DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS AND THEIR USERS

LES DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES ET LEURS UTILISATEURS

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international

Canada

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS AND THEIR USERS

Proceedings of the Third Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents
Ottawa, 11-13 May 1994

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Le compte rendu de la IIIe Conférence des rédacteurs de documents diplomatiques
Ottawa, 11-13 mai 1994

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Sous la direction de
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FOREWORD

This is the third volume of conference proceedings on the subject of editing diplomatic documents. The first conference was held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London in November 1989 and the record was published as *Occasional Papers*, No. 2 by their Historical Branch. The second volume, *The Optimum Formula for a Foreign Policy Document Series*, published by the Institute of Netherlands History, arose from the next conference, organized by the institute and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague in January 1992.

We sought in planning the third conference to follow the pattern established by the earlier meetings and to make possible the continued discussion of subjects taken up on those occasions. At the same time, we wanted to respond to suggestions made by the participants. It was these suggestions that led us to adopt as our theme the relationship between editors and users. Also in response to these suggestions, we scheduled a workshop on some technical aspects of publishing. This took place the day before the formal proceedings began, and the papers are published here as Chapter I. We were pleased that, in addition to the participants listed at the end of the volume, a number of Canadian academics, historians from other government departments, and past and present members of our foreign service were able to join us. Some of their contributions will be found in the summaries of the discussions.

The languages of the conference were English and French. The presentations and the summaries of discussion are printed in the language used by the authors, with abstracts of the papers in the other language. The only exceptions are remarks by our then deputy minister of foreign affairs, which are printed in full in both languages, and the final item, by Arthur Blanchette, which is printed as given, partly in English and partly in French.

This volume could not have been produced without the assistance of others. Gwyn Kutz of the department's Human Resources Development Bureau arranged for several recently appointed foreign service officers to serve as rapporteurs. Our efforts at desktop publishing were facilitated by the expertise of Joan Bechthold. Among our colleagues in Corporate Communications Division, we are particularly indebted to Bob Thompson who advised us throughout on design and production, and to Francine Fournier of Editorial Services who saved us from many errors in

translation. The book also benefited from the editorial skills of Marie-Joëlle Auclair and Jane Whitney. Finally, we thank Janet Ritchie of the Historical Section, upon whom we relied to prepare the entire text, as we do for so much else.

John Hilliker
Mary Halloran

AVANT-PROPOS

Voici le troisième volume des actes de la conférence sur la rédaction de documents diplomatiques. Le ministère des Affaires étrangères du Royaume-Uni, à Londres, a inauguré, en novembre 1989, cette série de conférences dont le procès-verbal a été publié par sa division historique dans un document intitulé *Occasional Papers*, n° 2. Le deuxième volume, intitulé *The Optimum Formula for a Foreign Policy Document Series*, publié par l'Institut d'histoire des Pays-Bas, est le compte rendu de la deuxième conférence, organisée conjointement par l'Institut et le ministère des Affaires étrangères à La Haye, en janvier 1992.

Nous avons essayé, en préparant la troisième conférence, de suivre le modèle des conférences précédentes et de permettre aux participants de revenir sur les thèmes qui y avaient été abordés. En même temps, pour tenir compte des suggestions des participants, nous avons opté pour le thème des relations entre les rédacteurs et les utilisateurs, et nous avons décidé d'organiser un atelier sur certains aspects techniques de la rédaction. L'atelier a eu lieu la veille de la tenue des conférences officielles, et le compte rendu constitue le chapitre I du volume. Nous sommes heureux qu'aient pu se joindre aux participants, dont les noms figurent à la fin du volume, des universitaires, des historiens d'autres ministères fédéraux et des membres anciens et actuels du service extérieur. Leurs contributions sont décrites dans les résumés des discussions.

Les conférences se sont déroulées en anglais et en français. Les exposés et les résumés des discussions sont toutefois publiés dans la langue utilisée par les auteurs, et les résumés analytiques dans l'autre langue, sauf pour le discours inaugural du sous-ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'époque, qui est publié en entier dans les deux langues, et le dernier exposé, donné par M. Arthur Blanchette, qui a été publié sous la forme dans laquelle nous l'avons reçu, soit en partie en anglais et en partie en français.

La réalisation du présent volume n'aurait pas été possible sans la collaboration de plusieurs autres personnes. M^me^ Gwyn Kutz, de la Direction générale du perfectionnement des ressources humaines du Ministère, a demandé à plusieurs nouveaux agents du service extérieur de faire fonction de rapporteurs. M^me^ Joan Bechthold, grâce à son expertise, nous a simplifié le travail d'éditique. Chez nos collègues de la Direction générale des communications, nous devons beaucoup à M. Bob Thompson qui nous a conseillés pendant toute la durée de la conception et de la

production, et à M^me^ Francine Fournier, des services de rédaction et de révision, qui nous a évité de nombreux pièges traductionnels. Le présent volume a également bénéficié de l'expertise de mesdames Marie-Joëlle Auclair et Jane Whitney du même service. Enfin, nous remercions M^me^ Janet Ritchie, de la Section des affaires historiques, qui s'est chargée de toute la préparation du texte, et de bien d'autres choses.

John Hilliker
Mary Halloran

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS AND THEIR USERS

Reid Morden

It is a great pleasure to welcome you all today to the Lester B. Pearson Building for the third conference of editors of diplomatic documents. In so doing, I am mindful of the debt that we owe to the Historical Branch of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London for inaugurating this series of meetings in 1989, and to the Institute of Netherlands History and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs for organizing the second conference in 1991. Our historians have benefited greatly from the exchanges that took place on both occasions, and I hope that the sessions that we have arranged for you will be similarly useful and instructive.

In planning this conference, we had three objectives in mind. The first was to provide an opportunity for you to discuss recent developments affecting some of the questions that you have considered in the past. This I am sure you will be doing throughout the conference, but the session that follows the break this morning (see Chapter II) was particularly designed with that purpose in mind.

Our second objective was to respond to the interest that some of you expressed in learning more about the uses that are made of the research that you carry out. Sessions 3, 4 and 5 and the users' round table were arranged in response to this interest. It seemed to us that Canada was a good place to examine this subject, for ours is a country in which many members of the scholarly community live at a great distance from the capital and from the documentary resources available in the National Archives here. We hope that our series *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, and those that you produce, will help make their task easier. We have asked a number of them to join us today and tomorrow, and we look forward to hearing how we are doing.

The third thing that we, like the organizers of the previous conferences, have done is to include papers examining the documentary record of some major issues in international relations. The subjects that we have chosen are related to the Cold War and the Korean conflict. Although we cannot promise you the same exquisite timing as the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, where your discussion of Germany in 1989 took place on the day that the Berlin Wall came down, we do think that the present is a good time to revisit the issues that we have

identified, as governments everywhere adjust their foreign policies to the vastly changed circumstances of the post-Cold War world.

Before we adjourn for coffee, I might say something about the rooms we are meeting in and what they tell us about this department and its relationship with the historical profession. We shall be having coffee in the Skelton lobby, named after O.D. Skelton, deputy minister from 1925 until 1941. He had been dean of arts at Queen's University before his appointment to the department, and forged strong links with the academic community during his 16 years here. It was he who established the standards for recruitment to the foreign service, and he made sure that a distinguished scholarly record ranked high among them, with history one of the favoured subjects of study. It was also Skelton who brought Marjorie McKenzie to the department. Although nominally his secretary, she became a contributor to the policy-making process and developed a comprehensive knowledge of departmental operations. This had an added value later in her career, when she was a mainstay of the department's Historical Division, serving as its acting head in 1955-1956. It is to the efforts of that division during the time that she was there that we owe the collection of records on which the early volumes of our *Documents* series are based.

In view of what I have said about Dr. Skelton and his contribution to the historical work of the department, you will realize that it is a special pleasure for us that his daughter Sheila and her husband Arthur Menzies, a distinguished former member of our foreign service, are joining us for the conference today and tomorrow.

The room in which we are meeting is named for Skelton's successor, Norman Robertson. As deputy minister during the Second World War, Robertson looked to the academic community to provide some of the additional staff required to handle the greatly expanded workload of the time. A number of those who came to the department then were historians. Their preponderance was such, in fact, that a professor from the University of Toronto referred to the place as the historian's "Babylonian captivity". I hope that the time you spend with us today and tomorrow will not seem like captivity, Babylonian or otherwise, and that your deliberations will be enjoyable as well as fruitful. I have been very glad to be able to join you today, and wish you every success in your meetings.

LES DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES ET LEURS UTILISATEURS

Reid Morden

C'est avec grand plaisir que je vous souhaite la bienvenue aujourd'hui à l'immeuble Lester B. Pearson, à l'occasion de la troisième conférence des rédacteurs de documents diplomatiques. Voilà qui me rappelle notre dette envers la Division des archives historiques du ministère des Affaires étrangères du Royaume-Uni, qui a inauguré cette série de rencontres en 1989, ainsi qu'envers l'Institut d'histoire des Pays-Bas et le ministère des Affaires étrangères de ce pays, qui ont organisé la deuxième conférence en 1991. Nos historiens ont largement bénéficié des échanges qui se sont déroulés à ces deux rencontres, et j'espère que les séances au programme cette année seront tout aussi utiles et instructives.

Lors de la planification de cette conférence, nous avions trois objectifs en vue. En premier lieu, nous voulions vous donner l'occasion de discuter de l'évolution récente de certains sujets que vous avez déjà abordés. Nul doute que c'est ce que vous ferez tout au long de la conférence, mais la séance qui suivra la pause (voir chapitre II) ce matin a été conçue dans ce but précis.

Deuxièmement, vous voulions donner suite au vœu exprimé par certains d'entre vous de connaître l'usage que l'on fait de vos recherches. Les 3e, 4e et 5e séances ainsi que la table ronde d'utilisateurs ont été conçues à cette fin. Il nous a semblé que le Canada était l'endroit indiqué pour se pencher sur ce sujet, puisqu'ici bon nombre de chercheurs vivent éloignés de la capitale et des ressources documentaires des Archives nationales à Ottawa. Nous espérons que notre série de *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada* et les ouvrages que vous publiez leur faciliteront la tâche. Nous avons invité un certain nombre de ces personnes à se joindre à nous aujourd'hui et demain, et nous avons hâte qu'ils nous disent si nos efforts portent fruit.

Troisièmement, comme les organisateurs des conférences précédentes, nous avons inscrit au programme des travaux passant en revue les documents d'archives de certaines grandes questions dans le domaine des relations internationales. Les sujets choisis ont trait à la Guerre froide et au conflit en Corée. Je doute que nous jouissions de la chance inouïe qu'a eue le ministère des Affaires étrangères du Royaume-Uni lors de la conférence de 1989, quand les débats sur

l'Allemagne se sont déroulés le jour même où s'écroulait le mur de Berlin. Il nous paraît tout de même opportun de nous pencher à nouveau sur les questions inscrites au programme, au moment où les gouvernements partout au monde modifient leur politique étrangère afin de tenir compte des changements considérables qui ont marqué l'après-Guerre froide.

Avant la pause-café, j'aimerais vous toucher un mot des locaux où se tiendront nos rencontres et de ce qu'ils nous révèlent sur le Ministère et sur ses liens avec la profession d'historien. La salle Skelton, où nous prendrons le café, est ainsi désignée en l'honneur de O.D. Skelton, qui fut sous-ministre de 1925 à 1941. Avant sa nomination au Ministère, M. Skelton avait été doyen de la faculté des lettres de l'Université Queen's; il a noué des liens étroits avec le milieu universitaire pendant les seize ans qu'il a passés ici. C'est à lui d'ailleurs qu'on doit les normes de recrutement du service extérieur; il a veillé à ce qu'un dossier universitaire distingué y occupe une place de choix, l'étude de l'histoire étant particulièrement recherchée. C'est aussi grâce à lui que Marjorie McKenzie est entrée au Ministère. Bien qu'elle fût sa secrétaire officiellement, M^me^ McKenzie a collaboré au processus décisionnel et acquis une connaissance exhaustive des opérations du Ministère. Ces atouts lui furent particulièrement utiles à une étape ultérieure de sa carrière, alors qu'elle était devenue un des piliers de la Direction des affaires historiques, qu'elle dirigea par intérim en 1955-1956. C'est aux efforts de la direction pendant son intérim que nous devons la collection d'ouvrages sur laquelle sont basés les premiers volumes de nos *Documents*.

Compte tenu de ce que j'ai dit au sujet de M. Skelton et de sa contribution aux travaux en histoire du Ministère, vous comprendrez à quel point nous sommes honorés d'accueillir parmi nous, aujourd'hui et demain à la conférence, la fille de M. Skelton et son mari, Arthur Menzies, ancien membre émérite de notre service des affaires étrangères.

La pièce où nous sommes en ce moment a été nommée en hommage au successeur de M. Skelton, Norman Robertson. En sa qualité de sous-ministre pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, M. Robertson a recruté à l'intérieur du corps universitaire une partie du personnel supplémentaire requis pour abattre l'énorme surcroît de travail. Un bon nombre d'entre eux étaient des historiens; ils étaient si nombreux au Ministère qu'un des professeurs de l'Université de Toronto avait désigné l'endroit comme « la Babylone des historiens ». J'espère que votre séjour parmi nous aujourd'hui et demain ne suscitera pas chez vous de sentiment de captivité comme à Babylone, et que vos délibérations seront non

seulement agréables mais fructueuses. C'est un plaisir pour moi d'être parmi vous aujourd'hui, et je vous souhaite beaucoup de succès dans vos réunions.

I: Some Technical Aspects of Publishing
Quelques aspects techniques de l'édition

APPROACHES TO PUBLICATION

Ennio Di Nolfo

Résumé

En préambule, le président explique qu'il a été décidé d'inscrire l'atelier au programme de la conférence dans le but précis d'examiner diverses méthodes de publication. Sur le plan de l'organisation, il existe fondamentalement deux démarches possibles : l'une dans laquelle tout le travail de publication est confié à des fonctionnaires du ministère des Affaires étrangères, et l'autre dans laquelle des historiens de l'extérieur de la fonction publique sont engagés pour diriger la publication d'une série entière ou d'un seul volume. Le professeur Di Nolfo explique de quelle façon les Italiens en sont venus à un compromis entre les deux formules, en confiant la publication à une commission composée d'universitaires et d'anciens diplomates nommés par le gouvernement, la commission étant appuyée dans son travail par le personnel du Ministère.

I am grateful to Dr. Hilliker for agreeing to organize this pre-conference workshop and to those who are participating in it. I assume that a realistic analysis of how we actually work can be of some help for the future.

Let me say a few words on how the idea of this workshop originated. It was in London, during the conference in honour of D.C. Watt, when I had a long conversation with some British and Dutch colleagues concerning the way we work. We soon realized the large variety of approaches to publication. This conversation was referred to Dr. Hilliker in order that he could consider the possibility of including this kind of discussion in the official program of our conference. Because it was too late for an official addition, the decision was taken to set up this preliminary workshop.

I spoke before of the variety of approaches to publication. There are technological ones and organizational ones. The latter were at the origin of the workshop. In fact what we realized in London was that there are basically two different systems of selection and publication, and maybe a midway compromise.

Under the first system the whole process is carried on within a foreign ministry by public servants. Scholars are employed by the government as "official historians" charged with the selection and publication of diplomatic documents, according to criteria and rules differing from country to country. This system poses a question: what interest are these historians serving, the work of history or the public interest of their country? Needless to say this is almost always an academic question. But it can become a sensitive one, the more our collections approach recent times. The many sections of American published documents that have been sanitized by publishers are an example of what I mean. On the other hand one must recognize that this system offers the best of all guarantees as to competence and knowledge of sources. In general this system produces excellent results.

The second system employs historians external to the public service. Usually they are the best-known specialists in the history of international relations in each country. They are hired either to take care of a whole series or to publish only one volume. This system raises other questions. How far and how well do these people know the archives? Are they competent enough in the many details of diplomatic correspondence? Are they sufficiently sensitive to technicalities? Do they serve academic rather than political interest? Are they in a position—that is, do they have sufficient time—to complete the difficult work of editing each volume?

The compromise lies in a combination of the two systems. That is when the publication is the work of a special task force made up of historians who do not belong to the foreign ministry and scholars plus technicians who belong to the foreign service. The two sides share the burden and responsibilities of the whole work, in order to avoid mistakes and to minimize misgivings.

This point offers me the opportunity to describe in a few words how the Italian collection is published. As you may know, the system is ruled by a commission of university professors and former diplomats appointed by the government. Since the collection is subdivided into 12 series (four years ago the decision was taken to publish post-World War II documents up to 1958), each series is assigned to one or two members of the commission. The president coordinates this subdivision in order to maximize results. When historians know that they have to publish certain sources for a determined period, they can rely on the staff of the ministry (who are generally selected according to their experience in archival research). These last actually perform the first phases of archival work. They look into the files and make a generous selection of those documents deemed to be of importance for the period. Photocopies of these

documents are given to the historian in charge of the series. He or she makes the final selection, asks for additional research in special fields, suggests further research in other archives. In the end the historian produces a body of documents selected according to their chronological order and ready for publication. All tasks related to summaries, indexes, analytical tables, etc. are carried out by the staff. Desktop preparation of documents has been experimented with and is being introduced in a massive way. As for the results, one must consider the fact that since this system was introduced (about 10 years ago) almost 50 volumes have been published. (We have now published two volumes of the 10th series: 1943-44 and 1945.)

We all, whatever our system of work, are challenged by the problems of time, costs, differences of method, and the advancement of technology. I do not think that this workshop can produce a perfect formula for a perfect method to publish diplomatic papers. But I dare to suggest that the more we are prepared to share our experiences the better we will be able to accomplish our work.

EDITING AND FOOTNOTING

Wendy Way

Résumé

M^me^ Way décrit les problèmes pratiques que pose l'édition des documents australiens, dont l'état des originaux est souvent imparfait. La première question qui se pose est celle de savoir jusqu'où les rédacteurs doivent aller dans la correction des incohérences constatées dans la disposition, l'emploi des majuscules et la ponctuation. Une autre difficulté a trait à l'annotation. La politique officielle en Australie consiste à recourir avec parcimonie aux notes infrapaginales; pourtant, beaucoup de personnes soutiennent que les volumes devraient renfermer davantage de renseignements susceptibles d'intéresser les spécialistes ou de leur être utiles. De quelle façon, demande l'auteure, ses collègues d'autres pays traitent-ils ces questions?

Let me say before I begin how delighted and grateful we all were in our project to learn of this splendid practical addition to the conference program. There are many many questions that all of our research officers would like to ask of all of you, and I hope to hear answers to some of them this afternoon.

I remember the first problem I had to deal with as an editor of documents. I stared at it for hours; I consulted my colleagues; I went back to the archives to look at the original. After all that I could still not determine whether the little black mark was a comma, or an accidental blotch on the page. One begins, I think, with a sense of the awesome responsibility of tampering with, perhaps violating, the sacred text of the original document. But editing is an insidious, creeping habit. Each alteration erodes that awe just a little, and the next alteration is correspondingly easier. So today I would probably take that same page, decide in a few seconds whether the text needed a comma, and mark it accordingly. But I believe it is necessary to guard against the erosion of awe, and to ask constantly how far the blue pencil should go.

I would like to describe some of the practical problems which face us in Australia. Our originals are often in a very poor condition. Most of

our published documents are cables, and the technology for creating these in the Australian Department in the 1940s was primitive. Copies of cables were reproduced for file, often very imperfectly, by means of typed mastersheets run through a spirit duplicator, and there are plenty of dubious blotches to interpret on these. And we might well ask, when thinking about cables in particular, what exactly constitutes the original document? It began, of course, with a draft at one end which was typed, enciphered, transmitted, deciphered and retyped at the other end. All of these operations were carried out by very few officers, under pressure, and errors, minor and serious, occurred at every stage. In the immediate post-war period our cable traffic was affected by serious transmission problems from some locations (Tokyo, for example, was particularly difficult) and gaps and incomprehensible passages occur. Our records are not always complete. It would be unusual to find a full set of copies of a particular cable from each of these stages and we must select an "original" for publication from a few imperfect alternatives.

Editing these imperfect "originals" is a major, time-consuming task. It has been said that it probably takes us more time to edit than it took to write them. And it can be a cause of anguish for our officers. Our aim is to preserve as much of the original as possible, to correct outright errors, but to avoid imposing any interpretation, and to keep as much of the flavour as we can. In other words, we try to walk a middle line somewhere between producing a facsimile and a fully edited version. It is impossible to formulate rules for every situation in this approach. Each document must be considered on its merits. We do have an in-house style manual, but it can give only guidelines, which are, in brief, that alteration should be made, without any indication, where there is a definite error of spelling or a serious error of punctuation. Alteration, indicated by square brackets, may be made where there is a serious grammatical error, or where text is really incomprehensible. Alteration should **not** be made simply to improve text which is awkward, abbreviated or difficult. And, finally, no change should ever be made without consulting another member of the team. This last point may seem overcautious, but we have found that blind spots develop and that another person can interpret a passage which defeats the one who has been staring at it for some time. A second opinion is a useful precaution against an alteration which unwittingly imposes an interpretation and against any temptation to tidy a document more than necessary.

Such guidelines leave many questions unanswered. I stress again that we have found it impossible to provide precise guidance for editing, and that we would like to know how others manage.

Some our greatest difficulties lie in deciding how far to correct inconsistencies in layout, capitalization and punctuation. Should we expose ourselves to accusations of carelessness, by leaving these as they are? How far should we expose errors and inconsistencies of the authors, and of their typists? How much should we allow the haste, or the difficult conditions under which the document was first written to show? How far should we try to interpret a cable which arrived on a desk in Canberra with sections missing or mutilated? Should we turn it into a composite document by filling in gaps from other versions if we can?

We experience similar uncertainties when it comes to annotation. Here at least it is possible to observe what others do, and we notice that some of you seem to prefer to publish almost without it, while others provide a wealth of notes.

Our current **official** policy is to keep annotation to the absolute minimum so as to speed production, and to give our volumes a leaner, more business-like look. Our style manual instructs that a footnote should be used for two reasons only: to verify the text of a document (by explaining difficulties, giving authority for alterations, suggesting possible interpretations) or to make the document comprehensible. It forbids provision of extra information which is interesting, relevant even, but not crucial to understanding the document. Difficulties arise here constantly. Some documents will need extensive background, others can stand alone; references to unpublished documents will sometimes need to be explained, sometimes not, and so on. How far to go is a matter for judgment, it cannot be prescribed and we find considerable differences of opinion.

I can imagine that some of you would be uneasy about this policy, as, indeed, are some of our own research officers. They argue that we should include more information of interest and use to scholars—archival information, cross-references to other published documents, explanations of material referred to but not published, information filling in the gaps in the story. I think it is also true to say that they find preparation of such full footnotes a particularly satisfying task. By virtue of their training and the personal qualities which make up the ideal researcher for this sort of work, they find it difficult to be anything other than absolutely thorough in their approach. Inherent in this problem is a question of staff morale, and while what I have described above is our official policy, it has been tempered by the enthusiasm of our officers, since footnotes once written tend not to be wasted.

The crux of the problem lies, however, not in the wishes of our staff, but in the question "who are our clients and what do they want from

us?" In arguing for a sparing approach to annotation, we assume that most of our clients are sophisticated scholars capable of finding for themselves much of the subsidiary information we might provide in footnotes, scholars who, if given the choice, would prefer more documents produced faster to beautifully produced volumes annotated in great detail. If we were to pitch our volumes at a different clientele, our approach might have to change. Let me give just one example of the way in which our perception of client needs has already affected our policy. Much of the annotation in our first seven volumes dealt with the location in Australian Archives files of documents referred to but not published. This was felt to be necessary, because it was assumed that the volumes would be used by scholars who would go on to undertake further research in the archives. As much of the archival material was virtually unlisted and thus inaccessible, we wanted to give them as much help as we possibly could. The archives are now much better organized, and we believe today's scholars ought to be able to manage on their own, so we no longer provide anything other than the citation of the published documents.

So what do we want to know about other approaches? We would like to know what reasons others give for favouring either a minimum or maximum approach. Do others try to prescribe what to annotate, or is it left to the individual editor's judgment? Has anyone managed to prescribe with success? In formulating annotation policy, what consideration is given to clients' needs, and if so, how are they envisaged? Is feedback obtained from clients? And finally, is there a need, as we seem to find, to consider the job satisfaction of editorial staff?

EAT: EDITING APART TOGETHER
Personnel and the Aspects of Continuity and Coordination

Marijke van Faassen

Résumé

Certains facteurs, notamment des changements parmi le personnel, ont contraint les responsables de la série sur la politique étrangère de la Hollande de 1919 à 1945 à trouver des moyens d'harmoniser et de normaliser leur travail. Le guide du rédacteur, qui décrit les différentes étapes du processus de publication et les aspects techniques de la production, facilite grandement la coordination et la continuité. Les rédacteurs ont également accès à une liste informatisée des dossiers consultés et des documents choisis, qui contribue à éviter le double emploi des ressources.

In this presentation the staff side of the work will be put to the forefront. First I will give some general information about the origins and structure of the Dutch documents project, then about coordinating the subprojects and ensuring continuity. Finally, I will offer some thoughts about the future way of working.

In 1971, the Institute of Netherlands History (ING) started a new series on Dutch foreign policy (*DBPN*) in the era 1919-1945. The project was divided into three subseries (1919-1929, 1930-1940, 1940-1945) and aimed to cover the whole area of Dutch foreign policy planning. In order to reflect the total process of decision-making the editors would collect documents not only in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also in other ministries, private collections and foreign archives. In the original proposal, each period was to be treated by two researchers, one senior and one junior. As one can imagine this was rather optimistic, even in the 1970s. In the end only three editors were appointed, one for each subseries or 2.5 full-time equivalents (FTE). As was pointed out in the April 1992 edition of the *Newsletter*, preparing the volumes of the *DBPN* was at first a rather solitary job. Each editor worked on his own. The

meetings of the supervisory committee, held approximately three times a year, were the only means to reach some coordination.

Over the past seven years this situation has changed considerably. The institute assigned 0.8 FTE to the project—especially to collect data for the index, to put copy into printable shape and to proofread. In the same period, all three subseries have been confronted with changes in the academic editors. With this, the questions of both continuity and coordination have become more urgent. Everyone who has ever "inherited" a documentary editor's *Unvollendete* knows that sometimes it is easier to start all over again by oneself, than to figure out the rationale of another person's selecting or editing processes. Moreover, the increasing employment of computerized copy processing in combination with the demands for a uniform layout by the institute's publishing department (house style) has created the need for more coordination.

Therefore, our aim was to find a way to harmonize and standardize the editorial practice of the three subseries and at the same time guarantee continuity. Of course there were still the regular meetings of the supervisory committee to discuss research strategy, ideas, general problems, etc. Nowadays the editors, the director of the institute and a special supervisor of the project are members of the committee.

More important was the description two years ago of the different aspects of the project in what we call our "editors' manual". The book consists of two parts. The first is primarily intended for the editors. A short introduction outlines the history and scope of the project and the objectives of the supervisory committee. Subsequently, the editorial practice is described step-by-step: a) the standards for selection, b) transcription procedures (photocopies or computerized copy, spelling and abbreviations, headlines and footnotes, summaries for the list of documents, etc.), c) agreements about the order in which the documents are published, in particular those of an identical date, d) rules of annotation, and, finally, e) assembling and ordering the different parts of individual volumes.

The second part deals more in detail with purely technical agreements between editors, in-house publisher and staff, for instance, about the place of the footnotes (before or after punctuation marks) or the abbreviations used within the documents (Your Excellency = Y.E., etc.). An annex with the most important biographical dictionaries by country and by subject, used during indexing, completes the manual. We planned to update it every six months, but experience shows that this will take place especially after periods of intensive copy processing. Next year, with the

publication of the volumes B IV and C VI, the first results of at least the coordination-side of EAT-ing, "editing apart together", can be evaluated.

In the meantime the board of the institute has decided that all three editors should concentrate on finishing series C first, to facilitate the start of a series D (post-war period) in about five years. So, as of next year we all have to work on the same period, which obviously brings problems of its own. For the sake of efficiency, we intend to split up the activities. For instance, two of us will be occupied with the archival research, while the third at the same time will take on the greater part of the final editing. Of course, we will have to take turns at the different tasks.

Even then we should try to avoid overlap. It does still occur that the same document is selected more than once. Sometimes the same document is found in several files, for example, when copies had been sent to other ministries or missions abroad. Therefore, one of us has prepared a computerized status report for his series. Status reports for the whole series will be ready next year. Six subdivisions are distinguished: a) files already gone through, b) files yet to be gone through, c) first selection of documents, d) documents already photocopied, e) edited documents (without summary) and f) final stage/manuscript. The documents in subdivisions 3-6 are specified by date, sender, addressee and some keywords defining the subject.

When updated regularly, there will be several advantages. I have already mentioned the possibility of searching for documents selected by oneself or a colleague. A search by keywords enables the reconstruction of the context of a specific document. This can be necessary to determine whether a subject is already sufficiently documented in the manuscript. Furthermore, there is the possibility of a permanent progress control or a better guarantee of continuity if one of the series should be postponed or an editor resigns.

It is to be hoped that the coordination forced on the editors of the 1919-1945 series by circumstances will turn out to be a fruitful experience at the start of a post-World War II series.

Erratum

Regrettably, two passages were dropped from E.A. Kelly's paper, *Contracting Out*. The corrected version is attached.

Malheureusement, deux passages ont été omis du document de E.A. Kelly intitulé *Contracting out*. Vous trouverez ci-joint la version corrigée.

CONTRACTING OUT

E.A. Kelly

Résumé

Le présent exposé porte sur les avantages et les désavantages de faire appel à des spécialistes de l'extérieur, par exemple à des historiens pour rédiger des documents, à des équipes techniques pour en assurer la mise en forme et à des adjoints de recherche. Le principal avantage de faire appel à des historiens et à des adjoints de recherche de l'extérieur réside dans les effets salutaires qu'une telle pratique peut avoir sur les rapports du Ministère avec le monde de l'enseignement et de la recherche. Les spécialistes techniques assurent le respect des normes, tout en dégageant les historiens du Ministère de l'obligation d'assurer la relecture d'épreuves, la photocomposition et le traitement des textes. Les désavantages de l'impartition tiennent principalement aux coûts, non seulement sur le plan financier, mais aussi sur celui du temps consacré à la préparation de documents conformes à la réglementation gouvernementale.

My presentation will describe our experience in publishing volumes in the series *Documents on Canadian External Relations* by contracting the services of historians who create the manuscripts, technical teams who prepare them for publication and research assistants. For purposes of clarity and brevity, I will list, in point form, the advantages and disadvantages of contracting out, but first I would like to offer a short overview of the project.

George Glazebrook, a former director of Historical Division, first promoted the idea to begin the publication of the series which came to be known as *Documents on Canadian External Relations*. In 1959, work began on Volume 1. It took eight years to be published. Recently we have been doing a little better.

The manuscript for Volume 1 was prepared by departmental officers. A retired senior member of the department edited the second volume. Graduate students on summer employment and university professors did Volumes 3 to 8. Dr. John Hilliker started on Volume 9

while still a professor at Lakehead University and, in 1976, joined the department. He subsequently edited Volumes 10 and 11. Volume 12 was edited by Dr. Donald Page, then of the University of Saskatchewan, who also became a member of the department. The initial work on Volume 13 was done by Dr. Page, and Dr. Norman Hillmer of Carleton University saw the project through to its completion.

Our most recent publication in the series, Volume 14, was edited by a member of our section, Dr. Hector Mackenzie, who is currently working on Volume 15. Another member of the staff, Greg Donaghy, is the editor of the forthcoming Volumes 16 and 17.

During the early years of the project, the principles of captioning, footnoting and indexing were established. A number of people in the department were involved in creating the standards to which we still adhere. One person stands out, however, for her significant contribution to the series. Elizabeth MacCallum, the first female head of post in the Canadian diplomatic service, lent her considerable talents to the creation of the index for Volume 1. Her work has stood as the model for all the indexing that followed.

Since the Historical Section was and is quite small, we tended, during the earlier years, to make virtue of necessity by recruiting talented historians to edit volumes under contract. Now I would like to address the advantages that we perceive in employing the services of an editor through the contracting process:

- if the project had remained solely in the hands of departmental personnel, it is possible that questions about the legitimacy of the series could have been raised by the academic community; there is, therefore, a benefit to having a member of that community take responsibility for the preparation of a manuscript for the series; in this way, the tradition of editorial independence is enhanced; within the parameters of the established presentation and format of the volumes and the objectives of the series, the contract editor has full autonomy in the creation of the manuscript;
- moreover, having a university professor work in the department offers him or her the opportunity to become familiar with our section and the general departmental environment; this can assist in fostering better relations between the department and the academic community;
- naturally our recruitment process concentrates on historians of Canadian international relations; while departmental historians

share the same broad interest, the successful candidate may be somewhat different in methodology and approach; the resulting cross-pollination process between the professor and ourselves offers benefits to both sides;

- the professor derives a professional benefit by being able to see material which would otherwise have to be made available under the Access to Information legislation; moreover, the contracted editor is exposed to a variety and range of local sources which may expand his or her investigative capabilities for future projects;
- not least, the editing of a volume in a series with an established reputation and a wide distribution both in Canada and abroad provides a valuable addition to the historian's record of publication.

The disadvantages relate mainly to the cost in terms of time and money:

- our budget is set up in such a way that, to hire under a contract a member of the academic community to edit one or two volumes creates an expensive and highly visible addition to our list of expenditures; not only does our budget assume the burden of the professor's salary, but the cost of the benefits offered by the university also become a departmental responsibility; on top of that, an administrative surcharge of up to 30 per cent may be levied against public funds;
- the contracting procedure is also extremely time-consuming; negotiations with the university and with the proposed contractor, along with internal consultations with departmental administrative advisers and the preparation of a number of documents including a submission to Treasury Board, engage large parts of a working day; there would be a significant impact on our work schedule if it were necessary to set aside time every two years to arrange for a contract editor;
- when an editor is chosen, we are contracting for that person's credentials and judgment; as already mentioned, the contractor may, however, display a variance in the approach to the work and a different arrangement of priorities in the issues being reviewed than the historians in the department who share the same environment; an editor unaccustomed to the work will often need to consult with the other departmental editors, which is an additional burden on their time;

- after the manuscript is complete, the professor's job is done and he or she returns to the university; our limited financial resources do not allow us to extend the contract through the technical editing process and, with the closing of the contract, we have no authority to request the professor's further involvement; when questions arise during the technical editing process, Dr. Hilliker and I are therefore left to try to interpret the wishes of the editor.

Once the manuscript is finished, it is time for a technical team to prepare it for publication. The nature of the project has dictated throughout the life of the series that outside help be obtained for some part of the technical preparation. For the following reasons we continue to find it most advantageous to contract out the technical work:

- if all the work were done in-house, the departmental historians would be called upon to do proofreading, photocopying, word processing and other tasks which would leave little time for us to carry out our normal responsibilities; the department does not, for example, have enough work to justify the employment of full-time proofreaders but it is too large a task for our small staff;
- an agreement with another unit in the department with similar needs might seem to be the answer to the creation of full-time positions for indexers, proofreaders and someone familiar with word processing; unfortunately our experience has taught us, when we had word-processing units in the department, that our work was not high on the list of priorities; we would be concerned, therefore, that our publication deadlines would not be met, resulting in serious implications for our budgetary situation;
- two members of our section have the responsibility to ensure that a consistency of style is maintained throughout the series: Dr. John Hilliker as the general editor of the series and myself as the project manager; we rely on the technical team to work within the stylistic parameters established in the earlier volumes; over the last several years, the technical team has consisted mainly of the spouses of serving and retired foreign service officers; in this pool of talent we have been able to find people with the appropriate qualifications and, as one or two members leave, the others are able to pass on to the replacements the principles established by the early technical specialists in the

department; this tradition has helped us to maintain a uniformity and consistency in the technical editing which has complemented the excellent manuscripts produced by historians on contract and our own employees; if the work were done in-house, that expertise would be lost and the standards of presentation of the scholarly apparatus would suffer since neither Dr. Hilliker nor myself would have the time to oversee the project on a daily basis;

- certain functions in the technical editing process require a familiarity with the department; by virtue of their marriage, the spouses of foreign service officers develop that knowledge; because of the rotational nature of the work of the foreign service officer, the spouse is at a disadvantage in establishing his or her own career; in contracting out the technical editing, we are providing work for qualified spouses of foreign service personnel; fortunately the department has established a policy on the employment of spouses and so we are able to offer them contract work without embarrassment or administrative complications.

The disadvantages to contracting out the editing work may be summarized as follows:

- contracting has an inherent rigidity because you receive only what you contract for and when unforeseen needs arise, an amendment to the contract has to be prepared, creating an additional burden on the budget; for an in-house project, unforeseen difficulties could disrupt the work schedule but there would be no additional pressure on our working capital;
- just recently we have had to undergo a lengthy process of going to tender for the technical work; all documentation has had to be prepared in both official languages and the offer is made according to the stipulations of the recent NAFTA agreement; this has involved me in meetings with a representative of Supply and Services Canada, the writing out of a detailed description of each step in the technical editing process and the study of a thirty-page document to teach me how to prepare criteria to evaluate submitted bids; we may, for example, receive bids on our project from American or Mexican firms; although next year's tendering documents will take less time to prepare, we still have to wait for two months for the tendering process to be complete;

- the editor would be able to exercise more control over every facet of the production of the volume if all the work were done in-house.

Finally, I would like to say a few words about our practice of hiring research assistants under contract:

- we have the advantage of contracting for research assistance as required; normally we designate projects to be carried out involving research in departmental files held by the National Archives; since we recruit graduate students of history and international relations, there is the dual benefit in that we get to know a number of developing scholars and they become familiar with the department; the student also receives a practical education in the full range of available resources;
- a disadvantage is that the student may not have any experience outside the university environment and we may not be familiar with his or her work habits or scholarly diligence.

This concludes my paper and in summary I would like to say that, as resources dwindle, we will be constantly challenged to find the most economical way to continue production of the *Documents* series. While we are not prepared to suffer any reduction in the quality of the manuscripts which we produce, we look to a future of yearly cost cutting in government and constant pressure to get more bang for the buck.

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- the contracting procedure is also extremely time-consuming; negotiations with the university and with the proposed contractor, along with internal consultations with departmental administrative advisers and the preparation of a number of documents including a submission to Treasury Board, engage large parts of a working day; there would be a significant

impact on our work schedule if it were necessary to set aside time every two years to arrange for a contract editor;

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APPLE ISLANDS AND FOREIGN POLICY
Desktop Publishing and the Editing of Diplomatic Documents

Keith Hamilton

Résumé

En 1990, la Direction de l'histoire du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commonwealth a fait l'acquisition d'un système d'éditique et, depuis, elle en a récolté bien des avantages : l'intervalle séparant l'épreuve finale de composition et la publication est passé de neuf à deux mois; les rédacteurs peuvent mieux contrôler le contenu et la disposition des documents et les coûts de dactylographie ont été grandement réduits. Mais peu à peu, des inconvénients sont devenus apparents : les économies de temps, d'énergie et de papier ne sont pas aussi substantielles qu'on l'avait d'abord espéré. L'expérience vécue à la direction semble indiquer que, pour réduire le travail de rédaction et les coûts, la direction doit pouvoir compter sur un personnel de soutien technique versé en éditique, sans quoi les ordinateurs risquent fort de transformer les spécialistes et chercheurs en commis-dactylographes.

The Historical Branch of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) decided to acquire their own desktop publishing (DTP) system primarily for economic reasons. Copy for volumes of *Documents on British Policy Overseas* (*DBPO*) had previously been prepared by sticking typewritten headings and footnotes on to photocopies of original documents (i.e., by doing a cut-and-paste job). But by keying in our own documents and providing our publisher, Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), with virtually camera-ready copy we could reduce production costs. HMSO would make savings on typesetting, cutting their costs by a third, and in return were prepared to peg the price of *DBPO* volumes and provide us with 100 free copies for presentation purposes. At the same time we in Historical Branch gained from equipping ourselves with a modern word-processing system which could be used both for the editing of volumes and for other purposes. Indeed, one reason why the FCO was prepared to sanction this additional expenditure was that it was seen as an

investment which would save on editing time and free the branch for other purposes.

The system purchased by the branch was based on Apple Macintosh Hardware and Microsoft Word software. Microsoft Word Version 5.1 was chosen because on Apple Mac it was considered adequate for the kind of publishing in which we were engaged. Since 1990 our system has been expanded on an incremental basis. By the summer of 1991, when we produced our first volumes on our DTP system, we had five terminals and one laser printer. Now, after approximately £34,000 has been spent on the system, each member of the editorial team has a workstation on his or her desk with on-line printing facilities. All the workstations are fitted with 40-megabyte hard disks and are linked together in three work groups by TOPS networking software, which enables on-line transfer of files between workstations within the group. Camera-ready copy is produced with the aid of a template set up with the technical assistance of HMSO that incorporates the 48 printing styles which appear in *DBPO*. Our workspace has become an archipelago of Apple islands.

The new system would seem to have obvious advantages. Previously, the whole process from the despatch of typescript to HMSO to publication of volumes took about nine months. Now the commercial typesetting process has been cut out and Historical Branch key in their own proofs. Final copy is sent on disks to HMSO and then processed through a high-grade printer to produce laser proofs. These are briefly checked by the editors before transmission to the printers. In consequence, the publishing process with HMSO has been reduced to only two months.

The editors also have greater immediate control over the content and layout of documents. Once the text of a document has been keyed in, ideally by the branch secretary, individual editors can work on it, adding to and amending footnotes and microfiche calendars. There is less need for manuscript notes and instructions to typists, the documents can be completed on screen, and there is no need for later negotiation with typesetters. Once individual documents have been run together in sequence, they can be transferred to a hard disk specifically set aside for finalizing volumes as a whole. It is at this stage that we ensure correct footnote cross-referencing and numbering of pages and documents.

All this would seem to suggest an immense saving in time, energy and paper. Indeed, when in October 1991 Historical Branch dealt with DTP in its *Newsletter*, we wrote that "despite a few teething problems the benefits have clearly outweighed any drawbacks." Over the past two and

a half years we have continued to reap the benefits of the system, but the drawbacks have become more apparent. Some of the problems with DTP were admittedly in the first instance disguised by the fact that in 1990 Historical Branch had a full-time secretary who, despite having had no previous experience of operating personal computers, quickly adapted to using our system. She was eager to explore and solve problems as they arose, and soon proved herself a computer-natural. We also recruited in 1990 a research assistant who soon proved to be equally adept at handling a word processor. Between them they quickly mastered and overcame difficulties arising with regard to formatting and using the correct style codes. There were one or two mishaps with our 1991 volumes on *Eastern Europe 1945-1946* and the *Korean War 1950-1951*. In one instance amendments to a document were not transferred to the final copy and, as a result, a long footnote tracing the origins of a previously withheld document, a footnote which we had spent some time in drafting and for which we had had to obtain Cabinet Office clearance, was omitted from the volume. It remained stranded on an Apple island and was only rescued after the volume had gone to print. Nevertheless, in June 1991, when we sent the volumes off to HMSO, we felt the operation had been a resounding success.

Unfortunately, we have since lost the services of both our full-time secretary and our computer-orientated research assistant. And the part-time secretaries that we have employed since the autumn of 1992 have, though they have been adequate copy-typists, never shown the same degree of flair in handling our DTP system. In consequence, it has been necessary to supervise closely the keying in of documents; it has been essential to ensure that secretaries have fully understood the format in which we want them reproduced; we have had to teach them how to use style codes; and my assistant editor has had to devote a good deal of her time to dealing with the all-too-numerous technical difficulties to which the system gives rise. There have been occasions when we have both had to key in whole documents for our forthcoming volume on the *United Nations 1946-1947*. My assistant editor has developed a high degree of proficiency in operating the system, way beyond that required by her job description, but she has nevertheless found herself performing essentially secretarial duties. Our publisher's savings have therefore to be measured against the high cost of engaging editors in clerical work.

A typical example of the sort of problem that can use up a lot of time arose a few months ago when it came to running document sections together in sequence so as to transform separate groups of edited documents into a single volume. It was, at first, difficult to do this whilst

at the same time retaining template style codes. This meant that my assistant editor had to spend long hours, instruction manual in hand, working out how this task could be accomplished. Time which should have been spent on the editing of documents was thus spent on computer problem solving. This was a tiring and frustrating exercise, the total cost of which would be very difficult to calculate.

There can be other hidden costs. There is always the temptation to print out updates of documents in the process of being edited. Without a great deal of self-discipline, it is very easy to use up vast quantities of paper. However, once the initial investment has been made the marginal cost of engaging in other publishing activities is substantially reduced. Opportunities exist for producing the *Newsletter*, *History Notes* and *Occasional Papers*, as well as invitations, wall charts and brochures, all of which can be time-consuming if excessive attention is paid to form. A research assistant can spend an entire afternoon deciding the layout of a page, selecting and inserting graphics, lengthening and shortening columns. In other words, DTP creates problems as well as opportunities if the operation is not tightly managed.

Finally, once competence in DTP has been demonstrated, there is always the possibility that others will turn to you for assistance. In some cases we have, through our possession of a DTP system, seemed to generate demand from within the office for our products. Our acquisition of Apple islands has enabled us to assume a higher profile in the busy world of diplomacy, albeit sometimes at the expense of our function as editors.

This is not to say that we have not benefited from having a sophisticated DTP system. There is much to be said for being able to call up a keyed-in document in order to add and refine footnotes and to have immediate control over what the finished product will look like. But our experience suggests that if editors' time is really to be saved and costs to be cut it is necessary to have technical support staff who are proficient in DTP. We require secretaries who understand the task in hand, and who can key in documents accurately and in the correct format; and we need assistants with the technical expertise to advise on computer problem solving. Without these elements computers can too easily transform scholars into clerks.

DIGITIZED DIPLOMACY
Diplomatic Documentation and the CD-ROM Edition

Greg Donaghy

Résumé

Le présent document d'atelier se veut une étude exploratoire sur quelques-uns des enjeux découlant de la publication de textes documentaires sur disque optique compact (CD-ROM). M. Donaghy soutient que le passage du support-papier au CD-ROM n'est pas un processus aussi simple que certains observateurs l'ont donné à entendre. Grâce à sa capacité de stockage et de recherche phénoménale, le CD-ROM constitue un nouvel outil auquel il faudra trouver de nouveaux modes d'expression. Pour mettre ces derniers au point, les rédacteurs devront disposer beaucoup plus de temps et d'argent qu'ils n'en ont maintenant.

As the series *Documents on Canadian External Relations* has moved farther into the post-war period, the volume of material available for publication has increased dramatically. A result of proliferating automatic cypher machines and inexpensive reproduction facilities, this explosion of paper has forced editors to adopt increasingly ruthless criteria in choosing documents for publication. Recent editors have had to limit their efforts to capture the full range of Canadian foreign policy and focus instead on the major developments that confronted policy-makers. Even so, editors are still forced to discard much of the raw material of diplomatic history—cables from posts and memoranda at the divisional level—in favour of summary documents reflecting agreed departmental positions. As a consequence, documents which reflect the "cut and thrust of debate among public servants" are frequently ignored.[1]

It is unlikely that documentary editors will soon receive the funds required to expand their projects in order to capture the more complicated policy-making process that characterized Cold War diplomacy. Indeed, as governments throughout the Western world struggle to reinvent and to modernize themselves in the 1990s, official historical projects may be further marginalized and forced to make do with even fewer resources.

Traditionally, documentary editors have confronted these methodological and fiscal challenges by resorting to microfiche and microfilm supplements. This durable and reliable technology, however, has had its share of problems. Microfiche and microfilm editions, for example, are relatively costly to produce. They are also cumbersome to use and difficult to store. Moreover, a new generation of researchers, weaned on personal computers (PC) and keyword searches, tends to dismiss this older and difficult-to-search medium with disdain. As a result, many editors have found themselves under increasing pressure to exploit new technologies to solve the problem of too many documents and too few dollars. Optical disk technology and CD-ROMs clearly hold out the most promise.

First explored in the 1920s in conjunction with the development of laser science, optical disk technology in its present form emerged in the 1970s in response to the demands of the American military for various forms of computer-assisted training.[2] By the early 1980s, Sony and Philips had joined forces to explore how this laser technology might be developed commercially. The result—reflecting the popularity of the audio CD, the widespread availability of PCs and the demand for a system to store larger amounts of information—was the Compact Disk-Read Only Memory (CD-ROM).[3] Closely resembling audio CDs in both appearance and structure, CD-ROMs retain information in a digital format that cannot be changed. Capable of storing up to 300,000 pages of text or 10,000 images in a single disk costing less than a dollar to duplicate, the CD-ROM offers editors (and their bureaucratic managers) the prospect of developing vast but cheaper collections of documents. Despite its relative youth, this technology has been accepted at a remarkably rapid rate. The first commercially published CD-ROMs were already on sale by 1985. Within two years, the International Standards Organization (ISO) had established standards governing the size of the disk and the format in which data should be stored. As a consequence, CD-ROM technology has successfully avoided most of the compatibility problems that plagued video in the early 1980s and has become an increasingly popular research tool. A recent study by University Microfilms International (UMI) suggested that academic and public libraries in the United States have almost reached the "saturation point", at which every library has at least one CD-ROM reader in operation.[4] Fully 98 per cent of American research libraries already utilize CD-ROM equipment and products.[5] According to figures provided by the Canadian Library Association, approximately 78 per cent of Canadian libraries claim to have some CD-ROM facilities in operation.[6]

The major impediments to the spread of CD-ROM technology—the price of the readers and the absence of inexpensive consumer products—are being overcome quickly. Currently, low-end readers can be purchased for as little as US$150, while more substantial units at the high-end retail for US$350-400.[7] This decline in price is reflected in the growing number of personal computers in which a CD-ROM drive is a standard feature. In the United States, for example, these drives are now installed in 20 per cent of computers sold.[8] At the same time, the price of CD-ROM disks has steadily declined. Between 1987 and 1990, the median retail price charged for a disk dropped from US$1,273 to US$795. In 1993, the median retail price stood at only US$435.[9] While hardware prices have fallen, the number of available titles has increased dramatically. In 1993 there were over 4,000 titles in print, a figure which represents a 38 per cent increase over the number of titles available in 1992.[10]

The direction in which this technology is headed is by no means entirely clear. Most commercial publishers still hesitate to surrender to its charms and are merely experimenting with the format.[11] Surveys conducted in the United States suggest that fewer than 50 per cent of people purchasing a CD-ROM drive ever bother to purchase other CD-ROM products. The market resistance to CD-ROMs recently prompted Microsoft to drop the price of its *Encarta Encyclopedia* from US $395 to US $139 in an effort to drum up business.[12] Still, CD-ROM technology seems likely to survive. The warm reception which accompanied the publication of the *Thesaurus Linguae Grecae*, a CD-ROM collection containing every one of the 66 million extant words of ancient Greek literature, and the appearance of the multivolume *Oxford English Dictionary* underline CD-ROM's growing popularity as a research tool. The decision of editors at two major American documentary projects, the Lincoln Legal Papers and the Papers of Thomas Jefferson, to proceed with CD-ROM editions is a clear signal to editors of diplomatic documents that they too should begin to explore seriously how CD-ROMs might assist them in their work.

The obvious, but mistaken, course for editors to follow in adopting CD-ROM technology to their current methodologies is simply to transfer the book to the disk. In other words, editors would continue to select and sparingly annotate a relatively small number of documents, which would be converted into electronic text by a word processor and then "published" as a CD-ROM. Neither the financial nor the scholarly benefits of following such a course would appear to justify abandoning an established format in favour of a new and untried medium. In the

Canadian case, for example, this kind of exercise would reduce the cost per volume by less than 5 per cent.

More important, simply converting a comparatively small selection of documents to CD-ROM ignores the overarching role the technology plays in determining the nature of its own content. In this case, Marshall McLuhan's over-used aphorism is decidedly apt: The medium is the message. With its capacity to search and organize vast amounts of textual data as well as video and audio clips almost instantaneously, CD-ROM constitutes a genuinely new medium in which the old methodologies will no longer work. Researchers will bring new expectations to documentary collections on CD-ROM, which editors will have to meet. As Art Spiegelmann, whose critically acclaimed comic-book depiction of the Holocaust was subsequently released on CD-ROM along with most of its supporting documentation, noted, "the least interesting thing about the [CD-ROM] is the book itself, because it was conceived as a book."[13] In abandoning their traditional paper-based publications for a CD-ROM format, editors will clearly have to bear in mind the need to transform their collections of documents into entirely new products.

The most obvious way to move toward these new products would be simply to increase by a factor of 10 or even 100 the number of documents included in a given collection. Rather than aim for a volume of 1,000 documents, as Canadian editors currently do, editors might plan on making available 100,000 documents at a time. Armed with the powerful software used to put together a CD-ROM collection, readers would be able to make connections instantly between subjects and events that would otherwise be inaccessible. In doing so, they would be working with a product that is fundamentally different from a bound collection of printed documents. After all, as Khrushchev once quipped of nuclear weapons, "quantity has a quality of its own."[14]

Over time, editors would be expected to improve on this basic model. For example, rather than identifying historical characters with terse descriptions, the CD-ROM would allow editors the room to include a full-scale biography that the reader could access by "clicking" a mouse on a highlighted name. Ultimately, imaginative editors would wish to incorporate newsreel or film footage and audio clips into their editorial apparatus in order to give readers an even richer experience. These kinds of adaptations would certainly meet the expectations of a new generation of researchers. Equally intriguing, they might also provide editors with a new and more important role in the dissemination of historical knowledge.

In so far as the CD-ROM represents a new type of "edition", it will do very little to alleviate the financial pressures that confront most editors today. The cost of word processing the documents alone would quickly exceed the small amount of money which might be saved on the actual production of the disk. Similarly, the editorial time required to annotate 100,000 documents would add substantially to the overall costs of individual projects. As the more advanced applications associated with multimedia CD-ROMs are added, the costs will escalate sharply. The *Thesaurus Linguae Grecae*, for example, required US$7 million in funding and 20 years to complete. Microsoft's *Encarta* is reported to have cost a much more modest US$5 million.[15] At least for the moment, it seems likely that producing the kind of large-scale and electronically accessible product that CD-ROM technology demands is beyond the scope of most editors of diplomatic documents.

However, there may still be a role for this new technology in making greater amounts of diplomatic documentation more available at a reduced price. Rather than transforming selected documents into electronic text, it is possible to use scanners to create facsimiles of documents that could be published as a CD-ROM. The Archives of the Indies of Spain, for example, has recently used this approach to put the letters of Christopher Columbus and his contemporaries onto disk. This relatively inexpensive process—it costs just pennies a page to scan a document—offers serious scholars one intriguing feature: with a facsimile of the original document on their computer screens, researchers would be able to avoid some of the interpretive difficulties that arise from the process of transcribing and publishing documents. However, this approach does not allow the kind of keyword searching and immediate cross-referencing that is one of the technology's most attractive characteristics. An indexing system, which would allow editors to "tag" each document with a brief textual description, would offer only limited compensation.

Nevertheless, this approach seems to offer editors an opportunity to publish large collections of documents at a modest cost. But while the possibilities raised by this use of CD-ROMs are exciting, lingering technical problems suggest that editors might be wise to confine themselves for the present to experimenting with the new technology. Despite the efforts of manufacturers, compatibility problems still plague parts of the industry. Most of the less sophisticated (and less expensive) software required to organize documents on CD-ROM, for example, cannot be made to run on every operating system. While the newest software is capable of operating in both IBM and Macintosh environments, it is impossible to tell when an industry standard will eventually emerge.

For the time being at least, any viable CD-ROM publication would need to appear in at least two versions or employ expensive software capable of running on IBM and Macintosh operating systems. The need to accommodate both operating environments raises obvious problems.

A related question surrounds the durability of the disks themselves. While original estimates suggested that the disks would last almost a century, subsequent calculations have steadily reduced this time. Some current critics suggest that the disks might survive only for as little as 18 years. While this may not be an issue for publications which are updated and reissued every few years, it is clearly a problem for publications which are published and then expected to thrive on their own. Indeed, an American funding agency, the National Historical Research and Publications Commission, currently refuses to underwrite documentary projects that rely solely on CD-ROM technology.

Clearly, there are hurdles that need to be overcome. Still, CD-ROMs promise to provide an inexpensive and popular means for editors to deepen and broaden their efforts to chronicle the evolution of twentieth-century diplomacy. In pursuing this course, however, editors must be aware that this technology will not magically remove the financial and spatial constraints under which they currently work. The demands of this new medium will create pressures that seem more likely to increase rather than decrease the cost of documentary editing. Moreover, a number of unresolved technical issues underline the need for caution. But caution should not be allowed to become inaction. Despite its current shortcomings, this technology seems poised to change documentary editing in unpredictable and profound ways. Like it or not, editors anxious to shape their craft tomorrow must begin to probe and explore the limits of the digital frontier today.

ENDNOTES

1. John Hilliker, "Documents on Canadian External Relations: Selection and Arrangement," in FCO Historical Branch, *Occasional Papers*, No 2, November 1989, p. 36. I am indebted to Richard Bingham, a real expert in this field, for answering my many questions about CD-ROM publishing and for half of this paper's title.

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11. Sarah Lyall, "Are these Books or What? CD-ROM and the Literary Industry," *The New York Times Book Review* (14 August 1994).

12. D.T. Max, "The End of the Book?" *The Atlantic Monthly* (September 1994), pp. 61-71.

13. Cited in Sarah Lyall, "Are these Books or What? CD-ROM and the Literary Industry."

14. Cited in "Booting electronic books," *The Economist* (3 September 1994), p. 83.

15. "The Lays of Ancient ROM," *The Economist* (22 August 1994), p. 71; D.T. Max, "The End of the Book?" p. 70.

II: Preservation and Declassification
Conservation et déclassification

ALICE IN THE LAND OF DELETE OR THE QUESTION OF PRESERVE OR NOT PRESERVE

Bob de Graaff[1]

Résumé

L'auteur aborde ici quelques-unes des difficultés que rencontrent les rédacteurs de séries de documents de la Hollande. La réalité de la politique étrangère, dont les fonds documentaires ne sont jamais le reflet exact, est au surplus déformée par le processus du tri documentaire. Pour compliquer encore la tâche du rédacteur, ce dernier doit composer avec les normes de tri différentes qu'appliquent les archivistes, d'un côté, et les historiens, de l'autre. Les modifications récentes apportées par les Pays-Bas aux critères de sélection des archives risquent aussi d'avoir des répercussions sur le travail des historiens et des rédacteurs de documents en séries.

A couple of years ago the editors of the *Documenten betreffende de Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland, 1919-1945*, the document series on Dutch foreign policy between 1919 and 1945, were running into some problems in the Netherlands General State Archives. The 1962 Archival Act prescribes that government records should be turned over to the state archives within 10 years of becoming 50 years old. Before doing so the departmental archivists have to ensure that the records are in an orderly form. The Archival Decree, based on the Archival Act, lays down the rules according to which records should either be kept or destroyed. Records should be preserved if they are of interest, first, to the administration that produced them or, second, to the citizen who seeks evidence or justice. Thirdly, they should also be kept if they are of historical interest. The departmental record officers can take care of the selection themselves but they have to seek the opinions of the general state archivist and the Archival Council, an advisory committee of the minister of culture, composed mainly of historians and archivists. They can also put the selection out by contract.

These rules meant that during the 1980s records originating from the 1920s and 1930s were frequently destroyed, rearranged or temporarily

unavailable because they were being selected under contract in a remote part of the country, where the government in its wisdom had located the record selection service to relieve the high unemployment in the region. This was extremely annoying for the editors, as in the final stages of a manuscript they would find that the last record group needed for completion was beyond their reach for a couple of years. Another problem was the rearrangement made during the selection process. The editors had consulted many of their documents while they were still in the departmental record deposits and thus knew them by their original organization. After the selection process the records were sometimes in a completely different order, and more often than not there were no means to establish their former order. The editors could easily foresee users of their volumes entering the reading room of the General State Archive in The Hague and asking for related documents from a record group mentioned in their volumes which no longer existed, thus providing lots of work for the staff of the reading room.

The editors therefore decided to consult with the General State Archive to try to find a solution. Although extremely friendly, the archivists told the editors that unfortunately there was little they could do. Record selection is the responsibility of the government offices themselves. If the editors wanted to make some arrangements they should contact the departmental record officers. This advice was hardly helpful, since the editors of the Dutch series on foreign policy compose their volumes of records from scores of governmental offices with which it would be very hard to make such arrangements on a lasting basis.

During the meeting one of the editors remarked that it would even be possible for a record produced in the series to be destroyed afterwards, although he thought this unlikely since the Dutch edition only contains the most important documents. One of the archivists at the meeting then asked how broad the selection from the records was. "Well," the editor said, "it all depends on the files. The range of material chosen is from 0 to 5 per cent." "In the latter case," the archivist remarked, "you may well preserve more than we do, since recently our policy has become to preserve overall only 5 per cent of the government records and I would be amazed if the editors' 5 per cent and ours would fully overlap." This was the first time the editors became aware that the General State Archive was advising governmental record officers that a destruction of 95 per cent was the expected outcome of the selection process of the future, whereas until then 70 per cent had been the overall norm.

Since then a fierce debate has started up between historians and archivists about the norms to be adopted during the selection process.

Before going into the details of that debate, I would first like to raise the philosophical question of the relation between our document series and the reality they claim to represent.

With a bit of imagination one can discern three historical worlds of foreign policy-making: first, the reality that once was; second, the documentary residue that is left, mainly by the decision-makers themselves; third, the image of the past decision-making that our series represent. The documentary residue, i.e., the second world, is almost necessarily not identical to the real past, the first world. A government adviser once showed me a cupboard filled with files pertaining to the troublesome decision-making process leading up to a particular act. "What reconstruction of decision-making?" he challenged me. "Here you have a cupboard full of paper, but I took care that the scrap of paper that finally led to acceptance of the bill by the Upper House was thrown away as soon as it had served its purpose." Nor are the second and the third world identical. Somewhere between the second and the third world is the Land of Delete, for which both the selecting record officers and the selecting editors are responsible.

Figure 1. From Reality to Document Series



I do not think that the experiences I described earlier are a purely Dutch phenomenon. The twentieth-century proliferation of paperwork in national bureaucracies has followed a general pattern throughout the developed world. Everywhere there is an inescapable need for archival selection. And everywhere the development of selection criteria and their application should lead to debate between archivists and historians, i.e. documentary editors, although maybe not to the same extent as in the Netherlands, where there is rather more distance between the editors and the archivists when it comes to selection than there is among some of our foreign counterparts. Doing research in national archives abroad, the Dutch editors are occasionally surprised by the small quantity of leftovers from diplomatic exchanges between the Netherlands and other countries. But, unlike in their own country, they feel themselves insufficiently qualified to judge the disparity between the three worlds I mentioned before...

Nevertheless, I would like to put some general questions before you that originated from their national experiences. The questions which should concern us as editors are, first, how many documents stray to the Land of Delete which actually should have a place in the main streets of the third world, our series? And, second, how can we be sure that there is some accord between the opinions of the archivists and those of the historians, especially the editors, as to which documents should be sentenced to the Land of Delete?

As an historian aiming to bring structure to chaos I am always looking for the wilderness which lives in documents, for the hidden messages they contain, which the originator of the document never conceived of as giving just that piece of information which makes a seemingly worthless document a shining diamond. Does not every historian once in a while have that longing to hide in the paper shredder just before the cutting blades? And sometimes I have a nightmarish vision that the best of all historian's worlds is the Land of Delete, where between all the failures of past administrations and the dullness of bureaucracy at its height such diamonds can be found. On the other hand there are archivists, who like neat and clean alleys between their thousands of boxes filled with easily retrievable documents.

Or is this a false contradistinction? Are not the archivist and the historian both trying to create order from chaos, each in their own way? I think that the essential difference between them is one of timing. Archivists want to establish order before historians consult their documents, whereas historians want order established only after they have consulted them. A secondary problem is that archivists maintain that they

never know which order historians are going to create and therefore which chaos they would like to encounter in the archives.

Another problem was added in the Netherlands by a change in emphasis in the selection by the archivists charged with reducing the volume of documents being turned over to the General State Archive. Their problem was enhanced by the anticipation that a new archival act would reduce the 50-year term to one of 20 years. They therefore decided to select no longer on the basis of the information contained in the documents but on the basis of whether documents represented statutory actions which could be considered to be the government's main policies.

Historians have protested against this narrowing of the selection criteria to a legalistic derivative of their administrative relevance. Government is not only a decision-making machine but also a collector of information about society. No formal law provides for the writing of political reports by diplomats about the countries where they are stationed, but it is very important to historians who study, for instance, the policy of the Netherlands government during the 1930s toward Jewish refugees from Germany to know what information the Dutch legation in Berlin was sending to The Hague on the treatment of Jews in the Third Reich.

As far as decision-making is concerned, one of the aspects that could become a victim of the new selection criterion is policy formulation. Documents containing decision-making which has not been enacted into statutory law run the risk of ending up in the shredder. Especially sensitive policies, such as the collection of intelligence, often lack a firm and formal legal basis.

Further, decisions are made long before politicians and officials realize that formal policies are needed. In the Netherlands this was the case with migrant workers who started to come in big numbers beginning in the early 1960s. Decision-making with regard to them was stored in their personal files, which have been destroyed under the new selection policy.

Another aspect of decision-making which is at risk of being destroyed too easily is the implementation of policy. Certain policies are established only during implementation. This was, for instance, true of the Dutch press policy, which came under fire during the 1930s when German diplomats complained time and again that their head of state was portrayed in an unfriendly manner. Such policies, which are formulated ad hoc, often leave much to the discretion of the individual official. His or her decisions can only be traced through the individual documents that are left.

Especially in the field of foreign policy there exists very little formal law. Acknowledging this, the archivists have decided that for certain areas of government policy they should not take statutory law as a basis for their selection decisions but "the working processes" of a government unit. Although the recognition by the archivists that statutory law alone is an insufficient basis for selection is to be applauded, the historians will have to wait for the outcome of selection on the basis of "working processes". So far the archivists' suggestions for new criteria have not impressed the historians as taking into account changes that have occurred over time. As editors who have a keen eye for changes in both the decision-making process and the underlying structures, we are probably more aware than other historians of the impact some of those changes had.

It is therefore a hopeful development that recently the Netherlands Historical Association has established a committee composed of both historians and archivists to debate problems regarding archival selection. One of the editors of the Dutch document series on foreign policy is a member of the new committee. Familiar with a broad range of record collections and with problems of selection he hopes to make a fruitful contribution to the debate.

Meanwhile the Dutch editors have come to realize that their volumes may occasionally save some documents from the Land of Delete. It is a doubtful honour to be in such a position. The editors' responsibility for making the right choices from the many documents for inclusion in their series has become a heavier one. The same holds true for their responsibility to present the selected documents accurately and in a context which leads to an understanding of the past realities as much as possible. After all, the editors do not like the users of their volumes to become Alices in Wonderland faced with riddles that have no answers.

ENDNOTE

1. The author thanks Marijke van Faassen and Joost Jonker for their comments on a draft of this paper.

UNLOCKING THE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR
The *Foreign Relations* Series and the Statute of October 1991

William Z. Slany

Résumé

L'auteur traite ici de l'incidence de la loi d'octobre 1991 par laquelle le Congrès créait la série Foreign Relations of the United States. *La loi, dont l'objet était de répondre aux doléances des milieux de l'enseignement et des médias, qui jugeaient incomplets les récents volumes de* Foreign Relations *parus, élargit considérablement les pratiques de rédaction existantes pour faire en sorte, notamment, que les volumes renferment des documents provenant de tous les organismes jouant un rôle pertinent, afin d'établir un relevé historique complet et précis, et pour que paraisse, d'ici 1996, la série portant sur les documents historiques de plus de 30 ans. La loi exige en outre que les dossiers du Département d'État de 30 ans ou plus soient déclassifiés et transférés aux Archives nationales. L'auteur parle des mesures prises par le Département d'État et par ses historiens pour accélérer la préparation de la série, en conformité avec les dispositions de la loi.*

Background

Americans like to think of their government as open and accessible to them. Foreign affairs was an exception. Diplomacy, through much of American history, was neither shared by government with the citizenry nor was it much understood or even relevant. Full access to the diplomatic record was not included in the general public's expectation of openness.

This situation has changed rapidly and profoundly during the last generation. Public anticipation of an early opening of the diplomatic record of the Cold War has grown, and the U.S. government has found it exceedingly difficult to meet this expectation fully. The accumulation of official documents in the archives and files of U.S. agencies is enormous.

At least 25 million pages of documents have been generated by the Department of State alone since 1945.

Much of this accumulation of paper is still treated as secret and remains inaccessible to all but a few official historians and records keepers. Over the past 50 years there has evolved an increasingly elaborate set of measures aimed at protecting national security information. This information security apparatus has, whatever else may have been its results, prevented the disclosure of much of the record of U.S. foreign policy in the post-World War II period, giving rise to an increasing number of documents on U.S. involvement in the Cold War that are still withheld from the public. This accumulation of secret documentation has created a growing concern regarding the conduct of foreign affairs, a desire for its democratization, and a rising expectation of access to the historical records of the Cold War presidencies.

Under the American constitutional system of the separation of power among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, presidents and Congress have competed with one another in attempting to manage government information. Successive presidents, beginning with Richard Nixon and including Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, have sought to revise the management of secret information. The thrust of all of the executive orders from these presidents has been to better control the handling of secret documents, but some effort has been made to deal with the mounting accumulation of classified documentation in the government's archives. These efforts were not notably successful, and the backlog of Cold War documents has grown ever more rapidly.

One means of access to diplomatic papers—special access to particular scholars to carry out approved research in diplomatic history—has gradually been eliminated by the various presidential actions. Until the Nixon presidency, scholars were given access to secret diplomatic papers. State Department officials determined who might have such access, and research notes were subject to State Department review and censorship. The program for such access was a source of mounting complaints, on the one hand, from the security officials who worried about the risk of leaks of sensitive information and, on the other, from journalists and others who wanted to gain the same access accorded to scholars. This special access program was abandoned by 1975.

As readers of American publications on foreign affairs know, special access to secret documents continues. Such access is very limited and generally requires approval in some form by cabinet-level officials.

Such special access usually has some tendentious quality and does not often meet the standards of professional historical scholarship.

The U.S. Congress has, since World War II, enacted a variety of legislation on information secrecy, but it has been mostly aimed at intelligence, espionage, military, nuclear technology and codes. Until 1991, Congress generally respected the secretary of state's prerogative to have exclusive jurisdiction over diplomatic documentation. The first breach in the wall around that exclusive body of diplomatic records was the Freedom of Information Act.

Originated in the 1960s but not truly workable until the mid-1970s, the Freedom of Information Act has provided access to all government records, including highly selective and limited access to a small portion of the secret diplomatic record. With financial means, patience and time, individual scholars could gain copies of significant if limited bodies of documentation on selected topics that government was willing to divulge.

For American scholars, the Department of State's official diplomatic documentary history series *Foreign Relations of the United States* has remained the most consistent method of gaining access to at least a selection of major foreign affairs records. After over 125 years of generally uninterrupted publication, even this series became enmeshed in conflicts between the legislative and the executive branches over the mounting demands from the American academic community and the press for broader and speedier revelation of the record of the Cold War.

A Short History of the *Foreign Relations* Series

President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of State William Seward began the publication of official U.S. diplomatic papers in 1862 in the course of the American Civil War. The department continued the publication of these papers on an annual basis throughout the remainder of the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. For many decades the publication of diplomatic papers was essentially a housekeeping task. Only after World War I were formal regulations and modern standards of historical scholarship applied to the *Foreign Relations* series. These regulations guided the editors of the series for next 65 years.

Pre-1991 Standards for the Preparation of the *Foreign Relations* Series

The *Foreign Relations* series was until the 1920s based exclusively on the records of the Department of State. This reflected the reality of the

State Department's exclusive role in the preparation and carrying out of foreign policy decisions. Over the decades and particularly since World War II, the president and agencies of government other than the State Department became more involved in the preparation or execution of foreign policy.

The *Foreign Relations* series changed too, and some agencies of the U.S. government that were involved in foreign affairs were not able or willing to cooperate in the inclusion of their often highly secret or sensitive records in published volumes. The documents recording the involvement of intelligence agencies, and to a lesser extent military agencies, in foreign relations with other countries raised special difficulties of access and declassification. The *Foreign Relations* series was strictly a publication of the Department of State and was dependent upon the voluntary cooperation of other agencies. Generally the level of cooperation was good, but long delays often occurred in providing access to historical records or in agreeing to the release of secret information.

Adoption of the October 1991 *Foreign Relations of the United States* Statute

The U.S. Congress acted in October 1991 to establish the *Foreign Relations* series under law. In the U.S. system of government, this was a considerable intrusion by the legislature into matters long considered by the executive branch to be its own responsibility. The statute of 1991 responded to the concerns of the academic community and the press regarding the incompleteness of recent *Foreign Relations* volumes. The lack of adequate and appropriate documentation in volumes documenting U.S. involvement in changes of government in Iran in 1953 and in Guatemala in 1954 were the two most notorious cases cited by critics of the series.

Outline of the 1991 *Foreign Relations* Statute

The October 1991 statute confirmed the long-standing editorial standards for preparing the *Foreign Relations* series and significantly broadened and sharpened them. In particular, the statute requires that:

1. the volumes include the records from all agencies necessary to provide a complete and accurate record;
2. the agencies provide full access to their historical records;
3. agency declassification of compiled volumes be completed in 120 days;

4. agency heads justify in writing any documents withheld from declassification, and
5. the *Foreign Relations* series be published at a 30-year line by 1996.

The statute also requires the Department of State to review for declassification all of its 30-year-old and older records, to transfer these records to the National Archives and to open them for public examination. The Department of State, with advice from its Historical Advisory Committee, has worked out a plan to review all of its 18 million pages of records, transfer them to the National Archives and open them for public review by 1996. Three million pages will have been transferred and opened by this spring. The review and transfer of these documents is being managed in a manner to minimize any impact it might have on research for the *Foreign Relations* volumes.

The *Foreign Relations* Acceleration Plan

In order to implement the law of October 1991, the State Department and its historians adopted a plan to accelerate the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series and attain a 30-year publication line by 1996 while broadening the range of documentary sources for the volumes. The plan seeks to balance three different conflicting considerations:

- government budgetary constraints meant there could be no increase in the size of the staff;
- the scope of the accelerated series would have to be broad enough to meet the law and the expectations of the users, and
- the size of the volumes and the series as a whole would have to reflect accurately what could be compiled and what could be expected to be declassified in time to be included in the series by 1996.

Determining the Size of the Accelerated Series

The plan called for the publication between 1992 and 1996 of approximately 60 to 70 printed volumes and microfiche supplements. These include the final 10 volumes of the 25 documenting the foreign affairs record of the Eisenhower administration, all of the more than 30 volumes and supplements documenting the Kennedy administration, and at least half of the more than 35 volumes intended to document the administration of President Johnson. Of these volumes, 30 would be prepared from scratch while the remaining 40 or so were already

completed or nearly completed manuscripts, some of them fairly far along in the review and declassification process.

The newly compiled volumes are to average about 400 documents each or 800 to 900 printed pages. This is the estimated upper limit that the State Department's 25 historians and editors are able to prepare and the various government agencies can declassify. More importantly this number of volumes and pages is determined by the amount of work that can be performed by the archivists at the Kennedy and Johnson presidential libraries, and the declassification reviewers in the various government agencies.

Presidential records will constitute the major segment of the documentation selected for publication in the accelerated *Foreign Relations* series. They will account for nearly half of the contents of many volumes. One of the most important factors determining the overall size of the series for the Johnson administration is the amount of the archivists' time that can be reasonably used at the Johnson Presidential Library in Texas (where the records of the Johnson White House are permanently stored and maintained). The 20 or so State Department historians cannot preempt all of the time and resources of the library for an indefinite period. Some reasonable proportion of the archivists' time must be left to serve other researchers—private and governmental.

A particular research problem for the Johnson period is how to review and appropriately use in our documentary series the audio records of some 8,000 telephone conversations conducted by President Johnson during his presidency. Only some of these conversations have been transcribed, and these are not entirely complete or accurate. Many of these conversations dealt at least in part with foreign policy issues. There are no useful indexes or guides. It remains to the State Department historians to find the methods to do this quickly and incisively.

The plan for the Johnson administration volumes therefore is based on the scale of research that can be carried out over the next several years. The plan includes the addition of special staff to the Johnson Presidential Library for several years in order to organize and service the requests for documents by State Department historians.

The complexity of the declassification process within the U.S. government is the other factor limiting the scale of the *Foreign Relations* series. Far more resources of government are committed to the declassification review of manuscripts than to their research and editing. The research, compilation, editing and declassification review of *Foreign Relations* book manuscripts is being steadily accelerated from an average

of six years in 1990 to an average of two and a half to three years in 1994.

The involvement of the U.S. government and its various agencies in intelligence and covert political activity raises the most difficult documentary research and declassification challenges. The largest portion of documentation denied declassification in *Foreign Relations* volumes in recent years deals with such activities. The 1991 statute requiring a complete and accurate foreign affairs record seems to make the inclusion of such sensitive materials mandatory, but such a requirement often conflicts with current foreign policy issues and relationships. Resolving such conflicts and limiting their impact upon the preparation and publication of the series has become a major issue.

Each *Foreign Relations* book manuscript is prepared by staff historians, and it is then reviewed, corrected and prepared for typesetting and publication by a team of editors. These editors regularly remind me that smaller manuscripts move more rapidly through the production process than larger ones.

It is for all these reasons that we have adopted a planned size for the series and projected our optimistic target of 1996.

Results Thus Far of the October 1991 Statute

The statute has been in effect for nearly three years. More than 30 volumes have been published in that time and up to 20 more will be published in 1995. The goal of publishing at a 30-year line by 1996 is still within reach, although it will be difficult.

Access to the records of other agencies has steadily broadened to include especially those of the Central Intelligence Agency and the departments of Defense, the Treasury and Commerce. Access has been gained to an increasing amount of intelligence documentation, but the process for documenting intelligence activities, including covert operations, is still being perfected.

Declassification review of book manuscripts, some of which previously took years to complete, is now accomplished in about a year. A backlog of 20 to 30 classified book manuscripts has been largely eliminated. The number of documents withheld from publication has been significantly reduced. On the average less than 3 per cent of material proposed for book manuscripts is withheld from publication following the declassification process.

The Historical Advisory Committee created by the October 1991 law has afforded the State Department historians support for greater access to records and with advice on how to deal with those cases where continued maintenance of secrecy seriously impairs the accuracy of book manuscripts. The committee has been a powerful force in convincing government agencies of the need to withhold from release only the most serious secrets—those whose release would genuinely impair diplomatic relations between the United States and some other nation.

Among the most important achievements thus far has been the success of the State Department in meeting that part of the October 1991 statute that requires the opening of the departmental records that are 30 years old and older. With the advice of the Historical Advisory Committee, the department has devised a plan for the identification, declassification review, transfer to the National Archives and opening for public review of all 30-year-old records by 1996. Three million additional pages of records were opened between the summer of 1993 and the spring of 1994, and the pace is accelerating.

The October 1991 law has been a positive force for the publication of a more comprehensive foreign affairs record of the United States earlier than was possible since the 1950s, and it has also provided a model for all U.S. agencies for opening their foreign affairs records to the public in no more than 30 years.

Conclusions

During the last several years, diplomatic historians in the United States have argued among themselves as to whether they were focusing too narrowly on the documentary record of the United States. One side holds that an accurate understanding of international affairs can only result from research in the records of all governments involved in a negotiation. They contend that the history of international relations should not be based solely on the record in U.S. archives. The other side, long accustomed to the growing accessibility of the American records of recent decades but unfamiliar with the availability of diplomatic records of other nations, finds it difficult to adapt to the wider context of recent research in international relations.

The expanding focus of the *Foreign Relations* series reflects the growing complexity and interdependence of the study of international affairs. Those of us concerned with the preparation of the documentary record of U.S. foreign policy grow increasingly aware and sensitive to the parallel efforts of historians and documentary editors in other foreign

ministries. Meetings like this one here in Ottawa demonstrate the possibilities for mutual cooperation and support among our various projects. It is also clear that the quality and completeness of our various publications require even more such cooperation in order both to make our various national audiences better understand the meaning and context of their nations' foreign affairs, and to illuminate these foreign affairs from a truly international point of view.

I thank our hosts, the Canadian External Affairs Department and particularly John Hilliker and the other officers of the Historical Staff, for bringing us together for this conference and allowing us to explore these important questions.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

Maryse Guilbeault and Benjamin Rowswell

Paulette Enjalran opened the discussion with the observation that France has resolved the contradiction between historians and archivists by offering education programs that mix both streams, thereby eliminating at the source possible disagreement between the two groups. Adding to the French point of view, **Jacques Bariéty** emphasized the fact that the French government scrupulously follows what he called an "absolute principle" that not a single document is eliminated from the files, except duplicates. The Quai d'Orsay keeps 100 per cent of all diplomatic documents, a practice which others deemed a "luxury solution". As well, each French ministry has the responsibility of archiving its own documents.

Antoine Fleury said that the questions of which documents to conserve and which to destroy are quite separate concerns, and that the latter is more likely to stimulate controversy, since it is an activity which takes place in the present and evokes strong emotions. He added that the difference between archivists and historians reflects whom they work for, and suggested that the best solution for the Netherlands might be to create a joint consultative committee composed of both groups. As it stands, it seems that since archivists work for the state, they have a long-term perspective, while historians work for themselves and respond to more current concerns. As a result, they place importance on different things. Prof. Fleury rang the alarm as to the **real** problem facing diplomatic historians today, which is the arbitrary destruction of diplomatic documents of international organizations. The absence of political authority often results in the widespread destruction of documentation.

Bob de Graaff pointed out that the distinction between archivists and historians has grown in the last decade, as archivists are trained less in history and more in management. Archivists in the Netherlands are becoming more "record managers"; they talk like officials, and are in a world of their own. They are apt to present the world as politicians and governments see it, not as historians do, thus leading to what he called a "trench war" between the two.

The two themes of the paper presented by **William Slany** which sparked the most reaction in the discussion which followed were the intergovernmental exchange of archival information and the accessibility

of intelligence information. On the question of sharing information between governments, three interesting points emerged. First, as **Richard Bone** pointed out, a balance must be struck between the free flow of information between governments and the accessibility of that information to the public, which the originating country might want restricted. When can governments declassify information provided to them by other countries? Second, the United States, according to Mr. Bone, is more restrictive of its information on the grounds that national security might be compromised. Finally, as Dr. Slany noted, sharing archives between governments goes against bureaucratic tendencies to guard information.

The discussion about the accessibility of archives from intelligence sources revealed the sensitive nature of the subject. **Meron Medzini** pointed out the distinction between military and civilian intelligence, noting that the former will remain largely inaccessible to historians. Although **Heather Yasamee** mentioned that she was in the process of requesting archival information from intelligence sources, other participants said that in their countries, editors do not seek that sort of information. In Canada, they seek to reproduce the decision-making process. In the United States, little research is done into espionage activities, since the lives of actors who are still alive might be endangered. **Sidney Aster** wrapped up the discussion by noting that intelligence records might not be as valuable to historians as is often assumed.

III: Why Publish?
Pourquoi publier?

PUBLICATION AND THE POLITICS OF MONEY

Heather Yasamee

Résumé

La notion de profits et pertes a toujours été appliquée à la publication des documents diplomatiques. La valeur des textes publiés n'est pas quantifiable en termes financiers, pas plus qu'on ne saurait la mesurer selon les coûts réels de publication. Dans l'examen de la rentabilité de leurs publications, les rédacteurs de séries britanniques doivent veiller à répondre aux attentes de trois clients : le ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commonwealth, les lecteurs de l'extérieur, en particulier le monde universitaire, et enfin l'éditeur, le Service d'édition des publications officielles du Royaume-Uni. Récemment, la série Documents on British Policy Overseas *a franchi avec succès l'examen d'efficacité auquel le gouvernement l'a soumise; l'équipe de rédaction n'en cherche pas moins des moyens de produire plus avec les ressources dont elle dispose. Elle envisage notamment d'adopter une démarche de plus en plus sélective, de façon à mettre davantage l'accent sur l'histoire plus récente; de créer une collection de textes contemporains; d'accroître la période couverte par les volumes dans la série* DBPO *et de continuer de miser sur l'éditique pour réduire ses coûts, par exemple en ajoutant des éléments technologiques nouveaux comme la lecture optique.*

"If I find that I do not lose by the sale, I shall think the advantage of diffusing information a gain."

(**Lord Palmerston**, 1831 on *British and Foreign State Papers*)

"We have nothing to lose as a nation, and a good deal to gain, by the widest possible publicity being given to our transactions with foreign countries."

(**Sir Eyre Crowe**, 1908)

"At a time when an increasing number of other countries are publishing diplomatic documents from their archives we have undoubtedly gained internationally from telling our own story in a straightforward way by

means of the original documents selected with full regard to the principle of editorial freedom."

(Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 1972 on *DBPO*)

"All major nations try through publishing selected documents from their national archives to ensure that the historical record of international affairs reflects their national perspective. We have received persuasive evidence that the British approach to this is second to none."

(FCO Efficiency Scrutiny, 1993)

When one of the first British publications of diplomatic documents went on general sale in 1831, the British foreign secretary, Lord Palmerston, commented, "If I find that I do not lose by the sale, I shall think the advantage of diffusing information a gain." This notion of profit and loss has continued to be applied to official publication throughout the 150 years or more that it has flourished under the wing of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.[1] Traditionally profit or gain has been associated not so much with money gain as with credit, influence and understanding. Today *Documents on British Policy Overseas* continues FCO policy of making readily accessible to the international foreign affairs community key documents of British foreign policy in the post-war period. The primary aim of the series is to promote knowledge and understanding of British foreign policy both at home and abroad. The value of this kind of publication is not quantifiable in money terms—still less can it be measured against the actual cost of publication. Herein lies both the strength and vulnerability of publishing projects when subject to the increasingly rigorous Treasury test of whether they give value for money.

In giving value for money the British editors have three customers to consider:

- the sponsoring government department—the Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
- the readership, which includes the FCO and other government departments, but is more substantially the public—in particular academics from graduate level upwards, and
- the publisher—Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

The common demand of these very different customers is more volumes, more quickly and more cheaply. Within this convergence of interest, there are differences as to what kind of volume they value.

Very broadly the FCO is concerned to influence and be understood. It usually has a greater interest in promoting understanding of policies in areas or on topics of current relevance. The more topical the volume, the more operationally useful it is likely to be. It can provide busy desk officers with convenient reference collections of back papers, in which they may find precedents, insights into the origins or historical roots of current problems or basic texts of agreements or protocols to which they may still need to refer (e.g., the Potsdam Protocol in the first volume of *DBPO*). Volumes also play their part in supporting FCO work by their availability for presentation as good-will gestures to those whom posts overseas wish to help or influence.

However much (or little) officials actually refer to volumes themselves, they are unlikely to study them as much as historians, researchers and academics—the main users—do. On the whole these main users are less concerned than the office to relate the past to the present and are more interested in the academic exercise of getting to the bottom of a particular puzzle—whether a live or dead issue. They want detail and depth and as far as the post-war period is concerned they are still digesting the years up to 1960.

The kind of detail and in-depth volumes produced in the series *DBPO* are appreciated by historians. The work done for them by the editors in presenting the official record in user-friendly form with meticulous scholarly footnotes, which elucidate the text as well as guide researchers beyond the published material into the archival labyrinth itself, gives remarkable value for money. It is also essential, if editors are to reconstruct accurately how events unfolded and show the basis on which decisions were taken or policy was formulated. Only by doing this can policies be understood and skimping here can undermine the whole point/aim of publication. At the same time it is a very labour-intensive process, slowing progress, and requiring highly skilled staff who cost money.

The cost of each volume is to some extent offset by its sale. By and large publishing—as distinct from editorial—costs are recouped through the sale of volumes, which currently retail at £50 for a volume of 500 pages with 1,200 frames of microfiches at a print run of 1,000. This format has been largely dictated by economics on the basis that smaller volumes take less editorial time to prepare, are cheaper to produce and can be sold at a more marketable price than the traditional large tomes of the inter-war series or the early volumes of *DBPO*, of which the Potsdam volume at well over a 1,000 pages is a prime example. Recent *DBPO* experience casts some doubt on these assumptions. It is not so much the

size of a volume which determines editorial costs as the effort that goes into it. Selecting less requires more sifting and greater intellectual effort. And since our more expensive volumes sell as well as the cheaper ones, I wonder how price-sensitive the market is for this kind of quality product.

Although the publishing costs are borne by HMSO, editorial costs are borne by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—amounting to no more than 0.006 per cent of the annual budget.[2] We are fortunate in that the office provides secure funding—including all facilities—for the series and attaches as much importance as the editors do to the integrity and impartiality of the series. Inevitably this security and freedom comes with a price-tag. In our case it is:

- partly the need to pay attention to what the FCO wants when drawing up publishing programs, and
- partly the requirement not only to publish but also to advise on or engage in historical or records-related work for the office as members of Historical Branch, Library and Records Department. This can take up to 50 per cent of branch time.

Providing a viable balance is held between this double requirement, it can give a varied and stimulating diet for the six historians working on *DBPO*. The politics of holding a balance or not, are almost entirely to do with money in the context of office-wide pressures to cut costs and make efficiency gains. Last year, *DBPO*, along with all other activities in Library and Records Department, was the subject of one such efficiency scrutiny. It emerged with flying colours and a recommendation that greater priority should be given to the work. In giving effect to this we shall be looking to see how we can produce more from existing resources. Ways of doing this may include:

1. An increasingly selective or land-mark approach. This will mean leaving more gaps than the inter-war series did. It may even be that we leave a big one by jumping ahead—as others have done—to a more recent period. Ideally we should like to get back inside the closed period—back to the days of *DBFP 1919-1939*, when the office published the records of Munich less than 10 years after the event. One drawback would undoubtedly be greater declassification problems, but in these days of more open government, now might be the time to try.
2. An alternative might be the introduction of a current document series on the Israeli and American models—although I understand that the American series is being discontinued in

favour of giving greater priority to the core publication, *Foreign Relations of the United States*.

3. When continuing with our core publication, *DBPO*, we may try a more broad-brush approach with greater time spans for volumes. This kind of approach is particularly suitable for areas or events of lesser significance for British foreign policy. It can, with caution, also be applied to more mainstream topics. For example, we are trying to draw out the time scale to two or three years for two volumes currently in preparation: one on Germany and European security from the 1952 Stalin Notes through to the 1954 Bonn Conventions and the other on the Middle East encompassing four years in all. This volume will follow a particular topic—the oil crisis in Iran—fairly tightly from 1951 to 1954 homing in on two crisis points: the decision not to use force to regain the Abadan oil fields and the toppling in 1953 of Mussadiq. In order to keep some depth, other related subjects will be treated very sparingly. I found this format worked quite well with a recent volume on the Korean War, where the scope of the volume, its extent and limits were very clearly defined in the preface and in write-off footnotes.
4. As regards production, we have already significantly reduced publishing costs—by as much as one third—with the introduction of a desktop publishing system and we hope that new technology may soon extend to accurate scanning for historical documents. This should significantly speed production as well as bring down costs. The two-tier form of publication of volume and microfiches was originally introduced by the *DBPO* as a cost-cutting way of making more of the raw material available at a fraction of the price of a visit to the Public Record Office in London. This has been successful, but now that advances in printing technology have narrowed the gap between the cost of printed page and microfiche frame, we shall be keeping our fiches policy under close review and further considering the advantages of CD-ROM for bulk runs of material.

These are just some of the thoughts we are turning over in our minds. We have yet to decide on any of them, and while I cannot say now which road we are likely to take, the aim will certainly be to move forward.

ENDNOTES

1. *British and Foreign State Papers* was begun by the Foreign Office Librarian, Lewis Hertslett, in 1826; this publication went on public sale in 1831. Publication ceased in 1968. The historical background to this and other FCO publications is briefly surveyed in "FCO Library: Print, Paper and Publications, 1782-1933," No. 5 in a series of *History Notes* produced by FCO Historical Branch and available on request. The more direct origins of *Documents on British Policy Overseas* (1984 ff.) are the two predecessor series: *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914*, (11 volumes, 1926-38) and *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*, (64 volumes, 1946-86).

2. 1993-94 Branch running costs of £282,771 compare with £3,334 million for the overall FCO budget.

DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES, OBJECTIFS POLITIQUES ET RIGUEUR SCIENTIFIQUE
Réflexions tirées de l'expérience française

Paulette Enjalran

Abstract

In examining the origins and character of Documents diplomatiques français, *the author argues that the standards and the methods of its editors do not differ from those of historians. Both strive for accuracy and impartiality in their work.*

La collection complète des *Documents diplomatiques français* (*DDF*) comprend à l'heure actuelle 149 volumes — répartis en quatre périodes : 1870-1871, 1871-1914, 1932-1939, la dernière période ayant pour point de départ le 20 juillet 1954. Le nombre de ces volumes serait plus élevé sans les ruptures de rythme entraînées par la Seconde Guerre mondiale. De nouveaux groupes de travail sont actuellement créés pour combler les lacunes.

L'intérêt des collections de Documents diplomatiques pour la recherche historique, et pour le grand public même qu'elles initient avec des exemples concrets au fonctionnement de l'action diplomatique, est d'évidence. Il est utile de s'interroger également, comme nous le faisons aujourd'hui, sur l'incidence occasionnelle ou provoquée que ces publications, qui sont en France des publications d'État, éditées par l'Imprimerie nationale, pourraient avoir sur la conduite de la politique étrangère, tout au moins sur l'aide qu'elles pourraient apporter aux responsables de l'action et de la décision diplomatique ou politique. Ont-elles pu être entreprises parfois avec des objectifs politiques précis, soit clairement formulés, soit implicites?

Il faut, bien entendu, pour esquisser une suggestion de réponse, distinguer la politique immédiate, expédition quotidienne des affaires, politique fréquemment et de plus en plus souvent affectée d'un signal d'urgence, d'ailleurs d'importance et de gravité diverse puisqu'elle peut aller d'un simple incident protocolaire à la mise en péril de vies humaines amenant l'intervention d'une cellule de crise. Des décisions rapides

s'imposent : rappel de personnel, envoi de secours, rapatriement d'archives dans une atmosphère de communications télégraphiques et téléphoniques avec les postes diplomatiques et consulaires, les réunions de responsables concernés, parfois des échanges de lettres entre chefs d'État, au milieu d'un déferlement de nouvelles lancées par les agences de Presse, les envoyés spéciaux et toutes les sources médiatiques.

Hors des cas exceptionnels, les documents, télégrammes, dépêches, lettres arrivés quotidiennement, par centaines, des postes, des Services français, des particuliers sont répartis entre les directions et sous-directions traitantes, figurant à l'organigramme du ministère des Affaires étrangères.

Certains documents de haute importance ou exceptionnellement confidentiels ne connaissent qu'une diffusion restreinte, limitée parfois au Ministre. La plupart des affaires atteignent la direction concernée et font l'objet, s'il y a lieu, d'une concertation avec le secrétaire général, remontant parfois au Ministre. Elles suscitent, le cas échéant, la rédaction de *notes* très étudiées qui reprennent tous les aspects de l'affaire. Elles peuvent donner matière à des instructions particulières envoyées aux postes, parfois à leur demande.

Il va de soi que le traitement au jour le jour de ces affaires courantes n'exige pas généralement le recours à des précédents très éloignés dans le passé et qu'elles peuvent être réglées avec les dossiers encore conservés par les Services, ou, parfois, à l'aide de documents déjà versés à la Direction des Archives diplomatiques mais restés au stade de classement intermédiaire sans être encore entrés dans l'inventaire définitif du Fonds historique prévu par la loi française sur les Archives du 6 décembre 1979.

Les instruments de travail imprimés les plus utiles à l'action diplomatique de court et moyen termes sont alors les publications des Traités en vigueur[1] et les publications de la *Documentation française* rattachée *au Premier ministre*, qui publie avec la collaboration des différents ministères, celui des Affaires étrangères en particulier, des documents d'actualité (*Textes du jour, Notes et Études* documentaires, Chronologies), travaux sérieux mais rapides, correspondant aux besoins du moment.

La collection des *Documents diplomatiques français* se place au contraire dans le long terme. Elle présente des caractères spécifiques dans ses objectifs et dans ses méthodes. Si l'on veut envisager à propos de ces travaux la notion d'*objectif politique* et dégager cette formulation de ce qu'elle pourrait présenter d'ambiguïté, il faut se reporter à la

première série de cette collection, et à son titre : *Les Origines diplomatiques de la guerre 1870-71, recueil de documents publiés par le ministère des Affaires étrangères.*

On connaît la violente commotion que fut pour la France la défaite de 1870, qui suscita du côté français et du côté allemand de nombreux ouvrages d'histoire, travaux nécessairement incomplets, parfois trop passionnés et souvent tendancieux. C'est en 1907 (arrêté du 9 mars) que le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Stéphen Pichon, créa une autre « institution chargée de réunir et de publier les documents relatifs à la tragédie de 1870, de déterminer le rôle et la responsabilité de chacun dans la déclaration de guerre et dans les négociations qui l'avaient préparée et suivie ». Il s'agissait en même temps de rechercher les causes d'un certain isolement français, de situer respectivement les pays et les gouvernements d'Europe les uns par rapport aux autres. Qui plus est, le même arrêté exprimait le principe démocratique selon lequel « le peuple a le droit d'être instruit de toute la vérité afin de porter des jugements équitables sur les hommes dont l'action a été si profonde sur ses destinées ». Il faut rappeler quelques expressions clés de ce texte : « réunir et mettre à jour dans un esprit de complète impartialité les documents qui permettent de raconter en connaissance de cause l'histoire d'une époque [. . .] recueil de faits vérifiés et contrôlés ». C'était l'affirmation de la valeur inestimable et du rôle indispensable du document authentique qui s'exprimait dans un besoin de voir enfin clair, plus de 30 ans après les événements.

Un tel arrêté signifiait néanmoins à l'époque une sorte de révolution dans les pratiques des Affaires étrangères, ce ministère qui apparaissait aux yeux de tous comme un temple du Secret. Si l'on s'intéresse à l'histoire des mentalités, on peut se rappeler la phrase mémorable, dans le style de l'époque, d'un pourtant remarquable chef de la division des Archives sous La Restauration, le comte d'Hauterive, gardien farouche du secret des Archives, hostile à toute communication de documents : « l'expérience du passé, écrivait-il, fut comme un flambeau qui ne cessa jamais d'éclairer la scène du présent ». Et il ajoutait : « On a voulu surtout que cette expérience ne servît qu'à nous[2] », comme si celui qui avait été dans sa jeunesse le collaborateur de Talleyrand voulait préserver les recettes de l'habileté diplomatique.

L'esprit avait changé en 1907; on s'aperçoit que l'arrêté créant cette première commission coïncide, à quelques jours près, avec les décrets de réorganisation de l'administration des Affaires étrangères par la commission créée à cet effet au mois de novembre 1906, dont le rapporteur fut Philippe Berthelot, l'adjoint au Cabinet du ministre des Affaires étrangères et dont on connaît la largeur de vues[3]. On lisait dans

le rapport au Président de la République, « les archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères doivent lui servir à faire de la politique plutôt que de l'histoire » (l'histoire bien entendu n'étant pas cependant par ces derniers termes exclue).

Les Archives des Affaires étrangères dont le travail se poursuivait dans l'ombre depuis le XVII[e] siècle étaient prêtes techniquement à fournir la matière documentaire nécessaire aux travaux de la nouvelle commission de publication. Les efforts pour le classement, l'inventaire et la conservation en avaient été stimulés par la Commission des Archives diplomatiques, créée depuis le 9 mai 1874, commission de sauvegarde qui a survécu jusqu'à nos jours et dont le ministre des Affaires étrangères est le premier président[4]. L'un de ses membres les plus brillants fut Gabriel Hanotaux, archiviste-paléographe, historien, diplomate puis ministre des Affaires étrangères. Il faut noter que la sévérité[5] de ses règlements vis-à-vis d'un large public n'avait pas laissé le ministère des Affaires étrangères fermé à l'évolution et au développement de la recherche historique que connut le XIX[e] siècle. Un des chefs de la Division des Archives avait été l'historien François Mignet[6]. Le Ministère participait à la collection des *Documents inédits* depuis sa création par Guizot[7]. Depuis 1880, le Bureau historique des Archives recrutait des archivistes-paléographes, anciens élèves de l'École des Chartes, spécialisés dans la recherche, la critique et la publication des documents.

C'est ainsi que la Commission créée en 1907 eut d'emblée à sa disposition les documents manuscrits à éditer, le ministère français des Affaires étrangères gardant ses propres archives depuis l'origine sans versement aux Archives Nationales, et possédant un personnel compétent, initié à la méthode historique.

Cette Commission de publication créée, qui prit, pour point de départ de son premier volume édité en 1910, la date du 25 décembre 1863, remplissait d'emblée les conditions pour mener à bien un travail scientifique, confié à des spécialistes de la diplomatie de l'histoire et des Archives. La lecture du dernier volume, le 29[e], où n'est occulté aucun des reproches reçus par la France de la part des Cours étrangères[8], ne laisse pas de doute sur la vertu d'impartialité qui a présidé à toute l'œuvre.

Dans son ouvrage *Tout empire périra*, qui a pour sous-titre *Une vision théorique des relations internationales*, le Professeur Jean-Baptiste Duroselle consacre un long développement au thème de *la Guerre*, la Guerre dont le spectre est toujours présent, au XIX[e] et la première moitié du XX[e] siècle, à l'arrière-plan des négociations et même des spéculations intellectuelles[9].

Le déroulement des faits, en notre domaine, le montre avec éclat. Les trois premières publications de documents diplomatiques menées à bien en France se termineront toutes à une date limite, celle d'une déclaration de guerre ou du début des hostilités ou des quelques jours qui les suivent : août 1870, août 1914, septembre 1939.

Lorsque le dernier volume des documents sur les origines de la guerre de 1870 (paraissait en 1932), depuis quatre ans déjà (le 28 janvier 1928), un décret avait été pris, instituant une nouvelle commission, qui, sous un dénomination semblable, devait étudier les origines de 1914-1918.

En ce qui concerne la troisième Commission, le déroulement de l'Histoire mondiale amena le gouvernement français à prendre un décret, le 2 mars 1961, pour étudier les origines du conflit de 1939-1945, témoignage d'une persistance dans les esprits, au cours des décennies, d'un concept et d'une réalité : la Guerre, toujours plus étendue et plus redoutable en raison des progrès techniques.

Il y avait certes de la part des États un objectif politique, celui de dégager, preuves à l'appui, leur responsabilité vis-à-vis de la résurgence de ce fléau. L'article 231 du traité de Versailles, qui posait la question des culpabilités, avait causé un vif émoi en France comme en Grande-Bretagne et ailleurs.

Comme ce fut déjà vrai pour la guerre de 1870, les publications de documents subséquentes dépassèrent ce caractère de plaidoyer défensif ou d'examen de conscience. Le terme que l'on retrouvait dans leurs trois titres successifs, le mot *origines*, dit nettement la volonté d'une étude des causes lointaines ou immédiates, qui permettent d'analyser les problèmes et leurs antécédents pour en percevoir la solution : approcher la Vérité, tel est le principal objectif politique de ce travail de longue haleine représenté par les *Documents diplomatiques français*.

Quand l'actuelle Commission de publication, créée en vertu du décret du 28 février 1983, succédait à celle de la Seconde Guerre mondiale qui venait de terminer ses travaux, elle entreprenait les siens dans un contexte international où, malgré l'absence d'un traité de paix avec l'Allemagne, la paix mondiale avait pu, pendant 30 ans, être préservée dans une atmosphère, il est vrai, troublée de graves conflits régionaux. L'objectif poursuivi dans la conduite des relations internationales se formule différemment, comme s'il ne s'agissait plus de prévenir ou de préparer la guerre avec efficience, mais d'assurer au mieux la continuation de la paix, de rendre la guerre impossible par l'équilibre des forces, paradoxalement, sous la menace constante du péril atomique.

Dans cet idéal et ces efforts de « paix perpétuelle », la publication en cours des *Documents diplomatiques français*, ouverte sur l'avenir, ne possède plus comme les précédentes de date limite où s'arrêter, de *terminus ad quem*, comme on dit de façon un peu pédante.

Les quatre collections françaises avec les nuances qu'elles présentent dans leur problématique au cours d'un siècle entier 1863-1960 (date actuellement atteinte malgré les interruptions signalées), et leurs 149 volumes offrent donc l'exemple d'une **histoire des relations internationales par les documents**, extrêmement variée et vivante. À travers les textes de diplomates, qui en ont été les témoins, on voit se succéder sur la scène internationale les prépondérances et les déclins, la naissance et la fin des Empires, la création de nouveaux États tandis que d'autres disparaissent, spectacle d'annexions et d'invasions et de tous les types de crises, d'institutions, d'idéologies. L'époque recouvre à la fois la désagrégation de l'Empire ottoman, la fin de l'Autriche-Hongrie, l'alliance franco-russe et le triomphe de la révolution soviétique, l'unité allemande, sa rupture et les discussions sur la réunification après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le développement de la politique multilatérale parallèle à l'extension du grand réseau des organisations internationales, la SDN, puis l'ONU, son organigramme complexe et les groupes régionaux, les étapes de la construction européenne, et l'emprise toujours plus accentuée des facteurs économiques. Chacun de ces titres évoque de volumineux dossiers et la liste est loin d'être complète.

Dès l'origine, les maîtres d'œuvre successifs de l'entreprise, les professeurs Pierre Renouvin, Maurice Baumont, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, et il ne faudrait pas oublier le rapport du Ministre (20 mail 1910) signé par les membres et les secrétaires de la toute première Commission pour l'étude des années 1870-1871, ont eu soin de rédiger des textes d'introduction, réflexions sur la méthode, qui établissent ou rappellent les principes de base, avec pour chaque période ou époque les questions particulières qu'il convient de poser aux documents. Entre ces historiens s'est établi un consensus pour le choix d'un ordre chronologique. Ils l'ont considéré comme le plus apte à faire saisir l'inextricable complexité de facteurs concomitants et leur interaction. Ils cherchaient en même temps une vision plus concrète, plus colorée, plus contrastée et finalement plus vraie de la vie internationale. Chaque matin, dans tous les postes diplomatiques et consulaires du monde, les chefs de postes réunissent leurs collaborateurs et cette réunion est le point de départ du ou des télégrammes du jour, résultat à la fois d'entretiens avec les autorités locales, des nouvelles glanées dans les réceptions ou ailleurs, de la lecture de la presse du pays, des instructions ou des questions du Département.

Si, poussant la méthode à l'extrême, on reconstituait la liste des textes envoyés au Ministère le même jour de tous les coins du monde, le résultat en serait sans doute curieux : on peut songer aux réactions diverses communiquées à Paris et suscitées de toutes parts, lorsque l'affaire algérienne fut portée, dans les années cinquante, devant l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU. Il se trouve que les archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères sont particulièrement bien équipées pour adopter un tel ordre chronologique puisqu'elles possèdent, en sus des dossiers, classés méthodiquement dans chaque direction de l'organigramme, *une collection chronologique des télégrammes* — Arrivée et Départ, classée par postes et bien conservée.

Le caractère scientifique des publications de *Documents diplomatiques français* est leur seule raison d'être et leur seul objectif politique. C'est la seule condition pour qu'ils puissent servir de justificatif en certaines circonstances. Elles imposent donc les mêmes disciplines de rigueur que tout travail scientifique : précision dans la reproduction des documents, dans l'étude de leur date de départ et d'arrivée à travers les étapes de leur acheminement jusqu'à leur ultime destinataire.

Précisons qu'ils faut distinguer cette collection de celles des *Livres jaunes* où sont regroupés les documents utilisés pour des négociations importantes. Composés parfois hâtivement, des erreurs, notamment chronologiques, ont pu y être relevées, justement au moment des travaux pour les publications de Documents dipomatiques. C'est ainsi que le Professeur Pierre Renouvin, spécialiste consommé dans « l'art de vérifier les dates » et l'enchaînement des événements, put corriger une grave erreur dans la succession des déclarations de guerre en 1914.

Cette finalité, qui est de comprendre le déroulement des événements, les causes et les conséquences, exige intuition et savoir pour la critique interne des textes, impartialité dans leur choix — le choix judicieux et impartial qui est le plus grand tourment des équipes, l'objet de leurs scrupules, le sujet de leurs discussions.

Les auteurs des publications diplomatiques se sont tenus en France à un principe de base, la publication intégrale du document sans aucune coupure, une phrase omise pouvant ouvrir la porte à un soupçon. Il est bien entendu que les documents complémentaires trop nombreux pour être publiés sont signalés en note. Le souci de faire côtoyer dans les équipes des spécialistes des archives, des historiens et des diplomates par leur formation entraînés à l'objectivité, garantit leur neutralité. La matière première qu'ils manient, télégrammes, dépêches diplomatiques ou notes, si elle exprime assez souvent des points de vue personnels, est soumise à

la discipline administrative et ne dérive pas dans les excès de passion ou d'idéologie. Il est relativement aisé d'analyser les intérêts et les aspirations des parties en présence. Le chercheur lucide, rompu aux études historiques et très loin du monde imaginaire d'Orwell, pratiquera donc sans trop de peine la vertu d'impartialité; la plus grande difficulté de choix reste pour lui de déterminer le document le plus riche de signification, celui qui donne l'image la plus proche de la réalité internationale. Les documents du XIX[e] siècle rendent compte principalement des relations entre les personnages de premier plan comme s'ils étaient à eux seuls les responsables de l'évolution historique.

Le problème majeur avant la Seconde Guerre mondiale est celui des alliances militaires. Les progrès d'une conception sociologique de l'histoire, une plus grande attention apportée à l'histoire des peuples et des civilisations, aux phénomènes économiques et démographiques (brassage des populations par les voyages et les immigrations (volontaires ou forcées), lié à la rapidité des transports et aux progrès techniques accélérés), une mondialisation des problèmes, dont ne sont pas absentes les préoccupations éthiques (déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme, protection de la nature) élargissent de plus en plus le champ des questions explorées par les documents diplomatiques. Les incidences culturelles ou commerciales ne peuvent être ignorées. Il importe, dans la recherche des causes et l'étude des décisions, d'envisager, non seulement le rôle des personnalités qui incarnent le pouvoir, mais aussi celui de groupes de pression multiples et des opinions publiques.

Tels sont les principes sans cesse médités depuis 1907 par les rédacteurs des Documents diplomatiques français.

Il ne faut pas se dissimuler que, malgré ces efforts et ces ambitions, la perfection sera toujours difficile à atteindre : beaucoup d'éléments d'appréciation pour le choix manqueront toujours (conversations secrètes, intervention du téléphone). Le poète diplomate Paul Claudel, ambassadeur à Washington de 1927 à 1932, écrivait en 1936 évoquant les événements de 1914 : « ... Qui connaîtra jamais la teneur des communications téléphoniques qui, pendant les derniers jours, ont été échangées d'une chancellerie à l'autre. Qui saura l'influence sur les événements de cet enchevêtrement inextricable et anonyme de quiproquos et de coq à l'âne[10] ».

Dans ces travaux scientifiques, le ministère des Affaires étrangères connut, après la Seconde Guerre mondiale surtout, des difficultés supplémentaires par la perte ou la destruction de documents qu'il fallut reconstituer grâce aux archives des ambassades.

Pour combler d'autres lacunes, il fallut parfois recourir à des dépôts d'archives extérieurs; celui de la Guerre en particulier pour les débuts essentiellement militaires de l'alliance franco-russe.

Le Ministère en revanche possède la précieuse série intitulée *Papiers d'agents*, 360 fonds d'anciens diplomates, riches en *lettres particulières* écrites au Ministre ou à leur supérieur hiérarchique en raison de leurs fonctions. Elles éclairent des circonstances, révèlent des ressorts psychologiques que l'impersonnalité des documents officiels ne laisse pas apparaître.

Quels sont les objectifs politiques visés par ces travaux scientifiques? Constituer un vaste *Corpus* où seront insérées les tranches chronologiques qui manquent encore, ensemble exclusivement composé, mises à part les exceptions obligatoires déjà signalées, de documents sortis du fonds des Archives des Affaires étrangères, les autres ministères et institutions étant compétents, de leur côté, pour publier les documents qu'ils ont produits.

L'apprenti diplomate trouvera dans ce *Corpus* une leçon de pratique politique, par les textes dont la lecture est aussi indispensable qu'une anthologie, dans un manuel d'histoire littéraire.

La consultation fréquente de la collection devrait s'imposer également aux diplomates en activité, comme une manière d'entretenir leur culture historique et surtout comme un **instrument de travail.** Il sera d'ailleurs aisé d'envisager, et on y songe, la constitution, grâce aux tables méthodiques détaillées, déjà présentes en tête de chaque volume, des refontes périodiques en un volume de synthèse consacré à des sujets importants, citons la Communauté européenne, la France, l'Union soviétique et les pays de l'Est...

Chacun reconnaît à l'Histoire les imperfections de toutes les sciences humaines : ces travaux ne dégageront pas, certes, des solutions automatiques pour l'action diplomatique; ils ne prévoiront pas l'imprévu, l'impossible, ni les situations aberrantes. Ils doivent pourtant, obligatoirement, être connus de tout acteur de la politique et de la diplomatie.

Aucune affaire ne peut s'introduire sans précédent, sans la connaissance de données permanentes géographiques, économiques, sociologiques, culturelles; l'historiographie actuelle s'intéresse tout particulièrement aux manifestations de la mémoire collective. Aucun historien n'ignore que tout accident qui, soudainement, focalise l'attention mondiale, est le résultat spectaculaire d'une lente évolution. C'est une constatation, devenue presque un lieu commun, que les clauses des traités

de Versailles, Saint-Germain, Trianon et Sèvres des années 1919-1920 contenaient les germes de la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

L'attentat de Sarajevo, qui déclencha la guerre de 1914-1918, fait divers tragique de la politique internationale, s'inscrivait, on le sait, dans la longue histoire de la Question d'orient. Dès le premier volume des *Documents diplomatiques français* (1re série *DDF* 1914-1918), le 4 février 1872, plus de 40 ans auparavant, se lit un document révélateur : une dépêche du consul général à Belgrade sur la situation des Slaves du Sud en Autriche et dans les Balkans. L'auteur parle du vaste chaos dont l'Autriche offre le spectacle, des aspirations communes des différentes familles « iugo-slaves », des rivalités intérieures et étrangères qui tendent à les séparer. Il examine plusieurs solutions tour à tour envisagées, tantôt au profit de la Croatie (Zagreb autrefois Agram), tantôt de la Serbie — soutenue par Saint-Pétersbourg. Les arguments invoqués aujourd'hui dans les discussions de notre actualité se trouvent déjà, alors, dans les cas de figure imaginés, comme dans un jeu de cartes rebattu plusieurs fois. Les volumes suivants de la même série aideraient certainement à comprendre ce drame de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine, provinces turques détachées de l'Empire ottoman sans être devenues comme la Serbie ou la Grèce des États indépendants. Passées sous la domination de l'Empire austro-hongrois, devenues en 1878 protectorat autrichien, puis annexées, elles avaient été, après la chute de cet Empire, ballotées dans des structures politiques successives, avec leur population mêlée de Serbes, de Slovènes et de Croates où se côtoyaient catholiques romains, orthodoxes et musulmans.

A-t-on pris soin de relire ces documents récemment? Car tel est le problème, celui de la vérité demeurée au fond du puits ou, pour emprunter le titre d'un ouvrage paru assez récemment, celui de la « Connaissance inutile[11] ».

On n'aurait pas l'inconscience de proposer aux diplomates dans leurs prenantes fonctions des séances d'études directes dans les dossiers d'archives. Les commissions de publication sont des relais, des sortes de bureaux historiques permanents qui peuvent les aider et dont ils doivent connaître les publications. Ils y sont tenus.

Un exemple a été récemment donné par le Professeur Jacques Bariéty, conseiller historique du ministre des Affaires étrangères et directeur du groupe récemment créé pour la publication des documents de 1920 à 1932. Il a organisé avec la collaboration de l'IHRIC (Institut d'Histoire de Relations Internationales Contemporaines) et des Archives

diplomatiques un colloque sur le sujet : « La France et le royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes en 1920 ».

L'utilité des *DDF* dans le domaine de l'action diplomatique pose un problème de diffusion auquel sont sensibilisés les services d'archives des Affaires étrangères et leur directeur[12]. Cette action basée sur la connaissance historique des problèmes est dans la tradition du ministère des Affaires étrangères français où il a toujours existé depuis la réorganisation du XVIII[e] siècle un groupe d'érudits chargé d'assister les commis dans leurs travaux[13]. Les *Instructions aux ambassadeurs* de l'Ancien Régime, qui sont publiées, contiennent, à l'usage des représentants de la France à l'étranger, de véritables tableaux historiques permettant, au XVIII[e] siècle, de faire le point des relations de la France avec tel or tel pays, et il n'est pas exagéré de dire qu'elles pourraient avoir encore aujourd'hui leur utilité.

La série que nous appelons les *DDF*, dont la lecture devrait être un devoir d'état pour les diplomates, présentera donc aussi une sorte de Patrimoine, avec ses milliers de documents édités avec l'année 1863 pour point de départ comme une mémoire du ministère des Affaires étrangères en tant qu'institution. On a reconnu maintes fois la qualité d'écriture qui ajoute à son intérêt. Le Ministère a compté parmi ses agents des écrivains célèbres comme Paul Claudel et Alexis Léger et beaucoup d'autres diplomates, parmi lesquels les Paul Cambon, les François Poncet — et de bien plus récents aussi — méritent le titre de diplomates écrivains. La solidité de pensée, la valeur d'expression de leurs texts en renforcent l'intérêt documentaire.

NOTES

1. *Recueil des traités et accords de la France*, publié depuis 1958 par le Bureau des traités de la Direction des Affaires juridiques du ministère des Affaires étrangères. Il concerne les accords en vigueur publiés au *Journal officiel*. Il peut être complété par le *Recueil général des Traités de la France* publié depuis 1976 sous la direction de Roger Pinto avec la collaboration d'Henry Rollet (contient les accords non publiés au *Journal* officiel).

Il faut ajouter à ces publications françaises le *Recueil des Traités* enregistrés à l'ONU.

2. P. Enjalran, *Les Archives du ministère des Relations extérieures* tome *Histoire*, pp. 251 ss.

3. *Les Affaires étrangères et le corps diplomatique français*, ouvrage collectif sous la direction de Jean Baillou, ministre plénipotentiaire, Paris, Éditions du CNRS, 1984, p. 55.

4. *Les Archives du ministère des Relations extérieures*, ouvr. cit., pp. 301, 245, 31.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. *Les Origines diplomatiques de la Guerre de 1870-1871*, Recueil de documents publié par le ministre des Affaires étrangères, t. XXIX, 16 juillet 1870-10 août 1870, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1932.

9. J.B. Duroselle, *Tout Empire périra.* Une vision théorique des relations internationales, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, Série internationale (16), p. 249.

10. Paul Claudel, *Souvenirs de la Carrière* (*Le téléphone*), dans *Œuvre en Prose*, Paris, Gallimard (Pléiade), p. 260.

11. J.-F. Revel, *La Connaissance inutile*, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1988, *passim.*

12. M. François Renouard, ministre plénipotentiaire, directeur des Archives diplomatiques et de la Documentation du ministère des Affaires étrangères.

13. *Les Archives du ministère des Relations extérieures*, ouvr. cit., pp. 95, 112, 316.

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS, POLITICAL OBJECTIVES, SCHOLARLY REQUIREMENTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

Reflections on the German Experience with the Series *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*

Hans-Peter Schwarz

Résumé

L'auteur traite ici d'une question importante qui intéresse tous les participants, celle de savoir comment les rédacteurs de documents diplomatiques réagissent devant les doutes profondément enracinés qu'entretient l'opinion publique contemporaine à propos de l'objectivité des publications gouvernementales. Pour tenir compte de cette préoccupation, le ministère allemand des Affaires étrangères a confié la publication d'une nouvelle série de documents diplomatiques à un organisme de recherche impartial et respecté, l'Institut für Zeitgeschichte de Munich, tout en exigeant qu'un bureau de l'Institut soit logé au ministère des Affaires étrangères à Bonn. Le Ministère assure le financement du projet et garantit le libre accès à tous les documents pertinents, tandis que l'Institut nomme les membres du comité de rédaction de la série, ainsi que tous les membres du personnel de rédaction, de manière à assurer un partage net des pouvoirs entre les spécialistes et les chercheurs, d'une part, et le ministère des Affaires étrangères, d'autre part, au sein d'une structure d'organisation complexe mais viable.

When you launch a new series of diplomatic documents, as we did in the early 1990s in the Federal Republic of Germany, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. In this instance, lessons could be drawn from the merits and shortcomings of earlier series of German diplomatic documents. We could analyze, as well, the editions of other countries—only merits, of course, no shortcomings whatsoever! But either way we had to find solutions to requirements and administrative conditions that are

more or less similar in all pluralist societies at the end of the twentieth century.

From the vast field of such problems let me take up only one question and give you an outline of how we have tried to solve it. This question may be phrased as follows: how can the editors of diplomatic documents deal with the deep-seated suspicion of contemporary public opinion with respect to the objectivity of governmental publications?

A critical, highly suspicious, sceptical public—maybe this is a typical German phenomenon. It is possible that critical historians, critical journalists and critical students in other countries equally mistrust the objectivity of their governmental institutions—objectivity with respect to the selection of documents, objectivity with respect to the allocation of scarce financial resources to the elucidation of certain periods with the result that others are much less well documented, objectivity also with respect to the inclusion of "critical" documents without any attempt at suppression or at deferment of declassification or at censoring parts of an important document.

As we all know, mistrust of these series is mostly unfounded and unjustified. Most archivists and most editors of official series are historians deeply committed to the standards of objective scholarship but also highly conscious of the basic legitimacy of such suspicion and scepticism in a liberal society. Nevertheless, this mistrust is a fact of life, at least in my country. Therefore, I think it is not unreasonable to address it even before the public mistrust boils up with respect to certain events that play a role in the selection or in the presentation of diplomatic documents.

How did we deal with this suspicion when we had to make the basic decisions on the organizational set-up of a new series of German diplomatic documents? We decided to apply the venerable principle of the division of powers to the edition, making sure that the prevailing power would be given to independent scholars but without depriving the government of the authority to deny declassification of a secret or a top-secret document if necessary.

Initially two organizational options were under discussion. The first option would have provided for the appointment of an independent university professor as general editor and, at his recommendation, of a board of editors to be entrusted with planning and carrying out the publication of a new series. The organizational responsibility, according to option number one, would have remained with the Foreign Office, though the general editor and the board of editors would have been

charged with making binding recommendations for the appointment of the editorial team and for the guidance of this team. The second option was to work out, at the recommendation of a general editor, a more complicated scheme, entrusting an independent research institute with the editing of the new series, and working out a complex organizational structure for the appointment of the editors and of the editorial team and for carrying out all organizational tasks involved, including the right to decide upon the concept and to choose the publisher.

At my recommendation, the second, much more radical option of a separation of powers between the community of scholars and the Foreign Office was adopted, and in 1989 a rather complex, but workable structure was set up. The German Foreign Office entrusted the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich, with the publication of the new series with the proviso that a branch be located at Bonn in rooms inside the secure area of the Foreign Office next to its political archive.

The Institut für Zeitgeschichte, as you know, is an independent and respected research institute in the field of contemporary history. It was founded in 1951 and is financed by the federal government and by the German Länder. Its statute provides for a non-political governing body composed of senior civil servants from different ministries of the federal government and from the Länder governments, for an independent director, and for an independent advisory council composed of respected university professors with scholarly credentials in different fields of contemporary history.

The institute receives a yearly grant from the budget of the Foreign Office covering all costs of the editing of the series *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (for personnel, administration, publication, travel, etc.). This grant is included in the budget of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte and is subject to the usual administrative regulations of independent research institutes according to German public law. The organizational responsibility for the editorial team lies with the institute; the responsibility for scholarly guidance and supervision lies with the general editor.

The governing body of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte appoints the general editor, with the consent of the German foreign minister and at the joint proposal of the advisory body, composed of independent university professors, and of the director of the institute. By a joint proposal of the general editor, the director of the institute, and the advisory body, the board of editors of the series is appointed by the governing body of the

institute. The same procedure applies to the appointment of each member of the editorial staff.

The exclusive responsibility for the edition as a whole, for the selection of documents, for the formal and substantial presentation of the documents, namely the most objective form of annotations, is entrusted to the general editor and to the board of governors. As full professors at different universities they do not belong to the Institut für Zeitgeschichte nor do they belong to the Foreign Office. Their task of setting up and guiding a complex edition requires, of course, regular meetings in Bonn (since 1990, usually one or two days per month). Each document printed, including the annotations, is discussed at the monthly meeting of the editors with the editorial staff.

All editors and, of course, the editorial staff have a clearance for classified documents of all categories, so they have free access to all documents in safekeeping in the political archive of the Foreign Office. This allows access without interference from the hierarchy of the Foreign Office or from the archivists in the political archive, so that all documents that might be included in the series or used for the purpose of annotation can be identified. Needless to say, it is up to the very competent editorial staff to make a first broad selection of documents proposed for inclusion. As in all similar editions, the editorial team plays a crucial part in the process. In general, two staff members and the head of the team are responsible to the editors for editing documents pertaining to one year (1963, 1964, 1965 and so on). Their responsibility is mentioned on the title page, but the basic responsibility for each volume lies entirely with the general editor and the board of editors.

What are the powers of the Foreign Office in this elaborate system of division of powers?

Some have already been mentioned, but at first glance, the ministry has many responsibilities. It provides for the funding (a difficult job, indeed, in the German political system, as in other countries). In addition, the ministry provides for accommodation of the editorial team and of the editors. It provides the computers and other technical equipment. It guarantees, as has been mentioned, free access to all relevant files and declassification of documents at the request of the editors.

Confidential documents under the 30-year rule are free for publication without specific approval. But in general such documents are only needed for the purpose of annotation. The bulk of documents included in our series consists of classified documents ("secret", "top

secret"). Germany has a decentralized system for the declassification of such documents. The responsibility for declassification lies first with the relevant ministry where the document was generated, and secondly with the respective desk officer. When the editors have decided to include a document in a publication, a request for release is made according to the general rules that are to be followed in the Foreign Office. In most instances, declassification is approved without delay. If a request has not been successful on the first attempt, and if the document cannot be replaced by another that is equally valid and for which permission to publish has been obtained, a second request is made. Owing to the location of competent and trustworthy editorial staff in the Foreign Office, and thanks to the support of the archivists of the Foreign Office and a general understanding of the prerequisites of scholarly research on the part of the diplomats, it is usually possible to have a frank discussion with a desk officer in charge who, for various reasons, has not declassified a document or a group of documents in the first instance. As a result, the second request is usually successful.

After the experience with the declassification practice for three years—1963, 1964 and 1965—one can say that, thanks to the liberal practice of declassification, each volume contains the essential documents that, after intensive discussion in the meetings of the editors with the editorial team, seemed to be "fit to print". If the requests for declassification were to be turned down in considerable numbers, independent scholars could not fulfil their responsibility toward the domestic and the international public. All depends on the willingness of the desk officers to declassify in a liberal spirit. But one should add that this liberal attitude is being helped by the continuing commitment of the archivists in the Foreign Office, and by the conviction in all echelons of bureaucratic decision-making at the Foreign Office that there is great public utility in unrestricted publication of documents, even if they show failures, internal controversies, errors of judgment and long-abandoned or still controversial policies on the part of German decision-makers.

As you may have seen, the first three volumes covering the entire year 1963 were published in September 1993. But the publication year on the title page reads 1994 because the Foreign Office rightly pointed out that our Archival Law prescribes a 30-year rule and has to be strictly obeyed. Therefore, the documents for the year 1963 are accessible, according to our legal requirements, only after January 2, 1994. The two volumes covering the entire year 1964 will appear in September 1994, and three volumes on 1965 in September 1995.

The compulsion to publish the relevant volumes year by year exactly 30 years after the events took place, thus making maximum use of the 30-year rule, will set, we hope, a standard for liberal archival policies. Though such a rigorous deadline is a burden for the editorial team and for the editors, it accustoms the desk officers to declassifying secret documents—at request, as I mentioned, without delay after 30 years. And since a liberal standard for declassification has prevailed from the very beginning, there is good reason to hope that this standard, once set, will not be lowered in the years to come.

Admittedly, what I have outlined is a somewhat complicated structure, also one that deviates from the organizational practice of other countries. We all know that conditions differ from country to country. There is no such thing as a perfect, universally applicable model. Nevertheless, we have tried a new model in order to avoid all sorts of political or bureaucratic interference in the publication of diplomatic documents. So far, the interlocking institutions have not turned out to be interblocking institutions. The system works, the reviews in the quality press are quite favourable, we have not heard the slightest criticism from any political camp, conservatives and progressives seem to be equally happy with the result, and let's hope that our friends in the international community of editors of diplomatic documents may now care to comment on the merits or the possible dangers of this new concept.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

Katrina Hicks

The chair, **Margaret Conrad**, opened the discussion by highlighting the three main themes raised by the presenters: the problem of rising costs, which may be checked by new technologies; the problem of relevance of publications for use within and outside the public service; and the problem of credibility faced by publishers because of public scepticism about truth and trust and the need to balance the input of scholars and bureaucrats.

Albert Legault commented generally on cost and noted that, in future, books may not even be printed, but will simply be put on a database and the user will download as required. He suggested that an international database would be a useful system for international information sharing which, though costly to start, would have long-term utility and be cost-effective. Professor Legault invited commentary from the British representatives.

Richard Bone responded that while the United Kingdom is discussing these ideas, they have made no firm policy decisions yet. He stated that we are on the eve of the second computer revolution, in which we currently have the capacity to store much information, yet are only now moving into the phase of accessing this information. The British and many other foreign offices are moving in the same direction, that is to ensure that they are not simply being led by technology. While the "siren voices" of information technology may tempt us to enter into massive data collection and dissemination projects, foreign office historians must be pragmatic and consider the real costs, needs and priorities.

On the question of international access, Mr. Bone stated that "Internet" for the British Foreign Office is a real possibility within the next year. Their aim is to make machine-readable information available on current international issues. But questions remain about its merits and the existence of viable markets, given other news sources already available. Information was once considered power, but now there is just too much. We have to make sense of it, define its value to us and determine what we need it for.

CD-ROM technology is more user-friendly than microfiche and print. Mr. Bone's instinct is that this technology is the way to go, but he welcomes other views. This year the Foreign Office is starting to transfer

their records to electronic media. The technology has tremendous potential which in his view outweighs possible problems like compatibility of systems.

William Slany confirmed that the United States is in step with the United Kingdom. CD-ROM was up and running as of January 1, 1994 for the *Foreign Relations* series and the 35 volumes on the Kennedy administration may be available on a single disk by year end. The question remains as to how to harness and channel this information. Internet is already being used for some documents. Cost continues to be a consideration, in terms of time, editing and typing; there was also the urgent need for the State Department to disseminate information to the appropriate users.

John Hilliker commented on the problem of too much information, which makes access almost more difficult than before. Referring to an article from the *New Yorker* about the demise of the card-catalogue system, he concurred with the view that computers provide too many choices.

William Slany pointed out that software is now being developed to emulate the speed and "searchability" of databases, which will help to solve this problem. The challenge is to determine an appropriate end use.

Antoine Fleury noted that two different issues were being discussed: the first relates to responsibilities for scholarly research and public information, the second to getting information into electronic formats. Computers are now a fact of life at universities all over the world and what we need is programs that can be adapted to specific needs. There are also outstanding questions about maintaining original electronic documents versus putting old archived documents on electronic systems.

Sidney Aster agreed that the first question to be answered is: "Who is your market?" Once that has been decided a decision on the most appropriate medium (e.g., CD-ROM) can be made. **Richard Bone** disagreed. In his view, one of the potentialities of the new technology is that we do not have to answer the question of market quite so rigidly as 20 years ago because we can produce more information more cheaply. For example, three years ago, the switch to desktop publishing put a ceiling on rising costs. Because CD-ROM has the same potential it does seem possible that more information can be made available to more people. Today, technologically unsophisticated organizations can create and read CD-ROMs. This is a genuine information revolution as CD-ROMs are more difficult to control than the printed word. By contrast, access

through a card index is controlled by the creator of the index. Using technology, the user can access anything by using keywords.

IV: Keeping in Touch with the Clientele
Pour rester en contact avec la clientèle

REDEFINING OUR ROLE
Pressures for Change in the 1990s
An Australian Perspective

Wendy Way

Résumé

Le projet sur les documents australiens relève du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce, mais jusqu'ici le projet s'est déroulé pour ainsi dire en marge de l'appareil gouvernemental, et d'une manière d'autant plus indépendante que le projet a été confié à un conseil consultatif de rédaction formé d'universitaires. Les changements récents qui ont touché les services et l'appareil gouvernemental ont contraint les Australiens à observer de façon plus stricte les usages du Ministère, notamment en matière de dotation, et un examen organisationnel les a amenés à considérer la fonction publique elle-même comme un client. Par souci de s'adapter à l'évolution des besoins des clients issus du monde de l'enseignement, les Australiens étudient de nouvelles méthodes de publication; ils songent notamment à s'orienter davantage d'après des thèmes et à la possibilité d'élargir l'éventail des utilisateurs potentiels en offrant des présentations adaptées à diverses clientèles. L'accroissement massif des documents d'archives souligne la nécessité d'un processus d'édition orienté en fonction d'axes thématiques.

I have been asked to do two things in this paper. First, to describe the pressures which have brought about much thought and debate and, finally, change, in the Australian documents project; and, second, to say something about the role of our Editorial Advisory Board. As the board has played an important part in the events I have to describe, I would like to begin with it.

When our project was established, some 20 years ago, it was endorsed by the cabinet of the day, and supported by the opposition, as an undertaking of the Australian government as a whole. For convenience it was physically located within the department whose records were expected to provide the bulk of the published matter, the then Department of External Affairs (now Foreign Affairs and Trade). An editor of historical

documents was recruited from a senior academic position to direct the project, which was staffed with a team of specialist historians. The department provided them all with salaries and desks, but otherwise the unit remained separate in its day-to-day operation. Its officers did not circulate through the range of positions and postings open to other officers of the department. It did not fit neatly into the departmental hierarchy: organizational charts of those days show it dangling awkwardly alone, responsible only to the department's head.

The separate nature of the project was further reinforced by the oversight of an Editorial Advisory Board of specialists in appropriate fields. The board comprises seven distinguished academic members, appointed to these largely honorary positions by the minister for foreign affairs. To emphasize the project's bipartisan nature, it also includes representatives of the prime minister and the leader of the opposition. For practical reasons, representatives of other agencies likely to have an interest in the project—currently Australian Archives and the Department of Defence—are represented at its meetings.

The board meets annually and reports to the minister for foreign affairs. It has outgrown earlier, more precise terms of reference relating to the establishment of the documents series; nowadays its function is simply described as being "to advise the Minister for Foreign Affairs with reference to the Documents project." Within that ambit come most matters of policy and performance—the shape and subject matter of the volumes, the rate of production, even their distribution. It has always held firmly to its responsibility to see that an acceptable rate of production is combined with high standards of scholarship, and that the volumes produced are given the widest circulation possible. On the other hand, it has been content to leave editorial details, including the selection of documents, to the editor, and it gives advice on such matters only when they are referred to it. For the project it provides a spur to productivity, a sounding-board for editorial problems, and, when necessary, a measure of protection.

There are points of potential friction between department and board. Some five years ago the project was absorbed into the department's divisional structure as a full branch and there is now a hierarchy of responsibility to which the editor, as any other branch head, is subject. Increasing requirements throughout the bureaucracy for economy, accountability and uniform management practices have impinged upon the project, whose officers must comply with many time-consuming requirements as a result. Staff must now be selected with an eye to their value for the mainstream department, where general positions are open to

them after two years' service. The board has already expressed its concern at this drain of expertise. And there is always the possibility that the department's view of the project's role and the view of the board may conflict. I will suggest ways in which this conflict might arise a little later.

Let me now turn to the pressures we experienced in 1992-93, which seemed to us to raise questions we are likely to face again and again in the future. These pressures came from three sources in particular: from the bureaucratic structure, from our clients, and from the archival documents we mine for our published material.

To begin with the bureaucracy: like many other foreign offices in recent years, ours has been obliged to close posts, to prune staff numbers, and at the same time to assume new responsibilities. When this squeeze was just beginning, our project was forced to surrender some staff positions, reducing us to a number we regard as the minimum necessary to maintain accustomed standards of research and production. If the pressure continues it must be expected that the department will again take a long hard look at our project. It may well ask whether present numbers can be sustained indefinitely. And it may well expect our officers to contribute more to its general goals and objectives.

Our branch is part of the department's Public Affairs Division, which was subject to internal review in 1992. The review panel's findings were based, to a considerable degree, on client responses. Here we ran into a problem. We provided a list of the persons and organizations we had traditionally regarded as our clients: academic researchers, post-graduate students, relevant institutions. The panel wanted to include representatives of the department, both in Canberra and at overseas posts. We protested that we did not regard the department as a client and did not expect it to use our product. The panel went ahead, nevertheless, and interviewed heads of some political branches in Canberra and a couple of ambassadors overseas. As we had predicted, none of the departmental representatives had found any use for our volumes.

The formal report of the review panel was generally favourable, but it was suggested, orally and quite informally, that we might do well to consider, as insurance for the future, how our activities might be made to seem more relevant to the department's main objectives. This advice seemed, on the one hand, to betray a lack of understanding of the detachment we believe our project requires to maintain its scholarly credibility but, on the other hand, it did make a great deal of political sense. We have therefore begun to think of the department as a potential client and to seek opportunities to contribute what we can. One such

opportunity came when the Editorial Advisory Board directed that copies of our volumes be placed in overseas Australian studies centres. This placement has been arranged through overseas posts, and the enthusiastic response from many has been gratifying. There is, it seems, a demand for suitable material to be used for representational purposes; we have stumbled upon a client need.

We recognize, however, that demands of the department could affect our work much more fundamentally. For example, it is possible that we might be required to set aside the program of publishing established by the Editorial Advisory Board to publish on an issue relating to current policy. How would the board respond in such a case? What should be the reaction of the editor of historical documents, who is a scholar responsible to the board but also a senior officer of the department? Boards have always accepted that we must attend to the department's need for historical advice, but demands for such advice in the past have seldom involved any significant setback to the publishing program. One exception I might mention here was preparation of a White Paper on the origins of Australia's military involvement in Vietnam. This required a significant diversion of staff time and was undertaken in a period when the question was highly political. The board made no formal protest then, although the editor of the day expressed, within the department, his concern that such a task might compromise the project's bipartisan status. Will bureaucratic pressures on staff numbers and on their functions mean more commissions of this kind, and future conflict between board and department?

The second pressure we have identified comes from our traditional clients, the academic community. We became aware of changing needs there as a result of an initiative by the Editorial Advisory Board early in 1992. At that time we had just completed editorial work on our 1946 volumes, and were well into research covering the year 1947. As the present 1937-49 series seemed close to completion, the board established a subcommittee to consider possible directions for the future.

The deliberations of the subcommittee provoked lively discussion, focusing on our academic clients. We realized that we did not know with any certainty who bought or used our volumes, who might use them if they were better advertised, what needs of users were being met, and what not. Lacking the means to indulge in full-scale market research, we had to rely on anecdotal evidence, and a telephone survey of university departments known to teach relevant undergraduate courses. It was fortunate that two of our recent recruits had been teaching undergraduates before joining us, and that some board members were still closely in touch

with teaching. And the Australian academic community, though widely scattered, is small enough to survey reasonably easily.

What we learned about undergraduate courses can be summed up briefly:

- universities are subject to very great pressures of numbers and of finances so that university libraries cannot possibly afford to purchase sufficient quantities of our volumes for general use by undergraduates;
- courses relating to the history of international relations are usually to be found in political science rather than history disciplines; undergraduates in these disciplines will probably lack the training to make use of primary documents, and
- the existing chronological format of our volumes is confusing for the less sophisticated student; footnotes and other scholarly apparatus add to their forbidding appearance.

Much as we might deplore some of these findings, we are forced to conclude that our traditional volumes do not meet the needs of most undergraduates and their teachers.

There is a small but growing demand for our volumes from post-graduate students. After family history, foreign policy is probably the busiest area of archival research in Australia, and we are accustomed to seeing researchers working in the archives reading room in Canberra with one or more of our volumes propped up alongside. Indeed, while this debate proceeded we received a testimonial in the form of a letter from one such student, who thanked us, on behalf of students working away from major locations of source documents, for making them available in published form. This service will continue to be essential, we argue, in a country so dominated by distance as is Australia. The author of the letter was a student of the University of Central Queensland, an institution with five separate campuses, in five Queensland coastal towns each at least 100 kilometres, and most nearer 300 kilometres, distant from any one of the others. He was some 1,400 kilometres from Canberra (about as far as London from Vienna).

With this evidence before it, the board's subcommittee favoured abandoning the chronological approach in favour of thematic volumes after the present series. Apart from the difficulties it posed for users, it was felt that the chronological approach had suited our project well in covering the period when Australia's foreign policy was directed by a handful of versatile officers. It would be less appropriate to a larger, more

compartmentalized department, and to post-war issues of greater complexity.

The subcommittee added other suggestions to broaden the appeal of the volumes and to meet the needs of a wider range of clients. A small "pathway" volume might be published, to help students unfamiliar with our kind of documentary material, by providing a few sample documents, with commentary and background. We might produce shorter, cheaper, topical volumes with bright and appealing soft covers, their subject matter chosen with an eye to syllabuses, the approaches pitched at students of various levels. One of the advantages of a thematic approach, we thought, would be that research into a major topic could be recycled in many ways, and spin-offs produced for various markets. Our primary aim here was not to increase sales for their own sake, but to foster the study of the history of Australia's international relations, to nurture and extend our clientele.

At this point the question of our proper role was raised. Were we really in the education business, as these suggestions seemed to imply? One response was that the department as a whole and our own Public Affairs Division in particular had acknowledged as a priority task the promotion of understanding within the Australian community of foreign and trade policy interests. Might not this include the history of foreign policy? All of this is arguable, but there can be no argument about the facts that implementing any of these ideas would take more time and more resources, and that our share of these is more likely to shrink than to increase.

The subcommittee reported all of this thinking to the Editorial Advisory Board at a meeting early in 1993. But at this meeting another more urgent problem took precedence, a problem constituting the third pressure I want to mention, arising from the archives themselves.

By this time we had completed our research for the year 1947. Our usual practice is to go the Australian Archives search room, and to photocopy from relevant files all significant material, which is then brought back and stored in the department ready for selection. It was a matter of simple measurement to establish that, using the same criteria, for 1947 we had accumulated more than double the quantity of significant material that we had for 1946. The clear fact was that departmental business and departmental paper were increasing massively. If we were to publish on all issues at the same depth we could expect at least to double the number of volumes we needed to produce, and the 1937-49 series would not be completed until well into the next century.

The board found this prospect unacceptable. Its members were anxious that we should catch up to the present, not fall further behind, and they knew that the minister for foreign affairs had expressed similar views. We were instructed to publish no more than two volumes for each calendar year remaining in the present series, the documents within them to be arranged by topic. We need not necessarily cover every issue—the extent of selectivity is left to the editor's discretion.

One result of the new format in the long term may be to provide the project team with more job satisfaction, in opportunities for greater depth of scholarship and the development of individual expertise. Perhaps some will be prepared to stay with the project longer in consequence. But the board's decision, and the related discussions, have had more immediate results.

It meant that we were able to look at the material we had collected for 1947 afresh, and to take steps which for us have been exciting and challenging. We decided first that the 1947 material regarding Indonesia was so compelling in its intrinsic interest and in its significance for Australian foreign policy that it should be dealt with in greater depth than usual in a volume of its own. As it covers a single topic, and that a bilateral relationship of considerable interest to the wider Australian community, this volume seemed to provide an opportunity to test the market. We will therefore publish it in two forms. One will be the traditional green and gold, case-bound Volume XI of *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49*. The other will have a soft cover, with bright colour and what we hope is an eye-catching design, and will be called *Diplomasi—Australia and Indonesia's Independence*. The material within the covers will be identical and we will await the sales figures with much interest. We plan to give both versions as much publicity as we can within and outside the department, and to provide copies freely for official use. There have already been enthusiastic responses from many sections of the department and from the foreign minister.

There will be other pressures to deal with—I have not touched upon technology, for example. But I hope that we have gone some way, and will go further, toward making the study of the history of foreign relations more relevant and more accessible for our departmental clients, our academic clients and the wider community.

THE CONSUMER AS PRODUCER

Donald Barry[1]

Résumé

Cet exposé relate l'expérience du professeur Barry en qualité de rédacteur spécialisé des volumes de 1952 et 1953 de la série Documents relatifs aux Relations extérieures du Canada. *On y discute des questions touchant la participation du rédacteur (accès aux dossiers et protection de l'indépendance de la recherche), l'organisation et la sélection des documents, les besoins des lecteurs, les modifications apportées aux volumes de 1952 et 1953 en raison de l'ampleur de la documentation, la complexité de certains sujets et la diversification des intérêts canadiens de l'après-guerre. L'auteur présente aussi des observations sur l'organisation des prochains volumes.*

It has been a long-standing practice of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to invite academics to edit volumes of the *Documents on Canadian External Relations* (*DCER*) series. One reason for doing so is that, presumably, they are well positioned to know the requirements of the books' intended audiences. Beginning in 1985 I spent two years in the department editing the 1952 and 1953 volumes of the series, my services being made available via a contract between the department and the University of Calgary. My assignment is to reflect upon that experience in my dual capacity as a producer and a consumer of the books.

From an academic's perspective the prospect of participating in the documents project has obvious attractions. In the first place, the assignment gives the editor access to a rich array of documentary sources. Editors, moreover, are encouraged to publish the results of other research undertaken while they are in the department. Second, the experience provides direct exposure to the department and its operations because the editor must be physically located there for a sustained period in order to carry the project. The ultimate value of the assignment, however, lies in the publication of the volumes, without which it would be very difficult to justify an extended leave from one's university responsibilities.

Requirements

In order for an editor's participation in the project to be credible two requirements must be met: access to the relevant records must be guaranteed and his or her scholarly independence must be protected. The importance of these concerns is clear. The editor must have a full understanding of the story he or she is telling. This can be achieved only if access to the complete departmental record is provided, including documents that it may not be possible for national interest reasons to cite or to include in the published account. If the integrity of the publication cannot be assured, the editor's credibility and that of the department will be put at risk.

As was the case with previous editors, the commitment to providing access to the relevant archival sources was spelled out in the contract between the department and the university. The department undertook to ensure access to all of the available records in its central registry files and to request permission for me to consult the relevant records of other departments, agencies and private collections, subject to my obtaining a valid security clearance.

The issue of scholarly independence was addressed in the established guidelines for the series, which state that "the documents selected are intended to illustrate the formulation and implementation of Canadian policy in the field of international relations. No documents will be omitted in order to gloss over or conceal what might in perspective be considered to be mistaken or misguided policies."[2] Wide latitude, therefore, is given to the editors, although the final selection is subject to review by the department utilizing Access to Information and Privacy Act criteria. In the case of the 1952 volume, two documents were withheld and personal information was removed from four other documents. No documents were omitted from the 1953 selection. However, some materials containing views expressed at that year's Commonwealth heads-of-government meeting were edited.

Organization and Selection

Organized with a chronological/topical framework, the *DCER* series is "designed, within the confines of manageable space and size, to provide a comprehensive, self-contained record of the major foreign policy decisions taken by the Government of Canada, and of the reasons for taking them, as well as of the major international events and trends affecting Canada, as evidenced mainly in the files of the Department of External Affairs."[3] As Robert Spencer observes, it constitutes "a half-way

house" between secondary works on Canadian foreign policy and the archival records from which the documents are selected.[4]

The readership can be broken down into three categories: occasional users, academic and professional researchers, and students.

For occasional users seeking information on specific topics the volumes serve primarily as source books.

For academics and professional researchers, while the documents are no substitute for original collections, the books serve a number of functions:

- they offer leads for research projects and provide a practical guide to locating the relevant files;
- they aid the declassification process by putting hitherto classified material into the public record;
- they allow readers to consult for themselves the documentary sources upon which interpretations presented in published works are based, and
- they also serve as useful teaching resources.

For students, the series provides an introduction to the use of primary sources.

Judging from reviews of the volumes, the series has done a good job of meeting the needs of its various audiences. The reviews also suggest that it compares favourably with those published elsewhere.[5]

While I was guided by the principles cited above in choosing documents for the 1952 and 1953 volumes, some changes were required to deal with the dramatic growth in the post-war documentary record, the complexity of some subjects in comparison with previous years, and the expansion of Canada's post-war interests and involvements.

Because of the expanding documentary base I could not, within the limits of the available time and resources, survey as broad a range of sources as had previous editors. Thus I decided to confine comprehensive coverage to the files of the Department of External Affairs and the Privy Council (PCO), the latter because of its centrality in the federal government policy process, together with ministerial and prime ministerial papers. Other collections were consulted in order to complete the consideration of individual subjects. In addition, I relied more heavily than previous editors on summary documents such as the reports of weekly meetings of heads of division in External Affairs (known as "weekly divisional notes"), and also on cabinet conclusions, and documents

prepared for cabinet. Despite this, the amount of material was such that a more selective approach to the subjects examined was required.

The second problem was the complexity of some subjects in comparison with previous years. Subjects such as the annual review, mutual aid and infrastructure process in NATO were left out of the volumes because adequate coverage would have required a much larger number of documents than could have been accommodated. To have given such lengthy treatment to such subjects, moreover, would have distorted the balance of importance of the issues arising during the period.

Finally, while adhering to the traditional presentational format consisting of chapters on the conduct of external relations, important issues of the period, multilateral organizations, functional issues, the Commonwealth and the United States, I replaced the traditional concluding chapter containing miscellaneous bilateral relationships with chapters on various regions: Western Europe and the Middle East, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Far East, and Latin America in order to take account of Canada's expanding international interests.

There were some omissions that I regretted. Lack of time and resources prevented me from integrating the documentary record and published government statements as fully as I would have liked. Another problem was that of access to the Privy Council Office collection. While I was given full access to its 1952 files, I received only partial access to its records for 1953. Documents taken from that source for the latter year were taken from material chosen by the PCO.

Observations

As John Hilliker pointed out in his presentation to the first editors conference in 1989, the *Documents on Canadian External Relations* series is approaching a crossroads. At some point a choice will have to be made between increasing the number of annual volumes in order to maintain the present approach or limiting coverage to specific topics.[6] Based on my experience and that of colleagues in using the series as a teaching and research instrument I would favour maintaining the broad sweep of coverage which captures the historical unfolding of Canada's external interests and involvements as well as the context within which individual policies were pursued.

It is also important in my view that the terms of access to Privy Council Office records be clarified. This collection is important and, on matters such as the formulation of foreign economic policy, indispensable for our understanding of Canada's external relations. Variable access to

this source means that the story cannot always be told with the same measure of assurance.

A third observation arises from my experience in introducing students to documentary research by exposing them to the original and *DCER* accounts of selected issues. They agreed that the published selections faithfully rendered the story, but they expressed strong interest in seeing more of the information contained on the material such as the names of the drafters of documents so that the lines of responsibility and initiative in policy development could be traced more effectively.

ENDNOTES

1. I would like to thank Patrick Brennan, Ronald Keith and Stephen Randall for sharing their experience in using the *Documents on Canadian External Relations* series.

2. Department of External Affairs, *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, 7, 1939-1941, Part 1 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), p. x.

3. Ibid.

4. Robert Spencer, review of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, 19, 1953, in *bout de papier*, 11, 1 (Spring 1994), p. 46.

5. See, for example, David MacKenzie, "The Perpetual Centennial Project: Twenty Years of the *Documents on Canadian External Relations* Series," *Acadiensis*, 20, 1 (Autumn 1990), pp. 264-274; and John English, review of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, 18, 1952, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 24, 4 (December 1991), pp. 844-846.

6. John Hilliker, "*Documents on Canadian External Relations*: Selection and Arrangement," Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Historical Branch, *Occasional Papers*, No. 2, 1989, p. 38.

LA PUBLICATION DE DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES SUISSES ET L'UTILISATION DE MOYENS INFORMATIQUES

Antoine Fleury

Abstract

Budgetary constraints and the proliferation of documentary sources have forced the editors of the new series of Swiss diplomatic documents, covering the years 1945 to 1961, to explore new methods of production. Although scanning has proved to be problematic, the editorial team is working with specialists in the field to adapt this technology to the indexing and storage of historical documents. In addition, the editors plan to make available to researchers a quantity of selected materials on CD-ROM as a supplement to the six published volumes.

Si on la compare à d'autres pays, la Suisse s'est préoccupée très tard de la possibilité d'offrir aux chercheurs, historiens et diplomates une collection de documents ayant trait à ses relations internationales. En effet, ce n'est qu'en 1972 qu'un projet d'historiens a été proposé, visant la préparation d'une collection de documents diplomatiques suisses pour la période allant de 1848, date de la création de l'État fédéral, à 1945[1]. Une Commission a été mise sur pied, composée d'historiens et de représentants du Département fédéral des affaires étrangères et des Archives fédérales suisses; elle a élaboré un plan de travail et de recherche qui a été approuvé par le Fonds national de la recherche scientifique.

Ce dernier a fourni dès 1973 un financement régulier aussi bien à la recherche proprement dite qu'aux frais de publication. De leur côté, tous les instituts d'histoire des universités suisses ont participé à la recherche concernant telle ou telle période en mettant à disposition des chercheurs engagés à temps partiel. Mise à part la collaboration constante des Archives fédérales, à Berne où s'effectue le travail de recherche, l'administration fédérale n'a apporté aucun soutien financier ni à la recherche ni à la publication.

Pour la période 1848-1945, une collection de 16 volumes a été publiée de 1979 à 1995.

Série des volumes *DDS* et date de leur parution[2] :

Volume 1	(1848-1865)	1990	Volume 8	(1920-1924)	1988
Volume 2	(1866-1873)	1985	Volume 9	(1925-1929)	1980
Volume 3	(1872-1890)	1986	Volume 10	(1930-1933)	1982
Volume 4	(1890-1904)	1994	Volume 11	(1934-1936)	1989
Volume 5	(1904-1914)	1983	Volume 12	(1937-1938)	1994
Volume 6	(1914-1918)	1981	Volume 13	(1939-1940)	1991
Volume 7/1	(1918-1919)	1979	Volume 14	(1941-1943)	1995
Volume 7/2	(1919-1920)	1984	Volume 15	(1943-1945)	1992

Chacun des volumes comprend entre 1 200 et 1 400 pages. Cela peut paraître modeste par rapport aux collections diplomatiques des grands États pour couvrir presque un siècle d'histoire de relations internationales, mais, aux yeux des historiens et du public suisses, c'est considérable; en effet, le sentiment est largement répandu en Suisse que la contribution du pays à la « grande politique » est marginale et que, par conséquent, la politique étrangère de l'État fédéral représente peu d'intérêts. À ce sentiment s'ajoute le réflexe — traditionnel chez les Suisses — de la prudence, de la confidentialité et du culte du secret.

Or, l'équipe d'historiens qui s'est engagée dans la recherche, puis à la sélection de documents, qui seraient jugés suffisamment intéressants pour être publiés, a été rapidement confrontée, comme les rédacteurs des collections d'autres pays destinées à couvrir la période contemporaine, au problème d'une masse documentaire de plus en plus difficile à maîtriser au fur et à mesure que l'on avance dans le XX^{e} siècle. En effet, à partir du moment où il s'agit de documenter la position et les relations internationales de la Suisse sur les plans de plus en plus divers et denses non seulement de la politique mais de l'économie, de la finance, de la défense, des développements sociaux, culturels et techniques, les dossiers sont de plus en plus épais. Par ailleurs, les initiateurs du projet ont opté pour une perspective très vaste, à savoir proposer un cadre historique à l'évolution de la politique étrangère de la Suisse de 1848 à 1945, faisant ressortir le rôle de la Suisse dans les relations internationales en tant qu'acteur, mais aussi en tant que témoin de l'histoire mondiale contemporaine. Ils ont donc eu à consulter les dossiers pertinents de pratiquement toute l'administration. Autrement dit le phénomène d'internationalisation des aspects les plus divers de la vie d'une nation se reflète immédiatement dans les archives des divers services de l'administration fédérale. Pour un petit pays comme la Suisse — situé au cœur de l'Europe, de plus en plus dépendant du monde extérieur et donc

présent un peu partout dans le monde par son commerce, ses émigrés, ses capitaux, son tourisme —, les relations internationales ont pris une importance croissante du XIX[e] siècle à nos jours.

Les rédacteurs des volumes ont pris conscience, au fur et à mesure de leur recherche, de cette internationalisation de fait de la Suisse dont l'opinion publique du pays a beaucoup de peine à saisir l'importance et la signification. Aussi, pour guider les chercheurs dans leur travail de sélection, la Commission nationale de publication de documents diplomatiques suisses a établi des instructions fixant quelques critères de sélection. Les catégories de documents qu'il s'est agi de retenir pour la publication constituent l'ossature centrale de toute la collection qui s'exprime dans la table méthodique établie pour chaque volume publié :

1. les documents qui illustrent ou rapportent les décisions ou les hésitations du gouvernement, les négociations antérieures ou consécutives à telle ou telle déclaration;
2. les documents qui éclairent la politique économique extérieure de la Suisse ou qui illustrent son rôle international, par exemple ses actions dans le domaine des bons offices, de la représentation des intérêts étrangers et dans le cadre de la Société des Nations et des organisations internationales;
3. les documents propres à faire connaître non seulement les actes, mais aussi les intentions et les projets de manière à fournir le plus possible d'éléments d'explication;
4. les documents que reçoit le gouvernement fédéral sur la vie politique, économique, sociale et militaire des États étrangers, dans la mesure où les informations contenues dans ces documents ont pu contribuer à orienter la politique étrangère de la Suisse;
5. les documents renfermant des appréciations portées par nos diplomates sur les courants d'opinion ainsi que les rapports qu'ils rédigent sur la situation intérieure des États où ils sont accrédités, pour autant que tel article ou telle campagne de presse ou encore tel événement intérieur devienne l'occasion d'échanges diplomatiques ou influe sur la politique du gouvernement fédéral.

Or, l'application de cette conception large et ouverte des relations internationales, confrontée à des contraintes techniques et financières, à savoir la préparation d'un nombre limité de volumes au regard d'une documentation de plus en plus abondante, a procuré déjà bien des difficultés aux rédacteurs chargés de la préparation des volumes couvrant

des périodes de plus en plus courtes. C'est la raison pour laquelle, quand il s'est agi d'envisager la suite de l'édition pour la période après 1945, où le tissu des relations internationales n'a cessé de se densifier sous divers aspects, les historiens convaincus de la nécessité de poursuivre une telle recherche systématique sur les relations internationale de la Suisse ont réfléchi à ce qu'il convenait de faire et de proposer si l'on voulait :

a) maintenir l'idée que tous les aspects importants des relations internationales doivent être mis au jour et documentés;

b) mettre à la disposition d'un public intéressé les résultats de la recherche.

La perspective de publier des volumes de 1 200 à 1 400 pages, à raison d'un volume par période de deux années — ce qui est le cas pour la période 1936-1945 — posait des problèmes à la fois **méthodologiques**, à savoir l'impossibilité de documenter de façon significative tous les aspects considérés comme importants, et **financiers**; en effet, dans un contexte de restrictions budgétaires aussi bien au sein des universités que du côté du Fonds national suisse de la recherche scientifique, il convenait de proposer une solution différente. D'où la réflexion qui a été menée en vue de recourir aux moyens de **l'informatique**. D'emblée, le recours à l'informatique en tant que moyen auxiliaire de recherche et en tant que technique de l'édition est apparu comme l'instrument qui permettrait aux historiens de satisfaire à la double exigence :

1. de transmettre à un public le plus large possible un nombre important de documents intéressants, sélectionnés avec la même rigueur et avec la même largeur de perspective des relations internationales que pour les périodes antérieures;

2. de réduire à terme le coût de la publication proprement dite, voire de supprimer dans l'avenir la publication elle-même au profit d'autres moyens d'accès aux documents que l'informatique permet d'envisager.

Il est inutile d'insister sur les considérations générales que l'on peut invoquer au sujet de la révolution qui est en train de s'opérer dans les moyens de communication, de transmission et de diffusion de documents. À cet égard, les historiens accusent un retard certain, mais il s'explique par les obstacles intrinsèques qui apparaissent dès que l'on veut recourir aux nouvelles technologies. Celles-ci sont en effet encore peu adaptées aux problèmes spécifiques que rencontre l'historien qui travaille dans les archives; la lecture optique de documents, devenue courante dans la bureautique quotidienne, est actuellement encore difficilement praticable quand il s'agit de saisir des textes manuscrits ou dactylographiés dans des

caractères différents d'un texte à l'autre. Certes, il existe des scanners performants, mais leurs coûts sont toujours très élevés et hors de portée de projets purement historiques; en outre, leur utilisation exige un personnel qualifié ou entraîné, autrement dit du temps et par conséquent des moyens supplémentaires qui viennent s'ajouter aux charges des collaborateurs historiens.

Aussi les propositions qui ont été présentées en 1991 au Fonds national suisse de la recherche scientifique devaient-elles être réalistes, modérées dans leurs coûts et prometteuses si l'on voulait que le Fonds maintienne son appui à l'entreprise que quelques-uns des rédacteurs de précédents volumes étaient décidés à poursuivre pour la période après 1945.

En vue de rendre le nouveau projet visible et réaliste aux yeux des autorités pressenties, la nouvelle Commission de publication, mise sur pied en 1992, a proposé une nouvelle période de recherche qui s'étendrait de 1945 à 1961 (ce qui correspond à l'ère Max Petitpierre, chef du Département fédéral des Affaires étrangères). Pour cette période, la Commission s'est engagée à publier six volumes de 500 pages, et, en complément à ces documents, à mettre à la disposition du public intéressé un nombre plus que double de documents originaux grâce à des moyens informatiques dont les modalités restent encore à déterminer.

Certes, ce projet de nouvelle série couplé à une nouvelle méthodologie bénéficiait d'atouts et d'attraits auprès de quiconque se préoccupait d'une étude systématique des relations internationales de la Suisse. En effet, au bénéfice des expériences acquises par la préparation des volumes de la période 1848-1945, la nouvelle Commission s'engageait à poursuivre avec la même rigueur le dépouillement systématique de tous les fonds des Archives fédérales relatifs à l'un ou l'autre aspect significatif des relations internationales de la Suisse; elle pouvait aussi proposer que, contrairement aux équipes antérieures qui ont souvent dû travailler à des rythmes différents, il serait possible pour la nouvelle série de travailler en continu, de manière à tirer tous les avantages de l'accumulation des documents et des connaissances grâce à une équipe restreinte. Elle pouvait indiquer aussi que la sélection, le classement et la mémorisation des documents seraient effectués à l'aide de moyens informatiques; en recourant à cette innovation technologique dans un travail de recherche de longue durée, il serait possible d'accumuler un nombre considérable d'informations et de documents qui, au-delà de l'édition proprement dite, seraient utiles à tous les utilisateurs potentiels de données informatisées : chercheurs, enseignants, fonctionnaires, diplomates, etc.

Si d'autres arguments ont été avancés en faveur de la poursuite du projet de publication de *Documents diplomatiques suisses* (synergie avec d'autres projets en cours, notamment *Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse*), l'argument du recours à l'informatique et des avantages qu'on est en droit d'en attendre au niveau de l'utilisation ultérieure des résultats de cette longue recherche a été décisif, car il implique aussi une expérience originale au titre de l'innovation technologique dans la recherche historique.

Quelles sont donc les solutions que nous sommes en train d'explorer en ce qui concerne l'utilisation de l'informatique? Ce sont avant tout les suivantes.

Il s'agit de stocker ou plus exactement d'introduire et de classer dans une mémoire tous les documents sélectionnés. À cet effet, chaque document est introduit dans une banque de données, constituée à partir d'une liste des dossiers que nous avons établie sur la base du concept de la table méthodique des volumes antérieurs et des inventaires de la période 1945-1961. Le document sélectionné est mémorisé sous deux formes.

Tout d'abord, on introduit des données référentielles particulières à chaque document qui seront utiles à l'édition et à l'annotation, et surtout à la consultation par le futur chercheur ou d'autres utilisateurs. La qualité de cette indexation est décisive, car d'elle dépend la multitude des entrées, c'est-à-dire des questions que le chercheur pourra poser. D'ores et déjà, il est évident que, grâce à une indexation systématique, l'investigation de la documentation sélectionnée dépasse de loin les possibilités d'interrogation des index traditionnels.

La deuxième forme de mémorisation du document sélectionné consiste à sa reproduction par la technique du balayage (*scanning*). Toutefois, l'utilisation du scanner (dont la technique est en pleine évolution) s'est révélée plus complexe et laborieuse dès qu'il s'agit de saisir des textes dont les caractères d'écriture sont variés et dont l'état de conservation ne facilite pas la manipulation. Si la saisie optique par scanner des documents sélectionnés était praticable pour la totalité de la documentation, l'entreprise serait plus facile et plus rapide sur le plan technique et présenterait un intérêt considérable pour la recherche ultérieure, puisque le questionnement de cette documentation pourrait être renouvelé indéfiniment.

Or, l'état matériel de la documentation à choisir ne permet pas une lecture automatique à l'aide du scanner, si ce n'est, avec la technologie dont on dispose actuellement, que dans une proportion limitée de 10 à 15 p.100 des documents de la période. Toutefois, cette contrainte

technique nous a conduits à découvrir l'intérêt de la reproduction des documents par image (image scanning).

Pour l'historien, il est clair que la reproduction par image est de loin la plus intéressante, dans la mesure où le document se trouve reproduit sous sa forme originale, avec notes marginales, passages soulignés, etc. que le fonctionnaire ou le diplomate, voire le ministre ou tout haut responsable politique, a pu y apposer en le lisant.

Cependant, cette technique de reproduction intégrale pose un problème qui est en voie de solution; il s'agit du stockage informatique des documents saisis par image dont le taux de compression s'est considérablement amélioré depuis le début de notre enquête.

Dans ces questions techniques, notre petite équipe d'historiens n'avait ni la compétence ni les moyens d'étudier toutes les contraintes techniques qui apparaissent dans une recherche de caractère historique qui n'intéresse que marginalement les grands producteurs de logiciels. Nous avons heureusement pu disposer de la collaboration technique de l'Office fédéral de l'Informatique, qui est chargé de proposer et de gérer des systèmes informatiques appropriés aux besoins de l'administration fédérale, à Berne; ses spécialistes n'étaient évidemment pas préparés à proposer des solutions immédiates à notre problème, mais leur disponibilité à nous aider à trouver des solutions dans le cadre de leur service nous a épargné des coûts et des possibilités d'égarement dont bien des équipes de recherche recourant à l'informatique ont été les victimes. La collaboration du service informatique des Archives fédérales, qui est en plein développement, s'avère d'ores et déjà très prometteuse, d'autant plus que le travail de recherche s'effectue dans le bâtiment des Archives fédérales.

Actuellement, le système informatique est conçu et sera développé à terme pour satisfaire à deux fonctions pratiques.

Premièrement, il doit faciliter la préparation et l'édition des six prochains volumes de la série pour la période 1945-1961, à raison de 500 pages par volume. Le recours à un programme informatique de publication devrait permettre à l'équipe de recherche de procéder directement à l'édition des textes. Les documents publiés, dont la quantité sera fortement réduite en comparaison des volumes parus pour la période 1848-1945, serviront en quelque sorte d'introduction à un ensemble documentaire plus large stocké dans la banque de données.

Deuxièmement, des documents choisis en fonction de leur intérêt historique et dont les chercheurs du projet estiment nécessaire qu'ils soient directement accessibles aux chercheurs, sont non seulement indexés, mais

aussi reproduits sous forme image; ils seront mis à la disposition des utilisateurs soit par un système d'accès en réseau, soit par l'édition de CD-ROM, le disque compact optique ayant acquis notre préférence, car il est plus économique pour l'utilisateur et particulièrement approprié à un recueil de textes.

Quelque soit le moyen d'accès à la banque de données documentaires, il reste encore certains problèmes juridiques à résoudre concernant notamment les droits d'auteur et des archives. Ces droits ne sont pas encore clairement identifiés tant le domaine est neuf, mais ils font déjà l'objet de discussions sur le plan international, en particulier au sein du Conseil international des Archives.

En conclusion, il est permis de dire que, malgré les obstacles et les incertitudes quant à la maîtrise de tous les aspects inhérents à un tel projet de recherche historique visant la mise à disposition de documents sur une vaste échelle, le recours à l'informatique est néanmoins la solution qui s'impose si l'on veut rendre cette documentation accessible à un utilisateur potentiel comptant de plus en plus sur l'informatique dans son travail personnel et habitué à nourrir sa recherche par la consultation de banques de données. Les recherches ponctuelles seront aussi grandement facilitées, puisque le chercheur pourra accéder à la fois directement à des informations très diverses tirées des documents et aux documents originaux en copie.

En tout cas, c'est le pari que l'équipe, chargée de poursuivre l'édition de documents diplomatiques suisses s'est donné, en prenant le risque d'appliquer une méthodologie nouvelle à une recherche traditionnelle; ce choix comporte cependant d'emblée l'énorme avantage de situer une recherche historique fondamentale dans le nouvel environnement informatique, de proposer à la fois une sélection très serrée de documents publiés sous forme de livre et une sélection plus large de documents considérés comme importants, grâce à des supports informatiques.

NOTES

1. Sur l'origine de ce projet et un bilan provisoire des travaux, cf. notre contribution « Les documents diplomatiques suisses. Histoire d'une publication majeure des historiens suisses ». *Revue Suisse d'Histoire*, vol. 41, 1991, pp. 521-533.

2. Tous les volumes publiés sont disponibles auprès des Éditions Benteli à Berne.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

Suzanne Gobeil

The theme running through the papers and the subsequent discussion was the potential for broadening the clientele for diplomatic documents by reducing costs and by producing new products which appeal to new markets.

Jacques Bariéty drew attention to the fact that sales of diplomatic documents in France had increased considerably when prices were reduced, and that the French editors are now pursuing a wider audience by addressing thematic issues as well as the traditional chronological record.

Expansion of markets through the production of new products has been tried with some success in a number of countries. In Israel, said **Meron Medzini**, it was decided to publish document collections in English in order to appeal to a wider audience, especially the media, who are particularly interested in collections of current documents. In his experience, as more books on Israeli foreign policy are published and cited, more people become aware of the documents; thus the audience, from being restricted to foreign embassies and libraries, has expanded to include the media and students. **Ian McGibbon** noted that in the past there had been a very small market for collections of New Zealand diplomatic documents. But collections of letters of two well-known diplomats have sold very well. Evidently this more personalized approach, combined with effective packaging and marketing, appeals to the general public.

John Hilliker raised the question of producing collections of documents for teaching purposes, noting the difficulty of introducing students to documentary sources when teaching history: published collections are manageable, whereas if one goes to the original sources one becomes mired in detail, which is particularly a problem at the undergraduate level. **Keith Hamilton** said that in the United Kingdom an occasional paper series, comprising short articles based on larger volumes of documents, has proved a useful tool for teaching students how to use documents. **Donald Barry** said he has found it effective to give students a package of selected materials on a particular subject, and with the professor as a resource person the students learn to interpret the documents themselves.

Wendy Way suggested that publication of short volumes tailored to the needs of specific courses was a solution. **Donald Page** and **Alan Cassels** pointed out that with new technology and under copyright agreements recently negotiated in Canada, professors can now create their own textbooks for their courses; in future, it is possible that students will no longer need to purchase volumes of documents.

V: The Historian and the Ministry
L'historien et le ministère

CLIO IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE
The Historian's Demise or Opportunity in Foreign Ministries[1]

Don Page

Résumé

Jusqu'à maintenant, les compétences qu'avait acquises un historien en travaillant sur des séries documentaires pouvaient lui permettre d'obtenir un poste dans un ministère des Affaires étrangères. À l'avenir, ce seront plutôt les services qu'il offre directement aux décideurs qui lui donneront les moyens de continuer son travail sur les séries. Les historiens doivent apprendre à mettre leurs talents à profit afin de donner à l'Histoire une tournure vivante et concrète. Autrement, ils risquent de mener un combat d'arrière-garde et de défendre une méthode de travail désuète, vouée à disparaître dans les ministères des Affaires étrangères.

Two fundamental issues, budgetary cutbacks and the forthcoming technological revolution in documentary creation, transmission and preservation, are challenging the historians' survival in foreign ministries. These two issues are not entirely exclusive of each other since financing may play an important part in determining the rate at which the automation of records is implemented within a foreign ministry. Historians must learn how to handle both in order to survive.

The pressure to do more with less or to streamline operations has been felt recently by most governments and there is no reason to expect that foreign ministries will be exempted from universal cost-cutting measures. The days when a foreign ministry's place at the court or proximity to the seat of power would ensure its unimpeded survival through difficult economic times have passed. In today's economic climate, all ministries must be able to defend their budgets relative to their importance in fulfilling the mandate of the government and the wishes of their current political masters.

In a time of financial regression, foreign offices have two choices. They must either reduce the extent of their foreign operations (something which they have been reluctant to do because of the clamour of the foreign

service community and the international ill-will or embarrassment involved) or cut programs. The reason for the dilemma is that, unlike most domestic departments, foreign offices do not have many expensive program budgets from which to exact the imposed cuts. In periods of retrenchment, one of the first areas to have been cut has been public relations or auxiliary operations into which most historical units seem to fit. In the eyes of most foreign service officers and administrators, anything that includes public relations, apart from the minister's relations with the media and selected publics, should be expended before reducing the actual machinery of diplomacy.[2] In this scenario, most historical work has been regarded as a helpful but unnecessary adjunct to the main task of diplomacy.

Furthermore, unless they are blessed with some powerful and historically minded officials at the top of the bureaucracy who will protect their interests, personnel and budgets, historians have no politically significant constituency to which to appeal for assistance. Those who understand the value of their documentary contribution to the nation's historical record have insufficient political clout to make a difference. In Canada, indeed, the foreign service in general does not have a strong public constituency to which it can appeal for support in the political battles associated with budget cutbacks.[3]

The historians' exposure was very apparent in the mid-1980s when the Historical Division within External Affairs (now the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) was threatened with cutbacks that would have reduced its staff of historians from 12 to 2 with the survivors functioning primarily in a reference capacity. It was assumed, though not specifically stated, that the continuing production of *Documents on Canadian External Relations* would be contracted to outside services. When word of the proposed reductions reached users of the collection, they were able to present some persuasive arguments for preserving the work of the Historical Division, largely in terms of the interests of the scholarly community, as well as of the international embarrassment that such a move could cause because our allies would continue to tell their side of international diplomacy. There were also the voices of some retired diplomats who expressed a nostalgic affinity to the Historical Division because of the help that it had been to them in the writing of their memoirs and other pieces. After a rather lengthy period of uncertain survival, the threatened cutbacks were scaled down and, with a more focused mandate, the pace of publication was improved while work on a two-volume history of the department was also allowed to continue. While arguments from the outside were noted, senior management's eventual

decision to preserve one half of the enterprise was more heavily influenced by departmental historians themselves, who convinced the cost cutters that their expertise, earned as a result of their work on the documents, the history and other research, was necessary to ongoing operations. Without a ministerial or senior bureaucratic appreciation for the value of the historical activity within the ministry, the chances of its survival will always be tenuous.

The fundamental question that must be answered well before the process of budget cutbacks begins is how does the work of the historians make a significant contribution to a ministry whose primary function must be the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs? Unless the answer to that question is indelibly implanted in the minds of the decision-makers, there is little hope for surviving the inevitable measures that will be imposed from above in the name of financial restraint. This realization will become even more important as foreign service officers are increasingly recruited from disciplines in which there is no appreciation for the historical perspective in decision-making, or administratively trained managers with no sense of the ministry's history are moved into the foreign office from other departments as part of bureaucratic adjustments and managerial training in the public service.

This situation is not helped by the fact that historical units have often been located in quarters that were distant from the ministry's central policy operations. Out of sight has too often been out of mind, meaning that they have been less likely to be asked to give the input that would have ensured their recognition as an important and integral part of the decision-making core. From a bureaucratic perspective, being visibly useful to the ministry's senior management has been essential to the survival of financial cutbacks or the down-sizing of programs.

The second major challenge affecting the ongoing work of historians within the ministry is the automation of records management. Now that it is possible to create, transmit and retain the records of diplomacy in an electronic format, historians need to be considering the impact that this will have on their production of documentary collections. All sponsors of such collections quickly realize that the process has been labour-intensive and costly. Access to electronic record-keeping will speed up the process of selecting documents and producing the printed format.

If documentary records are available and properly indexed through computers for internal use, then why can they not be released, according to the rules of declassification, to scholars and the general public in the same electronic format? Instead of relying upon a printed selection, users,

through modems and their personal computers, could have almost instant access from their offices to a wider range of unedited documents from the ministry's archives. Cost-conscious senior managers would then quickly conclude that there was little to be gained by the ministry in continuing to publish documentary collections in the present very expensive format.

Without the retrospective conversion of records to a machine-readable format, there is likely to be a gap that will have to be overcome through either printed or electronic means. Until an efficient and economical scanner is available, the printed version may still be cheaper to produce, but not for long. But technological innovation, as it comes to foreign ministries, could eliminate the need and the cost of producing a published collection of documents. If this were to happen, historians would quickly find themselves without employment in some foreign ministries. This must be avoided, if not for the sake of preserving the existing format of the documentary collections, for the well-being of foreign ministries which must have historians to help the decision-makers understand and use their ministry's history.

Ultimately, the survival of historians within any foreign ministry will depend upon their value to those who are responsible for developing and executing the nation's foreign policies. If they cannot be shown to contribute to the most important operations of the department, they will not survive the impact of the financial and technological changes that are on the horizon.

In some foreign ministries, a shift in orientation by historians to policy work will be difficult. The best graduate schools in Canada have trained historians well to compile and edit documentary collections and to write history. What they have not done so well is to prepare them to take on roles as public historians in modern managerial circles. As one historian of the tradition of public history in Canada has concluded, "The 'Wrong tradition,' which asserted the importance of training historians for participation in public life in the broadest sense, was lost"[4] at the very time in the 1960s when governments were employing more historians than ever before. A principal reason for this is explained by another historian of the profession in Canada:

> The organization of the modern university, the rapid accumulation of knowledge, and the expansion of graduate research since the later sixties reinforced specialization. In Canada as elsewhere most professional historians no longer describe great events. They deal with

> problems; their heavily documented articles are addressed primarily to each other.[5]

Thus our historians are adept at how to "dig and dissect, detail and describe, delineate and disseminate" but not to present their work and utilize their talents within a broad policy-making framework.[6] This turn of events is most unfortunate both for the profession and for the execution and understanding of foreign affairs. As Henry Kissinger has noted, "No significant conclusions are possible in the study of foreign affairs—the study of states acting as units—without an awareness of the historical context."[7]

Senior managers in foreign ministries must come to realize, through the work of historical staff, the importance of historical analysis and presentation to their conduct and explanation of foreign policy. This argument was made rather well by one of our former colleagues in the profession, David Trask, when he told the Bicentennial Foreign Policy Conference in 1976:

> The policymaker has no alternative but to make use of historical information and historical thought simply because he is specifically concerned with process, the bread and butter of historians. Policymakers consider plans for influencing future processes by reference to comprehension of past processes. History provides much of the data and ways of thinking available to those interested in shaping the future as process. . . . The statesman builds from a revealed past to a future not yet known. He is compelled to consult history for assistance in making policy, that is, for help in planning future processes. Historical information and historical thought constitute inherent and indispensable aspects of policymaking.[8]

We must ensure that it is historians who provide this information, rather than the mandarins who flit in and out of ministers' and deputy ministers' offices with their much heralded expertise in methodologies of the social sciences. As one policy historian has recently lamented:

> In the modern marketplace for policy advice, historians compete at a disadvantage for the attention of decisionmakers, whose habit is to turn to their experienced line staff, to lawyers and "hard" social scientists, or to policy analysts trained in systems analysis and operations research. Such policy advisors are trained

> in problem solving; they compare the costs and benefits of alternative solutions, predict outcomes, and recommend courses of action.[9]

To be effective, historians will have to work more closely with persons in other parts of the ministry who have had historical training in order to demonstrate the significance of their analytical thinking.

Even if associated with like-minded colleagues, historians may be at a disadvantage in the competition for influence because they are often reluctant to predict and are usually negative in their advice, making it difficult to work with politically motivated decision-makers who may eschew the lessons of history for the expedient or popular solution to a problem. We sometimes, however, tend to overrate the role of historians who work most effectively as part of a decision-making team rather than as solo policy advisers. In their classic work on this subject, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*, Ernest May and Richard Neustadt distil the historical wisdom and case-study data that Neustadt accumulated in advising presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy and their successors.[10] As we continue to assess the role played by historians in policy-making, we should not be overwhelmed by their absence but should take up the challenge of preparing and placing them in positions where their contribution can be valued as part of the decision-making process. If the historians are right, then their arguments may be seen as compelling rather than as merely plausible.

The historian who understands the mission of the government or the minister, the process for policy-making and the institutional framework within which policy will be made and implemented will be most likely to give thoughtful advice. Most often, foreign policy-making is a multifaceted bureaucratic exercise, to which the historian must add his or her perspective from the past. If the historian is not present, or worse still, abdicates his or her responsibility for analysis, there will be some social scientist who will provide one devoid of an appreciation of the unique, the contextual, and the problematical, or an amateur who will call upon a flawed historical knowledge or analogy to justify policy. In the end, foreign policy may be shaped more by the art of the possible or by political will than by the logic of historical analysis, but at least in the process a salutary lesson may sometimes be learned from the past.

The current debate in the United States over the use of historical analogies in public policy has rightly pointed out that there is, even among historians, no indisputable lesson to be learned from the past as a guaranteed tool to foretell the future or to provide a formula for dealing

with tomorrow's crisis.[11] Nevertheless, certain historical analogies become ingrained in the thinking of policy-makers as a means of validating their proposals or defeating opposition to them. Likewise, they are used in ministerial speeches to establish the desired tone or to get the audience on the right wavelength to accept what is to come. Some that have been commonly used over the years have been Chamberlain's appeasement, the spectre of another Vietnam, the lesson of the Holocaust, the division caused by the conscription crisis in Canada, McCarthy's witch-hunt, Canadian loss of control of assets to United States interests, and equating Canadian troops in Europe with influence. As a recent writer in *Newsweek* has pointed out, "Historical analogies have done more harm than good in the Bosnia debate. This isn't Vietnam."[12]

The answer may not be in the creation of an "Historical Watch", as has been suggested in some circles.[13] The proper use of historical analogies is not to make definitive pronouncements or judgments on an issue but to widen the debate to include considerations derived from our knowledge of the past. Certainly, the historian has a critical role to play in determining the proper use of the analogies that so many others will glibly throw around. Analogies also have a way of galvanizing the attention of ministers who have to live with their political repercussions.

An example of the historian's role in dealing with analogies was sparked by a headline, "Burundi atrocities reveal Canada's hypocrisy", in August 1988. The Secretary of State for External Affairs was at home in his Alberta riding when he read this Southam News wire story in the *Edmonton Journal*. While it was bad enough that the ruling Tutsis were again threatening to massacre the Hutus "to the sound of deafening silence from Canada," thereby "exposing to ridicule Canada's African policy as they kill and burn," the author was accusing Canada of having a "double standard" toward Africa.

> By ignoring these realities the government makes itself look, at worst, dishonest in its southern Africa policy and, at best, opportunist in picking Pretoria as an easy target for Canada to buffet on the world stage. Certainly the South African government believes the latter and dismisses Ottawa's pressure tactics accordingly. . . . For Canada to earn respect as a positive influence in Africa would seem to first require the removal of the double standard in its politics.[14]

By tying events in Burundi to the government's South African policy, the journalist had exposed a raw nerve. No area of foreign policy had

received so much attention from the minister as southern Africa. Canada had taken the lead in placing the item on the agenda of La Francophonie, the Commonwealth, and the G-7. An Eminent Persons Committee had been despatched to southern Africa and the department had significantly reallocated its personnel to reflect the importance of this issue. Now, just before an anticipated election, its policy was being questioned by attention to horrific events in Burundi, in which Canada had neither interest nor diplomatic representation, nor a current development assistance program. Within two hours of the minister's reaction to the news story, a 16-person task force was assembled under the leadership of an assistant deputy minister to develop a plan of action. Worldwide diplomatic activity was initiated post-haste, including representations to the Quai d'Orsay, the United Nations, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and Burundi's ambassador in Ottawa, in which Canada called for an independent inquiry into the tribal warfare and for assistance to the refugees. A Canadian ambassador was despatched from her post in Europe to neighbouring Rwanda to report on the situation.[15]

It was left to the historian on the task force to determine whether there was a valid comparison between Canada's stand on South Africa and what was being suggested as policy toward Burundi. The two countries were quite different in history, geography, racial tensions and economy, meaning that Canada's response to events in Burundi also had to be different from that to events in South Africa. Analogical thinking would have tried to duplicate what was being done regarding South Africa's apartheid, a course that would have been inappropriate, if not embarrassing, in Burundi. It was the historian's responsibility to identify the difference, so that others would not jump to unwarranted conclusions, as they tended to do under the pressure of a ministerial directive.

The adjustments that historians must make to work actively in the policy arena are formidable. Most often in foreign policy-making, time is of the essence because of externally imposed deadlines or the natural bureaucratic desire to please the minister. As one veteran of the Canadian foreign service has recently said:

> The rush of events in the world is now such that many of the most important foreign policy decisions—not just by Canada, but by everyone else too—inevitably have to be made: in desperate haste; without adequate information; by a tiny circle of people working under great pressure in the absence of specific instructions.[16]

The somewhat plodding methodology employed by most historians cannot be tolerated by impatient policy-makers. The historian must be able to respond to the deadline, even though the advice remains tentative because of the amount of time that would be required for a complete investigation. Inadequate though such advice may seem to the historian, it is likely to be better than anything else that is available.

For example, when President Bush made his first visit to Ottawa, the Prime Minister's Office questioned whether the Mulroney-Reagan friendship strategy was the best one to follow, given the criticism that it had received and recollections of the more confrontational style of Prime Minister Trudeau. An historian was asked to evaluate the importance of personal friendship between presidents and prime ministers as a means of ensuring that Canada would have a stronger influence in Washington on issues pertaining to the national interest. The deadline set was a day and a half. That left enough time to consult some biographies, a book on presidential-prime ministerial relationships and confidential reports of previous meetings, and to conduct oral interviews with former Canadian ambassadors to Washington. For the sake of expediency, the historian decided to go no farther back than the wartime relationship between Mackenzie King and Franklin Roosevelt. Such a study could never be published nor would it be considered to meet academic standards, but it had to be brought to a timely conclusion if it was to have any value at all. It delineated the circumstances and personalities that had made friendship significant in the past relationships. It also contained advice for the prime minister which varied from the leanings of some senior officials. The decision was made actively to pursue the friendship route, which, as it turned out, paid rich dividends for the prime minister's policies. Without that superficial overview by a professional historian, limited though it was to selective examination of the evidence, the perspective for decision-making would have been confined to impressionistic analogies drawn from the Trudeau-Mulroney experience with Reagan. At least the historian's broader frame of reference allowed for a more informed understanding of the issues involved.

The historian must be able to draw succinct conclusions from the past that have some relevance to current policy options. To do so, the historian must be included in policy-making circles or at least be privy to their machinations. As one senior historian in the Office of History of the United States Army Corps of Engineers has written. from inside Washington:

> Too many government historians do not attend staff meetings, meet policymakers, or read available

> correspondence files. There can be little surprise, then, that they do not relate their history to present-day issues. . . . Government historians with the best chances of influencing policy are those who work with policymakers on a regular basis.[17]

To increase the value of their services and work within foreign offices, historians need to become involved in the preparation and presentation of backgrounders, and in program analysis and assessment, comprehensive policy reviews, corporate culture and advocacy work.

Backgrounders

The task most often performed by historians is researching and writing "backgrounders" for policy documents and speeches. In Canada, such work is dictated by government policy that requires a contextual historical introduction for all policy recommendations before they can be considered by cabinet. Although they will probably be produced by desk officers, an historian may be called upon to assist in or contribute to the writing and, at the very least, to pass an eye over the content and conclusions. The main advantage in involving an historian in the process is to ensure that the backgrounder not merely confirms the wisdom of a particular policy choice but represents what really happened in leading up to the issue being addressed. Most desk officers welcome such input, as they, coming from a rotational service, are unlikely to be familiar with the background of the issue or to have the time to delve into it. For them, the primary objective is to obtain approval for a policy direction that they can proceed in implementing. They welcome the historian's assurance that they have provided the right historical perspective or an appropriate historical analogy upon which future policy can be based.

Program Analysis and Assessment

Related to the overview nature of backgrounders is the aspect of assessment which involves the analysis of world events or issues that are relevant to foreign policy interests. Such analysis may not necessarily be tied to policy formation. As one Canadian practitioner explains:

> The formulation of policy requires intensive consultations, extensive consensus, and, frequently, an indication of political acceptability. Not so with analysis, which is more heavily dependent on the organizational skills, writing abilities, knowledge and expertise of the

> analyst. . . . The best analysis is disciplined, precise, and pledged to accuracy. Its purpose is not to bless established truths or to celebrate the righteousness of received wisdom, but to probe, to identify and to synthesize.[18]

The historian's integrity requires that the evidence be followed to its logical conclusion, regardless of bureaucratic proclivities to the contrary, in order to produce sound, historically based analysis.

During the 1988 federal election in Canada, weekly reports were made available to senior managers on the statements made by the party leaders on such controversial subjects as free trade, nuclear submarines for patrolling and defending Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, expanded economic sanctions against South Africa, channelling more development assistance through non-government organizations, halting the testing of cruise missiles in Canada, global environmental protection and increased immigration. In each instance, the pronouncement was weighed against existing policy, implementation was assessed according to the probability of a majority or minority Liberal or Conservative government, and the diplomatic and financial cost of implementation was determined. It was in the comparison with existing policy, with its historical context and traditions, that the historian's insight was most valuable to the policy-makers and those responsible for writing the briefing books for the ministers who would be appointed after the formation of the next government.

Comprehensive Policy Reviews

In modern management practice, programs and operational units are continually being reviewed and evaluated in the light of changing priorities. Historians with more expertise than desk officers in evaluating a program or process over time bring a longer perspective and context to the exercise that ensures greater validity for the results. They are also trained in research methods, in ferreting out information, in evaluating evidence, in drawing comparisons, in conducting oral history interviews, and in formulating a presentation in a way that adds significant quality to the product. Among the many subjects that engaged the attention of an historian in the Department of External Affairs were the advisability of retaining our peacekeeping forces in Cyprus, the criteria for successful policy analysis within a foreign ministry, the reasons for the dissatisfaction of non-rotational personnel within the department, the political significance of viceregal visits abroad, nuclear relations with India, Quebec's international contacts, the establishment of a Canadian International Centre

for Human Rights and Democratic Development, and the means of handling opposition from domestic ethnic groups. Being apart from but knowledgeable about the operational framework within which the studies were conducted, the historian provided a perspective that would not have been as apparent to someone more directly involved in the activity and responsible for the outcome. The directors of the Policy Analysis Group and the Personnel Bureau sought out the services of a departmental historian for extensive studies that they were carrying out, so that the analysis could be done in the light of past developments and with comparisons to other organizations.[19] In both instances, the work of the historian came to the attention of senior management and significant adjustments were made in operations as a result.

Although comprehensive foreign policy reviews have occurred very rarely in Canadian history, it is noteworthy that an historian in the Policy Development Bureau, working directly for the associate under-secretary of state for external affairs, played a prominent role in one initiated by the Conservative government that took office in 1984. The plan was to strike a joint committee of members of the House of Commons and the Senate, who would conduct extensive public hearings on what Canadians wanted their foreign policy to be. The parliamentarians would then decide which of these policy suggestions to recommend to the government and the government would have to respond in a policy document. It was the historian's responsibility to draft the response as the government's foreign policy.

Why would an historian be chosen for this task? With the invitation wide open to the public to make policy recommendations and to parliamentarians to determine which of these should be advanced for consideration, the under-secretary was anxious that they be placed in a proper historical context so that the government would not become carried away in its quest for public affirmation to the point of supporting suggestions from articulate and politically powerful lobbies that would not be in the national interest. It was thought that an historian could best evaluate the merits of these suggestions against the historical context in which Canadian foreign policy had evolved under the theme of constructive internationalism. It was also recognized that any policy change that would result from this exercise would have to be negotiated with other government departments and succinctly presented in such a way as to be both understandable and acceptable.

After nine months of cross-Canada hearings, the Special Joint Committee presented 121 recommendations to the government.[20] The historian, who had been following the process closely, now had 120 days

in which to prepare the government's response. After negotiations with nine other government departments and agencies, some consultations with foreign embassies, and 13 internal drafts that followed the dictum of the minister to be as positive and forthcoming as possible, the government's response was presented to the House of Commons on December 4, 1986.

Not all the historian's recommendations found their way into the response in the way that he had intended. An example was the government's position on the committee's demand for the immediate imposition of full economic sanctions against South Africa. In an historical study of the impact and effectiveness of international economic sanctions, the historian concluded that they had worked only under very limited, almost exceptional conditions in the past, and that they would be inappropriate in the present situation. The prime minister, on the other hand, was intent upon strong sanctions in order to win the favour of the black South African leaders. The conclusion of the historian, therefore, was cast aside, but in the end full sanctions were not supported for another reason: the reluctance of the front line states to risk retaliation by South Africa.

There was also disagreement over a proposal to establish an international register of exports and imports of arms as a means of controlling the expanding trade in conventional weapons. Historical analysis going back to similar attempts by the League of Nations indicated that such a register would not work without the full cooperation of all parties concerned. Many of Canada's allies in 1986 were opposed to the suggestion, and it was questionable, according to an analysis of past attempts, whether transparency would actually inhibit the shipment of arms. The historian therefore recommended the outright rejection of this suggestion, with a brief historical explanation and justification, but the minister wanted a more positive response. In the end, the recommendation was referred to the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security for further study.[21]

While the historian's proposals on sanctions and the arms register did not influence government policy, these were exceptions, for the majority of his studies were accepted. After the minister had presented the response to the House of Commons, the historian/drafter turned presenter and defender, and spent considerable time touring the country to explain the review process and to respond to questions about the new policy directions.[22] In all this activity, support from the minister was of vital importance to the historian in securing the cooperation of desk officers and in working out interdepartmental squabbles. Despite the difficulties, the exercise was of lasting benefit to the historian, enlarging his area of

expertise and enhancing his overall value to the department's institutional memory.

In the move of the current Liberal government in Canada to democratize foreign policy as outlined in the now popular "red book" entitled *Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada*, we have been informed that:

> Liberals believe Canadians want their national government to play a more active, independent, internationalist role in this world of change. They do not want Canadian foreign policy to be determined solely through special personal relationships between world leaders. . . . Canadians are asking for a commitment from government to listen to their views, and to respect their needs by ensuring that no false distinction is made between domestic and foreign policy.[23]

The government's commitment to the democratization of foreign policy-making in Canada has been embodied in the establishment of a National Forum on Canada's International Relations, which has already had its first meeting to discuss major issues. Participants included representatives from Parliament and non-governmental organizations and members of the general public who had "an interest or involvement in world affairs."[24] As this National Forum meets annually, departmental historians should have their work cut out for them in validating the legitimacy of the public's demands against the past, the possible and the desirable.

Corporate Culture

"Once managers recognize the value of the corporate past," wrote the authors of an article in the *Harvard Business Review*, "they can enhance their ability to diagnose problems, reassess policy, measure performance, and even direct change."[25] Institutional memory is also an important tool for establishing a corporate identity as a powerful motivator for employees and the glue that often keeps them working together and an institution functioning well.[26] This was the conclusion of a 1983 study of personnel practices in the Department of External Affairs by a three-member task force which included an historian.[27] Through interviewing a wide selection of employees in the department, it was discovered that many support staff attributed their low morale to the fact that they did not understand how their work fitted into the mandate of the department or the government's foreign policy. Too many of them felt like mere cogs in a vast machine that was devoid of interest in them. At the conclusion of the

study, a senior manager told the historian: "We, in the Personnel Operations Bureau, are most grateful for the time you took to contribute to this study. I am certain the recommendations and changes to be made will have a significant impact on managers' approaches to dealing with human resources, for which you especially should feel a great sense of satisfaction."[28]

Recognizing the seriousness of the problems revealed by the study, the Training and Development Division asked an historian to brief all new recruits on the history and mandate of the department with special emphasis on how the individual employee's work contributed to the whole. The work of the historians in the department has also been used on many commemorative occasions, in personnel briefings and in media presentations to enhance the sense of the departmental culture. This kind of high-profile contribution added value to their activities for the department's managers.

Advocacy Work

Whether describing the corporate culture, analyzing past events, or placing contemporary policy in context, the historian can perform a valuable public relations function for a foreign ministry concerned about its image and credibility. Audiences addressed by one Canadian historian have included NATO parliamentarians, Texas investors, visiting university students, learned societies and service clubs. He has also provided subject-specific briefings for military attachés, parliamentary delegations, foreign service officers, and officials from foreign embassies and other departments.

One forum for advocacy work was of particular concern to the Canadian ministry's senior managers. Twice a month the department was responsible for presenting a four-hour briefing at the Canadian Centre for Management Development on issues on the international scene that were of interest to senior managers in other departments. Participants complained that briefers failed to answer questions fully for fear of compromising classified information, to relate international events to the interests of their audience, to organize their presentations in a way that indicated what was significant, and, most important, to put their subjects into an understandable Canadian context. In response to these concerns, the under-secretary asked an historian to apply his talents to the task.

In his presentation, the historian began by showing how the participants' domestic policy concerns were directly related to international developments and how international events could increasingly impinge

upon their decision-making. The first hour was then used to present the historical foundations upon which Canadian foreign policy had been constructed. The second hour was devoted to understanding Canada's position as a trading nation and the competitive challenges that it faced in the global economy. Thereafter, the participants chose for discussion the international issues that were of most concern to them. The historian then opened up the discussion with a brief overview of the background of the issues that had been selected before leading a discussion focusing on Canada's interest in them. The historian's ability to organize vast amounts of information and to provide a synthesis within an historical context was appreciated by the participants. Through his presentation, hundreds of senior mangers in the public service acquired a better appreciation of the work and the expertise of their foreign ministry, thereby meeting an important objective of the department's senior management.[29]

Conclusion

It is through work on documentary collections and other historical research that the value of the historian should be increased within the policy-making circles of a foreign ministry. I have no doubt that producers, promoters and users of your documentary collections will continue to extol the benefits of your work as a permanent record of your countries' accomplishments and international activities. The meticulously compiled and constructed books or collections on the newer CD-ROMs will continue to enhance the work of students and scholars who want to know more about your nations' foreign policies. Through these works, they are given access to important documents that would otherwise be lost in a plethora of files that will not likely be preserved in their entirety. But, in the end, it will be the historians' more direct benefit to the ministry that will determine their fate and the continuation of in-house production of their documentary collections. Whereas in the past it has been their expertise gained through their work on the documentary collections that has given them tenure, in the future it is more likely to be their direct service to the policy-makers that will allow them to continue their work on the collections. It will be the intellectual value that they add to the making of foreign policy and its management that will be most important and appreciated. Perhaps we should be asking ourselves: is it not better to be in the vanguard, presenting our talents so that history will be alive and applied, than in the rearguard, doing work that seems destined to die in foreign ministries that are increasingly subject to severe financial restraints and to the demands of the information highway? Foreign policy

will never be made by historians alone, nor should it. But none of us can afford to go into the future being unaware of our past.

ENDNOTES

1. While this paper is based upon my experience of 16 years as an historian with the Canadian Department of External Affairs in Ottawa and my contacts with fellow public historians in the American, British, French and Japanese foreign ministries, I hope that it will have some relevance for historians in foreign ministries at large. Many of the examples are derived from this public historian's experience of life and opportunities in a foreign ministry. I am very appreciative of the helpful comments by Meron Medzini, and have taken them into account in revising the paper for publication.

2. For the reasons for this attitude, see Don Page, "The Foreign Service and the Canadian Public," in Donald Story, ed., *The Canadian Foreign Service in Transition* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 1993), pp. 83-107.

3. Daryl Copeland, "Foreign Service in the Nineties: Problems and Prospects," *The PAFSO Papers*, 1 (January 1990), p. 12. Available through the Ottawa office of the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers.

4. John English, "The Tradition of Public History in Canada," *The Public Historian*, 5 (Winter 1983), p. 58.

5. Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing, 1900-1970* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 262

6. L. H. Fishel, Jr., "Public History and the Academy," in B.J. Howe et al., eds., *Public History: An Introduction* (Malabar: Krieger, 1986), p. 12. For a discussion of this subject in the Canadian context see D. Page, "Putting Clio in the Street: Historian for Hire," unpublished paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, University of Guelph, June 13, 1984, and D. Page and E. Yachnin, "Public History in Canada," unpublished study written for the Canadian Historical Association, May 1988. Since then, the only significant advance in public history within the federal government has taken place within the archival and preservation sector. Recognition for policy-related historical research awaits a champion of the cause within the federal bureaucracy.

7. Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored*, as quoted in David Trask, "A Reflection on Historians and Policymakers," (Washington: Department of State Speech, 1976), p. 3.

8. David Trask, "A Reflection on Historians and Policymakers," p. 3.

9. Hugh Davis Graham, "The Stunted Career of Policy History: a Critique and an Agenda," *The Public Historian*, 15 (Spring 1993), p. 17.

10. Ernest May and Richard Neustadt, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York: The Free Press, 1986). For an interesting aside on this see Barbara Tuchman, "An Inquiry into the Persistence of Unwisdom in Government," *Esquire* (May 1980), pp. 25-31.

11. Otis L. Graham, Jr., "Editor's Corner: The History Watch," *The Public Historian,* 15 (Summer 1993), pp. 7-9.

12. Mark Whitaker, "Getting Tough at Last," *Newsweek* (May 10,1993), p. 22.

13. James M. Banner Jr., "The History Watch: A Proposal," *The Public Historian,* 15 (Winter 1993), pp. 47-54. As the author has pointed out, there are concerns about historians working in the administration being taken captive and little likelihood that their views would be taken account of any more than those of economists or other social scientists. "The challenge," according to Bannerman, "is to find a means that can serve two ends: first, to offer timely, relevant, nonpartisan, independent advice to the White House, and, second, to evaluate the use of history by senior policy makers as explanation and justification for their policies and actions." Bannerman's own proposal for an outside "History Watch" would function like an external auditor for the propagation of historical truth. Without access to the inside, however, it would be no better than historians expressing their opinions, without the relevant information needed to make informed evaluations, in the op-ed pages of the *Washington Post.*

14. Jonathan Manthorpe, "Burundi atrocities reveal Canada's hypocrisy," *Ottawa Citizen,* 27 August 1988, B5.

15. "Clark lambastes Burundi over tribal massacre," *Citizen,* 1 September 1988, A12.

16. Michael Shenstone, "Foreign Service Crisis Management in the Nineties," Story, ed., *The Canadian Foreign Service in Transition,* p. 74.

17. Martin Reuss, "Historians and Policymaking: A View from Inside the Beltway," *The Public Historian,* 15 (Fall 1993), p. 70. See also James T. Stensvagg, "Searching for Congruence: Historians and Policymakers in the U.S. Army," *The Public Historian,* 14 (Winter 1992), pp. 55-70. Hugh Davis Graham has drawn attention to how historians working for government have shaped policy choices in agriculture, land use and water policy, and testified before legislators and courts. He also lists some prominent historians who have shaped American public policy. See H.D. Graham, "The Stunted Career of Policy History: a Critique and an Agenda," *The Public Historian,* 15 (Spring 1993), p. 17. A useful addendum to this article is the response of five historians to Graham's article in *The Public Historian,* 15 (Fall 1993), pp. 51-81.

18. Daryl Copeland, "Independence at Risk: Thoughts on the Future of Political Assessment," *bout de papier,* 10 (Winter 1993), p. 7.

19. For information on the more specific role played by an historian in these two program reviews see Don Page, "The Public Historian in Human Resource Development and Management," *The Public Historian,* 8 (Fall 1986), pp. 7-26, and "Drawing Lessons from a Policy Planning/Analysis Exercise," *The Public Historian,* 10 (Spring 1988), pp. 49-69.

20. The committee received written briefs from 568 organizations and 630 individuals and held 61 public hearings at which 385 organizations and 306 individuals presented their views. See *Independence and Internationalism: Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons* (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, June 1986).

21. *Canada's International Relations: Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons* (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1986), p. 48. Since then, the international climate has changed substantially and the United Nations has established an arms register.

22. Twenty-two university audiences and eight branches of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs were addressed on various aspects of the report.

23. *Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada* (Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada, 1993), p. 105. On this theme see also Lloyd Axworthy, "Canadian Foreign Policy: A Liberal Party Perspective," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 1 (Winter 1992/3), p. 14; André Ouellet, "The Commitments of a Liberal Foreign Policy Agenda," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 1 (Fall 1993), pp. 1-6.

24. *Creating Opportunity*, p. 109.

25. G.D. Smith and L.E. Steadman, "Present Value of Corporate History," *Harvard Business Review*, 59 (November-December 1981), p. 165. See also M. Price, "Corporate Historians Turning Past Accounts into Big Assets," *Chicago Tribune*, 28 (March 1981), Tempo 1-2 and Peter Drucker, *Managing in Turbulent Times* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), pp. 68-71.

26. T.E. Deal and A.A. Kennedy, *Corporate Cultures: the Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1982), p. 4.

27. External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Management of Non-Rotational Personnel in External Affairs," Project No. ACO8, unpublished paper, 21 December 1983.

28. Marc Perron, letter to the author, 24 May 1985. Quoted with the permission of the writer.

29. When the historian left the employment of the government, the department was unable to provide a satisfactory replacement and the job at the centre was subsequently contracted to a consultant. Meanwhile, the historian has been retained under contract to give periodic briefings through the Career Assignment Program of the federal public service.

COMMENTS ON THE PAPER PRESENTED BY PROFESSOR DON PAGE

Meron Medzini

Résumé

Dans son commentaire du texte de Don Page, l'auteur remet en question la notion que la connaissance de la documentation historique que détient l'historien employé par le gouvernement détermine son aptitude à conseiller ce dernier sur la politique actuelle. Avec de nombreux exemples à l'appui, il soutient qu'étant donné la complexité du monde d'aujourd'hui, cet historien ne se trouve pas nécessairement en possession des renseignements stratégiques et des compétences techniques nécessaires pour agir efficacement en tant que négociateur international. Il joue néanmoins un rôle important dans la préservation du témoignage écrit des négociations pour la postérité. En effet, et ce malgré les percées de l'informatique, les étudiants en histoire, en sciences politiques et en administration publique continueront avec les diplomates et les hauts représentants de faire appel à l'historien plus qu'à la machine pour leurs besoins d'analyses historiques.

The presentation we have just heard has left me with a number of questions that I would like to raise as a basis for our discussion.

While Professor Page is speaking, as it were, from the inside, having spent some 16 years as an historian in the Ministry for External Affairs in Ottawa, I am speaking from the outside. I am an academic, trained in history and international relations, who is contracted by the Israeli Foreign Ministry to edit their series *Israel's Foreign Relations, Selected Documents*. I have been doing this since 1970.

At the outset, and this was not made clear by Professor Page—what sort of documents are we talking about? Are we referring to the publication of current, non-classified documents, or are we talking about documents that are becoming available on the basis of the normal 30-year rule? If the latter case is the one we are discussing, then I am not sure that our colleagues now engaged in producing documentation on the Korea War are in a position to advise their respective governments on what

policy to pursue in Rwanda or in the matter of the civil war in Yemen or what to do in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I suspect that Professor Page is ascribing too many magic powers to the historian.

The next problem was already discussed by us at our last meeting in The Hague. It is quite difficult to argue that in various countries foreign policy is determined solely by the department of external affairs. Indeed, in many places this is simply not the case. There are many other factors involved in the formulation and execution of foreign policy ranging from the White House in the United States to the Elysée Palace in France and even 10 Downing Street in the United Kingdom to offices of prime ministers, defence ministers and other intelligence organizations who have a massive impact on foreign policy.

Many foreign ministries did not give the task of dealing with documents to professional historians. Some gave it to retired diplomats. Others went to academia and contracted professors of history and international relations or regional studies.

There is yet another problem: it is commonly assumed that the historian, be he or she an insider, member of the historical section of a given foreign ministry or an outsider on contract to a ministry, is a dispassionate, unbiased, politically correct individual who approaches his or her task in a sterile, almost clinical fashion, and whose advice therefore lacks prejudice and is based solely on scientific evidence. Alas, this utopian creature rarely exists.

Every historian who deserves the title has emotions, biases, prejudices, background, political leanings and personal likes or dislikes. Rare is the historian who can be absolutely objective. Is the historian above committing errors? I recall many colleagues in Israel and abroad who failed to predict the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1991 Gulf War. I would urge much caution in ascribing to historians such powers as to make them the repositories of all wisdom and knowledge.

There is yet another difficulty in giving historians a special role in advising their masters on foreign policy formulation, and that has to do with the "right to know". In certain countries, certainly those who find themselves engaged in highly sensitive negotiations, there are serious limitations on the right to know. I will provide a few examples:

The negotiations between France and the Algerian FLN in the early 1960s, culminating in the 1962 Evian Agreement, were conducted in secrecy. I am not aware that an historian accompanied them. The Kissinger style of negotiations was similar. In both the opening to China (1971) and his talks with the Vietcong in Paris, absolute secrecy was

maintained. In this case it can be argued that the negotiator was also an historian, but this is rare. And there is a danger in the negotiator being an historian. There is a story ascribed to Israel's founder, David Ben-Gurion, who used to write his diary as he was speaking to visitors. One day, two opposition leaders came to see him. While they talked, he wrote. As they left, one asked the other: "What was he writing?" The answer was: "He is already falsifying history." Many Israeli experts on the Arab world did not set foot in an Arab country until 1981, after the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. We can also argue that some top-notch foreign historians on Germany could never understand the depth of the situation that bred Nazism.

A third case was the secret Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization negotiations in Oslo. It can be argued that there were two historians present, but they were there not in their capacity as historians but rather because of their ties with the PLO. Their presence also allowed Israel and the PLO to claim that in case of failure this was no more than an academic exercise. It is true that on the Israeli side there were these two Middle Eastern specialists. The deputy foreign minister has a Ph.D. in political science and the foreign minister himself is a well-known writer of many books. This did not ensure a faultless agreement.

Let us take the argument one step forward. Professor Page is certainly right when he talks about a highly complicated new world. In the 1993 Israel-PLO Oslo talks, and even later, when the time came to translate the Declaration of Principles into an agreement on the governance of Gaza and Jericho, there was need not for historians but rather for economists, social anthropologists, lawyers and police officers, adept in matters of urban security and law and order. An historian would have been useless in helping determine complicated economic arrangements. When there was need to provide a solid background on Arab leaders, experts in that field were called in from the Military Intelligence Branch. They were privy to top-secret information not usually shared by the departmental historians.

The experts that are required now, to look again at the Arab-Israel scene, are hydrologists to advise on water, military people to advise on arms reduction, economists and environmentalists to help in the matter of economic development, and social scientists to deal with resettlement of refugees. All these items are on the agenda of the Arab-Israel multilateral talks now in progress.

There is a very important role for historians. They should be given the opportunity to accompany the negotiations, take notes, and

preserve the proper documentation and exchanges for posterity. This is a far more important role than they would have played in the talks themselves, especially if they are not always au courant.

The issue in the final analysis is not how to fight against budgetary cuts in various historical sections of foreign ministries. We are not here to preserve our position as a sort of medieval guild. Our main concern should be how our respective ministries and governments obtain the best advice to help them formulate and implement the best policy.

In some places budgetary considerations are dealt with by putting the publications of documents under the information budget, and not a special or separate historical section budget.

Finally, I do agree with Professor Page that, even in the day and age of electronics and the latest computer technology, there is a key role for the historian. The computers are not able to make a selection. They cannot write introductions to books or to chapters or to individual documents. They cannot assess and evaluate the relevance, importance and meaning of a given document. They cannot place them in a proper historical context and broad perspective.

As long as our "clients" or "users" will remain students of history, politics and government, international relations and regional studies, and not to forget diplomats and officials, they will look for an historian, not for a technician, not for a machine, be it the most advanced and modern. We still have a major role to fulfil. But we must be aware of the objective limitations that exist in our craft.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION/RAPPORT

Marie-Josée Langlois and/et Louis-Philippe Sylvestre

In his reply to the commentary on his paper, **Donald Page** noted that historians in foreign ministries are part of a team, but they are often left out of policy-making. The place for historians in policy-making should be recognized; otherwise, he fears, historical analysis will be left to the outside world, that is, the universities, instead of being done within government.

Hector Mackenzie pointed out that in Canada's case, the senior historian's position is no longer in policy planning but in the Historical Section, which would seem to indicate that a decision has been taken as to the historian's role in policy-making. But historians have long played a role in the Department of Foreign Affairs, although their influence is usually indirect. So far as policy planning is concerned, several people in that sector have historical training.

Selon **Antoine Fleury**, il n'existe jamais d'interprétation univoque en ce qui concerne l'histoire. Un historien ne peut pas prédire l'avenir, mais plutôt établir des bases de réflexion. Le problème est que les diplomates sont des techniciens, de même que les journalistes, et qu'ils dénaturent l'histoire. Les historiens doivent trouver un moyen de se faire comprendre facilement. On pourrait demander à M. Slany des États-Unis : Quel est le rôle des historiens dans le *policy planning staff*? Est-ce celui de justifier les décisions prises ou d'établir des bases de réflexion? Selon M. Fleury, le seul rôle qu'un historien devrait avoir est celui d'établir des bases de réflexion.

William Slany a dit que le gouvernement américain possède de nombreux historiens en dehors du State Department qui conseille l'Administration américaine. La section historique du Secrétariat d'État n'a pas de monopole à cet égard. Sur les 150 historiens du ministère, seulement 25 à 30 travaillent dans cette section. Ainsi le point de vue historique est exprimé par d'autres intervenants qui n'ont pas nécessairement la formation d'historien. Il faudrait assurer la présence des historiens dans le processus de décision. Il est trop facile pour les historiens de critiquer les décisions, ce qui ne fait qu'engendrer des tensions. Leurs compétences sont très peu utilisés lors des négociations mais ils servent à conserver et accumuler les documents des discussions. Le manque de temps — souvent on doit produire des documents en moins

de deux jours — ne favorise pas une analyse approfondie. Le rôle fondamental des historiens consiste à assurer la mémoire institutionnelle. Les historiens qui prennent part au processus de décision ne doivent pas le faire d'une manière académique.

Richard Bone remarked that the discussion is parallel with the debate in London at the first of these conferences, in 1989. It struck him that no one had predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall, yet they were discussing the role of the historian in policy planning. Events that influence foreign policy are usually unforeseeable. It is easy to predict that something will happen eventually, but what is important is when it will happen and no one can predict that. The historian's role is one of intellectual contribution. Knowing documents, understanding them and analyzing what they say is the historian's role in a foreign ministry.

Ennio Di Nolfo argued that historians should limit their ambitions, realize that their clients will always be students and academics and only hope for the ear of policy-makers.

VI: Peace and Cold War in Europe
Paix et guerre froide en Europe

ITALIAN DIPLOMACY FROM CO-BELLIGERENCY TO THE TREATY OF PEACE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

Pietro Pastorelli

Résumé

Inspiré des deux premiers volumes de la nouvelle série de documents diplomatiques italiens, le document suivant traite de la période critique de l'histoire de la diplomatie italienne allant de l'armistice de septembre 1943 à la première phase des négociations du traité de paix. Si les diplomates italiens ont essayé par de nombreux moyens, notamment par l'exploitation des différends de plus en plus vifs entre les alliés, de maintenir leur pays dans une position influente, il est apparu de plus en plus clairement au cours des négociations du traité de paix que l'Italie serait désormais « prise en otage » dans la guerre froide.

The publication of the first two volumes of the new series of *Italian Diplomatic Documents* edited by Prof. Di Nolfo and myself provides confirmation and clarification of some themes relevant to the reconstruction of Italian foreign policy after the armistice of September 1943, and to the initial phase of the peace treaty negotiations. Many of these themes concern directly Italian diplomacy's gradual awareness of the new international situation as a result of the country's defeat. It was a situation which neither the declaration of war against Germany on 13 October nor the recognition of Italy as a co-belligerent with the allied powers could attenuate. But it was also a condition to which the Italian diplomats, used to representing a "great power", would adjust slowly and with effort.

Beyond these general aspects, the two volumes serve to bring into focus the fact that the problems concerning Italy were important in the relations between the Western countries and the Soviet Union during the collaboration period as well as in the immediate post-war period. Italy was one of the "fertile lands" of the Cold War probably because it was in

Italy—or in relation to Italy—that certain conflicts originated, and, in 1947, culminated in a direct clash.

In this regard, the documents complete the picture both of the so-called "Italian Precedent" and of the definition of the terms of the peace treaty, an example of the victorious countries' difficulty in reaching a compromise.

About the "Italian Precedent", it is known that it had its origin in the Western powers' decision to exclude the Soviet Union from active participation in the Allied Control Commission, an exclusion for which the appointment of the Advisory Council for Italy did not compensate, as the council could only formulate recommendations which had a rather limited practical effect. Less well-known are the Soviets' reactions, and how the Italian government, in the hope of wedging its way among the allies to improve its own position inside the anti-German front, tried to turn these reactions to its advantage. Briefly, we remember here the process by which, between January and March 1944, the Moscow government and the monarchic government of Marshal Badoglio reached the decision to re-establish diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Volume I of the series fills the gaps in the history of this event, naturally as it pertains to Italian sources. In the past it had been generally believed that the negotiations were based on an exchange: recognition by the Soviets in exchange for Italian permission for the return to Italy of the major communist leaders exiled in the Soviet Union. In truth this exchange did not take place; it might have been a pre-condition for the Italy-Soviet Union talks on the issue. On 20 December 1943 (doc. 102), Renato Prunas, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had made the following observation: "Although we perfectly understand that the inclusion of even this small group in the current delicate phase of our national political life may represent a risk, it is nevertheless politically advisable not to displease Russia in any way, as it is in our essential interest to create an atmosphere of reciprocal understanding and good will."

This was the logical assumption of the Italian position, which would later be better explained by Prunas himself to Vyshinsky, the Soviet member of the Advisory Council for Italy, in the course of two talks they had on 11 and 12 January 1944 (not 7 and 11 January as previously believed). In the second meeting Vyshinsky showed that he perfectly perceived how a possible re-establishment of relations with the Italian government would have affected allied relations. "From a technical point of view," he observed, "the resumption of contacts is justified and

justifiable because it would place the Soviets in the same position as the English and the Americans, thus establishing equal status among the three major Allies. More complicated, however, is the political problem in view of the serious repercussions—direct or indirect—this initiative would have both on the Italian internal situation, and on the relations between the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain." Therefore, it can be said that Vyshinsky was perfectly aware that, while the resumption of direct relations with Badoglio's government would restore the Soviets to the same position of equality which the Anglo-American decision had denied them, it would annul the importance of the Italian case as a "precedent", but it would also cause a crisis in inter-allied relations.

When, on 4 March 1944, the Soviet member of the Advisory Council for Italy, Bogomolov (doc. 152), informed Prunas that the Moscow government was prepared to resume "direct relations with Italy", it was evident that, after evaluation of the risks to the internal relations of the Grand Alliance, the Soviets had decided to challenge them, as a means of circumventing the Anglo-American decisions. And so, on 11 March (doc. 156, note 3), Bogomolov announced the resumption of direct relations through an exchange of representatives "enjoying the usual diplomatic status", a formula which was precise as to contents (as it could be referred to only as an exchange of ambassadors), but rather vague as to form in order to attenuate the Western reactions. And it was this very caution which then allowed the Soviets to resist the Anglo-American diplomatic counter-offensive. Quaroni and Kostylev were immediately appointed to represent the two countries in the respective capital cities, although the Soviets, in consideration of the Anglo-American diplomatic protests, avoided the formal, official accreditation of the two diplomats. This compromise barely veiled the reality. At the end of March, Prunas commented: "Ambassador Bogomolov has explicitly stated that direct Italy-Russia relations will stay, whatever the Allies may think or do. . . . Therefore, the breach opened in the Allied coalition by the recent Italy-Russia accord, it seems to me, is destined to remain open notwithstanding the Anglo-American efforts to close it" (doc. 183). It was not by chance, therefore, that in March 1944 the Department of State, analyzing the relations with the Soviets, placed the issue of the Soviets' exchange of representatives with Italy, along with the issues of Poland and the Baltic States, among the most serious causes of divergence with the Soviet Union (*FRUS*, 1944, IV, pp. 839-42).

In commenting on this "incident" to Robert Murphy, in April 1944, Badoglio observed: "The US is making an error in surrendering (or so it seems to me) its influence in the Mediterranean. This region will

become the pivot in the future of a huge new Euro-African politico-economic set-up in which Italy will play a certain role. Your Soviet ally and Great Britain seem to see and appreciate this. Why do you withdraw? . . . It leaves my people with an impression that the US is abandoning Italy to Great Britain and the Soviet Union" (*FRUS*, 1944, III, p. 1103).

This mention of the Mediterranean problems indicates one of the major points on which, at the time, Italy intended to base its new foreign policy. Before and after the liberation of Rome (June 1944), there were underlying differences between British and Soviet objectives, but there was also a justified fear that the two European governments would reach a compromise which would have crushed Italy, thus wiping out any residual hopes the Italians might have for an independent foreign policy. But these residual hopes were indeed tenaciously rooted in Italian diplomacy, which moved in all directions in an effort to find some argument which might strengthen Italy's diplomatic weight.

The assumption that the Americans had no interest in the Mediterranean was not groundless. In fact, it was only between 1943 and 1947 that, gradually, the United States prepared its strategy in this region. But the Italians would suffer through other delusions before all that became absolutely clear. While the resumption of relations with the Soviet Union had stemmed from an opportunity, seized by the Italians, to exploit the dissent existing, at the time, within the coalition, they had barely scratched the solidarity of the block that had yet to win the war. The Italians had planted another seed in the persistent Anglo-American diffidence toward the Soviets, but had been unable to pick the fruits.

The Italians hoped that not only Great Britain but also all the other countries of the alliance would recognize the strategic importance of the Mediterranean area, a point on which the Italians thought they might be able to base a political action; they hoped that the breach opened in March 1944 would widen in their favour, when the Council of Foreign Ministers started preparation of the peace treaty for Italy. This theme—only recently studied as a problem connected to the origins of the Cold War—is extensively documented in Volume II.

The documents published in Volume II show quite effectively the development of the Italian perspective and the incapability of Italian diplomacy and its political leaders to push to the extreme the most realistic and pessimistic diagnosis for the future of the Grand Alliance. They recognized the impossibility of playing an autonomous role in the

negotiations. The documents show how their hopes became bitter disillusion.

Just before the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which started on 11 September 1945 in London, De Gasperi described to Byrnes, in a long letter, the Italian expectations of a peace with justice (doc. 446). For the Italian eastern border De Gasperi suggested the Wilson line of 1919, which would have left the western half of the Istrian peninsula to Italy; in addition, Fiume and Zara were to become a "special zone" with an autonomous special statute. For the northern border, he expressed a certain willingness to accept "minor" adjustments. But he vehemently refused to surrender the towns of Briga and Tenda to France. As to the colonies, he had no objections to ceding the Dodecanese to Greece, but he asked that the Italian business enterprises in the island of Rhodes be given some protection. The distinction between fascist colonies and pre-fascist colonies eliminated the case of Ethiopia. But for the rest, De Gasperi was adamant: Libya had to remain under Italy as a trusteeship; consideration would be given to possible military concessions in Cyrenaica. A trusteeship was also requested for Somalia, while for Eritrea the request was to maintain Italian sovereignty. In addition to the territorial issues, the Rome government nourished great hopes for other matters related to the peace treaty, such as the destiny of the Italian fleet, reparations, disarmament and Italian assets abroad.

The Italian representatives in London, Paris and Washington, Carandini, Saragat and Tarchiani respectively, endeavoured to ensure the support of the three Western governments. Reading their correspondence, one has the feeling that they were being given only vague, unspecific assurances. Italy's contribution to the victory would not be neglected, but no one went beyond making general promises of good will. These diplomats, however, like the politicians, imagined that Italy would be treated generously, that its point of view would be taken into account, and even that a revision of the armistice would accelerate normalization of Italy's international position. The only discordant voice was that of the Italian ambassador in Moscow, Pietro Quaroni, who never missed an occasion to throw icy water on Italian hopes. At the beginning of August he wrote to De Gasperi (doc. 390): "Unless a miracle occurs, the terms of the peace treaty will be hard, at least in comparison to what the Italians believe to be their rightful expectation. What is worse, is that the Big Three will later claim to have been generous with us, and will take offence at our not showing sufficient gratitude."

Indeed, all the problems related to the Italian peace instantly became tied to the tension among the great powers. Only marginal issues,

such as the Italian-French border, or the Dodecanese, were not affected. On the problem of the northern border, the Soviets favoured the "status quo" to avoid an amputation of the Italian territory in favour of Austria, and also to oppose the American delegation's rather decided inclination toward a plebiscite; the solution was largely affected by the Western representatives' desire not to help the Soviets in their game.

The problem of the eastern border was dominated by the strong support Yugoslavia received from the Soviets who were seeking access to the Adriatic Sea through a friendly country. Even more affected by the Soviets' requests was the issue of the colonies, because Russia had demanded participation in the Libya trusteeship. This matter in particular indicates the conflict between the Soviet government's aspirations and the Western powers' clear refusal; it also proved the soundness of the considerations expressed by Badoglio. These elements could be considered as providing the framework and the condition of the negotiations and were inherent in the nature of the relations among the victors.

Following the Yalta Conference, the Polish issue had already created discord; although the contention over the Soviet occupation of the Balkans had not yet reached an acute phase, it was a reason for increasing alarm. Now, the explicit will of the Soviets to increase their presence in the Mediterranean, which the British considered their exclusive domain, brought the issue of the Italian peace treaty to the core of the rising conflict. It could indeed be said that these problems became one of the motivations which turned the conflict of interests into cold war. What had happened was understood clearly by a member of the Italian delegation, which was in London in the hope of being able to exercise some influence on the negotiation. On 24 September 1945 this diplomat, then secretary of the "Borders Committee", wrote to Prunas (doc. 569): "We must make a fundamental and very painful observation: our problems are only a secondary, incidental aspect of a wider political game. The request to Italy to 'present its case' was little more than a formality; the issues which concern Italy will not be examined and decided upon on the basis of their intrinsic merits, unless these merits are compatible with other exigencies."

As is known, the London Conference ended with substantial lack of success. The subsequent volumes of the new series will contain a documented account of the progress of work on the peace treaty. But at the beginning of 1946, when Stalin, Truman and Churchill (no longer prime minister) emphasized the gravity or the inevitability of the conflict which was dividing the international system into two camps, the Italian peace treaty became more and more a "hostage" of the so-called "cold war logic".

CANADA, THE COLD WAR AND THE NEGOTIATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Hector Mackenzie

Résumé

L'auteur place les négociations du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord dans le contexte canadien pour montrer à quel point les positions adoptées par les négociateurs canadiens ont servi non seulement les opinions et les engagements du public, mais aussi l'élaboration des politiques dans d'autres domaines. Dans cette optique, la participation active du Canada à la définition du traité représente à la fois un changement d'attitude face à la politique en matière de défense et d'affaires extérieures, et une importante manifestation de l'engagement envers le multilatéralisme, rendu possible et nécessaire durant l'après-guerre.

An examination of the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty from a Canadian perspective seems a particularly appropriate topic for this conference of diplomatic editors. After all, when we last met in The Hague two years ago, we gathered in a room named for the principal Dutch negotiator in Washington, Dr. van Kleffens, who was the ambassador of the Netherlands to the United States throughout those crucial deliberations. Now we are meeting in a building named for Lester B. Pearson, one of Canada's key negotiators, first as the senior official in the Department of External Affairs, later as its minister. Although Norman Robertson, for whom this conference room is named, was Canada's high commissioner in London at this time and so was never present in Washington for discussions about North Atlantic security, he was actively involved in shaping Canadian policy from the beginning and his influence was considerable. For reasons which I suspect have more to do with semantics than reputation or distinction, Canada's principal negotiator in Washington does not have a part of our headquarters named for him. Otherwise, we might be meeting in the Wrong Room.

The details of the negotiation of an alliance for the collective security of the North Atlantic region are well known, especially to those

assembled here. The Department of State has published summaries or minutes for the initial trilateral as well as the later multilateral discussions.[1] Much of the record of the development of Canadian policy as well as our participation in the series of talks in Washington has been disclosed in accounts by a diplomat, Escott Reid,[2] and a scholar, James Eayrs.[3] These have been supplemented by numerous memoirs, biographies and analyses which testify to the importance of the subject and the range of interpretation possible. Most recently, we have selected documents to tell the story of the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty in the series *Documents on Canadian External Relations*.[4] As I have found when editing the volumes for 1948 and 1949, we have been able to add "some shadings and nuance" to earlier versions of these events, but a knowledgeable reader's assessment is unlikely to be transformed or significantly altered.[5]

For that reason, I do not propose in this paper to focus on the documentary record of the negotiations, except for purposes of illustration. Instead, I would like to place this subject in its Canadian context and to show how the positions taken by Canadian negotiators related not only to public pronouncements or commitments but also to the development of policy in other areas. Seen in that light, Canada's active participation in the articulation of what was, for it as well as for some others, an unprecedented scheme for regional collective security represents both a departure from earlier Canadian attitudes about defence and foreign policy and one manifestation, albeit perhaps the most important one, of a commitment to multilateralism which was made possible and necessary by the circumstances of the post-war world. As Leigh Sarty has argued recently, "Canada's commitment to multilateralism can be traced to the new constellation of power that emerged in the aftermath of World War II."[6]

That stance was the "logical culmination" of national and international circumstances.[7] Its application to North Atlantic security was closely related to developments in other realms of Canadian policy, both "high" and "low". For a country as dependent as Canada on international trade for prosperity and in a setting where the conduct of international economic policy was so closely linked to the development of the Cold War, that distinction may be less important than is usually the case.[8] As so often happens, opportunity and risk were opposite faces of the same coin. It would seem appropriate to begin our examination of the post-war context for decision-making in Ottawa with a brief glance at the *dramatis personae*.

With malice of forethought, George Ignatieff began the chapter of his memoirs entitled "Golden age of Canadian diplomacy" with Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King's announcement of his intention to retire.[9] Though Canada's foreign policy was no longer his exclusive domain, particularly after the appointment of Louis St. Laurent as secretary of state for external affairs in September 1946, Mackenzie King still kept a close and nervous watch on the international pretensions of his former department. In his final years at the helm, he was forced to concede more authority to his cabinet colleagues than ever before. But his political antennae were as sensitive as ever and his shadow could still darken an otherwise clear path, as seen from the vantage point of the enlightened Department of External Affairs![10] As we shall see, his sometimes idiosyncratic view of the world often had inconsistent and contradictory implications for policy-making. However, his approach was almost inevitably more cautious than that of others in the East Block. When he vacated the office of prime minister in mid-November 1948, the change in mood in the Department of External Affairs was palpable.

Louis St. Laurent was certainly not reckless—like his predecessor, as minister of foreign affairs and prime minister, he viewed international affairs through the prism of domestic politics.[11] Though he was only eight years younger than King, St. Laurent's openness to the advice of colleagues and officials enabled a younger generation of policy-makers to come to the fore and his unequivocal articulation of Canada's values and objectives in external relations was a marked departure from the style as well as the content of earlier pronouncements.

Foremost among his advisers, later his cabinet colleague, was Lester B. Pearson, who was under-secretary of state for external affairs until September 10, 1948, when he was sworn in as minister. As with the other members of the Canadian foreign service who were most closely involved with the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, Hume Wrong, Escott Reid and Norman Robertson, Pearson had been recruited by O.D. Skelton, the under-secretary of state for external affairs from 1925 until 1941. Like Skelton, they were nationalists, which in earlier years had meant autonomists. Unlike Skelton, this sometimes unharmonious quartet were convinced internationalists—whatever their differences over specific policies, none was intimidated by commitments or responsibilities in international affairs.[12]

Of course, the post-war world that they confronted seemed very different from the inter-war years whose disappointments and disasters had such a strong influence on their outlook. Even as Canadians invented and popularized the "North Atlantic Triangle", its proportions defied the rules

of conventional geometry.[13] With the continuing decline of Britain, Canada had to reassess its position while its extraordinary financial assistance to the mother country fostered the illusion that earlier trading patterns could be recreated.[14] Whether or not Canada's pre-war relationship with Britain constituted a "military alliance", its post-war requirements could not be satisfied in the same way.[15] One incidental benefit of the fact that Canada was less prone to define its international involvements in relation to British policy was that external commitments were more likely to be acceptable to French Canada.[16] In other words, foreign policy might unite rather than divide Canadians.

The rise of the United States posed problems as well for Canada, which were complicated by Canada's exchange crisis in 1947.[17] It is never easy living next door to a significantly greater power, particularly when that country is also the dominant Western nation in a divided world. Even more than during the Second World War, the United States turned its attention nervously northward as it contemplated the need for a defensive perimeter in the Canadian Arctic. Canadian policy-makers frequently had to reconcile the competing demands of national sovereignty and continental defence as well as the costs of both.[18] In the inter-war period, there had been concerns about the implications of isolationism south of the border; now there was wariness about the consequences of international involvement by the United States.

However, in a bi-polar world, there was never any serious question about Canada's international alignment. History, geography, culture, economics, military strategy and political tradition—all interwove Canada's fate with that of the United States and its principal allies. Generally speaking, the politics of the Cold War made international involvement by Canada more likely and more popular, even as it virtually eliminated any notion of an alternative foreign policy.[19] Especially when one considers how recently the notion of a formal military alliance in peacetime had been anathema to most Canadians—and particularly to Mackenzie King—the developments which led to the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty are even more remarkable.[20]

Canada's military and economic effort in the Second World War, as well as its participation in the elaboration of plans and institutions for the post-war world, contributed to a more confident and assertive outlook after 1945. That perspective was translated into active involvement in a number of international organizations and agencies for which there was no pre-war precedent, as well as others for which the past was an unhopeful and unhelpful guide. Canada's representation abroad grew exponentially

and the creative influence of Canadian delegations at international conferences no longer seemed anomalous.

No better example of the sea change in Canadian attitudes can be provided than by contrasting the unhelpful approach of Canada to the League of Nations with its positive efforts as the United Nations was defined and established. Canadian delegates contrived arguments to justify responsibility rather than excuses to avoid it. Status, though still important, was no longer the exclusive pursuit. Even as this activity strained the resources of the Department of External Affairs and the patience of Mackenzie King, it testified to the new consensus in Canada.

Relatively early in his term as secretary of state for external affairs, St. Laurent signalled another departure from the past. When he gave the Gray Lecture at the University of Toronto on January 13, 1947, St. Laurent encouraged discussion, even debate, about Canadian foreign policy—hardly an approach favoured by Mackenzie King. "A policy of world affairs," St. Laurent declared, "to be truly effective, must have its foundations laid upon general principles which have been tested in the life of the nation and which have secured the broad support of large groups of the population." Those principles, as defined by St. Laurent, were: national unity, political liberty, the rule of law, Christian values and "the acceptance of international responsibility in keeping with our conception of our role in world affairs."

According to St. Laurent, Canadians were also generally agreed as to how to apply those fundamental beliefs: preservation of the Commonwealth as an informal association with common experiences and interests; peaceful settlement of disputes with the United States as well as shared responsibility for continental security; common traditions with France; "support of constructive international organization"; and, perhaps less universally upheld, "the development of an effective diplomatic service." As part of Canada's proud record of achievement in recent years, St. Laurent drew particular attention to its delegation's role at the San Francisco Conference, which drew up the charter for the United Nations, and its subsequent participation in meetings of the United Nations General Assembly as well as its various committees and specialized agencies. In defining Canada's approach, St. Laurent noted, "we have, of course, been forced to keep in mind the limitations upon the influence of any secondary power."[21]

One implication of that stance had been the acceptance at San Francisco of a veto for the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations as the price for participation by the great powers.[22]

Before long, St. Laurent and his advisers believed that Soviet use of the veto had rendered the collective security provisions of the charter meaningless and that this obstructionism necessitated the development of an alternative arrangement, either by revision of the charter or by utilization of articles which were beyond the reach of the veto. In June and July 1947, Pearson and St. Laurent respectively sketched such a possibility vaguely, with the Commonwealth depicted as an appropriate model for cooperation.[23] On August 13, 1947, Reid was more explicit about the alternative to "immediate, drastic revision of the Charter," which ran the risk of driving the Soviet Union and its allies out of the United Nations. "Nothing in the Charter," Reid contended, "precludes the existence of regional political arrangements or agencies provided that they are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations and these regional agencies are entitled to take measures of collective self-defence against armed attack until the Security Council has acted." Reid then avoided any implication that his vision was limited: "The world is now so small that the whole of the Western world is in itself a mere region." However, he stepped back from the precipice in his final words to the Canadian Institute of Public Affairs, which denied "that the time has come when these things ought to be done" and reaffirmed the consistent government policy of striving to make the United Nations work.[24]

With the exception of the Ten Commandments and possibly the Speech from the Throne, the speaker is usually more important than the author of a speech, so it is not surprising that more attention was paid to later addresses which Reid and others wrote for St. Laurent than to Reid's own diagnosis and prescription, however much Reid's remarks anticipated later developments. In a speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, after Canada had accepted nomination for membership of the Security Council, St. Laurent protested the abuse of the veto and suggested an organization under Article 51 of the charter for "collective self-defence." Though Reid later complained of the ambivalence about revision of the charter, which Pearson introduced into St. Laurent's text, that may have saved it from more critical scrutiny by Mackenzie King.[25] After all, Mackenzie King was a man of Visions, not vision.

There was certainly nothing ambivalent about St. Laurent's reference in early October in Quebec City to the Soviet Union as an example of the kind of "theory-crazed totalitarian group" against which such an alliance might be directed. St. Laurent also underlined the relationship between international economic relations and political cooperation. As he explained to his business audience, the continuation of European recovery and North American prosperity through effective trade

and financial arrangements was important to counter the influence of Moscow.[26] "No other Canadian," Dale Thomson aptly comments, "could make the important statement with such hopes of a favourable reception; St. Laurent was pursuing his task of national unity by enlisting the support of all Canadians for the new, dynamic foreign policy."[27]

Eventually, the implementation of the program for European economic recovery, popularly known as the Marshall Plan, would ease financial difficulties on both continents. In mid-November 1947, however, Canada's measures to deal with its own dollar crisis lent impetus to official discussions of Canadian-American free trade, a notion whose fate would later be linked rather imaginatively by Mackenzie King to the prospect of a North Atlantic alliance.[28]

Near the end of November, his visit to London for the wedding of Princess Elizabeth played a part in shaping Mackenzie King's attitude in what was coming to be known as the Cold War. Less than a month before the anticipated breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers over the vexed question of treatment of Germany, the Canadian prime minister had a series of meetings with the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, the foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, the first lord of the admiralty, Viscount Alexander, and the leader of the opposition, Winston Churchill. Bevin's apocalyptic vision, which none of the others contradicted, terrified Mackenzie King. As he left one encounter, he remarked to Norman Robertson that "within three weeks, there may be another world war."[29]

Mackenzie King's reaction to this distressing news demonstrates the unpredictability of his attitudes as well as the interrelationship of external policies in the context of the Cold War. When he returned to Ottawa, the prime minister precipitated a cabinet crisis over the agreement reached in his absence for Canadian participation in the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). For King, that issue combined his traditional aversion to international commitments (particularly in unfamiliar parts of the world) with resentment that he had not been consulted and fear that war would break out on the Korean peninsula. Although a compromise was eventually reached, the episode came perilously close to prompting the resignations of St. Laurent and Pearson.[30] On the other hand, King personally intervened in food and finance negotiations between Britain and Canada to secure an interim agreement so that "the Russians would not be able to say that there is a break between the United Kingdom and the Dominion."[31] For the parsimonious prime minister, an intervention in favour of greater generosity was certainly uncharacteristic.

Yet, less than a month later, when he received Attlee's vital message describing the dire international situation and anticipating Bevin's appeal in the British House of Commons for Western Union, Mackenzie King reverted to form. To the consternation of Pearson and the British high commissioner, Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, King reacted negatively to one sentence which evoked for him unpleasant connotations of centralizing tendencies in the Commonwealth. "Indeed if we are to stem further encroachment of Soviet tide," Attlee had written, "we should organize ethical and spiritual forces of Western Europe backed by the power and resources of the Commonwealth and of the Americas, thus creating a solid foundation for the defence of Western civilization in the widest sense."[32] At King's request, Pearson drafted a reply which suggested that the United Nations was the appropriate forum for a confrontation with the Soviet Union and its satellites.[33] In the end, that message was not sent, possibly, as Pearson suggested to Wrong, because King's apprehensions about the United Nations had increased since Canada took its seat on the Security Council or because King had become preoccupied with the announcement of his retirement.[34] Whatever the explanation, it was a reminder of the unpredictability and apparent inconsistency of King's approach to international affairs.

Mercifully, King was in a more receptive mood and the incoming message was more carefully phrased when Attlee extended his invitation to the Canadians to join with the British and Americans in discussing North Atlantic security in Washington. Although the communist coup in Czechoslovakia has been cited, justifiably, as one of the key factors behind the momentum for a North Atlantic alliance, Ottawa's initial reaction to that crisis had been less than resolute. Much has been made of King's wariness about interference in the internal affairs of another country when St. Laurent proposed to make a condemnatory statement in the House of Commons; less attention has been paid to the fact that Pearson had similar reservations about raising the question in the Security Council of the United Nations.[35] The arrival of Attlee's message coincided with the death of Czech Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, whose personal tragedy may have touched King more than the political events of which it was a consequence.[36]

Soviet pressure on Norway provided the pretext for the British initiative, but the scope of what was proposed went far beyond Scandinavia. As Attlee put it, "only a bold move can avert the danger" of the expansion of Soviet influence in Western Europe and "the pace already set by Russia tells us that there is no time to lose." To counter the threat, "the most effective course is to take very early steps to conclude under

Article 51 of the Charter a regional Atlantic pact of mutual assistance in which all the countries threatened by a Russian move on the Atlantic could participate." Such an alliance was depicted as the second of three related arrangements, after what became the Brussels Treaty and before a "Mediterranean security system" designed to reassure Italy.[37]

Though the response from King introduced a minor element of confusion by referring to Article 52 of the charter, the positive tone was unmistakable and the acceptance of the invitation to participate in "exploratory talks" was unequivocal. "I am deeply impressed," King stated, "with the gravity of these developments. Certainly everything possible should be done, and that speedily, to avoid a possible repetition of the disastrous experiences of pre-war years when peaceful states allowed themselves to be victims of aggression, one by one." Of course, King was under no illusion that Canada would be an equal partner in any arrangement for collective security. On the contrary, he took comfort in the fact that such arrangements would "require the active leadership of the United Kingdom and of the United States."[38] Others might later celebrate the creative opportunities presented for a "middle power"—King preferred to play a minor role in the drama. Two days later, King had rediscovered his caution as he complained to his diary about the tendency of St. Laurent and the minister of national defence, Brooke Claxton, "to talk of the international problem."[39]

On March 17, 1948, the announcement of the signing of the Brussels Treaty, and the radio address by President Harry Truman welcoming it, provided the occasion for a meeting of the Liberal caucus, followed by a commitment by the cabinet and a declaration of intent by the prime minister. Throughout these deliberations and during the tripartite talks which followed, Pearson was careful to reassure King that "these talks are purely exploratory and on the official level only."[40] After listening to Truman's remarks, which went farther than King had anticipated, particularly with the announcement of the reintroduction of compulsory military service, the prime minister informed his cabinet of the British initiative and the imminent discussions in Washington.

A special supplement to the cabinet conclusions records that the ministers "noted the report of the Prime Minister and, after considerable discussion, agreed that Canada should be suitably represented on the official level, at the forthcoming discussions in Washington, it being the general view that Canada should adhere to an Atlantic regional pact, provided that the conditions of agreement proved acceptable to the government."[41] When he spoke in the House of Commons, King foreshadowed a consistent concern of the Canadian government in

discussion of a North Atlantic alliance when he commended the Brussels Treaty as "more than an alliance of the old kind." After reading Articles III (which referred to "the principles which form the basis of their common civilization") and IV (the pledge of "all military and other aid and assistance in their power" to a member attacked in Europe), King referred favourably to President Truman's expression of "the determination of the United States to help" the participants in the Western Union. "The peoples of all free countries may be assured," King concluded, "that Canada will play her full part in every movement to give substance to the conception of an effective system of collective security by the development of regional pacts under the Charter of the United Nations."[42] Especially for King, that sounded dangerously like a commitment!

Canada would be represented by Pearson and Wrong, assisted by others, with an inner circle of ministers and officials kept informed of the details and consulted on appropriate action. The translation of that tentative commitment into precise instructions for negotiation, as well as the attempts to persuade reluctant, sceptical or dissenting colleagues and other governments to reach a common understanding of what the situation required and what this opportunity afforded, would all be part of a process which would last more than a year and culminate in participation in a military alliance in peacetime.

In the remainder of this paper, I intend to provide an overview of this process from a Canadian perspective, with particular emphasis on the initial attitudes within that inner circle, the positions taken by the Canadian government on some of the important issues which had to be resolved as the "exploratory talks" became negotiations, an assessment of the outcome as seen from Ottawa and a comment on the interrelationship between the talks which led to the North Atlantic Treaty and other aspects of Canada's external relations in this period.

The intergovernmental consideration of North Atlantic security took just over one year to reach its conclusion. During that time, as Escott Reid notes, the participants were distracted by a range of other issues, some of which, like the Berlin crisis, were directly relevant to the purpose of the secret talks, while others not so obviously connected, such as the question of Palestine, threatened the Anglo-American understanding which was crucial to the success of the enterprise. The fact that 1948 was an election year in the United States affected the position of the Truman administration and the sensitivities of the Senate, both of which prompted delays and reassessments. From March 22, 1948, when Pearson joined British and American colleagues in the first meeting at the Pentagon, until

March 28, 1949, when the final text of the Treaty was confirmed by a somewhat larger group, there were more than 60 formal sessions and innumerable private encounters.[43]

The deliberations can be broken down into four stages, each of which culminated in a document which advanced the process one step further, though hardly at the pace foreseen in the early days. The tripartite talks, which ended on April Fool's Day, resulted in the "Pentagon Paper" which was styled as a position paper from the State Department, for approval by the secretary of state, the National Security Council and the president and for discussion with Congress, so as not to arouse the suspicions of the latter.[44] After a worrying hiatus, meetings of American officials with the ambassadors of Britain, Canada, France, Belgium and the Netherlands began on July 6 and concluded on September 10, 1948, with a report from the participants to their respective governments, called the "Washington Paper."[45] A draft treaty resulted from the next round of meetings of ambassadors (now including Luxembourg), in December 1948.[46] The final round of negotiations began on January 10, 1949. On March 18, the text of the North Atlantic Treaty was published, though the agreed interpretations were not disclosed until 1975, when they were published in the relevant volume of *Foreign Relations of the United States*.[47] Needless to say, an official Soviet interpretation of the treaty was released long before that![48] Presumably, courtesy of Donald Maclean, the Soviet Union knew considerably more about the negotiations much earlier than anyone else suspected at the time.[49]

Those initial tripartite talks, so carefully shrouded in secrecy, merit a brief glance, if only because there is evidence then of the differences among allies, as well as within the Canadian policy-making group, which would later assume greater importance. Of course, there is also ample proof of the fact, too easily forgotten in a detailed analysis of the specific objectives and outcomes in a complex and lengthy negotiation, that the participants shared broadly the same perceptions of the problem and the solution.

Before he left Ottawa, Pearson advised King that "the two principal issues in the Washington discussions" would be membership and obligations. On the former question, Pearson favoured the replacement of the Brussels Treaty by a broader alliance, possibly including Norway, Italy and Greece, three countries menaced by Soviet pressure. Pearson believed that the pact should include non-military provisions, so that it would be an effective instrument in the ideological struggle of the Cold War:

> Here it is essential to remember that the purpose of the pact is to rally the spiritual as well as the military and economic resources of Western Christendom against Soviet totalitarianism. To do this it should not be a merely negative anti-Soviet military alliance but should be the basis for a positive liberal and democratic counter-offensive. The pact may succeed in giving us a long period of peace if it results in creating an overwhelming preponderance of force against the Soviet Union. This force, however, to be overwhelming should not be only military and economic force; it should also include the force that comes from ability to rally to our side all non-Communists in all countries, including our own, who are now apathetic, fearful or doubtful.
>
> The proposed pact should make as clear as possible the methods which the peoples and governments of the Free World intend to follow to make good their faith in human rights and fundamental freedoms, in the worth and dignity of man and in the principles of parliamentary democracy, personal freedom and political liberty. If it can do this it will underline that this Pact is something far removed from alliances and arrangements of the old kind.[50]

In other words, Pearson shared King's aversion to a traditional military alliance.

That attitude was even more pronounced in a memorandum which Reid prepared for Pearson. The zealous and prolific Reid accompanied it by a revised version of a draft treaty which he had circulated the previous autumn and a draft working paper which he envisaged as the outcome of the talks and the precursor to a more comprehensive conference. Reid suggested that the states which the United Kingdom proposed to invite, with the exception of undemocratic Portugal, should receive invitations, along with Italy, Finland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. "It will be necessary constantly to keep in mind," he wrote, "the necessity of the pact being a basis for what one can call the spiritual mobilization of the liberal democracies as well as being a basis for economic and military cooperation against Soviet threats." The reciprocal obligation for defence would have to be flexible enough to deal with attempts to undermine or subvert a state as well as armed attack. It was vital to avoid "something which would be not much more than an old-fashioned military alliance." Instead, the new treaty must "give evidence of boldness and vigour."[51]

When he arrived in Washington, Pearson was advised very differently by the minister there, Thomas A. Stone, whose views were similar to those later expressed by Wrong. "Secret of success present talks is to keep in mind the one, immediate, simple objective—military security—and to remember urgency." According to Stone, the allies could add the "democratic trimmings" later.[52] Whether as a result of his personal convictions, his preliminary soundings of the views of Jack Hickerson of the State Department and Gladwyn Jebb from the Foreign Office, or such advice from the Canadian embassy in Washington, Pearson did not play the part that Reid had envisaged for him. In a subcommittee with Hickerson and Jebb, Pearson agreed to recommend an alliance limited to Western Europe (including Italy) and North America, with Greece, Turkey and Iran reassured by a separate presidential declaration.[53]

When he reported to Ottawa on March 27, 1948, Pearson referred to some of the proposals which had been put forward but dropped in discussion. The notion of expansion of the Brussels Pact to include the United States and Canada simply did not make sense to the latter. Similarly, a unilateral declaration by the United States "to the effect that an attack on any of the free Western European countries would be considered by the United States as an attack on herself" would be simple to implement but it would create an unfortunate but accurate impression of lack of reciprocity. It had also been suggested that the cause of European economic and social unity was better served by preserving the Brussels Pact than by absorbing it in an Atlantic Pact. The series of recommendations that emerged from the subcommittee still left room for differences about the prospective membership (including Italy), the need for a presidential commitment as an interim guarantee of the security of Western Europe, the relationship of the North Atlantic alliance to other security arrangements, the nature of the "pledge" or guarantee of assistance to victims of attacks, the arrangements for consultation within the alliance, the agencies to be established for these purposes, and the duration of the agreement.[54]

After a long discussion with King in Ottawa, Pearson conveyed to Wrong the prime minister's anxiety to add to the recommendations "a sentence on economic cooperation in the preamble and an article on the same subject in the Pact itself along the lines of the draft which we submitted at the last meeting and which I showed to him."[55] In fact, this concern was addressed informally in a "rough draft of a North Atlantic Pact" prepared in the State Department and read to Wrong by Hickerson, but that piece of paper was not circulated at the meetings in the Pentagon.[56] Consequently, there is no mention of this notion of economic

cooperation in the records of the tripartite discussions published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, nor does it appear in the "Pentagon Paper."[57] In that fallow field were sown the seeds of disagreement on tactics and commitments as well as objectives, particularly between the Canadian negotiators in Washington and those who viewed the discussions from Ottawa.

From this examination of the tripartite talks, it is clear that the principal concerns for the Canadian government were present from the first consideration of what became the North Atlantic Treaty. In the weeks and months that followed, these views would be conveyed in public speeches (dubbed by the *Ottawa Journal* "the Canadian crusade" for a regional security pact) as well as in secret negotiations. As Escott Reid notes, the addresses by ministers and officials "constituted part of the bargaining process."[58] Unquestionably the most important of these interventions was a speech by the secretary of state for external affairs, Louis St. Laurent, to the Canadian House of Commons on April 29, 1948.

Distressed at the apparent slackening of the pace in Washington as well as the flirtation there once more with unilateralism, St. Laurent was determined to push a regional security pact back to the top of the agenda. He reminded his fellow parliamentarians, and others beyond Parliament Hill, that he had advocated such an arrangement for collective security seven months earlier at the United Nations General Assembly. If anything, the need for "a dynamic counter-attraction to Communism" was even greater than before. In effect, the Western European democracies were the first line of defence for Canada and the United States. "We must at all costs avoid the fatal repetition of the history of the pre-war years when the Nazi aggressor picked off its victims one by one. Such a process does not end at the Atlantic."

St. Laurent reiterated his belief that "Canada should play its full part in creating and maintaining this overwhelming preponderance of moral, economic, and military force." Reading between the lines, as others in London and Washington did, the unmistakable implication was that the same arguments for a Canadian commitment to Western Europe applied with equal or greater measure to the United States.[59] Indeed, when St. Laurent referred again to a regional pact in mid-June, he made it clear that, without American participation, there would be little point in Canadian membership.[60] As Wrong explained to George Kennan of the State Department, there would be even less reason for Canada to make a unilateral guarantee to Western Europe.[61]

Perhaps because the Canadians could rely on support from European representatives as well as from within the State Department, this worry about the nature of the American commitment to Western Europe does not receive as much attention as it deserves as a "Canadian concern." Like the Europeans, they were wary of the past American record of reluctant and often late intervention in European crises. A unilateral declaration by an American administration that the United States would come to the aid of a victim of aggression on the other side of the Atlantic, whether or not it was supplemented by immediate assistance from American arsenals, would not meet the political need for reassurance in the face of Soviet pressure. It would also be vulnerable to repudiation or qualification, either by Congress or by a later president.

At the fifth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, on July 9, 1948, Pearson made that point directly to Robert Lovett, the under secretary of state and principal American negotiator. "The Canadian government," Pearson said, "could not make any contribution to the collective security of the area by any unilateral guarantee of western union security." Pearson was undoubtedly relieved when Lovett "interjected that the United States Government could not contemplate any such idea."[62] For similar reasons, the Canadians strongly resisted tendencies, particularly by the French, to elevate the short-term objective of material aid above the long-term goal of a North Atlantic pact.[63]

Once it was apparent that the United States would participate in a formal alliance, the focus of attention shifted to the nature of the "pledge" made by allies to one another. There was no serious division of opinion between the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa and the Canadian embassy in Washington, simply a desire, in common with Canada's allies to secure as explicit and comprehensive a guarantee as possible without jeopardizing American participation.[64] The Canadians understood and, to some extent, shared the State Department's anxiety that any clause which seemed to limit or violate constitutional procedures for dealing with international affairs might jeopardize ratification of the accord by Congress. Particularly after Dean Acheson succeeded General Marshall as secretary of state, the ambassadors and their governments were made acutely aware of sentiment in the Senate and its implications for the pact. But the Europeans were even more upset than the Canadians at the prospect of "watering down" the commitment, so this was not a question on which Pearson or Wrong was expected to take the lead.[65] Nor was it an issue which would determine whether or not Canada would sign the treaty.

Though the Canadians had definite, if not always unanimous, views on membership in the prospective organization, these were also not decisive influences on Canada's willingness to participate. With the notable exception of Escott Reid, the Canadians generally wanted a truly North Atlantic grouping of states. Reid's notion of a world-wide alliance including all members of the Commonwealth was never endorsed by ministers or advocated by negotiators. They consistently opposed membership for Greece and Turkey, whose security could be assured outside the framework of the alliance by the United States and the United Kingdom.[66]

Like their American counterparts, they blew hot and cold on the question of whether or not Italy should be a member of the club. When he first attempted to list the countries who should be asked to join, Pearson included Italy because of the internal threat posed there by the rise of the Communist Party.[67] Once the election was over, Canadian policy-makers tended to view Italy more as a strategic liability than as a political asset. When Italy knocked on the door in mid-January 1949, St. Laurent, Pearson and their advisers were not inclined to let her in.[68] Less than one month later, however, Wrong's instructions were reversed and efforts were made in Ottawa and through the embassy in Rome to repair any damage that Canada's earlier stance might have caused to bilateral relations.[69]

There was a similar ambivalence about Portugal, whose prospective participation would undermine any claim that this was an organization dedicated to Western democratic values. Reid was adamantly opposed to Portuguese membership from the start.[70] In the tripartite discussions, Pearson "mentioned the disadvantage of the inclusion of Portugal from the ideological point of view, but it was felt that this disadvantage was more than neutralized by the strategic advantage of Portugal's membership in the Pact."[71] That remained Canada's position throughout the discussions, despite attempts by Reid to sway his colleagues. As Wrong reported in mid-December 1948, "there has been strong emphasis on the strategic necessity of including Portugal which overruled our doubts arising from its form of Government."[72] Both the British and the Americans considered the Azores too valuable to exclude the Salazar regime.

Pearson readily agreed with Lovett's statement at a meeting of the ambassadors in Washington that "Greenland and Iceland were more important than some countries in Western Europe to the security of the United States and Canada," so there was an additional reason to favour Danish participation and an acceptance of limited obligations for Iceland.[73]

Sweden had been on the original list drawn up at the end of the tripartite talks, but it was dropped in December 1948 when it became obvious that it preferred to remain neutral, preferably in association with other Scandinavian countries. That preference and the direct threat posed by Russia prompted sympathy for Norway's participation, so much so that its ambassador in Washington joined the final round of talks. As for Ireland, the other "stepping-stone" across the Atlantic, its insistence on raising the question of partition was taken as evidence of a lack of serious intent.[74]

For all of the participants, the most vexed question pertaining to membership was France's determination to include French North Africa, particularly the three departments of Algeria, within the area protected by the pact. In early January 1949, St. Laurent informed Pearson and Wrong that his "main concern was about possible political difficulties in Canada if French North Africa and Italy were included in the Treaty, and in particular French North Africa." According to the prime minister, "this would introduce into public discussion of the Treaty the colonial question and possibly give rise later on to difficult issues should an independence movement develop strongly among the inhabitants of Morocco, Algeria or Tunis."[75] When France suggested that it would not sign the treaty unless Algeria was included within its territory, both Canada and the United States dropped their earlier objections, though neither was quick to inform the French government of this change in its stance.[76]

Of course, the part of the treaty to which most of the Canadians were most devoted, and with which they are most closely identified, was what became Article 2, dealing with economic and social cooperation. From the beginning, as we have seen, Canada's political leaders and their official advisers in Ottawa expressed their support for an agreement which was more than a traditional military alliance. Unfortunately, this enthusiasm was met with indifference or hostility on the part of their allies and scepticism on the part of the ambassador to the United States, Hume Wrong, who would have to negotiate its acceptance.

In the intermission between the tripartite talks and the later meetings, Wrong offered some blunt advice to Reid:

> I see no prospect that the United States would in the next year or so sign a treaty that goes as far as the Brussels Treaty. If that is the expectation in Ottawa, I think that steps should be taken to disabuse those who hold it. Certainly it is essential that we should be ready to approach the establishment of a real North Atlantic community by stages and not expect to get there at a

> rush. I believe that the central thing to concentrate on now is to secure a military undertaking on the lines of paragraph 5 of the document produced in the Pentagon talks last March with some simple general article which would cover economic collaboration and set up some sort of consultative organ or organs. If the other parties to the negotiation insist on something more they may wreck the whole project.[77]

It should be borne in mind that Wrong was reacting to the final passage in a flight of rhetorical fancy in which Reid called for "something along the lines of the Brussels Treaty" which would, *inter alia*, "set up new institutions" and "set forth the principles of Western society which we are trying not only to defend but to make the basis of an eventually united world." All of this was intended to combat "the forces of despair, apathy, doubt and fear" with "a bold move to raise in the hearts and minds and spirits of all those in the world who love freedom that confidence and faith which will restore their vigour."[78] For Reid, clearly, this was an article of faith.

As John English argues persuasively, "the Protestant missionary tradition" also influenced Lester Pearson, who called for measures "to promote the economic well-being of their peoples, and to achieve social justice, thereby creating an overwhelming superiority of moral, material, and military force on the side of peace and progress."[79] As well, for many of the mandarins, this approach was an outgrowth of their inclination and their experience in dealing with Europe.[80] So, whatever the sometimes considerable impatience of others with Reid's rhetorical flourishes, or excesses, his fundamental notion that the alliance should have a higher purpose expressed in its text was consistent with the views of the political leadership.

That does not mean that they agreed with the need for an elaborate treaty of the kind that Reid would conjure out of his bottom drawer or that they expected Canada's prospective allies to share the same vision. On the contrary, King, St. Laurent, Pearson and Claxton (who was acting secretary of state for external affairs for most of the autumn of 1948) anticipated objections from signatories of the Brussels Pact more preoccupied with military needs and wary of schemes which threatened to compete with their own notion of European unity. The Canadians were disappointed, but not entirely surprised, when Dean Acheson tried to eliminate Article 2 altogether. To combat these tendencies, they mustered diplomatic efforts in the various European capitals and attempted to persuade Acheson and his associates through Wrong.[81]

Whether a negotiator more convinced of the objective would have achieved more than Wrong is a moot point. From a close reading of the documents for 1949, there is some evidence to support Reid's contention that Wrong underplayed his hand and ignored his instructions when confronted with strident opposition to Article 2 from Acheson, who called forth the spectres of Vandenberg, Connally and anonymous others. What is more difficult to prove is whether this had any decisive impact on the outcome. Wrong may have been a more persuasive advocate when he conveyed Pearson's ultimatum on this question because his fellow negotiators recognized that his was not a personal position, and the sick-bed conversion of Acheson by Hickerson and Wrong similarly was a unique triumph.[82] Whatever might have been, Pearson commented after the final flurry of negotiations that "I feel this article is perhaps as strong as we can secure and it is therefore acceptable as it now stands."[83] Moreover, the real failure of Article 2 was in the implementation, not the drafting.

There is no reason to believe, as Reid suggests in *Time of Fear and Hope*, that had he had more time to refine a draft treaty or to elaborate instructions to the Canadian delegation, the outcome would have been different.[84] As it was, Arnold Heeney complained to Pearson that "the combination of your acting Minister [Claxton] and acting Under-Secretary [Reid] is pretty exhausting as you can imagine. The production of papers and the volume thereof has struck an all time high I should think and the North Atlantic crusade which you started is in danger of being checked by memoranda."[85] With advice from Wrong and Heeney, Claxton was not prepared to lay before the cabinet the mass of paper that Reid produced.[86] Nor was Pearson willing, from the safe distance of Paris, to give Reid's proposals the sweeping endorsement which he sought.[87]

Neither the differences over Article 2 nor its significance should be exaggerated. What cannot be overstated, however, is the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty to Canada's post-war policy and its vital relationship to other elements in Canada's external relations in the Cold War. We have already seen how the development of this notion was related to the perceived failure of the Security Council of the United Nations, a perception reinforced for Canada by its experience as a temporary member in 1948 and 1949. Virtually every issue which came before that body was interpreted according to the alignments and attitudes of the bi-polar world, so Canadian policy-makers needed no reminder about the pervasive influence of the Cold War. Participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization confirmed rather than altered Canada's

alignment and it provided opportunities, however illusory at times, to persuade its principal allies with the help of other secondary powers.

The negotiations which led to the North Atlantic Treaty were linked to Canada's international economic policy in ways both obvious and obscure. For Mackenzie King, even the prospect of economic cooperation under the rubric of an Atlantic community helped to justify, though it did not explain, his decision to scuttle the talks on Canadian-American free trade.[88] Moreover, the security pact was seen as the military counterpart to the Marshall Plan, in which Canada had a strong interest.

More generally, participation by Canada in a collective security pact which included both Britain and the United States offered the welcome prospect of resolving a traditional Canadian dilemma. Naturally enough, Hume Wrong examined the implications of the pact particularly for Canada's bilateral defence relations with the United States. But Wrong was also mindful of the benefits to Canada if the three participants in the tripartite talks became partners in an alliance. As he explained to George Kennan, "it would be far more difficult for Canada to collaborate in planning defence against Soviet aggression on the basis of a unilateral U.S. assurance than it would be if both countries were parties to an Atlantic agreement." Canadian anxieties about the implications of continental defence planning for Canadian sovereignty would likely be eased. "An Atlantic pact," Wrong contended, "would go a long way towards curing our split personality in defence matters by bringing the U.S., the U.K. and Canada into regular partnership."[89]

From the other side of the Atlantic, Norman Robertson came to a similar conclusion. After examining the implications for Australia and New Zealand of the reorientation of British policy away from the Commonwealth and toward Europe, Robertson commented that he was "more than ever impressed by our own good fortune," not only as a result of the exchange relief provided by the Marshall Plan, but also because that program "provides a context in which many of the difficulties which have beset our external policy for so long can be resolved."

> Ever since we have been in a position to shape our own policy abroad, we have had to wrestle with the antinomies created by our position as a North American country and as a member of the Commonwealth, by our special relationship with the United Kingdom and at the same time, although in less degree, with other countries in Western Europe as well. A situation in which our special relationship with the United Kingdom can be identified

> with our special relationships with other countries in Western Europe and in which the United States will be providing a firm basis, both economically and probably militarily, for this link across the North Atlantic, seems to me such a providential solution for so many of our problems that I feel we should go to great lengths and even incur considerable risks in order to consolidate our good fortune and ensure our proper place in this new partnership.

As Robertson observed, "it would be a mistake for us to allow our policy to be shaped too much either by financial caution or by a regard for our diplomatic status which might hamper the encouraging developments which are now on foot."[90] That assessment, with its intermingling of the benefits for Canada of a collective security arrangement and European economic recovery as well as the prospective resolution of our traditional dilemma in international affairs, was as valid in April 1948 as it would be one year or 46 years later. Whether Canada was a secondary power, a small power, a middle power or even a principal power, the perceived advantages of avoiding a choice between British and American policy was a welcome change for Canadian mandarins and their political masters.[91]

Dare I add that I am also pleased to be able to conclude a paper delivered in this room with a quotation from Norman Robertson!

ENDNOTES

1. United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1948, 3, *Western Europe* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 1-351; *FRUS*, 1949, 4, *Western Europe* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 1-285.

2. Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope: the Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977).

3. James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).

4. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER)*, 14, 1948 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1994), especially Chapter 4. Further information on this topic may be found in ibid., 15, 1949 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1995), Chapter 5.

5. *DCER*, 14, p. xix (introduction).

6. Leigh Sarty, "Sunset Boulevard revisited? Canadian internationalism after the Cold War," *International Journal*, 48, 4 (Autumn 1993), p.757.

7. Ibid., p. 759. See also Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: the Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993), especially p. 18.

8. Kim Richard Nossal has explained the distinction between "high" and "low" policy as follows: "High policy deals with the issues of war and peace. . . . Low policy refers to other issues on the agenda, such as trade, international monetary policy, immigration, or development assistance." Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1985), p. xiv.

9. George Ignatieff, *The Making of a Peacemonger: The Memoirs of George Ignatieff* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), p.107.

10. This vigilance is described well in two excellent studies of Lester Pearson and his diplomacy: John English, *Shadow of Heaven: The Life of Lester Pearson*, Volume 1: *1897-1948* (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1989), especially p. 323; Geoffrey A.H. Pearson,- *Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), particularly pp. 1-2. Lester Pearson himself discussed the problems of dealing with Mackenzie King, as well as the differences in outlook between them in his memoirs. See L.B. Pearson, *Mike: the Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*, Volume 2: *1948-1957*, ed. John A. Munroe and Alex I. Inglis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp. 28-31.

11. Dale Thomson, *Louis St. Laurent, Canadian* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 202-3.

12. Pearson, *Seize the Day*, Chapter 1.

13. See J.B. Brebner, *The North Atlantic Triangle* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1945) and Edgar McInnis, *The Atlantic Triangle and the Cold War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959). In his account of British external economic policy, R.S. Sayers described Canada's pre-war trade as "bilateral unbalance within a balanced 'North Atlantic Triangle'." *Financial Policy, 1939-45* (London, 1956), pp. 322-3. In his book, *Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle* (Toronto, 1976), C.P. Stacey makes no mention of the negotiations which would lead to the North Atlantic Treaty, though he does refer to the demise of Canadian-American free trade, which King contrived to link to the possibility of the Treaty. But Stacey discusses Mackenzie King's attitude toward the prospective alliance in his history of Canada's external relations, *Canada and the Age of Conflict*, Volume 2: *The Mackenzie King Era, 1921-1948* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), pp. 416-418.

14. Hector Mackenzie, "The Path to Temptation: The Negotiation of Canada's Reconstruction Loan to Britain in 1946," Canadian Historical Association, *Historical Papers*, 1982, 196ff; L.S. Pressnell, *External Economic Policy Since the War*, Volume I, *The Post-War Financial Settlement* (London, 1987), especially Chapter 11; J.L. Granatstein, *How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); B.W. Muirhead, *The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy: The Failure of the Anglo-European Option* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's, 1992), especially Chapter 1.

15. Norman Hillmer, "Defence and Ideology: the Anglo-Canadian Military 'Alliance' in the 1930s," *International Journal*, 33, 3 (Summer 1978), pp. 588-612.

16. But cf. James Eayrs: "Nothing in Quebec's past justified the complacent assumption that by 1948 the French-speaking majority of that province were ready to support Canada's membership in a military alliance for the defence of Western Europe just because Stalinism had replaced Kaiserism and Hitlerism in the allegations of Anglophones as the menace to freedom." Still, of all the French language dailies in Quebec, only *Le Devoir* opposed Canadian participation in the North Atlantic Treaty. Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, p. 57.

17. See R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, *American Dollars Canadian Prosperity* (Toronto: Samuel-Stevens, 1978), especially Chapters 2 and 3; *DCER*, 13, pp. 1407-1452.

18. By early 1948, concerns about American encroachments in the Canadian North had prompted a comprehensive review of the situation by a newly established Advisory Committee on Northern Development. See *DCER*, 14, pp. 1511-1529; Shelagh Grant, *Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988).

19. Denis Smith comments on the absence of an alternative policy in *The Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), pp. 200, 211-212.

20. When St. Laurent sat down after speaking to the House of Commons about the government's commitment, he asked Escott Reid "how that will go down." Reid replied that he thought it would "go down very well in the country." "I wasn't thinking of the country," St. Laurent said, "I was thinking of Laurier House [King's Ottawa residence]." Reid, "Memories of Louis St. Laurent, 1946-9," in Norman Penlington, ed., *On Canada: Essays in Honour of Frank H. Underhill* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 80. The anecdote is repeated in Reid's memoirs, *Radical Mandarin* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), p. 230.

21. Department of External Affairs (DEA), *Statements and Speeches* (*S/S*), 47/2, Louis S. St. Laurent, "The Foundation of Canadian Policy in World Affairs," inaugurating the Gray Foundation Lectureship at the University of Toronto, 13 January 1947. For Pearson's comments on the lecture, see *Mike*, 2, p. 25. Nossal describes the Gray Lecture as "the classic statement of postwar Canadian internationalism" and notes that the emphasis on rule of law and the acceptance of responsibility "sharply broke with the traditions of the interwar years." *Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, p. 55.

22. John Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957*, Volume 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), Chapter 8. A more personal account of the founding of the United Nations is provided in Escott Reid, *On Duty: A Canadian at the Making of the United Nations, 1945-1946* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1983).

23. Pearson spoke on 16 June at the University of Rochester and St. Laurent spoke in the House of Commons on 4 July. See Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, pp. 15-16.

24. *S/S*, 47/12, "Address by Escott Reid to Canadian Institute of Public Affairs, Lake Couchiching, Ontario, August 13, 1947." There is an excellent discussion of the relationship between the ideas in this speech and Reid's earlier views on the United Nations

and the bi-polar conflict in J.L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins 1935-1957* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 247-250.

25. Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, pp. 32-33. Eayrs aptly describes King as "aloof" from the consensus developing at this time among ministers and officials that "it would be prudent and expedient to create a Western security alliance of some kind to meet the threat of Soviet imperialism and to prevent the outbreak of war." Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, p. 18.

26. *S/S*, 47/16, "Address by Louis St. Laurent to Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Quebec, October 7, 1947."

27. Thomson, *St. Laurent*, p. 220.

28. Robert Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, "The Rise and Fall of Canadian-American Free Trade, 1947-8," *Canadian Historical Review*, 57 (December 1977), 459ff. See also: *DCER*, 14, pp. 1030-1072, especially pp. 1052-1053; *FRUS*, 9, *Western Hemisphere*, pp. 410-411.

29. J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record*, Volume 4, *1947-1948* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 111. See also John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson*, Volume 2: *1949-1972* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), which emphasizes the interview with Churchill.

30. Denis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), especially pp. 8-18; *DCER*, 13, pp. 964-1007; *DCER*, 14, pp. 136-151.

31. *Mackenzie King Record*, 4, pp. 128-9.

32. *DCER*, 14, Prime Minister of United Kingdom to Prime Minister of Canada, 14 January 1948, pp. 400-401. As Reid suggests in his memoirs, "Attlee and Bevin were careful in these messages to use language which would not disturb the United States Senate. They were not equally careful to refrain from language which would disturb Mackenzie King." *Radical Mandarin*, p. 228. This experience also qualifies (as does the reaction to the Berlin Crisis) the generalization made by Denis Smith about Mackenzie King's comparative receptivity to British as opposed to American appeals for support. *Diplomacy of Fear*, pp. 227-228.

33. *DCER*, 14, Pearson to St. Laurent, 17 January 1948, and Pearson to King, 17 January 1948, with enclosure, pp. 400-401,

34. Ibid., Pearson to Wrong, 29 January 1948, pp. 404-405. See also Pearson, *Mike*, 2, p.42. Eayrs conveys the mistaken impression that a formal reply was sent. *Growing Up Allied*, pp. 27-28.

35. King Diary, 3 March 1948; *DCER*, 14, Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) to Permanent Delegate to United Nations, Tel. 280, 16 March 1948 (the telegram was drafted and sent by Pearson), p. 325.

36. See J.W. Pickersgill, *My Years with Louis St. Laurent, A Political Memoir* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), p. 44.

37. *DCER*, 14, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to High Commissioner for United Kingdom, Tel. 220, 10 March 1948, pp. 419-420.

38. Ibid., p. 422. James Eayrs depicts King's reply to Attlee as embodying "a transformation of Canada's foreign policy." *Growing Up Allied*, p. 33.

39. *Mackenzie King Record*, 4, p. 167.

40. *DCER*, 14, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 15 March 1948, p. 429. For other examples, see enclosure to this document and Documents 316, 321, 322 and 334.

41. Ibid., p. 434; *Mackenzie King Record*, 4, pp. 170-173. Not surprisingly, King sought reassurance that compulsory military service (i.e., conscription) would not be necessary in Canada.

42. Pearson quotes at length from this speech in his memoirs. See *Mike*, 2, p. 43. Pickersgill, who was then in the Prime Minister's Office and who assisted in writing the speech, refers to King's statement as a "revolutionary change from a policy of no commitments in peacetime to a guarantee of collective action." *My Years*, p. 45.

43. Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, pp. 45-48.

44. *FRUS*, 1948, 3, pp. 70-75; *DCER*, 14, pp. 453-482.

45. *FRUS*, 1948, 3, pp. 237-249; *DCER*, 14, pp. 596-613.

46. The text of that draft was published by Sir Nicholas Henderson as an appendix to *The Birth of NATO* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 115-117.

47. Originally recorded in the minutes of the meeting of Ambassadors on 18 March 1949. *FRUS*, 1949, 4, pp. 222-223. After the publication of the "draft treaty", the Canadians made proposals to amend the text, without avail. See Henderson, *Birth of NATO*, p. 109.

48. *FRUS*, 1949, 4, pp. 261-265.

49. *Time of Fear and Hope*, pp. 80-81. Eayrs argues plausibly that, if the Soviet Union had wanted to strangle the alliance in the cradle, it should have leaked the existence of the talks to the American press or Congressional leaders. *Growing Up Allied*, pp. 71-72. Ironically, the need for security and the fear of leaks was one rationale offered for excluding the French from the preliminary talks. *DCER*, 14, Ambassador in United States to SSEA, WA-843, 23 March 1948, pp. 445-447.

50. Ibid., Pearson to King, 14 March 1948, pp. 430-432.

51. Ibid., Reid to Pearson, 18 March 1948, pp. 435-439. Arnold Heeney, clerk of the Privy Council and secretary to the cabinet, commented that "I recoil from the idea of such an omnibus scheme as you envisage at this stage—too many and too soon I w[oul]d think. Surely the USSR and friends w[oul]d be more impressed by a quick business-like arrangement between UK-US-Canada cum France and the Western Union (I incline to think the first four sh[oul]d federate with the Brussels lot) than by an amorphous conglom[eration] which included Finland, Italy, Portugal and Pakistan." Ibid., p. 435, n. 15. Pearson agreed with others in the Department of External Affairs who saw no particular advantage in taking the initiative by drafting a comprehensive treaty. Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, pp. 21-2. However, it may be significant that Pearson never instructed Reid to cease these essays, to which senior officials had to devote considerable time and effort.

52. *DCER*, 14, Stone to Pearson, 20 March 1948, pp. 441-442.

53. Ibid., Ambassador in United States to SSEA, WA-852, 23 March 1948 (Pearson to Reid), pp. 453-454.

54. Ibid., Pearson to King, 27 March 1948, pp. 455-462.

55. Ibid., SSEA to Ambassador in United States, EX-823, 29 March 1948, pp. 462-463.

56. Ibid., Ambassador in United States to SSEA, 31 March 1948 (for Pearson *only* from Wrong), pp. 463-465.

57. *FRUS*, 1948, 3, pp. 59-75.

58. *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 59.

59. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1948, 4, p. 3448. See also *FRUS*, 1948, 3, pp. 128-9, and Henderson, *Birth of NATO*, pp. 25-26.

60. See Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, p. 61.

61. Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 109.

62. *FRUS*, 1948, 3, p. 175. This exchange is also cited in Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 111. In his review of Reid's book, Lord Gladwyn identifies the nature of the American commitment as the crux of the negotiations. The review appeared in *International Journal*, 33, 1 (Winter, 1977-78), pp. 248-261.

63. See, especially, *DCER*, 14, Pearson to Vanier, 13 August 1948, pp. 564-568; also Pearson, *Seize the Day*, pp. 37-38. The question of the French attitude had come to a head at a private meeting of participants at Lovett's house on 20 August. The Canadian record (by Pearson) of that gathering is in *DCER*, 14, pp. 577-581. For Lovett's own summary, see *FRUS*, 1948, 3, pp. 214-221.

64. See Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, Chapter 12; John Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957*, Volume 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), pp. 109-111; Pearson, *Seize the Day*, pp. 34-37.

65. At his first meeting with the ambassadors, Acheson indicated that Lovett's consultations with senators Vandenberg and Connally had not gone as far as he had thought and that the phrasing of Article 5 was "the heart of the Senators' concern." Van Kleffens and Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador, were particularly outspoken about the dangers of undermining the commitment and thereby negating the political purpose of the alliance. Wrong simply indicated the Canadian government's satisfaction with the then current wording and the risks of diluting the language in an article whose contents were already well known to the public as a result of leaks (which Wrong was too polite to lay at the door of Congress). National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 25, file 283(s), Ambassador in United States to SSEA, WA-337, 9 February 1949.

66. See, for example, a memorandum prepared by Wrong which summarizes the views of St. Laurent and Pearson on various questions, including membership. RG 25, file 283(s), Wrong to Reid, 8 January 1949.

67. *DCER*, 14, Pearson to King, 14 March 1948, pp. 430-432.

68. During the security talks in December 1948, the Canadians had opposed Italian membership at the Working Group and in the Ambassadors' Group. At the end of the year, Pearson instructed Wrong "not to press our objections to Italian membership." *DCER*, 1948, p. 780, n. 225. However, in early January 1949, he telephoned Wrong to inform him that Prime Minister St. Laurent opposed including Italy or French North Africa in the Treaty. NAC, Wrong Papers, Vol. 6, file 32, Wrong, minute, January 4, 1949. See also RG 25, file 283(s), Wrong to Reid, 8 January 1949. The prime minister favoured some form of "simultaneous assurance" to Italy.

69. The revised instructions came in the form of responses to a series of questions from Wrong in early February. The question of Italian membership was also raised by the Italian ambassadors in Ottawa and Washington. See RG 25, file 283(s), SSEA to Ambassador in United States, EX-193, 27 January 1949; SSEA to Ambassador in United States, EX-300, 7 February 1949; Ambassador in United States to SSEA, WA-555, 2 March 1949.

70. See his memorandum to Pearson on 18 March 1948, in *DCER*, 14, pp. 435-439.

71. Ibid., Pearson to King, 27 March 1948, pp. 455-462.

72. Ibid., Ambassador in United States to SSEA, WA-3177, 17 December 1948, pp. 744-746.

73. *FRUS*, 1948, 3, p. 165.

74. For an exchange between foreign ministers on this subject, see RG 25, file 283(s), MacBride to Pearson, 7 February 1949; Pearson to MacBride, 22 February 1949.

75. Wrong Papers, Vol. 6, file 32, Wrong, minute, 4 January 1949. See also RG 25, file 283(s), Wrong, memorandum, 8 January 1949.

76. RG 25, file 283(s), SSEA to Ambassador in United States, EX-300, 7 February 1949. The situation was described aptly in a telegram from Washington reporting a conversation between T.A. Stone of the Canadian Embassy and T.C. Achilles of the State Department: "Achilles told Stone for his own very private ear that the United States will swallow Algeria. In turn, Stone told Achilles for his own very private ear that Canada would swallow Algeria too, and asked him if he had any idea when the United States would make a move to take the French out of their misery. Achilles said that for various reasons they wanted to let this question hang in the balance for as long as possible." Ibid., Ambassador in United States to SSEA, WA-188, 24 January 1949.

77. *DCER*, 14, Wrong to Reid, 17 June 1948, pp. 510-513.

78. Ibid., memorandum by Pearson (drafted by Reid), 1 June 1948, enclosed with Reid to Wrong, 3 June 1948, pp. 502-508. In his account of the NATO negotiations, Tom Keating justifiably emphasizes the "caustic comments" of Wrong and Robertson, but associates those criticisms too directly with Article 2, rather than with Reid's elaboration of a comprehensive treaty and instructions to the Canadian delegation in the autumn of 1948. Keating, *Canada and World Order*, pp. 88-89.

79. English, *The Worldly Years*, p. 15.

80. Mary Halloran, "Canada and the Origins of the Post-War Commitment," in Margaret O. MacMillan and David S. Sorenson, eds., *Canada and NATO: Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future* (Waterloo: University of Waterloo Press, 1990), p. 4.

81. Reid drafted and Pearson signed a message on this subject which was sent to the Canadian ambassadors in France, Belgium and the Netherlands on 17 February 1949. Wrong was informed of positive responses in the European capitals and instructed to revive the question on 21 February 1949. On 25 February, Wrong reported to Pearson that European views reflected a more positive approach to Article 2. See copies of these messages on RG 25, file 283(s).

82. See especially the minutes of the meeting of the ambassadors on 8 February 1949 for Wrong's efforts to persuade his colleagues. *FRUS*, 1949, 4, pp. 73-88. English summarizes Wrong's attitude and the representations to Acheson effectively in *Worldly Years*, pp. 22-23. Reid's critique of Wrong's negotiations may be found in *Time of Fear and Hope*, pp. 175-179.

83. RG 25, file 283(s), SSEA to Ambassador in United States, EX-570, 27 February 1949.

84. Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, Chapter 19 ("Disappointments and Frustrations").

85. NAC, Pearson Papers, Vol. 32, Heeney to Pearson, 19 November 1948. Claxton's biographer comments that his subject "had not been directly involved in the negotiations leading up to NATO. That job had been the task of Lester Pearson and the Department of External Affairs." David Jay Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 205.

86. *DCER*, 14, Heeney to Reid, 20 November 1948, pp. 674-675; Wrong, memorandum (of conversation with Claxton), 23 November 1948, pp. 685-686.

87. In a private letter to Pearson sent on the day that St. Laurent became prime minister, Reid asked for what he called a "100 per cent endorsation" of his views, to sway an ill-informed Claxton and a distracted St. Laurent as well as the Cabinet. In an interim reply, Pearson questioned whether "the urgency is as great as you indicate." His considered response came in two stages. *DCER*, 14, Read to Pearson, 15 November 1948, pp. 657-659; Delegation to General Assembly of United Nations in Paris (DGAUNP) to SSEA, Tel. 436, 20 November 1948 (Pearson to Reid), p. 674; DGAUNP to SSEA, Tel. 441, 21 November 1948 (Pearson to Reid), pp. 680-682; DGAUNP to SSEA, Tel. 463, 23 November 1948, pp. 684-685.

88. See above, n. 27. When Wrong explained the situation to Jack Hickerson, he added that the Canadian government wanted to treat the North Atlantic pact as a priority. In the circumstances, "to confront the Canadian people at the same time" with the question of free trade with the United States "would be of doubtful wisdom from the point of view of obtaining both objectives with a minimum of controversy." *FRUS*, 1948, 9, *The Western Hemisphere* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 410-411.

89. *DCER*, 14, Wrong to Pearson, 8 May 1948, pp. 497-499.

90. Ibid., High Commissioner in United Kingdom to SSEA, Despatch 713, 21 April 1948, pp. 1504-1510. J.L. Granatstein places this comment within the context of Robertson's views of the North Atlantic Treaty in his fine biography, *A Man of Influence: Norman Robertson and Canadian Statecraft 1929-68* (Ottawa: Deneau, 1981), pp. 235-237.

91. As Leigh Sarty notes, the Cold War context was the most important determinant of Canada's approach and its achievements in the post-war world. "The notion that a selfless commitment to a higher international ideal allowed Canada to escape the limitations of modest capabilities in an anarchical world is wishful thinking." Sarty, "Sunset Boulevard revisited," p. 761. Nossal provides a comprehensive inventory of the titles assigned to Canada's status in *Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, pp. 9-17.

THE REPORTS OF ROBERT A.D. FORD, Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1964-1980

Charles A. Ruud

Résumé

Après 16 années de services à Moscou en tant qu'ambassadeur du Canada, affectation d'une durée sans précédent, Robert Ford était considéré comme l'ultime autorité au pays dans le domaine des affaires soviétiques. Ses réflexions sur les relations canado-soviétiques, recueillies lors de deux affectations antérieures à Moscou, ont jeté les bases du rapport de 1954 qui a façonné la politique canadienne envers l'URSS pendant de nombreuses années. À partir de documents gouvernementaux et d'autres sources, l'auteur examine la façon dont Ford percevait l'Union soviétique et évalue ses réalisations en tant qu'ambassadeur, avec ses expériences antérieures comme toile de fond.

I begin by saluting the courage of John Hilliker. To include at a conference of editors of diplomatic papers historians who rather critically and sceptically consume their work is a bold undertaking. However, because I am now writing a book on Robert Ford, former Canadian ambassador to the Soviet Union, my study of the telegrams and commentary by this eminent diplomat has underscored for me the importance of your work: winnowing out from the vast and growing archives of diplomatic papers the relatively few documents that are historically important.

I

The paper by the Canadian editor at your first meeting in 1989 referred to his objective as the publication of "a comprehensive self-contained record of the major foreign policy decisions taken by the Government of Canada, and the reasons for taking them."[1] The British editor spoke more generally: "The main aim of governments in sponsoring publication of diplomatic documents is to tell their own story of foreign policy to as many people as possible both at home and abroad."[2]

To accomplish these goals, governments name skilled editors and researchers to assemble meticulous collections whose high standards of presentation include excellent format, sturdy bindings, quality paper and readable type. What result are volumes that—by their very heft and appearance—convey stability, continuity and high purpose. These books of record are the thoroughbreds in the stable of all government publications.

As an historian, my parameters for presenting to the reading public the foreign policy of a given government are largely different from those of most of my audience today. Even as we are commonly constrained by such basic standards as honesty and accuracy, I have the leeway, unlike you, to individuate a particular diplomat, Robert Ford, and to venture a judgment on his singular contributions.

In pursuing this line of inquiry, I will discuss what I have so far mined from our common source for documents—government archives, in addition to other sources—and cite what I consider my most significant find, and why.

II

My current research centres on a major practitioner of foreign policy during the Brezhnev years—the Canadian ambassador to Moscow, Robert A.D. Ford.

Just two days after his 49th birthday—on 10 January 1964—Robert Ford presented his credentials as Canadian ambassador to the Soviet Union; and he remained at the Moscow post for the next 16 years. He retired in 1983 after three final years in Ottawa as special adviser on East-West relations. Today, at 79, he lives in Vichy, France, wholly immobilized by a rare muscular disease.

When that disorder first surfaced during his undergraduate years at the University of Western Ontario, doctors gave Ford a year to live. He instead returned to classes in a year's time to complete his first-class honours degree in English and history. Aware that he faced progressive debilitation as he matured, Ford plunged immediately into the master's program in history at Cornell University, and there began to study the language and history of Russia. He also qualified through competitive examinations for the appointment he accepted in 1940 with Canada's Department of External Affairs.[3]

Recalling his student days, Ford has told me that his world view was most shaped by a single book: Carl Becker's *Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, which argues the continuity of common

beliefs in cultures over long periods. Becker made his case by showing how the humanistic beliefs that the *philosophes* put forward as revolutionary actually preserved and carried forward the long existent "climate of opinion" that was Christian and ecclesiastical.[4]

To begin his foreign service, Ford apprenticed in Rio de Janeiro and wartime London. By 1946 he was improving his Russian language skills as second secretary in Moscow, and there he briefly took charge when the Gouzenko affair forced a substantial exodus of personnel, including the ambassador. After another London stint and an Ottawa stay whose importance I will shortly show, Ford began his 1951-1954 term in Moscow as chargé d'affaires.

Promotion to ambassador sent Ford, then 41, to Bogota, followed by Belgrade and Cairo, and, for over a decade and a half, Moscow. Without question, his physical limitations figured into the extraordinary length of his last tour in a capital without a social whirl or many visitors from Canada. But there is no question that Ford remained so long in place as envoy in Moscow because he dealt with the Russians so effectively.

In 1977-78, External wrote of Ford: "Knowledge and abilities: exceptional: he is by far the most experienced and knowledgeable Canadian, inside or outside the government, in Soviet affairs; is the most experienced Western diplomat now serving in Moscow (as dean); and is by common consent one of the leading Western experts in this field." The report cited the "key contribution he made to the experts' report on East-West relations prepared for the NATO summit—a contribution that epitomized the unique place he has come to hold among the Western experts on Soviet affairs."[5]

A year later, External credited Ford as "a world authority on Soviet affairs. His interests range from the immediate to the very long-range and from technology and security matters to the cultural and literary domains. His advice on Soviet-Canadian relations is taken at the highest levels of government."

Citing "Soviet-made difficulties and restrictions", the report praises Ford's performance "in a country where everything including trade is a part of policy."[6] That December, as Ford's tenure was ending in Moscow, External summed up Ford's record as "consistently superior" and above "the standards normally expected of our heads of post."[7]

III

To perform so effectively, Ford coupled critical rationalism in the mode of Carl Becker with a studied, even exuberant, immersion in Russian culture. The result was the perspective of an insider; and from that viewpoint he could see quixotic Soviet politics and combative Marxism as a thin and brittle veneer covering a core Russian psychology and culture and Russian problems that had endured from pre-Revolution times.

Ford became ambassador just 10 months before the Presidium of the Communist Party, in late 1964, replaced Nikita Khrushchev with Leonid Brezhnev and partly restored Stalinist authoritarianism. The monolithic state they ruled seemed as formidable as ever as a political and military power bent on projecting its influence everywhere in the world.

Now, looking back, we label the Brezhnev era as a time of "stagnation", but Ford had the prescience at the time to assess what was happening. Based on assessments of the Soviet Union that he had formulated in the 1950s right after the death of Stalin, he began to argue that the irrational totalitarian amalgam imposed by Stalin was beginning to show signs of weakening from within because it differed so from core Russian values and aspirations.

IV

Before proceeding to what that knowledge caused Ford to advise regarding foreign policy, I must speak about yet other influences on Ford's thinking and diplomatic skills—his wife and his Moscow friends.

With respect to his wife, I agree with others, including Ford, that this consummate rationalist would not have understood Russia so well nor been so excellent an ambassador without the Brazilian he married in New York in 1946—Thereza Maria Gomes. She accompanied him for his first stint in Moscow and for all his subsequent postings until his retirement.

In the words of the Russian writer and poetess Zoya Boguslavskaya, who knew them both very well: "Thereza was so important not only because he was an invalid (I can't put it any other way), it was her character, her outlook and disposition that counted. Ford had chosen this volcanic woman, always charged with energy, and this energy charged him."[8] Although never forsaking his diplomatic bearing, and discretion, Ford with Thereza lived more resonantly within Russian culture.

Impatient as they were with sloth, they threw themselves into Moscow life—not by making an occasional appearance at a play or concert, but by entering Russian cultural circles. Ford consequently forged close relationships with Russian artists and intellectuals, reached informed opinions about their work, and actively translated poetry from Russian into English.

Boguslavskaya believed that "Ford loved Russia. As he told us himself, it was his Motherland, he spent his best years here. As soon as he married Thereza they came to Russia, it was their only 'country in common'." She added, "The sixteen years or so that he spent here were his happiness, his family, his country" in large part because of his "rich" command of the language at a time when "very few ambassadors could speak Russian."

"All of us were unhappy in those times of Khrushchev and Brezhnev—it was a difficult time for the intelligentsia," says Boguslavskaya. "It seemed to all of us that we lived very badly and, at the same time, we saw this man with an ailment that was progressing inevitably, which he treated as irrelevant, as his Christian duty. And there in the midst of us was this quiet, steadfast man."

The poet Evgeny Evtushenko speaks of Ford as "an exceptional ambassador because he was part of our Russian cultural life. I don't remember any important play or premier when I didn't see him. He was everywhere, even at hockey matches. Not because he was trying to *pretend* he was a so-called lover of the Russian people [but because] . . . he was a real aristocrat of the spirit." Claiming himself to be "a little bit of an anarchist and so I, a little bit, hate all . . . politicians" Evtushenko went on to argue that "the distant future must be decided not by professional politicians (because most of them are crooks), but by so-called amateurs like, for instance Vaclav Havel, who is an author and not a professional politician, but he's a distinguished man. And, in my opinion, Mr. Ford was one of these 'amateurs'."[9]

Thereza comes to the fore again in the remarks of Andrey Voznesensky, whom Ford says was his best friend among the Soviet intelligentsia.[10] This eminent poet sees Ford's character as "symbiosis, a synthesis of Thereza and Ford that was something closer to the Russian character. In the Russian character there exists a northern coldness—the Nordic traits in Ford's character; and at the same time there is the southern part of Russia—the Cossacks were debauched and wild. The fiery part was Thereza, the spirit of the Cossacks, the hooligans and brawlers

from the south of Russia. Joined together, these two opposites could understand the Russian character."

Voznesensky was also amused that Thereza could get away with a lot in Moscow because of her personality. "She had the reputation of a crazy woman not only among her friends, but also among intelligentsia and politicians, so she often dared ask questions that Ford would never ask . . . we had a good laugh when she told us how she sat by Khrushchev's side, asked naive and stupid questions and spoke the truth to his face."

But from my perspective as an historian, I disagree with Voznesensky's contention that "by himself Ford would not have been able to understand us" and my strongest proof is the summation that Ford wrote when he reported in person to External Affairs in March 1954, after three years in Moscow. It was to this seminal document that I alluded when I earlier described that same visit to Ottawa as very important; for here was the appraisal of an objective rationalist and historian that stands out for its acuity.

V

Ford himself later wrote of the genesis and impact of this particular report: "I was given six weeks to work on a paper on relations with the USSR, before I took over the operation direction of the European Division. . . . This was the first time an effort had been made to assess the USSR and our interest in it, and I think it served as the basis for our relations for many years."[11]

In that report, Ford lists the serious errors made by Stalin in foreign affairs after World War II. By breaking with Tito, Stalin created a defiant enemy. He misjudged the U.S. economy and incorrectly bet on growing weakness. He seriously underestimated the strength and independence of the Chinese communists and did not anticipate the world's reaction to his launching through the surrogate North the attack on South Korea in 1950.

Ford believed that whereas the heirs of Stalin were compelled to lessen the international conflicts and domestic shortcomings he had caused, they could not scale down the huge Soviet military establishment. And downsizing was impossible, Ford held, both because Russian tradition dating to the tsars called for a huge standing army to control an immense territory and because the Soviets needed huge numbers of conscripts for construction projects.[12]

As for the two Germanies, argued Ford, up to mid-1953 the Soviets might have agreed to reunification if all allied troops withdrew; but that summer's revolt of East German workers abruptly dashed their blind expectations that self-governed Germans would embrace communism by choice.[13]

That disillusionment, moreover, served to reinforce a centuries-old behavioral factor that Ford stressed again and again—what he termed the "almost psychopathic feeling of inferiority [of Russians] vis-à-vis the Western world." Because historically, Russians had found ego-boosting conquest irresistible, Ford doubted that "any single act of territorial expansion would have been different even if the Russian Government were not Marxist."[14]

Twenty-five years after he had written those words, Ford would devote a chapter of his memoirs to his 1954 report because he found it still relèvant—as it remains today. However, and of special interest here, Ford's editor would find that chapter too cerebral for general readers and cut it from the manuscript finally published in 1989 as *Our Man in Moscow*.[15]

VI

Of the many times that Ford applied his mid-1950s conclusions, one example dates to the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian revolution in November 1967, when damage to the Soviet embassy in Ottawa from an anti-Soviet demonstration stirred fury in Moscow and the charge that Canada was harbouring war criminals. In a telegram to External Affairs, Ford stressed that "Russian sensitivities are highly acute and the leaders react, not like representatives of a great power, but a small Latin American country. Therefore they are far more ready to perceive an insult than Americans, for example."[16]

The embassy incident had especially pained the Soviets, argued Ford, because much foreign response to their communist milestone had been critical, even hostile, and they had expected better in Canada. The Soviets had based that expectation, moreover, on their strong support of Expo that year, even as they had felt chagrin that their pavilion, in comparison with others, seemed "old-fashioned and badly presented."[17] Worse yet, said Ford, the KGB had new grounds to insist that "Canada is still essentially a stooge of [the] USA and that hopes for detaching Canada from its American alliance are illusory."[18]

Given this mix of bad feelings, Ford spelled out a balanced response. Canada should, he said, admit the inadequacy of police

protection against the demonstrators but ascribe no foreign policy significance to that shortcoming nor to the demonstration itself.[19]

As it happened, the Ottawa incident was a downturn after more than a year of excellent Canadian-Soviet relations that Ford had helped to promote, two high points being the signing of a nine-million-ton wheat contract in June 1966, and the visit to Moscow that November of Paul Martin, the minister of external affairs.[20] In between, in July, Ford had conducted D.S. Polyansky, a Soviet deputy prime minister, on a trans-Canada tour to acquaint him with a working democracy. In his report on that trip, Ford found Polyansky "obviously very anxious to learn" what was applicable to Russia and not at all inclined to utter the all-too-familiar Soviet visitor's remark: "Very interesting, but we have better in the USSR." Polyansky, of peasant origins, nonetheless struck Ford as representative of a new generation of Soviet leaders that might more constructively deal with Canada. Ford concluded that Polyansky was "highly intelligent" but also—in the mould of so many leaders—"suspicious" and "quick to take offense."[21]

Then, in 1969-71 under Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, says Ford, Canadian dealings with the Soviet Union became truly innovative because External Affairs for the first time based specific policy on "calculated reasons of national interest." The "soundness" of that strategy, contends Ford, "is proved by the fact that it has subsequently been followed by the USA, Great Britain, and possibly even West Germany."[22]

Ford echoed the deflating effect that the 1972 SALT I and trade agreements between Brezhnev and Nixon had on Canadian relations with the Soviet Union despite the successful exchange of visits by Prime Minister Trudeau and the Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin in 1971. Ford later wrote from Moscow, "Unfortunately for us the American-Soviet political and economic scene has been totally transformed since June 1972." For the moment the Russians had been "completely overwhelmed by the prospects of massive trade with the United States."[23]

Four years later, however, the Americans stumbled by offering sweeping disarmament proposals clearly alien to Soviet calculations of Russian interests—a point Ford made early in 1977 to Zbigniew Brzezinski, then national security adviser to Jimmy Carter.

Reporting to Ottawa on that conversation, Ford said that he had cast the Soviet rejection of Carter's plan as inevitable. In particular, Ford said he had pointed out to Brzezinski that the Russians had quite predictably felt threatened that "the Americans were departing radically

from the Vladivostok Agreement, were trying to up-stage them politically by sweeping disarmament suggestions, and were trying to establish a position of permanent American military superiority."[24] Ford in turn linked the manner of the turn-down to "Soviet anger over the [American] position on human rights" and cited, once more, the Russians' "constant fear of losing face."[25]

Five years later, as adviser on East-West relations, Ford received what he termed a "staggering" request from U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz for advice on East-West relations.[26] The bid came in August 1982, through Canada's Ambassador Gotlieb, who also conveyed to Ford that Shultz aide and Russian expert Helmet Sonnenfeldt issued the invitation because he knew no one who "knows more and thinks more about the USSR."

Ford responded with a paper that he and Shultz discussed at the State Department in early September. Although the secretary said he had not read the report in full, Ford informed Ottawa that the joint session convinced him that Shultz had "retained the main points." Shultz had consequently asked, said Ford, which U.S. actions had "humiliated" the Soviets; and Ford had answered by listing Congress's rejection of SALT II, its linkage of trade to Jewish emigration, Carter's letter to Sakharov, and Reagan's direct attacks on the Soviet Union, "which might better have been left to other members of the Government. While the Soviets frequently attacked the U.S., the [Soviet] President never did so directly."

Based on this exchange, Ford held that Shultz was inclined to a "somewhat less rigid attitude than that of the White House staff. But he certainly was not giving anything away." Then, looking ahead, Ford expressed caution about any more such meetings after his own imminent retirement but proposed sending some of his future papers on the Soviet Union to Shultz so that "we can continue to exploit this opening."

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From start to finish of his diplomatic career, Ford demonstrated high scholarly and historical standards in his analysis of foreign policy, and he strongly advocated that approach to the Department of External Affairs as a whole. After retirement, he reflected to Marcel Massé from Paris, "The Department cannot play the role intended for it unless it can clearly establish its intellectual credentials, both with other ministries and with foreign governments and international organizations. In the long run, this is the only justification for considering the Department as a central or key organ of the government." He recalled that when the department was

small and issues were less complex, a lot could be accomplished by "the exchange of ideas over lunch." Changes in the world and in Canada's role had since made searching assessments of issues absolutely essential—a truth that had been compellingly brought home to Ford in 1954 when he had worked full-time for a full six weeks both to probe Russian motives and to spell out his findings in clear and cogent prose.

To end with a comment on my own work, I have gone about assessing Robert A.D. Ford and his accomplishments by searching foreign policy documents and then going beyond them, for I have found that archival reports take on much greater meaning when evaluated from the perspective of Ford's sense of Russia, his view of the place of ideas in politics, and his understanding of human psychology. With respect to Ford as a shaper of foreign policy, however, I freely admit that my most important single source remains a document: the report Ford wrote in Ottawa in the spring of 1954.

ENDNOTES

1. "*Documents on Canadian External Relations*," in FCO Historical Branch, *Occasional Papers*, No. 2, November 1989, p. 10.

2. H.J. Yasamee, "British Methods of Reconciling Size of Modern Archives with Costs of Printing," in FCO Historical Branch, *Occasional Papers*, No. 2, November 1989, p. 25.

3. For the record, Ford scored slightly better on his written than on his oral exam. With a minimum requirement of 70%, Ford scored 74.4% on an essay. With a 60% requirement for education and experience, Ford scored 66.6%; and with a 70% passing mark on the oral examination, Ford received 72.5%. National Archives of Canada (NAC), Ford Papers, Vol. 3, No. 16.

4. Ford explained the influence of Becker in an interview with the author in Vichy, 1 June 1990. He wrote his M.A. thesis under Becker's supervision, titled, "Anti-Militarism in France from Sedan to the Dreyfus Case: A Study in the Psychology of an Era."

5. Ford Papers, Vol. 3, No. 16, FSOA Report for 1977-78.

6. Ibid., FSOA Report for 1978-79.

7. Ibid., report by A.E. Gotlieb, chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations.

8. These remarks of Zoya Boguslavskaya are from an interview recorded by the author on 10 June 1990, at Peredelkino.

9. Evtushenko made these remarks in a recorded interview with the author on 17 June 1990, in Moscow.

10. Voznesensky's comments on Ford were recorded by the author at Peredelkino on 10 June 1990.

11. Ford Papers, Ford to Marcel Massé, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 5 October 1983.

12. Quoted from the book manuscript provided to the author by Ambassador Ford.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. The original paper written by Ford in Ottawa was titled "Relations with the USSR: A Re-Assessment," and was dated July 1954. Ford intended that it be included in his *Our Man in Moscow: A Diplomat's Reflections on the Soviet Union* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).

16. Department of External Affairs (DEA) file 20-USSR-1-4, Ford to Ottawa, 22 November 1967.

17. DEA file 20-1-2-USSR, Ford to Ottawa, 21 Aug. 1967.

18. DEA file 20-USSR-1-4, Ford to Ottawa, 22 Nov. 1967.

19. Ibid.

20. DEA file 20-1-2-USSR, Ford to Ottawa, 28 May 1969.

21. DEA file 20-USSR-9, Ford, "Memorandum to the European Division," 20 July 1966.

22. DEA file 20-1-2-USSR, Ford, "Canadian Policy Toward the Soviet Union," 11 March 1975.

23. Ford Papers, Vol. 2, No. 17.

24. The Vladivostok summit in 1974 between Gerald Ford and Leonid Brezhnev had set guidelines for SALT II talks and had deferred discussion of cruise missiles and the Soviet Backfire bomber.

25. Ford Papers, Vol. 3, No. 26, Ford Report of 14 April 1977, conversation with Brzezinski in Washington, D.C.

26. Ford Papers, Vol. 3, No. 5.

RAPPORT SUR LES COMMENTAIRES DE M. ALBERT LEGAULT

Marie-Josée Langlois et Louis-Philippe Sylvestre

Les trois textes utilisent des approches différentes qui rendent une critique très difficile. Le texte de Pietro Pastorelli aborde l'histoire avec une analyse géopolitique, celui de Charles Ruud se fonde sur une analyse axée sur l'aspect psychologique humain, et celui d'Hector Mackenzie examine les facteurs nationaux et internationaux de la culture ou de la structure politique du Canada.

Pietro Pastorelli :

La reconnaissance diplomatique entre l'Italie post-fasciste et l'URSS est intéressante, mais on doit se questionner sur l'importance de l'Italie pendant la guerre froide. Si l'Eurocommunisme a joué un rôle fondamental dans la chute de l'empire russe, l'importance de l'Italie dans ce processus sera confirmée. Des études plus approfondies sur le sujet éclaireraient cette interrogation.

Charles Ruud :

Par son attachement à l'histoire et sa compréhension du pays, l'ancien ambassadeur Ford a joué un rôle important dans l'élaboration de politiques concernant l'URSS. Afin de valider les prédictions politiques de son œuvre de 1954, une comparaison avec d'autres textes de cette époque, telle l'œuvre de l'auteur français Jean Lalois, serait indiquée.

Durant cette période, l'Occident s'est concentré sur la course aux armements, ce qui a permis à l'URSS de consolider sa domination de l'Europe de l'Est. Il aurait été intéressant d'ajouter l'analyse de Ford sur la prolifération des armes (arms control).

Hector Mackenzie :

Le texte de M. Mackenzie nous a beaucoup appris sur la période d'après-guerre au Canada. Cette période se caractérise par un long processus de politique intérieure, qui a débouché sur l'adhésion du Canada à l'OTAN. L'auteur démontre l'opposition interne à la vision de Escott Reid visant à englober les pays du Commonwealth dans l'OTAN.

Les premières années de l'ONU sont caractérisées par la paralysie imposée par le veto de l'URSS. On a alors tenté de trouver d'autres options pour contourner ce problème. Ces débats sont encore d'actualité en 1994 avec l'Examen de la politique étrangère. La période 1945-1948 ressemble beaucoup à celle d'aujourd'hui. De nombreux principes sont toujours présents; ainsi le protestantisme de 1945 s'est sécularisé, mais les idées sont les mêmes, notamment la volonté d'arrêter la guerre.

Le multilatéralisme a permis au Canada de ne pas être isolé face aux États-Unis. Le Canada cherchait à maintenir la paix avec d'autres pays que ses alliés traditionnels. M. Legault s'interroge sur la vocation internationale des politiciens canadiens en 1994, pourtant si présent à cette époque.

Aujourd'hui, avec la fin de la menace soviétique, les règles de la politique internationale sont passées du domaine de l'armement à celui de l'économie. La mondialisation provoque une balkanisation de l'économie mondiale. Face à ce changement, quel est l'organisme qui peut répondre à notre vision multilatérale? Le Canada devrait se pencher sur ces questions plutôt que de concentrer ses efforts sur la séparation éventuelle du Québec et son intérêt pour le Nord.

VII: The Korean War
La guerre de Corée

THE ROAD TO CONSTRAINT
Canada and the Korean War
June-December 1950

Greg Donaghy

Résumé

Fondé sur les dossiers du ministère des Affaires extérieures, ce rapport retrace l'évolution de la politique canadienne au cours des six premiers mois de la guerre de Corée. Influencés par le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Lester B. Pearson, les décideurs canadiens étaient convaincus que l'offensive nord-coréenne représentait un défi à l'autorité des Nations unies, lancé à l'instigation de l'URSS. Du moins au début, Ottawa était plus encline à applaudir l'effort de guerre américain en Corée qu'à essayer de le limiter. Une dérogation a toutefois eu lieu au début du mois d'août 1950, quand des préoccupations au sujet de la politique intransigeante des États-Unis dans les affaires de l'Extrême-Orient ont entraîné un bref effort, de la part de M. Pearson, de modérer la position américaine. Mais son principal souci était alors la politique indienne, qui, fort imprudemment selon lui, reléguait au second plan les intérêts à long terme des Nations unies en faveur d'une solution pacifique et immédiate au conflit coréen. En novembre, quand l'intervention chinoise en Corée du Nord fit naître la menace d'une guerre mondiale à grande échelle, M. Pearson tenta encore quelques efforts pour tempérer la politique américaine. Il fallut néanmoins que le président américain agite par inadvertance le spectre de la guerre atomique en décembre pour que M. Pearson adopte un ton alarmant et fasse preuve de détermination. La retenue est enfin devenue le mot d'ordre de la diplomatie canadienne.

The rapid pace of developments during the initial phases of the Korean conflict have left a Canadian documentary record that is far from complete. The comparative ease with which Ottawa could communicate with its representatives in New York and Washington made record-keeping even more difficult. As Arnold Heeney, the under-secretary of state for external affairs, recalled in November 1950:

> Under these circumstances it was inevitable that some steps in the normal procedure for reaching policy decisions should be by-passed. . . . In order that prompt, yet considered, recommendations might be forwarded through the Minister to the Government, it was important, first, that a sufficient number of officials should be kept informed of the rapidly changing picture and, second, that this number should not be so great as to prevent the reaching of quick recommendations and decisions. The result was that small *ad hoc* meetings tended to take the place of formal exchanges of letters and memoranda. . . . Frequently a telephone call (duly camouflaged for security reasons) . . . contained an instruction which might otherwise have required a telegram or despatch.[1]

In addition, the cabinet met frequently during the early stages of the crisis without leaving any detailed record of its deliberations. In this haste, neither officials nor their political masters had the time to reflect in writing on the broad motives behind Canadian policy. As a consequence, any discussion of this policy during the initial stages of the Korean War is necessarily speculative and incomplete.

Despite its limitations, the documentary record remains the most important—and generally overlooked—source for the study of Canada's Korean policy.[2] Based on documents from the records of the Department of External Affairs, this paper traces the development of policy during the first six months of the conflict. Led by the secretary of state for external affairs, Lester Pearson, Canadian policy-makers were convinced that the North Korean attack represented a final Soviet-inspired challenge to the United Nations' battered authority. Canada sought to strike a balance between encouraging Washington's efforts to resist communist aggression in Korea and ensuring that American impatience did not render the UN irrelevant as an instrument of international security. At least initially, Ottawa was inclined to place a greater emphasis on applauding rather than moderating American efforts in Korea. In any event, Pearson's efforts to temper American policy at this stage were hampered by Canada's reluctance to contribute materially to the UN's effort in Korea.

By early August, Pearson's perspective had began to shift. Increasingly concerned that Washington's intemperate approach to Far Eastern affairs might divide the Western world from the Asian-Arab bloc, he briefly tried to moderate American policy. This desire to constrain Washington, however, remained a secondary consideration. Instead, Pearson's efforts were directed toward modifying Indian policy, which he

felt recklessly subordinated the long-term interests of the UN to an immediate desire to secure a peaceful settlement in Korea. Throughout the fall, he sought to draw the Arab-Asian bloc toward the Western powers by having it assume a greater responsibility for the UN's activities in Korea.

When Beijing intervened in North Korea in November 1950, the relative importance accorded the two aspects of Canadian policy changed again, this time decisively. Frightened that a Sino-American confrontation in Asia might escalate into a full-scale world war, Pearson began to cast about for a formula to halt the fighting. However, his efforts to moderate American policy remained tentative and inconclusive, constrained by his reluctance to jeopardize Canada's standing in Washington. Only when the American president, Harry Truman, inadvertently raised the spectre of atomic warfare in December 1950 did Pearson react with alarm and determination. Constraint then became the watchword of Canadian diplomacy.

Like their counterparts throughout the Western world, Canadian foreign policy-makers were surprised and dismayed by the North Korean attack on 25 June 1950. From the start, Pearson and his officials were determined to prevent the conflict from destroying the United Nations. The attack was seen in Ottawa as a Soviet-inspired challenge to the UN, whose prestige and authority were already ravaged by the organization's inability to respond to communist aggression in the late 1940s.[3] Canadian officials tended to equate the interests of the UN with those of the Western powers and were convinced that the aggression in Korea demanded a vigorous response:

> The political importance of South Korea stems primarily from the sponsorship of its existence as an independent state by the UN. Aggression against South Korea is by direct implication aggression against the UN. Military intervention in support of the UN is important to South-East Asia as an indication of how serious are the promises of the West to go to the aid of the newly independent states of the South-East . . . the importance of our moral commitments and of the necessity to stand firmly against the spread of communism can not be over-emphasized.[4]

Aware that only the United States was in a position to respond to the attack on the UN, Ottawa was anxious to encourage American efforts to support South Korea. Nevertheless, Pearson worried that Washington's tendency to unilateralism posed as great a threat to the UN as Soviet

aggression. "We had to keep the US action within the framework of the UN," he later recalled, since Canada could not "let the Americans take this over to the point where the UN was simply a screen."[5]

In the immediate aftermath of the North Korean attack, however, Canadian policy-makers had little reason to hope that either the United Nations or the Western powers would respond vigorously to this latest example of communist aggression. The United Nations had no effective forces at its command, and the United States, which had the power to act, had indicated several months earlier that Korea was "not vital to our security."[6] In the 36 hours following the attack, Canadian representatives in Washington and New York reported unhappily that they had unearthed no evidence that the United States was prepared to respond to the aggression in Korea.[7] On the evening of 26 June, in an off-the-record interview with the Ottawa press gallery, Pearson thus attempted to minimize the international significance of the attack and to deflect potential criticism from the United Nations. The situation in Korea was not necessarily a case of international aggression, he explained, for "[i]t could be argued legally that this was an internal conflict." Refusing to speculate on the possibility of UN or American action, Pearson suggested that "the present issue would be concluded before we could do anything to help."[8]

At roughly the same time, however, President Truman and his advisers reached a very different conclusion. Eager to meet this challenge to the Western position in Asia and determined to demonstrate the UN's capacity to respond to aggression, Truman decided to make American air and naval support available to South Korea. He also agreed to take a number of other steps intended to enhance the American position in Asia, including the deployment of the 7th Fleet to neutralize Formosa.[9] Informed of the American decision on the morning of 27 June, the Canadians reacted cautiously. Pearson was particularly disturbed by Washington's determination to act before the Security Council's anticipated resolution asking UN members to assist South Korea. The American action should be brought "within the terms of the Charter."[10] Upon reflection, as he indicated to cabinet that afternoon, Pearson supported Washington's decision to pursue a restrained "middle-course [of] giving limited assistance" to Korea. "If the United States' action was effective, the result would be helpful generally in the cold war."[11]

Canadian officials shared their minister's satisfaction. Hume Wrong, Canada's ambassador to Washington, welcomed Truman's steadfast performance as evidence that the United States had finally come of age as a world power:

> The President's decision and the reasons given for it go much further than I had expected and reveal that the United States, in spite of domestic controversy over Far Eastern policy, can promptly adopt firm and far-reaching measures. . . . One striking feature has been that the United States has shouldered the load which it alone was in a position to carry, without seeking to secure pledges of material assistance from other countries in advance.[12]

Heeney urged Pearson to secure cabinet's approval for an immediate announcement that two Canadian destroyers were being held in readiness in the Pacific. This hurried gesture of support would meet several Canadian objectives. It would encourage the United States in its "vigorous action" in resisting communist aggression in Korea, while simultaneously demonstrating the kind of Western unity which would deter Moscow from further aggression. More important, should other members of the United Nations follow the Canadian example, "assistance to Korea would be given the appearance of collective United Nations action rather than of United States action."[13] This, it was implied, would help preserve at least some of the UN's integrity and moral authority.

Yet the prime minister, Louis St. Laurent, was reluctant to act in the face of a hostile French Canadian press that questioned American motives. Before any Canadian contribution could be announced, he insisted on 28 June, the United Nations aspect of the operation needed to be strengthened.[14] During the next two days, pressure for a Canadian contribution mounted steadily as the situation in South Korea deteriorated. American officials in Washington pointedly hoped "that something . . . would be forthcoming promptly from Canada . . . in order to make the action to restore conditions in Korea a collective action under the auspices of the United Nations."[15] Though this early sign of Washington's desire to act within the framework of the UN was gratifying, St. Laurent refused to sanction a Canadian contribution that was not clearly under the auspices of the international organization. On the afternoon of 29 June 1950, cabinet again deferred a decision on Canada's contribution.[16] Late that evening, apparently supported by C.D. Howe, the minister of trade and commerce, and Brooke Claxton, the minister of defence, Pearson confronted the prime minister. The resulting compromise committed the government to announce its willingness to supply a small force of destroyers to assist South Korea provided "that such assistance . . . be in response to a request from the United Nations and in support of an operation authorised and sponsored by the United Nations."[17]

As it turned out, the United States was as determined as Canada to ensure that the UN's role in the defence of Korea was fully acknowledged. Reporting from New York on 30 June 1950, John Holmes, Canada's acting permanent representative to the United Nations, emphasized that "the Americans are quite as anxious as we are to make this a United Nations rather than a United States operation . . . both the British and the Americans . . . are obviously bending as far as possible to give this all the characteristics of a United Nations project."[18] Indeed, when Wrong approached American authorities to discuss this issue, he discovered that the State Department had already given it some considerable thought. For constitutional reasons, explained Jack Hickerson, assistant secretary of state for UN affairs, the United States could not, as Ottawa proposed, simply ask the UN to give General Douglas MacArthur "a mandate to organize and direct the forces now being made available by various members of the UN."[19] Instead, he suggested that the Security Council adopt a resolution whose operative clause "would recommend that all members providing forces under the Security Council resolutions [of 25 and 27 June 1950] should place these forces under the unified command of the United States."[20]

Hickerson's draft failed to meet Ottawa's concerns but it was clear that both countries were at least thinking along parallel lines. Worried that the American draft diminished the UN's responsibility for the actions undertaken in its name in Korea, Pearson proposed an alternative resolution, with the following operative clauses:

> The Security Council requests the United States to designate a commander (or commander-in-chief) of the forces made available by members of the United Nations under the Security Council resolutions; and
>
> Recommends that all members providing forces under the said resolution place such forces under the United Nations commander so designated.

This clever piece of drafting, he contended, would give the Korean action a "genuine United Nations character." By leaving unimpaired MacArthur's relationship with the American troops under his command, it also avoided creating any constitutional problems for Congress.[21]

Both Washington and London were wary of the language employed in the Canadian draft. For instance, they were reluctant to refer in the resolution to "United Nations forces" and the "United Nations Commander" lest these phrases were interpreted as invoking the defunct military staff machinery and handing Moscow a voice in the direction of

UN operations in Korea. The State Department also remained leery of any language that might annoy Congress. On the whole, however, the American and British reaction was gratifyingly positive.[22] Although Washington insisted on revising the resolution and inserted in the preamble language that raised Canadian fears that the UN might be drawn into the defence of Formosa, Ottawa was not inclined to express its anxieties too forcefully.[23] Canada's foremost objective—ensuring a face-saving role for the UN—was addressed in the resolution's key operative clauses, which remained essentially unaltered. Moreover, because he was becoming convinced that the war would inevitably result in the reunification of Korea under either Soviet or Western control, Pearson was careful to ensure that the UN would be able to distance itself from American policy in Korea in the future, if that became necessary:

> I do not see how there can be a return to the *status quo*. Either the communists make good their claim to all of Korea, or the United Nations will have to do something to strengthen the position of democratic forces under a better government than Syngman Rhee. One reason why we should be careful in not going too far in insisting on the United Nations character of the operation is that when the war is over, the United States may wish to continue United Nations responsibility for the control and government of Korea, in a way which we may not be able to support.[24]

In his determination to protect the future of the UN, Pearson was ready to weaken the one instrument that might have allowed the UN to shape American policy in Korea.

The satisfaction that Canadian officials felt when the Security Council created the unified command to their specifications on 7 July faded quickly in the face of domestic and international pressure for a Canadian contribution of ground troops. As it became obvious that the United States expected its Western allies to increase their stake in Korea, Wrong pressed Pearson for military forces. The United States was unselfishly engaged in nobly defending the principles of the United Nations and the non-Communist world, Wrong reminded his minister. Washington's willingness to maintain the UN character of the effort in Korea depended largely on the contributions from member states. "I think that readiness to welcome proposals from other countries will be increasingly determined by the extent of the contribution which each country is making, relative to its resources and its commitments."[25] Pearson agreed, but insisted that he needed time to allow support for the

UN effort to build. He was confronted with a reluctant cabinet, whose uneasiness at Washington's initial unpreparedness had been compounded by Truman's decision to neutralize Formosa, and he urged Wrong to ensure that matters were not still further complicated by a public appeal for ground troops.[26]

Pearson was too late. Even as Wrong discussed the matter with Hickerson at the State Department, the secretary general of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, yielded to American pressure and issued an appeal for ground troops.[27] In Ottawa, where ministers and officials were only too aware that Canada had no troops available, there was little inclination to meet Lie's request. Charles Ritchie, the associate under-secretary of state for external affairs responsible for European affairs, counselled the minister not to allow his attention to be distracted from events in Europe:

> Serious as is the Korean situation, and important as it is that we should not fail in our responsibility as a member of the United Nations, it would seem, at least as yet, that Korea is but a "side-show" in the over-all struggle between the USSR and the Western world. There is no room to believe that Western Europe is not still the main theatre, and it would be unfortunate if our attention should be diverted from Europe by reason of Korea.[28]

Claxton and the Chiefs of Staff Committee were also horrified at the prospect that Canadian resources might be frittered away in Korea when the real battle would be fought in Europe, if not in North America itself.[29] At the meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee called on 18 July to discuss Lie's appeal, the prime minister joined the formidable group opposed to a Canadian ground force contribution.[30]

Pearson was certainly conscious of the need not to jeopardize the Western position in Europe by Far Eastern adventures. On the other hand, he was acutely aware of the repercussions that would follow a negative Canadian response in Washington and in New York, where the response to Lie's appeal had been weak. Moreover, he was determined to maintain a strong UN role in the Korean operation. When faced with opposition in the Cabinet Defence Committee, he seized upon the intriguing idea, then making the rounds in New York, of a United Nations international force.[31] A force of divisional strength could be recruited in various countries, financed by the United Nations, and equipped by the United States. In addition to solving the immediate problem of a Canadian ground troop contribution, such a contingent would greatly strengthen the UN's role in

Korea, while possibly creating the kind of permanent force envisaged at the UN's founding conference in San Francisco.[32]

Though the notion was dismissed in the Cabinet Defence Committee discussions as impractical, Pearson pressed it much more forcefully in cabinet the following day. His persistence was rewarded. The Canadian statement, which rejected the secretary general's appeal for ground troops, promised that should a UN international force be recruited, "the Canadian government [would] give immediate consideration to . . . participation in such an undertaking."[33] Though careful to insist that this was not to be presented as a Canadian proposal, Ottawa quickly passed the prime minister's statement to Washington and New York, underlining St. Laurent's reference to an international force.[34] In both cities, the response was warm and exploratory discussions were soon under way on methods of financing, recruiting, training and commanding such forces.[35]

There was little opportunity for real support to develop for the proposed international force. When the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand agreed to make ground forces available to the Unified Command on 25 July, the pressure on St. Laurent's government for an immediate contribution of ground troops became almost intolerable. Still, cabinet hesitated and deferred its decision until Pearson had consulted with the American secretary of state, Dean Acheson, and his senior advisers on the immediate situation in Korea and its relationship to the overall Cold War struggle in Asia.[36]

Acheson went out of his way to comfort his Canadian counterpart, who was accompanied by Wrong and Norman Robertson, the clerk of the Privy Council. The United States, Acheson emphasized, was well aware that the conflict in Korea was not the primary struggle. If the communist bloc launched a major attack elsewhere, the United States would quickly retreat from Korea. Acheson was also persuasive in explaining that Washington's decision to neutralize Formosa was not made in panic but reflected a rational calculation of the strategic situation that was created by the outbreak of war in June 1950.[37]

Acheson's remarks had their intended effect and the Canadians returned to Ottawa reassured about American intentions in Korea and the Far East. Equally important, the talks encouraged Pearson's enthusiasm for a UN international force. The logistical obstacles, which Wrong characteristically emphasized in his reports on the meeting, were daunting but Pearson returned to Ottawa in a hopeful frame of mind:

> We were, I think, surprised at the interest in and importance attached to this idea of an international force

> for Korea now, but for other U.N. duties in the future. Personally, I think the whole question should be explored energetically and sympathetically. . . . Its practical importance might be considerable and its political international significance much greater.[38]

Pearson received additional support for his proposed contingent in New York, where he met with the secretary general on his way back to Ottawa. Lie thought that it might eventually become "the nucleus of a permanent force, available for police and preventative duties and [that it] might, in part, be stationed in Western Europe, where it could be a net addition to the effective forces of the North Atlantic countries."[39]

In the long and difficult cabinet debate that followed—four meetings stretching over five days—the question of Canada's contribution was finally resolved. For Pearson, it was clearly a frustrating struggle. At the first meeting on 2 August, he encountered so much support for the view that Canada should take no further action that he promptly, if obliquely, threatened to resign:

> I feel strongly . . . [that making no contribution] would be the wrong decision, and personally I would have great difficulty in reconciling it with my views on the menace which faces us, on the expression of that menace in Korea, and the necessity of defeating it there by United Nations action.[40]

He pressed the prime minister. The government should recruit a brigade of volunteers which would be associated with an international force under the Unified Command. Equipped and trained to function solely as part of a UN force, such a brigade offered exciting new possibilities:

> This idea has, I think, very much in its favour. It underlines the fact that from now on we fight only as a result of U.N. decisions, and with other U.N. members as a Police Force to make such decisions effective and to restore peace. If Canada emphasized this principle in announcing its decision, we might be initiating something new in the way of backing up the United Nations which could have important consequences. At the same time we would be basing one part of our small army on the Charter of the U.N.[41]

Led by Claxton and St. Laurent, cabinet remained unconvinced and unready to divert scarce Canadian resources to the defence of Korea. Cabinet instead agreed to recruit a special, self-contained brigade which

would not be marked for service in Korea but which could be used in accordance with Canada's future obligations under either the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty.[42]

Pearson's interest in exploiting the Korean War to create a genuine international force appeared to recede after the cabinet compromise. However, his determination to strengthen the UN's capacity to oppose communist aggression remained undiminished. As planning for the 5th General Assembly began in mid-August 1950, he was convinced that "[u]nder [the] present circumstances . . . it is necessary to transform the United Nations as far as possible into an anti-communist coalition, in fact, if not in form."[43] While the United States occupied itself with the "Uniting For Peace" resolution, which would bolster the UN's capacity to respond to aggression, Canada sought its own unique contribution to forging the anti-communist coalition. Canadian diplomats would seek to narrow the gap between the West and the Arab-Asian bloc that the war in Korea was beginning to widen:

> Canadian effort should be directed toward eliminating misunderstanding and bridging where possible, the gaps between the policies of the United States Government and those Asian governments, bearing in mind that the flexibility of United States policies will be limited by the November congressional elections and that on the other hand Asian opinion may become impatient with the delays of American politics and, therefore, more susceptible to Soviet propaganda.[44]

Pearson was well aware that reducing the divergence between Asian and Western policies in Asia would require certain adjustments in American policy. In mid-August he wrote Acheson an informal letter to express his growing apprehension at Truman's decision to isolate Formosa and the continuing risk of a direct confrontation with China. The consequences of an American conflict with China would obviously be far-reaching:

> [T]he cooperation between Asian and non-Asian members of the United Nations might be seriously—even disastrously—affected . . . at the very time when an encouraging measure of unity has been achieved in the decision to repel aggression in Korea.[45]

Despite this emerging concern over the nature of Washington's Far Eastern policy, Canadian officials remained much more disturbed by the course of Asian, and especially Indian, policy. India's apparent reluctance

to endorse the Security Council's resolutions calling upon member nations to support South Korea, its refusal to consult with its Commonwealth colleagues at the United Nations, and an ill-considered effort to mediate between Stalin and Truman by Nehru all contributed to Canadian unease. India, it seemed in Ottawa, was simply not shouldering its responsibilities as a member of the United Nations and as one of the most important states in Asia. By late July, Pearson had already begun to promote the idea of a UN body on Korea designed to "draw the leaders of India and Pakistan and other Asiatic countries into the political aspects of the Korean question."[46]

The problem loomed ever-larger as the summer drew to a close. In a letter to the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, a copy of which was handed to the Canadian high commissioner in New Delhi, Nehru complained bitterly about the West's failure to grasp the fundamental importance of the "vast revolutionary changes" that characterized post-colonial Asia's social and economic order. The Indian leader struck out at the very essence of the Western approach to Asia and seemed to suggest that its interest in Asian issues was ultimately futile:

> I have little doubt that the North Koreans will be driven out of South Korea in the end. What will happen then? The moment foreign troops are withdrawn, the same position will arise again. . . . The alternatives will thus be: armies of occupation and full control on colonial lines . . . or leaving them to shift for themselves and drift inevitably to communism. The former alternative appears to me to be out of the question for any length of time and the longer it endures, the more we strengthen communism there. If this analysis is correct, then the policy adopted by the Western Powers does not and cannot lead to any solution. . . . In a sense this argument may apply to Japan as well.[47]

The arrival of Nehru's disturbing opinions coincided with the Soviet Union's return to the UN Security Council on 1 August. Almost immediately, the Soviet representative tied up the UN's governing body into procedural knots. India attempted to mediate and proposed turning the problem of Korea over to a committee made up of the Security Council's non-permanent members.[48] This manoeuvre distressed Pearson because it threatened to hand over policy to a group of states that were only half-hearted supporters of the UN. It confirmed his suspicion that India needed to be drawn more closely toward the United Nations and the Western cause. He again sought to lure India into accepting a greater responsibility

for UN policy in Korea by accepting a place on an Asian commission to explore the future of Korea, which would function on the basis of a Western objective—a "free and united Korea"—that Nehru had more or less disavowed. While Asian leaders were not to be allowed to establish the UN's ultimate objectives in Korea, Pearson challenged them to accept a greater role in framing other aspects of UN policy for a settlement in Korea:

> To determine what more is required is, I think, primarily the responsibility and, indeed, the privilege of Asian members of the United Nations. . . . We get a lot of good advice from Asian leaders on the handling of Asian problems. This would be a good occasion to offer them responsibility for translating this advice into action.[49]

Although officials in New Delhi expressed polite interest in Pearson's ideas, they refused to be drawn.[50]

Canada pressed on with its proposal. The United Kingdom and the United States, though alarmed at the prospect of a commission composed of a majority of Asian members and chaired by India, were moderately encouraging.[51] A tentative Canadian draft resolution was circulated but was soon overtaken by events. By late September, MacArthur's successful landing at Inchon had thrown North Korean forces into full retreat and forced the UN to confront the prospect of allowing its troops to cross the 38th parallel and unite Korea by force. A British resolution, which secured the support of Canada and seven other sponsors, was quickly drafted to meet the altered circumstances. In addition to creating a United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), a body intended to advise the UN on the steps needed to create a unified and democratic Korea, the resolution anticipated and endorsed the Unified Command's decision to cross the 38th parallel.[52]

Obviously, these developments rendered Ottawa's efforts to have India accept a greater share of the responsibility for the UN's activities in Korea that much more complicated. Pearson, however, refused to retreat from what he had always seen as the logical outcome of the war in Korea: a stable and unified state. Rather than run the risk of further alienating Asian opinion by simply installing the Rhee government in North Korea, he proposed that the United Nations borrow a Soviet tactic and find some political group in North Korea that would cooperate with the West:

> If, for example, representatives of a resistance movement within North Korea could be added to Rhee's cabinet, or alternatively, if a resistance government were to emerge

in North Korea and call upon UN forces to help them liberate themselves, the situation would be easier.[53]

However difficult the situation might become, Pearson did not seem inclined to abandon Western objectives in order to retain the support of the Asian delegations. On 27 September 1950, he addressed the plenary session of the General Assembly and endorsed the United Nations' determination to secure a "united Korea, a free Korea". Once again, he invited the Asian powers to assume "a major share of the responsibility for advising the Korean people upon methods of government which they should adopt and procedures which they should follow."[54]

It was soon clear that India would refuse to accept any responsibility for a Korean settlement that envisaged uniting the country by force. In the General Assembly's First Committee, the Indian representative to the United Nations, Sir Benegal Rau, vaguely explained that his government felt that the 38th parallel should be crossed as only a last resort and only after every avenue of negotiation had been exhausted. Nevertheless, if the UN was determined to cross the parallel, then North Korea ought to be given a chance to surrender. In Ottawa, India's opposition to the "eight power" resolution was greeted with dismay. The prime minister, who seems to have developed an especially close relationship with Nehru during the latter's 1949 visit to Ottawa, was particularly upset.[55] He hoped that a means could be found "to go some distance toward meeting the Indian position and so preserve the united front to which we attach so much importance."[56]

Canadian officials urged Pearson to approach the American delegation to see if the "eight power" resolution could be amended or interpreted in a way that would give North Korea ample opportunity to accept the resolution before military measures were carried north of the 38th parallel.[57] Ottawa also suggested that he bluntly inform the Indian delegation that the time had come when India would have to accept its UN responsibilities. The Canadian delegation should remind Rau that India had supported the 27 June resolution, and that, in the considered view of the UN's military authorities, North Korea's military installations and armed forces had to be removed to achieve "peace and security in the Korean area." Rau should also be reminded, continued Ottawa, that "public statements criticizing the United Nations Commander . . . may encourage the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists to intervene in North Korea . . . [and] it is not in India's interest or anybody else's to say anything that would increase the likelihood of Chinese or Soviet intervention."[58]

Wrong immediately met with Acheson and suggested that the United Nations endorse a resolution giving North Korea 48 hours in which to surrender.[59] The initial American reaction was not encouraging. The secretary of state rejected the Canadian suggestion, fearful that an additional resolution might either interfere with military operations or provide North Korea with an opportunity to use negotiations to delay the Unified Command while it moved reinforcements south.[60] The following day, however, Acheson endorsed a second Canadian proposal. The president of the General Assembly, it was agreed, would urge the North Koreans to surrender in the two- or three-day period expected to lapse between the adoption of the "eight power" resolution and the UN invasion of North Korea. Wrong, at least, was confident that the American concession "would go some way towards attaining the purposes behind our original proposal."[61]

With the American concession in hand, Pearson was confident that there were grounds for hoping that the Indian delegation might make some move before the conclusion of the plenary debate to build on Western efforts to meet its position. Pearson and his colleagues waited in vain. With India abstaining, the United Nations adopted the "eight power" resolution permitting its forces to proceed into North Korea on 7 October 1950. The threatening nature of this resolution was not softened by the proposed presidential statement. A mix-up in Washington apparently resulted in the sudden withdrawal of American support. The experience left the Canadian delegation bitter and depressed. Naturally, some resentment was directed toward Washington:

> The whole episode is a disheartening one, both as an indication of the confusion and division in the United States counsels at the Assembly, and, more important, of their impatience with any line of policy than that which seems to be dictated by General MacArthur and the immediate military situation in Korea.[62]

It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that the delegation's annoyance hinted at a shift in Canada's attitude toward Washington's leading role in determining UN policy. A good deal more Canadian anger was reserved for India. Canada had gone out of its way, argued Pearson in a report to Ottawa, to amend the Western position and to bring it much closer to the Indian position. India made no corresponding effort to discover a basis for compromise and Pearson condemned India's behaviour harshly:

> Following its current tendency to try to bridge the gap between the Stalinist and non-Stalinist worlds . . . India

> failed to make any real contribution which might have brought the majority position closer to her own, thereby giving rise to the suspicion that New Delhi is perhaps more concerned with the appearances of compromise than with finding an acceptable solution to the Korean problem. Perhaps the Indians realize that any solution in Korea can only make the best of a bad job and therefore they do not wish to soil their hands unnecessarily at this stage in the proceedings.[63]

Both Heeney and Reid concurred. Indeed, in the wake of a statement by Nehru criticizing the UN's resolution a few days later, they bitterly complained of his refusal "to accept the responsibilities in external affairs which properly fall on him as prime minister of the leading state in Asia." They regretted using the restrained tactics that Canada had employed in its attempt to "put [Nehru] in a position where it would have become extremely difficult, if not impossible for him to reject a fair share of the burden of responsibilities." Perhaps the time had come to use more forceful means to place Nehru in a position where he could no longer dodge his obligation to support the United Nations, and by extension, the West.[64]

While Ottawa pondered how Nehru might be brought into line, United Nations forces pushed quickly and successfully into North Korea during October. Canadian officials were assured by State Department officials that MacArthur would give Beijing no excuse to commit its forces in North Korea and saw little reason for concern. Even the discovery of a handful of communist Chinese troops in North Korea in early November initially failed to shake Ottawa's equanimity. The small number of Chinese troops involved misled Pearson into thinking that Beijing's intention was perhaps designed to warn UN forces to stay away from its vital hydro-electric installations on the Yalu River. China, the minister felt, should be immediately reassured that the UN represented no threat to Chinese interests in the region of the North Korea frontier.[65]

Washington was well aware of these fears. Dean Rusk, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, moved quickly and successfully to reassure American allies that every effort was being made to limit hostilities. Despite Chinese provocation, the United States proposed to ask the Security Council to pass a resolution that merely called on "all states and authorities" to refrain from assisting North Korea and asked UNCURK to be prepared to help interested states settle conditions on the Korean frontier. "[T]he resolution," reported Wrong reassuringly, "is about as mild as one could reasonably expect in the circumstances."[66]

Ottawa agreed, describing the proposal as "a reasonable and realistic approach . . . affording time for the Chinese Communists to disengage and withdraw from Korea."[67] Canada would stand firmly by its American ally.[68]

Although momentarily reassured by Washington's promises of restraint, Canadian apprehension mounted as the Security Council began to consider the proposed "six power" resolution. Advocates of a moderate policy seemed to have been pushed aside by more extreme elements in Washington, and in its final version, the "six power" resolution seemed to single out Chinese intervention for condemnation. The American delegation had also adopted threatening and aggressive tactics. Observing developments in Lake Success, Pearson worried that "intimidation is now being administered to such a degree that it may be difficult for [the] Chinese to discern elements of reassurance which are still present."[69] Increasingly convinced that the "present atmosphere of haste and emotion" would lead to war with China, Pearson cautiously agreed to consult a handful of other UN delegations to gauge support for a proposal to establish a small demilitarized zone around the Yalu River hydro-electric facilities.[70] There was little support for the Canadian scheme. The United Kingdom and France, both of which Pearson consulted, remained committed to the "six power" resolution.[71]

Canadian anxieties were given little opportunity to subside. In mid-November, the United States approached several of its allies, including Canada, to ask their views on the desirability of allowing MacArthur to pursue fleeing Chinese aircraft into Manchuria. The provocative plan met with universal opposition and Washington was forced to retreat.[72] Simultaneously, Canadian officials learned of a British proposal to create a large demilitarized zone in North Korea in an effort to avoid a Sino-American conflict. This was too little, too late. Pearson and St. Laurent were already convinced that "some kind of negotiation with the Chinese Communists should be the immediate [Western] aim."[73] The following week, despite puzzling indications that the Chinese had suddenly abandoned the field, Pearson began to explore the idea of a negotiated settlement with his contacts in New York. He was delighted to discover that the notion had already attracted some favourable attention. Even Hickerson in the State Department, reported Pearson, did not automatically dismiss the suggestion.[74]

Pearson's hopes, however, were short-lived. In late November, over 250,000 additional Chinese troops were discovered hiding in North Korea, from where they began moving south with considerable success. In short order, MacArthur's forces were in full retreat. The reaction in

Washington, where Acheson accused China of an "act of brazen aggression. . . . even more immoral" than North Korea's original outrage, was far from reassuring.[75] In Ottawa, where officials had been speculating on the nature of Chinese intentions, intervention on such a large scale seemed to preclude any limited objectives. The only safe assumption was that Peking had acted "with the approval of, or, more likely, at the behest of the Russians."[76] As the spectre of a general war loomed ever larger, a determination to promote direct talks emerged as the central preoccupation of Canadian policy-makers: "[t]he main objective at the moment must be to get at least a *de facto* cease fire in order to create an atmosphere in which private negotiations might have the best chance for success."[77]

How to introduce the idea of a cease-fire into UN deliberations, however, posed a small problem. Warned by Gerry Riddell, Canada's permanent representative to the UN, that the United States would certainly denounce direct talks "as the worst kind of appeasement," Pearson remained reluctant to play too large a role in constraining American behaviour in Korea.[78] Instead, he turned to Nehru and suggested that the Indian prime minister issue an appeal for a cease-fire.[79] This proposition, which did not even include a promise of Canadian support, had little impact on Nehru and the Indian prime minister declined to risk his credibility on a scheme that neither side seemed ready to accept.[80]

Pearson's reluctance to act evaporated just before this exchange with Nehru was completed. Responding to a reporter's question on 30 November, Truman implied that the United States would use the atomic bomb in Korea if required: "It's one of our weapons."[81] Pearson was horrified. Aware that Attlee's concerns about the nature of American policy had driven the British prime minister to seek an immediate audience with Truman, Pearson seems to have decided to promote as favourable an atmosphere as possible for the Anglo-American talks. On 2 December, Canada launched a sustained diplomatic offensive among non-communist members of the UN designed to garner international support for a negotiated settlement with Beijing. The conclusion of an immediate cease-fire, proposed Canada, might be followed by the creation of a demilitarized zone and negotiations to devise a *modus vivendi* that might link a settlement in Korea with such other Far Eastern issues as the status of Formosa and the question of Chinese communist representation at the United Nations.[82]

While the British prime minister tried to convince Truman of the wisdom of avoiding an extended confrontation with China, Pearson supplemented Attlee's private soundings with a campaign of public speeches. Addressing the federal-provincial conference on 4 December

1950, Pearson pointedly reminded his audience of the need to avoid a direct confrontation with China:

> The obvious Soviet game is to provoke incidents and tensions at various points on the borderlands between the Western world and the Soviet Union and to try to lead us into the trap of concentrating too great a proportion of our limited resources on one or two isolated border points. It is clear that the communists are trying to lead us into this trap in Korea. . . . This would mean that we would be leaving exposed our most important, and in the long run, our most dangerous front which remains Western Europe.[83]

In a speech broadcast from Lake Success the following evening, the minister mounted an impassioned defence of the usefulness of diplomacy, attacking those who condemned negotiations as appeasement and emphasizing the importance of immediate negotiations. The speech was accompanied by a sustained campaign designed to by-pass American news sources and wire services, which Pearson feared were distorting the message of those interested in peace.[84] Constraint, it was clear, had finally emerged as the dominant characteristic of Canadian policy.

ENDNOTES

1. National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 25, file 50069-A-40, "Draft Section of Address to be Given by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs at the National Defence College, Kingston, [Ontario]" [2 November 1950]. I am indebted to Norman Hillmer, Angie Sauer, John Hilliker, John English, Ian McGibbon and Mary Donaghy for their helpful comments on the first draft of this paper.

2. The standard work on Canada and the Korean War remains Denis Stairs' *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974). It uses few primary sources but is, instead, a model of applied oral history. Current efforts to revise this work have not taken advantage of all of the available primary sources. See, for example, Robert Prince, "The Limits of Constraint: Canadian-American Relations and the Korean War, 1950-1951," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 27, 4 (Winter 1992-93). Similarly, new biographies dealing with two of the principal architects of Canadian policy, L.B. Pearson and Brooke Claxton, have not employed fully the records of the Department of External Affairs. See, John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson*, Volume 2: *1949-1972* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992) and David J. Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993). Most recently, Geoffrey Pearson has drawn on the complete diplomatic record in preparing his persuasive study of his father's

diplomacy, *Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993).

3. Recent evidence from the archives of the former Soviet Union suggests strongly that the North Korean attack, while endorsed by Stalin, was not intended to add to Soviet territory or to challenge the United States or the United Nations. Instead, Stalin seems to have offered North Korea his attack in order to counter Peking's influence in a region that was traditionally a source of concern for Moscow. See Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence From Russian Archives," Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper No. 8, November 1993.

4. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, American and Far Eastern Division to Defence Liaison Division (with the concurrence of D.V. LePan), 7 July 1950.

5. L.B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*, Volume 2: *1948-1957*, ed. John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 147.

6. Ibid, p. 147.

7. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), Tel. WA-1403, 26 June 1950; Acting Canadian Permanent Delegate to the United Nations (A/CPDUN) to SSEA, Tel. 406, 26 June 1950.

8. Ibid., Record of Minister's Press Conference, 26 June 1950.

9. Ian McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War*, Volume 1: *Politics and Diplomacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 64-66.

10. NAC, RG 2, Vol. 167, unsigned memorandum from L.B. Pearson to the Prime Minister, 27 June and 4 July 1950.

11. Ibid., Vol. 2645, Cabinet Conclusions, 27 June 1950.

12. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. WA-1417, 27 June 1950.

13. Ibid., A.D.P. Heeney, "Memorandum for the Minister," 28 June 1950.

14. RG 2, Vol. 2645, Cabinet Conclusions, 28 June 1950.

15. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. 1422, 28 June 1950.

16. RG 2, Vol. 167, L.B. Pearson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 27 June and 4 July 1950.

17. Ibid.

18. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, A/CPDUN to Ottawa, Tel. 421, 30 June 1950.

19. Ibid., Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. WA-1444, 30 June 1950.

20. Ibid., Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. WA-1447, 30 June 1950.

21. Ibid., SSEA to Ambassador in United States, Tel. EX-1037, 1 July 1950.

22. Ibid., D. LePan, "Memorandum for the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs," 2 July 1950; [L.B. Pearson], "Memorandum on the Draft Security Council Korea Resolution," 3 July 1950.

23. Ibid., Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. WA-1473, 4 July 1950; SSEA to Ambassador in United States, Tel. EX-1068, 5 July 1950; SSEA to Ambassador in United States, Tel. EX-1081, 6 July 1950; Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. WA-1494, 7 July 1950; A/CPDUN to SSEA, Tel. 450, 7 July 1950.

24. RG 2, Vol. 167, Lester Pearson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 27 June and 4 July 1950.

25. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. WA-1521, 12 July 1950.

26. Ibid., SSEA to Ambassador in United States, Tel. EX-1188, 13 July 1950.

27. Ibid., Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. WA-1544, 14 July 1950.

28. Ibid., C.S.A. Ritchie, "Memorandum for the under-secretary of state for external affairs," 18 July 1950; A.D.P. Heeney, "Memorandum for the Minister," 18 July 1950.

29. Bercuson, *True Patriot*, pp. 209-11.

30. RG 2, Vol. 2748, Cabinet Defence Committee Conclusions, 18 July 1950.

31. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, A.D.P. Heeney, "Memorandum for the Minister: Possible Establishment of a United Nations Volunteer Force," 18 July 1950.

32. RG 2, Vol. 2645, Cabinet Conclusions, 19 July 1950.

33. Ibid. See also, "Statement by the Prime Minister, 19 July, 1950," in *Canada and the Korean Crisis* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1950), pp. 28-29. Charles Ritchie's 18 July draft of this statement, which contains Pearson's marginalia introducing the notion of a UN force, is on RG 25, file 50069-A-40.

34. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, SSEA to CPDUN, Tel. 359, 19 July 1950.

35. Ibid., Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. WA-1595, 22 July 1950; CPDUN to SSEA, Tel. 508, 22 July 1950.

36. RG 2, Vol. 2645, Cabinet Conclusions, 27 July 1950.

37. NAC, St. Laurent Papers, Vol. 234, L.B. Pearson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 1 August 1950.

38. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. WA-1637, 31 July 1950; St. Laurent Papers, Vol. 234, L.B. Pearson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 1 August 1950.

39. St. Laurent Papers, Vol. 234, L.B. Pearson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 2 August 1950.

40. NAC, Pearson Papers, N1, Vol. 35, L.B. Pearson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 3 August 1950. Rumours of Pearson's threatened resignation were apparently current in Ottawa in August 1950. See Prince, "The Limits of Constraint," p. 140.

41. Pearson Papers, N1, Vol. 35, Attachment to L.B. Pearson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 3 August 1950.

42. RG 2, Vol. 2646, Cabinet Conclusions, 2, 3 and 7 August 1950.

43. RG 25, file 5475-DW-11-40, SSEA to Ambassador in United States, Tel. WA-1378, 22 August 1950.

44. RG 2, Vol. 245, L.B. Pearson,"Memorandum to the Cabinet," 11 September 1950.

45. RG 25, file 50056-A-40, L.B. Pearson to Dean Acheson, 15 August 1950.

46. Ibid., file 50069-A-40, Canadian Delegation to the United Nations to SSEA, Letter 357, 20 July 1950; Pearson Papers, N1, Vol. 35, L.B. Pearson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 26 July 1950.

47. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, Jawaharlal Nehru to Clement Attlee, 21 July 1950, enclosure to Canadian High Commissioner in United Kingdom to the SSEA, 24 July 1950.

48. Ibid., CPDUN to SSEA, Tel. 573, 15 August 1950.

49. Department of External Affairs (DEA) *Statements and Speeches* (*S/S*), 50/31, L.P. Pearson, "Canada and the Far East," 21 August 1950.

50. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, High Commissioner in India to SSEA, Tel. 187, 19 August 1950; Sir Girja Bajpai to Warwick Chipman, 20 September 1950.

51. Ibid., file 5475-DW-4-40, CPDUN to SSEA, Tel. 602, 25 August 1950, Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. WA-2088, 8 September 1950; file 50069-A-40, High Commissioner in United Kingdom to Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 20 September 1950.

52. "General Assembly Resolution of October 7, 1950, on 'the Problem of the Independence of Korea,'" reproduced in *Documents on the Korean Crisis* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951), pp. 5-6.

53. RG 25, file 4457-A-40, Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly to SSEA, Tel. 14, 22 September 1950.

54. *S/S*, 50/34, "Statement by Mr. L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly," 27 September 1950.

55. On Nehru's visit to Ottawa, see Escott Reid *Envoy to Nehru* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 4-5.

56. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, SSEA to Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly, Tel. 67, 4 October 1950.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid., Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly to SSEA, Tel. 63, 5 October 1950.

60. Ibid., Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. WA-2400, 5 October 1950.

61. Ibid., Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. WA-2402, 5 October 1950.

62. Ibid., Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly to SSEA, Tel. 92, 9 October 1950.

63. Ibid., Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly to SSEA, Despatch 53, 9 October 1950.

64. Ibid., SSEA to Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly, Tel. 144, 18 October 1950.

65. Ibid., Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly to Ambassador in United States, Tel. 324, 6 November 1950.

66. Ibid., Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. WA-2852, 6 November 1950.

67. Ibid., SSEA to Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly, Tel. 233, 7 November 1950.

68. Ibid., Ambassador in United States to Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly, Tel. 43, 7 November 1950.

69. Ibid., Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly to SSEA, Tel. 351, 9 November 1950.

70. Ibid., SSEA to Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly, Tels. 267 and 268, 11 November 1950.

71. Ibid., Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly to SSEA, Tel. 395, 14 November 1950.

72. Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 90-91.

73. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Tel. WA-2986, 18 November 1950.

74. Ibid., Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly to SSEA, Tel. 462, 21 November 1950.

75. Cited in McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War*, p. 178.

76. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, R.A.D. Ford, "Soviet Motives in Korea," 21 November 1950; A.D.P. Heeney, "Memorandum for Mr. Pearson," 29 November 1950; A.D.P. Heeney, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 30 November 1950.

77. Ibid., A.D.P. Heeney, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 30 November 1950.

78. Ibid., Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly to SSEA, Tels. 523 and 529, 29 November 1950.

79. Ibid., SSEA to High Commissioner in India, Tels. 164 and 165, 30 November 1950.

80. Ibid., High Commissioner in India to SSEA, Tel. 278, 2 December 1950.

81. Cited in McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War*, p. 178.

82. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, SSEA to All Missions, 2 December 1950.

83. "Excerpts from a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs at the Federal-Provincial Conference in Ottawa, December 4, 1950," in *Documents on the Korean Crisis*, pp. 13-15.

84. "Excerpts from a broadcast by the Secretary of State for External Affairs over the Trans-Canada Network, December 5, 1950," in *Documents on the Korean Crisis*, pp. 16-17; RG 25, file 50069-A-40, SSEA to All Missions, 5 December 1950; SSEA to All Consular Posts in the United States, 5 December 1950.

A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP? Canada-U.S. Relations and the Korean Armistice Negotiations January-July 1953

Steven Hugh Lee

Résumé

Lors des dernières étapes des négociations pour l'armistice mettant fin à la guerre de Corée, les représentants du ministère canadien des Affaires extérieures craignaient que la question des prisonniers de guerre n'entraîne une escalade débouchant sur un conflit général entre la Chine et les États-Unis. Ils furent rassurés par les concessions chinoises du printemps de 1953, mais critiquèrent ensuite la décision prise par les Américains vers la mi-mai d'exiger de nouvelles concessions des communistes. Ils reprochèrent au Département d'État de ne pas avoir consulté le Canada à ce sujet. Bien que le commandement de l'ONU eût modéré sa position finale pour tenir compte des objections des alliés, les décideurs américains ne consultèrent pas le gouvernement canadien sur leur décision du 20 mai d'intensifier le conflit, quitte à recourir à l'arme nucléaire, si les communistes rejetaient les propositions d'armistice. Lester Pearson apporta publiquement son soutien à l'ONU vers la fin-mai, mais le ministère des Affaires extérieures avisa tout de même les États-Unis qu'en l'absence de consultations en bonne et due forme, le Canada n'appuierait pas l'escalade du conflit. Dans l'ensemble, le fait que les États-Unis aient négligé de consulter pleinement le Canada au cours des négociations de l'armistice expose les limites des relations spéciales entre les deux pays.

The major work on Canada's participation in the Korean War is Denis Stairs' *The Diplomacy of Constraint*. Published in 1974, the book stressed Canadian policy-makers' attempts to prevent the United States from adopting escalatory containment strategies in Asia. But Stairs was not given access to primary departmental memoranda and the book concentrated on Canada-American relations during the early stages of the war.[1] Historians have tended to ignore Canada's role in the latter stages

of the conflict. This paper will seek to redress that imbalance by examining the reactions of Canadian policy-makers to the Eisenhower administration's strategy to obtain a favourable armistice agreement. A study of Canadian-American diplomatic initiatives during the armistice negotiations provides a unique perspective on the dynamics of allied consultation. American diplomacy vis-à-vis Canada was tied to the broader U.S. objective of getting allies publicly to support the United Nations Command's negotiating position. However, the diplomatic record demonstrates that the Americans did not fully consult the Canadians about the implications of the late May U.S./UNC proposals. The Canadian decision to support the UNC helped to maintain only the appearance of allied unity; the acrimony which accompanied the UNC position temporarily exacerbated tensions amongst the Western allies.

Canada and the Korean War 1950-1952

Canadian diplomacy in the initial stages of the Korean War had been defined in terms of helping the Western alliance teach the Soviet Union a lesson in collective free world security. Canadian politicians supported the UN move across the 38th parallel and the attempt to reunify the country through force. Chinese communist intervention in the late fall of 1950 resulted in a redefinition of Canadian goals. Worried that China's entry into the conflict had brought the West a step closer to global war, Canadian officials began to argue for a negotiated settlement with the communists. They attempted to constrain the United States from undertaking rash or provocative actions and they were uncomfortable about adopting a resolution branding the Chinese as aggressors in the conflict. But maintaining good relations with the United States in the Cold War was a vital aspect of Canadian and allied diplomacy. If the allies alienated the United States, it might turn once again to isolationism or take action on a unilateral basis. Neither option was satisfactory and these considerations contributed to pressures to compromise with American strategy. The United States was also prepared to compromise on its preferred position and on 1 February Canada and other countries supported the American "aggressor resolution" in the United Nations.

Negotiations for an armistice began in the summer of 1951. Limited progress was made in the first eight months of negotiations. In November, agreement was reached to accept the current line of contact as the boundary provided other issues were settled within 30 days. In February 1952 the two sides agreed that a political conference on Korea would be convened after an armistice. The most important matter left

unresolved was the POW issue. A U.S./UN poll in April 1952 showed that only 70,000 of 132,000 enemy prisoners were willing to be repatriated to their home country. In the same month, the UNC demanded the voluntary repatriation of POWs as a cardinal principle of their negotiating strategy. The communists rejected this position in May. The armistice was held up for over a year as both sides haggled over the future of the prisoners. The summer of 1952 witnessed the heaviest U.S./UN air raids of the war. These devastating raids were launched to get the communist side to make political concessions on the bargaining table.[2]

Fears about a complete breakdown in the negotiations were a major theme in Canadian diplomacy from late 1951 onwards. In September 1951, the British Commonwealth Relations Office sent a telegram to the U.K. high commissioners in the "old" Commonwealth informing them of the latest American thoughts with respect to the Korean armistice negotiations. The telegram described a meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson and British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison in Washington. At the meeting Acheson outlined a more aggressive containment policy which American planners were considering if the armistice negotiations should break down. The secretary of state pointed out that if the discussions broke down completely, the "world situation would have become much more dangerous." In light of this he proposed a series of escalatory steps to force concessions from the communists: the United States would increase its war production, authorize the UNC commander, General Matthew Ridgway, to increase the scale of offensive operations and give him the latitude to move as far north as the waist of the Korean peninsula. If major attacks from China were made on UN forces, Ridgway should be authorized to bomb military targets in China and pursue enemy aircraft across the Yalu River. UN members would also be asked to support a naval blockade of China.[3]

Canada and other allies understood the escalatory implications of these recommendations, which were embodied in an American National Security Council document known as NSC 118/2. Much of the debate surrounding the 1953 April-June armistice negotiations had been rehearsed in the previous year and a half. America's allies recognized the dangers of widening the conflict over the POW issue. In Ottawa, the acting under-secretary of state for external affairs, Escott Reid, summarized the situation in mid-February 1952: "The issue of prisoners of war would not pose such difficult problems if it were not for the possibility that a breakdown of the armistice negotiations may result in a mounting public demand in the United States for the extension of the war to China, with all that involves, such as a further alienation of democratic Asia from the

West and the possibility of war against China precipitating a general war with the Soviet Union."[4] This set the tone and context for Canadian objectives in the latter stages of the armistice discussions.

Canada's concerns were alleviated somewhat in the fall of 1952 when the United States agreed to a modified Indian UN resolution on the POW issue. The original Indian intention had been to de-emphasize the principle of non-forcible repatriation. The final document reaffirmed this principle in its preamble and annexed proposals. It also suggested that a neutral custodial commission be established to deal with the fate of the POWs. To officials in the Department of External Affairs the resolution signified settling the conflict through negotiations. But because of Soviet criticisms of the resolution, the Western allies were sceptical of the ability of the document to resolve the political stalemate.

Canada, the Eisenhower Administration and the Armistice Negotiations

By the time the "Indian resolution" passed the General Assembly, Dwight D. Eisenhower had been elected the 34th president of the United States. The new administration's containment strategies exacerbated Canadian fears about the dangers of American policies toward East Asia. At an informal meeting with Canadians in mid-February 1953, the new secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, explained the different approach to international affairs which the Eisenhower administration would pursue. Dulles said the new executive "was determined not to leave the initiative in the cold war to the Soviet Union." In his description of principles which were to underline the "New Look", Dulles remarked that the Soviet Union should not be permitted to choose the time and place for new diplomatic initiatives. "It was Eisenhower's policy to create situations which would worry the Kremlin by creating threats to Soviet influence at various points in the world." Pearson was disturbed about the implications of this conversation and remarked to Dulles that "it might be difficult to create uneasiness in the Soviet Union without at the same time creating uneasiness among the allies of the United States." Dulles agreed that a "coalition of democracies" would have a difficult time conducting "such a war of nerves as President Eisenhower's policy would require." Nevertheless, the United States needed to rely on its allies in the Cold War against the Soviet threat: "It would be of great help if political leaders in other countries could try to increase this fund of confidence even on occasions when it might not be possible for them to explain fully United States plans and intentions."[5]

The Korean armistice negotiations were a crucial test case of this emerging American strategy. The two basic principles of the "New Look" were complementary: the pursuit of a more aggressive containment stance while maintaining the solidarity of the Western alliance. Allied strength and unity were especially important in instances such as Korea where disunity might encourage Soviet or Chinese adventurism in Western Europe or Asia. The need to maintain allied unity was not new, and the Truman administration had understood the necessity of retaining the support of its Western allies in the Cold War. In practice, there was much continuity between the Truman and Eisenhower administrations; the origins of the tougher line toward the Chinese communists with respect to the Korean armistice lay in the Truman era. Under Eisenhower, however, there was a greater willingness to test the strength of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Dulles' approach to Pearson was an attempt to lay some of the foundations of the administration's new Cold War tactics and give fair warning to allied governments that the United States expected to receive their support.

In March 1953, there were hopeful signs that the communists were more willing than previously to negotiate an armistice in Korea, and the Canadian, the British and other Western governments received news of Chou En-lai's offer to exchange sick and wounded prisoners with a degree of optimism. In New York, David Johnson, Canada's permanent representative to the UN, commented: "No proposal since the Korean war began has raised such high hopes of an armistice among delegations here as Chou En Lai's statement of 30 March transmitted to the President of the General Assembly to-day, 31 March." Lester Pearson, president of the General Assembly, quickly informed that body of the positive tone of Chou's communication. According to Johnson, the minister "was roundly applauded". The general view of the Assembly was that Chou's concessions were genuine: "taken in the context of a whole series of moves pointing in the direction of conciliation, the offer should be seriously explored without delay."[6]

Canadian diplomats received confirmation of this encouraging news from other sources. On 2 April the Canadian high commissioner in the United Kingdom, Norman Robertson, wrote that the British Foreign Office believed that "the Chinese and Russians now mean business. The recent Chinese and Russian statements almost surely mean that the Russian and Chinese Governments consider it now to be in their interests to bring the Korean war to an end."[7] Writing from Moscow on 17 April, the Canadian chargé d'affaires, R.A.D. Ford, reported on a conversation with the Soviet foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov. This was only one of a

handful of meetings between a Soviet foreign minister and a Canadian representative in the city since 1947, and Molotov told Ford that "he sincerely hoped that the hostilities in Korea could be terminated shortly." According to the chargé d'affaires, "the reiteration of the assurance of Soviet intentions in Korea . . . tends to confirm the other bits of evidence we have that this time the Russians mean business."[8] The lack of direct contact with the Beijing government prevented a full understanding of China's position, but reports from British sources confirmed the Canadian view that the communists were more willing than previously to come to an armistice agreement.

The exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, which began on 20 April, and the reconvening of the armistice negotiations on 26 April, were viewed in positive terms by Canadian officials. In Ottawa, the acting under-secretary of state for external affairs, Charles Ritchie, wrote that "the progress achieved on the POW issue . . . is somewhat encouraging as evidence that the Communists are prepared to back up their words with deeds." Yet a certain amount of uncertainty and suspicion remained with respect to ultimate communist intentions, and Ritchie wondered if the Ottawa position was perhaps not too optimistic.[9]

These concerns compounded fears that certain elements in the United States might make it more difficult to achieve an early armistice. Canadians had worried about American public opinion throughout the war, and Ritchie was troubled over recent U.S. press reports about the treatment of American prisoners of war—he felt they might create a backlash and delay an armistice agreement. The department was also concerned about the impact some members of Congress might have on the negotiating process. Particularly distressing were the public statements by Senator Robert Taft. Hume Wrong, Canada's ambassador to the United States, attempted to dispel some of these fears in a despatch on 27 April. He argued that the secretary of state and the administration in general desired an armistice: too much should not be made of American press stories about how poorly POWs were treated in Korea.[10]

On 26 April, the communists presented a new set of proposals to the UNC: prisoners who did not agree to repatriation should be sent to a neutral state and their ultimate disposition should be decided by a political conference to be held six months after an armistice was signed. American officials were disgruntled. The American deputy secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, U. Alexis Johnson, told Wrong that the proposals were unworkable and remained "unacceptable to the United States." Ottawa agreed that the POWs should not be transferred to a neutral state, but should remain in Korea; that the final disposition of the prisoners should

not be left ultimately to a political conference; and that the communist counterproposals were vague as to the length of time POWS would be kept if they opted against repatriation. Differences between the Canadian and American approaches to the armistice rested on the importance Canadians continued to attach to maintaining a dialogue with the communists and not breaking off or recessing the negotiations over what Canadians perceived to be relatively minor bargaining points.

Possible American intransigence on the POW issue and the previous failure of the U.S. to consult adequately with its allies underlined Canadian fears. To Chester Ronning, head of the Far Eastern Division, the past history of American consultation with Canada was not encouraging. On 28 April, Ronning wrote that the United States had acted as if it had a blank cheque with respect to decision-making in the Korean conflict:

> . . . the United States Government did not consult its Allies when it recessed the Armistice negotiations at Panmunjom in October, 1952 (although we were informed in advance that this might be done). Canada was not directly consulted when the full Armistice negotiations were recently resumed (although again we were informed in advance). Canada was neither consulted nor informed in advance when the United States authorized the bombing of Communist power installations on the Yalu River in June, 1952, at a time when delicate negotiations were under way to break the prisoner-of-war deadlock. . . . Most important of all, neither Canada nor the other Allies of the United States were consulted, or informed in advance, when the United Nations Command interjected the principle of "voluntary repatriation" into the prisoner-of-war question in January 1952, a principle which was rapidly developed by the United States into an inflexible position.[11]

Ronning's memorandum was revised by the under-secretary, Dana Wilgress, and presented to Pearson. It reflected Canadian uncertainty regarding American and UNC intentions at the armistice discussions. Wilgress called for improved consultation with the United States on issues of political, as opposed to purely military, reasoning. He did not want Canada to be put in a position in which accepting the American position meant the possibility of widening the war. Noting that consultation between the United States and its allies was inadequate, he argued that "no country can be expected to commit its forces to political ventures not

clearly defined, when it places them under foreign command." Wilgress pointed out that "while we are in agreement with the United Nations Command . . . we do not consider that these points should be regarded as absolute conditions for an armistice but that, rather, they should be considered as proposals which may have to be modified for bargaining purposes. We have also told Washington that we agree that there should be some safeguards against 'interminable haggling' at the resumed sessions at Panmunjom; but we are somewhat apprehensive . . . that the United Nations Command may recess these meetings in a peremptory fashion." The lesson to be learnt from the Korean experience was that in any future or further aggression more formal arrangements for consultation would be needed.[12]

Americans continued to criticize the communist negotiating position. In a meeting with Canadian officials on 6 May, Johnson explained that he was "pessimistic about the Communists' desire to conclude an armistice at this time". In plenary sessions "the Communists were not showing any flexibility or an apparent desire to make progress."[13] During discussions held in Washington on 7 May Dulles told Pearson that the United States had been on the verge of breaking off negotiations with the communists. An alarmed Pearson spoke later in the day with U.S. officials Freeman Matthews, Livingston Merchant and James Bonbright. Matthews ventured the opinion that there had been a misunderstanding and that the senior UNC negotiator, General W.K. Harrison, had been instructed to obtain prior consent from Washington before undertaking any such move. Furthermore Harrison was told he could only ask for a recess of the talks for several days. Pearson found this explanation "reassuring". Nevertheless, American officials were at this time considering the possibility of breaking off negotiations if the communists did not accept terms to be laid out by the UNC.[14]

On 7 May, North Korean representative General Nam Il altered the earlier communist proposal and agreed not to remove prisoners from Korea. The period of "persuasion" was reduced from six months to four and he proposed that a five-member Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) be created to deal with the POW issue. The proposal was read with a sense of anticipation by Canadian diplomats who believed it might lay the foundations for an eventual armistice. Pearson wrote to Wrong that the only major difference between the United Nations resolution of December 1952 and the latest communist position was the communist omission of reference of the POW issue back to the UN if no agreement was reached during a political conference to be convened after an armistice. In a hopeful frame of mind after seemingly positive

discussions with U.S. officials in Washington, Pearson wrote: "I think the way is open for the conclusion of an armistice, if the United States administration is seriously determined to obtain one, as I believe it is." The external affairs minister was not very surprised that the communist counterproposals did not refer the POW issue back to the United Nations, "for the simple reason that neither government is a member of that body. In my view, it may be necessary for the United Nations Command to be prepared to consider a compromise on this point in the interest of obtaining an early armistice."[15]

The U.S. response to the communist negotiating position demonstrated the differences within the Western alliance on how to deal with the Sino-Soviet alliance in the Korean War context. In Washington, Alexis Johnson told Commonwealth representatives that the United States was unwilling to accept the communist proposals regarding the final disposition of prisoners. If the political conference could come to no common agreed policy, then the POWS should be transferred to civilian status. Furthermore, the "neutral" custodial commission should operate only on the basis of unanimity.[16] These counterproposals were put forward on 13 May. As a last minute concession to South Korean President Syngman Rhee, the UNC also demanded that all North Korean POWs be released immediately after the signing of an armistice. Against the instincts of its other Western allies, the United States had hardened its stance on POW issues. The Americans' reaction to the Chinese-North Korean proposals demonstrated that they were following Dulles' guidelines of putting pressure on the communist bloc. Dulles himself was strongly supportive of the demand for unanimity in the Neutral Nations Commission.[17]

Several days after Alexis Johnson had told the Canadians of his pessimism about the communists' desire for an armistice, Wrong reported that the State Department had strong reservations about any sort of general East-West dialogue. Prime Minister Churchill had made a speech in the British House of Commons suggesting a relaxation in tensions, but "privately and informally the State Department comment reflects grave doubts as to the usefulness of a conference in the terms suggested by Prime Minister Churchill." The Americans argued that such a conference would

> detract from the effectiveness of the President's initiative of April 16th when he called upon the Soviets to prove the sincerity of their peaceful words by deeds. A high level conference, even when described in such inimitable Churchilian phrases, would seem on the contrary to

provide an unusually advantageous forum for further Soviet gestures to back up their peace propaganda.[18]

Canadian officials were taken aback by the American counter-proposals. The proposals were unexpected and demonstrated the extent to which Canada was left in the dark about U.S. negotiating strategy. Pearson wrote to Wrong that he was "very disturbed" by the American position, especially since "it appeared to inject into the armistice discussions some ideas which had not been the subject of previous consideration." On 13 May, despite American assurances only a few days earlier that it was not about to break off the armistice negotiations, the Canadian cabinet noted that the Americans' new POW proposals "might have the result of bringing negotiations to an end."[19] Fears of an expanded conflict, involving China and possibly the Soviet Union, were renewed.

In London, officials in the Foreign Office sympathized with Canadian concerns. During a discussion with Norman Robertson on 13 May, Robert H. Scott of the Foreign Office argued that an attempt should be made by the UNC to obtain a cut-off date regarding the length of time POWs could be held after a political conference. He urged the importance of compromise: "What he had in mind was that it would be worth extending the negotiations for, say, a fortnight in the hope of reaching an agreement of this kind. If agreement could not be reached this question should not be regarded as a breaking-point in the negotiations and the United Nations negotiators would have to accept the Communist position."[20] On the same day, Pearson wrote a stern message to Wrong stating that "it should be made clear to the United States that we do not propose to follow them in the abandonment of the United Nations resolution which we accepted in good faith and would expect to carry out accordingly."[21] Canadians complained about the lack of consultation and worried about the potential consequences of the new U.S. position. On 18 May the government forwarded a memorandum to the American authorities via Wrong. It noted that the Canadian government was "disturbed" by the American proposal because it introduced several new elements into the negotiating process. Furthermore, it was "regrettable that this counter-proposal . . . was introduced without consultation between the United States and the other countries, such as Canada, with forces in Korea."[22]

The next day, 19 May, the Americans made some concessions which the Canadian government had been hoping for. With Dulles visiting India, Walter Bedell Smith, a former Second World War general and CIA head, took over as the acting secretary. At a meeting with the "old" Commonwealth members, Smith stated that the final UNC negotiating

position would be put forward on the 25th. In presenting the terms, the UN negotiators would avoid formal ultimatums, the Korean POWs would be treated on the same basis as the Chinese, and the custodial commission would vote on a basis of a majority of four.[23] According to the American version of the meeting, Smith argued that "in the absence of clear indications from the Communists that agreement could be reached . . . within a reasonable period there would be no purpose in carrying on negotiations any further." If negotiations ended, "it cannot be expected that military operations can just sit where they are. . . . [I]t must be expected that the military operations will have to be intensified."[24]

The Canadians were not completely satisfied with the modified proposals but did agree that they provided a basis for continued discussions. Ritchie wrote: "We cannot, at this stage, accept being pinned down to agreement to them as a 'final position' or to support any moves to break off the negotiations at Panmunjom."[25] On this point the American response was ambiguous. U. Alexis Johnson and John Hickerson, the assistant secretary of state for UN affairs, told the Canadian ambassador that although the proposals would not be put forward in the form of an ultimatum, "it was the intention to leave the other side with the impression, in the secret sessions at Panmunjom, that the UNC can go no further in making concessions."[26] A critical meeting of the American National Security Council the day before had agreed that "if conditions arise requiring more positive action in Korea," UNC air and naval operations would be extended to China and ground operations in Korea would be escalated. In short, if the communists proved intransigent the UNC would intensify the conflict.

Partly because of the international implications of escalating the war, the United States wanted its allies to support publicly the UNC position. Privately, Johnson noted: "If we can get our Allies committed in advance to support us, we would be in a much better position to handle any U.N. action and therefore the Indian Resolution would be easier to live with." Johnson also rejected a suggestion made by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley, to "tell our Allies now that we were going to void all previous agreements."[27]

In order to gain the full support of its Western partners, the American administration decided to agree to a majority voting procedure for the custodial commission. This decision was relayed to the Canadians and others on 23 May, two days before the UNC's last negotiating position was put forward. In passing on this information, however, Johnson said that he "anticipated trouble with the Communists on the question" and that it was "vital" that American allies provide their public

support to the U.S. position. If a common front was not upheld, "the cardinal position in the UNC position might be lost."[28] The Canadians now felt that the Americans were behaving responsibly toward their allies and a recommendation was made by Ritchie that Canada publicly state it had been fully consulted and that it supported the UNC position as a basis for negotiation. But Ritchie was unaware of the NSC decision to escalate the war in the event the communists were reluctant to sign an armistice on the UNC terms.[29]

On 26 May, Canadian hopes were deflated when they learned from the Australians that the U.S. National Security Council had decided that if the communists refused the UNC proposals, "General Clark will be instructed to break off negotiations, to cease to recognize [the] demilitarized zone, to bomb Kaesong, to step up military and air operations, and to release Chinese and Korean prisoners who do not wish to be repatriated."[30] Despite this information, Pearson went ahead with a scheduled speech in Vancouver on 27 May which supported the U.S./UNC position. He argued that the proposals should provide the basis for an acceptable armistice and that the major Western allies were firmly committed to them as fair, reasonable and in accordance with previous UN resolutions. "The Communists should not think, or try to make others think, that we are divided on this issue. We are not."[31] Privately, however, Canadians were very concerned about the implications of the NSC decision. Their fears were transmitted to Washington on 28 May:

> . . . the Minister also wishes you to say that we assume that there will be an opportunity for adequate consultation among the representatives of the countries concerned after the Communist reply has been submitted at Panmunjom on June 1. . . . [O]ur concern is that no decision be taken as to the next step until adequate opportunity for such consultation among the allies has been given. In the absence of such consultation Canada could not accept responsibility for any instructions which might be sent to General Clark regarding additional military action, in the event that the Communist reply might be considered by the US as a rejection of the UNC's proposals. The Minister considers that such additional military action involves both political and military considerations which must be discussed in advance among the allies concerned.[32]

Nor were the decisions of the U.S. National Security Council Canada's sole concern. With respect to the South Korean position on the

armistice talks, the Americans did consult the Canadians. On 30 May, Wrong reported that Syngman Rhee was insisting that he would remove the 18 South Korean divisions from UNC control unless the war was continued. Disturbed by this report, Pearson instructed Wrong to tell the Americans that Canada hoped the United States would not be dictated to by President Rhee: the terms of the armistice proposals should not be modified.[33]

Rhee's actions may inadvertently have served the United States' "New Look" objectives by creating pressure on Canada and other allies to rely more heavily on the United States to constrain him. The president's actions tended to reinforce the importance of the United States to its major allies. With the possibility that the communists might cause trouble over the custodial commission proposals, Rhee's threats distracted Canadians from the consequences of a breakdown in the discussions. When Bedell Smith confided to Wrong that congressional pressure leading up to the 25 May proposals had been fierce, he found a sympathetic audience. As Wrong wrote to Ottawa, "With the difficulties at home and the dangerous complications with Rhee I think that they did not do at all badly in the outcome."[34] Not all Canadians were concerned about the potentially dangerous situation which the U.S. National Security Council was leading its allies into. In his message Wrong reported that "no decision on action in the event of a rejection of the proposals has been taken by the National Security Council although the Council has discussed various courses of action." Wrong did not state that those courses of action all related to an expansion of the conflict. In fact, the U.S. Joint Strategic Plans Committee had earlier noted that "none of the courses which extend military action outside Korea can be effectively pursued without employing atomic weapons." The committee also pointed out that "extension of activity inside Korea would probably require action, at least against enemy bases in nearby Manchuria. This too could be effectively accomplished only by using the atomic bomb."[35]

Fortunately, the communists accepted the UNC terms on 4 May. Rhee took no action, in part because the United States offered the Republic of Korea a mutual security pact. The allies received a scare on the eve of the signing of the armistice when Rhee unilaterally issued orders to release 25,000 North Korean POWs. The action was very dangerous and it drew severe criticism from U.S. allies as well as from the communists. Lester Pearson, as president of the UN General Assembly, sent a letter to Rhee on 22 June saying that he had been shocked by the actions. He wrote that "it was regrettable that you have taken action which threatens the results already achieved and the prospect

of a peaceful solution of remaining problems."[36] The Korean government responded by arguing that the Koreans had in fact not broken any agreement. The South Koreans had made no pledge regarding the armistice and thus were acting within their power as a sovereign nation. To Canada's relief, the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. Though the South Koreans did not adhere to these agreements, the possibility of a war with China in Northeast Asia had greatly diminished. As long as the armistice held, a way had been paved for further peaceful negotiations to deal with the two Koreas.

The negotiations over the Korean armistice illustrate that there were important limits to America's willingness to consult with Canada. Policy-makers in the Department of External Affairs were critical of the initial U.S. counterproposals of 13 May. Although Canadian diplomats learned of American concessions on 23 May, the United States did not consult with them regarding the NSC decision to escalate the war if the communists proved intransigent. When questioned, Bedell Smith told Wrong only that no final decisions had been made. The United States was reluctant to share privileged information with a junior ally. Canadians did have access to the NSC conclusions through Australian and British channels of communication. Despite the knowledge of the potential consequences of the U.S. negotiating position, Pearson supported the UNC in his public speech in Vancouver on 27 May. Privately, however, the Canadians made it clear that they would not support any escalation of the war without prior discussion. It is impossible to say what course the war would have taken had the communists refused the UNC position of 25 May. The negotiations which led to the armistice demonstrated both the willingness of the Eisenhower administration to intensify the war over POW issues and some of the limits of Canadian-American consultation during the Korean conflict.

ENDNOTES

1. Denis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).

2. Rosemary Foot, *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

3. Public Record Office (PRO), FO371/92064, CRO telegram Y. No. 534, 18 September 1951.

4. National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 25, file 50069-A-40, Reid to Pearson, 19 February 1952.

5. External Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Documents on Canadian External Relations* (*DCER*), 19, 1953, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1991), p. 983.

6. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly to Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), No. 128, 1 April 1953.

7. Ibid., High Commissioner in United Kingdom to SSEA, No. 656, 2 April 1953.

8. *DCER*, 19, Chargé d'Affaires in Soviet Union to SSEA, 17 April 1953, p. 1462.

9. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, SSEA to Washington, EX-714, 25 April 1953.

10. Ibid., Washington to SSEA, WA-1029, 27 April 1953.

11. Ibid., Ronning, "Memo for the United Nations Division, Korea-Collective Security," 28 April 1953.

12. Ibid., "Memorandum for the Minister: Korea-Collective Security," 30 April 1953.

13. Ibid., file 50293-40, Washington to SSEA, WA-1122, 6 May 1953.

14. Rosemary Foot, "Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict," *International Security*, 13, 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 97-8.

15. *DCER*, 19, SSEA to Washington, EX-827, 12 May 1953, p. 77.

16. Ibid., Washington to SSEA, WA-1157, 11 May 1953, pp. 74-76. This telegram was received in Ottawa after EX-827 had been written. But the Department of External Affairs was aware, through press reports, of possible American intransigence prior to the reception of EX-827. See SSEA to Washington, EX-803, 8 May 1953, *DCER*, 19, p. 72.

17. Ibid., Washington to SSEA, WA-1169, 12 May 1953, p. 71.

18. RG 25, file 50293-40, Washington to SSEA, WA-1177, 13 May 1953.

19. *DCER*, 19, SSEA to Washington, EX-838, 12 May 1953, p. 79; NAC, RG 2, Cabinet Conclusions, 13 May 1953.

20. RG 25, file 50069-A-40, High Commissioner in United Kingdom to SSEA, No. 972, 14 May 1953.

21. Ibid., SSEA to Washington, EX-852, 14 May 1953.

22. *DCER*, 19, SSEA to Washington, EX-874, 18 May 1953, p. 85.

23. Ibid, Washington to SSEA, WA-1230, 19 May 1953, pp. 87-88.

24. National Archives, Washington (NA), RG 59, Lot 55D 388, Box 6, file "More Than One Embassy," Memo of Conversation, 19 May 1953. Wrong's telegram, however, made no mention of this U.S. position. Ian McGibbon has pointed out that the New Zealand record of the discussion did contain the substance of Smith's remarks. Nevertheless, the New Zealanders were dismayed by the American failure to consult its

allies. Like Canadian officials they made an important distinction between being consulted and simply being informed.

25. *DCER*, 19, Acting SSEA to Chargé d'Affaires in U.S., EX-897, 21 May 1953, p. 89.

26. Ibid., Washington to SSEA, WA-1261, 21 May 1953, p. 90.

27. United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*), 1952-54, 15 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 1045.

28. *DCER*, 19, Washington to SSEA, WA-1281, 23 May 1953, pp. 95-96.

29. Ibid., Acting SSEA to Washington, EX-922, 25 May 1953, p. 98.

30. NAC, RG 25, file 50069-A-40, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, to Australian High Commissioner, Ottawa, 26 May 1953. According to the British record, a telegram similar to the one sent by the Australians was sent to Ottawa as early as 23 May. CRO Y. No. 161 received 10:15 p.m. U.K. time (PRO DO35/5836). No record of this message has been found in the Canadian archives, but its contents became known to Canadian officials. On 27 May, Wrong referred to the British telegram and reported to Ottawa that "it is a little startling to learn that the National Security Council has approved in advance a plan of action, apparently for immediate application." File 50069-A-40, Washington to SSEA, WA-1303, 27 May 1953.

31. Department of External Affairs (DEA), *Statements and Speeches*, 53/29, "Far Eastern Issues," 27 May 1953.

32. *DCER*, 19, Acting SSEA to Washington, EX-946, 28 May 1953, p. 101.

33. Ibid., Washington to SSEA, WA-1324, 30 May 1953, pp. 102-104; Acting SSEA to Washington, EX-977, 3 June 1953, p. 106.

34. Ibid., Washington to SSEA, WA-1324, 30 May 1953, p. 104.

35. NA, RG218, 383.21 (3-19-45), sec. 128, "Future Courses of Action in Connection With the Situation in Korea," 11 May 1953.

36. DEA, Press Release, 23 June 1953.

COMMENTS ON DONAGHY AND LEE PAPERS

Ian McGibbon

Résumé

Dans ses remarques, l'auteur note que les rapports de Donaghy et de Lee, à l'instar d'autres publications du Commonwealth, constituent les correctifs tant attendus de la perspective essentiellement américaine de la guerre de Corée et jettent un peu de lumière sur les dilemmes auxquels étaient confrontées les petites puissances pendant la crise. Son commentaire montre que le Canada, comme d'autres membres du Commonwealth et de la coalition de l'ONU, a dû relever le défi et tenter d'influencer la politique américaine.

During the last decade, Britain, Australia and New Zealand have all produced official histories of their involvement in the Korean War based on archival resources. Canada, by contrast, has been slow to show a similar interest in the "forgotten war". The reason, I suspect, may lie partly in the availability of our chairman's excellent history, which, although not based on archival sources, provides an authoritative account of Canada's response to the Korean conflict. But every historian—or should I say political scientist?—sooner or later feels the chill winds of revision, and the two well-argued papers we have just heard, together with Robert Prince's recent article, represent the vanguard of the reassessment of Denis Stairs's work. Together with the other Commonwealth accounts, they provide an overdue corrective to the largely American-dominated perspective on the war and an insight into the workings of coalitions—a subject of considerable relevance today with the United Nations' efforts in Bosnia and elsewhere.

Both papers deal with the dilemmas confronting small powers during the Korean crisis. Canada's problem was shared by the United States' 14 other coalition partners, not excluding Britain. It was a difficult matter not only to determine the correct policy to be pursued, as Greg Donaghy clearly demonstrates, but also to ensure that one's views and concerns were taken on board in Washington. Steven Lee has outlined a situation which faced all the partners—the United States' tendency to overlook, whether deliberately or otherwise, the need to consult its allies

at crucial moments in the war, and the limits which the need for allied unity placed on their ability to do anything about it.

Greg Donaghy's paper indicates that Canadian policy was more complex than has been generally accepted. It was a policy, moreover, which shifted over time—as the nature of the war changed. Canada—like my own country—shared the assumption which lay at the heart of the American response: that the North Korean invasion was a Soviet-instigated move in the Cold War. Canada's initial attitude to the U.S. decision to intervene, like that of New Zealand, was one of relief mixed with anxiety—relief that a line had at last been drawn and that the United States had acted, anxiety that the crisis might be the Sarajevo of the Third World War (in which case deploying a large proportion of the West's available forces in a strategically unimportant theatre would be folly). Canada committed naval vessels and, somewhat belatedly, promised a ground force. Had the war ended when it should have—with the achievement of the Security Council's objective of restoring the Republic of Korea in September 1950—Canada would have emerged as a moderate encourager of successful American action within the UN context.

The crucial change in the complexion of the war occurred in October 1950 with the UN's shift from defender to aggressor. Having foiled North Korea's attempt to unify the peninsula by force, it would now seek to do the same itself. The result was a new war which involved the forces of the two communist superpowers, mainly Chinese but (as has been confirmed in recent years) also many thousands of Soviet airmen and air defence personnel. The time for constraint was September-October 1950 when the UN General Assembly was considering the 7 October 1950 resolution which supposedly authorized the invasion of North Korea, while the American government, unbeknown to its coalition partners, was urging General MacArthur to get across the 38th parallel regardless of the diplomatic manoeuvring.

During this period, it was the Indians who were the real constrainers. Indeed, measured against them, Canada was again an encourager. This is clearly outlined by Greg Donaghy. He refers to Canada's efforts to bring India into line, and Pearson's anger at Nehru's refusal to go along with the West. The philosophical divide between Nehru and Pearson, which Donaghy outlines, was undoubtedly important, but the main reason for India's stance was its conviction that China would respond forcefully to a UN crossing of the 38th parallel. China's efforts to convey its intentions to the Americans through New Delhi failed. For a variety of reasons, Washington chose not to listen to the messages being conveyed by the Indian ambassador in Peking—and the "old" Commonwealth

countries acquiesced in the American approach. Even after Chinese troops were found to be in North Korea, Canada's initial reaction was to assume that they were there to protect the hydro-electric installations along the Yalu River. Like New Zealand, it was uneasy about the situation, and strongly objected to American proposals to allow UN pilots the right of "hot pursuit" into Manchuria. But it was the disaster suffered by the UN forces at the end of November 1950 that finally induced Canada to take a more vigorous diplomatic role in the Korean crisis. Even then, it was Britain that emerged as the more forceful constrainer.

In reading Greg Donaghy's paper, I was struck by a major difference between the Canadian and New Zealand responses to the crisis—that is, the much greater salience in Wellington than in Ottawa of the Commonwealth as a consultative forum in determining policy. From this viewpoint, the Commonwealth hardly rates a mention in the paper, though it is noted that the British, Australian and New Zealand decisions at the end of July 1950 to provide ground forces imposed intolerable pressure on Ottawa to do likewise. I also recall Hector Mackenzie, in his paper this morning, referring to the existence of a special relationship between Canada and Britain in 1949. Certainly Canada and New Zealand had exhibited very different conceptions of Commonwealth relations in the previous 30 years, but I suspect that Greg Donaghy has understated the ("old") Commonwealth dimension in his paper. Was Pearson's emphasis on the UN context partly designed to avoid making a Canadian contribution within a British-dominated Commonwealth formation? Britain, Australia and New Zealand had, after all, wasted no time in agreeing to provide a joint force, and sought Canadian participation. There was a telling little exchange during subsequent discussion of the possible formation of a Commonwealth division. Canada insisted that it should be designated the "UN Police Division" and wanted it to include non-Commonwealth units. New Zealand's prime minister, by contrast, wanted the division's title to have the word "Empire" in it and no non-Commonwealth participants. While I agree generally with Greg Donaghy's line of argument, therefore, I think his paper focuses a little too exclusively on the Canadian-American relationship, given that it is sub-titled "Canada and the Korean War".

During December 1950-January 1951, Canada sought to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis and to avoid the possible consequences of a condemnation by the UN of China as an aggressor. To the extent that it opposed a widening of the war, it was henceforth a constrainer—but so were all the "old" Commonwealth partners and indeed most of the others. Although the removal of MacArthur from the scene in April 1951 allayed

many fears in coalition capitals, the threat of an expanded war hung over the frustrating armistice negotiations that began in July 1951 and were eventually brought to a conclusion two years later. Steven Lee has described the dangers that arose as the talks reached a critical stage in May 1953. It might be borne in mind that the outstanding issue in the last year of the war was the repatriation of prisoners of war. In effect, the UN fought on to determine the fate of a few thousands of enemy soldiers in its hands.

During this period, the "old" Commonwealth marched in step with the new. Canada, like New Zealand, regarded the General Assembly's resolution of 3 December 1952—the Indian resolution—as the basis of a settlement. Indeed, a Commonwealth front had been apparent during the debate on the resolution in New York. At one stage, Soviet delegate Vyshinsky had angrily castigated his Canadian and New Zealand counterparts as poodles barking at elephants, and dismissed the Australian delegate as a "country bumpkin". When the communists seemed to move in the direction of the Indian resolution in their proposals for ending the impasse in late April and early May 1953, there was concern in Ottawa, as in Canberra and Wellington, that this opportunity should not be missed, and belief that a spirit of compromise would ensure an agreement.

Steven Lee rightly emphasizes the emerging American "New Look" strategy in 1953. In this context, however, he might have made some reference to the U.S. decision to "de-neutralize" the Taiwan Straits in February 1953, especially as he purports to cover the period January-July 1953. The New Zealand government was not consulted about this decision, which, though not directly a UN matter, represented the dismantling of part of the framework of limited action in Korea. The same may well have applied to Canada. The American action certainly caused a furore in Britain.

Although the United States did not consult any of its UN coalition partners about the counterproposals which were put forward at Panmunjom, on 13 May 1953, it did carefully consult at least some of them about the UN Command's "final negotiating position" presented 12 days later. The British and "old" dominions' ambassadors met with State Department officials in Washington on 19 May and were specifically asked for their advice on the final proposals. However, as Steven Lee outlines, the Americans omitted to tell Ottawa—or any other coalition participant except Britain—that the National Security Council had decided, next day, upon a policy of launching an intensified campaign, including action outside Korea, if the new terms were rejected by the communists. Nevertheless, the ambassadors had been told on 19 May that the "people

of the U.S. would not stand for . . . [indefinite stalemate] and it must be expected that the military operations will have to be intensified" [*FRUS*, 1952-54, XV, 1056]—a point that could have been made in the paper. (Interestingly, the Canadian ambassador did not mention this comment in his initial report of the meeting, which is published in the Canadian documents volume for 1953, but he may have done so in a subsequent cable expanding his views which is not published in the volume.) It was the implication that intensification would take place automatically, without further consideration and consultation, which upset Canada—and the other dominions. They attempted to place a brake on possible action by insisting upon consultation about future action in the event of a communist rejection of the final terms.

This episode demonstrates that the United States was operating a three-tier system of consultation in relation to the negotiations: with Britain alone, with Britain and the "old" dominions, and with the other participants, who were not consulted about the final position ostensibly because of security considerations. However, the Commonwealth linkage blurred the top two tiers: can the Americans have been under any illusions that Britain would not advise its Commonwealth partners of the proposed intensification? It was in fact from London that New Zealand learned of American intentions. Britain also told Australia, and, it seems, Canada, though the cable cannot (as Steven Lee indicates in one of the footnotes to his paper) be found in Ottawa, and it was from the Australians that Canada eventually learned, third-hand, of the National Security Council's decision. This channel of communication via London made it difficult, of course, for the dominions to raise the matter in Washington directly. A similar problem had arisen earlier in the negotiations during discussion of the "joint warning statement".

The May 1953 episode is a revealing demonstration of the potential complications involved in mounting coalition operations, especially within a UN context. The United States faced an extraordinarily difficult diplomatic problem in 1953. On the one hand, it had to keep on side partners that were inclined to a conciliatory approach and a South Korean ally that took a diametrically opposite stance, while, on the other hand, it had to maintain a firm front to the communists at Panmunjom, for allied disunity was an incentive to them to go on stalling. In such circumstances, even poodles' barks may not be sufficient to gain attention.

RAPPORT

Annie Legault et Steven Rheault-Kihara

Denis Stairs, le président, remercie MM. Donaghy, Lee et McGibbon. Il souligne l'intérêt de comparer les différents points de vue et invite tous les participants à se joindre à la discussion.

Bob de Graaff souligne l'importance des contributions internationales dans ce domaine et suggère la réalisation d'une publication internationale.

Roger Sarty (historien en chef, ministère de la Défense nationale) demande si la contribution canadienne de troupes terrestres avait eu un effet réel ou si la seule contribution navale aurait été suffisante.

Steven Lee affirme que les troupes terrestres n'ont pas influencé la position américaine de négociation et qu'il existait de toute façon une séparation entre la contribution militaire et le processus de négociation.

Ian McGibbon rappelle que les troupes terrestres n'ont pas eu d'effet sur les négociations en Corée et qu'elles contribuaient surtout à la création d'une alliance, revêtant ainsi une importance diplomatique plutôt que militaire.

Meron Medzini rapporte que le Canada était divisé face aux États-Unis et à la Grande-Bretagne. Il demande si le Canada avait été consulté par Clement Attlee quand celui-ci est allé rencontrer les Américains.

Greg Donaghy affirme que le Canada n'avait pas été consulté mais plutôt informé de cette visite.

Steven Lee ajoute que la Grande-Bretagne, après consultation avec les États-Unis, était revenue rassurer le Canada sur les résultats de leur rencontre.

Arthur Menzies, ancien chef des opérations à la mission canadienne de Tokyo, déplore le fait que les documents présentés se concentrent surtout sur les négociations à New-York et Washington et ignorent les opérations sur le terrain. Des négociations ont aussi été menées par la Commission des Nations Unies au Japon avec la Corée et la Chine. D'ailleurs des informations circulaient entre les capitales et Tokyo de façon quotidienne, ce qui a permis aux pays du Commonwealth d'être constamment informés des plus récents événements.

Heather Yasamee désire rappeler, au sujet de la visite d'Attlee, que le rôle de la Grande-Bretagne était de communiquer les informations reçues aux pays du Commonwealth et de s'assurer de leur appui aux États-Unis. De plus, elle ajoute que les critiques adressées par M. McGibbon à l'endroit de M. Donaghy concernant l'importance attribuée aux relations canado-américaines sont plutôt sévères. La relation avec les États-Unis était au cœur de la crise de Corée et ce, pour tous les pays impliqués. Finalement, elle souligne que toutes les actions étaient déterminées selon l'interprétation faite des agissements et des motivations de l'autre camp. Il a longtemps noté le manque de documents présentant ces positions réelles et demande ce qu'il en est maintenant.

Steven Lee affirme que plusieurs informations concernant les vues chinoises et soviétiques sont maintenant accessibles par la presse chinoise. Cependant, toujours peu d'informations sont disponibles du côté soviétique.

Ian McGibbon précise qu'une Américaine du nom de Weathersby s'est rendu en Union soviétique pour trouver des documents publiés récemment au sujet de l'attaque en Corée. Ces documents semblent confirmer que les Chinois ont mené l'attaque et que les Soviétiques n'avaient nullement anticipé une guerre de cette durée.

Greg Donaghy répond aux propos de M. McGibbon et précise que le tiers de son document porte sur le Commonwealth, si l'on y considère l'Inde. De plus, les considérations de la Grande-Bretagne ont dû être éliminées compte tenu des contraintes d'espace. D'ailleurs, la rapidité avec laquelle les communications des États-Unis parvenaient au Canada ont déclassé la pertinence des informations en provenance de la Grande-Bretagne. C'est pourquoi l'influence américaine était prédominante sur la formulation de la politique canadienne.

Steven Lee se joint aux commentaires de M. Donaghy et affirme qu'en définitive, le cadre du Commonwealth se présentait comme une contrainte pour le Canada.

Denis Stairs remercie tous les participants de leurs interventions et conclue que cette discussion a su donner une perspective multilatérale au processus décisionnel en période de crise. Toutefois, il termine en rappelant que, même si nous savons ce qui en est de nos positions, la difficulté reste de savoir ce qui s'est réellement produit dans l'autre camp.

VIII: Users' Round Table
Table ronde des utilisateurs

MAPPING THE ARCHIVES
Documents on British Foreign Policy and *Documents on British Policy Overseas*

Sidney Aster

Résumé

L'auteur puise dans son expérience de professeur et d'historien pour discuter de l'importance de la série des documents britanniques pour les chercheurs. Que ce soit pour l'étudiant de premier cycle devant rédiger un rapport de recherche, pour le candidat au doctorat qui prépare son examen de scolarité ou pour le chercheur qui jette les bases de la recherche au Bureau des archives publiques, la série constitue un outil de recherche et d'enseignement indispensable.

The British government has been in the business of systematically publishing its official diplomatic documents at least since the early nineteenth century. The famous Blue Books date back to the period from 1812 to 1822 when Lord Castlereagh was secretary of state for foreign affairs. They were intended to give Parliament the information needed to reach a "judgement on foreign affairs. In practice, presentation meant . . . revelation. . . ." And as *pièces justicatives*, much was "omitted and texts were frequently curtailed." Soon afterwards, in 1825, the first of the *British and Foreign State Papers* was compiled by Lewis Hertslet for the use of the British government and its diplomats abroad. Because of widespread interest in the collection, it went on general sale in 1831 until its demise in 1968.[1] Thus there is a very strong British "national editorial tradition". In the twentieth century several more official publications have appeared, detailing the events leading up to the First World War, foreign affairs in the inter-war period from 1919-1939 and, since 1984, two further series have been documenting British foreign policy from 1945 to 1955.[2]

This long tradition has served its primary purposes. It has helped the British peoples to understand the history of their foreign relations with other countries and ensured that assessments of British activity internationally are based on available British documents.[3] This tradition

has also nourished generations of students, teachers, historians, politicians, administrators and journalists, both in Britain and abroad, who have been able to base their studies on archival sources. Such an audience is indebted to the British government for allowing primary diplomatic documents to appear in print.

Until recently, however, little attention was paid to the users of such publications. During the two previous conferences on the subject of editing diplomatic documents, in 1989 and again in 1992, interest was expressed in the users—the consumers—of these series. In the "Report on Proceedings" at the first conference in London, in 1989, "There was general agreement," the volume records, "that we should like to know more about how and by whom volumes of diplomatic documents were used."[4] In the "Report on Proceedings" of the second conference of editors at The Hague in 1992, it was similarly observed: "Little is known about users of our various publications. . . ."[5] One can safely surmise that users of *Documents on British Foreign Policy* and *Documents on British Policy Overseas* are a very diverse group which includes students, teachers, academics, historians, political scientists, civil servants, journalists, and domestic and foreign governments. But the writer, as an historian and professor, can begin to supply an answer to the questions raised about the consumers of documentary series.

Academic users—whether students, teachers or scholars—may be divided into two broad categories, with separate needs. There is the large body of undergraduate students, post-graduate M.A. and Ph.D. candidates and their instructors; and secondly, the active scholar, historian and researcher. For both these markets, the ongoing publication of diplomatic series is of enormous importance as a research and teaching tool. Undergraduates make some limited use of the diplomatic series in research papers or other forms of special interest subjects. More often than not the usefulness is determined by the specifics of an assignment. "Go off and read" is less inspiring than a directive, for example, to frame a diplomatic response to a despatch from abroad warning of an impending act of belligerency. In addition, some documents become part of collections of primary sources used for undergraduate instruction in the classroom or discussion in a tutorial/seminar format. The needs of this audience are well defined and the published volumes serve specific needs. In the future, some brief thematic collections, focusing on issues or crises, such as Versailles, disarmament, Munich, Korea and European integration, might prove useful in the classroom. Graduates and post-graduates make up a more sophisticated market. Foreign policy series can be used both in course work and in the preparation of field examinations. Ph.D.

candidates, once they are at work on their theses, also employ the collections to lay the foundation for eventual research at the Public Record Office in London.

Historians engaged in active research make intensive use of the series, usually as preparation for further archival research in the United Kingdom. For graduates and historians alike, *Documents on British Foreign Policy* and *Documents on British Policy Overseas* act as vital guides and signposts to materials at the Public Record Office. This editorial groundwork—this "mapping of the archives"[6]—helps in several ways. It indicates the most useful documents and files, and suggests further avenues of potential significance and research promise. Perhaps most relevant in a period of diminishing funding for research abroad, it reduces the amount of cost-intensive time and labour at the Public Record Office. For this groundwork, which is the structure and part of the ongoing *raison d'être* of the published series, all users must remain grateful to the editors, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the government of the United Kingdom.

Given such a picture of the academic market, the question arises as to how to target and service this clientele. This problem includes questions of publicity, format and future developments. There is a strong case for greater publicity to be given to the diplomatic series by way of circulars to history departments, advertisements in journals, and mailings to recognized users. Certainly, the editors of *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, including Heather Yasamee, M.E. Pelly, Keith Hamilton and the late Roger Bullen, have pioneered a major public relations exercise designed to explain the work of the Historical Branch of the FCO. Their lectures, articles, talks to university audiences, and other conference contributions have done much to educate the public, specialist and generalist, about the function, approach and problems of the editors of the British series.[7] The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Historical Branch, *Occasional Papers* was launched in November 1987. The first collation contained the records of a seminar in London, on the subject of "Valid Evidence", which was designed for historians to learn more about the Historical Branch and its work.[8] This and subsequent numbers merit greater distribution. Future issues might include relevant updates and information for the user of the diplomatic series. The listing in *Occasional Papers*, No. 7 of previously retained documents is one such example of information which deserves this wider dissemination.[9]

Principles of selection, scale and format have changed for the better when one compares *Documents on British Foreign Policy*[10] and

Documents on British Policy Overseas. On the basis of present approaches to these problems, a combination of printed and fiche documents, with appropriate footnotes and calendars, affords the best option to service the academic market. Such an approach fulfils the function of "mapping the archives." An even larger set of calendars and fiches would also be very helpful. However, converting to an all-calendar format, as was suggested at the 1989 conference,[11] while helping the historian on a visit to the Public Record Office, would penalize graduates and undergraduates and all other such users of the series from afar.

Future developments will encompass those changes influenced by the "information highway". There will be the sheer pressure of volume of documents which also raises the question of technological format. In 1914 the number of despatches received by the Foreign Office was 114,761. In 1939 the number of such documents had risen to 270,968. By 1945 this figure had all but doubled to 541,076; the figure had reached 630,268 by 1950 and 1,326,449 by 1991.[12] In the future, such pressures of volume, resulting as much from the ease of computer production as from the ongoing complexity of diplomatic business, will become even more serious. The options open to the editors of any series, faced with this information and technological revolution, are complex. The format of ongoing and future series will clearly be technology-driven. CD-ROMS might well capture the field and with their massive storage capacities help reduce the time needed at the Public Record Office. That element of selectivity—the mapping—which is at the heart of the users' needs, however, would be in danger of disappearing in a shift to CD-ROMs. Alternatively, some format of hard-copy print volumes supplemented with fiches and/or computer on-line retrieval systems might provide a sensible response combining selectivity with ease of access.

The editors of *Documents on British Policy Overseas* once observed, "Ultimately the volumes exist to tell a story. . . ."[13] The question one is left to ponder is, which story? Any diplomatic series is simultaneously telling several tales. There is the declared objective of recounting the Foreign Office/Foreign and Commonwealth Office story, which is certainly not one-dimensional. There is then the story which the elected government of the time might wish to have publicized if it could still exercise influence. There are additionally headline stories of the time which might or might not coincide with the stories of interest to present-day historians. And last, but not least, there are the editors' stories which are of two kinds: the story as told by the historian as editor and the one told by the historian as government employee. When such editors also

write and publish articles on historical subjects which they have previously documented, what hat are they then wearing?

ENDNOTES

1. Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, eds., A *Century of Diplomatic Blue Books, 1814-1914* (London, 1938), x-xiii, pp. 1-2; Sir Edward Hertslet, *Recollections of the Old Foreign Office* (London, 1901), p. 145.

2. *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, 11 vols., ed. G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London, 1926-38); *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, 4 Series, 64 vols., ed. E.L. Woodward et al. (London, 1946-86); and *Documents on British Policy Overseas, 1945-1955*, Series I, *1945-1950*, ed. M.E. Pelly et al. (London, 1984-), Series II, *1950-1955*, ed. Roger Bullen et al. (London, 1986-).

3. For a statement of these objectives see Roger Bullen and M.E. Pelly, "Documents on British Policy Overseas: Editorial Principles and Practices," in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Historical Branch, *Occasional Papers*, No. 1, November 1987, p. 14; and M.E. Pelly, "Editing Documents on British Policy Overseas, 1945-1955," *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 1 (1990), pp. 90-98, which is based on the previous article.

4. M.E. Pelly and H.J. Yasamee, "Report on Seminar for Editors of Diplomatic Documents Held in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 9 November 1989," in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Historical Branch, *Occasional Papers*, No. 2, November 1989, p. 3.

5. "Report on Proceedings," in *The Optimum Formula for a Foreign Policy Document Series: Proceedings of the Second Conference of Editors of Diplomatic*, The Hague, 16 and 17 January 1992, ed. Bob de Graaff and Joost Jonker ('s-Gravenhage, 1992), p. 10.

6. A similar function is mentioned in Albert E. Kersten, "Dutch Methods of Reconciling Size of Modern Archives with Costs of Printing," in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Historical Branch, *Occasional Papers*, No. 2, November 1989, p. 30.

7. Besides the contributions of the British editors cited herein, see also M.E. Pelly, "The Selection of Documents for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Series on British Foreign Policy," in *British Policy and the Transfer of Power in Asia: Documentary Perspectives*, ed. R.B. Smith and A.J. Stockwell (London, 1988); K.A. Hamilton, "The Pursuit of 'Enlightened Patriotism': The British Foreign Office and Historical Researchers during the Great War and Its Aftermath," *Historical Research*, 61 (1988), pp. 316-44; I am also grateful to Heather Yasamee for giving me a copy of her contribution to the June 1993 LSE conference "Historians and Officials: The Development of International History in Britain and the World."

8. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Historical Branch, *Occasional Papers*, No. 1, November 1987, p. 2.

9. "Examples of New Releases from FCO Records," in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Historical Branch, *Occasional Papers*, No. 7, November 1993, pp. 39-40.

10. On the editorial principals for this series, see "Preface," *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Series I, Vol. I, ed. E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (London, 1947), pp. iii-vi; E.L. Woodward, "Letter to the Editor," *American Historical Review*, 54 (1948-49), pp. 782-84; his notes for a talk at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ, 29 December 1952, copy supplied by the FCO; and his "British Foreign Policy Documents", *The Times*, 19, 20 Sept. 1955; see also Uri Bialer, "Telling the Truth to the People: Britain's Decision to Publish the Diplomatic Papers of the Inter-War Period," *Historical Journal*, 26 (1983), pp. 349-67.

11. Albert E. Kersten, "Dutch Methods of Reconciling Size of Modern Archives with Costs of Printing," in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Historical Branch, *Occasional Papers*, No. 2, November 1989, pp. 29-30.

12. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Library and Records Department, *History Notes*, No. 4: *FCO Records: Policy, Practice and Posterity, 1782-1993*, 2nd ed. (London, 1993); "Preface," *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, Vol. I, ed. M.E. Pelly and Heather Yasamee (London, 1984), p. vii; "Introduction to Series II," *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series II, Vol. I, ed. Roger Bullen and M.E. Pelly (London, 1986), pp. v-vi.

13. Roger Bullen and M.E. Pelly, "Documents on British Policy Overseas: Editorial Principles and Practice," in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Historical Branch, *Occasional Papers*, No. 1, November 1987, p. 22.

I DOCUMENTI DIPLOMATICI ITALIANI

Alan Cassels

Résumé

La série italienne de documents diplomatiques constitue un outil pédagogique inestimable grâce à son illustration au jour le jour de l'évolution de la politique étrangère. En outre, les notes infrapaginales regorgent de renseignements du genre de ceux que recherchent les étudiants et les professeurs. Selon l'auteur, l'utilité de la série documentaire pour les chercheurs spécialisés ne cessera d'augmenter au fil des ans : les nouvelles exigences frappant les historiens des affaires internationales leur laissent en effet de moins en moins le temps de se plonger longuement dans les archives.

All of us on this panel wear two professional hats. We are scholars engaged in historical writing, but we are also university teachers. The publication of diplomatic documents affects us primarily, I suppose, in the former capacity, but I should like to begin my remarks with a brief reference to the pedagogical service which printed documentary series provide. It is a perspective not often remarked upon, and perhaps it does not often occur to the series editors themselves. As teachers, we are concerned to demonstrate to our students how history comes to be constructed, which means exposure to the raw material of primary sources. In this respect, published diplomatic documents are readily accessible and usually so well organized as to make use by neophytes quite practical. This purpose, it goes without saying, is enhanced at the graduate level where one is dealing with the more able and serious student whether he or she intends to become a professional historian or not. And for the latter, the fledgling scholar, work with printed documents acts as an apprenticeship for research in the archives.

In this respect, I have always found *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani* invaluable, and I should like to mention certain features which especially commend the volumes as a teaching tool. Neither concerns the definition of what a nation's foreign policy was at a particular moment; instead, they focus on the more fascinating issue of how it came to be made in the first place, in other words policy-making. In the context of

the endless debate as to the virtues of chronological as opposed to topical arrangement of documents, the editors of *DDI* have chosen to deploy their records in chronological order (while providing a perfectly adequate topical index). This I have found to be a tremendous boon in illustrating to one's graduate students the evolution of policy on a day-to-day, even hour-to-hour, basis as one issue in one part of the world impinges on another elsewhere. It is a healthy antidote to the common student impression that a nation's foreign policy follows a rigid, preconceived plan. In a similar vein, there is the question of policy debates within cabinet or council of ministers, between ministries, between schools of thought within a foreign ministry. And which communications were actually composed or read by a minister, and which were mere routine missives? To what extent were decision-makers swayed by what we loosely call popular opinion? This is documentary footnote material to which we, wearing our professorial hat, direct our students' gaze. Again, I would congratulate the editors of *DDI* for supplying professional historians and students alike with a fair amount of this information. But I would also urge them to give as much of this sort of information in future volumes as they can; we cannot get enough of it.

As for an estimate of the utility of printed documentary series, and *DDI* in particular, to one's own scholarly activities, I am inclined to approach this by raising the issue of the value of archival research beyond the published excerpts. Let me hasten to add, and emphasize, that what follows is not meant to deny the essential validity (or indeed the sheer pleasure) of work in the archives. To start with a self-evident point, life is short and archives voluminous and often disorganized. I am aware, for instance, of the enormous quantity of hard work which has gone into bringing some order into Italy's foreign ministry archives. However, this is an endless task and, at the very least therefore, the file references at the head of printed documents serve as useful signposts when entering what at first sight often appears an archival maze. But I would go further and suggest we have all reviewed monographs, worthy and meticulously researched in the archives, which nonetheless do not change in any fundamental way the picture derived from printed documentary sources. It is almost as if archival references are being used for their own sake. And it sometimes seems a waste of the efforts and skill of the scholar-editors who have already mined the records and deposited the most valuable nuggets in their documentary volumes. One last word on this point: it can be argued that Fritz Fischer's famous work on the German diplomacy of World War I owed more to his imaginative reinterpretation of printed records than to any archival discoveries that he made.

The mention of Fischer leads me to a concluding point. That is that, without succumbing utterly to his *Primat der Innenpolitik*, we historians of international relations are now routinely expected to look for the dynamics of twentieth-century foreign policy far beyond its administrative apparatus. We are required to examine what, for want of a more precise phrase, historians increasingly term political culture—the environment in which policy-making operates in an age of mass politics. Inevitably, this leads the scholar some distance away from foreign ministry papers. It is a truism to say that the history of Nazi German foreign policy can be written solely from the Auswärtiges Amt files. The same holds broadly true of the Ministero degli Affari Esteri under Mussolini (in spite of the revelations contained in the papers of Ciano's *gabinetto*, which, anyway, was an imperium within the foreign ministry impero). Nationalist ideology and Führer-Duce personality may find reflection in the official record, but for a comprehensive analysis one must go further afield. Or if I am allowed a minute of self-advertisement, I myself have been working for the past half-dozen years on a study of ideology and international relations in the modern world, from the French Revolution to Germany's second unification. I submit that is manifestly impossible, physically and intellectually, to research this topic from diplomatic documents. Yet, such wide and interpretative subjects may well be the wave of the future in our field.

In relating all this, my purpose is not to detract from the importance of documentary sources which, I insist, remain vital. It is, rather, to emphasize the new demands on today's historian of international affairs. The broadened scope of our inquiries leaves proportionately less time and energy for our traditional and lengthy forays into the archives. In these circumstances, we shall be driven, if only for reasons of sanity and the need to disseminate the results of our labours with reasonable frequency, to rely more and more on the published excerpts. Ironically, we may be returning to the situation before the 30-year archival rule was introduced. In other words, the archival material may be ever more accessible, but the editors of *DDI* and their international colleagues here can expect that we, their principal customers, will probably turn to them in future more rather than less.

DOCUMENTS ON CANADIAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Gordon Stewart

Résumé

Dans son commentaire, l'auteur énonce les particularités qui ont fait la réputation de la série des documents canadiens auprès des spécialistes : la variété des documents et les rubriques d'aide, à savoir les introductions, les brèves biographies des personnages mentionnés dans le texte, les notes infrapaginales expliquant les questions complexes et le système cohérent de renvois. Au lieu de se limiter aux sujets à la mode, la série, dont la portée est générale, se veut une source documentaire de valeur durable. Le professeur Stewart suggère que les futurs rédacteurs continuent d'éviter les introductions dogmatiques, comme celles des ouvrages des années 1930, en faveur d'un style plus circonspect, et qu'ils envisagent la possibilité d'attirer l'attention des lecteurs sur les points qui prêtent à controverse chez les décideurs et leurs critiques.

The Canadian series of published documents on external affairs is regarded as exemplary in the scholarly community. The range of documents included, the comprehensive aid provided in the form of introductions, brief biographies of figures who appear in the text, footnote explanations of complex issues, and thoughtful indexing all contribute towards first-class quality and a high degree of usefulness for both the neophyte undergraduate and the seasoned researcher. The most recent series even includes marginal comments made by ministers, officials and others involved in policy-making and policy evaluation. The inclusion of such items is a powerful indicator of the seriousness of purpose and high standards of the Canadian series for it is often in such brief marginal comments that profound insight into a particular topic can be gained.

Documents on Canadian External Relations has also opted for a comprehensive approach which might be criticized on first acquaintance but turns out to be valuable. The big issue here is whether such series are designed to satisfy a particular audience in a particular era or whether they are designed to stand the test of time. If designed for the contemporary

world, for example, then it could be argued that entire topics are of such marginal interest that they ought to be excluded. Canadian volumes that include extensive records of correspondence on such apparently esoteric issues as air landing rights or such apparently local issues as the Trail Smelter in British Columbia could be questioned on grounds of current importance. On the other hand, these matters took up a great deal of time and attention and if we are to understand the context of policy-making as a whole and Canadian-American relations in particular in the 1920s and 1930s, such subjects must be included. It is impossible for current editors to anticipate what might be of interest to future readers and scholars or what topics might become significant in the future for the general public compared to their current status. In choosing to go for comprehensiveness the Canadian series is identifying itself as a publication that is designed for the ages rather than the present.

A telling example of what is at stake here is the correspondence on the St. Lawrence Seaway project from the 1920s to the 1950s. When students first encounter this topic they view it as a somewhat marginal question with regional importance at best. The correspondence between Canada and the United States and between Canadian ministers and officials on this subject reveals, however, that huge issues about security and national strategic interests were at stake. On the American side concerns ranged from the fear expressed by some politicians that the seaway would provide an imperial invasion route into the heart of the continent to a fear expressed by Dean Acheson in the post-1945 years that American success in the global economy hinged on her gaining better access to international oceanic trade routes. Acheson pointed out that the United States was unique in world history in being a great power whose industrial centres such as Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland and Buffalo were stuck far into a continental interior remote from international trade routes. Access by way of the seaway was therefore critical for the economic well-being of the free world's superpower. Pentagon officials added gravity to the case by arguing that strategic considerations demanded United States participation in, and partial control of, such a highway into the continent. In short, the seaway raised fundamental questions about national security and future economic and trade success, and was therefore viewed by contemporaries on both sides as a matter of great import. If topics were selected for the series based on a current league table of popularity much of this rich and fascinating material would not be accessible except to archival researchers.

Within this comprehensive approach *Documents on Canadian External Relations* has been organized on a chronological basis broken down into thematic sections. This is helpful for the casual reader and

scholarly user alike. In the case of undergraduate students such a plan makes it easier for them to pursue subjects for research projects. The accompanying lists of principal persons and the offices they held throughout their careers is also most helpful. It might be added here that even for the seasoned researcher it is of considerable assistance to have the careers set out and offices held of officials who played a role in policy-making. The inclusion of a rich array of photographs in the Newfoundland accession to Confederation volume is another sign of user-friendliness which is certainly to be welcomed. On the other hand, it must be conceded that the type of readers who use these volumes—university teachers, their students and specialist research scholars—would not turn to these volumes simply because they include such bonuses as pictures and an informative editorial apparatus. It is an open question whether there exists another substantial class of general, informed and interested readers among the public who might make more use of these volumes if such features were strengthened.

One marked feature of the modern Canadian series is the sea change that has taken place with respect to the editorial introductions. Those for the 1930s volumes were opinionated and partisan, setting out decided views on the ministers and politicians who made policy and giving in no uncertain terms the editors' score-card on how they had performed, and the wisdom or stupidity of certain policy initiatives. The more recent introductions are more circumspect, content to set the scene, provide information which will orient the reader and delineate the major themes of the period covered. There is probably no doubt that these more cautious introductions are to be preferred. This is especially so if the volumes are to stand the test of time. Controversial issues that preoccupy scholars now will disappear or will be substantially altered in the future and to taint a volume with the debates of one epoch will date the publication badly. On the other hand, it is worth pointing out that for student use, and perhaps the general reader, having an introduction which does get exercised with controversies over policy-making does bring the volume alive and enable such readers to appreciate and enjoy the contending points of view about the differing assumptions and approaches with respect to definitions of the national interest and so on. It is also important for readers to understand that policy is affected by personalities and their conflicts, and that foreign policy-making bureaucracies have particular cultures within which officials interact with each other and their counterparts in other countries. Bringing out these intersecting fields of personal, political and structural rivalries may well be necessary for the uninitiated reader. Perhaps a truly Canadian solution might be to attempt introductions which compromise between

these two goals—accurate information and orientation combined with some judicious drawing of attention to areas of controversy among policy-makers and those who write about them.

DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES FRANÇAIS

Robert J. Young

Résumé

L'auteur estime que les documents de la série française, surtout les 32 volumes de Documents diplomatiques français (1932-1939), *sont d'excellente qualité. Il loue le choix de documents, les index et les tables analytiques, de même que la décision qu'ont prise les rédacteurs de déborder de la documentation des Affaires étrangères pour s'étendre à celle d'autres services du gouvernement. En outre, il soutient qu'à une époque où l'innovation technologique nous menace d'une surcharge d'information, on apprécie d'autant plus la méthode de sélection et la démarche des rédacteurs. Il conclut en adressant quelques suggestions aux rédacteurs : premièrement, qu'ils conservent les prénoms dans l'index des noms de personnes; deuxièmement, qu'ils ajoutent un organigramme ministériel à chaque volume; troisièmement, qu'ils publient, en plus de la liste des dossiers examinés, une indication du nombre de documents non choisis, donc non publiés.*

The University of Winnipeg is essentially an undergraduate institution, which means that very few of its courses are designed for students with prior expertise. Furthermore, I teach no course in foreign policy or international relations. Because of the relative inexperience of our constituents, and the desired breadth of our courses, I try not to tailor research assignments to any one kind of source material—diplomatic or otherwise. Rather, I wait to find out where the interests of the students lie; and if that interest is such that these documents could be useful, I certainly do point out their availability and prospective richness. Although redundant for this audience, I should stress that I recommend these materials not only for the essay on foreign policy per se, but also for that on public and press opinion, on financial and economic policy, on domestic politics and strategic planning.

As I begin my transition from background to "Product Assessment", let me add one small and perhaps curious point. As you may know, large numbers of our students arrive at university with very little high school French; and some of them are well aware of this deficiency.

Often, therefore, I recommend to such individuals a volume (or photocopied pages) of the *Documents diplomatiques français (DDF)*. Many of the documents are short, and therefore not too daunting for the novice. All of them are intended to be purposeful, unambiguous, and both grammatically and syntactically correct. I am sure that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not publish its series with such a service in mind, but I suspect that it would not be disturbed to know that its *documents* were being used for such a purpose.

Product Assessment

Speaking principally of the 32 volumes in the *DDF* (1932-1939), I think it beyond dispute that we are working with a very high quality product. The document-selection process was done by skilled and experienced members of a publication commission, the same scholars who provided the requisite and useful annotations and cross-references, and the equally useful indices to personal names and to issues of international law. The documents are ordered chronologically throughout the volume, but each volume begins with a detailed *table analytique* which is based on themes as well as on chronology. The combination has been very effective. So, too, was the original decision to brighten the lights on the origins of the Second World War by going beyond the documentary base of the foreign ministry. It has been a considerable boon to have easy access to some of the documentation from the war, naval and air ministries, from the finance ministry, and from personal papers in a variety of public and private archives. Indeed, of the decisions made in the early 1960s, this was perhaps the most important and fortunate of them all. (This is why, incidentally, I have some misgivings about the commission's decision to construct its new series for the 1950s from documents drawn almost exclusively from the archives of the foreign ministry.)

So it is an excellent product, and convenient to use. More to the point, it is available in Winnipeg! Without belabouring the obvious, it is worth pointing out that these volumes give scholars from around the world some sense of policy-making in Paris during the 1930s, some sense of how diplomats in Paris viewed the rest of the world, and some sense of the range and complexities of the archival holdings from which a mere 500 to 600 documents have been drawn per volume. In short, there is no doubt whatever that scholars of international history are much indebted to those who produced this rich collection.

Further to this point, and following directly from many of the technology-addressed remarks which we have heard over the past two days, let me add another word of misgiving. While it is true that communications in the computer age are likely to have made book-burning a thing of the past, it seems unlikely that knowledge and understanding are **necessarily** much further advanced. Ignorance, I fear, can be sustained as easily by information overload as by information deprivation. That is why I believe that public and scholars alike will continue to benefit from the selection process and the editorial guidance which traditionally have been provided by men and women such as yourselves. In short, we should not be overly sanguine about the prospect of receiving, electronically, entire series of diplomatic documents, called up raw from the archives and transmitted, often enough, to *débutants*.

Having thus praised the quality of your past and ongoing editorial work, and made a case for its continuation, let me offer a few suggestions for your consideration. First, may I encourage the French editors to continue the progress which has been made with respect to the provision of *prénoms* in the name index. In the early years, there was a tendency to rely principally on family name, a custom which has its limitations for scholars—especially when they confront book publishers who insist on the inclusion of initials or first names in their own indices. In the case of France, this service is particularly precious, in that the commission's editors can advise the historian as to which *prénom*—Charles, Philippe or Antoine—was the one most commonly used by the subject.

Second, I think it would be worth considering the inclusion of some kind of ministerial organigramme in each volume, possibly one supplemented by some form of personnel directory. On balance, it may be easier for historians to understand the international issues at stake than it is for them to understand how a complex bureaucracy (a) was **supposed** to work and (b) how it actually worked—to which department or individuals did certain responsibilities normally fall, which *département* or *service* or *bureau* was more likely to have the ear of the minister, which members of the *secrétariat général*, and which of the *cabinet du ministre* assumed responsibilities for say, Eastern Europe, or liaisons with the war ministry or with the press. I do not want to be unrealistic here, taking editors far beyond their mandates, but I would like to encourage them to help us as fully as possible with their insights into how the ministry worked; and that certainly begins with a careful identification of each officer within the system and, ideally, of the inclusive dates during which he or she served in that office.

Third, as you are well aware, these documentary series must serve as an incentive to further research in the archives, and not as a deterrent from doing so or as an excuse for not doing so. Over the years I have seen too many North American scholars content themselves with what the commission has provided us with in print. It is, after all, more convenient, less expensive and less disruptive to family to stay put and read the published volumes. It is also much less frustrating, for one can avoid the daily lineups at the Quai d'Orsay, and the on-the-hour escort parties with which one is now obliged to enter and leave the archives. But, as everyone in this room knows, your documents are very often not enough in themselves. The historian needs to work with the original *fonds* from which the published documents have come, needs to appreciate more fully the context from which those selections have been made, needs to illuminate further those selections by bringing in light from files in the *Archives nationales* or from the archives at Vincennes, or even from some departmental archive—none of which may even have been available for use by the commission in 1964 or 1980.

That is why I wonder if the volumes could provide not only a list of the documentary series which have been scrutinized—which of course is being done by most editors now—but also some quantitative indication of the materials which have been left unselected and unpublished. For example, there are four volumes in the *DDF* for 1936—between 2,000 and 3,000 documents, only a very small proportion of which comprise despatches to or from the United States. Yet in the *sous-série* "Ambassade et Consulats Français"—without considering the *sous-série* of "Protocole", "Armée et Marine" or "Affaires Commerciales" or "Finances" or "Industrie et Travaux Publics" or "Navigation et Ports" or "Affaires Administratives", and only for the year 1936—I count in the latest *État numérique* 43 cartons of documents pertaining directly to the United States. You, of course, know all of this well, but those scholars who are less, if at all, acquainted with the archives perhaps should be put on formal and explicit alert. What they are getting from your volumes are at best highlights, and highlights only for what most of us would consider the major issues of the day. But relative to the whole, formidable collection, they are but conveniently packaged fragments, designed to entice researchers into the archives themselves.

Finally, there is yet one other inherent limitation on the utility of the published collections. Not only are they but partial representations of the archives from which they have been drawn, but they presume heavily upon the foreign reader's grasp of an underlying cultural subtext. Too often in our discussions, it seems to me, the cultural consideration has

been overshadowed by the editorial, the financial, the technological. Data housed in machine-readable form will not teach us that Valmy or Verdun are more than just geographical locations, that Henri Quatre and École Normale Supérieure are more than the names of two French schools, that Père Lachaise is more than just a cemetery. Even the familiar attempts to increase international communication by reducing the linguistic globe to English are not enough. We may translate a phrase like "marraines de guerre" without being able to discern its historical meaning, just as English-speakers seemed destined to struggle forever with the layered nuances of the *tutoiement*. That is why we must go not only to the archives, but to the countries which house the archives. That is why we need to have conversations with children and grandmothers, with academics and *concierges*, why we need to embrace the culture as fully as we can. Unless we do, we may never escape the literal text, a text which is to the society from which it came what the epidermis is to the soul.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

Stephen Rheault-Kihara and Marie-Christine Rioux

The chair, Denis Stairs, introduced the panel, noting that there were four representatives from Canadian universities studying other countries' foreign policies, and one from an American university studying Canada's foreign policy.

Summary of Robert Bothwell's Paper on *Foreign Relations of the United States*

Professor Bothwell confessed to being a "junkie" of document collections, but upon asking his colleagues had found that most were sporadic purchasers, and that very few had complete sets.

There have been ups and downs in the availability of Canadian documents to Canadian historians, first a virtual blockade, then liberality ended by the Access to Information and Privacy Acts, which have greatly complicated the historian's task by adding another layer of bureaucracy. Some have been forced to go abroad for material not available here.

Professor Bothwell paid tribute to *Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*) for its scope, complexity, and magnitude. In general American documents reveal some greater details of American policy, but the image of Canada is not foremost in the minds of its editors. The problem is that so little of Canada-U.S. relations is in written form; for example, in the 1955-57 series, one Canadian minister would negotiate with the American ambassador on the golf course. They then refused bureaucrats' attempts to record the facts, saying theirs were "gentlemen's conversations."

FRUS includes a subdivision on Canada-U.S. relations, but Canadian concerns can also be found elsewhere, and researchers can miss important documents. This problem could be overcome by a list of Canadian-American subjects treated outside the volumes dealing with bilateral relations.

Canadian nationalism is a great historical theme, but it is not represented in *FRUS* though there are plenty of documents. One volume, 1958-60, has 1,300 pages on Cuba, and only 50 on Canada.

Researchers have become more dependent on published documents as a result of the scarcity of funds for research. There is also a use for

documents in the classroom, even for undergraduate courses. But libraries have to be convinced of this, so it is incumbent on professors to assign document readings. Outstanding students use them already, though Professor Bothwell believes most Canadian students consider foreign relations as just another aspect of their own history, without looking for other countries' perspectives. Students in general are becoming less document-oriented.

Participants' Response

After the presentations by the panel, the chair invited comments from the other participants. In answer to the panel's mention of organigrammes, **Don Page** noted that organization charts take a good deal of work, especially when they have to be compiled from disparate data. Editors would be interested to hear if they are useful. Better the editors try to decipher the org charts than historians, joked **Robert Bothwell**, who wondered whether anyone understands even today's bureaucracies. **Paulette Enjalran** suggested that org charts need be prepared only when they signal significant changes in the composition of the service.

Meron Medzini argued that historians ask not only for documents but also for chronological information, bibliographies, org charts, and the identification of persons. Researchers should understand that resources limit what can be provided. It is important to have both user-friendly publications and friendly users.

Turning to the subject of prefaces and introductions, **Heather Yasamee** recalled that in the early volumes of the series she works on, the introductions were flat, informational and short. More recently they have expanded their aim to guide, attract and "signpost", so there is an opportunity to contribute to the interpretation of documents. Echoing members of the panel, she asked what hat must be worn, or are editors restricted to one hat at a time? Reconstructing facts is different from analysis, but selecting documents can help to shape opinions. Perhaps wearing both hats is healthy.

For **Keith Hamilton**, the issue is telling a story. Telling a story through documents means highlighting themes, therefore a limited number of documents is selected. Footnotes can fill in the story to an extent, but there is always the question of space and time.

Kunihiro Haraguchi concluded the discussion with a few words on the Japanese experience. The market for the Japanese documents is limited by language. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) first published documents in 1936. There have been 180 volumes, but they

have not gone beyond the 1930s. There is an obvious need to speed up. The MFA post-war documents are public. There are 140,000 pages, including 4,500 pages on the Korean war, but they are available only on microfilm.

Life and Good Times in Historical Division
En ce beau temps-là, aux Affaires historiques

LIFE AND GOOD TIMES IN HISTORICAL DIVISION
EN CE BEAU TEMPS-LÀ, AUX AFFAIRES HISTORIQUES

Arthur Blanchette

En présence d'un groupe aussi éminent de documentalistes, d'historiens et de professeurs de science politique, je vous avoue que je me sens un peu mal à l'aise ce soir, comme un amateur devant des professionnels. C'est que je suis devenu historien tout à fait à l'improviste et un peu par accident.

C'était vers la fin de 1969. Le Ministère était en butte à de vives critiques de la part des universitaires qui se plaignaient qu'il leur était à peu près impossible d'avoir accès à ses dossiers. Le nouveau sous-secrétaire de l'époque, Ed Ritchie, voulait le rendre plus accessible aux chercheurs et il me nomma directeur de ses services historiques en me donnant comme mission prioritaire d'ouvrir nos dossiers aux chercheurs, ce que j'ai pu faire grâce à son appui constant.

Jusque-là, ma carrière s'était déroulée surtout à l'étranger. Ma formation et mon expérience d'agent du service extérieur m'avaient appris, entre autres choses, à protéger soigneusement nos dépêches et nos dossiers de tout regard indiscret. Or voilà qu'on m'invitait, que dis-je, on m'ordonnait de lever le voile qui recouvrait nos documents. Je me suis plié de bonne grâce à cette directive, car elle cadrait bien avec mes propres convictions.

Vous le savez bien, la politique étrangère peut être très éphémère, comme nous l'a signalé ce matin notre collègue américain, M. Slany, et elle peut varier énormément. De plus, les fonctionnaires qui l'ont formulée et les ministres qui l'ont inspirée sont, par nature, appelés à disparaître. Il arrive même parfois que les pays qui ont mis en œuvre ces politiques disparaissent eux aussi.

Mais le vent du Temps respecte presque toujours les écrits. *Scripta manent*, comme disaient les Romains dans un autre contexte. D'où l'importance de rendre les archives disponibles à ceux qui rédigent l'histoire et l'importance des recueils officiels de documentation comme instrument de recherche, de divulgation : ce qui constitue le thème même de votre colloque.

As I was saying in French, I am not an historian by training. I became one rather abruptly and unexpectedly, indeed a bit by accident, toward the end of 1969 when I was named head of the department's historical services. Until then, I had been—in the context of this eminent gathering—a mere foreign service officer.

At the time, the department was under attack by professors and researchers across the country for neglecting their needs for accurate information about Canadian foreign policy. The new under-secretary (the public service head of the department, whose title now is deputy minister), Mr. Ed Ritchie, had heard that I was teaching part-time at the University of Ottawa in the communications field. In earlier years, I had been a departmental press officer for a while. The directorship of the Historical Division was becoming vacant and he appointed me to the post.

It turned out to be one of the happiest and most intellectually rewarding assignments of my career and I would want him to know that. It is not often that one can have real influence in a bureaucracy, let alone create or innovate, but he made that possible for me in this admittedly highly specialized sector and I am very much in his debt. Also, I met some of Canada's most distinguished scholars and learned a good deal from them. Several became and still are warm friends.

Altogether I spent about nine years in the division, broken by two postings abroad in Washington and Tunis. There are two or three high points during those years that I would like to mention, since they have a bearing on your deliberations.

The first concerns the need for access to departmental records on foreign policy for accurate historical presentations and analyses. The second is the importance of publishing those records, of making them available in book or other form, whereby they can reach a broader public, especially in large countries where it is not always easy for researchers to come to the capital to consult the records.

I remember Mr. Ritchie's first instructions to me vividly. They were clear, friendly and to the point. He was that sort of man. "Arthur", he said, "I want you to open up our records, open the department up. If you get into trouble, I'll support you." Well, fortunately, we didn't get into trouble.

The rationale behind the decision to open the department's records to researchers was that it is far better all around to have accurate analyses and presentations of Canadian foreign policy, based on the actual records, than to have it analyzed or presented on the basis of speculation, conjecture or guesswork.

Procedures were devised that still prevail today, giving researchers access to our records well within the 30-year closed period that prevailed at the time. All went ahead quite smoothly and the kingdom did not fall. I believe those procedures have been brought to your attention. Several scholars here tonight have made good use of this departmental service for their lectures and books.

Another way of making our records available to researchers was to hire them! Ed agreed that it would be a good idea to interview ministers, senior officers or others coming home from unusual assignments abroad so as to have their opinions, their roles, on record for future research. Thus our oral history program came into being. It went ahead great guns, while the money lasted, and it ventured well beyond interviews with cabinet ministers and departmental officers. Contracts were signed with several academics, who were of course given access to our records for the purposes of their interviews. But oral history, as you know, is a costly operation, involving the expenses of interviewers and interviewees, equipment and so on. In times of budgetary restraint, it is vulnerable. However, it was and still is a useful research tool.

As regards the publication of our records, when I arrived on the scene work was progressing on the well-known series of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*. It was established under the direction of the late George Glazebrook, as you heard from Mr. Kelly yesterday.

Three volumes had appeared. The fourth, fifth, and sixth bringing the record down to 1939 would be ready for publication shortly. It became necessary to find editors for the next few volumes, because another one of Mr. Ritchie's instructions was to keep the series moving ahead as fast as possible.

I was extraordinarily lucky in finding outstanding editors. They are all here tonight: David Murray of the University of Guelph, John Hilliker of Lakehead University, who now heads the department's Historical Section, Don Page, currently academic vice-president at Trinity Western University in British Columbia and Don Barry of the University of Calgary. It is nice to note that we are still on talking terms.

The *Documents* series was being produced under guidelines set by Prof. Glazebrook, notably that only final government decisions should be presented. Mr. Ritchie agreed that it would be much more interesting, and also more useful, if the factors and forces which had influenced those decisions and contributed to the results, if the reasons behind the decisions, could also be included.

I suggested that perhaps I should speak to a few departmental officers about this and to certain academics, such as Col. Stacey, one of Canada's most accomplished historians, a former head of the historical services of the Department of National Defence, who had retired from the army and was teaching at the University of Toronto. Ed's response was typical. "Arthur," he said, "you can consult anybody you like. But I want you to consult Jim Eayrs."

I might explain—for the benefit of those of our non-Canadian guests tonight who may not be aware of Prof. Eayrs—that he was, and still is, one of Canada's foremost authorities in the foreign and defence policy fields. He was also the severest critic of the department's restrictive access policy. I was already seeing him a good deal. He was the first researcher to have access to our records under the new procedures and we would often have coffee or lunch together and talk things over. Those of you who may be interested in knowing just how drastically the department had cut itself off from researchers may wish to read the prefaces of two of his books: *Diplomacy and its Discontents* and Volume III in his superb series entitled *In Defence of Canada.*

My consultations with departmental officers produced what, in retrospect, can only be viewed as a highly amusing reaction. "Arthur", several said to me, "you can't do this. If you do, we'll no longer be able to report with candour, or write honestly and objectively, if it's all going to be made public some time down the line." When I told Ed about this, it produced one of the biggest shrugs and highest raised eyebrows I have ever seen. But the sequel is rather funny. Later, when new volumes came out, some of those very officers would check to see whether any of their reports or recommendations had been selected or whether their names appeared on any documents. Needless to say, when that happened, they were quite pleased. So much for candour and objectivity!

The new guidelines took off with Volumes 7 and 8 (1939-1941), edited by David Murray, and are still followed today.

Incidentally, several Australian and Japanese colleagues, who had heard about our new services and procedures, came to Ottawa at the time to find out more about them.

Another highlight was the project concerned with the history of the department, which in essence is another way of opening it up and making it known. It was Prof. Glazebrook, I believe, who was at the origin of the idea, many years before my time in Historical Division. Delays occurred and it was decided to concentrate on the *Documents* series instead. I recall having spoken to Mr. Ritchie about it in the mid-

1970s and he agreed that something should be done. However, my posting to the Organization of American States in Washington in early 1976 intervened. Work on the history got under way a couple of years later.

My contribution to the history, such as it was, occurred mainly in 1984-85 after my return to Ottawa from Tunis. It consisted largely in redefining its scope so that it would concentrate somewhat more on the administrative and structural evolution of the department and less on its life and times. I also contributed to the creation of the Editorial Board of academics and departmental officers who have helped to guide the authors along the way. Our chairman is Prof. David Farr of Carleton University, whose contributions to the history and the work of the board have been invaluable.

The first volume, from the beginnings down to 1946, is now out and I am sure you are all aware of John Hilliker's fine study of the subject. The second one, with which Prof. Don Barry is associated as a co-author with John, covers the next two decades and should be published sometime next year. There are plans to bring the story down to the 1980s, but the Goddess Clio has as yet to determine its final parameters.

Many thanks. Merci beaucoup.

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