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# DISARMAMENT

## Bulletin

SEPTEMBER 1982

A REVIEW OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES



UNSSOD II and Canada . . . . .	1
UNSSOD II and Canada: The Prime Minister's Address . . . . .	2
NGO's and UNSSOD II . . . . .	3
SCEAND Report on Security and Disarmament Tabled . . . . .	3
Palme Commission Final Report . . . . .	4
Schiefer Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in Southeast Asia . . . . .	4
New Initiatives in Arms Control and Disarmament . . . . .	5
The SSEA on UNSSOD II and Canadian ACD priorities . . . . .	6
World Disarmament Campaign Launched . . . . .	6
Bilateral and Multilateral ACD Fora . . . . .	7
in Brief... . . . .	8

### UNSSOD II and Canada

The Second UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II) took place in New York from June 7 to July 10. It did not succeed in properly completing the items on its agenda, but the official Canadian view, in retrospect, is that the tasks the Session set for itself were too ambitious.

UNSSOD II, during three preparatory conferences in the preceding year, prepared for itself an arduous agenda containing six complex tasks. The two most lengthy and controversial were to reach unanimous agreement on: a review of the implementation of the recommendations of UNSSOD I in 1978; and a "comprehensive programme of disarmament", which some wished to see as a legally binding disarmament schedule, complete with dates for specific agreements to be concluded. It was not surprising that the drafting of the review document became a finger-pointing exercise. The drafting of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the forward-looking equivalent of the review document, was an exercise of even greater futility, although all delegations continued to hope, until the last week, that the necessary compromises could be made. Although far from homogeneous, the NNA, during the preparatory drafting in the Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, had recognized the comprehensive programme of disarmament as a means of using its numerical superiority in the UN to somehow pressure both East and West into committing themselves to progress in disarmament. However, because of the poor state of East-West relations, a spirit of compromise was in short supply. Having received a 44-page draft of mostly unagreed language from the 40-member Committee on Disarmament, the 157 delegations at UNSSOD II decided, after countless hours of unsuccessful negotiations, to return the comprehensive programme to the CD for further elaboration.

Canada used its position as a middle-power, and its reputation as a progressive member of NATO, to good advantage. Prime Minister Trudeau's speech was seen



as statesmanlike. It built on the "strategy of suffocation" elaborated at UNSSOD I, recognized what may be a sign from the USSR of willingness to allow a degree of on-site inspection to verify a treaty on chemical weapons, and pointed to the urgent necessity to agree on arms control measures related to outer space. The Prime Minister also stressed the importance of verification in negotiating disarmament agreements, and announced that Canada would be substantially increasing research in verification. He also announced that increased Canadian funding for arms control and disarmament would allow Canada to join the international verification mechanisms which would form part of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The Canadian Delegation exercised a leadership role by its chairmanship of the "Barton Group", an informal consultative body grouping the sixteen NATO members plus Ireland, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. A.R. Menzies, while guiding discussions in the Barton Group, attempted to find compromises among the often markedly different outlooks of its members and to work toward positions which could serve to advance work in the Session's various drafting groups. Canadian leadership was also instrumental in reaching agreement on the guidelines for an increased UN role in information dissemination on disarmament, one of the few areas in which agreement was reached. Considerable efforts were also made to maintain a dialogue with the large number of Canadians in New York for the Special Session.

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Dr. MacGuigan summed up the Canadian Government's view of UNSSOD II: "it should be a mistake to dwell too long on what was not achieved at UNSSOD II or to succumb to the temptation of sustained hand-wringing about failure. Rather, we should be grateful that it was held in spite of an exceedingly unpropitious international atmosphere.

"We should also welcome the fact that UNSSOD II preserved intact the viability of the United Nations system to deliberate constructively on international security matters, particularly arms control and disarmament. Despite the temptation to vote resolutions which could not achieve consensus, the non-aligned countries in the end chose the path of realism rather than a procedure which could only devalue the system.

"An important achievement of UNSSOD II was its reaffirmation of the Final Document of UNSSOD I. The Program of Action in that Final Document highlighted the importance of the negotiating process, as did the many world leaders who addressed the Special Session."

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### **UNSSOD II and Canada: The Prime Minister's Address**

The importance which Canada attaches to arms control and disarmament was symbolized by the attendance of the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable P.E. Trudeau, at the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. In his June 18 address to the plenary, he concentrated on nuclear issues, a focal point of public concern today. Following are excerpts from his address:

"Instability is the fuel that feeds the nuclear arms race. That is why, four years ago, I put before this Assembly a 'strategy of suffocation' designed to deprive the nuclear arms race of the oxygen on which it feeds, from the laboratories to the testing sites.

"The main elements of the strategy had long been familiar features of the arms-control dialogue: a comprehensive test ban; a halt to the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; a cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and a limitation, and eventual reduction, of military spending for new strategic weapons systems. It was in the combination of these elements that I saw a more coherent, a more efficient and a more promising instrument for curbing the nuclear arms race.

"But the strategy was never meant to be applied unilaterally. It always envisaged negotiated agreements between the nuclear powers. All elements of the strategy would probably not fall into place at once. But all were essential if the strategy were to have its full effect: the halt of the technological momentum of the arms race by freezing at the initial or testing stage the development of new weapons systems.

"While I continue to believe that such a technological freeze is fundamental to controlling the arms race, I would now propose, however, that it be enfolded into a more general policy of stabilization. I do not consider the strategy of suffocation to be in competition with current negotiations or with negotiations shortly to commence. Indeed, I believe that the more successful these negotiations are, the more likely will they need to be entrenched in agreements along the lines I have proposed.

"The impact of the current and proposed negotiations, if they succeed, will be to produce a stable balance at a much lower level of armament. It will involve not only important quantitative reductions, but a qualitative change, in that destabilizing systems will have been reduced. We will be dealing not only with a balance at lower levels but with a different kind of balance, in that it will be more stable.

"Thus a policy of stabilization has two complementary components: the suffocation strategy which seeks to inhibit the development of new weapons systems, and our current negotiating approach aimed at qualitative and quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenals designed to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels.

"Before I leave the subject of suffocation, I must underscore the urgency of coming to grips with the development of new weaponry for use in outer space. Twenty-five years ago, the first man-made satellite was launched. That event marked a leap in man's mastery of the earth's environment. Fifteen years ago, it did not seem premature to close off the possibility that space might be used for other than peaceful purposes. But today, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space is patently inadequate. That is how quickly, in today's world, science fiction becomes reality.

"The treaty lays down that nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction are not to be placed in orbit, around the earth or stationed in space. In retrospect, that

leaves loopholes which risk being highly destabilizing. I am thinking particularly of anti-satellite weapons or anti-missile laser systems. I believe that we cannot wait much longer if we are to be successful in foreclosing the prospect of space wars. I propose, therefore, that an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in outer space.

"Of course, the whole edifice rests on key assumptions about verification, and it is to the theory and practice of verification that we must increasingly give attention.


"Openness is central to the process of verification. But here, too, technology has taken us well beyond the notions about openness that were prevalent only 25 years ago. When we speak of verification by 'national technical means', we have in mind the vast range of activity that is detectable by the magic eye of highly sophisticated satellites plying their intrusive orbits around the globe. I sometimes wonder whether we realize the immensity of the leap we have made; and whether a certain reluctance in accepting the rigours of verification is not an insufferable anachronism.

"Verification is not only a matter of access. Verification entails a technology of its own that differs, from weapons system to weapons system. Therefore, ideally, the work on verification should prepare the way for arms control agreements that still lie ahead; otherwise, problems of verification will inevitably prevent the conclusion of even well advanced arms control negotiations. In this context I am encouraged by the positive approach to verification procedures contained in the remarks of the Soviet foreign minister earlier this week.

"However, given the complexity and characteristics of many modern weapons systems, so-called national technical means may not be adequate for verifying arms control or disarmament agreements. Consequently, the international community should address itself to verification as one of the most significant factors in disarmament negotiations in the 1980s.

"In Canada we are allocating increased funds for arms control and disarmament initiatives. This decision will allow us to take two important steps. First, we are committing resources to enable Canada to become a full participant in the international seismic data exchange, the international verification mechanism which will form part of the provisions of a comprehensive test ban treaty. We believe that the exchange should be





*Prime Minister Trudeau at UNSSOD II.*

fully operational at an early date and in advance of the treaty. Secondly, we will substantially increase research in verification. To develop effective verification procedures, Canada will be devoting more attention to utilizing expertise available inside and outside government....

"In the process of sifting the proposals before us, I hope that the Special Session will concentrate on what, with goodwill, is achievable. This Assembly has a right to expect sincerity of purpose and a determination to achieve concrete results on the part of all participants. A particularly heavy responsibility rests with the

two super-powers. They must give their undivided attention to negotiations to reduce their arsenals of nuclear weapons and should not deviate from that central objective by imposing political preconditions.

"This implies that the super-powers agree to communicate, to talk to each other, and to recognize the unquestionable common interest which unites them in a fundamental way; that is, the need to avoid a catastrophe which would destroy them both...."

*(Copies of the full text are available from the Bureau of Information of the Department of External Affairs.)*

## NGO's and UNSSOD II

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) played an active part at UNSSOD II both inside and outside the Conference. Apart from the massive June 12 rally for disarmament, NGO's organized panel discussions, film presentations, coffee houses, etc. As well, on June 24 and 25, representatives of over 50 NGO's and 20 peace and disarmament research institutes addressed the General Assembly. Speakers included Sean McBride, president of the International Peace Bureau and 1974 Nobel Peace prize recipient; Lord Philip Noel-Baker, 1959 Nobel Peace prize recipient; Dr. Homer Jack, Chairman of the NGO Committee on Disarmament at UN Headquarters; Rear Admiral Gene Larocque, Director of the Centre for Defense Information and Frank Blackaby, Director of the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute.

The Canadian speakers who addressed the plenary were Douglas Roche, M.P., International Chairman of Parliamentarians for World Order; Right Reverend Lois Wilson, Moderator of the United Church and representative of Project Ploughshares; Edgar M. Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress; Maurice Tugwell, Director of the Centre for Conflict Studies (University of New Brunswick) and Ruth Klaasen, Peace Research Institute-Dundas.

Fifteen representatives of Canadian NGO's, academics and other prominent individuals with an active interest in arms control and disarmament issues acted as consultants to the Canadian Delegation to UNSSOD II. The Canadian Delegation also provided briefing sessions for Canadian NGO's on issues relating to the Special Session.

## SCEAND Report on Security and Disarmament Tabled

The House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence Report on security and disarmament issues was tabled in the House on April 7, 1982. One of the main purposes of the study was to recommend policies which Canada should follow at UNSSOD II.

The organizational work, hearings and report-writing involving over 50 Members of Parliament took place between January and April, 1982 under the chairmanship of Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P. Fifty-one meetings were held, fifty witnesses appeared before the committee, and over one hundred briefs were received. All the views brought to the attention of the Committee were taken into account in the preparation of its report.

Because the international security and disarmament question is such an immense one, the Committee has recommended that work on this issue should continue now that its own mandate is completed. It recommends that a new special joint committee of the Senate and the House of Commons be established to examine the report of the United Nations second Special Session on Disarmament and to consider further the general question of international security and disarmament.

The Committee Report contains six main chapters, starting with an Introduction which notes the importance of international security and how it is pursued through defence and disarmament policies. Other chapters set out facts and figures about world armaments; summarize the testimony heard by the Committee during its hearings; provide a history of the international quest for security and disarmament since 1945; and provide a brief history of Canadian disarmament policies.

The final chapter deals with Canadian policies for the United Nations second Special Session on Disarmament, and contains specific recommendations.

For a general strategy on arms control and disarmament, the Committee recommended: strong support for urgent negotiations and agreements on strategic armaments and intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe; and the pursuit in UNSSOD II of rapid progress towards improvement in world political conditions; the establishment of confidence-building measures and crisis-management systems; and the negotiation of effective and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament including a compre-



hensive test ban, prohibition on chemical weapons, the prohibition of weapons for outer space, a verifiable ban on new weapons based on new scientific principles or new technologies, and regional force reductions under an MBFR agreement and similar accords.

Six Committee members presented

their dissenting views at a press conference on the same day as the Report was tabled.

The Report and the minutes of the hearings may be purchased from the Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 45 Sacré-Coeur Blvd, Hull, Québec, K1A 0S7.

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## Palme Commission Final Report

The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme, issued its report on June 1, 1982. On that day, Mr. Robert Ford, former Canadian Ambassador to the USSR and a member of the Commission, made an official presentation of the report to the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau.

The Commission aimed at producing a realistic report to assist UNSSOD II in its deliberations. There were difficulties in constructing a report which would reflect political realities, the idealism of so many thinking people around the world, and so many very differing approaches — Soviet, American, Canadian, German, Japanese, and Third World. It was therefore a considerable achievement to get an agreed report, above all with Soviet and American signatures. This happy result was in part due to the willingness of both sides to accept compromise.

In a general way the main themes of the report are (a) that a nuclear war will not produce any victors, and that it is an illusion to think that a limited nuclear war is possible; it is bound to escalate; and (b) that security cannot be achieved

by attempting to achieve military superiority; it must be based on the concept of mutual security.

The most important proposals and recommendations included:

- (a) re-affirmation of the significance of observing SALT I and continuing the SALT/START process;
- (b) the need for parity in conventional forces in Europe at the lowest possible levels which could then lead to agreement on the withdrawal of battlefield nuclear weapons in an area up to 150 kilometres on each side of the present East-West frontier;
- (c) re-affirmation of the importance of the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty;
- (d) support for Intermediate Nuclear Forces Talks;
- (e) the need for a Chemical Weapon Free Zone in Europe;
- (f) restrictions on the development of new weapons and other measures such as a ban on anti-satellite weapons; a call for a chemical weapons disarmament treaty, comprehensive test ban treaty;
- (g) a non-proliferation treaty with universal adherence, and confidence building measures;
- (h) a call for a limitation on conventional arms transfers together with guidelines;
- (i) a call for the strengthening of the role

of the U.N. Security Council and the office of the Secretary-General;  
(j) improvement of peace-keeping machinery and the use of U.N. Stand-by forces and regional security arrangements;  
(k) the need for economic security, noting the costs of the arms race and its effect on developing countries.

In his speech at UNSSOD II, the Prime Minister referred to the significant contribution of the Palme Commission Report to public awareness and understanding of arms control and disarmament issues.

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## Schiefer Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in Southeast Asia

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mark MacGuigan announced in Bangkok, Thailand on June 21, 1982 that Canada was submitting to the UN Secretary-General, an independent report prepared by Dr. Bruno Schiefer, Chairman of the Toxicology Group, University of Saskatchewan, on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia. Dr. Schiefer, recognized as one of the foremost experts on toxicology (mycotoxins) in Canada, was invited by the Department of External Affairs in February 1982 to undertake a scientific study on certain aspects of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia, in particular the use of mycotoxins as a lethal agent.

Canada has been concerned about the alleged use of chemical weapons in Laos and Cambodia since reports of the use of some sort of lethal or incapacitating agents began to be received from Laotian refugees in Thailand in 1976. In addition to humanitarian concerns, Canada has been concerned about the credibility of the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use of chemical weapons. To ensure that the extensive reports of the use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia were investigated, Canada co-sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution in 1980 which established an international group of experts to investigate these reports, and a subsequent resolution in 1981 which extended the group's mandate. In March 1981, Canada had submitted to the UN Secretary-General information volunteered by refugees in Thailand on the alleged use of chemical weapons.

Dr. Schiefer's report is based on the results of a two-week visit to Thailand in February where he held discussions with Thai government authorities, Thai



Official presentation by Mr. Robert Ford to Prime Minister Trudeau of the Palme Commission Final Report.



scientists, and Canadian Embassy officials, in addition to visiting refugee camps on the Laotian and Cambodian borders with Thailand, where he collected control samples and conducted interviews with victims of alleged attacks. His report concludes that events which are reported to have taken place at the time of alleged chemical weapons attacks cannot be explained on the basis of naturally occurring phenomena. Neither mycotoxins nor diseases naturally occurring in Southeast Asia can explain the reported symptoms of victims of the alleged chemical weapons attacks. The symptoms described, however, are consistent with tricothecene mycotoxicosis. The UN Experts' Group is to report to the General Assembly in the fall and it is hoped that Dr. Schiefer's report will provide a valuable scientific contribution to its work. In particular, Dr. Schiefer's report should serve to answer the many scientific questions that have been posed, particularly by the Soviet Union, regarding the natural occurrence of mycotoxins in Southeast Asia.


Dr. Schiefer's report, in its final conclusion, identified an urgent need to improve the verification and control procedures for chemical and/or biological weapons in order to determine if they are being used in Southeast Asia.

The report, which received much media coverage will be translated by the United Nations into French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, and Arabic, and circulated as a UN document, a rare undertaking. Two other reports on the same issue have been made available to the United Nations by

Canada. The first, an epidemiological investigation by a medical team from the Surgeon General Branch of the Department of National Defence was conducted in March 1982. Separate from the investigation carried on by Dr. Schiefer, and approaching the issue from the epidemiological perspective, the conclusions reached were strikingly similar. This report was submitted to the United Nations on August 25, 1982.

On September 7, 1982 the Department of External Affairs submitted a third report which constituted interviews obtained on a voluntary basis by Canadian immigration officers from refugees who claimed to have experienced CW attacks in April 1982. Similar in some respect to Canada's initial submission in March 1981, this report included photographs taken by the Canadian officials and certain other details.

Throughout this exercise now spanning some 15 months, the Canadian government has never attempted to point an accusing finger at any particular authority. It had been hoped that an increased public awareness of the issue would have resulted in the cessation of CW use from whatever source. This appears not to have happened. Nevertheless, in supporting the United Nations Group of Experts by providing data in addition to that obtained by the Group itself, Canada is hopeful that the international community can determine the facts and come to a conclusion. The Group of Experts is expected to submit its report at the 37th session of the General Assembly.



*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
Mark MacGuigan.*

already exchanging data on a provisional basis. In several months, Canada will be able to join these countries and, therefore, to be a full member of the Exchange from the outset. Canada has called for the early implementation of the Exchange in advance of a treaty.

Canada has been playing an active role in the Chemical Weapons (CW) Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament since its inception three years ago. A Canadian technical expert has been made available to the Canadian Delegation in Geneva for brief periods. Henceforth it will be possible to provide an expert for longer periods as and when warranted, thereby more effectively applying internationally recognized Canadian expertise in defensive measures in the course of negotiations on a treaty banning chemical weapons.

The increase in the Disarmament Fund will be used to assist research and teaching facilities in Canada through contributions and contracts. An initial step already underway is to provide depository libraries in Canada with the documents of the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva for the years 1974-1980, which most are missing, in order that they may have complete sets available to researchers. A second early step will be to increase assistance to research projects, which until now has been a relatively small part of the programme under the Disarmament Fund. As the Fund continues to grow in the next financial year, the programme will include assistance directed to enhancing teaching on arms control and disarmament.

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## **New Initiatives in Arms Control and Disarmament**

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, announced new initiatives in arms control and disarmament on July 7, 1982.

The initiatives underline the continuity of Canadian arms control and disarmament policy and reinforce the Government's commitment to the pursuit of verifiable agreements to limit and reduce forces. They are directly related to two specific Canadian priorities: to promote the realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; and to assist in the preparation of a chemical weapons convention. They also include a substantial increase in the Disarmament Fund of the Department of External Affairs. This increase will permit a broadening of research and public information activities which have formed an important part of Canadian policy and

which have been a response to the recommendations in the Final Document of the first U.N. Special Session on Disarmament.

In the balance of the current financial year, which ends March 31, 1983, a total of \$300,000 has been allocated in addition to the existing Disarmament Fund of \$150,000. There will be a further substantial increase in the next financial year.

Part of the international verification provisions of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) will be an International Seismic Data Exchange. Canada has been playing an active role for the past six years in the development of the exchange carried out in the Ad Hoc Group on Seismological Experts under the aegis of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Some countries are



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## The SSEA on UNSSOD II and Canadian ACD priorities

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, in his keynote address to the 25th Anniversary Commemorative Meeting of the Pugwash Movement at Pugwash, Nova Scotia on July 16, 1982, spoke of the second UN Special Session on Disarmament. Highlighting the active Canadian role at UNSSOD II, he underlined the importance Canada attaches to giving an impetus to the negotiating process through the policy of stabilization which Prime Minister Trudeau had proposed. Dr. MacGuigan also drew attention to Canada's traditional role as Chairman of the Barton Group, the consultative body of like-minded Western countries and to Canada's key contribution in promoting agreement on a world disarmament campaign.

"Canadian statements in the working groups and the Committee of the Whole underlined Canada's flexibility and desire to search for consensus language on such agenda items as a comprehensive program of disarmament, enhancement of the effectiveness of disarmament machinery, and a world disarmament campaign. It was a Canadian informal paper which formed the basis of deliberations on a world disarmament campaign, and sustained Canadian efforts played no small part in the consensus achieved on the conduct of the campaign. Canada was also active in its traditional role of chairman of the Barton Group, the informal consultative body of twenty like-minded Western countries...."

"Although the second Special Session on Disarmament did not achieve all that many people and governments hoped for, it did serve to focus attention on the crucial and often complex arms control and disarmament issues of our time. It also served, I believe, to underline the extent to which an exceedingly heavy responsibility rests with those countries which have embarked on serious arms control negotiations..."

Dr. MacGuigan outlined Canadian views on current negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons and described the new draft treaty tabled at the Vienna talks on reducing conventional forces in Europe. He stressed the high priority Canada attaches to an agreement on chemical weapons. In addition to referring to the new initiatives on arms control and disarmament which he announced on July 7, Dr. MacGuigan spoke of Canada's non-proliferation policy and of the expanding role in verification, "one of

the most significant factors in disarmament negotiations in the 1980's".

"...individuals with expertise and non-governmental organizations also have a vital role to play not only in achieving greater public understanding but also in ensuring that all available expertise is applied to this increasingly complex subject. Since World War II Canada has attached special importance to the development of international verification mechanisms. In recent years the Government has drawn on technical expertise in a number of departments. Further steps are being taken at the present time..."

"Within our research and public information program, established after UNSSOD I and substantially increased in size this year, we intend to put special emphasis in the coming year on research projects related to verification by Canadian universities, institutes and individuals.

"We will also institutionalize an expanding Canadian role in verification issues in order to utilize effectively expertise in several government departments and in the private sector in the negotiation of agreements on nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons systems. I am referring in particular to expertise in seismology, nuclear safeguards, remote sensing, toxicology and protective measures against chemical weapons, and communication satellites..."

Dr. MacGuigan concluded his speech with a call to Pugwash members to promote better understanding of arms control and disarmament issues:

"Part of the educational task of the Movement is, I believe, to increase public understanding that to attain peace and human survival one must seek to limit and reduce all weapons systems. It would be a tragedy if a result of the understandable and justifiable public concern about nuclear weapons were to make non-nuclear war more likely. Your business and the business of governments must continue to be the promotion of steps which reduce the likelihood of the use of force — the use of any weapons system..."

"I have no quarrel with those who wish to alert our peoples to the potential horrors of a nuclear war. The objective they seek, a world safe from the threat of a nuclear conflict, is the same goal which the Canadian Government pursues by every means at its disposal. We are not always in agreement,

however, on how this end can best be achieved. To explain complex negotiating positions to the general public can be exceedingly difficult. Simple declaratory statements are fairly easy to grasp but the potential negative implications for our overall objective — peace and security — are seldom self-evident. Moreover, in my experience, efforts to describe them can often be misunderstood. I very much hope that the Pugwash Movement will play its part, for which it is so eminently suited, in explaining that facile declaratory measures are no substitute for the negotiation of equitable and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements."

"The easy response to the current tensions of the international situation is to argue that only disarmament or only defence fundamentally matters. However, to insist that only one or the other can enhance security and preserve peace is to misunderstand the basic components of security policy. The realistic position is to recognize that disarmament and defence complement and support each other. Our challenge as responsible internationalists is to search for and discover new approaches to a balanced security policy which will both maintain our dedication to our ideals and enable us to move towards a realizable possibility of world peace."

*(The complete text is available in the "Statements and Speeches" Series issued by Domestic Information Programs Division of the Department of External Affairs)*

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## World Disarmament Campaign Launched

"World Campaign Reborn" was the way the *Disarmament Times* put it on July 19. Delegates called it "nothing short of a miracle", and singled out Canada as playing a leading role in the successful outcome of a text on the World Disarmament Campaign (WDC) launched at UNSSOD II. Perhaps it was a miracle; more likely it was dogged determination and a spirit of compromise on all sides that enabled a consensus to be achieved.

It was a comprehensive Canadian paper on WDC that focussed discussion in Working Group III of UNSSOD II, and pointed the way to a set of guidelines for a campaign under U.N. auspices that can be effective in all parts of the world. The WDC text is one of the only substantive agreed documents to emerge from the three working groups of the



Special Session.

The guidelines for WDC state that the campaign should be carried out in all regions in a balanced, factual and objective manner, should provide an opportunity for discussion and debate in all countries on all points of view relating to disarmament issues, objectives and conditions, and recognize the respective roles of the U.N. system, member states and non-governmental organizations in the Campaign. Another major Canadian objective was embodied in the WDC text, namely the inclusion of a review mechanism whereby the effectiveness of the Campaign can be examined periodically. In the Canadian statement to UNSSOD II on WDC on June 23 the Canadian representative said with regard to the importance of ensuring universality, balance and objectivity: "Canada is strongly of the view that this Special Session should provide for a review mechanism to assist member governments and the Centre for Disarmament in meeting this requirement. Canada therefore proposes that the Special Session mandate the Centre for Disarmament to make a detailed annual report on disarmament information, education and research activities in the U.N. system for consideration by the First Committee." This Canadian proposal is reflected in the WDC text adopted by UNSSOD II.

The WDC text also recognizes the central guidance role of the Centre for Disarmament within the U.N. system for WDC activities as advocated in the Canadian statement. Canada also urged recognition for the major role NGO's have to play in the Campaign: "It is Canada's view that this Special Session should encourage the efforts of all participants in the Campaign by formally recognizing in whatever wording it produces on this subject the important part Member States and non-governmental organizations, as well as the U.N. system, have to play in it."

### **Bilateral and Multilateral ACD Fora**

Apart from Canada's arms control and disarmament activities in the United Nations, it also participates actively in other international fora to encourage greater progress in this field. Having advocated a continuation of the SALT/START process, Canada is encouraged that the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks began in Geneva on June 29, 1982. In these talks, the US made an initial proposal to reduce in a first phase the overall number of ballistic missile warheads by at least one-

third below current levels with no more than half of these warheads deployed on land-based missiles. In a second phase the United States will seek equal ceilings on ballistic missile throw-weight, that is, the payload a missile can carry to a target.

The Soviet side has called for an interim freeze on strategic nuclear weapons to coincide with the beginning of the negotiations without making it a precondition. The US and the USSR seem to agree on the principle of seeking major reductions. It is encouraging that both sides have stated that they could respect the main provisions of the unratified SALT II Agreement while the negotiations proceed.

Canada has been a strong proponent of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) talks which began earlier this year. Since the NATO Ministerial meeting of December 1979, Canada has supported the "two track" decision to plan to deploy, starting in late 1983, Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles and at the same time to engage the Soviet Union in negotiations with the aim of setting limits on the INF of both sides at the lowest possible level. The maintenance of the resolve of the allied governments to improve NATO's INF capabilities in order to counter the threat posed by the Soviet mobile, triple warhead SS-20 missile, if the negotiations should fail to reduce that threat, is considered essential to provide an inducement for the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously on mutual constraints.

The "two-track" policy of NATO was undoubtedly the main factor in bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table in Geneva last November. Draft treaties have now been tabled by both sides. The US position, which was worked out in consultation with its allies, including Canada, is based on the "zero-level" proposal, under which no Pershing II or cruise missiles would be deployed if the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle its SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. The Soviet Union, starting from a claim of current equality in INF in Europe based on what is considered to be a distorted comparison of the delivery systems of the two sides, is seeking equal reductions from existing levels that would leave a preponderance of Soviet SS-20 missiles in place with no new INF on the NATO side.

Within the North Atlantic Alliance, Canada has promoted progress towards arms control and disarmament. (See article on SSEA address to NAC in the February 1982 Disarmament Bulletin.) On June 10, 1982 the Alliance issued a document on

arms control and disarmament calling for progress in the INF, START and MBFR talks as well as in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Alliance also reaffirmed its commitment to efforts to promote stable peace on a global scale:

— "In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the Allies will actively pursue efforts to obtain equitable and verifiable agreements including a total ban on chemical weapons.

— "In the Second Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly ... we trust that new impetus will be given to negotiations current and in prospect, especially by promoting military openness and verification, that the need for strict observance of the principle of renunciation of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter will be reaffirmed and that compliance with existing agreements will be strengthened."

In the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in which Canada is a direct participant, the West tabled a proposal on July 8, 1982 for a new negotiating position. The draft treaty, which makes substantial concessions to the Eastern side, is aimed at injecting new life into these negotiations.

The West has proposed that in a single agreement (as contrasted with the two sequential agreements proposed previously) all direct participants — that is, all countries having troops in the area of reductions — will undertake a binding obligation to reduce to a common collective ceiling on each side of approximately 700,000 ground force manpower and 900,000 ground and air forces combined. These reductions would be in four stages over a period of six years, with the United States and the Soviet Union withdrawing 13,000 and 30,000 troops respectively in the first year after conclusion of the Agreement. Agreement on manpower data remains a pre-condition.

In the Committee on Disarmament, the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, Canada has been participating in the new Working Group on a Comprehensive Test Ban which is considering verification and compliance measures, and in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Canada is also playing an active role in the discussions on arms control and outer space. In his speech to UNSSOD II the Prime Minister drew attention to the serious gaps in the present international agreements and proposed that an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in outer space.





## In Brief...

### ...The CIIA looks at ACD Issues

The Canadian Institute of International Affairs has recently focussed considerable attention on arms control and disarmament issues. A CIIA Working Group prepared a report entitled *The Other Road to Security: Canada and Disarmament* with recommendations for Canadian arms control and disarmament policy. The CIIA also conducted a survey of its members on arms control and disarmament. The initial results of the survey appeared as an article in the July/August issue of *International Perspectives*.

### ...UNAC Annual Conference

The United Nations Association in Canada and the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education sponsored a major conference on disarmament in preparation for UNSSOD II, May 13-16 in Toronto. Speakers included John Kenneth Galbraith; Ambassador Paul C. Warnke, former Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Shridath Ramphal, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth; the Honourable Charles Caccia, M.P., P.C., Minister of Labour; and Inga Thorsson, Swedish Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

### ...Atlantic Student Pugwash

The Student Pugwash Movement organiz-

ed a successful regional Conference in Halifax, May 28-30, entitled *Science in Society: Where Lies the Future*. The conference brought together sixty students and senior participants for workshops on various subjects. The workshop on "Science and International Security" considered arms control and disarmament issues.

### ...Safe and Sound

The Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, met with UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar on June 18, 1982 and presented him with English and French copies of the publication "Safe and Sound", a popular version of the important UN study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The writing of this book by the Canadian author Clyde Sanger was financed from the Disarmament Fund of the Canadian Government as a reaffirmation of Canada's commitment to the vital issues of disarmament and development, and to the value of greater public knowledge of these issues.

### ...Couchiching Conference

The fifty-first annual Couchiching Conference, entitled *The New Cold War: Political and Military Options for East and West* considered disarmament and security questions. A balanced programme of speakers presented various views to

stimulate discussion of the complex arms control and disarmament issues. Participants included Richard V. Allen, former Assistant to President Ronald Reagan for National Security Affairs; S.M. Plekhanov of the Soviet Academy of Science; and Norman Alcock, former Director of the Canadian Peace Research Institute. CBC television provided national coverage of the conference.

### ...Canada and the NPT

The Domestic Information Programs Division issued a paper on Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy in its *Canadian Foreign Policy Texts* series. The 22-page paper outlines the evolution of Canadian policy in this field and Canadian Safeguards policy. It also comments on the current international situation. Dr. MacGuigan also elaborated on this subject in his Keynote address to the 25th Anniversary Commemorative Meeting of the Pugwash Movement.

### ...Chemical Warfare Pamphlet


A pamphlet entitled *The Chemical Workers' Report on Chemical Warfare* has been produced by the International Federation of Chemical Energy and General Workers' Unions based in Geneva, Switzerland. The pamphlet provides a succinct overview of the CW issue as it exists today and contains a number of innovative ideas concerning the verification aspects of the issue. A highly readable publication, it is an excellent example of a useful and practical contribution by an NGO to public understanding of a significant and sensitive arms control and disarmament issue. Now in its second printing, the pamphlet can be obtained from the Federation at 48 rue de Moillebeau, P.O. Box 277, 1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland, or through the Canadian Labour Congress in Ottawa.

### ...Disarmament NGO Directory

The *Peace Unearth Directory* which provides general information about Canadian NGO's involved in peace and development work will soon be available. Copies may be purchased from PEACE UNEARTH, 1483 Pembina Hwy, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 2C7.

### ...Peace and Disarmament Information Centre

An Information Centre for Peace and Disarmament Studies is being established at McGill University. It is intended to be a community oriented information centre aimed at developing a greater awareness and a better understanding of disarmament problems and issues.



Prime Minister Trudeau presents a copy of "Safe and Sound" to UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar.