





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


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A REVIEW OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND ITS FRUITS:

“THE DREAM OF THE UNITED EMPIRE
LOYALISTS OF 1776.”

(From the ST. JAMES' MAGAZINE AND UNITED EMPIRE REVIEW.)

“This England never did, nor never shall,
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror,
But when it first did help to wound itself.

* * * * *
Come the three corners of the world in arms,
And we shall shock them. Nought shall make us rue,
If England to itself do rest but true.”

KING JOHN, Act v. Scene 7.

BY

ROBT. GRANT HALIBURTON, M.A., F.S.A.

FELLOW OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF NORTHERN ANTIQUARIES OF COPENHAGEN,
AUTHOR OF “COAL TRADE OF THE NEW DOMINION,” “INTERCOLONIAL
TRADE,” “NEW MATERIALS FOR THE HISTORY OF MAN,” ETC.

London:

SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, LOW, AND SEARLE,
CROWN BUILDINGS, 138, FLEET STREET.

1872.

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INTRODUCTION.

BRITISH Diplomacy having forced the nation to face the unpleasant alternative of rejecting the Alabama Treaty, or of being reduced to a worse condition than a conquered people, any minor considerations connected with it affecting merely the welfare of the Canadians, must sink into insignificance. To the people of the New Dominion they will have a far deeper and more enduring interest, and may exercise no slight influence on the future of the New World. A few days after this article appeared in the *St. James' Magazine*, a report of a lecture delivered by a veteran statesman of British America, the Honourable Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces, reached England, and excited a good deal of hostile criticism. It was assumed that he was suggesting new views of our national policy to the young men of the New Dominion that would be likely to create a spirit of discontent.

It is as well to remove any misapprehension on this point, for Mr. Howe has only given utterance to the very universal feeling of dissatisfaction that exists throughout British America. Mr. Marshall, in his interesting work, "The Canadian Dominion," thus refers to the same subject: "The time has not yet come when the Dominion may stand alone. The time need never come when the connexion with England should terminate. The Canadians have their dream of a united empire, with England at its head, and London as its metropolis. The sons of England in these colonies fret at the thought of English decadence, the signs of which they think they see in the indifference she manifests towards her colonial possessions. A wise policy, they believe, might con-

solidate an English empire which the world would be compelled to respect. Our present policy they fear will reduce England to a third-rate power. The imperial policy, favouring Canadian independence, is regarded, I have said, with some contempt as well as with sorrow. It is supposed to indicate a weak fear of a rival power, a feeling which no great nation can consciously retain without a fatal loss of self-respect. Such a fear, if it exists, Canadians say proudly, is wholly unreasonable. The United States would not fight for Canada; nor could they obtain Canada by fighting." Mr. Marshall, who as a stranger may be considered unprejudiced, says of their capabilities for defence, "The Canadians themselves are a peculiarly warlike people both in their training and temper, presenting in this characteristic, inherited from England, a marked contrast to the growing disposition of the people of the United States. 'It was difficult to conquer the South,' they say, with quiet assurance, 'but to subdue the North would be impossible.' They are hardy, stubborn, valorous; a nation of soldiers more truly than any people of this age, with the doubtful exception of Prussia."

Mr. Howe speaks as strongly of the timid policy of the British Government, which aims at buying peace at any cost:—

"But, it may be said, are we not part and parcel of a great empire upon which the sun never sets, which contains three hundred millions of people, whose wealth defies estimate, whose army is perfect in discipline, whose great navy dominates the sea. What have we to fear when this great empire protects us? This was our ancient faith, and proud boast under every trial. In the full belief that they were British subjects, that the allegiance which they freely paid to the Crown of England entitled them to protection, our forefathers helped to conquer, overrun, and organize these Provinces.

"But of late new doctrines have been propounded in the Mother Country. The disorganization of the Empire has been openly promulgated in leading and influential organs of public sentiment and opinion. Our brethren within the narrow seas have been

counselled to adopt a narrow policy,—to call home their legions, and leave the outlying provinces without a show of sympathy or protection; and, under the influence of panic, and imaginary battles of Dorking, troops are to be massed in the British Islands, and their shores are to be surrounded by ironclads. One Cabinet Minister tells us that British America cannot be defended, and another, that he hopes to see the day when the whole continent of America will peacefully repose and prosper under Republican institutions. And a third, on the eve of negotiations which are to involve our dearest interests, strips Canada of every soldier, and gathers up every old sentry-box and gun-carriage he can find, and ships them off to England.

“I do not desire to anticipate the full and ample discussion which Parliament will give to England’s recent diplomatic efforts to buy her own peace at the sacrifice of our interests, or of that Comedy of Errors into which she has blundered; but this I may say, that the time is rapidly approaching when Canadians and Englishmen must have a clear and distinct understanding as to the hopes and obligations of the future. If Imperial policy is to cover the whole ground, upon the faith of which our forefathers settled and improved, then let that be understood, and we know what to do. Leading newspapers have told us that our presence within the Empire is a source of danger, and that the time for separation is approaching, if it has not already come. Noble lords and erudite commoners have sneeringly told us that we may go when we are inclined. As yet, neither the Crown, the Parliament, nor the people of England have deliberately avowed this policy of dismemberment, although the tendency of English thought and legislation daily deepens the conviction that the drift is all that way. We must wait, my young friends, for further developments, not without anxiety for the future, but with a firm reliance on the goodness of Providence, and on our own ability to so shape the policy of our country as to protect her by our wit, should Englishmen, unmindful of the past, repudiate their national obligations.”

The answer to this has been the assertion that there is no disposition to loosen the ties that bind us to the Empire, and that the present policy has been necessary in order to teach us self-reliance. This statement is negatived by facts, and facts speak more strongly than words. Canadians do not object to the withdrawal of the troops, but to the spirit in which this measure was adopted. That we did not need such a stimulus to do our duty to the Empire and to ourselves, is proved by the fact, that before the troops were withdrawn, and at a time when such a step was disavowed, Nova Scotia, at the suggestion of its Adjutant-General, Colonel Sinclair, adopted a modification of the Prussian system. In 1866, out of a population of 360,000, over 40,000 went through battalion drill, or one-ninth of the whole population were trained to arms. A similar spirit and system here would create a force in Great Britain of four millions of soldiers.

But even if it were true that we needed a spur to urge us to do our duty to our country, was it necessary to remove not only every soldier, but also even the symbol of English rule, the British flag? Was it decent, even if justifiable, to have a grand auction of the military stores and munitions of war in our fortresses advertised for the benefit of Yankees and Fenians in the *New York Herald*, among its list of bankrupt sales: "To be sold at a bargain, for whatever it will bring, all the stock-in-trade of a great nation that is returning to Europe, and is retiring from the business of supremacy"?

This spiritless policy was a few years ago appropriately inaugurated by speeches in Parliament and elsewhere, which created wide-spread fears and a feeling of irritation throughout the Colonies, which this bankrupt sale, and the recent surrender of the navigation of the St. Lawrence, as well as almost every act of the British Government where our rights have conflicted with the claims of the Americans, have tended to confirm.

To negligence or indifference may be attributed some, at least, of the remarkable features in the history of British diplomacy in our affairs. A recent writer in the *Times* has described in an amusing

letter the ridicule which a foreign diplomatist cast upon our statesmen, whose achievements puzzled him. He could not sufficiently admire our generosity. Over and over again we have been overreached by the Americans, and have sacrificed immense tracts of valuable country, but we reward our statesmen for their blundering. The following article may supply a key to unlock the mystery. It was easy to be generous when it was only Colonists who suffered. Without any voice in Parliament, or a representative in the Colonial Office, which is merely a useful training-school for young statesmen, where they can try their "prentice hand" occasionally on Colonial subjects, *experimentum in corpore vili*, we have no power even to complain with any chance of being heard. The Government is not likely to entertain any criticism on its own policy, and if a protest is sent to a member of the Opposition, he is apt to be too much engrossed by local and party questions to be able to think of the interests of remote portions of the empire, and in all probability he has not the leisure to read the letter. When Colonial subjects are intruded upon Parliament, a significant remedy is sometimes resorted to. The *Times* of the 27th April says, "Mr. R. Fowler had risen to call attention to the affairs of South Africa, when the House was counted out at 25 minutes past 8 o'clock."

Need we be surprised at this? An Australian or Canadian Legislature, if it were invited to master that interesting subject, the sewerage and the smells of London, that so often very properly engrosses the attention of Parliament, might be tempted to imitate the example set by it on Friday last, and might escape the ordeal by being counted out. "Inertness," it is said, "is generally conscious incapacity." It is possible that Parliament is beginning to find out at last, what Colonists have long since learned to their cost, that the House of Commons is neither able nor willing to legislate for an Empire. Something formed on a far wider basis will be needed to satisfy the aspirations and the wants of the widespread English race, and to stay the progress of dismemberment. Elected by the people of the United Kingdom, instead of an

United Empire, the House of Commons is merely a local Legislature, that is useful only for "*Home Rule.*"

The apathy that exists as to every thing that occurs outside the United Kingdom has been slightly disturbed by a lucky incident that has at length forced the shortcomings of British statesmen on the attention of the public. Our diplomacy has very nearly succeeded in reducing the nation to the position of a conquered people. That was transgressing the bounds of prudence. As long as it only sacrificed Colonists, it earned very safely its titles and rewards; but the pocket of the British tax-payer has been invaded, and our diplomacy is at a discount—

Sed perit postquam cerdonibus esse timendus
Cœperat.

As "a fellow-feeling makes us wondrous kind," a temporary interest may be excited in the following sketch of our experience during the past century of British diplomacy and its fruits.

Vast and valuable as the territories are which we have lost through the generosity and blundering of British Statesmen, the article on "Transatlantic Britains" from the *St. James' Magazine and United Empire Review*, that is appended to this, will show the immense extent and enormous resources of the Dominion of Canada, and the great future that is awaiting it.

Since these articles appeared, a correspondence between the Canadian and the British Governments has been laid before Parliament, and gives to the subject I have discussed a fresh interest.

But I am induced to republish them not only for this reason, but also because an article has appeared in the *Times* which has openly avowed that Canadian rights were sacrificed by the Washington Commissioners, and has clearly expressed the views in favour of dismemberment which have for some years past inspired our Colonial policy.

R. G. HALIBURTON.

27, CLEVELAND GARDENS, HYDE PARK,
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THE DREAM OF THE "UNITED EMPIRE LOYALISTS" OF 1776:

A REVIEW OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND ITS FRUITS¹.

BY ROBERT GRANT HALIBURTON, F.S.A.

A FEW months ago it seemed a hopeless task for a colonist to appeal to the people of the mother country against the Alabama Treaty. It was generally imagined that it was a financial and diplomatic success; and the fact that it sacrificed the rights of Englishmen abroad, and ignored the minor consideration of national honour, was far more likely to be appreciated by Canadians, who knew that, as far as they were concerned, it was both a humiliation and an injustice. As the exorbitant demands of the American Government have shown that our concessions have been unwise and, what is worse, unprofitable, thousands may now feel some desire to know something of the history of British diplomacy in the New World, which at the end of a century has produced such unwelcome and unlooked-for results. The following observations therefore, originally intended only for Canadian readers, may interest Englishmen, as showing the view which those who know most of the Americans take of the Alabama Treaty and its results. The fact that since this article

¹ When this article was written it was intended for publication only in Canada. As it opens a new page in our history, it is believed that, as a Colonial review of the past century, it will be interesting to the British public. It is from the pen of a son of the late Judge Haliburton.—Editor of *St. James' Magazine*.

was written, a Canadian minister has warned his countrymen that the aim of British statesmen is soon to be attained, and that a separation of the New Dominion from the Empire is at hand, gives a practical interest to the following sketch of the history of that policy of dismemberment that is about to reap its first fruits.

It has been urged, that even if the Washington Treaty is a sacrifice of colonial rights, as an atonement for British wrongs, it is our duty to submit, for the honour of the empire. Let us see if this is the case.

A century of British diplomacy has taught us to regard the arrival of English statesmen with the same dread that heralds in the coming of the cholera or the approach of an earthquake.

A country larger than Prussia, extending nearly in a direct line from Maine to Vancouver's Island, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, is the monument of their generosity and of our misfortunes.

Lord Stormont, in criticizing the exploits in 1783 of our first Plenipotentiary, "that very extraordinary geographer and politician, Mr. Oswald," says, "There was prefixed to the article a very pompous preamble, setting forth that those treaties were the best observed where there were *reciprocal advantages*. He was for a long time at a loss to understand the meaning of those words. But at last he discovered that they meant only the advantage of America. In return for the manifold concessions on our part, *not one* had been made on theirs. In truth the American Commissioners had enriched the English language with several new terms and phrases. 'Reciprocal advantages,' for instance, meant the advantage of one of the parties only; and a regulation of boundaries meant a cession of territories."

That Mr. Oswald was more affectionately regarded by American statesmen than by ourselves may naturally be inferred. The astute Dr. Franklin, who had successfully hoodwinked him, bears this equivocal testimony to his merits as a diplomatist:—"The truth is, he appears so good and so reasonable a man, that though I have no objection to Mr. Grenville, I am loth to lose Mr. Oswald. He

seems to have nothing at heart but the good of mankind and putting a stop to mischief."

What a charming field for an unbounded philanthropy, from which none but colonists were likely to suffer! It appears, however, that he was in his dotage. "Mr. Oswald, as an old man, seems now to have no desire but that of being useful."

We can well imagine what was the fate of our fisheries when entrusted to such a benevolent diplomatist. They were given away without any equivalent whatever.

The subject of the American fisheries came up, but was very generously and summarily disposed of. When Lord North sarcastically suggested, that, merely "as a show of this boasted reciprocity," the right to enjoy the exhausted fisheries of the United States should have been *pro forma* secured, Lord Shelburne made a very startling reply, which would well repay the attention of our Commissioners and of the public:—"But why have you not stipulated a reciprocity of fishing in the American harbours and creeks? I will tell your lordships. Because we have abundant employment in our own. Would not an American think it sordid in the extreme, nay, consider it *bordering on madness*, to covet sterile wilds when we have fertile savannahs of our own?" If such was the deplorable condition of these fisheries a century ago that none but a lunatic would ask for them, it is to be feared that time has not very greatly enhanced the value of such acquisitions.

The writer recently visited an American fishing district, and was told of a village of two hundred houses that had entirely been deserted by its inhabitants; and he passed through another where fishing had been abandoned for shoe-making, and the people had been driven to make *soles* where they had formerly caught them.

The deterioration in these fisheries has given double force to Lord Shelburne's objection, that we must be demented to wish for them. Our Commissioners, however, seem rather to have inclined

to Lord North's view, that they should have been secured, if "merely for a show of this boasted reciprocity."

Anticipation is always better than reality; and an imaginary privilege, even though slightly lunatical, is better than none at all. The treaty, therefore, establishes our claim to these fisheries and to Bedlam. Surely Goldsmith must have had a prescience of this treaty when he provided a precedent for our diplomatists, by sending Moses as a Commissioner to Wakefield fair, and by bringing him back with a gross of green spectacles.

The navigation of the St. Lawrence has been secured to the Americans for ever, while its equivalent, a similar right over Lake Michigan, expires in ten years. The "manifest destiny" of the Munroe doctrine, to which our Commissioners have bowed, knows no limit but the Continent and eternity.

The Canadians are tenants by sufferance, or at most can only claim a life-interest, and ten years, it is to be hoped, will see them out. Even Dr. Cumming's faith in the unpleasant proximity of the end of all things has hardly tempted him or his followers to exchange freeholds for yearly tenancies. But had he been appointed one of these Commissioners to dispose of Colonial rights, what a sore temptation it would have been to him to have triumphantly vindicated his belief in the great tribulation coming! It is evident that our Commissioners, in limiting our future, must have taken either Mr. Munroe or Dr. Cumming as their guide.

In justice to Mr. Oswald it must be admitted that when he returned to England he set an excellent example to succeeding diplomatists. Having heard at last a little of the vast extent of the territories and the rights which he had benevolently sacrificed, he made all the amends in his power—*he wept!*

"He gave to misery (all he had) a tear."

A similar contrition on the part of our Commissioners would, no doubt, be gratefully received as a graceful tribute to distress.

When the Canadian Parliament meets much that has been kept

back will be submitted to the public. The fullest information as to American trade has no doubt been long ago collected, and will be accessible. The American fisheries have been secured. Such an important step was evidently not taken in the dark. We may therefore hope to be supplied with trustworthy information on one all-important point, "What opening for industry in boots and shoes will be supplied to us by the American fisheries?"

It may, however, be admitted that the settlement of the Alabama claims was in a great measure ensured by the one-sided reciprocity which characterizes this treaty, and that it is our duty to waive our interests and our rights for the sake of the empire.

It has been already shown what we have hitherto done in that way, but there were even more serious sacrifices imposed upon us a century ago, which rise up in judgment against those who have forgotten them.

The Jacobites suffered much, but it was nothing compared to the privations and neglect with which a grateful country has repaid the United Empire Loyalists and their descendants for their fidelity.

In 1783 a treaty was signed with successful rebels, in which no amnesty was secured for those who had for more than eight years fought through a weary civil war, and had risked their lives—their all—for the English Crown. At the merciless fiat, *ite capelle*, more than fifty thousand scapegoats of British diplomacy, men, women, and children, were driven into the wilderness.

The flower of the wealth, the intellect, and the refinement of the old colonies, these "Refugees," as they were significantly called, comprised the Fanenils, the Sewells, the Delanceys, the Robinsons, the Brentons, the Barclays, and a host of other well-known names, for even one of their enemies has admitted that all the giants went forth with the Tories. A few of them rose again to the surface, and won a place and a name abroad; but the great mass of them, consigned to poverty, were lost to the world and to the memory of men in the solitude of the backwoods. The neglect of them by

diplomaey seems to have been infectious, for even history itself has forgotten and ignored them.

" Unwept, unknown—all lost in endless night!
The sacred bard was wanting ?"

If Christianity dates back to its year of grace, and the Mahomedan recalls the Hegira of the Prophet, Loyalty in the New World has also its epoch; but its Hegira is the flight into the wilderness, and its Year of Grace is "The Year of Famine."

In one instance a temporary and fruitless stand was made against the isolation of solitary exile. In vain more than twenty thousand of these United Empire Loyalists strove to build up a city in Nova Scotia, which they called Shelburne. Few of them were fitted to be pioneers in a new country. Most of them had been brought up to comfort; and many of them, gentlemen by birth, had been reared in luxury. Accustomed to the gaities of fashionable life, they tried to revive some of the pleasures of better days by holding their weekly assemblies through the long and weary winter months, and thus earned for themselves, among their republican neighbours, the derisive name of "the dancing beggars."

Their useless and needless sacrifices were rewarded by exile—and their exile was consoled by contempt. "Thou sellest thy people for nought, and dost not increase thy wealth by their price. Thou makest us a reproach to our neighbours, a scorn and derision to them that are round about us."

But a worse enemy than contempt was awaiting them. The evil day drew near, and the *Hegira* was at hand. The town, besieged by want, surrendered to starvation; and poverty, like a strong man armed, entering in, took possession of their homes, and bade them begone. The fiat was obeyed. The scape-goats went forth, and were lost in the wilderness.

The forest has long since resumed its sway over the deserted

² Horace, Ode iv. 9.

town, and there are few traces of it left to tell the tale of the "dancing beggars" and their fate.

It is difficult to recall, except with indignation, the thankless, and, so far as we can see, the useless sacrifices which these United Empire Loyalists underwent; nor is the writer ever likely to forget them, for every time he signs his name in full, it recalls one of the most touching episodes of their history.

The peace of 1783 saw three orphan sisters thrown upon the world, in the wilderness of New Brunswick. Their father had sacrificed a large estate, and had fallen at the head of a regiment which he had raised. They had passed through the horrors of a shipwreck in midwinter, only to find their mother a frozen corpse, and to hear too soon that their only brother, Robert Grant, had fallen a victim to the exposures which he had undergone in his father's regiment. A relative and a namesake of his, the writer has inherited with his name, the memory, and what is of greater moment, the lessons of his misfortunes.

Since his death none of his kith or kin had ever been inside an American University, until last summer, when remembering the fact, while attending the International Trade Conference at Boston, the writer was tempted to remain a few days, in order to be present at the annual dinner at Harvard College.

On that occasion an Englishman, in addressing the immense assemblage that was present, alluded to the Treaty of Washington, and dilated in most abject terms on the beautiful spectacle which it afforded of a great nation voluntarily abasing itself, and acknowledging its errors. "Be 'umble, and you'll do."

A whole century seemed to rise up to protest against such a humiliation. The flight into the wilderness, the Ashburton Treaty, and a host of equally agreeable reminiscences were recalled, and with them a more recent picture of Canadians mortally wounded at Ridgeway, lingering long enough to hear on their death-bed of the thanks of the British Government—thanks not to them, but to a country that had suffered lawless miscreants to

openly arm and drill, and to march with noisy rejoicings against us in open day, amid the plaudits of the multitude.

Here was a treaty which forced us, an innocent people, to pay for the St. Alban's robbery, an outrage committed within the United States, in time of war, by American citizens, while repeated Fenian raids, invasions of British territory by American subjects in time of peace, were passed over in silence. Let Englishmen say and think what they like, Canadians can only regard that silence as an insult alike to the living and the dead. Such an outrage did the writer feel this treaty, and this boastful avowal of our humiliation to be, that though a loyal man, and the descendant of United Empire Loyalists, he was forced to avow that he was not an Englishman, but a native of the New World; and that he never felt greater pride in being a Canadian than he did at that moment, for knowing that we, at least, had done our duty to the Americans, he could stand up there before them, and thank God that he came from a country that had no apologies to offer to them.

What a commentary on this avowal was the memory of that young Loyalist, who having returned, at the end of a fruitless war, to his college, was doomed so soon to leave it to die—to die, too, with the conviction that the lives of his parents and himself had been thrown away, and that he had little to console him in his last moments but the tears of Oswald.

A hundred years had passed away, and the spirit of British diplomacy, still unchanged, had forced a kinsman and namesake of his, in the face of the past and its traditions, and in the presence of the American public, to thank God that he was a colonist, and that he was not an Englishman. Is it any wonder that such an episode should have left behind a painful misgiving, that the century about to close, with its disunion and disruption of the English-speaking race on this continent; its civil war of 1776; its flight into the wilderness; its year of famine, and years of exile; its sacrifices, surrenders, and neglect; its Fenian raids, and its Washington Treaty—had been a *mistake*.

This visit was not a fruitless one. It had taught a bitter, and perhaps a wholesome lesson. The history of a hundred years rose up, and pointed to the present as a judgment upon the past. If the reward of loyalty had been injustice, had not loyalty itself forgotten to be just? We had remembered only that we were sons, we were blind to the fact that we were brothers also. In the excess of our fidelity to the traditions of the Old World, we had ignored the ties that bound us to the New; and had treated our brother colonists, who had shaken off the trammels of British diplomacy and misrule, and had become a great nation, as aliens and enemies. *Our loyalty to the crown had swallowed up our loyalty to the race.*

"If it were so, it was a grievous fault,
And grievously hath Cæsar answer'd it."

The first instalment of the penalty our ancestors paid with their estates, and with their lives. But the sins of the fathers have been visited upon the children unto the third and fourth generation; and even at this late day we find ourselves invited to become the scapegoat of the Alabama story, and to go once more through the monotonous process of being sacrificed for the sake of the empire.

"Occidit miseris erambe repetita."

If we have no alternative but to submit, we must tell the world that this is to be the last page in the history of British diplomacy in our affairs. What a century of it we have had! What a beginning—the tears of Oswald, and the year of famine! What an ending—the Washington Treaty!

An American Indian ratifies a compact by appending to it his *totem*. Our *totem*, the king of beasts, we tacitly assume to be very appropriate. But times change, and the British lion is fast becoming a grim satire upon us, and like the British colonist, is being innocently mixed up with very questionable proceedings. Was it right to append the lion to the Washington Treaty? I simply ask, in common justice, was it fair to the lion?

The spirit of the age, or rather *the want of spirit of the age*, requires that we should substitute a much more appropriate symbol, a *lusus nature*, a native of the seashore, that is well known to the student of nature. It is made up of numerous long limbs attached to a very diminutive body. But it is a rare prize for the *aquarium*, as it generally baffles the collector, for when it is alarmed, it seeks safety in *dismemberment*, and the disappointed naturalist finds nothing but fragments of its limbs floating on the water.

British statesmen have adopted the stupid creature, if not as a symbol, at least as a precedent. Having loosened the ties that bind us to the mother country, they are ready, at the first note of danger, to dismember the empire, and to cast off the colonies.

The laws of society stamp the crime of self-murder with infamy, but there is no penalty for national suicide.

It would seem that this treaty is intended to be a parting gift, a farewell souvenir of British rule. The old flag, for which we have fought so often and so well, has ceased to wave over us, and only lingers for a time at Halifax, the port of departure. The British troops have followed the flag.

But the old world is consoling us by an equivalent. A special order of knighthood, that of "St. Michael and St. George" has been created for colonial politicians. It is a gratifying honour; but it is puzzling to know how it can be adapted to the democratic communities of the New World, that, so far from having any reverence for ancestors or for family pride, are rather disposed to "rejoice in that the man of low estate is exalted, and he that is high is brought low." In such matters this is a country of universal equality, where prescription and exclusive privileges are rudely invaded by the masses. The very savages have caught the infection. Micmac squaws have been known to speak of themselves as "ladies," and of their red lords and masters as "gentlemen!" We cannot expect that knighthood itself can long resist the spirit of the age.

Her Majesty is not the only source of honour. A Spanish order of knighthood is to be the reward of Canadian statesmen

for having indirectly aided Spanish despotism in its efforts to crush the gallant colonists of Cuba.

Though the colonial history of England has never been stained by the cruelties and oppression that from the days of Pizarro to the present have stamped the name of Spain with infamy, yet the very same aim and end have inspired the policy of both countries. The results have been diametrically opposite, dismemberment and the rule of the sword, but the secret source from which they have flowed is the very same—the principle of self-interest.

For nearly a couple of centuries Great Britain looked upon her colonies as being merely profitable preserves for her commerce. The famous "Colonial System" created by the Navigation Laws permitted none but British merchants to deal with us, and we were forced to ship our products to them only. Nor were we permitted to manufacture even a nail or button for ourselves, or to buy from foreigners³. It was simply an undisguised system of commercial slavery. How utterly our rights and interests were ignored is proved by a singular fact. The oppressive Act passed in the reign of Charles II., that declared that "no commodity of the growth or manufacture of Europe" should be imported into the colonies except what was laden or shipped in British ports and in British vessels, the first step towards cutting us off from commercial intercourse with all the rest of the civilized world, was actually entitled "An Act for the Encouragement of Trade!"

The language used seems to imply a paradox, until we remember that the framers of that Act, as well as the authors of every subsequent statute affecting us, had no other end in view but the encourage-

³ Though this system was no laughing matter to Colonists, it had occasionally its ludicrous side. There is among the state documents of the Province of Nova Scotia a letter from the Colonial Secretary to the Lieutenant-Governor, drawing his attention to the serious rumour that there were two hatters in Halifax, and insisting, if it was true, on their being forthwith abolished. It is the first instance which history records of a despatch having been written by a Secretary of State for the purpose of making the familiar inquiry, "Who's your hatter?"

ment of British Commerce, and looked upon the colonies in the same light and with the same interest, as the farmer regards his turnips and the drover his bullocks.

The utter selfishness of this statute is so naked and undisguised, that its innocent title, like the scanty costume of the savage, does not pretend to conceal the truth. Its unconseious nudity disarms criticism, and makes even indecency decent.

Hereafter, when Australian protectionists, or rather "the coming man," the New Zealander of the future, having discovered that the British mind is essentially bucolic and agricultural, shall have prohibited the people of the then dis-united kingdom from mechanical or manufacturing pursuits, and from using the products and commodities of Europe, except what is entered at Otago, and shipped in Maori bottoms, let him remember the primitive simplicity of former ages, and playfully give his legislation the pleasant title of "An Act for the Encouragement of Trade."

Though Britain became a mother country "for the encouragement of Trade," she may perhaps be betrayed into a slight weakness for her offspring. But commerce is less sentimental. It begot the colonies because they were likely to pay; and it is dismembering the empire because it does not pay.

"Hinc generandi amor, et moriendi contemptus."

Nations, as well as individuals, are apt to find that commerce is a good friend to prosperity, but a broken reed to a falling cause. Once already history tells us that a great empire was built up by commerce. But we also learn that it failed, in the hour of trial, to ward off the doom, *delenda est Carthago*. New Romes, yet in their infancy, are rising up in the Old World. It will soon be time for Carthage to set her house in order.

Free trade has tried us by the ledger, and finds that we are not likely to pay. The world, therefore, is open to us, and we are at liberty to leave the Empire as soon as we can conveniently do so.

Its policy of dismemberment is the very same that dictated the "Act for the Encouragement of Trade;" and that is devastating Cuba by fire and sword. It is an old friend with a new face; but it is a greater tax upon our patience, as it assumes the mask of liberality, and, while cutting loose the unprofitable ties that bind us to the Empire, it throws upon us the burden of gratitude for its generous concession of freedom to new nationalities.

Spain finds that Cuba does pay, and she is prepared to shed the last drop of blood of the colonists and of her soldiers to make it pay. The murderous struggle which has resulted in such misery to the unhappy Cubans is likely to bring us a rich harvest of mediæval honours. Stern justice may compel us to enforce our neutrality laws, even against our sympathies; but there is no obligation on us to accept any honours from the Spanish Government, or to disgrace ourselves by the favours of a despotism that is degrading humanity.

Let us think what would have been the consequence if the United States had suffered foreign titles to be accepted by its citizens? To settle the Alabama claims the British Cabinet might have spared the nation from doing penance by proxy, and might have relieved us from the necessity for giving up to the Americans for ever the right to the navigation of the St. Lawrence. The difficulty could have been amicably arranged by making a baron of every hero of Tammany, and dukes of all the notabilities of Washington. Gladstone, in this way, could have effectually popularized the House of Lords, and have killed two birds with one stone, by settling old scores with the Yankees and with the Aristocracy.

The colonial statesmen who laid the foundations of the republic remembered that this farce had been long ago played out by the Chiefs of the Red Man. The Continent had been once already bartered away for the beads and baubles of the Old World. The example was not forgotten. The memory of the cocked hat and coat of paint of the happy savage was preserved, not as a precedent, but as a scarecrow and a warning.

Orders of knight hood, fortunately, are not the only ties that bind us to the Mother Country. There is still another left to us. "If an Englishman," says Sir George Cornwall Lewis, "is to preserve a vestige of sympathetic feeling towards his own countrymen as such, he should certainly never see them out of England." Colonial criticism is evidently assumed to be more lenient; and the British Government therefore entrusts to an appreciative people an "Englishman out of England"—a Governor-General. The ordeal which awaits him is a very easy one, for the amenities of a century of British diplomacy have developed in us "sympathetic feelings" that are wanting in Englishmen themselves, and that are almost equal to any trial. His duties, which are light, are to draw the large salary which we supply, and to practise among us the frugal virtues of official seclusion. He has to discreetly temper all exuberance of loyalty on our part—a difficult task, for colonial loyalty has an embarrassing exuberance, and a vitality that defies control. Nothing apparently can kill it. It thrives on exile and starvation. Snubbing, patronizing, and neglect only call forth its energies and its gratitude; and cold water cannot drown it. But its patience, like that of a long-suffering, and long-eared animal, may be overtaxed, and some slight tact is needed in silencing and repressing, and especially in killing it.

We are therefore occasionally reminded, in a very affable way, that when we wish to change our allegiance (alliance, or allies, or whatever we may wish it to be), no difficulty whatever will be thrown in our way. It is not a hint for us to go, for that would be inhospitable and unkind. We are merely now and then shown the door, to convince us that it is not locked, and to make us feel at home.

The least return we can make for such distinguished courtesy would be to reciprocate the compliment. We prefer to compensate him with the more substantial, and probably not less acceptable reward of \$50,000 a year, being double the salary that is paid to the President of the United States. He would, however, be a bold man, who would, for five times that amount, venture to play the

same rôle among the Americans. Nothing but our long-suffering loyalty and the mercy of Heaven could have made it such a safe and agreeable experiment.

But he is merely fulfilling his mission, and must not be blamed for the mother country and the colonies being at cross purposes, and for there being a slight divergency in our views. The secret of the difficulty we can easily divine. That dream of the United Empire Loyalists seems to have proved a will-o'-the-wisp that cost them their fortunes and their lives, and that has placed their descendants in a false position.

A century ago the mantle of the Old Jacobites seemed to have fallen upon our ancestors. Loyalty to the Crown was the first duty of man; and rebellion was a grievous offence, not only against the King, but also against "the King of Kings." The State was a unit, and the colonies merely component parts of it. In the dim future, they saw a united empire, that, strengthened and cemented by time, was destined to overshadow the world. It was a pleasant dream, and had it been shared in by others it might in time have become a reality.

But while we have been claiming that we were British subjects, not as a matter of favour, but of right, for no people ever more dearly earned a title to their nationality than ourselves, the Mother Country has looked on the matter from a very different point of view. The empire was comprised within the limits of the United Kingdom. The colonies were merely offshoots, a numerous family whose future could safely be left to the chapter of accidents. In her eyes we had arrived at manhood without having undergone the preliminary process of having been weaned.

If the ordeal so long postponed had come rather hard on us, this surely arose from no weak fondness on her part; of that she never was accused. She had never taken kindly, or even patiently, to maternity, and had never pretended to disguise her feelings on that point. Each fresh addition to her family, so far from having been hailed as a grateful olive-branch, had always been bewailed as a

melancholy accident ; and instead of returning thanks for it to the Giver of all good things, she had only devoutly wished that it had been her neighbour's quiver that had been so richly blessed instead of her own.

The time has now come for disunion and dismemberment, and the spirit of the old Loyalists, like Banquo's Ghost, returns to reproach us. That dream of a "United Empire" has risen from the dead, and claims once more to be a living issue. That such an idea will soon be realized by the whole English race is, as we have seen, daily becoming more and more improbable. Each succeeding Cabinet, content with the present, refuses to do any thing in this matter for posterity, for "what has posterity ever done for them?" and damns the future of a great nation with "after me, the deluge!" Instead of our statesmen taxing our public spirit and our patriotism by the troublesome problem of a United Empire, these labour-saving machines are sending us rejoicing on a downward career of dismemberment, that is as easy as it is effectual.

With such an answer to the dream of the United Empire Loyalists before us, a protest on our part against the folly of the councils of the Mother Country might almost be excusable. We may at least indulge very safely and very sincerely in a regret that she shrinks from the costs and perils of supremacy, and "that she hath no strong rod to be a sceptre to rule. This is a lamentation, and will be for a lamentation."

"This is merely a debit and credit affair after all," said one of these economists to a Canadian at a commercial meeting in London. "What does your Province pay? If it brings 1000*l.* a year we may keep it. If it costs us that amount it must go." "I am not prepared," replied the colonist, "to answer your question ; for the way you have put it is somewhat new to me. The idea, however, is very old, and has been already acted on. You may have heard and perhaps may have admired the man, who was so mean that he cut off one of his feet to save himself in shoe-leather. The experiment proved highly successful. For the rest of his days he never needed more

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than one boot ; and that boot carried him to his grave more cheaply and expeditiously than a pair ever could have done."

Our economists have thrown this man in the shade. Life is only a matter of debit and credit account, and does not pay. Its balance is vanity and vexation of spirit. National life is equally unsatisfactory, and is terribly expensive. But a panacea has been suggested that has the double merit of being an effectual remedy, and a good speculation. The nation is advised to cut its throat to save itself the cost of living.

But the writer must not forget that he is not an American. He is not even an Englishman; he is only a colonist, and is trespassing on forbidden ground. "You protest as well as remonstrate. Were I *critically* to examine your language I could not admit your right, even individually, to protest against any legislation which Parliament may think fit to adopt in this matter." Such is the salutary lesson which a very distinguished British Minister has taught us. But he has also taught us another and a far more important lesson, that a century, that beginning with the amiable Oswald and ending with the Washington Treaty, has not even earned for us the empty right to "protest as well as to remonstrate," has been a slight mistake. A very trifling change in our destinies a hundred years ago would have made a very great change in the language of his homily. But a little reflection will suggest some sources of consolation.

If "Praise undeserved is satire in disguise," British diplomacy has been a cruel satire, not only on the nation, but also on, what is more desirable, the Americans. Never was the principle more triumphantly vindicated, than "a little civility goes a very long way." The Government of the United States has paid a dear penalty for having repeatedly allowed the Fenians to invade the Dominion, and has been bitterly reproached by the obsequious thanks of timid servility.

In this matter we may feel proud that we, as Canadians, can thank God that we have no apologies to offer to the Americans, and

no protests or remonstrances to submit to British Ministers for critical examination. Even if we were disposed to intrude advice, the precedents before us are not encouraging. A hundred years ago, Dr. Franklin, at the Bar of the House of Commons, protested against the policy of dismemberment, and was denounced as a thief and a robber. He proved to be a prophet, and the old colonies were lost to the Empire. But that was only a paltry piece-meal proceeding, but a first step, towards national disintegration. It has needed a century to develop a comprehensive scheme of dismemberment by which the interesting problem suggested by Dr. Franklin may be solved, "how a great nation may be made into a very little one."

If Englishmen are unwilling to face the future, and turn to the ledger as their guide, we cannot be expected to forget that dream of the past that cost our ancestors so dearly. Never was an idea so indelibly stamped upon the history of a country. To such an extent has it entered into our daily life, that "United Empire" has been abbreviated into "U. E." for popular use. The titles to lands in Ontario date back to what are still cited in courts of law as "U. E. grants." To claim to be descended from a U. E. family is like an Englishman's boast that his ancestors "came over at the Conquest." The very grave has claimed not only the dreamers but also their dream; and "U. E. graveyards" are the honoured resting-places of the Loyalists and their descendants. As philanthropic diplomacy stripped "the refugees" of all their worldly possessions; they had little to bequeath to us but the lessons of their misfortunes. If the writer has fearlessly recalled them, he may be pardoned for doing so. The right which he has claimed is his only heritage from a U. E. family.

It is to be feared that there is at present but little to encourage us to look across the water in our aspirations for national unity; but we may hope at some future day we may, by a reunion of the English race on this continent pave the way for a grander and a wider union.

The pole-star of the United Empire Loyalists of 1776 was loyalty

to the Crown, and it led them, as we have seen, to disunion, to exile, to sacrifices, to humiliation. The watchword of the United Empire Loyalists of the future must be "Reunion of the Empire," and "Loyalty to the Race."

Such, then, is the answer which the history of a century of British diplomacy gives to the question, Are we called upon "for the encouragement of trade," to atone for British wrongs by the sacrifice of Colonial rights? If we must submit to such a demand, let us at least take good care that the ratification of the Treaty is to be the last of a century of sacrifices, and that it must be an acquittance and discharge for ever, a pledge that we have earned at last our commercial emancipation.

Most sincerely it is to be hoped that the Treaty will be ratified, not because it is just, or what we had a right to expect, or because British diplomatists are entitled to any favours at our hands, but because it affords us an opportunity of closing a century of discord and disunion, by "burying the hatchet," and by making a friendly concession to a kindred people, who, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, are not only our nearest, but also our only neighbours. Descendants of the Old Colonists of 1766, who, wiser in their generation than the United Empire Loyalists, refused to be sacrificed "for the encouragement of trade," they are now a great nation.

Nature, which has, by ties of blood, united us to our kinsmen who are near us, and to a mighty Empire that is afar off, has divided us from the latter by an obstacle which nothing but the omnipotence of Parliament can remove. We need a statute to abolish the Atlantic Ocean, with its long and costly voyages, and its heavy taxes on trade for freight, commissions, &c. The impropriety of such an obstacle is so apparent, that our commercial policy refuses to recognize its existence. It is, however, difficult to ignore the fact that *dissociabile æquor* divides us from the Old World; and that as markets are generally profitable in proportion to their proximity, nature itself has made our brothers across the line nearer and more desirable customers than the mother country across the sea. Heavy

taxation, high tariffs, and old family feuds may neutralize the influence or geographical affinities and of ties of blood; but time will change all this.

We are on the threshold of another century, and must mould our future by the warnings and the lessons of the past. No one who reads the signs of the times can fail to see that we are on the eve of great changes, and perhaps in time of a "*New Departure*" in the history of the English race on this continent. Already the beginning of the end is at hand. The Old World is bidding farewell to the land, and to the dream of the United Empire Loyalists. While instinctively we are clinging to her skirts, the last hold on them is slipping from our grasp: and when the last British soldier is called upon to do a last act "for the encouragement of trade," by furling the British flag, and carrying it away with him from our shores, he will leave us a *nation*.

While British statesmen are doing so little to realize the idea of a United Empire, and so much to render it impossible, there is an unexpected source of hope from a quarter whence we might least look for it, from a new and mysterious influence that during the past few years is every where making itself felt and obeyed. The tendency to a reunion of races is suddenly developing itself throughout the civilized world in an inscrutable and irresistible way; and language is exerting a new power on the destinies of nations. That it must ultimately make itself felt among ourselves we cannot doubt. The language of commerce is now the English tongue, a fact that was strongly impressed upon the writer during a recent visit to St. Thomas, Santa Cruz, St. Eustacius, St. Bartholomew, St. Martin's, and other colonies in the foreign West Indies, where the Danish, Dutch, Swedish, and French languages have been swallowed up by our own; those islands being English communities in every thing except in name.

The English tongue is now more or less spoken throughout a large portion of the civilized world, and more than one-half of the commerce and shipping of the world is controlled by the English race,

the United Kingdom, in point of tonnage, standing first, the United States second, and the British Colonies third, the new Dominion alone ranking next to France as a maritime power. A reunion of the English race may well startle us by its magnitude and its grandeur, for if realized, it would dwarf the greatest nations of antiquity, and become one of the wonders of history. Nor need we believe that the problem is a hopeless one, or that language, which has elsewhere accomplished such marvels, will be powerless to reunite the wide-spread branches of the English race by its influence. In our day the magic power of the German tongue has realized the dream of a United Germany, while Austria is torn asunder by the tendency of its Slavic and Germanic races to gravitate east and west towards their kinsmen. As barbarism is elevated into civilization, its tribes and clans are merged into nations. The nations of civilization themselves are now about to realize a new stage of development; and their future seems destined to be regulated, not by trade or geographical boundaries, or historical traditions, but by a voice that, coming to them from the very cradle of their race, is destined to revive on a grander scale the very same rivalries that marked the early history of the world. Is there not reason to believe that future contests for supremacy will have a wider and grander theatre, that the wars of the Titans will be revived, and that a struggle of the races is awaiting us?

In looking forward to the future of the English people, we may have little to hope for from the aspirations of our statesmen, but we have much to expect from the spirit of the age and from the example and influence of other races. When we see languages that have no past national history to appeal to, breaking down the barriers that a thousand years of rivalry and division have built up, we cannot believe that the English tongue, that is identified with the birth of liberty, and with the growth of commerce and civilization, has in one short century of disunion lost its virtue; nor can we suppose that it alone is unable to re-echo

22 THE DREAM OF THE "UNITED EMPIRE LOYALISTS" OF 1776.

the voice of the reunion of races which has gone forth among the nations, and which nature itself seems to have learned at this late day—"those whom God has joined together let no man put asunder."

With much in the past to discourage us, we need not despair that in the future the hopes that for a century have slumbered in "U. E. graveyards" will yet be fulfilled, and that we are destined even in our day to realize that dream of the Loyalists—a United Empire.

"This England never did, nor never shall,
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror,
But when it first did help to wound itself.

* * * * *

Come the three corners of the world in arms,
And we shall shock them. Nought shall make us rue,
In England to itself do rest but true."

KING JOHN, Act v. Scene 7.

TRANSATLANTIC BRITAINS.

WHEN economists are steadily working out the dismemberment of the empire, and are desirous of severing the ties that bind the colonies to the mother country, it may be desirable to reflect on what the empire is likely to lose, and on what her commercial rivals are likely to gain by this threatened disruption. Were the colonies merely great grain or timber producing countries, their loss might be regarded with less anxiety, and we might be willing to trust to foreign sources for our supplies of food and wood in a time of war. But this is not the case; it is evident that there are colonies that are destined to become in time either the rivals of the mother country or a source of national wealth and strength to the empire.

A strange fate seems to have made us the owners of unrivalled commercial advantages on the Eastern and Western shores of the Atlantic and on the Pacific Coast. From Norway to the Cape of Good Hope the only important deposits of coal and iron on the seaboard are those of the United Kingdom. Coal, the great source of national wealth, is so bulky that it is unable to bear the cost of transport to the sea for commercial purposes; and even when situated on the seaboard, unless it can be utilized by being accessible, near some great highway of commerce, it is practically valueless as an article of export. Hence the extensive coal-beds of France, Germany, and Russia can never play an important part in commerce, except as respects the promotion of manufactures in their vicinity. The French Commission on the English coal-fields re-

ported that nature had given us advantages which defy competition, and enable England to export her coal to the most distant countries on the globe.

Turning to the New World, we find the Eastern and Western outlets of the New Dominion, Nova Scotia and Vancouver's Island, the very counterparts of the Mother Country in the possession of geographical and mineral advantages which are destined to be the envy and the admiration of less favoured countries.

From Alaska to Cape Horn there are no extensive deposits of coal and iron on the seaboard that can be compared with those of Vancouver's Island. At present, for the reasons already given, these mines are comparatively undeveloped. Australia, though so much more remote, is able to export its coal to San Francisco at so low a rate that Vancouver's Island collieries cannot compete with it. This state of things is temporary only. The Pacific Railway through the Dominion of Canada will terminate at British Columbia, and will create an immense trade in coal as back freight to the various ports of the Pacific.

As Vancouver's Island possesses an excellent climate, unrivalled harbours, and coal-seams and beds of iron ore near the water's edge, it is clear that nature itself has stamped upon the map of the world the site of the future Britain of the Pacific. A few years only will prove, what is even now to any reflecting mind a matter of certainty, that Vancouver's Island must become in time the home of a dominant race, that by their manufactures, commerce, and shipping must control the destinies of the Pacific.

It is, however, on the Atlantic seaboard of the New World that nature has especially favoured us. We find there a country that has natural advantages such as are enjoyed by no other part of the world.

Like Britain, Nova Scotia is the only part of the Atlantic seaboard which possesses extensive deposits of coal and iron. From the Labrador to Cape Horn we find no country that in this respect can ever claim to be a rival, Virginia being its only com-

petitor. Like Britain, it has excellent harbours near its beds of coal and iron; but in the extent of its coal deposits and in the value of its iron ores it far surpasses the mineral wealth of the mother country. The vertical thickness of the numerous coal-beds of the Pictou Basin is considerably over one hundred and fifty feet, one seam alone ranging from thirty-six to thirty-nine feet in thickness, being the largest bituminous seam in the world¹. It is underlaid by another twenty-two feet, while there are overlying and underlying seams ranging from three feet to twelve feet. Immense undeveloped beds of iron ore are to be found a few miles only from the coal-fields, some of which are of a quality second only to the best Swedish brands, a fact already testified to by Fairburn and other authorities.

In addition to iron ore as a source of future wealth we have underlying these beds of coal immense deposits of fire-clay, equal to the very best that are to be found in the mother country. Nothing but time and capital is needed to create on the Atlantic seaboard of the New World a rival of the Staffordshire "black country," and a competitor of the busy ship-yards of the Clyde.

But there are geographical advantages that are enjoyed by this Transatlantic Britain such as can be claimed by no other country on the habitable globe. Bulky products such as coal and pottery are valuable when they can be utilized to supply freights, and this only can be the case where they are situated near some great highway of commerce. No one can look at the position of Britain, which nature has made the janitor of the German Ocean, without seeing that she possesses peculiar advantages for controlling the trade of the north of Europe. Let us imagine, if we can, the

¹ The total vertical thickness of the Pictou coal seams described by Sir Wm. Logan in his recent Report, is over 170 feet, one half of which is fit for use. As it is not impossible that some of the small upper seams may prove to be identical, a deduction has been made, which is probably more than ample, as the oil coal, and all the seams under three feet, have been omitted from this calculation. Nothing approaching this thickness of coal seams is to be found in any other coal-field.

outlet of the Mediterranean also in the British Channel; and let us extend the United Kingdom across Europe, and imagine its eastern limit to be Constantinople; let us also conceive gold-mines, as well as unlimited deposits of coal and iron, at the two extremities of such a vast empire, and we can form some idea of the geographical and mineral advantages of the Dominion of Canada, which has a Britain at its eastern and western outlets, between them unlimited prairies that will yet rival the wheat-growing provinces of Russia, and vast virgin forests of timber that are almost inexhaustible; combine with all these advantages fisheries on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts that make the harvests of the sea almost as rich as those of the land, and we may form some conjecture as to the great future that awaits such a country.

If this view is correct, it is surely deserving of the attention, not only of European capitalists, but also of British statesmen. Already the foolish policy of dismemberment is loosening the ties that bind the empire together. When we give up half of North America, we shall be resigning not only a Britain on the Pacific, but also a country on the Atlantic that far surpasses the Mother Country in mineral resources, and in geographical facilities for commercial pre-eminence. This is no idle dream, but a matter of fact which can be demonstrated in a few words by a reference to the map of the New World. We find the Eastern extremity of the Dominion of Canada projecting far out into the Atlantic, near the two great highways of Western commerce, one of which, from the Atlantic seaboard of the United States, passes near the Southern coast of Nova Scotia, while the boundless wealth of the West is gradually finding an outlet in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, which washes the Northern shores of that province. The completion of the Intercolonial, and the European and North American railways makes Nova Scotia the eastern outlet of the Continent, and Halifax will ere long become the port of embarkation for Europe, and the point of transshipment, especially for ocean lines of foreign steamships. Why they have not already turned the coal deposits of that

province to good account must be a matter of surprise. Were it only a question of the cost of fuel, the gain to them would be immense. But there are other equally important considerations that should not be lost sight of. The supply of fuel necessary for an Atlantic voyage is so bulky that the space for freight is greatly diminished. Every ton of coal that can be spared represents a ton of freight that can be turned to account. It is manifest, therefore, that the double saving, both in the cost of fuel and in the available space for freight, will in time be inducements to utilize the coal supplies of Nova Scotia, and will lead the owners of French and German lines of steamships to possess their own collieries, and to ensure an ample supply at the lowest possible cost.

Until very recently the mines were held as a monopoly under a grant to the late Duke of York. An arrangement was effected a few years ago by the Provincial Government by which a considerable portion of the coal-mines of the province was transferred to them, and was thrown open to private enterprise. Unfortunately before much capital could be introduced into the country to develop these new mines, the American Government imposed a duty of \$1.25 per ton on imported coal, which acted as a damper on collieries that had been partially developed, and discouraged the formation of new companies. The pressure of the Free Trade party is yearly becoming more and more effective, and a few months, or a year at most, will see the obnoxious tax remitted. At present it is a grievous burthen on the people of the Atlantic seaboard, who are heavily taxed by the monopolies that are ruling the Republic with a rod of iron. This commercial oligarchy has none of that prestige that is connected with a landed aristocracy. The latter have a stake in the prosperity of their country, the former have no interest in the people, except so far as the ledger indicates their willingness and their ability to pay tribute to "the powers that be." The days of these gigantic monopolies are numbered in the United States, and when the burthens that are crushing manufactures and starving the consumer are thrown off, an enormous market will be

thrown open to Nova Scotian coal, and American and British capital will flow in to turn the neglected mineral resources of that province to good account.

This depression therefore in mining enterprise is merely temporary, and its termination will witness a rapid rise in the price of available mining properties, and Nova Scotian coal will enjoy almost a monopoly along the seaboard of the Eastern States, except when brought into competition with English coal. Thousands of persons, and several lines of railway, that are now forced to use wood, will be enabled to obtain a cheaper and a better fuel at a far lower cost. Ere long Transatlantic steamships, American consumers, and lines of railway in the Eastern States will depend on Nova Scotian collieries for their supplies of fuel².

Independently however of all these sources of future development there is another that alone is sufficient to ensure a great future to the mineral deposits of Nova Scotia. The enormous cereal wealth of the West seems almost to baffle sober calculation. It is increasing so rapidly that it overcrowds its outlets, and Western trade is clamouring for a direct highway by water to the ocean. At present New York, through its enterprise, is enabled to grow rich through its railways and its Erie Canal diverting Western trade from its natural channel. Massachusetts is spending

² It would seem by the following passage in a letter received from Nova Scotia, that even the local demand exceeds the supply. "We have had a coal-famine here. The Mayor applied to the General, who could do nothing, but referred him to the Storekeeper at the dockyard, where they are now issuing coal, and Halifax is now burning Welsh coal. But they have only 700 tons there, which, it is said, will not last until we receive some by rail or vessel. A number of steamers have lately put in for coal, which Cunard and Co. have, fortunately, for the credit of the place, been able to supply. To crown all, the railway has been blocked up by snow, and when it is open, Hoyt will be unable to sell his coal to the town for some time, as he has to supply American contracts. Serton's wharf is to be the depôt for the sale of coal from the numerous mines of which Gisborne is manager. Coal is now \$12.50 per ton." There has also been a coal-famine in Montreal, where coal is \$16 per ton. In the United States there have been similar complaints, but as long as a duty of \$1.25 is imposed on imported coal, the people must be at the mercy of Pennsylvanian monopolists.

its millions on the Hoosac tunnel, to tempt some portion of the wealth of the West towards New England. The West is the Eldorado of the New World. Its merchant princes see that they are paying black mail to New York, and wish for some direct water communication with the ocean. This is supplied by the circuitous course of the Mississippi, and by the more direct line of the Canadian lakes and the river and Gulf of St. Lawrence. They are urging that the locks should be enlarged and the canals deepened, so that propellers of 2000 tons may find their way, without breaking bulk, to the ocean; and the Canadian Government is taking steps to afford the necessary accommodation to Western shipping. Already propellers find their way from Toronto to Pictou in Nova Scotia. But there is an era in Western trade about to be opened that has not been thought of by Western traders. Supposing that every bushel that finds its way to Europe should be shipped through Canadian lakes and the St. Lawrence, only one-fifth of the products of the harvests of the West finds its way to Europe. The remainder is consumed at home, one half being needed by the populous States on the Atlantic seaboard. Hence the utmost success that can be aimed at by Canadian statesmen is to divert one-fifth of Western trade into the St. Lawrence.

A little energy only is needed to throw open a far more important branch of Western trade to the water highway of the New Dominion. When a lake-propeller reaches Pictou, it may safely pass through the Straits of Canso and reach Halifax on the southern shores of the province, but there its voyage must terminate. The voyage thence to the Eastern States needs an ocean steamship, and is as formidable as a passage across the Atlantic. The cost and delay of such a transshipment are such that the Erie Canal, and, above all, American lines of railway, would be less costly, and certainly far more expeditious.

But Nova Scotia, which, as has been stated, is a peninsula standing far out into the Atlantic, is connected only with the Con-

continent by a narrow neck of land that divides the Gulf of St. Lawrence from the Bay of Fundy, and that is formed of alluvial soil. Hence rock cuttings can be almost entirely avoided. The construction of a ship-canal therefore for a few miles only would enable lake-propellers to pass into the Bay of Fundy, the waters of which are navigated by American river-steamers that, with their high deck saloons, are almost precisely similar to those that are to be seen on the lakes of the West. There would be then nothing to prevent a lake-propeller from loading at Chicago and reaching Boston in a few days without breaking bulk, and without the necessity for transshipment. The route by the St. Lawrence and the Bay of Fundy, from Chicago to Boston, would be simply a coasting voyage.

Such an outlet, it is clear, would defy all competition, and would become for all time to come 'the great highway of Western commerce.

At present the objection to Montreal as a point of transshipment is, that there is nothing to send back to the West as return freight. Extend the voyage of lake-propellers, and they would not only secure at the Eastern extremity of the Continent, and at the most remote outlet of its railway system, emigrants and the manufactures and products of Europe and of the Eastern States, but they would also utilize the coal and pottery, and, if necessary, the extensive marble deposits of Nova Scotia, to replace the bulky articles that constitute the export of the West. We should find Nova Scotian coal utilized in the same way that England employs her supplies of fuel. Every propeller going West could always rely upon an ample supply of coal, pottery, &c., to complete its return cargo; and as British coal is still shipped to Quebec past the shores of Nova Scotia, the latter would be enabled to send her coal to the far West, as ballast or back freight, at a price that could defy competition on the part of the adjacent collieries of Illinois.

Even if there were no demand for coal for the lines of steamships connecting with Europe, and if the American markets of the Eastern States were closed, there would be an abundant outlet

supplied by the trade of the St. Lawrence, and the markets of the New Dominion, and of the Western States.

In connexion with this great water highway, and along its whole extent, from Lake Michigan to Halifax, we have the Intercolonial Railway, as an auxiliary rather than as a competitor, affording an outlet during those winter months when the water highways of the Continent are closed by ice. The very same causes which will lead to a vast development in the exports West, of coal, pottery, &c., apply to this railway. *Herapath's Railway Journal* has pointed out that the use of prepared peat for railway fuel will be greatly restricted by the importation of Nova Scotian coal. The downward freights by the Intercolonial Railway will be grain and other bulky articles; the upward freights will be of a very different description, such as European manufactures, and passengers. Hence there will be no freight for return trains, which will have to go back empty, or will be forced to carry back Nova Scotian coal, pottery, &c. The Intercolonial Railway therefore will be able to supply the West with Nova Scotian fuel at such a low rate, that even the moderate cost of Hodge's patent peat will fail to enable it to become a successful competitor.

The construction of the North Pacific Railway, and the proposed line through British territory, will tend still further to swell the volume of the trade that is destined to find its outlet at Nova Scotia.

It is difficult to estimate the magnitude of the commerce that will find its way through the waters and along the banks of the St. Lawrence. Though only in its infancy, the grain trade of the West is so vast, that a trifling saving per bushel on the freight of Western produce would be such an immense sum in the aggregate, that it would suffice in a few years to defray the cost of the Intercolonial Railway.

LONDON
GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, PRINTERS,
ST. JOHN'S SQUARE.

From THE TIMES, May 3, 1872.

It is impossible to read the Correspondence, just presented to Parliament, between the Ministers of the Crown at home and the Ministers of the Crown in Canada, without seeing that questions arise in it of far greater moment than the difficulties, embarrassing as they are, which have brought them to the surface. The Correspondence relates to the Treaty of Washington, and it will be remembered that the clauses of that Treaty, dealing with the disputed subject of the Canadian Fisheries, were accepted by Her Majesty, subject to their ratification by the Parliament of the Dominion. No attempt was, however, made to procure this ratification during the Session at Ottawa of last year, and the Correspondence before us fully explains the omission. The Ministers of Canada drew up a Minute towards the end of last July, in which it was stated that the provisions were regarded with almost unanimous dissatisfaction by all classes of the people, and in all places throughout the Dominion. This feeling was shared by all, and it was expressed with as much force in the agricultural districts of the West as in the Maritime Provinces. Lord Kimberley, as Secretary for the Colonies, answered this Minute last November, attempting to meet the objections; but he failed to satisfy the Canadian Ministry. What is more, their reply, received here on the 5th of February, just as our Session began, plainly declared that, in order to bring the Fishery Clauses before the Dominion Parliament this year with a fair chance of getting them approved, the Ministry must be enabled to announce at the same time some boon which might reconcile the country to the Treaty. The bribe they suggested was that we should guarantee a Canadian Loan of four millions, being half the estimated cost of constructing the Pacific Railway and enlarging the St. Lawrence Canals. Lord Kimberley's last words are an offer on the part of the Home Government to propose to the Imperial Parliament a guarantee of a loan of 2,500,000*l.* as soon as measures should have been taken in Canada to give effect to the Treaty. The nature of the transaction is to be partly concealed by cutting it up into two or three parts, by a process reminding us of "financial puzzles" and similar expedients of the past; but it is remarkable that Canada is to take the initiative, and trust to the power of the Home Government to carry the proposed guarantee through Parliament. The Correspondence closes with this despatch from Lord Kimberley, but we presume that his offer has been accepted by the Canadian Ministry.

The Correspondence, we have said, forces upon our attention questions of deeper and more permanent interest than its direct subject matter. The people of Canada are profoundly dissatisfied with the manner in which their interests were dealt with in the Treaty of Washington. How could it be otherwise? That Treaty was conceived with a view of relieving England from pressing and contingent liabilities. Our immediate motive was the knowledge

that there were standing claims against us on account of the Alabama. We watched with some uneasiness the repeated splutters of bad feeling between the fishermen of New England and the people of the Maritime Provinces, because we could never be certain that an ugly accident might not some day force us, much against our will, to become the champions of a quarrel we could only half approve. It is easy, therefore, to understand with what motives our Ministers suggested a Commission, and with what readiness they yielded to the hint that it should be allowed to settle all subjects of difference between the two countries. Lord Derby has repeatedly blamed their eagerness, and the American Government could not but be sensible of the advantage they obtained when the Commissioners arrived at Washington bound to come to some settlement on the points in dispute. It is true that one of the Commissioners was the Prime Minister of Canada, but against this circumstance must be set the facts that the other four approached their work from an English point of view, that the Commissioners as a body were instructed from day to day, and, we may almost say, from hour to hour, by the English Cabinet, and their work was done with an eye to the approval of the English people. It was inevitable that the results of their labours should not satisfy the inhabitants of the Dominion. We are far from saying that the Commissioners did not do their best for Canadian interests as they understood them, but it was not in human nature for them or their instructors to be to Canada what they are to England; and, as the Treaty was conceived for the purpose of removing the present and contingent liabilities of England, it was agreed upon as soon as it was believed that these liabilities were settled.

We have said that the Commissioners failed, and necessarily failed, to satisfy Canada, but we should only tell half the truth if we did not add that upon one of the subjects of Canadian dissatisfaction they acted with deeper knowledge than prevails in Canada itself. The Canadians have two complaints. They say that the Commissioners abandoned the Canadian claims for losses incurred through Fenian raids, and obtained from the United States no security that any effort would be made to prevent a repetition of these criminal irruptions. This is perfectly true. We have more than once endeavoured to explain the just indignation of Canada on the subject of the Fenian raids. A wretched crew of scoundrels, repudiated as such by all the native elements of American life, were suffered to plan and organize, without let or hindrance, raids into a neighbouring country at peace with the United States; and those raids, involving robbery and murder, never partook of the character of war, never, indeed, had any other object than that of keeping up a flow of subscriptions for the support of the Head Centres at New York and elsewhere. Peaceful Canadian students, farmers, and mechanics were compelled to turn out at a moment's notice at the busiest time of the year, and when, at a sacrifice of precious life, the marauders were driven back across the frontier, the utmost that was done was to subject a few specimen offenders

to mock trials and nominal punishments. The Canadians naturally resented this, and they expected that when the question of England's responsibility for lax neutrality in the matter of the Alabama was referred to arbitration, the lax neutrality of the United States should be referred also. Our Commissioners did moot these Canadian claims at Washington; but when they were told that negotiations must be broken off if the claims were pressed, they at once dropped them. Can we be surprised that the Canadians were disappointed? Their second grievance, that their inshore fisheries have been sold for ten years, does not appear to us equally substantial. We do not dwell on the fact that, being sold, money will be paid for them. The feeling we entertain, and which, undoubtedly, operated on the minds of the Commissioners, is that there is something not altogether sound in the assumed right of property in inshore fisheries. Fish come to a shore the bounty of nature, and though the authority of every maritime State extends to a league from its coast this authority rests upon the right of a State to keep the peace upon its shores by preventing strangers from coming without permission within gunshot. It is, in fact, an authority of police rather than of property, and where a country is not thoroughly settled, so that its own fishermen completely occupy its own fishing grounds, and the exclusion of strangers becomes necessary as a matter of police, their exclusion can scarcely be warranted on a technical claim of property. The Treaty of Washington, conceived in the spirit of these principles, granted to New England fishermen the right of fishing in Canadian waters in common with Canadian fishermen for ten years, in consideration of money payments, to be ascertained by valuation; and we confess that, if we have any regret about this part of the Treaty, it is that the grant was not made perpetual, so that United States' fishermen might for ever resort to Canadian waters, subject only to police regulations, just as our own fishermen of Cornwall go at the proper seasons to the neglected waters of Ireland.

We shall, of course, guarantee the loan of £2,500,000. It is the only reparation we can offer for having thrown overboard the Fenian claims at Washington; though we believe the proposed guarantee of the projected Pacific Railway to be a very doubtful kindness. But the question provoked at every stage of the discussion is—how long are we to go on affecting to defend the interests of Canada, which, in truth, we have neither the knowledge nor the ability to protect? Is there nothing in the precedent of Portugal and Brazil which might be considered with advantage in respect of Canada and England? We keep up the form of governing Canada from England; but, whenever it becomes a reality, Canada suffers, and the maintenance of the form has the effect of keeping the statesmen and people of Canada in a condition of dependence, if not of pupillage. When youths become men their fathers emancipate them, to the benefit of the world and in the interests of affectionate feeling between them both; and what is true of men in this respect is also true of nations.

(From the DAILY TELEGRAPH of May 6, 1872.)

As it is likely enough that advantage will be taken of the proposed arrangement for guaranteeing a Canadian loan of £2,500,000 to make party capital out of the proceeding in a sense hostile to the present Government, we think it right to dissociate ourselves at the outset from some of the arguments by which the transaction is supported. In one quarter the guarantee—not the first of the kind, it must be remembered—is called a bribe, suggested by the Canadian ministry as necessary in order to obtain the assent of the Dominion Parliament to the Washington Treaty. The transaction is, nevertheless, advocated, though “a very doubtful kindness at the best;” but the Canadians are told that the sooner they are divorced from our control and from a nominal allegiance to the Imperial Crown the better it will be for us all. Now, it is open to every one to place his own interpretation on the Treaty of Washington; but we are quite certain that, in the mass, the English people, who are neither shufflers nor cowards, will repudiate the idea that the convention was only a sneaking device to free us from the embarrassing dependence of Canada. It is disingenuous and unfair to pick out a single point in a complicated transaction, and to treat it without reference to the other features which show its full meaning. The object of the Treaty was to bring to a close every unsettled dispute between Great Britain, Canada, and the United States; and the end was sought, as such ends generally are, by a process of compromise, in which one side gave up something, as a supposed equivalent for a concession from the other. Obviously, the quarter whence the advantage came would be a matter of less practical importance than the gain itself; and all that either England, the Dominion, or the United States required to do was to strike a fair average of results. Now, if the Canadians deem the speedy completion of their great railway across the continent a matter of more urgent practical importance than cherishing a grievance about the Fenian raids, it is no business of ours to rail at them as if their assent to the Treaty had been bought; still less have we any right to speak of the act as a doubtful kindness on our part. Of that the Canadians are the best judges. It is possible they may think the development of the Dominion an object of prime importance, to forward which is worth even such a price as the restoration of amity between England and the States. As for the desirability of emancipating Canada from her connexion with England, and sending her adrift to sink or swim, the question lies in a nutshell. If the Canadians request that the bond should be dissolved, we are not the people to hold them fast against their will: we have long ago learned how futile that attempt would be. On the other hand, we will neither cut short the connexion by violent means nor shuffle out of it by trickery. The initiative may come from the other side; but it is not we who will deliberately set about the disintegration of our great Colonial Empire.

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