is some room for good faith in this area, because it is significant to undertake these obligations as against declining to do so. And an element of good faith should be extended to those who have done so as against those who have not.

Further, the Convention itself will surely nurture that good faith and the confidence that is basic to any universal arms control régime. As parties to the Convention increase in number, and our experience grows in applying the daily and routine systems of inspection to ensure that the obligations of the Convention are being fulfilled, so should confidence in the Convention increase.

Now I said that from my delegation's point of view we accept the need for mandatory challenge inspection. Why, in the light of what I have just said about the fundamental obligations of that continuing régime, should this be necessary? Because we must entertain the possibility that, at some stage, there may be a person, a State from within the convention which would try to avoid its obligations -- what someone else has referred to as the possibility of either an evil person or a mad person seeking to avoid obligations that have been entered into.

Under such circumstances the system of challenge inspection, under which such an eventuality could be brought to notice, would be required. But the development of that system has been questioned on the grounds that it may be open to frivolous use. While this is always possible, that is, the so-called mad person or evil person acting against the system, I think that our concern about that possibility should be kept in its correct perspective. It should not be allowed to come to dominate the other major issues of the Convention.

We should not allow ourselves to enter into a situation in which, when one person calls for a law that says "Thou shall not kill", someone else points out that it may be broken from time to time, and someone may get killed. If the answer to that situation is to decide not to have a law that says "Thou shall not kill", the exceptions would be allowed to dominate the fundamental principle. This should not occur.

The way of solving this problem in challenge inspection -- and this is the proposal that we would be grateful if others would consider -- is to consider what rules of evidence need to be developed, what body of practice needs to be agreed, so as to ensure that it would not be sufficient for a State to say "I challenge you", but would have to say "I have evidence that this happened, at this place, on that day. I want to look at it."

Such rules of evidence are common in other fields of law, and could be developed with benefit here. All that that would require is the existence of a body which could ensure quickly that the rules of evidence had been properly applied.

CD/PV.408

pp.22-27

USA/Hansen

23.4.87

BW,CTB,
CW

My delegation wishes to recognize the success of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention experts meeting which concluded its work on April 15th. This meeting resulted in the elaboration of modalities for measures, agreed in the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the parties to this Convention, to support and strengthen the norm against biological weapons. My delegation congratulates the distinguished experts who participated in this meeting, as well as Dr. Bo Rybeck and the entire Swedish delegation, for providing the leadership at the expert level which resulted in its successful completion. It is also appropriate to thank Ambassador Winfred Lang of Austria for providing political oversight.

The United States will fully implement and abide by the modalities developed by this meeting to increase transparency with respect to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We expect no less from all other States parties.

As members of this body are, without doubt, aware, from 13 to 15 April, the United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, carried out important discussions with leaders of the Soviet Union in Moscow. These discussions were not limited to arms control issues; they covered a broad range of issues including human rights, regional issues (such as the continued occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet Military forces), economic matters and bilateral relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union.

To a great extent, these are confidential discussions between two sovereign States which are not appropriately dealt with in a public forum. Nevertheless, I would like today to discuss to the extent possible issues relating to arms reduction which are relevant to the work of this body. In Moscow, the key elements for an agreement on removing all long-range intermediate nuclear forces from Europe were discussed and much progress was made. The basic structure of such an agreement would be the formula discussed between President Reagan and the General Secretary Gorbachev at Reykjavik; that is, 100 long-range warheads on SS-20 missiles would be allowed on the Soviet side in Asia, and 100 warheads on similar United States systems would be allowed in the United States.

It is important to note that the United States continues to advocate the complete elimination of this class of weapons. Because the Soviet Union has not been prepared to agree on this basis, the United States has reluctantly agreed to a reduction of such systems to 100 warheads on either side.

The reductions involved in the agreement would take place over a four-to-five-year period. Both the Soviet Union and the United States appear to agree on the need for very strict and intrusive measures of verification.

On nuclear testing, a subject of importance to the Conference on Disarmament, the United States continues to believe that the first order of business is the negotiation of improved means of verification for the 1974 and 1976 treaties limiting underground nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons or less. In Moscow, both sides agreed that accurate measurement and verification of nuclear test yields is an important matter requiring resolution. The Soviet Union advocates seismic means for such verification, while the United States believes on-site measurement by a method known as Cortex is the most effective method. At the next round of the bilateral nuclear testing experts meeting, to be held next month here in Geneva, experts will address this subject. One suggestion which we anticipate will be discussed is the idea of each side conducting nuclear tests at the other's test sites.

With regard to the work of this body, my delegation has taken note of the desire expressed by several members to establish an ad hoc committee on the first agenda item. I would therefore repeat what I said on 24 February: it is the position of my Government that the nuclear testing issue is closely linked to reductions in nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, the United States delegation believes it is time to engage in the legitimate work of this committee on the basis of an appropriate non-negotiating mandate. And, of course, the United States supports the work being conducted by the Conference's Group of Scientific Experts. They are, in our view, to be congratulated for their work dealing with exchanges of seismological data.

Yesterday was the 72nd anniversary of the first time poison gas was used in warfare. The United States of America deplors the use of chemical weapons in the prolonged war between Iran and Iraq. This tragic state of affairs appears to be duplicated in Kampuchea, where chemical weapons used by the Vietnamese are said to have killed nearly 1,000 civilians. The continued use of chemical weapons demonstrates that an arms control agreement, such as the 1925 Geneva Protocol, cannot rest on solemn vows. In any future chemical weapons ban, there must be legally binding agreements which serve as enforcing mechanisms, which deter States from acquiring such weapons by making the political price of their acquisition too high, and which provide assurance to all States that all other States are in total compliance with the commitments and obligations undertaken. The key to compliance lies in verification.

Secretary Shultz, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and their advisers also discussed the negotiations on a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons being conducted in this Conference. They noted that the United States has facilities for destroying chemical weapons and that the Soviet Union is constructing such a facility. Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed to have experts visit each other's sites to observe destruction procedures as one step in improving confidence between the States

with the largest chemical weapons capabilities. We welcome this move as well as the statement of the distinguished head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Nazarkin, in which he stated a desire to dispel mistrust on the part of the West.

In this context, I am pleased, on behalf of the Government of the United States, to invite Ambassador Nazarkin and appropriate Soviet experts to visit the United States chemical weapons destruction facility in Tooele, Utah. This visit would include a visit to a chemical weapons bunker. We suggest this visit be conducted during the week of 19 October this year.

My delegation has also noted the announcement by General Secretary Gorbachev that the Soviet Union has ceased the production of chemical weapons. We make the assumption that in ceasing production, open-air testing of agent stocks and the filling of agents into munitions has also been halted.

These actions now being taken by the Soviet Union were taken in 1969 by the United States on a unilateral basis. One need not be well schooled in mathematics to figure out how much agent the Soviet Union could have produced in the 18 or so years which have elapsed since the United States last produced chemical agents. It is also clear that recently manufactured chemical weapons would be technologically more advanced than those produced approximately 20 years ago.

These are some of the considerations which have led the United States Government to reach the decision to modernize its own chemical weapons capability.

Nevertheless, the United States remains committed to reaching an agreement which would lead to the destruction of all the world's chemical warfare capability, ridding humanity of the scourge of these horrible weapons for all time. Such a convention would require agreement on the type of effective verification régime which would both deter violations and provide confidence that commitments freely undertaken were being compiled with.

There now appears to be wider recognition in the Conference that effective verification means that doubts about a State's compliance with an agreement must be dealt with through on-site inspection. No one questions that, in the case of allegations of use and doubts about declared locations and facilities, challenge inspections would result in an on-site inspection. There is also movement toward acceptance of similar provisions for making on-site inspection of undeclared production facilities mandatory when a challenge inspection request is made. These are, in the view of my delegation, positive developments which we will study carefully.

In recent days, some discussions has taken place about the utility of alternative measures in dealing with challenge inspections related to undeclared stocks. My delegation has asked how any measure short of entering a bunker could provide assurance that the bunker did not contain chemical munitions. On 16 April, Ambassador Nazarkin attempted to provide an answer. My delegation will of course study the ideas he presented. Nevertheless, air sampling would show that the devices being used did not detect chemicals in the air -- nothing more. Moreover, I would note that the external configuration of a facility may help to define the possible uses of that

facility, but it does not define the internal contents. In addition, I would like to observe that storage facilities for chemical weapons stocks in the United States do not always have "ventilation systems, special sewerage and air filtering and waste water treatment installations", of which Ambassador Nazardin spoke. When he visits our facility in Utah we will be able to demonstrate this fact. All of this leads back to the basic fact that observation of a facility from outside provides no assurance that it does not contain chemical weapons. In a political sense, it seems clear that denying entry completely to the bunker would result in an assumption that it actually contains forbidden materials.

My delegation is not opposed to consideration of alternative measures within the time period allowed before an actual inspection is to commence. Our study and analysis, however, has not led us to discover any suitable alternative to access. And any alternative measure which may warrant consideration must not be used to delay the conduct of an inspection.

In this connection, I would note that general opinion now favours the immediate dispatch of an inspection team to the site to be inspected at the time the challenge inspection request is made. My delegation will also give this recent development its close attention. Similarly, we note a growing trend not to insert any institutional involvement between the inspection request and the conduct of an inspection. The United States position is that a fact-finding panel to deal with the possibility of frivolous inspection requests is necessary, but if the Conference moves toward having no filter at all between the request and the inspection, we shall also give this issue careful study.

No difficulty exists in agreeing with the basic premise voiced by the Soviet delegation on 16 April to the effect that there is a requirement for complete equality of obligation among the States parties to an agreement. I assume that all participants here share that view. The 3 April 1986 amendment to document CD/500 introduced by the United States delegation was intended to reaffirm this principle.

CD/PV.408

pp.29-31

USSR/Nazarkin

23.4.87

CTB,CW

The distinguished Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Hansen, who spoke before me, raised the issue of verification, particularly the Cortex method. As United States experts themselves recognize, this hydrodynamic method proposed by the United States for determining the magnitude of nuclear explosions does not provide measurement of the required accuracy. It allows for a high probability of error -- of the order of 30 per cent -- and it is virtually useless for measuring small explosions. We believe that a more reliable method -- and this was noted in Ambassador Hansen's statement -- is the seismic method of verification. We have put forward relevant proposals in this regard. We have proposed in particular a joint experiment at the State level using seismic equipment on Soviet and American testing sites to follow up the initiative taken by United States and Soviet scientists. The parties could exchange the results obtained from this experiment. We do not exclude the possibility of conducting a United States nuclear explosion on a Soviet testing site and a Soviet explosion on a United States testing site, which was

also mentioned in Ambassador Hansen's statement. After the seismic methods of verification have been tested as we suggest, the experts could hold talks to compare the effectiveness of these two methods.

Comrade President, may I dwell on a number of issues in connection with the statement we heard today from Ambassador Hansen on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

I listened with interest to his views on alternative measures that could be applied to identify secret stockpiles. These views will undoubtedly be studied by our experts. As I see it, a dialogue regarding alternative measures is very promising from the view point of finding a solution to the problem of challenge inspection. I also noted the flexibility of the United States delegation regarding the fact-finding panel. We welcome the United States delegation's reaffirmation of the principle of equality of obligations for all States parties to the convention. This is important, as previous United States proposals created considerable difficulties in this connection. As regards the United States representative's invitation to Soviet experts to visit the United States chemical weapon destruction facility in Tooele, Utah, in October this year, we are grateful for the invitation; we shall carefully consider it and shall be replying in due course.

CD/PV.409

p.6

GDR/Rose

28.4.87

CTB

On behalf of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, I would like to introduce today a working paper, based on document CD/743, which contains some additional suggestions as to what that subsidiary body should concern itself with. In fact, the document could function as a guideline for a systematic, goal-oriented exchange of views and for negotiations. It reflects both relevant proposals tabled at the Conference and new ideas advanced by various delegations. The text is at your disposal under reference number CD/746.

The first part of the paper deals with the contents and scope of a nuclear-test ban. All test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States should be prohibited in all environments and for all time. No party should cause, encourage or in any way participate in the conduct of nuclear-weapon tests. Appropriate ways and means must be found to rule out circumvention of a nuclear-test ban by nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Part two of the paper addresses possible means of verification, such as seismic and other national technical means, including remote sensing, and on-site inspection. In addition, a number of suggestions are made regarding the exchange of seismic data -- suggestions which, in my delegation's view, require further detailed and in-depth discussion or which have already been taken up by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

The third and final part of the working paper contains some observations on the necessary procedures for consultation and co-operation.

The United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 41/47 urged the Conference on Disarmament to commence practical work on a nuclear-test ban treaty at the beginning of its 1987 session. It also urged the Conference to take immediate steps for the establishment with the widest possible participation, of an international seismic monitoring network to make it possible to monitor and verify the effective implementation of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty. All this goes to underline the urgent need to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty coupled with appropriate and effective verification measures. In this area the delegation of Zaire once again warmly welcomes the decision of the Chinese Government to participate in the work of the ad hoc committee if it is established.

Pakistan has always supported a comprehensive, effective, verifiable and equitable ban on chemical weapons, and is therefore gratified at the progress which is being made in the negotiations taking place under item 4 of our agenda. At the same time, we also realize that the conclusion of such a convention would not by itself rid the world of the chemical weapons threat. If universal adherence is too ambitious a target to aspire to in the short term, the importance at least of all countries possessing chemical weapons stocks or chemical weapons capabilities becoming parties to the Convention at an early date can hardly be over-emphasized. As long as such countries remain outside the Convention, those which neither possess chemical weapons nor have the intention of acquiring them would continue to feel threatened, and might justifiably be reluctant to assume the obligations of a State party. Unless something is done about this dilemma, a considerable number of the latter category of States may thus not be in a position to adhere to the convention.

There is another scenario that presents a similar problem. This would arise if a State party acted in violation of its obligations. In such an event, any other State party which felt threatened as a result could feel compelled to withdraw from the Convention in order to acquire a deterrent capability of its own. Such an act could in turn lead to the withdrawal of other States, thus subjecting the chemical weapons prohibition régime to a degree of strain which it might not be able to withstand.

The problems I have just referred to do not admit of any easy solution. Yet we feel that if appropriate provisions are included in the Convention, a lot could be done to enhance incentives for States to adhere to it and to reduce pressures on a State to withdraw from it because it feels threatened by the chemical weapons capability of another State. This could be achieved in two ways: firstly, by assurances that a State party which feels exposed to a chemical weapons threat will be able to count on assistance from other States parties in resisting that threat; and secondly, by effective sanctions against a State which is the source of a chemical weapons threat to other States.

While we recognize that both these ways of approaching the problem -- assistance to the threatened State and sanctions against the State which is the source of the threat -- are in a certain sense interrelated, it is the

former, perhaps the less difficult of the two, which is the subject of the proposal made by Pakistan in document CD/752. Article X of the draft Convention already provides us with the necessary framework.

Our proposal is based on the premise that the existence of a chemical weapons threat anywhere in the world would jeopardize the viability of the CW Convention. It should therefore be a matter of concern for all States which have a stake in the preservation of the Convention, and calls for an appropriate response from them in the form of assistance to the threatened State.

If States are assured that by becoming parties to the Convention they would be able to rely on effective assistance from other States parties in the event of a chemical weapons threat, the incentives for adhering to the Convention would be substantially increased. Similarly, if States which have become parties to the Convention can depend on the support of other States parties in meeting a chemical weapons threat, the pressures to withdraw from the Convention in order to match the chemical weapons capability of an adversary would be considerably reduced.

Besides promoting the universality and viability of the Convention, effective provisions on assistance would by themselves have a deterrent effect upon States which might be considering the production or acquisition of chemical weapons or contemplating their use. If a State still undertakes the production or acquisition of chemical weapons or resorts to their use, an authoritative finding by the Executive Council to this effect would be of great political value. In addition, the assistance which the Executive Council or individual States might extend to the threatened State would hopefully enable it to cope with the situation which it faces.

The language proposed by Pakistan for article X is contained in the annex to document CD/752. It builds on the assistance provisions contained in two earlier multilaterally negotiated conventions, namely the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and the ENMOD Convention of 1977. Our proposal seeks to expand and strengthen these provisions, keeping in view the differences in the subject-matter of these three agreements. Relatively few States, it is believed, had biological weapons programmes at the time of the conclusion of the BW Convention, and instances of use of these weapons in the past have been infrequent. Similarly, environmental modification techniques have apparently not been employed on the scale that that Convention prohibits. As against this, the chemical weapons threat is much more serious. These weapons have often been used in this century, and exist today in the arsenals of an increasing number of States. In view of these considerations, we feel that assistance provisions of the kind contained in the BW and ENMOD conventions would not be adequate for a chemical weapons convention, unless they are considerably improved upon.

Under our proposal, the threatened State would be able to call for assistance not only against another State party but also any other State whose activities present a threat to the objectives of the Convention. Such a request would be addressed to the Executive Council, which would in the first instance undertake a factual determination as to whether the requesting State faced a chemical weapons threat. In carrying out this task, the Executive

Council would have the power to initiate an investigation or inquiry, including on-site inspection. In the event of a finding that the requesting State did face a chemical weapons threat, the Executive Council would also be obliged to decide on concrete measures of assistance to the threatened State including, in particular, assistance in protective measures. The precise nature and modalities of the assistance to be given would be for the Executive Council to decide in each individual case, depending on the circumstances. In addition to any collective action which the Executive Council might undertake, individual States would also be in a position to assist the requesting State once the Executive Council had determined that it faced a chemical weapons threat.

Besides the assistance which a State party might request and obtain in the face of an actual threat, the Consultative Committee would be entrusted with the task of initiating assistance programmes to enable interested States to develop a protective capability of their own. Furthermore, individual States would assume the obligation to encourage the free exchange and transfer among States parties of equipment, material and scientific and technological information relating to protection against chemical weapons.

We believe that the proposal contained in document CD/752 is both necessary and realistic. The obligation of providing assistance which States parties would assume would not, in our opinion, be too onerous considering the advantages that would accrue from it for the Convention. These advantages can be summarized in three words: universality, viability and effectiveness.

My delegation welcomes the fact that the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons envisages the commencement of work on article X during the 1987 session. It is our hope that, when this article is taken up, our proposal will receive consideration from other delegations.

CD/PV.409

pp.16-20

France/Morel

28.4.87

CW

In recent weeks the question of negotiating a convention banning chemical weapons has been the subject of a number of major statements that my delegation has studied with keen interest. Eager to attach all due importance to this discussion, France has produced a number of proposals on the non-production of chemical weapons, notably with a view to creating a Scientific Council. Today we would like to make one or two remarks on three points that we believe crucial to the negotiations: the destruction of stocks, the procedure of challenge inspection and the crucial question of security stocks.

First of all, with regard to the destruction of stocks, my delegation noted with interest the statement made here on 14 April by the representative of the Soviet Union concerning the proposals put forward on this project in Prague on 10 April by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Mr. Gorbachev stated that "as far as stocks of chemical weapons are concerned, the Soviet Union has started building a special plant to destroy them". My delegation welcomes this step in the direction desired by all because it deals with a practical aspect of the destruction of existing stocks, an essential element of any agreement providing for a complete ban. We think it would be all the more useful to hear from the Soviet delegation certain clarifications on the following points:

The first question deals with the relationship between the provisions of the draft convention concerning the starting of the process of eliminating chemical weapons on the one hand, and the commissioning of the destruction plant envisaged in the Soviet proposal on the other. More specifically, the draft convention provides that each State party should begin destroying its stocks of chemical weapons a certain number of months (yet to be decided) after the entry into force of the Convention. This time span is therefore relatively short. On the other hand, the Soviet statement indicates that a possibly fairly lengthy period will be necessary for the construction of a disposal plant. Therefore there is a risk that this plant might not be ready to operate when required. There is a possible time lag here, and we would like to have further information about this point.

The same query is also valid for the annual destruction capacity of the facility concerned. The draft convention, as we know, specifies a destruction period spread over 10 years. In this connection the Soviet representative stated here on 5 March that each year each State party should eliminate each year a ninth of its stocks in each of the existing categories. Therefore we think that the additional information concerning the ways and means of operating this destruction facility should lead the Soviet delegation to provide details of the volume that the USSR would have to destroy, and also the annual destruction capacity it thinks it will have to have.

The fact is that we have only very recently received indirect and very incomplete information with regard to the very existence of Soviet chemical weapons stocks. Hence the recent Soviet announcements concerning destruction give us an opportunity to get down to specifics in this fundamental aspect of the convention. It seems to us desirable that all countries participating in the negotiations should be in a position to assess the future relationship between the disposal plant and the stocks themselves. The bilateral Soviet-United States exchange visits proposed recently cannot serve as an adequate source of information for the entire international community.

The question of challenge inspection has recently been the subject of very useful exchanges of views, and we have noted with a great deal of interest the comments that have been submitted to the Conference on this subject. On the basis of the position my country has already set out on several occasions when giving its full backing to document CD/715 submitted by the United Kingdom, we would like to present today one or two comments of a practical nature with regard to the conduct of such inspections.

Generally speaking, we feel that it could be useful to inject a little method into our work, and to that end differentiate between three successive phases that would raise different problems: initiation of the inspection, the inspection process itself, and the final report and results phase.

First of all, we consider -- and it seems to us that agreement could be reached on this -- that all States parties should be able to activate the challenge inspection procedure. Any intervention by a collective body at the beginning of the procedure would in our view create more problems than it would solve. Obviously we cannot overlook the risk of an improper request for inspection: this is a real difficulty but introducing a screening mechanism

would run the risk of weighing down a procedure which is designed to be rapid. The process itself will quickly show whether or not the procedure has been abused. Therefore we think that the question of abuse of procedure is a subsidiary matter.

The second phase, the process of inspection proper, is obviously crucial and therefore demands special attention. Two concerns should guide the conduct of this process. First of all, we must constantly bear in mind the trigger, in other words the crisis of confidence between two States as regards respect for the Convention. The primary purpose of challenge inspection is clear: to restore confidence as soon as possible. Secondly, this initiative is of a serious nature because it reflects the concern of the requesting State as regards the chemical safety and because it could lead to the application of the Convention by one or several States being called into question.

The procedure must therefore be activated and organized between two partners, with the assistance of the corps of inspectors. Within a short time, these should be in a position to halt the procedure if it proves inapplicable, or else to pursue the procedure to completion, in the form of a full and objective report, either by means of direct access to the plant itself or by alternative means.

In any event the requested country remains obliged to satisfy the requesting country. This does not involve what may seem the improper exercise of a sort of privilege, but stems from the obligation for full respect that has been entered into by all States parties.

While observance of the Convention and its corollary, that is to say the restoration of confidence, may not be modified, its implementation may be adapted to circumstances. This is the purpose of the alternative measures: far from offering a loophole, these are other means of arriving at the same result as an alternative to direct inspection, which obviously is still the simplest solution.

We think it is desirable to envisage the maximum number of realistic possibilities as regards alternative measures in order to assess the role these alternative measures could play in the dialogue between the two States. But it seems neither possible nor desirable to codify them in the body of the Convention in circumstances that could rapidly become obsolete or prove too rigid.

The third and last phase deals with the report of the inspectors, and more generally speaking the outcome of talks between the requesting State and the requested State. In every case the report of the inspectors will be passed to the Executive Council, which will have the task of evaluating its findings. We believe that at this stage it is too early to spell out how the Executive Council may act. This being the case, any intervention in the procedure by the institutional bodies set up under the Convention should occur at this stage and not before.

But it must be quite clear that whatever the final outcome of the report and the contacts between the requesting and requested countries, it remains the duty of the later to respect the Convention strictly.

I have indicated the major importance that my delegation attaches to the question of security stocks, and I would like to make one or two remarks on this topic. Generally speaking we start from the idea that the destruction of existing stocks and production facilities is a lengthy undertaking, one that is technically complex and financially costly. It has been agreed during the course of negotiations that this would be spread over a period of 10 years. This period would be in fact the first phase in the implementation of the convention. Its proper functioning would be a pre-condition for the next phase: it is clear that the definitive régime of the Convention -- that is to say the total elimination of stocks and their non-reconstitution -- would enter into effect in the second phase only if the first phase had been completed satisfactorily.

The purpose of this 10-year first phase is to bring the effective chemical weapon capacities of all States to the attention of parties to the Convention and allow the verification of the data supplied; to define ways and means and phases for reducing the levels of chemical weapons over the 10-year period; and to test the effectiveness and compliance with the Convention of the concrete proposals actually implemented by the States over this period so as to move progressively towards the objective set for the end of the 10-year period -- the complete elimination of stocks and production facilities.

Since it goes without saying that this Convention will not encroach in any way on the rights and obligations of each State party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 under that Protocol, the use of chemical weapons will obviously remain prohibited during the 10-year period under the conditions stipulated in international law. Nevertheless, this period will give rise to a new situation from the point of view of the security of the States parties, one which must be considered with the greatest care.

It is important to guarantee not only the future security of signatories once stocks have been totally eliminated, but also their immediate security during the 10-year period. However, the issue of maintaining security during this period has not yet been the subject of the detailed debate which is necessary in order that consensus should be established in this area.

In August 1985 France submitted a contribution to discussion on this subject (document CD/630) which elaborated on the concept of balance in security, through the maintenance, over the 10-year period, of a genuine balance which will preserve the security of the States parties. In view of the extreme quantitative and qualitative disproportion in existing stocks, the application of a more or less linear system of destruction could lead only to increased insecurity right from the very beginning of the 10-year period for countries with only limited stocks, compared with States that have very large stocks. Consequently, the French paper CD/630 introduced the concept of security stocks that States would be authorized to hold right to the end of the 10-year period.

I would add that the concept of security stocks does not concern only States that declare chemical weapons stocks in the 30 days following the entry into force of the Convention. All States have an interest in maintaining the balance. If balance is not assured -- or if it is jeopardized either gradually or abruptly, for instance if one of the States parties withdraws from the Convention or refuses to proceed further with the elimination of

remaining stocks -- the security of all the States parties could be threatened. We therefore hope that the Conference will look in detail at this aspect of the Convention, and we will shortly be presenting proposals to this end.

CD/PV.410

pp.8-9

Poland/Turbanski

30.4.87

CW

BW

In our opinion the situation is much more complex with regard to the area of non-production. It seems that the most crucial question bearing on the possibilities of tangible progress is an agreement on relevant threshold production quantities for facilities producing chemicals belonging to categories 2, 3 and 4. The first steps in this direction have already been made. Further progress depends now on an active and constructive approach by all the delegations, without exception.

One of the outstanding issues is that of model agreements between the International Authority and States parties concerned. The concept of such agreements was very usefully considered during this session, but a lot of strenuous work remains to be done. However, the solution of some problems associated with model agreements is hardly possible without precise knowledge of relevant facilities. Though the experience of IAEA might be used to some extent in working out a model agreement, we should not forget the very specific characteristics of the chemical industry.

The series of informal discussions on the concept and procedure of challenge inspection, organized by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, was, we feel, a useful exercise. Together with some plenary statements, especially by the USSR and the United States delegations, it contributed to better comprehension of different positions and demonstrated more clearly points of common understanding.

Many proposals on this subject were put forward by the delegations. They have to be closely examined by the Committee or by the relevant working group. Many delegations, including my own, consider the United Kingdom proposals very interesting and useful, especially the idea of alternative measures. Like every new idea, it has to be developed and then evaluated again on the basis of its own merits.

That is why we would appeal to those delegations who at this stage are not prepared to engage in elaboration of possible alternative measures to join common efforts toward developing the idea, which we believe might help to identify a solution to the problem of challenge inspection.

With regard to the structure and functions of the Consultative Committee there is, in our opinion, a prevailing realistic approach on the part of the delegations.

As has already been pointed out by some speakers, an encouraging development has taken place with regard to the strengthening of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons. In pursuance of a decision of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention, the Meeting of

Scientific and Technical Experts has worked out modalities for the exchange of information and data on research centres and laboratories, outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins, as well as the promotion of peaceful co-operation in the field of biological research.

My delegation welcomes the results achieved, though in our opinion the scope of the exchange of international and other measures could have been broader.

Nevertheless, we share the opinion that an important step has been made toward building up confidence among States parties and enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention.

We hope that further steps toward strengthening verification procedures in the Convention will be taken in the near future. Appropriate proposals in this respect were made by the socialist countries during both the second Review Conference and the Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts.

CD/PV.410

pp.10-15

Canada/Beesley

30.4.87 CTB,CW

OS

In asking for the floor today Mr. President, I did not do so for the purpose of conducting an overview of the kind we have heard with interest today, but rather simply to report on a workshop relating to seismic verification which took place in Canada last year, and to give advance information on another workshop which I have already mentioned concerning outer space which will be held in the middle of May in Montreal. The workshops have one point in common: they relate to verification of eventual agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control, which is an extremely high priority for the Government of Canada. I would also make a brief reference to some very concrete verification issues relating to our negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, on which Canada is also doing some extremely practical research.

On the first subject, I would like to introduce a working paper relating to item 1 (Nuclear test ban), reporting on the proceedings of a workshop hosted by Canada on waveform data exchange last October in Ottawa.

On a number of occasions I have emphasized in this forum the importance that Canada attaches to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The realization of a negotiated and verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty constitutes a fundamental Canadian arms control and disarmament objective, and Canada will continue to pursue this goal with vigour, persistence and determination.

There are, regrettably, no short cuts or panaceas for the achievement of this important objective. It can be realized only through realistic and practical steps which will develop the confidence necessary to enable us to move forward. Our failure during this spring session to reach agreement on a mandate for a subsidiary body on a comprehensive test ban -- a failure that is the fault of none of our successive Presidents -- is most disappointing. Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee would allow us to make progress in a concrete, pragmatic and constructive fashion. I hope that we can do better in the summer session.

We have made clear consistently that Canada attaches particular importance to the improvement of means of verification of a comprehensive test ban, and Canada is devoting considerable human and financial resources both domestically and internationally to seismic verification. Measures Canada has taken include, as you know, the major upgrading of key seismic facilities in northern Canada and support for basic seismic research.

In order to expedite the work of the Group of Scientific Experts, Canada conducted in October in Ottawa of last year a workshop for seismic experts to discuss questions relating to the exchange of level 2 waveform data with a view to resolving some of the questions concerning the exchange of such data.

I am pleased today to table document CD/753 of 28 April, to which are annexed the proceedings of the Ottawa workshop. As the document indicates, the workshop, which was attended by 43 representatives from 17 countries, produced specific technical recommendations on the methods, protocols and formats for seismic waveform exchange. These have already been tabled by the Canadian delegation in the Group of Scientific Experts, the key forum for co-ordination of international efforts to develop an effective global seismic monitoring network -- I would like to repeat that: an effective global seismic monitoring network -- as recommendations for seismic waveform exchange in that eventual system. I hope that these proceedings will be of interest to all members of the CD. I would like to take the opportunity of thanking those delegations who have expressed appreciation to the Government of Canada for hosting this workshop, but I would be remiss if I did not, on behalf of the Canadian Government, express our gratitude to the participants who helped to make the workshop a success.

Mr. President, we are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament has a substantive role to play in the achievement of a comprehensive test ban.

As we all know, there are important related talks going on bilaterally which we hope will produce results on which the CD can build in its summer session. In this regard, the inherent complementarity of the bilateral and multilateral negotiations has been recognized by the United States and the USSR, both of which have reported to the CD on the progress of the bilateral discussions. I am amongst those who applaud the reports we have received and, of course, I express the sincere hope that this process will continue.

I hope that the working paper I have today tabled will not only provide further evidence of the substantive role which the Conference on Disarmament can play in achieving a comprehensive test ban, but will also give encouragement to the CD to establish an ad hoc committee as soon as possible to order to let us get on with the job expected of us.

Let me turn now to the subject of outer space. Much of the existing international legal régime governing the military uses of outer space is the product of treaties and agreements negotiated and concluded by the two major space Powers. While not directly engaging other countries, those treaties and agreements, most notably the ABM Treaty of 1972, constitute an important element of the existing legal framework, not least in their contribution to bringing about greater predictability in the military uses of the space environment and in their embodiment of a commitment to a co-operative approach to defining, through negotiation, agreed limits on the military uses of outer

space. The Canadian Government firmly supports such an approach, and indeed urges the United States and the USSR to continue to seek agreed ways to use outer space for national security purposes in a manner consistent with broad international security and stability, that is to say the security of all the nations and all the peoples of the world.

However, arms control in relation to outer space has always had an important multilateral dimension. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, concerning which I had the privilege of participating in some of the negotiations, has been and remains the keystone of a legal framework which currently governs activities in outer space, including certain military activities. Canada believes that the multilateral dimension of arms control in outer space is gaining increasing importance and will continue to do so. Canada's approach has also been premised on the belief that, in this multilateral context, verification issues will have a particular importance. Canada therefore welcomed the establishment for the first time in 1985 of an Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and the renewal of a mandate for it in each succeeding year. Canada has been active, as you know, in making substantive contributions to the deliberations of this subsidiary body each year, particularly in the form of working papers. These contributions reflect the work of a programme of sustained research in Canada under the auspices of the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs.

Canada is deeply committed to promoting progress in arms control and disarmament negotiations. The Canadian emphasis is on the practical, which is one reason why we have identified research into the verification of arms control agreements as an area where we can make, and hope to make, a useful contribution. As the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, has indicated, effective verification procedures cannot only help ensure compliance with arms control treaties but also facilitate their negotiation -- hence Canada's work in developing verification procedures and technology that meet the practical requirements of arms control agreements actually under negotiation or envisaged.

I want now to focus on some of the research undertaken in Canada which comprises the joint efforts of government, the academic community and the commercial sector. This approach is nowhere better illustrated than in the research relating to outer space. Canadian activities in this regard represent an attempt to develop and pursue an approach which is practical and innovative.

One of the major undertakings of the Verification Research Programme of Canada's Department of External Affairs over the past several years has been to bring together teams of experts from government, universities and industry to focus on Canadian space technology and know-how in its application to the process of arms control verification. A Canadian concept, termed PAXSAT pax being -- with apologies to the Chairman of our Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, as he does not need to be told this -- the Latin word for peace -- PAXSAT is the term which has emerged from these investigations. This concept centres on assessing the feasibility of applying space-based remote sensing technology to the tasks of verification in the context of multilateral arms control and disarmament.

Canada's PAXSAT research has concentrated on two potential applications of space-based remote sensing to multilateral arms control verification. The first is space-to-space remote sensing (which we refer to as PAXSAT A), dealing with verification of agreements involving space objects. The second, entailing space-to-ground remote sensing (which we refer to as PAXSAT B), focuses on how to assist in the verification of agreements involving conventional forces. I want to discuss very briefly this somewhat distinctive Canadian concept in very general terms, outlining the context of multilateral arms control verification and some of the major assumptions underlying the Canadian PAXSAT projects.

From the outset, PAXSAT research has recognized the important technical, political and military realities and trends in addressing the outer space issue. As a result, certain themes form core elements of the PAXSAT concept and contribute to the prospects of actually realizing such a multilateral verification system. These include the following:

Firstly, there must be the prospect of a significant multilateral agreement to warrant the level of sophistication of technology and the expenditure of funds required for the actual development of such an advanced technical verification system.

Secondly, parties to such a multilateral agreement should have the option, at least, of participating in its verification procedures.

Thirdly, use of the PAXSAT system should be treaty-specific: it would be used only with respect to the agreements to which it expressly applied, as part of an overall verification process for those agreements alone.

Fourthly, the treaty being verified would establish the requisite political authority for the verification mechanism and its operation.

Fifthly, technology requirements would be met collectively by participants and would, of course, be open to all States.

Sixthly, PAXSAT should be based, to the extent possible, on existing openly available technology, without requiring major costly improvements. The technology possessed by the Canadian commercial sector was adequate to provide a base for the PAXSAT studies.

Although the PAXSAT research is not yet complete, it has reached the point where its technical feasibility can begin to be assessed, at least in tentative ways. The workshop which Canada will host in Montreal next month, which we are pleased to learn will be attended by you, Mr. President, and in which all delegations in this forum have been invited to participate, will provide an occasion for further discussion and explanation of the concept. We also plan to make a report to the CD in June following our recess.

Mr. President, before concluding I would like to turn to another issue of major importance, the negotiation of a comprehensive, verifiable ban on chemical weapons, which remains the most active item on our agenda. Canada is pleased that the negotiating momentum which developed last year and the year before, under two very able chairmen, is being increased at the current CD session under the skilful Chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus and we intend to

continue our active participation in those negotiations. At the beginning of the summer part of the session the Canadian delegation will, as in the past, be providing to all participants our updated compendium of all CD documents relating to our chemical weapons negotiations.

Statements this week in this forum relating to further allegations of chemical weapon use in the Gulf war are tangible proof of the need to make deliberate haste in these negotiations. They also underline the importance of including in the treaty we are negotiating a provision for an unqualified, verifiable ban on the use of chemical weapons going beyond use and including, of course, possession, destruction, etc. Canada commends the recent action of the United Nations Secretary-General in initiating an investigation of these latest allegations of chemical weapon use.

The verification of such allegations of chemical or toxin weapon use is a subject to which Canada has devoted considerable research effort. We have initiated our own investigative activities in relation to certain such allegations in the past. We have drawn on this experience and that of others in making reports to the United Nations Secretary-General. In December 1985 we submitted to the Secretary-General a handbook dealing in a systematic and detailed way with various procedural aspects to such investigations. The handbook was also subsequently put forward in this forum. I want to announce that Canada has continued its follow-up work in relation to other practical and technical aspects of such investigations. The results will be made available to the United Nations very soon.

The results will be made available not only to the United Nations because Canada's activities in this regard reflect a pragmatic, operationally oriented approach which we consider essential if effectively verifiable agreements are to be concluded. I am not in a position to report on the precise nature of the presentation to be made, but I have no doubt that it will be of interest to every member of the CD. I believe that when we are in a position to report to the Conference in June on the research we have conducted and the practical results which have emerged from it, every member of the CD will find the report of interest and to direct relevance to our own chemical weapons negotiations.

The foregoing comments are intended to illustrate the approach which Canada has tried to follow consistently in the Conference on Disarmament. We have attempted to make concrete contributions through working papers and workshops, in lieu of rhetoric, concentrating on practical problems of verification of the arms control agreement we are together trying to achieve.

CD/PV.411

pp.6-9

USSR/Petrovsky

9.6.87

CTB

Speaking of the past, I would like to recall not only the squandered opportunities, of which there were quite a few, but above all the fact that during the process, the outline of a possible agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests, verification methods and techniques began to take shape. In 1974 and 1976 the Soviet Union and the United States concluded agreements on yield thresholds for underground nuclear-weapon tests and peaceful nuclear explosions, which, however, never entered into force

because of the United States position. The decade-long efforts of the Group of Scientific Experts on detection and identification of seismic events have produced some significant and useful lessons. The series of international experiments covering Level I seismic data exchanges is of great practical importance. At present, the Group is working on a new important aspect of seismic verification of the non-conduct of nuclear explosions, which is designed to upgrade the verification mechanism -- the exchange of Level II seismic data.

The 18-month-long unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions has generated immense moral and political potential in favour of ending nuclear tests and demonstrated in practice that it is indeed possible to adopt measures capable of ending nuclear-weapon tests once and for all. We are pleased to note the Conference's positive assessment of and response to the moratorium.

The document which has been submitted today -- further evidence of our resolve to make new efforts to achieve a general and complete ban on nuclear tests as soon as possible -- brings together the positive experience of many years of joint efforts to solve the problem of nuclear testing and new ideas and proposals recently advanced by many other nations, above all the six countries from four continents. At the same time the draft treaty is not just a collection of previous proposals but a qualitatively new document. It is imbued with the ideas and the spirit of new political thinking, which requires that diplomatic practice should be brought into line with the realities of the nuclear and space age.

This may be seen first and foremost in the issue of verification and control. We believe that verification is indispensable for effective implementation of real disarmament and confidence-building measures, especially when there is an acute lack of such confidence. The new document therefore includes large-scale verification measures ranging from declaring the location of test ranges to participation by international inspectors in verifying that no nuclear-weapons tests are conducted at these test ranges. For the purpose of effective verification we propose that an international inspectorate should be established, something which was not provided for either in the 1982 Soviet proposal on treaty provisions, or in the tripartite reports submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. The joint experiment by Soviet and United States scientists in Semipalatinsk has demonstrated vividly that such forms of verification are realistic and possible. With their equipment installed in the area of the Soviet nuclear-test site, United States experts performed effective verification of the non-conduct of explosions, thus performing, in fact, the functions of an international inspectorate.

In the document submitted today the question of creating an international seismic monitoring network is being developed in a new direction. Seismic stations with standard characteristics which would function with the participation of observers from an international inspectorate are to be a basic component of such a network. The implementation of this proposal would contribute significantly to creating a climate of mutual trust among States. The same purpose is served by a special section on international exchanges of data on the radioactivity of air masses.

Within the system of verification that we propose, major importance is attached to on-site inspections. Their purpose, as we see it, consists in settling problems which give rise to doubts as to compliance with the Treaty and which cannot be eliminated by means of the other verification measures envisaged in it. I would also like to stress that the State which has received a request for an on-site inspection will be obliged to allow unconditional access to the location designated in the request. In other words, the inspections will be mandatory, not voluntary. Obviously, the criteria and procedures governing requests for inspection and verification and their conduct, including the rights and functions of inspection teams, have yet to be developed. But this task is quite within the power of the Conference on Disarmament. Besides, experience in other nuclear weapon test ban negotiations is available in this area.

The content of the specific provisions of the document which has been put forward today proves once again that for us there is no problem of test ban verification. But I want everyone to have an absolutely clear understanding regarding the political meaning of this sentence. It does not at all mean that there is nothing more to discuss and elaborate. Quite the contrary: we stand for thorough elaboration of all the necessary specific arrangements, and we shall go as far in this direction as our partners will be prepared to go. We are also ready to consider other measures to verify the non-conduct of tests. In this context, I would like to confirm the positive attitude of the Soviet Union towards the proposals in this regard which have been put forward by the six countries from four continents. We have in mind sending Soviet experts to a meeting with experts from those countries to discuss the question of a general nuclear weapon test ban, as well as our readiness to take up the proposal made by those countries concerning assistance in nuclear weapon test ban verification, including on-site inspections. Certainly, we continue to consider verification not as an end in itself but as a means to ensure effective functioning of the treaty, which in turn must become a major self-contained measure facilitating progress in the limitation, reduction and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, in a nuclear-weapon-free world, the Treaty and the strict control envisaged therein, together with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, should become a guarantee against the reappearance of this type of weapon, and a major part of the supporting structure of a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

There is no doubt in anyone's mind that the cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests depend first and foremost on the USSR and the United States, which, in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament, bear particular responsibility in attaining the goals of nuclear disarmament. We therefore propose that the treaty should provide for the possibility that, initially, not all nuclear powers but only the USSR and the United States will participate in it.

Involvement of the Conference on Disarmament in the process of practical elaboration of a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests does not in any way conflict with the current bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations. On the contrary, it is designed to support the bilateral efforts with multilateral ones. This is all the more essential since the bilateral talks are unfortunately stalled. For our part, we want these talks to be full-scale,

purposeful and productive, so that with every passing day they bring us closer to the complete cessation of nuclear tests under strict international control. Being realists, we agreed at the bilateral Soviet-United States talks in Geneva to proceed in stages, on a step-by-step basis. The Soviet approach to full-scale negotiations on the nuclear-weapon test ban embodies our readiness to agree on a gradual solution of the problem through the introduction of intermediate limitations on the number and yield of nuclear explosions. The immediate declaration of a bilateral moratorium could be a first step in this respect. Although we would prefer a complete moratorium, nevertheless, taking into consideration the United States position, we would be ready to agree with the United States to limit the yield of nuclear explosions to one kiloton and reduce their number to a minimum. In our opinion, this might be done through appropriate legislation to be adopted by the United States Congress and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The ball is in the United States court.

At the same time it is obvious that even in the most favourable circumstances, the Soviet-United States negotiations, by virtue of their bilateral character, cannot provide a final solution to the problem -- the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests everywhere and by everyone. Hence our conviction that the elaboration of agreements at the Soviet-United States negotiations and the elaboration of a comprehensive treaty in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament should proceed in parallel.

In general, our approach to the organizational aspect is as follows: the Soviet Union is ready to participate in any bilateral, trilateral or multilateral forum in order to work for a radical solution to the problem of nuclear tests. We would like not only to set the existing machinery in motion, but also to ensure that it produces practical results at an early stage. We confirm our readiness to work within the Conference for the purpose of broadening the ban laid down in the 1963 Moscow Treaty -- which, incidentally, would be fully consistent with the intentions expressed and obligations undertaken by the parties at the time of its signature.

The experience of many years of negotiations and discussions having to do with the problem of nuclear weapon testing, the technology which is available today for verification purposes, and many other factors, gives grounds for believing that the conclusion of a treaty is perfectly feasible.

CD/PV.411

pp.16-17

Sweden/Theorin

9.6.87

CW

The flexible and positive approach of delegations to the negotiations is particularly gratifying for my delegation, as it facilitates the difficult task of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. This approach has brought a number of key problems closer to their solution. Progress has been made in the direction that all chemical weapon stocks should immediately be declared and, within a 10 year period, eliminated by destruction only. The initial declaration of stocks shall be verified and the stockpiles thereafter systematically monitored. What remains to be done is to agree on an order of destruction up to the end of the tenth year after the Convention has entered into force. Consensus on a broad outline of the order of destruction is growing. It is vital for trust in the convention that all States parties to it be obliged from the outset to declare all weapon stocks.

A régime for the elimination of chemical weapon production facilities is also taking shape. Understanding has been reached on the verification of declarations of such facilities and their closure, as well as international systematic monitoring and verification of the elimination of facilities.

To prohibit future production of chemical weapons in a verifiable manner is a major concern. Over the years more negotiating efforts and intellectual energy have been devoted to this part of the convention than to any other problem. It is unavoidable that the chemical industry will be affected by a system of non-production. As the outline of a generally acceptable verification régime is now emerging from the negotiations, it can, however, be stated that the industry, already subject to intrusive environmental and health regulations would assume a modest additional burden when the convention enters into force.

Some differences on details in the régime remain. But they should not be impossible to overcome. Trust in the convention will depend on the means provided to investigate also non-declared activities which could constitute violations of it. A challenge inspection system is indispensable. The core of the system should be international on-site challenge inspection. It would deter violations, if effectively designed.

Informal consultations on this matter during the spring session have been encouraging. Support is growing for the idea that a team of inspectors should be automatically dispatched following the request of a party. There are still differences of opinion as to whether the inspectors should have unimpeded access to the location or facility concerned, in accordance with the original request, also in the event that the request State proposes an alternative arrangement.

CD/PV.411

p.20

GDR/Rose

9.6.87

VER

Verification occupies a central place in the decisions adopted by the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. What must be created is an effective system to verify the implementation of disarmament steps in the strictest way possible so that the security of all parties may be ensured. The principle that genuine disarmament presupposes genuine verification applies in a very special way to the measures discussed at our forum. Do we not know all too well how much progress in the field of disarmament can be slowed down if divergencies persist on this particular subject?

The participants in the Berlin meeting have vigorously declared themselves in favour of overcoming any confrontational approach and asserting civilized standards and an atmosphere of openness, transparency and trust in international relations. There are many ways to achieve this. An important step, in this context, would be for the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO to enter into consultations in order to compare the military doctrines of the two alliances. The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty States is in every respect subordinated to the task of preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional. Hence the conclusion that many weapons are not synonymous with more security. Dependable security can only be attained by disarmament and arms limitation measures. That is why the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty are convinced that their military security will best be ensured by concrete

disarmament steps on the basis of equality and equal security. This is the lesson to be learned from history if we are to preserve our fragile world in this nuclear and space age, and if any military doctrine is to be labelled a "peace doctrine". We must arrive at a situation where international disputes are settled exclusively by political means and peace is made enduring by a comprehensive system of international security.

CD/PV.413

pp.4-5

Hungary/Meiszter

16.6.87

CTB

My delegation strongly urges all those concerned to put aside stereotyped positions, show flexibility and start practical work. To set up an Ad hoc Committee on a CTB without further delay is indispensable. The scope of a future CTB should not cause too many difficulties, since it is almost self-evident. On that understanding our practical efforts might be concentrated on other crucial aspects, among others verification.

In the view of my delegation, the proposal presented by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky of the USSR on behalf of the group of socialist delegations contains all the necessary major elements that provide a solid basis for sensible work. Whether a CTB is a short-term or long-term objective may well prove to be of less importance once the work has been started.

As one of the sponsors of the "Basic provisions" of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, I would like at this stage to highlight some of its features we find especially important. An outstanding feature of the proposal is that it provides for a ban on nuclear-weapon testing as far as the scope of a future treaty is concerned. As a first step the ban would apply to the two major nuclear Powers for a period of five years. The proposal leaves no doubt, however, that the final aim is a universal ban on nuclear-weapons testing by virtue of subsequent accession to it by the other nuclear Powers. This approach to the scope of participation is meant to accommodate well-known positions held by some of nuclear Powers.

The most remarkable feature of these provisions is undoubtedly the part dealing with verification of the test ban. It provides for the application of national means of verification, and access to the results of such verification for other States. Another provision for verification is the establishment of a network of international seismic stations, including the exchange of Level II seismic data and the measuring of atmospheric radioactivity and the exchange of the data obtained from such measurements.

Radical provisions are proposed for on-site inspection in cases when suspicions or doubts emerge concerning strict compliance with the treaty. Under its terms all parties would have the right to demand, and the challenged party would be obliged to provide access for, an on-site inspection to clarify events giving rise to suspicion on the basis of an appropriately substantiated request, through procedures to be elaborated.

We continue to hold that strict compliance with a future treaty is a must to ensure the effective functioning and authority of a CTBT. A verification régime on the lines proposed could meet that requirement. It could greatly contribute to dispelling long-held reservations to the effect that finding the appropriate verification mechanism may cause insurmountable difficulties.

CD/PV.413

p.9

Bulgaria/Tellalov

16.6.87

CTB

The issue of verification and control is a case in point. For years it was argued by a number of delegations that this problem is the main stumbling-block on the road towards an agreement. The joint proposal of the group of socialist countries is clear proof of their readiness to explore all avenues with a view to establishing a solid system of verification and control to be embodied in an agreement on a nuclear-test ban. Use of national technical means of verification, establishment of an international system of seismic verification, international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity, ensuring the non-functioning of nuclear-weapon test sites, on-site inspection: no idea has, in our view, been forgotten in the document tabled by the socialist countries. And it is worth mentioning again that the Group of socialist countries puts forwards the idea that an international inspectorate should be established, something which was not envisaged either in the 1982 USSR proposal or in the tripartite report submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

At the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly the political climate of the test ban issue was a bit improved, and a trend towards convergence of views emerged. There were also clear signs of greater openness on the matter during our spring session. Valuable work is being performed by the Group of Seismic Experts, which is preparing a second global collection and analysis test in 1988. There is no doubt in our mind that it is long overdue for the Conference to begin substantive work immediately on its agenda item 1.

CD/PV.413

pp.14-16

France/Morel

16.6.87

CW

The main characteristics of the security stock having thus been set out, I will merely add that our document describes the setting-up arrangements when the two distinct régimes come into force: the régime for security stocks, as just outlined, and the régimes for stockpiles other than security stocks, in accordance with the provisions at present being negotiated in the draft convention. It also sets out how, after eight years, when all other stocks and related facilities have been destroyed, a start would be made on the simultaneous destruction of security stocks and each single production facility.

Let me now turn to verification, which is obviously one of the essential elements of the system proposed. Since this is a transitory régime and one which is at odds with the ultimate aim of the convention, it is indispensable to ensure that it cannot be diverted from its final purpose. Verification is of decisive importance for the whole of the convention, but it is of course particularly significant for security stocks.

I will not return here to the production facility which is under permanent international control and which will be closed down during the ninth year and destroyed before the end of the tenth year. This is a relatively simple case of complete verification -- "unlimited", one might say -- whereas the definition of the verification régime for the security stock is inevitably a matter of greater complexity. As a matter of principle the security stock

must be subject to challenge inspection. But, as can be seen from the current work of the Conference on this subject, access to storage facilities has led to the search for balance between security considerations (and confidentiality) on the one hand, and the need to ensure full respect for the convention on the other. Our latest exchanges of views have shown that there is no ready-made a priori formula, but that it should be possible to establish a régime which is both strict and balanced and which will ensure effective and realistic verification.

We believe therefore that the verification régime for security stocks is simply one special case within the more general framework of verification of the convention, and that it does not merit special treatment. That is why we have refrained in this document from defining a single and therefore final formula, and have set out, together with the formula we prefer, other options which are less satisfactory in our view. The choice to be made between these various options will of course depend on the answers to three major questions:

The first, a particularly sensitive one, is that of location. In our wish to take part in an open exercise which would make it possible to appreciate, before choosing, the advantages and drawbacks of the various possible formulae, we are ready to envisage the declaration of the location of a security stock as from the very entry into force of the convention. This undoubtedly offers an advantage with regard to verification. But at the same time, we must appreciate the real and serious draw back as regards security, since declaring the location might also encourage a pre-emptive attack in the event of a crisis. That is why our preference falls on the option under which the location would not be declared publicly, but recorded in a sealed envelope which would be opened in the event of a challenge inspection. The possibility of transfer to another location would naturally have to be kept open, but this would then be subjected to the same conditions; that is to say, with the new location indicated in a sealed envelope.

The second question concerns the number of locations for security stocks, whether the location is declared or not. Here again, security considerations would lead us to believe that several locations would be preferable; but if the monitoring is to be effective, agreed limits are required, which we would suggest be set at five locations.

The third difficulty which should be pointed out here is the question of direct access in the case of challenge inspection. I raise this matter here for the record; the solution to be chosen with regard to security stocks will in the final analysis be the same as that decided on for the general régime.

Whatever the final balance determined for the monitoring of security stocks, we must recall that this will be carried out within a strictly defined framework, which will place heavy burdens on all the parties to the convention:

Initial declaration within 30 days of the entry into force of the convention, specifying the volume, composition and location of the place of storage, either publicly or in a sealed envelope;

During the first eight years, régime of challenge inspection which varies according to whether the location is known or not;

At the end of the eighth year, opening of the sealed envelopes where appropriate, and in any case placing of stocks under international control preparatory to phased destruction. The challenge inspection régime thus remains the indispensable instrument for verification.

This very brief recapitulation of the verification mechanisms enables us to emphasize that we do not intend to leave any escape clause in drawing up the régime which will be finally adopted.

There is still one point which can be linked to verification. This is what has been presented -- wrongly -- as the risk of CW proliferation which it is claimed would stem from the approach adopted by France. Some have stated that, by providing for the possibility of constituting a limited security stock for a period of 10 years, this would at least indirectly sanction CW proliferation. This is a complete misunderstanding. The risk of CW proliferation can be defined only in relation to a ban; it necessarily exists in any convention arrangement simply because sovereign States cannot be forced to accede to a convention. Everything which, like the security stocks, will help to enhance the effectiveness, the non-discriminatory character and the equality of all parties in the course of the 10-year period, will strengthen the credibility of the convention and encourage States to accede. But let me add above all that the provisions related to verification, and the destruction of security stocks and the sole production facility referred to above, clearly show that these provisions do not in any way encourage acquisition of a CW capability. The limited option proposed contains binding and very stringent provisions. Far from encouraging proliferation, the instrument we have suggested introduces clarity and equity in the relations between all the States parties in the decisive period of the first 10 years of implementation of the convention.

CD/PV.413

pp.18-19

Pakistan/Ahmad

16.6.87

CW

We are not unmindful of the outstanding issues, some of them of considerable complexity, which have yet to be resolved. Foremost among them are the questions of challenge inspection and of non-production of chemical weapons in civil industry. At the heart of both these issues lies the same consideration, that of effective verification. There has been no dearth of proposals on the question of challenge inspection. My delegation too submitted one such proposal last year in an attempt to bridge the differences which have prevented an agreement so far. We have been heartened by indications of gradual convergence of views during the spring part of the session. It is evident, however, that considerable work remains to be done before this convergence is translated into treaty language. The issue of challenge inspection raises two considerations: one the one hand, the need for a stringent verification régime which would make it extremely difficult for any violation of the convention to go undetected, and on the other hand, the right of a State to protect installations of a highly sensitive nature having relevance to its supreme security interests from unreasonable and unjustified scrutiny. In our view, these two considerations are not irreconcilable, and we are confident that it would be possible to work out a mechanism which takes due account of both. One way of doing so would be to entrust the Executive Council with decision-making authority in disputed cases under an appropriate voting mechanism which guarantees that such differences are settled with all possible dispatch.

In the context of challenge inspection, some concern has been expressed about the possibility of what are described as "frivolous" challenges. My delegation feels that these fears are largely exaggerated. We do not subscribe to the view that some States or their leaders act responsibly while others do not. In any event, more harm would be done by placing undue impediments on the right of a State to request inspection than would result from a resort to "frivolous" challenge.

My delegation has consistently taken the view that declarations regarding chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities should be made at the earliest possible stage, and should be comprehensive and detailed in order to be fully verifiable. We therefore welcome the flexibility shown by the Soviet delegation earlier during this session on the question of the declaration of locations of chemical weapon stocks and their verification. We hope that the Ad hoc Committee will soon be able to finalize the relevant provisions of article IV of the convention.

Despite encouraging progress in several areas, a number of important questions remain open besides those I have already mentioned, including questions relating to scope, the definition of chemical weapons, the definition of production facilities and measures to be taken for their elimination, and organizational questions. Nor should we forget articles X and XI dealing retrospectively with assistance and with economic and technological development. The importance of the final clauses (articles XII to XVI) should also not be underestimated. Articles X and XI are of great interest to the developing countries, and we are happy to note that the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee envisages their being taken up during the current session. My delegation has submitted a proposal on the question of assistance which we hope will receive consideration when work on article X commences.

An important subject to which the Conference should address itself is that of adequate follow-up action to established violations of the Convention. In this context, the question of sanctions to be taken against a State which has been found to have acted in violation of its obligations under the convention deserves serious examination. To withdraw from such a State its rights and privileges under the convention can hardly be regarded as a response commensurate with the gravity of an act posing a threat to the objectives of the convention. The States parties to the convention ought to go further and undertake collective action to remedy the situation.

My delegation has noticed a tendency to enter into too many technical and procedural details in drafting the convention. We feel that many of these details could be left to the international authority and its organs which will be established under the convention. In trying to settle all these matters at this stage by including them in the text of the convention or its annexes, we run the risk of unduly delaying its conclusion. There is also a more pragmatic reason why we feel this should not be attempted. It is quite likely that, after the entry into force of the convention and with the benefit of actual experience, a need might be felt to improve some of the technical and procedural details relating to implementation. If all these details are contained in the text of the convention, the necessary modification may be

extremely difficult to bring about in view of the obvious difficulties in amending a multilateral international agreement. My delegation therefore does not favour introducing into the convention such an element of rigidity which may not be in the interest of its effective implementation.

Before I passe on to other items on our agenda, may I say that my delegation has been dismayed at the statement just made by the distinguished Ambassador of France. The proposal that parties to the Convention should be permitted to maintain secret security stockpiles of chemical weapons would negate the main objectives of the ban. It would also seriously undermine confidence in the observance of the convention, and only deepen mutual suspicion among States parties will all its perilous consequences. It comes at a particularly inopportune time in view of the progress that is being made in the negotiations taking place in this Conference.

CD/PV.415

p.3

Mexico/Garcia Robles

23.6.87

CTB

The authors of the statements are very well placed to prevent the absence of adequate procedures to verify compliance with the obligations entered into from being cited to justify a negative attitude, since on 7 August last year, at the second summit meeting held in Mexico, they adopted a document on verification measures which is reproduced in its entirety in Conference document CD/723 of the 15th of the same month and year, whose seventh paragraph reads as follows:

"In connection with a mutual halt in nuclear testing, our six nations are prepared to establish promptly and in co-operation with the United States and the USSR, temporary monitoring stations at existing test sites and to operate them for an initial period of one year. All data should be available to the six nations, the United States and the USSR. Data analysis could be a joint undertaking and preliminary analysis would be done at the sites. Monitoring of test sites by instruments installed on site would provide an extremely high sensitivity down to small fractions of a kiloton and even tons of explosives."

Obviously this is what the authors of the joint statement have in mind when they conclude their statement by alluding to it in the three last paragraphs, which I will now read out by way of rounding off my own statement:

"In Mexico, we made a concrete offer on verification of a halt to nuclear testing. That offer remains.

CD/PV.416

p.5

Morocco/Benhima

25.6.87

CTB

An internationally monitored nuclear test ban would considerably restrict the operational capacity of countries to manufacture or use nuclear weapons. It would also hold back the race to develop new weapons, and would stem the rivalry between the Powers in the atomic club.

Finally, such a treaty would offer these Powers an opportunity to honour the commitments entered into under the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty, thus taking a decisive step towards a world where nuclear weapons will no longer be the dangerous guarantees of international security and peace.

Only two atom bombs have been used in wartime. None the less, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1,570 nuclear tests were conducted between 1945 and the end of 1986, despite the partial nuclear test ban treaty which dates back to 1963. The General Assembly, gravely concerned about the ever more rapid continuation of this testing, has never ceased to appeal to all States to refrain from nuclear testing and to urge the drafting of a treaty prohibiting all tests. Unfortunately, the proliferation of resolutions is paralleled by a constant increase in the number of tests.

More than ever the negotiation of such a treaty is a matter of high priority, and there is no need to underline its urgency. The ways and means of achieving this objective have already been set by the United Nations General Assembly. In its recent resolution 41/46 A, the Assembly requested the members of the Conference on Disarmament to create at the beginning of 1987 "an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear test explosions". It also recommended that "such an ad hoc committee should comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification".

In this connection, we may note that the terms of the mandate as defined by General Assembly already contain elements of compromise likely to meet the wishes of certain delegations to study further the question of verification. In our view, the difficulties of greater or lesser seriousness linked to verification have done all too much to prevent the Conference from negotiating seriously.

I should like to recall in this connection a statement by the United Nations Secretary-General 15 years ago, recognizing that all technical aspects relating to the verification of a nuclear test ban have been amply examined. We may add to this observation the results of the painstaking and laudable work carried out by the Group of Scientific Experts. The technical test comprising data exchange and analysis which the Group undertook a year ago demonstrated the reliability of national means of seismic event detection.

CD/PV.416

pp.11-12

Mongolia/Bayart

25.6.87

CTB

The significance of the Soviet Moratorium also lies in the fact that at the same time, a number of methods of verifying the non-conduct of nuclear tests were themselves subjected to tests in which specialists and equipment from the United States were involved at the non-governmental level. It seems to us that these methods could be incorporated in a future nuclear test-ban treaty.

In the document submitted by the socialist countries, questions of verification are among the central issues. The document proposes a clearly defined system providing for a combination of three types of verification -- national technical means, an international system of seismic monitoring and on-site inspections.

The Mongolian delegation is convinced that the use of these three types of verification together could provide the parties with a full assurance that not a single suspicious wave-form event would pass unnoticed.

Indeed to a significant extent this is already a reality as a result of an extensive network of seismological stations in many States. Moreover, practical experience has confirmed this. According to information published by Soviet specialists, in April 1986 the seismological station in Obninsk in the USSR easily detected a nuclear explosion with a yield of 1.3 kilotons which was conducted in Nevada. In their opinion, 20 Soviet stations provide sufficient information on nuclear tests world-wide. It may be assumed that the 200-odd similar stations near the socialist countries, either installed by the United States of America or operating under their control, work just as well as the 20 Soviet ones.

In Mongolia we learned with satisfaction that the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, in their joint declaration of 22 May this year, reaffirmed their proposals for nuclear test ban verification addressed to the USSR and the United States. We must make use of these proposals.

As we know, the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to send representatives to meet experts from the six States to participate in a joint search for mutually acceptable solutions which might then form the basis of reliable verification machinery for a complete and general nuclear-weapon test ban treaty. We would like to express the hope that the United States has not yet said its last word on the proposals made by the six States.

In reply to the joint declaration of the six States, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union M.S. Gorbachev, again called upon the United States to begin full-scale talks on the complete cessation of nuclear test under strict international control including on-site inspections, and referred favourably to the possibility of using the proposals put forward by the Delhi Six in the context of measures which might be agreed at such talks.

CD/PV.416

p.17

GDR/Rose

25.6.87

CTB

Today I intend to draw your attention specifically to some aspects of the verification procedures contained in CD/756. Firstly, for the first time ever, verification provisions are presented in their complexity, reflecting circumstances and possibilities as they really exist. Properly combined, national technical means of verification, international verification measures and on-site inspections can ensure sufficiently reliable verification. Clandestine tests involving militarily significant yields would thus be practically ruled out.

Secondly, the parties to the treaty which have the necessary national technical means would make available to the relevant organ to be set up under the treaty any pertinent data obtained by those means. Both the establishment of an organ pursuant to the treaty and the obligation to provide information are new elements.

Thirdly, the parties to a future accord are called upon to create an international system of seismic verification, for which they would have to allow the establishment of stations on their territory in order to ensure the continuous exchange of level II seismic data. Monitoring stations would operate with the participation of observers from an international inspectorate.

Fourthly, every State party would undertake to participate in the international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity and to allow aerosol monitoring stations on its territory.

Fifthly, international inspectors would be present at test ranges to verify that no nuclear explosions are conducted there, so that those sites can no longer be used to explode nuclear devices.

Lastly, on-site inspection would be mandatory. Here again, States would have equal rights and duties.

Consequently, the measures elaborated upon in the "Basic provisions" document would ensure (a) strict observance of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon testing; (b) utilization of effective and modern technical means for the verification system; (c) virtually global coverage; and (d) verification on a democratic basis, with equal rights for all parties to the treaty.

The sponsors of CD/756 are prepared to look into any other verification proposal made during CTBT negotiations. Clearly, the socialist countries know no taboos when it comes to verifying compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty. They will go as far as the other negotiating parties are prepared to go.

My delegation is convinced that the new proposal of the socialist countries offers a chance to work out all the details of the required verification provisions and the other parts of a treaty.

CD/PV.417

pp.2-5

Norway/Kristvik

30.6.87 CW,CTB

One of the main problems concerns the question of on-site challenge inspection. It is the view of the Norwegian Government that it is absolutely necessary to dispatch the inspection team to the site concerned within 48 hours after the issue of a request for an on-site inspection. The investigation at the site should be detailed and comprehensive. We have taken note of the idea which was presented by the United States at the recent Holmenkollen Symposium in Oslo, that when an inspection takes place, provisions should be made to protect sensitive types of installations and facilities. Norway believes that this notion of "managed conduct" is a way in which to address security concerns related to the challenge inspection issue.

In this context, I should like to point out that on-site challenge inspection would occur only in exceptional circumstances. Thus, it would represent the "safety net" to the convention, which would already contain an elaborate system of routine on-site inspections. In fact, an effective chemical weapons convention will necessitate more comprehensive monitoring systems than any existing disarmament treaty.

The solution to these questions will require the flexibility of all parties concerned. Against this background, Norway welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are continuing their bilateral talks on all aspects of a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. These consultations, which were initiated after the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985, have had a positive effect on the negotiating process in the Conference on Disarmament.

My country is of the opinion that both the multilateral negotiations and the bilateral talks should be intensified with a view to solving the main outstanding questions. The international community expects these abhorrent weapons to be eliminated as soon as possible.

Chemical weapons have recently been used in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The incorporation in the global convention of a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is therefore necessary. The Norwegian research programme of verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons should be seen against this background. As a result of six years' research at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, procedures have been developed for verification of alleged use. Today, I take pleasure in introducing documents CD/761 and CD/762.

The first document summarizes the results of research undertaken in 1986 and 1987, when the procedures were tested in two field exercises. These tests confirmed that the methods we have developed can be used on an all-year basis.

The procedures, which are outlined and described in Document CD/762, cover the following phases of an investigation; establishment of the inspection team, survey of the alleged contaminated area, collection of samples, field analysis, preparation of samples for transport of laboratories, analysis in laboratories and preparation of the report of the inspection team. In elaborating this system we have consulted a number of countries, in particular Canada.

Document CD/762 provides that the international inspectors should conduct their mission in the least intrusive manner necessary to accomplish their task. On the basis of the field exercises, my country proposes that on-site inspection should take place within 48 hours after a request has been received by the Technical Secretariat. A proper investigation requires efficient methods for carrying out the inspection, with special emphasis on sampling and sample analysis. Within 10 days after the completion of their on-site inspection, the international inspectors should present their findings in a report to the Technical Secretariat.

In presenting these proposed procedures, I should like to stress that the work undertaken at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment during 1986 and 1987 shows that some aspects of verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons need to be further examined. We shall continue our research programme with that in mind, and shall also take into account that some of these procedures could be applied to other situations concerning fact-finding.

Norway's development of procedures for on-site inspection on the basis of field experiments, which provide realistic and reliable data and avoid the artificial conditions of a laboratory, will contribute to the effective implementation of the convention. The wealth of research results will, no doubt, facilitate the work of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. In addition, the general aspects of the procedures should be incorporated in an annex to article IX of the Convention. Canada and Norway will therefore table a joint proposal for such an annex on 7 July.

A comprehensive nuclear-test ban would contribute to the promotion of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation efforts. We are therefore of the opinion that a test ban, which should include a prohibition of both nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, should be concluded as soon as possible. This necessitates, however, that the Conference on Disarmament should resume its work on practical and interrelated issues, which in any case need to be addressed in detail prior to the conclusion of a test-ban treaty. Such issues include compliance, verification and the scope of the test ban. Two years ago, Norway and nine other Western countries outlined a suitable programme of work for these issues (document CD/621 of 24 July 1985). Against this background, my country regrets that the Conference on Disarmament has not yet agreed on a mandate for an Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban.

However, the United States and the Soviet Union are conducting bilateral talks on testing issues. Norway hopes that these two countries, prior to the seventh session of these talks next month, will agree on an agenda for initiation of bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing, based on a step-by-step approach. In this context, joint United States-Soviet experiments designed to improve verification measures would be of particular interest. Norway has also taken note of the inclusion of a system of mandatory on-site inspections in the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests" which the Soviet Union introduced on 9 June (document CD/756).

In the field of seismological verification, the Group of Scientific Experts is preparing for the international experiment for the exchange and processing of seismic wave-form data (level II data). NOR SAR, being one of the world's largest seismological observatories, will take an active part in this experiment. Its implementation will, no doubt, represent a further step towards the establishment of a future global system for the international exchange of seismic data.

Norway has consistently maintained that such a global system must take advantage of the rapid and ongoing technological developments in seismic instrumentation, data communication and computer systems. This is the general thesis of document CD/763, which also describes the recent operation and associated research activities at the large-aperture Norwegian Seismic Array (NOR SAR) and the small-aperture Norwegian Regional Seismic Array System (NORESS).

Drawing on the experience gained in the operation of these two arrays, document CD/763 contains three concrete proposals concerning principles for a modern seismic data exchange system. Firstly, the global seismic network should, to the extent it is practically possible and otherwise appropriate, incorporate the establishment of small-aperture seismic arrays along NORESS principles. Secondly, seismic data exchange by dedicated, high-capacity links, such as satellite channels using small dedicated ground stations, would form a convenient, efficient and reliable method for the needs of the envisaged global data exchange system. Thirdly, it must be possible, through an international data centre in the global seismic network, to request and obtain any level II data from any participating station.

Let me turn now specifically to the first item on our agenda, a nuclear-test ban. This Conference is well aware that representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union have been meeting in Geneva since July 1986 in a series of discussions known as the nuclear testing experts meetings. The most recent session ended on 29 May, and the next is scheduled for mid-July. Within the context of those meetings, the United States has proposed to the Soviet Union a process whereby the two countries initiate negotiations on the subject of nuclear testing. The Soviet Union has, thus far, rejected the United States proposals.

At the October 1986 Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, and in the recent discussions in Moscow between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, both sides agreed that a comprehensive nuclear-test ban is a long-term objective which must be approached via a step-by-step process. The first order of business in this step-by-step process will be the negotiation of verification improvements to the threshold testing treaties of 1974 and 1976, i.e., the threshold test-ban treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty.

Agreement on such improvements would lead to the ratification of those treaties by the United States. The United States has agreed that, in parallel with reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both countries, a subsequent step could be to proceed to negotiations on intermediate limitations on nuclear testing. For its part, the United States has consistently affirmed its position that the ultimate goal of ceasing nuclear testing can only be reached through a series of steps in conjunction with a parallel programme to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons.

In apparent harmony with its understanding that this is a step-by-step process, the Soviet Union has proposed joint experiments on improved verification that would allow a demonstration of both direct hydrodynamic yield measurement techniques, advocated by the United States, and indirect seismic methods, favoured by the USSR.

This, in the United States' understanding, would be related to the first step, i.e., the negotiation of verification improvements for the threshold test-ban treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty. The United States has regarded this proposal as a potentially useful initiative; it is being addressed by representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union.

At no time during the bilateral discussions has there been serious discussion of any kind of testing moratorium. Proposals to make a moratorium the first step in the process must be regarded as an appeal to emotions rather than good sense. Such an approach undermines the work already accomplished, and if pursued, would ensure that a first step is never taken. It is ironic that a first-step testing moratorium is inconsistent with the joint verification activities proposed at the highest levels of the Soviet Government.

The basic idea of the concept of confidence-building measures, as developed in the European context, is to create more openness -- or "transparency" if you like. One can thereby reduce the fears and mistrust which too much secretiveness with regard to military matters can engender on either side. In Stockholm, 35 countries reached agreement on a set of measures including notification and observation of various military activities, as well as provisions for on-site inspection. It will be a challenge for all of us to work out confidence-building measures applicable in other parts of the world as well, particularly in regions where tensions occur, and it would seem that such measures, tailored to the specific situation, could play a useful role as a first step forward towards political accommodation. The Netherlands has advocated before such confidence-building measures in the areas of Central America and the Middle East.

The second point concerns verification. It is increasingly recognized that asking for on-site inspection is reasonable and legitimate. As we all know, verification has been a stumbling-block in many arms control negotiations in the past. The growing consensus on the need for strict verification holds the promise of progress with regard to arms control in general. But let us bear in mind that verification is a matter where the details -- the fine print -- are all-important.

The third point I would like to touch upon is that of deep cuts. Reductions in nuclear weapons on a scale we dared not hope for at the beginning of the decade now appear feasible. It is towards the goal of banning long-range INF missiles that most progress has been made, a subject to which my country attaches particular importance. We equally welcome the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are in agreement on the principle of a 50 per cent cut in their strategic arsenals. It is clear that we have come a long way, if we compare this to the much more modest limitations contained in the SALT treaties of the 1970s. However, somewhere down the road towards nuclear disarmament, one reaches a point beyond which the negative impact of the conventional imbalance in Europe becomes untenable.

This brings me to the fourth point, the increasing need for arms control in the conventional field. As you know, we have been struggling with this issue in the MBFR talks in Vienna for many years. This is an example of a negotiating process that has been blocked by the twin problems of insufficient transparency and disagreement over verification provisions. I do mean that efforts to achieve meaningful results in that forum should be continued.

Determination should guide us in a joint effort to bring the chemical weapons treaty within sight. In defining the essential characteristics of the treaty, some basic facts are to be borne in mind.

Firstly, the convention must, by its very nature, be detailed so as to cover all essential requirements; on the other hand, we must realize that not every single detail can be foreseen or taken care of. Technological developments will not come to a halt. The treaty should therefore provide for

a continuous review, among other things, of the lists of chemicals to be covered under the different régimes of control and prohibition.

Secondly, verification remains a key component of every credible and solid arms control treaty. That applies in particular to the chemical weapons convention. There, verification requires essentially a three fold structure: declaring and dismantling of stocks and production facilities; strict verification provisions including routine inspection of the relevant part of the chemical industry in an equitable but adequate way; and finally an appropriate régime for consultation, fact-finding procedures and challenge inspections.

The effectiveness of challenge inspections is closely related to the efficiency of the routine part of the verification régime -- verification of destruction and verification of non-production. A very stringent system of challenge inspection, and that is what we need, will prove acceptable only if it is reserved for exceptional cases of serious concern about compliance. The first condition for an effective challenge-inspection régime is therefore an effective system for routine inspection. The second condition is my view, is that when a party considers a challenge inspection to be necessary, no obstacle whatever should be able to prevent the inspection from taking place. The third condition is that an inspection should always and under all circumstances lead to a quick and clear answer. The challenged State party should therefore be under a stringent obligation to disapprove the allegations contained in the challenge request.

I am perfectly aware that meeting these conditions is not possible without paying the price of a certain openness. I am, however, convinced that, upon close consideration, this price is relatively small and is convincingly outweighed by the common goal of an effective world-wide ban on chemical weapons. Important work on this subject has been done in the recent past, especially by the United Kingdom (see document CD/715) and by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Netherlands will consider making a further contribution to the discussion on this most important subject when appropriate.

Recent reports on renewed use of these horrendous weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq have once again underlined the urgency of our work to bring about agreement on a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention.

CD/PV.418

pp.10,12-14

Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda 2.7.87

OS
CTB

Allow me at the very beginning of my statement to express my thanks to the Government of Canada for organizing an outer space workshop in Montreal in May. As a participant in that workshop, I would like to stress that it was a lively and very useful gathering which again drew attention to the necessity to prevent an arms race in outer space, to achieve relevant agreements and to ensure their effective verification. Especially as far as verification is concerned, the workshop proved that there are ways to explore how it could be done. New ideas were brought out and the exchange of views was sincere and valuable. Our thanks and appreciation go also to Ambassador Beesley of

Canada, who was the master-mind of the workshop and served as leader of our deliberations there with the famous Beesley approach, his skill at getting everyone to speak his mind openly.

It will be very important to evolve appropriate methods of verification which will ensure that outer space is not being used for aggressive military ends. The Montreal workshop I mentioned a while ago dealt with one of the possible approaches, that is verification through satellites. Another possible approach -- inspection of objects launched into outer space -- is reflected in the proposal advanced by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Yuli Vorontsov, at the beginning of our spring session. It is our feeling that a combination of the two approaches, that is verification "from below and from above" might lead to the establishment of an effective and viable verification system for outer space. Much still has to be discussed, especially how practically to combine the use of national satellites with their possible international use for verification purposes. My delegation would be only too happy if the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space could also discuss these important problems.

Our Conference can be considered a multilateral body with considerable experience in the area of a CTB. It was actively involved in the negotiation of the 1963 partial test-ban treaty; later it received reports from the participants in the trilateral negotiations on a CTB, the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom; it supports the activities of the group of scientific experts on seismology; it discussed verification and compliance aspects of a CTB in an ad hoc committee in 1982 and 1983. Moreover, we keep on discussing the problem widely at plenary meetings, where a number of important proposals have already been made. One of them, of which my country is a sponsor, came right at the beginning of the present summer session.

The document in question, entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests", was submitted by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Vladimir Petrovsky, on 9 June. It reflects the firm readiness of the socialist countries to negotiate in order to achieve the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. The proposal is envisaged as a platform for negotiations within our Conference, but not as the only one, since we have repeatedly reaffirmed our readiness to discuss any constructive proposals. In our opinion, the substance of all existing proposals could be discussed in an ad hoc committee on the CTB with an appropriately formulated mandate.

Today I would like to draw the attention of the distinguished representatives to section D of the proposal, entitled "Ensuring compliance with the Treaty". It is clearly stipulated here that verification of the CTBT would be assured through both national and international means of verification, including on-site inspection. Important information gained through national technical means will be placed at the disposal of the appropriate organ established under the Treaty and, where necessary, may also be placed at the disposal of other parties. We believe that such a provision rightly combines the national nature of the technical means at the disposal of

some countries with the contribution they may make to all the participants to the treaty.

International verification will be based on the continuous international exchange of level II data in accordance with agreed guidelines which will form an integral part of the treaty. For this purpose, a network of seismic stations with standard specifications will be established. We consider that members of the international inspectorate should be allowed to participate in the operation of these stations. In addition, the exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity would also be carried out.

After the treaty enters into force, it would be necessary to ensure that no nuclear explosions were being carried out at the former test ranges. For this to be reliably ensured we again propose the participation of both national personnel and international inspectors. Procedures for such verification will have to be agreed in advance.

Should national or international measures be insufficient to provide an assurance that the treaty is being fully complied with, an event whose status is unclear might be clarified through an on-site inspection. Each State party would have the right to request such an inspection in the territory of another State party. We maintain that the request for an on-site inspection should cite grounds for the request, and that the requested State would be obligated to grant access to the locations specified in the request. My delegation is not going to suggest complete and detailed guidelines on how to handle the requests, how to conduct on-site inspections or how to define the rights and functions of the inspecting personnel. We have a number of ideas in this regard, but the best way to proceed in formulating criteria and procedures for on-site inspections will be through common efforts in the relevant ad hoc committee, so that the interests and preoccupations of all future participants in the CTBT are duly taken into account. The same applies to the treaty organs, especially the international inspectorate, for which the functions and rules of procedure could be mutually agreed and specified in an annex to the treaty.

CD/PV.418

p.16

USSR/Nazarkin

2.7.87

CW

On many such questions the United States position still remains unclear. This also refers, in particular, to such a field as challenge inspections. The present United States views, in our understanding, presuppose that a challenge without the right of refusal should cover all sites and facilities on the territory of a State party without distinction as to the form of ownership or the degree of Government control thereof. Such was the United States interpretation of article X of its draft convention in CD/500. And what, in this connection, would its interpretation be of article XI of the same document? Is this article deleted or not? And if it remains, then in what cases does the United States side propose to apply it? Resolving the issue of challenge inspections depends to a considerable degree on the answer to this question.

There is another problem -- that of responsibility for the actions of the subsidiary of a company registered in one of the States parties to the future convention. In this case, two situations may arise: when the subsidiary

operates on the territory of another State party, and when it operates in a State not party to the convention. A third situation is also possible: that in which an international company registered in the territory of a State party operates in the territory of such a State. Such transnational corporations sometimes operate on the territory of other countries as a "State within a State", refusing to allow the activities of their subsidiaries to be monitored. The question of which State should be responsible for ensuring that these corporations observe the provisions of the convention is therefore of practical importance. Answers to this question would seem to be called for not only from the United States but also from other States in whose economic systems companies with considerable networks of affiliates on the territory of other States play an extensive role.

CD/PV.419

pp.4-6

Finland/Kahiluoto

7.7.87

CW

Second, verification of the fact that no new chemical weapons will be produced once the convention enters into force is of essential importance. Arrangements concerning non-production, unlike those concerning destruction of existing stockpiles, do not have a fixed time-limit.

Arrangements concerning non-production must avoid unduly hampering the legitimate operations of civilian chemical industry. There seems to be general agreement on this point. At the same time, we feel, like many others, that the additional supervision of the industry stemming from the verification régime of non-production will not prove to be too burdensome. The civilian chemical industry is already heavily regulated because of the potential hazards it poses to health and the environment.

Third, challenge inspection undoubtedly remains the major unresolved issue at this point. Sensitive security concerns of States are intimately involved here. It is encouraging, however, that a reasoned dialogue on this issue seems to have begun. Differences are being narrowed. In view of the grave consequences which suspicions of undeclared stocks or production facilities, if not promptly and satisfactorily allayed, would have for the convention and international security in general, an effective system of challenge inspections is clearly a necessity.

It has been quite clear from the very beginning that effective verification of compliance with the provisions of the chemical weapons convention is essential for the parties to have any confidence in it. Verification involves not only working out the necessary procedures in the convention itself, but also development of reliable technical methods and instruments to carry out specific verification tasks that those procedures entail.

It is precisely this latter aspect of chemical weapons verification to which Finland has devoted considerable efforts and resources since 1973. Our research project, conducted by a team of scientists from a number of Finnish universities and funded by the Finnish Government, develops instrumental methods for the detection, analysis and identification of chemical warfare agents. Since 1977, the results of the work have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament (and its predecessor) in the form of handbook-type annual reports, the so-called Finnish Blue Books.

Altogether, 11 Blue Books have been published so far, including this year's report. The latest report (CD/764) was introduced in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this past Friday. It is our hope that once a chemical weapons convention is concluded and enters into force, the Finnish Blue Books will constitute a kind of technical verification data base from which all States parties, and the Technical Secretariat in particular, may benefit.

Let me now briefly summarize the work done so far. The first 10 years of the project were devoted to developing analytical methods for three types of laboratories -- portable detection kits, trailer-installed field laboratories and stationary central laboratories -- as well as for collection of identification data on chemical warfare agents, their precursors, and degradation products. The findings were drawn together in the 1984 report.

In the 1985 report, attention was turned to air monitoring of chemical warfare agents. The report describes in detail various techniques for collecting and analysing low-volume, medium-volume and high-volume air samples. The two latest reports describe how these techniques were tested in practice by means of large-scale field experiments. Kilogram amounts of harmless stimulants of warfare agents were released into the atmosphere as finely dispersed aerosols. Air samples were then collected as far away as 200 kilometers downwind. At all distances, all the stimulants released could be detected and identified.

This is significant in two ways. First, the experiments prove that the techniques developed really work in actual field conditions and are highly selective and sensitive. Second, the experiments prove that even very small releases of chemical warfare agents can be discovered at great distances if a network of detection stations is available.

While verification of compliance with the convention will be primarily based on data reporting and inspections, it is, in our view, important to have available, as a complement, methods which can reliably detect and identify atmospheric releases of chemical agents regardless of source.

Since air monitoring facilities are also needed for surveillance of ambient air for reasons of environmental protection, it would not, in our view, be necessary to establish a monitoring network solely for the purpose of chemical weapons verification provided that the facilities are designed with both purposes in mind. We will shortly present a working paper to this Conference on the aspect of air monitoring.

Another important subject recently addressed by the Finnish Project on Verification of Chemical Disarmament is automatic monitoring. In February this year, the project organized a workshop in Helsinki for the purpose of studying the potential applications of automatic monitoring systems in the context of verifying a chemical weapons convention. Twenty-odd qualified experts from a number of countries involved with the chemical weapons negotiations participated. The proceedings of the workshop have just been circulated to the Conference on Disarmament as document CD/765. They were introduced in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons last Friday.

We in Finland appreciate the work done on various aspects of arms control

verification in many countries, members and non-members of the CD alike. We have followed with interest the Norwegian research programme of verification of alleged use of chemical weapons since it was initiated in 1981. We are also aware of the important work on this and other subjects of verification carried out by Canada.

May I take this opportunity to thank the Governments of Canada and Norway for the valuable meetings they organized for our benefit among others, in the month of May. We found the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal as well as the Oslo Symposium on the Chemical Weapons Convention most informative on the issues concerned.

At this advanced stage of chemical weapons negotiations, a certain amount of co-ordination among the various national-level chemical weapons verification projects might be in order. After all, they do have a common goal: the rapid conclusion and effective functioning of a chemical weapons convention. Specifically, we have in mind a division of labour where outstanding technical verification issues would be apportioned among the various interested projects for in-depth study.

The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons would, in our view, be the most competent body to help to identify such outstanding technical issues for this purpose, perhaps even indicating an order of priority for their examination. Based on such guidance, representatives for the various interested projects could then agree among themselves on which of them would do what.

CD/PV.419

pp.6-8

Norway/Huslid

7.7.87

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I have asked for the floor today to introduce -- and I consider this as a special honor -- to introduce on behalf of Canada and my own country, Norway, a concrete proposal in connection with the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. These negotiations have also just been extensively dealt with by my Finnish colleague, and I am grateful for the positive comments he made on the research made by the two countries. The proposal I have the honour to introduce is contained in document CD/766, of 2 July 1987, which concerns procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons.

We know that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in war. That Protocol is adhered to by more than 100 countries. It has, however, no verification provisions. For this reason, an understanding was reached in this Conference in 1983 to incorporate in the convention on which we are now negotiating a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. It is, of course, necessary to see to it that this is done in a way which does not erode the status of the Geneva Protocol, which is one of the oldest arms control treaties. The incorporation of a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the chemical weapons convention could, in fact, reinforce the Geneva Protocol.

It is therefore necessary to devise a proper verification mechanism which could be included in the new convention and applied in cases of allegations of use of chemical weapons. In order to contribute to this, both Canada and Norway initiated research programmes on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons in this field in 1981. The results of this research have

been submitted to the Conference on Disarmament. It follows from the documents which have already been submitted that Canada and Norway have studied all phases of the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, i.e. from establishment of an inspection team and the team's investigation to submission of its report.

Against this background and taking into account the advanced phase of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, Canada and Norway have jointly elaborated a draft treaty text concerning general procedures for the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons.

Any allegation of the use of chemical weapons would, of course, be a matter of the most serious concern to the States parties to a convention banning chemical weapons altogether. Immediate on-site inspection, whether at the invitation of the State party on whose territory the alleged use of chemical weapons occurred or at the request of another State party, would be necessary for the purpose of maintaining the effectiveness and authority of the convention. Thus provisions in article IX concerning consultations, co-operation and fact-finding have relevance to verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, and the procedures applicable for verifying such an event should be included in an annex to article IX. We have thus elaborated a proposal for such an annex. In drawing up this proposal we have consulted a number of countries.

I cannot here go into any detail as to the concrete content of this proposal, and I refer to the paper, but I would like to mention a few salient points. The proposal requires that, upon receipt of a request from a State party for an inspection, the International Authority shall immediately notify the State party (or States parties) concerned of the requirement to conduct on-site inspection within 48 hours. The State party (or States parties) so notified shall make the necessary preparations for the arrival of the inspection team. The team should comprise a number of International Inspectors with the necessary qualifications, experience and training, as well as supporting staff with special skills or training, who may be required to assist the International Inspectors.

The International Inspectors shall be permitted to take with them the necessary equipment and supplies and have unimpeded access to the site or sites. They shall collect enough samples so that a reliable conclusion may be reached as to the allegation of the use of chemical weapons and also interview people who may have been affected by the alleged use.

The samples shall be analysed by at least two designated laboratories. The Technical Secretariat shall draw up a list of certified laboratories, which must be in possession of standardized equipment for the type or types of analysis to be conducted. The Executive Council shall approve this list. The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the laboratory analyses of samples so that these results may be taken into account with the report of the inspection team.

The report of the International Inspectors shall be submitted to the Technical Secretariat within 10 days of the completion of the inspection. The report shall be factual in nature and contain the findings of the International Inspectors. The Technical Secretariat shall provide a copy of

the report to the State party that requested the inspection, to each State party that received the inspection, to the State party alleged to have used chemical weapons, and to the members of the Executive Council.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to add that the proposal contains a clause which states that the Technical Secretariat, under the supervision of the Executive Council, shall elaborate, and revise as necessary, technical procedures and interview questionnaires for the guidance of International Inspectors in the conduct of an on-site inspection.

The proposal tabled by Canada and Norway is based on six years of research by our two countries in the field of verification of alleged use. Canada and Norway submit this proposal as a basis for negotiations on the text for an annex to article IX concerning general procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. We hope that the content of this proposal can be included prior to the beginning of the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament in the rolling text, which will reflect the status of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention at that time.

The proposal which I have presented today, should be seen in light of the commitment of both Canada and Norway to contribute to an early conclusion of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. It concerns a question which so far has not been dealt with in detail in the negotiations. In fact, the proposal is the first full-fledged text covering all phases of the procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. We commend the proposal for your constructive consideration.

CD/PV.419

pp.12-13

Japan/Yamada

7.7.87

OS

In reviewing the international law related to arms control and disarmament in outer space, we cannot bypass the basic issue of definition of a "space weapon". There are a number of complex problems which would make an abstract definition quite inadequate. For example, how do we deal with dual-purpose technologies? How do we set the criteria for defining a weapon? Which should be regarded as more important, the purpose of use or the objective function? It would seem much more practical to seek, through our work to grasp how outer space is being actually used, to identify the instances of military use, to categorize them, and to consider such measures as may be called for.

As measures to secure compliance with article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the installation of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction in space and other celestial bodies, we may recall article XI of the same Treaty, which stipulates for the provision of information on space activities and was later developed into the Convention on Registration, and article XII, which stipulates for the opening of all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies to representatives of other States parties on a basis of reciprocity. However, as I said earlier, the information to be provided under the Convention on Registration is limited. Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty, which was one of the key provisions seriously discussed in negotiating the Treaty, stipulates for nothing with respect to outer space other than celestial bodies. Therefore, those provisions are of only limited relevance

in relation to verification. We need to see if these limited provisions are adequate to cope with the verification needs that arise from current space activities.

There have been truly remarkable developments in space technology compared to 1967 when the Outer Space Treaty was concluded. A large-scale space tracking radar can provide crucial information and a satellite in itself can apparently play an important role as a means of verification. Based on these changes in circumstances, it would be useful to examine what kind of technical verification means would be applicable to a multilateral verification system. Conversely, if we can identify available verification means, we may also be able to go on to see what kind of prohibiting provisions can be agreed on multilaterally.

One important proposal in this regard relates to the establishment of an ISMA (international satellite monitoring agency). There will be a number of legal, financial, and technical problems to be resolved on this proposal. However, my delegation shares the hope that such a proposal can contribute towards the solution of the verification issues, and it is keenly interested in seeing how the proposal is dealt with and developed in the future.

I have tried to set forth briefly the views of my delegation on the issues before us. As a country devoted to technological development for the peaceful use of outer space, we wish to continue to contribute to the deliberations in the CD on developing a sharper focus on verification and other problems, bearing in mind the technologies available to us.

CD/PV.420

pp.4-6

Canada/Beesley

9.7.87

CW

Canada's long-standing interest in the broad issues of verification is by now well known. In the context of chemical weapons, we have devoted special attention, and considerable research effort, to questions relating to the verification of allegations of chemical weapon use. Last year, I tabled in this forum a Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, which had earlier been presented to the United Nations Secretary-General. I am pleased to inform the Conference that we will be shortly submitting to the Conference on Disarmament a report entitled Verification: Development of a Portable Trichothecene Sensor Kit for the Detection of T-2 Mycotoxin in Human Blood Samples. It was conveyed to the United Nations Secretary-General on 20 May 1987. In his letter to His Excellency the Secretary-General, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, said the following:

"The recent confirmed use of chemical weapons, in violation of international law, underlines the need to add to the body of knowledge which will contribute to the efficacy of a future treaty banning chemical weapons altogether. Such a treaty will, of necessity, make provision for the verification of allegations of the use of these weapons, with a view to deterring their use".

In referring specifically to the portable sensor kit, Mr. Clark pointed out:

"This research project was undertaken as a case-study, to develop a better understanding of the technical problems associated with the provision of appropriate sensors to an investigating team. The speedy collection and subsequent analysis of samples pose many problems to an investigating team. These problems are compounded if the allegation relates to a 'novel' agent, that is, a chemical substance not previously used for or associated with hostile purposes".

The report which I will be submitting, while documenting two years of work, still leaves many questions unanswered. Nevertheless, we wish to share this work with other members of the international community who are also concerned with these matters.

There is general agreement that, in addition to providing for cessation of the production of chemical weapons and for their destruction, the convention we are negotiating should also expressly ban the use of such weapons. The inclusion of such a provision will not only reaffirm the ban on use as set out in the 1925 Geneva Protocol but, by doing so in a context which includes specific provision for the verification of any allegations of use, will significantly strengthen the authority of the Protocol. We must ensure, of course, that nothing in the convention undermines the continuing authority of the 1925 Protocol - the point raised by my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Huslid of Norway, earlier this week and a point which has regularly been raised by the French delegation, to whom we are indebted as the guardians of that Protocol.

Canada was therefore particularly pleased to join with Norway in preparing a proposed annex to article IX entitled "General procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons". It attempts to set out a practical, workable framework for verifying allegations of use. We are indebted to Ambassador Huslid for the clarity with which he introduced this joint proposal for our collective consideration. Norway, although not yet officially a member of a CD, has consistently contributed most usefully to our work over many years. Like Canada, Norway has devoted special attention to questions relating to chemical weapons use. This has proved invaluable in the formulation of the proposed annex to article IX. Yet I suggest that the full value of the Norwegian and Canadian research efforts in these areas, much of which is of a highly technical nature, may come to be appreciated only after a convention is concluded and a technical secretariat has been set up to implement the convention and all its verification requirements. The same point could be made about the valuable work which Finland has shared, over the years, with the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors.

The proposed annex reflects our view that any type of use of chemical weapons would constitute the most serious kind of breach of the convention and that the verification requirement must be of a rigour that reflects the gravity of any such allegation. It takes cognizance of what seems to be an emerging consensus within this forum that the investigation of an alleged use must involve short-notice, on-site inspections. As formulated, the proposed annex aims to include provisions relating to procedures, techniques and allocation of responsibility at appropriate levels of both generality and precision, while allowing for the reality that many procedural and technical details will need to be worked out, by the Technical Secretariat under the supervision of the Executive Council. The annex aims to provide the necessary

framework and guidance within which the more detailed procedures and techniques can be devised and effectively implemented. We join with the Norwegian delegation in commending it to the attention of the Conference for inclusion in the rolling text of the convention.

Earlier in my comments, I made a generally positive appreciation of the manner in which our negotiations are now proceeding. I also cited concrete events which underline the importance and urgency of our making progress. In concluding, I would like to register a cautionary note. We are embarked upon some of the most politically sensitive, legally intricate and technically demanding multilateral arms negotiations ever undertaken. If we are successful, this will be the first time in the history of multilateral arms control that a major disarmament agreement has been concluded that also involves the creation from scratch of an elaborate, permanent new institution to oversee the implementation of such an agreement (we might usefully recall that the International Atomic Energy Agency preceded the conclusion of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and that its responsibilities continue to embrace other than arms control questions). Moreover, the implementation of this agreement will necessarily involve an unprecedented degree of intrusiveness into both military and civilian sectors of our societies. We therefore need to proceed with care and deliberation. Several important issues remain unresolved. On the question of challenge inspections, for example, while some considerable progress has been made, we have not yet been able to reach agreement with the required degree of precision. There also remains much detailed work to be done not only on technical questions but also on matters relating to the establishment, operation and governance of the international authority which will be responsible for overseeing the implementing of the convention.

CD/PV.421

pp.6,8-9

UK/Mellor

14.7.87

CTB
CW

Finally, I come to constraints on nuclear testing. A nuclear test ban has long been one of the subjects on the Conference on Disarmament's agenda and you all know far better than I that, following the 1977-1980 negotiations, a committee of this Conference considered the subject for two years. I regret it has not been possible since then to agree a mandate for further discussion.

Meanwhile, the group of scientific experts has continued its very valuable work. I hope that this will continue free from any sort of politicization. The scientific group demonstrates how the Conference on Disarmament can best contribute to the discussion of nuclear testing constraints. The 1977-1980 negotiations were not brought to a successful conclusion. Nor is it useful to see those negotiations necessarily as the starting point for what we now need to do. Instead, I believe that the Conference on Disarmament should look to its own strengths, the sort of discussions which resolve technical problems and expose remaining difficulties. The present group does just this in the technical field. A committee could perform the same role in relation to other issues. Among them is the need to address verification problems. These remain unresolved, despite ill-informed claims to the contrary. Such a prospect was laid down in the Western programme of work and, indeed, in the draft mandate proposed earlier by the distinguished Czechoslovak delegate, Ambassador Vejvoda. Both were acceptable to us.

Chemical weapons are, of course, the classic example of the futility of unilateral gestures. The United Kingdom gave up its chemical weapons capability in the 1950s and the United States stopped making such weapons in 1969. But it was only in April this year that the Soviet Union announced they had finally ceased production. And even if this is so, the West now faces a truly massive Soviet stockpile. Very few countries are prepared to admit their possession of chemical weapons, but the reports of the spread of such weapons are too frequent and too insistent to ignore.

I would like to pay tribute to the valuable work that has been done at this Conference. Our aim for chemical weapons is particularly ambitious. It is not to set limits. It is not to freeze existing levels. It is to abolish them completely, in an effective, verifiable, global ban. You were kind enough, Mr. President, to mention my predecessor, Timothy Renton, and since he spoke at this Conference last year we have seen encouraging progress: substantial areas of agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons and of their means of production; and acceptance of the importance of a verification régime for civil chemical production. The momentum that developed last year under Dr. Cromartie has been maintained under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus and I was pleased to have the opportunity of an informal talk with him yesterday. I am heartened by the warm reception for the British paper on challenge inspection that we tabled last year and many problems of principle seem set for resolution. Nevertheless, as the solutions to some of our differences of principle become clearer, so it becomes more important to think through all the practical implications. Permit me to mention two areas in particular.

In the first place, we all accept the need to verify that chemical weapons are not secretly produced and that precursors made in the civil industry are not diverted or abused. But, at the same time, we recognize the need to reconcile the objectives of the convention with the legitimate concerns of civil industry if the convention is to be acceptable to all. This inevitably means looking at very detailed issues. The seminar held here in Geneva last week for representatives for many national chemical industries gave an opportunity for detailed and practical discussions of this crucial area. We must now build on this experience. We must agree among ourselves such crucial questions as those chemicals we wish to see subject to verifications; those levels of production which should concern the convention; and how to update the overall régime to take account of advances in science.

My second example has perhaps received less attention in the past. Once all the negotiating problems have been resolved, we have to move quickly and effectively from an agreed convention to implementing an actual global ban, which actually works in the way the negotiators intend. We in the United Kingdom have in the past stressed the case for having an international organization able to carry out this all-important task of overseeing implementation. Progress has been made. But we now need to give further thought to how the organization can be set up, so that everything necessary in done to good time.

That is why I am tabling today a new United Kingdom paper, which I think has been distributed, entitled "Making the chemical weapons ban effective".

It contains our detailed ideas on what is needed. The paper suggests that some aspects can be left in the hands of a Preparatory Commission. However, the paper also notes that further work is needed here, in the Ad hoc Committee. We must ensure that adequate verification technology is available. And we have to obtain a clearer idea of the likely size and cost of the permanent staff of the organization.

Once more, openness should not mean more rhetoric but more disclosure. What we need is not more speeches, but more facts and figures. We need to know what other Governments have, where they have it and what they do with it. Now is the time, I believe, for all delegations, including those which have declined in the past, to indicate their likely future declarations. Only in this way can realistic estimates be prepared. And only in this way can the crucial confidence in this mutual endeavour be established. The new United Kingdom paper provides the framework within which, we hope, good intentions can be translated into effective action.

CD/PV.421

pp.18-21

Mexico/Gracia Robles

14.7.87

CW

I shall now turn to two questions which, in view of their importance, will be crucial to the success of our work: I refer to what is termed "non-production" and to all that relates to verification.

As I said a moment ago, one of the paramount objectives of the convention we are now negotiating is to prevent the manufacture of chemical weapons in future. To achieve this objective, it will be inevitable to impose certain controls on civilian industry, including some restrictions on industries producing substances that might be diverted to prohibited purposes. This is something which will undoubtedly affect all States parties, whether they are possessors or not possessors of chemical weapons, developed countries or developing countries, and it has therefore been playing a preponderant role in our discussions for some time.

The substances of interest have been divided into three basic categories in keeping with the risk they entail. On the basis of this classification, a number of verification systems involving measures of varying stringency have been devised. Thus, the production of substances in schedule 1 -- mostly neurotoxic agents -- in amounts exceeding one tonne per year will be prohibited; the manufacture of compounds in schedule 2 -- key precursors -- will be subject to a strict régime of international inspections to avoid their diversion for prohibited purposes; and, finally, the production and use of the substances in schedule 3 -- those that could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons but are employed on a large scale for legitimate peaceful activities -- will have to be declared as precisely as possible to the international authority.

To complete this system, we must consider the problem posed by the "commercial super-toxics", in other words, the highly toxic substances that are used in civilian industry, for instance, in the pharmaceutical branch and in the production of pesticides. It would appear necessary to set up for them a special category, one distinct from the three already established, in order to deal with them adequately. However, the differences of opinion that exist concerning the compounds that could be considered and the type of measures that would be applied to them have precluded our finding a solution to this

issue -- which, as all parties to the negotiations recognize, is both necessary and urgent.

We all know that the present schedules cannot be exhaustive or definitive. Their first review will take place when States possessing chemical weapons declare the composition of their arsenals to the international authority. Maybe these will include chemicals which have not been considered in the course of negotiations; consideration will then have to be given to the incorporation of those substances in the schedules. Later on, if we want the convention to keep its full force, periodic updating of the schedules in the light of the progress of science and technology will be inevitable. That is why the importance has been recognized of a flexible, expeditious and reliable mechanism for this purpose. It will thus be possible to include a new chemical in the schedules, to withdraw it from them or to shift it from one schedule to another. We have worked to this end during this session and progress has been satisfactory.

My delegation considers that appropriate verification machinery is essential if an international disarmament agreement is to function effectively for all its parties. The convention on chemical weapons, of course, does not elude this general rule. Ambitious in its objectives, the draft which is now being drawn up also establishes a very broad system of verification designed to guarantee full compliance with all its provisions.

An independent international body created by the convention itself would be responsible for these very delicate tasks. This seems to us an optimum solution for ensuring the credibility of the instrument. As you will all recall, that was the course chosen by the Latin American States when, over 20 years ago, they negotiated the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the functioning of the body that was set up has been entirely satisfactory.

The problems posed by the verification of the numerous obligations the convention will impose are obviously considerable. To guarantee, on the one hand, that chemical weapons will not be produced in future and that prohibited activities will not be carried out, while taking into account, on the other hand, the protection of trade secrets and the need not to interfere excessively in national civilian activities makes the design of appropriate verification machinery even more difficult. We are all aware of the great difficulties this involves and we must strive to resolve them. Some sacrifices will be inevitable for the sake of the greater interest.

The main body will be a consultative committee made up of all the States parties. As it is hoped that the convention will have the greatest possible number of adherents, it will not be easy for the committee to take expeditious decisions and to intervene rapidly and effectively in case of crisis. Consequently, it will be necessary to establish a subsidiary body of the committee, of limited membership and called the executive council, which will be formally subordinate to the committee and will discharge all its functions while the committee is not in session.

Serious differences of opinion have arisen in regard to the composition of the executive council. My delegation believes that the only valid criterion for the selection of the members of that body is that of equitable political and geographical distribution. Using this method, as happens in the

case of other bodies in the United Nations family, each group will freely select its representatives, taking account of the parameters it deems appropriate.

As for the difficult problem of decision-making, my delegation inclines in favour of adopting the simple and unambiguous procedure of a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. We believe that to demand consensus would seriously hinder the work of the committee and the council as it would give each of the parties a right of veto that it could exercise at any time, to the detriment of the proper functioning of the convention.

The international verification machinery that is going to be entrusted to the consultative committee and its subsidiary bodies contains two elements that will ensure its full effectiveness: on the one hand, a system of declarations and routine inspections that seeks to be as complete as possible and, on the other, a "safety net" for use only in exceptional cases -- challenge inspection -- designed to remedy possible deficiencies in the normal procedure.

In our negotiations, emphasis was, quite justifiably, placed on building a system with no loopholes, a mechanism that would give everybody full confidence that the provisions of the convention were being observed. A whole series of measures to be applied to the activities of States parties has been designed for this purpose, ranging from permanent verification of destruction of arsenals to systematic inspections, without prior notice, of civilian production facilities. My delegation is fully in favour of a strict régime in order effectively to guarantee the complete disappearance of the chemical threat.

"Challenge inspection" constitutes the essential complement to the routine system. My delegation sees such inspection as an exceptional event prompted by serious doubts about compliance with the convention that have not been dispelled through normal channels. In view of the political damage that it will inevitably cause, we do not believe that it will be frequent. However, we do consider that a State's right to request such inspection if it feels it to be necessary must not be limited.

It has not been possible to reach agreement on reasonable procedures for challenge inspection. The excessive demands of some -- the immediate opening of facilities -- together with the excessive hesitancy of others -- the subjecting of inspection to the consent of the receiving State -- have prevented the finding of an intermediate position that could satisfy one and all. For its part, my delegation remains convinced that the text drawn up in the intensive consultations held by the chairman of the relevant working group last year and which could not even be included in the Committee's report because of the opposition of one delegation constitutes an excellent negotiating basis since it contains realistic proposals and limits to the minimum the possibilities of refusing an inspection.

The 1925 Protocol, to which Spain is a contracting party and which meant a large step in the right direction, none the less reserves the possibility of possessing chemical weapons and the legitimacy of their use as a reprisal. And, although these arms were not used in the Second World War, we have seen with indignation that they have been used in other conflicts, and especially in the conflict raging today between Iraq and Iran. Consequently, only the radical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of these weapons will be an absolute guarantee of the impossibility of their use. Of course, a treaty of this kind requires in its turn rigorous procedures for verifying that its terms are being respected by all its parties and also requires universal participation and, first and foremost, the participation of the great military Powers.

Consequently, my country is in favour of rapid, effective and sure verification systems and we believe that the necessary efforts should be made to resolve the greatest problem still outstanding: in our view, the problem of challenge inspection, whether in the case of chemical weapons storage facilities or in the case of production facilities. We welcome the favourable disposition that has been shown in the area of principles and we hope that it will swiftly be transformed into texts that will ensure the necessary rapidity and effectiveness in the functioning of this final "safety net" in the implementation of the future convention. We continue to believe that the proposal by the United Kingdom in document CD/715 provides an excellent basis for this work.

As you know, our delegation is participating actively to that end in the work of the Ad hoc Committee, where, of course it is still necessary to resolve other detailed questions, such as those of the schedules of chemicals to be subject to various verification procedures, the declaration of arsenals, obsolete weapons, the order of destruction, the institutional systems, and also the sanctions or measures to be adopted in the event of proven violations of the future convention. And I should like to stress that, if the possibility of reprisals is excluded, it will be essential to guarantee absolutely that the convention will be respected.

In connection with the order of destruction of existing chemical weapons, the Spanish delegation has submitted a working paper whose purpose is to achieve a reduction through "equal gradients of risk" of each chemical in each annual destruction period, taking as a basis for computation the median lethal dose or the median incapacitating dose, which are the most significant parameters in the military utilization of chemical weapons. On that basis, the equivalent masses of risk of each chemical can be determined, which enables a comparison to be made of the chemicals to be destroyed, or the substances to be replaced when that is necessary because of imperatives relating to the handling of stocks, the capacity of the destruction facility, or any other considerations, including political considerations, that make it advisable to have a solid basis of comparison. Our proposal is compatible with others and we would be prepared to study any combinations capable of yielding the desired result. However, we must point out as of now that we do not deem it desirable to establish provisions designed to permit, even temporarily, chemical armament in order to achieve a new equilibrium which today does not exist or provisions that would imply an invitation to countries which today do not possess chemical weapons to acquire them.

I am referring to the fact that next week the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) will reconvene in Geneva and will work towards the second global seismological monitoring experiment, an experiment which, for the first time, will include the exchange of wave-form data. This will be a remarkable and significant instance of international co-operation, not only for scientific purposes, but to demonstrate that a comprehensive nuclear test ban will be able to be verified. On the occasion of the first global experiment, 37 States participated, 75 seismological stations were linked. Clearly there will be at least a similar number on this next occasion.

In the interval between the last global experiment, in 1984, and today, work has not stood still, either nationally or in terms of international co-operation, in the field of seismological monitoring. Allow me to describe briefly Australia's own work, both nationally and in co-operation with others as an example of such continuing developments.

In view of its geographical position and because it is a large "quiet" continent in terms of background noise, Australia is particularly well placed to play a major role in seismic monitoring. This was recognized in the decision of the GSE to designate Australia as one of four International Data Centres (IDC) for the major network trail planned for 1988-89. The four IDCs will fulfill the requirement for the framework of the international seismic monitoring network. In 1984, the Australian Government decided, in keeping with its support for the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, to upgrade Australia's own capacity to contribute to an international seismic monitoring network. In September 1986, the Government opened the Australian Seismological Centre (ASC) in Canberra which draws together seismic information from seismic stations and arrays on the Australian continent and in Antarctica. In June 1987, the Government dedicated a new seismic array processor (ASPRO) that will provide enhanced analysis of seismic data. This system is capable of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions down to yields of a few kilotonnes at the main United States, French, Soviet and Chinese nuclear test sites and, of course, it is well known that the United Kingdom's tests are conducted at a United States site. It is our intention shortly to commence publication, on a regular basis, of an Australian Seismological Centre Bulletin which would give all details of nuclear tests monitored by the Centre. We see this among other things as in keeping with the spirit of last year's General Assembly resolution 41/59 N on the notification of nuclear tests, in which we urged all States, including the nuclear-weapon States, to comply by making available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations all information they have on time, location and yield of nuclear explosions.

Australia's own national seismic capability is derived in large measure from international co-operation: with New Zealand; with the United States, which jointly operates the recently dedicated Alice Springs Seismic Array Processor; with other countries participating in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts. Our co-operation with New Zealand has now been formalized in the Australia-New Zealand Seismic Monitoring Agreement which was signed by the two Prime Ministers in Apia on 30 April this year. I have the privilege now, on behalf of the delegations of New Zealand and Australia, to circulate to members of the Conference English-language copies of that Agreement. I

might mention that the Agreement is being issued by the Secretariat in all languages as document CD/775.

With respect to this Agreement between Australia and New Zealand, I would make the following main points. The Agreement complements the efforts being made in the Group of Scientific Experts, in which both Australia and New Zealand participate actively. The Agreement demonstrates the importance both countries attach to the seismic monitoring of nuclear tests. The Agreement reiterates Australia and New Zealand's strong and active commitment to the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. It demonstrates the importance we attach to early progress towards the verification régime needed to support a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, both as a necessary task to be accomplished before such a treaty can come into operation and as something the effective operation of which would in itself enhance prospects for a treaty. We believe that bilateral co-operation such as this, as well as being intrinsically positive, has a valuable demonstration effect, stimulating interest in international co-operation in seismic monitoring and, in particular, in the possibility of an international monitoring network. We hope that the Agreement will give added momentum to the conviction that the time has come for the establishment of a global seismic network.

Exactly one year ago, on 18 July 1986, I tabled in this Conference document CD/717. It is the Australian proposal for the immediate establishment of a global seismic network. A decision on this proposal was not able to be taken last year, but the proposal was noted in the records and report of the Conference. And, as already mentioned, events have moved on. The reality is that the forthcoming global experiment will for all effective purposes establish such a network for a period of the experiment. The adoption of the proposal made in CD/717 would ensure that that network was established permanently. We are asking that, before this 1987 session of the Conference concludes, the Conference adopt our proposal. It is simple, it makes sense, it is utterly consistent with the stated policy on nuclear testing of all who sit at this table. It would represent a major concrete achievement by this Conference.

Some may ask "Why do this now? or "What, at root, is at issue?" The fact is that, while various bilateral talks are proceeding, while we are talking here, while resolutions are being adopted at the Assembly, and important declarations issued elsewhere by specific groups, such as the six-country group, on the political level, it is clear that agreement to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty has yet to be settled. That agreement will come, and we believe it, because it is necessary. Even those who say it is not ripe yet never say it will not come. What do we do in the meantime? Do we simply wait? Our answer is no. We believe that we should follow what is the only sensible course of action under such circumstances: build every necessary piece of this structure -- the structure of a treaty -- so that, when the last piece is ready, no time will be lost in fitting it in and in completing the treaty. It would be tragic if we were unprepared, if we were not ready when agreement comes. Building a global seismic network now will mean that we will be ready. And, by demonstrating that a comprehensive treaty can be verified, we will forge a positive interaction between the political and technical aspects of the nuclear testing problem.

A central part of that positive interaction is the signal we will send to testing States. They say verification is a problem. What does it mean to them, what does it do to political prospects, if we deny that and say, "Let's have the negotiation first and worry about verification later"? Surely it is better to respond by saying, "If you have a problem with verification, then let's fix that problem"? On a political level this would respond to seriously-expressed concerns and would answer them. The establishment of a global seismic network is precisely such a response, precisely such an answer. We should give that response this year: we should adopt the proposal outlined in CD/717.

CD/PV.423

pp.6-7

Argentina/Campora

21.7.87

OS

The Ad hoc Committee has now begun its deliberations on the third item on its programme of work, which concerns proposals and future initiatives for preventing an arms race in outer space. It is obvious that, to prevent an arms race in outer space, the first measure that must be taken is to avoid the deployment of weapons, and that requires both a binding commitment in that sense and the adoption of verification systems that will ensure compliance with that commitment. The Conference on Disarmament is giving proof within the context of other items that it is possible to draw up complex verification procedures when there is the political will necessary to reconcile the goals of disarmament with those of national security and industrial and commercial secrecy. Why should it not be possible to establish a binding régime for the registration of objects launched into space? That is very simple to do given political will. Regrettably, the space Powers wish to reserve a wide measure of freedom of action for themselves in the military use of outer space and prefer to keep secret the nature of the vast majority of objects that they launch into space. It is then inevitable that the secrecy of the activity of some should generate a similar attitude in others.

The 1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space provides an appropriate basis of rules that can be perfected, first of all, by establishing their binding nature and then by incorporating in them verification clauses enabling it to be checked that the information recorded is reliable. The efficient operation of a register of objects launched into space and a corresponding verification system would solve a series of problems relating to the immunity of satellites intended for peaceful use, since it would be possible, as a result, to ascertain the purpose of a space object and, consequently, its right to enjoy immunity. Similar arrangements could be made for the registration of those satellites which have special functions, such as observation satellites, early-warning satellites, satellites for the purpose of monitoring compliance with disarmament agreements, etc.

There is, perhaps today, no greater focus of attention among the issues linked to the drawing up of disarmament treaties or agreements than that of verification. For almost two years now -- to be precise, since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 40/152/0 relating to verification, a resolution supported by the two military alliances -- we have undoubtedly been witnessing a real diplomatic competition as to who is more enthusiastic about verification formulae. Verification is today the essential and preliminary step for any disarmament agreement. Very complex formulae are being tested in the context of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and we are all aware

too of the situation with regard to the verification of nuclear-weapon tests and to other items such as radiological weapons, negative assurances and so on. Verification in the context of the items we have mentioned should provide a solution to intricate situations such as, for instance, avoiding non-permitted production of substances within an industry as common and widely scattered as the chemical industry. None the less, gradually and with admirable creativity and imagination, verification mechanisms are being worked out.

But we cannot help feeling surprised at the fact that the analysis of the item relating to verification within the framework of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space has not been the subject of greater attention despite the fact that activity in outer space originates here on the Earth's surface in a very limited number of places. The space Powers, which are few in number, also have only a few places for launching objects into space. Verification of the nature of the objects that are placed in space could be effected at the launch-sites themselves and that would entirely dispel all doubts as to the military or peaceful nature of an object sent into space. It is obvious that the implementation of monitoring and verification machinery at the bases for the launching of vehicles with cargoes of a military and strategic nature would be resisted by the respective space Powers. It can be deduced therefore that the opening of such sites for the verification, albeit only visual, of loads to be placed in orbit would require a political decision by the space Powers, aimed at achieving a certain transparency in their policy for the use of outer space. To sum up and to conclude this statement, it just remains for me to point out that the prevention of an arms race in outer space depends solely on simple acts of political will by the space Powers.

CD/PV.423

pp.12-16

Canada/Beesley

21.7.87

VER
OS

May I also say, since the main topic of my comments will be verification, how really encouraging it is to have heard so many references to verification in each of the speeches we have heard this morning. I do not know if we have had a previous occasion where that has proven true, and I doubt if it would have occurred a year ago, and this is extremely encouraging. Indeed, I have asked for the floor today to table two documents. The first of these is a summary report of the Outer Space Workshop which was held for heads of Conference on Disarmament and observer delegations in Montreal on 14-17 May 1987. The second is a Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals compiled by the Verification Research Unit of the Canadian Department of External Affairs. Delegations may recall that in my comments to the Conference on 30 April I drew attention to Canada's emphasis on practical work towards arms control agreements. Consistent with this approach we have undertaken continuing research on the verification of such agreements. The two documents that I am tabling are both examples of this practical approach.

It is the essence of an arms control and disarmament agreement that contracting parties agree to renounce, limit or destroy armaments or military forces in return for treaty commitments by other parties to do the same. To ask States to renounce or scrap weapons in return for treaty obligations as a preferable way of protecting their security is to demand of them a very serious and difficult decision. In effect, a State accepts a treaty in lieu

of weapons as a means of protecting its security. This is an extremely important undertaking, since a primary responsibility of all Governments must be to protect the security, however defined or perceived, of their respective countries. Given the traditional and contemporary concern with national security, the importance of verification becomes evident: it is the means by which a party ensures confidence, throughout the life of an arms control agreement, that other parties are complying with their obligations, while at the same time demonstrating its own good faith.

It is the Canadian position, which I wish to emphasize, that the careful negotiation and drafting of adequate and effective verification provisions is essential to preventing a deterioration of confidence in an arms control or disarmament agreement. This applies a fortiori to agreements involving nuclear weapons and nuclear tests. In a world where there are relatively few internationally effective sanctions, verification inevitably must play a critical role in ensuring that a treaty is and remains effective, and does not become a source of tension rather than a means of lessening or eliminating it.

As pointed out during a seminar in Ottawa on 19 June at the Conference on Nuclear Weapons and the Law, verification can be perceived to perform a series of central functions, but there would seem to be four of particular importance: deterrence of non-compliance; confidence-building; removal of uncertainty; and treaty assessment.

Through its primary role in holding out a credible prospect of detection of non-compliance with an agreement, verification serves to protect the security of all the parties to an agreement. When adequate and effective verification increases the risk of detection that a prospective violator would face, the temptation to seek advantage by violating an agreement is reduced and deterrence is enhanced. There are political costs to a violator in being exposed.

Second, verification also seeks to demonstrate compliance, not merely non-compliance or possible non-compliance. Continued evidence of compliance with an agreement can develop and maintain confidence in the intentions of other parties. The concept of good faith is central to the law of treaties as a whole, and arms control in particular, and is applicable both to the fulfillment of treaty obligations and to their interpretation. Thus, increased trust based on demonstrated good faith could have positive benefits for the conduct of relations between the States in question as well as for international relations generally. Equally so, the cynical assumption of the automaticity and inevitability of bad faith on the part of the other side negates the whole arms control process and risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Verification has a third role, however -- perhaps even the most important -- that of clarifying facts and removing uncertainty where doubts arise. When an ambiguous activity is detected, an effective verification system will counteract false alarms by producing clear evidence. If uncertainty continues with respect to an activity's legitimacy, it may be an indication of an inadequacy in a treaty provision, as much as an indication of bad faith.

Finally, verification can provide a means of surveillance and appraisal of the effectiveness of the treaty itself. By providing a broad range of

objective, operationally relevant data, verification provisions can provide an invaluable information base for the continuing review and assessment of a treaty's operation in practice and, perhaps, point the way to possible changes in either the substance of the treaty or its manner of application, as well as providing useful and instructive guidelines for future treaties.

It was with these considerations in mind that we invited heads of the Conference on Disarmament and observer delegations to attend the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal on 14-17 May 1987. The Workshop was intended to provide tangible evidence that the Canadian Government takes seriously the responsibility which the Conference on Disarmament has accepted "to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space". It will be recalled that the Canadian delegation has already submitted a series of working papers to the Conference on Disarmament on this subject. We have tabled three working papers dealing respectively with the stabilizing and destabilizing characteristics of arms control agreements on outer space; with international law relevant to arms control in outer space; and with terminology relevant to outer space.

These working papers were not meant to propound a specifically Canadian governmental viewpoint, but rather to build upon and contribute to the pool of information in this area and to outline the issues as comprehensively as possible. Consistent with this objective, the purpose of the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal, and I thank the distinguished representative of India for his kind comments, was to provide an opportunity for an exchange of views, in an informal setting, on a number of broad legal questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, focusing in particular on the current legal régime relevant to outer space. The Workshop also exposed participants to the presentation of some of the results of Canadian PAXSAT research concerning the use of space-based remote sensing techniques for arms control and disarmament verification.

Today, I would like to table a summary report on the Outer Space Workshop as CD/773, together with its annex, the detailed report. The report seeks to provide a distillation of the issues and viewpoints which emerged during discussions at the various segments of the Workshop. In keeping with the aim and atmosphere of the Workshop, the report does not attempt to draw conclusions or recommendations from these deliberations, and we must apologize if any delegate, any observer, feels that his or her views were not adequately reported, but we have certainly done our best.

We are pleased that representatives of 35 countries, in addition to Canadian officials, and an honourable representative of the Conference on Disarmament secretariat, were able to attend the Workshop. The positive response to the Canadian Government's invitation attests, in our view, to the importance attached by all member and observer delegations of this Conference to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Canadian Government fully shares this interest and this concern. It is hoped that the Outer Space Workshop has stimulated some new ideas and approaches to this subject and brought out the complexity and variety of viewpoints on many of the questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space -- complexities and varieties which we must try to develop into common ground. Clearly, there can

be no "quick fixes" in this area. It is our hope that the Outer Space Workshop has contributed, in a modest way, to our efforts to achieve progress.

I now turn to the Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals. It will be recalled that when I last spoke, I mentioned that I had carried personally the message from the Prime Minister on the Peace Run. I am glad I did not have to carry this particular Compendium with me on that occasion -- it's pretty heavy stuff. But one principle that underlines the Verification Research Programme of Canada's Department of External Affairs is that verification can be profitably examined independently of specific treaty contexts. While the verification provisions of a particular treaty must be determined by the purpose, scope and nature of that agreement, much valuable work on general principles, provisions and techniques can be done well before actual negotiations begin and, of course, during such negotiations. The work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which recently began examining the question of "verification in all its aspects", is an example of a potentially profitable international study of procedures to assist arms control negotiators.

It is for the foregoing reasons that Canada has undertaken considerable research work of a specific nature relating to verification. One aspect of the research relates to the multitude of verification proposals now extant. In the years since the Second World War, during which time arms control negotiations have been almost continuously in progress, large numbers of verification proposals have been put forward from many sources from which many lessons can be drawn. Many proposals have been made by Governments in connection with arms control topics that are still under discussion, if not active negotiation; others have been developed by interested analysts and published in open literature. Even those proposals which are several years old may remain highly relevant to current conditions. It is for this reason that the Canadian Government has compiled a Compendium which is intended to be a quick reference catalogue to almost 700 arms control verification proposals originating in publications and statements of Governments and intergovernmental bodies as well as in academic literature on the subject. We are making this Compendium available to the Conference on Disarmament so as to ensure that all delegations have an opportunity to work from the same comprehensive information base compiled in a readily available format. The Canadian Government hopes that this will contribute to progress towards developing arms control and disarmament agreements.

CD/PV.423

p.16

New Zealand/Graham

21.7.87

CTB

New Zealand joins Australia in submitting the Seismic Monitoring Agreement between our two countries to the Conference on Disarmament for its information. This Agreement formalizes the co-operation and exchange of information that has occurred between our two countries over many years and which will continue to develop and expand in the years ahead. Among other things this Agreement reflects the important part which seismic technology can play in arms control, especially a comprehensive nuclear test ban, something which both our countries take very seriously indeed. Pending some breakthrough on the policy issue of a CTB, it is important that the interim time be used productively to perfect a technical infrastructure which will permit verification of a complete test ban when one is concluded. We are happy to

play our part in that process. It is our belief that the wisdom of concluding a CTB sooner rather than later will be accepted before very much longer by all the parties involved.

CD/PV.424

pp.7-10

Japan/Yamada

23.7.87

CW

My delegation attaches significant importance to the destruction of existing chemical weapons and related facilities. Japan possesses no chemical weapons and has no intention of acquiring them. By adhering to the convention, she legally binds herself as a non-chemical-weapon State, while chemical-weapon States have 10 years to dispose of their chemical weapons. For the security of my country, it is indispensable that all the existing chemical weapons and production facilities be placed, from the beginning of the entry into force of the convention, under strict international control and be eliminated according to the internationally agreed formula.

As I have already stated, we were able to agree on a framework of the detailed procedures for destruction of chemical weapons in the course of the spring part of this session. I would like to note that we have the following common understandings on this important issue;

(a) The chemical weapons to be destroyed shall be all chemical weapons "under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, regardless of location",

(b) All chemical weapons shall be destroyed "beginning not later than 12 months and finishing not later than 10 years",

(c) States parties may destroy their stocks at a faster pace,

(d) Chemical weapons shall be destroyed only at specifically designated and appropriately designed and equipped facility(ies).

And, with regard to the verification measures:

(a) States parties shall take such measures as they consider appropriate to secure their storage facility(ies) and shall prevent any movement of their chemical weapons,

(b) States parties shall provide access to any chemical weapons, destruction facilities and facilities' storage for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification,

(c) International Inspectors shall have unimpeded access to all parts of the storage facilities and may request clarification of any ambiguities arising from the inspection.

My delegation earnestly hopes that, taking due account of these common understandings, we will bring our work to a successful completion.

Security of a State during the entire destruction stage is a legitimate concern which we must attend to. While the procedures for destruction of chemical weapons stocks should start simultaneously for all chemical-weapon States, the mechanism of destruction at an accelerated pace for the State possessing larger stockpiles should be explored in view of the considerable imbalance in the size of existing stockpiles.

I should also like to call upon all chemical-weapon States to announce at an early stage their possession, as well as the composition of, and other factors pertaining to their stockpiles. Such actions on the part of chemical-weapon States, as well as the announcement of non-possession by non-chemical-weapon State, as is the case with Japan, will not only contribute to our work for the solution of the problems facing us, but will also help planning of the verification work at the outset of the Convention. I sincerely hope that other States will follow the example given by the United States in 1986 and provide the relevant information.

The other aspect with regard to destruction is the issue of chemical weapons production facilities. Much has also been developed in the past on the issue. We have the common understandings which we should not undermine. They are:

(a) The chemical weapons production facilities will be declared and destroyed within 10 years,

(b) Such facilities to be destroyed shall be all chemical weapons production facilities "under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, regardless of location",

(c) Chemical weapons production facilities shall be declared within 30 days, which declaration shall be promptly confirmed through on-site inspection,

(d) States parties shall immediately cease all activity at each chemical weapons production facility and, within three months, close such facility,

(e) International systematic monitoring shall be initiated as soon as possible after the closure of such facility and shall continue until this facility is eliminated within 10 years.

As destruction of chemical weapons stocks proceeds and controls are placed on the civil chemical industry, the prolonged existence of chemical weapons production facilities may increase the potential danger to the convention régime. It is the desire of my delegation to see that such facilities are dismantled at the earliest opportunity.

Next, I should like to deal with the issue of "non-production". I wish to express our appreciation of the work done so far in identifying the chemical substances to be controlled and the régimes to which they would be subject under the convention. The recent meeting of the representatives of the industry was also extremely useful. Despite the detailed discussions which have taken place on this matter, I nevertheless feel that it is important to place the issue in perspective so that the problems may be sorted out and progress made towards final agreement.

The negotiations on the issue of non-production have dealt with two different aspects:

(i) The non-production of chemical weapons per se; and (ii) the monitoring of the production, etc. of certain substances in the chemical industry. The discussions to this date may at times have tended to confuse

these two differing aspects. Under article VI, those chemical substances whose production is to be prohibited or subjected to other controls are subdivided into three categories. They are listed in one of the three schedules of the annex, on each of which methods of control are being developed.

Schedule (1) relates to the first aspect, that is non-production of chemical weapons per se, which is the main objective of the convention. On the other hand, schedules (2) and (3) relate to the second aspect; the chemical substances listed in these schedules are intended for peaceful purposes, but are placed under a monitoring régime to preclude their misuse for weapon purposes. The aim is to enhance confidence in the convention régime. We feel that there are distinct conceptual differences between the two.

The lists and the control régimes developed to this date are, in our view, generally reasonable. In order to expedite our work for final agreement, we must have a clear idea of the correlation among the various chemical substances in the schedules. We must also give due consideration to legitimate concerns raised at the recent meetings of representatives of the industry.

We have not addressed ourselves to the issue of definition for some time now. The existing wording in draft article II was formulated before the recent development in our negotiations. We have now clarified many aspects of the destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities. We have identified chemical substances to be controlled and the régime to which such substances will be subjected. In the light of these achievements, we should re-examine the issue of definition, bearing in mind the general purpose criterion.

The issue of challenge verification, the verification safety-net, is by its nature a complex and difficult problem. I wish to note that four areas of common understanding identified by Ambassador Ian Cromartie on this issue (CD/734) are very relevant. The interrelated aspects of the procedure for requesting challenge, the time frame for the dispatch of international inspectors, their access to the site and facility, the safeguarding of the legitimate security concerns of both the challenging and challenged States and the necessary follow-up will all require much examination and careful elaboration through businesslike considerations of the various aspects of the issue.

The verification measures envisaged to ensure compliance with the convention will comprise data exchange, routine inspections, the use of monitoring equipment, and challenge inspections, etc. These verification measures will be required to monitor the various declarations concerning chemical weapons stockpiles, production facilities, destruction facilities and non-production, as well as the issues concerning "use", and clandestine stockpiles and production facilities. They will require much manpower, and material and financial resources. I feel that we should keep a realistic perspective in our work on the convention in identifying the substances to be controlled and the extent to which they will be so controlled so that a practical, rational and cost-effective verification régime may be established under this convention.

The international verification of the storage and destruction of chemical weapons has been accepted as regards its principles and numerous modalities have already been defined. The same applies to monitoring of the closure and elimination of production facilities.

The system for the verification of non-production is also under preparation. The known combat agents and their precursors have been taken stock of and it has already been agreed that they will be placed under international surveillance because they can all be used for peaceful purposes, if only for research. Significant progress has been made in this area that it was essential to cover. We welcome the dispelling of the apparent confusion between chemical weapons and chemical substances produced for non-prohibited purposes. We also appreciate the fact that the need to avoid unduly impeding the development of the chemical industry and of research is now beginning to be recognized by all.

Whatever progress has been or may yet be made in the areas of verification that I have just mentioned, they will none the less be incomplete until a satisfactory solution has been found to the crucial problem of challenge inspection. The very usefulness of the verification of installations coming under the convention depends, in the final analysis, on compliance with the obligation to declare them, whether they be chemical weapons stockpiles facilities or factories making dual-purpose substances. The régime for systematic verification must, therefore, be complemented and strengthened by an effective and binding régime for challenge inspection so as to form a coherent set of measures to discourage violations by making them detectable wherever they may occur.

The international organization to be set up will be the spearhead of verification of chemical disarmament. It should be able to begin its activities as soon as possible after the entry into force. We welcome the fact that, as can be seen from the excellent working paper that the United Kingdom introduced here on 14 July last, there has been concrete thinking on the subject. In this regard I am pleased to be able to announce that my country would give favourable consideration to hosting the international organization if the Conference so requested.

The negotiations taking place in the Conference on Disarmament aim at ensuring lasting compliance with the ban on the use of chemical weapons established by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. But it must be stressed that the success of such an endeavour will depend on the support that it gets from the international community in the form of accession and ratification by the greatest possible number of countries. That implies broad participation in the negotiating process. Each and everyone should be able to present his proposals and describe his position with respect to the various aspects of the draft convention.

Universal acceptance of the future convention will be encouraged if we manage to take into account certain concerns. Of these, the need for undiminished security is probably the most important and it should be resolved in the context of the order of destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons.

In this regard, it is clear that account will have to be taken of the very marked differences, both quantitative and qualitative, between the stocks that countries hold.

The universal character of the future convention could be jeopardized if the convention is not legally consistent. It will be important for the future convention to be structured logically around the fundamental principles expressed in its first article so that the wording used lends itself as little as possible to dubious or ambiguous interpretations.

Finally, it is essential that there should be no confusion as to the actual definition of chemical weapons. My country advocates a legal definition of the weapon itself and hopes that it will be possible to go beyond a mere enumeration of the material elements of which such weapons may consist. Suggestions have been informally advanced by the delegation of Belgium to other delegations with a view to discussion of this matter.

Belgium has no chemical military capability and has no intention of acquiring such a capability. The obsolete chemical munitions that are to be found in a part of Belgian territory and which date from the First World War pose specific problems. My country insists that the future convention must not uselessly complicate the problems that these old chemical munitions already pose for the countries that have inherited them.

CD/PV.425

p.5

Iran/Velayati

28.7.87

CW

The Islamic Republic of Iran is constantly and strongly calling for an effective international régime for compliance with provisions on the use of chemical weapons. Concerted, all-out action for strengthening the present Protocol is a necessary prerequisite for fortifying the new convention. The theoretical views on verification and prevention should be accompanied by practical experiences of violation of the Geneva Protocol by Iraq. We have started compiling these experiences and we hope that we will be able to provide this Conference with the results at a convenient time.

The efforts of the Conference in the field of chemical disarmament are noteworthy. The decisions of the Conference regarding the convention on prohibition of the deployment, development, production and possession of chemical weapons will be a litmus test of how far the Conference has been successful in carrying out its obligations. The plans proposed by various countries regarding the new convention reflect the comprehension by delegations of the urgency and importance attached to the subject.

One of the positive elements in the draft convention is the destruction of the present world arsenals of chemical weapons. We believe that the expressed concerns regarding the prolongation of the time-limit for the destruction of all chemical weapons are justifiable because, during the 10-year period proposed, the possibility of the use of such weapons will continue to exist. Therefore it is advisable that the Conference should consider the reduction of this time-limit to the shortest possible and that during this period of time all the stockpiles should come under international supervision.

We consider that there are available, at least currently, two important prerequisites conducive to concrete negotiation and early conclusion of an ASAT ban agreement. Firstly, the two leading space powers now observe an actual moratorium on testing and deployment of such weapons. Secondly, the majority of the countries today favour an early agreement to ban all dedicated ASAT weapons and dismantle the existing ones. Many CD delegations have already tabled specific proposals on how to achieve such a ban.

Appropriate measures, designed also to produce a confidence-building effect, could lead us to the accomplishment of this objective. Ensuring the immunity of satellites and, possibly, their associated ground stations, for example, may be viewed as an important step towards attaining an ASAT ban in a more comprehensive and realistic manner. Such an agreement could take care of the need to prevent development, testing and deployment of new dedicated ASAT weapon systems and to eliminate the existing ones. There could also be a prohibition of the use of force against space objects. Such a provision would have the merit of outlawing interference with the normal functioning of space objects by systems which usually serve other purposes but could, in principle, be used in an ASAT mode. This would address the problem of the so-called dual-capability space weapon systems.

The view has been expressed in the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 that the problem of dual-capability systems might present certain difficulties in banning all dedicated ASAT systems. Such apprehensions do not seem, however, to be justified. There are ways to overcome possible difficulties in this respect. The key criterion to be used, for example, in assessing the actual capability of a system to be a military significant ASAT weapon would be the testing of such systems. Opponents of a CTB have insistently tried to convince us that nuclear testing is of immense importance for ensuring the military significance and reliability of new weapons designs. If we are expected to believe such an argument regarding the CTB, I fail to see why we should have to believe otherwise in the ASAT context. To be reliable, a space system meant to perform ASAT functions should be tested extensively enough in such a mode. Given the existing monitoring capabilities of each side, these tests cannot remain hidden. Thus, military significant ASAT systems would inevitably be known to the other side, something that would facilitate verification of the ban on them.

Another reservation with respect to the suggested agreement on satellite immunity contends that, under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, space objects are already protected against use of force. We do not recognize the importance of the Charter in international law. A careful consideration of Article 2, paragraph 4, in its entirety would, however, reveal that its provisions actually prohibit the use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of States. It seems very hard to imagine how the specific case of outer space -- this common heritage of mankind -- could reasonably be linked with the notion of "territorial integrity and political independence of States". A more feasible alternative is the elaboration of a special agreement to provide immunity for satellites, which would specifically complement and enhance the general provision of the Charter.

In my statement of 2 April this year, I dwelt in detail upon a valuable idea relevant to all measures providing for the non-introduction of weapons into outer space. I refer to the Soviet proposal of 3 February 1987 to establish an international inspectorate for the purpose of verifying such agreements. The concrete elements of this proposal deserve very careful consideration. The suggested team of international inspectors could serve to monitor the implementation both of an ASAT ban and of a comprehensive prohibition of the deployment of any other type of space weapons. The Ad hoc Committee should, in our opinion, take up the proposal seriously and examine, in practical terms, its specific provisions.

CD/PV.425

pp.13-14

GDR/Rose

28.7.87

OS

In the course of the debate, various delegations have addressed the question of what a treaty banning ASAT weapons should look like and how the immunity of satellites could be ensured in a legally-binding manner. At the plenary session on 24 July 1986, my delegation described the principal elements which it felt ought to form part of a future treaty. Today, I intend to develop a number of ideas which concern the scope of a future accord, verification of compliance, and the relationship between a ban on ASAT systems and the peaceful use of outer space. In so doing, I will take into account suggestions and proposals put forward by various other delegations.

Even though the Committee has not been able so far to agree on the objects to be protected in outer space, it seems to us that a common denominator is emerging on what the envisaged treaty should cover. The assumption to proceed from, in this context, is that there are no weapons in outer space and that, consequently, all objects in space must be protected. Given this assumption, it should be within the scope of the treaty to: (a) ban the use of force against any space object, (b) prevent the deliberate destruction or damaging of space objects; (c) prohibit interference with the normal functioning of any space object; (d) proscribe the development, production or deployment of ASAT weapons; and (e) provide for the destruction under international control of any ASAT weapons that may already exist. It ought to be possible on this basis to meet the concerns expressed by a number of delegations which have said that it would be difficult to distinguish between dedicated and non-dedicated ASAT capabilities. "Rules of the road" or a "code of conduct" could find their place under the type of scope I have outlined just now. It goes without saying that all these things require in-depth study.

Ensuring compliance is undoubtedly one of the most crucial and thorniest problems. Various options would be conceivable individually or in combinations: (a) broadening of information exchanges on trajectory parameters and functions of space objects; (b) use of national technical means of verification (c) creation of a multilateral consultative mechanism complementary to other forms of consultation, (d) establishment of an international inspectorate provided with far-reaching powers, including the right to conduct stringent on-site challenge inspections. The details of these measures and methods need to be worked out.

In this connection, allow me to comment briefly on the role an international inspectorate could play. The USSR delegation has suggested the establishment of such an inspectorate for the purpose of verifying that no weapons are deployed in outer space. The proposed body should, for instance, have the right to conduct on-site inspections of all objects designed to be launched into and stationed in outer space. The creation of that inspectorate would also be of major importance for ascertaining compliance with a future ASAT accord. In fact, the inspectorate would serve to verify reliably the non-deployment of whole classes of possible ASAT weapons. With this Soviet proposal and the French suggestion that an international satellite monitoring agency be set up, plus Canada's PAXSAT concept, a full-fledged system of possible verification measures is shaping up. At this stage, it would seem desirable to probe its potential. Therefore, the Ad hoc Committee should have a closer look, in the near future, at all the issues related to that matter, preferably by enlisting the help of experts, who could function as a working group of the Committee.

In view of the above-mentioned possibilities, an international inspectorate would be quite capable of verifying the non-stationing of ASAT weapons in outer space. As for verification in regard to ground- and air-launched ASAT weapons, it may be a good idea to draw on the experience gathered also in other disarmament negotiation fora.

There is another aspect of broad importance for the verification of compliance with multilateral treaties. Their effective operation is in the interests of every signatory. It is against this background that my delegation believes it to be necessary to discuss how information on compliance, obtained by national technical means could be made available to all States parties, either directly or through a multilateral machinery.

We must seek not only to prohibit arms in outer space, but also to advance co-operation in peaceful research into and use of outer space. Any disarmament agreement will have to be a direct contribution to the strengthening of international collaboration. This very endeavour is behind the proposal the Soviet Union tabled on 10 June 1986 concerning the establishment of an international outer space agency, which could be placed in charge, among other things, of monitoring compliance with multilateral treaties. This idea was pursued further in the Soviet proposal that an international centre for joint space technology research for developing countries should be set up with the assistance of the leading space Powers.

CD/PV.426

p.4

Yugoslavia/Kosin

30.7.87

VER

Reassuring is the convergence of views on verification as a political vehicle towards greater transparency, as well as the acceptance of strict and binding methods. That would permit not only verification of compliance with a treaty, but also the accumulation of experience for new treaties. Above all, this is a test of political will and interest in a new method of negotiation which is more political than technical in character.

I mentioned that we Australians have acted both multilaterally and bilaterally on this subject. With regard to our bilateral actions, it is sufficient to say that we have discussed repeatedly with other States our concerns regarding an end to nuclear testing, and we have entered into agreements such as our bilateral agreement with New Zealand on seismic monitoring designed to advance work on the verification régime required for a nuclear-test ban.

It will not be surprising to anyone to hear me report that in our bilateral discussions we have found a deep and widespread conviction around the globe that the promise to end nuclear testing, made three decades ago, must be fulfilled as quickly as possible.

Finally, with regard to the nuclear testing issue, the Group of Scientific Experts is at work this week and next and we expect that, inter alia, consideration will be given to the Australian proposal for the immediate establishment of a global seismic monitoring network.

The work of the Group of Scientific Experts is an example of how we can proceed irrespective of the unresolved issue of a mandate. But we must proceed on both fronts, the political and the technical, so that both of these aspects of a ban on nuclear testing can be joined together at the earliest possible time and give us a treaty.

Preventing an arms race in space involves, in our view, preventing the development and deployment of arms against space assets, not just the prevention of the use of force in space. For example, the existing legal régime offers very little in the way of specific protection for satellites. The variety of views which there is on the meaning of such terms as "peaceful uses", "militarization" and "stabilizing" introduces a wide area of uncertainty and ambiguity into attempts to establish what are permitted or prohibited uses of space and, into attempts to define which satellites should be protected.

The question of whether compliance with a non-arms régime can be verified effectively is, of course, of fundamental relevance to our work. It is true that with ever-increasing technological sophistication, verification of what functions space objects are capable of performing becomes increasingly difficult. But we must not forget that sophisticated technologies are also helpful in devising increasingly sophisticated techniques of verification.

This Conference can and should make a contribution in the area of verification, not least because the technology is not limited to the major space Powers alone. This was admirably demonstrated by the workshop and the presentation given to us in the Conference on Disarmament on the PAXSAT concept by the Canadian Department of External Affairs.

In this respect, I would like to address briefly verification proposals regarding the possibility that surveillance and monitoring functions of satellites should be entrusted to an international agency.

Australia supports the concept of international means of verification as an extension of the principles that the issue of global stability are the legitimate business of every nation, and that together with the right to be heard on these issues comes the obligation to play a full role in making possible a more stable and secure world with a minimum level of armaments.

We also believe that national technical means will need to be supplemented by new measures, and that they will need to be protected for the indefinite future.

We therefore see an international satellite monitoring agency as a positive contribution to existing arms control efforts in terms of its verification, confidence-building and transparency objectives.

Such an agency might also help to provide for a system which could verify that the threshold between permissible and non-permissible military uses of space, once identified and agreed upon, is not crossed.

But considerably more work needs to be done in defining the scope and application of the proposal -- technological feasibility and cost being two major factors.

The concept of an international satellite monitoring agency is yet another area where this Conference clearly has the resources to make its own contribution towards seeking the most effective ways and means of meeting the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space.

The effectiveness and viability of the existing and future legal régime pertaining to outer space ultimately depends on two factors -- participation in and compliance with such a régime, and the ability of States parties to verify that the agreements are being complied with. This involves both a political decision as well as adequate technological means to support that decision. That decision will be based on a cost-benefit analysis of whether an agreement is cost- and security- effective, and whether it will deter non-compliance.

Accordingly, this Conference must continue to seek to demonstrate in a scientific and rigorous way on what basis we might need additional multilateral agreements to regulate activities in outer space, and how this might practically and realistically be achieved.

CD/PV.426

p.18

USA/Friedersdorf

30.7.87

CW

The reaction of the international community to the use of chemical warfare in the Iran-Iraq war has been meagre. This has very serious implications for the effectiveness of any future convention banning chemical weapons. If vigorous action is not taken by the international community when there is clear-cut evidence that people are being killed by chemical weapons, can we expect vigorous action against less dramatic violations, for example, of a prohibition on possession of such weapons? The United States calls upon other nations, especially other members of the Conference on Disarmament, to join in condemning the use of chemical weapons to prevent erosion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and to make clear that compliance with existing agreements is essential to progress in arms control.

The United States will continue to remind others that treaties that can be violated with impunity, offer nothing but a false sense of security. That is why delegations in the Conference on Disarmament must concentrate on negotiating a chemical weapons convention that is truly verifiable, in order that nations can be confident that violations will be detected. The international community must not look the other way when violations are discovered.

CD/PV.427

p.5

GDR/Rose

4.8.87

OS

Many delegations believe that the Conference should devote more attention to practical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. It was in this context that I presented some ideas in my speech of 28 July on what a treaty banning ASAT weapons could look like and how the immunity of space objects could be guaranteed in very practical terms.

Today I would like to introduce, on behalf of the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic and my own, a working paper in which we suggest the main provisions of a future treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects. The paper has come out as CD/777. It focuses on the scope of such a treaty, compliance with its provisions and the safeguarding of the peaceful exploration and use of outer space for the good of all peoples. Various verification methods and techniques are proposed, among them on-site challenge inspections under the auspices of an international inspectorate. Information obtained through national means, as well as data on launch parameters and the general function of space objects, should be made available to all parties to the treaty.

CD/PV.428

pp.8-11

USSR/Schevardnadze

6.8.87 VER, CTB,
NW, OS, CW

I would like to address specifically the question of verification -- matters of principle and matters of application.

The experience of the past few years has shown that there is verification spoken of for propaganda purposes, and there is real, permanent verification.

Now, I would say that the philosophy underlying our approach to the problem of real verification gives a particularly full and clear idea of the evolution of our outlook, which has now developed into a system of unorthodox political views, in other words, a new political thinking.

Foolproof, indisputable, reliable and extremely strict and rigorous methods providing 100 per cent confidence that weapons are being eliminated, that obligations relating to the remaining weapons and permitted military activities are being complied with, and that the bans are not being circumvented -- this, and no less than this, is the verification that we envision.

The Soviet Union is proposing an exceptionally wide variety of forms and methods of verification -- both national and international. All of them have been set forth in detail in the document submitted to your forum on 9 June 1987, concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests -- and, by the

way, some of them have already been and are being used in practice. I would like to remind you that United States scientists equipped with appropriate monitoring instruments stayed for a long time in the area of our nuclear test site. The USSR Academy of Sciences has reached a new agreement with United States colleagues for the installation of monitoring equipment and the exchange of data.

As a practical step to advance the preparation of such a treaty we propose that a special group of scientific experts should be set up, which would be assigned the task of submitting to the Conference well-founded and agreed-upon recommendations on the structure and functions of a system of verification for any possible agreement not to conduct nuclear weapon tests.

We believe that there is also a need to establish an international system of global radiation safety monitoring, involving the use of space communication links. Such a system would be useful for more effectively verifying compliance with a ban on nuclear testing, once such a ban is imposed. At the same time it could be used to monitor the extent of pollution of the atmosphere, the soil, ground water and the sea on a global and regional scale. It would also provide an additional safeguard in case of any malfunctions or especially accidents at nuclear power plants.

We establish a strong link between nuclear arms reductions -- at this stage, reductions in intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles -- and an accord on measures of verification.

These include an exchange of initial data concerning the two sides' missiles, and verification of such data through on-site inspections.

We insist on continuous monitoring of the process of destroying the missiles. The elimination of the missile production base and infrastructure will also be subject to verification.

The system of verification that we propose is designed to create an atmosphere of absolute confidence that the agreement will not be circumvented in any way.

And finally, we believe that there should be mandatory access to Soviet and United States military facilities in third countries where missiles could be stationed.

As you can see, we are expanding the area of confidence to the maximum by opening up the territory of the Soviet Union to inspections. However, complete confidence naturally presupposes complete reciprocity. An example and a confirmation of this is Stockholm and the decisions adopted there. This, I would say, is the material expression of the principle of confidence; this is new political thinking in action. Naturally, we would like its geographical scope not to be confined to one continent.

In our opinion, verification will have a particularly important role to play in preventing an arms race in space.

We would be extremely grateful if you took a close look at the proposal for the establishment of an international verification system to make sure that outer space remains peaceful. Is not the idea of inspecting every space launch a reasonable one? There are as yet not that many space launch centres in the world, and the presence of international inspectors there would reliably guarantee that the subjects placed in outer space are not weapons and are not equipped with any weapons. But we go further, and propose not merely a presence but a permanent presence of groups of inspectors at all space launch sites. Information about each upcoming launch, including the location of the site, the type of launch vehicle, general information about the object to be launched and the time of launch would be given in advance to representatives of the inspectorate.

What doubts can there be about the sincerity of verification proposals made by a Power which is very actively involved in launching space objects?

All States engaged in space activities would be placed in an absolutely equal position, and permanent monitoring by inspectors would guarantee the reliability of verification. After all, a space launch complex is something that cannot be hidden. In this case the technology itself ensures relatively simple and effective verification. Furthermore, our proposal provides for the right to conduct an on-site inspection should suspicion arise that a launch was carried out from an undeclared launch site.

And, in the event of a total ban on space strike arms, the Soviet Union would be willing to extend inspections to storage facilities, industrial plants, laboratories, testing centres, etc.

If a State has no intention of putting weapons in space, there can be no reason for it to object to international inspections of its space activities.

Space is a common asset of all mankind. It is much more than a training ground for military technocrats who cast away traditional humanistic ideals. It is a sphere for the peaceful application of peaceful efforts. It is this vision of outer space that the Soviet Union intends to pursue most vigorously.

Reflections about space inevitably lead one to think about the distances that humanity has to travel in order to reach its cherished goals. Some of those distances have yet to be covered from beginning to end, others have been covered half of the way, and there are still others where the end of the road is already in sight.

I would like to make a few comments about one long-sought goal which is within reach and which the Conference on Disarmament has almost attained, and event of great significance for all of mankind -- a complete ban on chemical weapons and the elimination of their stockpiles. Two thirds of a century have passed since the first attack at Ypres, which marked the beginning of the military use of this barbaric weapon of mass annihilation. Ever since, Governments of many nations and various international forums have sought to devise legal constraints on the production and use of lethal substances, but only now, in our time, is it becoming possible to adopt a historic convention to that effect.

What could stand in the way of this? Only attempts to outline the draft of a future treaty with one hand while assembling canisters of binary chemical weapons with the other.

Need one say how immoral this is, how incompatible with the goal before us?

The Soviet Union will continue to co-operate actively with all the participants in the Conference on Disarmament so that the long-awaited convention becomes a reality. We did not dramatize the debates and differences that emerged in the process. One thing alone was considered absolutely imperative -- that the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their stockpiles should be adopted, and as early as possible.

I am instructed to inform you that the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on this question will proceed from the need to make legally binding the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without the right of refusal. This decision is another vivid manifestation of our commitment to genuine and effective verification, in accordance with the principles of new political thinking.

In order to build an atmosphere of trust, and in the interests of an early conclusion of an international convention, the Soviet side invites the participants in the chemical weapons negotiations to visit the Soviet military facility at Shikhan'y to see standard items of our chemical weapons and observe the technology for the destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile facility. Later we will invite experts to the special chemical weapon destruction plant now being built in the vicinity of the town of Chapayevsk.

In making this announcement I hope that the participants in the Conference will duly appreciate our desire to untie the most complicated knots that have appeared in the process of drawing up the convention.

CD/PV.428

pp.14-16

Argentina/Campora

6.8.87

CW

The chemical weapons convention as we have known it so far would be a non-discriminatory treaty, since all the parties would be on an equal footing once the process of destruction of chemical weapons and existing production facilities had been completed. At that stage the treaty will serve as a model, because it will be unlike the non-proliferation Treaty, which lays down in law the existence of two categories of States: those that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not. In the future convention there will be a single category of States with the same rights and obligations, and an identical verification mechanism applicable for all States, and it will not be a means of allocating world power, like the non-proliferation Treaty, but an instrument with an equalitarian purpose within the international community. Thus we have within reach the possibility of drawing up a treaty that would not be discriminatory from the political and military standpoints. It is also important, that it should not be discriminatory from an economic and technological viewpoint. In this regard the future convention should not be devised in such a way as to allow for its use to maintain inequalities in the field of trade or technology or to prevent the development or transfer of chemicals, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

During the course of the negotiations, we have noted that time and again the need has emerged to reconcile three legitimate interests of States: Firstly, that of completely eliminating the possibility of the threat of chemical warfare; secondly, that of guaranteeing that a State's security would not be undermined; and, thirdly, that of ensuring unimpeded development of chemical activities for peaceful purposes. Clearly, a strict monitoring régime would offer greater safeguards, but it could effect the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes. Conversely, a less strict verification régime would detract from confidence in the convention and would create a lack of security at the international level. Consequently the aspect of security and the aspect of the peaceful uses of chemicals should be properly balanced in the convention. The way in which this question is resolved will determine whether the objective sought through the convention will be successfully attained. When these two aspects are raised, it is the ultimate objective that should guide the negotiations.

This criterion should be reflected, in the first place, in the definition of chemical weapons. We are all aware that article II of the convention is crucial to its effectiveness. The present wording was provisionally adopted in 1984, and should be studied at an appropriate time in the light of progress in our work and the clearer picture we now have of the convention. Progress in the negotiations has also highlighted the need for the toxicity criterion to be determined in a precise and practical manner, and that the concepts used should be uniform throughout the text of the convention.

The establishment of an order of destruction is another of the major tasks before the Ad hoc Committee. Just as the existence of chemicals that pose a greater risk for the convention is recognized, it should also be recognized that there are chemical weapons that are more dangerous than others and, consequently, they should be destroyed first, otherwise we would be jeopardizing the principle of promoting confidence at the start of the destruction phase.

The principle of not undermining the security of any State during the chemical weapon destruction phase is of fundamental importance. The disparity between chemical-weapon and non-chemical-weapon States will be maintained during the period of destruction of stockpiles and even subsequently should there be chemical-weapon States that are not parties to the convention. Consequently, one cannot rule out the threatened or potential use of chemical weapons. To make up for that disparity and make the principle a reality, States parties, particularly those that do not possess chemical weapons, should be assured of the possibility of some capacity to defend themselves against chemical warfare. Bearing in mind that what is involved is defence against a weapon of mass destruction, protection measures should guarantee the safety not only of the military but also, and particularly, of the civilian population.

With respect to the non-production of chemical weapons, monitoring should in no way detract from the inalienable right of all States parties to the convention to research, develop, produce, acquire, transfer and use all chemical substances for peaceful purposes, with the only quantitative restriction applying to a certain limited quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals per year for non-prohibited purposes. Similarly, the provisions of

the treaty should not be interpreted or implemented in a discriminatory fashion, as this would affect countries' economic, social, scientific and technological development. Agreement by States parties to the convention to renounce possession of chemical weapons, particularly States that do not possess them, should provide a guarantee of access to the exchange of all chemical substances, equipment and scientific and technological information and international co-operation for peaceful purposes. Just as the undertaking to destroy chemical weapons and existing production facilities, and not to produce chemical weapons, will be subject to verification, commitments regarding assistance and co-operation in the field of peaceful uses should also be assessed. The future convention will set up a variety of bodies which could perform this function.

It should be emphasized once again that the future chemical weapons convention will mark an important milestone in international relations in the area of disarmament, because its significance lies in the mechanisms of verification and monitoring that will be adopted for on-site as well as challenge inspections. It is essential to make progress in sensitive areas such as challenge inspection, counting on the clear-cut determination of the great Powers to resolve those issues on which there is still no consensus, drawing on the guidelines that are being drawn up step by step under the wise guidance of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus. The statement of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that we have heard today will no doubt facilitate a solution to the issues that remain pending in the area of challenge inspection.

We are convinced that the threat of chemical weapons will not be totally eliminated until we have universal accession to the convention. This objective would be facilitated through joint action by States at two levels concurrently: At the world-wide level, through effective and judicious action by military Powers possessing chemical weapons, and at the regional level, through the political handling of procedures for accession to the convention and the responsibilities deriving therefrom. In this way an appropriate and adequate regional balance would be achieved in a world-wide framework of confidence created by chemical disarmament by the countries with the greatest war-making potential.

CD/PV.428

pp.18-19

Peru/Calderon

6.8.87

CW,OS
NFZ

Quite apart from this overall perception of the problem, the continuation of nuclear tests on Mururoa atoll is prompting concern in the South Pacific. Peru is of the view that this situation cannot and must not pass unnoticed, as what is at stake is the ecological integrity of the South Pacific. It is for this reason, and not through any animosity, that Peru has sought the support of Colombia, Chile and Ecuador, which, together with our country, form the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific, with a view to approaching the Government of France through the appropriate diplomatic channels to make it possible to send a new scientific mission to Mururoa atoll and neighbouring areas to verify that the nuclear explosions on the test site are indeed harmless and that the levels of radioactivity are below internationally tolerable limits. These steps could be carried out in accordance with the precedent established by the Atkinson mission in 1983.

In keeping with this position, a few weeks ago, during the tenth session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), which was held in Montevideo, Peru proposed that the Council of this regional body should embark on a study of alternative measures, which could include an additional protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco to prevent radioactive contamination of the marine environment in the oceanic masses falling within the zone of application referred to in article 4, paragraph 2 of the main Treaty. This proposal was adopted by consensus, and its implementation will of course have to take account of the provisions of article 7 of the Treaty of Rarotonga. Within the same context, concrete steps have also been taken to promote co-operation between OPANAL and the South Pacific Forum.

The prohibition of chemical weapons has now become the major issue before the Conference on Disarmament, given the continuing possibility of arriving at a comprehensive treaty on the subject in the near future. It is true that progress has not been spectacular, but the important thing is that there is a determination to negotiate. Furthermore, we have observed a commendable effort to find imaginative solutions to unusual problems, with a particularly constructive contribution from the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, who, with dedication, sound judgement and skill, has set an appropriate pace for our work and maintained a high level of enthusiasm.

However, there are a variety of outstanding issues which undoubtedly require a great deal of work. We are thinking first and foremost of on-site challenge inspections, the question of jurisdiction and control, verification of destruction and procedures to carry out such destruction, and the use of chemical facilities and products for peaceful purposes, including the strengthening of international co-operation. Furthermore, there is a problem which, even though it is not an urgent one, is none the less relevant to this forum. We are referring specifically to the procedure that will have to be followed once the Ad hoc Committee has successfully completed its work. The disagreeable recollection of the last multilateral instrument negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament leads us to proceed cautiously in this regard. As we are aware, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques was opened for signature by States in 1976, despite the fact that there was no consensus in this negotiating forum regarding the scope of the obligations stipulated in article I. The same must not happen in the case of chemical weapons, and we are duty-bound to prevent this from occurring.

With respect to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it is clear that first of all a verifiable distinction must be drawn between the placing of objects in orbit with hostile military intent and the placing of those with non-hostile military intent. Under article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the prohibition, which extends only to the objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, applies once the object is placed in orbit, in other words once a circuit around the Earth has been completed. On that basis Peru

supports all initiatives aimed at amending the 1967 Treaty as a means of finding a partial solution to the problem, but it would advocate the simpler amendment of prohibiting the placing in orbit of any object carrying any type of weapon whatsoever. We do not think it would be necessary to introduce new elements such as the concept of "space weapons", as what defines the prohibition is non-placement in orbit. Nor is it possible to accept new criteria concerning the length of time the objects remain in orbit, because the approach followed in the 1967 Treaty is much more appropriate in that it prohibits even the temporary presence of a delivery system in outer space, provided it completes a circuit around the Earth.

CD/PV.429

pp.2-6

USSR/Nazarkin

11.8.87

CW

In his statement the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR said that "the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on this question will proceed from the need to make legally binding the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without the right of refusal".

It would not be an overstatement to say that this is now the key problem in the negotiations. Progress on a number of other issues also depends on the speedy solution of this problem. We support the efforts being made to solve the problem of challenge inspections by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, R. Ekéus, and several other representatives. Our new initiatives are designed to make a tangible contribution to the early resolution of this issue.

The Soviet side stated some time ago that it supported the United Kingdom proposal in document CD/715. We continue to believe that this document could serve as a basis for an integrated solution of the challenge inspection problem. We note the support expressed by a number of delegations for the United Kingdom proposal. Unfortunately, the United States delegation is not among them.

Having considered the existing situation in all its aspects and wishing to facilitate an early agreement, and also proceeding from the need to establish the most stringent verification of the chemical weapons convention, the Soviet Union has decided to go beyond the United Kingdom proposal and adopt the principle of mandatory challenge inspections. As you know, we had earlier agreed that a refusal of challenge inspections would not be permitted in certain instances, e.g. in cases of the suspected use of chemical weapons, as well as in the case of declared locations and facilities. Now we extend this principle of mandatory challenge inspections to all possible cases, making it a universal one.

In our view, the procedure of challenge inspections must reliably ensure that it is impossible for a State to conceal the fact and the consequences of a violation of the convention. We think that no more than 48 hours should elapse between the time of the challenge and the arrival of the inspection group at the inspection site.

The fact that we have adopted the principle of mandatory challenge inspections does not, however, mean that we can disregard the possible disclosure of sensitive data, which can happen during such inspections, especially in cases of abuse. All the misgivings that we previously expressed in this regard obviously remain valid.

Nevertheless, in accepting mandatory challenge inspections we proceed from the understanding that measures should be adopted with a view to minimizing the danger of disclosure of sensitive data, and that all parties must be in an equal position as regards both the right to request of challenge inspection and the obligation to meet such request.

First and foremost we consider that maximum possible use should be made of the central idea of the United Kingdom proposal on challenge inspections -- the possibility for the requested State to suggest alternative measures for conducting inspections in order to demonstrate compliance with its obligations. We suggest that the search be continued for opportunities to elaborate such alternative measures, which may, if necessary and with a view to ensuring that secrets unrelated to chemical weapons remain undisclosed, offer a substitute for complete access to the facilities by the inspectors (for example, visual observation of the facility from the outside, photographing it, analysis of chemical samples, partial access inside the facility, etc.).

It would seem technical means of international verification using remote control might also serve as a possible alternative measure.

It is our understanding that the possibility of using alternative measures is generally recognized by the participants in the Conference. We note that in its statement on 23 April this year the United States delegation also spoke in favour of such a possibility.

It goes without saying that the time-limits for agreeing on the procedure for conducting challenge inspections must be clearly defined. We would not object if this time-limit does not exceed 48 hours. Whether the suggested alternative measures are satisfactory should be decided, in our view, by the State suspecting non-compliance with the Convention.

Apart from the alternative measures, in our view, attention should also be paid to the development of the so-called "managed conduct" of inspections suggested by the United States delegation. To preclude the possibility that challenge inspections might be used for purposes incompatible with the task of verifying compliance by States parties with their obligations, or for disclosing secrets unrelated to chemical weapons, the convention should, in our opinion, envisage concrete procedures for conducting such inspections. It would seem feasible to devise measures which would effectively preclude any possibility of using challenge inspections for obtaining secret data, and in particular, to ensure that the methodologies and instruments used by international inspectors in the course of inspections strictly correspond to their tasks and that the requested State has access to all such instruments for the purpose of testing them. The instruments used in the course of international inspections should be standard and uniform for all States parties. The technical parameters of such instruments must be strictly limited to the purposes of verifying possible violations of the convention.

Should the right of challenge be abused, the requested State would suffer certain material harm related to both the leak of information and the disruption of the normal operation of the facility or plant. In this connection we consider that thought might be given to the desirability of

incorporating in the Convention a provision concerning States' liability, including material liability, for abuse of the right to challenge inspections and for any damage suffered by the receiving State as a result of an unjustified inspection. In particular, States parties to the convention might have the right to raise the question of compensation for the financial loss caused as a result of a halt to the operations of a facility or the disclosure of commercial or other secrets because of the conduct of challenge inspections, if the inspection does not confirm non-compliance with the convention.

Each request must obviously contain the necessary data: which provision of the convention has been violated, where and when the suspected violation has occurred or is occurring, the nature of the suspected violation. It is equally clear that without such basic data no request could be met.

In suggesting measures which would prevent abuse of the right of challenge and the use of inspections for purposes incompatible with the tasks of verifying compliance with the obligations under the convention and the disclosure of secrets which have nothing to do with chemical weapons, we consider that such measures should be elaborated within the framework of the principle of mandatory inspections, and not in opposition to it; they must not weaken this principle or make any exceptions to it.

We believe that a request for inspection can be made by any State party to the convention without exception. Everybody must have equal rights. Similarly, there should be no discrimination as regards the form of ownership of those locations and facilities for which an inspection is sought. A request for inspection, in our opinion, can be submitted in relation to any facility or location on the territory of a State party, or under its jurisdiction or control, or belonging to any natural or legal person of a State party, wherever they may be situated. This, in our view, is a necessary condition to make challenge inspections a genuinely effective instrument.

We cannot accept the United States concept of a "fact-finding panel" made up of representatives of a limited number of States, which would play the role of a "filter". This concept seems to us to be undemocratic and would not ensure equal rights for all parties to the convention. We understood the United States delegation's statement on 23 April this year to mean that the United States side is ready to consider the possibility of abandoning this concept. We would like to learn the outcome of such consideration.

Furthermore, we are not quite clear about the status of article XI of the United States draft convention contained in document CD/500. In his statement on 23 July this year, United States Ambassador Friedersdorf said in response to our question that in the opinion of the United States side "challenge inspection should cover all relevant locations and facilities of a State party without distinction between private property or government ownership". In so doing he referred to the amendment made by the United States delegation in April last year to its draft convention (CD/685). That amendment, however, concerns article X, which deals with special inspections, and has nothing to do with article XI, which provides for ad hoc inspections. If the United States delegation continues to regard article XI as part of its position, we would like to know in which cases it allows for the application of this article envisaging the right to refuse challenge inspections.

To sum up the above, our view of the challenge inspections provisions is as follows:

Firstly, challenge inspections should be mandatory, without the right for the requested State to refuse such inspections.

Secondly, the period between the time of request and the arrival of the inspectors at the inspection site should not exceed 48 hours.

Thirdly, all States parties to the convention should have equal rights and obligations as regards both submitting a request and accommodating it.

Fourthly, the request should contain the necessary basic data (what, where, when, how).

Fifthly, it is necessary to adopt measures in order to prevent the use of challenge inspection for purposes incompatible with the task of verifying compliance with the convention.

Sixthly, the requested State may suggest alternative measures. Whether they are satisfactory shall be decided by the requesting State.

Seventhly, the time within which agreement should be reached on the verification procedure should not exceed 48 hours (during that same period inspectors arrive at the inspection site).

There is no need to reiterate the importance of confidence-building measures for speeding up the negotiations. Guided by the necessity to improve the atmosphere of trust, and in the interests of the early conclusion of the convention, the Soviet side has issued an invitation to visit the Soviet military facility at Shikhany to see standard items of our chemical munitions and observe the chemical weapon destruction technology at a mobile facility. At present the Soviet delegation is working out practical details in connection with this invitation. We are planning this visit for 7 and 8 October 1987. We intend to invite two persons from every delegation, including observers, participating in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Delegations will be informed of all the necessary details regarding this visit before the end of this session.

Later on, after the special chemical weapons destruction facility now being built in the vicinity of the town of Chapayevsk has been constructed, we will invite experts to visit it as well.

Some time ago the United States side invited us to visit the chemical weapon destruction facility at Tooele, Utah. On 23 July United States Ambassador Friedersdorf recalled this invitation. We have already informed the United States delegation that we accept this invitation, which we view as a step towards strengthening mutual confidence.

CD/PV.430

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Sweden/Ekeus

13.8.87

OS

The continued deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee, under the able leadership of Ambassador Pugliese, have been very useful. The Committee has benefited from valuable presentations, such as that of the Canadian PAXSAT for

space-to-space and space-to-earth verification. The analysis of legal and technical matters, as well as definitions, which has taken place this year has made a valuable contribution.

Substantive proposals have been made. I can, for instance, refer to the main provisions of a treaty text submitted by two delegations, the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia. As nothing indicating the contrary has been brought forward in the Committee, my delegation also finds quite interesting the idea voiced by Argentina that the Conference's report could register statements by member States that they have not permanently deployed weapons in space.

The centre piece of the work of the Committee has been and, in the opinion of my delegation, must continue to be proposals and initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. Only the need to examine possible measures to that end warrants the efforts of the Conference on the item. That such an examination takes place does as such not prejudice the conclusions to be drawn by the Committee. Statements made have illustrated substantial differences of opinion among States on the adequacy of present legal barriers to an arms race in outer space, on the urgency of additional measures and on the scope and contents of such measures. It has also been disputed whether such measures could be verified at all. The fact that positions are indeed divergent does not, however, detract from, but add to the importance of continued and deepened consideration of the matter.

One aspect of military space activities that might constitute a threat to the vital national interests of many States is the development of anti-satellite weapons. There is a strong case for pursuing the matter of a global prohibition of ASAT weapons and ASAT warfare. A comprehensive ban would cover the development, testing, deployment and use of such weapons.

A number of political and technical problems would have to be solved before such a comprehensive ban could be realized. It has been emphasized that a workable definition of ASAT weapons must be laid down. Verification arrangements, possibility of a very far-reaching character, would have to be devised. The Ad hoc Committee should continue to explore problems of this nature in order to prepare the ground for substantive negotiations.

CD/PV.430

pp.12-16

USSR/Nazarkin

13.8.87

CTB, OS

In drafting the "Basic provisions", the sponsors took into account numerous views and ideas expressed earlier by other participants in the Conference. To a large degree, this concerns the problem of verification. The document proposes an extremely varied "assortment" of forms and methods of verification, both national and international, including some not previously suggested or discussed.

I would like to recall that the socialist countries' proposal envisages the use of national technical means of verification, the creation of an international seismic verification system with a network of standard seismic stations that would function with the participation of representatives of an international inspectorate, verification -- again with the participation of international inspectors -- of the non-conduct of nuclear explosions at test

sites, and mandatory on-site inspections without the right of refusal. The proposal also envisages co-operation in the international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity. I should like to dwell on this matter a little later.

It is clear that the concrete needs for particular forms of verification, including seismic verification, can be determined only in the process of devising the entire system for verifying the non-conduct of nuclear explosions. In our view, the time has come to start developing such a system.

This is what prompted the Soviet Union's proposal for the establishment of a special group of scientific experts charged with preparing scientifically based recommendations on the structure and functions of a verification system for any possible agreement not to conduct nuclear weapon tests. This proposal was put forward in the statement by E.A. Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, on 6 August. Such a group could consider all the aspects of verification in their relationship to one another, including seismic data exchange, on-site inspections, standard characteristics of seismic stations, means of monitoring atmospheric radioactivity, etc. Attention should also be paid to the possible financial implications of the establishment of a verification system.

In making this proposal for a group of scientific experts, we also proceed from the need to put work on a nuclear test ban on a practical footing as soon as possible. I should like to take this opportunity to express our support for the draft mandate and ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda that was recently formally submitted by Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia as document CD/772. As is well known, because of the difficulties concerning a mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, no such work is yet being done.

With regard to the group of scientific experts on verification, we suggest that, before the end of this year's session, the Conference on Disarmament should take a decision in principle to establish the proposed group at the beginning of the Conference's next annual session.

The fact that the Soviet Union has put forward the idea of establishing a group of scientific experts does not, of course, detract from the role that we ascribe to the work of the seismic experts, on which their distinguished Chairman, Mr. Dahlman, is, it seems, to report to the Conference today. That group is currently working on an important development designed to lift the machinery for seismic verification to a qualitatively new stage -- the exchange of level II seismic data. It also has important tasks to fulfil in connection with preparations for the international experiment next year, 1988.

Our proposal for the establishment of a group of experts on verification is, on the whole, aimed at accomplishing the logical next step.

In his statement before the Conference on Disarmament on 6 August, Minister Shevardnadze mentioned that the USSR Academy of Sciences had reached a new agreement with United States colleagues on the installation of monitoring instruments and on the exchange of data from them. This agreement on the Soviet-United States "Verification of compliance with a nuclear-test-

ban treaty" project provides in particular that, in Soviet territory, three seismic stations in Kazakhstan will continue work under the project until at least 15 December this year. In August or September of this year, a chemical explosion with a yield of up to 10 tonnes will be carried out at or near a test site in Kazakhstan in order to calibrate the seismic stations. Use will also be made for calibration purposes of industrial explosions in the vicinity of the stations.

Beginning in January 1988, the three stations in Kazakhstan will be relocated at a distance of over 1,000 kilometres from the test site. The purpose of this transfer is, firstly, to test the possibility of low-threshold monitoring of explosions of about 1 kiloton and, secondly, to support the international experiment in the exchange of level II seismic data in 1988.

However, besides seismic devices, there are also many other achievements of modern science and technology that can be used for verification purposes.

I should like to recall in this context that, in his statement before the Conference, Minister Shevardnadze proposed the establishment of an international system of global radiation safety monitoring using space communication links. The main functions of such a system could be making monitoring of compliance with a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests more effective; monitoring the status of pollution of the atmosphere, the soil, and ground and sea water on a global and regional scale; collecting, collating and analysing data on, and identifying trends in the radiation situation; prompt acquisition of data on the radiation situation as a result of accidents at nuclear facilities and nuclear power stations or of unauthorized nuclear explosions; forecasting of the possible consequences, etc.

We proceed from the idea that such a system of global radiation safety monitoring could be established even before the entry into force of the treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The question of establishing this system could be discussed within the special group of scientific experts on verification that we are proposing.

Permit me now to move on to item 5 of the Conference's agenda, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

The Soviet Union consider the task of preventing the transfer of the arms race to outer space as one of the most urgent of our time and it intends, as the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, emphasized in his statement, to work towards "a strict and universal ban on deployment of any weapons in outer space".

Our proposals for the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the deployment in outer space of weapons of any kind and of a treaty banning the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth remain on the table.

We have reaffirmed on more than one occasion our willingness to come to an agreement even on partial measures, for example, on the immunity of artificial Earth satellites not carrying weapons of any kind on board and on banning the development of new anti-satellite systems and eliminating the existing ones.

The Conference also has before it a joint document from the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia entitled "Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects" (CD/777 of 31 July this year), which we support.

The views expressed by a number of other delegations also deserve most serious consideration. For example, in his statement on 21 July this year, the head of the Indian delegation, Ambassador Teja, showed the urgent need for the prohibition as soon as possible of the development, testing and deployment of new anti-satellite systems and for elimination of such systems as already exist, and also expressed interesting ideas about ensuring the immunity of artificial Earth satellites. In his statement on 7 July, the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada, also expressed support for the view that "space objects and their activities for peaceful purposes should not be attacked and should be duly protected". We have also noted the readiness expressed by the delegation of China to proceed, as a first step, to negotiations on the banning of anti-satellite systems and we are, of course, in full agreement with Ambassador Fan's view that this measure must be complemented by other steps aimed at preventing an arms race in space. Interesting views on agenda item 5 have been expressed today by the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus. We shall, of course, study those views attentively.

The socialist countries' proposals, together with the ideas of other delegations, constitute for the Conference on Disarmament useful assets that could serve as a good basis for business-like work on preventing an arms race in outer space.

It goes without saying that agreement on this issue without reliable verification is unthinkable. In this connection, I should like to recall that, on 17 March this year, the Soviet delegation proposed that consideration should be given to the possibility of establishing an international system, to include an international inspectorate, for verifying the non-deployment in outer space of weapons of any kind. Our proposal met with great interest and a number of questions were put to us in order better to understand its essence.

Many of those questions were answered in principle in the statement by the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, on 6 August. Today, the Soviet delegation would like to make some further clarifications.

The Soviet Union is proposing that a start should be made on establishing a verification system right away, without waiting for the conclusion of the corresponding agreement on space, so that the system can be operational as soon as possible. The principal purpose of such verification would be to determine that objects launched into space were not weapons and were not equipped with weapons of any kind. The concrete list of the systems and devices that the verification bodies should not allow to be launched into space would have to be agreed upon in the course of negotiations. The intention is that the verification system could be refined if an international agreement or agreements are drawn up.

We are convinced that on-site inspection immediately before launch is the simplest and most effective way of making sure that objects launched into space are not equipped with weapons of any kind. The distinguished Ambassador of Argentina, Mr. Campora, also talked about this point in his statement on 21 July. Such inspection might begin not long before the object to be launched into space is installed on the carrier rocket or other launch vehicle. However, should the future agreement provide for a complete ban on space strike weapons, the Soviet Union would, as Minister Shevardnadze stated, be "willing to extend inspections to storage facilities, industrial plants, laboratories, testing centres, etc." The verification system we propose would provide for groups of inspectors to be present permanently at all sites for the launching of space objects with a view to verifying all such objects irrespective of their means of launching. In addition, representatives of the secretariat would be given in good time information on each upcoming launch, including the site, the type of launch vehicle, general information about the object to be launched and the time of the launch. In cases where launches were infrequent, use could be made of inspections on the basis of prior notifications of the launches, instead of permanently stationing inspectors at the launch sites. Should an undeclared launch be suspected, the inspectorate would have the right to request the relevant information from specially designated observatories, a list of which would be compiled by the time the verification system became operational, and also to make, if necessary, a special on-site inspection if the launch could have been made from an undeclared launching site.

What is meant here is, of course, the verification of the non-stationing in space of weapons of any kind, and not the verification of launches of ballistic missiles unconnected with the placing of any devices in an orbit for an artificial Earth satellite or on a flight path towards other celestial bodies.

Although we view an international inspectorate as the principal element of a possible verification system, this does not preclude the possibility of establishing other structures, for example, means of tracking space objects, within the framework of the inspectorate.

As experience of negotiations that have reached an advanced stage -- for example, those on prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons -- shows, it would be advisable to make provision within the framework of the verification system for some central executive body and secretariat. The corps of inspectors and the number of inspection groups would have to be defined taking into account the need for the verification to cover all sites or ranges for the launching of space objects. From the organizational point of view, the verification system could function either independently or within the framework of a world space organization once that is set up. It would be advisable to provide for a certain link between the verification system and the United Nations bodies to which States already, as is provided for by the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, send general information on the objects they launch into space.

Naturally, specific questions relating to the composition, structure, organization and financing of the verification system should be the subject of negotiation. Account might be taken in this respect of the experience in devising measures and machinery for verifying compliance with disarmament agreements in other fields.

The presentation on 6 August by the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Comrade Shevardnadze, has lent a fresh impetus to our work. My delegation appreciates the USSR's determined endeavours to resolve the challenge inspection issue on the basis of equality, and it considers the invitation to see chemical weapons installations in the Soviet Union as a valuable step to build the trust needed for the conclusion of the convention.

Regrettably, the negotiating pace has slowed down during the summer session. We are asking ourselves whether it is a coincidence that, at this very juncture, preparations for the production of binary chemical weapons have been entering a crucial phase. The attempts on the eve of the conclusion of the convention to increase the weight of chemical arms in military and security planning are bound to harm the negotiating climate, and can in no way be regarded as being helpful in finding solutions to unresolved problems.

We would all enjoy more security if we sought to finalize the convention text as early as possible so that the treaty may come into force soon.

Stability and security at the time when the convention becomes effective also presuppose that the ban on the production, acquisition and use of chemical arms, as well as any other obligation undertaken, are valid, and compliance with them is reliably verified from the very first day on. If all stocks of chemical weapons were placed under "international arrest" until the accord takes effect, we would have a useful additional security measure. No State party will be able, in its storage facilities for chemical weapons, to engage in any activity prohibited under the treaty since those facilities will be subject to stringent international control. The fears of all the sides in question would thus be allayed, including the concerns of those who do not possess chemical weapons, as is the case with my own country.

Let me now talk about some of the aspects of the work to be done during the inter-sessional period. Progress on the jurisdiction and control issue would be instrumental in establishing the responsibilities of States parties, which will have to ensure, for example, that anyone under their jurisdiction and control refrains from activities prohibited under the convention. Furthermore, it would be their responsibility to take appropriate measures guaranteeing that all their natural and juridical persons, even if they are not in the territory of their home countries, abide by the accord. The question of what would be "appropriate" will have to be answered on the basis of the constitutional and legal systems of the various States parties. Once this is recognized as a principle, it ought to be possible to come up quickly with a formula acceptable to everyone.

Negotiations on a chemical-weapon ban have progressed this year to the point where verification has moved out of the realm of non-committal polemics -- hopefully for good -- into the area of serious professional work on constructive solutions. Detailed verification provisions have been drawn up for articles IV, V and VI. A text setting forth guidelines on the international inspectorate has been agreed after thorough deliberations. The most important thing to do now is to lay down the ground rules governing challenge inspection and, in so doing, to put the keystone into the

verification edifice. I am sure everyone will appreciate the fundamental significance of the steps which the Soviet Union has taken in this respect, and on which Ambassador Nazarkin elaborated on 11 August. We hope this will induce other parties to make their positions more transparent. If this were the case, we would be considerably closer to a text on the challenge inspection procedure.

In our efforts to solve the on-site challenge verification issue in such a way that the legitimate interests of the receiving State are taken into account, while ruling out any misuse, the functions to be performed by the inspectors are increasingly becoming the focus of attention. It will be their duty to record the facts needed to clarify cases of suspicion. This is exactly what must guide their conduct. They will have to act on the basis of guidelines issued by the technical secretariat. The Canadian and Norwegian studies on inspections in the event of the alleged use of chemical weapons are very useful in this context.

Whenever the requesting and receiving States are locked in dispute over an alternative measure suggested, tried and tested procedures should be available to settle the argument. Thus, objective elements would be added to the procedure, leaving less room for arbitrariness.

The role of the Executive Council in the event of a challenge inspection is a major subject in discussions and negotiations these days. Challenge procedures are of particular interest not only to the parties immediately involved, but also to all other signatories to the future convention. That is why the Executive Council will have a crucial role to play, especially when it comes to assessing the findings of the teams of inspectors. It is from those findings that the requesting country will draw its conclusions. However, the organization of States parties will only be in a position to react to the findings, say by taking action against a particular party to the convention found to be in violation of its obligations, if one of its organs -- namely, the Executive Council -- has had a chance to evaluate the inspection results independently. My delegation subscribes to the view expressed in the United Kingdom paper CD/715 that the Executive Council should be enabled to take into consideration the inspection report as well as any other material available and the opinions of the principal parties involved.

At this advanced stage in the drafting process, it would seem a good idea to have a closer look at the issues pertaining to the structure of the organization to be created. The wide range of important tasks to be tackled calls for an organizational framework that measures up to high political and professional standards. It is imperative that the organs to be set up be vested with political authority in order to ensure that States parties fulfil all their obligations. Moreover, in view of the host of details to be coped with in overseeing the operation of the treaty and verifying compliance with it, efficiency is needed. In our search for the most appropriate solution, the following notion is gaining currency: the system of organs to be established in consequence of the convention should have the character of an international organization with a legal status of its own, comparable to that of other international agencies within the United Nations system. The creation of such an organization would also undoubtedly enhance the international status of its officers, including international inspectors.

The powers and functions of the principal organs of the organization to be set up must be developed further on the basis of the concrete tasks defined in the convention. The maintenance of strict democratic principles and the effective use of existing means under a modern and rational style of working require that the responsibilities of the various organs and their interrelationships be sharply delineated. In formulating the provisions concerning the highest organ -- the conference of representatives of all States parties to the convention -- we must ensure that it establishes the organization's general policies and see to it that the process of implementing the treaty is properly overseen and continuously reviewed.

It would then be incumbent upon the executive organ to run the day-to-day affairs of the organization, represent the highest organ when it is not in session and take the decisions required for the work of the technical secretariat and other subsidiary bodies.

Democratic principles, respect for the security interests of all parties to the future convention, political weight and an efficient style of work are high standards which this body will have to meet. This is what must determine the composition and the decision-making procedures of the Executive Council so that it will be able to carry out its duties, essentially through decisions achieved in a process of co-operation, and so that the possibility of its work being stymied or stalemated is largely excluded. For all these reasons, the organ must be composed of a relatively restricted number of members. The various political groups should be represented in a balanced fashion, and due regard should be given to the equitable geographical distribution of seats.

What is particularly disappointing to us is the fact that we have once again been unable to set up a committee on item 1 of our agenda, i.e., on a nuclear test ban. There is a wealth of material waiting to be discussed in a business-like and detailed manner. Suffice it to mention in this context the "Basic provisions" which the socialist delegations have submitted to the Conference in CD/756. Yet nothing is happening. One simply cannot overlook the United States position and its undisguised opposition to a negotiating mandate, as well as the effect this is having on this forum. Still, it will always be worth trying to seek agreement on individual issues and to go as far as possible in the preparations for a treaty. We are not fatalistic about it. On the contrary, we are convinced that the political will to conclude an accord will finally prevail.

The delegation of the Group of Socialist States have gone a long way to bring about agreement on a mandate. They are also prepared to support the official proposal tabled by the Group of 21 in document CD/772, which could well serve as a possible compromise. My delegation is very appreciative of the considerable efforts of the presidency of our Conference, some of whom have put forward informal or personal papers in order to achieve an understanding. This goes in particular for Ambassador Vejvoda, who guided our meetings in the month of April.

I do hope it will eventually be possible, when the Conference on Disarmament opens its 1988 session, to start practical work on a wide range of problems. It is for this reason that my delegation welcomes Minister Shevardnadze's proposal that a special group of scientists be assigned the job of working out recommendations for the structure and function of a system to verify any agreement on the non-conduct of nuclear weapon tests.

CD/PV.431

p.11

India/Teja

18.8.87

CW

I would now like to turn to the subject of chemical weapons. It would not be an exaggeration to state that under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, we have achieved remarkable progress and are within sight of a convention. Difficult issues such as the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities, challenge inspection, and the legal liabilities of States parties in terms of jurisdiction, are a few remaining areas, but here too agreement would seem to be close. At this stage I would, however, like to draw attention to the fact that the basic objective of the chemical weapons convention is the destruction of chemical weapons and related production facilities. A related objective is to ensure that these weapons are never produced again. This kind of monitoring is quite unique in the disarmament field, and none of the existing safeguard régimes provide us with a valid precedent. The Ad hoc Committee will need to exercise creativity, rather than look backwards to inadequate precedents. In this connection, I may add that the time has also come for the Ad hoc Committee to focus attention on articles X and XI of the convention. In the light of important linkages between disarmament and security on the one side, and economic development on the other, the CW convention should necessarily include provisions relating to the unhindered development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes, with special emphasis placed on the needs of the developing countries. Such an emphasis can be placed in two ways: by ensuring that none of the provisions will be interpreted so as to hamper the development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes, and in a positive way, by introducing special provisions intended to promote international co-operation to assist in the development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes. Naturally such undertakings would also include in-built means of verification.

CD/PV.432

pp.6-7

Sweden/Andersson

20.8.87

CTB,
CSCE

Today there is consensus among experts that a nuclear test ban would halt the development of new generations of nuclear weapons. It would help to slow down the arms race. It would also constitute a basis for seriously addressing the question of deep cuts in existing arsenals. Furthermore, a nuclear test ban would give a badly needed boost to efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

In this field, as in disarmament affairs generally, the ultimate goal must always be kept clearly in sight. But all problems cannot be solved at once, and where there is an obstacle we must use our imagination and realism to overcome it and to achieve progress wherever possible. This Conference has

a duty to be prepared the day a test-ban treaty can be a reality. Efforts to this end must be launched without delay. There is work to be done on the adequate verification of such a treaty, as well as on its exact scope and contents.

Sweden welcomes bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on this issue. Agreements to introduce new restraints on testing must be steps towards a global comprehensive test-ban treaty, negotiated in this forum. This matter is urgent. A comprehensive test ban is already long overdue.

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe attempts to handle these questions. This process has shown the strength of the multilateral approach. The basis for stability and peace is patiently built in a process where 35 States, big and small, participate on an equal footing.

Sweden welcomes recent proposals at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna for European disarmament negotiations with the participation of all States of the two military alliances, but within the CSCE framework. It is essential for all the 35 States to be adequately informed on the development of such negotiations, and to participate in a continuous exchange of views on the subject-matter, which is of obvious concern to all of them. The legitimate security concerns of all CSCE States must be taken into account.

Regional confidence-building measures could be useful complements to agreements covering the whole continent. One should, for example, give serious thought to what could be done to increase security in the most sensitive areas, such as the border between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Sweden supports the idea of a corridor, free of battlefield nuclear weapons, in the border area between the two military alliances.

Sweden attaches great importance to the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area. Such an arrangement would be confidence-building, and constitute one step towards a nuclear-weapons-free world.

As this decade is drawing to a close, we continue to face danger threatening the very existence of humankind. But there are also some encouraging signs that a safer course can be set. We expect the bilateral talks on nuclear and space weapons to yield early concrete results. This Conference continues to make progress in its vitally important work on a convention banning chemical weapons. The 35 States of the CSCE are poised for a new phase to negotiate confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe. There is an emerging understanding on the crucial issue of disarmament verification, implying new patterns of international co-operation.

Consideration of agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", produced mixed results in 1987. On a positive note, the Group of Scientific Experts, led by the skilful efforts of Dr. Dahlman of Sweden, held two productive sessions to design a new global seismic data exchange system permitting the wider use of full wave-form or level II, data, and to plan its forthcoming large-scale experiment. The United States welcomes this progress, and we congratulate the Canadian expert, Dr. Peter Basham, on his selection as principal co-ordinator of the experiment.

The United States strongly endorses the important work of the Group of Scientific Experts, in particular the advances toward full and open access to all seismic data by all participants in the global exchange. To facilitate that work, the United States will host a workshop on international data centres this fall in Washington.

I want to note that both Argentina and India have participated at the expert level in the most recent meeting, as well as States not members of the Conference such as Denmark, Turkey and New Zealand. Norway, the Western candidate for membership in the Conference, has continued its long tradition of contributions with the dedicated service of the GSE's scientific secretary, Dr. Ringdal. Norway also submitted a valuable working paper on seismic data exchange (CD/763). It would be helpful if other States would join in direct support of the work of the GSE.

On a less positive note, it again proved impossible to reach consensus on a mandate for an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1 to resume the substantive consideration of such important nuclear-test-ban issues as verification and compliance, which were last so addressed in 1983. In our delegation's view, such a resumption remains the appropriate course of action for dealing with these matters.

There has never been any doubt as to the importance the United States attaches to effective verification of arms limitation agreements, including those regarding nuclear testing. Our delegation is encouraged that other States are increasingly coming to share this view.

Over the years, the United States has devoted much effort and technical and financial resources to developing and sustaining verification capabilities. It is an effort that must continue, because verification requirements change in a dynamic way with the changing prospects for agreements, the evolution of military technology, and the assessments that all States make of their confidence that other States parties to agreements will honour their commitments.

The United States developed and deployed satellite, seismic and other systems a quarter of a century ago to monitor compliance with the 1963 limited test-ban Treaty. It has developed electrical methods of measuring the yield of underground nuclear explosions, such as the CORTEX system, whose application could permit ratification of the existing bilateral treaties limiting such explosions to 150 kilotons or less.

In co-operation with many States and institutions around the world, the United States installed a World-wide Seismic System Network and has made the enormous amount of data it collects universally available. It would be helpful if the Soviet Union also made this type of data available on past Soviet nuclear explosions. As referred to by Foreign Minister Schevardnadze in his remarks before the plenary on 6 August, when he referred to the real need for establishing a "real, permanent verification" system.

Even a cursory examination of the record will show many other initiatives for verification that have been undertaken by the United States. The development of prototype remotely deployed tamper-resistant seismic equipment producing authenticated data for text-ban monitoring, and the development of equipment used by the International Atomic Energy Agency in its vital task of safeguarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, are two examples that come to mind.

Thus the United States delegation welcomes the new willingness to address issues related to verification of and compliance with a nuclear test ban. Perhaps this will prove feasible in 1988, in an appropriately mandated ad hoc committee.

Since early 1986 there has been a pronounced trend toward dealing seriously with the security concerns that underlie these negotiations. This trend is reflected both in the converging of views on a number of the basic verification provisions of the convention, and in the increasing support for other measures to build confidence during the negotiations. The most recent evidence of this trend was the announcement by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on 6 August that the Soviet Union supports a mandatory challenge inspection provision, and his invitation to Conference delegations to visit the Soviet chemical weapons facility at Shikhany. We welcomes these steps.

During the summer part of the session, a number of new and important ideas were put forward. This makes it clear that the negotiations are not stagnating, and that delegations are searching for solutions to real problems. Let me cite a few examples. In CD/757, the French delegation identified a real security problem faced by States with small stockpiles and proposed possible solutions. Canada and Norway pooled their expertise on the investigation of use of chemical weapons and proposed, in CD/766, an annex on this important subject. The United Kingdom presented a thoughtful analysis in CD/769 of the steps that need to be taken to ensure that the verification system functions effectively from the very beginning of the convention. The distinguished Director for Political Affairs at the Finnish Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Kahiluoto, proposed in his plenary statement on 7 July that efforts be undertaken to co-ordinate the various national-level CW verification projects that are under way. All of these proposals represent fresh thinking about how to solve the problems that remain before us.

In the same spirit I would like to draw attention to the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, and the cluster co-ordinators, Mr. Nieuwenhuys, Mr. Macedo and Dr. Krutzsch. Each in his own effective way has made important contributions to the negotiations. I want to express the deep appreciation of our delegation for their dedicated efforts.

Appendix II of the draft report of the Ad hoc Committee, and the addendum to the report, demonstrate clearly that during the summer an impressive amount of essential work was accomplished by the Chairman and the three co-ordinators. This material will be the basis for substantial additions to the "rolling text" during the inter-sessional period and in the 1988 session.

I have spoken about what has been achieved. Let me now turn to what remains to be done.

First of all, we must continue to focus on the real security concerns of States. We must develop effective provisions for challenge inspection, for monitoring the civil chemical industry, and for ensuring undiminished security for all States during the period for destruction of chemical weapons. We must find an approach that will encourage all States possessing chemical weapons to become parties to the convention, and that will minimize the chances that non-parties will pose a chemical weapons threat to parties.

Second, we must seek to ensure that the provisions of the convention can be effectively implemented. We must clarify the functions and interrelationships of its administrative bodies. We must amplify the detailed provisions that are necessary to implement its complex verification system, and explore the tasks of the Preparatory Commission, starting from CD/769. We must consider both instruments and procedures for inspections.

Third, we must prevent erosion of existing constraints on chemical weapons while we are negotiating. We must support investigation of reports that chemical weapons have been used, and condemn use of chemical weapons when it is established. We must all adopt measures to end the dangerous spread of chemical weapons.

Finally, we must intensify efforts to build confidence among the negotiating States. The United States is gratified that the importance of greater openness about chemical weapons capabilities is being recognized by a number of delegations. The United States welcomes these constructive steps. But there is still a long way to go. Many members of the Conference have not even indicated whether or not their countries possess chemical weapons. The United States delegation calls upon these delegations to make their position clear.

CD/PV.432

pp.21-23

Poland/Turbanski

20.8.87

OS,CW

Our attention during the present session has also been drawn to a number of partial solutions. There seems to be a growing consensus regarding the idea of an arrangement on the immunity of artificial satellites combined with a ban on anti-satellite weapons. Poland welcomes in particular the outline of basic provisions of such an agreement presented recently to this Conference by the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia. Such an agreement would be an important step in creating a comprehensive legal régime for the peaceful uses of outer space. It would also introduce an important element of confidence, and could establish the basis for necessary co-operation in cases of satellite collisions, the risk of which is increasing with continued tests and growing amounts of man-made debris in outer space.

The work of the Conference has not only brought forth ideas for possible international agreements, but has also helped to outline crucial elements of such agreements. This applies in particular to the problem of verification, which so many speakers on so many occasions have described as the "heart of the matter".

The Soviet idea of an international inspectorate presented during this session and developed in recent statements by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Ambassador Nazarkin is the most valuable contribution to the practical solution of this problem. Poland welcomes this new, bold and far-reaching proposal. We sincerely hope that it will become a subject of serious discussion at the Conference and a key element of a future agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We also express our appreciation for the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal, and the presentation made to the Conference by Canada on the results of its PAXSAT research programme. It enhanced our knowledge of possible remote sensing techniques, and should be helpful in our efforts.

Progress which has been made during this session in the area of verification, traditionally such a difficult domain of any disarmament negotiations, is the best proof of the possibility of making a decisive step in the prevention of an arms race in outer space. What is necessary now is the reorientation of our efforts towards a genuine search for acceptable solutions in this field, and the political will of the participants in the Conference to undertake such an effort.

The draft report currently under consideration in the Committee does not, in our opinion, fully reflect the present stage of the negotiations. We are more advanced in our work than is shown in the annexes to the report. I have in mind the results of diverse consultations at different levels, as well as declarations and announcements by delegations desiring to contribute to the development of mutual confidence and better understanding. All these assist in attentive and scrupulous preparations for the final stage of the negotiations on the convention and its subsequent signature.

Of special importance in this respect was the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. E. Shevardnadze, concerning the principle of mandatory challenge inspections. This approach by the Soviet Union opens up a new perspective to the solution of one of the most difficult and sensitive problems in the convention. At the final stage of negotiations the importance of confidence-building measures has increased considerably. The Soviet invitation to Shikhan'y is, especially in this context, a step without precedent. Not only the process of destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile facility, but also standard items of chemical munitions, will be demonstrated. The same goal will be served well by the Soviet invitation for delegations to visit a chemical weapon destruction facility at Chapayevsk, as well as the Soviet delegation's visit to a destruction facility in the United States (Tooele).

CD/PV.432

pp.25,27

Egypt/Alfarargi

20.8.87

CTB,CW

The Conference continued its consideration of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament through informal meetings of the Conference. Although we agreed on a method of structured discussion to deal with the subjects under consideration, we are still far from implementing the relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions, the last of which is resolution 41/86 F, which calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-1 and to submit recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate multilateral negotiations of agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages for nuclear arms control and the reduction of nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination. I do not believe that the Conference can make any progress in this field as long as there are States which insist on nuclear armament as a means of deterrence.

It may be appropriate to comment in this context on the subject of mandatory challenge inspection, as long as there is quasi-unanimity on its being a corner-stone in reaching a convention. Adhesion to treaties is an act of sovereignty decided by every State in accordance with its supreme interest. And withdrawal from treaties in the field of disarmament is an accepted principle when the supreme interests of a State are jeopardized. It follows that any State having chemical weapons, or having the intention to acquire such weapons with the intent of using them, will not adhere to the convention. It is true that this will render it liable to moral pressure, but at least it will be freed from the legal responsibility that results from contravening the convention. That is why we do not understand why those considering the subject of mandatory challenge inspection concentrate on the aspect of verification of compliance while ignoring the aspect of abuse of mandatory challenge inspection and its threat to national security and the production of chemical weapons for peaceful purposes. That is why we support the inclusion of detailed provisions on challenge inspection, ensuring that this method of verification would not be abused and that compensation would be forthcoming for any damage resulting therefrom.

CD/PV.432

pp.33-35

Sri Lanka/Rodrigo

20.8.87

CTB,CW,
OS

The test ban has been yoked to questions of verification, as well as to what are described as the necessities of nuclear deterrence. Much has been already advanced to meet requirements in relation to verification, including proposals for on-site inspection and the means of benefiting from the considerable advances in seismology as well as the global data exchange systems.

In contrast to the stagnation in the CD on this question, there is happily a clearer flow and movement in respect of item 4 of the agenda of the CD, on chemical weapons. My delegation's gratitude needs to be expressed for the work carried out in the Ad hoc Committee last year under Ambassador

Cromartie of the United Kingdom, and the major progress achieved under the guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden this year. Thanks to their sustained efforts, agreement on a convention on chemical weapons is a distinct certainty. Outstanding issues most certainly remain, such as those relating to verification, including the balance between the demands of a strict, binding verification régime to prevent violations of the proposed convention and, on the other hand, the concern of States to protect vital installations from unwarranted prying. An extended session of the Conference on Disarmament in November this year should be carefully considered if it could accelerate negotiations. Success on this issue would offer a clear example of the capabilities of the CD as a negotiating organ on an issue whose time has come -- an observation also made by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Sweden. Confidence-building measures such as the proposed exchange of visits to chemical facilities have contributed to bring success closer. We are grateful to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for innovative initiatives and modalities to speed up work.

The benefits of the peaceful, rational and equitable exploitation of outer space are perhaps impossible yet to properly assess. However, we already have a more than clear assessment of the dangers perilously imminent in the creeping "weaponization" of outer space. Some 75 per cent of satellites in space are oriented towards military rather than development objectives. Calls for their protection should be examined in relation to the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer space. On-site inspection of space objects by an international inspectorate at the point of launch has been suggested as a contribution to prevent the deployment of weapons in space.

The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union made serious and worthy proposals earlier this month with the object of ensuring that items launched into space are not equipped with weapons.

The proposal of your country, France, Mr. President, in 1978 for an international satellite monitoring agency has been studied intensely and remains on the table. The Canadian presentation on verification and PAXSAT and proposals by China, the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia, Japan and Argentina call for close examination and study in the Ad hoc Committee. Proposals for a comprehensive ASAT weapons ban and revisions to the 1967 outer space Treaty to remedy its shortcomings have also been put forward.

CD/PV.432

pp.37-38

Australia/Butler

20.8.87

CTB

I want to speak briefly now on the occasion of our move towards the adoption of the progress report of the Group of Scientific Experts, the report that is given in document CD/778, which I assume this Conference will adopt at a later stage today. That report, which was introduced last week by the distinguished Chairman of the GSE, Dr. Dahlman, records that the work of this Group, which has been in existence now for 11 years, continues to be strongly supported by members of this Conference. Nineteen of us took part in the last session of the Group of Scientific Experts, and we were joined by six other States non-members of the Conference on Disarmament. National contributions were made to the work of the GSE by some 27 States. During their work in

their last session they gave attention principally to designing a new global seismic data exchange system which would involve the wider use of level II or wave-form data, and they took a further step towards planning the forthcoming large-scale International data exchange experiment. Because the Australian Government remains committed to the earliest possible introduction of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, we consider this work to be of vital significance.

Quite simply, the Group of Scientific Experts will, once again, when they conduct their second global experiment, bring into existence a global seismic monitoring network. It is our firm view that when that system is brought into existence a few months from now, operating through over 70 national centres and four international data exchange centres, in this case with level II as well as level I data, it should remain operational in the future. Simply, when we turn it on again this time, we should not turn it off. By that means we will have moved towards the establishment, permanently, of a major means of verification of a future nuclear test-ban treaty.

My delegation has proposed, in CD/717, that this Conference take the policy of political decision required to ensure that a global seismic network is established, and I am again calling attention to that proposal today and saying quite specifically that in simple, practical terms, a way of achieving that purpose will be to refrain, on the next occasion, from turning the system off when we collectively turn it on to conduct the next global experiment. I would hope, as we move to our final decision this week and next, that a decision of the kind proposed by my delegation and described again now will in fact be taken by this Conference.

May I say too that it was a matter of immense interest and satisfaction to my delegation to hear the contribution to our Conference's work made this morning by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Sweden, and I hope his delegation would consider it acceptable if, in this context of talking about the need for the verification of a nuclear test-ban treaty, I could recall straight away what the distinguished Foreign Minister of Sweden said this morning. He said: "This Conference has a duty to be prepared the day a test-ban treaty can be a reality. Efforts to this end must be launched without delay". My Government shares that view.

One such effort is what the GSE is doing, and what we have proposed should be the permanent establishment of a global seismic network. The other effort that is required is, of course, the establishment of a committee, an ad hoc subsidiary body, under item 1 of our agenda, and it is my delegation's earnest hope that the last remaining procedural obstacles to that development will be removed soon and that that committee will be established as soon as we commence our work next year. But in the meantime, as the distinguished Foreign Minister of Sweden has said, there is work to be done and we should lose no further time in getting on with that work so that we are ready the day on which a nuclear test-ban treaty is open for signature.

CD/PV.432

pp.38-40

Japan/Yamada

20.8.87

CTB

As we approach the end of this year's session, I wish today to comment briefly on the work of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, as well as on our agenda item I, "Nuclear test ban".

On 13 August, Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden presented to the plenary the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts in document CD/778. I had occasion in the spring part of this session to set forth the views of my delegation on the valuable work being performed by the Ad hoc Group. I will not repeat them, except again to express our appreciation for the very able chairmanship of Dr. Dahlman and to underline a few points which we consider to be of particular importance.

Firstly, my delegation welcomes the further steps taken by the Ad hoc Group with a view to giving practical and technical substance to the concept of a modern international seismic data exchange system based on the expeditious exchange of wave-form (level II) and parameter (level I) data, and to the planning of a large-scale experiment. We wish in particular to offer our most positive encouragement to the five new study groups that have been established, and to their convenors, as well as to Dr. Basham of Canada, who has been appointed as the principal co-ordinator of the large-scale experiment.

We continue to attach great importance to the contribution to be made by the widening network of co-operative national investigations into level II or wave-form data exchange, and our seismic expert, Dr. Suehiro, has been working extensively with his colleagues from a number of countries in this areas. One notable sign of progress in this regard is the fact that technical information, experience and recommendations resulting from these exchanges have been collected in Conference Room Paper 167, in the form of a source-book on seismic wave-form exchange which, we hope, will serve as a valuable basis for further expansion of this co-operative endeavour.

Secondly, the progress report (CD/778) contains in its paragraph 11 the reaffirmation of a principle which we consider vitally important, namely, that the international data centres should be open facilities for participating States, providing free and easy access to any data and results of analysis. The task before the Ad hoc Group is to give concrete and technical substance to this principle as quickly and on as wide a basis as possible. It has been somewhat disappointing that some countries apparently still feel a little hesitant or reluctant to translate this principle into practical terms. We hope that they will find themselves in a position to move forward in this regard as expeditiously as possible.

Thirdly, we believe that the objective towards which the Ad hoc Group is working, namely, an international seismic monitoring system, should be attained on a truly global basis in terms of participation by countries and on the soundest possible technical footing. I wish to underscore the importance, reaffirmed in the progress report (CD/778), of a stage-by-stage approach to the large-scale experiment.

In the view of my delegation, these are the points that we in the Conference should bear in mind as we follow the valuable work being undertaken by our scientific experts. Also, we should constantly remind ourselves that their work is designed to form an indispensable basis for our tackling the important question of verification under our priority agenda item, that is, a nuclear test ban. In this context, it may now be time for us to start considering the possibility of the Conference's not just taking note of the work being carried out by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts but also giving political encouragement, guidance and directives to their work.

Verification of a nuclear test ban in all its aspects -- technical, political, legal or financial -- is but one of a host of issues that should be the subjects of practical and substantive examination by the Conference, and most suitably in an ad hoc committee. This leads me to the question of the necessity for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. Last week, I had occasion to speak on behalf of a group of Western countries on the subject. Today I will speak in my national capacity as a representative of Japan.

My Government's positive attitude toward the nuclear-test-ban issue is well known. At the beginning of this year's session, I voiced optimism concerning the early resumption of substantive work by the Conference on a nuclear test ban. That optimism was based on the fact that there existed a general and strong expectation of early commencement of the work, the emerging common perception of the subject-matter of the work and the wide recognition of the necessity of verification as well as willingness to participate in its implementation.

CD/PV.432

pp.43-44

Pakistan/Ahmad

20.8.87

CW

The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons registered significant progress during this session under the energetic chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. This is reflected in the additions that have been made to the "rolling text" on such questions as verification of declarations on chemical weapons and of their destruction, modalities for the revision of lists under article VI, and the technical secretariat. However, the momentum achieved in the spring part of the session was not maintained during the summer. The issues which remain outstanding, among them the questions of the order of destruction, commercial super-toxic chemicals, challenge inspection and organizational matters, are complex and their resolution will not be easy. Besides these politically difficult problems, it will also be necessary to agree on the details of certain outstanding technical matters. It is therefore important that negotiations should be intensified and the opportunity for inter-sessional work fully availed of.

Consultations carried out by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the issue of challenge inspection have led to some narrowing of differences, especially as regards the initiation of this process. However, the crucial question -- how to resolve a situation in which the challenging State and the challenged State are unable to agree how the inspection is to be conducted -- remains. My delegation cannot think of any solution to this problem, except that the matter be entrusted to the Executive Council. As has been rightly pointed out, time is of the essence in challenge inspection, and if doubts about compliance remain unresolved, confidence in the convention would be seriously undermined and its viability put at stake.

My delegation has taken a special interest in article X and XI of the draft convention dealing, respectively, with assistance and with economic and technological development. We are looking forward to listening to the views of other delegations at the consultations on these two issues which are due to be held before the end of the current session, and hope that further consideration will be given to these two articles during the inter-sessional period. Our proposal on article X is before the Conference in document CD/752. We also support the Brazilian proposal on article XI contained in document CD/CW/WP.176.

Concern has been expressed by a few delegations, including mine, over the possibility that some of the States possessing a chemical weapons capability might not adhere to the convention, or that activities which would undermine the objectives of the convention might be carried out on the territories of non-parties. These are problems that will need to be given careful attention by the Conference. Our proposal in CD/752 seeks to address these concerns by assuring States parties facing a chemical weapons threat from any source, whether a party or non-party, of assistance from other States parties. The question of the responsibility of States parties for the activities of their persons, whether natural or legal, on the territory of non-parties is also relevant in this context. There is, moreover, the wider question of what States parties can do collectively about a State party which violates the convention, or about a non-party which retains or acquires a chemical weapons capability.

CD/PV.432

pp.46-47

GDR/Rose

20.8.87

CTB

The progress report which the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events prepared on its twenty-fourth session has now been distributed as document CD/778. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic appreciates the efforts the Group made towards a blueprint for a modern international system for the exchange of seismic data. The Group of Socialist States gives its approval to the report. We thank the Chairman, Mr. Dahlman, and the members of the Ad hoc Group for their work on a highly sophisticated scientific and technological matter.

It is my delegation's understanding that the expeditious exchange of seismic data will be a very important measure to complement verification of compliance with a future comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests by national technical means under an effective system of international co-operation.

As can be gathered from the Ad hoc Group's report, solutions are being considered that go far beyond the generally acknowledged scope of seismological research. It appears desirable, therefore, that the Group should not confine itself to just one possible solution. Rather, different options should be worked out, annotated by detailed information about their potential and ways to translate them into action. In fact, this will be needed before any concrete decision on the future data exchange system can be made. I think it would be correct to assume that initial conditions will not be the same everywhere in the world.

We note that the Ad hoc Group has not yet arrived at a full consensus on the best way of devising such a system. Goal-oriented scientific technological studies are required in order to establish and eventually operate a properly functioning exchange of seismic data within the framework of a verification system for a nuclear test ban.

As for the proposed experiment on the exchange of level II seismic data, my delegation shares the view of the Ad hoc Group that the overall concept of the system should be developed under a step-by-step process. It endorses the scientific experts' suggestion concerning the dates of their next session. As in the past, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic will continue to lend active support to the efforts of the Ad hoc Group.

I would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Group of Socialist States, to back the Soviet proposals that a special group of scientific experts be set up which would be assigned the task of submitting recommendations on the structure and functions of a system of verification for any possible agreement not to conduct nuclear weapon tests. If this proposal were implemented, all the facets of verification of compliance with relevant accords would be addressed in a purposeful manner. We do hope this initiative will meet with the unanimous approval of the Conference.

CD/PV.433

pp.5-10,12-14

Canada/Beesley

25.8.87

VER,CW,
CTB,OS

There is no issue which has proven more controversial than that of verification. Even if it is not on our agenda as a separate item, it is omnipresent in our work. During my time, this issue of verification, a long-standing Canadian priority which we have regarded as the key to arms control and disarmament agreements, has gradually come to be universally accepted as the essential requirement for the conclusion of such agreements. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. van den Broek, pointed out in his statement to the CD last month, "it is increasingly recognized that asking for on-site inspection" to verify a treaty with important security implications "is reasonable and legitimate". He went on to say that "the growing consensus on the need for strict verification holds the promise of progress with regard to arms control in general". It is stating the obvious to say that the Canadian Government fully shares that view. What may not be so obvious is that such a statement could not have been made four years ago.

As I pointed out in my statement last month, verification performs a series of central functions, the most important being deterrence of non-compliance, confidence-building, removal of uncertainty and treaty assessment. The success this year of the working group on verification at the United Nations Disarmament Commission, under Canadian chairmanship, in reaching provisional agreement on several verification principles, further testifies to the emerging international consensus on these issues. This has to be seen as progress. Thus while verification is sometimes portrayed as an obstacle in the way of a solution, for Canada it has always been a central part of the solution.

It is in this context that I welcome and acknowledge the importance of the statement made in this room by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Shevardnadze, when he said that "real verification" ought to involve "foolproof, indisputable, reliable and extremely strict and rigorous methods". The specific verification-related suggestions he made at that time in relation to chemical weapons, outer space and nuclear testing will be studied with care by Canadian authorities with these criteria in mind. I should like to come back later to the question of the standards to be sought in verification measures.

The recent announcement by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that the Soviet Union now agrees to a fully mandatory challenge inspection régime is a most important statement, even when read in the light of the five qualifying points made later by Ambassador Nazarkin in his elaboration of USSR views on this issue. Clearly, certain important details remain to be negotiated in this area, as indicated in Ambassador Ekéus' report on his consultations. Inter alia, there needs to be agreement on the precise manner in which challenges would be initiated.

It has long been agreed that allegations of the use of chemical weapons must be dealt with as promptly as possible, and that the only adequate method of determining whether or not chemical weapons have been used is on-site inspection. Canada has considered this problem in much detail and this year, together with the delegation of Norway, we have provided a paper (CD/766) proposing an annex to article IX on this important subject. We hope that it will be possible for the Ad hoc Committee to give full attention to the important question of the verification of CW use as soon as this is practicable.

We have also broken new ground in the CW negotiations this year in developing an understanding of the type of international organization required to oversee the implementation of a CW convention. Much work remains to be done before this organization can become a reality. It is critical that we thoroughly understand what we expect such an organization to do before we can complete our work on article VIII of the draft treaty. The Canadian delegation intends to contribute substantively to this as part of our work. I suggest, however, that the mere fact that we are collectively now addressing such issues is an encouraging sign and a clear mark of progress.

Turning now to the nuclear test ban, in the Canadian policy statement mentioned earlier it was emphasized that the pursuit of a comprehensive test ban was a fundamental -- perhaps the fundamental -- nuclear issue before the Committee on Disarmament. The attainment of this objective remains a major priority of the Canadian Government. The step-by-step approach favoured by Canada four years ago, an approach which now has the support of most delegations around this table, remains the most realistic in our view.

There is, of course, another subject on which verification is crucial. As in other arms control and disarmament areas, adequate verification of a comprehensive test ban would be of vital importance. There has, however, been considerable progress in the past four years in the development of a global seismic verification system, and the Group of Scientific Experts is to be congratulated for its constructive work in this area during this period. A Group which may have been considered somewhat controversial four years ago is now universally acknowledged as one of the corner-stones of our Conference on this issue. The large-scale level II data exchange experiment, which could take place as early as next year, will be especially important in demonstrating the feasibility of verification by seismic means. Canada attaches great importance to the effective utilization of wave-form data, including its adequate dissemination to all international data centres within a global system, for this verification purpose. Here too, much has been

achieved during the past four years. The Canadian Government recently commissioned in-depth research at the University of Toronto which has already produced interesting and promising results. I am therefore delighted that one of the scientific experts on my delegation, Dr. Peter Basham, has been chosen to co-ordinate this experiment. We know that he will receive the support and co-operation from others which the importance of the endeavour fully warrants.

Given the complexity of many of the questions we have discussed under the existing outer space mandate, the Canadian Government considers that the best way to expedite our work is to put forth our views in the form of working papers. The purpose is to concretize discussions and negotiations, whether or not delegations agree with the papers tabled. Even disagreement clarifies issues, far more than general statements not focused on specific proposals. In my statement to the Conference on 2 April I cited the series of working papers that Canada has put forward, and I do not need to do so again. I would however like to refer to our workshop in Montreal in May of this year, which I had the honour to chair, as another instance of our effort to make concrete contributions in this field. I wish to thank the many delegations which have expressed their appreciation for this workshop. The Canadian PAXSAT presentation to the Ad hoc Committee represented a further effort to concentrate on the practical problems of verification.

With regard to the specific question of verification concerning outer space, I think that it is worth reiterating the point I made to the Conference in my statement of 21 July. Careful negotiation, drafting and implementation of adequate and effective verification systems is essential if verification is not to become a source of tension rather than a means of lessening it or eliminating it. We are pleased to note that the Soviet Union is giving attention to this problem, as evidenced in the proposal outlined in Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's speech to the Conference on Disarmament on 6 August. We would encourage the Soviet Union to give further thought to its proposal for an international verification system. We have particularly taken note that, as seems clear from this and other elements of Mr. Shevardnadze's statement, the Soviet Union accepts in principle that useful and practical work on aspects of verification can be done independently of a specific negotiating context, and without having previously reached agreement on the details of what is to be controlled. This is a view which has long been advocated by Canada.

By way of clarification, I should also emphasize, however, that, as reflected in our own PAXSAT feasibility study, in our view the implementation of verification systems ought, at least in most circumstances, to be treaty-specific. Canada has not advocated third-party approaches involving verification activities outside the context of an agreement or by countries not party to an agreement. A corollary to this approach has been that Canada has not advocated the putting into place of verification systems or procedures in advance of the conclusion of an agreement. These comments are applicable, of course, not only to outer space but to nuclear test issues as well.

I would make an additional, final point about our work in relation to outer space. The working papers my delegation has submitted have pointed to the potential importance of careful drafting of definitions. The somewhat

restrictive definition -- if I may so -- of outer space weapons which appears in Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement of 6 August reinforces us in our view that such work could indeed be useful. This is of special importance because, as I have emphasized on other occasions, the central and essential purpose of any arms control agreement and its related verification system must be to enhance stability, and thus we should close the door on any possible areas of ambiguity or uncertainty. I hope I have succeed in indicating some progress even on outer space over the past four years.

I want now to conclude by addressing, to my mind, the heart of the problem that faces us in arms control, that is to say, the nature of the transaction we would be dealing with. In doing so I will draw upon a recent statement I made in a conference in Ottawa. It is the essence of an arms control and disarmament agreement that the contracting parties agree to renounce, limit or destroy armaments or military forces in return for treaty commitments by other parties to do the same. To ask States to renounce or scrap weapons in return for treaty obligations as an alternative measure of protecting their security is to demand of them a very serious and difficult decision. In effect, a State accepts a treaty in lieu of weapons as a means of protecting its security. This is an extremely important undertaking, since a primary responsibility of any Government must be to protect the security of the country, however defined or perceived. Given the traditional -- and contemporary -- concern with national security, the importance of verification becomes evident: it is the means by which a party ensures confidence, throughout the life of an arms control agreement, that other parties are complying with their obligations while at the same time demonstrating its own good faith. In a world where there are relatively few internationally effective sanctions, verification must inevitably play a critical role in ensuring that a treaty is and remains effective and does not become a source of tension rather than a means of lessening or eliminating it.

There is a very special role that verification must play. Events of recent years have underscored the crucial importance in certain arms control agreements of compliance with their provisions, and, thus, of verification of compliance. It is axiomatic that in an imperfect world, just as there can be no arms control without confidence in compliance, there can be no confidence in compliance without adequate verification. It follows that verification can be seen as the very foundation upon which the whole edifice of arms control agreements rests.

We have seen how even clear-cut and specific verification mechanisms in some multilateral agreements such as the biological and toxin weapons Convention of 1972, which is not merely an arms control agreement but a genuine disarmament agreement, have proven inadequate to dispel suspicions of violations. We have seen in the Gulf War the consequences of the absence of any verification process in the 1925 Geneva Poison Gas Protocol, which is, admittedly, only a non-first-use treaty, but an important one -- of the kind advocated by many for the control of nuclear weapons. We have also seen how evidence derived from the verification mechanisms of some bilateral agreements (such as the ABM Treaty and the threshold test-ban Treaty) can prove ambiguous, and give rise to disputes and suspicion rather than confidence and good faith in dealing with situations suggesting controversial activities.

These few examples -- in multilateral and bilateral agreements -- demonstrate not only the importance of verification and compliance, but the political sensitivity of the whole process of detecting and handling events suggesting possible non-compliance. Indeed, recent concerns about verification and compliance seem in some cases to have eroded confidence among the parties to arms control agreements rather than reinforced it. None the less, it is the Canadian position, which I wish to emphasize, that the careful negotiation and drafting of adequate and effective verification provisions and the establishment of the necessary implementing mechanisms is essential to preventing such a deterioration of confidence. This applies a fortiori to agreements involving nuclear weapons and nuclear tests.

In my Ottawa statement, I pointed out that "Clearly, no verification can be totally foolproof. A verification mechanism must be able to detect, beyond a reasonable doubt, any violation of an agreement that would permit a State to acquire, or clearly indicate an intention to acquire, a military capability threatening to the national security of any other party". I analysed in that statement, at some length, the standard of verification which might be acceptable. Since I have circulated copies of my Ottawa statement to all delegations, I will not take the time of the Conference to read it into the record.

CD/PV.433

pp.16-17

Algeria/Hacene

25.8.87 CTB,CW

My delegation has already had occasion to speak on this subject; therefore I will merely recall that the lack of negotiations under item 1 cannot have any valid justification, particularly in the light of the new political and technical developments which have been recorded on this issue. In this context, the input of the Group of Seismic Experts, which has embarked on a new stage of its work, deserves our commendation.

A chemical weapons ban is still the sole topic on which genuine negotiations are taking place. The Ad hoc Committee dealing with this task has made further progress under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus, to whom my delegation would like to pay special tribute. This progress is reflected in particular in the "rolling text" bearing the symbol CD/CW/WP.167. Nevertheless, some aspects of the future convention remain controversial, and the Ad hoc Committee even marked time during the second part of the session on questions which were thought to be on the point of being settled. Thus it is extremely important that all delegations should show their firm resolve to arrive at solutions on the main issues still pending, and that nothing should further complicate an already complex situation.

Problems related to verification and compliance continue to be the subject of intensive consideration and consultation within the Ad hoc Committee. From experience to date we should draw the lesson that a realistic reply to these undoubtedly important questions lies in the search for a balance between two requirements. On the one hand, the convention must contain provisions which will ensure that all States parties will comply with the commitments they undertake. On the other hand, these provisions should not lead to the creation of situations of needless tension or hamper the development of the

civilian chemical industry, particularly in the developing countries. This is why it seems to us especially important to provide for effective procedures and the democratic functioning of the organs of the future convention.

My delegation would like to take this opportunity to recall the great importance which it attaches to the development of international co-operation in chemicals under the future convention. We would express the hope that the forthcoming consultations on articles 10 and 11 of the draft convention will make it possible to pave the way for fruitful work on this matter.

CD/PV.434

p.5

Bulgaria/Bojilov

27.8.87

CTB, OS,
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Our delegations attach exceptional importance to the inclusion in a future treaty of provision for reliable measures to verify compliance with the nuclear test-ban agreement. That is why far-reaching forms and methods of verification are proposed in the document, both national and international, including measures which have never been proposed before and have never been considered. I would remind you that in the socialist countries' proposal there is provision for the use of national technical means of verification, and the creation of an international seismic monitoring system, whose operation would involve participation by representatives of an international inspectorate, verification of the non-conduct of nuclear explosions on testing ranges -- also with participation by international inspectors -- and mandatory on-site inspections without the right to refuse such inspections.

In our view, all the necessary conditions exist for a start on the elaboration of a system to verify the non-conduct of nuclear explosions. The most suitable and effective body for such work would be an ad hoc group of experts which would have a mandate to prepare scientifically well-founded recommendations on the structure and functions of a verification system for any possible agreement on the non-conduct of nuclear explosions. In mooted this proposal we in no way belittle the role which the Ad hoc Group of Seismic Experts should play. As in the past, we favour the continuation of its activities with a view to completion of the development of a system for rapid transmission of level II seismic data which would form the basis of international seismic monitoring of the nuclear weapon test ban.

CD/PV.435

pp.3-4

France/de la Baume

28.8.87

CW

I note that in his comments on article IV, the Chairman of the Committee said that we were now in a situation where only one country "still has some reservations on openly declaring and accepting verification at all stockpile locations as soon as 30 days after the entry into force of the convention". This very explicit statement refers to the French position, which is thus singled out and summarized in an inadequate manner.

I must first of all note that at no other point in his presentation did the Chairman single out any other delegation, whereas on many items various countries also have quite specific positions. Therefore as far as our delegation is concerned there is an unfortunate difference in treatment. I do not feel that this sort of approach is likely to facilitate smooth negotiations.

I would now like to recall the facts. The French delegation declared that it was prepared to accept the declaration of the stockpile locations on the thirtieth day after the entry into force of the Convention. While taking such a step forward regarding the principle for all stocks, it proposed in working paper CD/757, which submitted on 11 June last, that special consideration should be given to ways and means of declaring security stocks: whilst accepting the possibility of a public and complete declaration of such stocks, we pointed out that it might be preferable not to make such a declaration public for reasons of security, but to resort to the so-called sealed envelope procedure. In any event, and even if this procedure were to be adopted, the location of the stock would be communicated to the international authority and would be open to challenge inspection.

Whilst moving forward on the question of declarations of location, we wanted to underscore the importance of security questions. Indeed, I observe that the Chairman's presentation itself notes on the same page 3, in the last paragraph, that the much discussed issues of the order of destruction of stocks is related to fundamental security concerns. I would take the liberty of recalling that it is indeed our special position on location which has to be tied in directly with the debate under way on this subject, on the subject of which the Chairman of the Committee has himself invited all delegations to give careful attention to the relevant sections of the report and to look for mutual acceptable solutions.

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Compendium of verbatim statements
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