Human Security for an Urban Century

LOCAL CHALLENGES, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

humansecurity-cities.org

Contents

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(Front cover:) "La Chinga", a
13-year-old gang member from
Medellín, Colombia, points his gun at
the camera. Children growing up in
cities are often at heightened risk of
being recruited into organized armed
criminal groups. The average age of
recruitment for child gang members
has been estimated at between 11 and
14, and has been falling in recent years.

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Foreword

The objective of this project has been to examine in detail the nature and scale of organized armed violence in urban areas and to explore the value of bringing a human security lens to the challenges posed by cities at the beginning of an "Urban Century."

For the first time in history, the majority of people now live in cities. Rapid urbanization is already shaping trends in global peace and security. Armed violence is increasingly taking place in sprawling hillside slums, involving adolescent boys with automatic weapons, corrupt police officers determined to "clean up" city streets, or vigilante groups who take justice into their own hands. The violence feeds on the toxic mix of transnational criminal organizations and failed public security.

This book is the product of a unique research partnership between the Human Security Research and Outreach Program of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, and the Canadian Consortium on Human Security, a research network operated through the University of British Columbia's Centre of International Relations. Over the past year, our two organizations have together explored the issues of human security in urban spaces. Through this partnership, we have sponsored expert dialogues and conferences, supported graduate student research awards, created a new website (www.humansecurity-cities.org), and presented our early findings to international experts at the United Nations World Urban Forum in Vancouver in June 2006.

Building secure cities will be critical to the prevention of armed violence and the protection of civilians.

These research and outreach efforts were critical to the identification of a new community of expertise relevant to the human security and cities agenda. This book provides an overview of what we have learned from these expert consultations. It provides a collection of contributions from 40 leading academics, civil society experts, government officials, and graduate students woven together with a general narrative that tells a compelling story about the human security challenges and opportunities we will face.

Among its main conclusions is that building secure cities — cities with effective public security; inclusive, participatory governance; and positive social capital — will be critical to the prevention of armed violence and the protection of civilian populations from such violence when prevention fails. This research suggests that achieving "cities without slums" — the 11th target of the seventh UN Millennium Development Goal — will require a clear recognition of the linkages between security and development. It also suggests that much more work is required by researchers and policy makers in order to fully understand the profound implications rapid urbanization holds for the human security agenda.

Michael Small
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Brian Job
Principal Investigator, Canadian
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Preface

This book is the product of a unique research partnership known as humansecurity-cities.org, a virtual community of expertise brought together by the Canadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS) hosted by the University of British Columbia (UBC), and the Human Security Research and Outreach Program supported by Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT).

Humansecurity-cities.org was launched in early 2006 as a vehicle to explore the potential for cooperative scholarship and policy development related to an urban human security agenda. The project's early activities were exploratory in nature, involving discussion with academics, policy makers and practitioners through a conference-call methodology known as Fast Talk Teams. Themes identified through this early research were developed into a discussion paper entitled *Freedom from Fear in Urban Spaces*, released in May 2006. New scholarship in this area was encouraged through a jointly supported CCHS/DFAIT graduate research awards competition which provided 10 Masters- and PhD-level research grants for essays on issues relevant to human security and cities.

In early June 2006, a two-day conference was held at UBC's Liu Institute for Global Issues which brought together some 40 Canadian and international experts, including the graduate research award winners, to discuss these issues in more detail. DFAIT and CCHS also participated in the United Nations World Urban Forum in Vancouver in late June 2006, where the early research of the humansecurity-cities.org partnership was provided to a range of international experts through workshops and networking events.

Human Security for an Urban Century: Local Challenges, Global Perspectives is the most recent and comprehensive product developed by the humansecurity-cities.org partnership. It includes the work of 40 external contributors who share viewpoints and information from a broad variety of backgrounds and fields. The narrative text, jointly authored by DFAIT and CCHS, provides a snapshot of human security challenges and opportunities, with facts and analysis based on research and consultations conducted over the past year. *Human Security for an Urban Century* aims to take stock of what we have learned in the hope of devising a longer-term, strategic policy agenda for advancing human security in urban spaces.

This book would not have been possible without the help of the experts who generously volunteered their thoughtful contributions. In addition to these authors, we wish to express our sincere thanks to our research interns, Jeremy Bryan, Lindsey Weber and Kevin Wyjad; our production coordinator and editorial consultant, Stephanie Power; our publication designers, Joss Maclennan and Jennifer Lunergan of Joss Maclennan Design; and our French editor, Michel Forand. We also benefited greatly from the input of friends and colleagues including Don Hubert, Michael Small and Brian Job whose support and encouragement were critical to the success of this project.

The views expressed in this volume represent those of the experts engaged throughout this process and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, the Canadian Consortium on Human Security, or the University of British Columbia.

Maciek Hawrylak, Sarah Houghton and Robert Lawson, Human Security Research and Outreach Program, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada

Wendy McAvoy, Canadian Consortium on Human Security

Slum housing in Mumbai, India stands in stark contrast with the affluent suburb of Bandra in the background.

CHAPTER 1

Human security at the dawn of an Urban Century

FAST FACTS AND FIGURES

> In 2005, global urbanization crossed 50 percent for the first time in human history, and will reach 60 percent by 2030.[1]

> Cities of the developing world now account for over 90 percent of the world's urban growth.

> The global rural population will begin to decline after 2015.

> In Latin America, 64 percent of the poor live in urban, not rural, areas.

> The mayor of Mexico City, which is home to about 20 million people, governs more people than the leaders of 75 percent of the world's states.[2]

For the first time in human history as many people now live in cities as in rural areas. By 2030, it is estimated that 60 percent of the world's population will live in cities.[3] We have entered what some are calling the "Urban Century."[4] Conceptions of local and global governance are changing in an age when the mayor of a mega-city such as Mexico City now governs more people than the leaders of 75 percent of the world's states. With a third of all urban dwellers living in slums, rapid urbanization is also reshaping the security and development challenges facing the global community.

Urbanization is not a new phenomenon. Much of human history has been shaped by shifts from agrarian to urban societies. What is new is the unprecedented speed and scale of recent demographic shifts. At the dawn of the 19th century, just three percent of the world lived in cities. This number increased to 13 percent in 1900. By 1950, still less than 30 percent of the world was urbanized.[5] Since then, the global urban population has *quadrupled*,[6] with urban population

growth significantly outpacing rural growth *(see Figure 1.1).*

The speed of this demographic shift is without precedent in human history.[7] The population of metropolitan Dhaka, Bangladesh, for example, exploded from 400,000 in 1950 to almost 10 million in 2006.[8] The scale of urbanization we are witnessing today is also staggering. As Figure 1.2 shows, it took roughly 10,000 years for the world's urban population to reach one billion, whereas it is expected to take only 15 years to grow from three to four billion.

A "city" can be defined in many ways. This book will focus on cities with populations greater than 100,000 people.

Today's urbanization is also occurring primarily in the cities of the developing world, which now account for over 90 percent of

Defining "city" and "urban"

Patricia McCarney, Director, Global Cities Program[1]
University of Toronto

Global trends in urbanization raise questions about how cities are defined. An analysis of 228 countries and areas of the world by the United Nations shows that governments use different definitions, underscoring the degree to which the concept is contested, and pointing to the difficulties of gathering data in a field without standard definitions:

> **105** countries base their city data on **administrative** criteria, usually geographic boundaries such as "city limits" (83 use this as their sole method of distinguishing urban from rural).

> **100** countries define cities by **population size or population density** (57 use this as their sole urban criterion). However, the minimum population deemed necessary to constitute a city ranges broadly, from a low of **200** to a high of **50,000**.

> **25** countries specify **economic** characteristics as significant, though not exclusive, in defining cities — typically, the proportion of the labour force employed in non-agricultural activities.

> **18** countries count the availability of **urban infrastructure** in their definitions, including the presence of paved streets, water supply systems, sewage systems or electric lighting.[2]

Interestingly, **25** countries provide **no definition** of "urban" at all, whereas **six** countries regard their **entire populations** as urban.[3]

While "city" and "urban" are often used interchangeably, they can denote different concepts. Though "city" normally refers to the statistical grouping of people in a single area, "urban" can refer to the transformation in mindset that occurs in cities. "Urban" generally denotes the altered patterns of social, economic, political and cultural interaction unique to cities that develop as a result of different kinds of employment, diversified social and political structures, and the built environment, among other factors. The 1938 characterization of "urban as a way life" by Louis Wirth continues to inform the study of the modern city and urbanization trends worldwide.[4] ●

1 For more information, see www.globalcities.ca.

2 United Nations, Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses, Revision 1 (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1998) and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2004).

3 United Nations, Principles and Recommendations (1998) and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision (2004).

4 Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," American Journal of Sociology 44 (1938) 1-24.

global urban growth.[9] This figure will represent almost all population growth on the planet in the next quarter-century, as rural populations are expected to decline after 2015.[10] However, much of this urban expansion is occurring in a context of rapid but highly inequitable economic growth. With many municipal governments already lacking the capacity to provide basic security to all urban dwellers, such rapid urbanization means that each year more and more people are living in impoverished, informal slums in and around urban areas.

Human security in urban spaces

The term "human security" has now been in widespread use for about a decade.[11] It emerged as a critique of approaches to the promotion of international peace and security that focused almost exclusively on the security of states and their governments. The essential idea of human security is that people rather than nation-states are the principal point of reference, and that the security of states is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. In an increasingly interdependent world, the security of people in one part of the world depends on the security of people elsewhere. International peace and security is ultimately constructed

on the foundation of people who are secure.[12]

The term itself has been associated with efforts to reduce people's vulnerability to a broad array of risks ranging from attacks on civilian populations in civil wars through to people's social-psychological well-being. Whatever the breadth of the definition, one thing is clear: any conception of human security must address the question of safety from physical violence for people and their communities.

One fundamental objective in the pursuit of human security is *reducing the human costs of war*. This is achieved by creating and strengthening international humanitarian standards, enforcing the rule of law, promoting the peaceful resolution of conflicts where they exist, and preventing their re-emergence. Since the end of the Cold War, human security has been shaped less by wars *between* states and more by armed conflict within states. With 90 percent of conflicts now taking place *within* states, people are now much more likely to be killed or injured as a result of the failure of a state to maintain the rule of law within its own territory than its inability to defend its borders from attacks by other states.

A closer look at the violent threats faced by people living in major cities and slums suggests a need to focus on reducing the risk of

FIGURE 1.1 World population growth 1950-2020

SOURCE: *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2001 Revision*

FIGURE 1.2 The declining time needed for one billion additional urban dwellers

World's total urban population	Years taken
0 to 1 billion urban dwellers	~10,000 (c.8,000 B.C.–1960)
1 to 2 billion urban dwellers	25 (1960–1985)
2 to 3 billion urban dwellers	17 (1985–2002)
3 to 4 billion urban dwellers	15 (2002–2017)

SOURCE: David Satterthwaite (2005)

Human security and cities in the Greater Near East[1]

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With the shift of populations to urban centres, the world is entering the "Urban Century." In particular, demographic shifts in the string of cities that arc from Lagos, Nigeria north to Cairo, Egypt, then east and southeast to Karachi, Pakistan and Jakarta, Indonesia — an area broadly referred to as "the Greater Near East" — will be significant. As populations dramatically increase in emerging countries' urban areas, much of that growth will take place in the Greater Near East.

Urbanization in and of itself, of course, is neither necessarily a good nor a bad thing. It is unlikely, however, that Dhaka, Bangladesh — which has grown from 400,000 inhabitants in 1950 to 10 million in 2000, and is projected to top 19 million by 2015 — will be able to sustain such growth rates without significant impacts on the safety and security of its population.[2]

In the same vein, Lagos offers a prime example of the challenges of urban agglomerations and the critical emphasis these human security themes should receive. Nigeria's governmental structures are simply unable to deliver public services or to ensure public safety to the current urban population. Adequate sewage and water services are lacking, as almost 10 million urban Nigerians are without a reliable water supply and more than seven million are without sewage control.[3] Lagos is officially referred to by development agencies as "very dangerous", particularly at night. Rampantly high rates of crime are indicative of inadequate public safety services. Similarly, more than half of Karachi's population resides in shantytowns, communities where virtually no public services are provided. Law enforcement and public safety are in scant supply.

Yet many cities of the Greater Near East, for all their anarchy and dysfunction, will retain direct and indirect commercial links to the rest of the world, and their inhabitants will be able to travel to other cities and will have access to the world's most modern communication and computing technologies. Some of these urban agglomerations may well become what some have referred to as "feral cities": urban centres, acting as a kind of "super nest", attracting resources — both positive *and* negative — from rural centres, including human capital and labour, skills, food, water and raw materials.[4] The term itself is admittedly provocative, yet represents a phenomenon already taking place

around the globe. Cities in this condition will pose a particularly serious security threat because they will have substantial pockets of insecurity within their municipal boundaries and extensive commercial, communications and transportation links to the rest of the world.

For those who inhabit urban spaces of the future, security may depend on how states cope with the broader human dilemma. Sustainable development and security intersect and are mutually reinforcing in cities; one cannot occur without the other. And yet, it remains likely that in the Greater Near East, in particular, more and more people will be compelled by economic or environmental pressures to migrate to cities that lack the infrastructure to support the rapid, concentrated population growth they induce, thus threatening increasingly negative urban human security outcomes.

Anarchy, governmental collapse, ethnic rivalry, cultural grievances, religious-ideological extremism,

environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, competition for economic resources, drug trafficking, alliances between narco-traffickers and terrorists, the proliferation of "inhumane weapons" and the spread of infectious diseases threaten everyone. It is not possible to be isolated from their effects.

The question then is not whether the emphasis should be placed on traditional security issues, which normally derive from the relationships among states, or on non-traditional human security issues, which are not confined by national boundaries. The answer is that the focus must be on both. ●

1 Drawn in part from P. H. Liotta and James F. Miskel, A Fevered Crescent: Security and Insecurity in the Greater Near East (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006).

2 Based on data compiled by the National Geographic Society and the United Nations Population Division.

3 United States Agency for International Development, "Making Cities Work," August 2002, August 2006, http://www.makingcitieswork.org/urbanWorld/profiles.

4 See, for example, Norman Myers, The Gaia Atlas of Future Worlds: Challenges and Opportunities in an Age of Change (New York: Anchor Books, 1990) 83.

"TARGET KABUL"
Human insecurity in the Afghan capital

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Over the past quarter century, the Afghan capital city of Kabul has been centrally involved in wars conducted by Soviet, Mujahideen, Taliban and American forces. The reasons for targeting the city varied by group — though for all parties, Kabul's strategic and symbolic value as a transportation hub and seat of political power was central.

In an abstract sense, the city's urban character was a source of grievance for some groups, such as the Taliban, who drew support predominantly from the rural regions. The capital was the heart of education, the site of peaceful political opposition, the locus for freedom of expression — especially for women — and moreover, the container in which rapid societal progress was conceived and from where it was pushed into the provinces, in a process of city-driven cultural change.

More specifically, the urban lens can also help shed light on some of the hidden impacts of conflict generated by war. One of the key outcomes of the Soviet occupation, during which most military activities took place primarily in rural areas, was a massive influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Kabul and other Afghan cities.[1] This influx overloaded the ability of the city

Kabul became the place where limits to residents' "right to the city" were more widespread, more visible and more violent than probably anywhere else in the world.

to provide basic services to the newcomers, which exacerbated urban poverty and contributed significantly to the tipping of the balance between public appreciation of, and hostility toward, the communist ideology.

Conversely, the 1996 capture of Kabul by the Taliban was a "forceful imposition upon the city of distorted traditional, decentralized, rural values and lifestyles."[2] Kabul became the place where limits to residents' "right to the city"[3] were more widespread, more visible and more violent than probably anywhere else in the world. Urban cosmopolitanism was destroyed by an oppressive regime of prohibitions that minimized freedom of movement to the extent that most

women left their homes only in circumstances of immediate need for water or food. The Taliban also used forced migration from rural areas to the capital, most visibly in the case of the displacement of 200,000 mostly Tajik residents of the Shomali plain in early 1997 "to create a dense Pashtun-settled ring north of Kabul in order to make it clear once and for all that Kabul was a Pashtun city."[4] This initial measure of forced resettlement soon developed into full-scale scorched earth tactics as part of an ethnic cleansing campaign during the summer of 1999 involving the destruction of irrigation systems, farmland and shelter, which again forced thousands to flee, with 30,000 escaping south to Kabul.[5]

Finally, the experience of absolute vulnerability among city dwellers was demonstrated during the US-led campaign to liberate Afghanistan from Taliban rule after the attacks of September 11, 2001. In an attempt to avoid civilian casualties, area bombardment was eschewed in favour of numerous precision attacks on urban infrastructure (radar sites, airfields, command posts, etc.) that could support Taliban resistance. However, most of these sites were surrounded

by slums with large numbers of people and fragile housing, with the result that most civilian deaths in the war occurred in densely populated areas of Afghan cities.[6] Cumulatively, these numerous small death tolls meant that the US-led bombing campaign, however well-designed to minimize civilian casualties, was the most lethal in terms of bomb tonnage since the Vietnam era, resulting in between 2,214 and 2,571 civilian casualties.[7]

The 1990-1991 Iraq war, by contrast, resulted in 284-363 civilians killed per 10,000 tons of bombs.[8]

Immediately after each phase of open conflict, however, Kabul and other Afghan cities demonstrated their conflict resilience by serving as safe havens for hundreds of thousands of IDPs and returning refugees. Yet the rapid influx of new people, the legacy of traditional urban planning, weak accountabilities in a network of multiple players, and the loss of the majority of land titles during the two decades of fighting, means that as Kabul recovers from war, inter-group competition for power in a city burdened by its responsibilities could result in the failure of public security.[9] ●

Afghan refugees walk back to their tents after receiving clothing and other supplies in a refugee camp on the outskirts of Kabul. (February 2005)

1 Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand, "Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State, and the 'Post-Conflict' Challenge in Afghanistan," Development and Change 33.5 (2002) 885-909.

2 Marc Herold, "Urban Dimensions of the Punishment of Afghanistan by US Bombs," Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics, ed. Stephen D. N. Graham (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) 313.

3 Henri Lefebvre, "Space and Politics," Writings on Cities, eds. Eleanore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996) 185-202.

4 Conrad Schetter, "Ethnoscapes, National Territorialisation, and the Afghan War," Geopolitics 10 (2005) 69.

5 Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, Afghanistan — The Mirage of Peace (London: Zed Books, 2004) 70-71.

6 Herold, 317.

7 Herold, 316. Variances due to competing casualty figures.

8 Herold, 316. Variances due to competing casualty figures.

9 Daniel Esser, "The city as arena, hub and prey — Patterns of violence in Kabul and Karachi," Environment and Urbanization 16.2 (2004) 31-38.0

FIGURE 1.3 **Typology of urban violence**

Organized crime

MAIN ACTORS	Drug cartels, human trafficking networks, arms smugglers, state security forces (intelligence) and police officers
ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES	Command structure, often trans-national, limited territorial control, mainly economically motivated
IMPACTS/ OUTCOMES	Targeted killings, kidnapping, extortion, systematic sexual abuse, human trafficking and enslavement, small arms proliferation

Open armed conflict

MAIN ACTORS	Rebel groups, paramilitaries (e.g. Cacique Nutibara Bloc (BCN), Colombia), state military forces
ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES	Struggle for territory in interstate or civil war context occurring in cities, usually large scale, political/ideological/ identity motivated
IMPACTS/ OUTCOMES	Significant civilian casualties, mass population displacement, war crimes and crimes against humanity, genocide, terror-ism, humanitarian crises, gender-based violence, recruitment of child soldiers

Degree of organization ↑

Intensity/impact →

Anomic Crime†

MAIN ACTORS	Individual criminals, state security/ police forces*
ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES	Ad hoc acts of violent crime and delinquency, usually economically motivated
IMPACTS/ OUTCOMES	Sporadic murder, assault, gender-based violence, robbery/theft

Endemic community violence

MAIN ACTORS	Urban gangs (e.g. Cape Town Scorpions, South Africa), vigilante groups/community defence organizations, ethnic militias (e.g. Egbesu Boys of Africa, Nigeria), state security forces and police officers*
ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES	Widespread/routine violent crime in the context of failed public security, limited command structure and territorial control, primarily economically motivated
IMPACTS/ OUTCOMES	High rates of gang/police/civilian casualties, unlawful killings, recruitment of "urban child soldiers," social cleansing, gender-based violence, inter-gang warfare and police shoot-outs, kidnapping, trafficking, robbery/theft

† This publication will not deal with anomic crime due to its more limited impact on human security.

* In countries that do not have separate police forces for urban areas, law enforce-ment in cities is provided by national security forces (e.g. Haiti National Police, Philippine National Police, the Nigeria Police Force). In the context of the failure of public security, such forces may also be complicit in criminal activity, perpetu-ating insecurity rather than providing security.

physical violence in situations outside of formal armed conflicts as well. Extraordinarily high levels of violence are also affecting cities — prominent hubs of power that can become flashpoints of large-scale violence between groups.[13] As a result, human security is increasingly at risk in urban environments.

Understanding violence and conflict in urban areas

The loss of territorial control by the state is a defining feature of civil wars, often due to the existence of rebel armies, insurgents or paramilitaries which physically exert control over part of the country, and are engaged in open armed conflict with state forces. Such violence may be fuelled by groups with competing political, ideological or economic ambitions, in societies deeply divided by ethnic or religious differences, or with high levels of social inequality. As Figure 1.3 illustrates, **open armed conflict** in urban areas, with its profoundly negative human security impacts, is generally carried out by highly organized groups, and characterized by a high level of intensity (as measured by human casualties).

The horrific acts of violence wrought by these actors — atrocities, war crimes, genocide, use of landmines and improvised explosives, recruitment of child soldiers,

gender-based violence and small arms deaths — are felt in places such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where 3.3 million people are estimated to have died since 1998, or the Darfur region of Sudan, where 146,000 have perished in battle-related deaths since 2003.[14] But the effects of open armed conflict are also felt in urban areas. The pillaging of Kindu in eastern DRC in 2001 and the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 are two examples.[15]

The failure of the state to control urban spaces within its territory can lead to **endemic community violence**, with devastating impacts on civilians. When the state cannot provide for the needs of its citizens, the security void is increasingly filled by private actors — vigilante groups, gangs, and militia groups that seek to exert control over defined urban spaces. Areas of cities in Afghanistan, Colombia, the DRC, Jamaica, Pakistan, Somalia and South Africa have, at some point, fallen under the control of gangs with cohesive organization and demarcated territory.[16] Unlawful killings, exploitation, the use of children in armed gangs, and rape are just some of the consequences of failed public security in fragile cities.

Failed public security can produce levels of violence comparable to a civil war. High rates of gang, police and civilian casualties; recruitment

When the state cannot provide for the needs of its citizens, the security void is increasingly filled by private actors that seek to exert control over defined urban spaces.

of "urban child soldiers"; social cleansing (systematic violence against "undesirable" social groups perpetrated by criminal groups or security forces); and gender-based violence are just some of the symptoms of endemic community violence, which can result in fatality rates comparable to those in situations of open armed conflict. A 2002 case study found that between 1978 and 2000, more people, particularly children, died in armed violence in the slums of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (49,913) than in all of Colombia (39,000), a country that is actually experiencing civil conflict.[17] Endemic violent crime in El Salvador resulted in more violent deaths in the years following its civil war than during the war itself.[18]

WHAT KIND OF CONFLICT?
Cities, war and the failure of urban public security

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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

In many parts of the world, the conceptual dividing line between cities in conflict and cities at war is surprisingly thin, owing to the failures of public security and the extent of everyday violence that characterize both settings. In both cases, the state is usually ineffective, illegitimate, unaccountable, or some combination thereof, and is unable or unwilling to provide for the security of rapidly growing cities and their populations.

The violence caused by groups waging open combat in, and over, cities is fairly straightforward. Open warfare between a regime and its opponents can lead to absolute chaos and destruction, especially where religious, ethnic or other differences play out at an urban level, thus thwarting the prospects for political stability, economic development and any semblance of human security for citizens caught in the crossfire of larger political battles.

In addition to the obvious dangers of open warfare to civilians, evidence drawn from war-torn cities as disparate as Mogadishu, Baghdad and Kandahar all suggest that private militias are important actors in this dynamic. This is primarily because they

With public police delegitimized, gangs and vigilante groups often become so powerful that they are able to successfully battle police for control over urban space.

serve as armed challengers to the regime in power while also offering themselves as legitimate alternatives for guaranteeing public security. In these conditions of violent struggle over the means of coercion, violence and terror are more likely to accelerate than decelerate, particularly as public and private security forces compete for the hearts and minds of citizens and for control of the security environment.

Conflict and insecurity do not only occur when a city is embroiled in massive armed conflict. Violence, a delegitimized public security apparatus, and citizens taking matters into their own hands are increasingly features of many cities that would not

normally be characterized as "in conflict". From Rio de Janeiro to Mexico City to Johannesburg, there is a rise in the number of privately organized security forces who seek to counter an ineffective local policing apparatus, a state of affairs that has similarly led to ongoing conflict and diminishes the quality of life and human security of large portions of the urban population.

In these conflict cities, despite the fact that local or national levels of government may be much more legitimate and removed from localized, urban violence, few citizens trust the local policing apparatus. In 2005, for example, Amnesty International reported that police killed approximately 2,000 persons a year in the Brazilian states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.[1] With public police delegitimized, gangs and vigilante groups often become so powerful that they are able to successfully battle police for control over urban space, as happens frequently in Rio's favelas and in the Mexico City barrio of Tepito. A conflict between federal police and local residents in Tepito in late August 2005 resulted in a warning from a Mexico City police chief that no group will ever again "try to stop police authorities

[from] entering any specific territory of Mexico City."[2]

Local mafias are emerging as the principal purveyors of their own employment, policing and security services, in ways that lead to a deteriorating rule of law and more urban violence. The recent massacres of citizens in São Paulo in July 2006, perpetrated by local drug-linked mafias and organizations of delinquents — a mere two months after an earlier police-gang skirmish that left almost 200 police, gang members and civilians dead — is just one example of the threats that are becoming characteristic of some urban spaces.[3]

In cities that are experiencing conflict, violence is generally more acute than in cities that are not at war but experiencing failed public security. Nonetheless, far more people live in cities of the latter category. The problems that are endemic to these cities where conflict is seen as normal are worldwide problems of enormous proportions that must be addressed if political, economic and social sustainability for all the peoples of our urbanizing globe is to be achieved. ●

Police officers stand in front of a fire they say was caused as a result of an attack by a powerful gang in São Paolo, Brazil. (August 2006)

1　United States, Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005 — Brazil," 8 March 2006, 10 August 2006, http:// www.state.gov /g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61718.htm

2　"Riot in popular Mexican neighborhood of Tepito," 29 August 2005, 8 August 2006, http://www.cenobita.com /html/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=39.

3　Marcelo Soares and Patrick J. McDonnell, "Death Toll in Sao Paulo Rises to 133," Los Angeles Times, 17 May 2006, A16. See also "Lula says government willing to help Sao Paulo fight gangsters," EFE News Service, 12 July 2006.

Human insecurity in six post-conflict cities

Koenraad Van Brabant, Head of Reflective Practice and Learning, Interpeace, Geneva

In early 2006, Interpeace (formerly WSP International) conducted a rapid research exercise surveying six cities in order to gain a better understanding of how human security plays out in urban areas that have been affected by violence. The cities examined were Bissau, Guinea Bissau; Bujumbura, Burundi; Guatemala City, Guatemala; Burao, Somaliland; Galcayo, Somalia; and Mogadishu, Somalia. The following are some of the study's key findings:

> Heavy fighting causes large-scale displacement, either of a town's entire population (as in Bissau and Burao), or part of a larger city's population (as in Mogadishu). Physical destruction resulting from fighting is often aggravated by looting, and even after violent conflict has ended, temporary stability between warring groups can lead to divided cities (as has occurred in Galcayo).

> Physical insecurity does not come only from warring parties, such as armies, rebel groups or militia, but also from paramilitary groups and death squads, criminal gangs and business people that engage in violent business competition. In a general absence of law and order, assassins are for hire, kidnappings occur for ransom or to force a debt payment (as in Mogadishu), and petty crime and sexual violence increase (as in Bujumbura). High levels of insecurity are caused not only by violent conflict itself, but can also persist through a culture of violence that often remains after the war has ended.

> Occasionally, part of an urban population is armed by the party that controls the city. A besieged government in Bissau, for example, released prisoners and provided them with firearms, while the authorities in Bujumbura have, in the past, also armed certain youth groups. These weapons are not normally collected in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, and can remain a source of insecurity for many years. There remain today an estimated 200-300,000 small arms in circulation in Bujumbura alone.

> Still, large cities are often comparatively more secure than smaller cities or the countryside. The more general trend, therefore, is for displaced people to migrate to these large cities, and for displaced urban dwellers to return as soon as acute fighting diminishes. An influx of people displaced or migrating from the countryside may contribute to a (temporary) ruralization of parts of the city as they bring with them typically rural possessions, such as cattle, and may begin cultivating in the city (as has occurred in Burao and Bujumbura).

> Large-scale violence is likely to reduce public spaces, which are taken over by displaced people, military authorities or freelance gunmen. The prolonged displacement of families may also lead to public and private properties being occupied, sold and bought by persons other than the original owners. The long-term effect can be a large number of property disputes that are irresolvable without increased security and the return of law and order.

> War-related violence tends to quickly lead to the demise of city administrations, and the resultant power vacuum may be filled by military authorities or armed groups. The post-war restoration of a local civil administration tends to be slow and delicate due to a mix of lack of authority, resources, experience and skills. A clear national decentralization policy (which we see in

Somaliland, but not in Guinea Bissau or Guatemala) can begin to address this issue. Still, the rehabilitation of public infrastructure and services in the city may take a long time, and additional private or community initiatives may be required.

> Recreating an effective and trustworthy local police force can be difficult. Under-resourced and poorly supervised police forces are vulnerable to corruption (as is reported in Bissau and Guatemala City). A large and powerful police force, on the other hand, may also abuse its power or be manipulated for political purposes.

> It would be a mistake to automatically associate male youth with violence. Many young men, such as those in Mogadishu, are themselves vulnerable to armed groups while providing for their families and engaging in active peacebuilding.

> Finally, while cities may contribute to national stability and improved security in the long run, it is important to note that "conflict entrepreneurs" (the politico-military elite involved in initiating and sustaining violent conflict) are often based in urban areas. Urbanism may stimulate moderation and toleration for diversity, but it can also feed ambitions for political control. ●

A boy walks by a group of soldiers in Guatemala City during the first day of a joint army and national police operation to patrol the most dangerous neighbourhoods of the city. (July 2004)

Why do cities matter on the global stage?

Dan Lewis, Chief, Disaster, Post-Conflict and Safety Section
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In what is now an urbanized world, cities are critical focal points for investment, trade, communication, commerce, production and consumption. With over half the global population already living in urban areas, growing to an estimated two-thirds by 2050, cities are centres where larger political and economic outcomes are determined. It is typically within and across cities that change at the state level takes place.

Cities are magnets for in-migration by those seeking a better life, as well as loci for problems that arise from rapid economic and demographic shifts. However, these global trends, combined with insufficient capacity, resources and good governance in many developing countries, have resulted in the deepening of urban poverty and the proliferation of slums that today are home to nearly one billion people worldwide.

As a result of these developments, some states are increasingly unable to exercise coherent control over their territories and peoples, allowing for the proliferation of local and international criminal networks. State institutions are increasingly undermined by non-state actors such as gangs and vigilante groups, which impose informal social governance and justice systems within localized "governance voids". While these groups can support social cohesion, they more often corrupt social capital and hasten social fragmentation.

The consequences of these developments are communities in which an increasing portion of the population, especially youth, is excluded from society. These groups may turn to illicit, criminal and violent activities, contributing to an overall sense of community insecurity. In marginalized urban communities, disease, crime, vandalism, drugs, pollution and lack of basic services add to the lack of safety and security.

How these urban issues are managed will determine what kind of impact urbanization will have on the global population. These problems are not restricted to the

With over half the global population already living in urban areas, growing to an estimated two-thirds by 2050, cities are centres where larger political and economic outcomes are determined. It is typically within and across cities that change at the state level takes place.

developing world; as despair turns to anger, as global mobility and communications increase, more and more cities face the risk of becoming targets of extremism that can foment in isolated and impoverished urban areas. ●

Organized crime, such as illicit activities carried out by drug cartels and human trafficking networks, flourishes in the context of failed public security. Transnational criminal networks threaten people's safety and lives by carrying out targeted executions, trafficking and enslaving humans, and smuggling small arms across borders. Although they often feature a higher degree of organization and permanence than urban gangs or militias, this type of crime may have less severe human security impacts (as measured by civilian casualties) than open armed conflict and endemic community violence in urban areas.

Cities have both a role to play in improving human security and the potential to provide it.

A final type of urban violence worthy of mention is **anomic crime** — crime committed by individual actors unaffiliated with an organized group on a random, ad hoc basis. Although this type of crime can be found in virtually all cities, its relatively small overall impact and unorganized nature do not render it a significant threat to human security.

Providing human security in an era of urbanization

Cities predated modern states and were one of the first forms of government capable of protecting people from outside threats. They were the first sites of a conscious social bargain through which some individual freedoms were exchanged for a set of common rights and responsibilities maintained by civic authorities.

Most security issues were local issues. Walls protected the city from external attack from local and regional enemies, and the city itself provided public security for people within its walls. These were among the first forms of collective public security — cities that protected people within a defined urban space.

Today's cities protect people not with walls but with effective public security forces capable of maintaining the rule of law. Cities also feature unique characteristics that have the potential to make them resilient to conflict. Effective, inclusive and responsive governance at the local level can play a key role in preventing and mitigating violent conflict by easing tensions between groups before they erupt into violence, and by ensuring that minority views are represented. The proximity of local leaders to the community can allow them to be more responsive to the needs of their constituents, while engaging civil society actors in participatory, transparent decision-making processes can empower people and build trust.

Well-managed cities can take advantage of the built environment and population density to promote conflict resilience. Frequent interaction and inter-group dialogue among urban residents can build positive social capital — the networks between people and groups that build trust and social cohesion. With sufficient resources, effective leadership, and a degree of autonomy, municipal governments can take advantage of institutions and processes designed to build inter-group trust. These are the foundations of conflict-resilient cities.

Cities have both a role to play in improving human security and the potential to provide it. They are therefore logical entry points for policy interventions that seek to enhance public security and build peace. Building strong, peaceful cities — or "city-building" — will be a valuable goal in the "Urban Century." Focusing on cities can improve state capacity, strengthen state legitimacy, and instil the practice of peaceful resolution of conflict from the ground up. If it is true that "a country's global success rests on local shoulders,"[19] ensuring that people at the local level enjoy freedom from fear is an important first step toward improving human security.

CHAPTER 2
Armed conflict and failed public security in cities

> One billion people live in slums today, and there will be an estimated two billion slum dwellers by 2030.[20]

> More than 90 percent of slums are found in the developing world.

> Half of the world's slum dwellers live in Asia.

> 72 percent of urban Sub-Saharan Africans and 80 percent of urban Nicaraguans and Haitians live in slums.

(Opposite:) **The bodies of people killed in a gang turf war lie on a street in the Rocinha slum of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.** (February 2006)

Today one billion people live in slums.[21] This is expected to increase to two billion by 2030. Slums are largely poor, densely populated, unplanned and informal communities in urban or peri-urban areas.[22] In some cities, *most* of the population lives in slums: 60 percent of Nairobi's population lives in slums on only five percent of the city's land.[23] In other cases, slums have gradually merged into each other, spanning hundreds of square kilometres and housing millions. UN-HABITAT estimates that in 2005, 57.4 percent of South Asia's urban population and 71.8 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's urban population were living in slums.[24]

The growth of slums can breed violence and insecurity largely for two reasons. First, their sheer size and population can stretch state capacity to the point at which the state is *unable* to provide these areas with basic public security. Second, state security forces may be *unwilling* to provide security in slums, due to, for example, a lack of incentive to risk their lives entering dangerous areas. In the absence of

In the absence of effective public security, slum residents and urban elites alike may seek ways to protect themselves, resulting in the privatization of security.

effective public security, slum residents and urban elites alike may seek ways to protect themselves, resulting in the privatization of security. This can, in turn, contribute to a process illustrated in Figure 2.1, in which the failure of public security and the rapid growth of urban slums feed into a cycle in which community security is continually undermined.

The failure of public security can occur both in countries that are experiencing conflict and those that are not — and even in relatively stable states. The violent threats

faced by people living in cities with failed public security and endemic community violence, and those living in cities experiencing open armed conflict, are comparable. Cities with embedded community violence and cities besieged by war are among the most dangerous places in the world to live.

The failure of public security

Many local governments lack the capacity to provide security for rapidly growing urban populations. In some cities, security forces include teenage boys who have had only a few days of training, and lack basic equipment such as handcuffs, flashlights and helmets.[25] Many security forces are also unable to recruit enough officers to keep up with the needs of growing cities, producing alarmingly low police-to-citizen ratios. The population of Cité Soleil, a two-square-kilometre slum in the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince, grew from 1,000 in the 1960s to an estimated 350,000 in 2003.[26] This growth strained the central government's ability to meet the needs of its citizens in a context of already weak state capacity.

The failure of public security also occurs in some slums because security forces are unwilling to provide it. Some urban areas are considered simply too dangerous to enter.

In 2001, almost half the cities in Latin America and the Caribbean had areas considered inaccessible or dangerous to the police due to organized violence.[27] In 1995, Mexico City was reportedly divided among 1,500 competing gangs.[28] Officers hired by the state to provide security may lack incentives to take the risks necessary to maintain public security in these areas because they are often paid meagre salaries and enjoy little job security. Police in Kabul, Afghanistan, for example, earned as little as US$ 16-18 a month in 2004.[29]

Contributing to the unwillingness

FIGURE 2.1 **Endemic community violence and the failure of public security in urban spaces**

to provide security is a prevailing culture of impunity in the security sector. In many cities, police are known to use unnecessary force, including torture and unlawful killings, without legal ramifications. For example, research by a Nigerian human rights organization found that senior officers, inspectors and superintendents were knowledgeable of, and even complicit in, acts of torture leading to death perpetrated by police officers.[30] Thus, even when security forces have the capacity, they may still choose not to provide public security in some cases.

The failure of public security and public distrust of security forces can be mutually reinforcing phenomena. Widespread distrust of security forces operating in urban areas can stem from three main sources. The first is their known or suspected collusion with gangs in criminal activity. Security officers have long been known to participate in the illicit drug trade, and to provide arms or information — or turn a blind eye — to criminal activity in many cities. The second is an excessive use of force against people on the streets and in police custody. In extreme cases, this includes torture, rape and unlawful killings.

The third is the practice of targeting minorities, young people and marginalized groups for security crackdowns. For example, in 2002

The use of torture, unlawful killings, and routinely high levels of corruption among security forces have been reported in cities throughout the world, in both developed and developing countries.

Kenyan state forces arbitrarily arrested hundreds of refugees from Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo who were living in Nairobi's approximately 130 slums, in a massive military-style operation.[31] Children and youth are also frequently targets of excessive force used by security forces. Although these campaigns are often pursued under the guise of enhancing public security by ridding the streets of "objectionable" individuals, they are perhaps one of the most flagrant examples of the failure of public security resulting from an unwillingness to protect vulnerable groups. Such operations not only exacerbate insecurity and mistrust in communities, but also undermine the legitimacy of state security forces.

Because an excessive use of force is sometimes used by those who patrol slum communities, it is not always clear if these security forces are enhancing or undermining human security. One study in Brazil found that inhabitants of *favelas*, or shantytowns, lacked effective protection from police, but "…when the police [did] intervene, it [was] often by mounting 'invasions' — violent mass raids using no warrants or, on rare occasions, collective warrants that label the entire community as criminal."[32] The use of torture, unlawful killings, and routinely high levels of corruption among security forces have been reported in cities throughout the world, in both developed and developing countries.

The privatization of security

When security forces are unable or unwilling to protect cities, residents are left to provide their own security. Thus, in many cities, security has become a private commodity among wealthy elites. In South Africa, for example, the number of private security guards has increased by 150 percent since 1997, compared to a 2.2 percent *decrease* in the number of police officials in the same period.[33] Even state police forces there have turned to private security companies to protect some police stations.

Public security and organized armed violence in Rio de Janeiro

Sam Logan, South American Correspondent for the International Relations and Security Network

The greater metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro contains nearly 1,000 shantytowns, or *favelas*, that are home to over a million Brazilians.[1] Most of these favelas are under the control of an "owner" who employs a highly-organized network of young men to maintain a sense of law and order.[2] While often preventing crimes such as theft, rape, assault and murder by providing their own brand of security, these gangs also protect criminal enterprises, such as the illicit drug trade, from invading police and rival gang factions.[3] Because formal state policing does not occur in gang-controlled favelas, favela residents have come to rely on the owner for protection.

In many cases, police officers broker an agreement with the favela owner, whereby the police accept payments in exchange for protection. Withholding information on a gang's criminal activities or the whereabouts of gang leaders is typical of such agreements.[4] This type of relationship is common yet extremely tenuous in Rio, as police officers are invariably ordered to invade a favela where they have already made a business arrangement. When they do invade, officers may have "shoot-to-kill" standing orders issued to them for known gang members.[5]

Politicians at both the state and municipal level have traditionally been tough on crime, supporting zero-tolerance policies when publicly dealing with drug gangs. Security forces are often sent on seek-and-destroy or occupation missions designed to close off favela communities from the outside world.[6] The result frequently creates urban guerrilla battlefields in which the civilian community is caught in the crossfire.

This situation has developed for two main reasons. First, Brazil's criminal justice system works very slowly and often fails to bring alleged criminals to trial.[7] This leads to a feeling of criminal impunity that is demoralizing to police officers. Secondly, the military police units formed under Brazil's last military regime were never disbanded and have maintained their hard-line approach to security provision, rather than adopting a community-based, preventive approach to policing.[8] To make matters worse, Rio's police officers are paid dismal wages, and some see it well within their right to extort criminals and

> Security forces are often sent on seek-and-destroy or occupation missions designed to close off favela communities from the outside world. The result frequently creates urban guerrilla battlefields in which the civilian community is caught in the crossfire.

gangs members for money to supplement their earnings.[9] Some more enterprising police officers sell seized weapons, or accept jobs as off-duty assassins.

These elements of corruption and criminal enterprise within the public security system reinforce a reality of violence and oppression that weighs heaviest on favela residents, who must face a gang-ruled public security vacuum every day. ●

1 Viva Rio, Favela Tem Memoria Project, August 2006, http://www.favelatemmemoria.com.br/publique/cgi/cgilua.exe/sys/start.htm?infoid=26&sid=5.

2 Miguel Misse, Malandros, Marginais e Vagabundos: A acumulação social da violência no Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro, 1999) 324.

3 Luke Dowdney, Children of the Drug Trade: A Case Study of Children in Organized Armed Violence in Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro: Viveiros de Castro Editora Ltda, 2003) 64-70.

4 Ronaldo Pereira, member of Rio de Janeiro's Military Police. Personal interview. September 2004. Name changed to protect privacy of interviewee.

5 Pereira, 2004.

6 "Em meio a ataques, Garotinho anuncia medidas contra a violência," Folha Online, 5 July 2003, August 2006, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/cotidiano/ult95u74410.shtml.

7 Rubem César Fernandes, Director of Viva Rio. Statement. Rio de Janeiro, 16 July 2003.

8 Jacqueline Muniz, Reform of the Military Police: The Military Model and its Effects (Oxford: Centre for Brazilian Studies, 2002) 1.

9 Amnesty International, Rio de Janeiro 2003: Candelaria and Vigario Geral 10 years on (London: Amnesty International, 2003) 8.

A Brazilian soldier takes part in a military operation in a Rio de Janeiro slum aimed at finding weaponry stolen from an army barrack in the city. (March 2006)

The privatization of security in São Paulo

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Of heightened concern in recent years is the degree to which São Paulo, Brazil is marked by spatial segregation, economic disparity, organized crime and a "culture of lethal police action."[1] Recent occurrences suggest that São Paulo may be experiencing what some have termed an "urban guerilla war."[2] Events such as the Mother's Day violence of 2006, in which 152 police and suspected criminal organization members were killed, have shown that an unaccountable police force and under-regulated private security firms have become directly and violently engaged with organized crime on the streets of the city. The privatization of security has undoubtedly played a central role in the ratcheting up of deadly armed confrontations in urban São Paulo.

Privatized security apparatuses are providing physical security for a large proportion of São Paulo's population as they struggle under the routine threat of violent and economic crime in a city under-protected by public security services. Consistent underspending by various levels of government on public security and social services in periphery communities has allowed criminal activity to skyrocket. In 2004, there were a reported 875,033 criminal acts in the city, of which 5,797 were homicides.[3]

Citizens' adaptation to being perpetually threatened can be seen in the substantial increase in private security firms in recent years. Between 2000 and 2004, the number of private security personnel in Brazil — many of whom were civil or military police — doubled from 540,334 to 1,148,568. The impact of the private security sector on the public security workforce is notable. In the 10 years prior to 2000, 88 percent of all police officers killed in São Paulo were killed while off-duty, most while working privately.[4] The employment of private security forces further stratifies the segregation of society based on racial, economic and social lines. The result is a city which is punctuated by highly fortified security bubbles, protected by unaccountable and under-regulated private forces, which are designed to resist the reality of a disparate and deeply troubled Brazilian society.

While the upper and middle classes of São Paulo are occupied in defending themselves from prospective thieves and kidnappers through private means, residents of favelas on the social and economic periphery also benefit from a form of private protection. In the São Paulo metropolitan area, where many periphery settlements are not as concentrated as in Rio de Janeiro — and, as a result, not subject to the same degree of turf wars — most communities are controlled by a larger criminal network, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC). Unlike the territorial gangs of Rio, the PCC is not known to maintain an openly armed presence within the favelas. Rather, its decentralized, affiliate-based organizational structure has been compared to that of Al Qaeda,[5] allowing it to function virtually independent of major leaders, many of whom are imprisoned.

The lack of state presence in São Paulo's periphery settlements allows the PCC to monopolize security within favelas and to operate the drug trade and other criminal ventures virtually unhindered. Although not respectful of human rights, the PCC's armed presence provides favela residents a degree of protection from military-style police incursions into their communities.

(Opposite:) **Buses were set ablaze by gangs as part of the Mother's Day 2006 wave of violent attacks in São Paulo, Brazil.** (May 2006)

For many periphery communities, the PCC is more than just a sophisticated criminal organization which provides security. The PCC is often called "the party" — in the same frame as political movements — by residents of periphery settlements where it holds a power base.[6] In addition to security, the PCC has a community outreach component, aimed at creating political and social support for the movement within the periphery population. Although much of the PCC leadership is incarcerated, and the organization depends on extortion and the illicit economy, the PCC is active in favela communities, providing social assistance programs and basic services to favela residents.[7] As a result, community perception of the PCC is significantly divergent from what is often portrayed by the media.

The overwhelming presence of the PCC and its monopoly on violence within the favelas has occurred in the public security vacuum of periphery communities. The provision of security and basic services by the PCC, made possible by shady connections with public employees and a deep involvement in the criminal economy, is acting as a substitute for public security and government.

In time, as São Paulo becomes increasingly polarized and spatially segregated through the effect of increasingly violent private security forces, it may experience more regular occurrences of urban guerilla warfare. Addressing São Paulo's permutations of private security and the upswing in violence associated with these vigilante-style private actors is central to ensuring that the Mother's Day violence of 2006 remains an isolated incident. ●

1 State of São Paulo, Police Ombudsman (2001).

2 Luiz Flavio Borges D'Urso, President of the São Paulo chapter of the Order of Brazilian Lawyers, called the six days of violence "urban guerilla war" when denouncing the attacks and calling for action by government.

3 Portal do Estado do Governo de São Paulo; Acervo de Dados em Segurança Pública.

4 State of São Paulo, Police Ombudsman (2001).

5 "The mob takes on the state," The Economist, 18 May 2006, August 2006, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=6950391.

6 Kleber Tomaz, "PCC conquista favela com leite e comida," Folha Online, 2 July 2006, August 2006, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/cotidiano/ult95u123422.shtml.

7 Fabio Schivartche, "Secretário da Segurança diz que PCC é o Bolsa-Família da favela," Folha Online, 20 August 2006, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/cotidiano/ult95u125199.shtml.

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
Small arms in urban environments

Nicolas Florquin, Researcher, Small Arms Survey, Geneva

Analysts and policymakers have traditionally considered the issue of small arms proliferation and misuse at the national and regional levels. With the global trend of rapid urbanization, however, a growing proportion of violent acts — including those involving firearms — is taking place in urban settings. This development calls for a re-examination of the challenges posed by small arms from an urban perspective, to allow for a better understanding of the specific challenges and opportunities, if any, that cities represent for the global struggle against armed violence.

It remains unclear whether there are more firearms in cities than in rural areas. Small Arms Survey research in post-conflict settings such as Burundi does suggest that there are more guns in the capital than in the provinces. There is also a greater variety of guns, including handguns, available in Bujumbura than in the rest of the country.[1] Survey data covering mostly western countries not affected by conflict provides a different picture. Firearm ownership rates (including both long guns and handguns) appear to be substantially higher in rural areas than in cities. When looking at handguns only, however, ownership rates in cities exceed those of rural areas in several countries. This suggests that the types of guns available — and the motivations behind their possession — are usually different in cities than in rural areas. Gun ownership appears to be primarily a response to security concerns in cities (thus the preference for handguns), while motivations in rural areas are more diverse (e.g. security but also hunting, as well as assault weapons left after war).

As most people on the planet now live in urban areas, most violent incidents are likely to occur in cities. Megalopolises such as Rio de Janeiro, Johannesburg and Nairobi are often associated with exceedingly high rates of armed violence. However, more detailed research is needed to produce a large dataset that can help to determine whether population-adjusted rates of armed violence are systematically higher in cities than in rural areas. There are interesting exceptions in some of the countries most affected by armed violence. Colombian cities such as Bogotá, Cali and Medellín, for example, experience lower homicide rates per 100,000 than the national average, pointing to higher rates in rural areas.[2] In short, while the largest number of violent incidents do occur in urban environments, people are not necessarily more vulnerable to violence in cities than in rural areas.

Armed conflict radically affects capital cities and documenting these challenges will be key for effective post-conflict reconstruction.[3] Cities are seen as important military targets as well as sources of shelter for civilians. During conflict, militias may be formed and weapons brought in to "secure" the city, while refugees and internally displaced persons seeking shelter will add demographic pressure to an already weakened economy. After peace is brokered, ex-combatants are often attracted into capital cities in a search for income, employment, and disarmament and demobilization benefits, and may contribute to high rates of criminality if they are not satisfied with their lot.

The proliferation of small arms in urban areas after a conflict is usually characterized by cheaper and more easily accessible firearms for gangs and other armed groups. When young people, particularly young men, are excluded from non-violent avenues of social and economic advancement, or if they face discrimination or threats to their security, their use of small arms to achieve certain goals may be legitimized by society. Such circumstances can lead to an urban arms race as disputes that may have otherwise been resolved with fistfights increasingly

manifest in firearm violence.

Gun control measures can contribute to decreasing urban violence levels. Banning the carrying of guns in Bogotá during traditionally violent holidays or late at night has been shown to reduce rates of violence.[4] In the United States, targeted gun seizures in high-crime areas as well as programs aimed at discouraging gang membership have also shown positive results,[5] while, on the other hand, gun-buyback programs have generally been shown to be unsuccessful.[6] This suggests that gun control measures can, in some forms, be an effective component of more comprehensive strategies to tackle urban armed violence. ●

1   Nicolas Florquin and Stéphanie Pézard, Étude sur la prolifération des armes légères au Burundi (Bujumbura and Geneva: Ligue Iteka, Small Arms Survey and United Nations Development Programme, 2005).

2   Katherine Aguirre and Jorge A. Restrepo, Aproximación a la Situación de Violencia e Inseguridad en Bogotá D.C. (Bogota: Conflict Analysis Resource Center, 2005) 22.

3   For the impact of conflict and weapons proliferation during and after conflict in a capital city, see the example of Bangui, Central African Republic in Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 302-333.

4   Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 230-233.

5   Ibid., 311-313.

6   Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 190.

At the same time, gated residential enclaves — heavily guarded urban fortresses with sophisticated alarm systems, electric fences, surveillance cameras and private security guards — are increasingly common in societies that are highly divided, whether along racial lines (such as Cape Town) or along income lines (such as Managua). São Paolo boasts 240 helipads — compared to 10 in New York City — which shuttle the rich from the city to walled compounds such as Alphaville, an exclusive suburb patrolled by a private army of 1,100 guards.[34] Ever-growing demand for elite security has fuelled the growth of a lucrative, but often unregulated, private security sector in many countries.

Privatization can undermine public security in two contrasting ways. In some cases, private security guards are better armed than public forces, but less bound by standards of conduct, and disgruntled from inadequate pay or from having been discharged from military service,[35] leading to abusive and unlawful behaviour. In other cases, the allure of jobs in the private sector may attract the most skilled or ambitious individuals — including those who have already received training in the public forces — reducing the effectiveness of publicly provided security.

Ever-growing demand for elite security has fuelled the growth of a lucrative, but often unregulated, private security sector in many countries.

On the other end of the spectrum, those who are unable to afford private security services may develop adaptive strategies to fill the security vacuum. Community organizations are frequently formed to provide protection for residents. These groups are often peaceful and inclusive, such as neighbourhood watch groups, but in other cases they may employ armed violence as a means of community defence — for example, citizens' militias and protection rackets. In Nicaragua, youth gangs claiming to protect residents from inter-gang warfare have emerged, in some cases becoming an institutionalized presence in poor communities.[36] In Haiti's capital of Port-au-Prince, armed insurgents have forcibly occupied police stations and assumed law enforcement responsibilities.[37] Filling the security void led one gang member from August Town, Jamaica to comment, "We have our own justice, the state does not provide justice."[38]

SOCIAL CLEANSING

Social cleansing is a term used to describe the violent targeting, forcible deportation or systematic eradication of "undesirable" elements of society from a given area. Social cleansing can involve extrajudicial executions, physical assault or unlawful detainment and incarceration perpetrated by paramilitary groups and members of the police or military against such social groups as street children, the homeless, homosexuals, alleged criminals or gang members, and members of ethnic or religious groups. Social cleansing campaigns targeting street children and suspected youth gang members have been carried out in cities by groups alleging that their victims are the cause of societal ills.

A forensics officer examines the tied hands of an adolescent boy found tortured and disfigured by the side of the road in Guatemala City. A string of violent and mysterious killings targeting gang members and criminals in the country prompted suspicions of a social cleansing campaign aimed at cleaning up "undesirable" elements of society. (August 2005)

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Slum dwellers living in security voids are particularly vulnerable to extortion and corruption by gangs and corrupt public authorities, as well as being caught in the midst of violent disputes between groups competing for power. When poor people cannot afford to pay protection fees to police or other, informal authorities, they may face violent reprisals, such as having their houses set ablaze.[39] During a 2001 clash between landlords and gangs of tenants in Nairobi's largest slum, Kibera, 12 people were killed, about 100 women and girls were raped, hundreds more were injured, and thousands were displaced as houses were burned to the ground.[40]

The growth of the private security sector in many countries — symptomatic of the state's inability to protect its population — reduces pressure on the state to provide these services publicly.

When security is provided privately — by individuals or other groups in lieu of the state — it can lead to greater insecurity for the urban poor.

In communities home to thousands of bored, poor, young people (particularly men), local gangs or public officials have been known to recruit from their ranks to establish vigilante groups that conduct violent counter-attacks on gangs. The distinction between these well-armed vigilante groups and community gangs is not always easy to make. In slums outside Cape Town, for example, a vigilante group known as People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad) was formed to rid the community of murdering gang leaders. This led gangs to seek vengeance on Pagad, exacerbating inter-gang warfare and creating a vicious circle of violence.[41]

Security privatization can exacerbate the gap between the rich and the poor both physically, through the erection of elite gated communities, and socially, by aggravating a sense of grievance among people living in violent urban environments. Heightened hostilities between security forces, gangs and vigilantes can manifest in armed, violent clashes, deepening social stratification and worsening community violence. At the same time, the growth of the private security sector in many countries — symptomatic of the state's inability to protect its population — reduces pressure on the state to provide these services publicly, which can contribute to state security forces' unwillingness to protect poor populations.[42]

When security is provided privately — by individuals or other groups in lieu of the state — it can lead to greater insecurity for the urban poor.

Slum insecurity: Gangs and guns

The impact of failed public security in slums is not limited to actors involved in local law enforcement. Some armed criminal groups have expanded into organized criminal empires with thousands of members, complex internal organization, and aggressive recruitment strategies, which compete in open armed combat with gangs or authorities for territorial control.[43] Politicians reportedly enter Rio de Janeiro's dangerous favelas only with permission from gang leaders; the groups control territory while operating a kind of parallel government that interacts with the state only occasionally. The gangs can, in effect, "negotiate the terms of [their] sovereignty,"[44] undermining wider state authority and legitimacy.

The proliferation and ease of availability of small arms in urban areas has compounded the challenge that organized criminal violence presents to human security.

The widespread use of guns in encounters between gangs, police and vigilante groups has been on the rise in recent years, increasing the lethality of urban violence.[45] At the same time, other armed groups have moved into some urban areas, taking advantage of the impunity afforded to them in anonymous, overcrowded and under-policed slums. This phenomenon has been referred to as the "urbanization of conflict", or the "urbanization of insurgency",[46] seriously threatening the security of urban dwellers, particularly youth. In Medellín, for example, the lines between gangs and other armed groups have blurred as paramilitary groups such as the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia's Bloque Metro have trained and hired several of the approximately 300 armed gangs, or "combos", for political murders and to battle guerrilla militias over turf.[47]

Gun violence linked to urban gangs is particularly severe in cities in Latin America. In Brazil, more than 100 people are killed by firearms every day, and the gun death rate in Rio de Janeiro is more than double the national average.[48] Youth are often particularly affected by guns: the Pan American Health Organization estimates that

A man stands amid the ruins of his house in the hillside slum of Grand Ravine in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Hundreds of residents fled the slum to escape fierce fighting between rival gangs that had left at least 46 people dead in three months in the summer of 2006. (August 2006)

one in five schoolboys in the Caribbean has brought a gun to school and admitted to past or present involvement in a gang.[49] In Colombia, firearm-related deaths among youth under 18 increased by 284.7 percent between 1979 and 2001.[50]

Perhaps one of the most drastic accounts of armed violence against children is captured by the following statement made by Casa Alianza/ Covenant House of Latin America to the UN High Commission on Human Rights on March 17, 2003:

"More than 50 children and youth under the age of 23 are being murdered every month in Honduras, a Central American country of barely six million people. Sixty percent of the murders have not been investigated sufficiently in order to identify the killers. Of the murderers who have been identified, one third of them are police officers, one third of them gang members, and one third members of the public who, with no confidence in the judicial system, take 'justice' into their own hands and kill whom they perceive to be the criminals of society."[51]

The availability of small arms in many cities means that ordinary civilians, gang members and private security guards are often better armed than state security forces. Guns in many cities are illegally purchased at low prices, sometimes from current or former state security personnel.[52] Not only has the number of illegally held firearms been on the rise in many cities, but more lethal weapons such as assault rifles, machine guns, and sub-machine guns are becoming increasingly common on city streets.[53]

Gangs and organized crime cartels are often heavily involved in the global illicit drug trade, perpetuating urban gang violence by providing the finances needed to purchase firearms, bribe authorities, and pay gang members' salaries. Increases in addictive drug use are correlated with spikes in violence as rival factions fight for turf and control over lucrative trade connections.[54]

Exclusion, evasion and eviction

Slums are physical manifestations of social and economic disparity in cities, as well as visible reminders of the impromptu, unplanned character of rapid urbanization. People living in these environments often face social stratification and territorial exclusion, which has been linked to higher levels of violence.[55] In regions of the world where income inequalities are highest — Africa and Latin America — the highest rates of homicide and violence can be found.[56] In São Paulo, the most territorially segregated districts have the highest homicide rates.[57] In Cairo, the rapid growth of migrant slums in the mid-1990s sparked violent clashes by militant Islamic groups against the Egyptian state.[58]

Informal slum housing is generally beyond state regulation. Deliberately or not, by evading state tax and regulatory systems, slum dwellers are not

Insecure land tenure can result in forced evictions and dispossession among the most vulnerable of the urban poor. It is one of the most immediate and ubiquitous sources of human insecurity for slum dwellers.

formal constituents of the city, and are therefore not considered to be entitled to municipal services, including security services. This is another factor that can reduce pressure on the state to provide public security, particularly in these areas. Insecure land tenure can result in forced evictions and dispossession among the most vulnerable of the urban poor and, aside from being a human rights violation,[59] is one of the most immediate and ubiquitous sources of human insecurity for slum dwellers. In Mumbai, for example, authorities seeking space for infrastructure development projects have set fire to entire slum neighbourhoods and have used violence against residents, displacing an estimated 400,000 people since 2004.[60]

Forced evictions: A threat to urban human security

Jean du Plessis, Acting Executive Director, Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, Geneva

Many urban poor face a desperate struggle for survival, often arriving in cities having fled from disintegrating rural economies. In some cases, they end up accessing land for housing through processes deemed illegal or even criminal by authorities. There are often no guarantees to long-term security in either the informal or the formal market.

> *Fear of forced eviction is a daily reality for millions of inhabitants of the world's cities.*

In informal settlements, there are often problems with long-term tenure security and lack of basic services. In both formal and informal slum communities, rents can be extortionately high, as can costs of necessities such as water. Living conditions can also be severe, with people having no option but to build under marginal, unhealthy and often dangerous conditions. Forced evictions are an extreme expression of the failure of many governments to effectively deal with insecurity of tenure.[1]

Every year, millions of people around the world are forcibly evicted, leaving them homeless. Often these are large-scale evictions, where entire communities of tens or even hundreds of thousands of people are removed. In most cases, communities are not provided with any compensation or alternative housing.

Fear of forced eviction is a daily reality for millions of inhabitants of the world's cities. The impact of evictions on families and communities is severe and deeply traumatic. Property is often damaged or destroyed, productive assets are lost or rendered useless, social networks are broken up, livelihood strategies are compromised, access to essential facilities and services is lost, and violence including rape, physical assault and even murder has been used to force people to comply with evictions.

Forced evictions without consultation, adequate alternatives and compensation are not only illegal under international law, but also compromise fundamental human rights principles and are counterproductive to the achievement of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. ●

1 Forced evictions are defined as the removal of people from their homes or lands against their will, directly or indirectly attributable to the state. Under international human rights law, people have the right to be protected against forced evictions as part of the broader right to housing. For more information, see http://www.cohre.org.

REPORTED FORCED EVICTIONS

Selection of seven countries 1995-2005

Country	
Bangladesh	242,442
China	4,142,933
India	1,117,015
Indonesia	645,662
Nigeria	2,334,433
South Africa	826,679
Zimbabwe	974,300

SOURCE: COHRE Gobal Forced Evictions Database, June 19, 2006

An estimated 10 million people were forcibly evicted in just seven countries between 1995 and 2005, as shown in the table above, based on data from the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) evictions database. COHRE records instances of forced eviction based on information received from affected persons and from media monitoring. As many evictions go unreported, the actual number of forced evictions occurring in these seven countries is almost certainly higher than the 10 million reported.

Forced evictions can further exacerbate social tensions and deepen social stratification. In many cases, forced evictions disproportionately impact women, children and indigenous peoples, and violate international agreements on the protection of children and other vulnerable groups. They are sometimes used as a

Evicted residents in Johannesburg, South Africa scramble to save and protect their possessions. (2005)

deliberate political tool, as punishment for political activity or affiliation, as a means of ethnic cleansing, or to target refugee or migrant populations.[61] Forced evictions serve as an example, not just of the failure of states to protect vulnerable populations, but often of deliberate measures taken by states to exacerbate human *insecurity*, particularly in conflict and post-conflict contexts.

The failure of public security can be an indication of larger state fragility or weak governance. That "fragile cities" can exist even in relatively stable states indicates the importance of understanding violent threats in unconventional terms — not just in countries that *are* at war. That being said, people living in cities in countries that are at war also face high levels of armed violence and insecurity, particularly when the city itself becomes the focal point for urban combat.

OPERATION *MURAMBATSVINA:*

The battle over urban space and security in Zimbabwe

Amanda Hammar, Programme Coordinator, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala

In May 2005, the Zimbabwean Government initiated an urban "clean-up" campaign called "Operation *Murambatsvina*" (Operation Restore Order). Officially aimed at "driving out the filth" and "restoring order" in urban areas, in practice it was a highly militarized, nationwide operation with a more complex agenda. The campaign was viewed by critics as combining political retribution against opposition supporters in the cities (urban areas were indeed strongholds of the political opposition that the long-standing Zanu-PF regime had been attempting to crush since 2000) with a pre-emptive strike against growing urban discontent in a time of extreme economic hardship for which many blamed the government.[1]

At its official launch in Harare, Operation Murambatsvina was portrayed as an exercise that would "stop all forms of illegal activities," "eradicate chaos", and "bring sanity back to the City of Harare."[2] Street vendors and small-business operators accused of operating illegally were arrested and had their businesses destroyed. Self-built homes in high-density townships

were suddenly delegalized in a striking reversal of the *de facto* government acceptance of self-assisted housing since independence. Bulldozers and demolition squads were brought in, the latter often made up of Zanu-PF-trained youth militia, resulting in injuries and even some deaths. Families were forced to destroy their own homes by hand under threat of beatings, fines or imprisonment.

Within the first six weeks of the operation, an estimated 700,000 urban residents lost their homes and/or livelihoods.

Within the first six weeks of the operation, an estimated 700,000 urban residents lost their homes and/or livelihoods, and up to 2.4 million people were said to be affected overall.[3] Occupants were forcibly removed to either distant rural areas, or were relocated to peri-urban holding camps

with inadequate shelter or access to food, clean water, sanitation or the means of earning a living. The camps, still in place over a year later, are guarded by security authorities loyal to the ruling party that control the little humanitarian assistance allowed in. Abuses in the distribution of resources have been reported, including alleged denial of food aid to some of the displaced and demands for sexual favours.

President Mugabe has claimed that the operation was a well-designed reconstruction program, and that Zimbabwe "would not lower its urban living standards to allow for mud huts and bush latrines."[4] Yet many evicted residents reported a failure on the part of the government to provide them with alternative accommodations. The ongoing campaign, far from generating urban renewal, has resulted in unprecedented scales of urban poverty, homelessness and extreme vulnerability, particularly in terms of food security, health and safety.

Since 2000, critics have argued that the Zimbabwean Government has become increasingly authoritarian,

repressive and violent. Legislation that substantially curtails political and personal freedoms has been introduced, alongside an active loyalist youth militia. The police force itself has become increasingly politicized in recent years, and there is growing

Zimbabwe riot police watch as bulldozers destroy a house in Harare as part of the Operation *Murambatsvina* crackdown. (June 2005)

evidence of both former and current police officers engaging in acts of criminality and abuse toward citizens. At the same time, an internal split in the opposition party in early 2006 generated inter-party violence specifically affecting urban areas. Under such conditions, both the political-legal framework and institutional capacity for providing public security has largely fallen away.

Rather than restoring order in cities,

Operation Murambatsvina has served to heighten the likelihood of crime and increase social cleavages by undermining legitimate livelihoods, shelter and security for impoverished urban dwellers. With the loss of trust in the police, a militarized public sector, and the undermining of democratic local government, cities, like many rural areas, have become spaces of human insecurity for the majority of Zimbabweans. ●

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2 Transcript of a speech by Sekesai Makwavarara, Chairperson of the Harare Commission, presented at Town House, Harare on the occasion of the official launch of Operation Murambatsvina, 19 May 2006.

3 Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues in Zimbabwe (New York: United Nations, 2005). See also "Harare's hawkers go undercover," Sunday Independent (South Africa), 31 July 2005; "Vending blitz hurting Zimbabwean hawkers," Associated Press, 20 September 2005; "Zimbabwe arrests vendors," The New York Times, 8 October 2005.

4 "Mugabe defends urban demolitions," BBC News, 18 September 2005, August 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4258508.stm. See also "In Zimbabwe, homeless belie leader's claim", The New York Times, 13 November 2005; and "Zimbabwe rejects UN assistance to provide shelter to victims," People's Daily (China), 3 November 2005.

URBICIDE

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As the size and importance of urban areas increases, the deliberate, strategic and targeted destruction of cities has emerged in recent years as a distinct threat to human security. Referred to as **urbicide** (literally, "the killing of the city"), this process seeks to attack and destroy the city as a physical space and a social and cultural symbol. From divisive urban planning to unrestrained destruction during warfare, urbicide can be precipitated by state and non-state actors for a variety of reasons, such as "cleansing" a territory of a certain group. One of the most explicit examples of urbicide was the siege of Sarajevo (1992-1995), which resulted in large-scale destruction and dramatic population reconfigurations due to ethno-nationalist violence. Other examples include the Zimbabwean Government's 2005 campaign to forcibly clear urban slums, and Israel's 2002 military campaign in the Palestinian refugee camp of Jenin. When cities are viewed as strategic targets of terror and violence, human security is undermined and the potential for large-scale civilian casualties is increased.

Mourners kneel in front of a grave during a funeral ceremony at the former Sarajevo soccer stadium converted into a cemetery amid the siege of the city. (January 1995)

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Besieged cities: Armed conflict in urban spaces

Urban centres, particularly capitals, have long been prized areas of control in times of war. The battles for Stalingrad, Berlin, and Manila in World War Two were among the deadliest in terms of both civilian and combatant casualties. Today, with 90 percent of conflicts now taking place within states rather than between them, cities have become even more significant as contested spaces of political and military control. In the past two decades in particular, major cities have provided the setting for scores of armed conflicts, with serious implications for human security.

Major cities have provided the setting for scores of armed conflicts, with serious implications for human security.

Several key examples show how city streets are replacing battle "fields" in situations of armed conflict. In 1982, as Israel sought to defeat the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon, it carried out a strategic invasion of the capital city Beirut. The siege resulted in an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 casualties in only one month. A decade later, the divided city of Mogadishu became the focal point of the civil war in Somalia, causing widespread famine and spurring international humanitarian and peacekeeping interventions. The most intense urban warfare took place during the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993, when between 1,000 to 1,500 Somalis died in a period of only two days of combat.

The four-year siege of Sarajevo during the Bosnian War transformed the city into a war zone, with snipers roaming the streets.[62] Hospitals, schools, offices, sports arenas, government buildings, libraries and homes were destroyed in a campaign that has been described as "urbicide" — the deliberate killing of the city. Liberia's capital Monrovia was another prominent battleground in that country's protracted civil war. Some of the heaviest combat — often involving children and youth — took place on the city's streets. The two-month siege of the city in 2003 by the LURD rebel group resulted in over 1,000 civilian casualties, as well as widespread rape, assault, displacement, and ultimately the resignation of President Charles Taylor.

Cities have also played an important role in both the 1991 Gulf War and the current conflict in Iraq, with

The heightened significance of urban war zones has had — and will continue to have — grave implications for the safety of urban dwellers.

the capital of Baghdad as a prominent target. In 2004, tens of thousands of Iraqis fled the city of Falluja, and many civilians were reportedly killed, during the two-week siege of the city.[63]

In all of these cases, the unconventional urban terrain has posed serious challenges to military tactics, communications and weaponry. But more importantly, the heightened significance of urban war zones has had — and will continue to have — grave implications for the safety of urban dwellers, when city streets become war zones, schools become barracks, tunnels become trenches, and temples become targets. These violent threats are compounded when hospitals are bombed and airports and throughways are closed. Without a doubt, besieged cities experiencing open armed conflict are among the most dangerous places in the world to live.

In 2001, Amelia Azucena Mazariedos was at home in Guatemala City when some children sought shelter in her house from gang members. The gang members fired through her window and she was shot in the spine. (April 2006)

CHAPTER 3
The human face of urban insecurity

FAST FACTS AND FIGURES

> A 2004 multi-country study found the average age for recruitment into gangs to be approximately 13.5 years old.[64]

> In Guatemala City, an estimated 3,000 children live on the streets, and 334 street children were killed in 10 months in 2005.[65]

> Of the roughly 600,000 to 800,000 people who are trafficked across international borders annually, an estimated 80 percent are female, and up to 50 percent are children.[66]

> A growing percentage of the world's displaced — a population made up of some 8.4 million refugees and 23.7 million internally displaced persons[67] — are moving to cities.[68]

> While several international normative and legal measures have been developed around the recruitment of child soldiers, comparable measures do not exist for children who are recruited into urban gangs.

The failure of public security in cities has significant negative impacts on the lives of people living in cities. Organized armed groups, such as gangs and paramilitaries, derive income from illicit drug and arms trades, the sex industry, human trafficking, and ransomed kidnapping, which flourish in many large, urban areas. In some cities, violence is so widespread that it has become a normal part of everyday life, with certain groups of the population — children, women, the poor, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) — particularly vulnerable to pervasive insecurity.[69]

Children growing up in cities are particularly vulnerable to threats of armed violence. Many children living in slums are recruited into armed urban gangs. Boys and girls who live and work on the streets may be targeted for violence, discrimination and abuse, in some cases by the very people who are supposed to protect them. Poor men and women in urban areas are susceptible to gender-based violence, and women in particular face threats of sexual exploitation in cities. IDPs, refugees and migrants who move to cities seeking shelter from conflict can face violent threats from state security forces, urban gangs and hostile incumbents. Understanding the challenges faced by people found in the most vulnerable situations in cities is vital to improving human security in urban spaces.

Children and youth in urban gangs

Children growing up and living in impoverished slum settlements face a host of violent threats. They are often at heightened risk of being recruited into armed criminal groups, targeted by social cleansing campaigns, trafficked, and forced into the sex trade or domestic servitude. The "youth bulge" problem — that a disproportionate number of underemployed youth in a population has been historically linked with social upheaval — is now becoming more identified with urban areas in an age of rapid urbanization. Many cities in the developing world are made up of

CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN ORGANIZED ARMED VIOLENCE:

Understanding urban violence in Rio de Janeiro and beyond

Luke Dowdney, Researcher, Viva Rio, Rio de Janeiro

Between December 1987 and November 2001, 467 Israeli and Palestinian minors were killed in the region's protracted conflict[1] while, during the same period, 3,937 under 18-year-olds were killed by gunfire in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro — a city in a country that is not at war.[2]

An estimated 5,000 to 6,000 children and adolescents are currently involved in Rio de Janeiro's drug trade.[3] Employed and armed by three main drug factions,[4] they take part in violent armed confrontations with rival groups and state security forces, including the police. In many respects, their roles are similar to those of child soldiers fighting in rebel armies, as Rio's drug factions seek to control the city's urban favelas, or shantytown communities, via territorial and para-military domination.[5]

The motivations for children and youth to join armed groups as soldiers, and drug factions as gang members, are similar. Although joining a drug faction in Rio is voluntary, poor children are particularly susceptible since few have anything to look forward to.

Children provoke policemen in a slum of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. (June 2005)

And, like groups that use child soldiers, 15- to 17-year-olds make up the majority of those involved in armed disputes in Rio, with recruitment sometimes beginning as early as eight years of age.[6] Owing to their involvement in faction disputes, children and adolescents are sometimes targeted by police for summary execution. In 2001, officers reportedly killed a total of 52 under-18-year-olds during police operations.[7]

Military approaches to Rio de Janeiro's drug trafficking disputes are unlikely to work. Wars end, but the

drug trade doesn't; gangs will continue to compete for control of the trade as long as people continue to buy drugs. Demobilization programs make sense for child soldiers once peace agreements are signed, but peace agreements have no counterpart in the constant violent struggle to control the drug trade. Moreover, care should be taken when drawing similarities between child soldiers and gang members, because if we categorize children in gangs as soldiers, it may serve only to legitimize already high levels of lethal state force used against them.

Beyond Rio de Janeiro

From the favelas of Rio de Janeiro to the townships of Cape Town; and from the inner-city communities of Kingston, Jamaica, to the rural provinces of the Philippines and *colonias* of San Salvador, children and youth are dying in increasing numbers due to gun violence. Increasing firearms-related mortality reflects the growing involvement of young people in organized armed groups that function outside of traditionally defined war zones.

In 2004, the Children and Youth in Organised Armed Violence project published *Neither War Nor Peace: International Comparisons of Children and Youth in Organised Armed Violence*.[8] Building on previous research carried out in Rio de Janeiro, this investigation examined "children and youth employed or otherwise participating in

organized armed violence where there are elements of a command structure and power over territory, local population or resources."[9] Violent youth groups encompassed by the definition range from "institutionalized"[10] street gangs in El Salvador, Honduras and the United States, to politically motivated armed groups known as "popular organizations" in Haiti, and vigilante groups and ethnic militia in Nigeria.

The study[11] found that the average age at which boys tended to join organized armed groups was 13, with the exception of Nigeria, where 15-16 was more normal. However, the study observed the decreasing age of child and youth members among all groups investigated, and the relatively new use of guns among boys as young as 12 years old. The groups studied were involved in armed confrontations with other armed groups on a varying scale, and the more militarized groups, such as the drug factions of Rio de Janeiro and the ethnic militia of Nigeria, were often engaged in direct confrontation with state security forces.[12]

Governments have historically used hard-line, conventional law enforcement tactics to deal with children and youth in organized armed violence. However, a focus solely on penalizing offenders will tend to be ineffective as it does not deal with the root causes of the problem; the juvenile justice and penal systems in most countries affected by youth gang problems are

inadequate and tend to worsen the problem; and armed groups tend to become more organized and increasingly violent when faced with such tactics.[13] ●

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9 This definition of "children and youth in organised armed violence" was agreed by participants at an international seminar hosted by Viva Rio in Rio de Janeiro, September 2002.

10 "Often these institutionalized gangs become business enterprises within the informal economy and a few are linked to international criminal cartels. Gangs have variable ties to conventional institutions and, in given conditions, assume social, economic, political, cultural, religious or military roles." John M. Hagedorn, People And Folks: Gangs, Crime and the Underclass in a Rustbelt City (Chicago: Lakeview Press, Second Edition, 1998).

11 The study makes comparisons among organized armed groups in Colombia, El Salvador, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Philippines, South Africa and the United States.

12 Dowdney, Neither War Nor Peace, 49-53.

13 Ibid., 140-154.

Girls, gangs and urban violence in Medellín

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Despite a significant decrease in violence over the past few years, the city of Medellín, Colombia remains notorious for gang violence, drug cartels and paramilitary activity. Though many families flee rural areas to keep their children from being recruited into armed groups,[1] the dangers and poverty of the city can quickly turn a supposed refuge into a threat. "Social cleansing" by vigilante groups and paramilitaries against prostitutes, gang members, street children and drug addicts

For many marginalized young people, it is safer to be in the relative protection of a gang than to brave the streets alone.

means that for many marginalized young people, it is safer to be in the relative protection of a gang than to brave the streets alone. Urban youth gang members are often labeled as delinquents and criminals, and they

often play similar roles in the city as child soldiers do in rural conflict zones.

While research has brought attention to the large numbers of female child soldiers in guerrilla armies in Colombia,[2] the presence of girls in urban Colombian gangs has received considerably less attention. A recent study found that the percentage of girls involved in Medellín gangs went from approximately seven percent to nine percent in 2002, then up to 12 percent in 2003, and continues to rise.[3] This translates into 800-1,200 girl gang members in one city alone and does not take into account the many girls who are unofficially involved in gangs as girlfriends, prostitutes, drug mules and messengers.

While many Colombian girls flee rural areas due to the risks of abuse by armed groups in Colombia's predominantly rural-based civil conflict, the city offers many opportunities for them to become involved in gangs, prostitution and other dangerous criminal activities. Girls are more likely to be girlfriends of gang members than members themselves,[4] but

Joining a gang is one way for girls to reclaim urban spaces that have been taken from them due to violence.

they are nonetheless critical to the structure, function and economy of the gang. Consequently, they may see themselves as gang members while their male counterparts do not.[5]

Urban areas where gangs operate are also frequently off-limits for many girls and women due to the fear of being raped or assaulted. Joining a gang is one way for girls to combat these severe restrictions on their mobility and to reclaim urban spaces that have been taken from them due to violence. In a society where violence is a currency to solve problems, a street reputation for being *loca* (crazy) or especially violent can be a useful tool for warding off potential attackers.[6]

As many Colombian gangs have strong links to the commercial

sex trade and human trafficking,[7] prostitution can serve as a gateway for girls to become involved in gangs. Girls are also more likely than boys to cite physical, sexual and emotional abuse as their reason for joining a gang,[8] yet many of them do not regard themselves as victims.[9] Many girls deliberately choose counter-cultural roles by becoming gang members or child combatants as an alternative to unstable homes or domestic violence. Others are attracted to the violence, guns and *machismo* attitudes of male gang members, and they may seek gang involvement because it gives them a sense of rebellion and power in reaction to abusive or restrictive family situations. As one young woman from Medellín noted, "A lot of the young women are escaping from horrible home situations, especially with their fathers... So if the girls go out with these guys from the paramilitary it gives them a sense of rebellion, of power. These guys protect them — a guy with a gun. It is very common."[10]

Girls from rural areas may also find cities to be a welcome escape from the monotony of small community life[11] and may try to assert their equality by accepting riskier tasks or engaging in "masculine" behaviours, such as excessive drinking and drug use.[12] Many of them are also distinctly aware of their ability to use sexuality as a means to gain status, wealth and protection.[13]

Many girls deliberately choose counter-cultural roles by becoming gang members or child combatants as an alternative to unstable homes or domestic violence.

Because these gangs are strongly rooted in ideas of masculine dominance and misogynist violence, the role of women and girls in reinforcing these values is a critical element in understanding gang structure. Young women in Colombia have the capacity to combat or support gang violence. Unfortunately, the best chance of survival for many marginalized girls is to enroll in the same gangs that threaten their own security. ●

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HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Human trafficking, sometimes referred to as "relocation plus exploitation," is the criminal, commercial trade in human beings for exploitive purposes. Cities such as Bangkok, Lagos, Medellín, New Delhi and Venice have become major transit points for organized trafficking in persons, drawing victims to the city from rural areas. Once in urban areas, many are forced into begging, prostitution or arranged marriage, or are employed against their will through the threat of destitution, detention or violence. International human trafficking networks ensnare victims — most often women and children — through kidnapping, manipulation and intimidation. The global trafficking of humans from city to city by large, organized criminal networks has become an increasingly serious threat to international security.

A Nigerian woman who works as a prostitute in Paris, after being beaten up the previous night. (2003)

With few jobs available and poor prospects for the future, disaffected kids can perceive organized criminal gangs as appealing opportunities to provide them with an income, a social network and a sense of security.

significant youth populations — about half of the urban population in Africa, for example, is under 19.[70]

In poor urban slums, disaffected kids growing up in crowded households (a common feature of slums) tend to spend more time on the streets. With few jobs available and poor prospects for the future, organized criminal gangs can be perceived as appealing opportunities to provide them with an income, social network and sense of security.

Despite the very real dangers of armed urban gangs, the average age of recruitment for child gang members is between 11 and 14, and has been falling in recent years.[71] In some gangs, children make up a significant minority or even a majority of the membership. In Medellín, for instance, an estimated 60 to 70

percent of gang members are children.[72] These child gang members are often considered expendable; they are commonly relegated to the lowest organizational tasks in the gang, and are often the first to be sent into armed confrontation with rival gangs or state security forces.

Targeted assaults and executions carried out by state security forces against children known or alleged to associate with armed gangs can occur in the culture of impunity that prevails in some major urban areas. Reports from non-governmental organizations working in Honduras, for example, have indicated that more than 1,200 children and youth died between 1998 and 2002 due to urban violence and social cleansing campaigns.[73]

The intensity of the violence faced by children in organized, armed urban gangs is in many ways comparable to that faced by child soldiers operating in rural areas. For example, both child soldiers and children in armed gangs face violent threats associated with armed combat against rival groups, they are often recruited against their will, are at heightened risk of sexual abuse, suffer psychological trauma, and find defecting difficult, if not impossible.

Like child soldiers, children in gangs are often viewed as armed combatants and targeted by state security forces because they pose a violent threat.[74] The Children and Youth in Organised Armed Violence

project of Brazilian NGO Viva Rio warns that classifying children in gangs as urban "child soldiers" could compound this problem,[75] placing boys and girls in greater danger. However, appreciating the similarities that children face in these very different contexts may help to inform future child protection strategies.

The intensity of the violence faced by children in organized, armed urban gangs is in many ways comparable to that faced by child soldiers in rural areas.

In some cases, there are strong criminal and organizational linkages between rural-based insurgent groups and urban-based gangs. Youth gang members in Medellín, for example, are not considered "combatants," yet it is believed that most of the city's youth gangs have been co-opted by paramilitary and guerrilla armies.[76] In Port-au-Prince, gangs engage in violent clashes over urban turf, politics and criminal enterprises with rival factions, UN peacekeepers and state security forces, which have claimed hundreds of lives.[77] In Sierra

Leone, following the country's civil war, slums materialized in the capital, Freetown, which were made up almost entirely of youth ex-combatants. This created an environment in which violent crime in and around the city flourished as disenchanted and psychologically traumatized young people struggled to survive.[78] Children who lack alternate livelihood options and are already armed, trained combatants are at heightened risk of re-recruitment into armed groups.

Street children: Living and working in the city

Whether or not they are experiencing armed conflict, cities can be sites of violence and insecurity for children growing up on the streets. An estimated 100 million children live and work on the streets in cities around the world, and about 40 percent of these children are homeless.[79] In Egypt, it is estimated that there are between 200,000 and one million homeless children, most of them in the cities of Cairo and Alexandria.[80] Street children range in age from three to 18, and are mainly boys.[81] They resort to life on the streets for many reasons, often having arrived in cities from rural areas in search of employment and security. Some have fled situations of domestic abuse or intractable poverty, while others are orphans who have lost their parents to violent conflict, HIV/AIDS or other illnesses.

Phnom Penh: A world capital for human trafficking

Benjamin Perrin, Founder, The Future Group, Calgary

Over the past decade, major urban areas in Cambodia have become inundated by the sex trade. Nowhere is this more prevalent than in the major commercial centre of Phnom Penh, where human trafficking has become one of the country's biggest businesses. As the seat of government and home to the country's largest international airport, Phnom Penh is the first stop for most business travellers and tourists. As a result, a plethora of brothels, karaoke bars, massage parlours, guesthouses and nightclubs have sprung up and flourished since the end of the bloody Khmer Rouge era.

A 2001 study estimated that 15,000 to 20,000 women and children were involved in the sex trade in Phnom Penh, while an additional 3,000 to 5,000 street children were targeted by pedophiles and forced to perform sexual acts for money.[1] Based on these figures, approximately two percent of Phnom Penh's entire population is caught up in the sex trade. The implications for the safety and security of those vulnerable to such widespread sexual exploitation in the city are severe. Most of those involved are women and children who have been trafficked from impoverished rural areas or brought from neighbouring countries, such as Vietnam and Thailand.

Organized criminal networks, including Vietnamese and Chinese triads, have preyed upon the desperation of impoverished Cambodians, and are profiting significantly from control of human trafficking networks and Phnom Penh's urban sex trade. These groups employ heavily armed guards to "protect" sex workers, who are viewed as productive assets. Most brothels hire armed guards, many of whom are former Khmer Rouge soldiers, to intimidate those who would interfere in their illicit businesses. In 2004, one of these organized criminal groups used armed force to seize 83 trafficking victims that had been rescued and were being sheltered in a non-governmental organization recovery centre.[2]

Deeply-rooted corruption and a weak judicial system have been assessed to be significant barriers to anti-trafficking efforts in Cambodia.[3] At the same time, reports have suggested that police officials are often

Cambodian sex workers wait for clients in a popular Phnom Penh red light district. (2001)

© Reuters/Chor Sokunthea

Human trafficking in Cambodia pulls tens of thousands of vulnerable people toward major urban centres.

complicit actors in the sex industry, reportedly providing inside information to brothel owners, informing them of upcoming raids.[4]

Human trafficking in Cambodia pulls tens of thousands of vulnerable people toward major urban centres, who find themselves facing sexual exploitation, violence, sexually-transmitted disease (including high rates of HIV/AIDS) and continued poverty. The violence, health implications, corruption and impunity that accompany illicit rural-urban human trafficking can only impede the country's future prospects for reaching its development and human security goals. ●

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Children living in the streets face grave threats to their security. They often face the possibility of recruitment into armed gangs, or are unlawfully detained and harassed by state security officers. Others are shipped away to rural areas. Because of the perception that they are criminals or associated with gangs, street children may be targets for social cleansing campaigns carried out by both state and non-state actors. For example, reports have indicated that in 2005, 431 street children and youths in Honduras were murdered,[82] while in Guatemala, 124 street children were killed in only three months.[83]

Boys and girls living on the streets are extremely vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.

In Lagos, security forces and the Bakassi Boys, a well-known vigilante group, have engaged in violent campaigns aimed at cleansing the city of street orphans.[84] In Harare, some 10,000 street children and vagrants were detained by state forces in 2005, as part of what the government called a "crime-fighting measure."[85] In November 2006, street children labelled as "wanderers"

were reportedly arrested and subjected to physical abuse in crowded detention centres as part of a "round-up campaign" in Vietnam's capital city, Hanoi.[86]

Boys and girls living on the streets are also extremely vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse and exploitation. Many suffer from addiction to drugs and chemical substances, live in unsanitary conditions, and face human rights violations and abuse on a daily basis. In 2000, 86 percent of Egyptian street children surveyed identified violence as a major problem in their lives, while 50 percent stated that they had experienced rape.[87]

The gendered dimensions of human insecurity in cities

The situation of women and girls can sometimes be overlooked in discussions of gangs and urban violence. After all, men are far more likely than women to be both victims and perpetrators of organized armed violence.[88] In El Salvador, for example, the ratio of males to females who died of gunshot wounds in 2000 was 35:1.[89] In Brazil, an estimated 94 percent of gun deaths were among men in 2000.[90]

However, these statistics do not justify neglect of the impact of urban armed violence on women and girls,

THE URBAN DISPLACED:
Internally displaced persons and refugees in cities

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A growing percentage of the world's displaced — some 8.34 million refugees and 23.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs)[1] — are moving to urban environments, often illegally, rather than living in traditional camps. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 18 percent of all persons of concern to them live in urban areas, up from one percent 10 years ago.[2] The camps the displaced leave may range in size from a few hundred to tens or hundreds of thousands of refugees — the Lugufu camp in Tanzania was home to 90,000 Congolese refugees in 2005.[3] Not only can these camps be overcrowded and unsafe, but refugees increasingly spend longer periods of time in them — on average 17 years — making them semi-permanent habitations.[4]

The displaced tend to move to cities for three reasons: to find employment, to register their displaced status with authorities, and for safety. Employment schemes in camps usually do not cater to people with urban backgrounds, who instead have to travel to cities illegally as day labourers or on a more

Once in cities, the displaced often continue to suffer from a lack of protection. They are more likely to be detained, to face discrimination and deportation, and to suffer from other human rights abuses.

Iraqi migrant Ahlam al-Jibouri and her children eat a meal during a power outage in their home in a slum of Damascus, Syria. (January 2007)

long-term basis.[5] Indeed, a relationship of dependency can develop between the displaced labourers and the city they work in. As one IDP living in a camp in Mogadishu noted, "If the life of other people in the city changes, ours also changes, because I depend on them via my work and God's destiny."[6]

The displaced also travel to cities to seek out recognition and assistance, but these processes can take six to 18 months during which time they are left without protection or assistance.[7] Limiting assistance appears to have been a deliberate policy on the part of the UNHCR due to fears of creating dependency among urban refugees and of pull-factors which could result in more migration from refugee camps.[8] Such fears do not similarly affect camp policies and lead to urban refugees often being ignored by the UNHCR and other aid agencies.

Safety is often a primary concern in refugees' decisions to relocate to urban centres, particularly when camp environments are too dangerous.[9] IDPs also flee to cities for safety, yet often end up trapped in the precarious conditions of shantytowns.[10] These IDP movements can destabilize urban centres due both to their size and abruptness, weakening urban infrastructure and overloading social services.[11]

Unfortunately, once in cities, the displaced often continue to suffer from a lack of protection.[12] They are more likely to be detained, to face discrimination and deportation, and to suffer from other human rights abuses.[13] Many children are forced into the streets or into child labour for survival. Girls and young women in particular face a number of threats linked to gender-based violence, including discrimination, trafficking and sexual exploitation.[14]

The insecurity of urban refugees is exacerbated in cities by their inability or unwillingness to gain legal or citizenship rights. Some urban refugees choose not to register their status to avoid the stigma associated with being labelled a refugee or for fear of being forced to relocate to camps once registered.[15] This can contribute to a refugee's sense of loss of place, where they are "neither from here [the city] nor from there [their original home]."[16]

Finally, housing is often insecure in cities where IDPs and refugees relocate. Informal settlements may be demolished, as has occurred in Khartoum, where the government of Sudan undertook a process of systematically demolishing shantytowns housing the displaced — since 2004, over 300,000 have lost their homes.[17] ●

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2   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2006), Karen Jacobsen, "Just Enough for the City: Refugees Make Their Own Way," World Refugee Survey 2004 (Washington: US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2005).

3   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2006).

4   Gil Loescher and James Milner, Protracted Refugee Situations: Domestic and International Security Implications (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 15.

5   Karen Jacobsen et al., "The Sudan: The Unique Challenges of Displacement in Khartoum," Caught between Borders: Response Strategies of the Internally Displaced, eds. Marc Vincent and Birgitte Refslund Sorensen (London: Pluto Press, Norwegian Refugee Council, 2001) 58-9; Michela Macchiavello, "Forced Migrants as an Under-Utilized Asset: Refugee Skills, Livelihoods, and Achievements in Kampala, Uganda," New Issues in Refugee Research (Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2003) 6.

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7   Alison Parker, Hidden in Plain View: Refugees Living without Protection in Nairobi and Kampala (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002) 27-31.

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12 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World's Refugees: Human Displacement in the New Millennium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 114-15.

13 Buscher (2003) 3; Parker (2002).

14 Save the Children Sweden, Urban Flight and Plight of War Affected Children in Africa: Research Summary (2005) 36-39.

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16 Citing a Colombian male IDP in Living in Fear: Colombia's Cycle of Violence (Amsterdam: Medecins Sans Frontieres — Holland, 2006) 34.

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Human security of urban refugees in Cairo

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Currently in Egypt, there are somewhere between 50,000 and 80,000 asylum seekers, mostly African refugees with official refugee status, or whose claims for asylum have been rejected but who remain in the country.[1] Recognized refugees and asylum seekers are under the protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office, which works closely with the Government of Egypt.

In December 2005, a three-month-long sit-in organized by some 2,000 Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers was violently broken up by 4,000 baton-wielding Egyptian riot police. The forcible removal of protesters left 28 refugees — mostly women and children — dead, while hundreds more were injured or detained and threatened with deportation to Sudan.[2]

African refugees in Cairo face violent threats daily, lacking adequate protection from the state and access to justice. Refugees widely report racially motivated discrimination and violent attacks in their daily encounters with the residents of Cairo and the Egyptian police.[3] Discrimination is present in the realms of employment, access to education for children, housing, health care, and in overall contact with the host society.[4] Southern Sudanese, who tend to have a darker complexion than the average Egyptian, often complain about targeted attacks by both the police and street thugs.[5]

Public security is undermined when police fail to register claims of harassment from refugees because they do not recognize their UNHCR refugee cards. Police officers have also reportedly been known to round up people on the streets who look black African, subjecting them to physical abuse and harassment.[6] Since many asylum seekers and refugees do not have official documents or residence permits, many live in fear of arrest and deportation owing to their illegal status.

Although cities offer refugees an opportunity to "hide" their illegal

Egyptian riot police surround Sudanese women and children during a forceful evacuation of Sudanese asylum seekers from a protest outside UN offices in Cairo. (December 2005)

© AFP/Cris Bouroncle

status by becoming anonymous residents of the urban space, their anonymity also renders the monitoring and protection of refugees more challenging. As non-citizens often residing illegally, refugees lack access to rights and services available to Egyptian nationals, such as protective and judicial services, and are subject to a heightened risk of arrest, discrimination, racially-motivated violence and harassment. ●

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4 Cynthia Johnston, "Egypt's African Migrants Dodge Rocks, Fight Racism," Reuters, 24 June 2005, August 2006, http://www.mafhoum.com/press3/103S21.htm

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who are affected by male-dominated organized violence in different ways. In some cities, organized violence against women and girls is systemic and widespread. Threats and intimidation, psychological abuse, and community insecurity disproportionately affect females. Further, rape is sometimes used by gangs as a systematic tool of intimidation and subjugation, particularly against young girls. This is also true for girls who are gang members themselves.[91] A March 2006 USAID gender-based study identified violence against women as one of the main means of terrorization used by urban gangs in Port-au-Prince, while a November 2005 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs report on Haiti noted that "a worrying percentage of rapes [were] gang rapes."[92]

Despite the violence they face from armed gangs, women should not be portrayed solely as helpless victims of gang violence. While most gangs are male-dominated, female-dominated gangs also exist.[93] In addition, women and girls may be active in auxiliary gang roles as messengers and informants, thus contributing to the perpetuation of urban violence by these groups.

While females are less likely to join an organized armed gang than males, women and girls are more likely to fall prey to human trafficking circles or to be caught up in the

A March 2006 USAID gender-based study identified violence against women as one of the main means of terrorization used by urban gangs in Port-au-Prince.

sex industry. Cities such as Bangkok, Lagos and Medellín have become focal points for organized trafficking in persons and the sex trade. According to Nigeria's National Agency for Prohibition and Trafficking in Persons and Other Related Matters, an estimated 15 million Nigerian children are being transported from rural to urban areas for child labour, slavery, or to work as prostitutes.[94] In India, Pakistan and Middle Eastern countries, an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 women and girls are trafficked and subjected to bond servitude and forced prostitution annually.[95] Many trafficking victims are sent to large cities in Asia, the Middle East, Western Europe, and North America where they are sold and exploited.[96] Human trafficking not only perpetuates physical and gender-based violence, but is also closely tied to the spread of HIV/AIDS.

Human security of female migrant workers in Dhaka

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Bangladesh is home to more than 3,500 garment factories employing approximately 2.5 million Bangladeshis, 80 percent of whom are women.[1] Explosive urban growth in the capital city, Dhaka, is pushing it toward becoming the ninth largest city in the world by 2015.[2]

For many migrant women, slums offer a chronically insecure, but economically necessary, place of residence.

Many young women are lured from rural areas and smaller towns to Dhaka by the promise of paying jobs, particularly in the garment industry. Others take jobs as domestic aids in the households of Dhaka's upper and middle class. Once there, many newly-arrived workers are vulnerable to exploitation and violence. In some cases, women find themselves in situations of involuntary servitude in which they remain employed against their will through the threat of destitution, detention, violence or other extreme hardship to themselves and their families.

For many migrant women, slums offer a chronically insecure, but economically necessary, place of residence. The estimated three million poor that reside in Dhaka's 3,000 slums must endure a public security vacuum that has left many communities under the control of *mastans* — armed bands of thugs who run protection rackets through an intricate system of collection and payments.[3] Mastans dispense their own brand of security through coercion, extortion, assault, torture, rape and even murder. These organized syndicates appear to operate with impunity, which has lead to accusations of a political-criminal nexus.[4]

Female labourers are particularly vulnerable to the mastans in the slums in which they live. Working long shifts obliges them to commute home through the slums on foot at late hours, where they are vulnerable to

Many women choose not to report crimes for fear of violent retribution, or assault from police officers themselves.

violent attack, rape and physical abuse. Many women choose not to report such crimes for fear of violent retribution, or assault from police officers themselves.[5]

In August 2001, large scale demolitions and evictions were carried out by the Bangladeshi government in Dhaka, forcibly evicting thousands of families from their homes.[6] The Asian Coalition for Housing Rights reports that police raided shacks in the slums, arresting men on phony charges while mastans worked their way through the settlements looting homes and raping women.[7]

Such crimes are all too common with rural migrants continuing to pour into Dhaka. However, while the

challenges facing these women are daunting, Bangladeshi women have demonstrated resilience through the formation of approximately 9,000 civil society groups throughout the country that seek to respond to their needs.[8] These groups have key roles to play in improving the status of women in Bangladeshi society, and empowering them to take control of their living situations. ●

1 United States, Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005 — Bangladesh," 8 March 2006, 30 August 2006, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrtp/2005/61705.htm

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Displaced persons and voluntary migrants

Every year, millions of men, women and children migrate to the world's burgeoning cities in search of economic opportunity, shelter and improved security. In regions of the world that are experiencing conflict, a growing percentage of the world's displaced — some 8.4 million refugees and 23.7 million IDPs — are moving to cities for the same reasons.[97] In some countries, IDPs travel to urban areas because it is here where humanitarian assistance is accessible,[98] although in general there are fewer formal assistance programs for refugees living in urban areas.[99] While the majority of refugees settle in temporary camps located in rural areas along international borders, IDPs are more likely to relocate to urban or peri-urban settlements. It is estimated, for instance, that 40 percent of the 1.5 million registered IDPs in Colombia live in 10 major cities.[100]

At the same time, many people move to cities voluntarily in search of employment, but find that once there, they remain unable to rise out of poverty. Each year, many thousands of migrant workers find themselves forced by economic necessity to squat in crowded, impoverished and insecure slums.

Rapid population influxes, whether of voluntary migrants or displaced people, can overwhelm a city's infrastructure and service provision, including policing. This strains a city's ability to protect its residents, and may contribute to the failure of public security.

Rapid population influxes, whether of voluntary migrants or displaced people, can overwhelm a city's infrastructure and service provision, including policing.

Violent threats to urban migrants are compounded by discrimination, stigmatization and poverty, as new migrants adapt to unfamiliar urban environments. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable to human security threats perpetrated by human traffickers, organized crime syndicates, and even state security forces. The dangers posed to female migrant workers are amplified by widespread, traditional patriarchal norms that do not acknowledge and respect women's rights.

CHAPTER 4
Conflict-resilient cities

(Opposite:) **The Sarajevo Orchestra rehearses for a concert in the rubble of the National and University Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The library was firebombed and its collection almost completely destroyed by Serbian forces during the siege of Sarajevo in 1992.** (September 1993)

In the 21st century, efforts to prevent and mitigate violent conflict will need to adapt to the increasingly urban nature of armed violence. Fortunately, several unique characteristics of cities have the potential to make them *conflict-resilient*: city dwellers enjoy varied tiers of government representation and close proximity to authorities, frequent interaction and ease of association with community groups, and visible sites of peaceful protest. Effective, inclusive and responsive local-level political institutions can play a central role in preventing tensions between groups from escalating into organized violence. Population density can also potentially promote positive social capital in cities, which in turn can allow cities to act as buffers against national- or regional-level conflict.

Interventions which seek to build urban conflict resilience should focus on strengthening the capacity of cities to provide basic services. Effective and equitable service provision builds state legitimacy at the level of governance closest to the people. Cities are also important sites for rebuilding state capacity and preventing security

Effective, inclusive and responsive local-level political institutions can play a central role in preventing tensions between groups from escalating into organized violence.

failures in post-conflict environments. A specific focus on peacebuilding at the urban level — or "city-building" — to re-establish confidence in the state is potentially both a manageable and scalable approach to reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict.

Governance and democracy at the local level

Effective, inclusive and responsive governance at the local level is a key ingredient in building conflict-resilient cities. Flexibility and proximity to communities places local leaders in a unique position to be sensitive to the interests of

LOCAL LEADERSHIP AND CONFLICT RESILIENCE

Effective, responsive leadership at the local level can play a key role in fostering urban conflict resilience. Closer proximity to the people and more direct influence over day-to-day events provides local leaders with a unique advantage in directly engaging with the population and responding quickly to their needs and interests. Municipal leaders can forge personal bonds and encourage positive social capital among groups, which is particularly important in urban environments characterized by distrust, such as conflict and post-conflict situations.[1] Trusted local leaders can be champions for political, social and economic initiatives that foster peace and cohesion.[2] Nurturing skilful and representative leaders at the local level can also have a broader positive impact on conflict resilience, as local leaders such as city mayors and councillors often go on to pursue state-level political positions.

1 Ken Bush, Building Capacity for Peace and Unity: The Role of Local Government in Peacebuilding (Ottawa: Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2004) 22.

2 Bush (2004), 48.

their constituents, enabling them to respond to the needs of the community in an inclusive, participatory and transparent fashion. Involving civil society actors in decision-making through consultations and dialogue increases transparency and accountability in governance, and fosters stakeholder responsibility and civic empowerment.[105] This may help to resolve disputes before they erupt into conflict by engaging groups in dialogue and ensuring that minority views are represented. In the city of Durban, for instance, involving traditional chiefs in policy planning helped to defuse conflict in the wake of South Africa's move from apartheid to democratic rule.[106]

Community engagement in decision-making offers a way to connect people to their city and to each other. The Canada-Bosnia and Herzegovina Local and Cantonal Government Cooperation Program, for example, is a project that seeks to strengthen effectiveness and transparency of local government institutions in the Municipality of Tuzla in a post-conflict environment characterized by high levels of poverty, displacement and ethnic heterogeneity.[107] This approach can help to reduce tensions between urban populations and authorities by bridging gaps between those who govern and the governed.[108]

Flexibility and proximity to communities places local leaders in a unique position to be sensitive to the interests of their constituents, enabling them to respond to community needs in an inclusive, participatory and transparent fashion.

Inclusive institutions allow marginalized communities to be represented in talks with local officials, planners and donors. Shack/Slum Dwellers International is one civil society group that facilitates such partnerships. Participatory budgeting schemes, which bring together local politicians and community members in budget formulation, provide slum communities with access to public resources and decision-making. These schemes have received international acclaim, and have been adopted in more than 300 cities throughout the world, allowing marginalized populations to improve living conditions and

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Democratic governance can play an important role in building strong cities.

Women voters show their identification cards while standing in a line outside a polling booth in Allahabad, India. (June 2005)

security in their communities. Other community-driven approaches have helped to empower people in decentralized decision-making, such as the Community Organizations Development Institute in Thailand, which has undertaken sustainable, participatory slum upgrading and low-cost housing construction activities in recent years.[109]

Democratic governance can play an important role in building strong cities. By empowering groups through representation and opening lines of communication between groups based on principles of tolerance, inclusion, and respect for minority rights, democratic governance can help to reduce the likelihood of inter-group violence in urban spaces.[110]

However, effective local governance and democracy are frustrated by deeply entrenched corruption among authorities in many cities, which often has a disproportionately harmful effect on the poor. High

levels of corruption are particularly common in slum settlements. According to UN-HABITAT, cities with a larger proportion of slum dwellers tend to score higher on indices of corruption and lower on government effectiveness. Combating corruption, therefore, is an important step in improving urban livelihoods and building conflict-resilient cities.

CONFLICT RESILIENCE IN BOSNIA:
The City of Tuzla

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Tuzla's history of multi-ethnic coex-istence and resistance to outside oppression provides an example of conflict resilience in a region charac-terized by protracted instability. During World War II, Tuzla Muslims hid Jews and Serbs from Croatian Nazi sympa-thizers.[1] In the Balkan wars of the 1990s, Tuzla stood out as a place where ethnic groups lived together in relative

Because of Tuzla's history, its inhabitants identify themselves as citizens of the same city rather than solely members of distinct ethnic groups.

peace. Croats took shelter in the multi-cultural city following the Serb attack on the United Nations safe haven of Srebrenica.[2] As one author has observed, "Past struggles — mainly the history of fighting off invaders rather than fighting amongst themselves — run through Tuzla's political identity like blood through veins."[3] Because of Tuzla's history, its inhabitants identify

themselves as citizens of the same city rather than solely members of distinct ethnic groups.

Multi-ethnic tolerance is evident in Tuzla's political and economic life. The city's economy demands inter-ethnic integration,[4] and is characterized by informal markets where Croats, Serbs and Muslims shop and trade peace-fully[5] — an illustration of bridging social capital in practice. Selim Beslagiç, the city's mayor from 1990 to 2000, used Tuzla's history of tolerance and cooperation to inspire his con-stituency to stand united in the face of external conflict. He discouraged divi-sive nationalist rhetoric and founded the Citizens' Forum of Tuzla, one of the first multicultural non-governmental organizations in the Balkans geared toward the promotion of civil rights.[6] Beslagiç also supported the creation of the Centre for Culture of Peace and Nonviolence, an independent citizens' association that supported ethnic reconciliation in post-Yugoslav coun-tries.[7] His peacebuilding efforts were rewarded with a Nobel Peace Prize nomination in 1997.

Tuzla's resilience to conflict has attracted foreign investment and capacity-building projects, which can

advance long-term human security by promoting violence prevention and good governance. These programs are exem-plified by the Canadian Urban Institute's 1998 Canada-Bosnia and Herzegovina Local and Cantonal Government Coop-eration Program. Completed in 2005, the program demonstrated how policy interventions can use a city's base of tolerance and unity to enhance their chances of success in promoting solid systems of governance that can enhance future conflict resilience.[8] ●

1 B. Egbert, "A Noble Act of Harmony in the Balkans," The Christian Science Monitor (9 October 1997) 30.

2 Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin Books, 1995) 294.

3 Tony Samphier, "Springs of hope," New Internationalist, March 1996, August 2006, http://www.newint.org/issue277/hope.htm.

4 Susan Woodward, "Implementing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Post-Dayton Primer and Memorandum of Warning," Brookings Discussion Papers (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, May 1996) 74.

5 Lisa Cavicchia, Canada-Bosnia and Herzegovina Local and Cantonal Government Cooperation Program, Project Manager (2000-2002). Telephone interview. 24 May 2006.

6 Council of Europe, October 2002, August 2006, http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/Events/2002-10-Intercultural-Dialogue/CV_Beslagic.asp.

7 Centre for Culture of Peace and Nonviolence, November 2002, August 2006, http://balkansnet.org/ccpn.

8 Canadian Urban Institute, Canada-Bosnia and Herzegovina Local and Cantonal Government Coopera-tion Program — Phase II, Final Program Report (March 2005) 70.

Strengthening social capital for conflict resilience

Although slums can be dangerous places to live, slum dwellers can also form valuable social networks that enable them to cope with economic hardships and security challenges. With cities home to diverse arrays of people, positive social capital can build trust between groups of people of different backgrounds and power levels. The unique geophysical characteristics of cities, combined with population density, offer opportunities for the creation of positive social capital.

The term social capital, while not universally agreed upon, generally refers to the relationships or networks between people in communities, and the resources that permit cooperation between them.[111] Three types of social capital — bonding, bridging and linking — together capture the elements of building trust within and across groups *(see Figure 4.1)*.[112]

Engendering positive social capital requires that all three types of social capital are fostered together. Activities – *continued on page 71*

People living in slum communities, like Nairobi's massive Kibera slum shown here, can form valuable social networks that enable them to cope with economic hardships and security challenges.

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Realizing the cosmopolitan ideal

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Cities around the world feature kaleidoscopic societies of people of many origins, identities and faiths.[1] Metropolises in Western states, such as London, New York, Paris and Sydney, are well-known in this regard, but the melting pot scenario is dramatically appearing in fast-growing developing world mega-cities such as Lagos, Mumbai, Jakarta and São Paulo.

In recent years, inter-group tensions have erupted into violence in each of the Western cosmopolitan cities named above, and in other settings as diverse as Antwerp, Karachi, Dili, Lagos and Johannesburg.[2] Often, the source of violence among identity groups is discriminatory access to economic opportunity, state-provided services, effective policing or access to justice and civil rights.

In practical terms, local government most often addresses issues of political empowerment and basic human needs such as housing, clean water and access to healthcare. Robust, city-level democracy can facilitate conflict resilience and mitigate violence in today's diverse city environments by providing for nonviolent resolution of social disputes through legitimate institutions. Resilient urban democracies are more likely to successfully manage and contain inter-group tensions that

Resilient urban democracies are more likely to successfully manage and contain inter-group tensions that could lead to violence than are city authorities lacking legitimacy and the consent of the people.

could lead to violence than are city authorities lacking legitimacy and the consent of the people. Strong systems of urban democracy diffuse values of tolerance, inclusion, accountability and citizen participation, deepening conflict resilience and broadening the basis of human security at the community level.

Urban democracy can't be waged as a winner-take-all contest if it is to promote conflict resilience. Generally, strong proportionally elected city council systems allow for representation of a wider variety of group interests, and can more easily facilitate bargaining and negotiation among disparate interests than can centralized mayoral systems.[3] Beyond this, it must be

remembered that democracy is more than just elections; cities that effectively employ democratic practices to manage inter-group conflict share in common a determination to devise accommodating and locally appropriate policies. In Cape Town, South Africa, for example, apartheid-era divisions of the city by race-based neighbourhoods have been addressed through a concerted effort to create democratic institutions that allow for consensus-oriented decision making on housing projects, transportation routes, anti-gang efforts and inner-city urban economic renewal.

Local urban democracy should emphasize human rights, inclusive representation in elected institutions by leaders held accountable to the people, the exercise of citizenship through direct participation, and routinized processes for negotiating differences and finding common ground. Again, Cape Town's democracy provides an example. Political leaders such as Mayor Helen Zille are able to reach across ethnic, racial and religious boundaries to build social consensus by campaigning on a human rights and service delivery platform. Ideally, democracy should also provide space and support for the emergence of civil society groups that cut across ethnic,

religious or other identity lines, reinforcing a sense of common identity, creating social capital and allowing for the practice of democracy outside of official institutions.[4]

Research has consistently shown that positive measures for the democratic inclusion of marginalized or disadvantaged groups are critical to ameliorating inter-group violence, especially in the developing world's slum communities.

Research has consistently shown that positive measures for the democratic inclusion of marginalized or disadvantaged groups is critical to ameliorating inter-group violence, especially in the developing world's slum communities. Inclusion can be achieved through policies such as the decentralization of some power and service delivery functions to neighbourhood councils, and the creation of representative police forces that practice sensitive and contextually appropriate "community" policing.[5]

These institutions may feature guaranteed participation by people of different groups, for example, in interfaith councils that seek to build bridges among faith traditions.[6]

Inclusion can be realized through processes of consultation and participatory policymaking that explicitly seek extensive engagement and involvement with a wide range of identity groups. Development policies should also focus on especially vulnerable groups, particularly youth and women. For example, in São Paulo and Lagos, civic engagement programs aimed at youth have proven to be pivotal in addressing root causes of conflict in youth disaffection and alienation.

Finally, local-level democracy must increasingly face a stark reality: many urban residents are marginalized in the cities where they work, live and pay taxes because they are not official citizens of that state. In Johannesburg, many tensions from the apartheid period have been ameliorated through institutional and policy reform, only to be replaced by animosity and violent encounters between South Africans and immigrant groups as a serious concern in Africa's most globally connected city. While inclusion of these communities in formal systems of democracy may be constrained by issues of legal citizenship, governments such as those of New York and Chicago have begun to move to allow legal migrant residents to vote in some

local elections. Saving such reforms, local governments are increasingly in need of methods of participatory policymaking that reach out to such otherwise disenfranchised immigrant communities.[7] ●

1 United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2004).

2 The literature on inter-ethnic riots is a good place to start in understanding the causes of such violence and patterns of escalation. See, for example, Donald Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). See also the findings of cross-national research on such riots as conflict accelerators that often crystallize along ethnic lines in Lethal Ethnic Riots: Lessons from India and Beyond, United States Institute of Peace Special Report No. 101 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2003).

3 Democracy at the Local Level in East and Southern Africa: Profiles in Governance (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2004). This report and the local democracy assessment instrument developed to guide the teams through a comprehensive analysis of underlying social and economic relations and political processes are available on-line at http://www.idea.int/africa/dll/. See also Andrew Reynolds et al., Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2005).

4 Jonathan Barkan, Street-Level Democracy: Political Settings at the Margins of Global Power (Bloomfield, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1999).

5 On decentralization and city-level governance in Africa, see Dele Oluwu and James S. Wunsch, eds., Local Governance in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic Decentralization (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

6 For further information on interfaith dialogues, see David R. Smock, ed., Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2002).

7 For an overview of peace commissions, see Michael Lund, "Peace Commissions for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation," Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation, Conflict Management and Governance, Timothy D. Sisk et al. (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2001) 90-97.

Urban democracy helps defuse conflict in Durban, South Africa

Jo Beall, Director, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics

The city of Durban has played an important role in helping to overcome the legacy of a violent transition from apartheid to democracy in the South African province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). The transition lasted from the mid-1980s until the first non-racial elections in 1994, with conflict between supporters of the nationally victorious African National Congress (ANC) and regionally strong Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Political violence reached the proportions of a civil war that left 20,000 dead and a million people displaced. By involving in metropolitan governance the 15 traditional leaders (the *amakhosi*)[1] from peri-urban areas on the city's periphery — some of whom had been involved in the violence[2] — eThekwini Metro, the large municipal authority that governs Greater Durban, worked with a hybrid system of accountability that adapted rigid blueprints for democracy to meet local needs.

Provincial and municipal government officials and traditional leaders, or *amakhosi*, take part in a gift ceremony together in eThekwini, South Africa. (February 2006)

One root of the problem was that the amakhosi supported the primarily ethnic Zulu IFP with its mainly rural constituency against the more urbanized ANC. Initially, supporters of the ANC resisted local political participation by the amakhosi falling within eThekwini's new boundaries.[3] However, President Thabo Mbeki accommodated traditional authorities at the national level and the Metro Council, in line with national legislation, invited traditional leaders in eThekwini to participate more fully in municipal affairs in 2003.

Some see chieftaincy as characterized by customary forms of accountability, while others view it as anti-democratic; significantly, viewing it as oppressive of women.[4] eThekwini Metro has thrown down the gauntlet to the amakhosi, encouraging them to earn the right to represent their people by accommodating themselves to democratic processes. The amakhosi cannot comprise more than 20 percent of representatives on municipal councils, they do not have voting rights, and they do not deal with the budget. However, they receive a monthly allowance and, as paid participants in the local governance process, cooperate more willingly with the Metro on improving peri-urban infrastructure and introducing development projects.

The incorporation of potentially competing power structures into eThekwini's urban governance, made possible by institutional pluralism and strong roots of democracy within the city, has avoided tensions that could have threatened local security. The policy and its formation have also contributed to national stability by defusing a regional flashpoint, by containing traditional authority within constitutional parameters, and by demonstrating that democratic transition is a process and not something achieved by the stroke of a legislative pen. ●

eThekwini Metro, the large municipal authority that governs Greater Durban, worked with a hybrid system of accountability that adapted rigid blueprints for democracy to meet local needs.

The incorporation of potentially competing power structures into eThekwini's urban governance, made possible by institutional pluralism and strong roots of democracy in the city, has avoided tensions that could have threatened local security.

1 Recognizing that the terms "traditional authorities" and "chieftaincy" are contentious, they are used here as shorthand, although the vernacular isiZulu terms *inkosi* (singular) and *amakhosi* (plural) are preferred when referring specifically to KwaZulu-Natal.

2 Jo Beall, et al., "Emergent Democracy and 'Resurgent' Tradition: Institutions, Chieftaincy and Transitions in KwaZulu-Natal," Journal of Southern African Studies, 31.4 (2006) 755-771.

3 C. Goodenough, Traditional Leaders, A KwaZulu-Natal Study 1999 to 2001 (Durban: Independent Projects Trust, 2002) 53-57.

4 Jo Beall, "Decentralizing Government and De-centering Gender: Lessons from Local Government Reform in South Africa," Politics and Society, 33.2 (2005) 253-276.

Social capital interventions in Cali, Colombia

Simon Snoxell, Visiting Scholar, London South Bank University

A city of two million people, Cali, Colombia is characterized by high levels of violence. In 2001, Cali's homicide rate was 90 per 100,000, with nearly half of the victims being between 15 and 25 years old.[1] Many of Cali's homicides were attributable to gang violence, which constitutes a serious human security threat. It has been argued that a primary cause of Colombia's violence is weak social capital.[2]

Between 2002 and 2003, the Foundation in Health and Social Development (FUNDAPS), worked with 11 youth groups to strengthen social capital and reduce violence in Aguablanca, one of the most deprived and violent districts in Cali. A survey of Aguablanca found that youth had high levels of bonding social capital with friends, family and immediate neighbours, but low levels of bridging and linking capital with the wider community and institutions, especially the police. Evidence from the survey also suggested that youth groups could provide the fellowship young people might otherwise seek in gangs.

The FUNDAPS intervention built upon this bonding social capital among group members to undertake activities aimed at increasing youth social connectedness with the community,[3] including sports and dance, as well as youth engagement in the management of conflict resolution services based in health centres; and youth representation at the Peaceful Coexistence Committee, responsible for project approvals, evaluation and management.

Although more research is required in order to firmly establish what long-term effects these interventions have on wider community social capital and human security, one study[4] did conclude that even in a violent district such as Aguablanca, external organizations can help forge social capital to promote peace by developing youth community engagement activities. Because of support from FUNDAPS, youth groups increased their membership, and developed high levels of trust and mutual respect between members and the community. Officials acquired an increasing faith in the contributions of young people to the community, so much so that the local government is now funding some youth groups rather than ignoring them.

By building linking capital between youth groups and the authorities,

> *One study concluded that even in a violent district such as Aguablanca, external organizations can help forge social capital to promote peace by developing youth community engagement activities.*

FUNDAPS' relatively cheap and context-specific intervention improved local grassroots governance through empowering youth, reducing alienation and making local government more accountable.[5] ●

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1 These rates varied enormously among districts.

2 J. Sudarsky, Colombia's Social Capital: The National Measurement with the BARCAS (Unpublished, 1999).

3 The social capital survey also found that youth had high levels of trust in schools and churches. This suggests that these organizations should be supported in extending their community development activities.

4 By researchers at London South Bank University (2005).

5 The program was tailored to the high-intensity contact of a dense urban environment, and total costs over two years were approximately US$300,000.

that aim to build only bonding social capital between members of the same age group, for example, may only serve to strengthen the cohesion of urban gangs. Likewise, social isolation can result if bridging and linking capital between groups are not built simultaneously, frustrating the potentially positive contribution to conflict resilience.[113] Such approaches can produce *negative* social capital — namely, when bonds are formed between groups to produce outcomes that can exacerbate human insecurity.

Building positive social capital between specific groups can be particularly effective in creative problem-solving to foster peace and cohesion at the local level. GROOTS International is one example of a grassroots women's organization that develops partnerships for development and problem solving, including post-disaster rebuilding.[114] In post-conflict environments, people turn to social networks first to provide security and basic services, such as neighbourhood watch groups and garbage collection initiatives.[115] In Somalia, the Somali Youth Development Network, based in Mogadishu, allows young people to work together in peacebuilding dialogue and activities.[116]

Building positive social capital between specific groups can be particularly effective in creative problem-solving to foster peace and cohesion at the local level.

FIGURE 4.1 Three kinds of social capital

	Description	Example (Positive)	Example (Negative)
Bonding	Relationships among people who see themselves as sharing a common background	Slum dwellers working together on community upgrading projects	Ethnicity-based armed street gangs
Bridging	Relationships among people without a common background	Inter-ethnic peace negotiations	International, multi-city human trafficking networks
Linking	Relationships among people of different power levels	Community policing alliances between state authorities and slum residents	Children employed as drug-runners by organized criminal cartels

SOURCE: Adapted from Snoxell (2006)

Upgrading slums, building human security

Juma Assiago, Urban Safety and Youth Expert, Safer Cities Programme
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)

Safety and security are prerequisites to achieving the United Nations Millennium Development Goal 7, Target 11 on improving the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020.

Within slums, the lack of adequate infrastructure such as street lights or roads can leave people cut off from their larger communities, physically or by fear.

Slums are spatial concentrations of social, economic and environmental deprivation, and are often perceived as engines of crime. Residents are typically excluded from mainstream social and economic activities, live on marginal incomes, and have no voice in local decision-making. Within slums, the lack of adequate infrastructure such as street lights or roads can leave people cut off from their larger communities,

physically or by fear. This isolation can lead to the disintegration of social capital, often generating groups at risk of becoming victims of crime and violence.

However, a breakthrough in rebuilding and strengthening human security in slums has come with the recognition that even modest initiatives to physically upgrade slums can improve social capital. For example, in Nairobi's Korogocho slum, the Adopt-a-Light concept — drawing on private sector sponsorship of street lighting in several busy areas identified by the community, and enabled by Nairobi City Council — has enhanced perceptions of safety and provoked new interaction among people, groups and public institutions. Urban interactions of this sort build positive social capital as people form new relationships and bonds of trust grow stronger. In Korogocho, as a result of the Adopt-a-Light project, a new, more secure environment has emerged that enhances the quality of life of many people.

The active participation of urban governments is necessary for slum upgrading in order to make these

A breakthrough in rebuilding and strengthening human security in slums has come with the recognition that even modest initiatives to physically upgrade slums can improve social capital.

areas safe for people to live. Urban governments can act as mobilizing agents of local resources and partnerships. In this context, physical improvements that contribute to social and economic upgrading of slums are an exercise in better governance, leading ultimately to increased human security. This is a starting point for addressing deeper vulnerabilities in terms of tenure, livelihoods and isolation, and overcoming the perceptions that, unchecked, will prevent the achievement of Millennium Development Goal 7, Target 11 in the next 14 years. ●

Targeted social capital interventions have demonstrated that concerted attempts to build relationships between discrete groups in cities can help reduce violence. The Gender, Peace and Development Project in the conflict-affected region of Muslim Mindanao in the Philippines, for example, builds positive social capital by bringing together Christians, Muslims and indigenous Lumads in community peacebuilding activities.[117] An intervention designed to

Cooperation between governments and slum dwellers, including community associations, builds trust between people with different levels of power, thus forging linking capital and enhancing conflict resilience.

build linking social capital between youth groups and municipal authorities in Cali, Colombia, led one official to comment, "We can now say that the young population

is very close to us and we can count on them to undertake awareness activities."[118]

Cooperation between governments and slum dwellers, including community associations, builds trust between people with different levels of power, thus forging linking capital and enhancing conflict resilience. Squatters in Nairobi's Huruma Ghetto, who had previously been forced to pay exorbitant bribes or face violent evictions, joined together in 2002 to collectively engage city authorities in negotiations for housing construction.[119] By bringing slum residents into local urban democratic processes, such as participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, bridging capital can also be enhanced, as people from different parts of the city work together to improve human security and quality of living.[120]

Urban social capital developed between potentially antagonistic communities can help to buffer cities against internal conflict before it emerges or escalates, and provide protection against outside identity-based violence at the state or global level. For example, Lucknow and Surat, two Indian cities with vibrant and mixed civil societies, were able to avoid the violence that plagued more segregated Hindu-Muslim cities such as Aligarh and Ahmedabad from the 1960s to the 1990s.[121]

Urban social capital developed between potentially antagonistic communities can help to buffer cities against internal conflict before it emerges or escalates, and provide protection against outside identity-based violence at the state or global level.

Social capital can also contribute to conflict resilience in times of political upheaval and transformation, as illustrated by peaceful democratic protests in the Ukraine in 2004. By mobilizing civil society networks, half a million protesters converged in the capital, Kiev, and successfully pressured the government into reversing election results that were largely seen as fraudulent.[122] This example shows that the cohesion that can result from positive social capital can help to engender dramatic change in cities without compromising human security.

SHACK/SLUM DWELLERS INTERNATIONAL

Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) is one example of an international civil society organization that seeks to empower the urban poor. SDI is a South Africa-based volunteer network of community and grassroots initiatives with membership from over 23 developing countries. Its primary goal is to facilitate sustained, long-term investments in vulnerable communities to support activities such as savings and credit schemes, and the achievement of secure land tenure.[1] SDI's work with slum dwellers to help ameliorate poor urban living conditions serves as a potential model for additional initiatives to enable local democratic participation and enhance urban conflict resilience.

1 Shack/Slum Dwellers International, *International Advocacy*, 6 July 2006, http://www.sdinet.org/rituals/ ritual9.htm.

Providing the basics: Services and security

A third component of urban conflict resilience is the provision of basic services. The failure of local authorities to provide basic services to marginalized populations can exacerbate inequalities and fuel tensions between groups. On the other hand, municipal authorities are well placed to respond to the immediate needs of their constituents in emergency situations or in early stages of conflict, and in so doing may help to prevent tensions from mounting. In conflict situations, effective municipal govern- ments can mitigate the impact of violence and insecurity by providing effective law enforcement and access to justice, and by protecting vulnerable populations

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A municipal worker collects garbage from a housing project in Cape Town, South Africa. The provision of basic services can be a key component of urban conflict resilience.

© IDRC/Peter Bennett

If slum residents gain access to services such as potable water, solid waste removal, transportation, policing and education, they will be better able to build safe and healthy communities.

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through emergency shelters and assistance.[123] Local-level governments also typically make decisions about access to land, which can often ignite or defuse conflict. Decision-making about land-use planning that is participatory and transparent can be key to helping prevent conflict.[124]

The longer that slum residents remain in the same place, the more time they have to form networks that build social capital among neighbours and acquaintances. Policies such as extending land tenure in areas of informal housing are likely to contribute to permanence by providing slum residents with security and confidence in the future.[125] Recent land tenure policies in Burkina Faso, Senegal and Tanzania have

been well-received, with the number of evictions in these countries dropping.[126] Service provision may have a similar effect. If slum residents gain access to services such as potable water, solid waste removal, transportation, policing and education, they will be better able to build safe and healthy communities.

Democratic urban governance can help to counteract slum policies that generate negative social capital such as clearances and demolitions. Such governments are more likely to protect vulnerable groups because they involve in decision-making the very people they are trying to help. In Rio de Janeiro, the return to democratic governance in the 1980s corresponded with the development of projects such as Favela Bairo,

One of several hand-operated water pumps installed in the St. Marc area as part of the USAID Haiti Transition Initiative. The local municipality and water authority used functioning parts from the old hand pumps to repair five additional pumps in the St. Marc downtown. (2005)

a program that invested over US$600 million in the provision of public services including clean drinking water and roads to slums in the city.[127]

Involving the community in decision-making and security provision is the operating principle behind community policing, a proactive approach to law enforcement that encourages

The peacebuilding impact of conventional service delivery

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Militarized conflicts are typically patched into international and national networks. However, regardless of the factors that cause or sustain such conflicts, the consequent violence is experienced in the fields, streets, neighbourhoods, families, and ultimately, the bodies and minds of children, women and men at very

Within a rapidly urbanizing world, local governments and civil society can, and often do, serve as the cornerstone for peacebuilding and reconstruction.

local levels. Within a rapidly urbanizing world, this should focus our attention on urban spaces. Local governments and civil society can, and often do, serve as the cornerstone for peacebuilding and reconstruction.

There is much to be learned from the experiences of municipalities within conflict and post-conflict settings. A recent collection of case studies commissioned by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities demonstrates that effective and legitimate structures of local governance (the interaction of government, private sector and civil society) are key factors in transforming and defusing violent conflict — just as ineffective and illegitimate structures of governance are key factors in stymieing peace efforts or pushing non-violent conflict into the realm of violence.[1]

One of the key lessons drawn from urban experiences in three countries at different stages of violent conflict (Philippines, the Palestinian Territories and Bosnia and Herzegovina) is that the most significant contributions to peacebuilding and conflict-dismantling may be found in the conventional, even mundane, work of local governments. This is logical given that this is the level of government closest to its citizens and therefore most likely to be aware of, and responsive to, their needs. This would include work in water and sanitation, health and social services, public safety, local

The most significant contributions to peacebuilding and conflict-dismantling may be found in the conventional, even mundane, work of local governments.

transportation, public employment and local economic development. Within communities that have been terrorized, traumatized and factionalized, the way in which local governments deliver public goods and services will have a far greater impact on their citizens' support for (or non-blocking of) constructive alternatives to war-fighting, than *ad hoc*, short-term, donor-driven "reconciliation" initiatives.

However, there are other lessons to be culled from the experiences of the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon. In both cases, citizens have

often become dependent on the support and essential services provided by the charitable wings of extremist political-military groups. In the absence of an effective, inclusive, representative, and ideally, democratically-elected government, the provision of such support and services tends to legitimize groups that promote extremism and violence, and by extension can serve to legitimize their entire range of activities. Again, this should remind us that it is the *way in which* a local government functions, rather than the functions it performs, that have the greatest impact on the development of conflict-resilient/peace-nurturing cities. ●

While there are limits to how far one can generalize and apply the "good practices" and lessons generated from one context to another, the list below suggests where to look, how to look and what to support in our efforts to strengthen peacebuilding and conflict resilience within cities and municipalities.

GOOD PRACTICES IN GOOD GOVERNANCE AND URBAN PEACEBUILDING

> Build capacity and leadership abilities of local government.

> Actively involve citizens in municipal planning and decision-making.

> Bring government and basic service delivery closer to citizens.

> Support community ownership of development activities.

> Enable access to scarce resources.

LESSONS LEARNED FOR PEACEBUILDING IN URBAN SPACES

> Generating active community participation helps sustain results.

> Decentralization requires sustained support.

> Local governments can play a role in strengthening civil society.

> Big problems seem insurmountable, but can be broken down into manageable segments.

The way in which local governments deliver public goods and services will have a far greater impact on their citizens' support for constructive alternatives to war-fighting than ad hoc, short-term, donor-driven "reconciliation" initiatives.

1 Kenneth Bush, et al., <u>Building Capacity for Peace and Unity: The Role of Local Government in Peacebuilding</u> (Ottawa: Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2004).

The built environment, urban peacebuilding and conflict resilience

Scott Bollens, Professor of Urban Planning, University of California, Irvine

The built urban environment can be a critical agent in the development of tolerance that enhances conflict resilience and human security. Urban management can close or open up a city physically, fragment or integrate a city socially, and create cities that reinforce and harden group identities or seek to transcend them. The shared geography of the urban sphere is a crucible of difference, and a litmus test of whether different groups can coexist amidst proximity and interdependence.

Organized armed violence in cities takes place on a continuum between extremes of conflict and stability (see figure below). The built environment plays a crucial role in determining a city's placement on the continuum. Conflict can erupt over the control of settlement patterns, dispossession from land, control of land ownership, and ethnic boundaries and identities.

Cities can move to different points on the continuum over time, and policies related to physical space can affect this movement. In Johannesburg, South Africa, urban leaders during the 1991-1995 transition targeted the need to radically transform the basic parameters of apartheid-based urban governance.[1] Amidst halting

Urban management can create cities that reinforce and harden group identities or seek to transcend them.

national progress toward peace in Northern Ireland, Belfast policymakers have made efforts to modify the city's strong ethnic territoriality.[2] Large-scale planning frameworks and development projects have been instrumental in transforming Barcelona from a chaotic

Urban conflict > Urban stability continuum*

ACTIVE CONFLICT > SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE > MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE > STABILITY/NORMALCY

- Jerusalem
- Mostar (BiH)
  - Nicosia (Cyprus)
- Belfast (Northern Ireland) • Johannesburg (South Africa)
  - Sarajevo (BiH)
    - Basque Country (Spain) • Barcelona (Spain)

* Cities' placement along the continuum is determined by a sole overriding criterion among multiple urban dimensions — the degree to which active inter-group conflict over root political issues has been effectively addressed. The continuum is not intended to be a comprehensive measuring tool, but rather a useful heuristic model, enabling thinking about the differences among types of contested cites and what these differences mean for urban intervention and national peacemaking.

and speculative Francoist city, to a fragile and emerging democratic city, to — eventually — the stabilized and robust multinational city of today.[3]

Urban policies seeking the return of minority households in Sarajevo and Mostar are crucial in efforts to reconstitute multi-nationalism in Bosnia. In Mostar, the international community has endeavoured to delineate a common strip of land along the former confrontation line, designed to be a place where government institutions would be located and where interethnic activities would be encouraged. In the cases of both Sarajevo and Mostar, the international community sees the city as being a fundamental anchor holding the state together socially and politically.[4]

Cities are necessary and strategic foundations on which to build a sustainable, integrated, conflict-resilient society. If properly planned, a city can constitute a container within which positive economic and social interactions take place. Policymakers should revitalize and redevelop public spaces as places of democracy, inter-group interaction and neutrality. Urban spaces permit cohesion and social equality, and encourage activities that are the grounds for nurturing urban citizenship. Urban structures such as walls that physically segregate groups or serve to strengthen psychological cleavages should be discouraged to allow for a mixing of populations

Policymakers should revitalize and redevelop public spaces as places of democracy, inter-group interaction and neutrality.

and the normalization of urban fabric that strengthens conflict resilience. People affected by projects that alter a city's physical geography should participate in the process from the beginning. Involving the local populace in a process of democratic deliberation is of vital significance in reconstructing the social cohesion of a traumatized or war-torn city.

In order to extend the impact and enhance the sustainability of innovative urban strategies, institutional linkages should be developed that diffuse peacebuilding knowledge both horizontally (to other urban areas in the country) and vertically (to regional and state governments, and to international organizations). During conflict transition periods, associations of local governments should seek to incorporate local grassroots lessons into state-level diplomatic peace negotiations and their implementation. These associations can develop principles of tolerance and peace that can guide all participating local governments in a

country, and show through practical handbooks how urbanism can productively address conflict. Local government organizations that operate at the international level can be repositories of information about how municipal governments can facilitate and promote peacebuilding. With such local governmental and non- governmental advocacy, the chances that peace accords will recognize the importance of urbanism and local governance in peacebuilding processes are increased.

Planning actions and principles will not turn around a society that is splintered or unravelled; they cannot create peace where it does not exist in people's hearts and souls. What urbanism can do, however, is create physical and psychological spaces that can co-contribute to the safety of people living in cities. ●

1 Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber, An Interim Strategic Framework for the Central Witwatersrand. Document 2: Policy Approaches. ISF Working Group, Planning Framework Task Team, Physical Development Working Group. Prepared by GAPS: Architects and Urban Designers. June 1993.

2 Scott A. Bollens, "Ethnic Stability and Urban Reconstruction: Policy Dilemmas in Polarized Cities," Comparative Political Studies 31. 6 (1998) 683-713.

3 A key document here is Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona, The General Metropolitan Plan for Barcelona (1976). See also Scott A. Bollens, "Urban Planning and Peace Building," Progress in Planning (Elsevier Press, forthcoming).

4 Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mission Implementation Plan (2003); OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar, Recommendations of the Commission (2003).

HUMAN SECURITY AND THE MEDIA IN CITIES

Ross Howard, President, Media and Democracy Group, Halifax

Media development is an essential element of city peacebuilding and human security. The opportunities for the conventional news media to enable very large groups of informed, engaged and self-determined citizens, and for intended-outcome programming formats to inspire attitudinal and behavioural change, have never been greater. The decade's technological advances have enabled the electronic media to overcome illiteracy and poverty and become near-ubiquitous in urban areas. Even in slums there are transistor radios; talk-shows rival the street market or mosque in mobilizing opinions. Successes such as Soul City in Johannesburg, Video SEWA in Ahmedabad, India, and Kothmale FM Community Radio in Sri Lanka[1] confirm that media development can address massed urban realities as part of peacebuilding. Simultaneous development of a skilled media and a media-supportive legal-legislative infrastructure should be integral to all initiatives regarding human security and cities.

1 Alfonso Gumucio Dagron, <u>Making Waves: Stories of Participatory Communication for Social Change</u> (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 2001).

closer bonds between security officers and the public.[128] Examples of community policing initiatives include staffing local policing units with community members as well as police officers; hiring more bilingual officers for neighbourhoods with concentrated ethnic populations; encouraging police to patrol by foot rather than in vehicles; and establishing neighbourhood advisory councils for community members to discuss specific concerns with police officers.

Community policing is an example of how building positive social capital between community members and the state can help to peacefully resolve disputes, thereby potentially preventing violence from erupting in urban areas.

Community policing provides an encouraging example of how building positive social capital between community members and the state can help to peacefully resolve disputes, thereby potentially preventing violence from erupting in urban areas. In slum areas of Mumbai, community police stations, or *panchayats*, are staffed by local volunteers who work in partnership with police officers to patrol the streets and resolve disputes.[129] This approach has helped community members resolve disputes in a fashion that is both cost-effective (community members volunteer their time) and empowering for women (who often make up a majority of panchayat members).

In Bogotá, community policing combined with educational programs, increased investment in policing and innovations in street lighting have helped reduce the number of homicides per year by 75 percent since 1993.[130] Community policing strategies in major Colombian cities are now being used by the United Nations Development Programme as models for other cities in Latin America such as in El Salvador and Ecuador.[131]

Capacity building for urban conflict resilience

Capacity building for local governance and democratic development play important roles in peacebuilding in post-conflict environments. In the short term, a focus on the local level may be more practical and productive than a focus on

state-level institutions. In the wake of violent conflict, citizens often no longer trust the state for protection and basic services, turning instead to community support networks. This is illustrated by the thousands of voluntary organizations that emerged in Belfast since the 1970s as a response to a breakdown in state legitimacy during periods of vicious sectarian fighting.[132] Municipal governments can cooperate with such local networks on urban reconstruction to reduce the likelihood of recurring violence and lubricate the rebuilding process.[133]

Urban centres have the potential to drive national post-conflict reconstruction efforts by projecting an image of recovery and peace that can foster confidence in larger peace processes. Sarajevo, for example, suffered a 43-month siege by Serbian forces in 1992-95, resulting in an estimated 12,000 deaths.[134] However, the city's remarkable recovery — characterized by inter-ethnic marriages and civic engagement among youth groups — served as a source of symbolic and practical peacebuilding for Bosnians.[135] In the Middle East, the Municipal Alliance for Peace, working in partnership with city councillors from the UK, works with Israeli and Palestinian local governments to build capacity and foster peaceful dialogue through town-twinning arrangements.[136]

Advancing human security in the built environment

The physical space where people live — their built environment — has an important, if often overlooked, impact on urban security. Some environments are more conducive to promoting social capital than others.[137] Cities that are territorially segregated — those with hollowed-out cores and affluent suburbs, gated enclaves amidst sprawling slums, or physically divided or isolated ethnic or cultural groups — are less likely to enjoy the benefits of positive social capital.

On the other hand, urban policies that seek to promote interaction among groups, including the creation and maintenance of public spaces, can nurture diversity and integration, thereby building unity and supporting inter-group exchanges.[138] Urban planning (by building diverse communities) and urban management (through effective representation and access to decision-making) can be effective in reducing violence and insecurity that can stem from social stigma, discrimination and isolation.

Effective local governance can promote urban conflict resilience by offering a path to physical improvements that encourage the growth of stable urban communities. Civil society also has a key role to play in enhancing safety and security in urban communities. Movements that

Urban policies that seek to promote interaction among groups, including the creation and maintenance of public spaces, can nurture diversity and integration, thereby building unity and supporting inter-group exchanges.

empower marginalized groups to bring an end to forced evictions and ensure land security can help to prevent violent conflict that can flourish when people are excluded and discriminated against.

Examples include the Women Advancement Trust in Tanzania, and Estrategia in Peru, a civil society group that works to promote and protect land tenure for disadvantaged women and assists in the construction of secure dwellings for them.[139] By bringing together basic elements of conflict resilience — effective and inclusive governance and positive social capital — and allowing them to interact and reinforce one another, urban conflict resilience can be enhanced even in the most challenging urban spaces.

Potential indicators of urban fragility

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State fragility has serious implications for human security, a point driven home by recent events in countries such as Somalia and Sudan. Using an urban lens to examine fragility can perhaps offer the possibility of a more nuanced understanding of the threat of armed violence in cities, and how such violence may be alleviated. Fragility indicators have been

> *Using an urban lens to examine fragility can perhaps offer the possibility of a more nuanced understanding of the threat of armed violence in cities, and how such violence may be alleviated.*

advanced elsewhere in efforts to provide a snapshot of a particular situation, in order to draw comparisons between states and over time. A complementary urban indicator system could potentially do the same for the city level, and expose possible links between city and state fragility.

To that end, we propose here six concepts and 11 indicators to represent city fragility. *(See chart on opposite page.)* Undoubtedly, urban-focused quantitative research faces many challenges: data for some cities are relatively easy to find, while systematic records are scarce for cities plagued by violent conflict.[1] Thus, the selection of indicators presented here is merely illustrative.

The ability to gauge a city's fragility could provide policymakers with a tool for focusing their interventions and measuring the impact of programs. Fostering robust, conflict-resilient cities can be a key building block in improving human security, and knowing which specific indicators to target, and in which cities, could assist this effort.

The challenge of collecting data at the urban level: Future directions

In order to devise a system of indicators of urban fragility, more data must be compiled at the city level so that theories and indicator systems can be tested against fact, refined and made stronger. A complete statistical image of most cities in the developing world is simply not available. Notably, important aspects of conflict resilience such as social capital and urban citizenship are very difficult to capture with quantitative data. Time-series datasets that allow longer-term trends to be identified are rare. Although a city's violent crime rate may be relatively low, it may have risen steadily in the past decade; a single snapshot does not tell the full story, and this highlights the need for trend lines.

Despite current difficulties, the future of urban data collection looks promising. For example, data mapping enabled by technology — the placing of events and figures in a spatial context — allows cities to be examined with more precision. Simple, standardized questionnaires can help measure things such as crime and social capital in developing cities with limited resources. As quantitative research in cities expands, we can combine resources with ingenuity to improve our understanding of urban fragility and conflict resilience. ●

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1 A preliminary mock-up comparing standard values based on indicator data for a sample of cities, as well as additional notes about data limitations, are available at www.humansecurity-cities.org.

11 POTENTIAL INDICATORS OF URBAN FRAGILITY

Urban public security

Physical security — measured here in two contrasting ways — can be a key indicator of urban fragility.

1 **Homicide rates**: Pervasive violent crime is a sign of official inability to maintain urban public security.

2 **Police per capita**: The police force is a key measurable tool that cities can use to ensure peace and order.

Responsive urban governance

Urban residents rely on their local governments to provide crucial services. If local governments are not able to peacefully resolve dilemmas, this could give rise to insecurity and fragility.

3 **Corruption**: Corruption robs cities of the capacity to equitably improve urban living conditions for all citizens, and can increase tensions between those who govern and the governed.

4 **Perceived access to decision-making**: Public perceptions of access to decision-making can be a more accurate indicator of responsive urban governance than potentially corrupt and illegitimate official institutions and elections.

Social capital in cities

The networks of relationships that form between people during day-to-day interactions in cities facilitate trust and cooperation. Fragile cities are likely to lack a strong social fabric enabled by community participation.

5 **Participation in community organizations**: Involvement in community organizations that work to benefit society as a whole can build social capital by providing space for positive human interaction; high levels of citizen participation indicate a vibrant city with strong interpersonal connections.

Urban economic development

Uneven economic growth can contribute to urban fragility by widening social cleavages.

6 **Wealth disparity**: Economic inequality at the local level is highly visible to urban residents and can contribute to tensions born of marginalization.

7 **Percentage of population in slums**: High proportions of a city's population living in slums are indicative of an economy unable to positively engage the entire population in formal economic activity.

Urban citizenship

The failure of a city to provide all of its residents with a secure home and access to basic services may indicate a fundamental weakness of the state.

8 **Land tenure**: Access to a secure place to live safeguarded by law is a first step to a sense of ownership in the city, and the responsibilities of citizenship that it instils.

9 **Access to public services**: High levels of access to public services indicate socio-economic inclusion.

Urban demographic stability

Sudden changes in demographic composition can create tensions between what a city is capable of providing and what its population demands.

10 **Age distribution**: "Youth bulges" create economic pressures such as a demand for jobs that may not be met by the city. High youth unemployment is correlated with crime, which threatens public security.

11 **Population growth**: Sudden increases in population, whether caused by high birth rates or migration, can strain the ability of cities to provide services and lead to increased competition over scarce resources in urban spaces.

Quick-impact urban infrastructure projects, like this one in the Port-au-Prince neighbourhood of Cité Soleil, have been part of a United States Agency for International Development initiative to increase stability and reduce violent conflict in Haiti's cities. (2006)

CHAPTER 5
Safer cities for an Urban Century

This book has attempted to demonstrate the value of examining human security from an urban perspective. Rapid urbanization is setting in motion new dynamics in which organized gangs and transnational criminal networks are taking advantage of failed public security within sprawling urban spaces to generate new threats to people's safety and lives. From Cape Town to Cairo, Bangkok to Baghdad, Kingston to Kandahar, guns, gangs and drugs are finding their way on to city streets with devastating consequences for civilian populations. In some cases, more deaths are being caused by armed violence in cities within countries formally at peace than within countries experiencing civil war.

Rapid urbanization is having a particularly profound impact in the developing world where many local governments lack the capacity to provide adequate public security for their ever-growing populations. In some cities, the inability or unwillingness by public security forces to provide public security is resulting in the progressive privatization of security. While elites are often able to hire private security forces, slum dwellers are increasingly being victimized by highly organized and heavily armed gangs who are filling the void left when public security fails. Cities besieged by modern war are also the sites of significant human security challenges — for example, protecting civilian populations in urban spaces when armed combatants take advantage of the density of buildings and populations found in cities to conceal their operations.

Yet, out of these challenges emerge exciting opportunities for improving security, advancing human rights, and building dynamic, conflict-resilient communities. As the level of government closest to the people, inclusive, effective and responsive local-level institutions can play a vital role in reducing tensions and resolving conflicts between groups, thereby preventing violence from erupting. Diverse, densely populated cities also have the potential to foster positive social capital, building a strong social fabric that can potentially

CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY:
Protecting children in cities

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Urban areas are a locus of development work supported by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in its partner countries. In the last five years, CIDA has invested roughly $100 million per year in projects with urban reach. They include multi-donor trust funds for infrastructure development and funding to Canadian organizations with an urban focus.

While CIDA does not have a distinct "urban program", investments in CIDA priority sectors — such as private sector development, governance, environment, health and education — have a specific urban focus and a direct urban impact. For example, within governance, a key area of investment is local governance and decentralization. CIDA's work in this area seeks to promote the development of policy frameworks for good local governance, increase local capacity to provide basic infrastructure and services, and enhance public participation in municipal service delivery and decision-making on local development.

Over the last five years, CIDA has also invested an average of $145 million per year on projects that focus on conflict prevention and resolution, and

While CIDA does not have a distinct "urban program", investments in CIDA priority sectors — such as private sector development, governance, environment, health and education — have a specific urban focus and a direct urban impact.

peace and security,[1] most with a direct or indirect impact on human security (e.g. security system reform, child protection, crime prevention, HIV/AIDS prevention). Approximately 30 percent of this investment has an urban reach.

Below are two examples of CIDA's work related to human security in urban areas:

> Established in 2001, the $2-million Child Protection Research Fund supports research that is innovative

and multi-dimensional in its analyses of the complexity of children's lives. This research is grounded in a rights-based approach which views children as active participants in their own development. Two of the projects address urban violence: one looks at young people released from juvenile detention centres in São Paulo, Brazil; the other focuses on the early prevention of aggressive behaviour in Medellín, Colombia.

> The Promoting and Protecting the Interests of Children Who Work Project aims to develop concrete solutions to improve the health, safety and learning opportunities for children who work in small businesses in Aswan, Egypt. Children's participation is key to this project in which girl and boy participants identify labour hazards in their workplaces and then design and deliver interventions that improve their working and learning conditions. Started in 2002, the project works with 350 working children, ranging in age from six- to 18-years-old. ●

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1 This does not include humanitarian assistance projects.

help to buffer cities from conflict. Reconciling these positive and negative aspects of urbanization will be critical to building safer cities for the future.

Existing efforts and actors in urban security and development

A variety of actors, ranging from UN bodies, to bilateral donors, to community-based organizations, have undertaken efforts to enhance the safety of people living in urban areas. These efforts signal a growing acknowledgement that cities are key entry points for programs that seek to enhance security and development.

In the UN system, there are a number of institutions that have been established to address the specific security and development needs of cities. UN-HABITAT's Safer Cities Programme has partnered with local governments in programs that seek to build good governance and prevent crime and violence in cities such as Dar es Salaam, Johannesburg and São Paulo. Several other UN agencies, including the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Population Fund, have also undertaken city-based activities.

At the regional level, the Organization of American States' increasing emphasis on urban democracy has been demonstrated by the establishment in 2001 of the High-Level

In recent years, city governments themselves have become actors in international diplomacy. Through what is known as "city diplomacy," cities are increasingly cooperating in international fora to play a role in strengthening each other's capacities to prevent and mitigate armed violence.

Inter-American Network on Decentralization, Local Government and Citizen Participation, which establishes strategic guidelines on decentralization and collates and disseminates best practices among members. Additional work is being done by the International Organization for Migration which has helped migrants integrate into cities through its Urban and Rural Community Support Program.

In recent years, city governments themselves have become actors in international diplomacy. Through what is known as "city diplomacy,"

cities are increasingly cooperating in international fora to play a role in strengthening each other's capacities to prevent and mitigate armed violence. For example, municipal authorities in Tuzla (Bosnia), Osijek (Croatia) and Novisad (Serbia) worked together, in conjunction with civil society groups, during the Balkan wars to protect and conserve their multi-ethnic societies. In the post-war period, the three cities contributed to the peace process at the local level by signing a *Protocol on the Promotion of Interethnic Tolerance*.[140] United Cities and Local Governments, the so-called "UN of cities", encourages this kind of diplomacy and conflict prevention at the urban level through its Committee on City Diplomacy.[141] Members of the Cities Alliance, a global coalition of cities and development organizations that support slum-upgrading programs,[142] are also active in bridging development and security in cities.

Despite rapid urbanization, donor funding to urban-specific projects has tended to be relatively modest — for example, just US$2 billion per year was spent by the World Bank on urban projects between 1970 and 2000, representing about three to seven percent of the Bank's overall funding.[143] The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development devotes very little attention

THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE:
Urban initiatives

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With half of the world's population now living in cities, the challenges associated with urbanization shape how we think of human security. In urban areas, the poor often locate illegally on marginal lands, with no land tenure security and substandard infrastructure services. The environmental burden in these areas is further compounded by inadequate access to water supply and sanitation, drainage and solid waste management. Low-paying jobs in the informal sector such as manual work, vending and construction make the urban poor particularly vulnerable to changing social, economic and environmental conditions, including pollution and disease.

In this context, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC)'s urban programming aims to increase the resilience of cities in the face of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime,

social conflict and disasters. With an emphasis on democratic decision-making and meaningful participation of the urban poor, IDRC's Urban Poverty and Environment Program (UPE)[1] encourages more equitable environmental governance by supporting nine multi-stakeholder research projects through the Focus City Research Initiative (FCRI). In Jakarta, the FCRI focuses on the economics behind slum upgrading, and in Colombo, it

focuses on linking poverty, health and inadequate access to services. In the Middle East, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, the UPE supports sustainable water demand management, wastewater reuse and urban agriculture.

Another key area of IDRC's urban programming is enhancing public security. Public insecurity is a growing problem in cities worldwide, but particularly in Latin America. Most armed conflicts in the region have

IDRC's Urban Poverty and Environment Program encourages effective models of basic service provision, such as waste collection, in low-income and marginalized areas. (2006)

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ended, but levels of violence remain stubbornly high. By some measures, Latin America is the most violent continent in the world.

Cities lie at the crossroads of these trends, making local governments central actors in the drive to reduce conflict, insecurity and violence. For the last two years, IDRC's Peace, Conflict and Development Program has been supporting research into these issues, led by ICLEI — Local Governments for Sustainability, and Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales Sede Ecuador (FLACSO) Ecuador.[2] This project will develop a policy framework to promote peaceful coexistence at the local level, placing particular emphasis on the concerns of disadvantaged groups. Guidelines and tools for the engagement of local government and civil society will also be developed, focusing on four cities in Latin America. ●

1 For more information on the IDRC Urban Poverty and Environment Program, see http://www.idrc.ca/upe.

2 For more information on the IDRC Peace, Conflict and Development Program, see http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-2839-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html.

explicitly to urban issues. Much of the urban-specific programming offered by donors concentrates on improving urban water supply and sanitation, increasing access to education, helping to prevent the spread of communicable diseases, and reducing poverty. The World Bank's Urban Development Program promotes "urban upgrading," focusing primarily on improving access to housing and other basic services. There has been a growing recognition of the importance of cities within the donor community, however this work tends to prioritize development rather than security objectives.

At the local level, some programs, particularly those led by civil society, have been directed at improving human security in cities. For example, the Brazil-based NGO Viva Rio works in over 350 favelas, or shantytowns, on disarmament and gun awareness campaigns, with a focus on youth.[144] Examples of work being done to strengthen local-level democratic development include International IDEA's Local Democracy Assessment Guides and the National Democratic Institute and the World Bank's handbooks on best practices for local governance.[145] On the issue of urban forced evictions, the international NGO Human Rights Watch has spearheaded a campaign calling on the Cambodian Government to

There appears to be a clear and growing international recognition of the important synergies between security and development in the urban context.

strengthen its housing and resettlement policy to protect forced evictees in Phnom Penh.[146]

While this evidence of increased international engagement on urban issues is welcomed, these efforts remain largely focused on developmental impacts rather than security objectives.[147] Nevertheless, there appears to be a clear and growing international recognition of the important synergies between security and development in the urban context.

Transnational dimensions of urban armed violence

The research presented in this volume suggests that much of the organized armed violence that takes place on city streets is perpetrated by groups that are linked to transnational criminal organizations or internationalized weapons flows – *continued on page 95*

SIDA'S PROGRAMMING ACTIVITIES:
Advancing human security in urban environments

Agneta Danielsson, Senior Programme Officer, Department for Infrastructure and Economic Cooperation Urban Division, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

Studies have shown that the urban poor identify safety and security as priority concerns — as important as hunger, unemployment and lack of safe drinking water.[1] Unfortunately however, human security in an urban context has received little attention from national governments and donors.

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)'s urban support aims to enhance human security in cities either indirectly through various urban programs, or directly through ongoing support for the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)'s Safer Cities Programme. An example of the former is Sida's Urban Development Programme in South Africa (1996-2007), which has included support to three municipalities. The program focuses on comprehensive urban and spatial planning with a high degree of participation from the target communities.

Some security measures were as simple as increasing lighting in selected townships in Nelson Mandela Bay. Women and girls now feel freer to move around without constant fear of being assaulted and raped on a dark street. In Buffalo City, the Geographic Information System component of the program has worked to create a municipal safety and security application which enables the drawing of statistical information from various sources, such as police, fire, rescue, and disaster management services, in order to provide better information on which to base violence-prevention interventions.

Access to land and security of tenure in urban and slum settlements has become a focus area for Sida's urban support, notably in Kenya, where an integrated land and urban sector program involving both the government and civil society was launched in 2006. Conflicts over land and water are not uncommon in Kenya's cities. They can jeopardize the outcome of interventions and sometimes give rise to outbreaks of violence among distressed groups. Sida therefore views interventions in this area as an important tool to improve urban human security.

Lastly, children and youth constitute half of the population in many countries, and in many unsafe urban environments they are the first victims. However, children frequently become the perpetrators of violence themselves, as can be seen in many post-conflict countries. Often, children and youth caught up in camps for internally displaced persons choose to migrate to the nearest urban centre, where they end up on the streets. Against this background, Sida commissioned Save the Children Sweden to conduct a research project entitled *Urban flight and plight of war affected children in Africa* (2006). ●

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1 See for example Christine Kessides, The Urban Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction (Washington: The Cities Alliance, 2006) 40, 65.

(Opposite:) **Sida's urban programming includes a focus on access to land and security of tenure in slum settlements such as Kibera in Nairobi, Kenya.**

INCREASING STABILITY BY IMPROVING URBAN SECURITY:

USAID's Haiti Transition Initiative in Port-au-Prince

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The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) began its Haiti Transition Initiative (HTI) in May 2004, with implementing partner the International Organization for Migration. Recognizing that Haiti's stability rested in part on the security of its cities, HTI activities in Port-au-Prince developed along three principles: USAID support for community-driven, small-scale urban development projects; law enforcement provided by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUS-TAH) to encourage community leaders to take action regarding the problem of gang violence; and community leadership and ownership of programming. With these three pillars in mind, the HTI initiated quick, visible, high-impact project activities in the neighbourhoods of Martissant, Bel Air and Cité Soleil.

The driving belief behind the HTI was that engaging residents of conflict-prone urban neighbourhoods in community-driven, paid, manageable projects would reduce frustrations and generate momentum around positive, productive activities, thereby reducing incentives for violent conflict.

The projects included the rehabilitation of roads, bridges, water and electric systems, public markets and sports infrastructure, and socio-cultural activities. They involved a high proportion of youth normally at risk of criminal and gang activities and created frameworks for bridging the gap between government and community residents. The final result was a concrete example of the security-development nexus: residents benefited from an improved urban living environment and learned tools of conflict resolution and dialogue, while simultaneously enhancing citizen confidence and participation in the state (thus building government credibility).

The HTI activities in Bel Air are a case in point. The community was wracked by gang violence and a population that deeply distrusted the interim government. After months of consultation with the community, a series of HTI project activities were initiated in the neighbourhood, commencing with the repair of a public kiosk that had been burned down by police during riots earlier in the year. This positive interaction encouraged Bel Air residents to nominate additional

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projects in the immediate vicinity of the kiosk, which HTI pursued. MINUSTAH peacekeepers established a permanent base in Bel Air at Fort National, which resulted in an improved security situation. HTI reinforced MINUSTAH's permanent presence in the area with intensive clean-up and road rehabilitation projects — using community labour — to saturate the

Fort National area with positive, relationship-building activities.

As trust and goodwill were built in HTI-targeted neighbourhoods, MINUSTAH peacekeepers were able to expand their regular patrols to these areas to ensure the security of staff and workers and engage in relationship-building with the local residents they were mandated to protect. Meanwhile, the return of regular peacekeeping patrols enabled a widening of the scope of HTI community engagement projects in Bel Air as the security situation stabilized. Eventually, the combined efforts helped to push gangs out of the neighbourhood, as community activists became increasingly free from fear of intimidation or retaliation by gang members. Ironically, a key indication of success for HTI was the return of normal urban activity to Bel Air: bustling markets and traffic jams.

HTI is also working in volatile urban neighbourhoods in Cap Haïtien, Gonaives, St. Marc, Petit Goâve and Les Cayes. However, given the lack

The Haiti Transition Initiative's small-scale urban development projects, like this one in Cité Soleil, Port-au-Prince, are aimed at contributing to security and stability in the country's cities. (2006)

of active violence in these cities, the focus of the HTI in these communities is conflict prevention and mitigation through participatory mechanisms that bring communities and government together to create positive change. ●

Improving human security by rebuilding urban communities in Kabul

Hoshina Hideaki, Senior Advisor, Japan International Cooperation Agency

Afghanistan has suffered greatly from domestic and international conflict over the last quarter of the 20th century. As a result, nearly all social services and infrastructure in Afghan cities and villages have collapsed or been heavily damaged. This has contributed to making Afghanistan one of the poorest countries in the world.

Reconstruction of both physical and service infrastructures in Afghanistan commenced in 2002 with pledged assistance from the international donor community for the rebuilding of the national government.

In early 2005, the donor community approved the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy, the medium- and long-term development plan for the country. However, the implementation of development projects and programs has shown only gradual progress, as Afghanistan's post-war reconstruction has been hindered by increasing incidents of violent attacks throughout the country, including Kabul.

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has implemented several post-war reconstruction projects in Kabul as part of an emergency rehabilitation program. The program began with an a priori analysis of general socio-physical demands in post-war urban communities. The study quickly identified urgent reconstruction projects to be pursued and implemented in the areas of physical infrastructure, education, health and telecommunications.

Rehabilitation and reconstruction projects that have been undertaken as part of Kabul's post-war development include:

> Reconstruction of arterial roads in Kabul to facilitate urban transportation. The improved roads allow better traffic flow and provide increased safety for both vehicles and pedestrians.

> A national radio and TV station, which included the construction of the building, equipment set-up, and technical assistance in broadcasting skills and technology. The radio and TV broadcaster is believed to be an indispensable tool for promoting good governance and rebuilding social networks.

In addition, JICA has assisted several programs that serve the needs of demobilized and disarmed soldiers reintegrating into Kabul. In 2004, the agency launched the Vocational Training Project for Ex-Combatants

JICA has assisted several programs that serve the needs of demobilized and disarmed soldiers reintegrating into Kabul. The need for reintegration services is overwhelming given Afghanistan's ongoing insurgency, high unemployment and estimated 60,000 former combatants.

to provide vocational training for instructors and ex-combatants in such fields as sheet metal working, welding and lathe operation, to prepare them for employment in urban areas. The need for reintegration services is overwhelming given Afghanistan's ongoing insurgency, high unemployment and estimated 60,000 former combatants.[1] ●

1 For more information, see http://www.jica.go.jp/afghanistan/english/pdf/afghanistan.pdf.

and gang cultures. For example, international human trafficking is enabled by large criminal networks with operations in major cities throughout the world. These cities serve as major transit points or end destinations for the many thousands of women and children who are sold into the sex trade each year. It is also the case that American gang culture is being mimicked across the Americas, from music and fashion to a growing willingness to engage in drive-by shootings and armed urban combat with rival gangs and state security forces.[148] The widespread appeal of American gang culture, particularly its powerful bonding effect on marginalized urban youth, may help to account for the proliferation of organized gangs as well as why it is so difficult to reduce incidents of armed violence in many cities.

In this sense, urban gangs can be seen as a local manifestation of transnational crime. In Latin America, youth gangs are frequently involved in drug trafficking, one of the most challenging international illegal enterprises. Not only are there important links between urban gangs and transnational crime, but evidence also suggests that these links are becoming more prominent. As one recent study found, "youth gangs no longer operate only within the boundaries of a particular, relatively small neighbourhood, but increasingly extend their sphere of influence across cities, regions and countries."[149]

Transnational criminal activities, such as trafficking in drugs and weapons, are often closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Cocaine, opium, guns, and even people, are used as currency for illicit transactions between criminal groups.[150]

A member of the South African police unloads guns onto a pile of more than 1,000 illegal firearms destroyed in Cape Town. (September 2003)

© AFP/Anna Zieminski

Security system reform in urban spaces

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Identifying security system reform (SSR) programs with a specific urban focus — that is, programs that are explicitly designed for urban rather than rural environments — can be difficult. However, cases in post-conflict cities such as Freetown, Sierra Leone, and in non-war cities such as San José, Costa Rica; Bogotá, Colombia; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, point to some early positive results of urban-based SSR programs.

Broadly speaking, while few SSR programs are deliberately structured for the urban environment, policing reforms in particular are urban-tailored by default. There are two main reasons for this. First, the population density, volatility and political significance of cities ensure that urban requirements take priority as far as donors and national authorities are concerned. Second, public police forces work mainly in urban areas. Indeed, rural areas in the South are more likely to be policed by community-based or vigilante-style groups than by public police.

Circumstantial evidence also suggests that consciously urban-tailored programs can mitigate or reduce violence. For example, an appropriately trained and resourced police force can prevent small-scale urban looting or rioting from getting out of hand.

Similarly, police who are subject to civilian oversight may be less corrupt, politicized or repressive.

At the operational level, a recent policing development which responds to the needs and features of the urban environment is community policing. Most models of community policing focus on proactive crime prevention. They feature officers assigned to specific communities in order to establish long-lasting relationships with, for example, neighbourhood groups, business and civic leaders, and schools, as well as to increase police visibility. Cities are in some ways organic entities, so weaving police into the urban fabric in this way is a necessary condition for effective and transparent justice. This may be taken as a given in many Western societies, but consensus between the police and the local populace can be difficult to achieve in a society such as Nigeria's, where the federal — and riot — police are drawn from outside their operational locality (Nigeria's constitution does not allow local or state police).

Another aspect of SSR that might benefit from urban tailoring concerns the volatile relationship between police and military forces in many cities. This is usually at the expense of public safety. The streets of Lagos, for example, are full of soldiers and police independently manning traffic checkpoints, each seeking bribes. This is not a specifically urban problem, but it is most evident in cities, and its repercussions are most severe in urban areas. As one example, a United Nations official estimated that up to 75 percent of Dili's 120,000 population fled East Timor's capital in May 2006 after clashes between several hundred former soldiers and police.[1]

A few cases help to illustrate the potential of urban-specific SSR programs. In Sierra Leone, for instance, community policing (or local-needs policing, as it is known) was introduced through partnership boards established at the local level, and special emphasis was placed on dealing with the vulnerable and those who had suffered most during the war. Furthermore, urban SSR was important to Sierra Leone because the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was based in Freetown. Not only was peace tied to reform as far as most Sierra Leoneans were concerned, but donors also believed that reforming the country's notorious police would encourage support for Kabbah, their protégé.

Success has been easier to measure statistically in community policing programs implemented in non-post-

conflict environments. For example, in the Hatillo area of San José, a community policing initiative in 1997 resulted in a 9.5 percent decline in crime, which is a good figure considering that 38 percent of Hatillo residents estimated that crime had actually increased during the period. Moreover, police visibility increased, with only 7.5 percent of residents saying they had never seen police in their neighbourhood, versus 35.2 percent from a year earlier.[2]

For such reasons, urban-tailored SSR programs have the potential to positively influence human security outcomes. Even so, security agencies cannot solve entrenched social problems on their own, even if they wanted to. While order can be achieved by repressive means — witness Saddam Hussein's Baghdad — civil society partnerships are necessary for cities to achieve participatory and accountable forms of public security. ●

1 "Residents flee East Timor capital," BBC News, 5 May 2006, 15 August 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4975722.stm.

2 Rachel Neild, Themes And Debates In Public Security Reform: A Manual for Civil Society Community Policing, Washington Office on Latin America, 1998, August 2006, http://www.wola.org/publications/pub_security_themesdebates_communitypolicing.pdf.

Major criminal organizations, such as the Triads in Hong Kong and the Japanese Yakuza, profit from forging alliances with other criminal networks to expand their reach and profits.[151] There are also demonstrated linkages between arms and drug trafficking and terrorism, with profits from illicit trade used to support terrorist networks.[152]

The transnational dimensions of the gun trade are well documented and the linkages to urban armed violence are frequently just as clear. The lethality of urban armed violence is often enabled by illegal arms trafficking. For example, many of Brazil's guns are smuggled illegally from Paraguay,[153] and many of West Africa's guns are imported through Warri, a port town in southern Nigeria.[154] The high rates of firearm violence in South African cities today are assessed to be the result of the influx of guns from the civil war in Mozambique. The limited success of disarmament efforts following Angola's conflict also resulted in many guns being illegally smuggled across the border into South Africa.[155]

The links between actors that perpetrate violence — from members of international organized criminal networks, to armed insurgents waging combat against states, to paramilitary groups controlling regions within states, to violent gangs controlling

The transnational dimensions of the gun trade are well documented and the linkages to urban armed violence are frequently just as clear.

city slums — support the argument that international actors have an important role to play in helping to combat urban violence. They suggest an explanation for why efforts by local and national level governments to combat urban armed violence may have limited success: international issues are most effectively addressed by international actors and regimes.

Existing international norms and laws offer a platform upon which states can build to address the transnational dimensions of urban violence. The *UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime* is one such example that recognizes the significant roles played by international drug cartels, human trafficking networks and illicit arms traffickers in perpetuating armed violence in urban areas. The Convention has three protocols: one on human trafficking, one on the smuggling of migrants, and one on illicit small arms trafficking.

Community policing through police *panchayats* in Mumbai

Sheela Patel, Director, Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres, Mumbai

In Mumbai and other Indian cities, inadequate and corrupt police forces and inequitable access to policing services for the poor — and particularly for poor women — has led authorities to re-examine the way in which policing services are being delivered. To address problems in providing public security, an alliance of neighbourhood organizations has become involved in neighbourhood policing through a system of police *panchayats* — neighbourhood organizations that serve to mitigate local disputes and act as a liaison between slum residents and police. Today, about 200 police panchayat centres dot Mumbai's informal slum neighbourhoods, which are home to about half of the city's population.

Prior to the development of the panchayat system, interactions between the police and inhabitants of these informal settlements were overwhelmingly negative. Frequently, there was no regular police presence in the slums, as police entered them only when they had to arrest suspects or deal with a crime.

The panchayat system has addressed communications problems by harnessing existing community organizations, such as micro-finance groups, to channel slum dwellers' concerns. Typically, about seven women and three men are nominated to liaise with an official from the local police detachment. Each representative covers a designated area, meeting regularly with constituents to hear complaints and arbitrate disputes. This arrangement has allowed panchayat representatives to mitigate and resolve disputes without resorting to the formal legal system, thereby reducing police caseloads.

The panchayat system has sought to resolve problems at the neighbourhood level, and to address them in an environment that focuses on dispute resolution rather than imposing sentences. The system has also improved police transparency and accountability, since police procedures are now under more scrutiny from the public. It has also helped to empower women, both because of the important roles they play in the system, and because they often feel more comfortable reporting crimes such as sexual harassment and violence to a female panchayat representative than to a male officer.

The panchayat system has sought to resolve problems at the neighbourhood level, and to address them in an environment that focuses on dispute resolution rather than imposing sentences. The system has also improved police transparency and accountability.

As more and more of India's elites employ privatized security services, and the state reduces financial support for public police forces, the negative impact of the dwindling quality of policing is felt overwhelmingly by the poor. Familiarizing the poor with policing institutions and making police accountable for their actions is vital for both the poor and the police. ●

The urban dimension of peace operations and peacebuilding efforts

Given the growing prominence of cities as pivotal flashpoints in conflicts — and as sites of alarming levels of armed violence outside of conflict — this volume has also suggested that it is time to examine peace operations and peacebuilding initiatives more explicitly through an urban optic. The Somali civil war in 1992, and the UN peacekeeping intervention that followed, focused heavily on the capital city of Mogadishu, just as Sierra Leone's civil war in 2001 focused on its capital, Freetown. The most gruesome atrocities of the Bosnian war of 1992-95, a war that resulted in a multilateral, NATO-led military intervention, occurred in two prominent cities: its capital, Sarajevo, and the town of Srebrenica. The intractable gang violence in Haiti's capital city, Port-au-Prince, has greatly complicated post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in the Western Hemisphere's poorest country. The current conflict in Iraq has certainly placed issues related to urban warfare at the centre of strategic analysis and military doctrinal development.

Although peace operations typically have a strong national orientation, people's perceptions of security tend to be shaped by local circumstances. Thus, peace support operations will need to adapt to urban challenges to fully realize the advantages offered by strong and well-governed cities in supporting human security, as well as state stabilization and related peacebuilding efforts. With armed violence occurring more and more in urban areas, it is likely that the tools of the trade for peace operations will

Urban-specific security system reform, including reform of police forces and justice systems, will be required to respond to the unique and growing security and law enforcement needs of city dwellers.

continue to evolve. For example, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs are already moving beyond "cash for guns" or "seeds for guns" types of initiatives. Urbanization suggests that DDR programs that address the specific needs of city dwellers, such as training in tailoring, driving, and small business development, will be needed to effectively reintegrate former combatants into urban societies.[156] Lessons learned from DDR can also potentially be adapted to challenges facing cities experiencing failures of public security, such as disarming gangs and reintegrating gang members into civil society.[157] This also means ensuring that children growing up in war zones and youth ex-combatants do not turn to a life of violent urban crime after peace has been brokered — as has occurred in some Latin American and African countries following years of civil war.

Urban-specific security system reform (SSR), including reform of police forces and justice systems, will be required to respond to the unique and growing security and law enforcement needs of city dwellers. Community policing activities, such as small police units made up of civilian-police partners, have the potential to improve security while developing valuable partnerships between slum dwellers and state security forces. In short, peace operations as well as DDR and SSR initiatives that adapt to the strategic challenges of the urban context will be critical to the success of peace support efforts in an Urban Century.

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF PARAMILITARIES IN COLOMBIA:

Implications for urban security in Medellín

Brodie Ferguson, Research Associate, Conflict Analysis Resource Center, Bogotá

Until recently, the presence of armed criminal gangs, guerrilla militias and paramilitary groups in Medellín — Colombia's second-largest city with over two million inhabitants — resulted in the city having one of the highest per-capita murder rates in the world.[1] While levels of violence remain high by international standards, the city has experienced impressive reductions in key indicators which can be attributed to a variety of local and national security initiatives.

The current process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) being carried out nationally within the framework of the Justice and Peace Law, a national peace plan passed in June 2005, has had especially strong implications for public security in Medellín. DDR programs targeted the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and their urban proxies beginning in late 2003

following the AUC's announcement of a unilateral ceasefire. That November, 860 paramilitaries belonging to Medellín's AUC-linked Cacique Nutibara Bloc (BCN) publicly laid down arms, the first of a series of 37 collective

demobilizations in which over 30,000 combatants have disarmed.[2] These demobilized combatants have been resettled throughout roughly one third of Colombia's municipalities, with the largest number by far being resettled

Paramilitaries linked to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) publicly surrender their arms in Medellín as part of a peace agreement signed with the government. (November 2003)

in Medellín. As a result of the ceasefire and demobilization, reported homicides in Medellín have shown a remarkable decline, dropping some 45 percent in 2003 and an additional 40 percent in 2004.[3]

Nonetheless, there are some clear negative implications of the way in which DDR is being conducted in Colombia's cities. A primary concern with this process is that ex-combatants are simply being recycled into security-related jobs in licensed firms

Paramilitaries may have demobilized at least partially because they can continue to consolidate their power in Colombia's urban centres.

as well as in the informal sector. Federal legislation permitting the arming of security-providing bodies makes it possible for demobilized paramilitaries to re-arm themselves as part of private security firms.[4] In August 2005, the Ministry of the Interior and Justice announced the creation of a *guardia cívica* (civic guard), whereby demobilized combatants would provide unarmed security in parks and commercial centres and at public events. These and other concerns, such as reports that the BCN has been promoting the creation of neighbourhood security bodies run by BCN ex-combatants, have drawn robust criticism of the DDR process from groups such as Amnesty International.[5]

There are also concerns that close links between paramilitary groups and organized crime networks make the participation of ex-combatants in criminal activities all too likely. Reports suggest that the BCN has drawn considerable strength from relationships with criminal gangs operating in the poorer neighborhoods of Medellín.[6] In 2000, there were an estimated 8,000 youths linked to criminal gangs in the city, engaged in activities ranging from petty crime and extortion to drug trafficking and social cleansing.[7]

A recent study by the Universidad Nacional de Colombia's Institute for Political Studies and International Relations and the Conflict Analysis Resource Center found that while paramilitary demobilization has resulted in a nearly 50 percent decline in homicides in Colombia, the number of criminal acts has increased.[8] While gross human rights violations such as massacres may have been successfully addressed by the demobilization process, the growth of crime and the intermingling of ex-combatants and organized crime syndicates suggests that paramilitaries may have demobilized at least partially because they can continue to consolidate their power in Colombia's urban centres.

This is but one example. The post-conflict experiences of San Salvador and Guatemala City provide a clear reminder of the need for careful monitoring of the disarmament and reintegration components of a DDR program. Despite impressive reductions in homicide rates in recent years in Medellín, the number of weapons turned in by demobilized armed groups has fallen well below expected, suggesting that ex-combatants are keeping their arms for use in criminal activity or resale on the black market, with unknown potential for renewed political violence. Careful attention must be given to the control of these weapons if improvements in urban security are to be maintained in the wake of the demobilization of Colombia's paramilitary groups. ●

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Canadian best practices in building local governance for peacebuilding

Wafa Saad, Regional Coordinator, Middle East, Federation of Canadian Municipalities

Effective local governments play a dual role in conflict prevention: they promote democratic processes at the local level through consultation and public engagement, and they deliver basic services. Strong and effective municipal governments have five distinct characteristics that have significant implications for their role in security, peacebuilding and conflict resolution: legitimate and transparent

Strong and effective municipal governments have distinct characteristics that have significant implications for their role in security, peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

leadership; improved service delivery that touches people's lives directly; collaborative relationships with communities; participatory and transparent governance; and acting as a focal point for facilitation and coordination of services and decision-making.

As building these capacities in municipal governments is a key element in enhancing local security and supporting local development, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) has implemented local governance capacity-building programs in the Palestinian Territories and Sri Lanka.

The Palestinian Municipal Management Project

The FCM has worked in partnership with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) since 1997 to help reduce poverty and contribute to peace and human security in Rafah and Khan Younis, two cities in Gaza. Both cities suffer from very high unemployment, large refugee populations (making up 70 percent of the populations of 140,000 and 180,000 respectively), weak institutional structures, and inadequate and deteriorating infrastructure. Compounding these factors is the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The program's goal is "to support development and peace initiatives that improve the quality of life of citizens and achieve sustainable development

in the Palestinian municipalities," particularly considering the impasse between the Israelis and Palestinians at the national level. The program's key successes, results and best practices include:

> Improved local economic development capacities through the implementation of a **Local Initiatives Support Fund** (**LISF**), which built social capital by bringing together a committee composed of members of the municipal council, senior staff, and community representatives (including a women's group and neighbourhood and refugee camp representatives) to manage a fund designed to respond to the community's priorities. The LISF sowed practices of transparency, accountability and inclusiveness at the community level and strengthened linkages between community groups and municipalities through the proper group management of local economic development projects, thereby addressing some of the roots of violence at the local level.

> **Increased public participation in municipal decision-making**: Community groups have come to see real benefits in engaging with the municipalities, viewing them as partners in community development. Likewise, the municipalities have learned to value support and cooperation with the community, and see their role in serving the community more expansively, reducing potential tensions and improving perceptions on both sides.

> **Enhancing municipal leadership skills and management capacities**: Providing municipal staff and administrators with leadership skills, the ability to facilitate public participation and forge strong community bonds are essential contributions to peace, particularly at a time when other authorities are less capable of doing so and where local authorities are being forced to operate in much greater isolation from the central authority.

In the absence of support from central government, local governments' proximity to populations is vital to addressing acute economic and social disruptions. By improving human security and stimulating local economic development, local governments can help to stem the effects of ongoing violence by alleviating the suffering of the Palestinian people and helping to preserve social and economic stability at a critical juncture.

The Canada/Sri Lanka Municipal Cooperation Program

FCM has also partnered with CIDA since late 2005 to increase local government capacities to support national Sri Lankan post-tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in a conflict-mitigating manner. Four urban governments in Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Galle and Kalmunai are receiving technical assistance to improve local governance, primarily in areas of operations management, service delivery and strengthened participatory mechanisms. Financial support is being given to municipalities to help fund sub-projects that affect the quality of life of the local population. In restoring basic services (such as water, sanitation and emergency services), basic management capacity (for conflict-mitigating land use planning), and necessary governance and accountability tools (including public participation mechanisms), the program should contribute to strengthening the conflict resilience of these fragile municipalities. ●

Local economic development projects, supported by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities and the Canadian International Development Agency, are discussed at a public meeting in Khan Younis in the Palestinian Territories.

Local governments work together to build peace in the Middle East

Peter Knip, Director, VNG International, Association of Netherlands Municipalities

The Municipal Alliance for Peace in the Middle East (MAP), established in June 2005, is a cooperative development and peacebuilding framework of the national municipal associations of Israel (Union of Local Authorities in Israel — ULAI) and the Palestinian Territories (Association of Palestinian Local Authorities — APLA), and international partners. The MAP has been endorsed by 31 Israeli and Palestinian mayors, numerous municipal representatives from 17 countries, and other national and international organizations including the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), the United Nations Development Programme, United Cities and Local Governments, and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities. The international arm of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG International) mediates in this process, provides technical assistance and facilitates bilateral meetings.

The rise to power of Hamas on the local and national level in the Palestinian Territories has affected the willingness of the international donor community to fund the MAP.

The MAP is aimed at promoting, facilitating and implementing trilateral local initiatives by Palestinian, Israeli and third-country municipalities. This bottom-up approach could be characterized as "peace through development," and is yet another example of how the security-development nexus expresses itself at the municipal level.

Nonetheless, despite this and the escalation in conflict in mid-2006, there are still municipal leaders, both Palestinian and Israeli, who want to proceed in trilateral projects.

The MAP is aimed at promoting, facilitating and implementing trilateral local initiatives by Palestinian, Israeli and third-country municipalities. The program's overall objective is to support peace, dialogue and mutual understanding among Israeli and Palestinian citizens through practical, on-the-ground projects. This bottom-up approach could be characterized as "peace through development," and is yet another example of how the security-development nexus expresses itself at the municipal level.

Though deep controversies exist regarding the causes of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, Israeli and Palestinian mayors face many concrete, practical problems in their municipalities that are similar and which give them common ground. Within the APLA, the ULAI and the group of involved mayors, there is a widespread view that only palpable and visible projects in their communities can convince their citizens that cooperation is worthwhile and that dialogue contributes to peace in their territories. As a result, the program aims, through local projects, to mobilize local political leaders, civil society, business

communities, the media and other actors to create a broad-based municipal lobby for peace even while national politics may remain at a standstill. Needless to say, it is a courageous step for all participating mayors to engage in dialogue and concrete cooperation with representatives from what is seen by many local citizens as the enemy.

The involved municipal leaders are convinced that local authorities are a critical first-order partner in paving the road to peace and mutual understanding between Palestinians and Israelis. Israeli and Palestinian municipalities together can set in motion a municipal movement that will bring citizens closer together, despite stalemate and political tension at the national level.

The first MAP pilot projects are scheduled to begin in January 2007, and will involve cities including The Hague and Emmen in the Netherlands, and Bethlehem, Tubas, Nazareth and Ra'anana on the Palestinian and Israeli sides. The projects will help build the Bethlehem region's capacity to manage environmental and natural resources

The program aims, through local projects, to create a broad-based municipal lobby for peace even while national politics may remain at a standstill.

through the creation of a Geographic Information System and associated human resource capacities.

The future will show whether the international community is prepared to build a part- nership with local governments in Israel and the Palestinian Territories to contribute to peace and conflict resolution from below. Nonetheless, it is hoped that the MAP will be able to contribute to resolution of the region's complicated situation of insecurity, and that perhaps safer and more integrated cities — including stronger bonds between people on all sides — will help to forge a durable and equitable peace at the national level. ●

CITY DIPLOMACY

Prepared with files from
Peter Knip, Director
VNG International

City diplomacy refers to the growing cooperation among cities and their associations, often in close conjunction with non-governmental organizations and the business community, on international initiatives to promote peace and conflict resolution.

Some key city diplomacy initiatives have included solidarity missions (e.g. between European Union cities and cities in the North Cauca region of Colombia), awareness raising, lobbying for international financial support and engagement, bringing conflict parties together in dialogue, and developing projects to support peacebuilding in conflict areas.

The international organization of local governments, United Cities and Local Governments, has designated city diplomacy as one of its priority themes.

An international agenda on organized armed violence?

A central argument of this volume is that the scale of organized armed violence in large urban areas frequently exceeds that of all but the most devastating of current wars. Research on contemporary armed conflicts frequently uses the threshold of 1,000, 100 or even 25 "battle-deaths" annually to define a civil war[158] — a comparatively low number compared with the scale of urban armed violence in numerous cities discussed in previous chapters of this volume. Evidence from Colombia, a country experiencing an intense civil war, suggests that more people are dying from armed violence in urban areas than from the conflict between rebel groups and government forces.

Much has been done, particularly in the past 15 years, to adapt the international laws and institutions originally designed to respond to the challenges of wars *between* states to address the challenges posed by a different kind of conflict — civil wars *within* states. The evidence is mounting, however, to suggest that the changing nature of organized armed violence may be more radical than many had imagined. Traditional definitions of war and armed conflict may be obscuring a crisis of armed violence within contemporary cities.

Take, for example, a central theme that has run through this volume — the violent threats facing children in urban environments — and compare the international responses to this set of challenges with those devoted to the challenges facing child soldiers in armed conflicts.

Evidence is mounting to suggest that the changing nature of organized armed violence may be more radical than many had imagined. Traditional definitions of war and armed conflict may be obscuring a crisis of armed violence within contemporary cities.

In 1996, Graça Machel's groundbreaking report on the impact of armed conflict on children was released, noting that there were approximately 300,000 child soldiers worldwide. Since that time, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict has been negotiated, raising the minimum age of soldiers; the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court has defined the conscription, enlistment, or use in hostilities of children under the age of 15 as a war crime; the UN Secretary-General has created a Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict; 180 countries endorsed a global action plan entitled *A World Fit for Children* at the UN Special Session on Children; and the UN Security Council has adopted seven thematic resolutions devoted to children and armed conflict. Agencies and NGOs in the field have responded by ensuring child protection is included in peacekeeping mandates, targeting DDR programs to children (including specific emphasis on girls), and monitoring and reporting on persistent violators as listed by the Secretary-General in his annual list of armed groups who recruit and/or use children.

Children fighting in urban gangs experience violence comparable to that faced by child soldiers. This is particularly true when children in urban gangs are given military-grade weapons and put on the frontlines of armed combat against enemy gangs or state security forces. Beyond the direct violence they face, there are other important similarities: aggressive recruitment strategies, the widespread use of drugs, the prevalence of sexual violence, social

stigmatization, and the likelihood of long-term psychological effects caused by exposure to violence. And the millions of children living in the streets and fighting in urban armed gangs far outnumber the estimated 300,000 child soldiers fighting in war zones throughout the world.

The evidence of alarming levels of violence faced by children living in some urban areas makes a compelling case for enhancing protection of these young people. But where is the international response on behalf of children facing the brunt of organized armed violence in cities supposedly at peace?

Or consider another key theme that reoccurs throughout this volume: that the aggressive, even repressive tactics employed by law enforcement officials in situations where urban security has broken down are frequently counter-productive. These harsh tactics frequently exacerbate levels of violence, harden the attitudes of communities against law enforcement, and do nothing to address the underlying causes of insecurity. Here, an internationally agreed set of standards that are directly applicable already exists.

The *Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials*, adopted by consensus at the UN in 1990, establish clear and detailed guidelines for law enforcement to ensure that the use

The fact that much organized armed violence takes place outside situations defined as armed conflicts should lead to a systematic examination of whether the international normative, institutional and legal framework constructed in the 20th century to respond to the predominant form of organized armed violence of that era — international and intra-state armed conflict — can be adapted to the urban insecurity realities of the 21st century.

of force is necessary, proportionate, and accountable within a legal system.[159] Although the principles are non-binding and not widely known, their application could assist in the rebuilding of failed public security

systems. The *Basic Principles* also demonstrate the potential role of international standards of conduct in promoting the rule of law and preventing human rights violations. To help address the crisis of insecurity in large urban areas around the world, the establishment of similar standards might be warranted with respect to the promotion of community-based policing and the regulation of private security companies.

Clearly these are only tentative suggestions. Much more research and analysis is needed in order to know how and where international efforts could contribute to addressing urban insecurity. One thing, however, is clear. International efforts to promote human security — to enhance the safety of people and their communities from the threat of physical violence — must respond to the real insecurities people face in their daily lives. The fact that much organized armed violence takes place outside situations defined as armed conflicts should lead to a systematic examination of whether the international normative, institutional and legal framework constructed in the 20th century to respond to the predominant form of organized armed violence of that era — international and intra-state armed conflict — can be adapted to the urban insecurity realities of the 21st century.

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21. The term "slum", while not universally agreed upon, broadly describes informal or illegal settlements in and around cities, also known as "squatter communities" or "shantytowns". It is important not to perceive slum dwellers as criminals or helpless victims. However, while it should be recognized that many slums are peaceful places with dynamic, adaptive and lively communities, they also house some of the poorest members of society in unsanitary areas that are under-serviced by infrastructure and under-protected by state security forces, which can be a catalyst for conflict.

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155 For example, one report found that only about 10 percent of guns in circulation in Angola were collected by a government disarmament campaign. See "Angola: Widespread small arms could lead to increase in crime," IRIN, 7 Feb 2003, 1 Dec 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID= 32179&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&Select Country=ANGOLA.

156 See LiberianNational Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration – Joint Implementation Unit, "DDRR Consolidated Report Phase 1, 2 & 3 (Status of Disarmament and Demobilisation Activities as at 1/16/2005)," 1 Dec. 2006, http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/coor- dination/sectoral/DDR/doc/Fortnightly%20Report% 20% 2016th%20january%202005.pdf.

157 While strictly speaking it is not possible to have demobilization activities in a non-conflict situation, disarming and reintegrating gang members, paramilitaries, and other urban combatants is nonetheless key to conflict resolution.

158 The Correlates of War Project, http://www.correlates ofwar.org/, and the Political Instability Task Force's State Failure project http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/ pitf/ use the figure of 1,000 battle deaths per year.

159 "Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials," Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1 Dec 2006, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/ b/h_comp43.htm.

*Human Security for an Urban Century:
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Human Security for an Urban Century
draws on the work of 40 external con-
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information from a broad variety of back-
grounds and fields. Together they
include policymakers, academics, field
practitioners and non-governmental
organization representatives who apply
an urban lens to fields including children
and armed conflict, security system
reform, small arms and light weapons,
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among others. The narrative text, jointly
authored by DFAIT and CCHS, provides a
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and opportunities, with facts and analy-
sis based on research and consultations
conducted in 2006-07. This publication
aims to take stock of this knowledge in
the hope of devising a longer-term,
strategic policy agenda for advancing
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