




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

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H E S S I A N Forces,

In the

P A Y of *Great - Britain*,

Impartially and Freely Examind;

W I T H S O M E

REFLECTIONS on the present Conjunction
of *A F F A I R S*.

I N A N S W E R

To a late Pamphlet, intituled, *Considerations on the
present State of Affairs, &c.*



L O N D O N :

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
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


T H E
C A S E
O F T H E

H E S S I A N Forces,

In the P A Y of

G R E A T - B R I T A I N , & c .



HERE is nothing more remarkable in the Conduct of the *Writers against their Country*, than repeating the same Things, and insisting on the same Points, after They have been often confuted and expos'd. There is, perhaps, some little Policy in this manner of Writing, which may prove of Advantage to their *Patron*. It may serve his Purpose, for want of

other Expedients, at a critical Point of Time. It may divert the Attention of the Publick from fresh Inquiries, by engaging their thoughts on the same exploded Topicks. It may give a Cue to his Creatures what is expected from them, and furnish them with Arguments, such as They are, for answering those Expectations and supporting Him in his Measures.

This Winter hath been very fruitful of *ministerial Apologies*. We have had *Observations on the Writings of the Craftsman*; a *Sequel to the Observations*; *farther Observations*; *Sedition and Defamation display'd*; the *Crisis*; a *Defence of the Measures of the present Administration*; and *Considerations on the present State of Affairs*; besides the weekly Artillery of those regular, standing Troops, the Authors of the *London Journal*, the *Free Britton*, the *Flying-Post*, and their auxiliary the *Daily Courant*.

But as the chief Stress, in Point of Argument, seems to be laid on the *Considerations*, I shall confine my Remarks to that Piece, though it contains only a confident Repetition of Assertions, which have been often proved false, and of Reasonings upon them, which have been as often refuted. It is, in the main, only a Re-publication of the *Enquiry*, long since neglected and despised, but new-modell'd indeed, in some Parts, according to the Circumstances of the Times, and accommodated to the present Scheme of Affairs. I shall therefore be very short in my Observations on these Heads.

That the Treaty of Vienna, says our Author, was the only Source and Foundation of all the Troubles, that have distracted Europe for some Years past, must be allow'd by all; though He knows very well that This hath long been a Point in Dispute, very strongly controverted; and He cannot be ignorant

ignorant that, in the general Opinion of Mankind, it hath been determin'd against Those, who advanc'd it. Did He never read *John Trot's* Letters upon this Subject; or, does He think that no Body else hath read them? Other Reasons may be there found for the *Troubles of Europe*, especially with Relation to *Great Britain*, than the Treaty of *Vienna*; but there is no End of repeating the same Things. I must therefore refer the Reader to those *excellent Pieces*; and shall only observe, in general, that it is far from being *allow'd by all that the Treaty of Vienna was the only Source of all our Troubles*, as this Writer asserts; or that the *Union of the two Families*, which He mentions, was ever design'd; for all the Endeavours of *France, England and Holland* have not been since able to prevail upon the *Emperor* to consent to a *Measure*, which tends most effectually, in the present Circumstances of the *two Families*, to unite them; I mean to produce a *Reunion of their Dominions*; but not in the House of *Austria*, as He supposes; for I take *Don Carlos* to be a Branch of the House of *Bourbon*; and therefore if the *Contingency*, which He mentions, should happen, and the *Marriage*, with which We have been so often threaten'd, should take Place, the Dominions of *Spain* and the *Empire* might be united in *that Family*.

The Assertion of *secret Engagements*, in the Treaty of *Vienna*, to *deprive us of some of our Possessions and most valuable Privileges of Trade*, is likewise repeated by *this Writer*; though the Course of so many Years as have pass'd since the Conclusion of *that Treaty*, and even our Reconciliation with *Spain* have not yet brought any of *those Engagements* to Light.—Did the Design of the *Ostend Company* proceed from the Treaty of *Vienna*;

Vienna; or was not *that Charter* granted long before, upon the Pretension of a natural Right, not alienated by any *Treaties*?—How does it appear that the Demand, which *Spain* made, of the Restitution of *Gibraltar* was a Consequence of any Engagement in *this Treaty*?—Hath it not been fully proved, on the contrary, that their Pretensions to this Place, whether just or not, were always founded on a LETTER, written by his late Majesty, now publick?—How does it appear that the *Emperor* ever concurred with the Court of *Spain* in any Design to deprive us of that *inestimable Possession*; or gave them any Assistance, when They actually besieged it?—Lastly, how does it appear that either *Spain* or the *Emperor* had concerted any Project, in Favour of the *Pretender*?—Did not his *Imperial Majesty* disown any such Design in the most solemn Manner; and hath not the King of *Spain* confirm'd his Asseseration, even since their *Disunion*, by a particular Clause in the Treaty of *Seville*, in which that Charge is call'd a *Pretence* only?

In short, the Treaty of *Vienna*, according to my Apprehension, hath never yet been proved to be any Thing more than an Accommodation of Differences between those *two Courts*, not in the least dangerous to *us*, after they had thought Themselves very ill used by the *Mediators*, on whom they relyed. Sending back the *Infanta* from *France* was such an Indignity as the Court of *Spain* must certainly resent; and though our *Author* is pleas'd to assert that the Conduct of *Great Britain* gave neither the *Emperor* nor *Spain* the least *Pretence for a Complaint*; I must take the Liberty to contradict Him, and can look upon such an Assertion in no other Light than as a shameless Insult on the common Sense and Knowledge of Mankind; for

for without insisting on the *Refusal of the sole Mediation*, hath it not been often urg'd by these *Writers* Themselves that our *Defeat of the Spanish Fleet in the Mediterranean* lay still at their Hearts; and hath it not been as often proved that the Conclusion of a *private Treaty at Madrid*, without the Knowledge of the *Emperor*, whilst He continued under our *Mediation*, gave Him some Reason to be offended, and to call our *Impartiality* a little in Question?

As these Reasons have been repeated in all our *anniversary Pamphlets*, to justify the Expediency of the *Treaty of Hanover*; so our Author is not ashamed to speak in the same Manner concerning the *Accession of other States to this Treaty*; though every Body knows that *Holland* acceded to it, under very large Restrictions; (not to say any Thing of the *Peace*, which was made for them with the *Algerines*) and it cannot be forgot that one of the Reasons, urg'd by Count *Horn* to the States of *Sweden* for their *Accession*, was that the *Treaty of Hanover did not lay them under so many Obligations as former Treaties*; though they had a Subsidy of *fifty thousand Pounds a Year, for three Years*, both from *England* and *France*, as a Consideration for *acceding to it*. I shall say nothing of the *Convention of Denmark*; because it does not appear that *We* paid any Thing for it; and I am at a Loss to think what Reason there can be for any *new Convention with that Court*, as *We* have been lately inform'd there is, which may be the Occasion of new Expences to this Nation; but it is plain, from this Account, that the formidable Union of *Spain* and the *Emperor* gave these two Courts no Alarm. They took Occasion to make a *Penny* of it, and were well paid for being ready to *muster*; that is, They have hitherto received their Money being *Farce*.

Let us now see whether the Consequences of the Treaty of *Hanover* will not justify our Account of these *Accessions*. It was said, at first, to be a *defensive Treaty* only; and, indeed, it contain'd no *offensive Stipulations*, any more than the Treaty of *Vienna*. *Holland* would not have enter'd into it, even under the *Limitations*, upon which she acceded at last, if it had been an *offensive Treaty*; and neither *Holland* nor *France* did any Thing more, than prepare Themselves against *Attacks*; but *England* hath been charg'd with acting *offensively*, by sending two Fleets of Ships of War, one to the *West-Indies*, and the other to the *Mediterranean*. The former of These block'd up the Merchant Ships of *Spain* in their Port and lay in the most unwholsome Climate in the Universe till the Ships were almost destroy'd, and scarce Men enough were left alive to bring them back in that ruinous Condition. The Consequence of This was, that *Spain* interrupted the *British* Commerce in all Parts, and plundered our Merchants without any Reprizals; for though the *Considerer* speaks of *Hostilities between the Crown of England and of Spain*, I do not remember any *Hostilities* that *We* have been guilty of towards *Them*, since the *blocking up their Galleons*. The War between *Us* and *Spain* seems to have been carried on in much the same Manner with That, mentioned in *Terence*,

-----nunquam vili iniquus

Certationem comparatam, quam hæc hodie inter nos fuit.

Ego vapulando, Ille verberando, usque ambo defessi sumus.

In the mean Time, *France* and *Holland* were permitted to carry on their Trade, without Molestation; as They suffer'd the *Spaniards*, in Return, to besiege *Gibraltar*, without furnishing any Quota of *Men, Ships, or Money*, for the Defence of it; and indeed *England*, being thus charg'd with beginning *Hostilities*, was in
a man-

a manner left without any *Ally*; engaged by the Treaty of *Hanover* to assist the *other contracting Parties*, in case They had been attack'd; but not intitled to their Assistance, when her own Possessions were attack'd; because she stood charg'd with being the *Aggressor*.— How this Step was understood by *Spain*, appears from the *Marquis de Pozzobuono's* * Letter to the Duke of *Newcastle*, the 1st of *January*, 1726-7; and surely, it could never be imagin'd that any other Interpretation could be given to such a Measure!

The *Considerer* having laid it down as an Axiom, which *must be allow'd by all*, and supported by *undoubted Evidences in Facts*, as He speaks in another Place, that the Treaty of *Vienna* made *Counter-Alliances* necessary on our Part, proceeds to shew that an Alliance with *France* was the most proper Alliance in this Case.

He allows, indeed, that *an Alliance with Holland, whose Interests in most Respects is inseparable from That of England, was certainly the most natural and obvious on this Occasion*; but, it seems, *the Constitution of that Republick makes it almost impossible to keep a Negotiation secret there*. — Now, I cannot see any Reason why a *Negotiation* may not be kept as secret *there* as in any other Court. I confess, indeed, that when a *Negotiation* is form'd into a *Treaty*, it cannot be kept secret; because it must be brought before the *States* for their Consent; and I should be glad to know what good Purpose it can serve to keep any *Treaty secret*, after it is once concluded. I am sure, such *clandestine Treaties* have serv'd many a *bad Purpose* in our own Memory.

* See *Rouss.'s Collection*, Tom 2^d f. 363.

Another Reason, given by *our Author*, for not treating with *Holland*, upon this Occasion, is that *We are farther remov'd from any sudden Resentment*; and therefore it was thought *the most adviseable Step, for the common good of both Nations, that England should first strengthen herself by an Alliance with some other considerable Powers, whose Interest it is to check the Imperial Power*; and as the *Opposition between the Emperor and France must be constant in all Junctures and Events, an Alliance with France was certainly the most natural Alliance England could have, in this Case.*

I have put the *Author's Argument* in its full Strength, as He hath stated it, that He may have no Reason to complain of Misrepresentation; and I will leave the World to judge whether it can do his Cause any Service; for *if England is farther remov'd from the Effects of any sudden Resentment*, why should she be the first to provide against Danger, and to strengthen Herself with any *Alliances*? Why did not *France* lead the Way; since the Consequences of the *Vienna Treaty* were so formidable to *that Crown*? Or what Danger could We apprehend from *that Treaty*, when the *Opposition of France to the Emperor was so certain*, and the Interest of *Holland* made it so necessary for Her to court *our Alliance*, without any *private Restrictions*, or *preliminary Services*? May it not likewise be ask'd, whether there is not as *constant a Jealousy and secret Rivalship between France and England, as between France and the Emperor*?

The *Considerer* seems to allow that *France abstractedly hath no great Concern for the Rights and Possessions of Great-Britain*; but then We are told that the *Union of Spain and the Emperor, which must create the greatest Alarm and Uneasiness to France,*

France, would keep her faithful to her Engagements in Point of Interest, as long as that Union subsisted. — If so, was it our Interest to dissolve that Union; or can We rely on the Fidelity of France with the same Confidence, after the Cause of her Apprehensions, by the Dissolution of the Vienna Treaty, is remov'd? May not this Separation of Spain and the Emperor be follow'd by a new Union between France and Spain, more formidable to Us than *That*, which We have dissolv'd? — Or, may it not be ask'd, why We converted the *defensive Treaty of Hanover*, which was so wisely projected for the Peace of Europe, and the Interest of Great-Britain, into the *offensive Treaty of Seville*? For the Stipulation of *Spanish Troops*, in Convention to the *Quadruple Alliance*, is certainly an *offensive Stipulation*, whether it should be ever executed or not; and We see that it hath already put Europe in Arms.

Yet this Separation of the two Courts, of Vienna and Madrid, hath been extoll'd as the greatest Master-piece of Politicks that any Minister ever performed; though one would think it did not require any extraordinary Address to dissolve an Union between two Crowns, which hath been so often represented *unnatural* and *unaccountable* in the very Foundation of it. Did not the Emperor's Ministers shew more Dexterity in cultivating such an Union; the same Ministers, who likewise found Means to detach the King of Prussia from the Hanover Alliance; though the Interests of the two Families of Brandenburg and Austria were incompatible? — But this Author, it seems, is of another Opinion; and We are given to understand that nobody but a *Machiavel* could have negotiated Spain into such a Temper, as to abandon in-

tirely the Imperial Court; to quit her vast Expectations from thence; and to enter into a strict Union with the Hanover Allies.—Pray, Sir, what *vast Expectations* do you mean? The great Advantages of the *Vienna Treaty* were formerly supposed to lye on the Side of the *Emperor*; and if *Spain* had any *Expectations* of establishing the Succession of *Don Carlos* by an *Union* with the *Emperor*, They found Themselves disappointed; for as beneficial as this Alliance was to Him, He would never consent to *that Succession*, upon their Terms. Nay, if We may believe the *Considerer*, *Spain* was so far from having any reasonable *Expectations* of this Nature, that one Design of the *Vienna Treaty* was to *defeat the Succession* of *Don Carlos*. As This is a very extraordinary Argument, in Justification of the *Treaty of Seville*, I will quote it at length. —*The Conduct of the Emperor, in endeavouring to delay and disappoint the Introduction of neutral Garri-sons and the Succession of Don Carlos; and the STEPS taken with THAT VIEW, in the VIENNA TREATY, without the Consent of England and France, contrasting Parties to the Quadruple Alliance, sufficiently justified England and France in making this Variation, without the Consent of the Emperor.*—Is it not very surprizing that *Spain* should pay so dear for a *Treaty*, which was calculated to disappoint her most favourite *View*?—Is it not very mysterious that in a *Treaty*, which was projected with a Design of *uniting the two Families by Marriages*, and laying the Foundation of an *universal Monarchy in Europe*, any Steps should be taken to *defeat the Succession of a Prince*, in whose Person this formidable Conjunction of Dominions was to take Place? — If This was one of the Designs of the *Vienna Treaty*, it must indeed

indeed be confessed a very *unaccountable Alliance*; and the Merit of having *dissolv'd* it will be greatly diminish'd. Neither can We wonder at the Conduct of the *Emperor* in this Case; for how can We think it strange that He should endeavour to *defeat the Succession of Don Carlos*, by the Introduction of *Spanish Troops* into *Italy*, when *Spain* herself had concurred in *taking Steps, with that View, in the Treaty of Vienna?* — But the *Author* must have certainly been half asleep and nodding over his *Treaties*, when He let such Stuff fall from his Pen. I shall therefore consider this Affair a little farther, as if no such *egregious Blunder* had been committed.

At the Time of making the *Hanover Treaty*, the *Emperor's* Conduct, with respect to the Succession of *Don Carlos*, was not thought a sufficient Reason for violating that Part of the *Quadruple Alliance*, which related to it. The Proposition of 6000 *Spaniards*, instead of 6000 *Neutrals*, seems to have been disapproved by *England* at the Congress of *Soissons*; and never relish'd, till some short Time before it was made a Stipulation of the *Seville Treaty*; that is, some Time before the Meeting of *Parliament*, last Year. The Consent of the *Empire* was obtain'd, and the *Letters expectative* deliver'd before the Differences between the *Empire* and *Spain* were adjusted; so that the *Emperor* had made all his Engagements good; and *Spain* ought to have call'd on the *Neutral Powers*, who were to garrison the Places, at their own Expence, to perform their Engagements, as well as the *Emperor*. None of the Parties seem'd to think that there had been any affected Delay at *Vienna* in that Matter; but though the *Quadruple Treaty* says that 6000 *Neutrals* are to be

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introduc'd, it does not say *when*. The Consent of the Duke of *Tuscany* was sought ; whether ever obtain'd, I know not ; but in the Year 1723, (*Octob.* 25.) He protested, by a *solemn Act* at *Cambray*, against the Stipulations of the *Quadruple Alliance*, relating to his Dominions ; which * *Act* was repeated and confirm'd the 26th of *January* following. *Spain* never liked *this Stipulation* ; and before and at the Congress of *Cambray* desired 6000 *Spaniards* ; but the *French*, at that Time, did not care to risque an Accession of Power to the Crown of *Spain*, any more than the *English*. Both apprehended the King of *Spain*, at that Time, to have a Design of setting aside the *Renunciations*, founded on the Treaty of *Utrecht*, and of uniting *France* and *Spain*. The Persons in Power, in *France*, since the Duke of *Bourbon's* Removal, have been thought to wish for such an *Union* ; but as the *French* King hath *Sons*, those Designs must be laid aside ; and as *France* hath now no Reason to fear such an Accession of Power as *Tuscany* would be to the Crown of *Spain*, it is her Interest to promote the Introduction of *Spanish Troops* ; which may oblige the *Emperor* to keep a greater Body of Forces than formerly in *Italy* ; by which Means *France* will meet with less Opposition, if ever They attack Him in *Germany* ; as *Spain* will have a favourable Opportunity of enlarging their Territories in *Italy* ; and This will be a Foundation of Friendship between *those Crowns*.

The Queen of *Spain* could not have desir'd the Change from *neutral* to *Spanish Troops*, but upon the Hopes that her Son may be King of *Spain* ;

* *Roussët*, Tom. IV. p. 146.

the Prince of *Asturias* being very sickly and not likely to have Children.

It is said that *France* and *England* are Guaranties for the *Emperor's* Dominions in *Italy* against any Encroachments, which *Spain* may attempt to make upon them.

I answer, that the Purposes of the *Quadruple Alliance* would have been effectually secur'd by *neutral Troops*; but it is extremely probable that the Introduction of *Spaniards* will be follow'd by Invasions on the *Emperor's* Dominions; for though the Introduction of only 6000 *Spaniards* is stipulated, yet if They are put in Possession of *Leghorn*, They may admit as many more as They please by the Help of their Fleet, which is large enough for that Purpose, and will be as good as a Bridge between *Italy* and *Spain*. In this Case, *France* will not be very forward, to execute their Engagements of Guaranty in the *Emperor's* behalf; and if *England* does, she must lose her Trade to *Spain* and to *Leghorn*. If *France* should think fit to quarrel with the *Emperor*, she will encourage *Spain* to invade his *Italian* Dominions; and when the *Emperor* complains of it, They will, without much Difficulty (according to the modern Way of interpreting the Obligations of *Treaties*) find out some Act or other of the *Emperor*, which They will alledge as a Reason for his having forfeited a Right to that Guaranty. But surely Princes should endeavour to concert their *Treaties* in such a Manner, that there may be Reason to hope their Guaranty will not be wanted, and not so as to be almost sure that it will!—In this latter Case, a Foundation is laid for a War; and as it will be the Interest both of *France* and *England* not to quarrel too easily with *Spain*, on Account of the Benefits
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of trading with Them; so the *Emperor* will not trust very readily to their *Guaranty*.

The *Quadruple Alliance* directed that when *Don Carlos* was in Possession, *Spain* should yield up to Him *Porto Longone*, which is now in the Hands of that Crown. The Reason of This was, that They might have no Place to land Troops at, to disturb him at their Pleasure.—I don't remember that the *Seville Treaty* takes any Notice of This.

How can this Author say, p. 40. that the Introduction of *Spaniards* was necessary for the *effectual Security of that Succession*? The Treaty of *Seville* it self expresses an Apprehension of Danger to that Succession from *Spanish* Troops; and stipulates that when *Don Carlos* is in quiet Possession, *those Troops* shall withdraw; that *thereby* it may be secure from all Events. The Provisions, in the *Quadruple Alliance*, against the Introduction of *Spaniards*, are founded on the same Apprehension; and though the Treaty of *Seville* says that They shall withdraw, when *Don Carlos* is in quiet Possession; yet who is to be Judge when that Possession may be said to be *quiet and free from Danger of being disturb'd*? Will not the King of *Spain* take the Decision of that Question upon himself, and give his Troops Orders to keep Possession of those Dominions, if He finds it his Interest? It cannot surely be doubted whether 6000 *Neutrals* are more proper for the effectual Security of that Succession than 6000 *Spaniards*, unless upon the Supposition that *Don Carlos* should be King of *Spain*, with which Crown the Possession of these Dominions was made incompatible by the *Quadruple Alliance*. Neutral Troops would oppose all Attempts from the *Emperor*, or from *Spain* in Prejudice of *this Succession*; and *Time and Experience* have fully

fully shewn that they may be more readily introduc'd; the *Emperor* having long since declared that He is willing to consent to *their Introduction*, and that he will not consent to the Introduction of *Spaniards*.

But if the *Emperor's* Conduct justifies the Measures of the *Seville* Allies, what have the *States* of the *Empire* done to deserve this Treatment? Why should the Parties to the *Quadruple Alliance* engage, by the Treaty of *Seville*, to introduce *Spanish* Garrisons into their Fields, without their Consent, when the *same Parties* have declared that the *Dominions* in question cannot be dispos'd of *without their Consent*; nay, have engaged Themselves in a Guaranty of this very Provision? If the *Emperor* consents to this *Variation*, as it is call'd, without their Concurrence, He will involve Himself in the Guilt of violating the *Oath*, taken at his Election, and be liable to be divested of the *Imperial* Dignity. The *Imperial Ministers* have declar'd This in very strong Terms in a *Paper*, handed about at *Ratisbon*, in answer to another *Paper*, said to have been written by Monsieur *de Chavigny*, the *French* Minister there; and in *that Paper* They assert that, by a secret Article of the Treaty of *Madrid*, in 1721, between *France*, *Spain* and *England*, the Introduction of *Spanish* Troops was stipulated. If This is true, it is very astonishing; and I hope the *Considerer* will allow that it might give the *Emperor* some little *Pretence to complain of our Conduct*, whilst He looked upon us as his Friend, and We were acting the Part of a *Mediator*. But certain it is that, in the Year 1721, a *defensive Treaty* was made between those three Powers (besides the *Treaty of Commerce* between *Spain* and *England*) and the Number of Troops to be furnish'd

nish'd by each was specify'd. This *Treaty* was carry'd on so privately, that neither Count *Windisgratz*, nor Baron *Pentenrieder* were able to penetrate into the Secret of it. This *Treaty* is printed in *Roussel*, (Tom. 4. p. 101.) though a certain *Gentleman* asserted that the *Treaty* of 1721 was only a *Treaty of Commerce*, at which the *Emperor* could take no Offence.

It is said expressly in *that Paper*, agreeably to what was always said by the Publick, that the Plan of the *Quadruple Alliance* was settled by *France* and *England*, and by Them sent to *Vienna*; and that these two Powers offer'd *Sicily* to the *Emperor*, before *Tuscany* and *Parma* were brought into Question; and indeed there are not any Words, in the *Quadruple Alliance*, which can lead one to imagine that *Sicily* was the *Equivalent* given to the *Emperor* for the Successions of *Tuscany* and *Parma*.

If the present Scheme of Negotiations is to bring the *Emperor* into the *Treaty of Seville*, in Case the *States of the Empire* will consent to the Introduction of *Spanish Troops*, and to promise his Endeavours to obtain their Consent, Affairs will be in a worse Situation than they were in at the Time of the *Quadruple Alliance*; and if the *Emperor* should be secure against any Danger from the *Turks*, He would certainly do what lies in his Power to prevent them from giving their Consent.

Thus stands our Case at present, and such are the Consequences of the happy Conclusion of the *Treaty of Seville*; which our *Author* calls, in several Places, a perfect and absolute Peace with Spain; though He drops an Observation, in one Place, that a *War in Italy* (which is the natural Consequence of *this Treaty*, unless prevented by some lucky Incident) must affect the whole Confederacy on
each

each Side ; that is, involve all Europe in a War. He tells us likewise that, by this absolute Peace with Spain, all our Rights, Privileges and Possessions are renew'd and confirm'd ; reasonable Stipulations are made for Reparations of past Damages ; and the strongest Obligations given for putting our Trade on the Foot of former Treaties.—Such gross Assertions as These, the dull *Crambe repetita* of every Court Scribbler, require no Answer. They deserve only our Contempt.—I shall therefore pass over all his trite Panegyrick on *prudent and steady Measures ;* (which He afterwards calls, somewhat more properly, *an Appearance of Steadiness and Force ;*) *successful Negotiations ; unwillingness to put the Nation to an extraordinary Expence, by any unnecessary Precautions ; the happy Effects of the Treaty of Hanover ; and the happy Conclusion of the Treaty of Seville !* — I will not, I say, endeavour to rob any Persons of the secret Pleasure and Gratification, which such *Incense* may give them.

But as this whole Deduction of Arguments is evidently made to recommend the Continuance of *twelve Thousand Hessian Troops in our Pay ;* I will consider that Affair, as it deserves, in a manner partly *serious* and partly *ludicrous ;* for though the Case of *these Troops* is become a Point of very sober Consequence to *Great-Britain ;* yet the Reasoning of *this Author,* in their Behalf, is so ridiculous, that it is impossible for the gravest Man to preserve his Temper, and forbear bursting out, now and then, into a Fit of Laughter.

In order to obviate the *Clamours industriously raised against the Hessian Troops, which this Nation hath, of late Years, been oblig'd to maintain,* (for I shall not enter into any Debate, at present, concerning

the *Number of our Forces at home*) He engages to prove that They were first taken into our Pay, and since continued, *in Consequence of Treaties, made for the Interest of Great-Britain, and the Preservation of the Peace and Ballance of Europe, independent of any other Interest and Consideration whatsoever.*

If He had succeeded in this *Undertaking*, it would have saved me the Trouble of any *Remarks*; but I think it demonstrable that He hath not brought one tolerable Argument to support his Proposition. That the *Hessian Troops* were taken into our Pay, *in Consequence of Treaties*, I shall not deny. Whether *those Treaties* were made solely for the Interest of Great Britain, and the Preservation of the Peace and Ballance of Europe; appears in some Measure already by the *happy Effects of them*, and my preceding Observations. But let us now examine a little more particularly how the *Interest of Great Britain*, as well as the *Peace and Ballance of Europe*, makes the Continuation of this great Expence necessary to us.

The *Considerer* tells us that immediately after the Conclusion of the *Treaty of Hanover*, the *Consequences of the Vienna Treaty* began to shew themselves openly, and obliged his late Majesty to apply to his Parliament for extraordinary Assistance; which was agreed to, says he, by an *Address of the House of Commons*, on the 25th of March, 1726, who desired Him “ not only to encrease his Number of *Seamen*, but to concert such other Measures, “ as would best conduce to the Security of the “ Trade and Navigation of this Kingdom and “ the Preservation of the Peace of *Europe*; with “ Assurances that They would effectually make “ good ALL SUCH EXPENCES and ENGAGEMENTS

“ MENTS, as should be made for obtaining those
 “ great and desirable Ends — A most ample
Vote of Credit indeed! I hope it is not quoted
 by Way of *Precedent*, or to prepare the Nation
 for one of the *same Nature* this Year.

*At this Juncture, says the Considerer, and in
 Consequence of the Measures, concerted between his
 Majesty and his Allies, the late King agreed with
 the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel for a Body of twelve
 thousand Hessians, to be ready to march for his
 Majesty's Service upon Demand.*

We are told that France likewise increas'd their
 Forces very considerably, for the Sake of the
common Cause; and that the Dutch, having acce-
 ded to the *Treaty of Hanover*, immediately pro-
 ceeded to an *Augmentation of their Troops*; re-
 quiring at the *same Time*, that England and
 France would have their respective *Quotas of
 twelve thousand Men in readiness and at Hand* for
 the Defence of the Republick, in Case of an im-
 mediate Attack; which They had more Reason to
 apprehend than any of the Allies, on Account of
 their Situation, with Respect to the Imperial Gar-
 risons in the low Countries, on one Side, and their
 being exposed, on the other, to the Forces of the
 King of Prussia, who had been lately gained by the
 Emperor — From hence it appears very plain-
 ly that England need not have courted Holland in-
 to an *Alliance*, which was so necessary to her De-
 fence against immediate Attacks, whilst England
 was far removed from the Danger; and I have
 shewn before that France was still more concern'd
 in Point of *particular Interest*, to oppose the De-
 signs of the *Vienna Treaty*; though I hope it will
 prove at last, that she had some Regard to the
common Cause in the Augmentation of her Forces;
 but

but it is certain, from this very State of the Case, that *England*, being thus remotely concern'd in the Consequences of *that Treaty* might have hold a slower Pace and involv'd her self in fewer Inconveniences than she hath felt, as well as procur'd more *Advantages* than she hath gain'd — But let us hear the *Considerer* a little farther.

This equitable Demand, says He, *on the Part of the States could hardly have been answer'd by the King, if He had rais'd no Troops but in England.* — Why? — *Because the Dutch, it seems, are too well acquainted with the Accidents of the Sea, and the Difficulties and Delays, which attend the Transporting great Bodies of Troops, to depend upon such Help in a Case, which if it happen'd at all, would be sudden and too quick to be withstood by slow Movements.* — Therefore it is necessary to keep *twelve thousand foreign Troops* in constant Readiness, at the Expence of *Great-Britain*, to march to their Assistance.

This is surely one of the most frivolous Arguments that was ever advanc'd in a Point of such Consequence. Will any Man, except *this Author*, pretend to say that the *Accidents of the Sea, and the Difficulties of transporting Troops from England to Holland*, are a sufficient Reason for the Expence of maintaining such a Body of *foreign Troops*? What Power could intercept them? *France* was an original Ally in the Treaty of *Hanover*; and surely *Spain* was not able to cope with the Fleets of *England* and *Holland*! Nothing therefore but the *common Accidents of the Sea* could interrupt our Succours; and are We to avoid them, by such a constant Burthen of Expence as a *Land Tax of six Pence in the Pound*, and, what is still worse, *carried out of the Kingdom*? But even allowing That to be

be true, against the Evidence of common Sense, will it be said that *these Troops are the most properly plac'd for this Purpose in case of Need?* Can We suppose that the *Landgrave of Hesse* would leave his own Dominions in a defenceless Condition, in case of any sudden Attempt from the *Vienna Allies*, and march immediately to the Assistance of *Holland*?—Or, even supposing Him so honourably regardless of his own Safety, as to run any Hazards in the Execution of his Engagements; might not the March of these Troops into *Holland* be attended with many more *Accidents, Difficulties* and *Delays*, than the Transportation of Succours from *England*?

But there is another Consideration, which renders this Argument still more ridiculous. The *Considerer* seems to allude to the Case of *Embsden*, when He speaks of our Obligations to support *Holland* against the Attacks of the King of *Prussia*; whereas the Troops of *Hesse Cassel* can never be employ'd to assist the *Dutch* to protect *that Place* against the Execution of a Decree of the *Aulick Council*. It appears from the Papers in *Roussel*, (*Tom. 4.*) that the *States of Holland* don't pretend to dispute the Authority of that *Court of Justice*. They only solicited the Court of *Vienna* to suspend the Execution of that Decree, in hopes that Matters might be amicably made up between the Prince and the *States of East Friesland*. They exhorted the Prince to desist from the Rigour of *that Decree* in his Favour, and say that They are interested in the Consequence of the Execution of it., as it may be the Expulsion of their Garrison, which They have kept there 120 Years, to secure the Observation of Conventions between the Prince and *States of East Friesland*. They say likewise that the Money lent by their
Sub-

Subjects to the *States of East Friesland* will be in Danger of being lost, if the Form of Government, establish'd in that Country, should be chang'd; and farther, They have always desired their Allies to support their Instances at the Court of *Vienna* for the Mitigation of this Decree. They at length say (*July 9, 1728.*) that They hope the *Allies* will consider This as *Casus Fæderis*. They desire it may be carried to the *Congress*. Count *Zinzen-dorf* denies it to be a Matter, that can be considered there, because the *Decree of the Auclick Council* regarded only the Administration of Justice in the *Empire*. When *Rance* was call'd upon to back the Instances of the *States* at *Vienna*, she said that *she would, from Affection for their Interests*; insinuating that she was not oblig'd. Let any one therefore judge whether in a Matter, thus circumstanc'd, and thus thought of by one of the *Allies* of *Hanover*, a *Prince of the Empire* would run the Hazard of being put to the *Ban of the Empire* for opposing, by his Troops, the Execution of a Decree of a Court of Justice of the *Empire*. — See *Roussel*, Tom. 4. p. 498, &c.

Nor can these Troops, or the Troops of *Hanover* (which are said likewise to be considerably augmented upon the *Hanover Treaty*) be employ'd, for the same Reason, to make a Diversion in *Germany*, by attacking the *Emperor's hereditary Dominions*, or otherwise acting offensively in the *Empire*, without offending against the Laws of the *Empire*. The *Electors of Hanover*; and the *Landgrave of Hesse Cassel* are oblig'd, as Members of the *Germanick Body*, to assist the *Emperor* to protect the Rights and Privileges of the *Empire*, when invaded by any Attempts to introduce Troops into their *Fiefs* without their Consent; which Consent the contracting Parties

Parties to the *Seville Treaty* have declar'd, by the Treaty of *Quadruple Alliance*, to be necessary; and unless there is some other Treaty besides That sign'd by Lord *Townshend* and General *Diemar* (for That refers only to the Case of the *Hanover Treaty*) there can arise no Case upon the *Seville Treaty*, which will oblige those Troops to act either *offensively* or *defensively*.

Our *Author* proceeds in the following sagacious Manner. — *But here, perhaps, it will be ask'd what hath Great-Britain to do with this String of foreign Troops? What have We to apprehend from the Forces of Prussia, Muscovy, or the Emperor? What Good can the Swedes, the Danes, the Hessians, or the Hanoverians do us? — Aye, what indeed? Our Author would do well to give a better Answer to these Queries. But He goes on with the same judicious Observations. — It was our Business to lie by; to wait; and see the Consequences and Events of the Vienna Treaty, and to take our Measures accordingly, at a proper Season. — No Doubt on't, Mr. Considerer; but you seem to think that you have cut us quite down in what follows. It would be unfair therefore not to quote it. — This indeed, say you, would have been a prudent Step, if the Terms of the Vienna Treaty, and the Measures taken, and the Forces rais'd in Consequence of it, by the contracting Parties, had not been directly levell'd at the Interest of Great-Britain. This would be a very plausible Doctrine, if the Possessions of Gibraltar and Port-Mahon; if the Trade to Italy and Spain, to the East and West-Indies, and the Baltick; if the Ballance of Europe, and the present, happy Establishment were become indifferent Things to this Nation; as indeed, one would think, They were, especially the last, by the*

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weekly

weekly licentious Writings of some Gentlemen, who would be thought to be Men of no little Consequence.

—— I have but a single Objection to all this Vein of shrewd Reasoning; which is, that every one of the Points, mention'd by the *Author*, remains to be prov'd, as I have observ'd before; and if They cannot be prov'd, He plainly owns the Folly of our Conduct. As to the *last Point*, I shall have Occasion to consider that Charge in another Place; and will only observe, at present, that *those Gentlemen*, to whom He alludes, cannot have discover'd a greater Indifference to the present, happy Establishment, in their weekly, licentious Writings, than some other Gentlemen have discover'd, by their extraordinary Measures, to the Trade of this Kingdom and the Ballance of Europe; the former of which is, I am afraid, too manifestly negotiated into French Hands, and the latter very much impair'd, in its most beneficial Branches, by some late wise Treaties.

Having given us these exquisite Reasons for taking the *Hessian* Troops into our Pay, He produces a *Mustter-Roll* of the Forces on both Sides, as They stood in the Year 1727; which I shall draw up in opposite Columns, or (to use the *Author's* Words) in *Battle Array*, against each other.

To

To Hanover Alliance.		To Vienna Alliance.	
Land Forces.		Land Forces.	
<i>English,</i>	— 26,000.	<i>Imperial,</i>	— 227,000.
<i>French,</i>	— 160,000.	<i>Prussian,</i>	— 70,000.
<i>Dutch,</i>	— 50,000.	<i>Spanish,</i>	— 60,000.
<i>Hanoverians,</i>	— 22,000.	<i>Muscovite,</i>	— 30,000.
<i>Danes,</i>	— 24,000.		
<i>Hessians,</i>	— 12,000.		
<i>Swedes,</i>	— 10,000.		
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Sum total	— 304,000.	Sum total	— 387,000.
		Deduct	— 304,000.
		<hr/>	
		To Ballance.	— 83,000.

I wonder the *Considerer*, when He was giving us a List of the *confederate Forces*, (as He expresses it) on both Sides, should forget our great Ally, the Duke of *Wolfenbuttle*; who enter'd into a Guaranty of all the *British* Dominions; and stipulated, I think, to furnish a Body of 5000 Men, in Case of need; but perhaps, He consider'd the *secret Articles* of that Alliance; by which it is provided that *these Troops* are not to move out of *Germany* in our Defence. — Let us therefore return to the State of the *two Alliances* of *Hanover* and *Vienna*, as They stood in the Year 1727; upon which our *Author* makes the following Remark — *Thus Matters stood in 1727, when almost all the Powers of Europe were, directly or indirectly, engaged and ranged on the Side of the Treaty of Vienna or Hanover.*

I hope He will give me Leave to add my Opinion that this Arrangement of the Forces, in re-

gular *Battalia*, on both Sides, shews the busy Genius of *some Gentlemen*, who have taken great Pains to arm all *Europe*, at the Expence of their *own Country*; and if They should be able to disarm it again, at an equal Expence, what other Merit will They have, than That of conjuring down a *Spirit* of their own raising?— But the Reader will perceive that the *Considerer* grows quite *ludicrous*, towards the latter End of his Performance; and the Laugh would be justly turn'd upon us, if We should enter into a *grave* Confutation of his Arguments.

He seems to insinuate, by this *List of the Forces on both Sides*, that instead of 12,000 *Hessians* our excellent *Ministers* ought to have demanded 83,000; and that it is owing to their extreme Moderation, that the desirable Work of a *Peace* hath not been yet accomplished; for, according to the *Rule of Three*, if 12,000 *Hessians* can procure us a *Peace* in *five Years*, 83,000 *Hessians* would have done it in about the *seventh Part* of that Time.

To shew that the *Hanover Allies* went on, Hand in Hand together, He tells us that the *Dutch* not only augmented their *Land Forces*, but *had likewise made Preparations to fit out eighteen Men of War*. Nay, He might have added that They actually shew'd out a Fleet, at *Spithead*, for several Months together; and though it might not, perhaps, be victuall'd and provided for any *farther Voyage*; yet it must be confess'd to be an *Appearance of Steadiness and Force*, at least; and considering the great Advantages, which *England* hath reap'd from the *Hanover Alliance*, it may be put in Balance against the several great Squadrons, which she hath been at the Expence of sending to all Parts of the World.

As to the *French*, the *same Author* tells us that They had got every Thing ready for taking the *Field*. The only Question was WHERE They should take the *Field*; and at last a very wise Thought jump'd into the Head of a *certain Gentleman*, viz. to whose Advantage the Events even of a successful War might turn; which hath hitherto prevented them from taking the *Field* any where.

However, this equal Co-operation of the *Hanover Allies*, with our *Hessian Auxiliaries*, made the *Emperor* look about Him, and consent to a Plan of *Preliminaries*; which would certainly have produc'd an *absolute Peace*, long before the *Treaty of Seville* effected it; had not *Spain* been provok'd at these Steps, taken without her Approbation, and entertain'd some small Hopes of Disturbances in England, on Account of the late King's Death.—It may be ask'd, perhaps, what Hopes, of this Nature, *Spain* could possibly entertain upon his present Majesty's Accession to the Throne with the general Acclamations of all Parties? I answer, from the Change of the Ministry; which would have occasion'd Disturbances, no Doubt, of the utmost Consequence to all Europe.

However, these separate Negotiations with the *Emperor* (which his Ministers were artfully drawn into) gave such Umbrage to *Spain*, that They likewise came into separate Negotiations with us and concluded that *absolute Peace*, call'd the *Treaty of Seville*, which gave the *Emperor* Umbrage, in his Turn; and This is the Foot, which We stand upon at present.

Here the *Considerer* asks another wise Question; or, which is much the same Thing, puts it into the Mouth of an *Adversary*.

But of what Use, says He, can the *Hessians* be for the Execution of the *Treaty of Seville*; and parti-

particularly for the Introduction of Spanish Garrisons into Tuscany and Parma?

In Answer to This, the *Considerer* gives us many weighty Arguments, to shew that *these Troops* are of the utmost Use, not only upon this Occasion, but likewise upon all Occasions, that can possibly happen in *Europe*.

In order to set this Matter in the clearest Light, I must desire the Reader to recollect that it appears by the Account of the *two Alliances*, as it stood when *Spain* and the *Emperor* were together, that the Land Forces on the *Vienna* Side over-balance'd Those of the *Hanover Allies* by 83,000 Men; but the Forces of *Spain*, (*viz.* 60,000) being taken from *one Side* and plac'd to the *other*, will make the Confederates of *Hanover* more numerous than Those of *Vienna* by 37,000; from whence it may be inferr'd, perhaps, that there is not so great a Necessity of the 12000 *Hessians*; which would be true, if it were fix'd on which Side the *Hessians* are to be; but as it is yet impossible to know which of the two Powers (*Spain* or the *Emperor*) will be most refractory; and as Care must be always taken of the *Ballance of Europe*; it follows, according to this *Gentleman's* incomparable Reasoning, that there will always be a Necessity of keeping up the *Hessians*, whether the *Emperor* or *Spain* stands out, or *both*, in order to maintain the *Ballance of Europe*.

In short, I cannot compare the Author's Reasoning, in this most excellent Dissertation, to any Thing, but a strong *Chain*, consisting of several Links; each of which, as it is infrangible in its self, so is it inseparable from any of the rest, It is necessary therefore to lay it out at its full
Length,

Length, in order to form a true Judgment of it, and then observe how the whole is connected for the Interest of *Great Britain*.

In demonstrating the Necessity of keeping up the *Hessians*, the Author proceeds in the following Manner; and the first Joint of his *Sorites*, or *Rat's Tail*, is a *Postulatum*, which nobody must deny, *viz.*

1. p. 6. *It must be allow'd by all* that the Treaty of *Vienna* laid the Foundation of a formidable Power in *Europe*, by the Union of the two Families, of *Spain* and *Austria*.

2. p. 8. The *Vienna* Treaty made the Counter-Alliance of *Hanover* absolutely necessary.

3. p. 14. The Treaty of *Hanover* made it necessary to take 12,000 *Hessians* into our Pay.

4. p. 15. That the *Accidents of the Sea* made it necessary to keep up the *Hessians*, for the Protection of *Holland*.

5. p. 27. The Jealousy of the *French* and *Dutch* of the Advantages to *Great Britain*, by the *Assiento Trade*, made it necessary to keep up the *Hessians*.

6. p. 28. The *Peace* not being yet concluded, at the Congress of *Soissons*, made it necessary to continue the *Hessians*.

7. P. 29. If We had appear'd at the Congress in a *naked Posture*, by disbanding the *Hessians*, the *French* would not have stood by us in Defence of *Gibraltar* or *Port-Mahon*. Therefore it was necessary to keep up the *Hessians*, that We might be in a Readiness to assist *France*, in order to make *France* ready to assist us.

8. p. 32. The Treaty of *Seville* could never have been accomplished without the *Hessians*; and therefore the *Security of our Possessions* and the full

Enjoyment

Enjoyment of our Commerce, as well as the Separation of Spain from the Emperor are intirely owing to the Hessians.

9. p. 34. As the *Hessians* were necessary to make the *Emperor* and *Spain* quarrel, so they are no less necessary to make them agree; and consequently it is necessary to keep up the *Hessians*, till the Peace of *Europe* is absolutely concluded.

11. p. 36. As there are now but small Hopes of gaining the *Emperor's* Consent to the Introduction of *Spanish* Troops, by Way of *Negotiation*; and as it is impossible to do it by *Force*, without the *Hessians*; *Spain* hath a Right, by the Treaty of *Seville*, to demand the *Hessians*; for why should *England* expect to reap the Fruits of successful *Negotiations*, without *Expençe*?

12. P. 42. The *Emperor* having, at present, a large Body of Forces in *Italy*, makes it necessary to keep up the *Hessians*.

13. *Ib.* *France* being both unable and unwilling to make a *Diversion* upon the *Rhine* or in *Flanders*, it is necessary to keep up the *Hessians*, for this Purpose likewise.

14. P. 45. The *Weakness* of the *Emperor* is as good a Reason as his *Strength* for keeping up the *Hessians*.

15. P. 47. It is plain that the *Hessians* are not kept up, for the Sake of the King's foreign *Dominions*; and yet his Majesty hath a Right to demand the *Hessians*, for the Defence of those *Dominions*.

15. P. 51, 52. The Distress of *Trade*, the Loss of *Gibraltar* and *Portmahon*, the Reparation of *Dunkirk*, the Violation of all our *Treaties*, the total Subversion of the Protestant Establishment in the *House of Hanover*, and throwing the whole World
into

into Confusion, will be the fatal Consequences of
— disbanding the *Hessians*.

From whence it follows that it is a most abominable Practice to talk of the Debts of the Nation, and sending Money abroad to pay foreign Troops in a Point of such publick Utility—as the *Hessians*. The *Hessians*! who are the *Triarii* of Great Britain; her last Resort in all Cases, both in Peace and War; both at Home and Abroad; howsoever ally'd, or wheresoever distress'd!

But We must now be a little serious again; for the Subject requires it, though not the Author or his Manner of Reasoning.

Although this Deduction, says He, is gone into so great a Length; yet it seems necessary, before I conclude, to remove some Insinuations, industriously spread against the Hessian Troops; as if they were not hired, or continued in our Pay, for the Sake and Interest of Great Britain.

I think the Author Himself hath pretty plainly confirm'd the Truth of such Insinuations; but He prudently lays them to the Charge of the Enemies of the Government; (that is of the Ministry;) who are, in a Manner, defy'd to produce one Reason or Fact, during the Negotiations and Transactions of so many Years, to shew the Probability of such an Imputation; and if the Author is rightly inform'd, not one Word had pass'd for some Years, before the Conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna, about Bremen and Verhden.—Though I am no Enemy of the Government, I very much suspect the Truth of this Information, and think myself able to prove the Falshood of it; but as I have not Room to enter into such a Deduction, at present, I shall content myself with presenting the Considerer with a Passage out of the Works of one of his Fellow-Labourers in the Ministry; by Name Francis Walsingham,

ham, Esq; who, in Order to shew the superior Fidelity of the *French* to the *Germans*, gave us the following judicious Intimation, in his *Free Briton* of *Thursday* November the 26th, 1730, N^o. 52;— *Had the antient Proverb of German Faith been infallible, a certain great Prince had granted an INVESTITURE; which He once solemnly promised, on a very valuable Consideration; nor would He have expected a MILLION STERLING, as a refreshing Fee.*— I do not quote this *low Fellow*, by Way of Authority, but only for the Sake of Information; for as contemptible a *Writer* as He is in Himself, He sometimes blabs out *Secrets*, which are intrusted to Him, in Confidence, by his *Pay-master*.— I wish therefore He would let us know, who this *certain Prince* is; *what Investiture* He means; *what valuable Consideration* was paid for it; and from *whom that Prince* hath expected a *Million Sterling*, as a *refreshing Fee*.— The Resolution of these Questions might, perhaps, clear up the Dispute, whether *Sicily* was granted as an *Equivalent* to the *Emperor* for his Consent to the Disposition of the *Italian Dominions*, in Favour of *Don Carlos*.

The *Votes of Parliament*, which the *Author* quotes in Justification of the *Hessians*, and for the Support of his Majesty's *foreign Dominions*, are very little to the Purpose; because what is prudent at *one Time* may not be prudent at *all Times*.— Besides, I presume, *this Author* will not insist upon a *Vote of Parliament* as an unanswerable Argument in it self for the Wisdom, or Reasonableness of any Measure. *The Defeat of the Spanish Fleet in the Mediterranean*, if I mistake not, was voted by Parliament a *wise and just Action*; and yet our *Ministers* seem to have quite different Sentiments of it, at present.

The

The *Considerer* puts the Dominions of *Hanover* upon the same Foot with all other Dominions in *Alliance* with us ; and from thence argues that they have an equal Right to our Protection ; especially if they were attack'd out of Resentment for his Majesty's Conduct as King of *Great Britain*. But, even supposing This to be the Case, are they not a Weight upon the Strength of *England*? Are they not a constant Pledge, as it were, in the *Emperor's* Hands ; which may tempt Him, at any Time, to insist upon high Terms? Or would it be in his Power to molest us at all, if it were not for *these Dominions*?

The *Author* speaks out at last, and tells us very plainly that though *there is no formal Alliance between Great Britain and Hanover: (the Quality of King and Elector residing in the same Person)* yet the UNION between the two Governments, and the Obligations of mutual Defence and Guaranty are as strongly and necessarily imply'd, as the most formal Treaties and Conventions could possibly make them.

What UNION of the two Governments can the *Author* possibly mean? Though We have the Happiness of living under the same Prince, I thank God, We do not live under the same Form of Government. Ours is limited; theirs is absolute; and whilst this Difference subsists, there can be no Union between them. But if the Obligations of mutual Defence and Guaranty are as strongly and necessarily imply'd as the most formal Treaties and Conventions could possibly make them; I should be glad to be inform'd what Effect that excellent Provision in the *Act of Settlement* can ever have, which was made to secure us from the Danger and Expence of Wars, on Account of any Dominions, not belonging to the Imperial Crown of these Kingdoms.

The

The single Question is (as our Author states it Himself) whether the Continuance of the Hessian Troops, in the Pay of Great Britain, be for the Honour and Interest of the King and this Kingdom; which, I hope, hath been fairly examined in the preceding Pages.

The only Observation, that I shall make farther, is, that though *our Author desires this Controversy may be confin'd to the true Merits of the Question, without any Mistrrepresentations*; yet He concludes with the basest Reflection on *those Gentlemen, who differ from Him in this Measure, as Persons, who are really griev'd, not that We have any Thing to do with Hanover Dominions; but that We have any Thing to do with the Elector of Hanover.*

As infamous as the Design of this Reflection is, I will venture to say there are multitudes of Persons, in this Kingdom, zealously affected to the *Electors of Hanover*, who heartily wish that *We had nothing to do with the Hanover Dominions*; but We must always expect these mean Arts from Men, who want better Arguments; for as *no Bishop, no King* was the Cant-Expression of one Reign; it is now turn'd into *no W—le, no House of Hanover!*

But We trust in his Majesty's Wisdom, that He will not only separate the *Royal Character* from the *Minister*, but likewise consider Himself in a *double Capacity*, as King of *Great Britain* and Elector of *Hanover*. He will have the Goodness to excuse the laudable Partiality of *Englishmen* towards their own Country, and not make the Case of *Twelve Thousand Hessians* (which They may apprehend to be an useless Burthen upon them) the only Criterion of Loyalty to his Person and Affection to his Government.

